

MICROCOPY

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 9

1930-39

793.94/3411-3609
Dec. 1931-Jan. 1932



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NAHS, Date 12-18-75

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Beiping

Dated January 5, 1932

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,


Washington

16, January 5, 1 p.m.

Consul General, Nanking reports informal conversation

yesterday with Eugene Chen, new Minister of Foreign Affairs,
in the course of which Chen made guarded statement that
Premier Inukai had approached him unofficially on the sub-
ject of opening discussions regarding Manchuria. Chen
referred to his conversations with the General Staff in
Japan last summer and believes that Inukai is on footing
of closer understanding with Japanese General Staff than
his predecessor. He criticized bitterly Japanese action
in Manchuria stating that a government unable to control
its army was a menace to civilized world. He insisted
that Chinese withdrawal from Chinchow had been against the
orders of the Government but admitted that military action
by China was now useless. He intimated that he was seeking
some dignified way of opening discussions with Japan but
while he expressed optimism regarding outcome of Manchurian
situation he gave impression of being rather at a loss as

to



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#16 from Peiping, January 5,
1932

to measures to take. In conclusion he expressed the hope
that powers and especially United States would lend China
friendly assistance.

JOHNSON

KLP-HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 5, 1932

Rec'd 10:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

19, January 5, 4 p. m.

Following from Reuter January fourth.

Tokyo. "Three destroyers have been ordered to sail from Sasebo to Foochow where the cruiser KITAGAMI has landed one hundred blue jackets to protect Japanese lives and property.

A Japanese teacher and his wife were murdered outside the Japanese club at Foochow on the night of January three and two Japanese officers from the cruiser were assaulted in the west park there the following day."

JOHNSON

CSB

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ASIAN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 5 1932
Department of State

F/DEW
193.94/3412

JAN 9 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R Canton/48 FOR #95

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED Dec 10
TO NAME 1-1127 6 p 0

REGARDING:

Manchurian Dispute. Students hard to pacify.

ek

793.94/3413

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 5, 1932

Secretary of State,

Washington

21, January 5, 6 p.m.

Following from American Consul at Foochow:

"January 4, 10 p.m. On afternoon of January second Captain and Commander of Japanese naval vessel were attacked by students while investigating anti-Japanese demonstrations in a local park. Instantly escorted to Bureau of Public Safety in order to protect them from angry mob and were kept there from 4 to 10 p.m., Chinese authorities asserting in the meantime that it was unsafe for them to return to Consulate.

Japanese school teacher and wife brutally killed at about 8 p.m. on January 3rd. Identity of assailants not established.

British mission school burnt, reported by incendi-
arism.

Japanese Consulate General has given local authorities
until

Rec'd 11:55 a.m.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 5 1932

Department of State

F/DEW 793.94/3414

9 1932

193.94
note

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#21 from Peiping via N.R.,
January 5, 1932.

until January 5th, 10 a.m. to take down anti-Japanese posters, give reliable assurance of cessation of anti-Japanese parades, et cetera. Should Chinese authorities not satisfy Japanese demands, Japanese will take action.

About one hundred armed Japanese sailors sent to Foochow tonight.

All local registered schools reported closed.

Recommend U.S.S. STEWART remain at Foochow".

Above is being repeated to the Commander-in-Chief.

JOHNSON

KLP-CSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 5, 1932

Rec'd 2:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

20, January 5, 5 p. m.

Following from Harbin:

"January 4, 4 p. m.

One. On January second and third the business section of Harbin seethed with excitement, due to a Russian crowd gathering in front of a Chinese shop whose employees were accused of beating a Russian customer on December 31st. To disperse the crowd the Chinese police blocked off a portion of Kitakukuaia Street, and on both days at odd times fired from rifles up and down the street. Six Russians and one Chinese police were killed and over 20 Russians were wounded, some very seriously.

Two. Chinese authorities officially blame local White Russians, who are much disturbed but feel outraged at the wanton shooting of the police, who are now in large numbers patrolling the streets.

Three. Many Chinese and Russians believe that certain Japanese are instigating the row with the Russian element to cause disorder and that Communist agents are also active in creating

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 5 1932
Department of State


F/DEW 793.94/3415

FILED

JAN 13 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



MAN

CORRECTED SECOND SHEET

2- #20, from Peiping, January 5,
1932

in creating unrest, the first for the purpose of creating
a reason to ask Japanese troops to come to Harbin.

Four. American, British, French and Japanese con-
suls held an informal meeting yesterday to discuss the
situation and decided to point out to the Chinese auth-
orities the seriousness of the situation and to request
them to take all possible measures to safeguard the lives
and interests of our respective nationals."

JOHNSON

KLP

CSB

793.74/3415

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #20, from Peiping, Jan. 5, 5 p.m.

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all possible measures to safeguard the lives and interests
of our respective nationals."

JOHNSON

(END MESSAGE)

KLP

CSB

*See corrected copy attached
1-6-32*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Riga, Latvia.

December 22, 1931.

Handwritten: EE
A/

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JAN 8 - 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Handwritten: COPY IN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 1 1932
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
Handwritten: AC/D

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 6 1932
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/3416

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK		Yes	No
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To the Department		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
To the Bureau		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
To the Library		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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To the Destruction		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Handwritten: m s d, 7CB

No. 8349

JAN 14 1932

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

JAN 20 1932

FILED

1/ I have the honor to enclose a translation of a
speech made on December 2, 1931, before a Social Demo-
cratic audience by Mr. T. Cielens, concerning the present
Manchurian situation and what the speaker conceived to be
its background and possible ramifications. Mr. Cielens
is one of the leaders of the Latvian Social Democratic
Party

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Party,^a member of the Saeima, and, until this summer, was Chairman of the Saeima Committee on Foreign Affairs. In 1927 he was Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Social Democratic Party was returned to the 4th Latvian Saeima in the October Elections as the strongest single party in the chamber, although with slightly reduced numbers. The bourgeois groups are split into multitudinous small fractions.

Mr. Cielens repeats the view that the Manchurian Japanese-Chinese complications may be but the prelude to a Japanese-Russian war which in its turn might spread to the European frontiers of Russia. The only comment in the Riga bourgeois press on the speech has been, so far, that it was "made in Moscow." The Latvian Social Democracy, it may be remarked, is much closer in general psychology and sympathies to Moscow than is the German Social Democracy.

In this general connection, the Department is already familiar with the Moscow lucubrations concerning the position of the United States in the Manchurian matter and reference may also be made to this Legation's despatches Nos. 8291 and 8339, of December 4 and 10, 1931, respectively.

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole

Felix Cole
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

15m J
Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo, via Department.
Copy to E.I.C., Paris.
Copy to American Embassy, Warsaw.
Copy to American Embassy, London.

In triplicate to Department.

710 Japan-China.

FC/mhg

101

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8349

of December 22, 1931, from Legation
at Riga.

SOURCE: SOCIAL DEMOCRATS,
No. 273,
December 4, 1931.

IS THERE ANY DANGER OF A WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST?

(Translation)

A speech delivered by P. Cielens* on December 2, 1931.

Almost everybody is watching events in the Far East. War has not been declared de jure, but two members of the League of Nations are throwing bombs at each other, are bombarding each other and are killing citizens of the other. War is being waged unofficially regardless of the fact that the Covenant of the League of Nations, signed by both powers, prohibits war and provides certain moral, material and even military sanctions against the aggressor. The Kellogg Pact, too, also signed by both countries, solemnly denounces war as an instrument of national policy. This time the aggressor is Japan. There can be no question that it has violated the above-mentioned international treaties. If Japan feels that China has hurt important economic and political interests, it could apply to the League of Nations asking to have the case submitted to a court of arbitration or to the League International Tribunal and could use other diplomatic measures to protect its interests. Japan has, however, not adopted that method, but has chosen the way of open and high-handed aggression. Therefore the whole responsibility rests on Japan.

The question now is - why has Japan done this?

Economic

* One of the leaders of the Latvian Social Democratic Party. Member of the Saeima. Until this summer, Chairman of the Saeima Committee on Foreign Affairs. In 1927 was Minister of Foreign Affairs.

-2-

Economic and political interests have always been the causes of wars and aggressive conflicts.

In looking for new markets for their goods, for places for the investment of capital, and for wide capitalistic exploitation of undeveloped nations, the great capitalistic powers have hardly ever failed to adopt aggressive measures. Furthermore, competition in armaments increases political differences and distrust.

We are now passing through an extremely serious crisis. It would seem that, under present conditions, the powers would have to avoid adventurous wars, and that it would be necessary to start at least a gradual reduction of armed forces in order to reduce the budget. This, however, is not so. Instead of disarmament we see still greater competition in armaments. The economic crisis has only intensified the differences between countries. All are trying by customs protection, contingents, and valuta restrictions, to keep out foreign goods. We are living now in a period of general economic nationalism.

This increased competition in armaments and this economic nationalism also increases the political differences between countries. In connection with economic nationalism new difficulties arise for the overindustrialized and overcapitalized powers in the domain of selling their goods and in the investment of capital abroad. They are on the lookout for new markets for their goods and new fields for their capital.

In the last century America was to a large extent such a land for the investment of capital and for the disposition of goods. But now this is no longer the case. America itself has become the largest exporter of capital
and

-3-

and industrial products. Australia is completely in the hands of Great Britain and the new customs system will join it still closer to the British imperial economic union. Africa represents a land of deserts and is comparatively poor. Its population is uncivilized and capital investments do not promise large profits. The richest territories of South Africa have already been divided up into spheres of influence among the different powers. The only country left is Asia. India has already been occupied by England. The failure of the Round Table conference and sending of Ghandi home with his goat and spinning wheel show that England has decided to continue India under its influence. Japanese, French, Italian, and American capital have nothing to look for there. But there are other territories in Asia that have not yet been opened for capitalistic exploitation. These are China and Siberia.

The population of China is something enormous. The German journal GEOPOLITIC estimates its population at 450 million or about 1/5 the total population of the world. These people could be large consumers of industrial goods. They are backward, of great working capacity, and obedient. A Chinese workman is paid 50-80 santims for a 12-hour working day. Capital finds them well fitted for exploitation. China, in the eyes of capitalists, is a real paradise. Besides that, China has great natural riches. In China there is plenty of coal and oil, both of which are so indispensable to modern industrial development. There are also lead and copper mines. It produces excellent rice and wheat. It is partly surrounded by seas and possesses large

-4-

large navigable rivers, which mean cheap transport. But on the other side, it is bounded by Siberia, which is now closed for capitalistic exploitation. The one who rules North of China (Manchuria) has the best chance to force his way into Siberia. It is therefore not surprising that China appears to capitalists as a paradise on earth. That is why the great capitalistic powers look for the ^{way} out of the crisis by strengthening their influence in these lands. Japan has always looked toward China and has tried to subject the latter to its influence. Japan is culturally and technically a highly developed country. It can be regarded as the pre-war Germany of Asia. But Japan lacks a natural basis for its further development. Its population increases rapidly. It lacks the iron ore, coal, and oil, essential for industrial development. Japan's goods need a market. That is why Japan has repeatedly stretched its hands for Manchuria. In 1895, after the Chinese-Japanese war, Japan took the island of Formosa from China and separated Korea from China, establishing an "independent" Korea. In 1905 Japan captured Port-Arthur from Russia (and China) as well as a large portion of the island Sakhalin and the South Manchurian railway. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea and made it a colony. During the world war Japan gained a strong footing in China, economically as well as politically. But now Japan is de facto conquering all Manchuria.

After the Japanese invasion, China asked the League of Nations for help. But the latter is weak and circles around the problem like a cat around a hot pot. Japanese has twice been morally condemned and Japan has been told

to

-5-

to withdraw its troops from China; but it has paid no attention and has only gone further into Manchuria. The Japanese have excused themselves by saying that Chinese molest their citizens, organize a boycott of Japanese goods, and that they only aim at establishing order and peace. China is militarily weak, Japan strong. There is a British saying that: "The strongest is always right." And so it will be this time too. The League of Nations, according to news reports, is drawing up a resolution in which it will be said that Japan must withdraw its troops, but no time limit will be set. And that means - never.

What is likely to be the further development of this conflict? I do not want to make any prophesies like Churchill, but I should like to mention some possibilities based upon facts. It is very likely that Japan has the backing of greater capitalistic forces with far-reaching plans. Japan's occupation of Manchuria is already a threat to very important interests of Soviet Russia. The latter owns a railway in Manchuria. The Japanese have already crossed that railway and in that connection, there has been an exchange of rather sharp notes between Japan and Soviet Russia.

Further developments might bring on interference by Soviet Russia. It is not impossible that certain powerful capitalist interests go even further in their plans and aims. They may be secretly deliberating how to bar communist roads to China and India, and debating whether it would not be a good idea to fill up the main well of communist poison in Moscow itself. One Five Year Plan can be followed by another, and if it proves to be a

success

-8-

success to the extent of 50% only, even then there would be enough anti-capitalistic, poisonous matter to irritate the nostrils of the most powerful capitalists. This kind of rather positive discussion can be read in the capitalistic press - especially in that of America. It is not normal, it is absolutely abnormal that 1/16 part of the world remains outside normal (capitalistic, of course) economics. If business is not going well, the cause should be looked for in the fact that the foreign trade monopoly has closed the wide Russian market to all the outer world and that the communist regime has made impossible the investment of foreign capital in Russia. What a freedom of action there would be for the capitalistic expansion (in selling its goods and in the investment of capital) if there should be "good order and peace" [in Russia]. How much American capital could be absorbed by Siberia alone? And how much German and English capital could be absorbed by the Ukraine? And how much French capital could be invested in the Caucasus and Turkestan? Such are the present thoughts here, and there, and somewhere else, too. It is therefore not surprising that the Japanese diplomacy has succeeded in preparing a good political support for its plans. The United States of America - which in 1940 forced Japan politically out of Manchukuo and Vladivostok, which is a deadly antagonist of Japan in the Pacific ocean - now keeps thoughtfully silent and shows no signs of excitement. Everywhere else, too, there prevails a favorable neutrality towards Japan. The gentlemen of the League of Nations hold sessions, deliberating, telegraph and radio, trying to

-7-

to produce by witchcraft a formula which would draw wool over the eyes of the world and especially of the Chinese by representing the Japanese attacks as ^a purely peaceful measure.

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria is intended not only as an iron barrier to shut the communist roads to China and India, but also as an iron whip on the Third International in all Asia - China and India. Perhaps even more than that. It is not at all impossible that those who are backing Japan hope to start something more - to provoke Soviet Russia to a war in the same ill-starred fields of Manchuria where the glory of Tsarism was broken in 1905. That there are such plans is likely to be true, since certain objective facts exist which give a fairly great credibility to such a political variant.

No one is a prophet and therefore no one can foretell with certainty what will happen tomorrow or the day after. One thing, however, is certain - political matters are becoming more and more complicated. The present conflict between China and Japan may, all of a sudden, assume great historical importance and have far-reaching consequences. If Japan and those who are behind should succeed in provoking Soviet Russia to wage war in the Far East, then peace would also be in danger in the West of Russia - on the Dniestr and the Pripet... Whatever the results of the bloody conflict in the Far East - the Disarmament Conference will meet at a very unfavorable moment. The economic contest among the great powers is becoming more severe

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-8-

severe, political differences are growing, the conservative imperialists are in power in England, and a fascist victory threatens in Germany. These agents of German capital [The German fascists] can easily be used by the great capitalistic powers "to establish order" in Eastern Europe, just as the bands of von der Peltz were once used.

Under these conditions Latvian workmen must keep their eyes open - the three small Baltic countries must unite to maintain peace and their neutrality.

2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
~~O.N.I.~~ AND M.I.D.

LAM

CORRECTED COPY GRAY

FROM

PEIPING VIA HR

Dated January 5, 1932

Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

F/DEW

Secretary of State


Washington

23, January 5, 3 p.m.

Your 1, January 4, 2 p.m.

Following submitted by Military Attache:

"December 29th I sent Aldrich in a locomotive to Taliangho to observe whether Chinese troops were occupying the line trenches on the south bank of pale covering railway bridge and further to observe conditions in general. Foreign observers had been informed by Chinese headquarters that the railway crossing the bridge had been made unserviceable by a removal of the rails. Aldrich found no Chinese troops in trenches or vicinity of Taliangho and the railway line had not been disturbed. He continued across bridge and on up line entering the station at Kowpangtze without interference. He found the station occupied by Japanese troops and not being able to establish his identity to the satisfaction of the local commanding officer he was sent to division headquarters where he was cordially received by the Chief of Staff who was soon satisfied as to his identity and invited Aldrich to remain with the Japanese



793.94/3417

FILED

1002
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CORRECTED COPY

mam

2- #23, from Peiping, January 5,
1932

Japanese army or told him he could return to Chinchow when he desired. Aldrich returned at once to Kowpangtze and to Chinchow arriving at latter place January 1, 8 a.m. Aldrich was not arrested nor unduly detained after satisfactorily establishing his identity. Recommend no action by the Department.

I concur in recommendation of no (repeat no) action by the Department.

CSB

JOHNSON

7E

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 5, 1932

Rec'd 3:30 p. m.

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington.

23, January 5, 3 p. m.


Your 1, January 4, 2 p. m.

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satisfied as to his identity and invited Aldrich to remain
with the Japanese army or told him he could return to
Chinchow



793.94/3417

See corrected copy

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #23, from Peiping, Jan. 5, 3 p.m.

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

JOHNSON

JHR

WSB

102
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL



DCR

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, MR. PAUL CLAUDEL.

Manchuria.

The French Ambassador came to see me in respect to the next steps to be taken in Manchuria. He read me a translation of a note which he had received from M. Briand, conveying the information that M. Briand had sent instructions to the French representatives in China and Japan asking the following questions:

- (1) Exactly what the Japanese have done in Manchuria;
- (2) What is the scope and character of the Japanese advance, including recent reinforcements in Chinchow;
- (3) What resistance has been made by the regular troops of China;
- (4) What was the fact about and what was the result of the negotiations which took place between the Japanese and the Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang, because the French have conflicting reports about what these negotiations were;

- (5) The general situation of the new government in

Nanking -

F/DEW

793.94/3418

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

Nanking - what its attitude and real intentions are in respect to Manchuria.

The Ambassador suggested that I might make similar inquiries. I told him that I would look the matter up and in case we did not have sufficient information on those subjects would do so.

I then told the Ambassador that I was very glad he had come because I had been on the point of sending for him to talk with me about future steps in Manchuria. I told him I was contemplating two steps:

(1) The Senate has asked for the entire correspondence in regard to the negotiations over Manchuria, and I am seriously considering sending up to them every written note and memorandum which has passed between this government and the Japanese and Chinese Governments. The Senate also has asked for the papers which have passed between this government and the League of Nations. In response to that I shall send up only the communications which have been made public by the League, and shall not send up the various memoranda which the League circulated in confidence;

(2) I am considering sending a formal note to Japan which, while disclaiming final judgment until the report

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

report of the Manchurian Commission, would yet make it clear that the impression of the entire record of action by Japan up to this date upon this government was to the effect- (A) that Japan had destroyed the administrative integrity of the Chinese Government in Manchuria, and (B) that it had used non-pacific means to accomplish a national object, and in view of this that our government felt bound to notify Japan that as we had done in 1915 in respect to the twenty-one demands we should not recognize the validity of any treaties which were executed between Japan and China under pressure of this military occupation so far as such treaties might interfere with our own treaty rights.

I told the Ambassador that I should like to know how such steps would strike M. Briand, for while we were proposing probably to go along on somewhat that line anyhow, it would considerably add to the influence of the step if it was joined in by France and Great Britain who also had great interests there. The Ambassador replied that he felt that some steps were absolutely necessary in view of what had taken place in Chinchow, which he regarded as a slap in the face to the European nations and ourselves, and that he would communicate with M. Briand and let me know.


HLS.

S HLS:HHR


NO. 198 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, December 24, 1931.



JAN 5 1932



SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Conflict - Correspondence
between Briand and Yoshizawa.

793.94
THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

- I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of a trans-
1/ lation of a letter dated December 7, 1931, from Briand to
2/ Yoshizawa and the latter's reply dated December 11, which
Drummond has handed me for my information.

Inasmuch as this correspondence relates to the nego-
tiations carried on at Paris during the recent session of
the Council there, it is presumed that the Department has
already been informed concerning the substance of these
letters. Nevertheless, as a matter of record, the complete
text of the communications is being forwarded for the
Department's information.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Enclosures:

- No.1: Translation of letter,
Dec.7,1931.
No.2: Copy of letter dated
Dec.11,1931.

Original and 5 copies to Department of State.
.1 copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

F/DEW

793.94/3419

FILED

FEB 10 1932

Enclosure No. 1
with Despatch No.
198 Political, dated
December 24, 1931.

TRANSLATION.

Paris, December 7, 1931.

Sir:

After consultation with my colleagues, with the exception of the Representatives of the two Parties, I regret to inform you that, in view of the information which Your Excellency conveyed to me confidentially - especially with regard to the limits of the zone - we do not feel able to make the recommendations to the Chinese Government mentioned in the memorandum which Your Excellency handed me the 1st of December; nevertheless, should the Japanese Government entertain the possibility of presenting other propositions in regard to these limits, my colleagues and I would naturally be disposed to undertake a new examination of this question.

My colleagues and I are, in any case, convinced that the Japanese Government will conform, in all respects, to the resolution of September 30th, especially in such a way as to prevent any aggravation of the situation. It would be deplorable if, at the time when an agreement can be foreseen, which, we think, could be accepted by the two Parties, the situation be aggravated and even compromised by new conflicts.

It is with this idea in view that I take the liberty of drawing Your Excellency's attention to the proposition contained in my letter of November 29th and to the reply of Your Excellency thereto, to the effect that should there appear to be any danger of conflict between Chinese and Japanese troops, the Japanese Government would be entirely disposed to examine carefully the suggestions made, with a view to avoid this conflict.

I beg you to accept, etc.....

(signed): Aristide Briand
President of the Council.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 with
Despatch No. 198
Political, dated
December 24, 1931.

COPY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

OFFICE OF THE JAPANESE
DELEGATION TO THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Paris, December 11, 1931.

Your Excellency,

Your Excellency was good enough to inform me that having consulted with your colleagues on the proposition of the Japanese Government confidentially communicated to you on the subject of Chinchow particularly as regards the limits of the zone contemplated, you did not feel it possible to make a recommendation to the Chinese Government on the sense indicated in my memorandum on December 1st. The Japanese Government have carefully re-examined the question in all its phases, with special reference to the actual conditions of the locality, and they regret to find themselves unable to discover any other practicable plan than the one already submitted to your consideration, in definition of the eastern boundary of the zone.

2. The Japanese Government, however, are now directing their best endeavors to secure a suitable solution of the pending difficulty between the two Parties, and they hope that the Council will for the present watch the development of the question. It would be needless to add that it is the settled intention of the Japanese Government to respect the Resolution of the Council of September 30th, with a view to preventing the aggravation of the situation.

3. With regard to the final paragraph of my Note of December 1st, quoted in Your Excellency's Note under acknowledgment, I am charged by my Government to state that the question is at present no more than a purely hypothetical one, but that should such an emergency ever present itself, the Japanese Government are persuaded that any intermediation of neutral observers between the Japanese and Chinese commanders will be found not only impracticable but liable to lead to highly undesirable complications involving the Governments represented by such observers.

I have the honor to be,

Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

(signed): Yoshizawa
Representative of Japan on the Council.

His Excellency M. A. Briand,
President of the Council
of the League of Nations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

FROM

Plain

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PEIPING via N.R.

Dated January 6, 1932

Rec(d 4:00a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

28, January 6, 1 p.m.

Following from NIPPON DEMPO, Mukden, January 4th:

"Now that the government at Chinchow has disappeared steps will be taken to form a new realm jointly by Tsang Shih Yi Fok, Mukden, General Heiu Chia of Kirin, General Chang Ching Hui of Heilungkiang and General Tang Yu Lin of Jenol. Formation of a new Manchuria and Mongolia state by a federation of the four provinces governed by them is anticipated. Their representatives are meeting in Mukden taking advantage of the new year holidays.

A conference of provincial autonomy in the line of federation will shortly be convened."

JOHNSON

JS

F/DEW 793.94/3420

FILED

JAN 14 1932

Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 6 C 1932
Department of State

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/3421

TRANSFERRED TO 793.94 COMMISSION/16

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Gray

FROM
PEIPING

Dated January 6, 1932

Rec'd 2:45a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

25, January 6, 10 a.m.

Legation's 21, January 5, 6 p.m.

Following from the Commander in Chief:

"Have ordered STEWART remain at Foochow
until further orders."

JOHNSON

JS

FE
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



F/DEW

793.94/3422

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JAN 8 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

Berne

Dated January 5, 1932

Rec'd 9:15 a. m.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

JAN 7 1932

Secretary of State,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington. Am. 1/7/32

5, January 6, noon.

Your 173, December 23, 11 a. m.

The documents in question have reached Berne but are very incomplete without record of telephone conversations between yourself and General Dawes as no transcript was made in Paris. You may think it wise to order the transcripts of necessary conversations to be put in the next pouch for the Legation and Consulate.

WILSON

RR

HPD

Documents regarding the Paris meeting of the Council.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 15 1932

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 6 1932

Department of State

F/DEW

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FILED

JAN 16 1932

103
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

January 15, 1932.

AmLegation,

Berne, Switzerland.

Your 5, January 6, noon.

I do not believe the records of telephone conversations exchanged between General Dawes and me would serve any useful purpose to your files. The informal nature of the conversations, together with the many interruptions which occurred because of atmospheric interference, make the records of value chiefly to refresh the recollection of those who participated in the conversations. A re-reading of the record indicates that nothing was said in the telephone conversations which does not appear in some form in telegraphic correspondence in so far as the exchange of views serve to develop policy of action.

CR 3
Jan 15 1932

793.94/3423

U VC/AB

DISTRIBUT

Rem
FE
M.H.
SK

Simon
22 JAN 1932



Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

1-128

793.94/3423

793.94/3423
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2 pm

103

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/3424

TRANSFERRED TO 793.94 COMMISSION/17

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 114

PM RECD

EE
ME


AMERICAN CONSULATE

Monterrey, Mexico, January 2, 1932.

SUBJECT: Editorial on Action of the United States in the
Manchuria Question.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State



Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a clipping, with translation, from the local newspaper "El Sol" of December 31, 1931 containing an editorial referring to the action of the United States in the Manchurian question.

While this newspaper is not the more important one published here, nevertheless inasmuch as the Mexican press in general has not commented unfavorably on American diplomatic action regarding Manchuria and this is an isolated instance of adverse comment it might be of interest to the Department.

Respectfully yours,

Edward I. Nathan
Edward I. Nathan,
American Consul

Enclosure:

Clipping from "El Sol".
Translation of above.

File 800/891,

EIN/ERA.

In quintuplicate to Department.
Copy to Embassy.
Copy to Consul General.

7/10/32
705.04/3425

EL SOL - - December 31, 1931.
Monterrey, Mexico.

UNA COPIA DEL MODELO

Mister Forbes, Embajador de los Estados Unidos en el Japón, obedeciendo instrucciones del Departamento de Estado de Washington, manifestó al gobierno japonés, por medio de su Secretario de Relaciones, que la casa Blanca veía con cierta "preocupación" la amenaza de un ataque de las tropas japonesas a Chinchow.

La indicación de Mister Forbes fué verbal simplemente, y los japoneses se han contrariado al saber que los Estados Unidos dieron publicidad a esas instrucciones transmitidas al Embajador norteamericano; pues consideran que ellas forman parte del Plan del Departamento de Estado de Washington para obligar a las tropas del Japón a retirarse de Manchuria, "por medio de una persuasión moral, o movilizandó la opinión mundial en ese sentido", según frases del Coronel Simpson cuando comenzó el conflicto chino-japonés.

La respuesta que el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Tokio dió al Embajador Forbes, fué la siguiente:

"El Japón tiene el mismo derecho para proteger las vidas y propiedades de los japoneses en Manchuria, que el de los Estados Unidos para proteger vidas y propiedades de sus nacionales en Nicaragua"

Y así terminó la breve entrevista, que no ha de haber sido muy grata para el representante diplomático de los Estados Unidos en territorio nipón, aunque sobre esto nada digan los mensajes relativos.

Alegan, además, los japoneses, que ellos son propietarios del ferrocarril del sur de Manchuria, y que por obra de un tratado internacional están obligados a proteger esa línea férrea en toda su extensión, al mismo tiempo que les incumbe el deber de vigilar los intereses de sus nacionales, "continuamente amenazados por actividades de bandidos que infestan aquella zona".

Tampoco en las esferas gubernamentales de Washington ha de haber causado impresión muy satisfactoria, lo dicho por el Ministro de Relaciones a Mister Forbes.

Y lo único que "puede hacer" el gobierno de la Casa Blanca, según declaran algunos de sus altos funcionarios, es "esperar tranquilamente el informe que rinda la Comisión Investigadora nombrada por la Liga de Naciones".

La diplomacia norteamericana no anduvo muy certera en esta ocasión; pues sin quererlo uno, se le viene a la memoria aquello del tejado de vidrio, para no arrojarle piedras al del vecino.

Indudablemente que todo intento de pacificación es siempre digno de las más cálidas alabanzas. Sobradas lecciones dolorosas dejó la última guerra europea, para que el procurar "buen entendimiento" —como ahora se dice— entre el Japón y China, venga a ser una labor altamente meritoria.

Pero el papel de conciliador no le corresponde, por cierto, al gobierno de los Estados Unidos, aun cuando este país sea el "omnipotente" en la actualidad.

Y la prueba mejor de que no le toca desempeñar el papel conciliatorio, está en la respuesta dada por el Ministro de Relaciones del Japón al diplomático norteamericano.

Es el peligro que va corriéndose cuando se da un buen consejo, y éste no ha sido puesto en práctica por quien lo da.

Podemos tener como seguro que el Embajador Forbes ni siquiera sospechó recibir respuesta semejante; y es probable que ni la Secretaría de Estado en Washington llegase a tal sospecha. Porque así suelen ser de inesperadas ciertas "salidas" de la diplomacia.

Ciertamente que si el Japón no cuenta para sostenerse fuerte en Manchuria, con razones de más peso que las alegadas por los Estados Unidos para haber invadido a Nicaragua, tan abominable es un caso como el otro. Porque la defensa de vidas y de intereses sería siempre una "picardihuela" para que los fuertes se metan en donde viven los débiles.

Sin embargo, lo ostensible es que en Manchuria se ha hecho una copia del modelo puesto en Nicaragua. Los japoneses no podrán vanagloriarse de originalidad en su procedimiento; pero han logrado, sí, soltarles una "picolargada" a sus consejeros, y éstos han tenido que verse obligados a quedarse con ella bien metida en el cuerpo, y... "esperar tranquilamente el informe de la Comisión Investigadora"

Translation from "El Sol" dated December 31, 1931.

A COPY OF THE MODEL.

Mr. Forbes, Ambassador of the United States at Japan, under instructions from the Department of State at Washington, informed the Japanese Government, through its Foreign Minister, that the White House looked upon the threat of an attack by the Japanese troops on Chinchow, with a certain "preoccupation".

Mr. Forbes' information was simply communicated verbally, and the Japanese have been annoyed on learning that the United States gave publicity to instructions transmitted to the North American Ambassador as they consider these form a part of the Plan of the Department of State at Washington to compel the Japanese troops to withdraw from Manchuria, "through moral persuasion, or by mobilizing the world's opinion in that direction," according to Colonel Simpson's phrases when the Chinese-Japanese conflict began.

The Tokio Foreign Minister's reply to Ambassador Forbes was as follows:

"Japan has the same right to protect the lives and properties of the Japanese people in Manchuria, as the United States has to protect the lives and properties of its citizens in Nicaragua."

And thus the brief interview ended, which must not have been very pleasant to the diplomatic representative of the United States in Japanese territory, although nothing is being said in this regard in reports made.

Besides, the Japanese allege that they own the railroad south of Manchuria and that through an international treaty they are obligated to protect the entire extent of this railroad line; further, that it is their duty to protect the interests of their people, which are "continually threatened by the activities of bandits who infest that zone."

Nor must the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Relations to Mr. Forbes have created a satisfactory impression in the governmental circles at Washington.

The only thing that the government at the White House "can do", in accordance with statements made by some of its high officials is, "to await calmly the report to be rendered by the Investigation Committee appointed by the League of Nations."

The North American diplomacy was not well aimed this time. Involuntarily this brings to mind that "he who lives in a glass house should not throw stones."

Undoubtedly all intentions towards making peace are worthy of the warmest praise. The many bitter lessons which the last European war left are enough to make the task of bringing about a "good understanding" between Japan and China, highly meritorious.

But the role of conciliation does not surely belong to the government of the United States, even though that country be the "omnipotent" at present.

And

1038

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

And the best proof that the conciliatory role is not to be accomplished by the United States is in the reply given to the North American diplomat by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Relations.

This is the risk taken when good advice is given, and this has not been put into practice by the giver.

We can be sure that Ambassador Forbes did not even suspect that he was going to receive such a reply; and it is very probable that neither the Department of State at Washington had this in mind. Because certain diplomatic "issues" happen unexpectedly.

Certainly if Japan does not have stronger reasons for remaining in Manchuria, than those alleged by the United States for invading Nicaragua, then one case is as detestable as the other. Because the defense of lives and interests would always be a "roughish trick" so that the strong may thrust themselves where the weak live.

However, it is apparent that in Manchuria a copy of the model at Nicaragua was put into practice. The Japanese cannot boast of the originality of their procedure, but they have been able to "put one over" on their advisers and these have been obliged to swallow it and "calmly await the report from the Investigation Committee."

- - - - -

1035
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 114

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Monterrey, Mexico, January 2, 1932.

SUBJECT: Editorial on Action of the United States in the
Manchuria Question.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a clipping, with translation, from the local newspaper "El Sol" of December 31, 1931 containing an editorial referring to the action of the United States in the Manchurian question.

While this newspaper is not the more important one published here, nevertheless inasmuch as the Mexican press in general has not commented unfavorably on American diplomatic action regarding Manchuria and this is an isolated instance of adverse comment it might be of interest to the Department.

Respectfully yours,

Edward I. Nathan,
American Consul

Enclosure:

Clipping from "El Sol".
Translation of above.

File 800/891.

EIN/EHA.

In quintuplicate to Department.
Copy to Embassy.
Copy to Consul General.

EKA

EL - - - December 31, 1931.

Monterrey, Mexico.

UNA COPIA DEL MODELO

Mister Forbes, Embajador de los Estados Unidos en el Japón, obedeciendo instrucciones del Departamento de Estado de Washington, manifestó al gobierno japonés, por medio de su Secretario de Relaciones, que la casa Blanca veía con cierta "preocupación" la amenaza de un ataque de las tropas japonesas a Chinchow.

La indicación de Mister Forbes fué verbal simplemente, y los japoneses se han contrariado al saber que los Estados Unidos dieron publicidad a esas instrucciones transmitidas al Embajador norteamericano; pues consideran que ellas forman parte del Plan del Departamento de Estado de Washington para obligar a las tropas del Japón a retirarse de Manchuria, "por medio de una persuasión moral, o movilizandole la opinión mundial en ese sentido", según frases del Coronel Simpson cuando comenzó el conflicto chino-japonés.

La respuesta que el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Tokio dió al Embajador Forbes, fué la siguiente:

"El Japón tiene el mismo derecho para proteger las vidas y propiedades de los japoneses en Manchuria, que el de los Estados Unidos para proteger vidas y propiedades de sus nacionales en Nicaragua."

Y así terminó la breve entrevista, que no ha de haber sido muy grata para el representante diplomático de los Estados Unidos en territorio nipón, aunque sobre esto nada digan los mensajes relativos.

Alegan, además, los japoneses, que ellos son propietarios del ferrocarril del sur de Manchuria, y que por obra de un tratado internacional están obligados a proteger esa línea férrea en toda su extensión, al mismo tiempo que les incumbe el deber de vigilar los intereses de sus nacionales, "continuamente amenazados por actividades de bandidos que infestan aquella zona".

Tampoco en las esferas gubernamentales de Washington ha de haber causado impresión muy satisfactoria, lo dicho por el Ministro de Relaciones a Mister Forbes.

Y lo único que "puede hacer" el gobierno de la Casa Blanca, según declaran algunos de sus altos funcionarios, es "esperar tranquilamente el informe que rinda la Comisión Investigadora nombrada por la Liga de Naciones".

La diplomacia norteamericana no anduvo muy certera en esta ocasión; pues sin quererlo uno, se le viene a la memoria aquello del tejado de vidrio, para no arrojarle piedras al del vecino.

Indudablemente que todo intento de pacificación es siempre digno de las más cálidas alabanzas. Sobradas lecciones dolorosas dejó la última guerra europea, para que el procurar "buen entendimiento" —como ahora se dice— entre el Japón y China, venga a ser una labor altamente meritoria.

Pero el papel de conciliador no le corresponde, por cierto, al gobierno de los Estados Unidos, aun cuando este país sea el "omnipotente" en la actualidad.

Y la prueba mejor de que no le toca desempeñar el papel conciliatorio, está en la respuesta dada por el Ministro de Relaciones del Japón al diplomático norteamericano.

Es el peligro que va corriéndose cuando se da un buen consejo, y éste no ha sido puesto en práctica por quien lo da.

Podemos tener como seguro que el Embajador Forbes ni siquiera sospechó recibir respuesta semejante; y es probable que ni la Secretaría de Estado en Washington llegase a tal sospecha. Porque así suelen ser de inesperadas ciertas "salidas" de la diplomacia.

Ciertamente que si el Japón no cuenta para sostenerse fuerte en Manchuria, con razones de más peso que las alegadas por los Estados Unidos para haber invadido a Nicaragua, tan abominable es un caso como el otro. Porque la defensa de vidas y de intereses sería siempre una "picardihuela" para que los fuertes se metan en donde viven los débiles.

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Translation from "El Sol" dated December 31, 1931.

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The Tokio Foreign Minister's reply to Ambassador Forbes was as follows:

"Japan has the same right to protect the lives and properties of the Japanese people in Manchuria, as the United States has to protect the lives and properties of its citizens in Nicaragua."

And thus the brief interview ended, which must not have been very pleasant to the diplomatic representative of the United States in Japanese territory, although nothing is being said in this regard in reports made.

Besides, the Japanese allege that they own the railroad south of Manchuria and that through an international treaty they are obligated to protect the entire extent of this railroad line; further, that it is their duty to protect the interests of their people, which are "continually threatened by the activities of bandits who infest that zone."

Nor must the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Relations to Mr. Forbes have created a satisfactory impression in the governmental circles at Washington.

The only thing that the government at the White House "can do", in accordance with statements made by some of its high officials is, "to await calmly the report to be rendered by the Investigation Committee appointed by the League of Nations."

The North American diplomacy was not well aimed this time. Involuntarily this brings to mind that "he who lives in a glass house should not throw stones."

Undoubtedly all intentions towards making peace are worthy of the warmest praise. The many bitter lessons which the last European war left are enough to make the task of bringing about a "good understanding" between Japan and China, highly meritorious.

But the role of conciliation does not surely belong to the government of the United States, even though that country be the "omnipotent" at present.

and

10042
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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This is the risk taken when good advice is given, and this has not been put into practice by the giver.

We can be sure that Ambassador Forbes did not even suspect that he was going to receive such a reply; and it is very probable that neither the Department of State at Washington had this in mind. Because certain diplomatic "issues" happen unexpectedly.

Certainly if Japan does not have stronger reasons for remaining in Manchuria, than those alleged by the United States for invading Nicaragua, then one case is as detestable as the other. Because the defense of lives and interests would always be a "roughish trick" so that the strong may thrust themselves where the weak live.

Moreover, it is apparent that in Manchuria a copy of the model at Nicaragua was put into practice. The Japanese cannot boast of the originality of their procedure, but they have been able to "put one over" on their advisers and these have been obliged to swallow it and "calmly await the report from the Investigation Committee."

No. 114

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Monterrey, Mexico, January 2, 1932.

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Enclosure:
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Translation of above.

File 800/891.

KIN/EHA.

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C.R.G.

EL - - - - - December 11, 1941.

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1046

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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1047

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 114

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Manchuria Question.

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Enclosure:
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File 800/891,

KIN/ERA.

In quintuplicate to Department.
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C. R. G.

EL PASO - - December 21, 1961.

Monterrey, Mexico.

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1051
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 114

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A true copy of
the signed original.
nat. E. R. G.

EL - - - - - December 11, 1941.

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Y lo único que "puede hacer" el gobierno de la Casa Blanca, según declaran algunos de sus altos funcionarios, es "esperar tranquilamente el informe que rinda la Comisión Investigadora nombrada por la Liga de Naciones".

La diplomacia norteamericana no anduvo muy certera en esta ocasión; pues sin quererlo uno, se le viene a la memoria aquello del tejado de vidrio, para no arrojarle piedras al del vecino.

Indudablemente que todo intento de pacificación es siempre digno de las más cálidas alabanzas. Sobradas lecciones dolorosas dejó la última guerra europea, para que el procurar "buen entendimiento" —como ahora se dice— entre el Japón y China, venga a ser una labor altamente meritoria.

Pero el papel de conciliador no le corresponde, por cierto, al gobierno de los Estados Unidos, aun cuando este país sea el "omnipotente" en la actualidad.

Y la prueba mejor de que no le toca desempeñar el papel conciliatorio, está en la respuesta dada por el Ministro de Relaciones del Japón al diplomático norteamericano.

Es el peligro que va corriéndose cuando se da un buen consejo, y éste no ha sido puesto en práctica por quien lo da.

Podemos tener como seguro que el Embajador Forbes ni siquiera sospechó recibir respuesta semejante; y es probable que ni la Secretaría de Estado en Washington llegase a tal sospecha. Porque así suelen ser de inesperadas ciertas "salidas" de la diplomacia.

Ciertamente que si el Japón no cuenta para sostenerse fuerte en Manchuria, con razones de más peso que las alegadas por los Estados Unidos para haber invadido a Nicaragua, tan abominable es un caso como el otro. Porque la defensa de vidas y de intereses sería siempre una "picardihuela" para que los fuertes se metan en donde viven los débiles.

Sin embargo, lo ostensible es que en Manchuria se ha hecho una copia del modelo puesto en Nicaragua. Los japoneses no podrán vanagloriarse de originalidad en su procedimiento; pero han logrado, si, soltarles una "picolargada" a sus consejeros, y éstos han tenido que verse obligados a quedarse con ella bien metida en el cuerpo, y... "esperar tranquilamente el informe de la Comisión Investigadora".

Translation from "El Sol" dated December 31, 1931.

A COPY OF THE MODEL.

Mr. Forbes, Ambassador of the United States at Japan, under instructions from the Department of State at Washington, informed the Japanese Government, through its Foreign Minister, that the White House looked upon the threat of an attack by the Japanese troops on Chinchow, with a certain "preoccupation".

Mr. Forbes' information was simply communicated verbally, and the Japanese have been annoyed on learning that the United States gave publicity to instructions transmitted to the North American Ambassador as they consider these form a part of the Plan of the Department of State at Washington to compel the Japanese troops to withdraw from Manchuria, "through moral persuasion, or by mobilizing the world's opinion in that direction," according to Colonel Simpson's phrases when the Chinese-Japanese conflict began.

The Tokio Foreign Minister's reply to Ambassador Forbes was as follows:

" Japan has the same right to protect the lives and properties of the Japanese people in Manchuria, as the United States has to protect the lives and properties of its citizens in Nicaragua."

And thus the brief interview ended, which must not have been very pleasant to the diplomatic representative of the United States in Japanese territory, although nothing is being said in this regard in reports made.

Besides, the Japanese allege that they own the railroad south of Manchuria and that through an international treaty they are obligated to protect the entire extent of this railroad line; further, that it is their duty to protect the interests of their people, which are "continually threatened by the activities of bandits who infest that zone."

Nor must the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Relations to Mr. Forbes have created a satisfactory impression in the governmental circles at Washington.

The only thing that the government at the White House "can do", in accordance with statements made by some of its high officials is, "to await calmly the report to be rendered by the Investigation Committee appointed by the League of Nations "

The North American diplomacy was not well aimed this time. Involenterily this brings to mind that "he who lives in a glass house should not throw stones."

Undoubtedly all intentions towards making peace are worthy of the warmest praise. The many bitter lessons which the last European war left are enough to make the task of bringing about a "good understanding" between Japan and China, highly meritorious.

But the role of conciliation does not surely belong to the government of the United States, even though that country be the "omnipotent" at present.

And

10054
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

And the best proof that the conciliatory role is not to be accomplished by the United States is in the reply given to the North American diplomat by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Relations.

This is the risk taken when good advice is given, and this has not been put into practice by the giver.

We can be sure that Ambassador Forbes did not even suspect that he was going to receive such a reply; and it is very probable that neither the Department of State at Washington had this in mind. Because certain diplomatic "issues" happen unexpectedly.

Certainly if Japan does not have stronger reasons for remaining in Manchuria, than those alleged by the United States for invading Nicaragua, then one case is as detestable as the other. Because the defense of lives and interests would always be a "roughish trick" so that the strong may thrust themselves where the weak live.

However, it is apparent that in Manchuria a copy of the model at Nicaragua was put into practice. The Japanese cannot boast of the originality of their procedure, but they have been able to "put one over" on their advisers and these have been obliged to swallow it and "calmly await the report from the Investigation Committee."

A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

Department of State

1932 JAN - 5 - PM 5:12

Washington,

January 5, 1932.

AMCONSUL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

GENEVA (Switzerland).

3 Under date January 2, the NEW YORK TIMES carries
an article, under Geneva date line January 1, which
refers to a Chinese note, dated December 25, addressed
to the League, in reference to the Manchuria situation,
and to the answer made by the Council.

Please telegraph the Department (a) ~~a resume~~ ^{important portions} of the
Chinese note and (b) the substantive portions of the
Council's reply.

793.94/3425A

FE:MMH:REK
m.m.f.

RSM
FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

1056

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DECOR - 412

Dear Sir

Please attach
this to

tel*3

to Geneva

Jan. 5- 32

~~##~~

2

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JANUARY 2, 1932.

PASSIVE RESISTANCE ADOPTED BY LEAGUE

Geneva Will Attempt Only to
Strengthen Moral Position
Concerning Manchuria.

HURTFUL EFFECT ADMITTED

Spokesman Expects Washington to
Follow Same Policy—Reaction
in Japan Hoped For.

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

GENEVA, Jan. 1.—The League of Nations probably will confine itself, according to one of its spokesmen, to a policy of passive resistance to the extension and consolidation of Japanese power to Chinchow and elsewhere in Manchuria. By this meant it would keep the paper record clear and seek with whatever protests are "de rigueur" to maintain a good legal position and try as far as prudence permits to strengthen its moral position while biding its time.

The spokesman expects Washington to follow the same policy. Indeed, according to him, it is really Washington's policy which the League has adopted, partly for its merits and more because it could not in the existing situation of the Western world do better.

"Although a passive policy," he explained, "no doubt is unheroic and the immediate effect from the view point of prestige undoubtedly will be hurtful to Washington and even more to Geneva, yet it is the best of a bad bargain and it does have fair possibilities of success in the long run. Japan cannot convert any de facto gain in Manchuria into a de jure right until the League powers and the United States recognize whatever eventual treaty contains this conversion. We thus are able to keep the issue open and gain time for Japan to realize the adventure has not been worth the candle and a civilian reaction against the military has set in. Sooner or later Manchuria is going to give Tokyo a bad case of indigestion."

Sees International Conference.

"Far Eastern experts predict that a reaction will come, and probably with considerable violence, within six or eight months if the Japanese are left to themselves. Then, when a more liberal view prevails and the Japanese have withdrawn their troops into the treaty zone and otherwise have shown they are depending on only peaceful means for the advancement of their claims, an international conference can be called."

"A definite settlement then will be reached, no doubt along the lines which the League's inquiry commission will have meanwhile recommended. There undoubtedly is a case for Japan in Manchuria, but the civilized world cannot afford to let Japan win it by the methods so far followed."

The spokesman admits this policy may not be agreeable to China, particularly to her new government. The attitude Eugene Chen will take toward Geneva is awaited here with some apprehension, both regarding Manchuria and the general program for the reconstruction of China under League auspices, which Nanking adopted a year ago. It is feared that with Mr. Chen Moscow's stock will rise considerably.

The spokesman admits that a similar non-recognition policy has not prevented Moscow from strengthening its de jure and its de facto positions. He agrees also that a passive policy has the defect that it not only cannot succeed in time to help the disarmament conference but it will make the peace organization appear in the worst light just when it needs to appear in the best, in order to persuade the powers to limit their arms. His answer is that it cannot be helped, since the League is unable to go further than its great powers and the United States will go.

Chinese Note and Reply Published.

The Secretariat's prediction a few days ago regarding the Council's attitude toward Nanking's appeal is confirmed, now that the text of the appeal and the answer to it have been published here. In the reply Philippe Berthelot, who as Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry acted in behalf of Aristide Briand, as President of the Council, when the appeal was handed over on Dec. 28, says he told the bearer, Victor Hoo Chi-Tsai, that the French and "several other governments" already had protested to Tokyo.

The Chinese note, dated Dec. 25, said, "China cannot tolerate the invasion and occupation of her territory" and declared that "for the purpose of attacking Chinchow the Japanese are calling the regular Chinese Army bandits whereas, as a matter of fact, they are hiring bandits on a large scale and providing them with guns to create disorders."

After other charges, it says, "It is beyond doubt that Japan is intentionally disregarding her obligations" not to aggravate the situation and disregarding the statement of the President of the Council on Dec. 10 that it was "indispensable" to refrain from any initiative leading to further fighting. It concludes with an "urgent appeal" for the "immediate adoption of effective measures to deal with this situation, with a view to giving effect to the resolution of Dec. 10."

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

R&P

GRAY

FROM

Geneva

Dated January 1932

Rec'd 2:15 p. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

3, January 6, noon.

Avcnol has handed me for communication to you the following text (translated by this office) of an aide memoire dated December 30, transmitted to Briand by the Chinese delegation at Paris:

"The Chinese delegation in its communication of December 29 informed the members of the Council that on December 25 2,000 Japanese soldiers commanded by 70 officers arrived at Tangku en route for Tientsin. A telegram from Nanking of December 29 gives the following supplementary information on this head.

The commander of the Japanese troops at Tientsin a letter addressed to the management of the Peiping-Liaoning (Peiping-Lukden) Railway demanded that three trains be placed at his disposal for transporting troops to Tientsin. The Chinese Government considered that it could not authorize the transport of such a considerable number of Japanese troops. In fact the freedom of communications between Peiping and the sea, stipulated in Article nine of the Protocol



FK 793.94/3426

RECEIVED
JAN 11 1932

REP

2- #3, from Geneva, Jan. 6, noon.

Protocol of September 7, 1901, is in no wise hindered and Article one of the regulation relative to military transports by railway between Peiping and Shanhaikwan imposes certain restrictions on such transports. Consequently orders were given to the management of the railway in question to refuse the Japanese demand. Nevertheless the Japanese troops seized the trains by force and proceeded to Tientsin.

It is certain that there exists a close connection between the present situation at Chinchow and the arrival at Tientsin of the said Japanese troops, that their presence constitutes a threat to order and peace in the north of China, and that Japan has consciously acted in violation of the resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations. It is upon the Japanese Government that the entire responsibility must fall for all consequences which may result from such action."

GILBERT

WSB

HPD

February 5, 1932.

The Situation at Nanking.

(Nanking's February 4, 5 p.m.)

Mr. Johnson, after discussing the presence of "three Japanese cruisers and four destroyers lying in the river directly opposite Nanking all cleared for action and with guns manned and trained on the city", suggests "representations be made as tactfully as possible to Tokyo with a view to having the Japanese consent to withdraw all but one of their present units here".

It is confirmed from Tokyo that a Japanese army division is now on its way to Shanghai; its ultimate destination may be Nanking. It would seem to be futile, in the face of Japan's recent reservations and her obvious intent to "improve the situation" by forcible means, to make further representations to Tokyo at this time concerning the disposition of her naval forces, as suggested by Mr. Johnson.

Beyond making every possible attempt to relieve the acute situation in the Shanghai area it would appear that we would have to wait developments before taking further action.

FE: RSM:BJL

February 5, 1932.

The Situation at Nanking.

(Nanking's February 4, 5 p.m.)

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FE: RSM: EJJ

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM

Geneva

Dated January 6, 1932

Rec'd 8:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

4, January 6, 2 p.m.


Consulate's 3, January 6, noon.

Avenol has handed to me for communication to you the

following text of an aide memoire dated December 31 trans-
mitted by the Chinese delegation at Paris to Briand:

"In spite of the provisions contained in paragraph
two of the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council
of the League of Nations on December 10th, 1931, with
reference to Manchurian affairs noting that the two
parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid
any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain
from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and
loss of life, the Japanese army on the pretext of suppress-
ing bandits has now advanced westward of Liao River and on
December 24 occupied Tienchuangtai. Again, on December 28
and 29, they seized successively Tawa station and the city

of



EK 793.94/3427

FILED
JAN 13 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

2-#4 from Geneva, January 6, 1932.

of Panshan. Japanese troops have repeatedly attacked and pressed upon the Chinese army with an evident intention of capturing Chinchow.

Such actions on the part of Japan have not only encroached upon China's territorial sovereignty, thus violating the principles of international law, the League Covenant, the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, but have utterly scorned the recent resolution of the Council of the League of Nations.

The declaration of the Japanese Foreign Office of December 27, explaining that the movement of Japanese troops toward the west of Liao River was for protecting themselves against local bandits encouraged by Chinese army at Chinchow is entirely contrary to fact.

The Chinese Government has received a report to the effect that Japan again despatched on December 27 a mixed brigade from Korea to Manchuria. The increase of Japanese forces in Manchuria and similar actions have aggravated the situation and would lead to further fighting and loss of life. Japan should be held responsible for whatever consequences that may unfortunately happen as a result of

China's

1006

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#4 from Geneva, January 6, 1932

China's necessary measures for self-defense.

Aside from the protest duly lodged with the Japanese Government the Chinese Government wishes to call the attention of the Council to the above mentioned facts and hopes that the Council will immediately take effective measures to prevent the aggravation of the present serious situation in order to be in accordance with the League's resolution".

GILBERT

CSB-WSB

1065

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP


FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated January 6,

Rec'd 2:55 p. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.


2, January 6, ^{11 am} noon

Department's 3, January 5, 6 p. m.

The following is the text of the Chinese note referred to addressed by the Chinese delegation at Paris to the President of the Council under date of December 26th not 25th:

"Under the instructions of my Government, I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency the following telegraphic message dated December 25th from the Acting President of the Executive Yuan:

'With a view to avoiding the aggravation of the situation in Manchuria, both China and Japan have accepted the obligations under the various resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations. On our part we have been sincerely carrying out these obligations. During the Council meeting of December 10 our delegate had, in connection with the second paragraph of the resolution of that date, made it clear among other things that China cannot



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JAN 13 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #2, from Geneva, Jan. 6, noon.

cannot tolerate the invasion and occupation of her territory by the troops of any foreign country.

According to reports we have recently received, however, the situation is daily becoming more critical. The facts are briefly as follows. On 21st instant under the pretext of bandit suppression the Japanese troops occupied Fakumen. Two days later Tienchuanantai was occupied by Japanese infantry and cavalry with armored trains on the Chinese owned Koupangtze-Yingkow Railway. At the same time Japanese planes also bombarded and machine gunned Panshan. For the purpose of attacking Chinchow the Japanese are calling the regular Chinese army bandits whereas as a matter of fact they are hiring bandits in large number and providing them with guns to create disorders. More Japanese reinforcements are being sent to Shanhaikwan, Chinhwangtao and other places.

It is beyond doubt that Japan is intentionally disregarding her obligations under second paragraph of Council's resolution on December 10th and that she is also ignoring Your Excellency's statement in regard to the same paragraph to the effect that it is indispensable and urgent to abstain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and from all other action likely to aggravate the situation. The present situation in

Chinchow and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #2, from Geneva, Jan. 6, noon.

Chinchow and other places is becoming worse and more critical than before. I therefore have the honor to make this urgent appeal to Your Excellency for the immediate adoption of effective measures to deal with this situation with a view to giving effect to the resolution of December 10th.

The text of this note was transmitted to the Secretary General of the League under date of December 29 by Berthelot on behalf of Briand with the following covering letter:

"I have the honor to forward to you herewith for the information of the members of the Council a letter from the Chinese delegation handed to me by Mr. Hoo on the 28th instant.

I informed Mr. Hoo that the French Government and to my knowledge several other governments also had already taken steps at Tokyo to draw the Japanese Government's attention to its engagement under the resolution of December 10th that it would refrain from any initiative which might aggravate the situation."

The foregoing are given in full as it is felt that summarization or excerpts therefrom might be misleading.

GILBERT

WSB

CSB

1061

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/3429

TRANSFERRED TO 793.94 COMMISSION/18

1069

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via NR

Dated January 7, 1932

Recd 5:50 a.m.

ICR

Secretary of State

Washington.

PRIORITY

January 7, 2 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation

today:

"January 7, 1 p.m. According to information received by the Kailan Mining Administration the Japanese troops that have been advancing towards Shanghai Kwan for several days have now reached that place without resistance from Chinese forces and have taken over telephone and telegraph lines eastward from there.

Local Japanese military authorities will hold a review tomorrow morning in the Japanese concession of Japanese troops at Tientsin now numbering approximately 3000.

Repeated to Department."

LOCKHART.

JAN 12 1932

FILED

F/DEW 793.94/3430

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894.23

1 - 1070

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TCR

January 14 1932.

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

The Department encloses for your information and for transmission to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, for his very discreet use, confidential as to source, a summary of certain telegrams received by the Department bearing on the Manchuria situation. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in these messages.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
Summary of telegrams
(in duplicate).


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1/7/32

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OR
Jan. 13 1932 PM

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1071

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

Digest of Information from American Official
Sources in Regard to the Manchuria Situation,
received from January 1 to January 7, 1932,
inclusive.

According to the American Military Attache, foreign observers who were requested by the Chinese Commander, General Jung Chen, to leave and the last Chinese troop trains left Chinchow on the morning of January 1, 1932, and all Chinese regular troops evacuated South Manchuria before the night of January 2. Observers arrived back in Peiping on January 2. Neither regular troops nor the Provincial Government remained at Chinchow, the Mayor and local police alone remaining.

According to the American Consul General at Mukden, the Japanese headquarters announced the occupation of Chinchow by Japanese troops on the morning of January 3.

The American Minister at Peiping quoted the NIPPON DEMPO, Mukden, January 4, 1932, as stating that the formation of a new Manchuria-Mongolia state by a federation of the provinces of Fengtien, Hailungkiang, Kirin, and Jehol is anticipated and that representatives of the governors of those provinces were then meeting in Mukden and a conference would soon be held to consider the formation of a federation of autonomous provinces.

The American Consul General at Tientsin reported, on January 4, that Chinese troops were still moving westward through Chinwangtao, that Japanese planes were conducting reconnaissance flights over the Chinwangtao-Shanhaikwan area and that several Japanese naval vessels were at Chinwangtao.

The

1 1072

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The American Consul General at Tientsin reported on January 7, ¹³⁴³⁰1932, that, according to information received from the Kailan Mining Administration, Japanese troops had reached Shanhaikwan, without encountering resistance from Chinese forces, and had taken over telephone and telegraph lines to the eastward.

According to the American Consul General at Harbin, General Ma Chan-shan on January 6 was at Sungpuchen, near Harbin, ostensibly to consult with General Chang Ching-hui. The Harbin press reported that General Chang would proceed to Tsitsihar on January 6 to inspect conditions there.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED
THE SECRETARY

January 5, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, MR. PAUL CLAUDEL.

Manchuria.

793.94
793.94
The French Ambassador called and read to me two
messages received from his government. The first
stated that they appreciate the force of our arguments;
that M. Briand and the Secretary General of the League
of Nations has appointed General McCoy as a member of
the Commission of the League of Nations in Manchuria and
the Commission is now complete and will become official
as soon as the Chinese and Japanese Governments give
notice of their assent - the Chinese representative has
already said that he has no objection. The second stated
that the capture of Chinchow has entirely changed the
situation in Manchuria, and the inquiry that Ambassador
Claudel reported from his Foreign Office the other day
of the questions to be made of the Japanese Government
are no longer as important as they were then, because
events have gone more quickly than anticipated; that
under such conditions a new démarche seems entirely
necessary to call once more the attention of the Tokyo
Foreign Minister to the obligations which he has
accepted

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 7 1932
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/3431

FILED

MAR 5 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

accepted and to bring him to accept clearly his responsibility; that it would be well to call attention to the absence of any resistance on the part of the Chinese troops; and how can the Japanese Government reconcile the large military movement with the terms of the Resolution of December 10th of the Council of the League of Nations, and reconcile it with the solemn obligations they took to refrain from any new initiative which would result in new loss of life and new battles; that the number of the Japanese forces in Manchuria seems now to be exceeding the number authorized for the protection of their railway, and such a fact inspires anxiety and would seem of itself alone to be reason for a new démarche, even if the capture of Chinchow was not sufficient to give a full reason for it; that M. Briand has authorized the French Ambassador in Japan to make such a démarche whenever ^{British and American} his colleagues have received similar authority and asks that the Government in Washington be informed and asked to instruct their Ambassador in Tokyo to make the same démarche, and that this in M. Briand's opinion does not conflict with the note that we are proposing to send.

When

1007
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

When the Ambassador had finished, I told him that I had been considering this matter since my last interview with him and I fully agreed that the occupation of Chinchow made it necessary for a new démarche by these countries; that, however, I felt that because the American Government was not a party to the League of Nations our démarche could not follow exactly the line pointed out in M. Briand's telegram and be based upon the action of the Council of December 10th - that I felt we must follow the line of the treaties to which this government was a party and that I had been preparing a note to both China and Japan which would follow the basis in general of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. I then read him the third draft of the note upon which I had been working and told him that my final note would probably be along approximately that line and it would be sent in a very short time, probably through Tokyo. He said he fully understood my reason and agreed with it. He made the comment that the note seemed to him to be very strong.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR


1076

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE


CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR,
SIR RONALD LINDSAY.

Manchuria.



793.94

During the call of the British Ambassador I told him that now that the Japanese had occupied Chinchow I was going to send a note to both the Japanese and Chinese Governments notifying them that we did not intend to recognize any treaties, understandings, or situations, which might be entered into by China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States or their citizens in China or impairing the sovereignty, independence, or territorial or administrative integrity of China or affecting the open-door policy or which might be arrived at by steps contrary to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. I read the Ambassador a draft of a note which I had been working on and told him my note would follow somewhat that line. I pointed out that we had done the same thing in 1915 at the time of the 21 Demands and that it had been effective six years later in restoring our rights. I pointed out that it would

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F/DEW

793.94/3432

FILED

MAR 5 1932

1077
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

be effective if the other countries, like Great Britain and France, in the same position which we were took similar steps, and I said that I intended to bring the same thing to the attention of the French Government. The Ambassador said that Great Britain had rights similar to ours and would be interested in taking the same steps. I asked him to let us know, and said I would act promptly - inside a day or two.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/3433

TRANSFERRED TO 793.94 COMMISSION/L9

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.114 Narcotics/296 FOR Letter

FROM National Anti-Opium (Huang, Garfield) DATED October 24, 1931.
TO Association of China NAME 1-1172 ...

REGARDING:

Japanese action in Manchuria. Copy of TANAKA
MEMORIAL in which the background of recent -
is unveiled and the unparalleled Japanese
imperialistic design with the world as final
objective is shown.

hs

793.94/3434

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated FROM to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated January 7, 1932

Rec'd

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 7 1932

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

31, January 7, 4 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking:

793.94
"January 6, 10 a. m. My January 4, 10 a. m. On January 5, 5 p. m. the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave interview to von Wiegand with injunction against publication which as reported to me by the latter was briefly as follows: "Chen has two principal diplomatic objectives, namely, to reestablish normal relations with the Soviet Government and to effect a satisfactory settlement through negotiation with Japan regarding Manchuria. The only obstacle he sees to the immediate attainment of the first objective is the difficulty of guarding against subversive propaganda after the resumption of diplomatic relations. He sees no means of achieving the second aim at present but is willing to await the turn of events. He has no expectation that the League will lessen hold of Japan on Manchuria but thinks the League has given useful publicity to the situation. He expressed the belief that some incident

F/DEW

793.94/3435

JAN 11 1932

10081
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #31, from Peiping, Jan. 7, 4 p.m.

incident will lead Japan to invade Chinese territory and thus bring about effective intervention by other powers in a way favorable to China. Incidentally he expressed surprise at the mild tone of the protests made by the Japanese Government against killing of Japanese in southern ports."

"Not repeated to the Department."

JOHNSON

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 7, 1932

Rec'd 10:56 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

32, January 7, 5 p.m.


Legation's 20, January 5, 5 p.m.

Following from American Consul at Harbin:

"January 5, 5 p.m.

One. My telegram of January 4, 4 p.m. No untoward incident happened at Harbin yesterday or today in daytime except several thousand police with fixed bayonets patrolled and are patrolling the streets adding to the alarm of the population. About ten o'clock last night the Chinese police started firing from rifles for unknown reasons indiscriminately on four streets and blocked off Chinese street in the business section, causing a panic, preventing many persons from returning to their homes and forcing them to spend the night with friends. It is feared there will be more shooting tonight.

Two. General Ting Chao, commander of the railway guard



F/DEW

793.94/3436

FILED

JAN 14 1932

03
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#32 from Peiping via N.R.,
January 7, 1932.

guard troops, assured the Consular Corps through the Senior Consul that he could maintain peace and order here but he is suspected of having decided leanings toward the Japanese".

"January 6, 10 a.m. No serious incidents occurred last night at Harbin. In addition to large numbers of police a big force of General Ting Chu's railway guard soldiers patrolled the streets which were deserted because the frightened population stayed indoors. Shops, theatres and restaurants have suffered heavily financially owing to the reign of terror caused by the Chinese police shooting up and down the street which put a damper upon the Christmas holiday spirit of the Russians. Soldiers and police still much in evidence this morning".

JOHNSON

WSB

1034

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND W.L.D.

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 7, 1932

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

33, January 7, 6 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"January 6, noon.

One. General Ma is now at Sungpuchen, southern terminus of the Huhai Railway, opposite Harbin on the left bank of the Sungari River, ostensibly to consult with General Chang Ching Hui, who the local press reports will proceed today to Tsitsihar to inspect conditions there. It is possible but not probable that General Ma will accompany him to Tsitsihar.

Two. Now that the Chinese forces have been eliminated from Chinchow, General Ma and his troops are the only so-called regular forces in Manchuria stations opposed to the Japanese. Unless Ma receives support from Soviet Russia which appears unlikely he will not be in a position to resist Japanese demands".

JOHNSON

WWC-HPD

F/DEW 793.94/3437

JAN 19 1932

793.94

1085

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department
 OR

RECEIVED Department of State

Charge to
 \$

1932 JAN - 7 - AM 11:00

Washington,

January 7, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF
 STATE
 AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Classifications Cancelled. Authority: Dept of State
 Policy Release May 15, 1967: PWD/working, NND 10128167*

Please deliver to the Foreign Office on behalf of
 your Government as soon as possible the following note:

QUOTE With the recent military operations about
 Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority
 of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South
 Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931,
 has been destroyed. The American Government continues
 confident that the work of the neutral commission recently
 authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will
 facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now
 existing between China and Japan. But in view of the
 present situation and of its own rights and obligations
 therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty
 to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the
 Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit
 the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend
 to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between
 those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the

Enciphered by _____

RECEIVED

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

793.94/3437a
 7/1/94

793.94/3437A

1086

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

- 2 -

treaty rights of the United States, or its citizens, in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity, of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that, it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement, which may be brought about by means, contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China, and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties. UNQUOTE

State that an identical note is being sent to the Chinese Government.

Stimson

CR
 JAN. 7, 1962. 11

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 JAN 10 1962

1962 JAN - 7 - PM 12:05

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

1087

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

RECEIVED

Washington,

January 7, 1932.

JAN 7 11:51

AMERICAN CONSUL,
 NANKING (China).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Classification Cancelled: Authority Dep of State;
 Cons Release May 15, 1969; Old Dowling VNS 10/25/69*

Please deliver to the Foreign Office, as through the
 Legation, on behalf of your Government as soon as possible
 the following note:

QUOTE With the recent military operations about
 Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority
 of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South
 Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931,
 has been destroyed. The American Government continues
 confident that the work of the neutral commission recently
 authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will
 facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now
 existing between China and Japan. But in view of the
 present situation and of its own rights and obligations
 therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty
 to notify both ^{and} the Imperial Japanese Government ~~and~~ the
 Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit
 the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend
 to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between

793.94/3437B
 n/j
 7/11/93

793.94/3437B

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

1088

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
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OR

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties. UNQUOTE

State that an identical note is being sent to the Japanese Government.

Repeat whole of above to Legation.

Stinson
SKH

Jan. 7, 1932.
M

Note: See Telegram 7
Em date to Tokyo.

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

1085

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIVISION OF
 EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY

JAN 6 1932

December 31, 1931.

SKH:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sam Harper tells me this morning -- and intimates that he would like to have me pass the information along to you -- that he spent some time last evening with Svirsky (?) discussing American-Soviet relations. In re American/Manchurian policy, Svirsky said that he found three opinions in Moscow. Pravda (Communist International) believes that the United States has been lenient toward Japan in order to provoke a war between Japan and China and eventually between Japan and Soviet Russia. The Soviet officials (evidently those in the Foreign Office -- Sam thought) are divided between those who believe that the pro-Japanese attitude of the United States is to be interpreted by the fact that a secret understanding exists between Washington and Tokyo, and second, those who interpret our friendliness toward Japan by American provincialism in diplomacy. Svirsky said that if there had been good relations between the United States and Soviet Russia Japan would not have dared to do what she has actually done in Manchuria. This is handed on for what, if anything, it may be worth.

GHB:AT

F/DEW

793.94/3438

FILED

JAN 7 1932

109

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

cib

PLAIN

Peiping

Dated January 8, 1932

Recd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

32, January 8, 2 p.m.


Following from Reuter:

Washington, January seventh, "The State Department announces that the powers interested have decided to take 'sweeping unmistakable' action regarding Manchuria.

The United States has invoked the nine power treaty on Manchuria which stipulates that none of the signatories shall acquire special privileges to the detriment of the other powers."

JOHNSON

JS



1091

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

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Charge Department
OR

RECEIVED
Department of State

Charge to
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1932 JAN - 7 - PM 1:40

Washington,

January 7, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS IN AMERICA

AMERICAN CONSUL,
GENEVA (Switzerland).

4
CONFIDENTIAL.

I am today instructing the American Embassy in Japan and the Legation in China to deliver to the Foreign Offices respectively identical notes, text as follows:

QUOTE With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/3439A

1092

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties. UNQUOTE

Give Drummond this.

Shannon

8/11

*Note: See telegram
 of same date to Tokyo.*

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 AUG 11 1951

FE:SKH/ZMF

19:11 11-2-1951

FE

Enciphered by _____

RECEIVED

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Foochow/47 FOR #44 to Leg't

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED Dec 4, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 o p o

REGARDING:

Manchurian situation. Japanese vessel anchored off Foochow.

ek

793.94/3440

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

II - THE SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION.

1. General.

On or about November 14, 1931 the Commanding Officer of a small shallow-drafted Japanese naval vessel (國島) made application to the Customs authorities at Pagoda Anchorage for a pilot to Foochow City. It was also requested that a berth be assigned the vessel opposite Foochow City. It is the writer's understanding that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

That the Provincial authorities were informed in the premises. The local authorities refused to accede to this request on the grounds that no suitable anchorage was available and that the local populace would be excited. On the afternoon of November 14, 1931 Commissioner Ch'en Pei K'un (陳培鈺), accompanied by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Safety, called on all the Consuls, including the writer, and stated that the Japanese were sending a naval vessel to Foochow, that Japanese sailors had been coming in small groups to the Japanese Consulate General during the preceeding night and the whole of that day, carrying large bundles, which were believed to contain arms and ammunition, and further that the Japanese Consul General had issued (identification) certificates to all local Japanese and Formosans to be used in case of evacuation. They further stated that in view of the happenings at Tientsin a few days before they intepreted this action as indicating that the Japanese were planning on causing trouble in Foochow. Commissioner Ch'en said that he wished to warn the Consuls in advance that should trouble occur in Foochow that the Japanese would be responsible for instigating it and not the Chinese. During the same afternoon a delegation

from

from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce also called on all the Consuls (excluding the Japanese Consul General), their mission being the same as the above-described visit of Commissioner Ch'en. My French and British colleagues (the writer was absent from the Consulate and having no advance notice of the hurried visit did not see this delegation) state that these men appeared to be representatives of the Kuomintang Pu (Party Headquarters) rather than members of the Chamber of Commerce.

Some of the local foreign residents, including certain consular officers, interpreted the foregoing visits as a deep-laid scheme on the part of the Chinese to provide an alibi for trouble which they contemplated stirring up. Another view, in which the writer concurred, was that the Chinese authorities were thoroughly frightened. Thus far the latter view seems to have been the correct one.

Regardless of the protests of the Provincial Government the Japanese naval vessel came up the river and anchored opposite Foochow City on the afternoon of November 15, 1931. The Japanese Consul General stated that it was necessary for this naval vessel to be stationed at Foochow, as any trouble which might take place would occur suddenly, leaving no time to transfer forces from Pagoda Anchorage to Foochow. The Japanese were taking

taking precautionary measures against any anti-Japanese demonstrations which might take place as a result of the refusal of the Japanese in Manchuria to withdraw to the railway zone by November 16, 1931.

The Chinese authorities have kept the situation well in hand since the Manchurian incident, and there have been no cases of violence against Japanese. The city, however, has been plastered with anti-Japanese posters, some of which were couched in the most violent terms, and parades, hot speeches, and seizure of Japanese goods have been the order of the day. The arrival of the Japanese naval vessel at Foochow intensified the anti-Japanese feeling, but an element of fear then crept into this feeling of hatred. The Chinese authorities redoubled their efforts to maintain peace and thus far no untoward incident has taken place. There are reported findings of unexploded bombs and bomb-throwings, but there have been no official verifications as to the responsible parties. Reports as to who threw the bombs are conflicting. Some say Formosans and others say the followers of the late Lin Mei-sheng (林梅生) (see despatch No. 27, dated September 14, 1931, pp. 5-7). The ignorant masses have now become accustomed to seeing the Japanese gunboat, and since they have learned that it caused no

harm

1098

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

harm little attention is now paid to it. Its arrival has had one good effect in forcing upon the officials the necessity of redoubling their efforts to maintain peace. It is reported that some of the more violent anti-Japanese placards are disappearing from the street and that student parades are less popular than formerly.

Although the situation has been more or less tense during the month under report, still the Chinese authorities have been on the alert and have prevented any serious incidents taking place. The fear of the Japanese taking Foochow has no doubt contributed in preventing serious trouble from breaking out.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

FROM


GRAY

Tokio

Dated January 8, 1932

Rec'd 8:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 8 1932

Department of State

3, January 8, 4 p. m.

Neville and I were invited, at Inukai's suggestion, to pose with him for a movietone introducing him to the American public. His speech, which the Fox organization will present later, declares peace is now restored in Manchuria and his expectation that orderly civil processes will follow. The Prime Minister and I had at his instance, a conversation before the picture was taken. I referred to a suggestion he had made in a previous conversation that work would be offered to Chinese ex-soldiers so that they would disarm and abandon banditry, and I asked whether there was any expectation that this program would be carried out. He expressed the hope that this would soon be possible.

Yesterday's paper contained a vigorous statement, purporting to be an interview given out by Minami, asserting Japan proposed to extend her control over Manchuria and Mongolia

F/DEW 793.94/3441

FILED

JAN 14 1932

793.94
note
894.4061 movement

REP

2- #3, from Tokio, Jan. 8, 4 p. m.

and Mongolia and would brook no interference on the part of any outside nation with her activities in China. I asked the Prime Minister if this meant Japan was now proposing to extend her pretensions over Mongolia as well as Manchuria; to which he replied the Japanese spoke of Manchuria and Mongolia together, meaning Eastern inner Mongolia next to Manchuria and that they had no intention of reaching out after outer Mongolia. I then suggested it would be helpful to us if we could have a map indicating what Japan regarded as the present boundaries of Manchuria; at which he laughed and said it would be difficult as the boundaries are indeterminate.

There was no allusion to the Chamberlain case.

FORBES

HPD

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET:

GRAY

FROM

Tokio

Dated January 8, 1932

Rec'd 7:44 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

4, January 8, 6 p.m.

I delivered your note Department's telegram No. 7,

January 7, noon, this afternoon to Nagai. He asked if it could be given to the public. I replied I understood it had already been given out in Washington. He asked if the 149th and 150th words, namely, "those which" refer to "any treaty or agreement" three lines before, or "treaty rights" in the line before.

I await your reply before answering.

JHR-WSB

FORBES

F/DEW 793.94/3442

FILED

JAN 13 1932

793.94

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 8 1932
Department of State
I-9-52
H. A. L.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

January 9, 1932.

Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

1932 JAN - 9 - PM 5:00

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Your number 4, January 8, 6 p.m.

For your guidance.

It is assumed that the inquiry was made for purposes of precision in translating, and that, for that reason, a reply should be given. In the Department's opinion, the language of the note is perfectly clear. For your assurance, the antecedent of QUOTE those UNQUOTE is QUOTE treaty rights UNQUOTE. If you feel that a useful purpose will be served by so stating to Nagai, you are authorized to do so. In case you do so, however, you should also state that the Department feels that it would not repeat not serve any useful purpose to concentrate attention upon a relatively unimportant detail of phraseology. The terms of the note should be considered as a whole. They are in line with this Government's traditional policy and clearly indicate its position in regard to rights and obligations under treaties and agreements

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/3442

793.94/3442

9.

3442

5 pm

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department

OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

- 2 -

agreements to which it is a party, the existence and provisions of which are of common knowledge. It is a unilateral statement affirming a specified intention, and neither its phraseology nor any definitions or interpretations which may be placed thereupon commit this Government either affirmatively or negatively except as specified therein.

sig

S. Thompson

Secret

FE:SKH:LM

RHM
FE
m.m.w

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Del to Nanking Jan. 8 - 1932
NANKING JAN 8 1932
Dated January 8, 1932
Rec'd 5:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

4, January 8, 2 p. m.

Your No. 2, January 7, noon.

I delivered the note to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs at 1 p. m. After reading it he said he would reply in due course. (END GRAY).

Two. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that the Chinese Government has determined upon the following steps which will be taken "almost immediately":
(first), to break off diplomatic relations with Japan.
(second), to address the League of Nations invoking against Japan the economic sanctions provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant. In reply to a question he added that the second step would necessarily involve an earlier meeting of the League Council.

Repeated to Legation.

PECK

WSB

HPD

F/DEW 793.94/3443

FILED
JAN 13 1932

193.94
note
500.C112

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram has been closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Nanking

Dated January 8, 1932

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,

FROM

Washington

URGENT.

5, January 8, 5 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My No. 4, January 8, 2 p.m.

At 4 p.m. the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me in haste and informed me that after studying the communication which I had handed to him at 1 p.m. the Chinese Government had decided to hold in abeyance temporarily the severing of relations and the appeal to the League. The reason for this was that the Chinese Government wished to investigate the possibility that the communication addressed by the American Government to China and Japan might accomplish the same which the Chinese Government had sought to achieve by those measures. Mr. Chen said that although the note referred by name only to the Pact of Paris nevertheless its text would indicate that it was based also on the Nine Power Treaty on principles and policies and he inquired whether I could inform him whether the American Government

in

*Let. to Nanking
Jan. 8 - 1932*

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 8 1932
Department of State

F/DEW 793.94/3444

FILED

JAN 13 1932

793.94

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#5 from Nanking, January 8, 1932.

in drafting its communication had that treaty in mind as well as the Pact of Paris. He also inquired whether the American Government had any intention to convene a conference of the signatories of the said treaty or failing that what the attitude of the American Government would be toward a request by China that such a conference be convened. I told Mr. Chen that I had no information on these points and suggested that he might desire to instruct the Chinese Minister in Washington to approach the Secretary of State. He replied that in view of the important decisions at stake his Government earnestly desired to obtain the information described above at the earliest possible moment and he requested that I telegraph direct to which I then assented. He said that it was his wish that I keep in close contact with my British colleague on this matter.

Repeated to the Legation.

PECK

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

1932 JAN - 8 - PM 4:33

Washington,

January 8, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 4, January 8, 2 p.m., and 5, January 8, 5 p.m.

This Government's note of January 7 envisages provisions of all treaties by virtue of which the United States has rights in and with regard to Manchuria. Without making any commitment, either affirmative or negative, with regard to its future course of action, which course will depend on developments, the Department perceives at present no, repeat no, immediate occasion for calling a conference and believes that it would not, repeat not, be opportune under existing circumstances to propose that step. ¶ You may so inform Foreign Minister orally and Department will so inform Chinese Minister here.

Repeat to Peiping. as

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Jan. 8, 1932. P.M.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19


Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/3444

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINESE LEGATION
WASHINGTON



December 29, 1931.

January 7 1932.

My dear Dr. Hornbeck:

Dr. W. W. Yen wishes to enclose to you

for the information of the State Department three
copies of a cable which has just been received.

Yours sincerely,

Hawking Yen

Enclosure:
Copies of cable.

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck
Far Eastern Division
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/3445

FILED
JAN 8 1932
JAN 5 1932

793.94
note
893/77
894/23

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY THE CHINESE LEGATION
FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING, DATED DEC. 29, 1931.

The Peiping-Liaoning (Peking-Mukden) Railway Administration reported that the Japanese garrison commander of the Tientsin area had requested by letter that the railway administration prepare three military trains for transporting from Tientsin to Tientsin of about 70 Japanese officers, 1900 soldiers, 160 horses and 4 cannon. The Special Diplomatic Commission (Nanking) is of the opinion that Article 9 of the Protocol of 1901 provides only for the maintenance of open communication between Peiping and the sea; at present there is no danger of such communication being obstructed; besides, according to Article 1 of the Railway Regulations, there are certain restrictions concerning the transportation of foreign troops by rail between Shanhaikwan and Peiping; we are, therefore, under no obligation to comply with the Japanese request. Accordingly this Ministry telegraphed to the said railway administration to categorically refuse to transport such men and war materials over the line. It has now been reported that the Japanese military authorities have compelled the railway administration to carry out such transportation to Tientsin. This matter has an intimate connection with the Chinchow question and affects most seriously the peace and order of North China. The Japanese are intentionally violating the Council Resolution of the League. The responsibility must, therefore, lie on Japan for whatever consequences such an act will entail.

Chinese Legation,
Washington, December 29, 1931.

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY THE CHINESE LEGATION
FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING, DATED DEC. 29, 1931.

The Peiping-Liaoning (Peking-Mukden) Railway Administration reported that the Japanese garrison commander of the Tientsin area had requested by letter that the railway administration prepare three military trains for transporting from Tanku to Tientsin of about 70 Japanese officers, 1900 soldiers, 160 horses and 4 cannon. The Special Diplomatic Commission (Nanking) is of the opinion that Article 9 of the Protocol of 1901 provides only for the maintenance of open communication between Peiping and the sea; at present there is no danger of such communication being obstructed; besides, according to Article 1 of the Railway Regulations, there are certain restrictions concerning the transportation of foreign troops by rail between Shanhsikwan and Peiping; we are, therefore, under no obligation to comply with the Japanese request. Accordingly this Ministry telegraphed to the said railway administration to categorically refuse to transport such men and war materials over the line. It has now been reported that the Japanese military authorities have compelled the railway administration to carry out such transportation to Tientsin. This matter has an intimate connection with the Chinchow question and affects most seriously the peace and order of North China. The Japanese are intentionally violating the Council Resolution of the League. The responsibility must, therefore, lie on Japan for whatever consequences such an act will entail.

Chinese Legation,
Washington, December 28, 1931.

1 1 1 1
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 6, 1932.

My dear Mr. Yen:

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 29, 1931, enclosing, at the request of Dr. W. W. Yen and for the information of the Department of State, copies of a cable, dated December 29, 1931, received by the Chinese Legation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government, in regard to the transportation of Japanese soldiers and materiel on the Tangku-Tientsin line of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway.


Sincerely yours,

Mr. Hawking Yen,

Chinese Chargé d'Affaires.

FE:RPB:EJL

FE



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/3446

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RADIOGRAM



December 30, 1931.

9:30 A.M.



From Peiping,
To The Adjutant General.

SECRET

Number 315. December 30th.

Hostility of new Nanking Government to young Marshal and
Marshal's fear of Yen Feng aggression in this area, and secret
negotiations with Japanese which makes return of Mukden clique
to Manchuria not the impossibility formerly believed, explains
partial withdrawal Chinese troops from Chinchow.

Tenney.

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GSD: [unclear]
LE Wilpherson *Mar 19,*
1973

JAN 8 1932

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
F/DEW 793.94/3448

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Stutts NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY



January 6, 1932.

Memorandum of conversation with the Italian Ambassador.

F/DEW

793.94/3449

793.94
note
SODA4d

The Ambassador wanted to ask about Manchuria, whether the stories were true that the Secretary yesterday sent for the British and French Ambassadors to consult with them as to concerted action on the part of the three powers in Manchuria under the Nine Power Treaty. I told the Ambassador that I had no reason to think the Secretary had sent for either the British or French Ambassadors and that I did not know the subject of the conversation. He said that, if any concerted action was to be taken under the Nine Power Treaty, Italy wished to be included since it also was a signatory to the Treaty. I told him I could not conceive of action being taken under the Treaty without consultation ^{with} of the various signatories and that, in any case, ~~there~~ no concerted action with anyone was, so far as I knew, contemplated in Manchuria. I said that if the attack on the American Vice Consul was indicative of possible mistreatment of foreigners in general in Manchuria, it would undoubtedly be true that the various nations would all have to act and that it might be more effective if they acted in concert.

U WRC/AB

W. R. Castle, Jr.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

January 7, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Manchuria.

I called in the Japanese Ambassador and told him I had decided to send a note to Japan and China, to set out the position of the United States Government at this situation. I then repeated to him verbally the substance of the note, called his attention to the fact that a similar note was sent in 1915 at the time of the twenty-one demands, and gave him a copy of this note. He told me that he very well recollected the sending of the note at the time of the twenty-one demands. I then said that when I was asked by the press about this note I would give the following background: (1) that we had no quarrel with any of Japan's rights in Manchuria, (2) that we had no desire to intrude into the terms of any settlement which might be made in the future between China and Japan except (a) such settlement should not impair our own rights in China and (b) there should not be any violation of the Kellogg Pact.

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auto War

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123 C 353

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

I told him that I should make public the note for release in tomorrow morning's papers and that I should call in the ambassadors of the other members of the Nine Power Treaty and notify them all that we had taken this step by ourselves in defense of our own rights and not in concert with them, and that he was the first one of those ambassadors whom I had informed of the contents of the note.

123 C 353
After I had closed, the Japanese Ambassador told me that General Honjo's representative at Harbin, whom he thought was a lieutenant colonel, although he did not remember his name, had called upon Mr. Chamberlain there and expressed his regret at the occurrences at Mukden. I told him I was very glad to hear that.

H. L. S.

S:HLS:BMS

1118

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 9 1932

January 7, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
THE CHINESE MINISTER, MR. W. W. YEN.

Manchuria.

193.94
711.93

I told the Chinese Minister that I had sent to the Japanese and Chinese Governments a note, of which I was going to read him a copy, and I read him the note and then handed him the copy. I then told him the substance of our position: (1) that we had no quarrel with any of Japan's rights in Manchuria, (2) that we had no desire to intrude into the terms of any settlement which might be made in the future between China and Japan except (a) such settlement should not impair our own rights in China and (b) there should not be any violation of the Kellogg Pact. I told him that I was going to notify the other members of the Nine Power Treaty this morning and that the contents of the note would not be made public by me before tomorrow morning and I hoped that it would not be by any of the others. He said, of course not.

He then asked what I intended to do, and he used the phrase, "since the League of Nations has failed in its efforts". I broke in and said that I did not think that

it

F/DEW

793.94/3451

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

it was true that the League of Nations had failed, that we thought that their efforts in getting the appointment of a neutral commission under the conciliation steps instituted by the League were very important, and that I hoped that a solution would come out of it, and I explained my careful efforts to show our entire sympathy with the general objective of the League, while not running any risk of crossing wires with their work. I said that under this step we had referred to the treaty rights of the Nine Power Treaty and I hoped that this would clarify the air somewhat, but as to what future steps should be taken, I would not forecast now what we would do, but wait and see what would be the effect of the step already taken.

He then showed me an extract from his instructions which he handed me, and which are annexed to this with the copy of the note which I have given him, and I read them and said that in some respects those instructions seemed to be met by what I had now done in respect to this note.

H. L. S.

S:HLS:BMS

1120
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINESE LEGATION
WASHINGTON

EXTRACT FROM INSTRUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN MINISTER OF CHINA
TO DR. W.W. YEN ON HIS DEPARTURE FROM CHINA.

You will convey in subsequent interviews a brief summary of the recent incidents which have taken place in China, and consistently press for some action on the part of the United States of America, to the end that respect for international treaties in general, the Paris Pact for the Preservation of Peace, and the Nine Power Treaty in particular, will be maintained, so that the peace of the Far East will not be disturbed.

January 7th, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 9 1932

Department of State

THE SECRETARY

January 7, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE FRENCH CHARGE, MRS. JULES HENRY.

Manchuria.

793.94

When the French Chargé came I reminded him of my talk with M. Claudel and my statement that while I did not feel it would be appropriate for us to comply with Mr. Briand's request that we should make a démarche under the Resolution of the League of December 9th, I nevertheless would make one under our own treaties. I told the Ambassador that I this morning had sent to both China and Japan a note in the form of the copy which I handed him. I told him that in this note we based our position upon both the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, and that I was therefore notifying the fellow signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty of our action; that although I had not made any effort to obtain concerted action, I should appreciate it very much if the other Powers followed somewhat similar action, especially France.

I inquired about M. Briand's health. He said that while M. Briand was confined to his room and saw only M. Berthelot, he had not had any stroke. The Ambassador

then

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793.94/3452

751.002

112
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

then mentioned that M. Maginot, the War Minister, had
had a stroke and died last night. I expressed my
sympathy and said I would send a telegram.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

French Note

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED
JAN 9 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 9 1932
Department of State

January 7, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, SIR RONALD LINDSAY.

Manchuria.

793.94

The British Ambassador came and I read him the note which we are sending to both Japan and China, and handed him a copy. I told him that M. Claudel had brought up to me a suggestion from Briand that we should make a démarche on the basis of the League Resolution of December 9th, but that I had told him I thought that would be inappropriate from the United States which was not a member of the League of Nations, and that I had therefore based my note upon our own treaties. The British Ambassador said yes, he thought this note was more "massive" than one based upon the other foundation. I pointed out that the note treated first our treaty rights under the Nine-Power Pact and second our treaty rights under the Pact of Paris, and I pointed out the difference in the nature of those rights - that the first were more of the type of ordinary treaty rights, while the second carried out in substance the policy announced by Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Hoover in the Joint Communiqué

at

F/DEW

793.94/3453

1125
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

at the Rapidan in 1929.

I told the Ambassador that we should greatly appreciate it if Great Britain followed suit with some similar action. He said he would at once telegraph the note to Great Britain. I told him that the note would not be made public here until tomorrow and I hoped they would not make it public.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

British Copy

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China; commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

Copy to Chinese Ministry

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

Copy of Note Given Italy

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY



January 7, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, MR. NOBILE GIACOMO DE MARTINO.

Manchuria.

793.94

I told the Italian Ambassador that I had just sent a note to Tokyo and to Nanking, of which I would read him a copy, and I read him this note and handed the copy to him. I told him that we had sent this note individually, representing our own rights, but that I intended to notify all of the other signatories of the Nine Power Pact, of which he was the first, and would welcome any similar action that they might see fit to take in protection of their rights under this treaty, although there had been no concert about my sending this note.

I told him that it was true that I had talked informally with Claudel and Lindsay on this general subject when they had called on me about it, but at that time I had not fully made up my mind about the subject and it was not until last night that I had formulated this note, and that I had sent it this morning. I then said that speaking informally, I was a little tired of making representations and I thought it would clear the air to make a clear statement

F/DEW

793.94/3454

113
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

statement of our rights in the premises, which this note attempted to do. I told him that it followed in general the form of the note which we sent in 1915 in respect to the twenty-one demands, and that that note had assisted in preserving our rights eventually.

H. L. S.

S:HLS:BMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY: CLS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 8, 1932.

Mr. Secretary:

Herewith a brief memorandum
on interference with American
interests in Manchuria.

The attached despatch from
Mukden, of which, unfortunately
we have only a carbon copy, gives
an account of various types of
interference with considerable
detail.

BKH:ZMF

793.94/3610½

note

393.115

893/74

893/6463

811.51673

113
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 9 1932

Department of State

January 7, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR, MR. PAUL MAY.

Manchuria.

793.94
I told the Belgian Ambassador that I had sent a note to China and Japan this morning, and I handed him a copy of this note. I explained to him that this followed the line of the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, calling his attention especially to the latter. I told him that it followed a suggestion that had come to me from Monsieur Briend the other day as to the necessity of a démarche, subsequent to the events which had taken place at Chinchow.

I said that I had not sought to organize a concert of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty as a condition for my acting, but that I should be very glad if they followed suit, and I told him that in order to give them time to communicate with their governments before this was made public, I should not make it public until tomorrow's press. He thanked me and said he would at once communicate it to his government.

H. L. S.

S:HLS:BMS

F/DEW

793.94/3455

1133

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

Belgian Copy

With the recent military operations about
Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority
of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South
Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931,
has been destroyed. The American Government continues
confident that the work of the neutral commission recently
authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will
facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties
now existing between China and Japan. But in
view of the present situation and of its own rights
and obligations therein, the American Government deems
it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese
Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic
that it cannot admit the legality of any situation
de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or
agreement entered into between those Governments, or
agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of
the United States or its citizens in China, including
those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence,
or the territorial and administrative integrity of the
Republic of China, or to the international policy relative
to China; commonly known as the open door policy; and that
it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or
agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to
the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of
August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as
well as the United States, are parties.

1 1 3 4

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

DIVISION OF



January 7, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
THE DUTCH MINISTER, MR. J. H. VAN ROYEN.

Manchuria.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEC 31 1937

F/DEW

793.94/3456

793.94

I told the Dutch Minister that I had this morning sent a note to China and to Japan with respect to the military operations at Chinchow and handed him a copy. I then explained the note, substantially reading it to him, and further explained the fact that it was based both upon the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. I told him that I was notifying this morning all of the other signatories of the Nine Power Treaty in the hope that they would take similar action.

I pointed out that we had no quarrel with Japan as to her treaty rights in Manchuria, nor would we seek to intrude into any settlement which she might make with China, provided only that it would not impair our own treaty rights under the Nine Power Treaty or the Open Door policy or violate the Pact of Paris. He did not seem to have a very clear opinion of the relations of these treaties and asked whether we would claim any objection in case Japan acquired Manchuria or annexed it. I took a copy of the Nine Power Treaty and read him that portion

JAN 11 1932

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

portion of Article 1 which covered that point and pointed out to him that such action would be a violation of that treaty. He said that he would at once report this to his government.

H. L. S.

S:HLS:BMS

136

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dutch Minister

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

1137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 9 1932
Department of State

January 7, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE PORTUGUESE MINISTER, VISCOUNT D'ALTE.

Manchuria.

793.94

The Portuguese Minister came, and I told him that this morning I had sent a note to Japan and to China, and I handed him a copy. I explained the situation and that this note was intended to make clear our position and our rights under both the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, and that I was notifying the representatives of all the fellow signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty today so that they would have time to communicate with their governments. I told the Minister I did not expect to make this note public until at least tomorrow. He said that he would at once communicate with his government and he thought, no doubt, his government would send an identic note.

HLS.

8 HLS:HHR

F/DEW

793.94/3457

1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

For

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

1130
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 123 C 353/199 FOR Tel. #11-2 pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED Jan. 4, 1932
TO NAME 1-1172 ***

REGARDING: Attack of Japanese soldiers at Mukden on Consul Culver B.
Chamberlain

793.94/3458

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated January 8, 1932

Rec'd 1:50 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington


7, January 8, 1932

I handed text of note filed in Department's No. 4,
January 7, 1 p. m., to Avenol this noon. Drummond is still
absent and is not expected to return until January 16.
Avenol expressed the opinion that the text of the note
would serve to strengthen the position of the Manchurian
Commission. He asked me regarding the status of publicity
respecting text of note or position taken therein. He
volunteered the opinion that in view of psychology of
relationship between Japanese people and Japanese Govern-
ment that for it to remain secret would serve the best
end in the present situation. In the meantime he is of
course regarding it as strictly confidential and is sending
it only to Drummond in either case under the same conditions

Would appreciate being able to inform Avenol regarding
status of publicity and whether if by any chance it is
desired that it should be made known confidentially to
members of the Council or be employed as a League communique,
as in the case of certain previous American notes to Tokyo
and Peiping.

GILBERT

WSB - CSB



F/DEM

793.94/3459

FILED

JAN 14 1932

1 0141

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
X PLAIN

1932 JAN - 9 - PM 5:45

Washington,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

January 9, 1932.
5 pm

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

793.94/3459
7. Your *7/3459* January 8, 1 p. m.

Text was made public here on January 7.

793.94/3459

FE:SKH:LM

FE

OK
Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____,

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1922 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

FROM GREEN
GENEVA

Dated January 8, 1932

Rec'd 2:10 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

8, January 8, 3 p. m.

Incidental to my conversation with Avenol, reported in
my No. 7, January 8, 1 p. m., he gave me the following in-
formation respecting the Manchurian Commission:


One. It is expected that a formal invitation will go
forward to General McCoy at almost any moment. All members
of Council have acquiesced/except Japan whose acquiescence
is believed to be on its way.

Two. With an eye to public and particularly Chinese
opinion it is desired to advance matters as rapidly as
possible. Thus it is planned that the Commission will be
officially "constituted" on January 10, the receipt of
formal acceptances from commissioners being regarded pro
forma will not be awaited.

Three. The first meeting of the Commission will take
place at Geneva on January 10th. General McCoy for obvious
reasons will not be expected and thus will not be invited
to attend.

Four. It is expected that the Commission will decide
to proceed

See 793.94/3021



F/DEW

793.94/3460

FILED

JAN 18 1932

793.94
note
793.94/113
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Del to Geneva
1.9.32

REP

2- #8, from Geneva, Jan. 8, 3 p. m.

to proceed to Manchuria by the United States, thus incidentally enabling General McCoy to join Commission en route.

Five. The foregoing envisages the Commission visiting Tokyo. The Chinese may object to this route giving as grounds that it is the longest route and that haste is desirable. One of their real reasons for objecting will be, however, the stop in Tokyo. In view of the visit in Tokyo the Commission will proceed direct from Tokyo to Nanking.

Six. Please regard the foregoing as relatively confidential and is naturally subject change.

Seven. It is noted that there is no jurist on the Commission. Consideration is being given by the employment in a technical capacity of Walter Young who is I believe at present in Manchuria and who I think is known to the Department. Avenol would appreciate comment from the Department on Young's suitability for his confidential use. I would appreciate instructions on this last point.

GILBERT

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
RECEIVED

Washington,

1932 JAN - 9 - PM 5:44

January 9, 1932.

6 pm

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

8. Your number 8, 3460, January 8, 3 p.m., paragraph seven.

The Department considers Walter Young thoroughly qualified for the position mentioned and has reason to believe that his services would be available.

For your own confidential guidance, the Department would regard Young's appointment with favor but Department does not wish to make any express recommendation.

793.94/3460

RAM
FE:RSM:LM

FE

793.94/3460

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MAM

FROM

GRAY

HANKOW VIA NR

Dated January 8, 1932

Rec'd 5:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

3, January 8, noon.

Communists are heavily attacking Hwangpei city
twenty miles north of Hankow. Although Shekow, ten
miles north of Hankow, is protected by strong military
trenches, I have, as a precautionary measure, advised
the American women and children of the Lutheran Theo-
logical Seminary there to withdraw therefrom for a few
days. Legation and Nanking informed.

OSB

ADAMS

F/DEW

793.94/3461

FILED

JAN 13 1932

793.94
note
792.00 R
202.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM GRAY

Peiping via H. R.

Dated January 8, 1932

Rec'd 6 p. m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

40, January 8, 5 p. m.

Legation's 35, January 7, 8 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"January 7, noon.

One. Conditions at Harbin yesterday and last night
quiet with fewer police patrolling the streets.

Two. Latest reports indicate that situation Manchuria
station, Hailar and Tsitsihar fairly normal except that
business is very bad in these places.

Three. Yesterday at 11 a. m. General Ma crossed the
frozen Sungari by motor car and proceeded to the residence
of General Chang Ching Hui, where he had a conference with
the latter lasting three hours. It is believed that they
discussed matters relative to General Ma's return to
Tsitsihar to maintain peace and order upon which the few
Japanese soldiers there would be withdrawn. General Ma
recrossed the Sungari and left Sungpuchen for Hailun at
4 p. m.


Four.

F/DEW

793.94/3462

FILED

JAN 16 1932



REP

2- #40, from Peiping, Jan. 8, 5 p.m.

Four. General Chang Ching Hui left Harbin for Tsitsihar at 5:20 p. m. yesterday ostensibly to examine into conditions there but probably to proclaim the independence of Heilungkian province. Chinese press reports that he will return to Harbin on the 9th. A prominent Chinese official of the Chinese Eastern Railway informed me last night that he believed Chang would soon proceed to Mukden and there together with Hsi Chia, Chang Kuan of Kirin province, and Tsang Shihi, Chang Kuan of Fengtien province, declare the three provinces united and agree upon a head official for Manchuria perhaps Chang Tso Hsiang, Chang Ching Hui or the ex-emperor Puyi. It is my opinion that the moves of these officials are being directed by the Japanese military.

Five. A letter dated January 5th received from a reliable American at Manchuria Station states that he had a report from one of his employees who had just returned from Siberia to the effect that the barracks in Siberia which were full of troops at the time of the Russo-Chinese conflict two years ago are empty, but that the Soviet officials were nearly all prepared for war with Japan, that all officers born in 1898 had been called out for a second term, that at Chita the Red command had taken

114

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-12-75

REP

3- #40, from Peiping, Jan. 8, 5 p.m.

had taken over several freight car loads of winter boots originally intended for sale in China and that huge amounts of dry bread were being accumulated in warehouses.

It is my opinion that Soviet officials are not contemplating an offensive war but are afraid that the Japanese might attempt to invade Siberia. Soviet officials here fear that Mo Te Hui President and Li Shao Ken Vice President of the Chinese Eastern Railway will be replaced by pro-Japanese Chinese who will attempt gradually to lessen Soviet influence in the railway."

JOHNSON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 9, 1932

Rec'd 6:52 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 9 1932
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

43, January 9, 1 p. m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, January eighth:

793.94

"Commenting on the American note to China and Japan
an official spokesman here asserted that it would be
impossible for Japan to modify her action in Manchuria
as she has taken the minimum action necessary to preserve
her legitimate rights and interests. She had no
intention of seeking more than she was entitled to under
the existing treaties wherefore she could only reiterate
her strict adherence to the policy of the 'open door'
and equal opportunity for all nations and that she had
no intention of retaining the territory which circum-
stances had compelled her to occupy temporarily."

JOHNSON

JS

F/DEW 793.94/3463

FILED

JAN 14 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

CORRECTED COPY

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N. M.

Dated January 8, 1932

FROM

Rec'd. 5:11 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

37, January 8, 1 p.m.

Following from Lieutenant Brown at Mukden:

"Second and 20th divisions headquarters respectively, Kowpangtze and Chinchow, together with miscellaneous forces total 15,000 occupy railroad Mukden to Shanhaikwan, last named believed reached Wednesday. Peipiao line being cleared and although intention occupy Jehol emphatically denied large scale impressment animal transport presages either that or possibly extensive anti-bandit campaigns.

Heavy artillery being returned to Mukden light artillery replacing, considerable bridge building materials moving south. Communications poorest and except for the presence South Manchuria Railway Company employees and equipment almost impossible.

Japanese correspondents given every consideration by the Japanese military extensible to press planes accompanying advance

COPIES SENT TO
S. N. AND M. I. D.

FAR EAST
JAN 11 1932
Department of State

793.94/3464

FILED

JAN 14 1932

CJH

CORRECTED PAGE TWO

#37 from Peiping.

advance which encountered no opposition. See no casualties and although irregular forces reported to have been hampering communications saw no evidence of that while on the military trains.

Ranking officer states that military share honors this drive with the diplomats in view of the implied secret agreement with Marshal and said that it remains necessary only to adopt a "Panama policy of the United States" towards Manchuria.

Attitude of the Japanese forces stiff, officers generally agreeing presence Chinchow observers responsible for the most part Chinese guerrilla warfare necessitating present expeditionary force."

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 8, 1932

Rec'd 5:11 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

37, January 8, 1 p. m.

Following from Lieutenant Brown at Mukden:

"Second and 20th divisions headquarters respectively,
Kowpangtze and Chinchow, together with miscellaneous forces
total 15,000 occupy railroad Mukden to Shanhaikwan, last
named believed reached Wednesday. Peipiao line being
cleared and although intention occupy Jehol emphatically
denied large scale impressment animal transport presages
either that or possibly extensive anti-bandit campaigns.

Heavy artillery being returned to Mukden light
artillery replacing, considerable bridge building materials
moving south. Communications poorest and except for the
presence South Manchuria Railway Company employees and
equipment almost impossible.

Japanese correspondents given every consideration by
the Japanese military extensible to press planes
accompanying advance which encountered no opposition.
See no casualties and although irregular forces reported
to have

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 9 1932
Department of State
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O.N.I. AND M.I.

F/DEW

793.94/3434

FILED

JAN 18 1932

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1 5
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #37, from Peiping, Jan. 8, 1 p.m.

to have been hampering communications saw no evidence of that while on the military trains.

Ranking officer states that military share honors this drive with the (?) in view of the implied secret agreement with Marshal and said that it remains necessary only to adopt a "Panama policy of the United States" towards Manchuria.

Attitude of the Japanese forces stiff, officers generally agreeing presence Chinchow observers responsible for the most part Chinese guerrilla warfare necessitating present expeditionary force."

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN



FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 9, 1932

Rec'd 4:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



44, January 9, 2 p. m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, January eighth:

"More decisive steps' are contemplated by Japan if the anti-Japanese boycott continues it was stated in official quarters here today which emphasized the tremendous losses suffered by Japanese merchants.

Asked to explain the nature of the steps an official spokesman intimated that they might entail either the landing of bluejackets or even a blockade of the principal ports of China."

JOHNSON

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FILED

JAN 14 1932

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

DM REC'D
TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State



Washington,
January 13, 1932.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

JAN 13 32

6p

13 One. Please reread the Department's telegraphic instructions No. 166 of September 24, 2 p. m., first two sentences, and No. 230 of November 16, 2 p. m., final paragraph.

Two. The Legation at Peiping relays press reports from Tokyo, dated January 8, ¹³⁴⁶⁵ one stating that QUOTE more decisive steps UNQUOTE such as landing of bluejackets or blockade of Chinese ports are contemplated by Japan if the boycott continues in China and another quoting the comments of QUOTE an official spokesman UNQUOTE on our note of January 7. The Department would appreciate direct information and comments from the embassy on these and similar important matters of current interest.

793.94/3465

Sim

993.94/3465

FE:RSM:REK

m.m.H
FE
STAN

JAN. 15. 1932.PM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 9, 1932

Secretary of State,
Washington.

45, January 9, 3 p. m.

Following from Reuter, Peiping, January eighth:

793.94

"Reports current abroad that the Japanese have 'captured' Shanhaikuan are quite misleading. There are always some Japanese troops stationed at that town but the Japanese troops which occupied Chinchow up to yesterday at least had not advanced as far as Shanhaikuan. Japanese railway troops were about twelve miles away but the regular forces were much farther off. The Chinese Ninth Brigade is stated to be still at Shanhaikuan."

From Kuo Wen, Peiping, January eighth:

"Chinese telegraphic advices from Shanhaikuan state that the Japanese military have replaced all the Chinese employed at the various stations east of Shanghaiuan with workers from the South Manchurian Railway and that the telephone and telegraph lines between stations inside the Great Wall and those outside have been cut by the Japanese troops arrived at Shanghaiuan from Chingwangtao

on Thursday

Rec'd 4:15 a. m.
Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 9 1932

Department of State

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F/DEW

793.94/3466

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JAN 14 1932

1 015
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #45, from Peiping, Jan. 9, 3 p.m.

on Thursday, bringing the total Japanese garrison the
barrier to some two thousand men it is said."

(END MESSAGE).


JOHNSON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

DIVISION OF TEACHER TRAINING



State of Oklahoma
Department of Public Instruction

JOHN VAUGHAN, SUPERINTENDENT
CLAY W. KERR, ASST. SUPERINTENDENT


Oklahoma City

January 6, 1932

flb E.C.
JANUARY 16 1932

N. CONGER, DIRECTOR

JAN 9 32



Honorable Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The State Department of Education is in receipt of some literature from the National Salvation Association of Chekiang Provincial Senior Middle School, Chairman C. Lin, pertaining to the Japanese-Chinese situation. They enclose a bulletin whose front page carries the following wording: Title: "Japan and the next World War", Secret Memorial Concerning Manchuria, Mongolia, China, U. S. A. & the World, Submitted by General Tanaka (The then Premier of Japan) to The Japanese Emperor in 1927, Published by The China Critic, 50 Peking Road, Shanghai, China, and along the left margin is some writing in Chinese.

I am interested in knowing what the State Department knows about this Secret Memorial and whether it is regarded as at all significant in connection with the present Japanese movement in Manchuria. This information is not sought for any publicity purposes. I am simply interested in knowing whether or not this Memorial is bona fides and whether it, in any sense, represents the general policy of the present Japanese government.

Very sincerely yours,

N. Conger

N. Conger
Director of Teacher Training

NC:B

F/DEW

793.94/3467

FILED

JAN 18 1932

1 1159

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 16 1932.

In reply refer to
FE - 793.94/3467.

Mr. N. Conger,

Director of Teacher Training,

State of Oklahoma Department of
Public Instruction,

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 6, 1932, stating that you have received a bulletin, published by THE CHINA CRITIC entitled "Japan and the next World War", purporting to be a Secret Memorial submitted by General Tanaka to the Japanese Emperor in 1927, and inquiring what the Department of State knows about this so-called Secret Memorial.


Inasmuch as the bulletin referred to was published in a foreign country under foreign auspices, the Department of State, although aware of its existence and contents, is not in position to comment upon its authenticity or significance.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

SKH
Stanley K. Hornbeck
Chief,

Division of Far Eastern Affairs.



sgs.
FE:ECB

mmh.
FE

793.94/3467

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I. *ff*

MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 9, 1932

Rec'd 9:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

42, January 9, noon.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"January 8, 5 p.m. General Chang Ching Hui returned
to Harbin today. Chi Hsiang a ~~(?)~~ ~~(?)~~ a Japanese adviser.
has been made Chairman of the Committee of Safety at Tsit-
sihar."

JOHNSON

WSB-HPD

F/DEW

793.94/3468

FILED

JAN 15 1932

793.94

Copy handed by Mr. Secrest on Jan 7, 1932.

To the Ambassadors of Japan, Italy, Great Britain,

France and Belgium and the Ministers of China.

Holland and Portugal.

D. Z. R.

file

WHL

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

793.94/3468A

116

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN
London

Dated January 9, 1932

Secretary of State,
Washington.

7, January 9, 1 p. m.

Foreign Office has at noon today handed the following
communiqué to press correspondents.

"His Majesty's Government stand by the policy of the
open door for international trade in Manchuria which is
guaranteed by the Nine Power Treaty of Washington. Since
recent events in Manchuria the Japanese representative
on the Council of the League of Nations stated on October
13th that Japan was the champion in Manchuria of the
principle of equal opportunity and of the open door for
the economic activities of all nations. Further, on
December 28th the Japanese Prime Minister stated that
Japan would adhere to the open door policy and would
welcome foreign participation and cooperation in Manchurian
enterprises. In view of these statements His Majesty's
Government does not consider it necessary to address any
formal note to the Japanese Government on the lines of
the American Government's note, but the Japanese Ambassador
has been requested to obtain confirmation of these assur-
ances from his Government."

HPD- JHR

ATHERTON

FROM

9:50 a.
Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 9 1932

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 15 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FILED

793.94/3469

FILED

JAN 16 1932

1932
note
741.94

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 10, 1932

Rec'd. 3:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,


Washington.

46, January 10, 11 a.m.

793.94
Following extracts from PEIPING LEADER this morning under caption "America acts at last": "Capture of Chinchow by Japanese forces and advance on Shanhaikwan has now impressed American State Department officials with fact that they cannot rely upon Japanese official promises - promises which are made to be broken at will. We have reason to believe that State Department was aroused from its state of lethargy and tameness by growing force of public opinion in United States calling for more definite action to stop Japanese military maniacs from orgy of bloodshed, plunder and seizure of territory.

So called 'open door' in Manchuria has been tightly closed by Japanese invaders since their unwelcome entry into that vast piece of Chinese territory, as foreign business men can testify.

Note which was



F/DEW

793.94/3470

FILED

JAN 19 1932

CJH

page 2 - #46 from Peiping via
N. R.

Note which was transmitted to both China and Japan on the seventh was the strongest warning United States Government has yet delivered. But Reuter report from Washington explaining American State Department's amplification of note 'reiterates firstly that United States does not intend to interfere in slightest degree with Japan's legitimate treaty rights regarding Manchuria and, secondly, that she does not desire to intrude into any settlement which Japan may make, on condition that nothing in such settlement impairs American rights or violates Kellogg Pact!'. If Reuter report is correct it means United States has told Japan she may hit her with a stick but in same breath tells her that stick is only made of paper.

General opinion not only in China but in America itself is that American note should have been delivered months ago when Japanese occupation first began. It is purely case of locking door after thief has carried away jewels. When Japanese began their general advance on Chinchow some weeks ago they suddenly withdrew troops as result of note from Colonel Stimson stating he did not understand press reports of Japanese advance on Chinchow when Baron Shidehara had given assurances no further aggressions would be made. Japanese promptly stopped at that time believing United

States might

CJH

Page 3 - #46 from
Peiping via N.R.

States might take strong action. Bitter Japanese press comment brought forth statement from man in control of American^{to} foreign policy that he did not mean/hurt feelings of powerful island empire. Japanese militarists were then fully assured that they could advance westward without restraint from powers and so they took Chinchow and are seizing Shanahaikwan - Mukden section of peiping - Mukden Railway. They are expected to pounce upon Shanhaikwan any time. If American Government had firmly insisted that Japanese army arrest its advance upon Chinchow instead of displaying timidity by apologetic tone of State Department Chinchow might still be in Chinese hands and Shanhaikwan would not now be menaced".

JOHNSON

JS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

m.m.H. U
FE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 18 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE January 11, 1932.

Referring to the mention on
page two herein of a "dangerous
spread of Communist power", --

Mr. Sokolsky said to me last
week that it was his estimate that
there would probably occur on or
about May first some kind of Com-
munist outbreak in the Yangtze
valley.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

1167
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

A portion of **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.

Peiping

Dated January 11, 1932

Rec'd 2:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

49, January 11, 11 a.m.

Following from Consul General at Nanking:

"January 9, 4 p.m. In compliance with the desire of
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ingram and I had a long
talk with him today in the course of which Chen gave us a
confidential complete and very frank explanation of the
predicament of the National Government. Synopsis of his
statement follows:

Sun Fo left Nanking for Shanghai January 8, 11 p.m.,
and may not return. The principal reason of his departure
is the refusal of important members of the party and the
Government to take up their posts, owing to their fear that
the Government will not be able to solve the Japanese con-
troversy in a way to meet popular sentiment and their know-
ledge that failure will subject them to violent attack. It
is the sincere conviction of Chen that no National Govern-
ment which fails to eject Japan from the occupied areas or
at least to take positive steps to that end can henceforth
survive

FROM SIA
RECEIVED

JAN 11 1932

DIVISION OF

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 11 1932
Department of State

F/DEW 793.94/3471

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FILED
JAN 15 1932

MET

2-#49 from Peiping, January 11,
1932

survive in China. The decision to sever diplomatic relations with Japan was occasioned by this feeling and by a hope that effective third party intervention might be brought about. Chinese leaders here seem to feel unanimously that China must suffer diplomatic distresses if faced with Japan alone. Chen admitted that under the new system if Sun Fo resigns all other members of the Government must likewise go. He predicts that Chiang Kai Shek would be unable to form and maintain another government and that the disintegration of the National Government will necessarily result in a dangerous spread of Communist power. He says local military leaders will be unable to stem this tide because the troops have been influenced by Communism and are behind in their pay and rebellious. Ingram is making report of the same tenor.

(GRAY) The Minister of Railways informs me that Sun Fo went to Shanghai to persuade Wang Ching Wei to take up duties in the Government and will go to home of Chiang Kai Shek for the same purpose. This information attributed predicament of the Government half to Japanese invasion and half to lack of cooperation from Chiang and others".

CIB-WSB


JOHNSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hustism NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
January 11, 1932.

The title "Shengchang",
referred to in the attached
telegram, means "Provincial
Governor".



JBJ



REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TO
FROM

TO
FROM

DIVISION OF

RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 11, 1932

Rec'd 3 a. m.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 11 1932

Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE

JAN 12 1932

Secretary of State, JAN 12 1932

Washington. SECRETARY'S OFFICE

48, January 11, 10 a. m.

Following from Consul General at Harbin:

"January 9, 11 a. m.

One. At noon on January 7 at Tsitsihar General Chang Ching Hui announced that he had on January 3rd taken over the control of all military and civil affairs in Heilungkiang Province with the title of Shengchang and notified Chinese Government orally in only Mukden, Kirin and Harbin to this effect.

Two. General Ma will probably serve under Governor Chang as Commander of the Provincial military forces.

Three. General Ting Chao, who has begun to lean toward the Japanese, commenced yesterday to commandeer thirty auto buses to carry troops south of Harbin against a large band of brigands, who appeared to be threatening to march on Harbin. By the time he had gathered the buses he received a report that the brigands had scattered so he did not send the troops. This gave rise to rumor that Kirin troops were being sent to Harbin and that he had decided to resist them."

JHR - WSB

JOHNSON

793.94
note
893.50

F/DEM

793.94/3472

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JAN 15 1932

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

PEIPING


Dated January 11, 1932

RECEIVED

Rec'd 9:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

JAN 11 1932
DIVISION OF



51, January 11, 6 p. m.

Wellington Koo called this noon and inquired as to the

significance of the Department's notes to China and to Department's telegram. I informed him orally of the contents of Department's 3, January 8, 5 p. m., to Nanking. In the course of the conversation, during which he brought up the question of a conference under the Nine Power Treaty, he expressed belief that there could be no settlement to the Manchurian question unless realities were boldly and honestly faced and the interests of all three parties to the questions involved in the situation in Manchuria, namely, China, Japan and Russia, were taken into consideration at such conference. He expressed the belief that Russia must necessarily be a party to such conference. I told Koo that I had no information as to the Department's views in regard to such a conference either as to its composition or as to the time of holding it. I said that I felt that among the factors

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FILED

JAN 14 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #51, from Peiping, Jan. 11, 6 p.m.

factors to be taken into consideration in determining the time when such a conference should be called would be the existence of a responsible government in China with a leadership capable of facing the problems involved and committing itself to a plan for their settlement.

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

RECEIVED FROM

Peiping via N. R.

JAN 11 1932

Dated January 11, 1932

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 10:10

Secretary of State,
Washington.

50, January 11, 5 p. m. (PARTS 1 TO 4).

Following is summary of editorials appearing in January
ninth issue of three vernacular papers subsequent to the
presentation of American Government's identic note of
January seventh to China and Japan.

SHIH CHIEF JIH PAO, PEIPING editorial, states Chinese
authorities who are accustomed to rely on others feel that
the American note brings pressure to bear on Japan in
favor of China and that the American Government has raised
the "siege" on behalf of China. The editorial, after
reviewing contents of note, comes to conclusion that note
is merely a scrap of paper which cannot be relied upon
to produce any material results and the United States is
solely concerned with her own rights and interests in
Manchuria and does not intend to interfere in the present
dispute.

CHING PAO (Peiping press) editorial states that
Chinese people wonder why Anti-War Pact and Nine Power

Treaty

F/DEW

793.94/3474

FILED

JAN 19 1932

793.94

REP

2- #50, from Peiping, Jan. 11, 10:10
a.m.

Treaty were not invoked by the United States before. The editorial expresses opinion that the United States is merely making reservations regarding her position and policy vis a vis Manchuria and that the note was not designed to stop Japanese aggression. Therefore the Chinese peoples cannot feel happy over the action taken by the United States. It continues by deploring China's inaction which it asserts has been saved by international division only by virtue of the attempt of the powers to maintain the balance of power in the Far East. China has played one power off against another for years but the editorial asserts that this will not avail now and that China must become unified and steps must be taken to cope with foreign aggression.

Editorial proceeds expressing the opinion:

(One). That first step taken by the Japanese destroyed China's territorial and administrative integrity as well as "open door policy". Furthermore Japanese measures were designed to destroy Anti-War Pact and that United States should have taken steps long ago to maintain these treaties; her present action coming too late.

(Two). That China's military strength is manifestly not equal to that of Japan which has made slaves of thirty
million

REP

3- #50, from Peiping, Jan. 11, 10:10a.m.

million Chinese and violated her treaty obligations. In the absence of justice and effective action on the part of the powers China will become an easy prey to Communism.

(Three). That Japan's principal object in occupying Manchuria was to gain control of her resources and thus strengthen her military power.

The editorial expresses the opinion that the world faces a catastrophe of the first magnitude if no steps are taken to check Japan. China cherishes no hatred toward the Japanese people realizing that the Japanese militarists are responsible for the present aggressiveness of the Island Empire. China desires a peaceful settlement of the issue and hopes that world public opinion will compel Japan to repent for her crimes. If not, the editorial concludes, the four hundred millions of China must unite and struggle to the bitter end. But the hope is expressed that the United States and other powers will render every assistance for which China will be not ungrateful.

(END PARTS 1 TO 4 INCLUSIVE).

JOHNSON

KLP
HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

RECEIVED
JAN 11 1933
DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 11, 1933

Rec'd 10:57 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

50, January 11, 5 p.m. (PART FIVE)

(For press data regarding above vernacular papers
see Legation's despatch No. 1102, July 27, 1931).

(END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

KLP-HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION

When a correspondent asked if the Secretary had anything to say regarding the reported occupation today of Chinchow by Japanese forces, the Secretary declined to comment. A correspondent asked whether the Secretary could say if the United States planned any further action. The Secretary replied that

-3-

he would rather not comment on the situation. He added that he would give the press everything he could when the time comes. When a correspondent enquired whether anything had been done since the last Japanese memorandum was received, the Secretary replied in the negative.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary had heard anything from the League of Nations Commission which was supposed to go to China to learn if the Japanese had occupied Manchuria. In reply, the Secretary said he had not heard when the Commission was going. He added that he had heard certain names mentioned as having been chosen to serve on the commission, but had no other information, than press accounts, as to the truth of those reports.

A correspondent observed that the League had announced Mr. Hines' name as the American member of the Commission. In reply, the Secretary said Mr. Hines was unable to go. The correspondent enquired whether the League had found a substitute. The Secretary replied that no substitute had been found, so far as he knew. He asked if announcement had not been made of Mr. Hines' inability to go. A correspondent replied in the negative. The Secretary remarked that he had been under the impression that it had, since it occurred ten days ago. Mr. Hines was unable to go because of business engagements. A correspondent asked how the information was sent to the League. The Secretary replied that it was sent by Mr. Hines through the State Department. A correspondent asked if there had been any suggestion of any other person to act. The Secretary replied in the negative.

A correspondent referred to a press despatch to the effect that Ambassador Forbes had indicated his desire to retire and return to the United States. The Secretary, in reply, said he had seen the story to that effect and also to the effect that there was a rumor of some disagreement between himself and

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Mr. Forbes. The Secretary characterized the latter story as being entirely untrue. He recalled that when he asked Mr. Forbes to go to Japan as Ambassador it was well understood that Mr. Forbes could stay there only a comparatively short time. That was nearly two years ago and, while there has been no resuggestion on the Ambassador's part that he wants to get away at any particular moment, yet it was understood he was not there for a long term. The Secretary added that he could not say too strongly there had not been the slightest difference of viewpoint between the Ambassador and himself. Mr. Forbes has been most cordial and faithful in every bit of work he had and the Secretary said he felt it would be a great injustice to Mr. Forbes for such a story to be circulated.

A correspondent asked if the Ambassador ever indicated a definite date when he would like to return to the United States. The Secretary replied in the negative.

A correspondent asked if something was not said during the Ambassador's recent visit to this country as to when he would return to the United States. FOR BACKGROUND ONLY, the Secretary said that the Ambassador had reminded him of the original understanding, but did not fix any definite time for his return. The correspondent enquired whether anything was said then regarding Mr. Forbes' return after the crisis. FOR BACKGROUND ONLY, the Secretary replied that Mr. Forbes said nothing more than that he would not embarrass us by allowing his private convenience to interfere in the middle of a crisis. A correspondent enquired whether Ambassador Forbes' resignation had been submitted. The Secretary replied in the negative and added that no time for retirement was suggested.

A correspondent said he thought that all the press despatches emphasized the fact there was no difference of opinion between the Secretary and the Ambassador. The Secretary said he was glad of that, because there had been none. The

-5-

correspondent continued by saying that the inference in the despatches from the Far East seemed to be that the final entrance of Japan into Chinchow had ended the crisis. The Secretary said he would leave that for the correspondents to decide.

ITALY

A correspondent enquired whether the Department had taken any further action in regard to the various recent bombings and bomb scares. The Secretary said they had occurred while he was away from the Department, but he understood the correspondents had been told that the State Department conferred with the Department of Justice on the subject. He added that he had heard nothing further except that the Department of Justice had taken the matter up.

SECRETARY STIMSON

A correspondent said that during the Secretary's absence the press got some very erroneous information. It was understood that Secretary was shooting ducks out of season. The Secretary said he understood that a group of newspaper correspondents seized with avidity the idea that he was a lawbreaker. He explained that he was after a much more difficult bird--a perfectly legal one.

Walter A. Foote,
Acting Chief.

1181
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET:

FROM

GRAY

RECEIVED
JAN 11 1932
DIVISION OF

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 11, 1932

Rec'd 1:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

53, January 11, 8 p.m.

Following from Lieutenant Brown at Mukden:

"Press reaction to American note strong. Peiping-Mukden Railway now occupied to Shanhaikwan. Japanese have appointed new manager for north half of Peiping-Mukden line. On January 9 Japanese officer stated Japanese General Staff now prepared for soviets and troops movement north confirms this.. On January 10 Semenoff was in Mukden conferring with Japanese - Mongols".

JOHNSON

JHR-WSB

F/DEW

793.94/3476

FILED

JAN 19 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

January 8, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND COUNT KABAYAMA.

Manchuria.

Count Kabayama called to see me and told me that he had left Japan while Mr. Wakatsuki was Premier and Baron Shidehara was Foreign Minister. He began by saying something as to the serious nature of the situation which had come up in Japan with the army. I replied that it was a tragedy, and I referred to my talk with Mr. Debuchi only a week before September 18th, when we had agreed on the improvement which had taken place in the relations between the United States and Japan and how we hoped we would perhaps soon be able to straighten out the trouble over immigration. I said that now this situation had occurred which had produced the serious impression upon American sentiment which Count Kabayama himself must have noted. Count Kabayama had referred to the attitude of the army and its quarrel with the civil government, and I pointed out the deep feeling of the American people which such a situation violated - our deep seated belief in the subordination of the military to the civil authorities, explaining how it dated back in English history to the ship money affair

of

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 12 1932
Department of State

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JAN 14 1932

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

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of Charles I. I said that ever since that time we had believed that the civil authorities must rule the army and told him how we had felt towards Germany when it was proved in Germany how the army ruled the civil authorities. Count Kabayama had told me he realized the defect in the Japanese Constitution and how they had realized it ever since the difficulty over the ratification of the Naval Treaty in 1930; that thinking men had been planning to remedy this. He explained to me the difficulties inherent in the Japanese conception in the sanctity of the Emperor. He also told me that in this case the navy had opposed the army in the Manchurian policy; that the navy had thought that this original trouble with the Chinese at Mukden should be treated as an isolated right and not be made the basis for a political campaign such as the army proceeded to make it.

I explained to Count Kabayama our position in this present matter. I said first that we had no antagonism or objection to Japan's legitimate treaty rights in Manchuria but looked upon them with sympathy, and second that we did not seek at all to intrude into any settlement of this quarrel with China which Japan had, provided only that the settlement did not impair our rights in the open

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

open door in China or violate the peace treaties. I explained to him our views as to the importance of the open door, and I described the importance of the peace treaties. Incidentally I told him of my own views towards Japan's position in the Orient and how I felt that it was greatly to the interest of the United States to have a strong, responsible Japan friendly to our western points of view acting as our friend and interpreter on the edge of Asia with all of the uncertainties of China and Russia behind. I told him how when this thing had broken out I had remembered Wakatsuki's courageous fight for the ratification of the Naval Treaty and had advised that he be given an opportunity to control his army. Count Kabayama said yes, that my attitude was well known; that he had found it expressed in London. I told him that I was very troubled because I looked forward now to the importance of making strong representations for the defense of American rights and interests in Manchuria, and I pointed to the cases lying on my desk comprising the injuries done to no less than thirteen American corporations in Manchuria, and I told him that I had read a Reuters dispatch which indicated that Japan was thinking of setting up an independent or
autonomous

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

autonomous Manchuria and if that were done it would make a very serious breach with this country because it would be a complete violation of the open door policy embodied in the Nine-Power treaty. He said that the establishment of such an independent Manchuria would be in his opinion unthinkable by Japan. I asked him whether the armies in Japan were going beyond the Great Wall, and he said no, they were not. He told me how for many years there had been an evolution of party government in Japan which was taking away power from the army, and yet that the army was a stabilizing influence in the Orient. He told me of how he had come to this country as an informal representative of industrial Japan and of his talks with Baron Dan and how Baron Dan had asked him to bring along Kamatsu. He said that he was going over to New York to talk with Thomas Lamont and other friends there.

HLS.

S HLS:HR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75






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RECEIVED
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mexico, December 30, 1931.

JAN 11 32



F/DEW

793.94/3478

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

793.94/3478
With reference to my despatch No. 1039 of December 20, 1931, I have the honor to enclose a translation of an editorial which appeared in EL NACIONAL, the organ of the National Revolutionary Party, of December 20, 1931, commenting on the Manchurian situation. The Department will note that the tone of this editorial is somewhat different from that of EL UNIVERSAL MEXICO so far as criti-

cism

MAR 7 - 1932


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

cism of the United States is concerned.

Respectfully yours,


J. Reuben Clark, Jr.

✓
Enclosure:

Translation of an editorial appearing in EL
NACIONAL of December 29, 1961.

710 (U.S.-Japan)

JCS:B

1110

Enclosure to despatch number of December 30, 1931,
from the American Embassy at Mexico City

T R A N S L A T I O N

(EL NACIONAL: December 29, 1931)

THE IMPERIALISM OF THE ORIENT AND THE DOCTRINE OF SPANISH
AMERICA

The determination taken by the Imperial Government of Japan to have General Honjo's forces advance to the stronghold of Chinchow, the last refuge of Chinese authority in Manchuria, is the latest episode in a war of conquest carried on amid the astonishment of a world which had been accustomed itself to the belief that this kind of warlike enterprise could not be tolerated because it is contrary to contemporary international ethics.

Through the failure of the mediation of the principal body for international action - the League of Nations -, and through the arrogance of the aggressor State's reply to the admonitions of the chanceries interested in the enforcement of the treaties and conventions which guarantee the sovereignty and the integrity of the nation attacked, we have suddenly returned to a state of affairs which means that defenceless nations are no longer protected.

General Honjo's attitude finds an exact parallel in that of Prince Henry of Prussia, when the latter, on the pretext of seeking reparation for the killing of two German missionaries, had the German fleet penetrate the Bay of Quiaochao in order to force the hand of the Celestial Empire in the granting of excessive concessions in Shantung.

The (world --) war and its aftermath have netted us nothing. Contracts are binding only in proportion to
the

-2-

the feebleness of the States in question; when they define the duties of the (great) powers, they have but the validity, attributed to them by Bethman Hollweg, of mere "scraps of paper". International action is effective in terminating differences which may arise between small countries; but it is a poor and sorry thing in the face of a puissance de proie determined to carry out its designs, even - as in the case under discussion - in disregard of concrete agreements, general duties, and at the loss of all moral authority.

Despite the obvious nature of a military invasion effected by a nation on territory the sovereignty over which is universally recognized as belonging to another State, the powers of judgment which ought to shape public opinion in regard to this serious question are misled and confused with lamentable facility. Not a few disregard the humane issue involved in the defence of a weak and helpless people, the victim of the aggression, in order solely to contemplate, as a spectacle of surpassing interest, the struggle of the imperialisms for predominance in the markets of the Orient.

We had already noticed that even in Mexico -- a country which, by reason of its past history, its traditions, and its political and geographical position, must constantly espouse the cause of defenceless peoples who are the victims of aggression -- newspapers were not lacking (such as that of Bucareli⁽¹⁾) to undertake the thankless task of arguing in defence of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. But now, when the ^{direct} intervention of the chief powers has brought

(1) Translator's note: The reference is to EXCELSIOR, whose offices are on Calle Bucareli.

-3-

brought the crisis to a head, and when the relations between Japan and the United States are becoming momentarily more strained, not a few Spanish-American publications pride themselves on playing up the overbearing arrogance employed by the Japanese Government in its reply to the White House.

Newspapers in Montevideo and Buenos Aires applaud the Chancery at Tokio for the parallel which it established between the Japanese intervention in Manchuria and the American intervention in the Republic of Nicaragua, and are happy to add -- according to reports from the news agencies -- that Japan has more "right" to invade Manchuria than the United States has to intervene in Nicaragua.

Public opinion in Spanish-America -- and, we may even say, among the majority of the people in the United States -- has always energetically repudiated, definitely opposed, and unreservedly condemned each act of intervention, peaceful or armed, temporary or permanent, which any country has carried out in any other on this Continent. This sentiment, which is the guiding essential spirit of the entire policy of the peoples of Spanish America -- and which has been fully ratified by its adoption as the common standard of ethics throughout the world -- makes it imperative for us to express our solidarity with any country which has suffered invasion or intervention, as is the present case in China, a country which is engaging in a heroic struggle for its political and social transformation and which has entrusted its external defence to the righteousness of its cause (la fuerza de su derecho) and to international coöperation.

To side with Japanese imperialism, overlooking its arrogance and its excesses, merely because it justifies itself by (pointing to) the acts (of others) which we have
condemned

1191

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

condemned time and again --- to do this would, apart from indicating an inconsistency in our own doctrine, lead to an accumulation of the reasons, an enrichment of the multiple factors availed of by the imperialist groups which demand intervention in these latitudes.

The same reasons today adduced in justification of the Japanese invasion would tomorrow be used to support acts prejudicial to the independence, the integrity, and the sovereignty of our own countries.

Translated by
KCT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated January 11, 1932

Rec'd 1:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

52, January 11, 7 p.m.

Following from Lieutenant Aldrich:

793.94
"One. January 9, 3 p.m. Shanhaikwan very quiet, Japanese here about 300; nearest Japanese detachment 20 men Wanchiatun 6 miles distant. Nearest brigade headquarters Suichang 30 miles distant. No evidence Japanese intention of occupying Shanhaikwan in the immediate future. Shall send details interview with the Chinese commanding officer at Shanhaikwan and Japanese commanding officer at Shanhaikwan from Chinwantao."

"Two. January 10. Japanese commander in chief at Shanhaikwan polite but uncommunicative. Stated that area is quiet and Japanese have no intention occupying Shanhaikwan as objective has been reached. He had no objection my going outside the wall but thought no transportation available

General Ho 9th brigade apparently maintains close touch with Japanese and I believe that his information fairly reliable. He knows that Japanese armored train attempted to

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 11 1932
Department of State

F/DEM

793.94/2479

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JAN 19 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-52 from Peiping via N.R.,
January 11, 1932

to enter Shanhaikwan January 6 but after his objection
only ~~licenses~~ ^{locomotives} entered for water. Same date detachment
Japanese railway workers from South Manchuria Railway
entered Shanhaikwan with railway transportation officer
to aid repair rolling stock but have left. He reports
that Japanese appear anxious maintain present quiet and
believes they have no intention advance inside the wall".

JOHNSON

WSB


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM DCR
FE(RPB)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-B-12



9 January 1932

F/DEW

Memorandum for Far Eastern Division, State Department

The following was received from Naval Attache, Peiping, dated
8 January 1932:

"LIEUT BROWN NOW MUKDEN HAVING JUST VISITED CHINCHOW IN JAPANESE
MILITARY TRAIN REPORTS SECOND DIVISION HEADQUARTERS KOU-PANGTZE TWENTIETH
DIVISION HEADQUARTERS CHINCHOW. FIFTEEN THOUSAND JAPANESE OCCUPY RAILWAY
MUKDEN TO SHANKAI KUAN. PEIPAO LINE BEING CLEARED AND ALTHOUGH JAPANESE
DENY INTENTION TO OCCUPY JEHOL LARGE SCALE IMPRESSMENT ANIMAL TRANSPORT
PRESAGES THIS OR ELSE EXTENSION ANTI BANDIT CAMPAIGN. CONSIDERABLE
BRIDGE BUILDING MATERIAL MOVING SOUTH FROM MUKDEN. NO EVIDENCE OF
CHINESE IRREGULARS HAMPERING COMMUNICATIONS. ATTITUDE OF JAPANESE
FORCES STIFF. JAPANESE SAY PRESENCE FOREIGN OBSERVERS RESPONSIBLE FOR
CHINESE GUERRILLA WARFARE WHICH NECESSITATED PRESENT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE"

793.94/3480

We need this for my

JAN 18 1932

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*Mar 19,
1913*

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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 4 1932

2657-N-377

Department of State
November 27, 1931.
Special.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 4 1932
Department of State

Chief of Staff's Address to Military Attaches.

1. The following is an address given by the Chief of Staff at a tea which he gave on November 20th for the Military Attaches prior to their departure for Manchuria. It is particularly interesting as it is a direct statement from the Chief of Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army, and as such bears considerable attention. In the fourth paragraph you will notice that the Chief of Staff at that time that the Japanese troops will not be withdrawn from Manchuria, which means into the railroad zone until peace and order has been secured and the lives and property of Japanese nationals are protected. This of course leaves a large loop-hole, the interpretation of which the Japanese military will apply themselves.

At your request we are inviting you to Manchuria. I believe the whole problem in connection with the Manchurian incident, which has caused so much concern not only to the League of Nations but to various European nations and America as well, can be solved naturally if all will recognize satisfactorily the special character of the situation in Manchuria and Mongolia, particularly as regards the relations between those two territories and Japan.

I presume that all of you have been studying the situation and are fully aware of the points I have just mentioned. I also imagine that you are well versed in Japanese affairs. But there is nothing so convincing as seeing for one's self. I hope you will make all the investigations you desire, in your own personal observations on the real situation in Manchuria, on your present trip, short though it is.

I hope you will pay special attention to the historical background of Japan's interests in the relations with Manchuria, as well as how Japan's rights and interests are maintained there. I also hope you will have special opportunity to observe how the Japanese people, including Koreans, who are living in Manchuria and Mongolia, are attempting to promote their lives there; also I hope the attitude of the Chinese police and officials toward them.

If you attain a full understanding of these foregoing points, I think you will recognize why the Japanese Government, as well as the other nations, in viewing the Manchurian problem with such care. I think you will also agree that it is worthless to discuss the question of withdrawing Japanese troops from Manchuria as a means of settling the dispute, as is so eagerly demanded by the Peking Government, before peace and order have been secured, and before the Chinese have proved themselves able to protect the lives and property of Japanese nationals.

Our accommodations may not be such as we wish, but I hope you will ask your guide for whatever you want without reserve, and accomplish in full the object of your inspection. It is getting cold now and I hope you will take good care of yourself and return home in good health and spirit.

Hate

F/DEM

790.94/3401

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The following is the official Japanese translation as given to the Military Attaches on November 1st. The other translation was the one forwarded to us in Japanese and also the statement given to the press. Note that the first sentence disagrees. The first translation states that the Military Attaches had requested permission to visit Manchuria. This is an error. They did not request permission to visit Manchuria, but were invited to do so by the Chief of Staff. The rest of the translation agrees in principle with the former.

I am glad to know that you are going to make an observation tour over Manchuria and all our necessary arrangements have been completed now. Since the recent incident became a question of the League of Nations, European and American countries have begun to see Manchuria and Mongolia with a deep concern, and the League of Nations is earnestly discussing how to bring the dispute to a settlement. From our point of view it seems that the more clearly they recognize the characteristics of Manchurian problems and their relations to our country, the sooner the misunderstanding, if any, could vanish. I feel safe in saying in this respect that all of you are so familiar with Japan and the Japanese people that you could not fail to see the reality of Manchurian affairs. But I believe it is not useless to add to your knowledge about Manchuria by your personal observation, although I fear that the trip will be too short for that purpose. I should recommend you, at this juncture, that you will pay due attention to the historical relations between Japan and Manchuria, the vital importance of our interests in that continent, and the economic conditions of Manchuria developed to a great degree by Japanese subjects and also to the extent of cultural trait on the part of Chinese authorities under their compatriots and the struggle for their existence. If you could understand all these things you would readily approve of the sincere attitude of the Japanese people at large, toward Manchurian problems and you could find out the utter groundlessness of Franklin's proposal of our early evacuation previous to any agreement, while the real situation in Manchuria is that peace and order has not yet been restored and the lives and property of all our residents are still at stake.

As for your questions you may wish to bring the trip of Mr. Isayama, the Chief of Staff, will be glad to answer as far as he can.

I wish you every success in your Manchurian trip and at the same time hope you will take care of your health against the severe cold of Manchurian winter.

Source: Official.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache.

Thomas R. Cranford, Jr.
1st Lt., U.S.A., (1)
Asst. Military Attache.

2/ Tokyo

Report No. 5978

17 Nov. 1931.

1197
FAP LASHEN
JAN 4 1931

2063-324

84

December 2, 1931.

Summary of Military Events.

1. Japanese troops capture Tsitsihar.

In our last summary we called attention to the fact that the Japanese had concentrated the majority of their forces in Manchuria along the Hsiao-shan-ping railway, reinforcing their troops which were on the north bank of the Honni River, also, that the Japanese had sent an ultimatum to General Ma Chan-shan demanding his withdrawal north of the Chinese Eastern Railway. General Ma refused to comply with the Japanese demands, and, as the Japanese claim, continued to increase the number of his troops. The Japanese General staff informed us that on November 16th, General Ma had collected about 20,000 infantry, 20 pieces of artillery, 10 trench mortars, 2 anti-aircraft guns, and about 2000 cavalry, and that the cavalry was moving around the Japanese right flank to attack the Japanese rear.

Later they reported that on the 17th a clash had occurred between the two cavalry detachments and that a general engagement was imminent. The engagement began around three o'clock on the morning of November 18th. No precipitated this fight cannot be said, but again the Japanese claim they fought only in self-defense.

The following is an account of the battle as published by the Asahi Shinbun received from one of their reporters on the front:

At daybreak on November 18th, in the face of a concentrated fire of artillery, machine guns and rifles from the enemy's position at Tsingli, the Japanese threw the weight of their main body against the enemy's center, ably assisted by armored motorcars and airplanes. The enemy, who offered a very close fight, finally gave way, taking to flight in a regular stampede for Angakchi. The Japanese followed up their success by occupying the enemy's first, second, third, and fourth positions and pushed forward in pursuit. Angakchi was taken at 3:00 p.m. The enemy fled in three directions; that is, eastward and westward along the . . . and towards Tsitsihar. Ma Chan-shan sped northward on a train composed of two coaches along the Tsitsihar-Hsiao-shan line. Flight Captain Adaguchi pursued the train and bombed it from the air, but the fugitive got away."

"Thus, the Japanese dealt a crushing blow to the obstinate Tsitsihar army more than seven times as strong, and sent a party of soldiers into the walled city of Tsitsihar. By 10:00 a.m. on November 19th the Sun flag was seen waving on the top of the crenellated wall."

The above checks very closely with other accounts published in the Japanese press.

The Asahi reported that about 3:00 a.m., November 18th, the Heilungkiang Army, General Ma commanding, opened heavy fire on the Japanese troops and that Lt. General Tazon, commander of the 2nd Division, ordered a general attack which took place about 6:00 a.m. under cover of a heavy artillery fire.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Although the press reports that Tsitsihar was occupied on the 18th, the General Staff stated that Japanese troops arrived there on that evening, but camped outside the city, occupying it on the 20th, and that General Ma had retreated to Hailun.

From all accounts obtainable the Chinese offered the most stubborn resistance that the Japanese have encountered so far in the Manchurian trouble, but the superior training and equipment of the Japanese naturally won out.

The General Staff published the following casualty list several days after the battle:

Killed - Officers	3	Enlisted	33	Total	36
Wounded - Officers	6	Enlisted	120	Total	126
Grand Total					162

This fighting took place under severe weather conditions, the temperature being 30 degrees below zero C. Despite the fact the Japanese troops were equipped with fleece-lined overcoats, mittens, and helmets, during the week November 15th to 24th, they suffered no less than 300 casualties from frost-bite. These men were evacuated to the base hospitals.

They estimated that General Ma's casualties were between two and three thousand men. If his casualties were so large it was undoubtedly due to the armored motor cars and airplanes used by the Japanese.

According to the General Staff the Japanese troops taking part in this battle were:

- 10 battalion of Infantry
- 2 squadrons of Cavalry
- 5 batteries of Field Artillery
- 1 company of Engineers
- 2 batteries of Heavy Field Artillery

Total of 3,500 men.

No mention was made of the armored motorcars and airplanes, which were used, as the press published photographic evidence to that effect.

It is probable that more troops than listed above were used, as the bulk of the Japanese army in Manchuria was in rear of the Nenai River ready to reinforce the front line at any time.

With the fall of Tsitsihar the Japanese military in Manchuria extended their control over a third province, leaving only Jehol outside their power, and at the same time overcame one of the two remaining strongholds of Chang Hsueh-liang, Chinchow being the other.

2. Japanese Movement to the South.

On November 24th, the Japanese sent the Korean Brigade, the newly arrived Hiroaki Brigade, designated as the 4th Mixed Brigade, and some Railway Guards south from Mukden for the purpose of exterminating

- 3 -

the bandits in the area between the M.H.A. and the M.V.R. However, it was clearly seen that this was but a preliminary move towards Chinchow. Evidently, not satisfied with what they had gained, the military authorities in Mukden planned to drive out the last remnants of Chang Hsueh-liang's army from Manchuria, and on November 26th, the clash came, and the advance on Chinchow began. The exact movements of the troops sent on the 26th has not been clearly indicated in the press here, and the General Staff have not cleared that up. Chinchow was bombed on the 26th, and on the 27th the 4th Mixed Brigade (Mitsuzaki Brigade) took Mukden and pushed on, while the Korean Brigade and the detachment of Railway Guards also advanced towards Chinchow, while the 2nd Division was concentrating in Mukden. However, thanks to the pressure brought to bear by foreign powers, Tokyo on the 27th ordered the troops not to proceed beyond the Ta Liang River, near Chinchow, but some cavalry and advance troops had already crossed over. This order was later supplemented and all the troops were ordered to withdraw to the east bank of the Liao River. This withdrawal was accomplished by the night of November 28th.

It is interesting to note that both the General Staff and Foreign Office have given us repeated assurances that they had not intended the advance on Chinchow, and the above plainly shows that the military authorities are acting largely upon their own initiative, as there has been no occurrences in or near Chinchow which would justify sending troops there, as was in the case of the first battle on the Honni River.

Colonel Melroy telegraphed from Mukden that 13 battalions of Infantry had been used in the advance on Chinchow.

The General Staff now states that since the withdrawal to the east bank of the Liao River, which is practically the line held before the advance on Chinchow, Chinese troops have moved into the area occupied by the Japanese on their advance towards Chinchow. They state that large detachments have again taken over Jehumen and Kowpingtze and from all indications it does not appear that they have any intention of withdrawing, and forming the such talked of Neutral zone.

3. More Troops for Manchuria.

On November 29th, 170 replacements for the 2nd Division passed through Tokyo from Sendai enroute to Manchuria. Sendai is the home station of the 2nd Division.

100 men of the Telegraph Corps and 80 automotive mechanics left Tokyo on November 24th.

1,150 recruits to replace the time-expired men of the Railway Battalions left Kobe recently for Manchuria. According to the General Staff, replacements are made twice a year, June 1st and December 1st, and they stated that this change is a normal procedure.

As it was noted above, the Mitsuzaki Brigade has reached Manchuria, but the Korean Brigade which it was to relieve, has not yet been withdrawn.

- 4 -

4. Distribution of Troops.

We have been unable recently to get an accurate idea of the distribution of troops, but from conversations at the General Staff on November 28th and 29th, it appears that the majority of Japanese troops in Manchuria were until the 29th concentrated in and around Mukden, and to the south thereof. However, the 4th Mixed Brigade left Mukden on the 30th for Tsitsihar as the Japanese claim it is again coming trouble in that area.

5. Fighting again in Tientsin.

On the 30th fighting again started in Tientsin between the Chinese and the Japanese, and the firing became general, continuing for several days. On the 28th the General Staff stated that the situation in Tientsin was serious and between 300 and 400 men from the Korean Brigade were ordered from Mukden to Tientsin to reinforce the garrison there. These troops left Mukden on the afternoon of the 28th, and proceeded to Tientsin via Beiren arriving in Tientsin the evening of the 30th, and in Tientsin on the morning of December 1st. A detachment of Japanese marines were landed in Tientsin on the 27th from the two destroyers "Fuyo" and "Yamukaya" at Taku. Both the Chinese and Japanese sections of the city were shelled, resulting in a number of casualties. On the 28th the situation quieted down somewhat but heavy firing commenced again on the 29th. However, according to the press it quieted down again on the 30th, but they report the situation is still fraught with danger.

6. Military Attaches in Manchuria.

The British, French, Polish, Argentine and American Military Attaches, also a representative of the Italian Embassy, left Tokyo on November 1st for Manchuria as guests of the Japanese General Staff. After paying their respects on General Honjo in Mukden, they went to Changchun, and then returned to Mukden. They left Mukden again on the 25th for Chanchun and spent the 30th in Kirin. They returned to Changchun on the same day and are reported to have left for Tsitsihar on December 1st. They expect to return to Mukden on December 4th.

The press reports that several attaches from Peking have been in Chinchow for the past week.

7. Military Possibilities in Manchuria.

Now that the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria have taken Mukden, Kirin, and Heilungchian Provinces, the only Chinese forces which oppose them are in Chinchow. Their attempt last week to grapple with those troops was frustrated by pressure from Tokyo and foreign sources. This nevertheless did not mean that they do not wish to drive these troops south of the Great Wall. It simply means that they are willing to call off the action provided the Neutral Zone is created between Haiman and the Great Wall. In the event that this Neutral Zone is not created or that the Chinese invade this zone, the Japanese will no doubt renew their advance on Chinchow.

1201

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

Recent reports from the General Staff state that General Ma has become somewhat conciliatory towards the Japanese but that General Hsu Yao-shu, a former lieutenant of Ma's, is becoming active in the vicinity of Tsitsihar, thereby endangering the Japanese troops left in that place. Consequently they sent the 4th Mixed Brigade to Tsitsihar from Mukden on November 30th to prevent any trouble from arising.

There are almost daily reports of clashes between the Japanese troops and bandits, with the exception of the immediate vicinity of Mukden and Kirin this form of guerrilla warfare is rampant throughout all Manchuria, and is giving the Japanese considerable trouble. The so-called bandits are in general scattered bodies of ex-soldiers, and they are harassing the Japanese as much as possible. However, at the same time they are preying upon their own people. With the exception of a possible advance on Chinchow, there does not seem to be any possibility of another large engagement taking place, and it appears that the Japanese will continue to hold the positions they occupy and strengthen themselves by the formation of local governing bodies of Chinese.

for and in the absence of the Military Attache.

Source: General Staff and
Local Press.

Thomas G. Crawford, Jr.
1st Lt., U. S. A., Ret.
Asst. Military Attache.

120
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75


PAUL CLAUDEL
AMBASSADEUR DE FRANCE

with his best regards.

WASHINGTON

120

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



RECEIVED

JAN 8 - 1932

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

F/DEW

The French Ambassador to the Court of St.

James does not think that the British Government is

willing to act in Tokio, because, in so doing, they would

assume the part of the Council of the League of Nations.

Moreover, it appears that China has asked the immediate
reunion of the Council.

Sir Victor Wellesley said to M. de Fleuriau

that, the Chinese having evacuated Chinchow and the

Japanese having taken the city without any fighting, the

conflicting forces were going to be separated by the

Great Wall. It therefore was necessary to wait for further
information before talking to the Japanese Government.

Washington, January 5th, 1932.

FILED

JAN 13 1932

793.94

793.94/3483

10204
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
AUX ÉTATS-UNIS

His Excellency

The Honorable Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of State,

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

(By messenger).

1205

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 14 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Dated January 11, 1932

Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

10, January 11, 6 p.m.

The following refer to pertinent paragraphs in

Consulate's number 8, January 8, 3 p.m. Paragraphs one and two. Japan's acquiescence received this afternoon. The members of the Council are being advised today that membership of Manchurian Commission has been agreed to by China and Japan and they will be asked to submit objections if any, within two days. Avenol does not envisage any objections being received. If this proves to be the case, the Commission will be "constituted" on January 14 and an invitation to General McCoy will go forward on that date. Paragraph three. First meeting of the commission will take place at Geneva on January 14 or 19. Paragraph seven. Reference Department's number 8, January 8, 3 p.m., Avenol appreciates information respecting Young. I am inclined to believe that Young will shortly be approached respecting his possible employment.

Department's

F/DEW 793.94/3484

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#10 from Geneva, January 11,
1932

Department's telegram number 7, January 9, 5 p.m., with respect to press intimations that London and Paris would make the same or similar demarches/^{as}embodied in American note, Avenol states that he has learned that London and Paris were more inclined in any action via a vis Japan to take their stand on previous Council action. He added that any possible action by Paris was being delayed by Briand's present physical condition and political position.

GILBERT

WSB

1207
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 12, 1932.

Mr. Castle:

In view of this telegram,
it would seem to me that the
Secretary might wish either to
speak to the French Ambassador
or to telegraph to Paris.

If you concur, may I suggest
that you bring this especially
to the Secretary's attention.

(21 from Paris)

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 12 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SKH

SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

NA

71

793.94/2485

Mr. Henderson

I shall speak with
the Secretary about this but don't
wonder he will want to do anything
as he is firm in the point that he has
not asked any of the others to follow
along *(21 from Paris)*
WHL
Jan 12

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated **FROM**
to anyone.

PARIS

Dated January 11, 1932

Rec'd 6:22 p.m.

Secretary of State


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Washington

JAN 12 1932

DIVISION OF

21, January 11, 6 p.m.



F/DEW

793.94/3485

In a conversation which the Counsellor of the Em-
bassy had this morning with the Chief of the Far Eastern
section of the Foreign Office the question of the Manchu-
rian situation came up and reference was made to the re-
cent American note to the Japanese and Chinese Governments
and to what if any action France proposed to take in the
premises.

Monsieur Naggiar said that the Belgian Embassy had
recently asked the Foreign Office what reply they proposed
to make on the American Government's suggestion that the
other powers signatory to the Nine Power Treaty send notes
to the Chinese Government and the Japanese Government in
the same sense as the American note. Naggiar said that the
Foreign Office had replied to the Belgian Embassy that no
such request had been made to the French Government by the
United

FILED
JAN 17 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #21, from Paris, January 11,
1932

United States Government. He added that the Foreign Office had telegraphed Claudel to ask whether such a request had been made of him and that a reply had been received that no request either official or unofficial had been made but that meeting you informally at a dinner you had referred to the matter expressing the hope that the French Government might take similar action. Naggiar said that on January 3 last following the taking of Chinchow the French Government had proposed at Washington and London that further demarches be made divided along the lines of the representations made by the three ambassadors on December 23 but that neither Washington nor London had felt such a move at that time advisable. He was of course au courant of the communique issued by the British Foreign Office on January 9 to the effect that the British were not joining with us and indicated that in view of the British stand he did not think that the French could very well agree to join in with the American proposal even if made. He went on to say however for our confidential information that Briand was for the moment considering whether some form of statement should not

12
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

3- #21, from Paris, January 11,
1932

not be made by the President of the Council of the League of Nations to Japan and China making reference to the resolution of the Council of December 10th last. This is merely under discussion however and Naggiar particularly requested that no mention be made of it. It was made plain to Naggiar that the Embassy had received no instructions to take up the matter and was merely interested in learning the French Government's views.

PFC


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



Mr. Secretary:

Herewith a suggestion by Mr. Blakeslee
that an informal statement be made to the
press expressing gratification at the appoint-
ment of the League's Commission of Inquiry.

It occurs to me that this might be
linked with or be introduced by some special
mention of the League's choice of General
McCoy.


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SKH


SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



January 7, 1932.



May I suggest, for your consideration, the advisability of the Secretary's making an informal statement to the press in which he would express his gratification at the appointment of the Council's Commission of Inquiry, pay a fitting tribute to the character and qualifications of the newly appointed members, and point out again that the American Government had given its full approval to the resolution which provided for the Commission, and that he looked forward with confidence to the work of the Commission in facilitating the solution of the differences between China and Japan.

There are substantial reasons for making such a statement.

1. It would stress again - and it cannot be stressed too often - that it is a fundamental policy of the United States to give its strongest support to every effort to solve international differences by methods of conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement.

2. It would make a most favorable impression upon the large and influential element in our population which is intensely interested in the Manchuria situation, wishes a peaceful settlement, and is a little restless because our Government does not "do more". As representative leaders of this element I have in mind such men as Lowell, Garfield,

Nicholas

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JAN 14 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Nicholas Murray Butler, Shotwell and Ambassador Houghton.

3. It apparently would not disturb the isolation^{at}.

4. It would make a favorable impression in League circles, where there is a measure of opinion that our Government has not given as strong support to the League^{efforts} as might have been done.

5. It would complement the formal note of January 7.

Such a statement might be made in the near future -- possibly today at the press conference, when the Secretary, I understand, is to discuss the Commission -- or a few days later, after the Chinese and Japanese Governments have given their formal approval of the members of the Commission.

GHB
GHB/REK

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

RECEIVED
JAN 12 1932
DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 12, 1932

Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 12 1932

Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

54, January 12, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul at Mukden:

"January 11, 4 p. m.

Telegram No. 30. Headquarters report that Japanese
cavalry detachment yesterday was ambushed at Chinsi,
thirty miles southwest of Chihhsien, casualties one
colonel, three officers, fifteen soldiers killed, twenty
wounded. Punitive expedition consisting of one
regiment and one battalion sent from Chihhsien and Kaochia
station this morning."

JOHNSON

HPD

KLP

F/DEW

793.94/3487



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JAN 19 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY



F/DEW

Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Osborne, Counselor of
the British Embassy.

*793.94
note
741/94
✓*

Mr. Osborne came in to leave the attached
aide memoire covering the British position on our note to
China and Japan. Mr. Osborne says that he is very
much surprised and deeply disappointed that the British
Government did not follow our lead. I told him that
our action was taken to maintain in the future the rights
of American citizens in the Orient, that this action was,
of course, independent of what might be done by any other
Government, but that we had thought very likely the other
Governments might take similar action in the protection of
the rights of their own citizens.

File

793.94/3488

WRC


JAN 13 1932

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75



AIDE MEMOIRE



Sir John Simon fully understands

the action taken by the United States Government in addressing to the Chinese and Japanese Governments their note of January 7th. This action in substance corresponds with the feelings of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. At the same time the latter have felt that as a League Power their position is somewhat different in view of the explicit declaration made by the Japanese delegate to the Council of the League on October 13th, to the effect that Japan had no territorial ambitions in Manchuria and was the champion in Manchuria of the principle of equal opportunity and the open door for the economic activities of all nations.

Sir John Simon has therefore confined his action to saying to the Japanese Ambassador on January 8th that the effect of the recent Japanese action in Manchuria upon the "open door" was likely to be raised in Parliament as soon as it reassembled. Sir John Simon recalled the Japanese declaration of October 13th and a similar statement by the Japanese Prime Minister reported by Reuter's Agency on December 28th, and said that while His Majesty's Government had no reason to doubt these declarations, he would be glad if

the/

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

the Japanese Ambassador would communicate with his Government and obtain specific authority to confirm them. This would enable Sir John Simon to give a satisfactory answer in Parliament and would meet the situation on this point so far as His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were concerned.

Sir John Simon also suggested that the Japanese Government might consider making a satisfactory declaration at the meeting of the Council of the League on January 25th of their determination to respect the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty. The Ambassador expressed appreciation of both suggestions and promised to communicate them to Tokyo.


BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

11th January, 1932

1218


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 7 - 1932



SEH:

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

There was received in Washington yesterday a "flash" from Paris to the effect that the French Government was making representations to Japan on the basis of the Franco-Japanese Agreement of 1907.

The substance of the agreement referred to, as given in MACMURRAY (Volume I, page 640), is as follows:

"The Governments of Japan and France, being agreed to respect the independence and integrity of China, as well as the principle of equal treatment in that country for the commerce and subjects or citizens (i.e., ressortissants) of all nations, and having a special interest in having order and a pacific state of things guaranteed especially in the regions of the Chinese Empire adjacent to the territories where they have the rights of sovereignty, protection or occupation, engage to support each other for assuring the peace and security in those regions, with a view to maintaining the respective situation and the territorial rights of the two Contracting Parties in the Continent of Asia."

The text of the telegram from Paris referred to, as published in the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE this morning, (attributed to UP) and the text of a somewhat similar telegram from Paris (attributed to AP) but referring to the Nine Power Pact are attached hereto.

It is possible that the first telegram is the result of a confusion in the mind of the UP correspondent between the two treaties which are referred to as the possible basis of any further representations to Tokyo on the

Manchuria

F/DEW

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FILED

JAN 13 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Manchuria situation, which the press generally appear to know is in contemplation. It may also be possible that the telegram has some bearing upon the reported "understanding" between France and Japan relating to Japan's attitude toward China in Manchuria and France's attitude toward China in Yunnan.

RMM.
RSM:EJL

6/14

122

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE - January 7, 1932.

Paris Instructs Tokio Envoy

PARIS, Jan. 6 (UP).—The Foreign Office announced today that the French Ambassador at Tokio had been instructed "to point out to the Japanese government" certain clauses of the Franco-Japanese Treaty of 1905. Simultaneously the French, British and American Ambassadors will ask information on Japan's plans. The Foreign Office said.

French Expect Three-Power Move

PARIS, Jan. 6 (AP).—France is carrying on conversations with the United States and Great Britain with a view to taking further common action in Manchuria it was revealed today. The proposal under discussion, it was said, is to ask Japan to define just what she wants in Manchuria and to point out again certain clauses of the nine-power pact. No steps in this direction have been taken and there has been no decision to act, the reports said.


1221
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
January 13, 1932.

~~MMH:~~
~~SKH:~~
~~RSM:~~

Harbin transmits herewith a copy of a letter written by Mr. Charles A. Leonard, an American missionary, describing conditions at Tsitsihar during the latter part of November 1931. The most interesting information in this letter are references to the comparatively heavy losses of the Japanese in driving back General Ma and rumors that the Japanese killed their prisoners.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
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AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL


HARBIN CHINA, December 17, 1931.

JAN 12 32



CONDITIONS AT TSITSIHAR.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON



F/DEW

793.94/3490

SIR:

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2293, of even date, sent to the Legation on the subject of conditions at Tsitsihar, Heilungchiang Province, as seen by the Reverend C. A. Leonard.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

FILED
JAN 13 1932

1 enclosure as above indicated, with 1 sub-enclosure.

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TH/th

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2293

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, December 17, 1931

SUBJECT: CONDITIONS AT TSITSIKAR AS SEEN BY THE REV.
CHARLES A. LEONARD

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, as of possible
1/ interest to the Legation, a copy of a letter written by
Charles A. Leonard, an American missionary who was active
in relief work during the Russo-Chinese dispute two years
ago and who has secured several thousand dollars from the
local Chinese Chamber of Commerce to relieve the Chinese
wounded soldiers mentioned in his letter, which describes
conditions as he found them at Tsitsikar in the latter part
of November, 1931.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

Enclosure as indicated

Copies have been sent to the Department.

GCH/TLL

Tsitsihar, November 25, 1931.

The writer was asked by the Chinese Christian Relief Committee of Harbin, recently organized as the Harbin Christian Cross Society, to go to Tsitsihar to investigate the condition of Chinese wounded soldiers brought here from the battle between Japan and China in the Nonni River Bridge region and around Tsitsihar city. The Chinese Christians in Harbin were not sure that these soldiers were receiving proper attention since the departure of General Ma Chan Shan. Not being sure that any Chinese member of the Committee would be allowed to see the soldiers in the hospital here, and knowing that the writer, who is a member of the Harbin Cross Society, was coming up this way, they asked that we visit the wounded and report.

We find that there are now 130 wounded Chinese soldiers in the public hospital here. The Hospital is in charge of Dr. Ho Fu-chuan, a graduate of the Peking Union Medical College. Before the Japanese drove the Chinese army back and entered Tsitsihar city there were some 200 wounded soldiers in the Hospital but fearing they might be mistreated by the Japanese troops upon entering the city those soldiers who were able to leave the Hospital fled from the city.

Dr. Ho stated that he has sufficient funds for caring for the wounded for twenty days or a month. He is hoping that our Relief Committee will be able to find funds in Harbin at the end of that time to make it possible for him to continue his treatment of the patients. Such money as he has was given to him by General Ma when he left for the north. Now that General Ma is being persecuted by the Japanese and has been driven back far on the Manchurian plains to the northeast Dr. Ho states that he cannot expect any financial aid from him. The Tsitsihar Chamber of Commerce is having difficulty meeting claims that are made upon it because business has been practically at a standstill since the Japanese pressed the war into this region and have now taken the city. On day before yesterday, Nov. 23, the Chamber of Commerce was required by the Japanese authorities to furnish \$20,000 for the purchase of stoves and other equipment of buildings for the winter for the Japanese army, which has now taken charge of the city and all civil and military affairs. So it is not thought that the Chamber of Commerce will be able to furnish much for the care of the wounded Chinese soldiers here? The writer was asked to present to the Chinese relief organizations in Harbin the matter of assisting in providing for the wounded Chinese soldiers after money in hand has been expended, and we were asked to bring the money to Tsitsihar personally if possible on account of business between Tsitsihar and Harbin being so badly demoralized that it is not safe to try to send money through the banks at this time, especially when intended for wounded Chinese soldiers.

Dr. Ho is sleeping the wounded soldiers and other patients on the floor of eight or ten wards in order to conserve room space. He is afraid there will not be sufficient funds for fuel in this cold climate, so is in this way keeping down expenses by heating only a part of the Hospital.

The Chinese claim that they captured seventy Japanese during the fighting south of this city and that these were brought here to Tsitsihar, where they were relieved of their rifles and then

-turned-

- 2 -

turned over to the Japanese when the city was entered. We have never heard any statement, however, as to how many Chinese soldiers were captured by the Japanese. In questioning the wounded Chinese soldiers in the Hospital we made it a point in each ward to ask the question: "How many Chinese soldiers were captured by the Japanese and where did they take them?" The wounded soldiers invariably replied that all soldiers captured were killed on the spot by those who captured them. Some, they stated, were buried after captured and being shot or sabered. A man in the hospital spoke up and declared that the Japanese regarded General Ma's troops as bandits because they opposed him, and stated that an order was issued requiring that any Chinese captured in Chinese military uniform be shot.

These wounded soldiers in the Hospital stated that Chinese wounded on the battle field were shot or sabered by Japanese soldiers who came across them. It was stated that the Japanese soldiers would kick the wounded and if they showed any signs of life they were killed immediately. One man spoke up and stated that he had been kicked in the head, but that he was so badly wounded he did not have strength enough to move and was left on the field as dead. The same information was given by a number in each separate ward. We cannot vouch to the truth of these statements but give them as a part of our report of investigation. It is also claimed that some Japanese soldiers were also killed by the Chinese who captured them. As we looked upon the mangled bodies, some blown to pieces by bombs, others with their limbs gone, parts of their faces almost mass of wounds we were reminded of conditions in hospitals in France during the Great War there. This has been more than "an incident," and is a matter of more serious consequence than is known in other parts of the world.

It is stated that the Japanese are having their difficulties. The Chinese claim that more than 1,500 small boxes for the ashes of cremated Japanese soldiers have been made and have been used, a crematory having been built at Tsitsihar. It is stated that there is still considerable fighting northeast of here, at Tai An Chen, seventy English miles northeast of Tsitsihar, the Japanese being determined to pursue General Ma, as far as possible, and that an order for one thousand more boxes has just been given. They state that between 200 and 300 cavalymen fell into a trap during the heaviest of the fighting recently and were almost entirely wiped out. The commanding officer of this group escaped and is said to have wept bitter tears here at the loss of his men. More than a hundred Japanese soldiers have been brought in from the north the past few days with frozen feet and legs. The severe cold weather is being felt keenly by the Japanese, who come from a much warmer climate. The three thousand or more troops now north of the Chinese Eastern Railway must suffer great inconvenience if they are to fight on the plains these Chinese soldiers, who, though with less equipment and limited ammunition, are seasoned to the severe north Manchurian winters.

Chinese representatives of the Tsitsihar Chamber of Commerce, telegraph and telephone offices, the Tai-An Railway, electric light administration, etc., were invited to a meeting this week by the Japanese military authorities here and each was directed to sign a request that the Japanese appoint Japanese to assist in the management of these. They are having difficulty finding a

-Chinese-

- 3 -

Chinese who is willing to become head of the Heilungchiang autonomous (Japanese) government. They first tried General Yu Sheng Chang but he refused. Then they tried to persuade Liu Kuen Heng, who was educated in Japan, but so far he has refused, and is keeping himself secluded in the home of a friend. It is thought, however, that as soon as Ma Chan Shan is beaten sufficiently and Tsitsihar City is secure in the hands of the Japanese, then such military pressure will be brought to bear as at Mukden and Kirin and the Japanese will then be able to "persuade" someone to accept the position.

No one seems to know the whereabouts of Chang Hai Peng. The Japanese used him until he was unwilling to fight his Chinese brothers with the vigor desired by the Japanese, so he was dismissed and the Japanese went ahead with their advance to Tsitsihar and northeast. The Japanese should erect a monument to this notorious traitor, but it is claimed, he has been rejected by them and has joined the bandits. This we have not been able to verify.

General Ma Chan Shan when retreating was considerate enough not to use the trenches and railway embankment of the Chinese Eastern Railway at Anganghsi, which he had a right to do in order to protect the Railway, for policing of the same is in the hands of the Chinese, for thus he could have involved the Japanese with the Russian Soviet Government, for they certainly would have damaged the Railway. As he was forced to retreat northeast he could also have made an advantageous stand just outside Tsitsihar city but he did not do this in order to save the city from bombardment. As it was only a few bombs were dropped on the city.

Without the four army ~~tanks~~ tanks and a squadron of good airplanes the Japanese would not be able to whip General Ma and his men. Even with these powerful auxiliaries, superior rifles and plenty of ammunition the Japanese have had heavy losses. The fighting is on the plains. As the Japanese have taken the offensive all the way they have been at the disadvantage of having to make the advances and have been cut down in large numbers on several occasions.

The picturesque old city of Tai-an-chen, which means "The military port of peace," came into being several hundred years ago when the emperor of China sent a small force of Chinese soldiers with their families from far down at Peking to assist in protecting this part of the country from invaders from the north. It also lies far out on the Manchurian plains, Keshan, on further north, another apparent objective of the Japanese, is in some of the richest black-soil territory of Heilungchiang Province. That part of the province is also rich in gold and coal mines, and there are indications of oil in that region.

It is reported that the Japanese are not making much progress against General Ma in that region. Some claim that the four tanks have been captured by the Chinese. Four more bombing airplanes came from the south yesterday to join the squadron already here at Tsitsihar, and more Japanese forces have come from the south. It is thought that this means that a bombing raid will be made on the north forces of the Chinese. The weather is ideal and not extremely cold yet. Should a real North Manchuria

-blizzard-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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blizzard come the Japanese would be put at great disadvantage.

A group of Japanese officers and soldiers went to Anganghshai to-day. Their taking up of rooms there has brought apprehension to the inhabitants of that town.

One's heart is made to ache as he sees the distress, great disadvantage and loss of business among the Chinese as a result of this war by the Japanese. Everything in North Manchuria has been demoralized, and the people are losing millions of dollars as a result.

Before the Russian invasion in 1929 North Manchuria was the most prosperous section of China. There have been and still are bandits galore, but at that time these were gradually disappearing as the Chinese improved their governing powers. The Russian and Japanese invasions have done more than anything else to demoralize the country and encourage banditry, but in spite of banditry now and during previous years our observation has been that the Japanese throughout this region, over all of which the writer has traveled many times, have had the protection of the Chinese spite of the fact that they dealt almost entirely in opium, morphine and other narcotics.

Chas. A. Leonard

Tsitsihar, November 26, 1931.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 5290

RECD
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, December 17, 1931

COPIES SENT TO
GEN. AND M.I.D.

SUBJECT: THE HAILUANG PROVINCE GOVERNMENT

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 12 1932
HONORABLE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 12 1932
Department of State

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information
1/ of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2292, of even
date, sent to the Legation on the subject of negotiations
relative to the formation of a new provincial government
at Tsitsikar.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson
G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

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End

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JAN 20 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2202

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, December 17, 1931

SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS RELATIVE TO NEW HEILUNGHANG
GOVERNMENT.

The Honorable

Nelson Truax Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of December 11th, 1931, 3 P. M., reporting that a conference had been held by General Ma Chan Shan and General Chang Ching Hwei, the local Civil Administrator, at Sungpuehen, across the river from Harbin, on December 11th, and to report that on December 18th, Mr. Chao Shou Jen, who has been acting as a mediator between these two generals and who has been secretary of the former Tsitsihar government, called on me and informed me in regard to a meeting of General Ma with Colonel Itagaki at Hailun on December 7th and in regard to the conference referred to above. The gist of his remarks is stated below.

Colonel Itagaki's recent visit to Hailun was not desired by General Ma, and Mr. Chao advised the Japanese, who was General Renjo's representative, against the same, but Colonel Itagaki insisted upon making the journey. The train carrying the party of Japanese was stopped at Guihua, which is half way to Hailun on the railway. As the Japanese insisted upon proceeding, they were searched by the Chinese police and revolvers were taken from them. Colonel Itagaki and his

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-2-

two Japanese military assistants were separated from the rest of the party, the latter being put under Chinese military supervision. Only Colonel Itagaki and his two assistants were allowed to see General Ma. General Ma was informed that the object of the recent Japanese military movements was to secure complete cooperation between Japan and the Chinese authorities in Manchuria, that the Japanese military desired no more fighting with General Ma, with whom they desired to establish cooperation, and that they wanted General Ma to control the military affairs and General Chang Ching Hwei of Harbin to control the civil affairs in Heilungchiang Province. General Ma replied that as a military man he would obey the orders of the Nanking Government and that concerning civil affairs in Heilungchiang Province he would consult with General Chang.

On December 11th General Ma met General Chang at Sungpu, the terminal of the Huhai Railway. At this meeting General Ma informed General Chang that it would not serve the latter's personal interests nor those of China to establish a government at Tsitsihar. In regard to the recent mission to Tsitsihar of General Ying Hsua, the Assistant Chief of Police at Harbin, with the object of forming a provincial government in the former city, General Ma advised General Chang against it. However, he stated that he would not object to General Ying returning to Tsitsihar and helping maintain peace and order with the police force brought from Harbin provided the situation was allowed to continue as it is.

General Ma's present policy is to remain at Hailun and await the results of any action that might be taken by the Nanking Government and the League of Nations. He stated that he would not attack the Japanese troops unless the latter should again take the offensive against his troops.

-It is-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

It is well known that General Ma receives funds from other parts of China and from overseas Chinese. With these funds he probably will be able to support his troops, numbering about ten thousand, during the winter months. He is in no condition to fight the Japanese as he is very short of munitions. It is believed that General Chang Ching Hwei, despite urgings on the part of the Japanese, would rather remain as Civil Administrator at Harbin than to become a governor at Tsitsihar as long as General Ma with his troops controls the richest section of Heilungchiang Province.

Respectfully yours,

G. G. Hanson
American Consul General

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GCH/TLL

Copies have been sent to
The Department,
The Consulate General at Mukden.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 26 1931 CHINESE LEGATION
WASHINGTON

Department of State
JAN 12 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RELATIONS

December 26, 1931.

JAN 9 1932

F/LEW

793.94/3492

Dear Dr. Hornbeck:

793.74
For your information I enclose herewith
part of a letter which I received from a Chinese
student who attended the Eighth Conference on Inter-
national Relations at Riverside, California, in
which there was considerable discussion of the Man-
churian situation.

With best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

W. W. Brown

Enclosure:
Part of letter
as above.

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Far Eastern Division,
Department of State.

JAN 13 1932

FILED

It is a great relief to hear that you have finally arrived at Washington to take up the all-important diplomatic duties with the American Government.

I attended the Eighth Conference on International Relations at Riverside, California, December 13 to December 18, where the Manchurian Problem was discussed both at the round table and at the general sessions. I am on my way back to Berkeley. Inasmuch as there are bits of information of vital importance, I hasten to write this from the hotel here.

Mr. Chester Rowell, whom I presume you know, was at the Conference too. He had been one of the American delegates to the Conference on Pacific Relations at Shanghai in October and had been in close touch, so I understand, with the Nanking Government then. On his way back to America, he secured interviews with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He talked with Vice-Minister Shiratori (白鳥氏) and Mr. Nagai (長井松三) on the Manchurian situation. I presume he had already made report to the Nanking Government concerning these interviews and the policies of the Japanese Government as revealed therein. If so, you, no doubt, have also been informed of the same. From what I gathered from Mr. Rowell, there leaves no doubt that the policy of the Japanese Government (both the Military Group and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agree in that matter) is to establish a separate government of governments in Manchuria, which would be nominally Chinese but actually under Japanese control, or in other words, to turn Manchuria into a virtual Japanese protectorate. This is to be carried out through the following steps:

(1) Manchuria must be separated from China proper so that politically and diplomatically Japan can deal with the Manchurian Government without the annoying interference from the Nanking Government. The most effective way to bring that about is to overthrow the Nanking Government. Hence co-operation with Canton to oust Chiang Kai-Shek. Shiratori told Mr. Rowell that Japan "encourages" the Canton Government to overthrow Chiang and that Eugene Chen promised in return the "neutralization" of Manchuria. Now that Chiang has been overthrown, whether the Canton group will succeed in establishing itself in Chiang's stead as the Central Government is in grave doubt. With a China devoid of any Central Government, Japan can rightly declare to the world that the only way out for her is to negotiate with the Government of Manchuria.

(2) Chang Hsueh-Liang must be ousted from Manchuria. No trace of Chiang's military force or civil government shall remain in Manchuria. The drive toward Chinchow is therefore a predestined matter, although Japan has definitely pledged on paper that she will not take "initiative" in offense.

(3) Before Chang Hsueh-Liang's troops are definitely forced out of Chinchow, Japan is to reserve her liberty of military action under the formula of "driving against the bandits for the safety of Japanese lives and properties in Manchuria." Mr. Nagai admitted to Mr. Rowell that Japan would re-organize

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the bandits and scattered soldiers to look after the safety of Japanese lives and properties under a new Manchurian government rather than allow the ordered troops of Chang Hsueh-Liang to do the same.

(4) When a puppet government has been successfully established in Manchuria, Japan can calmly withdraw her troops to the "railway zone" in apparent conformity with the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations!

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 9, 1932.

Dear Dr. Yen:


I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of December 26, 1931, enclosing, for my information, a copy of a part of a letter, relating to the Manchuria situation, received by you from a Chinese student who attended the Eighth Conference on International Relations, held at Riverside, California, from December 13, to 16, 1931, which I have read with interest.

With kind wishes,

Yours sincerely,


Dr. W. W. Yen,
Chinese Minister,
Washington, D. C.

FE:RPB:EJL FE



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 DEC 17 1934
 Department of State

January 8, 1932.

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THE UNDER SECRETARY
 JAN 11 1932
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Chinese Minister
 Mr. Hornbeck.



Subject: Chinese Government's Inquiry,
Through Consul General Peck,
Regarding Calling a Conference
under the Nine-Power Treaty
(See Nanking's telegrams 4 and
5, January 8).

F/DEW
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In connection with the inquiry communicated by
 Consul General Peck on behalf of the Chinese Minister
 for Foreign Affairs, with regard to the possibility
 that this Government will call a conference under the
 Nine-Power Treaty; and, in connection with the Depart-
 ment's reply of January 8 (copies attached), Mr.
 Hornbeck asked the Chinese Minister to call.

The Minister repeated, with emphasis, expression
 of his gratification, expressed earlier in the day,
 over the American Government's note of January 7.

Mr. Hornbeck inquired whether the Minister had
 received anything from his Government on that subject.
 The Minister said that he had not.

Mr. Hornbeck then said that we had received an
 inquiry through Consul General Peck on behalf of the
 Chinese Foreign Minister: the Minister had inquired with
 regard to the possibility that the American Government
 intended

FILED
 JAN 13 1932

- 2 -

intended now to call a conference under the Nine-Power Treaty. He said that this Government did not desire to commit itself at this point, either affirmatively or negatively, with regard to intentions and steps contemplated for the future. We had just taken, as the Minister realized, a very important step. It would be desirable to watch developments. The Manchuria question is of very great importance, but many other questions and problems are on the world's calendar, compelling immediate attention. It would not seem that at this moment there was occasion or that it would be opportune under present circumstances to raise the question of calling a conference.

The Minister said that, immediately after the Secretary of State had informed him on January 7 of the contents of our note, he had telegraphed his Government reporting the facts and expressing his view that this action introduced a very helpful factor in the situation. He read the text of his telegram. He said that he had no doubt but that the inquiry of the Minister for Foreign Affairs had been made before receipt of his telegram. He said that, although he thought that the calling of a conference would be helpful, he realized that many factors, including that of timeliness, had to be given consideration. He said that he realized that

the

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

the Manchuria question had been the subject of a great deal of inter-communication among governments -- as was expressly provided for in Article 7 of the Nine-Power Treaty. He hoped, however, that serious thought would continue to be given to the advantages which might be derived from the holding of a conference expressly called ad hoc.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

MAM

TELEGRAM SENT

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

January 8, 1932

5 p.m.

AMERICAN CONSUL

NANKING (CHINA)

3

CONFIDENTIAL

Your 4, January 8, 2 p.m., and 5, January 8, 5 p.m.

This Government's note of January 7 envisages pro-
visions of all treaties by virtue of which the United
States has rights in and with regard to Manchuria. With-
out making any commitment, either affirmative or negative,
with regard to its future course of action, which course
will depend on developments, the Department perceives at
present no repeat no immediate occasion for calling a
conference and believes that it would not repeat not be
opportune under existing circumstances to propose that
step.

You may so inform Foreign Minister orally and De-
partment will so inform Chinese Minister here.

Repeat to Peiping as Department's No. 8.

STIMSON

FE:SKH:ZMF

REP

A portion of this
telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone.

NANKING

Dated January 8, 1932

Rec'd 5:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

4, January 8, 2 p. m.

Your No. 2, January 7, noon.

I delivered the note to the Chinese Minister of Foreign
Affairs at 1 p. m. After reading it he said he would
reply in due course. (END GRAY).

Two. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me
that the Chinese Government has determined upon the follow-
ing steps which will be taken "almost immediately":
(first), to break off diplomatic relations with Japan.
(second), to address the League of Nations invoking against
Japan the economic sanctions provided for in Article 16
of the Covenant. In reply to a question he added that the
second step would necessarily involve an earlier meeting
of the League Council.

Repeated to Legation.

PECK

WSB

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Nanking

Dated January 8, 1932

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

URGENT.

5, January 8, 5 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My No. 4, January 8, 2 p.m.

At 4 p.m. the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me in haste and informed me that after studying the communication which I had handed to him at 1 p.m. the Chinese Government had decided to hold in abeyance temporarily the severing of relations and the appeal to the League. The reason for this was that the Chinese Government wished to investigate the possibility that the communication addressed by the American Government to China and Japan might accomplish the same which the Chinese Government had sought to achieve by those measures. Mr. Chen said that although the note referred by name only to the Pact of Paris nevertheless its text would indicate that it was based also on the Nine Power Treaty on principles and policies and he inquired whether I could inform him whether the American Government

in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#5 from Nanking, January 8, 1938

in drafting its communication had that treaty in mind as well as the Pact of Paris. He also inquired whether the American Government had any intention to convene a conference of the signatories of the said treaty or failing that what the attitude of the American Government would be toward a request by China that such a conference be convened. I told Mr. Chen that I had no information on these points and suggested that he might desire to instruct the Chinese Minister in Washington to approach the Secretary of State. He replied that in view of the important decisions at stake his Government earnestly desired to obtain the information described above at the earliest possible moment and he requested that I telegraph direct to which I then assented. He said that it was his wish that I keep in close contact with my British colleague on this matter.

Repeated to the Legation.

PECK


WSB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

1.6.32

~~SIX-~~

JEF suggests the
 attached reply to
 Mr. Lancaster, which
 answers the question
 he asks in the final
 paragraph without
 attempting to answer
 any questions which
 he does not ask.



Notes J. R. [Signature]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 8, 1932.

Dear Mr. Lancaster:

I have your letter of January 4, 1932, and wish to thank you for the information contained therein, concerning which the Department has from time to time been receiving reports from various sources.

The inquiry which you raise in the last paragraph of your letter is a rather large one and I am afraid that I am not in a position to furnish you with a copy of any particular document such as you request. As of possible assistance to you in studying the question of Japan's rights in Manchuria, and incidentally in Mukden, I should suggest that you consult either or both of the two reference works referred to below:

1. "Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China" by John V. A. MacMurray, published by the Oxford University Press, New York, in 1921. See index under "Manchuria", "Railways", and "Mukden".

2.

Mr. William W. Lancaster,
55 Wall Street,
New York, New York.

793.94/3493

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

2. "Manchuria, Treaties and Agreements",
published by the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace in 1921 as Pamphlet No. 44.

Yours sincerely,

Stanley K. H. H.

Mr. Lancaster:

I would suggest also that you consult C. Walter
Young's JAPANESE JURISDICTION IN THE SOUTH MANCHURIA
RAILWAY AREAS; JAPAN'S SPECIAL POSITION IN MANCHURIA;
and THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF THE KWANTUNG
LEASED TERRITORY.


S.K.H.

OK ✓
Jan. 12 1982.

JEJ/VDM

[Signature]

Wam



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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 8, 1932.

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Conversation.



Mr. Thaddeus Zazulinski, Secretary of
Polish Embassy,

Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton.

F/DEW

793.94

Mr. Zazulinski called and was received by Mr. Hamilton. He stated that the Polish Government was of course interested in anything that had a bearing on Russia and that, as events in Manchuria had possible Russian repercussions, Mr. Zazulinski wondered whether Mr. Hamilton could give him any background information with regard to the identic note sent by Secretary Stimson on January 7 to China and Japan. Mr. Zazulinski stated that he was particularly interested in the motives that prompted the Secretary to send such a note and in the objectives that the Secretary desired to attain by sending the note.

Mr. Hamilton replied that he was not in position to answer and consulted Mr. Hornbeck, who spoke briefly to Mr. Zazulinski. Mr. Hornbeck stated that he thought that the Polish Ambassador should ask the Secretary of State the questions propounded by Mr. Zazulinski, as these questions involved matters of high policy. Mr. Hornbeck stated, speaking broadly, the general motive behind the sending of the identic note was the desire to exert more effective pressure coupled with a desire to give notice of a general reservation of all

American

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FILED
JAN 13 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

American rights that were being and might be affected by
the present situation.

Mr. Zazulinski expressed his thanks for the information
given him by Mr. Hornbeck.

MMH/REK

12/11/75

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 13, 1932

Rec'd 4:30 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

58, January 13, 10 a. m.

Following from Reuter, Peiping, January eleventh:

"The following comments on the American note regarding Manchuria have been made by Dr. Wellington Koo: The American note addressed to China and Japan is obviously intended to define the attitude of the United States towards the march of events in Manchuria since September. I hope it will have the effect of calling a halt to the relentless pursuit of a policy of aggression on the part of Japan and defiance of all her treaty obligations. It is a statesmanlike move, characteristic of a great peace loving nation which has been a sponsor of the Anti-War Pact and founder of the policy of the 'open door' and that of upholding the sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China, policies which find their solemn confirmation in the Nine Power Treaty to which Japan is likewise a party. The warlike activities of the Japanese army which now cover the whole extent of Manchuria have

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JAN 14 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP


2- #58, from Peiping, Jan. 13, 10 a.m.

have made a mockery of all of the instruments and instrumentalities of peace and cast a gloom over the international horizon. In the new note of the United States one sees a ray of light, and hope that the international treaties solemnly entered into for the purpose of outlawing war and maintaining peace may yet carry some weight in the comity of civilized nations, and that their wilful violations by a militaristic nation cannot forever be condoned. I believe it is the more likely to produce a wholesome effect because it is inspired by a spirit of frank and friendly counsel and though defending some great principles of international intercourse, it is couched in calm and courteous language."

JOHNSON

JS

1251
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



My dear Castle,
I am extremely
sorry, to disturb you even in
your private house but as you
were kind enough to allow me
to do so, I enclose a "note verbal"
drawn up in accordance with
instructions just received—

As

As my Government
intends to publish the note
to-morrow, I am anxious to
have it reach you before you
read the contents in the papers.
I suppose our Foreign Office
has miscalculated the time
which I would have to take
the note to you in the State
Department.

With many thanks

for your kindness, I am,

yours sincerely

J. H. R. Rogers

Washington, January 12th 1932.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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RECEIVED

JAN 13 1932

NOTE VERBALE. SECRETARY'S OFFICE



Nº. 166.

*Letter to my house Jan 12, 7.30 p.m.
by the Netherlands Minister
Willy*

The Netherland Minister has not failed to com-

municate to his Government the contents of the note re-
mitted to him by the Secretary of State on January seventh
which note was sent by the Department of State to the
Republican Chinese and Imperial Japanese Governments.

In reply thereto the Netherland Minister has
been instructed to present to the Secretary of State the
thanks of the Netherland Government for that communication.

The Netherland Government shares the confidence
expressed by the American Government that the neutral
commission will facilitate the solution of the difficulties
in Manchuria. The Netherland Government considers that it
would be in the common interest of the whole world, which,
shaken by the most severe and prolonged crisis, needs more
than ever good international relations, if a friendly
settlement between China and Japan were reached at an
earliest possible date.

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JAN 16 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

As far as principles are concerned, which have moved the American Government to address itself to China and Japan, it seems scarcely necessary to say, that they are a matter of the liveliest interest to the Netherland Government.

The United States Government has suggested that the latter might consider to take a similar action. The Netherland Government doubts whether this procedure would be expedient in the circumstances. The Chinese and Japanese Governments have replied to the American note and therefore their points of view have already been stated. Moreover the Netherlands as a member of the League of Nations must bear in mind that the Council of the League, in warmly welcomed cooperation with the United States, is doing its utmost and will doubtless continue to try to prevent unfavorable developments and to contribute to an acceptable solution of the difficulties.

Washington, D.C.,

12 January 1932.

125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated January 13, 1932

Rec'd 9:15 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 13 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND

Secretary of State,
Washington.

January 13, 1 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 13, 3 p. m. Approximately 350 Japanese troops entrained at Tientsin this morning for Suichung. Japanese military authorities state that movement is not designed to reenforce troops in that area but because of improved situation in Tientsin-Peiping area. It is possible, however, that movement has some relation to enclosing on Jehol from Chinchow which appears to have already started. Repeated to the Department."

LOCKHART

RR

WSB

F/DEW

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note
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FILED
JAN 13 1932

1256

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 19 1932.

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:


The Department encloses for your information and for transmission to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, for his very discreet use, confidential as to source, a summary of certain telegrams received by the Department bearing on the Manchuria situation. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in these messages.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
Summary of telegrams
(in duplicate).



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Jan. 18 1932.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Digest of Information from American Official
 Sources in Regard to the Manchuria Situation,
 received from January 8 to January 13, 1932,
 inclusive.

The Military Attache at Peiping reports that he has received reliable information that the Japanese military reported taking control of Shanhaikwan on January 7.

The American Military Attache at Tokyo reports that the Chinese troops retreated from Chinchow to the Shanhaikwan, Lanchow and Tangshan area, except the Third Cavalry Brigade, which went to Jehol Province, and that Shanhaikwan was occupied by Japanese troops from Tientsin.

Lieutenant Brown, U.S.A., reports from Mukden ³⁴⁶⁴ that Japanese forces totaling approximately fifteen thousand occupy the railroad from Mukden to Shanhaikwan; that the Peipiao-Chinchow railway line is being cleared and, although the intention to occupy Jehol is emphatically denied, the large scale impressment of animal transport presages either that or the possibility of extensive anti-bandit campaigns by the Japanese.

The Consul General at Harbin ³⁴⁶² reports that information obtained from a reliable private source indicates that Soviet officials are nearly all prepared for war with Japan and that military supplies are being accumulated.

The American Consul General at Harbin ³⁴⁷² reports that General Chang Ching-hui has announced that on January 3 he took over the control of all military and civil affairs in Heilungkiang Province with the title of Shengchang (Provincial Governor), and that he notified the Chinese Government orally in Mukden, Kirin and Harbin, only. The Consul

General

- 2 -

General comments that General Ma will probably serve under General Chang as Commander of the provincial military forces.

Lieutenant Aldrich, U.S.A., on January 9/³⁴⁷⁹ reports from Shanhaikwan that there is no evidence of Japanese intention of occupying Shanhaikwan in the immediate future; that Japanese in Shanhaikwan number about three hundred and the nearest brigade headquarters is at Suichung, thirty miles distant; that the Japanese Commander in Chief at Shanhaikwan informed him (apparently on January 10) that the area was quiet and that the Japanese had no intention of occupying Shanhaikwan as their objective had been reached.


Lieutenant Brown, U.S.A., reports from Mukden (apparently on January 11)/³⁴⁷⁶ that the Peiping-Mukden Railway was occupied (by Japanese) to Shanhaikwan; that the Japanese have appointed a new manager for the north half of the line; that on January 9 a Japanese officer stated that the Japanese General Staff is now prepared for the Soviets and that troop movements north confirm this; and that on January 10 General Semenov (former Cossack officer and "white" Russian leader) was in Mukden conferring with Japanese and Mongols.

The American Consul General at Tientsin/³⁴⁹⁸ reports that approximately three hundred and fifty Japanese troops entrained at Tientsin on January 13 for Suichung; that the Japanese military authorities stated that the movement was not designed to reinforce troops in that area but was due to the improved situation in the Tientsin-Peiping area; and that it is possible that the movement has some relation to enclosing on Jehol from Chinchow.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY



Memorandum of conversation with the Italian Ambassador
January 7.

The Italian Ambassador came to see me immediately after seeing the Secretary, in a very cheerful frame of mind because the Secretary had given him a copy of our note to Japan and China. I impressed upon him the fact that, as he quite knew, we were not taking any joint action with Great Britain and France such as he had feared, but that we were taking instead independent action which we very much hoped the various signatories to the Nine Power Treaty would find worth copying.

W. R. Castle, Jr.


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JAN 14 1932


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY



January 8, 1932.



Memorandum of conversation with the German Ambassador,
January 7.



The German Ambassador came in to ask what the
could tell him about the Manchurian situation. Although
the Germans are not a signatory of the Nine Power Treaty,
I told the Ambassador in general what we were doing. He
seemed pleased that the United States was taking this at-
titude and said he hoped the other signatories of the treaty
will cooperate with us.

WRC
W. R. Castle, Jr.

U WRC/AB

JAN 14 1932

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
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

RADIOGRAM



Received at the War Department.

January 9, 1932.

9:30 A. M.

From M. A. Peiping

To The Adjutant General .

CONFIDENTIAL

1422 NPG

Number 319.

Upon Minister's request and due to sensitiveness of area am
sending Lieut. Aldrich Shanhaikwan tonight.

Margetts.

JJ

DCR

SLC

F/DEW

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JAN 13 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 13, 1932

Rec'd 1:45 p. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 JAN 13 1932
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND

Secretary of State,

Washington.

61, January 13, 2 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"January 11, 2 p. m.

Local Chinese officials and press state that yesterday at 2 p. m. a Japanese airplane dropped bombs into Pinhsien where meeting of representatives from districts not under control of Hsi Chia was taking place and that some casualties and damage resulted. Report confirmed by an American missionary who sent Chinese doctor to treat wounded, but Ohashi informed me that the Japanese military mission here stated that it had received no report of such bombing."

"January 12, 6 p. m.

Chinese officials state that Yushu was bombed by a Japanese airplane on the 9th, and Wutaitzu village near Yushu and Wuchang on the 10th."

JOHNSON

HFD
 KLP

F/DEW


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JAN 13 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

FROM

Peiping

Dated January 13, 1932

Rec'd 12:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

65, January 13, 6 p.m.


The newspapers indicate that General McCoy has agreed

to serve on the committee which the League is sending to
Manchuria to make an investigation. I desire to place in
the hands of the Department the following appreciation of
the situation for such use as the Department cares to make
of it.

The Japanese by force of arms have now occupied all
important places in Manchuria and are in control of all
means of communications. They have also obtained control
over the administration of Manchuria which is being main-
tained through Chinese organizations almost completely in
the hands of Japanese advisers. So far as I know there is
no communication between authorities in China south of
the Wall and authorities in Manchuria. It is still uncer-
tain whether the Japanese will push their line as far west
as Jehol. To all intents and purposes Manchuria, from

Shanhaikwan

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F / DEW

793.94/3503

FILED

JAN 22 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#65 from Peiping, January 13,
 1932

Shanhaikwan to Tsitsihar, and from Tsitsihar to Harbin, and from Harbin to Tumen, and the area bounded by these places, is as separated from China and Chinese control as is Formosa.

This occupation began on September 18th when the Japanese announced that it was necessary to obtain a settlement of outstanding questions with China and to secure protection for Japanese interests and property.

I am more and more convinced that Japanese activities in Manchuria must be viewed in the light of Russo-Japanese relations rather than Sino-Japanese relations. It would appear that the Japanese Government made a careful survey of conditions in China last summer and reached the conclusion that China was disintegrating, that Chinese leadership was losing its prestige, and that the Kuomentang was no longer powerful. The Japanese Government apparently believed that Chang Hsueh Liang would not receive support from the Government south of the Wall if attacked. With this knowledge and the belief that the powers were preoccupied with domestic troubles due to world-wide depression and that Soviet Russia was in no position to take action,

the

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#65 from Peiping, January 13,
1932.

the higher military authorities of Japan concluded that it was their opportunity to act in Manchuria and push Japan's strategic boundary further west in preparation for the clash with Soviet Russia which they considered inevitable.

I am convinced there can be no settlement of the questions which have arisen in Manchuria that does not take into consideration the interests of China, Russia and Japan. China is too weak to maintain her sovereignty in Manchuria and is unable to maintain, as between Russia and Japan, the neutrality of Manchuria which lies between these two countries, both vitally interested in that area. No solution which does not take into consideration the interests of all three can be permanent. Unfortunately there is no Government in China or group of leaders willing to face these problems honestly and take responsibility for their settlement for, being unable to maintain her position in Manchuria by force, China would have to accept a settlement which must impair her sovereignty there.

Nothing short of outside force or an economic collapse at home will persuade Japan to retire from her present position

126F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-#65 from Peiping, January 13,
1932.

position it is my conviction.

It seems to me that the above considerations must be taken into account in connection with any investigation by the commission which is about to visit Manchuria or when considering the advisability of calling a conference under the Nine Power Treaty for the purpose of finding a settlement of the Manchurian problem.

JOHNSON

WSB-HPD

126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 13 1932

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6, January 13, 6 p. m.



CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94

The Italian press has published extensive accounts of the note on the Manchurian situation delivered to the Japanese Government by the American Ambassador at Tokyo on January 8th together with the comments thereon in the foreign papers but up to the present no editorial comment has appeared here. From informal conversations with Foreign Office officials I have been given to understand that, although the Italian Government is naturally desirous of following the example of the United States in this matter, there is a feeling that the Italian position is similar to that of British Government which it is understood considers that the undertakings to maintain the "open door" already given by Japan at Geneva render any formal action unnecessary. It is expected that a decision as to Italy's action in this regard will be reached shortly and that it will be immediately communicated to de Martino in Washington.

CSB - HPD

KIRK



F/DEW 793.94/3504

FILED

JAN 21 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1268

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Nanking

Dated January 13, 1932

Rec'd 2 p.m.

FROM

JAN 13 1932

DIVISION OF

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Secretary of State,

Washington

10, January 13, 7 p.m.

Your number 2, January 7, noon.

One. Following is translation of note addressed to the American Minister, dated January 12, but handed to me January 13, 11 a.m.:

"Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of January 8, 1932, stating that the recent military operations about Chinchow have destroyed the last remaining administrative authority of the Republic of China in South Manchuria as it existed before September 18, 1931; that the American Government of is still confident that the neutral committee/investigation of recently appointed by the Council/the League of Nations will facilitate the final solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan; but that the American Government in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations deems that it is its duty to make

the

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 13 1932
Department of State

F/DEW 793.94/3505

FILED

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#10 from Nanking, January 13,
 1932

the following notification to the Governments of China and Japan: that is, that the American Government can not recognize as legal any situation de facto and that it does not intend to recognize any treaty or agreement concluded by the Chinese and Japanese Governments or their representatives which may impair treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, or which may impair the sovereignty, the independence or the territorial and administrative integrity of China or which may violate the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy; and also that the American Government does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means violative of the Pact against War signed by China, Japan and the United States at Paris on August 27, 1928.

It is amply evident that the American Government takes the most serious view of the lawless acts of the Japanese military forces in the ^{Three} Eastern Provinces and that it upholds, also, the dignity of international covenants and of the Pact against War. The Chinese Government from the time that the present events in the Northeast began on September 18th, 1931,

1 2 7
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#10 from Nanking, January 13,
1932

1931, and up to the present day, has in every respect fulfilled its duties as prescribed in the Pact against War and the Chinese Government therefore has taken no steps of any nature whatever calculated to aggravate the situation but has, in accordance with procedures set forth in existing international covenants, asked that the signatory powers direct their special attention to these events.

The Japanese military forces, on the contrary, following the adoption of the resolution of the League of Nations of September 30th, 1931, and the meeting of the Council on October 24, 1931, have still continuously extended the field of their invasions and even after the passing of the League's resolution of December 10, 1931, have openly invaded and seized Chinchow, the seat of the Chinese local government. More recently Japan has occupied Suichung ^{advanced on} and Shanhaikuan and has increased the numbers of Japanese naval vessels and troops at Chingwantao, Tientsin and other places. In addition to this there are indications of an intention to attack Jehol. These violations of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact against War and this disregard of the repeated decisions

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-#10 from Nanking, January 13,
1932

decisions of the League are facts which it has not been possible to conceal. The Japanese Government, therefore, must bear full responsibility for all the events involved.

With reference to the notification of Your Excellency's Government that in this matter it does not recognize as legal any situation de facto, I have the honor to state that the Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged with the Japanese Government, the gravest protests against the various invasions and lawless acts perpetuated by the Japanese troops since September 18, 1931, and has made it known internationally that the Chinese Government accords them no recognition whatsoever. ~~This is all matter of record.~~

With regard to the treaties or agreements referred to in the note under reply, I have the honor to state that the Chinese Government, basing its position on its sovereignty and independence and on the principle of territorial and administrative integrity has absolutely no intention of concluding any treaties or agreements of the categories described.

It is the sincere hope of the Chinese Government that Your Excellency's Government will continue to promote the effectiveness

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quitsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

5-#10 from Nanking, January 18,
1932

effectiveness of international covenants in order that their
dignity:: may be conserved.

I have the honor to bring the above to the attention
of Your Excellency and to express the hope that you will
transmit it to Your Excellency's Government for its infor-
mation and action. Seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
signed Chen Yu Jen (Eugene Chen).

Two. The Chinese Foreign Office states that Chinese
text of this note has been telegraphed to the Chinese Lega-
tion in Washington but without instructions to deliver to
the Department. I suggested that Foreign Office supply
English translation as has often been done under similar
circumstances but was informed that the absence of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs made this impossible. It was
added that possibly an English translation would be tele-
graphed to the Chinese Legation. I understand that the
Minister of Foreign Affairs will return from Shanghai today.

Three. Owing to the instructions for early transmission
no Chinese translation was sent with the Department's note
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs which was contrary to

the

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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6-#10 from Nanking, January 13,
1932.

the usual ^{*practice*} ~~(#)~~ of the American Legation. I have attempted to make a literal translation of the reply and I invite attention of the Department to the slight misquotation of the Department's note which is to be found in that portion of the translation beginning "which may impair ~~the~~ treaty rights" and ending "or which may impair the sovereignty".

Four. The Chinese Foreign Office informs me that the Chinese text of this note will be released after probable time of its receipt by the Department.

Repeated to the Legation.

PECK



(#) apparent omission

WSB-KLP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quigley NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



PLAIN

PEIPING

Dated January 13, 1932

Rec'd 8:03 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

62, January 13, 3 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, January twelfth,

"The Soviet Ambassador visited the Japanese Premier Mr. Inukai this morning and expressed anxiety regarding the reports of a possible conflict in North Manchuria between General Ting Chow, Commander of the Chinese railways guards at Harbin, and Hsia, Governor of Kirin Province.

Apparently believing that Japan is able to control the actions of these two 'Chinese paladins', Monsieur Troianostsky, the Ambassador, is understood to have expressed a hope that as the conflict was liable to jeopardize Soviet interests Japan would do her best to prevent it.

It is understood that questions connected with the lumber trade, fisheries and long term credits were also discussed".

JOHNSON

OX



F/DEW

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JAN 20 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM
RECEIVED

Peiping via N.R.

JAN 14 1932

Dated January 13, 1932

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND

Rec'd 11 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

64, January 13, 5 p.m.

Following from American Consul/General at Nanking:

"One. Eugene Chen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, went to Shanghai January 11, 11 a.m. and Yeh Kung Cho, Minister of Railways, January 11, 11 p.m. Yesterday afternoon Yeh informed W. H. Donald that Sun Fo, Eugene Chen and other members of the Government, now in Shanghai, are desperately attempting to devise some way to cope with the dangers threatening China and seem prepared to adopt any course of action no matter how "radical", such as begging for assistance from the Soviet Government. At the railway station Yeh confirmed this to me.

Two. The present Government has the double task of protecting the nation from the Japanese invasion and of maintaining its own existence. The Chinese seem to be convinced that the Japanese under the domination of the military

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 14 1932
Department of State

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#64 from Peiping via N.R.,
January 13, 1932.

military party are now actually pushing their forces into
Jehol and into the Tientsin area with Shantung as their
goal. They seem to realize that war would certainly be
disastrous and would only facilitate the Japanese conquest.

(END PART ONE)

JOHNSON

KLP-WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED

Peiping

JAN 14 1932

Dated January 13, 1932

DIVISION OF

FROM

Recd 11:15 p.m.

COMMUNICATIONS AND

Secretary of State

Washington.

64, January 13, 5 p.m. (PART TWO)

they profess entire disbelief in Japanese promises of withdrawal from Manchuria and elsewhere. Internally the government is confronted with maturing obligations incurred by the previous regime mainly for the support of military forces in the provinces. Having demanded and achieved the elimination of Chiang Kai Shek from the government they now realize their inability to do without him. High dignitaries have been sent to implore Chiang, Wang Ching Wei and Hu Han Min to take up their posts. Several hundred Nanking students left Nanking last night for Shanghai with the same object in cars supplied gratis. It is difficult to ^{SEE} ~~select~~ what material improvement in the Manchurian situation could be made by the three leaders who are now absent but Chinese popular opinion seems to be that their participation in the government would counteract the separatist tendency prevalent throughout China. The feeling is that owing to economic destitution and communist intrigue complete chaos will ensue unless this tendency is checked. (END PART TWO)


JOHNSON

JS

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib



FROM

GRAY

Peiping

Dated January 13, 1932.

Recd 11:24 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

64, January 13, 5 p.m. (PART THREE)

In the face of these forebodings the only discernible ground for optimism is the inherent stability of the Chinese race which quality has enabled the nation to reestablish itself after similar crises in the past.


Three. In regard to Chang Hsueh Lian the indications are that whereas the former regime had a sympathetic understanding with him the present government has attempted to remove him but is now powerless to do so and will soon be begging for his assistance.

Four. The identic note of January 7 has aroused among the Chinese gratitude for the friendship displayed but there is slight expectation that the aggressive policy attributed to Japan will be checked by the note." (END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON.

JS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
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Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY AFTERNOON, JAN. 7, 1932

At the press conference at 4:00 o'clock this afternoon, Secretary Stimson read to the correspondents the following note which was sent to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government through the American Ambassador at Tokyo and the American Minister in Peiping, respectively:

"With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties."

The Secretary then said the news report which was flashed from the Department this afternoon by one of the press associations to the effect that this Government had invoked the Nine-Power Pact was not accurate. The above note is an invocation of the rights of the United States and its citizens under the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris. The Secretary here said that his remarks were NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION OR QUOTATION AND WERE FOR BACKGROUND ONLY. Hitherto, we have been engaged in efforts of conciliation to endeavor to stop the outbreak of a state of war. In order to accomplish that conciliation a commission has been established by the resolution of the League of

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Nations of December 10. It presumably will continue the work of fact-finding and of investigation, which goes with conciliation.

In view of the unsettled condition in Manchuria, this Government deems that it is necessary and most appropriate that attention should be called to the rights of the United States and its citizens, and that is what the above note does. After the note had been sent, the representatives of the other eight powers, signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty, were called in as a matter of courtesy and informed of what this Government had done. Those meetings took place this morning after the above mentioned note had been sent.

FOR ATTRIBUTION TO THE DEPARTMENT BUT NOT FOR QUOTATION, the Secretary said that, in the first place, of course, we have no desire to question Japan's legitimate treaty rights in Manchuria. We do not intend to interfere with them in the slightest degree. In the second place, we have no desire to intrude ourselves into any settlement which Japan and China may make of their present unhappy difficulties, with the exception of the following:

First, that nothing in that settlement must impair our rights and the rights of our citizens in China as set out in the open door policy and in the Nine-Power Treaty, which embodied the open door policy;

Second, that that settlement should not be achieved by a violation of the methods agreed to in the Kellogg Pact.

The Secretary then continued, FOR BACKGROUND AND NOT FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION, by saying that he desired to recall to the minds of the correspondents what is meant by the "open door policy." Mr. Stimson here paused to say that it was understood that nothing contained in this press conference could be released before tomorrow's newspapers. The policy of the open door was begun by John Hay in 1899 or 1900. At that time Japan

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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had concluded a war with China and had received as a result of that war Port Arthur and certain rights in Southern Manchuria. Three powers then got together and took those away from Japan and gave them to Russia. The Secretary said that, if he remembered correctly, the powers were France, Germany and Russia. Russia then occupied that part of the Orient, France had quite recently before that time occupied Indo-China, the British had taken Weihaiwei, and Germany had commuted the lives of some German missionaries into Tsingtao, and China was popularly said to have been dismembered and broken up and she appeared to be quite helpless to protect herself. John Hay stepped in and obtained an informal agreement between the great powers of the world that they would not dismember China further and that all nations should share the privilege of commerce with China without discrimination. That was known as the policy of the open door, and it was next in importance in the policies of this country to the Monroe Doctrine, and it has been strongly emphasized ever since until in 1922 it was embodied in the Nine-Power Treaty agreed to by the United States, Japan, China, Great Britain, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal and Italy. It is, therefore, one of the most important policies of this country and one in which our governments and our citizens are deeply interested. It is of vital importance to the future because, as everyone knows, or ought to know, the development of the Orient is going to be undoubtedly the great development of the coming century. Our trade with the Orient quadrupled in the first eight or nine years after the Great War. Our trade with the Orient has increased much more rapidly than in other parts of the world and is still doing so. Last year our trade with the Orient increased six per cent, according to the statement of the National Foreign Trade Council of January 3, 1932, while everyone knows what has happened to our trade with Europe. The preservation of the integrity of China and the

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preservation of equal rights among the nations of the world in the commerce of China without discrimination is the key-stone of that future development and it has been this country which initiated it and has stood for it.

The first part of the above mentioned note down to the phrase, "commonly known as the open door policy," is related to that, and the last five lines of the note relate to the Pact of Paris, which is an entirely different kind of treaty. That is a treaty which does not give individual rights of trade, or material rights, so to speak, but it is an attempt to establish a method of peaceful solution of difficulties which the whole world will develop and while our action under the first part of it is of comparatively old and well-understood method of vindicating the personal rights of the nations and citizens under a treaty which gives such rights, the statement in the last five lines is of a different nature and is a more novel and interesting step in that it is new. In order to refresh the minds of the correspondents as to what that means, the Secretary read the joint statement of President Hoover and Prime Minister MacDonald issued at the Rapidan about two years ago:

"In signing the Paris Peace Pact, fifty-six nations have declared that war shall not be used as an instrument of national policy. We have agreed that all disputes shall be settled by pacific means." Then follows the following lines which the Secretary desired to bring to the attention of the correspondents as being the thought embodied in the above quoted note:

"Both our governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact, not only as a declaration of good intentions, but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge."

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ALSO FOR BACKGROUND, the Secretary recalled the tangled situation which we have been dealing with for four months and how earnestly we have labored to keep acrimony out of the situation and to be clear and firm without being in the least degree truculent. That is very important now in the treatment of the above mentioned note and that is the intention of the writer of the note. Mr. Stimson continued by saying that he wanted to call the attention of the correspondents to the fact that in sending this note, so far as the open door policy is concerned, we are following the precedent of a note which this Government delivered to China and Japan on May 13, 1915, at the time when Japan had made the so-called twenty-one demands on China and had enforced those demands by an ultimatum. The twenty-one demands were delivered in January, 1915, and on May 13 of the same year this Government, under President Wilson and Secretary Bryan, gave a note very much like the present one to both of those countries. Mr. Stimson then read the following from the note of May 13, 1915:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy."

The twenty-one demands were partly that Japan was claiming certain rights and certain railroads and occupations of Shantung and also covered certain claims of Japan in regard to Manchuria and certain other claims which this Government evidently thought jeopardized the open door policy. This Government made that protest in 1915 and a long time intervened, because of the World War, but the force of public opinion which rallied around the effort made by this Government resulted in 1921, five years

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later, at the time of the Washington Naval Conference, in the evacuation of Shantung by Japan and the settlement of other controversies. At that time Mr. Hughes, who participated in those transactions, spoke of the note of May 13, 1915 in the following language:

"That statement was in accord with the historic policy of the United States in its relation to China and its position as thus stated has been and still is consistently maintained."

In sending the above note today, our Government is maintaining that policy in regard to China with the same consistency and attempting to do it in the same temper of fair firmness and dignity that was done and has been done ever since John Hay originated the policy. The present situation is a very delicate one. Manchuria, as so many writers have said very truthfully, is the danger spot of the Far East. It is the place where three great races or three great nations all have rights which impact upon each other within the same area of Manchuria, and it is a place where all the other nations of the world, particularly the Nine-Power nations, have rights of commerce entered into under that Nine-Power Treaty. That Treaty is not limited to the nine original powers that framed it and it was open to adherence by any other nations that chose to do so. Five other nations later adhered to the Nine-Power Treaty.

A correspondent here asked if the note was given to Ambassador Debuchi. Mr. Stimson replied that the note was sent direct to Tokyo and Nanking but that copies of it were given to Ambassador Debuchi of Japan and the new Chinese Minister, Dr. Yen. A correspondent here asked if the other signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty were taking or had taken similar action or if they contemplated taking similar action. In reply, the Secretary said that he also called in the representatives of the other six powers, signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty, and

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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gave each a copy of today's note. The Secretary has not yet had time to call in the representatives of the other five powers which adhered later to the Nine-Power Treaty and to give them copies of the note. Referring to the question whether the other powers contemplated similar action, the Secretary said he had asked for no promises and that he did not know. He has given them the opportunity to do so by telling them what we have done. We do not know, however, how many powers will take similar action. The Secretary again said he wanted to make clear the difference between what he called the invocation of the Pact and the invocation of the rights of the United States under that Pact. He said he was speaking now for the rights of the United States and American citizens under that Treaty and that he would be very glad if the other powers should see fit to assert the rights of their citizens as we have asserted ours. As for the names of the five powers that subsequently adhered to the Nine-Power Treaty, Mr. Stimson said they were Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Bolivia and Mexico.

A correspondent asked if there was anything new regarding the assault on Consul Chamberlain by Japanese soldiers. The Secretary replied in the negative and said that it was still being negotiated in this respect: The Government of Japan promptly made an apology, which has been accepted, but the question of the punishment of the men who assaulted Consul Chamberlain is still under negotiation. The correspondent said that he understood the Secretary had thanked the Japanese Ambassador for the prompt action of Japan in expressing that Government's regrets but that he got the definite impression that the Secretary had withheld its acceptance. Mr. Stimson replied that he accepted the apology but that he said that he had not yet received Mr. Chamberlain's report of the incident and would have to keep it open until the report was received. Consul Chamber-

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
lain's report was received the next day and the Secretary then had another interview with the Japanese Ambassador on the subject of the consequences to the offenders. So far as the Japanese Government's apology is concerned - it has been delivered and was accepted. A correspondent then asked if this statement regarding the Chamberlain incident might be used this afternoon. The Secretary replied in the affirmative. Mr. Stimson then continued by saying that this note should not be connected with the Chamberlain incident, as the note was drafted before the Secretary had heard of that incident and the matter of the note is altogether too important a thing of another character to be mixed up with even an attack on one of our consuls. We are not acting at all in a fit of temper, but we are acting in a constructive way to attempt to clarify the situation and to preserve the historic policy of the United States in Manchuria. It was just an accident that the Chamberlain incident occurred while the Secretary was preparing the above quoted note.

A correspondent here said that the gentlemen of the press all appreciated the comprehensive array of information which the Secretary presented to them in this press conference.

M. J. McDermott.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
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Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1932

At the press conference this afternoon Under Secretary Castle announced the release of a message of condolence from Secretary Stimson on the death of the French Minister of War.

Mr. Castle announced that word had been received of the delivery, by Consul General Peck, of the note from Secretary Stimson, in the Sino-Japanese situation, to the Chinese Government. A telegram was also received from Ambassador Forbes saying he had delivered the note to the Foreign Office in Tokyo yesterday afternoon.

The Under Secretary announced the release of a telegram from Ambassador Forbes concerning the attempt to assassinate the Emperor of Japan.

In the case of the attack on Consul Chamberlain, the Under Secretary said a message had been received from Consul General Hanson in Harbin to the effect that Lieutenant Colonel Hyakutake, chief of the local Japanese military mission, dressed in military uniform, wearing his sword and decorations and accompanied by Vice Consul Takigawa, who interpreted, acting under instructions of General Ninomiya, chief of the gendarmes of the Kuantung army, called at the Consulate General at 3 o'clock and tendered to Mr. Chamberlain in the presence of Captain Nimmer and himself the formal apology of General Ninomiya for the assault by the Japanese patrol on Mr. Chamberlain at Mukden on January 3.

Consul Chamberlain expressed his appreciation of the thought which prompted the apology of the General but added that the case was out of his hands.

Just before departing the Lieutenant Colonel expressed his personal regrets and offered Mr. Chamberlain a present sent

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by the General. Mr. Chamberlain politely and rightly refused to accept it. That, of course, is delightfully Oriental, as the Orientals give presents on all sorts of occasions.

Consul Foote had an experience of that kind just prior to his departure from Sumatra. One of the Sultans in that country offered him a magnificent and expensive present as a mark of his friendship and appreciation. Mr. Foote, knowing that American Government officials are prohibited by law from receiving decorations or presents from foreign governments and also knowing that he was supposed to return to the Sultan an equally expensive present, called on His Highness and expressed his deep appreciation and explained that he was not worthy to receive such a present, but that he would be equally grateful if the Sultan would give him an autographed photograph instead. The Sultan immediately agreed and asked for Mr. Foote's photograph in exchange. This incident illustrates the Oriental custom of giving presents.

A correspondent enquired what was being done about the soldiers who participated in the assault on Consul Chamberlain. Mr. Castle said he did not know. As the Secretary said yesterday, the question of the punishment of the soldiers is the one question that remains open.

The Under Secretary also announced the release of a telegram from Harbin concerning the patrolling of the streets by the Chinese just before Christmas, which rather spoiled the Russian Christmas celebration.

ARMAMENTS

A correspondent enquired regarding a story which appeared in the morning newspapers to the effect that the Under Secretary might be named as a member of the delegation to the forthcoming disarmament conference at Geneva. In reply, Mr. Castle

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said he had not been asked to go to the conference, that his name had not been considered and that, so far as he knew, the delegation was entirely complete.

SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION

A correspondent asked whether the Under Secretary knew what countries, if any, were going to take action similar to ours under the Nine Power Treaty. Mr. Castle replied in the negative.

A correspondent remarked that, as he understood it, our action did not constitute the invocation of the Nine Power Pact as it did not put the conference machinery in motion. Mr. Castle agreed that that was the case. The correspondent asked what action would be necessary formally to invoke the pact. The Under Secretary said he supposed that if it should be decided to have a conference under the pact, a conference would be called, but that was not in any way under discussion at the time. The Secretary's note was a mere statement as to American rights. The correspondent asked if a single signatory might call such a conference or if it would require a majority of the signatories. The Under Secretary said he did not know. He thought the signatories would probably discuss whether it was the wise thing to do before calling a conference. That would be the normal thing to do.

Another correspondent asked whether, by the same token, the Secretary's declaration might be called an invocation of the Kellogg Pact. Mr. Castle said he would not call it an invocation of any pact. He thought the Secretary's reference to the Kellogg Pact was a very interesting thing.

A correspondent said his office was in receipt of a despatch from Nanking to the effect that the Foreign Office would appeal to the League of Nations to apply economic sanctions against Japan under Article 16 of the League Covenant.

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He also announced that China was prepared to offer military resistance to Japanese penetration south of the Great Wall and appealed to the State Department to bring additional pressure to bear on Japan to respect its treaty obligations. Mr. Castle said the Department had received a telegram in regard to an appeal to be made to the League but an hour later word was received that the Foreign Office had said they were not going to do it.

Returning to the question of the invocation of the treaties, a correspondent said that two representatives of the press were particularly interested in the question. Mr. Castle said he realized that but he was not interested particularly in a row between two press associations.

Aside from such a disagreement, the correspondent said that legal authorities in the State Department admitted very wide usage of the word "invocation" and cited certain cases where sections of a treaty have been called to the attention of another nation in which it was said those sections were invoked. So the correspondent understood that invocation did not necessarily mean the calling of a formal conference, but was more in the nature of an appeal or reference to. Mr. Castle agreed with the use of the word "appeal", but not with the use of the expression "reference to." Mr. Castle suggested the legal authorities write a thesis on the use of the words. Since it might be the subject of a thesis, the correspondent raised the question of a curbstone opinion. Mr. Castle, however, said he declined to give curbstone opinions.

In view of the fact that Mr. Stimson's note referred to the open door policy, a correspondent asked if there was any information indicating that Japan was closing Manchuria to American commerce. Mr. Castle replied that there was none

-5-

whatever. The Secretary in that note referred to treaties which might be made in the future. The correspondent asked if any protests had been received from American firms operating in Manchuria regarding commercial restrictions placed on them by the Japanese or if any of our banks had reported that Japan had tied up the currency. Mr. Castle said there might have been requests made to the Department for information, but he did not remember any protests from any of them. The correspondent said he was reliably informed by the firms out there that they had taken up with the Department the difficulties resulting from Japanese occupation. Mr. Castle said that was quite true. The correspondent asked if that had not been the subject of representations to the Foreign Office. Mr. Castle replied in the affirmative.

A correspondent asked what happened as a result of the note despatched under similar circumstances in 1915 concerning the open door policy. The Under Secretary said he could not remember offhand, except that it worked. Whether the note had anything to do with it or not, the twenty-one demands never became effective. A correspondent observed that the matter of the twenty-one demands extended over a number of years and is still in dispute. Mr. Castle agreed that that might probably be so. A correspondent asked if the 1915 note kept the commercial door open in Manchuria. The Under Secretary replied in the affirmative. Whether it was that solely that did it, he could not say, but the door remained open. A correspondent enquired whether the occupation of Shantung at that time was not more or less analagous to the situation in Manchuria today. Mr. Castle replied in the affirmative. He added that he could not say whether the Japanese actually were in occupation in all parts of Shantung. A correspondent asked if the Germans had not been expelled from that region originally. Mr. Castle

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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replied in the affirmative. A correspondent recalled that when he was in the Far East the Japanese authorities were administering Shantung.

M. J. McDermott.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 13 1972
DIVISION OF
AFFAIRS AND
RELATIONS
A correspondent observed that a despatch had been received from London indicating that Great Britain did not intend to follow this country's action with regard to the Manchurian situation. NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION OR QUOTATION, the Secretary recalled that he had carefully pointed out to the press that

Press Release
1/9/32

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

the action which we took was as an individual, representing the individual rights of the United States, and he had pointed out explicitly that this was quite different from the combined actions of conciliation between the other countries that had preceded it. The Secretary said he thought the bulk of the press reports had made it clear, but there was some danger of misunderstanding. This is not a concerted action. He recalled that he had told the correspondents that he notified the other powers as a matter of courtesy. They are quite free to do what they like. Our statement was made as a statement of the attitude of the United States in respect to the rights of its own government and of its own citizens. It was not made on behalf of any other power.

A correspondent asked if it was not true that since John Hay's time, since the first announcement of the open door policy, it had been traditional that we worked alone in the Far East and always did what seemed proper from the American standpoint without concerted action. The Secretary, in reply, said he thought it would be proper to say this country had been the leader--had always made the first move.

The Secretary continued by saying that our statement was a re-affirmation of what is a matter of record, both by treaty and former statements, which were given to the press. Our declaration was intended as a restatement of our position for the past thirty years, and which the recent occurrences had seemed to us to make it appropriate to re-state. We are always, in a matter like this, on delicate ground and it is well to have a clear understanding. It is dangerous to use catch word phrases. "Invocation" is one which the Secretary said he was particularly on his guard against in this case. Exactly what the correspondents meant when they said some one invoked the Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Pact, the Secretary did not know. He had already told the correspon-

F/DEW

793.94/3510

FILED

JAN 14 1932

-4-

dents what his intention was. We asserted what we deemed to be our policy in respect to our rights under that treaty.

A correspondent said that the language of the press was different from the language of diplomacy. The Secretary said he realized that difficulty and, as he said before, he was full of admiration for the way they had gotten over those difficulties. But there had been creeping into the headlines, chiefly, things which have no application. At least, they did not mean anything to the Secretary and he did not know what they meant to the correspondents. The Secretary said it was important that that be made clear in respect to both treaties covered by our note--the Nine-Power Pact and the Kellogg Pact.

The Secretary explained that if there was anything like invocation by all the powers, that was done about three months ago when several of the powers sent notes to the other powers, including ourselves, that they were going to send notes on the Kellogg Pact and suggesting that the others do it, and we, among others, did. That was an entirely different thing from what this country did the other day.

A correspondent asked if it was not true that we invoked the treaties some weeks ago and we are now preparing to utilize them--the difference being between "utilization" and "invocation." The Secretary said, in reply, the whole purpose of sending the note was simply that we were calling our rights to the attention of the two powers who, in the course of their relations, might not think we were alive to them.

A correspondent asked if we had received a reply from either China or Japan as yet. The Secretary replied in the negative and added that there had hardly been time yet. The correspondent asked if there had been any informal indication when either reply might come. The Secretary replied in the negative and added that there might not be any reply. He recalled that

-5-

he had told the correspondents the other day the note was a declaration by this country, merely a statement. A correspondent referred to press reports from Tokyo. The Secretary said he had noticed that a spokesman for the Foreign Office seemed also to take the view that it might not require an answer. The correspondent also referred to reports that the spokesman for the Foreign Office had said the note from this country would not stop operations in Manchuria. The Secretary recalled that he had told the correspondents that the statement was intended for history and made with a broad view of the future. He added that when he said the statement was intended for history, he did not, of course, mean for history alone.

A correspondent enquired whether the Secretary had heard anything from Tokyo in regard to the Chamberlain incident. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and added that he had received word of a second apology being made, but since he had seen it reported in the press he had not mentioned it to the correspondents. General Honjo sent an officer to Consul Chamberlain personally in Harbin to express his regrets.

The correspondent asked if anything was being done to punish the men guilty of the attack. That appeared to him to be the crucial point. Without saying whether it was a crucial point, the Secretary said it was an important point about which we had not yet received information.

A correspondent asked if there was any likelihood, aside from the fact there was no fatality, of the case resolving itself into another Imbrie affair when an American Consul was killed and Persia had to bear the expense of bringing the body back. In reply, the Secretary said the Chamberlain matter did not in his opinion involve pecuniary compensation.

M. J. McDermott.

1297

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum sent by the Japanese Government
to the Chinese Government on Oct. 9th.

*Sent to Mr. Carter's
have from Japanese
Embassy, arriving
Oct. 8, 1972
Sign*

Shigemitsu has been instructed to forward

to the Chinese Government the following memorandum
dated October 9. (1) The Japanese Government has
already made it clear that the Manchurian affair is
nothing but the outcome of a deep-rooted anti-Japanese
feeling in China which has taken a specially provocative
form in the recent challenge to Japanese troops com-
pelling the latter to resort to measures of self-defence.
The responsibility for the present situation naturally
lies with the Chinese Government.

DCR
File
F/DEW

The Japanese Government has time and again re-
quested the Chinese Government to take proper steps to
check the anti-Japanese movement so systematically car-
ried out in various places in China. Being desirous
of maintaining cordial relations between the two coun-
tries, this Government has exercised the greatest pa-
tience and forbearance in the hope that this deplorable
state of affairs may yet improve. Unfortunately, however,
this anti-Japanese agitation seems now to be assuming
alarming proportions. It is learned that the anti-
Japanese societies at Shanghai and elsewhere have passed
resolutions not only to enforce prohibition of trading
in and transportation of Japanese goods but to order
cancellation of existing contracts and otherwise to
prohibit all business transactions and to cancel con-

793.94/3511

tracts of employment between Chinese and Japanese in order thus to effect the so-called "severance of economic relations with Japan". For that purpose examination and detention of goods and persons, intimidation and violence, and various other means are being employed to give effect to such resolutions and severe penalties are meted out to any who may fail to comply with these orders, some societies even going so far as to threaten capital punishment. Moreover, cases of expropriation and detention of goods owned by Japanese people and of threats and violence against their lives and property have become so numerous and insistent throughout China that they have been forced to withdraw totally or partially from various localities.

(2) It is to be noted that the anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as an instrument of national policy under the direction of the Nationalist Party which in view of the peculiar political organization of China is inseparable in function from the Government. That movement must therefore be clearly distinguished from the one which originates spontaneously amongst the people. It is therefore evident that the present anti-Japanese movement in China is not only in contravention of the letter and spirit of the treaties existing between the two countries but consti-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

tutes a form of hostile act without the use of arms
contrary to all standards of justice and friendship.

The Chinese Government will be assuming a very serious responsibility if it should fail to take prompt and effective measures to quell that agitation. Moreover, in meting out penal sentences to individual citizens anti-Japanese societies which are purely private organizations are clearly usurping the authority of the National Government.

(3) It will be remembered that at a recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva the Chinese representative as well as the Japanese gave assurance that their respective governments would endeavor to prevent aggravation of the situation. The Chinese Government obviously against that pledge is actually aggravating the situation by making no honest or effective effort to restrain activities of anti-Japanese societies which are jeopardizing the lives and property as well as the liberty of trade of Japanese subjects in different parts of China.

(4) The Japanese Government desires to call once more the serious attention of the Chinese Government to these actions on the part of anti-Japanese societies and to declare at the same time that the Chinese Government will be held responsible for whatever

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

may be the consequences of its failure to suppress
the anti-Japanese movement and to afford adequate
protection to the lives and property of Japanese sub-
jects in China.

With the compliments of

Katsuji Debuchi
Japanese Ambassador

1301

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

copy

Memorandum from
State

October 12, 1931.

S.K.H.

Cat 9, 1931

Attached paper is a copy of the memorandum submitted here by the Japanese Ambassador on behalf of the Japanese Government on the evening of October 8.

Note: The Japanese Government apparently gave this memorandum publicity all over the world. Newspaper accounts from Japan have stated that this paper, though addressed to the Chinese Government and minatory in tone, was drafted for the effect which it would have on world opinion and was for public consumption.

It was printed in some American newspapers.

SKH/ZMF

F.W. 793.94/3511

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF
RECEIVED

FROM

Tokio

JAN 14 1932

Dated January 14, 1932

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 7:59 a.m.

NEGOTIATIONS

Secretary of State,

Washington

7, January 14, 4 p.m.

Department's 13, January 13, 6 p.m.

The Embassy has no knowledge of any authentic report

of plan for "more decisive steps" such as blockade of
 Chinese ports if boycott continues. No "official spokes-

man" has made any important announcement on the note of

the 7th beyond telling of its receipt. The note proved
 exceedingly difficult to translate into Japanese, because
 the language has no relative pronouns and qualifying clauses
 have to be thrown into adjective form. This caused some

confusion, but it was not important as the public has
 accepted the note with little or no excitement as a state-

ment of the American position. Yoshizawa, the new Foreign

Minister, is to take office tonight. I am to call on him

tomorrow when I am informed I shall receive the reply of the

Japanese Government both in Japanese and English. The

newspapers

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JAN 18 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#7 from Tokio, January 14,
1932

newspapers report that 300 bluejackets were landed at Tsingtau and subsequently withdrawn. They were landed it is stated because of a riot which took place between Japanese residents and Chinese at that port.

A great many of the press reports that seem to be credited in China are never published in Japan, or appear in milder form in the more sensational papers.

The Embassy will keep the Department informed of important events.

FORBES

WWC-WSB

1304

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 14, 1932

Rec'd 10 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED FROM
JAN 14 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

Secretary of State,

Washington

68, January 14, noon.

Legation's 52, January 11, 7 p.m.

Following is summary of reports received yesterday
from Lieutenant Aldrich:

"All detachments of Japanese troops and South Manchurian operators between Shanhaikwan and Chinchow are withdrawing to latter place on account of the threat of Chinese cavalry operating against the Japanese in the Peipiao area.

All stations between Lienchan and Chinchow are occupied by small detachments of Japanese troops and South Manchurian Railway staff are entirely in control of railway. At Suichung there are brigade headquarters and two battalions; at Chinchow headquarters of the twentieth division armored train and many troops.

It is reported that Japanese desire to occupy Peipiao on account of the railway coal supply but occupation has been

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 14 1932
Department of State

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JAN 18 1932
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#68 from Peiping via N.R.,
January 14, 1932.

been delayed by resistance of Chinese cavalry brigade.

Japanese are trying to reorganize the railway to Chinchow ostensibly under the new Manchurian Government and through traffic is expected as soon as the Peipiao area is under control. Many troops are being returned to Mukden from Chinchow, traffic east of Chinchow is still badly disorganized.

At Shanhaikwan there is one Japanese light cruiser and two small air craft carriers. At Chingwangtao two destroyers and a small transport. It is not believed Japanese have present intention of occupying Shanhaikwan".

JOHNSON

RR-CSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FROM

JAN 14 1932

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND

Secretary of State,

Washington

70, January 14, 2 p.m.

Following from American Consul at Tsingtau:

"January 14, 9 a.m.

Japanese landing forces, with the exception of small
contingent, returned to ships yesterday evening. City
quiet though situation still menacing".

HPD_CSB

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 14, 1932

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 14 1932

Department of State

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JAN 18 1932

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REP

FROM

GRAY

RECEIVED
JAN 14 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 14, 1932

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 14 1932

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

67, January 14, 11 a. m.

Following from American Consul at Tsingtau:

"January 13, 3 p. m. Local Kuomintang headquarters building yesterday evening gutted and fired by Japanese civilians, immediately following which approximately 500 Japanese marines including machine gun detachment were landed. Article recently published by local Kuomin newspaper regarding attempted assassination of the Japanese Emperor. Immediate protest by Japanese Consul General had resulted in negotiations for redress which apparently were about to achieve a satisfactory settlement ^{meanwhile} Japanese civilians whose ringleaders were apparently members of the Kokusaikai took matters into their own hands and yesterday morning raided the newspaper office. A mass meeting of Japanese residents was held in the afternoon following which

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#67 from Peiping via N.R.,
January 14, 1932.

a second raid on the newspaper and Kuomintang headquarters was staged. The firing of the latter building was accomplished later in the evening by a large mob of civilians who forcibly prevented the Chinese fire brigade from extinguishing the blaze.

Japanese sources deny proof of Japanese guilt but impartial reports to date strongly corroborate Chinese charges. While there is no evidence of official Japanese outbreaks police apparently made no effort to check offenders.

*note
894.3393*

Japanese naval vessels in port, cruisers KUMA and YOKUMO. The present landing forces concentrated at Japanese Consulate General and Residents Association Hall. Japanese authorities state that force will be withdrawn as situation quiets. Chinese population has remained surprisingly tranquil. So far as known there have been no serious casualties. Matter being further investigated and reported on by mail".

JOHNSON

OSB_WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

A portion of this
telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone.

NANKING

Dated January 14, 1932

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED
Rec'd 10:20 a. m.

DIVISION OF

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 14 1932

Department of State

11, January 14, 7 p. m. (GRAY).

One. In compliance with his request I called on the
Minister of Foreign Affairs at five o'clock p. m. He
showed me a Reuter bulletin dated Tokyo January 13th to
the general effect that Japanese official circles stated
that the Department's identic note of January 7th caused
Eugene Chen to desist from tentative efforts to begin
negotiations for the settlement of the Manchurian contro-
versy. Chen characterized the statement as a lie and said
he intended to publish an official denial. He said he
could not have approached the Japanese Consul General in
Shanghai as alleged for he had never seen him and knew
nothing about him. (END GRAY).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Two. I expressed gratification at his denial to me that
the note had interrupted efforts to open negotiations.

Although

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793.94/3516

FILED

JAN 16 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #11, from Nanking, Jan. 14, 7 p.m.

Although I had no instructions to express any views on the subject I felt safe in saying that the American Government instead of wishing to discourage such efforts would regard them as a good thing. Chen said that an important conference would be held the same evening and that it was possible some way of beginning negotiations might be found.

Repeated to Legation.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

mam

CORRECTED COPY GRAY

FROM

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated January 14, 1932

Rec'd 3:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

71, January 14, 3 p.m. (PARTS ONE AND TWO)

Following from American Consulate General at Harbin:

January 13, 1 p.m.,

One. Japanese military through instrumentality of Hsi Ching's new Kirin Government and General Yu-shien Chou's troops, aided, it is reported by the Chinese, by Japanese aeroplanes and cannons, Japanese officers and soldiers, have commenced a drive to eliminate the remnant of the old Kirin Government now located at Pinhsien. This has caused uneasiness on part of General Ting Chao's guard troops on eastern line of Chinese Eastern Railway.

Two. Secretary Chao, who yesterday returned from Hailun after a trip to Kirin, via Changchun and Mukden, informed me last evening that he was assisting Chang Ching Hui arrange an amicable settlement between the Kirin and Pinhsien Governments, the former of which controls 12 districts

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FILED

JAN 18 1932

mam

2- corrected copy, #71, from
Peiping, January 14, 1932

districts and the latter about 30 districts, and that General Ma favored a peaceful settlement of the Kirin difficulty and, as far as Heilungkiang was concerned, would try to maintain an independent attitude, although his funds with which to pay his 10,000 regular and 10,000 volunteer troops were running low.

Three. General Ting Chao favors a peaceful settlement so there is little hope for the Pinhsien Government to hold out long. General Chang Tso Chou has several thousand old Kirin Government troops at Yushu but they will probably go over to the new government troops under Yu Hsien Chou now reported to be advancing north towards Yushu. Ting Chao has stated that Harbin has little to fear from any projected clash between these troops.

Four. An early press report that leaflets were dropped from Japanese aeroplanes over Pinhsien

(END PARTS ONE AND TWO)

WSB

JOHNSON

CSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RECEIVED
JAN 14 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND

GRAY

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 14 1932
Department of State

Peiping via R.R.

Dated January 14, 1932

Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

71, January 14, 3 p.m. (PARTS ONE AND TWO)

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Pinhsien

See correction Copy
1-18-32

F/DEW 793.94/3517

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MET

2-#71 from Peiping via N.R.,
January 14, 1932.

Pinhsien Governments, the former of which controls 12 districts and the latter about 30 districts (?) and that General Ma favored a peaceful settlement of the (?) (?) and, as far as Heilungkiang was concerned, would try to maintain an independent attitude, although his funds with which to pay his 10,000 regular and 10,000 volunteer troops were running low.

Three. General Ting Chao favors a peaceful settlement so there is little hope for the Pinhsien Government to hold out long. General Chang Tso Chou has several thousand old Kirin Government troops at Yushu but they will probably go over to the new government troops under Yu Hsien Chou now reported to be advancing north towards Yushu. Ting Chao has stated that Harbin has little to fear from any projected clash ^{between} these troops.

Four. An early press report that leaflets were dropped from Japanese aeroplanes over Pinhsien (END PARTS ONE AND TWO)


JOHNSON

WSB-OSB-HPD

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



GRAY

FROM

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated January 14, 1932

Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

71, January 14, 3 p.m. (PART THREE)

on January 10th warning the people of the town to evacuate and the officials to dissolve the Government as the city would be attacked on January 17th.


Five. Owing to the Capitol Theatre incident, his oppressive measures against local Russians, which culminated in the street shooting of innocent Russians during the New Year's day holidays, his opposition to Chang Ching Hui and Ting Chao and his affiliations with the old Mukden party, General Wang Jui Hua, Harbin chief of police, was forced on January 12, by pressure from all sides, including Japanese, to resign. Chang Ching Hui appointed as his successor General Chin Jung Kwei who was twice before chief of police at Harbin. With Wang fell the last hopes of local Kuomintang remnant, a prominent member of which at the eleventh hour vainly begged me to intercede with Chang on Wang's behalf on the grounds that the latter's departure would secure the peace of the city and the freedom of message communications". (END MESSAGE)

CSB
WSB

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



Secretary of State
Washington

FROM

GRAY

HANKOW VIA NH

Dated January 14, 1932

Rec'd 4:52 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 15 1932

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

9, January 14, 5 p.m.

My number 3, January 8, noon.

The Communist pressure on Hwangpei city has been removed through troop reinforcements sent from Hankow. The Communist force is reported to have split into two or more parts. One of these has retired toward Hwangan. The other is reported to be proceeding west and south of Hankow in an effort to cross to the south bank of the Yangtze.

Legation and Nanking informed.

CSB

ADAMS

F/DEW

793.94/3513

FILED

JAN 18 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Lima, December 31, 1931.

No.----


AM RECD



JAN 14 1932

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK

Yes No



F/UEW

793.94/3519

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a
1/ clipping from EL COMERCIO of December 31, 1931,
which embodies a communication from the Japanese
Legation at Lima concerning the present difficulties
in Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Garret G. Ackerson, Jr.
Secretary of Embassy.

GGA:BJ

Enclosure:

- 1/ Clipping from EL COMERCIO
(Attached to original only)

FILED

JAN 18 1932

793.94

American Embassy,
Lima, Peru.

Enclosure 1/ to Embassy despatch of December 31, 1931.

(Clipping from EL COMERCIO of December 31, 1931)

Comunicado de la Legación del Japón

El secretario de la legación del Japón saluda atentamente al señor director del diario "El Comercio" y tiene el agrado de enviarle adjunta la traducción al castellano de la declaración formulada por el gobierno del Japón sobre el asunto de Manchuria, el día 27 del mes en curso, rogándole se sirva publicarla en el prestigioso diario de su digna dirección, por lo que le anticipa sus gracias más expresivas.

Lima, 30 de diciembre de 1931.

EL DIA 27 DE DICIEMBRE EL GOBIERNO IMPERIAL DEL JAPON FORMULO LA SIGUIENTE DECLARACION SOBRE EL ASUNTO DE LA MANCHURIA.—

1) —El gobierno imperial del Japón ha dado siempre singular importancia al mantenimiento de la paz y del orden en la Manchuria. En diversas ocasiones se han tomado las medidas legales para asegurarlas y para evitar que ese territorio fuera el campo de batalla de facciones militaristas.

Sólo cuando la paz y el orden permanezcan inalterables el territorio podrá ser habitado con toda libertad por los chinos y los extranjeros. En el caso contrario, es inútil hablar de "puerta abierta" y de igualdad de condiciones para las actividades comerciales de las demás naciones.

Pero los sucesos de septiembre último le han creado al Japón, muy a su pesar, una responsabilidad nueva y una esfera de acción mucho más amplia. Los actos de violencia ejecutados por los chinos, han hecho necesarias las medidas tomadas por el Japón en defensa propia, siguiendo su cometido de mantener el orden público y los derechos de los particulares en tan vasto territorio. Esperaba el gobierno del Japón que las autoridades locales pusieran su contingente de cooperación para la defensa de las leyes y el cumplimiento del orden. Pero, con gran extrañeza, ha visto que casi todas han perdido el control juzgando o dimitiendo sus cargos en tan críticos momentos.

Fue, por lo tanto, deber del Japón, en defensa propia, valerse de sus propios medios, evitando molestias y quebrantos, dentro de lo posible, a los habitantes pacíficos, expuestos a la violencia originada por los disturbios en la región.

Cometería una falta de íntima civilización dejando a la población a merced de la anarquía, y desprovista de los elementos de la vida civilizada moderna.

Por estas razones incontrovertibles, es que el ejército japonés, con sacrificios enormes, ha gastado mucho tiempo y muchas energías con el fin de asegurar las vidas y propiedades en todas aquellas regiones en que las au-

toridades locales se confesaron impotentes para gobernar. Tal es la responsabilidad que a ellas compete en los sucesos, responsabilidad que no han querido asumir ni evitar.

2) —Más aún: De esta punible desatendencia y abandono se ha originado la quiebra de la organización de justicia y de la normalidad de la vida civilizada, dando lugar a que los bandidos y criminales infesten al país y que su audacia creciera de punto.

El prestigio y la dinámica organización de las tropas japonesas han sido por algún tiempo suficientes para mantenerlos en jaque, conservando el orden en los lugares amagados por tan desagradables huéspedes. Sin embargo, desde el comienzo de noviembre, subitamente aumentaron las actividades de los bandidos en la zona vecina al ferrocarril surmanchuriano, sobre todo en la parte oeste de la línea principal. Estableciéndose, entonces, por el examen de los individuos bandidos a la mano, por los documentos hallados y por otras fuentes de información que los saqueos, robos, violencias llevadas a cabo eran el fruto de las intrigas sistemáticas de las autoridades militares de Chin Chow, coludidas con los bandidos.

Los informes de algunos observadores militares extranjeros sostienen que no han hallado evidencia alguna de preparación de las tropas chinas para el ataque; pero esta idea es errónea, existe un hecho claro y evidente, y es que las autoridades militares de Chin Chow mantienen grandes y numerosas fuerzas en varios lugares al oeste de Takushan, en la línea férrea entre Peiping y Mukden e igualmente en el territorio aledaño, y el reconocimiento practicado por el ejército japonés confirma definitivamente no sólo que existen preparativos para la guerra, sino ha quedado demostrado un hecho más grave y significativo: la vanguardia del ejército chino esta estacionada a lo largo de la línea que conecta Tsinchutai, Taian, Paichipai y otros lugares estratégicos de la banda derecha del Río Liao, avanzando hasta Chin Chow. Tal situación constituye por sí misma una amenaza grave y constante contra los contingentes japoneses esparcidos a lo largo del ferrocarril surmanchuriano, y otros lugares. Pero el peligro, en realidad, es más grande del que parece a simple vista si se tiene en cuenta que las ciudades de Mukden, Yingkow y Hopei, por el ferrocarril Peiping-Mukden, están solo separadas por espacio de tres o cuatro horas de viaje de Takushan y Koupant-su, bases estratégicas de las fuerzas chinas.

Las fuerzas de los bandidos en que militan gran número de oficiales y soldados licenciados del ejército chino, ganan diariamente terreno. Citaré solamente un ejemplo: El número de bandidos acampados al fianco oeste de la línea principal del ferrocarril surmanchuriano, calculábase, hacia principios de noviembre, en 1.300 hombres; sin embargo, las investigaciones llevadas a cabo en los primeros días de diciembre, revela el hecho de que forman un ejército de más de 30.000 hombres.

Algo más: han formado grandes grupos, por adición de partidas aisladas, llegando cada uno a sumar centenares y aún millares perfectamente armados y equipados, en posesión de ametralladoras y aún tanques de guerra. No es posible, por consiguiente, diferenciarlos de las tropas regulares.

No es posible ya dudar de este estado de cosas puntualizado largamente; los bandidos han sido armados y ayudados eficazmente por las autoridades militares de Chin Chow.

Según las estadísticas recopiladas en el consulado general del Japón en Mukden, los casos de ataques e incursiones efectuados por los bandidos en las vecindades de la zona del ferrocarril, durante la primera decena de noviembre, último, ascendieron a 278, al promediar de dicho mes, a 341, al finalizar 238 y en los comienzos de diciembre, alcanzaban la cifra de 472. Fácil es considerar lo anormal de la situación si se contempla que el número de estos ataques llegó a la asombrosa cifra de 1.529 en sólo cuarenta días.

La estrategia usada por estas bandas de malhechores, cuando se ven atacadas por nuestras tropas regulares, es escapar hacia el oeste, refugiándose en la orilla derecha del Río Liao, donde nuestro ejército desea de evitar rozamientos con las fuerzas regulares chinas ha determinado no llegar en su persecución.

3) —El día 24 de noviembre el ministro de relaciones exteriores de China pasó una nota a los ministros de las potencias principales extranjeras en Nanking, en la que se declaraba que el gobierno chino, para evitar choques entre fuerzas japonesas y chinas, estaba dispuesto a retirar sus tropas a lugares situados detrás de la gran muralla.

A raíz de esta resolución, oficialmente puesta en conocimiento de nues-

tro gobierno el día 26, este avisó su voluntad de aceptarla como principio. A la vez se impartió instrucciones al ministro del Japón en Shanghay y a la legación en Peiping para iniciar conversaciones sobre la materia con el ministro de relaciones exteriores y con el mariscal Chang Hsuh-liang, respectivamente.

Desde el día 30 de noviembre hasta el 3 de diciembre último se realizaron algunas conferencias entre el ministro del Japón en China y el ministro de relaciones exteriores de este último país. En estas conversaciones el ministro de relaciones exteriores de China retiró las propuestas anteriores, abriendo paso a futuras negociaciones.

Igualmente tuvieron lugar negociaciones entre el mariscal Chang Hsuh-liang y nuestro representante en Peiping y con el subordinado de dicho mariscal el 4 de diciembre.

Este manifestó su voluntad el día 7 de llamar sus tropas de Chin Chow con un movimiento espontáneo de retiro, dando a la vez seguridades repetidas de la rápida ejecución de lo pactado.

Pero tratándose ahora no del verbalismo de las conferencias sino de los hechos, no hay ni remoto vislumbre de tal retiro. Por el contrario, las defensas y fortificaciones de Chin Chow han sido aumentadas.

4) —Hasta el momento transcurrido hace casi un mes, desde el ofrecimiento de iniciación de retiro de las tropas de Chin Chow, la falta de buena fe por parte de la China no deja vislumbrar esperanza alguna de ver realizado el ofrecimiento.

Es lamentable indicar que todo indica un recrudecimiento de las actividades arriba mencionadas por los bandidos saltadores amenazando traer la completa destrucción de toda paz y seguridad en toda la extensión de la Manchuria.

De los hechos arriba consignados se desprende que si las tropas japonesas quieren tener éxito deben avanzar hasta el punto, al oeste del Río


Liao, donde los bandidos tienen sus bases.

Las fuerzas japonesas, de acuerdo con las resoluciones del Consejo de la Liga adoptadas el día 30 de septiembre y el día 10 de diciembre, no están haciendo campaña alguna contra las tropas regulares chinas, pero las condiciones presentes de anormalidad reinante en Manchuria, las necesidades del caso, obligan a las tropas japonesas a continuar sus operaciones contra los elementos sin ley. Este es el punto sobre el cual el representante del Japón ha hecho una declaración definitiva en la reciente sesión del Consejo de la Liga en día 10 de diciembre. Mientras las autoridades militares de Chin Chow continúan excitando y manipulando los movimientos de las organizaciones de los bandidos contra el ejército japonés, así como contra los habitantes pacíficos japoneses y de otras nacionalidades, mientras los oficiales y soldados del ejército en Chin Chow alegando imparcialidad se mezclan, sin embargo, en gran número, con esos grupos de bandoleros, siendo casi imposible distinguir los últimos de los primeros, la responsabilidad por las medidas adoptadas por el ejército japonés en defensa propia, debe caer enteramente sobre el gobierno chino.




5) —Durante el curso del mes pasado, a pesar de la indignación surgida entre todo el pueblo manchuriano y de acuerdo con el deseo constante del gobierno japonés para cumplir rigurosamente las resoluciones del Consejo de la Liga las operaciones militares contra los bandidos se han contenido dentro del límite comparativamente estrecho y el gobierno ha hecho todo lo que está a su alcance a fin de evitar los choques entre las fuerzas de ambos países.

El gobierno del Japón confía en que su prolongada paciencia y su sincero anhelo de mantenerse estrictamente dentro de los dictados y estipulaciones de los convenios internacionales no fracase y lleven al convencimiento del mundo de la sinceridad y seriedad de su propósito.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



JAN 14 32 December 29, 1931.



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To the Field			
In U. S. A.			

copy
MED
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No. 8353

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/

I have the honor to forward herewith a translation of the Moscow PRAVDA's editorial comment on a TASS telegram from New York City concerning a recent article in the NEW REPUBLIC on the Manchurian question.

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole

Felix Cole,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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793.94/3520

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JAN 26 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Enclosure: ✓

1. The United States is Responsible for the
Occupation of Manchuria.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 352, December 23, 1931.)

(In quadruplicate.)

Copy to E.I.C.Paris.

Copy to E.I.C.Paris for Peiping.

710 R (Japan - China.)

LMH/hs

1321

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8353 of DEC 29 1931
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 352,
December 23, 1931,
Page 1.

THE UNITED STATES IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OCCUPATION
OF MANCHURIA.

THE NEW REPUBLIC EXPOSES THE INTERNAL MECHANISM OF
STIMSON'S TACTICS.

THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS WAITING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY
FOR EXERCISING PRESSURE UPON JAPAN.

(Translation of editorial comment on a
TASS telegram from New York concerning
the NEW REPUBLIC article.)

The views of the NEW REPUBLIC deserve every attention,
although it must be said that the said periodical clearly
underrates the economic power of Japanese imperialism.

It is of course true that American imperialism has
not shown energetic resistance to the Japanese occupation.
But even this proposition of the periodical's is true
only in part. The recent sharp speech of Stimson against
the attempts on the part of the Japanese raiders to
capture Chinchow with a quick move, and the dissatisfaction
of the American Senate with Stimson's insufficiently
energetic tactics, shows that the "direct support of the
Japanese occupation" has certain bounds.

The United States supports the Japanese occupation
in that measure and to that extent that will be help-
ful in attaining the following three aims of Stimson's:

the

-2-

the weakening of Japan, the custing of Japanese capital from Inner China, and the spoiling of Japanese-Soviet mutual relations. In order to attain these ends, American imperialism supported the Japanese occupation, endeavoring to drag the conflict out, to tie up Japan in this conflict for a long time, to "entangle" Japan in Manchuria, as it were. But be that as it may, Stimson has rendered a tremendous service to Japanese imperialism, and from this point of view it must be clear that the occupation of Manchuria became possible in a huge measure thanks to the provocative schemes of the Department of State of the United States.

That is why it may be said that the responsibility for the occupation of Manchuria devolves first of all upon the United States.

But it is equally doubtless that American imperialism will bring all possible pressure to bear upon Japan, will employ all the means enumerated by the NEW REPUBLIC, as soon as this will be deemed convenient and expedient. And that moment will arrive the sooner, the more broadly the failure of Stimson's tactics will become manifest.

js/fk

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Muta O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 977.

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


LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Teheran, Persia,
December 15, 1931.

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793.94/3521

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit as enclosures: 1) Copy in French of circular telegram sent by the Imperial Persian Government to the Governments of Japan and China reminding them of their obligations under the Kellogg pact for the renunciation of war; 2) Copy of the reply of the Chinese Government in English, and 3) Copy of the reply of the Japanese Government in English.

These documents were supplied me by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs upon my verbal request.

Respectfully yours,

Charles C. Hart.

Enclosures: 3, as stated.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

File No. 711

CCH/FE

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Enclosure No. 1,
Despatch No. 977.

COPY. JEME

Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

T o k i o

C'est avec inquiétude que le Gouvernement Persan a suivi le développement des événements de Mandchourie qui ont créé depuis le 18 septembre une situation préoccupante entre le Japon et la Chine. Le Conseil de la SDN s'emploie avec activité après en avoir été saisi à la régler. A cet effort s'est associé mon Gouvernement. En outre le Gouvernement Persan estime qu'il est de son devoir d'attirer l'attention des Gouvernements Japonais et Chinois avec lui signataires du pacte du 27 août 1928 de la renonciation à la Guerre sur les dispositions de ce pacte et notamment sur l'article 2 ainsi conçu les Hautes Parties Contractantes reconnaissent que le règlement ou la solution de tous les différends ou conflits de quelque nature ou de quelque origine qu'ils puissent être qui pourront surgir entre elles ne devront jamais être recherchés que par des moyens pacifiques. Dans le monde entier l'opinion publique attend que les engagements ainsi contractants soient observés par le Japon et la Chine. Mon Gouvernement a confiance que cet espoir ne sera pas déçu et que conscients de leurs engagements solennels et des obligations qu'à l'égard des autres signataires du Pacte ils leur imposent les deux Gouvernements en cause s'abstiendront avec soin de toute initiative susceptible de compromettre le succès des efforts précédemment entrepris pour amener par des voies pacifiques le règlement du conflit qui s'est élevé entre eux.

Foroughi
Ministre Extérieur.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY.

Enclosure No. 2,
Despatch No. 977.

Radio Pahlevi
TEHERAN.

NS 23/10/31/1055 Nanking 406/405 23 1700

ChiGovt Etat -

His Excellency Mr. Foroughi, Minister for Foreign
 Affairs, Teheran, Persia.

The Chinese Government has received from Persian Government the communication in which the Persian Government invites the attention of the Chinese Government to the provisions of the treaty for the renunciation of war august 27th comma 1928 comma and expresses hope that both the Chinese and Japanese Governments will refrain from taking any steps that might endanger the success of the efforts already in progress to secure a peaceful settlement of the present situation in China paragraph the Chinese Government feels thankful to the Persian Government for the deep concern shown in the development of events in the northeastern provinces of China since september 18th when Japanese troops comma in defiance of international law comma the Treaty for the renunciation of war and other international agreements began their unprovoked attack on shenyang and other cities stop being desirous of strictly adhering to the undertakings assumed under international treaties comma particularly the covenant of the league of nations and the treaty for the renunciation of war comma China has judiciously refrained from employing force to meet the military aggressions of Japan and has been seeking comma from that and other international agreements designed for the maintenance of peace comma in
 the

-2-

the belief that Japan will be awakened to her legal as well as moral duty to human civilization paragraph the Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the active efforts now in progress in Geneva arrive at a settlement of the present case in the interests of justice and peace comma will soon be crowned with success which will be conducive to the well being not only of China but of the whole world stop the Chinese Government will persist in its own efforts to seek the settlement of all questions of whatever nature by peaceful means comma and will give the council of the league of nations every assistance devising a permanent system ensuring the effective observance of this policy in the future in the Far East paragraph Chinglun Frank W Lee acting minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China 23rd very beginning comma a just and adequate settlement by pacific means stop we have therefore entrusted our case unreservedly to the League of Nations stop we absolutely rely on the solemn engagements contained in the Treaty for the renunciation of war comma the covenant of the League of Nations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY.

Enclosure No. 3,
Despatch No. 977.

Legation du Japon

Teheran, novembre 3, 1931

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honor to communicate to Your Highness, under instruction from my Government the following reply to the Identic note addressed to them by the Imperial Persian Government as one of the signatories to the Pact of Paris.

1. The Japanese Government realizes as fully as any other signatory of the Pact of Paris, 1928, responsibility incurred under the provisions of that solemn pact. They have made it clear on various occasions that the Japanese railway guards in taking military measures in Manchuria since night of September in haste have been actuated solely by necessity of defending themselves as well as protecting the South Manchuria Railway and lives and property of the Japanese subjects against wanton attacks by Chinese troops and armed bandits. Nothing is farther from thoughts of the Japanese Government than to have recourse to war for solution of their outstanding differences with China.

2. It is their settled aim to compose their differences by all pacific means. In the note of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chinese Minister in Tokyo, dated October 9, the Japanese Government has already declared their readiness to enter into negotiations with responsible representatives of China for adjustment of the present difficulties. They still hold the same view. So far as they are concerned, they have no intention whatever of proceeding to any steps that might hamper any efforts intended to assure the pacific settlement of the conflict between Japan and China.

3.

-2-

3. On the other hand they have repeatedly called attention of the Chinese Government to organized hostile agitation against Japan now in process in various parts of China. The suspension of all commercial intercourse with Japan at present practiced in China is in no sense a spontaneous act of individual chinese. It is enforced by anti-Japanese organizations that have taken law into their own hands and are heavily penalizing even with threat of capital punishment any chinese who may be found disobeying their arbitrary decrees. Acts of violence levelled against Japanese residents also continue unabated in many places under jurisdiction of the Government of Nanking. It will be manifest to all fair observers of actual situation that those activities of anti-Japanese organizations are acquiesced in by the Chinese Government as a means to attain national aims of China. The Japanese Government desires to point out that such acquiescence by the chinese government in lawless proceedings of their own nationals cannot be regarded as being in harmony with the letter or spirit of the stipulations contained in Article 2 of the Pact of Paris.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to Your Highness, Monsieur le Ministre, the assurance of my highest considerations.

(signed)

1 3 2
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94-Commission FOR correspondence

FROM } all sources (-----) DATED subsequent to
TO } NAME Dec. 10, 1931

REGARDING: the commission to make an inquiry in Manchuria and China,
as proposed by the Council of the League of Nations in its Resolution
of December 10th, 1931.

dew

793.94/3522

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.51 Silver/64 FOR Memorandum

FROM Far Eastern Division Hornbeck DATED Jan 8, 1932
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Expression of appreciation by the Chinese Minister over the United States note to Japan and China.

ek.

793.94/3523

1331

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

January 12, 1932.

The Italian Ambassador

Mr. Hornbeck.

JAN 13 1932

RECEIVED

JAN 13 1932

Subject: Manchuria Situation and
Related Questions.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

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The Ambassador called. He read from a telegram from his Government quoting newspaper accounts of the settlement of the Chamberlain incident, with details, and said that he wished to inquire whether the American Government had accepted the Japanese Government's amends. I replied that we regarded the matter as settled and were gratified; and I explained to him the details (in view of the fact that what he had read me from his telegram was not quite accurate). The Ambassador expressed his gratification that the matter had been thus disposed of.

The Ambassador said that he wished to inform me that he had not yet heard from his Government as to the action which it would take in view of the American Government's note to Japan of January 7. He said that he felt that they should do something to manifest their interest and concern with regard to the Nine-Power Treaty. He thought that it was not a good thing to let matters go by in silence. He went on to say that the "poor League of Nations"

JAN 14 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Nations" had suffered a blow. He said that Italy had at no time had great enthusiasm for the League as the Italians felt that the League was run by France. Yet, he said, the League could serve useful purposes. France and Japan, he said, have a military understanding. At that point I inquired whether he meant an understanding between the Governments or an understanding between their War Offices. He said he meant the War Offices; and that he had known about it when he was in Japan. I asked him whether that might effect the Disarmament Conference. He replied: "Yes, it may".

The Ambassador reverted to the first matter discussed, the Chamberlain case, and said that it was gratifying to have such matters settled satisfactorily. I expressed assent.

The conversation there ended.

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

I-13

Mr. Secretary



You will be
interested in the
information

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p. 2...

JAN 13 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Skiff

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

January 12, 1932.

Counselor of the Chinese
Legation, Dr. Hankling Yen

RECEIVED

Mr. Hornbeck

JAN 13 1932

JAN 13 1932

Subject: Manchuria Situation and the SECRETARY'S OFFICE
Chinese Minister's Plans.

Dr. Yen said that he had come with no special objective except to keep in touch. I said that I was always glad to see him.

I said that the newspapers had stated that the Chinese Foreign Office was sending us a note. Dr. Yen said that he had so noted, but the Legation had received nothing. I told him that we had no information except what the newspapers had said.

Dr. Yen said that the newspapers also had stated that the Chinese Government had thought of breaking off diplomatic relations; but that his Legation has received nothing on that point and did not believe that there had been anything in it. He went on to say that he and the Minister thought that it would be very foolish for China to make such a move. I said that, speaking unofficially and without authority, expressing only my personal opinion, I would think so too. Dr. Yen said that so far they had proceeded on the policy of avoiding war. I said that there was a great deal to be said in favor of that policy.

Dr. Yen

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JAN 14 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Dr. Yen said that the Chinese Minister would leave in a few days for Geneva. I said that I thought the newspapers had stated that Dr. Alfred Sze was to continue with China's case in the League. Dr. Yen said that effort had been made so to arrange, but that Dr. Sze was ill and there was no one else who could be sent just now except Dr. W. W. Yen. So, Dr. ^{W.W.}Yen was going; and, after the meeting of the Council, he would probably represent China at the Disarmament Conference.

SKH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 15 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated January 15, 1932

Rec'd 7:57 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 15 1932

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

10, January 15, 6 p. m.

Embassy's 7, January 14, 4 p. m.

I have been informed that the Japanese Government's
reply to our note will not be ready until tomorrow.

FORBES

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JAN 20 1932

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1337

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED

JAN 15 1932

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS AND PH

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 14, 1932

Rec'd 4:40 p. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 15 1932
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

73, January 14, 5 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Hankow:

"January 13, 4 p. m.

793.94

The Japanese Consul General here has written me officially, bringing to my notice an article in the Chinese vernacular press reporting that an American Citizen named Dr. S. Eddy had remarked in a lecture at a meeting of the Hupeh Provincial Government on January 11, that it was his belief that an anti-Japanese boycott was the most effective and legal way for China to cope with the Japanese aggression. The Japanese Consul General expresses his astonishment that a person of any intelligent class of American citizens should voice an opinion of this nature and requests me to investigate the accuracy of the report and inform him so that he may report the case to his Government.

I respectfully request the Legation's instruction as to whether I should comply with the Japanese Consul General's request.

For the

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793.94/3527

FILED

JAN 21 1932

REP

2- #73, from Peiping, Jan. 14, 5 p.m.

For the Legation's information I may say that some days ago the Secretary of the Navy Young Men's Christian Association at Hankow informed me that Dr. Eddy would give a lecture on "The challenge of the East" at a public luncheon at the terminus on January 15 and asked me to preside at the luncheon. I declined to do so."

Legation is replying as follows:

"January 14. 3 p. m.

Your January 13, 4 p. m. You may say courteously to your Japanese colleague that Dr. Eddy is a private citizen who is travelling in China in an entirely unofficial capacity and that you therefore do not feel any useful purpose would be served by attempting to verify statements made by him unless they are alleged to be in contravention of law. You could perhaps say, however, that if an occasion presented itself you would informally suggest to Eddy the desirability of refraining from publicly expressing opinions regarding political questions of an international character.

The Legation may add for your confidential information that Eddy is also reported to have occasionally severely criticised Chinese corruption elsewhere in his public addresses but no complaints have been received from Chinese authorities.

The Legation

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #73, from Peiping, Jan. 14, 5 p.m.

The Legation approves your decision not to preside at
the lecture on the 15th.

See also for your guidance Legation's circular No.
520, February 13, 1920" (Department's mail instruction to
the Legation No. 1092 December 26, 1919).

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD




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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 202. Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, January 4, 1932.



SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Dispute. Transmitting
 Minutes of the Council and other Documents.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's despatch
 793.94/3137
 No. 184 Political of November 21, 1931 and previous despatches
 transmitting documents relating to the appeal of the
 Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant of the
 League of Nations, and to transmit herewith the Minutes of
 1/ the meetings of the Council held in Paris from November 16
 to December 10, 1931, together with the other pertinent documents
 mentioned on the enclosed list, which have now been
 furnished me by the Secretary General pursuant to the
 Council's resolution of September 22, 1931.

These documents, taken with those previously sent,
 will form a complete set up to the close of the year 1931.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
 Prentiss B. Gilbert,
 American Consul.

Enclosures:

Documents mentioned
 on enclosed list.

Original and Five copies to Department of State.
 One copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

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JAN 4 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1
with No 202 Pol. of
Jan. 4 1932

LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE CHINESE-JAPANESE CONFLICT,
as enclosures to Despatch No.202 Political,
dated January 4,1932.

* * * *

C./65th Session/P.V.17(1)
C./65th Session/P.V.18(1)
C./65th Session/P.V.19(1)
C./65th Session/P.V.20(1)

* * * *

C.M.440 to
C.M.475.

* * * *

C.M.490 to
C.M.532.

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C.M.534
C.M.537
C.M.539
C.M.548
C.M.553
C.M.554
C.M.559
C.M.561

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C.M.563 to
C.M.568.

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C.M.571
C.M.572.

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C./65th Session/P.V.17(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

SEVENTEENTH MEETING (PUBLIC, THEN PRIVATE).

Held at Paris on Monday, November 16th, 1931, at 4 p.m.

President: M. BRIAND.

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. Germany was represented by M. VON BÜLOW, the British Empire by Sir John SIMON, the Irish Free State by Mr. LESTER, Italy by M. SCIALOJA, Norway by M. COLBAN, Peru by M. PRADA, and Yugoslavia by M. FOTITCH.

2956. **Representation of the Irish Free State.**

The PRESIDENT communicated to the Council the following telegram dated November 14th, addressed to the Secretary-General by Mr. McGilligan:

"Kindly convey to President my regret that I am unable attend Council session personally owing to extreme pressure of Parliamentary work. Mr. Lester will represent Irish Free State in my absence. — MCGILLIGAN."

2957. **Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant (continuation).**

The PRESIDENT. — In opening our meeting, I would first of all thank the members of the Council for having been good enough, in view of the reasons which prevented me from going to Geneva at the present moment, to agree to meet in Paris. I am happy to welcome them all on behalf of the French Government.

I should like particularly to welcome those of our colleagues who are sitting for the first time on the Council—Sir John Simon, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, and M. von Bülow, Secretary of State at the German Foreign Office.

The Council is meeting to-day in accordance with its decision of October 24th to adjourn until November 16th, in order then to make a further examination of the dispute between China and Japan. My first duty is to inform my colleagues on the Council of the situation and of the steps which, as President in office, I have felt it necessary to make since our last meeting.

While at its October meeting the Council was unable to obtain the agreement of the two parties concerned to the draft resolution which it had prepared with a view to facilitating the execution of the unanimous resolution of September 30th, it nevertheless only separated after confirming that draft by a vote which, as I then pointed out, is of great moral significance. That vote reaffirmed the principles contained in the Council resolution of September 30th, and I would observe that, while the Japanese representative was unable to accept the draft resolution of October 24th, the very definite declarations with which he accompanied the statement of his position at the meetings of the Council on October 22nd, 23rd and 24th, have shown that his Government is firmly resolved to fulfil the undertakings to which it subscribed in accepting the resolution of September 30th.

Immediately after the last meeting of the Council, I received from M. Sze a letter in which, after pointing out that China, like every Member of the League of Nations, was bound to a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations, the Chinese representative stated, with the authorisation of his Government, that China was determined loyally to fulfil all its obligations under the Covenant. He added that the Chinese Government was prepared to give proofs of this

- 2 -

intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement, as provided in Article 13 of the Covenant.

On October 26th, the Japanese representative communicated to the Council a declaration made on the same day at Tokio, containing a statement of the "basic principles" which, in the opinion of Japan, it was essential that China should recognise, and to which M. Yoshizawa referred on several occasions during our discussions.

After examining, with all the attention which it merited, the text of the Japanese "basic principles" as made public, it appeared to me that, on the one hand, the first four of these principles were fully covered by the draft resolution submitted to the Council on October 24th and that, on the other hand, with regard to the fifth—that is to say, respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria—a solution could doubtless be sought along the lines indicated in M. Sze's statement.

In these circumstances, taking advantage of the powers which the Council conferred on me for the interval between our meetings, I wrote to the Japanese representative informing him of my views and recalling the procedure laid down in the draft resolution of October 24th for guaranteeing the safety of persons and property before evacuation.

In his reply dated November 7th, the Japanese representative informed me of his objections regarding the fifth of the fundamental points. He was not sure that the terms of the communication from the Chinese representative did not justify some doubt as to the Chinese Government's interpretation of the validity of some of the treaties on which the relations between Japan and China were based, and this the Japanese Government could in no case accept.

That is the stage which the dispute has reached if it is regarded from the legal point of view and in the light of the various documents submitted.

I now come to the actual situation in Manchuria.

In this connection I have also had to avail myself on several occasions of the powers conferred on me by the Council, either for the purpose of asking the two parties concerned to furnish information, or to draw attention to the principles contained in the resolution of September 30th.

I made a point, in the first place, of obtaining particulars when the Chinese Government drew my attention on the 3rd and 4th of this month to the fact that part of the salt revenue serving as security for certain international loans had been seized in some of the occupied territories. The information I received from the two parties was communicated to the Members of the Council.

Secondly, in two cases in which the information received might give grounds for apprehending an encounter between armed forces, I thought it well to remind the Governments of the obligations devolving on them under the resolution of September 30th, and asked them to give the necessary orders to their army commanders to ensure that these obligations should be observed.

Though events have not yet justified the hopes we expressed when we separated on October 24th, I must, however, inform the Council that I have always found the two parties ready to supply me with all the information I have asked them to give. I regard this as evidence of their desire to co-operate loyally with the Council in the settlement of a dispute the special difficulty and gravity of which we all realise.

There is no need to remind you that the Council will continue its efforts to devise a solution in that spirit of objectivity and impartiality which it has constantly observed, without concerning itself with hasty judgments or tendentious commentaries, and with the sole desire, in accordance with the Covenant of the League, to make peace and justice prevail on the basis of respect for international obligations.

Sir John SIMON. — Mr. President, may I thank you for your kind reference to myself, and assure you that I, as representing my country, shall take the greatest satisfaction in co-operating with you and with all my colleagues on the Council, to promote the purposes and to maintain the moral authority of the League of Nations?

M. von BÜLOW. — I should like to thank you sincerely for your friendly remarks with regard to myself. I regret that I have been unable to take part personally in the discussions which have previously taken place on the question on our agenda, but I have closely studied this problem and I hope I shall be able to bring the aid of my country to the solution we are all seeking.

The PRESIDENT. — A number of my colleagues have expressed to me the very natural and legitimate desire that, before we enter upon the grave problem on our agenda, conversations should take place between us to examine the procedure and methods which we might employ and which would be most likely to enable us to achieve the object we have in view. This proposal is a very natural one and is in conformity with all the precedents.

We have not seen one another since October, when we framed a draft resolution. Certain steps which your President has taken have elicited interesting documents and information not without importance for the examination of the question before us. It is quite natural that the members of the Council should desire to consider this situation among themselves and to confer together freely as to the best procedure to be adopted.

Accordingly, as far as I am concerned, I see no objection—in fact I see many advantages—to this meeting, which is a formal opening meeting, being followed by a private meeting of the

- 3 -

members of the Council at which questions of procedure might be examined. We might then approach the subject which we have to discuss at a later public meeting.

The President's proposal was adopted.

(The Council then went into private session.)

2958. Delimitation of the Frontier between Iraq and Syria.

The PRESIDENT proposed that the Council should examine a question which did not appear on the agenda: the delimitation of the frontier between Iraq and Syria. Document C.843.1931.VI concerning this matter had already been circulated to the Members of the Council. The President suggested that the Yugoslav representative, Rapporteur for questions relating to mandates, be asked to deal with this matter.

The President's proposal was adopted.

2959. Expenditure resulting from the Summoning of the Council in Paris: Transfer of a Sum of 60,000 Swiss Francs from Item 3 to Item 2 (b) of the 1931 Budget.

The PRESIDENT referred to his correspondence¹ with the Secretary-General regarding the expenditure resulting from the summoning of the Council in Paris, and submitted the following draft resolution:

" The Council:

" Having been informed that in view of the expenses involved by the prolongation of the sixty-fifth ordinary session of the Council due to the continuation of the examination of the Sino-Japanese question, and in view particularly of the high cost of the telegrams despatched to the Members of the Council, item 2 of the 1931 Budget, ' Sessions of the Council ', is almost exhausted;

" Considering that, in view of the strictly political character of the present session of the Council, no objection can be raised to drawing on item 3, ' Unforeseen Expenditure (subject to special vote of Council) ', for a sum sufficient to cover the cost of the said session:

" Decides to transfer the sum of 60,000 Swiss francs from item 3 of the 1931 Budget, ' Unforeseen Expenditure (subject to special vote of Council) ', to item 2 (b), ' Extraordinary Sessions of the Council '."

The draft resolution was adopted.

¹ See document C.849.1931.X.

C./65th Session/P.V.18(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

EIGHTEENTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

Held at Paris on Saturday, November 21st, 1931, at 4.30 p.m.

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. Germany was represented by M. VON MUTIUS and the British Empire by Lord CECIL.

2960. Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant (continuation).

The PRESIDENT. — Since our last public meeting, the Members of the Council have actively endeavoured to seek a method, suitable to the circumstances, of peacefully settling the dispute between China and Japan.

It may be well to repeat that the Council is acting in this question on the basis of Article 11 of the Covenant, which has been invoked by the Chinese Government. In virtue of this article, it is the duty of the Council of the League to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations by a unanimous decision of its Members. A resolution was unanimously adopted on September 30th. That resolution retains its full executive force.

It would be desirable to refer to the essential provisions. In the first place, the resolution records the declaration made to the Council by the Japanese Government to the effect that the latter has no territorial designs in Manchuria. Since Japan has no territorial designs it follows —and the resolution of September 30th also recorded a declaration by the Japanese representative to this effect—that the Japanese Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops within the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively insured. Such are the essential factors of the problem as far as Japan is concerned.

On his side, the Chinese representative has declared that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside the railway zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are re-established.

The Council's duty is to seek, in concert with the parties, suitable means of enabling them to carry out these undertakings as quickly as possible.

In the private conversations which the representatives of Japan and China have had with the President of the Council, certain possibilities have been considered. I think that the numerous discussions which have taken place during the week have been useful, inasmuch as they have enabled certain ideas to be cleared up and the points of view of the two Governments to be sufficiently defined with regard to the methods which they envisage to settle their dispute.

Before I ask the Japanese and Chinese representatives to speak, I should like to appeal to them urgently to confine themselves as far as possible during the present meeting to outlining the suggestions they desire to lay before the Council with a view to putting an end to the present situation in Manchuria.

I should add that, while the Members of the Council were endeavouring to bring together the points of view of the two Governments, they shared the emotion felt by public opinion owing to the gravity of the events. I think I shall be voicing the feelings of all my colleagues in saying that the Council will certainly desire to remind the two parties of the assurance given by them

- 2 -

and recorded by the Council on September 30th, that they would respectively take all necessary steps not to aggravate the situation.

The Council's efforts to settle the dispute peacefully might be rendered vain if military operations continued and if public opinion in the two countries could not recover the calm necessary to enable the two Governments to co-operate in full confidence with the Council for the maintenance of peace.

M. YOSHIZAWA. — Mr. President: I have listened with the greatest attention and keen interest to what you have just said, and I desire to state how greatly my Government and I myself appreciate the efforts made by you, by all the Members of the Council and by the Secretary-General, to bring about a peaceful settlement of the present unfortunate dispute.

On September 30th, the Council unanimously adopted the resolution which serves as the basis, and, if I may so express myself, as a guide for all our work.

The Japanese Government entirely accepted that resolution. It is anxious that the resolution should be observed in the spirit and the letter, and hopes in this way to find a path to a successful and final settlement.

I have already informed the Council on several occasions that the origin of the present events in Manchuria unfortunately does not date merely from September 18th. The openly declared policy of the Chinese Nationalist Party, which consists in rejecting the most solemn undertakings by a unilateral repudiation of the treaties, the disregarding in practice of the clauses of the treaties which is encouraged by that party, and the anti-foreign campaigns which it foments and directs, have led in Manchuria to a long series of vexatious acts, of acts of hostility and provocation, and to cases of the denial of justice; and the Japanese people has been forced to realise that China was seeking in every way to take from the Japanese nation its legally acquired rights and to deprive the Japanese and Koreans residing in Manchuria of the fruits of their hard and patient labour. The Japanese and Koreans who had settled in those districts in the hope of being able to live and work there in peace are now of opinion that the safety of their lives, their property and their business undertakings is entirely dependent on the goodwill and pleasure of the Chinese authorities. It is easy to understand the sentiments of the entire Japanese nation, for which these rights and interests in Manchuria are of vital importance. Japan's right to live and her very existence are to-day at stake.

The scene of the incidents is remote, as the President stated the other day. The situation is a complicated one and even the news which we receive is often inaccurate.

So as to be able to pursue our efforts usefully on the basis of Article 11 of the Covenant and of the resolution of September 30th, it is essential that we should have a clear view of realities, and I think that everyone will agree in desiring to obtain impartial information on the situation. Accordingly, the Japanese Government considers that the essential condition of a fundamental solution of the question is a real knowledge of the situation as a whole, both in Manchuria and in China itself. It is for this reason that it proposes that the League of Nations should send a Commission of Enquiry to the spot. I believe that this proposal cannot fail to obtain the approval of all the Members of the Council. Of course, this Commission would not be empowered to intervene in the negotiations which may be initiated between the two parties, or to supervise the movements of the military forces of either.

There is one thing that I should like to add. In my Government's view, the creation and despatch of this Commission in no way modify its sincere desire to withdraw its troops as quickly as possible within the railway zone, in pursuance of the resolution of September 30th.

Already, to the extent permitted by the restoration of order, it has brought back a considerable number of detachments, and it will pursue this withdrawal, in the conditions envisaged by it up to the present, as soon as the necessary security has been established.

M. SZE. — Mr. President and Members of the Council: In order to show my extreme desire to co-operate with you, I will confine my remarks to a brief statement of our position, and, in deference to what you have just said, refrain from saying anything that would aggravate the situation.

The military occupation of Chinese territory by Japanese forces in violation of solemn treaties and of the Covenant is the crux of the situation. No disposition which fails to provide for the immediate cessation of all military operations and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces immediately set in motion and progressively executed over a period of time of the shortest possible duration can pretend to be a solution of the problem. My Government cannot bargain for withdrawal, or consent that withdrawal be dependent upon any other matter than the arrangement of details for securing the safety of life and property in the evacuated areas.

I reaffirm my former declarations that China is prepared to assume full responsibility for the maintenance of public order and the security of the life and property of Japanese nationals in Manchuria outside the area of the Southern Manchurian Railway. If further assurance is deemed necessary, any reasonable arrangement involving neutral co-operation under the auspices of the League will be accepted.

Face to face with events which rapidly march from bad to worse, we have been engaged in discussions which have led to no fruitful results, except, perhaps, to make more clear the issue

- 3 -

which is before the Council. That issue is now plain, and the time has come to act, for, while we debate, suffering is increasing and irreparable damage is being done. Further delay can only render more difficult the task which confronts us. In order to secure the prompt and complete evacuation of its territory, China has the firm intention of demanding, as circumstances may require, every right and every remedy secured to it as a Member of the League of Nations—by Article II and by any other article or articles of the Covenant.

Lord CECIL. — I think that probably all the Members of the Council will desire to consider the proposal which has been made by the Japanese representative. I do not propose myself to express any definite opinion upon it, but merely wish to say that, in my view, there is urgent necessity for some means to be elaborated to enable the Council to know accurately what is going on in Manchuria. My Government and I myself have held this view from the very outset of these discussions. We should have been glad if some means of this kind could have been taken even in September last; but the proposal which the Japanese representative has made certainly appears to afford some hope that we may ultimately obtain authoritative information regarding the actual events in Manchuria.

I earnestly hope it may be possible for us, whatever we may say or do with regard to other aspects of this problem, at any rate to accept the proposal before us.

M. YOSHIZAWA. — I should like to draw the attention of the British representative to the following passage in my speech: "Accordingly, the Japanese Government considers that the essential condition of a fundamental solution of the question is a real knowledge of the situation as a whole both in Manchuria and in China itself".

My proposal means that the enquiry would be made, not only in Manchuria, but in China itself. That, moreover, is the view I have already set forth.

M. SZE. — Under the resolution of September 30th, provision was made for information to be collected on the spot. This information was to be furnished by both parties, as well as by neutrals. May I enquire whether any neutrals visited the Nonni bridge and Tsitsihar and the surrounding district to collect information?

In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I should like also to say, with reference to the proposal made by the representative of Japan, that, when the composition, duties, etc., of the so-called Commission of Enquiry are being discussed, I shall propose amendments. I shall have to examine the whole matter before I can express any opinion whatever thereon, and I beg the Council not to misinterpret my attitude by thinking that I have accepted the whole proposal without knowing what it is.

It is understood that my country desires to be as conciliatory as possible, but it must be recognised that the matter before the Council at the present moment is the immediate cessation of hostilities so that the situation may not be aggravated, and the withdrawal of the Japanese troops in proportion as security is assured.

Lord CECIL. — I entirely agree with the President that our chief business in these proceedings is to take such measures as we think appropriate for safeguarding peace. This is our main purpose and, if I understand rightly, the anxiety of the Chinese representative. It would evidently be a complete failure of our duties—a complete failure of the whole object we have in view—if, during the progress of the work of this Commission, hostilities continued as they have unhappily continued during the past weeks.

With reference to the question put by the Chinese representative, I can inform him that I know of some neutral representatives who are in the district to which he refers. The district in question is very large, but I know that a British representative is at Anganchi, which is more or less in the region in question. I do not know whether there is anyone in Tsitsihar, but doubtless investigators will go wherever they think they can most usefully obtain information as to the events which are taking place.

M. SZE. — I express my sincere thanks to the British representative for his clear and definite answer. May I enquire whether it is possible for the information collected by the representative he mentions to be made available to the Council?

Lord CECIL. — I shall certainly see that the point just mentioned by M. Sze is considered, but I shall have to ascertain what other Members of the Council and Sir John Simon think to be right in this matter.

I do not mean by this remark that there is any reluctance on the part of the British Government to make this information available. I should, however, like to consider how far the information to which the Chinese representative refers is of such a character as to be of any use to the Council.

The PRESIDENT. — I must say that the French Government will take steps to ensure that those of its officials who are on duty in the areas concerned observe and report to their Government what they have seen. There is no need for me to say that any important information obtained by the French Government in this way will certainly be placed at the disposal of the Council.

M. VON MUTIUS. — When we met here on November 16th, we found, to our great regret, that the position in Manchuria, far from improving since October 24th and even since September 30th,

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had become appreciably worse, in spite of the Council's efforts to bring about a speedy settlement of the dispute.

The Japanese representative has explained to us why his Government has hitherto felt unable to carry out the undertaking entered into on September 30th to withdraw its troops within the railway zone. The Chinese representative, on his side, had already replied at Geneva that the state of insecurity which undoubtedly prevails in Manchuria, and which is at the present moment preventing the evacuation of the Japanese troops, was due precisely to the presence of those troops. I think it is sufficient for us to place on record these two views and to take account of the situation as it exists to-day. Our discussions have shown us the necessity of looking for some means of settlement other than those considered at Geneva. What is important is that we should deal with the situation before us and draw from it the necessary conclusions. While we do not wish at present either to go back into the past or to endeavour to fix the responsibility, we do desire to fulfil, and we are bound to proclaim, the duty which is incumbent upon us all—to put an end to a dispute which has already lasted too long. In a word, we have to find a practical solution of the difference which divides two great nations and which is causing anxiety to world public opinion.

The whole world is relying on the League of Nations to remove this danger to peace. The nations demand that we should find a satisfactory solution, and that confidence in the League of Nations, which is the very foundation of its existence and the essential condition of the success of all its efforts, should in no way be impaired. Public opinion has told us again and again that the fate of the League of Nations—that is to say, the fate of all peoples—is now at stake.

We have, of course, no intention of asking two Members of the League to surrender vital interests. The principal task of the League is to find just and equitable solutions. What we have to do is quite clear. The Council has not to solve all the questions at present at issue in Manchuria, but to put an end to a situation which is very like war and which certainly presents a grave danger of war.

The Japanese representative's suggestion which, if I am not mistaken, China does not entirely reject—that is to say, that a Commission instructed both to furnish impartial information and to co-operate in the pacification of the country be sent to the places in which disturbances have occurred—accordingly appears to me to be calculated to strengthen, in China and in Japan, the forces making for conciliation and peace.

I therefore venture once again to appeal to our Chinese and Japanese colleagues to make an effort to find with us the solution we all desire. We ask them not to allow themselves to be held back by scruples which we respect, but to contemplate an arrangement which, while leaving their principles unimpaired, will enable us to overcome the present difficulty and to take the first step towards an agreement. In this task we desire to aid them.

M. LERROUX. — The Council will perhaps allow me to lay before it certain considerations regarding the grave incident with which it is now dealing. It is, in fact, an incident, and I feel that we should constantly bear in mind that, whatever interest we, like the parties, may have in the relations of China and Japan as a whole, the incident of September 18th and the actual situation which has resulted therefrom constitute the essential subject-matter of our discussions.

This is our third meeting, and the position in itself, far from improving, has become definitely more serious. The parties concerned will perhaps forgive the representative of a Power which, though widely separated from them geographically, is nevertheless closely united to them by ties of ancient friendship, for looking at the question from the point of view of the interests of a neutral nation and the interests of the League. If the matter is regarded from these two aspects, the important point is not the history of the relations between China and Japan, nor the validity of the treaties and protocols in which these relations are defined; it is not even the nature of the dispute which divides the two countries. The only important point is the methods employed to remedy the position and the question whether these methods can be reconciled with the principles of our international charters—the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris.

What are the facts? An incident occurred in a region with a very special regime, where two nations are living side by side under conditions known to you all. We have no direct information from neutral and impartial sources with regard to this initial incident. I venture to stress this important fact. Three months after the incident, the Council of the League of Nations, the highest and most powerful international authority, has been unable to procure the most elementary information as to the exact origin of the most serious dispute with which it has ever had to deal. In these circumstances, we must congratulate ourselves on the Japanese proposal.

We should first of all acknowledge that the intentions of the Japanese Government are absolutely honourable. With its customary nobility of mind, it spontaneously declared to us that it had no territorial design in Manchuria, and that it would continue "as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be".

Those are the actual words of the resolution we adopted unanimously on September 30th. In this connection, I desire to make two statements. The first is that, to my mind, this resolution, in taking account of the wishes of the Japanese Government, recognised the very special position of Manchuria by reversing the rôle which the desire for security should play in such matters, since it makes the evacuation of Chinese territory by Japanese troops depend upon the security of Japanese nationals and their property. Seeing that this application of the principle of security might be taken in future as a precedent, which would certainly be dangerous, I think it essential to lay stress upon its exceptional character, this being attributable to the desire for conciliation and understanding which the Council has constantly displayed in this matter. The second

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statement I wish to make is that to my mind the words "safety" and "protection" should be understood in their obvious and direct sense, and that, for my part, I should find it very difficult to extend them so as to include—as some of the documents submitted to us would seem to suggest—the settlement of certain questions relating to the disputed treaties.

I think it essential that we should consider in that light the solution which we must find for the question before us. In doing so we can, I am sure, rely upon the entire goodwill of the two nations directly concerned.

M. SCIALOJA. — I think we are very near the settlement of a problem which, at times, it appeared almost impossible to solve. If there is now a hope that we may achieve our object, this is largely due, Mr. President, to your energy and wisdom, two qualities in which you are pre-eminent.

I do not desire to prolong the discussion. I think we are all agreed, and, when there is agreement, we should act upon it and not lose time in talking. Now we have only to act. I accordingly desire to make the following declaration on behalf of the Italian Government.

My Government will place at the disposal of the Commission of Enquiry all the facilities it possesses on the spot. We have a good many people there. We have Government officials and persons holding prominent social positions. All the Italians on the spot will contribute towards the enquiry. We cannot do much more than that, but what we do we shall do thoroughly.

The enquiry will be conducted by persons appointed by us—above all by witnesses of what has occurred and what may still occur. These persons will also be able to explain to us the significance of the events, for occurrences very often acquire an importance which was not at first suspected. In order to understand certain acts, one must know the spirit in which they were performed. An effort must always be made to ascertain that spirit, and it is for the purpose of assisting in this way that Italy will place at the disposal of the Commission of Enquiry all the means at her disposal.

M. ZALESKI. — From the very beginning of the serious dispute between China and Japan, the Polish Government associated itself with all the steps taken by the Council which appeared likely to bring about pacification and to restore between these two great countries the good understanding upon which peace depends.

The extreme complexity of the dispute and the special position of the territory which has become the scene of the events we are now considering have given to the matter submitted to the Council a wholly exceptional character, and have necessitated the employment by the Council of methods which are also exceptional.

The Council did not possess, and it does not possess even now, all the information required for the purpose of recommending measures which would bring the dispute in the Far East to a speedy end.

The Polish Government is prepared to support the proposal to send a commission of experts to study the position on the spot, because it hopes that that proposal will be accepted by the parties concerned, and that it will be a first step towards the pacification of public opinion in China and Japan and the restoration of normal conditions in Manchuria.

M. FOTITCH. — If the Council could unanimously accept the proposal to send a Commission of Enquiry, I also am ready to support it. I should welcome it because I see in it a solution likely to restore peace and tranquillity in the area with which we are concerned. The Council has made every endeavour to discharge its duty under Article 11 of the Covenant. If these efforts have not produced all the results which might legitimately have been expected, the reason is that the dispute with which we are faced is of wholly exceptional character, exceptional by reason of the remoteness of the scene of action—which has made it very difficult for the Council to obtain correct information—but exceptional also by reason of the intricacy and nature of the contractual relations existing between the two parties. For these reasons, the Council has been obliged to resort to a procedure which the President, at the meeting on October 24th, described as exceptional and one which could not be taken as a precedent.

I therefore accept the proposal to send a Commission of Enquiry, in the hope that this will enable the Council successfully to discharge its duties under Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

M. COLBAN. — I shall not make a long speech. If I did so, I could only repeat more or less word for word what previous speakers have already said. I will therefore simply say that I accept the proposal to set up a Commission of Enquiry under the conditions specified by the previous speakers.

M. MATOS. — I also do not wish to prolong the discussion, but desire to state that I agree to the appointment of the Commission of Enquiry which has just been suggested.

M. GONZALEZ-PRADA. — I agree with what has been said regarding the adoption of any measures likely to lead to practical and decisive results.

M. GARAY. — No one will rejoice more heartily than the representative of a small country at the peaceful turn which the Sino-Japanese dispute—a dispute which has been before us now for a long time—seems to be taking. Indeed, the existence and future of small States are closely bound up with the maintenance of peace, for peace is the essential condition, the natural and

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necessary environment, for the operation and development of law, and law is the support and stay of the weak. The events which have occurred in Manchuria during the past two months have brought in question certain principles of international law with regard to which the representative of the smallest State on the Council would have much to say and many reservations to make. But I would rather dwell on the great hope which is reviving among us that at last the efforts we have made on three occasions to bring the parties to an agreement will, with the loyal and resolute co-operation of our colleagues, the representatives of China and Japan, be successful. I express that desire on behalf of my Government.

The PRESIDENT. — As President of this meeting, I should be failing in my duty if I did not thank the representatives of Japan and China for having consented, in deference to a suggestion which I ventured to make, to keep their remarks within the bounds of those conciliatory and courteous discussions which have so often enabled us to deal with the most difficult situations. I should like to thank them for the tone of their explanations. If, as I hope, we succeed in reaching a friendly settlement of the grave dispute which has been referred to our jurisdiction, I am convinced that their attitude will be found to have singularly facilitated our task.

I am glad that a proposal that is concrete and definite—at least, as regards its principle—has been made by the Japanese representative. He proposes the appointment of a commission, which he calls a Commission of Enquiry, and which would proceed to the distant countries we are dealing with to examine the difficulties of the situation and the causes of dispute, and to seek means of appeasing it and of allowing us to achieve a solution, not a temporary solution which can always be arrived at by dint of effort and goodwill, but a lasting solution—that is to say, one capable of ushering in a long period of appeasement and pacific co-operation between two great peoples. This is the end we have in view.

What will be the character of this commission? I duly noted the reservations of the Chinese representative, and I understand them. This is a very recent proposal, in regard to which he has perhaps not been able to obtain from his Government all the information he requires—a proposal that does not contain the details without which it is difficult for him to pronounce an opinion. But I also noticed that he would not refuse to make an effort of conciliation if he thought that it would not be incompatible with the vital interests of his country.

As regards the Japanese representative, I imagine that, having put forward this suggestion, he has considered all its repercussions and all its consequences. I think that the despatch of a commission such as that suggested would, apart from the valuable information which it would be likely to give us, create a calmer atmosphere, as the Polish representative has pointed out. The very fact of the appointment and departure of the Commission and the certainty that it would be on the spot and would study the circumstances and the difficulties of the situation are calculated to remove many anxieties and to tranquillise public opinion.

The Commission would consist of competent persons belonging to countries which have always shown themselves favourable to the settlement of disputes. It would be felt that the dispute was entering upon a new phase and was approaching the end. Many incidents would thus be avoided, for I would remind the Japanese representative that there can be no doubt that the despatch and the labours of a commission would occupy a certain time, and it is unthinkable that, during this period, acts of hostility could be committed which would lead to bloodshed in these areas and still further aggravate the situation. When we come to examine the substance of this proposal, we shall undoubtedly have to seek, with the assistance of our colleagues, the means of ensuring that this commission should be able to begin its work with the certainty that it will not be disturbed by incidents such as those that have come to our notice.

I hope that the Chinese representative, after obtaining all the explanations which he very rightly desires, will understand that here, too, he must make an effort to co-operate with us with a view to a peaceful solution.

What will be the character of this commission? This, of course, is the first question which arises. What will be the importance of the Commission? How many countries will be represented? Who will be the members? What exactly will be its terms of reference? How will it communicate to us the first results of its work, for I think that, as its investigations proceed, it should supply us with information? Here we have a whole series of problems raised by the Japanese representative's proposal. These are the problems which we must consider to-morrow. We must bring out the essential points of the proposal which has been laid before us, and this can only be done by co-operation between all the Members of the Council of the League, including the representatives of China and Japan.

All that we can do now is to note this proposal, to place it on record with great satisfaction, to see in it a beginning of the solution which we earnestly desire, and to make every effort to achieve success along the lines indicated, so that, in as short a time as possible, we shall be able to say that this serious conflict is closed.

In moments like the present, which are fraught with trouble and anxiety, the President has not merely to consider the success of his work as President—that is a minor point—he must remember that he has in his hands the future of that high and noble institution the League of Nations, and he must do nothing which might compromise the League. It would give me immense gratification to reach a successful result in conjunction with you. I should like to say, however, that, while we are pursuing our tentative efforts, which it is always easy to criticise and even to ridicule, the peoples of the world are not losing faith. If I laid before you the enormous quantity of telegrams which reach me from every part of the world testifying to the confidence which people place in us, to their hopes and to their faith in our success, I am sure that, like myself,

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you would find this a great comfort. It would show you the great moral force of the League of Nations and how criminal it would be to allow a passing event to destroy such a force, with all its hopes for the future.

I am confident that the dispute with which we are dealing will not lead to any such disastrous result; and, when we have studied the proposal before us, when we have framed a draft resolution and have at last reached unanimity, I feel sure that we shall separate with the joy of a result achieved and with still greater confidence in the noble institution to which we belong.

M. SZE. — With reference to the appeal just made by our President for co-operation, I can assure him that the Chinese Government and the Chinese people greatly appreciate all the efforts he has made. I think I can say, without fear of contradiction, that the Chinese Government and people have tried their best—and I think they have succeeded—to do nothing that would make the present task more difficult.

As regards the proposed Commission of Enquiry, I think I should, even at the risk of repetition, make the position of my Government clear. While raising no objection to the proposal, but, on the contrary, being in favour of any means of obtaining a more accurate knowledge of events in Manchuria, the Chinese Government will not for a moment agree that the creation of a Commission of Enquiry should, in any way, furnish an excuse for a delay in beginning and progressively carrying out, in the shortest possible time, the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops.

The Chinese Government will not be willing to discuss the proposal for a Commission of Enquiry upon any other basis. Whether or not a Commission of Enquiry is appointed, the immediate and imperative task which, according to the view of my Government, is before the Council is to take steps to stop the aggravation of the situation by the immediate cessation of hostilities, and to secure the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, which withdrawal should begin at once and proceed progressively to a prompt completion.

M. YOSHIKAWA. — I beg to thank you, Mr. President, for your very friendly words. The question we are now discussing is both complicated and important. For the moment, the particulars I have given are only in the nature of general principles, for I am still in communication with my Government on this subject. Nevertheless, I have been greatly encouraged by your observations. I also thank the members of the Council for their very friendly words.

As I have already stated on many occasions, my Government is prepared to withdraw its troops as soon as the safety of Japanese nationals and their property is effectively assured. Unfortunately, the situation is still dangerous, but my Government is at present endeavouring to improve it.

The PRESIDENT. — The Council has now a proposal before it. This proposal will be considered, and, as soon as a draft resolution can be laid before the parties and the other Members of the Council, another meeting will be held.

C./65th Session/P.V.19(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

NINETEENTH MEETING (PUBLIC)

Held on Wednesday, December 9th, 1931, at 5 p.m.

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General.
The British Empire was represented by Lord CECIL, Spain by M. DE MADARIAGA and Poland by M. DE CHLAPOWSKI.

2961. **Tribute to the Memory of M. Salandra.**

The PRESIDENT. — This morning we received the sad news of Antonio Salandra's death. This great Italian statesman was one of those who have made a valuable contribution to the work of the League. His name must now be added to the already lengthy list of men whose memory we piously cherish.

In the Council, where he sat for nearly two years, his charm, his sagacity and the keen intelligence which he concealed under an appearance of smiling good-fellowship, won for him the friendship of all his colleagues.

I should like to recall the words with which he welcomed us at Rome, in 1924, to the Doria Palace:

"It is only right that within the walls of Rome there should be appreciated at its true value the effort which is being made by the League to ensure to the peoples a durable peace, which cannot henceforth be imposed on the world by the preponderance of a single nation but which may in future be guaranteed by the desire of all nations for peace."

I have thought it opportune to recall these words at a moment when the Council, after three weeks of efforts to settle a dispute between two of its Members which has been referred to it, is resuming its public meetings.

I am sure I shall be voicing your sentiments in requesting our eminent colleague, M. Scialoja, to convey our most sincere condolences to M. Salandra's family and to the Italian Government.

M. SCIALOJA. — I should like to thank you most warmly, Mr. President, for what you have just said regarding our late colleague, Antonio Salandra. For my country and myself this is a cruel blow. I shall add nothing to what you have said of the statesman, because that is the part of Salandra's life which is most familiar to the world.

But, as a former colleague of Antonio Salandra's at the University of Rome, where he was Professor of Law, I will only add that he was one of our greatest Italian writers. It is difficult to write as Salandra did on a multiplicity of subjects in a style which was always suited to the subjects he was dealing with. Latterly, he had begun to write the history of the most important part of his life. As a rule, books of this kind constitute rather an apologia than an impartial judgment of the facts. Those of Salandra, on the contrary, are an unbiased expression of the truth. His works will remain classic on account of their purity of style and simplicity of expression.

So when I go back to Rome I shall no longer find my old friend, with whom I used to talk almost daily of our studies. I shall keenly feel the loss of a man who has lived about as long as I have, since he was only two years older than myself, and I cannot help thinking that before very long I shall follow him. Those who have known me and whose thoughts and deeds I have shared are awaiting me.

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I should like to thank you again, Mr. President, for the tribute you have paid to my distinguished countryman.

2962. **Tribute to the Memory of M. Loucheur.**

M. FOTITCH. — Since our last public meeting, the League has lost a faithful and valuable supporter. Louis Loucheur, a former French Minister and statesman, who has been carried off by a sudden illness, had on many occasions rendered important services to the League. In economic questions the League had no more capable adviser, and it is especially in this field of work that his prodigious energy and keen and fertile mind were applied. It was with inspired devotion and tireless zeal that Louis Loucheur threw himself into the League's work, and we all remember the outstanding part he took in the Economic Conference of 1927, which he was the first to propose, in the numerous Committees of the League of Nations and of the Assembly, and in the Commission of Enquiry for European Union.

I feel, however, that it is especially incumbent upon me to recall the services rendered by Louis Loucheur in the final settlement of the so-called question of the optants. It is by a cruel irony of fate that I should have to recall this in the very room where, on April 28th, 1930, we signed with him, as President of the Eastern Reparations Conference, the agreements that put an end to those disputes.

The members of the Council will all remember the long and difficult discussions on this thorny question, which went through many Council sessions without a final solution being arrived at. Thanks to Loucheur's authority, tact, inexhaustible good-will and generous enthusiasm, we were finally able to settle this question to the satisfaction of all concerned. In this matter, Loucheur rendered genuine service to the cause of peace and earned our sincere gratitude.

In paying a heartfelt tribute to his memory, I am sure, Mr. President, I am speaking for all my colleagues on the Council.

The PRESIDENT. — You will not be surprised if I associate myself most warmly with the just and well-deserved tribute which has been paid to the memory of Louis Loucheur. I thank the representative of Yugoslavia most sincerely for having given this just appreciation of a man who was among the most energetic and ardent collaborators of the League of Nations. In the name of the League, I thank him. I also thank him in the name of my country, which has not yet realised the extent of the loss it has suffered. Lastly, I thank him most profoundly in my own name. Loucheur was not only a comrade-in-arms, closely associated with most of my efforts; he was a friend—a devoted, faithful and always loyal friend. His death is a cruel loss to me; one feels those losses keenly when one has reached the time of life that I have reached myself.

2963. **Mandates : Delimitation of the Frontier between Syria and Iraq.**

M. FOTITCH presented the following report and draft resolution:

"The Council has before it a joint request by the British and French Governments relating to the delimitation of the frontier between Iraq and Syria, which territories are under their respective mandates. The information communicated by the two mandatory Powers¹ shows that certain difficulties were encountered in carrying out the provisions of Article I of the Convention signed by them on December 23rd, 1920,² as regards the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier.

"In the first place, divergencies of opinion exist as to the exact interpretation of the frontier which Article I of the Convention was intended to define. Secondly, it was found that, whatever interpretation was placed upon Article I of the Convention, a frontier drawn in strict conformity therewith would be likely to be unsatisfactory in certain sectors for military, political, administrative, tribal, economic, geographical or other reasons.

¹ Document C.843.1931.VI.

² Article I:

"The boundaries between the territories under the French mandate of Syria and the Lebanon, on the one hand, and the British mandates of Mesopotamia and Palestine, on the other, are determined as follows:

"On the east, the Tigris from Jeziret-ibn-Omar to the boundaries of the former vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul.

"On the south-east and south, the aforesaid boundary of the former vilayets southwards as far as Roumelan Koeui; thence a line leaving in the territory under the French mandate the entire basin of the western Kabur and passing in a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kemal, thence a straight line to Imtar to the south of Jebul Druse, then a line to the south of Nasib on the Hejaz Railway, then a line to Semakh on the Lake of Tiberias, traced to the south of the railway, which descends towards the lake and parallel to the railway. Deraa and its environs will remain in the territory under the French mandate; the frontier will, in principle, leave the valley of the Yarmuk in the territory under the French mandate, but will be drawn as close as possible to the railway in such a manner as to allow the construction in the valley of the Yarmuk of a railway entirely situated in the territory under the British mandate. At Semakh, the frontier will be fixed in such a manner as to allow each of the two High Contracting Parties to construct and establish a harbour and railway station giving free access to the Lake of Tiberias.

"On the west"

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"The British and French Governments consider that it is not within the competence of a Delimitation Commission such as that referred to in Article 2¹ of the Convention to modify the frontier defined in Article 1 to an extent sufficient in the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier to remove the unsatisfactory features above mentioned.

"The mandatory Powers being for these reasons unable to prepare suitable joint instructions for the Commission as regards the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier, and desirous of promoting a speedy, final and equitable settlement of a question of primary importance to the populations of the territories over which they exercise their respective mandates, have invited the Council to examine all aspects of the difficulties referred to above. They propose that, after forming its conclusion as to the intentions of Article 1 of the Franco-British Convention of December 23rd, 1920, the Council should indicate a frontier between Syria and Iraq based thereon but modified as required by the aforementioned considerations, the frontier so indicated to be accepted by all concerned as a definitive solution of the frontier question.

"The British and French Governments suggest that the task of the Council would be facilitated by the appointment of a Commission, which would collect on the spot such information and would make such recommendations as might assist the Council to reach a decision.

* * *

"I do not propose that the Council should examine the substance of the question forthwith, since the two Powers which have submitted it to us have not yet sent us the memoranda and maps defining their respective points of view, and since they suggest that, before the Council comes to a decision, it should send a Commission of Enquiry to the spot. The action of the Council, if it accepts the mission offered to it, should, in my opinion, be confined for the moment to the appointment of this Commission and the definition of the task which it will be called upon to undertake.

"I therefore propose that the Commission should consist of three commissioners selected for their special competence, being nationals of countries not parties to the question, whose appointment might be entrusted to the President in Office of the Council, assisted by the Rapporteur for mandates questions. In order to facilitate this choice, the two parties might be requested to submit proposals in this connection. The Commission would be assisted by four assessors, each of the parties appointing two.

"The Commission's task would be defined by the actual terms of the request made by the British and French Governments; it would consist in collecting on the spot full information and particulars as to the military, political, administrative, tribal, economic, geographical and other problems which the question involves, so as to permit of its thorough investigation. The Commission would then make such suggestions to the Council as might assist the latter in framing its decision, which will be final, with regard to the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier.

"Needless to say, the expenses involved by this consultation would have to be borne by the two mandatory Powers concerned.

"Should the Council be prepared to accept the various suggestions which I have the honour to submit to it, I propose that it should adopt the following resolution,

"The Council,

"In pursuance of the joint request by the British and French Governments:

"(1) Decides to accept, in principle, the British and French Government's request that it should examine all aspects of the difficulties raised by the delimitation of the frontier between Syria and Iraq, should form its conclusions as to the intentions of Article 1 of the Franco-British Convention of December 23rd, 1920, and should then indicate a frontier between Syria and Iraq based on this Convention but modified as required by the aforementioned considerations;

"(2) Decides to set up a Commission consisting of three commissioners selected for their special competence, being nationals of countries not parties to the question, assisted by four assessors, to collect full information and particulars on the spot, and to make such suggestions as may assist the Council in framing its decision on this question; this decision will be final;

¹ Article 2:

"A commission shall be established within three months from the signature of the present Convention to trace on the spot the boundary-line laid down in Article 1 between the French and British mandatory territories. This commission shall be composed of four members. Two of these members shall be nominated by the British and French Governments respectively, the two others shall be nominated, with the consent of the mandatory Power, by the local Governments concerned in the French and British mandatory territories respectively.

"In case any dispute should arise in connection with the work of the commission, the question shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.

"The final reports by the commission shall give the definite description of the boundary as it has been actually demarcated on the ground; the necessary maps shall be annexed thereto and signed by the commission. The reports, with their annexes, shall be made in triplicate; one copy shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, one copy shall be kept by the mandatory, and one by the other Government concerned."

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" (3) Requests the President in Office of the Council to appoint, with the assistance of the Rapporteur for mandates questions, the members of the above-mentioned Commission; the two parties are requested to submit jointly proposals in this connection;

" (4) Decides that the sums required by the Commission for the accomplishment of its work shall be borne by the British and French Governments, the mandatory Powers for Iraq and Syria. "

The PRESIDENT. — The report which has just been submitted to the Council provides that the President in Office of the Council will have to appoint, with the assistance of the Rapporteur on mandates questions, the members of the Commission which is to be sent by the League to examine on the spot the problems connected with the delimitation of the frontier between Syria and Iraq.

Since by a coincidence the present President of the Council is the representative of one of the parties concerned, I think my colleagues will agree with me that, in accordance with the Council's usual procedure, my predecessor, the Spanish representative, should be asked to undertake this particular duty.

In taking this decision, the Council will simply be following the procedure observed in minorities questions, when, if the President in Office belongs to a country interested in a question under examination, he delegates his power to deal with it to his predecessor in office.

The President's proposal was adopted.

Lord CECIL. — I desire, on behalf of the British Government, to express my warm thanks to the Rapporteur, and, I hope, by anticipation, to the Council for the proposal which is now before it. I am sure all the members of the Council will agree with me that this will constitute, when adopted, a valuable step towards the settlement of this question.

Perhaps I may be permitted to add that this seems to me an excellent and striking example of that part of the work of the League of Nations which is not so spectacular as some of the other activities in which we are engaged, but which is nevertheless of very great importance for the welfare and happiness of mankind. We have here a question which has arisen between two of the Members of the Council and which I hope will, by this step, be settled without undue controversy or undue delay to the satisfaction, I doubt not, of all parties concerned.

I venture to express once more the thanks of my Government to the Council and to the Rapporteur.

The draft resolution was adopted.

2964. **Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant** (continuation).

The PRESIDENT read the following draft resolution:

" The Council,

" (1) Reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30th, 1931, by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly bound; it therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution, so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution;

" (2) Considering that events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24th;

" Notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life;

" (3) Invites the two parties to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation;

" (4) Invites the other Members of the Council to furnish the Council with any information received from their representatives on the spot;

" (5) Without prejudice to the carrying out of the above-mentioned measures,

" Desiring, in view of the special circumstances of the case, to contribute towards a final and fundamental solution by the two Governments of the questions at issue between them:

" Decides to appoint a Commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them, upon which peace depends;

" The Governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to assist the Commission.

" The two Governments will afford the Commission all facilities to obtain on the spot whatever information it may require;

" It is understood that, should the two parties initiate any negotiations, these would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the Commission, nor would it be within the competence of the Commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either party.

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"The appointment and deliberations of the Commission shall not prejudice in any way the undertaking given by the Japanese Government in the resolution of September 30th as regards the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone.

"(6) Between now and its next ordinary session, which will be held on January 25th, 1932, the Council, which remains seized of the matter, invites its President to follow the question and to summon it afresh if necessary."

The President then made the following declaration:

"It will be observed that the resolution which is before you provides for action on two separate lines: (1) to put an end to the immediate threat to peace; (2) to facilitate the final solution of existing causes of dispute between the two countries.

"The Council was glad to find during its present sittings that an enquiry into the circumstances which tend to disturb the relations between China and Japan, in itself desirable, would be acceptable to the parties. The Council therefore welcomed the proposal to establish a Commission which was brought before it on November 21st. The final paragraph of the resolution provides for the appointment and functioning of such a Commission.

"I shall now make certain comments on the resolution paragraph by paragraph.

"Paragraph 1. — This paragraph reaffirms the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council on September 30th, laying particular stress on the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone on the conditions described therein as speedily as possible.

"The Council attaches the utmost importance to this resolution and is persuaded that the two Governments will set themselves to the complete fulfilment of the engagements which they assumed on September 30th.

"Paragraph 2. — It is an unfortunate fact that, since the last meeting of the Council, events have occurred which have seriously aggravated the situation, and have given rise to legitimate apprehension. It is indispensable and urgent to abstain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting, and from all other action likely to aggravate the situation.

"Paragraph 4. — Under paragraph 4, the Members of the Council other than the parties are requested to continue to furnish the Council with information received from their representatives on the spot.

"Such information having proved of high value in the past, the Powers who have the possibility of sending such representatives to various localities have agreed to do all that is possible to continue and improve the present system.

"For this purpose, these Powers will keep in touch with the two parties, so that the latter may, should they so desire, indicate to them the localities to which they would desire the despatch of such representatives.

"Paragraph 5 provides for the institution of a Commission of Enquiry. Subject to its purely advisory character, the terms of reference of the Commission are wide. In principle, no question which it feels called upon to study will be excluded, provided that the question relates to any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends. Each of the two Governments will have the right to request the Commission to consider any question the examination of which it particularly desires. The Commission will have full discretion to determine the questions upon which it will report to the Council, and will have power to make interim reports when desirable.

"If the undertakings given by the two parties according to the resolution of September 30th have not been carried out by the time of the arrival of the Commission, the Commission should as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation.

"It is specially provided that, 'should the two parties initiate any negotiations, these would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the Commission, nor would it be within the competence of the Commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either party'. This latter provision does not limit in any way its faculty of investigation. It is also clear that the Commission will enjoy full liberty of movement in order to obtain the information it may require for its reports."

M. YOSHIZAWA. — Mr. President, I have heard with great interest the speech you have just made, and I feel it my duty to express my opinion in regard to it. I must say, however, that the instructions for which I asked my Government last evening have not yet reached me, and consequently I am bound to ask the Council to hold another meeting on this question to-morrow afternoon, when I expect to be able to express my views in a definite manner.

The PRESIDENT. — I do not think any of the members of the Council wish to oppose the request of the Japanese representative. I myself, as President, shall no doubt have a few comments to add at the next meeting to the statement I have made to-day.

The discussion was postponed to the next meeting.

C./65th Session/P.V.20(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

TWENTIETH MEETING (PUBLIC, THEN PRIVATE).

Held on Thursday, December 10th, 1931, at 4.30 p.m.

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. The British Empire was represented by Lord CECIL, Spain by M. DE MADARIAGA and Poland by M. DE CHLAPOWSKI.

2965. Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant (continuation).

The PRESIDENT. — The Japanese representative informed the Council yesterday that he had not yet received from his Government instructions that would enable him to make a definite pronouncement, and he requested us to allow him to postpone his statement until to-day's meeting. We acceded to his desire. I hope that he is now in a position to make his statement, and I therefore call upon him to speak.

M. YOSHIZAWA. — Mr. President and Members of the Council, I wish to thank you for your courtesy in complying with my request to put off the meeting of the Council until to-day. I wish also to express my sense of gratitude and sincere appreciation for the efforts which, since the beginning of the present session of the Council, you have been good enough to make in regard to the question which has engaged our serious attention.

The special circumstances of the situation in China, the great distance which separates us here from Manchuria, the diversity and the magnitude of the interests at stake, have made our work very difficult. In dealing with this question, however, you have amply displayed the spirit of conciliation, goodwill and patience. Thanks to your labour and tact, Mr. President, we have before us the draft resolution which furnishes us with the means of clarifying the situation.

With regard to paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, I am happy to accept it on behalf of the Japanese Government, on the understanding that this paragraph is not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria. Such action is admittedly an exceptional measure called for by the special situation prevailing in Manchuria, and its necessity will naturally be obviated when normal conditions shall have been restored in that region.

With these considerations, I am happy to be able to declare that the Japanese Government accepts the draft resolution now before us.

M. SZE. — My Government intends to discharge in good faith every obligation which it assumes in agreeing to this resolution as interpreted by the President of the Council. The entire arrangement being a practical one designed to meet the pending emergency, it becomes necessary, in the interest of a complete understanding, for me to place upon record certain observations and reservations in point of principle, as follows:

I. China must and does fully reserve any and all rights, remedies and juridical positions to which she is or may be entitled under and by virtue of all of the provisions of the Covenant, under all the existing treaties to which China is a party, and under the accepted principles of international law and practice.

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II. The present arrangement evidenced by the resolution and the statement made by the President of the Council is regarded by China as a practical measure embodying four essential and interdependent elements:

- (a) Immediate cessation of hostilities;
- (b) Liquidation of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria within the shortest possible period of time;
- (c) Neutral observation and reporting upon all developments from now on;
- (d) A comprehensive enquiry into the entire Manchurian situation on the spot by a Commission appointed by the Council.

The said arrangement being in effect and in spirit predicated upon these fundamental factors, its integrity would be manifestly destroyed by the failure of any one of them to materialise and be effectively realised as contemplated.

III. China understands and expects that the Commission provided for in the resolution will make it its first duty to enquire into and report with its recommendations on the withdrawal of the Japanese forces if such withdrawal has not been completed when the Commission arrives on the spot.

IV. China assumes that the said arrangement neither directly nor by implication affects the question of reparations and damages to China and her nationals growing out of the recent events in Manchuria, and makes specific reservation in that respect.

V. In accepting the resolution laid before us, China appreciates the efforts of the Council to prevent further fighting and bloodshed by enjoining both China and Japan to avoid any initiative which may lead to further fighting or any other action likely to aggravate the situation. It must be clearly pointed out that this injunction should not be violated under the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by a state of affairs which it is the very purpose of the resolution to do away with. It is to be observed that much of the lawlessness now prevalent in Manchuria is due to the interruption of normal life caused by the invasion of the Japanese forces. The only sure way of restoring the normal peaceful life is to hasten the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and allow the Chinese authorities to assume the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order. China cannot tolerate the invasion and occupation of her territory by the troops of any foreign country; far less can she permit these troops to usurp the police functions of the Chinese authorities.

VI. China notes with satisfaction the purpose to continue and improve the present system of neutral observation and reporting through representatives of other Powers, and China will from time to time, as occasion requires, indicate the localities to which it seems desirable to dispatch such representatives.

VII. It should be understood that, in agreeing to this resolution, which provides for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces to the railway zone, China in no way recedes from the position she has always taken with respect to the maintenance of military forces in the said railway zone.

VIII. China would regard any attempt by Japan to bring about complications of a political character affecting China's territorial or administrative integrity (such as promoting so-called independence movements or utilising disorderly elements for such purposes) as an obvious violation of the undertaking to avoid any further aggravation of the situation.

Lord CECIL. — I am glad that both my Japanese and Chinese colleagues have accepted the resolution, and I do not desire to make any comment on their declarations except on one point.

The Council has heard the declarations of the Japanese and Chinese representatives on paragraph 2. There can be no doubt that the position in Manchuria is difficult and exceptional. It may well be that circumstances may arise there which will cause danger to Japanese lives and property from elements of the population out of control, and if an emergency of that kind should arise it might become inevitable that Japanese forces in the neighbourhood should take action against bandits and the like. But I welcome the recognition by my Japanese colleague of the exceptional character of the situation and that the necessity for such exceptional action will come to an end as soon as normal conditions have been restored. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that the Japanese declaration weakens the obligation set out in paragraph 2 of the resolution to avoid any action which will lead to a recrudescence of fighting between the Chinese and Japanese troops, or a further aggravation of the situation.

M. DE MADARIAGA. — I should like to associate myself with Lord Cecil's remarks, both when he expressed his satisfaction at the agreement between the two parties on this question and when he commented briefly on what the Japanese representative had said. I would point out that the Japanese representative's observations are in harmony with the terms of our resolution; it begins, as you will remember, with a reaffirmation of the resolution passed unanimously on September 30th, 1931, whereby the two Governments recognise that the situation is an exceptional one and

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that the necessary steps should be taken to bring about the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone as quickly as possible. In the second paragraph of our present resolution, too, the parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.

In these circumstances, the Japanese representative's observations, which are obviously to be attributed to a feeling of scrupulous frankness deserving of our respect, merely strengthen our assurance that this resolution, which is going to be voted upon, will be faithfully and loyally executed in the spirit and in the letter, not only in all the general cases to which the Japanese representative's explicit observations do not apply, but even in the cases to which they do apply, since Japan will be bound by the resolution which she is going to accept in a moment, and will be careful to apply even these exceptional measures in the spirit of our resolution.

The PRESIDENT. — As no one else wishes to speak, I will put the draft resolution to the vote.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. — The adoption of the Council's resolution marks an important step, and, I hope, a decisive one, towards the settlement of the dispute between China and Japan.

In noting with satisfaction the vote which has just been taken and which, concurrently with the creation of a calmer frame of mind, should prepare the way for a complete solution of the questions at issue, I cannot refrain, as President in Office of the Council, from submitting a few general considerations which find their logical place at the conclusion of our investigations.

The situation existing between China and Japan last September was brought before the Council under Article 11 of the Covenant. Being called upon "to take effectual action to safeguard the peace of nations", according to the terms of this article, the Council did not attempt to evade the responsibility of seeking a settlement, although it realised the extreme complexity and exceptional difficulty of the problem. On September 30th, it unanimously adopted a resolution, the full execution of which by the two parties was considered likely to restore between them "the good understanding upon which peace depends".

Since then, though there has not been "resort to war" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Covenant, there have unfortunately been "acts of hostility". Nevertheless, as the parties themselves offered to continue their loyal co-operation with the Council with a view to achieving a friendly settlement, it was on the basis of Article 11 of the Covenant that we resumed the study of this question at our last meeting, with our eyes also on the application of the Pact of Paris.

In such a special case, we could not be expected to draw up a model settlement which could serve as a precedent for the future. We had to attempt something at once more modest and more difficult. Article 11 of the Covenant, which requires a unanimous vote, including that of the parties, obliged us to seek a solution on the lines of conciliation and compromise. This was the view which we took of our task. Various texts were gradually drafted, were communicated to the parties concerned and were re-examined in the light of the objections or reservations which they put forward. In this way we progressed by slow and gradual stages and by successive approximations until we reached the empirical solution which appeared to us to be the best suited to the special case before us. While the Council fixed no time-limit for the complete evacuation of the Japanese troops, it is none the less firmly convinced that the withdrawal of those troops within the railway zone will be carried out as rapidly as possible, under the conditions laid down in the resolution of September 30th last.

The sending of a Commission of Enquiry to the spot will enable the Council to continue its endeavours with a fuller knowledge of the facts and with due regard to all the factors of a problem the solution of which was rendered particularly difficult by the inadequacy of our information as to what was taking place in these distant lands.

This problem, I repeat, is of a very special character, because of the exceptional nature of the treaty or customary relations existing in normal times between the two countries, and also because the political status of one of these countries is governed by the international obligations of a Nine-Power Convention concluded at Washington in 1922, which it was not within our competence to interpret here.

If I lay stress upon the special character of the problem and on the reasons which led us in dealing with it to proceed with particular caution, it is in order to make it perfectly clear that the resolution which has just been adopted can in no way affect the doctrine of the Council of the League of Nations. That doctrine, as regards the occupation of territory and the operation of the articles of the Covenant, has been set forth in reports most carefully studied by distinguished lawyers and statesmen; it has been given official sanction by Council resolutions, and it retains its full force.

Except in the case of an express stipulation in treaties in force, the Covenant of the League of Nations does not authorise a State, however well founded its grievances against another State, to seek redress by methods other than the pacific methods set forth in Article 12 of the Covenant. For Members of the League that is a fundamental principle, in the same way as the "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations", on which such stress has rightly been laid in the Preamble to the Covenant. These two principles are of equal value. Any infringement of either lays a grave responsibility on Members of the League. This responsibility was reaffirmed in the Pact of Paris, whose signatories assumed or renewed the undertaking to resort to pacific means alone for the settlement of international disputes.

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I felt I ought to recall these principles at the conclusion of a discussion in which both the Covenant and the Pact of Paris have been invoked.

Having said this, I can now, with all the greater freedom, survey the first results which have been obtained by our efforts.

The war which threatened has been averted. Long-continued vigilance, patience and tenacity have brought this about. The obstacles set in its way, slight though they were, have at least restricted and slowed down the movement of events and checked its initial impetus, which presented the greatest danger to peace.

Three months have thus been gained, and this is not only likely to bring about a calmer frame of mind, to arouse public opinion throughout the world and thus to improve the psychological conditions of peace, but has made it possible to create machinery for the local organisation of peace. With the full consent of the two parties, to whom such an agreement does great credit, a Commission of the League will shortly be setting out for China, and, even before that Commission was set up, it was not a mere vain recognition of our rôle that both sides freely agreed that neutral observers should be sent to the spot by the Powers.

The communications of those observers who are in the actual zone of conflict will continue to supply us with valuable information. It is not that I wish to regard that information as likely to enlighten us on possible responsibilities, because I do not for a moment imagine that two Members of the Council, after having entered here into a formal undertaking on the basis of Article 11 of the Covenant, could place themselves in the position of having to shoulder any such responsibilities before world public opinion; but I think that, in a moment of tension, when facts are apt to be distorted, it is rendering a great service to both the countries concerned to supply them with accurate information as to what is going on on both sides in the occupied territories.

This information, being obtained in an entirely impartial spirit, will always be carefully examined by us, and it is our ardent hope that the information we receive will be all that we can desire. If the calmer atmosphere sought by the Council is to be created, it is essential that no further incidents of any kind should take place. On November 26th, the two parties advised us of the apprehensions which they felt owing to the situation in the Chinchow district. We thereupon took steps to avert the immediate danger thus brought to our notice and we remain ready to take any special action if the necessity should occur again. The observers sent to that area have noted, on the one hand, that the Japanese troops have been adequately withdrawn and, on the Chinese side, that no movements or preparations of an offensive character were taking place. The Council is therefore entitled to be confident that there will be no further hostilities and that, even if there is no official delimitation of a demilitarised zone, the definite undertakings which have been accepted on both sides will in any case suffice to prevent any further clash.

At this solemn moment when we are concluding a contract of good faith and honour, turning with emotion towards the representatives of China and Japan, may I say that I do not think I should be doing justice to two great peoples Members of the Council of the League of Nations if I did not state most emphatically, in my own name and in the name of my colleagues, that we firmly believe that our hopes will be realised.

I do not wish to conclude without thanking the Drafting Committee for the very valuable help it has given us during this difficult session under the authoritative and skilful guidance of Lord Cecil, assisted by the wisdom and experience of the Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond.

Finally, it is my pleasant duty to thank the great Republic of the United States for having assisted in the work of the Council of the League of Nations by means of parallel and incessant activities within the limits which it has itself determined.

LORD CECIL. — The observations which we have just heard add one more to the many obligations which the cause of peace and the League of Nations owe to our President, whom we all regard with respect and, if I may say so, with affection.

I agree most fully with the conclusions at which our President has arrived and I only desire to add a very few words to what he has said.

He has pointed out that the proceedings which have engaged the Council's attention for the last three months were initiated under Article 11 of the Covenant. Under that article the task of the Council is not one of arbitration or decision, but mediation and persuasion. Nothing can be done under it except by the unanimous consent of all Members of the Council, including the parties to the dispute. It is evident that procedure of that kind may easily be prolonged. It is true that we reached a first stage of agreement at the end of September, but the agreement we then arrived at proved insufficient to put an end to the dispute or even to the hostile measures which have accompanied it. We have now arrived at a larger settlement, but the success of that, too, must depend upon the parties. It is easy for either of them, if they desire to do so, to destroy the work of conciliation on which we have been engaged. I am confident that that will not happen. If it did, the party that so acted would bear a heavy load of responsibility before the public opinion of the world. I adhere most heartily to what our President has said as to the necessity for submitting all international disputes to pacific settlement. In no case nowadays must a nation take the law into its own hands. The substitution of reason for violence in the settlement of international disputes, the strict observance of international obligations, the promotion of friendship and co-operation between nations—these are the chief objects for which the League of Nations was brought into existence. It is therefore a matter for the heartiest congratulation that the parties have agreed to the appointment of this Commission, which will be charged with investigating, not only the actual questions that have here arisen, but the whole of the international

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relations between the parties. It is a heavy task, but the commissioners, whoever they may be, will be assured of the sympathy and support of all men of goodwill throughout the world, including, I doubt not, those who are nationals of the two parties to this difference.

M. DE MADARIAGA. — While I was listening to your statement, Mr. President, I thought that perhaps only those who have seen you at work at close quarters during the last few months realise your capacity to do something better than speak about the League of Nations—that is, to work for it.

You have summed up our views about this matter so adequately that there really remains very little for me to say.

If during the past few days we have sometimes felt pessimistic in measuring the distance which separated what we wished to happen according to the spirit of the Covenant from what was actually happening, at other times we were consoled by the fact that the distance which separates what we have done from what might have happened if there had been no League of Nations is much greater still.

We are far from having finished our work. This is only a first stage, but it is a very important one, since it has been marked, as the British representative emphasised, by the setting up of a Commission. The appointment of a Commission, especially by the League of Nations, is still perhaps the surest guarantee we have to-day that difficulties will be settled in the fairest manner and in the interests of peace. A Commission provides guarantees of knowledge and impartiality. I am sure that all the Members of the Council have every confidence that the President and the Secretary-General will see to it that this Commission faithfully reflects that spirit of impartiality and knowledge which must be the best guarantee of the League's work.

In conclusion, I should like to say that this conflict, which still exists and may exist for some little time yet, because it is a very difficult one and is the outcome of extremely complex circumstances, has proved to us the necessity of recasting as quickly as possible the methods available for dealing with all international difficulties. It is essential that these methods should be made internationally pure, and that such matters should be approached in an impartial spirit and not only with a view to setting up an international equilibrium. They must be approached, not only with the desire to settle the immediate conflict, but, what is still more important, to prevent disputes in the future.

M. MATOS. — I feel it my duty to submit very respectfully on this occasion a few observations concerning the serious incident which has momentarily disturbed the friendship and harmony between two great countries for whom we all have the greatest liking and respect.

As has been said on many occasions, the Council of the League of Nations had to intervene in this dispute on the basis of Article 11 of the Covenant, and I need not dwell on the fact that this has been one of the most difficult cases ever brought before the Council, owing to the special conditions in which it has arisen, the circumstances in which events have taken place, and the extreme complexity of the incidents which have resulted.

In conversations and private meetings between the members of the Council, I have had an opportunity of expressing with full frankness and sincerity the misgivings and apprehensions with which, as the representative of a small State, I watched the unfortunate events which were taking place between the parties. I was and am seriously anxious that the principles of international law should be safeguarded.

It is obvious that, according to existing treaties, it is inadmissible that disputes arising between States, whatever their nature or origin, should be settled by other than pacific means. Nor is it admissible that the respect for and execution of treaties between countries can depend upon the will of one of the parties. Such methods would be completely destructive of the international order, and hence of the maintenance of peace.

In particular, the resort to measures of coercion for the recovery of contractual debts is contrary to the principles of the Porter resolution adopted by the Hague Conference of 1907. Although the protection of the lives and property of nationals abroad is a generally recognised obligation, it appears to me that the fulfilment of that obligation must be subordinated to respect for the fundamental rights of States. That duty of protection must be discharged, moreover, in harmony with the spirit underlying the new international organisations which have been set up to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes between States in all circumstances.

I therefore think that I should be failing in my duty if on this occasion I observed a silence which might seem to imply an acceptance or endorsement on my part of views which I should regard as contrary to the principles and aspirations of the countries of America. There is a further and essential justification in my view for this attitude, since the defence of the principles which should prevail in international relations tends to consolidate the authority and prestige of the League of Nations, in which the weak countries put their trust, and through the normal operation of which these countries hope that, by a continuous process of evolution, the cause of law, justice and solidarity between the members of the community of nations will triumph.

I should like to say definitely that, when I voted for the resolution adopted and accepted by the parties, I did so in the spirit which is reflected in the words of our distinguished President. I must also lay stress on the fact that, in my opinion, this resolution is designed to settle a very special and particularly complicated case, without prejudice to certain views which may have

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been expressed in the course of the dispute. Hence, I do not consider that it can be taken as a precedent for the future.

I should like to say, however, that it would have been impossible for me to vote for the resolution if it had not embodied the principle proclaimed by M. Briand at the end of our October meeting. This principle is that the military occupation of the territory of a Member of the League cannot be used by another Member of the League to impose direct negotiations on questions that are pending. It is because this great principle has been safeguarded that I cannot oppose the resolution which has been adopted.

I cannot conclude without again expressing, as a member of the Council, my feelings of profound respect for the two great nations—China and Japan—and without expressing wishes for the re-establishment of normal relations between them as soon as possible, and for the promotion of their common interests and of peace and order, which are of equal concern to the countries of every continent.

M. VON MUTIUS. — Mr. President, I desire to associate myself with your remarks a few moments ago when you expressed the Council's satisfaction at having been able to bring about a certain measure of agreement between China and Japan. The resolution which we have adopted can hardly meet all the conflicting desires of the two parties. We can, nevertheless, congratulate ourselves on having found, without drawing upon all the resources at the League's disposal, a solution which, while respecting the principles of the two parties, is likely to avert the danger which this dispute entails for the peace of the world. The pacific settlement of disputes is and must remain the principal task of the League of Nations. I am grateful to the President of the Council and my other colleagues for having emphasised this so strongly. Germany is particularly interested in the maintenance of this principle. I hope that the work which has been begun to-day will only be a first step towards the final settlement of an incident which has caused so much anxiety. Our colleagues from China and Japan can count upon our support in reaching that settlement.

I do not wish to conclude, Mr. President, without expressing our gratitude for the skilful manner in which you have conducted our debates and for the hospitable welcome we have received in Paris.

M. DE CHLAPOWSKI. — Having voted, on behalf of the Polish Government, for the resolution which has been laid before us, I should like to express the ardent hope that the solution accepted by the two parties will contribute towards the restoration of normal relations and good understanding between those two great nations in the Far East—China and Japan.

I would refer you to the statement made by the Polish Foreign Minister at the meeting on November 21st and to the observations of the President, and I will confine myself to emphasising once more the extremely complicated and very special character of the conflict we are dealing with, which has obliged the Council to adopt a very exceptional procedure and very exceptional methods in carrying out the task devolving upon it under Article II of the Covenant.

The Polish Government is convinced that the patient work of the Council during this long session has brought about a relaxation of the prevailing tension and has prevented the aggravation of a conflict which, without the League's intervention, might have assumed proportions much more dangerous to international relations.

I cannot conclude without expressing my admiration for the untiring efforts made by M. Briand, as President of the Council, in the last few weeks in order to reach a solution acceptable to the parties concerned and a settlement of a matter of such high importance to the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

M. GONZALEZ-PRADA. — Like my honourable colleagues, I am highly gratified at the Council's adoption of a resolution which we must hope will be effective in maintaining peace. But I should like to add a few words with regard to certain points of doctrine which I cannot pass over in silence.

We are obliged to recognise that the Council is faced with a problem of an entirely special character, both from the point of view of international law and from that of the events themselves. But, if these exceptional circumstances seem to have led us away—in a manner which I hope is also exceptional—from certain fundamental principles of international law, I think it my duty as representative of Peru to make certain statements in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding as to the bearings of the Council's resolution and the President's statement from the point of view of doctrine, and as to their repercussions outside Europe.

Nothing in the text to which I have given my approval in order not to raise any obstacle to the pacific settlement of a dispute must be interpreted as affecting certain principles without which the existence and the rights of weak countries would not have that security which makes force unnecessary, this being the main purpose pursued by the Covenant of the League.

Some of these principles are as follows:

- (1) No State has the right to effect the military occupation of the territory of another in order to ensure the execution of certain treaties;
- (2) No State is entitled to oblige another—having invaded its territory—to enter upon direct negotiations on the bearing and legal value of treaties previously existing between the two States;
- (3) The exercise of the right possessed by each State to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its nationals must be limited by respect for the sovereignty of the other State; no

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State being entitled, in order to provide such protection, to authorise its military forces to penetrate into the territory of the other for the purpose of carrying out police operations:

(4) The fact that a State has certain rights, claims, economic concessions, etc., in regard to another State does not entitle the former to effect the military occupation of the territory or to seize the property of the debtor State. Any recovery of debts by compulsion is illicit, in accordance with the principles accepted by the Second Peace Conference (The Hague, 1907).

Even if the measures which have been accepted by the two parties concerned, and which we have adopted exceptionally in the special case of Manchuria, may be justifiable for the immediate purpose of averting war, they must in no case be interpreted as implying a renunciation of the principles of international law which have reference to the defence of the rights and interests of weak countries and which constitute the main safeguard of their independence.

It is for these reasons that I desire to inform my colleagues of the spirit in which I have given my approval to the resolution we have adopted, and how anxious I am to satisfy myself that the principles on which the Covenant is based remain intact.

M. GARAY. — Before reading my written statement I should like to thank you, Mr. President, most warmly for your constant efforts in the cause of peace and international conciliation. The task which has confronted you has been so difficult and so complicated, as you have yourself said, that your energy, your devotion to the cause of peace and your great intellectual qualities could hardly have found a greater and more worthy problem to engage them.

I should also like to thank the Chairman and the members of the Drafting Committee for their excellent work, which we highly appreciate. I would merely say one word regarding our distinguished Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond — he is beyond all praise.

The Council, which is a political organ of the League of Nations, having had to face an exceptionally grave and complicated situation with very limited means at its disposal, has, after long and strenuous efforts, been able to draw up the text of a resolution capable of unanimous acceptance, without which no decision taken under Article 11 of the Covenant can have executive force.

This resolution constitutes a compromise between the extreme claims of the parties, and has been accepted by the latter; so that it is purely practical in character and cannot be invoked later as a precedent. The Council is unanimous on this point, which it is hardly necessary to emphasise.

But, owing to the fact that policy creates its own law according to the influence exerted by interests and circumstances, and sometimes departs from the principles of pure doctrine, we, who represent nations without material interests in the areas affected and whose only desire in the present conflict is to safeguard the ideal of peace, law and justice, feel it necessary to dispel any ambiguity so far as we are concerned by reasserting on this occasion the traditional attitude of the countries which we represent towards certain important principles of international law which the events of the last few months have brought into prominence.

One of these principles is that of intervention, or rather of non-intervention.

We recognise the League's right to intervene among its Members to ensure world peace and to preserve their territorial integrity or political independence in conformity with the relevant articles of the Covenant. On the other hand, a State's intervention in the affairs or territory of another with whom it is not at war must in our opinion be confined strictly to the limits and conditions laid down in the treaties between the parties.

We are far from denying the right of any State to safeguard the lives and property of its nationals residing abroad, but we do not regard this right as absolute, and it ends as soon as it begins to encroach upon the sovereign rights of a foreign State, rights which cannot be disregarded. The Republics of America have in their laws set up the principle of equality between nationals and foreigners; but they have refused to grant foreigners a preferential treatment or a superior status, which would be derogatory to the national dignity and would destroy the legal equality which is the basis of the international community.

We have very opportunely been reminded of the Porter proposal approved in 1907 at The Hague by the nations represented at the Second Peace Conference. This proposal, which allows resort to force for the recovery of contractual debts between Governments only when the debtor State refuses arbitration, or makes it impossible to draw up a special arbitration agreement, or does not comply with the award given, embodies a principle which is now universally recognised as forming part of international law. I would add that the Porter proposal was in its turn based on the Drago doctrine, which expressed the strong aspirations of the Latin-American group of the Conference. The Drago doctrine, which declares that it is not allowable to use compulsion for the recovery of the public debts of States in general, together with the older Calvo proposal, which condemns intervention, even by diplomatic means, to support private claims of a pecuniary nature, are characteristic elements of what is sometimes termed Latin-American international law.

We therefore have a heritage of legal principles, general aspirations and international traditions which we have to take into account in considering these grave questions from our own standpoint, and I think it is a mere matter of straightforwardness that I should set forth these views and considerations here.

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In our view, the intention of the Covenant in substituting peaceful and reasonable means of settlement for resort to force was to deprive the signatory nations of the dangerous right of taking the law into their own hands. Hence we should view with the greatest anxiety any return in international life to methods of force departing from the procedure of conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and mediation laid down as compulsory in the Covenant.

Subject to the above remarks, and expressing my most ardent hopes for the solution of the dispute which has arisen between two of the original Members of the League, who are at the same time very respected Members of the Council, I gladly accept on behalf of my Government the resolution which we have approved.

M. SZE. — Reference has been made to the special character of the question before us. I should like to say that China cannot be expected to admit that the operation of treaties, covenants and accepted principles of international law stops at the border of Manchuria.

With regard to your reference to Chinchow, I beg to say that the conditions round the Chinchow region are normal; there are no movements of Chinese troops, no increase of troops or preparations for any attack towards the positions at present occupied by the Japanese troops. The foregoing has been confirmed by all the neutral observers. I can assure the Council that the Chinese Government does not contemplate any change in its present policy.

I wish also to join with the previous speakers in expressing to you my warmest sentiments of respect and high esteem, and I also wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express my thanks for the courtesy and hospitality of your great country towards my delegation.

(The Council went into private meeting.)

2966. **Expenditure resulting from the Summoning of the Council in Paris: Gift from the French Government.**

M. MATOS presented the following report¹:

"The Members of the Council will have seen the two notes by the Secretary-General (documents C.871.1931.X and C.967.1931.X) informing the Council of the contribution made by the French Government towards the supplementary expenses involved in the holding of the present meetings in Paris.

"By the Financial Regulations, it is necessary that the acceptance of gifts to the League be approved by the Council. I am sure all my colleagues will join with me in thanking the Government of the French Republic for their generous gift, which I hereby propose that the Council accept."

M. YOSHIZAWA. — As representative of Japan—that is, as representative of a party to the present dispute—I should like to express my most sincere thanks for this very generous gift from the French Government.

The conclusions of the report were adopted.

2967. **Close of the Session.**

The PRESIDENT. — The Council's task is thus at an end. I should like to ask those of my colleagues who have been good enough to serve on the Drafting Committee to remain a few days longer in Paris in order not to leave their President alone to deal with a situation which still needs to be examined.

Lord CECIL. — I am obliged to return to England to-morrow afternoon, otherwise I should have been glad to give any assistance I could; but I have spoken to the British Ambassador here, who will be pleased to take my place.

The PRESIDENT. — It now remains for me to thank you sincerely for having assisted me in my task in such a way as to earn me praise, a large share of which falls to you.

I declare the sixty-fifth session of the Council closed.

¹ Document C.968.1931.X.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to
the Council and the
Members of the League.

C.862.M.440.1931.VII.

Paris,

November 17th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
circulate to the Council the following letter
which he has received from the Chinese
Representative on the Council.

PARIS, 16th November 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have to-day received a telegram stating that, on the 13th instant, the Chinese troops in the neighbourhood of Tangshi and Wulinor were attacked by Japanese cavalry and artillery with heavy resulting casualties to the Chinese troops. At noon of the fourteenth instant, the Chinese forces were again attacked, in the same locality, by a large force of Japanese troops aided by four aeroplanes. The engagement lasted five hours during which Commander Shah was seriously wounded, and a large number of Chinese soldiers killed. The Chinese forces are retreating. The determination of General Honjo to cross the Chinese Eastern Railway with the purpose of occupying Tsitsihar is borne out by a statement to this effect by the Japanese consul Hayashi and also by the fear felt by Russia as shown by a note from Litvinoff to Tokyo. The rumour spread by the Japanese that the Chinese Central Government is negotiating with the Soviet Government for supplies of military equipment for the Heilungkiang forces is absolutely false.

I ask you to be good enough to circulate the above to the Members of the Council.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.863. M.441. 1931.VII.

Paris, November 17th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT

Communication by the Japanese Delegation concerning
the Salt Tax incidents in Manchuria.

Note by the Secretary-General:

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Members of the Council a letter dated November 16th from the Japanese representative on the Council concerning the question of the Salt Tax.

Paris, November 13th, 1931.

Sir,

With reference to my letter dated November 6th,* I have the honour to communicate to you certain supplementary particulars which my Government has just sent me concerning the question of the Salt Tax.

(Signed) YOSHIKAWA.

1) The Chinese Government has reorganised the Salt Tax system in accordance with Article 5 of the Reorganisation Loan Act of 1913 ensuring the priority of the service of various loans contracted by China and secured on the revenues of the Salt Tax. In 1916, however, the local military authorities of the Sze-Chwan seized the revenues of the Salt Tax and since then the system established in 1913 has gradually broken down, so much so that during the last months of the Peking Government's

* See Document C.811. M.401. 1931.VII.

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existence, all the revenues of the Salt Tax were seized by the local military authorities, except in the Chihli and in part of Shantung. This state of affairs led to repeated protests on the part of the Powers concerned, notably Japan, Great Britain and France. These representations had no effect and the service of the loans secured on the Salt Tax had to be suspended.

2) When, in June 1928 the Nanking Government had practically realised the unification of the country, the Powers concerned applied to that Government for the restoration of the Salt Tax system. The Nanking Government took no action on this request and in November of the same year established the so-called "Ten million silver dollars system". The provincial military authorities were therefore able to go on seizing what remained of the Salt Tax revenues after deducting the contribution of each province and the costs of the Collection Office. This not only affected loans secured on the surplus revenues (particularly in the case of Japan the "96" bonds of 1922, the Shantung Treasury bonds of 1923), but was contrary even to the Salt Tax system organised by the 1913 Reorganisation Loan. Japan, in concert with Great Britain and France, therefore, protested but in vain against the maintenance of the Ten Million Dollar System.

3) Thus, in spite of the repeated protests of the Powers concerned, China, violating her previous undertakings, has completely upset the Salt Tax system established by the Reorganisation Loan and the greater part of the Salt Tax revenues have for more than 10 years been abandoned to the local military authorities at the expense of the holders of bonds of the different loans.

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In Manchuria in particular practically the whole revenues of the Salt Tax have served to cover the military and administrative expenditure of Chang-Taolin and Chang-Hsuehliang. It has now become evident, however, that Chang-Hsuehliang directing the Chinese forces stationed in various parts of Manchuria and with the help of the bandits is striving by every means to attack the security of our troops and the interests of Japanese nationals in Manchuria. It is therefore perfectly comprehensible that in these exceptional circumstances the Japanese military authorities should have interfered with the dispatch of funds which were aimed at maintaining activities directed against themselves.

Furthermore, local organs have been established by the Chinese to maintain order in Manchuria and their action cannot but be beneficial to these regions until the situation in Manchuria again becomes normal. To place at the disposal of the Committee for the Maintenance of Order organized at Mukden the resources which have hitherto gone to Chang-Hsuehliang amounts in short to reinforcing the action of the body which is in fact responsible for the maintenance of order until the restoration of normal conditions, and to this extent this action can only be regarded as highly desirable. Accordingly, the action of the military authorities in intervening to transfer the surplus revenues of the Chinese Salt Tax Office to another Chinese body cannot be regarded as unjustifiable.

It should further be pointed out that the Japanese military authorities have exercised no pressure on the Salt Tax Office. They have in no way interfered with the

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dispatch of the provincial contribution to the Central Government or with the payment of the Salt Tax Office's own expenses. Nor have they seized the smallest sum for their own use.

4) The Japanese Government considers that the measures taken by the military authorities are in no way contrary to the Resolution of the Council of the League of September 30th, or to the declarations made by the Japanese representative at the Council meetings of October 24th and 25th. On the contrary, these measures seem to it likely to promote the restoration of order and to prevent the situation from being aggravated.

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C.864. M. 442.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

Paris,

November 17th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation transmitting a note handed on November 15th by Baron Shidehara to the Chinese Minister at Tokio in reply to his note of November 11th, protesting against the advance of the Japanese troops at the Nonni Bridge.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication forwarded to him by the Japanese Delegation.

Paris, November 16th, 1931.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward to you herewith translation of a note handed on November 15th by Baron Shidehara to the Chinese Minister at Tokio in reply to a note from the Minister of November 11th protesting against the advance of our troops at the Nonni Bridge.

I should be greatly obliged if you would communicate this document to the President and Members of the Council.

(Signed) S. SAWADA.

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TEXT (Translation) OF BARON SHIDEHARA'S REPLY
TO THE CHINESE MINISTER (NOVEMBER 15th, 1931).

Monsieur le Ministre,

In reply to your note of November 11th, I have the honour to communicate the following:

1) The Taonan-Angangchi railway was built by the South Manchurian Company under a contract. In spite of repeated requests by the South Manchurian Railway, the Chinese authorities have not yet paid their debt to it. They have also refused to convert this debt into a loan. This railway may therefore in point of fact be regarded as belonging to the South Manchurian Company which has a great interest in preserving the property and in maintaining traffic on this line.

2) About the middle of October the Heilungkiang army destroyed the railway bridges on the Nonni River. This was not only an illegal act which was prejudicial to the interests of the South Manchurian Company, but also, when a Japanese adviser and employees belonging to the Taonan-Angangchi railway proceeded to the spot to repair the bridges, Chinese forces opened fire on them and prevented them from proceeding with the repairs.

3) With a view to protecting the interests of the South Manchurian Company the Japanese authorities at Tsitsikar got into touch with the Heilungkiang army and asked on several occasions that the bridge should be repaired.

The officer commanding the Chinese troops merely gave evasive replies. However, the date when the river begins to freeze over was approaching and ice on the river could prevent the work being carried out. The Taonan-Angangchi railway administration, therefore, decided to undertake the work itself with the assistance of the South Manchurian, and asked for the protection of Japanese troops.

4) In order to avoid any conflict between the Japanese and Chinese troops the Japanese commander thought it necessary

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that the Heilungkiang and Chang-Haipeng armies should withdraw to a distance of 10 kilometres from each bank; the two adversaries assented to this request.

Major Hayashi's communication mentioned in your letter of November 5th appears to refer to the request submitted by that officer to the Heilungkiang army. This communication was made with a view to ensuring the security of the repair operations, and to avoid any conflict between our protecting troops and the Heilungkiang and Chang-Haipeng forces. It was an entirely friendly and very urgent measure necessitated by events.

5) Nevertheless the Heilungkiang troops not having carried out the orders given them by the Chinese authorities, a detachment of Japanese protecting troops who had approached the bridges on November 4th was suddenly greeted by a fusillade which caused numerous casualties. Accordingly the Japanese forces were obliged to take defensive measures. The fighting which occurred between the Japanese and Chinese troops was therefore caused by the treacherous action of the Chinese forces who must be regarded as entirely responsible.

6) At present the Heilungkiang authorities are continuing to concentrate enormous forces near Tsitsihar, Angangchi and in the district to the south of these localities. They appear to desire to envelop and attack the small number of Japanese troops stationed in the Tahsing region. This threat against our troops is growing hourly more definite and I have the honour to notify your Excellency that the responsibility for the consequences which might result from a conflict between the Japanese and Chinese troops caused by the provocative attitude of the latter, must be regarded as belonging to China.

7) Your Excellency's note dated November 11th mentions that Major Hayashi is said to have called upon General Ma commanding the Heilungkiang troops, to hand over his duties to Chang-Heipeng. I have the honour to give a formal denial of this assertion.

I would request your Excellency to communicate the foregoing to your Government.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.865.M.443.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Incidents at Tientsin.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, dated November 17th, from the Japanese Delegation, forwarding a communication of November 13th from the Japanese Minister to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris,

November 17th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

(Translation)

Sir,

I have the honour to forward to you the English translation of a communication of November 13th from the Japanese Minister to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, drawing attention to obvious inaccuracies in the circular telegram of November 9th from General Chang-Hsueh-Liang.

(Signed) S. SAWADA.

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NOTE CONCERNING CERTAIN FACTS MENTIONED IN MARSHAL CHANG HSUEHLIANG CIRCULAR TELEGRAM DATED NOVEMBER 9th, 1931
(handed by Japanese Minister in China to Chinese Foreign Office, November 13th, 1931).

It has been reported by newspapers that Marshal Chang-Hsuehliang, Deputy-Commander in Chief of the Army, Navy and Air force of the National Government issued circular telegram under the date of the ninth instant regarding the riot which occurred in Tientsin under the administrative jurisdiction of your Government the eighth instant. The same circular telegram contains such gross misrepresentations of facts as follows:

(1) It says "Over two thousand plain clothes soldiers assembled at Haikuangssu of the Japanese Concession at 10.30 the eighth instant and forming themselves into three separate parties marched from there about 11.00 p.m. into the Chinese area and towards the Chinese provincial Government, Municipal Office and Public Safety Bureau "and it is reported that large number plain clothes soldiers again marched out from inside Japanese Concession."

Nothing indicating the approach of the disturbance witnessed in the Japanese Concession until about 10.30 p.m. the eighth instant when the sound of rifle shooting was heard in the direction of the Nanshi district closely adjacent to the Japanese Concession and Japanese troops took stand on border of the Japanese Concession to protect it about 11.30 p.m. It was entirely untrue that rioters proceeded to the Chinese area from inside the Japanese Concession.

The Japanese Consul General at Tientsin, in the interview with Chang-Hsuehming, Mayor of Tientsin, on the ninth instant, explained that the rioters were reported to have entered Nanshi from the direction of Palitai (which is outside of the Japanese Concession) and that the allegation was entirely untrue, that rioters marched out from the Japanese Concession. The Mayor was satisfied of the correctness of this explanation.

(2) Marshal Chang's circular telegram also says "I have requested the Japanese Consul to control the plain clothes soldiers in the Japanese Concession".

It has been frequently declared by the Japanese Government that they would allow nobody to use the Japanese Concession as the base of political movement. The Japanese authorities had been keeping the Concession under the strictest control and there were no plain clothes soldiers in it neither at time of nor after the riot.

(3) The circular telegram continues to say: "The Commander of Japanese troops demanded General Wang, the Provincial Governor, to withdraw the Chinese troops, police and Pacantui (soldiers in charge of maintenance of public order) three hundred metres off the boundary of the Japanese Concession but General Wang enquired on what ground the Japanese Commander made such a demand".

In the exchange of notes between the Japanese and Chinese Governments of July 1902, it was undertaken by the Chinese Government not to march or station any troops within twenty li of the Japanese troops stationed in Tientsin.

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It was in contravention of this undertaking that the Chinese troops marched to a point only fifty metres distant from the Japanese troops. The Chinese troops fired on the Japanese troops and marched into the Japanese Concession with the result that Private Sawaka and Sergeant Major Miyamoto were shot to death at twelve a.m. and four thirty a.m. respectively the ninth instant, a Japanese woman in the Concession died from a piercing rifle wound on the thigh and several other Japanese subjects were wounded.

Such an outrageous conduct of the Chinese military amply justifies the aforesaid demand of the Japanese Commander in the light of the above-said treaty obligation of the Chinese Government and also with a view to avoiding any unnecessary clash between Japanese and Chinese troops.

Chinese authorities gave no heed to the warning given beforehand by the Chinese Consul General at Tientsin and failed to prevent the unauthorized attack of the Chinese soldiers. Dual responsibility must be borne by the Chinese Government for the abovesaid casualty and any other consequences of the attack.

There are certain foreigners resident at Tientsin who witnessed Chinese soldiers firing at the Japanese Concession.

(In this connection it must be pointed out that event after the incident in question the Chinese continued their perfidious attitude. According to the report of the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin under the date of the thirteenth instant, the Chinese authorities at Tientsin informed the Japanese Consul General on the twelfth instant that plain clothes soldiers might appear at night of that day but that they (Chinese authorities) would despatch Baoantui to repulse them, it was promised that no shooting would be allowed and only bayonets be used. But the shooting started about one a.m. on the thirteenth instant and at about five o'clock machine guns and trench mortars were heard and a large number of shots fell on the Japanese barracks and troops and part of the Chinese area closely adjacent the Japanese Concession. (Japanese returned no fire).

(4) It is stated in the circular telegram "As plain the clothes soldiers were routed, the Chinese troops retreated at six o'clock in order to avoid clash between Japanese and Chinese troops. When it was about to become quiet at half past six o'clock, more than thirty gunshots fell in the Chinese native town. They seem to have come from Japanese park and Japanese barracks at Haikuangssu."

But facts are that as the result of conversations between the representatives of Japanese and Chinese authorities, an arrangement was reached for the Chinese troops to recede before six a.m. ninth instant but in spite of this arrangement and of fact that the plain clothes soldiers had fled, Chinese troops did not recede but again fired on the Japanese troops and the latter were compelled to return their fire in self-defence. No such heavy bombardment as described by Marshal Chang was made. The Chinese troops withdrew not earlier than eight a.m.

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(5) The circular telegram says towards the end:
"According to the statement of some plain clothes soldiers who were arrested after the incident, they were supplied with rifles, pistols, machine guns, and shells, and given forty dollars per head under the supervision of a few Japanese men". It need hardly be said that such statement is an entire fabrication.

The Japanese Government were unable to countenance a no less responsible person than the Deputy-Commander in Chief of the Army, Navy and Air force of the National Government in taking the liberty of issuing such a mendacious circular telegram whereby to dishonour the fair and neutral attitude of Japanese authorities and Japanese troops, and propagandise as if Japanese had participated in creation of disturbance in Tientsin on the eighth instant.

In addressing this note of protest to you, I have the honour to request you to see that your Government take proper steps with Marshal Chang Hsuehliang in regard to such irresponsible action of his as aforesaid.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.866.M.444.1931.VII.

Paris,

November 17th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation concerning
the evacuation of the Japanese Consulate at Tsitsihar.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
circulate to the Council the following letter,
dated Paris November 17th, 1931, which he has
just received from the Japanese Delegation.

Paris, November 17th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have the honour to notify you that I have just been
informed from Tokio that M. Shinizu, Japanese Consul at Tsitsihar,
accompanied by twelve other Japanese including the members of the
Consulate, Major Hayashi and the employees of the South Manchurian
Bureau, have been obliged to evacuate Tsitsihar and arrived at
Harbin on November 15th.

Requesting you to communicate this information to the
President and Members of the Council, I have the honour to be,
etc.

(Signed) S. SAWADA,

Director of the Japanese
League of Nations Office.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to
the Council and
Members of the League.

C.367.M.445.1931.VII.

Paris,

November 17th 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation concerning
the situation in the district north of the Nonni
River.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
circulate to the Council the following letter
dated November 17th, 1931 which he has just
received from the representative of China on
the Council.

Paris, 17th November 1931.

Ref.121.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

Further telegrams received by me relating to the
situation in the region north of the Nonni River Bridge show
that Japanese aeroplanes have dropped bombs at Fulscherhi and
Kelimutsu, and that additional bombing aeroplanes are being
sent to the region.

Reports from Tsitsihar show that the following demands
from the representatives of General Honjo have been addressed to
General Ma: (1) troops which, under the direction of General Ma
have been ordered to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Tsitsihar
on account of the present crisis must be withdrawn to their
original positions; (2) troops under General Ma shall be for-
bidden to advance south of the Chinese eastern railway; (3) the
Taonan-Angangchi railway shall be operated by the Taonan-Angangchi
railway administration. The forces under General Ma shall
not in any way interfere with the operations of the railway.
If there is such interference at any time the Japanese Imperial
forces will immediately take effective measures.

The foregoing measures, it is declared by the representa-
tives of General Honjo, must be carried out within ten days from
November 15th. If General Ma accepts this demand Japan will
consider the withdrawal of her troops.

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In a postscript to the foregoing demands made by General Honjo's representatives, it is added that an answer to them must be given to them before noon of November 16th to the Japanese Secret Service Bureau at Harbin.

Commenting upon his refusal to accept the foregoing demands, General Ma draws attention to the fact that his troops are within the borders of the province of Heilungkiang and are there solely to protect Chinese territory against invasion by rebels, and that whether or not they will be withdrawn must depend upon the situation. General Ma also points out that the sovereign territorial rights of China are being violated by the utilisation of the South Manchuria Railway forces to control a railway in which it has merely loan interests.

May I ask you to be good enough to cause the foregoing to be circulated to the Members of the Council.

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and the Members of the League.

C.868.M.446.1931.VII.

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Paris, November 18th 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the
Council concerning the rumours relating to the establish-
ment of a Monarchy in Manchuria.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which he has received from the Representative of China on the Council.

Ref./122.

Paris, November 17th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg to convey to you the following cable message which I have received from my Government and request you to be good enough to have it circulated to the Members of the Council.

"Since the forcible occupation of various places in the North-Eastern Provinces, the Japanese military authorities have been frequently instigating or utilizing bandits, rebels and other undesirable elements to disturb local peace and order as well as to organize illegal governments which are usurping administrative powers under the protection or coercion of the Japanese troops.

"It has been lately reported that during the recent disturbance in Tientsin created by insurgent rioters who made use of the Japanese Concession as a base of operations, the ex-Emperor Puyi of the former Manchu Dynasty was kidnapped and escorted by the Japanese from the said Concession to Mukden for establishing a bogus government with himself proclaimed as emperor.

"The National Government has already declared to the League of Nations and to the Governments of friendly powers that the Chinese Government and people will not recognise any illegitimate institutions established in subversion of China's administrative integrity in those places of the North-Eastern Provinces which remain under the occupation of Japanese troops. In the event that establishment of Puyi's bogus government is confirmed, the National Government will regard such government as a seditious institution and at the same time as an auxiliary organ of the Japanese Government in disguise, while all acts of such government which are necessarily illegal will be repudiated by the National Government."

(Signed) Sao-Ko Alfred SZE

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.869.M.417.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE
COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on
the Council with regard to the situation in the
Tsitsikar district.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Council the following telegram dated November 17th,
which the representative of China has just handed to him.

By 14th Japanese Consul Shiroya in Tsitsikar left
with all his colleagues, Next day General Honjos represent-
ative in Harbin Kychmitze sent a note demanding that Heilung-
kiang army should immediately withdraw to north of Tsitsikar.
General Ma replied by requesting that both parties should
withdraw simultaneously. Not only was our proposition
rejected but General Honjos' representative further demanded
verbally that Heilungkiang should declare independence and
break off from our Central Government at once. Japanese would
immediately start serious attack and destroy our force by all
measures. Japanese army continued aggressive, attack to-day
but advance was checked by our counter-attacks. During these
few days four or five Japanese airplanes usually-made series
of air-raids and dropped many bombs on our soldiers.
According to latest reports Japanese reinforcements amounting
to more than a thousand arrived in the neighbourhood of Nonni
Bridge recently. Taking measures for aggressive attacks in
the near future. Please refer these to League Council and
draw up any measures to stop them if possible.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

C.870.M.448.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Paris, November 18th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE
COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on
the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Council the following letter which he has received
from the Representative of China.

Paris, 18th November, 1931.

To the Secretary-General,

Sir,

The Japanese Government, in Document C.854 of
November 14th, denies the accuracy of the reports on the
situation in Manchuria submitted to the Council by the Chinese
Representative.

The Chinese Representative maintains the accuracy
of his reports, but, if the Japanese Government is disposed to
question their correctness, he would say, as he has had
occasion to say several times before, that his Government has
desired that the actual conditions and events in Manchuria
since September eighteenth should be observed and reported
upon by a neutral Commission appointed by the League, but to
this reasonable proposition Japan has offered a persistent
objection. So long as the Chinese Government asks for a third
party and neutral judgment as to what is happening in
Manchuria, and the Japanese Government refuses to allow this
to be done, it may safely be left to the world's opinion and
to my colleagues upon the Council to judge as to the
comparative accuracy of the Chinese and Japanese versions.

It would be an easy matter for me to point out the
extent to which latest Japanese reports have contradicted earlier
ones, as well as the extent to which later events have falsified
earlier Japanese declarations, but I have not thought that such
a tu quoque argument would facilitate the task which is now
confronting the Council.

May I ask you to be good enough to cause the above to
be circulated to Members of the Council.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.873.M.449.1931.VII.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

Paris, November 18th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation forwarding the translation of a note concerning events in China and Manchuria handed to the Chinese Minister in Tokio by Baron Shidehara on November 16th in reply to a note dated November 4th.

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following letter dated Paris, November 18th which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation.

Sir,

I have the honour to send you herewith the translation of a note concerning events in China and Manchuria handed to the Chinese Minister at Tokio by Baron Shidehara on November 16th in reply to a note dated November 4th.

(Signed) S. SAWADA

Director of the Japanese
League of Nations Office.

REPLY FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED NOVEMBER 16th TO THE
NOTE FROM THE CHINESE MINISTER IN TOKIO DATED NOVEMBER 4th

(TRANSLATION)

(1) Your Excellency's note mentions that: "The resolution voted in the Council of the League of Nations on October 24th under which the Japanese troops were completely to evacuate the parts of the north eastern provinces occupied by them before November 16th having been unanimously adopted by thirteen States represented on the Council, the Chinese Government is firmly convinced that the Japanese Government in deference to the wishes of the highest organism for the maintenance of peace in the world will desire to carry out the provisions of this resolution."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Japanese Government, considering that this draft resolution did not answer to the present situation and that consequently it would not be likely to lead to a satisfactory solution of the question, was unable to accept it, and accordingly the draft resolution was not adopted.

Nevertheless the Chinese Government, disregarding the facts, invoking a draft resolution not formally adopted, and arbitrarily presuming a determination on the part of the League of Nations, demands its performance. This constitutes an endeavour to exploit the League of Nations for its own ends.

Your Excellency's note also mentions that "the Council's resolution of September 30th having been unreservedly accepted by Japan, the League of Nations was convinced that the Japanese Government would forthwith begin the withdrawal of its troops and would have concluded it within the two following weeks" and again that "the Council, reiterating on October 24th the previous resolution, laid down a fresh time limit for evacuation, thus hoping to restore the status quo ante. The resolution of September 30th, however, did not provide any time limit for the withdrawal of Japanese troops and the Japanese Government asks what right the Chinese Government has to presume and proclaim a determination to which the League of Nations and the Council have given no expression.

2) The Japanese Government considering that the resolution of September 30th was in perfect agreement with its proposed course of avoiding the aggravation of the situation by either of the two opposing parties and of permitting them to find a satisfactory solution in common, willingly accepted this resolution. The Japanese Government keenly desires to comply with the provisions of the resolution in question, but it regrets to observe that the latter is not being respected on the Chinese side, and particularly that the situation has in no way improved, as a consequence of the insincerity displayed by China as regards the observance of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said resolution which lays down the duty of avoiding any aggravation of the situation with a view to the re-establishment of normal relations between our two countries.

The Japanese Government has the most positive proof that China is attempting to disturb order in the districts round the South Manchurian Railway by supporting the activity of troops of soldiers or of armed bandits. The Heilungkiang army attacked the detachment of our troops which was sent at the request of the Tsoonan-Angangchi Railway administration to protect the repair-works on the Nonni Railway Bridge. Our troops were able to repulse that attack, but the Chinese forces - more than ten times as numerous as ours - are concentrated in the region of Tsitsihar and Angangchi and to the South of these places. They are adopting the most provocative attitude towards our troops.

- 3 -

With regard to the Anti-Japanese agitation in China, Your Excellency's note of October 13th states that the "Chinese Government is observing with greatest scrupulousness resolution of Council of League Nations by adopting special measures for protection of Japanese lives and property and by refraining from all acts tending to aggravate situation." Contrary to these statements, the anti-Japanese agitation is continuing; not only is there no sign that it is decreasing but it is extending and becoming worse.

The Japanese residents are being subjected throughout China to acts of violence or intimidation; they are being refused the most necessary articles; their telegraphic, telephonic and postal communications are subjected to considerable interference. Chinese subjects are prevented from remaining in their service. By all these measures their means of life and their business are not only seriously threatened but their very existence is in danger, so much so that 1,200 Japanese living in China outside Manchuria have been compelled to abandon their homes and to take refuge in places of safety. The so-called "breach of economic relations" has assumed unimaginable proportions. Japanese goods are seized or confiscated, business relations with Japanese are broken off, the transport by and loading and unloading of goods on our boats are prohibited; Chinese workers are prevented from working in Japanese shops or warehouses; the Chinese representatives of our business houses are compelled to hand in their resignations. Such illegal acts are innumerable. Orders of an anti-Japanese character have been given by the Commissariat of Communications of the Chinese Government to the General Office of Works and by the Commissariat of Industry to the Enterprises Control Office. The Education Department has put into operation a rule relating to the voluntary army of students which contains anti-Japanese provisions. There are many other facts which prove that the Chinese Government authorities are taking part in the anti-Japanese movement.

With a view to putting into practice the breach of economic relations, the anti-Japanese associations have instituted among the numerous penalties which they are inflicting, that of clothing in special garments signifying "traitor to the country" and leading through the town persons who act contrary to their orders, or again, they shut them up in cages and expose them to the crowd. Such acts are of barbarous inhumanity and are scarcely comprehensible to civilised persons.

It was stated in Your Excellency's letter of October 13th that freedom to choose one's purchases is an individual right and that no Government could object thereto. Does the Chinese Government in face of acts such as those I have just mentioned claim that the measures taken against Japanese goods and the so-called "breach of economic relations" are free individual acts?

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Having regard to the special organisation of the Chinese State, it becomes perfectly clear to any impartial observer that the anti-Japanese agitation is being carried on under the pressure of private organisations whose functions it is difficult to distinguish from the functions of the Government. The Chinese Government not only takes no friendly steps to put down this movement, but on the contrary protects and encourages it. This attitude is contrary to the Council resolution of September 30th. It also constitutes, as the Japanese Government has shown in its reply to the notes sent by the Governments that signed the Paris Pact of 1928, a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of Article 2 of that Pact.

3. The Japanese Government considers that it is of the utmost importance for the purpose of bringing about a satisfactory solution of present events and maintaining lasting peace in the Far East that the Chinese Government should in future refrain from repudiating existing treaties and prejudicing the rights and interests secured by these treaties, that it should abandon the policy hitherto pursued of employing for this purpose anti-foreign movements, and that it should realise the duties necessarily devolving on any Government in its normal relations with friendly nations.

The Japanese Government therefore is of opinion that so long as the Chinese Government has not taken account of these duties, it would serve no useful purpose for the two countries to enter into negotiations on points such as "the details of the evacuation and handing over of the occupied territories" mentioned in Your Excellency's letter of November 4th, and the Japanese Government is therefore unable to consent thereto.

The Japanese Government has therefore the honour to make a fresh offer to the Chinese Government to co-operate with it with a view to bringing about a rapid and satisfactory solution of the present incidents and to accelerate the return of normal relations between the two countries, a result which would be achieved if the Chinese Government sincerely carried out the Council resolution of September 30th and accepted the views set forth by the Japanese Government in its declaration of October 26th and in its reply dated November 6th to the President of the Council of the League of Nations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C.874M.450.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
 Council and the Members
 of the League.

Paris, November 18th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Letter from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Representative the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter.

Paris, November 18th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I enclose herewith a statement by the Fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang Party concerning the Sino-Japanese conflict. As you know, the Kuomintang Party is the body from which the various organs of the Government ultimately derive their authority. This statement is therefore an authoritative exposition, in a calm and dignified form, of the temper of the Chinese people, with which my Government must reckon.

As you will see, it is absolutely impossible for any Government in China, in any circumstances to accept a settlement that involves direct negotiations on the five points under the pressure of military occupation, in whatever form this proposal is disguised. We cannot accept it for two reasons.

In the first place because the fifth point has nothing to do with security, and all the points together would swiftly grow into a political and economic programme for establishing a Japanese protectorate of Manchuria if negotiations on them were in any way linked up with evacuation.

In the second place because we will not and cannot accept the position that we should resign the twenty-one demands as a condition for Japan fulfilling her treaty obligations under the Covenant and the Paris Pact.

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For two months the Council has been labouring to reach an equitable compromise under Article XI. No compromise which made evacuation conditional upon direct negotiations on the five points would be equitable. If such a proposal is put to us, we shall not only reject it but quote in a public meeting what M. Briand and other Members of the Council have said on the impossibility of reconciling negotiation under military pressure with the Covenant and the Paris Pact, and press for a public explanation of the reasons that have led them to change their view. If the Council declared it could do no more under Article XI we should not shrink from immediately invoking other Articles of the Covenant.

This is a life and death issue for the Chinese Government which has staked its political existence on the policy of relying on the League. It is therefore bound to push this policy to its conclusion and test the competence of the League to the utmost. If the League fails, the Chinese Government will be forced to put the blame publicly where it belongs, namely, on the unwillingness of the Great Powers to lift a finger in defence of the Covenant which they are solemnly pledged to defend. The matter is therefore also a life and death issue for the League and for the Disarmament Conference.

The temper of the Chinese people is rapidly hardening and their patience is becoming exhausted. The situation in my view is extremely grave.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

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ANNEX.

STATEMENT OF THE FOURTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE KUOMINTANG PARTY
CONCERNING JAPANESE AGGRESSIONS IN CHINA.

"The fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang Party of China views the grave situation produced by the acts of deliberate aggression on the part of Japan not only as a matter affecting her national existence but also as of great concern to the safety of humanity. Japan's conduct is clearly a violation of international law, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Anti-War Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, and an infringement of the Chinese territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity as well as constituting a menace to the peace of nations. The Congress therefore decides to issue the following statement as an expression of the determined will of the whole Kuomintang as well as of the entire Chinese Nation:

"On the eighteenth of September Japanese troops attacked and took Shenyang (Mukden) and successively occupied nearly all other important cities in the Liaoning (the Province of which Mukden is its capital) and Kirin Provinces. It is almost two months since, at the very beginning, China submitted this extraordinary case of military aggression to the League of Nations in the belief that the instruments designed for the preservation of international peace would prove effective and justice in the end prevail.

"On September thirtieth the Council of the League of Nations unanimously passed a resolution calling upon Japan to withdraw her troops, it being understood such withdrawal was to be completed before the fourteenth of October when the League Council was to meet again in case of necessity. This resolution was officially accepted by the Japanese Delegate in a formal declaration. While the Chinese Government exerted its utmost during this period to carry out the Council resolution by scrupulously adhering to a policy of peace and by giving full protection to Japanese nationals so that no unfortunate incidents would happen to them, the Japanese troops, on the other hand, not only did not show any sign of withdrawal but, on the contrary, bombarded Chinchow by air, wrecked part of the Peking-Mukden railway, extended their military occupation, and threatened the Chinese coasts and inland waters with a large number of vessels. In order to cope with the unusually grave situation, the Council called the emergency meeting of October thirteenth. On October twenty-fourth a resolution was adopted by all the Members of the Council except Japan providing in unmistakable terms that Japan should complete the withdrawal of her troops before November 16th and that China should take over all the territory unlawfully occupied by Japanese troops. The Chinese Government respects the Resolution. Conformably with its provisions, China has appointed a committee to take over the areas to be evacuated and notified the Japanese Government of this appointment. Meanwhile, she is making every effort to perform all her other obligations arising from the Resolution. Besides, neutral observers are understood to have already been selected by the Powers.

"Japan however, again remains oblivious of the Council Resolution and perpetuates all kinds of acts of destruction and obstruction with the result that the Peace which China and the Powers are exerting their concerted efforts to promote cannot be fully realized. Mr. Briand, President of the League Council, has, however, called her attention to the fact that, while the Council Resolution of October 24th had all the moral effect, that of September thirtieth had fully executory force, and that Japan, in agreeing to the resolution of September thirtieth, had not stated

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that the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria were in any way connected with the safety of lives and property of Japanese nationals. He called upon Japan to fulfil its undertakings solemnly contracted under the Resolution of September thirtieth and repeatedly confirmed by declarations during the last session of the Council and to continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of her troops to the railway zone.

"Japan, however, has not only failed to withdraw her troops, but has constantly increased their number. They have occupied Taonan and other places, repeatedly attempted to invade Tungliao and attacked the Chinese troops in the Nonni Bridge district with the declared intention of seizing Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang Province. They have made use of bandits and monarchists in the Liaoning and Kirin Provinces for organising unlawful administrations and furthering the so-called Independence movement, thereby complicating the task of China when she comes to take over the occupied territories. Moreover, the Japanese military authorities, by appropriating the salt revenue in Yinkow (Newchwang) and Changchun, directly interfere with the fiscal system of China and indirectly prejudice China's ability to meet her international financial obligations.

"On November eighth and the succeeding days, organised mobs were supplied with arms in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin and permitted to sally forth from the Concession to attack the police stations and other Chinese administrative offices. A great number of gun-shots were fired from the Japanese barracks into the territory under Chinese control. These are facts known to all the foreign nationals in Tientsin and can be proved by exploded shells, seized arms and other evidences.

"Such acts of undeclared war are singularly vicious and seldom witnessed elsewhere in the world. They not only violate international law and international treaties, but constitute in particular a direct challenge to civilisation and humanity as well as to the sanctity of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, and the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922.

"Under these circumstances, Japan putting forward the five so-called fundamental principles insists that China should agree to enter into direct negotiations with Japan before withdrawal of troops is effected. It is evident that Japan desires through the pressure of military occupation to coerce China into accepting her demands.

"Moreover, as regards the so-called treaty rights which Japan has been advocating before the nations with specious arguments, the people of China, in the light of Japan's conduct since September eighteenth, cannot but entertain profound doubts on the following five points:

(1) Does the Covenant of the League of Nations possess any valid force? Should Japan be allowed to defy openly the Resolutions of the Council in disregard of the provisions of the Covenant? Should not the League, by virtue of Articles 15 and 16 of the Covenant, check effectively the acts of Japan?

(2) Is the treaty for the Renunciation of War valid at all? Why do Japanese troops publicly attack Chinese troops without cause and why is Japan with impunity permitted by flagrant use of force to prosecute her national policy of aggression? Should not steps be taken immediately to rectify her course?

(3) Is the Nine-Power Treaty still valid? Why is Japan allowed to impair the sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China, and should not concerted action be taken to remedy the situation?

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(4) Are not the privileges of the concessions within Chinese territory enjoyed by Japan in China by virtue of treaties limited to the peaceful trade and residence of her nationals? Is Japan permitted by treaties to abuse the position of her concession at Tientsin by making it a base of operations for intriguing against the safety of China?

(5) Does not Japan's seizure of the Chinese salt revenue upon which many of China's foreign loans are secured, at once constitute a direct impairment of the financial system of the Chinese Government and a serious impediment to China's meeting her financial obligations to other Powers?

"In thus demanding of China unilateral observance of Japan's so-called treaty rights and herself disregarding treaties as witnessed in her repeated acts of breach, Japan must bear the responsibility for disturbing international peace and undermining the sanctity of treaties. Now that the Council of the League of Nations is going to meet again, the Congress, in view of the above-mentioned questions, earnestly invites the attention of the Members of the League of Nations and the Signatory Powers of the Anti-War Pact and the Washington Nine-Power Treaty to the fact that Japan has since September eighteenth long looked upon these international agreements as mere scraps of paper. She has actually violated the territorial sovereignty of China and resorted to the use of force without any justification. The Congress holds resolutely that the National Government of China shall employ every resource of the nation to preserve China's territory and sovereignty intact. At the same time, the Congress fervently hopes and is confident that, at its forthcoming meeting, the Council of the League of Nations will act upon the provisions of Article 15 and 16 of the League Covenant so as to put an effective and immediate stop to Japan's aggressive activities and that all the Signatories of the Anti-War Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington will fulfil their solemn obligations arising therefrom so that the peace of the world in general and that in the Far East in particular will not be trampled down by militarism, and humanity will not be trampled down by military and that the dignity of the League of Nations as well as the sanctity of international treaties will not be violated. Japan has for nearly two months occupied the three North-Eastern Provinces by military force. China's patience has already been taxed to the limit. Should Japan persist in defying the just and righteous opinion of the League of Nations and should the League of Nations as well as the various friendly Powers find themselves unable to carry out their sacred treaty obligations, the Chinese people, in order to maintain the sanctity of the League Covenant, the Anti War Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, and in defence of their national existence, will do their best to perform their duty whatever sacrifice may be involved. For self-defence is not only a natural right of every independent nation, but also a legal right to which China is entitled under international law.

"The Congress therefore feels in duty bound to lead the whole nation forward to struggle to the very last in order to safeguard the cause of justice rather than yield to force, and thus to fulfil our sacred duty as a Signatory Power of the above-mentioned international treaties."

"(Signed) Secretariat Kuomintang Party,

Nanking, November 16th, 1931."

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C. 875.M. 451.1931.VII.

Communicated to the Council and
to the Members of the League.

Paris, November 18th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation dated November 18th,
concerning the incidents in Heilungkiang since November 15th.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate
to the Council the following letter which he has
just received from the Japanese Delegation.

Paris, November 18th, 1931.

Sir,

With reference to the communications made on several
occasions, I have the honour to forward to you the latest
information which has reached me concerning the attack on our
troops by Chinese forces in the Tahsing district.

I would ask you to be good enough to communicate this
information to the President and the Members of the Council.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) S. SAWADA.

Director of the Japanese
League of Nations Office.

INCIDENTS IN HEILUNGKIANG SINCE NOVEMBER 15th.

(Translation)

1. The Japanese military authorities entered into negotia-
tions with General Ma Chan Shan with regard to the five points
mentioned in Document C. 860.M. 438,1931.VII. General Ma had
to reply before midday on November 18th.
2. On that date no reply was received, but at 9.45 p.m.
the Civil Commissioner Shan-Ching-Hui of the Heilungkiang Govern-
ment at Harbin informed the Japanese Consulate General and the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Representatives of the Japanese Army that he had just received, at 9.40 p.m., a telephonic communication from General Ma. The latter had told him that he himself had gone on November 15th to persuade his colleagues to accept the Japanese demands, and that as a result of these conversations he had decided to accept them all. He was therefore sending a messenger to Harbin with this communication. The messenger ought to arrive at about 8 a.m. on November 17th. General Ma asked Monsicur Chang-Ching-Hui to inform the Japanese authorities and to explain to them the causes of the delay.

3. The messenger to whom General Ma referred had not arrived at mid-day on the 17th. The Japanese military representative on applying to M. Liu, official of Heilungkiang at Harbin learnt that the latter had received a telegram from the provincial authorities to the effect that the reply to the Japanese proposals was:

- (a) Request for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops.
- (b) The Heilungkiang army reserved the right to send forces south of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
- (c) Refusal of the unconditional non-destruction of the Taonan-Angangchi railway track.

General Ma's reply reached the Japanese authorities at 12.30 p.m. It was entirely different from M. Chang's communication, and reproduced the three points published by M. Lui.

4. The Japanese military authorities then made a last attempt to avert hostilities, although General Ma's attitude and the advance of his troops inspired the most legitimate apprehensions. The military authorities accordingly asked the Consul-General of Japan at Harbin to communicate the following to General Ma through M. Chang.

- (a) Request for explanations for the changed attitude of General Ma, who had first of all announced that he accepted the Japanese proposals.
- (b) Responsibility of the Chinese should the concentration of the Chinese forces be continued and result in a conflict with the Japanese troops.

Again, the officer commanding the Japanese troops at the Nonni bridge received the most definite instructions to act only with the greatest circumspection and to take care that our troops should not begin hostilities.

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5. The central Japanese authorities soon learned that, since the 17th, from 2,000 to 3,000 Chinese troops had proceeded to the first line and were beginning to attack our forces. Part of the Chinese forces turned our positions on the right and opened fighting. At dawn on November 18th the Japanese forces were compelled in their turn to begin hostilities.

6. General Ma apparently wished to take advantage of the numerical inferiority of the Japanese forces in Manchuria to launch his attack. The home effectives which were to relieve the Korea garrison troops left Kijina (Japan) only on the 17th; some aeroplane flights which it has been decided to dispatch in view of recent events have not yet arrived (there are at present on the spot only reconnaissance aeroplanes), and as the reinforcements urgently sent from the neighbourhood of Lukden had not been able as yet to join up with the troops attacked, the latter are in an extremely precarious position.

Moreover, the Chinchow centre, taking advantage of the events in the north, is pursuing with fresh vigour its campaign of inciting groups of soldiers and bandits for the purpose of creating disorder in the districts through which the South Manchurian Railway runs.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.373.M.452.1931.VII.

Paris,

November 18th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation regarding the
Japanese Government's attitude to the fundamental
principles on which the relations between China
and Japan should be based.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
communicate to the Council the following letter
dated November 18th which he has received from
the Japanese delegation:

Paris,

November 18th, 1931.

Sir,

With reference to the note dated November 3rd
(document C.789.M.383.1931.VII) in which the Chinese delegation
would appear to suggest that the Japanese Government has modi-
fied its attitude in recommending an agreement regarding certain
fundamental principles on which the normal relations between
the two countries should be based, I have the honour to forward
to you herewith a communication which I beg you to transmit
to the President and Members of the Council.

(Signed) S. SAWADA,

Director of the Japanese
League of Nations Office.

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(Translation).

The Japanese representative has already explained to the Council on several occasions that the causes of the regrettable situation in Manchuria are of long standing. Japanese rights and interests were seriously threatened even before September 18th. A long series of vexatious measures, of acts of hostility, even of acts of provocation, systematic infractions of treaties and agreements concluded between the two countries, the openly expressed desire to take away from the Japanese their lawfully acquired rights and their interests representing the fruit of long and painful work, the deliberate oppression of the Koreans who had been able for centuries past to work freely in Manchuria, the increasingly obvious and threatening hostility of the Chinese military forces - all these things have created an atmosphere of extreme tension and nervousness. The Japanese and Koreans who had settled in Manchuria in the hope of being able to live and work in peace now fear that the safety of their lives, their property and their interests are entirely dependent on the will and pleasure of the Chinese authorities.

Since the present incidents began, the Japanese Government has made a point of drawing the attention of world public opinion to this situation. It has deemed it indispensable for the future of the relations between China and Japan that the atmosphere of tension should be improved and that an agreement should be reached on certain broad principles that should govern the relations of Japan with China in future. In the absence of such an agreement the safety of nationals and their property in Manchuria could not really be assured, since now incidents and new disputes would be certain to occur.

It had already expressed that idea in the reply of the Japanese Minister in China to M. Soong concerning the latter's proposal to entrust the settlement of the Manchuria incident to a Mixed Sino-Japanese Committee.

The Japanese Minister said:

"There is no doubt that the present situation is only the manifestation, due to a fortuitous incident, of the regrettable atmosphere which has been gathering round Sino-Japanese relations for more than ten years.

"The possibility of similar incidents will continue unless that atmosphere can be improved. In consideration of the general situation to which I have just referred, the Mixed Sino-Japanese Committee, Your Excellency has discussed with me, should not only endeavour to settle the present incident, but should go further and try to establish basic principles which will make possible, in the future, the avoidance of a repetition of such acts, thus making the present unfortunate incident the occasion of good relations in the future. Certain difficulties will no doubt stand in the way of the achievement of the proposed aim, but I am convinced that it is not impossible to overcome them provided both parties are sincere and resolute.

- 3 -

"If your Excellency shares the views which I have had the honour to express to you, the Japanese Government is prepared to accept with pleasure the setting up of the proposed Mixed Committee."

In his declaration of September 24th, he also emphasised this point and said:

"It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbours no territorial designs in Manchuria. What we desire is that the Japanese subjects shall be enabled to engage safely in various peaceful pursuits, and be given an opportunity of participating in the development of that land by means of capital and labour. It is the proper duty of a Government to protect the rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the nation or individuals. The endeavours of the Japanese Government to guard the South Manchuria Railway against wanton attacks should be viewed in no other light. The Japanese Government, true to its established policy, is prepared to co-operate with the Chinese Government in order to prevent the present incident from developing into a disastrous situation between the two countries, and to work out such constructive plans as will once for all eradicate causes for future friction. The Japanese Government would be more than gratified if the present difficulty could be brought to a solution which will give a new turn to the mutual relations between the two countries."

In the same way, the Japanese Government stated in its reply of October 9th to the Chinese Note of October 5th:

"The Japanese Government considers that the most urgent task of the moment is the collaboration of our two Governments, with a view to calming excited national feelings by rapidly establishing through direct negotiation fundamental points capable of constituting a basis allowing of the resumption of normal relations. Once national feelings are allayed by direct negotiation, the Japanese troops might, without overmuch apprehension, return entirely to the railway zone, thus facilitating the assertion of authority and the maintenance of order in the localities in question."

"The Japanese Government is ready to negotiate immediately with the responsible representatives of the Chinese Government in order to establish the fundamental points referred to."

The Japanese Government expressed the same opinion in its reply of October 12th to the telegram of October 9th from the President of the Council:

"The Japanese Government considers that, in the existing circumstances, the most pressing necessity is to relieve the tension between the Japanese and Chinese peoples by mutual co-operation. To this end, it is essential to agree upon certain main principles to form a foundation for the maintenance of normal relations between the two countries. Once these principles have been laid down, the state of tension between the two nations will undoubtedly relax and the

- 4 -

Japanese forces will be able to retire without apprehension within the South Manchurian railway zone. The Japanese Government is prepared to open negotiations with the responsible representatives of China on these fundamental points."

Finally, in its declaration of October 26th, the Japanese Government defined the five basic principles which it considered should be recognised in order that the safety of its nationals might be guaranteed:

"The Japanese Government are persuaded that in the present situation the safety of Japanese subjects in Manchuria can hardly be ensured without provision being made to remove the national antipathies and suspicion existing in the mutual relations of the two Powers. With this end in view, they have already expressed in the Note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of October 9th to the Chinese Minister at Tokio, their readiness to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Government on certain basic principles that should regulate the normal inter-relationship between the two countries. That Note was communicated at the time to the Council of the League. Convinced that this method of procedure is alone calculated to open out a way from the situation, the Japanese Government have consistently held to their proposals in that sense throughout the recent discussions at the Council of the League. The basic principles which they have had in mind relate to:

- 1) Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct;
- 2) Respect for China's territorial integrity;
- 3) Complete suppression of all organised movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred;
- 4) Effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects;
- 5) Respect for the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria.

"The Japanese Government believes that all these points, being in entire accord with the aims and aspirations of the League of Nations and embodying the natural basis upon which peace in the Far East must depend, will commend themselves to the approval of the public opinion of the world. The refusal by the Japanese representative to lay these points on the Council table was due to the consideration that they should, in their nature, properly form the subject of negotiations between the parties directly involved.

"With the future welfare of both nations in mind, the Japanese Government feel that the urgent need at the present moment is to arrive at a solution of the problem by the co-operation of the two countries and thus to seek the path of common happiness and prosperity. Their willingness remains unaltered and unabated to open negotiations with the Chinese Government on the subject of the basic principles above formulated, concerning the normal relations between Japan and China and on the subject of the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the South Manchurian."

Thus the documents quoted above show that the Japanese Government has always followed a consistent policy, and that there has been no change in its attitude on this matter since the beginning of the present incidents.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.877.M.453.1931.VII.

Paris, November 19th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation with regard
to the situation in the Tsitsihar district.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following letter he has just received from the Japanese delegation : -

Paris, November 18th, 1931.

Sir,

Following upon my communication of to-day's date I have the honour to inform you that General Manchanshan's army having launched an offensive on a large scale against the Japanese troops, the latter have been obliged to abandon the reserved attitude mentioned in my previous communication and to counter-attack the Chinese forces, pursuing them in the direction of Anganchi.

I have moreover just received the text of a communiqué published to-day in this connection by the Japanese Minister of War. It points out that the advance of the Japanese troops is the inevitable result of the provocations of the Chinese forces. The Japanese troops in deference to the Government's pacific policy had arrested their advance at Tahsing on the occasion of the previous combats round the Nonni bridges although they could easily have pursued it and have overthrown the Chinese forces.

The communiqué recalls the fruitless negotiations which have taken place with General Ma and states that despite the threatening attitude of the Chinese forces the Japanese authorities have endeavoured to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. It was only after being attacked by the Chinese that our troops accepted combat this morning; this action is purely defensive and is only aimed at striking a decisive blow against the Manchanshan army, whose bellicose attitude endangers the Japanese effectives stationed at the Nonni bridges. When this purpose has been achieved the Japanese forces will not remain in these districts but will retire as soon as possible to the South of Taonan or Chienchantung. They will strictly respect the Chinese Eastern Railway if the Chinese armies do not employ it for strategic purposes.

In view of the gravity of the situation caused by the provocations on the Chinese side, I should be obliged if you would urgently communicate this letter to the President and members of the Council.

(Signed) S. SAWADA
Director of the Japanese League of Nations Office.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.878.M.454.1931.VII.

Paris, November 19th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE
COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation forwarding its observations on the Chinese Representative's communication to the Council dated November 17th, 1931, and contained in Document C.868.M.446.1931.VII.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation:-

Paris, November 19th, 1931.

Sir,

With reference to the Chinese Representative's communication (C.868.M.446.1931.VII), I have the honour to deny formally:

1. the use of the Japanese concession at Tientsin as a base of operations by the insurgents during the disturbances which recently took place in that town. The Mayor of Tientsin has himself recognised the inaccuracy of this allegation (see Document C.865.M.443.1931.VII).
2. any participation by the Japanese authorities in a movement for the restoration of the ex-Emperor Puyi. The Japanese authorities have, on the contrary, always discouraged any attempt of this kind. According to a telegram received from our Consul-General at Tientsin, the ex-Emperor Puyi did not feel himself to be in safety, having been frequently threatened and having even had two bombs sent to him in a parcel on November 6th. He fled during the Tientsin riots without the knowledge of the Japanese authorities.

Requesting you to communicate the foregoing to the President and Members of the Council, I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) S.SAWADA,
Director of the Japanese
League of Nations Office.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.870.M.454.1931.VII.

Paris, November 19th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE
COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation forwarding its observations on the Chinese Representative's communication to the Council dated November 17th, 1931, and contained in Document C.868.M.446.1931.VII.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation:-

Paris, November 19th, 1931.

Sir,

With reference to the Chinese Representative's communication (C.868.M.446.1931.VII), I have the honour to deny formally:

1. the use of the Japanese concession at Tientsin as a base of operations by the insurgents during the disturbances which recently took place in that town. The Mayor of Tientsin has himself recognised the inaccuracy of this allegation (see Document C.865.M.443.1931.VII).
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Requesting you to communicate the foregoing to the President and Members of the Council, I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) S.SAWADA,
Director of the Japanese
League of Nations Office.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.879.M.455.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
Council and to the
Members of the League.

Paris,

November 19th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation enclosing
a table relating to brigandage in Manchuria.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication dated November 19th which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation.

Paris, November 19th, 1931.

Sir,

I have the honour to send herewith a table relating to brigandage in Manchuria.

In this connection I venture to draw attention to one of the latest exploits of Chinese brigand soldiers who on November 15th captured four foreigners - two Germans and two Czechoslovaks - who were hunting several kilometres to the north of Hsinming. They were carried off by a group of about seventy armed horsemen who imprisoned them in a Chinese house. The Chinese police and the Japanese troops were warned by the Chinese servant who accompanied these persons and who succeeded in escaping. A Japanese reconnaissance aeroplane was sent to look for them. The garments of the foreigners having been removed, they were unable to return to Hsinming until late at night.

I would ask you to communicate this information to the Council, and am, etc.,

(Signed) S. SAWADA,

Director of the Japanese
League of Nations Office.

FIGURES OF BRIGANDAGE IN MANCHURIA

(September 18th - November 15th)

	Sep:18: - 30th:	1st Oct: 10th	11 Oct: 20th	21 Oct: 30th	1st Nov: 15th	TOTAL
				(1)	(1)	
A. Number of raids by brigands.	257	199	212	220	76	964
Number of persons.	61,814	24,960	30,896	21,685	7,226	146,581
B. Casualties						
(Japanese soldiers	1	1	11	2	-	15
(Japanese police	-	-	-	2	-	2
(Japanese						
(civilians	3	-	1	1	-	5
Killed (Corean civilians	131	1	1	-	-	133
(Chinese police	8	2	2	8	7	27
(Chinese civilians	51	237	13	91	3	395
(Foreign civilians	1	-	-	-	-	1
(Japanese soldiers	-	6	1	8	1	16
(Japanese police	-	-	-	3	-	3
(Japanese						
(civilians	1	-	1	1	-	3
Wound- (Corean civilians	22	2	1	2	-	27
ed (Chinese police	-	-	-	2	1	3
(Chinese civilians	103	13	20	11	-	147
(Japanese soldiers	-	-	-	-	-	-
(Japanese police	-	-	-	-	-	-
(Japanese						
(civilians	-	-	1	1	-	2
Missing (Corean civilians	-	18	174	-	-	192
(Chinese police	-	-	-	-	1	1
(Chinese civilians	-	200	24	36	3	263

(1) Provisional figures.

- 2 -

	18th Sep - 30th	1 Oct - 10	11 Oct - 20th	21 Oct - 30th (1)	1st Nov - 15th (1)	TOTAL
C. Principal acts of violence.						
Burning of (Japanese	1	1	1	1	-	3
houses (Corean	26	-	-	-	1	27
houses (Chinese	31	65	1	93 do.	208	305
Destruction of telegr. or telephone lines.	2	1	3	1	3	10
Attacks on public buildings	6	1	5	2	-	14
Attacks on stations	-	-	-	2	-	2
Attacks on towns or villages	-	-	-	1	-	1
Attacks on trains	1	-	1	-	-	2
Attacks on armoured trains.	-	-	2	-	-	2
Attacks on vessels	1	3	1	-	-	5
Attacks on Japanese farms.	-	1	-	-	-	1
Attacks on Chinese police.	-	-	-	-	7	7
Occupation of towns or villages.	-	3	-	-	-	3
Firing on aircraft	-	-	1	-	-	1
D. Number of expeditions against brigands						
Japanese troops	13	12	12	11	3	51
Japanese police	6	18	8	11	4	36
Japanese armoured trains.	-	-	1	2	2	5
Chinese troops	-	-	1	2	-	3
Chinese police	15	-	-	33	7	55

(1) Provisional figures.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.881.M.456.1931.VII.

Paris, 21st November 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council,
dated November 20th, forwarding (a) a cable from Nankin of
the same date, concerning the events in Heilungkiang and
(b) the substance of a note of November 20th from the
Chinese Government to the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Council the following letter which he has just received
from the Representative of China on the Council.

November 20th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of two
further cable messages* I have received. I shall be glad if you
will be good enough to have these messages circulated at once to
the Members of the Council.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

pp. K.L. Low

* Refs/126 & 126a.

Ref/126.

The following is a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation
from Nanking, dated November 20th:

Japanese aircraft bombed and annihilated three thousand
of General Ma Chan-Shan's troops at Heilun, to the north of
Harbin, this morning.

It is reported that the Japanese army intends to continue
the advance to take Karsan where General Ma's troops are reported
to have retreated and to attack North Heilungkiang and the Jehol
district.

Ref/126a.

- 2 -

The following is the substance of a note despatched by the Chinese Government to the Japanese Government on November 20th, 1931:-

The Japanese Government, in violation of international law and agreements, has repeatedly interfered with the administration of the Chinese Government by presenting demands upon the provincial authorities of Heilungkiang for giving up administrative power, and has despatched troops north of the Nonni River Bridge, attacking the Chinese troops. China has already made several vigorous protests, pointing out the serious responsibility of the Japanese Government.

In the last few days the Japanese Government concentrated a large number of troops, continued to advance, and, beginning from noon of November 17th, directed violent attacks on Chinese troops, their aeroplanes bombing and dropping leaflets which announced their determination to take Tsitsihar. It is now reported that Tsitsihar has now been

completely occupied by the Japanese troops. Having occupied strategic places in Lianing and Kirin, and Japanese troops, in total disregard of the Resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations, have been deliberately aggravating the situation by aggressive acts of a more serious nature. The capture of the capital of Heilungkiang and other places in that province occurred at the very time when the Council is in session. The Chinese Government makes this urgent strong protest, holds the Japanese Government entirely responsible for these acts and reserves the right to make all necessary demands on Japan.

SOCIETE DES NATIONS

Communiqué au Conseil
et aux
Membres de la Société

C.881.M.456.1931.VII

Erratum

Paris, le 23 novembre 1931

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS EN VERTU DE L'ARTICLE 11 DU PACTE.

Texte français.

- Page I - avant-dernière ligne : remplacer les mots "le district"
par les mots "la province"
- Page 2 - 5ème ligne- Remplacer les mots "Gouvernement japonais"
par les mots "Gouvernement chinois".

English Text.

- Page I - replace, on the last line, the word "district"
by the word "province".
-

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.882.M.457.1931.VII.
Paris, November 22nd, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the
Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

Paris, November 21st, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg to inform you regarding two messages of significance.

1. Rengo report (Japanese news agency) from Mukden on November 20th:

"Growing grave atmosphere among the Chinese troops stationed in the vicinity of Shan-Hai-Kwan has caused such threatening condition that Japanese women and children resident in Shan-Hai-Kwan on November 17th took refuge in Japanese military barracks as a precaution against emergency.

"Chinese troops in the vicinity of Chin-Chow are fast increasing.

"A brigade of Chinese infantry transferred from the main force east of Chin-Chow is crossing the Taling River.

"All Chinese brigades are now busily engaged in recruiting new troops."

2. Reuters report from Mukden received on November 21st:

"This morning the newly arrived Japanese brigade marched through Mukden and passed General Honjo near his headquarters. The men are quartering in Chinese barracks near Chang Hsueh-Liang's arsenal. It is believed that the brigade numbers approximately 5,000 men, which means the strength of the Japanese army in Manchuria is at least 2,000 over the treaty limit until such time as the Korean brigade returns".

With reference to the report of Rengo, a Japanese news agency, I deem it desirable to point out to you that from past experience, a message of this nature from a Japanese source, directly or indirectly, indicates that military activities in the regions concerned are under contemplation by the Japanese army.

Will you be so good as to have this communication circulated to the Members of the Council?

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration

(Signed) Sao-Ko Alfred SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to
the Council and the
Members of the League.

C.384.M.458.1931.VII.

Paris, November 22nd, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Letter from the Representative of China forwarding a
Resolution adopted on November 20th, by the Fourth
National Congress of the Kuomintang.

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to
the Council the following letter which he has received
from the Representative of China on the Council.

Ref./129.

Paris, November 22nd, 1931.

To the Secretary-General:

Sir,

I beg to communicate to you the following Resolution
adopted on November 20th by the Fourth National Congress of
the Kuomintang which I am requested to forward to you and to
ask you to be good enough to circulate to the Members of the
Council:-

"Whereas since the military occupation of various
places in the Three North-Eastern Provinces by Japan,
the League of Nations has twice adopted resolutions
calling for complete withdrawal of Japanese troops
within a stipulated period and under the observation
of neutral representatives;

"Whereas while China has fulfilled every obligation
laid down in these resolutions, Japan not only has defied
world opinion but has carried even further the policy of
military aggression with the result that the Chinese
troops of Heilungkiang had to resort to measures of self-
defence, causing the situation to become more and more
critical;

- 2 -

"Whereas just at the time when the Council of the League of Nations was in full session, Japanese troops forcibly occupied Tsitsihar, capital of the Heilungkiang Province, thus again widening the area of Japanese invasion;

"Whereas recognised authority for safeguarding justice is in danger of yielding to sheer force while all agreements designed for the preservation of peace among civilised nations seem to be destined to complete failure;

"In the interests of national preservation and for the maintenance of international justice and peace, the representatives of the Kuomintang in Congress assembled do, therefore, solemnly resolve:

1) That the act of self-defence on the part of General Ma Chan-Shan, Chairman of the Heilungkiang Province, against unlawful advance of the Japanese troops is an act not only for defending Chinese territory in the face of foreign aggression but also for upholding international justice and peace and perpetuating, at a sacrifice, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the anti-War Pact, the Nine-Power Treaty and all other international agreements; and this Congress calls the serious attention of all the members of the League of Nations and Signatories to the above Pact and Treaty to the sacred obligations they have assumed under these instruments;

2) That the National Government of China, in carrying out all its policies, domestic as well as foreign, and all measures of expediency in respect to the forcible occupation of the Three North-Eastern Provinces by Japan, has faithfully performed its duty to the Chinese Nation and is fully empowered in all matters pertaining to the protection of the country and the safeguarding of its territorial integrity to adopt whatever measures as are necessary for lawful self-defence while this Congress pledges at whatever sacrifice its full support to the National Government."

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE*

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.885.M.459.1931.VII.

Paris, November 23rd 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Memorandum by the Representative of China on the Council
concerning the proposal for the appointment of a Commission.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council
the following memorandum, dated November 22nd.

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COUNCIL
CONCERNING THE PROPOSAL FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSION.

Paris, 22nd November 1931.

Sir,

I enclose herewith a Memorandum which I ask you to be good enough
to circulate to all the Members of the Council other than China and Japan.

Memorandum.

In order to remove all possibility of misunderstanding I deem it
my duty to place before you the following considerations affecting yester-
day's proposal for the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry.

1. In principle there can be no objection to a properly constituted
Commission to investigate and report upon the existing situation in
Manchuria. Indeed, it is a step which might well have been taken two
months ago had not Japan refused to entertain the suggestion.

2. I beg, however, to point out that the creation, at this juncture,
of such a Commission, however constituted and whatever the scope of its
activity might be is a purely illusory proposal unless it is based upon
a simultaneously effective disposition covering the immediate needs of a
situation which brooks no further delay. To put the matter more con-
cretely, enquiry, without at the same time providing for immediate
cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of Japanese forces (such
withdrawal to begin at once and proceed progressively to prompt com-
pletion) becomes a mere device to condone and perpetuate for a more or
less indefinite period the unjustifiable occupation of China's territory
by an aggressor who has already virtually attained his unlawful objective
while these discussions have been going on.

3. In the circumstances you will readily see that, as I tried to
make plain at yesterday's meeting of the Council, it is quite impossible
for me to consider the proposal in question, or to participate in work-
ing out the details connected with it, until the bases above mentioned
have been adequately laid down.

China still sincerely hopes for a genuine solution of the problem
at the hands of the Council but she can hardly be expected seriously to
visualise proposals that ignore and evade the essential factors which
lie at the very foundation of her appeal to the League of Nations.

(Signed) Sao KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.886.M.460.1931.VII.

Paris, November 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese delegation with regard
to the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the
Members of the Council the following letter, dated November
23rd, which he has just received from the Japanese delegation.

(Translation)

Paris, November 23rd, 1931.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that in a telegram received
on November 20th the Japanese military authorities report that
the train which left Mandchouli at ten o'clock on the morning
of the 18th reached Harbin without any delay at a quarter past
four on the 19th. A telegram dated November 21st adds that the
western line of the Chinese Eastern Railway was working smooth-
ly on the 19th and 20th, and that communications between Harbin-
Pokula-Mandchouli were not interrupted.

I am informed in a telegram of November 22nd that the
Japanese Consul returned to Tsitsihar on the previous day.

I should be very glad if you would be good enough to communi-
cate the above information to the President and Members of the
Council.

(signed) S. S.W.D..

Director of the Japanese League
of Nations Office.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.837.M.461.1931.VII.

Paris, November 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese delegation regarding the move-
ments of Japanese troops in Manchuria.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to
the Council the following letter dated November 23rd, which
he has just received from the Japanese delegation.

(Translation)

Paris, November 23rd, 1931.

Sir,

I have the honour to notify you that I have been
informed by a telegram received on November 21st that a
brigade staff, two battalions of infantry, some heavy
artillery and detachments of technical services arrived at
Chanchiatung on the morning of the 20th, returning from
Taonan.

(Signed) S. SAWADA

Director of the Japanese
League of Nations Office.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.888.M.462.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
Council and to the
Members of the League.

Paris,

November 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate the following letter which he has just received from the representative of China.

Paris, 23rd November, 1931.

Ref./132.

To the Secretary-General,

Sir,

I have just received the following two messages from Nanking which I request you to be good enough to circulate to the Members of the Council.

1. Since the fall of Tsitsihar, the Japanese have spread absolutely false rumours to the effect that large numbers of Chinese troops are concentrated at Chinchow and Shan-Hai-Kwan, with the evident intention of paving the way for attacking and capturing these places. A beginning of the new Japanese move is already seen in the attack on Hsin-Min City by several hundred bandits with the assistance of Japanese soldiers on the 22nd at 3 a.m. The local police of the said city dispersed an attacking mob at 6 a.m. after which trench mortar shells, hand grenades, barrels of kerosene oil, were found near the office of the magistrate; also, two bombs were discovered in the Japanese Consulate which had clearly been used as a base of operations. On the 23rd at 8 a.m., one Japanese plane reconnoitred Hsin-Min.

2. On November 21st, three thousand Japanese troops and on the 22nd, one thousand Japanese troops and an aviation corps passed Seoul, Korea, on their way to Mukden.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League

C.289.M.463.1931.VII
Paris, November 24th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese delegation regarding the withdrawal
of a regiment from the Tsitsihar district.

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to
the Council the following letter which he has just received from
the Japanese delegation.

(Translation)

Paris, November 24th, 1931.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I have just received
news from Tokio that the military command in Manchuria has
decided to withdraw from the Tsitsihar district forces amounting
to about one regiment. These forces are to be despatched in the
direction of Changchun beginning on November 25th and the withdrawal
of the other troops will be pursued according to local circumstances
and the transport available.

Requesting you to communicate this information to the
President and Members of the Council,

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(sgd) S. SAWADA.
Director of the Japanese League of
Nations Office.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the
League.

C.890.M.464.1931.VII.

Paris November 24th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation, contradicting
Press reports of a Japanese offensive against Chinchow.

Note by the Secretary General.

The Secretary General has the honour to communicate to
the Council the following letter which he has just received from
the Japanese Delegation :

Paris November 24th, 1931.

(Translation)

Sir,

I have the honour to communicate to you the summary of a
telegram which I have received from my Government regarding Press
reports to the effect that Japanese forces were preparing to
attack Chinchow.

I would beg you to communicate the information in question
to the President and Members of the Council and have the honour,
etc.

(Signed) S. Sawada.

Director of the Japanese
League of Nations Office.

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Summary of official telegrams received by
the Japanese Delegation.

Tokio, November 24th,

(Translation)

The report which has appeared in the Press that our forces are preparing a general offensive against Chinchow is entirely unfounded. It should be pointed out that apart from the Chinese troops concentrated at Chinchow, about 100,000 of Chang-Hsueh-Liang's troops are still in the neighbourhood of the Great Wall. Under these circumstances an offensive would require military preparations on an enormous scale. This fact in itself is sufficient to show the absurdity of such rumours.

A telegram from our Consulate at Liaoyang states that a strong infantry column with artillery has proceeded to the neighbourhood of Anshan, Chienshan, Tangkangtsu and Nantai,¹⁾ for the purpose of dispersing large bands of brigands in that area.

This operation may have given rise to the rumours of an attack on Chinchow.

1) Places on the main line of the South Manchurian Railway.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.891.M.465.1931.VII.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

Paris,

November 24th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council forwarding translation of a note addressed to the Japanese Government by the National Government of the Republic of China on November 21st, 1931.

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication which he has just received from the Representative of China on the Council.

Ref.133.

Paris, November 24th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have just received from Nanking the following English translation of the text of a note addressed to the Japanese Government by the National Government of the Republic of China on November 21st, which I request you to be good enough to circulate to the Members of the Council.

"1. In accordance with the Resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on September 30th and the Resolution adopted by thirteen of the Members of the Council on October 24th, the Governments of China and Japan are under obligations to avoid any act of aggression or any act tending to aggravate the situation. As formerly pointed out by the President of the Council, M. Briand, the Resolution of October 24th possesses full moral force. Furthermore, since the note under acknowledgment specifically refers to paragraphs five and six of the Resolution of September 30th, it is clear that the Japanese Government is fully aware of its obligations under the Resolution adopted by the Council.

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"However, from September 30th to the present moment, troops under the direction of the Japanese Government have been every moment extending their warlike operations on Chinese soil and committing acts which would not be permitted by international law even in a state of war. For example, the Japanese troops on October 8th raided Chinchow which caused great consternation abroad; and, more recently, they seized Chinese national revenue and allied themselves with bandit elements by supplying them with arms and ammunition with the object of inciting them to disturb the peace and order of the occupied areas or in the vicinity of these areas.

"The Japanese authorities in the Japanese Concession in Tientsin have abused their position by allowing a large number of armed plain-clothes rioters to sally from the Japanese Concession and attack Chinese public office buildings with the result that many Government employees and civilians were killed and wounded.

"Moreover, Japanese troops under the pretext of effecting repairs to railway bridges on the Nonni River - which repairment they have no right to make - have invaded the Heilungkiang Province, attacked the Chinese troops and exerted military pressure upon the provincial authorities.

"The Chinese Government has, on several occasions, lodged strong protests with the Japanese Government and pointed out the grave responsibility which must accrue to the Japanese Government.

"According to latest reports, Japanese troops on November 18th and 19th occupied Langangchi and Tsitsihar. The Japanese forces had previously conducted serial attack on Tsitsihar and distributed leaflets declaring Japan's determination to capture the Capital of Heilungkiang. Should the foregoing aggressive action represent the fixed policy of the Japanese Government, the official endorsement by the Japanese Government of the Resolution of September 30th adopted by the League Council would be most incommensurable.

"2. Instead of awakening to its responsibilities, the Japanese Government has always alleged that the neutral and passive manifestation of feelings on the part of the Chinese people are contrary to the Resolution of the League Council. This the Chinese Government cannot admit. Although extremely angry with the Japanese aggressive activities, the Chinese people in their attitude towards Japanese residents in China confine their reactions to the realm of commercial relations and have not deliberately sought to injure the lives and property of the Japanese residents. The Chinese Government has, excepting the areas under Japanese occupation, endeavored its utmost to protect Japanese nationals.

"In view of the scrupulous observance by the Chinese Government and people of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War and other international agreements, any unbiased observer cannot but feel amazed at the fact that the Chinese people have kept themselves within legal bounds in their reactions to the Japanese outrages. Instead of awakening to her ill considered actions, the Japanese Government has sought under pressure to restore ordinary friendly feelings of the Chinese people towards Japan. This is virtually an attempt to reverse the order of things. The National Government of the Republic of China is, therefore, constrained to point out to the Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Government that so long as the Japanese troops remain in the occupied areas, so long as the status quo ante is not restored and so long as Japanese aggressive actions do not cease, the Chinese people will be unable to restore their ordinary feelings towards the Japanese people. The Chinese Government believes this to be quite comprehensible to the Japanese Government.

"3. The Japanese Government should have, in observance of her obligations under International Law, the League Covenant and the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, as well as in fulfillment of her undertakings under the Resolution adopted by the League Council on September 30th and that adopted on October 24th which has full moral force, completed withdrawal of her troops within the specified time limit long ago and no room is left for further argument.

"The Chinese Government has the honour to request the Japanese Government to change, in accordance with previous notes addressed by the Chinese Government, as well as the reply sent by the President of the Council of the League of Nations under the date of November 1st, her past policy immediately and negotiate the details of withdrawal of the Japanese troops and of the retrocession of the evacuated territory with Chinese commissioners already appointed by the Chinese Government for this purpose so that the Japanese troops now invading and occupying various centres of the North-eastern Provinces will be immediately and completely withdrawn and peace in the Far East which has already been ruptured will be restored."

(Sgd) S.O-KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

C.892.M.466.1931.VII.

Paris, November 25th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the British Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Representative on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, dated November 24th.

24th November, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I am desired by Lord Cecil to inform you that His Majesty's Minister in Nanking telegraphed on November 22nd to say that he had arranged to send the British Military Attaché and other observers to the Chinchow neighbourhood immediately.

His Majesty's Minister added that arrangements could also be made for the despatch of British observers to the Tsitsihar-Angangchi area.

I am to request that you will be good enough to communicate the above information to the members of the Council.

(Signed) ALEXANDER CADOGAN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.893.M.467.1931.VII.

Communicated to the Council
and to the Members of the League.

Paris, November 25th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Letter from the Representative of China on the Council

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which he has just received from the Representative of China, relating to reconnoitring by Japanese aeroplanes in the neighbourhood of Hsinmin and Pei-Chi-Pao.

Paris, November 25th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received from Nanking the following three reports which I request you to be good enough to circulate to the Members of the Council:

1. On November 22nd, "bandits" attacked Hsinmin. After repulsion, three Japanese planes came and dropped one bomb. Then three Japanese armoured trains and three Japanese army trains from Huang-Ku-Tun and Chu-Liu-Ho, respectively arrived. Three Japanese officers and thirty Japanese soldiers appeared protesting that plain-clothes men were concealed within the city but departed after confirming that the "bandits" were from the east.
2. On November 22nd, two Japanese planes flew to Pei-Chi-Pao circled Yangho and reconnoitred.
3. On November 22nd, four Japanese planes flew to Hsinmin and dropped one bomb.

(Sgd.) Q. KUANPSON YOUNG

for SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
 Council and the
 Members of the League.

C.894.M.468.1931.VII.

Paris, November 25th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Letter from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter from the Representative of China on the Council, proposing that a neutral zone should be established in the Chinchow district.
 Ref. 136.

Paris, November 25th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

Positive information of the utmost urgency just received from my Government indicates that, notwithstanding Japanese assurances to the contrary, the Japanese Army is converging on Chinchow. A serious conflict therefore impends between the Japanese and Chinese forces, which China earnestly wishes to avoid, and it would seem that it can be prevented only if without any delay the Council interposes some decisive action. My Government accordingly asks the Council at once to take all necessary steps for the establishment of a neutral zone between the present stations of the Chinese and Japanese forces; such zone to be occupied by British, French, Italian and other neutral detachments under Council authority.

In such circumstances China could and would, if requested by the Council, in the interest of peace withdraw her forces within the Great Wall.

Please bring this communication to the immediate attention of the Council.

(Signed) SLO-KE ALFRED SZE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C. 895.M.469.1931.VII.
Paris, November 25th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the President of the
Council to the Chinese and Japanese Governments.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council copy of the following telegram which the President of the Council despatched on November 25th to the Chinese and Japanese Governments.

On behalf of my colleagues on the Council, I have the honour to make the following appeal to the Japanese and Chinese Governments. The Council is striving to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute, but its efforts would be in vain if fresh engagements were to occur between Chinese and Japanese forces. The Council specially calls the attention of the two Governments to the situation existing in the Chinchow region. Already certain Governments have decided to send observers there. But it is for the two parties to give the Commanders of their respective forces the strictest orders to refrain from any action which might lead to further engagements and further loss of human life. My colleagues and I rely on the will of the two Governments to take all necessary measures for this purpose urgently.

Aristide BRIAND
President,
Council League of Nations.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.896.M.470.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

Paris,

November 26th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese delegation regarding
the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Tsitsihar.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
communicate to the Council the following letter
dated November 25th which he has just received
from the Japanese delegation.

Paris, November 25th, 1931.

(Translation)

Sir,

With reference to my communication of November 24th
regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Tsitsihar,*
I have the honour to inform you that I am advised in a telegram
from Mukden that in spite of transport difficulties caused in
particular by the extreme cold, this withdrawal was begun on
the 24th and is now continuing.

Requesting you to communicate this information to
the President and the Members of the Council.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) S. SAWADA,

Delegate of the Japanese League of
Nations Office.

* See Document C.889.M.463.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.897.M.471.1931.VII,

Paris,

November 26th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation concerning
the movements of Japanese troops.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Council the following letter which he has
just received from the Chinese Delegation.

Paris, November 26th, 1931.

Ref.139.

Sir,

I have just received the two following urgent reports
from Peiping, which I request you to be good enough to circulate
to the Members of the Council.

1. "Japanese troops occupied Hsinmin at noon to-day,
November 25th. A certain Japanese major kept the
Chinese magistrate in custody in the local Chamber
of Commerce. A part of the Chinese local defence
corps has been disarmed by the Japanese troops and
more than 20 shells were fired by the latter at
Koutaitse, north of the city."
11. "Six Japanese defence corps are concentrating at
Yingkow and it seems that they are advancing
westward."

C. Knapson Young,
For Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.898.M.472.1931.VII.

Paris, November 26th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation forwarding a
Note addressed to the Japanese Government by the National
Government of the Republic of China on November 25th, 1931.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Council the following letter which he has just
received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./137.

Paris, 26th November 1931.

The Secretary-General of
the League of Nations.

Sir:

I have just received from Nanking the following
English translation of the text of a Note addressed to the
Japanese Government by the National Government of the
Republic of China, dated November 25th, which I request you
to be good enough to circulate to the Members of the
Council.

"According to the latest reports, Japanese troops
have been busily concentrating at various points
southwest of Shenyang (Mukden) and are preparing an
attack upon Chinchow and other places. At the same
time, false reports are being circulated by the Japanese,
alleging that China has sent heavy reinforcements to
Chinchow, creating thereby a very critical situation
and that attack on the Japanese forces appears quite
probable. Moreover, on the 22nd instant, Japanese
troops assisted bandits in their attack on Hsinmin.

"These activities of the Japanese troops are
similar to the tactics adopted by them in their previous
invasion of Heilunkiang and other centres. The whole
world is amazed at the persistent pressure brought upon
China by the Japanese Government in the execution of its
plans of aggression. The Chinese Government declares
that the Japanese Government must shoulder the heavy
responsibility should any untoward incident happen in
Chinchow, Hsinmin and neighbourhood".

(Signed) C. Knappson Young

for S.O-KE ALFRED SZE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.899.M.473.1931.VII.
Paris, November 26th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the British Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Representative on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following information communicated to him on November 26th, 1931.

M E M O R A N D U M .

The following information has been received by His Majesty's Government:-

The British official observers report that Tsitsihar was occupied by Japanese cavalry on the morning of November 19th. The city was formally occupied in the afternoon of the same day. Such remnants of the Chinese forces as have not been scattered have retired north-east along the Tsitsihar-Koshang railway towards Koshang.

A report from Harbin, dated 1.p.m. November 19th, states that there was no apparent interference with the Chinese eastern railway and that trains were running as usual. It was learnt from Japanese military sources at Harbin on November 24th that no Japanese troops will move north of Tsitsihar, the weather, moreover, being so severe as to preclude any serious advances. Japanese troops are quartered in Tsitsihar, the headquarters of the 2nd Division being in the South Manchurian railway buildings. When other accommodation is available it is intended to remove the troops from these buildings and to station no troops in the city. All is reported to be quiet. The casualties on November 18th are reported as being as follows:-

Japanese: Killed 4, wounded 108.

Chinese: Killed and wounded and died from cold, 600.

-2-

In view of serious reports of an impending clash at Chinchow, official observers left Peking for that area on November 23rd. At 6 p.m. on November 24th they reported that the situation at Chinchow was then normal and that there were no signs of any preparation for an attack. Reports emanating from Japanese official sources were being circulated to the effect that Chinese were sending more troops outside the wall, but no sign of any such movements had been discovered. The Chinese Commander at Chinchow denied that there was any concentration of troops near Tungliao. He appeared to expect that the Japanese troops would soon arrive at Chinchow but no arrangements for defence had apparently been made.

A report from British Military Observers in the Chinchow area, dated November 25th, gives the following disposition of Chinese troops: The 10th Brigade are towards Koupantze with one battalion at Tahushan acting as railway protection. North of the railway 20th Brigade, South of the railway 12th Brigade and 20th Artillery Brigade, calibre 77 mm. Total with administrative and security 23,000. The 9th Brigade is at Shan-haikuan occupying area Linchou to the Wall. Chinchow headquarters report that Sinminfu was taken by the Japanese to-day and over 1,400 on the move south-west. Some hundred Japanese sailors have been landed unarmed at Shanhaikuan.

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION,
PARIS,

26th November, 1931.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.900.M.474.1931.VII.

Paris, November 27, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation regarding the position in the district situated between the South Manchurian Railway line and the Liao-ho river.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following letter, dated November 26, 1931, which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation.

Translation.

Japanese League of Nations Office. Paris, November 26, 1931.

Sir,

With reference to my communication dated November 24th concerning the despatch of a column of infantry to the neighbourhood of Anchan, Chienshan, Tangkangtsu and Nantai to disperse large bands of Chinese brigands and irregulars in this district, I have the honour to inform you that according to a telegram received today two battalions of infantry engaged in this action returned yesterday evening to Mukden after dispersing the brigands in the district situated between the South Manchurian Railway line and the Liao-ho, although a large number were able to take refuge on the right bank of this river. The other detachments were to rejoin their garrisons on the 25th, after driving away the bandits from the neighbourhood of Tai-zu-ho.

Requesting you to communicate the foregoing to the President and Members of the Council,

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) S. SAWADA,

Director of the Japanese League of Nations Office.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.901.M.475.1931.VII.

Paris,

November 27th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation
concerning the situation at Tientsin.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
communicate to the Council the following letter
dated November 27th, 1931, which he has just
received from the Japanese Delegation.

Paris, November 27th, 1931.

Translation.

Japanese League of Nations Office.

Sir,

I have just received from Tokio the following information concerning an aggression by Chinese troops against the Japanese Concession at Tientsin.

Order appearing to be restored at Tientsin, the Japanese volunteer corps were disarmed yesterday (November 26th). At about 8.20 p.m., however, the left part of the line of defence, situated within the Concession near the Japanese barracks, underwent a violent cannonade from field guns, mortars and machine guns. The Commander of the Japanese troops immediately demanded that firing should cease, but no notice having been taken of his demand, the Japanese forces were obliged to open fire in their turn. Hostilities spread all along the defence line and fighting was still going on on November 27th at midday (local time).

The Commander of the Japanese forces has urgently asked for re-enforcements, the situation of our troops being critical. The Chinese forces stationed in the neighbourhood of Tientsin number 40,000 men, with 10 pieces of artillery. The Japanese detachments in the district consist of five companies, only three of which are stationed at Tientsin (490 men).

This situation is causing the Japanese Government some anxiety, and I should be glad if you would communicate this information urgently to the President and Members of the Council.

(Signed) S. SAWADA,

Director of the Japanese
League of Nations Office.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.925.M.490.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
 Council and the
Members of the League.

Paris,

November 27th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Situation at Tientsin and in the Chinchow district.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which he has just received from the Representative of China.

Paris, November 27th, 1931.

Ref.141.

Sir,

I have just received the following reports which I request you to be good enough to circulate to the Members of the Council:

1. On November 26th, after 8.30 p.m., there was an outburst of Japanese artillery and machine-gun fire at Tientsin. Some plain clothes gunmen, who disappeared when fired at by the Chinese police started the trouble. The Japanese alleged that they fired because of bullets entering the Concession. During the Japanese bombardment shells fell near the Civil Governor's and the Major's headquarters in the Chinese City.

2. Japanese troops continue to advance in the direction of Chinchow. On November 27th, at 10 a.m., a Japanese armoured train, followed by a Japanese troop train, advanced westward to Pai-Chi-Pu and clashed with the Chinese troops; the latter are preparing to retreat to Li-Chia-Wo-Pu.

Japanese planes reconnoitered Chinchow for half an hour.

(Signed) SAC-KE ALFRED SZE.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
 Council and the
Members of the League.

C.926.M.491.1931.VII.

Paris,

November 28th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Attack on the Chinese City of Tientsin.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
 circulate to the Council the following letter
 from the Chinese Representative.

Ref.142.

Paris, November 27th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received a further telegram which states that, on the 26th instant at 8.0 p.m., some twenty persons in mufti started firing upon the Chinese police in the Chinese City. The Chinese police took the necessary defensive measures against these irregulars and at the same time notified both the Japanese Consul and the Japanese military authorities, as the part of the Chinese City concerned is near the Japanese Concession.

On the pretext that some shots were fired into the Japanese military quarters, however, the Japanese troops started shelling the Chinese City with their heavy artillery, about forty shells being fired. At the same time, Japanese troops made an attack. Fighting subsided about midnight, but heavy firing was resumed in the early hours, when the Japanese troops also used machine-guns. The Chinese police refrained from returning the fire after the preliminary sorties; four police were killed and twenty wounded, while other casualties are as yet unknown.

At 9.0 a.m. to-day, the Japanese troops renewed their attacks and forced the Chinese police to withdraw from the police station of that district.

I shall be obliged if you will be good enough to circulate the above to the Members of the Council.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

p.C. KUANPSUN YUNG.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to
the Council and
the Members of the
League.

C.927.M.492.1931.VII.

Paris,

November 28th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Situation in the neighbourhood of Chinchow.

Noted by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
circulate to the Council the following
communication from the Chinese representative.

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have just received a cablegram from Nanking dated
November 27th, stating that the Japanese troops continued their
drive towards Chinchow and that one Japanese armoured train and
seven hundred Japanese troops proceeded, about noon, from Pei-Chi-
Pao westward and attacked, with heavy artillery, a Chinese armoured
train at Jao-Yang-Ho. One bridge east of Jao-Yang-Ho is
reported to have been damaged.

I shall be obliged if you will be good enough to cir-
culate the above to the Members of the Council.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest
consideration.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE,

p. C. KUANPSON YUNG.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.928.M.493.1931.VII.

Paris, November 27th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Japanese Delegation

Reply to the telegram of the President of the Council
to the Japanese and Chinese Governments dated
November 25th, 1931.(1)

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate
to the Council the following letter dated November 27th, 1931,
which the President of the Council has just received from the
Japanese delegation.

Paris, November 27th, 1931.

Translation

Your Excellency,

On my Government's instructions I have the honour to transmit
to you the following reply to the telegram which you were good
enough to send it:

1. The Japanese Government has the honour to acknowledge
receipt of the telegram of His Excellency, the President of the
Council of the League of Nations dated Paris, November 25th, 1931.

2. Your Excellency has been informed by the communications
made to you on several occasions by the Japanese representative on

(1) See Document C.895.M.469.1931.VII.

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the Council, of the serious threat to our troops constituted by the presence of very large Chinese regular forces in the Chinchow district and by the employment of bands of brigands and soldiers in civilian clothes by the Chinese authorities for the purpose of disturbing order in Manchuria.

The Japanese troops, in obedience to the policy pursued by the Japanese Government of avoiding any aggravation of the situation will undertake no act of hostility except in self-defence or as a police measure.

3. The Japanese Government entirely shares Your Excellency's desire to avoid, as far as possible, any conflict between the Japanese and Chinese forces in the Chinchow district.

It therefore has no objection in principle to declaring that should the Chinese forces be withdrawn from the Chinchow district to the west of Shanghai-kwan, as the Chinese Government recently proposed through the Government of the French Republic, the Japanese forces will not enter the zone thus evacuated except in the event of a serious and urgent threat endangering the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in Northern China and the safety of the Japanese troops stationed there.

The Japanese Government is prepared to instruct its authorities on the spot to conclude detailed arrangements in this connection with the Chinese local authorities.

In informing you of the foregoing I have the honour to be, etc.

(Sgd). K. YOSHIKAWA

Japanese Representative on the Council.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

C.929 M.494.1931.VII.

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the British Representative
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Representative on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following information communicated to him on November 28th, 1931.

The Secretary-General of the
League of Nations.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Paris.

November 28th, 1931.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the following information has been received by His Majesty's Government:-

Firing began on the borders of the Japanese Concession at Tientsin on the evening of November 26th and continued intermittently throughout the night. Firing died down on the morning of November 27th. The Chinese allege that plain-clothes men again appeared and attacked Chinese police whilst the Japanese, who used machine guns and light artillery, maintain that there was a deliberate attack on the Japanese Concession by Chinese troops.

On the morning of November 27th Japanese aeroplanes circled over Chinchow. Chinese Headquarters state that an armoured train engagement took place early in the morning of November 27th at Jao-Yang-Ho south west of Sin-Min-Fu. At various tactical points along the railway in the direction of Tahushan personal inspection by British official observers disclosed trenches of weak construction, but the Chinese neither intend nor are able to put up a resolute defence.

It is confirmed from an unofficial British source that several Chinese have been killed in the engagement and that the Japanese train had returned to Pai-Chi-pu. According to the same source, Japanese aeroplanes have been flying over Chinchow at intervals during November 27th.

I have the honour etc.,

(Signed) ALEXANDER CADOGAN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.930.M.495.1931.VII.

Paris,

November 28th, 1931.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation
concerning the recent activities of brigands in Manchuria.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the Japanese Delegation's request, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to
the Council the following information.

SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF

BRIGANDS AND IRREGULAR SOLDIERS.

DISTRICT OF HSINMIN.

1. On November 17th a band of brigands appeared 13 kilometres to the north of Hsinmin and plundered the neighbourhood.

2. In the night of the 22nd, at about 3 a.m., a band of about 200 brigands appeared two or three leagues to the north of Hsinmin. The Chinese police forces were able to drive them back before dawn. A Japanese aeroplane assisted in the pursuit of the brigands and dropped a bomb which fell to the south east of the town without causing damage.

3. On the 23rd at about 4 a.m. a band of about 100 bandits destroyed the telephone lines and railway signals between Hsinmin and Chuliuhe. Traffic was interrupted for two hours. The Chinese police forces repulsed these bandits after one hour's fighting.

As a result of these incidents the inhabitants became alarmed and a large number left the town.

4. On the 24th a numerous band of disbanded Chinese soldiers appeared at Kaotaitzu (6 km. to the north of Hsinmin). A Japanese column was sent there from Chuliuhe. On the way, at Yaokaotaitzu, the Chinese police opened fire on it, although it was marching under the Japanese flag. Our forces lost four killed and nine wounded. The Chinese police forces fled from Hsinmin and a battalion of Japanese infantry proceeded to this town to replace them.

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DISTRICT OF TUNHUA.

1. Some hundred Chinese soldiers rebelled and attacked the station of Chiaoho, on the Kirin-Tunhua line (50 km. to the east of Kirin). They killed the chief of the railway guards and two railway employees, plundered the till and fled towards Naitzushan. A Japanese armoured train and Chinese soldiers were sent to the spot.

2. On the 23rd at 2 a.m. a dozen brigands attacked the station of Weihulin (the fourth station to the east of Chiaoho).

3. At Emy (50 km. to the north of Tunhua) ninety-five Chinese soldiers with about seventy brigands, after pillaging the town, marched on Tunhua, where there are only forty Chinese soldiers and fifty police. The inhabitants of the town sought refuge in places of safety.

On the 24th at 7 a.m. these brigands called upon the Chamber of Commerce to hand over 11,000 silver dollars.

At the request of the Japanese Consul a section of infantry was sent to Kirin with six police and five armed volunteers on November 25th.

DISTRICT OF TASHICHIAO.

On the 25th at about 9 a.m. some 100 brigands with machine guns and mortars attacked the district situated between Sha-nan and Luchatun (to the south of Tashichiao). The police of Wafangtien and that of Tashichiao endeavoured to drive them off but the brigands occupied the hill to the south of Sha-nan. Reinforcements have been sent to dislodge them. (These brigands appear to be the Chinese soldiers of the Yingkow water guard).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

C.931.M.496.1931.VII

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF
THE COVENANT

CREATION OF A NEUTRAL ZONE IN THE CHINCHOW REGION

Letter addressed by the President of the Council to the
Representatives of China and Japan on November 28th, 1931.

(Translation)

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

Your Excellency,

You were good enough during the interview I had with you this afternoon to draw my attention to the situation in the Chinchow region.

I reported our conversation to the Members of the Council, whom I called together to-day for an exchange of views. We decided to submit the following proposal to our respective Governments:

It is proposed that those Governments which are able to send observers to the Chinchow region should give them the following instructions:

(1) The observers shall in concert with one another examine the possibility of establishing as between the Chinese and Japanese troops a neutral zone or any other system calculated to prevent any collision between the troops of the two Parties.

(2) The said observers will in concert with one another consider the means of establishing liaison with the commanders of the Chinese and Japanese forces with a view to the necessary arrangements being made.

In order that these instructions may produce the desired results, the commander of the Chinese forces should be authorised to get into touch with the observers in question.

Your excellency will, I am sure, draw the attention of your Government to this important point.

(Signed) ARISTIDE BRIAND.

President in Office of the Council.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.932.M.497.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Situation in the neighbourhood of Chinchow.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
circulate to the Council the following letter
which he has just received from the Representative
of China.

Ref.144.

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received a report from Nanking that,
according to an urgent message from Chinchow, the Japanese
troops are continuing their advance towards Chinchow: At
1.00 a.m. on November 28th, about one hundred Japanese
cavalry appeared north of Li-Chia-Wo-Pu and simultaneously
several hundred Japanese infantry supported by artillery
appeared to the south of the said town. The object of their
advance seems to be Ta-hu-shan. The Chinese troops have
now withdrawn to Pei-chen.

I shall be much obliged if you will be good enough
to circulate this message to the Members of the Council.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

p. C.KUANPSON YOUNG.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.953.M.498.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRAL ZONE IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD
OF CHINCHOW.

Reply from the Representative of China on the
Council to the letter, dated November 26th, 1931,
from the President of the Council.

Paris, November 27th, 1931.

To the President of the Council.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of yesterday, in which you informed me that the Members of the
Council, whom you convened yesterday for an exchange of views, had
decided to submit to their respective Governments the following pro-
posal:

"It is proposed that those Governments which are able
to send observers to the Chinchow region should give them
the following instructions:

- 1) The observers shall concert with each other to study
the possibility of establishing between the Chinese
and Japanese troops, the demarcation of a neutral zone,
or institute any other measure for the purpose of
avoiding contact between these troops.
- 2) The said observers shall concert with each other to
establish a method of liaison with the Commanders of
the Chinese and Japanese forces in view of necessary
arrangements.

In order that these instructions might have the useful
results which are to be expected, it would be desirable that
the Commander of the Chinese forces should be authorised to
get in touch with the observers concerned."

As you requested, I immediately drew the attention of my
Government to the above proposal. I have now received a reply from
my Government, which I hasten to place before you.

The Chinese Government desires to thank you and the Members
of the Council for the proposal and to say that it is immediately
giving orders to the Commander of the Chinese forces at Chinchow,
authorising him to put himself into communication with the observers
concerned, for the stated purpose of effecting the necessary arrange-
ments for avoiding contact between the Chinese and Japanese forces.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

C.934.M.499.1931.VII.
Paris, November 28th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE
COVENANT.

Situation in the neighbourhood of Tsitsihar.

Communication from the British Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Representative on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following information communicated to him on November 28th, 1931.

M E M O R A N D U M.

The following information has been received from a British observer recently at Tsitsihar:

Returned November 24th from Tsitsihar which is completely under Japanese military control, troops quartered in various places in the town and at main station (although small walled city in the heart of the town containing provincial government buildings is not occupied). Provincial Kuomintang and telegraph office occupied by civilian administration, buildings closed, certain amount of house to house searches for arms, etc., but no looting or other excesses, occupation carried out in an orderly manner. Certain amount of alarm among inhabitants, no Chinese administration of any kind functioning, all senior officials have fled except assistant chief of police who remained with one-third of normal force and Commissary for Foreign Affairs. Japanese have not interfered with former but smallness of his force makes it difficult for him to take the responsibility of safety of the city. Latter informed me that he was co-operating with Chamber of Commerce in arranging for organisation of provincial committee of public safety but negotiations not yet complete as they had not yet come to agreement with Japanese whose assent and indirect control would be necessary.

Most of the Japanese residents have now returned to Tsitsihar and large number of South Manchurian Railway officials and civilians have also arrived. Railway to Taonan repaired. No indications of Japanese intention to advance further north (although aeroplane reconnaissances are made daily). Military authorities state that they intend to withdraw to Taonan portion of troops now in Tsitsihar, (estimated at 2,500). Japanese troops in poor condition owing rapidity of advance and bitter weather conditions; exceptionally heavy casualties from frostbite - 350 hors de combat.

No interference whatever with Chinese Eastern Railway and no Japanese troops in railway zone.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Paris.

28th November, 1931.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.935.M.500.1931.VII.
Paris, November 28th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE
11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese delegation concerning
the incidents at Tientsin.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Council the following communication dated November 28th, 1931,
which he has just received from the Japanese delegation.

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

Sir,

With reference to my previous letter concerning the
fresh incidents at Tientsin, I have the honour to communi-
cate to you a translation of a protest made by M.
Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister in China, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs at Nanking.

Requesting you to communicate this information to
the President and Members of the Council, I have the
honour to be, etc.

(Sgd) S. SAWADA

Director of the Japanese League of
Nations Office

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

O.935.L.500.1931.VII.
Paris, November 28th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE
11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese delegation concerning
the incidents at Tientsin.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Council the following communication dated November 28th, 1931,
which he has just received from the Japanese delegation.

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

Sir,

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fresh incidents at Tientsin, I have the honour to communi-
cate to you a translation of a protest made by M.
Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister in China, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs at Nanking.

Requesting you to communicate this information to
the President and Members of the Council, I have the
honour to be, etc.

(Sgd) S. SAWADA

Director of the Japanese League of
Nations Office

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NOTE OF PROTEST CONCERNING THE TIENTSIN INCIDENTS
submitted by the Japanese Minister in China to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist
Government (Translation).

Nanking, November 28th 1931.

Monsieur le Ministre,

According to a report which has just been sent to me by the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin, the Chinese troops in that town suddenly opened fire on November 26th after 8 o'clock on the Japanese barracks and on our Concession. Although the Chinese authorities were requested to cease fire, the attack was nevertheless continued and the Japanese forces stationed at Tientsin were finally compelled to reply in order to defend the Concession and the Japanese nationals. The bombardment had not yet ceased in the afternoon of the 27th.

The course of events was as follows:

- (1) Although the Chinese authorities at Tientsin had not yet fulfilled all the obligations which they had entered into as a result of the previous incident, the Japanese command, wishing to give evidence of its pacific spirit, had dispersed part of its forces and had even disarmed the volunteer troops at 3 p.m. on November 26th. The Japanese defence was thus considerably reduced, and an attempt appears to have been made on the Chinese side to take advantage of these circumstances.
- (2) At 8 o'clock on the same day, the Chinese town at Tientsin was suddenly plunged into darkness.
- (3) At 8.25 the Chinese troops sent up rockets over our Concession and began to bombard the Japanese barracks and the Concession with guns, mortars and machine-guns.
- (4) At 9.10 the Chinese troops began to bombard the Japanese barracks from a distance of about 800 metres to the north-west.
- (5) In these circumstances, the Japanese troops were obliged to fire back and fighting commenced at 9.15.
- (6) When the attack opened, the Japanese Consul General and the commander of our troops approached the Chinese authorities, and asked them to stop the bombardment. The Chinese authorities replied that their forces were firing on irregular soldiers and that by mistake the shells had fallen on the Japanese side. They promised that the bombardment would cease before 10.30.

This promise was not kept, however, and firing still continued on the afternoon of the 27th.

- (7) The Japanese Consul immediately applied to the nearest post of the Chinese police forces for details regarding the presence of the irregular soldiers. He was told in reply that they had no knowledge of this fact.

That being the case, this was clearly a pre-meditated attack by the Chinese authorities at Tientsin against the Japanese. It is therefore of the greatest importance, in order to avoid extending this incident, that Your Excellency's Government should order the immediate cessation of the attack by Chinese forces, and should instruct the local authorities to get into touch with the Japanese authorities to consult with them for the purpose of bringing about a pacific settlement of the incident.

I have therefore the honour to request the Chinese Government urgently to take appropriate and effective measures for this purpose.

(Signed) SHIGEMITSU

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.936.M.501.1931.VII.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

Paris, November 29th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the French Representative
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the French Representative
on the Council, the Secretary-General has the
honour to circulate to the Council the following
information which has been communicated to him.

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

Sir:

The French Government has received the following
information regarding the situation in Manchuria:

1) Japanese troops removed from the calm sectors
are said to be concentrating at Mukden and a movement is said
to have been begun along the railway line in the direction of
Chinchow. Aircraft are reported to be very active. Sin-Min-Fu
was occupied by a Japanese advance guard.

2) In the Chinchow region there is no sign of any
Chinese attack; it does not even appear that important defensive
positions have been organised by the Chinese. Moreover, order
prevails in the district.

3) French observers at Chinchow urge that the Com-
mander of the Japanese troops should receive instructions which
would enable him to get into touch without delay with neutral
observers so as to stop the forward movement of the Japanese
troops and consider the possibility of fixing a neutral zone.

(Signed) R. MASSIGLI.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.937 M.502.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

Paris, November 29th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Situation in the neighbourhood of Chinchow.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Council the following letter which he has just
received from the Representative of China.

Ref./145.

To the Secretary-General.

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

Sir,

I have received a cablegram from Nanking transmitting a report from Chinchow on November 27th as published by the Shanghai Evening Post, an American owned and edited paper, and sent by its correspondent there. The contents are of such importance, especially emanating from a neutral and impartial source, that I beg to give you the following summary and to request you to have it circulated to the Members of the Council.

"There is not the slightest intention or possibility that the Chinese troops at Chinchow will launch an attack against the Japanese positions in Mukden or elsewhere.

"This is the considered opinion of foreign military attachés from American, British and French legations who arrived at Chinchow on the 24th of November, interviewed General Mei Chung-Lin, the Acting Governor and General Yang Chen, Chief of Staff, and personally inspected the military situation in Chinchow and its vicinity.

"According to foreign observers, Chinese troops here do not exceed 20,000.

"Few Chinese troops are in evidence in the City of Chinchow, where peace and order are maintained by the cadet corps.

"The Chinese troops in evidence along the Peiping-Mukden Railway consist chiefly of miscellaneous units which have collected in the vicinity of Chinchow after having been expelled from the various parts of Manchuria after Japanese occupation."

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.938.M.503.1931.VII.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

Paris,.

November 29th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which he has just received from the Representative of China.

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

Ref./146.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received the following two reports from Nanking which I request you to be good enough to circulate to the Members of the Council:

1. In the regions in Manchuria under Japanese occupation, a move has been started by Japanese land corporations falsely and forcibly to establish titles to land, now legally held by Chinese. The Chowa Agricultural Corporation, a Japanese concern, has written letters to eleven villages, including Huang-Ku-Tun, Niu-Hsin-Tun and others, claiming that the land belonged to two Japanese who had transferred it to the Corporation several years ago and ordered the tenants to apply for certificates issued by the Corporation, threatening eviction if this is not complied with. On November 11, the said Corporation erected boundary signs with the following words: "This Land Property of the Chowa Corporation".

2. According to a delayed Reuter's report, which is quoted below, dated November 23 from Mukden, two Chinese were killed by Japanese sentries at Huang-Ka-Tun without apparent cause.

"There was a tragic incident here yesterday night which is arousing considerable amount of adverse comment as it resulted in Japanese sentries at Huang-Ka-Tun station shooting and killing two Chinese without apparent cause. The Chinese concerned were man, his wife, son

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and daughter - a family in rather poor circumstances, the man being a ticket-collector employed by the Peiping-Mukden Railway. The party emerged late at night from Huang-Ka-Tun station, terminus of Peiping-Mukden Railway in Chinese City.

There are no Japanese troops in the station itself but there is a sentry post right across the street. The party of four - very obviously a family party - coming out of the station crossed the street and when some distance from the sentries were challenged in Japanese. Immediately, probably from fear, the party began running with the man and son leading. The sentries immediately levelled their rifles and shot down both, killing them instantly. A brilliant moon gave excellent visibility of a kind which one imagines should also have enabled the sentries to see the people to be an ordinary family party homebound. It is perhaps a little remarkable that this sort of thing can still happen here. Moreover, it should be remembered that no martial law is in force so that such summary shooting demands greater justification."

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.939 M.504. 1931. VII.

Paris, November 29th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the British Representative on
the Council

Note by the Secretary-General

At the request of the British Representative on
the Council the Secretary-General has the honour to
circulate to the Council the following
information communicated to him on
November 29th, 1931.

Information received from British observers

British observers telegraphing at 11 a.m. on
November 28th report that Chinese Headquarters state that a
mixed force of Japanese troops has occupied Li-chia-wo-pu
station. A Chinese armoured train has withdrawn towards
Tahushan, where there is one battalion less a company of
Chinese troops. Train now only runs north as far as Tahushan.
No definite news from either flank, though Japanese forces
reported to be moving in direction of Ko.....

Another British observer reports having interviewed
General Ma on November 28th, who has established Government
at Hailun.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.940.M.505.1931.VII.

Paris,

November 29th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRAL ZONE IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF CHINCHOW.

Reply from the Representative of Japan on the
Council to the letter, dated November 26th, 1931,
from the President of the Council.

Paris, November 28th, 1931.

Your Excellency,

With reference to my letter of November 27th, I have the honour to acquaint you that my Government has just informed me that it has examined with great care the proposal submitted to the Governments represented on the Council.

The policy which the Japanese Government has so far consistently pursued in the true interest of good relations between China and Japan has been not to resort, in disputes capable of direct settlement with China, to the interposition of third parties; and it cannot but pursue this line of conduct in the present case.

Within these limits it will, of course, always be prepared to give the fullest consideration to any means of avoiding a conflict. It was in this spirit that it welcomed China's recent proposal, which was transmitted to it by His Excellency the French Ambassador at Tokio.

As you have certainly been informed by M. de Martel, Baron Shidehara, when expressing to the latter the hope, which the Japanese Government shares with the French Government, that hostilities would be avoided in the Chinchow district, informed him that if China withdrew her troops entirely from the Chinchow district to Shanghai-Kwan and west of that place and only maintained the administration (including the policing) of the Chinchow district at Shanghai-Kwan, the Japanese Government would be prepared to undertake in principle that Japanese troops would not enter the zone thus evacuated by the Chinese troops, except in the unexpected case of serious and urgent circumstances threatening the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in Northern China and the safety of the Japanese troops stationed therein.

The Japanese Government at the same time expressed its readiness to order its competent authorities on the spot to enter into negotiations at any moment with the local Chinese authorities regarding the exact determination of the above-mentioned zone and the detailed measures for giving effect to this arrangement.

Under these circumstances it would be desirable in the opinion of the Japanese Government to see how the above-mentioned suggestions will be received.

(Signed) K. YOSHIKAWA,

Japanese Representative on the Council.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.941.M.506.1931.VII.

Paris, November 29th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE

COVENANT

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRAL ZONE IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF CHINCHOW.

Reply by the President of the Council to the letter from the
Japanese Representative on the Council dated November 26th 1931.*

Paris, November 29th, 1931.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated
November 26th in which you communicated to me your Government's
opinion on the proposal which I transmitted to you on November 26th.

I cannot help thinking that a misunderstanding exists with
regard to the bearing of this proposal which does not constitute,
as you seem to think, an invitation "to resort to the interposition
of third parties" in a dispute capable of direct settlement between
Japan and China.

What my colleagues on the Council and myself contemplated was
certain measures to be taken in a dangerous situation to which Your
Excellency, like the Chinese Representative, had drawn my attention.
The measures in question were exceptional measures to be taken
rapidly to avoid a conflict between the opposing forces in the
district of Chinchow and thus to prevent loss of human life. It is
for this reason that my colleagues and I regard it as extremely
important that the facilities mentioned in my letter of November
26th should be given to the representatives sent to the spot by
certain Powers.

Moreover, the exceptional measures contemplated may be taken
without prejudice to the wider proposals which your Government may
wish to submit to the Chinese Government.

I further venture to remind you that as regards the particular
case with which we are dealing, viz., the danger of encounters
between Japanese and Chinese forces in the Chinchow district, the
Chinese proposal for the creation of a neutral zone involved the
despatch of international detachments to the said zone. For this
proposal, which raised difficulties of a practical nature, my
colleagues and I substituted the suggestion which I again wish to
recommend to your Government's attention.

(Signed) ARIOTIDE BRIAND,

President in Office of the Council.

* See Document C.940.M.505.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.942.M.507.1931.VII.
Paris, November 30th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the British representative on
the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Representative on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following information communicated to him on November 30th, 1931.

MEMORANDUM

A British official observer, reporting on November 28th, stated that he had witnessed the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Sinmin to Mukden.

An official report from Tientsin states that on the night of November 26th a disturbance broke out on the border of the Japanese concession and Chinese city on similar lines to that of November 8th. Firing seems to have begun on the Chinese side but whether direct intention against Japanese or not it is impossible to say. The upshot was that the Japanese on their side opened fire even using mountain guns. The outbreak was generally anticipated and even foretold by local Chinese of all classes. Firing began at about 8 p.m. and continued intermittently until 10 a.m. November 27th. Quiet seems to be temporarily restored but traffic is again dislocated. The Japanese maintain that

- 2. -

regular Chinese troops participated in spite of the Governor's promise of November 15th that they would all be withdrawn beyond 20 li radius.

The Japanese General has demanded of the Chinese

(1) the cessation of hostilities. (2) Bona fide withdrawal of troops 20 li from Tientsin. (3) The withdrawal of special armed police to the northern district of Tientsin. (4) The stoppage of troop movements in this province. (5) the stoppage of anti-Japanese agitation. The Chinese have replied (1) that no action has been taken against the Japanese, only against Pienitui. (2) This has already been done. (3) That the withdrawal of all such police would result in fresh outbreaks. The Chinese are willing that an international force should patrol the area in question. (4) There is no movement of troops towards Tientsin. (5) This has already been done.

As regards (2) it is rumoured in Tientsin that the 15th Brigade, which had been withdrawn, has returned to Tientsin and that Chinese artillery has been mounted in the city. The Chinese, however, flatly deny the truth of these reports. 150 Japanese marines were expected to arrive at Tientsin on the night of November 27th. The Chinese generally seemed to expect further outbreaks in the course of the next twenty-four hours.

United Kingdom Delegation,
PARIS.
30th November, 1931.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to
the Council and
the Members of the League.

C.943.M.508.1931.VII.

Paris,

November 30th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the British Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Representative
on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour
to circulate to the Council the following information
communicated to him on November 30th, 1931.

"A British official observer reports that he
returned from Hailun on November 27th. General Ma has
transferred the Provincial Government from Tsitsihar to
Hailun. The District Administration was functioning
as usual. The Japanese have not advanced north of
Tsitsihar though aeroplanes had reconnoitred Tai-an-Chen
without dropping bombs."

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.944.M.509.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

Paris,

December 1st, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
circulate to the Council the following letters
which he has just received from the representa-
tive of China.

Paris, 30th November 1931.

Ref./148.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received the following report from Nanking,
which I request you to be good enough to circulate to the
Members of the Council.

"On November 27th, thirty-six Japanese reserves,
and on the following day, one thousand four hundred
Japanese troops, including a telegraph corps, passed
Seoul, Korea, for Manchuria."

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

Paris, 30th November 1931.

Ref./149.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received the following report from Nanking,
which I request you to be good enough to circulate to the
Members of the Council.

(1) On November 28th, thirty-six Japanese soldiers
attacked and entered the town of Li-chia-wo-po, south-
west of Mukien, and left after twelve hours, taking
with them Chinese long distance telephone and tele-
graph instruments.

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(2) On the same day, Japanese planes dropped bombs in the vicinity of the railway station at Ta-hu-shan.

(3) The railway bridge and telegraphic lines east of Ta-hu-shan have been seriously damaged."

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

Ref./150.

Paris, 30th November 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received the following report from Nanking, which I request you to be good enough to circulate to the Members of the Council.

"1. On November 29th, about six hundred Japanese cavalry with artillery proceeded from New-Chwang to Yin-Kow.

2. On the same day, one Japanese aeroplane circled over Kou-pang-tze and another flew over Chinchow.

3. According to a report from the Tientsin local authorities, in the early morning of November 29th, there was intermittent rifle and machine-gun firing by the Japanese troops at Hai-Kwan-ssu and other places near the border of the Japanese Concession. The Chinese police did not return the fire."

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

C.945.II.510.1931.VII.

PARIS, December 1st, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

China's reply to the Japanese demands concerning the situation at Tientsin.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which he has just received from the Representative of China.

PARIS, 30th November, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg to communicate to you the following English translation of the main points of China's reply to the demands made by Japan on November 27th concerning the situation at Tientsin.

"Having repeatedly declared that China has only taken defensive measures against the plain-clothes irregulars and is absolutely not hostile to Japan, China is confident that Japan will fully understand China's attitude which has always been friendly and hopes that both parties will check actions that may give rise to misunderstanding.

"The Chinese troops have already been withdrawn temporarily to twenty li (approximately seven miles) from the city. The Japanese Consul-General at Tientsin has been informed to this effect.

"The local Chinese police are responsible for the safety of the civilian population. If the Chinese police should be withdrawn as demanded by Japan, the life and property of both the Chinese and foreigners in the evacuated territory could not be protected. It is hoped that this difficulty is understood by Japan. However, China is ready to consider withdrawal if effective measures for the maintenance of order can be arranged by the joint efforts of the local authorities of the friendly nations.

"Orders have been issued by the Chinese authorities forbidding popular anti-Japanese movements."

I request you to be good enough to have this communication circulated to the Members of the Council.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) SAO-KI ALFRED SZE.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.946.M.511.1931.VII.

Paris, December 1st, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Representative of France
on the Council

Note by the Secretary-General

At the request of the Representative of France on the Council, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following information which has just been communicated to him.

December 1st, 1931.

MEMORANDUM

(Translation)

1. It is reported that the Japanese Command has decided to bring back all available forces within the South-Manchurian Zone with the exception of two battalions in the Tsitsihar zone, one battalion at Kirin, another at Chang-Chun and one battalion on the Liao river opposite Sin-Min. (Information dated November 29th).

2. A Japanese aeroplane flew over Chinchow on the morning of November 30th, but dropped no bombs.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.947.M.512.1931.VII.

Paris,

December 1st, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the British Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Representative on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following information communicated to him on December 1st, 1931.

M E M O R A N D U M.

The following reports have been received from British official observers:-

Interviews with civil officials and tour of Chinchow disclosed normal state. Shops and schools are open, government departments are functioning, troops orderly, revenue collection shrinking because of trade stagnation. There is no disorder or brigandage.

A party of about forty Japanese soldiers in uniform carrying side-arms arrived at Harbin early morning of November 27th by rail from Changchun and were conveyed later to Japanese Consulate-General. Chinese Eastern Railway administration does not appear to have raised any difficulties.

United Kingdom Delegation,
PARIS.

December 1st, 1931.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.948.M.513.1931.VII.

Paris,

December 1st, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which he has just received from the Representative of China.

Paris, December 1st, 1931.

Sir,

The following reports from Nanking, which were delayed in transmission thereto from the localities concerned, have been received to-day. I request you to be good enough to circulate them to the Members of the Council:

1. According to the reports of the local Tientsin authorities with reference to the disturbances of November 26th, the Japanese troops with plain-clothes men fired on Chinese police with rifles and machine-guns south and southeast of the city in the early morning of November 26th, beginning at 2.0 a.m. At 7.0 a.m., machine-gun fire came from the top of the southeast wall and the Japanese JENTAN Company.

From 2.0 a.m. until daybreak, machine-gun fire continued at Chakow. Japanese regular troops and about twenty plain-clothes men opened fire in the vicinity of the Telephone Building at 8.0 p.m.

The lower section of Nen-kwan was also attacked.

2. On November 27th, Japanese troops and armoured trains moved from Li-chia-wo-po to Tang-shia-wo-po, continuing their attack on the Chinese armoured trains. The firing was heard as far south as Ta-hu-shan.

On the same day, Japanese aeroplanes reconnoitered Ta-hu-shan, Ta-lin-ho, Kou-pang-tse and Chinchow. Seven Japanese planes bombed and machine-gunned the Chinese armoured trains at Jac-yang-ho and Li-chia-wo-po.

3. Over 800 Japanese troops appeared at Chin-huang-tao, near Shan-hai-kuan and the Great Wall. They dug trenches and set up electric barbed wires.

4. A Japanese motor boat, Hakuyo Maru, transported over 90 Japanese marines, four machine-guns, and four cases of ammunition to the Japanese Concession at Tientsin.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.949.M.514.1931.VII

Paris, December 1st, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT

Situation in the Chinchow district

Communication from the French representative on
the Council

Note by the Secretary-General

At the request of the French representative on the Council
the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the
Council the following information which has just been
communicated to him.

Paris, December 1st, 1931.

To the Secretary-General,

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that, according to the
information which the French Government has received from its
representatives in the Chinchow district, the press reports
concerning certain changes in the dispositions and numbers of
the Chinese troops in this district and that of Tsin-Wang-Tao
are unfounded.

M. Briand will be obliged if you would communicate the
present letter to his colleagues on the Council for their
information.

(Signed) R. MASSIGLI

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.950.M.515.1931.VII.

Paris, December 2nd, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the British Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Representative on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following information communicated to him on December 2nd, 1931.

M E M O R A N D U M

The following report has been received by the British Government:-

Mukden. November 30:- Imminent departure of Chang-Ching-Hui from Harbin to Tsitsihar to assume chairmanship of Hai-Lung-Kiang is indicated by despatch to the latter place of 500 police specially recruited. Japanese activity at Harbin very noticeable. 400 Japanese officially described as volunteers have arrived.

Chinchow. 2 p.m. December 1: Japanese aeroplanes survey over railway at Chinchow. Damage to railway near Jao-Yangho not yet repaired. Chinese headquarters state that Japanese have withdrawn to Chu-liu-ho and eastward leaving 100 men at Hsin-min-fu and advance detachment at Li-chai-kou.

Situation at Tientsin remains quiet. Japanese headquarters there state that naval landing party will now return to ships at Tang-ku.

United Kingdom Delegation,
PARIS
2nd December, 1931.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.951.M.516.1931.VII.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

Paris, December 2nd, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to
circulate to the Council the following letter
which he has just received from the Represen-
tative of China.

Ref.153.

Paris, December 2nd, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received the following reports from Nanking
which I request you to be good enough to circulate to the Members
of the Council:

1. On November 30th, at 11.0 a.m., one Japanese
aeroplane reconnoitred Ta-hu-shan; it re-appeared
on the morning of December 1st.
2. On December 1st, at 10.40 a.m., one Japanese
aeroplane reconnoitred Chinchow.
3. On November 30th at 2.0 a.m., three Japanese
war vessels arrived at Chin-huang-tao, near the
Great Wall.
4. On December 1st, three hundred additional Japanese
troops arrived in Tientsin.

(Signed) SAO-KE-ALFRED SZE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.952.M.517.1931.VII.

Paris, December 3rd, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Japanese Delegation

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication dated December 3rd, 1931, which he has just received from the Japanese delegation.

Translation

Paris, December 3rd, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

The representative of China communicated to you under date of November 29th (C.938.M.503.1931.VII) a report that two Chinese had been killed without apparent cause by Japanese sentries at Huang-Ka-Tun.

I immediately applied to my Government to ascertain the facts of this case. Our Consul-General at Mukden has just informed me that this report is entirely unfounded. The telegram I have received gives the following particulars:

About 11 o'clock on November 22nd our gendarmes discovered the bodies of two Chinese who had been killed by a hatchet in the High Street of Huang-Ka-Tun situated in front of the station. Enquiries which were at once made by our gendarmerie showed that the victims were an employee of the Peiping-Mukden railway named Wan Ching Nan (26 years of age) and his son (six years of age) who had been killed as a result of private vengeance. The weapon used in committing the crime was found near the bodies. The Chinese authorities are therefore fully aware that the murder was not committed by our soldiers. The Chinese police is actively searching for the murderer.

The same cable states that there are only five or six gendarmes at Huang-Ka-Tun station and that no sentry was posted there.

In requesting you to communicate the foregoing to the President and the Members of the Council, I can only deplore once more the regrettable methods of propaganda which do not hesitate to submit to the Council of the League of Nations reports whose accuracy has not been verified.

I am, etc.

(Sgd) S. SAWADA

Director of the Japanese League
of Nations Office.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.953.M.518.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

Paris,

December 3rd, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Disposition of the Chinese forces east of the Great Wall.

Communication from the Representative of France
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of France
on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour
to transmit to the Council the following informa-
tion which has just been communicated to him.

Paris, December 2nd, 1931.

Translation.

The French delegation has the honour to forward
herewith to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations a
memorandum summarising the facts ascertained by French
observers as to the disposition of the Chinese forces east
of the Great Wall in the zone of the Pekin - Mukden railway.

The French delegation will be glad if the Secretary-
General would communicate this memorandum to the Members of
the Council.

MEMORANDUM.

December 2nd, 1931.

Late on November 26th, the Chinese forces east of
the Great Wall in the zone of the Pekin-Mukden railway were
as follows:-

- a) From Chang-Hai-Koan to Chinchow excluded, 12
machine guns and 2,000 men;
- b) At Chinchow and in the neighbouring camps, 12th
and 20th brigades of infantry, one battalion
of engineers and transport services, 18 77
guns and 48 machine guns; in all 18,000 men;

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- c) At Chang-Yang-King, the Staff, the 19th infantry brigade, one communications company, 1 company of guards, one cavalry squadron, one 85 battery; in all 800 men.
- d) At Ta-Ling-Ho-Tien, 2,000 men;
- e) At Keou-Pang-Tseu, 2 infantry companies, one 75 mortar company, 1 machine gun company, 12 guns, 10 37 guns; in all 1,200 men;
- f) Along the railway track from Keou-Pang-Tseu to Ying-Keou, one infantry battalion with 3 companies, between Keou-Pang-Tseu and Pang-Chang; one company to the south, and one armoured train; in all 800 men;
- g) Between Keou-Pang-Tseu and Ta-Hou-Chang, one battalion with one company at Tsing-Toei-Tseu; at Ta-Hou-Chang, 3 companies, 2 armoured trains; 800 men;
- h) On the railway track from Ta-Hou-Chang to Tong-Liao, one independent cavalry brigade; in all 2,000 men.

In all about 27,600 men, 16-17,000 of these being combatant troops.

These arrangements correspond to the normal disposition of the Chinese garrisons before September 18th, except for one infantry brigade, one battalion of engineers and the cavalry brigade.

In all the garrisons conditions were normal; the commanders had received no special instructions.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.954.M.519.1931.VII.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

Paris,

December 4th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit
to the Council the following communication, dated
December 3rd, which he has received from the Japanese
Delegation.

Paris, December 3rd, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Translation.

Sir,

A communication dated December 1st (C.947.M.512.1931.
VII) mentions that a party of about forty Japanese soldiers in
uniform arrived at Harbin early on the morning of November 27th
and proceeded to the Japanese Consulate General.

Our Consulate General informs me that there must have
been a mistake, some forty delegates of the Japanese Boy Scouts
sent on a visit to the armies having gone on that date to
Harbin. They were wearing winter great-coats that had been
lent by the military authorities because of the extreme cold.
This must be the reason for the mistake.

Fifteen representatives of the Students' Federation
left Mukden for Harbin on the 28th also wearing military great-
coats.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) S. SAWADA,

Director of the Japanese League
of Nations Office.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.955.M.520.1931.VII.

Paris,

December 5th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT,

Situation in the neighbourhood of Chinchow.

Communication from the British Representative on
the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Representative
on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour
to circulate to the Council the following information
communicated to him on December 5th, 1931.

Memorandum.

The following report has been received from a
British observer:-

Chinchow, December 3rd: The situation is normal except
for daily air reconnaissances over Chinchow. Conditions
at Tugliac have been normal since the departure of the
Japanese. The latter have 100 men at Lin-Ho-Kou stated
by them to be for the defence of Sinmin from bandits.
British railway officials are supervising repairs to the
tracks and damaged bridges in the vicinity of Jao-yang-ho.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.956.M.521.1931.VII.
Paris, December 5th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communicated from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication, dated December 5th, which he has received from the Japanese Delegation.

Translation.

Japanese League of Nations Office.
Paris.
December 5th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir:

With reference to the British Government's communication (C.950.M.515.1931.VII) mentioning the arrival at Harbin of "400 Japanese officially described as volunteers", our General Consulate at Mukden has informed me that this must be a mistake (probable confusion with the boy-scout delegates mentioned in my previous communication). The British General Consulate would not have been informed by the Harbin Consulate of such a fact.

(sgd): S. SAWADA.

Director of the Japanese League
of Nations Office.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.957.M.522.1931.VII.
Paris, . December 6th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Disposition of Chinese Forces east of the Great Wall.

Communication from the representative of France on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the representative of France on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following information which has just been communicated to him.

In continuation of previous communications the French delegation has the honour to inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations that further information received from the French observers in the Chinchow district shows that no appreciable change in the situation has occurred since November 27th. According to these observers the particulars furnished on that date, which were communicated to the Secretariat of the League in a memorandum of December 2nd, (*) may in general be regarded as still holding good. The numbers of effectives mentioned in the memorandum represent the maximum Chinese forces in the district.

The trains are running regularly and no requisitioning of wagons for the transport of Chinese troops is reported in the Tientsin line.

(*) See Document C.953.M.518.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.958.M.523.1931.VII.

Paris, December 6th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the British Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Representative on the Council the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following information communicated to him on December 6th, 1931.

M E M O R A N D U M.

The following reports have been received from British official Observers in Manchuria:-

The views of foreign Observers are identical, as follows:-
300 Japanese troops still west of Liao area are stationed at Hsinmin-Tun and Chuliuho with a detachment patrolling the railway west to break in the line near Paichipu because of alleged banditry of which our Observer saw no evidence. A troop train sufficient to evacuate Japanese personnel is held at Hsinmin-Tun.

There have been no movements of Chinese troops on the railways north of the Wall. Japanese reports that Chinchow area has been reinforced by 12 to 30 trains cannot be confirmed. The Chief Control Officer of Peking-Mukden railway states that Yingkow station has been handed over to the Chinese police.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.959.M.524.1931.VII.

Paris, December 7th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to
the Council the following letter which he has just received
from the Representative of China.

Ref./155

Paris, December 6th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General,

Sir,

In connection with certain prevailing reports that there
are Chinese outposts in the neighbourhood of Hsin-min and that
these constituted a menace to the Japanese troops at Mukden,
I have the honour to forward to you, for circulation to the Members
of the Council, the substance of a message sent by Marshal Chang.

General Yung Chin has reported from Chinchow that a
neutral observer has confirmed the fact that Japanese troops
have been moving back and forth between Liu-ho-kou and Pei-chi-pao
(towns in the neighbourhood of Hsin-min) on the pretext of
suppressing bandits. In view of these circumstances, there are
obviously no Chinese outposts in that vicinity.

I am instructed to inform Members of the Council that
the Chinese troops are still all stationed west of Li-Chiao-Wo-Pu
(about halfway between Hsin-min and Houpangtze) and that there
are none east of that place.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest
consideration.

(sgd) SAC-KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

C.960.M.525.1931.VII.

PARIS, December 7th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which he has just received from the Representative of China.

Ref. 156.

PARIS, Decembre 6th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received the following reports from Manking which I request you to be good enough to circulate to the Members of the Council :

1. The Japanese Army continues to menace the peace of Chinchow by sending aeroplanes to reconnoitre the city daily. According to the latest reports received, on December 3rd and 4th, one Japanese plane circled over the provisional provincial administrative buildings many times.
2. On the 3rd of December, one Japanese aeroplane also reconnoitred Harbin.
3. On December 1st and 2nd, 36 cases of trench mortar shells and 3 pistols were discovered hidden in cotton bales, which were the property of the Japanese "International Transportation Company", in the Harbin warehouse of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration,

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.961.M.526.1931.VII.

Paris, December 7th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication, dated December 6th, 1931, which he has just received from the Japanese delegation.

Summary of telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation.

LATEST INFORMATION CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF JAPANESE
AND CHINESE TROOPS.

November 30th. The troops sent from Liaoyang, one regiment of cavalry sent from Kunjuling and one company of engineers sent from Tiekling were brought back from Tsitsihar and regained their respective garrisons.

December 1st. The contingents remaining at Tsitsihar, which were suffering greatly from the cold and had many wounded, were relieved by forces from General Suzuki's mixed brigade which arrived recently from the home country.

December 3rd. The third infantry regiment returned to Mukden from the Tsitsihar district.

Calm being restored in the Taonan district, the troops in these places were brought back within the zones.

The troops from the Liac district have gradually been withdrawn. The contingents of the Liaoyan garrison have all regained that town.

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November 28th. In the morning the Chinese forces were increased in the entire district east of Taliugho. Seven trains were seen moving east and two west between noon and 2 p.m. Our observers ascertained the presence of troops with artillery at Faichipu, Taoshan, Koupantze and Chen-an. The total forces in this district on December 3rd were estimated at two infantry brigades, one cavalry brigade and one artillery group.

On November 29th there were twelve trains in the district, while next day there were twenty-one or twenty-two; most of the troops appear to be quartered in the wagons.

A report dated December 4th states that the number of Chinese forces in these districts has not yet decreased. The sixth cavalry brigade coming from the district of the Great Wall, has just reached Chinchow; the third cavalry brigade has apparently begun to advance on Hsinmin; part of the tenth infantry brigade has arrived at Chang-Wu. The Chinese forces have thus advanced to the west of Mukden, gradually surrounding this town.

The irregulars acting with the Chinese forces cut our telegraph lines between Hsinmin and Chuliuho on November 29th. Attempts were made in the rear of the Japanese troops to interrupt traffic and a locomotive was derailed.

According to information dated November 30th, the irregulars who are supported or armed by the Chinese authorities and are along the South Manchurian Railway and in the districts west of the railway, number about 19,000. Detachments of volunteers numbering about 5,000 men are being organized. The number of true bandits in the whole province of Mukden is at present about 5,000.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.962.M.527.1931.VII.

Paris, December 8th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE
11 OF THE COVENANT.

Situation in the Province of Heilungkiang.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
circulate to the Council the following letter
which he has just received from the Represen-
tative of China.

Ref./157.

Paris, December 7th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have been instructed by my Government to request you
to be good enough to forward this communication to the Members
of the Council.

General Ma Chan-shan has requested the Government to
deny officially the press reports alleging that he is preparing
to launch an attack on Tsitsihar. General Ma states that he is
now only taken up with the task of re-organizing his troops,
which has been found imperative after their withdrawal from
Tsitsihar. He will welcome neutral observers appointed by the
League Council to accompany him when arrangements have been made
for the evacuation of the Japanese troops from the Province of
Heilungkiang.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League

C.963.M.528.1931.VII.

Paris, December 8th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication, dated December 8th, 1931, which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation.

OFFICIAL TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY THE JAPANESE DELEGATION.

December 7th, 1931.

Chinese forces in the Chinchow District.

The forces of Marshal Chang-Hueh-Liang's army in the Chinchow district were roughly as follows on December 4th :

1. Between Chinchow and Suichung : about 3 infantry brigades, one cavalry brigade, and one artillery brigade. Entrenchments are being constructed east of Chinchow on the Taling-ho line.

2. East of Chinchow, in the district of Koupantze, Tahushan and Panshan (on the Yinkow line) : about 2 infantry brigades and one artillery regiment. Heishan (10 kilometres north of Tahushan): one cavalry brigade.

3. In front of the main forces on the Heishan-Tahushan-Suichung-Chinchow-Panshan line, there is a line of outposts of from 100 to 200 infantrymen stationed at Tienshuantai, Taian, Paichipu, Changwu and Fakumen, and also along the Liao.

On December 5th about 200 to 300 Chinese soldiers proceeded to repair the railway track between Tienshuantai and Hopei.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to
the Council.

C.964.M.529.1931.VII.

Paris, December 9th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

DRAFT RESOLUTION.

The Council

1. Reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30th 1931, by which the two Parties declare that they are solemnly bound. It therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution, so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be affected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution.
2. Considering that events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council Meeting of October 24th,

Notes that the two Parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.
3. Invites the two Parties to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation.
4. Invites the other Members of the Council to furnish the Council with any information received from their representatives on the spot.
5. Without prejudice to the carrying out of the above-mentioned measures,

Desiring, in view of the special circumstances of the case, to contribute towards a final and fundamental solution by the two Governments of the questions at issue between them,

Decides to appoint a Commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them, upon which peace depends.

The Governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to assist the Commission.

The two Governments will afford the Commission all facilities to obtain on the spot whatever information it may require.

It is understood that should the two Parties initiate any negotiations, these would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the Commission, nor would it be within the competence of the Commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either Party.

The appointment and deliberations of the Commission shall not prejudice in any way the undertaking given by the Japanese Government in the resolution of September 30th as regards to withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone.

6. Between now and its next ordinary Session, which will be held on January 25th, 1932, the Council, which remains seized of the matter, invites its President to follow the question and to summon it afresh if necessary.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.965.M.530.1931.VII.

Paris,

December 9th, 1931.

Communicated to
the Council.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Declaration by the President.

Paris, 9/XII/31.

It will be observed that the resolution which is before you provides for action on two separate lines: (1) to put an end to the immediate threat to peace; (2) to facilitate the final solution of existing causes of dispute between the two countries.

The Council was glad to find during its present sittings that an enquiry into the circumstances which tend to disturb the relations between China and Japan, in itself desirable, would be acceptable to the Parties. The Council therefore welcomed the proposal to establish a Commission which was brought before it on November 21st. The final paragraph of the resolution provides for the appointment and functioning of such a Commission.

I shall now make certain comments on the resolution paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1. This paragraph reaffirms the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council on September 30th, laying particular stress on the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone on the conditions described therein as speedily as possible.

The Council attaches the utmost importance to this resolution, and is persuaded that the two Governments will set themselves to the complete fulfilment of the engagements which they assumed on September 30th.

Paragraph 2. It is an unfortunate fact that since the last meeting of the Council events have occurred which have seriously aggravated the situation, and have given rise to legitimate apprehension. It is indispensable and urgent to abstain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting, and from all other action likely to aggravate the situation.

Paragraph 4. Under paragraph 4, the members of the Council other than the Parties are requested to continue to furnish the Council with information received from their representatives on the spot.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Such information having proved of high value in the past, the Powers who have the possibility of sending such representatives to various localities have agreed to do all that is possible to continue and improve the present system.

For this purpose, these Powers will keep in touch with the two Parties, so that the latter may, should they so desire, indicate to them the localities to which they would desire the despatch of such representatives.

Paragraph 5. Provides for the institution of a Commission of Enquiry. Subject to its purely advisory character, the terms of reference of the Commission are wide. In principle no question which it feels called upon to study will be excluded provided that the question relates to any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends. Each of the two Governments will have the right to request the Commission to consider any question the examination of which it particularly desires. The Commission will have full discretion to determine the questions upon which it will report to the Council, and will have power to make interim reports when desirable.

If the undertakings given by the two Parties according to the resolution of September 30th have not been carried out by the time of the arrival of the Commission, the Commission should as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation.

It is specially provided that "should the two Parties initiate any negotiations, these would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the Commission, nor would it be within the competence of the Commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either Party". This latter provision does not limit in any way its faculty of investigation. It is also clear that the Commission will enjoy full liberty of movement in order to obtain the information it may require for its reports.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
 Council and the
 Members of the League.

C.966.M.531.1931.VII.
 Paris, December 9th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Situation on the west of the Liao River.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letters which he has just received from the Representative of China.

Ref./158

Paris, December 9th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received the following reports from Nanking, which I request you to be good enough to circulate to the Members of the Council:

1. Japanese cavalry are advancing to the west of the Liao River.
2. The Japanese have appointed nineteen Chinese regimental commanders, ordering them to gather together lawless elements for the purpose of disturbing Chinchow.

(Sgd.) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

Ref./159

Paris, December 9th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received the following report which I request you to be good enough to circulate immediately to the Members of the Council.

At 11.50 a.m. of December 9th, three Japanese aeroplanes dropped two bombs at Tienchangtai on the Tinkow Branch Line, nineteen kilometres north of Newchang. Afterwards, seven bombs were dropped on Tawa, thirty-seven kilometres north of Newchang. And finally, on their return over Tienchangtai, twenty more bombs were dropped.

(Sgd.) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.969.M.532.1931.VII.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

Paris, December 10th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour
to circulate to the Council the follow-
ing letter which he has just received
from the Representative of China.

Ref./160.

Paris, December 10th, 1931.

Sir,

I have received the following reports from Nanking
which I request you to be good enough to circulate immediately
to the Members of the Council:

1. On December 9th, at 11.30 a.m., eight Japanese
aeroplanes, flying along the Kou-Pang-Tse Yinkow Line, dropped
21 bombs on the village of Cheng-Chia-Tun and 7 bombs on the
Tawa Station. During the raid, machine-guns were also fired
by the Japanese aeroplanes.

2. On the same day, at 11.20 a.m., two Japanese aerc-
planes reconnoitred Chinchow, flying over the Provincial
Administration Building for half an hour. At 12.05 p.m.,
three Japanese aeroplanes flew over Chinchow again at an
extremely low altitude, only about ten feet above the roofs.

3. The Japanese have begun the construction on
December 7th of an aerodrome at Ma-Chia-kou, east of Harbin.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quitsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
 Council and the Members
 of the League.

C.971.M.534.1931.VII.

Geneva, December 12th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Anti-Japanese agitation in China and activity of the bandits and irregular troops in Manchuria.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication, dated December 11th, 1931, which he has received from the Japanese delegation.

1) ANTI-JAPANESE AGITATION IN CHINA.

(Summary of recent telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation).

I. ORGANISATION - OFFICIAL PARTICIPATION.

(a) The Commissariat of Education sent, on November 10th, to the Peiping Education Bureau and to all faculties the order to devote several hours a week in schools to the teaching of "the history of Japanese aggressive policy and imperialism in China", over and above the ordinary curriculum.

(b) The Executive Yuan of the National Government recently sent Chang-Hsueh-liang secret instructions to be communicated to the government of each province, to the administrative departments and to the police. This document bears the title "Instructions for the guidance of the organs of the party in their anti-Japanese campaign", and reads as follows:

1. General Instructions.

- 1) All sections of the Nationalist Party must give a lead to the masses and make them organise patriotic anti-Japanese associations.
- 2) These associations are to draw up a plan of action, taking into account the special circumstances of each area, and carry it into effect after submitting it to the headquarters of the Party and securing its approval.
- 3) The members of the local sections and all who belong to the movement must join forces in the anti-Japanese campaign.
- 4) The anti-Japanese organisations must, in the course of their activities, avoid the destruction of Japanese shops or any violence towards Japanese subjects.

2. Investigations.

- 1) All local sections of the Party and patriotic anti-Japanese associations must keep strict watch on Chinese employed in Japanese factories, shops, companies and consulates in China, as well as on their relations with the Japanese. They will notify any plotting and make secret reports from time to time.
- 2) All local sections of the Party and patriotic anti-Japanese associations must appoint members to a supervising committee which will collect information, watch the Japanese and undertake any special action.
- 3) The members entrusted with supervisory work will, at all meetings, be responsible for the inspection and arrest of suspected persons.

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3. Propaganda.

- 1) The local sections of the Party, the patriotic anti-Japanese associations and the popular groups must organise verbal propaganda and the distribution of printed matter. They will receive general indications concerning propaganda by secret instructions from the local party headquarters.
- 2) The propaganda workers will draw up regulations, organise theatrical and propaganda groups, dressed for the part, to depict Japanese atrocities in China, and strike the popular imagination.

4. Communications.

- 1) The local sections of the Party and the patriotic anti-Japanese associations must set up an office to deal with correspondence.
- 2) These offices must supply the Party headquarters, on their responsibility, with information concerning the action taken.
- 3) They must publish press information on the anti-Japanese movement and arouse popular interest in the movement.

(c) At Canton the Executive Commission of the Nationalist Party instructed the anti-Japanese association on November 15th to raise a sum of one million taels in aid of General Ma, by putting up to auction confiscated Japanese goods. Regulations have been issued instituting a more stringent system of treatment for Japanese goods, more especially as regards supervision of the stocks of Japanese traders to prevent any secret transport of goods, supervision on the arrival and departure of Japanese ships, communication to the Nationalist Party of particulars regarding passengers and goods conveyed, expediting of inspection, the main object being confiscation, etc.

II. INSTANCES OF RECENT CASES.

1. Chang-Sha.

On November 8th, a Japanese trader, Mr. Nakajima, wanted to dispatch four pieces of flannel. This was discovered by the members of the anti-Japanese association, who, being unable to arrest his Chinese servant, carried off the latter's wife and father as hostages.

2. Shanghai.

a) On November 12th, the Kôtei Japanese factory was having some goods conveyed by two lorries. These were stopped by inspectors of the anti-Japanese association; the goods were only saved by the intervention of the marines.

b) On November 12th, two employees of the Japanese firm of Suzuki were assaulted by gangs of Chinese when entering the concession. Two other Japanese who came to see what was happening were also attacked. All four were severely injured.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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c) On November 18th, inspectors of the anti-Japanese association, having entered the premises of a textile merchant, arrested two employees for selling Japanese goods; on the 22nd, all the pieces of Japanese cotton goods in this shop were removed by force.

The Municipal Council police having arrested the inspectors of the association and brought them up before the special local court on a charge of theft accompanied by assault, the court merely fined them 20 dollars, allowing them the benefit of the provisions governing first offenders.

d) On December 6th, a Japanese employee and a Chinese employee of a Japanese merchant at Shanghai were arrested by the members of the anti-Japanese association, while packing goods. As a result of representations made by the Japanese police, the Japanese was released after 36 hours confinement (during which he was less severely treated than the Chinese), but the Chinese will only be released provided a Chinese merchant goes bail for him.

e) On December 2nd, the anti-Japanese association confiscated on the Nanao wharf 20 bales of newspaper paper (worth 1600 dollars) the property of a Japanese merchant; the Japanese police were able to recover them.

f) On December 7th, the anti-Japanese association seized at Woosung some machine parts (value 2,200 yen), which were being sent to the Japanese spinning firm Nikka. They were only returned after negotiations with the Chinese police.

g) The number of fresh cases of outrages, insults and oppression of Japanese at Shanghai, from October 19th to November 18th, totals 149 (i.e. 347 cases in all since September 18th) with 217 victims (total 504). In addition, 153 school children were assaulted during that period.

h) The anti-Japanese association continues to imprison as traitors Chinese merchants who buy or sell Japanese goods. Six of them have been placed in confinement since the beginning of December.

i) The seizure of Japanese goods on the premises of Chinese traders continues: the Municipal Council police reports 12 cases during the last ten days of November, including 5 at the office for the inspection of Japanese goods at the southern railway station. The total value of the goods is 7,000 dollars.

3. Soo-Chow.

On the 15th and 16th, upon the arrival of the 60th division, the propagandist groups attached to that corps put large anti-Japanese posters in the most frequented places of the town.

4. Canton.

On the 10th, 39 tons of manganese which a Japanese dealer had bought at Kwang-si were seized by Chinese soldiers. He was asked to pay 500 taels to recover the goods.

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(2) ACTIVITIES OF BANDITS IN MANCHURIA.

I.

(I) Mukden district.

1. On December 9th, about 200 bandits appeared some 4 kilometres to the west of Hunho station. They are being opposed by Chinese police forces.

2. A village near Yaochienhutun station (on the Mukden-Antung railway line) was attacked by 200 disbanded soldiers; ten police officers were sent to the spot.

(II). Penhsihu district.

On December 1st, a party of about 70 bandits endeavoured to destroy the light railway line between Penhsihu and Niuhsintai. Another group of about 35 bandits attacked a village three leagues east of Niuhsintai. Police officers were sent to the spot.

On the 4th, about 40 bandits attempted an attack on the railway zone near Chiaotou station. The Chiaotou police dispersed them with the help of soldiers.

On the 7th, about 100 bandits attacked Niuhsintai and carried off a Japanese employee.

As the police forces which went to the spot were unable to overtake the bandits, they left eight men at Niuhsintai. On the morning of the 8th, over 100 bandits attacked them, burning the railway station and the police station. The deputy-head and two policemen were killed and an assistant was wounded. The Penhsihu police were immediately called out and soldiers were at once sent off in search of the bandits. In their absence, ex-soldiers, 10 police officers from Mukden and 7 police officers from Fushun were entrusted with the maintenance of order in Penhsihu and the neighbourhood. The bandits managed to escape, taking with them a machine gun, two carbines and five revolvers.

(III) Tiehling district.

The appearance of bandits in the neighbourhood of Shihopu (Tiehling district) compelled the Koreans to flee, leaving behind them 2,000 bales of rice. On the morning of the 7th, 25 police officers left Tiehling with about 30 soldiers, 50 Chinese police and 24 Koreans in order to recover the rice. A detachment of Japanese troops was sent to disperse the bandits. It was to return to its base on the same day.

(IV) Hsinmin district.

On the 5th, as it was rumoured that a party of bandits north-west of Hsinmin intended to attack Kungtaipu, a great many of the inhabitants of the district took refuge at Mukden. The Chinese civil guard (with a strength of 600 men) asked the Japanese troops for help. There being a large number of Korean farms in the district, the Japanese forces sent an aeroplane to reconnoitre. In the evening, about 30 bandits attacked a Japanese farm with a machine gun.

On the afternoon of the 8th, between Hsinmin and Liu-chiakou, about 12 bandits attacked the train from Peiping. All the passengers were robbed. The bandits even stole the garments of Mr. Steele, Head of the Transport Office of the Peiping-Mukden Railway. Foreign newspaper correspondents and the British Military Attaché at Peiping went to Kungtaipu on November 8th to obtain information with regard to the activities of the bandits and the present situation of the Korean peasants. They witnessed the attack by bandits on the 9th.

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(V) Tungliao district.

The Okura farm at Tungliao was attacked by bandits on November 27th, and the Korean, Chinese and Mongolian peasants working there were obliged to abandon it, after a fight lasting two days, for want of ammunition. The farm was pillaged and burnt.

II.

The presence of the following groups of bandits and irregulars in touch with the Chinese forces was ascertained east of Talingho, near the South Manchurian Railway zone, between December 1st and 7th.

December 1st	Tangkangtzu	...	about 100 men
	west of Anshan	...	40 "
	south-west of Haicheng	...	50 "
December 5th	Kungtaipu	...	30 men with machine guns
December 6th	Kungtaipu	...	several hundred, with machine guns
	Hsinchentzu	...	200 men, with machine guns
	Chieupientai	...	300 men, with machine guns
December 7th	Niuhsintai	...	100 men (who made two attacks).

The bands of irregulars in touch with the Chinese Army bore patriotic names. In view of the international situation, they were ordered to change them. For example, a band of 2,000 men operating in the Anshan district changed its name from the "Anti-Japanese Blood and Iron Volunteer Corps" to the less picturesque name "Corps for the Protection of the Panshan, Haipeng and Yinkow Communes".

III. ATTACKS BY BANDITS FROM NOVEMBER 11th TO NOVEMBER 20th, 1931.

<u>Number of raids:</u>		Total	...	
Classified				341
by districts:	Changehum, Kung-chu-ling, Ssu-ping-kai			63
	Kai-yuan, Tieh-ling	...		118
	Mukden, Fushun and Penhsihu	...		37
	Liao-yuang, Anshan	...		24
	Tashichao, Yingkow	...		68
	Antung	...		23
	Pi-tzu-wo	...		8
Classified according to the number of bandits:	under 50 bandits	...		223
	50-200 bandits	...		68
	200-300 bandits	...		12
	over 300 bandits	...		31
	others	...		7
Casualties:	killed	...		59
	wounded	...		19
	carried off as hostages	...		69

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

C.974.M.537:1931.VII.

Geneva, December 16th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Information received by the Chinese Delegation
since December 10th.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to
the Council the following communication, dated December 14th,
1931, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./161.

Paris, December 14th, 1931.

Sir,

I have the honour to communicate to you the following
reports from Nanking which have been received by the Chinese
Delegation since the last Council Meeting:

- (1) One Japanese gun-boat arrived on December 9th at
Chinhwangtao with seventy to eighty troops.
- (2) On December 9th, three Japanese aeroplanes flying from
Tashinchiao to the North of Tienchuangtai dropped two bombs which
destroyed the long distance telephone between Tawa and Tienchuang-
tai and seriously damaged in six places railway tracks south of
Tawa. On the same day two Japanese aeroplanes machine-gunned
and dropped two bombs on Tien Hsien, Heilungkiang.
- (3) On December 10th, one Japanese aeroplane circled over
the provincial administrative buildings in Chinchow for twenty
minutes and one reconnoitred Ihsien and another Hulutao.
- (4) On the 10th of December, the Chinese station master and
two employees were carried off by Japanese troops who refused
No.150 train of the Peking-Mukden Railway the passage through
Hsinmin Station. They were released after a protest was lodged
with the Japanese Consul.
- (5) On December 11th, Japanese gendarmes questioned, imprison-
ed and wounded Chinese passengers at Hsinmin Station.
- (6) The Japanese troops at Hsinmin are said to have enlisted
over 1,700 Mongolian bandits and are demanding the local population
to contribute 800 dollars for their daily expenses.
- (7) The Japanese have placed under a "Changchun-Tunhwa Railway
Administration" the two railways: Kirin-Changchun and Kirin-Tunhwa;
and they are sending surveying corps for the purpose of extending
these railways westward to Talai and eastward to Hueining.

(Signed) HOO CHI-TSAI.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.984.M.539.1931.VII.
Geneva, ~~September~~ ^{December} 17th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

SITUATION TO THE WEST OF THE RIVER LIAO.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication dated December 14th, 1931, which he has received from the Japanese delegation.

Paris, December 14th, 1931.

Sir,

With reference to the Chinese delegation's communication of December 9th (C.966.M.531.1931.VII), I have the honour to convey to you the following information:

(1) Small detachments have been sent from time to time in pursuit of bandits in the direction of the Chengchiatun-Tsungliac Railway, but no Japanese forces are advancing west of the river Liao.

(2) The report that nineteen Chinese regimental commanders have been appointed by the Japanese is so inherently improbable that it does not even need to be denied. I only mention it as a matter of principle.

(3) As regards the alleged bombardment of Tienchangtai, etc. I am informed that as the Chinese forces sent an armoured train and their troops attempted to occupy Hopci, our troops dropped bombs on the Yingkow railway line to prevent them from advancing to the last-named place, which is opposite the Japanese branch of the line. No towns have been bombarded.

I would ask you to be good enough to bring the above to the notice of the President and Members of the Council, and I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) S. SAWADA.

Director of the Japanese League
of Nations Bureau.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League

C.936.M.548.1931.VII.
Geneva, December 17th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the British Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following information communicated to him by the British Government on December 17th, 1931.

Report from British Military Attaché states that bombs were dropped by Japanese aeroplanes near TAWA station on Koupangtze Yinkow railway on December 9th doing some damage to line.

Situation at Tientsing reported quiet December 11th.

Reported from Chinchow December 15th that air reconnaissance over Chinchow had ceased during previous few days.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
 Council and Members
 of the League.

C.997.M.553.1931.VII.

Geneva,

December 21st, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT:

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communications forwarded to him on December 19th, 1931, by the Japanese Delegation, concerning:

- (1) Brigandage in Manchuria.
- (2) The anti-Japanese agitation in China.
- (3) The relief of Japanese troops in Manchuria.

(1) BRIGANDAGE IN MANCHURIA.

Summary of telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation.

1. The Okura farm at Tungliao, which was attacked by bandits on November 29th, employed 365 Koreans, of whom 223 were women. Most of the latter have been lost sight of.
2. On December 13th, a detachment of Japanese soldiers, sent to ascertain the thickness of the ice on the river Liao, was attacked by a body of about 60 bandits. Two soldiers were killed.
3. On the night of December 15th-16th, a body of about 200 bandits attacked a Japanese farm near Kungtaipo. The bandits withdrew after an hour's fighting, setting fire to several houses. They returned on the afternoon of the 17th and looted several hamlets near the farm. They were armed with rifles and machine-guns. This body appears to be one of the detachments supported by the Chinese Army referred to in previous communications.
4. A body of about 80 mounted irregulars attacked Hanchiaotze (between Mukden and Hsinmin) on December 15th. They were armed with machine-guns and infantry guns. Some 10 Japanese police officers with a machine-gun were sent to the scene.
5. On December 17th a body of about 2,000 irregulars was reported; it has crossed the Liao and is advancing eastwards. There is great agitation among the Korean peasants in the neighbourhood. There are about 5,000 Koreans in those parts.

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6. Our troops have undertaken police operations on a fairly large scale against the bandits west of Changchun. 600 men with artillery have left for Lungjuling and Chengchiatun. A detachment has also started from Lungjuling.

Official telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation.

Tokio, December 12th.

The following attacks by bandits took place between November 21st and 30th in the neighbourhood of the South Manchurian Railway zone:

Number of raids, 438 (increase as compared with the previous 10 days: 97).

The areas in which brigandage is most common are:

Tiehling-Kaifeng	161
Changchun-Kungjuling	110

There were 80 attacks by bands of more than 100 men, 13 by more than 500 men, and 10 by more than 1,000 men.

(2) ANTI JAPANESE AGITATION.

Official Telegrams Received by the Japanese Delegation.

Shanghai, December 15th.

On the afternoon of the 13th an anti-Japanese meeting was held under the auspices of the Federation of Anti-Japanese Associations.

About 1600 students and workmen took part in this demonstration, which displayed Communistic tendencies. Some 50 leaflets of different kinds were distributed during the meeting. Among the resolutions passed, the following are mentioned:

1. Opposition to the joint administration of Tientsin (?), to the establishment of a neutral zone in the Chinchow area, and to the dispatch of a neutral Commission of Enquiry.
2. Arming of the masses of the people, declaration of war on Japan, and recovery of the lost territories.
3. Resignation of Dr. Sze, and non-recognition of any secret agreement concluded by him.
4. Prosecution of the boycott of Japanese goods to the utmost, formation of new groups of inspectors of Japanese goods, and sale of seized goods for the benefit of workers on strike.
5. Application to the Soviets for assistance, etc.

At the close of the meeting the demonstrators proceeded to the premises of the Shanghai Committee of the Nationalist Party and broke the door and the windows. About 15 trams and motor-buses were also broken up by the crowd.

The Corporation and our Consulate-General having been informed that Communists were likely to make an attack, the municipal police and the Japanese police had to be held in readiness.

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3. RELIEF OF TROOPS IN MANCHURIA

Official Telegram Received by the Japanese
Delegation.

Tokio, December 17th, 1931.

The War Office has issued a statement to the effect that fresh troops are to be sent from Japan to relieve the troops now in Manchuria.

The latter, being very few in proportion to the duties they have to perform, have been continuously in readiness for action for three months, and are very tired. Moreover, it is necessary that the contingents still in Manchuria should return as soon as possible to defend Korea.

A detachment of troops from Korea was sent from Manchuria to Tientsin about the end of November; this detachment also will be relieved by troops from Japan.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and to the
Members of the League.

C.998.M.554.1931.VII.

Geneva,

December 21st, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
transmit to the Council the following communication,
dated December 19th 1931, which he has received from
the Chinese Delegation.

To the Secretary-General.

Paris, December 19th, 1931.

Sir,

The Chinese Delegation has received the following
reports from Nanking which I beg you to be good enough to
circulate to the Members of the Council:

1. Over three hundred Japanese soldiers along the
river in Kaoliyingtse, west of the South
Manchurian Railway, are making preparations for
military operations.
2. There are indications of Japanese troop movements
in the vicinity of Hsinmin.
3. The Japanese have appointed a bandit, Wang
Tseng-chund, to be Commander of the Gendarmes
in the Western part of the Mukden Province and
to gather together lawless elements at Yingkow
of which, up to present, more than one thousand
have been enlisted. They are receiving a monthly
pay of twelve dollars each and wear a uniform of
yellow coat and gray trousers. Three thousand
rifles have been supplied to them.
4. At 9 o'clock in the evening of December 11th,
hundred and thirteen Japanese soldiers with
officers took the Seventh train from Tientsin to
Shanhaikwan carrying with them two heavy guns,
six machine-guns, twenty-four cases of ammunition
and many other articles for military use.

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5. On the 15th of December, six Japanese aeroplanes reconnoitred over Taling Station at Tungliac and dropped one bomb on Tsengtaokopu and more than ten on Tahang Station.
6. On December 15th, three Japanese armoured trains proceeded westward from Liaoyuan.
7. On the 16th at 11 a.m., one Japanese aeroplane flying from Liaoyuan reconnoitred over Tungliac. At noon of the same day five Japanese aeroplanes dropped on the city of Tungliac twenty-six bombs of which three did not explode. Twenty-one of them fell on the following points: one on the West Gate Garden, killing one person; one on the Chuen Chang Hsin Shop, killing one person; two on the Hwa Hsin Company; one on the Electric Plant; one on the Chamber of Commerce; three near the Kwan Yin Hae building; two on the Hsiao Chia Ki building; one on the Ki Shen Lee; one in front of the Tien Chin East Gate; four on the first District; two on the Tung Lai Lung; one on the Fa Ho How Yuan; and one on the Educational Association.
8. On December 16th General Honjo issued a statement to the effect that the Provinces of Mukden and Kirin are now independent and have severed their relationship with the Chinese Government, that the attitude of the Heilungkiang Government has changed, and that the authorities of Jehol and Inner Mongolia will also have to follow suit. He further stated that, as there are people fomenting trouble in the West of Mukden, the Japanese troops, having the duty of maintaining peace and order in the whole of Manchuria, will attack and drive them out of Manchuria.
9. The Japanese Ministry of War officially announced on the 19th of December that parts of the 1st, 10th and 12th divisions have been dispatched to Manchuria and a part of the 5th division to Tientsin.

With reference to the above reports, I venture to point out to you that these reports, together with other ones, which I will duly communicate to you as soon as they are confirmed, indicate that, in spite of the Council Resolution of December 10th, the Japanese, besides endeavouring to strengthen their positions in the areas already under their occupation, are still contemplating to extend their military occupation in Manchuria.

(Signed) Hoo Chi-tsai.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and to the
Members of the League.

C.1007.M.559.1931.VII.

Geneva, December 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE JAPANESE DELEGATION.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communications dated December 21st, 1931, which he has received concerning: 1) The repair of a bridge on the Tsitsihar line; 2) Brigandage in Manchuria.

1) Repair of a Bridge on the Tsitsihar Line.

Paris, December 21st, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

The Japanese Consulate at Tsitsihar informs me that it has hitherto been impossible to repair a bridge on the Tsitsihar line, situated 33 km. to the north of Lungchiang, which was destroyed during the retreat of the army from Heilungkiang. An agreement has been reached between the Heilungkiang authorities and the South Manchurian Railway Company. The work will be carried out by the employees of the latter under the protection of the troops under the command of General MACHANSHAN.

(Signed) S. SAWADA

Director of the Japanese League of
Nations Bureau.

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2) Brigandage in Manchuria.

Paris, December 21st, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

As I have already had the honour to inform you on several occasions, the activities of brigands and other lawless elements in Manchuria are steadily increasing. Numerous Japanese subjects have suffered from their attacks, and a station on the Antung line is reported to have been captured by disbanded soldiers, who killed the stationmaster. With reference to fresh measures of repression taken by our forces, I beg once more to draw attention to the situation in Manchuria with regard to the bands in question and to the Chinese forces with which they are in touch.

Brigandage has been rife in the Three Provinces for many years. The troops of brigands, however, used not to number more than a few dozen men. To-day, in districts where previously small bands found it difficult to maintain themselves by rapine and plunder, there exist groups which frequently number as many as 2,000 men equipped with arms and ammunition. These bands attack towns and railways, and are a serious menace both to our troops and subjects.

This situation has prevented the return of ^{the} troops from Korea according to plan. The defence of this latter province, however, makes their presence imperative and, as I informed the Council a few days back, the Japanese Government has decided to replace them by troops from the home country, and at the same time to relieve the other effectives belonging to the Kwantung army, which have undergone great hardships during three months of continuous alarms.

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On the other hand, we are informed that during the first ten days of October the regular Chinese forces stationed in the Chinchow district and at various points in the neighbourhood of the Peking-Mukden line numbered 20,000 men. On November 26th a French observer reported 28,000 men. This increase in strength was due more especially to the advance from the Great Wall of the Twentieth Infantry Brigade and other forces, which had been joined by the fugitive troops from Peitaying (Seventh Brigade). On December 4th the position ^{occupied by} / the Chinese forces extended along a line from Chang-Wu to the west of Mukden as far as the Yinghow line after passing through Heishan, Tahushan, Suichung, Chinchow and Panshan (communications dated December 5th and 8th), with a line of out posts as far as the course of the Liao river. Our troops, which are scattered up and down the zone, are thus in a position which exposes them to the possibility of rapid attack, Mukden being less than four hours from Tahushan and Hopei three hours from Kowpangtse.

The critical position of our forces is aggravated by the activities of the irregular bands already mentioned. Prisoners' statements and other facts make it clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that these bands are in close ^{relations} / with the regular Chinese forces. At the beginning of the month of November the number of brigands to the west of the South Manchurian railway line was approximately 13,000, among which the following groups were reported:

- a) West of Tashichao 2,000.
- b) Neighbourhood of Taian 2,000.
- c) West of Mukden along the Peking-Mukden
railway line about 1,000.

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- d) To the west of Shantung and Keping 300.
- e) South-east of Hungjuling 600.
- f) North-east of Chenchiatun 1,400.
- g) Neighbourhood of Tungliao 1,600.

By the middle of December the numbers of brigands had reached approximately 30,000 and their activities were on the increase: our Consul General at Munden reported that from November 1st to 10th there had been 278 attacks by brigands; 341 from the 11th to the 20th and 438 from the 21st to 30th. The number of attacks by large bands numbering more than 500 men also increased to a considerable extent, and during the last ten days of November they rose to 23 including 10 by bodies of more than 1,000 men. From December 1st to 10th there were 672 attacks.

These figures demonstrate the importance of the task which at present devolves upon the Japanese troops, who are far from ^{being} sufficiently numerous to constitute an adequate ^{the} defence against/dangers which threaten the security of Japanese subjects and property. That, moreover, is the reason which has prevented the Japanese Government from withdrawing all its Korean contingents before now and which is now leading it to take steps to have them relieved.

(Signed) S. SAWADA

Director of the Japanese League of
Nations Bureau.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

circulated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.1009.M.561.1931.VII.

Geneva,

December 28th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
circulate to the Council the following communi-
cation dated December 24th, 1931 which he has
received from the Chinese Delegation.

Paris, December 24th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

The Chinese Delegation has received the following reports
from Nanking which I beg you to be good enough to circulate to
the Members of the Council:

1. In the evening of the 17th of December over two hundred
Japanese cavalry with four field guns arrived at Liaoyuan.
2. The situation at Tungliao has become very serious, as
several hundreds of Japanese soldiers with more than
ten aeroplanes have further been dispatched to Liaoyuan.
Japanese armoured trains are arriving daily at Mentah
Station. Large bodies of Mongol bandits are being
instigated by the Japanese to invade Tungliao and
Chienchiatien.
3. Japanese troops at Yingkow are keeping ready for use at
any moment the locomotives they had detained, and
have repaired the damaged railway tracks.
4. From December 18th to 19th, there was at Hsinmin a total
increase of over three hundred Japanese soldiers and
more than forty cases of ammunition were transported
thereto.
5. On the morning of December 19th, two Japanese aeroplanes
dropped twelve bombs on Tamintun (Hsinmin), killing and
wounding five persons and destroying many buildings.
6. General Honjo recently again issued a statement to the
effect that since the end of last month, the Japanese
troops, which intended to advance westward from Hsinmin,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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stopped on their own initiative so as to give the Chinese enough time to consider the situation; but facts have proved to be contrary to the expectation of the Japanese, who, in spite of their extreme patience, are threatened in the West of the Liac River by the Chinese Volunteer corps, soldiers, police forces and bandits, totalling hundred thousand. Under such circumstances, should the Japanese further remain calm, peace and order in Southern Manchuria would be totally wrecked. It is, therefore, necessary to launch an attack. The Japanese troops will crush any one who resists.

All the reports given above shows an increase of Japanese military activity in South Manchuria with the purpose of penetrating into the unoccupied areas.

(Signed) HOO CHI-TSAI.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.1011.M.563.1931.VII.
Geneva, December 28th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Paris.
December 25th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

The Chinese Delegation has received the following reports from Nanking which I beg you to be good enough to circulate to the Members of the Council:

1. On December 21st, over three hundred Japanese soldiers with three aeroplanes attacked and occupied Fakumen.
2. On December 21st, at 2.00 A.M., more than two hundred Japanese soldiers entered Lichiakopu, 50 li east of Saling.
3. On the morning of December 22nd, over five hundred Japanese soldiers with three field guns crossed the river near Yingkow and landed at the northern bank.
4. On the morning of the 23rd of December, more than five hundred Japanese soldiers with eight field guns arrived in the District of Hwangshihkian.
5. On December 23rd, at 1:00 P.M., a Chinese armoured train inspecting the Koupangtze-Yingkow Railway line arrived at Weichiakow near Tienchuangtai. A Japanese armoured train with fifty Japanese soldiers and one heavy gun, protecting hundred workers who were repairing rails, arrived there also. The Japanese suddenly fired on the Chinese who returned fire for self-defence. At 2.00 P.M., Japanese reinforcement of four hundred infantry with seven heavy guns and hundred cavalry rushed to the place and attacked the Chinese forces. The fight lasted until half past four o'clock in the same afternoon. The Chinese retreated and Japanese troops numbering five hundred occupied Tienchuangtai.
6. Japanese aeroplanes bombarded and machine-gunned Panshan, and the Chinese armoured trains stationed there retreated to Tawa. Traffic in Tienchuangtai is interrupted and railway lines between Tawa and Yingkow are damaged.
7. Two Japanese war-vessels arrived at Chinhwangtao on December 23rd; and three are expected to arrive on the 25th at Tangku where two are already anchored.
8. The Japanese troops at Mukden have been ordered to get ready to advance westward at any moment.

(Signed) HOOCHI-TSAI.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.1012.M.564.1931.VII.

Geneva, December 29th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Declaration made by the Japanese Government on December 27th, 1931.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following Declaration made by the Japanese Government on December 27th, 1931.

1) Statement by Japanese Government on maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria is matter to which Government Japan have always attached utmost importance. They have on various occasions taken every lawful step in order secure it and prevent Manchuria from becoming battleground of militarist factions. Only if peace and order prevail can the country be safe either for Chinese or for foreigner: in absence of peace and order it is futile to speak of open door or of equal opportunity for economic activities of all nations. But events of September last have in spite of her wishes created new responsibility and wider sphere of action for Japan. Attacked by Chinese violence her acts of necessary self-protection resulted to her considerable embarrassment in her having to assume duty of maintaining public order and private rights throughout a wide area. Local authorities might have been expected to co-operate in upholding law and order. But in fact they almost unanimously fled or resigned. It was Japan's clear duty to render her steps of self-defence as little disturbing as possible to peaceable inhabitants of region. It would have been breach of that duty to have left population prey to anarchy - deprived of all apparatus of civilised life. Therefore Japanese military have at considerable sacrifice expended much time and energy in securing safety of persons and property in districts where native authorities had become ineffective. This is responsibility which was thrust upon them by events and one which they had as little desire to assume as to evade.

2) But further than that not only did existing machinery of justice and civilised existence break down but criminal activities of bandits who infest country were naturally stimulated. Prestige and efficiency of Japanese troops were for some time sufficient keep them in check and maintain order wherever they were stationed. Since beginning November however sudden increase in activities of bandits has been noted in vicinity South Manchuria Railway zone and especially to west of the main line - and it has been established to demonstration by examination arrested individuals, by documents which have been seized and from other sources of information that their depredations are being carried on through systematic intrigues of Chinese military authorities. Reports have indeed been made by certain of foreign military observers suggesting that they found no evidence of any preparations being made by Chinese for attack. But as a matter of fact military authorities Chinchow are maintaining large forces at various points west of Takushen on Peiping Mukden Railway and in adjacent territory. Reconnaissances conducted by Japanese Army

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have not only definitely confirmed assurance that these forces are engaged in making preparations for war but have also revealed fact that their outposts are stationed along line connecting Tienchuantai, Taian, Peichipao and other points on right bank river Liao well advanced from Chinchow. It will readily be admitted that such situation in itself constitutes constant menace to Japanese contingents dispersed along South Manchuria Railway and elsewhere but danger is even greater than it seems at first sight if further fact is taken into consideration that Peiping-Mukden Railway places cities of Mukden, Tinkao and Hopei within short journey of three or four hours from Takushan and Kuopantsu (which are bases of Chinese forces) bandit forces (which include large number officers and men discharged from Chinese Army) are daily gaining strength. For instance number bandits on western bank of main line of South Manchuria Railway was estimated early November at 1,300 whereas investigations conducted in early December revealed fact that they then numbered over 30,000. Moreover they are banded together in large groups comprising several hundreds or even thousands each equipped with machine guns and trench mortars; so that they can no longer be distinguished from regular troops. This point unmistakably to existence of state of things in which so-called bandits are directed and provided with arms by Chinchow Military Authorities. According to statistics compiled in Japanese Consulate-General Mukden cases of bandit raids in vicinity of railway zone numbered 278 during first ten days of November, 341 during second ten days, 438 during final ten days of month, and 472 during first ten days December thus reaching astounding total of 1,529 in forty days. It is usual strategy of these bandit troops when attacked by our men to fly westward or to take refuge on right bank River Liao; where our Army anxious to avoid any collision with Chinese regulars has made it point to refrain from further pursuit.

3) On 24th November Foreign Minister China made intimation to ministers at Nanking of principal powers to effect that Chinese Government in order avoid any collision between Chinese and Japanese forces were prepared withdraw their troops to points within Great Wall. Upon proposal to that effect being officially made on 26th this Government signified their readiness to accept it in principle - at same time instructing Japanese Minister Shanghai and legation Peiping to open conversations on matter with Chinese Foreign Minister and with Marshal Chang Hsuehliang respectively. Japanese Minister in China had several conferences accordingly with Chinese Foreign Minister between 30th November and 3rd December. In midst of these conversations latter withdrew overture and declined further negotiations. Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang with whom our representative Peiping carried on negotiations from 4th December onwards, either directly or through Marshal's subordinates, expressed on 7th his willingness to call in his Chinchow forces as spontaneous move of withdrawal; and he has since given repeated assurances as to speedy execution his promise. In point of fact however there is no sign any such withdrawal. On contrary defences of Chinchow have since been strengthened.

4) Accordingly at present moment, now almost month subsequent to initiation of these negotiations for withdrawal of Chinchow troops, there appears no prospect of obtaining any tangible result owing entirely to want of good faith on Chinese side. At same time increased activity above described on part of marauding bands threatens to bring about complete destruction of all peace and security throughout whole extent of South Manchuria. In these circumstances Japanese forces have now

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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begun general movement with view to campaign against bandit on more extensive scale than hitherto. It is obvious from what has been said above that Japanese Army if it is achieve anything like adequate success will have to advance to points west of River Liao where bandits have their base. Certainly Japanese forces in deference to resolutions of League Council adopted 30th September and 10th December are not in field against regular Chinese forces; but in present abnormal conditions prevailing Manchuria necessities of case compel them to continue their operation against lawless elements. This is point on which Representative Japan at recent session of Council League, held on 10th December, made definite declaration. So long as Chinchow Military Authorities while simulating an unaggressive attitude continue to instigate and manipulate movements of bandit organizations against Japanese Army as well as Japanese and other peaceable inhabitants and so long as officers and men of Chinchow Army mingle in large numbers with these bandit groups and so render it impossible distinguish latter from regular troops, so long must responsibility for consequences of any action which may be entailed upon Japanese Army in self-defence rest entirely with Chinese.

5) During course of past month in spite of indignation aroused throughout country by behaviour of Chinchow Military Authorities and in accordance with constant desire of Japanese Government to abide scrupulously by resolutions of League Council operations of army against bandits have been restrained within comparatively narrow limits and governments have done everything in their power devise means for forestalling collision between forces of two countries in course of eventual anti-bandit campaign. Japanese Government are confident that their prolonged forbearance and their desire strictly to adhere to stipulations of international engagements will not fail to command recognition by public opinion of world.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.1013.M.565.1931.VII.

Geneva, December 29th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF
THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication, dated December 26th, 1931.

BRIGANDAGE IN MANCHURIA.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese
delegation.

Acts of brigandage in the South Manchurian Railway area,
December 1st to 10th:

Number of attacks, 472 (increase as compared with the
previous ten days, 34)

including in the Tiehling area, 139;
Mukden, 47; Chikuanshan area, 33.

Number of persons carried off as hostages, 173; killed
and wounded, 20.

Attacks by bands of over 100 brigands	89
" " " " " 300 "	30
" " " " " 1000 "	6

Kirin Area:

1) On the morning of December 16th, a body of 500 to 600 brigands attacked the station at Lafa, on the Kirin-Turhwa line. They disarmed the Chinese guards, destroyed a bridge, and cut the telegraph wires. In the evening they attacked the town of Chiaoho, and looted two Japanese and 17 Korean shops. Troops were sent from Kirin, but were unable to come into contact with them.

2) On December 17th our troops had a two-hour engagement with brigands near the village of Heilintai. One soldier was wounded.

Area North-West of Mukden:

1) There is a body of some 2000 brigands along the Chengchiantun-Tungliao line. A detachment of 500 men with artillery was sent into this area on December 16th.

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2) On December 17th, brigands burned 16 houses belonging to Koreans, south of the Okura farm at Kungtaipo, two Koreans being killed. They then attacked a Korean village west of the same farm, and burned five houses. Police officers were sent to the aid of the Koreans. Aircraft will probably be sent.

A Chinese village was also attacked, and more than 70 women carried off by the brigands.

Since the beginning of December there have been 11 attacks on Japanese farms in this neighbourhood. A large proportion of the Koreans employed on these farms (some 3500) are taking refuge at Mukden.

Antung Railway Area.

1) At about 2.30 a.m. on the 17th, a band of 70 brigands attacked the neighbourhood of the station at Linchiatai, but were repulsed by the police and troops. Two Chinese and two Koreans were wounded.

Next day, at 9 p.m., about 100 brigands attacked the station at Chiumuchuang; they were repulsed after a prolonged engagement, in the course of which the station-master (Japanese) and a Chinese clerk were killed, and a police officer and a Chinese clerk wounded.

2) The brigands concentrated at Tienchiangtai have been making frequent attacks since the river Liao became completely frozen over, as they are now able to cross with ease. On December 18th they gave out that they were going to attack the Yingkow reservoirs, but would not molest the Chinese, as they only wanted to cause damage to the Japanese. About 30 police officers were sent to protect the reservoirs.

3) Owing to the dangerous position of the railway officials of the Antung line, the company is now making arrangements to remove their families to safer areas. On the 19th, 4 families were evacuated from Linchiatai to Antung.

4) At 7 a.m. on December 20th, a motor patrol of 5 soldiers, which was following the railway line, was attacked about 3 km. from Hopei by some 30 Chinese irregulars with a machine-gun. One soldier was killed and two wounded; reinforcements sent from Hopei were unable to come up with the brigands.

5) A body of 700 irregulars led by the late police commissioner of Fenghuangcheng has been operating in the Lungwang area since December 16th. They are advancing into the Tahushan area (neutral zone).

The volunteers responsible for maintaining order have fled to Yenshantze, leaving the population unprotected. On December 18th some 60 soldiers, accompanied by 39 police officers, were sent to endeavour to evacuate the Japanese nationals. They returned on the 20th, bringing with them 16 Japanese nationals.

6) About 3.30 a.m. on December 22nd, brigands attacked the railway station and police station at Kaolimen, killed a Japanese police officer and a Chinese clerk, and looted the clerks' houses.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.1014.M.566.1931.VII.
Geneva, December 30th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE
COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication, dated December 29th, 1931, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./167.

Paris,
December 29, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg to communicate to you the following reports, which have been received by the Chinese Delegation from Nanking:

1. On December 21st, over one hundred Japanese infantry entered Tsihtaitze Village of Liao-chung-sien, where the Chinese police forces, resisting for two hours, repulsed the Japanese, who retreated to Laiyang.
2. On the forenoon of the 24th of December, Japanese aeroplanes, besides bombarding Pan-shan, dropped also bombs on Shih-shan and Ting-chia-wo-pu.
3. After occupying the city of Tien-chuang-tai on the 23rd of December, Japanese troops occupied Tien-chuang-tai Station on the following day.
4. The first contingent of the 4th division of the Japanese troops arrived at Mukden on December 24th. The Japanese troops at Mukden are ready for advancing westward and have requisitioned several hundreds of wagons. Seven divisions of infantry and artillery are ready to be sent from Japan to Manchuria by way of Yingkow.
5. On the noon of December 25th, two Japanese aeroplanes dropped on Tawa, whereto Chinese troops had retreated from Tien-chuang-tai, more than ten bombs, destroying Chinese armoured trains and damaging ten sections of railway tracks.
6. On the 25th of December, two thousand Japanese soldiers with horses and guns under the command of seventy officers arrived at Tangku with the object of proceeding to Tientsin.
7. On December 26th, two Japanese aeroplanes again dropped over twenty bombs on Tawa and Pan-shan, damaging many passenger trains and telegraphic wires. On the same day, one Japanese aeroplane dropped two bombs on Changwu. Places as Tang-chia-wo-pu and Shih-shan Station along the Peking Mukden Railway have all been bombarded by Japanese aeroplanes.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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8. The Japanese are now dividing their troops into three groups for their drive on Chinchow; one group is starting from Yingkow to take Koupangtze and then to march straight forward; the other group will invade Chinchow, advancing along the Peking-Mukden Railway; and the third group, having occupied Fakumen, will attack Kungping, Tangliac, Changwu and nearby points with Ihhsien as their final goal. The Japanese troops at Yukwan (near Shanhaikwan) will endeavour to damage the railway tracks of the Peking-Mukden Railway so as to cut off the connection between Chinese troops within and without the Great Wall.

(Signed) Hoo Chi Tsai.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.1015.M.567.1931.VII.
Geneva, December 30th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the British representative on the
Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate
to the Council the following information transmitted to him on
December 29th, 1931 by the British Government.

According to reports from Newchwang on December 22nd,
Japanese army sent eighty carts loaded with ammunition and
provisions northward and brought twenty five field guns from
Antung. A few cavalry had arrived. One battalion of
Japanese infantry with auxiliary arms was reported to have left
Newchwang for Tienchuangtai where they will cross Liao river
to encounter Chinese forces.

British military attaché reported December 24th that
Japanese after occupying Faku had returned to their original
positions. Local transport at Yingkow was being commandeered.
On December 25th British military attaché reported that
Japanese aeroplanes dropped bombs at various places and that
Japanese were in full possession of Tienchuangtai and rail road
and had driven back Chinese armoured train. December 27th he
reported further bombing at Changwu and Tawa station and that
new Japanese units were across Liao river.

According to reports from Mukden eight hundred
Japanese infantry with field guns and motor ambulance arrived
at Yingkow from Mukden December 26th. Japanese near Tien-
chuangtai operating against two thousand bandits said to be
supplied from Chinchow.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and
Members of the League.

C.1016.M.568.1931.VII.

Geneva, December 30th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE JAPANESE DELEGATION.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication dated December 28th, 1931, which he has received concerning brigandage in Manchuria.

BRIGANDAGE IN MANCHURIA.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese
Delegation.

Kirin Area.

On December 24th, about 8.30 p.m., a band of brigands attacked the station at Kutiensu and seized a sum of 3,800 taels. Pursuit by troops and police was ineffectual.

Mukden Area.

1) On December 25th the Japanese clerk abducted from Niuhsintai by the brigands on December 7th (communication dated December 11th) made his escape but was pursued by about 200 brigands. Some 30 police officers from Penhsihu and 40 soldiers were called out.

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2) On the same day a body of 700 to 800 brigands attacked Ssupactai (between Mukden and Hsinmin), where there is a large Japanese farm. An aeroplane was at once dispatched.

Antung-Mukden Railway Area.

1) On the night of December 25th-26th, a band, probably belonging to the group commanded by Liutchening and Hsuwonhai (see previous communication), cut down eight telegraph poles between Fenghuangcheng and Kaolimen, and burned a score of sleepers on a railway bridge, thus completely dislocating the traffic. Ssutaitzu was attacked, and communications with Chikanshan are interrupted. The main body of the brigands attacked Fenghuangcheng on the night of the 26th-27th, setting fire to several houses. The brigands made several attacks on the quarters of the Japanese troops. They burned part of the police station, attacked the prison, released the prisoners, and caused damage of various kinds to public buildings.

During these events, a Japanese soldier was killed. Telephonic and telegraphic communication has not yet been restored. The railway company is repairing the track as rapidly as possible. Troops were sent from Antung on the morning of the 27th.

2) Owing to the resumption of activity by brigands in various parts of Manchuria, especially the Antung railway area, orders have been given for a mixed brigade, drawn from the troops in Korea, to be sent.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.1019.M.571.1931.X.
Geneva, December 31st, 1931.

EXPENSES INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXAMINATION BY THE COUNCIL OF
THE SINO-JAPANESE QUESTION.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the letter sent by him on December 29th to the President in Office of the Council and the latter's telegraphic reply transmitted to him on December 30th.

I.

Letter dated December 29th, 1931 from the Secretary-General to His Excellency M. Aristide Briand, President in Office of the Council.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the expenses which are chargeable to Item 2(b) of the League's budget for 1931, "Extraordinary Sessions of the Council", and which cover both the Council meeting at Paris from November 16th to December 10th and the miscellaneous expenses incurred from the beginning of October to December 31st in connection with the examination of the Sino-Japanese question, will amount approximately to a sum of 154,000 Swiss francs; 117,700 francs have already been disbursed and the balance of 36,300 francs represent expenditure incurred but in respect of which the final accounts have not yet been received.

Including a transfer of 8,000 francs from head 2(a): "Ordinary Sessions of the Council", the credits under Item 2(b) of the budget amounted to 31,000 francs; they were increased to approximately 131,000 francs by the transfer of 60,000 francs which you were good enough to approve on November 12th and by the two special contributions of 100,000 French francs generously made by the Government of the Republic.

A deficit of some 23,000 francs is therefore to be anticipated on the said item and, in accordance with the Financial Regulations, this deficit must be covered by a transfer before December 31st, on which date the League's accounts are closed.

The only item in this chapter of the budget which shows a large credit balance is No.3: "Unforeseen Expenditure (subject to special vote of Council)", from which the funds required for the transfer made on November 12th have already been taken.

I have accordingly the honour to request you, in view of the urgency of the question, to be good enough to inform me by telegram whether you agree to transfer the sum of 25,000 Swiss francs from Item 3 to No.2(b) "Extraordinary Sessions of the Council".

I will duly communicate your reply, together with the present letter, to the Members of the Council, who will be asked to ratify your decision as soon as the next session opens.

(Signed) J. AVENOL.
Secretary-General ad interim.

II.

Telegram dated December 30th from His Excellency M. Aristide Briand, President in Office of the Council, to the Secretary-General.

In reply to your letter of December 29th, 1931, requesting my authorisation to transfer in the budget for the current financial year a sum of 25,000 Swiss francs from Item 3 (Unforeseen Expenditure) to Item 2(b) (Extraordinary Sessions of the Council), I have the honour to inform you that I authorise this transfer, subject to ratification by the Council at its session in January.

ARISTIDE BRIAND.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.1020.M.572.1931.VII.

Geneva, December 31st, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which the Representative of China, in accordance with instructions from his Government, addressed on December 26th to the Acting President of the Council, together with the letter dated December 29th by which it was communicated to the Secretary-General.

Paris, December 28th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Translation.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward to you herewith for the information of the Members of the Council a letter from the Chinese delegation handed to me by Mr. Hoo on the 28th instant.

I informed Mr. Hoo that the French Government, and, to my knowledge several other Governments also, had already taken steps at Tokyo to draw the Japanese Government's attention to its engagement under the Resolution of December 10th that it would refrain from any initiative which might aggravate the situation.

(Signed) Berthelot.

For the Minister of Foreign Affairs
and by delegation.
Ambassador of France
Secretary-General.

Paris, December 26th, 1931.

Monsieur le Président,

Under the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency the following telegraphic message, dated December 25th, from the Acting President of the Executive Yuan:

"With a view to avoiding the aggravation of the situation in Manchuria, both China and Japan have accepted the obligations under the various Resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations. On our part we have been sincerely carrying out these obligations. During the Council Meeting of December 10th our delegate had, in connection with the Second Paragraph of the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Resolution of that date, made it clear among other things that China cannot tolerate the invasion and occupation of her territory by the troops of any foreign country.

"According to reports we have recently received, however, the situation is daily becoming more critical. The facts are briefly as follows. On 21st, inst., under the pretext of bandit suppression, the Japanese troops occupied Faku-men. Two days later, Tienchuangtai was occupied by Japanese infantry and cavalry with armoured trains on the Chinese-owned Koupangtze-Yingkow Railway. At the same time Japanese planes also bombed and machine-gunned Panshan. For the purpose of attacking Chinchow, the Japanese are calling the regular Chinese army bandits, whereas, as a matter of fact, they are hiring bandits in large scale and providing them with guns to create disorders. More Japanese reinforcements are being sent to Shanhaikwan, Chinkwangtao and other places.

"It is beyond doubt that Japan is intentionally disregarding her obligations under Second Paragraph of Council's Resolution on December 10th and that she is also ignoring Your Excellency's Statement in regard to the same paragraph to the effect that it is indispensable and urgent to abstain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and from all other action likely to aggravate the situation. The present situation in Chinchow and other places is becoming worse and more critical than before. I, therefore, have honour to make this urgent appeal to Your Excellency for the immediate adoption of effective measures to deal with this situation with a view to giving effect to the Resolution of December 10th.

(Signed) Chen Ming-chu".

Please accept, Monsieur le Président, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Hoo Chi-tsai.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

January ¹⁵~~16~~, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL,
MUKDEN (China).

795 2412
mtz
HW
11/51693
Referring to various difficulties of National City Bank, can you inform Department whether the Netherlands Harbor Works Company account has been settled? Also, can you ^{discreetly obtain} ~~give~~ approximate figures for the decrease, if any, in business or in profits, in amount or percentage, of Mukden branch since September 18, 1931?

Telegraph Department and inform Legation by mail.

793.94/3528A

10-1
Jan. 15, 1932.

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

JAN 15 1932



U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM

GRAY

Tokio

Dated January 16, 1932

Rec'd 6:45 a. m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

13, January 16, 4 p. m.

The Foreign Minister Yoshizawa received me at eleven o'clock this morning and handed me a reply written in Japanese and English, which is being cabled today. He advised me it would be given out to the newspapers here today. After I had read it he asked me if I had any comment to make. I told him that the semblance of war, which was being fairly sedulously maintained here, with constant newspaper references to "battle area", exhibition of captured trophies, and also the fact that throughout Manchuria they talked of it as "war" without qualification, seemed inconsistent with their assertion that it was not a hostile occupation. This he explained by saying the hostility was not toward the Chinese people or Government but against the lawless elements whose suppression was necessary for an orderly community.

Today's paper announces here that China is proposing to sever diplomatic relations with Japan. And I asked if there were any truth in this; to which he replied that they

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JAN 22 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #13, from Tokio, Jan.16, 4 p. m.

they had no official information.

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I told him the papers announced officially the Japanese were planning the establishment of an independent Manchurian government in February. I asked him if there were any truth in this; to which he said that, while he was in Manchuria, he was advised that the Chinese governors of the Provinces of Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol were said to be in favor of the establishment of such a government, and he understood conversations were being held looking to such a development at the present time. I am sure he also meant to include Mukden province. He said this was on Chinese initiative.

I asked if it were not unquestionably true that these men were placed in power by the Japanese military authorities and selected from men who would not be unfriendly towards Japan. His reply was vague, but he emphasized the fact that all Chinese former high civil officials but one had deserted their posts or resigned. He said these Chinese governors now planning an independent Manchuria Government were actuated by the desire of self protection both of life and property. I asked if in that case the Japanese would be prepared to support the pretensions of such a government by force. His reply was vague but he said that Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang had spent 80 per cent of his

REP

3- #13, from Tokio, Jan. 16, 4 p.m.

of his revenues in maintaining armed forces and the Japanese proposed to urge upon the new Chinese Manchurian Government a substantial reduction of the proportion of money spent for military establishments.

I asked the same question I had asked of Inukai in regard to the plans for the employment of former Chinese soldiers; he assured us that this was their plan.

He laid great stress upon the open door so often when I commented on its not being open now, he said that was merely during the period of suppressing banditry. I told him it took us six years to suppress banditry in the Philippines, where we exercised sovereignty, and intimated that the door might be closed for quite a while. But he emphasized the desirability of attracting American capital and business cooperation to Manchuria.

FORBES

KLP

HFD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TRANSFERRED TO 793.94 COMMISSION/ 30

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Tokio

Dated January 16, 1932

Rec'd 6:03 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

11, January 16, 2 p. m.

Department's telegram No. 7, January 7, noon

I have just received the reply of the Japanese Government which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note dated the eighth January, which has had the most careful attention of this Government.

The Government of Japan were well aware that the Government of the United States could always be relied on to do everything in their power to support Japan's efforts to secure the full and complete fulfillment in every detail of the Treaties of Washington and the Kellogg Treaty for the Outlawry of War. They are glad to receive this additional assurance of the fact.

As regards the question which Your Excellency specifically mentions of the policy of the so-called 'open door', the Japanese Government, as has so often been stated, regard that policy as a cardinal feature of the politics of the



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #11, from Tokio, Jan. 16, 2 p.m.

of the Far East, and only regrets that its effectiveness is so seriously diminished by the unsettled conditions which prevail throughout China. In so far as they can secure it, the policy of the open door will always be maintained in Manchuria, as in China proper.

They take note of the statement by the Government of the United States that the latter cannot admit the legality of matters which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens or which might be brought about by means contrary to the Treaty of 27 August 1928. It might be the subject of an academic doubt, whether in a given case the impropriety of means necessarily and always ~~voids~~ the end ~~secured~~, but as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means, that question does not practically arise.

It may be added that the treaties which relate to China must necessarily be applied with due regard to the state of affairs from time to time prevailing in that country, and that the present unsettled and distracted state of China is not what was in the contemplation of the high contracting parties at the time of the Treaty of Washington. It was certainly not satisfactory then: but it did not display that disunion and those antagonisms which it does today. This cannot affect the binding
character

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #11, from Tokio, Jan. 16, 2 p.m.

character or the stipulations of treaties: but it may in material respects modify their application, since they must necessarily be applied with reference to the state of facts as they exist.

My Government desire further to point out that any replacement which has occurred in the personnel of the administration of Manchuria has been the necessary act of the local population. Even in cases of hostile occupation - which this was not - it is customary for the local officials to remain in the exercise of their functions. In the present case they for the most part fled or resigned: it was their own behaviour which was calculated to destroy the working of the apparatus of government. The Japanese Government cannot think that the Chinese people, unlike all others, are destitute of the power of self determination and of organizing themselves in order to secure civilized conditions when deserted by the existing officials.

While it need not be repeated that Japan entertains in Manchuria no territorial aims or ambitions, yet, as Your Excellency knows, the welfare and safety of Manchuria and its accessibility for general trade are matters of the deepest interest and of quite extraordinary importance to the Japanese people. That the American Government are always alive to the exigencies of Far Eastern questions

has already

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

4- #11, from Tokio, Jan.16, 2 p.m.

has already been made evident on more than one occasion.
At the present juncture, when the very existence of our
national polity is involved, it is agreeable to be assured
that the American Government are devoting in a friendly
spirit such sedulous care to the correct appreciation of
the situation.

I shall be obliged if Your Excellency will transmit
this communication to your Government, and I avail myself,
et cetera.

FORBES

KLP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated January 16, 1932

Rec'd 6:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

12, January 16, 9 a. m.

My No. 10, January 13, 7 p. m.


The Chinese Foreign Office has unofficially approved the translation as telegraphed to the Department but wishes to add "three" after "military forces in the" and "advanced on" after "Suichung and" and to delete the words "this is all matter of record".

Legation informed.

PECK

RR

HPD



F/DEW 793.94/3531

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



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Conversation.

January 14, 1932.

The Netherlands Minister

Mr. Hornbeck.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

JAN 15 1932

RECORDED

Subject: Netherland Legation's Note
Verbale of January 12.

The Netherland Minister called on me and inquired whether I had read his Government's note relating to the American Government's note to China and Japan of January 7.

I stated that I did not know that his Government had sent a note. The Minister said that he had handed the note to Mr. Castle on the evening of January 12 and that its text had now been published in Holland. He inquired concerning the Japanese and the Chinese Governments' replies to our note. I stated that we had received a reply from the Chinese Government late yesterday afternoon, but that the reply from the Japanese Government was, so we were informed, not going to be sent until after the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yoshizawa, had been installed -- which I thought would take place today. The Minister expressed surprise and said that his Government's note contained a statement that the Chinese and Japanese Governments had already replied to the American Government's note and

793.94/3532

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JAN 16 1932

notes

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and that it must be that his Government had thought that such was the case. After some reflection, he continued to the effect that in the published edition of his Government's note, in the press, at home, that sentence had been omitted. He inquired whether we would be publishing the note here. I said that I did not know. He suggested that, in case we make public here the note which we have received from his Government, we confer with him before doing so. I said that I would attempt to insure his being consulted, in that event.

The Minister then talked of the situation in Manchuria, the interest of his Government, his own interest in the League of Nations, etc. I expressed briefly my view that the whole question is one in which not only the rights but the interests of the whole world are involved -- the important question being whether the world is to go forward or to retreat in connection with the attempt to maintain peace by processes of law.

The Minister said that he quite agreed. He said that there was, however, one bit of silver lining in the present situation, so far as the interests of the Netherlands are concerned: he then made express reference to that Government's problems in the Netherlands East Indies.

With

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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With another expression of his personal feeling
that effort must be made to strengthen the peace
machinery, the Minister rose and the conversation
ended.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 84.

AMERICAN CONSULATE


Yunnanfu, China, December 8, 1931. (Q)

SUBJECT: Anti-Japanese Boycott in the Yunnanfu
Consular District.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington.



In compliance with the Peiping Legation's telegram

of November 25, 11 a.m., I have the honor to report as follows on the organization and present activities of the local Anti-Japanese Association and the boycott of Japanese goods in this consular district.

The background of events germane to the boycott may be found in sections of this Consulate's despatches, Nos. 70, 74, and 80, dated September 9, October 14, and November 16, 1931, respectively.

The Yunnanfu Anti-Japanese Association, organized by the Yunnanfu Chamber of Commerce shortly after the Wanpao-shan incident to disseminate anti-Japanese propaganda and organize an effective boycott of Japanese goods, enlarged and intensified its activities when the Japanese occupied Mukden, September 18th.

The organization as now functioning consists of an Executive Committee and eight divisions; namely, Secretariat, Censorship, Propaganda, Secret Information, Registration, Examination, Inspection, and Accounts, with a Chief in charge of each division.

The Executive Committee is composed of the Chiefs-of-Division, three members of the Yunnanfu Chamber of Commerce

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Commerce, one member of the Bureau of Provincial Party Affairs, and one member of the Municipal Bureau of Party Affairs of the Yunnanfu municipality. The Secretariat, in addition to its regular duties, is charged with reporting to and receiving the Provincial Government's sanction for executing the recommendations of the Executive Committee. The Secretariat and the Division of Accounts maintain an office in the Chamber of Commerce Building. It is in this office that the Executive Committee meet and decide upon matters of a general nature affecting the Association's policy and activities.

The Division of Censorship is charged with exercising a strict supervision over the vernacular press and prohibits anything being published in favor of the Japanese or critical of the boycott movement. Some members of this division are employees of the Yunnanfu Wireless Administration. In fact, the employees of this administration have organized a subsidiary anti-Japanese association of their own. Due to the interferent censorship of these employees during October, the Japanese Consul at Yunnanfu was completely cut off from direct communication with his legation at Peiping. It was with the assistance of his consular colleagues that Mr. Hashimaru received timely instructions to evacuate Japanese residents and close the consulate.

The Division of Propaganda is incessantly at work stirring up hatred against the Japanese. This Division is making use of the regular Kuomintang printing office for

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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for printing varieties of anti-Japanese hand-bills and posters for the bulletin boards and for general distribution to the public. This division also supplies school children and other groups with flags and banners for use in the anti-Japanese demonstration parades. The public orators of this division have been drawn from the Propaganda Department of the Provincial Kuomintang Headquarters. These men are now engaged in coaching students of the middle and higher schools in the art of haranguing the public on Japanese issues. Students of both sexes have enrolled for this service.

The Division of Secret Information aids in the boycott movement by disclosing the tricks of various merchants whose loyalty to "the complete severance of economic relations with Japan" is somewhat questionable. It has been stated that officials of the Chinese Maritime Customs in Yunnan are under instructions to open their records of imports for inspection by members of this division. The Chief of the Division of Secret Information is also said to be receiving advance information from agents at Shanghai and Hongkong on the movements of Japanese goods for southwest China.

The Division of Registration handles all matters in connection with the recording of stocks of Japanese goods held by local Chinese merchants and individuals; and issues permits to import such goods as were ordered prior to September 16th. This Division is assisted by men of the Division of Examination. The latter visit the various mercantile establishments to check up the inventories of stocks
registered

- 4 -

registered and to search for anything hidden. It is now a common sight in Yunnanfu to see members of the examination corps in and about the business quarter dressed in white uniforms with blue and white arm bands.

Since October 6th, men of the Division of Inspection, have been on duty at the railway station, the customs examination sheds, the post office, and the offices of the Special Consumption Tax section of the Bureau of Finance. Here they participate in the actual physical examination of all imported merchandise. If Japanese goods are found they are immediately seized and conveyed by carts or coolie carriers hired for the purpose to the division's headquarters where the consignees must produce exemption permits issued by the Division of Registration or suffer a fine and confiscation. By the end of November approximately Yunnan \$300,000.00 had been collected as fines paid by "unpatriotic merchants".

The Division of Accounts functions as its name implies and, in addition, the Chief of this division acts as paymaster to the employed personnel of the Association. Fines and other monies of the Association are turned over to this division for meeting necessary expenses. If there be a surplus after meeting such expenses such surplus is deposited in the Government controlled Futien Bank for "national purposes".

The following is a translation of the Anti-Japanese Association's five articles governing the punishment of persons who import Japanese goods:

ARTICLE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

ARTICLE 1. A fine equivalent to the value of the goods shall be imposed on those who order enemy's goods, by mail or telegraph, after September 16th and before November 4th.

ARTICLE 2. Half of the property of those who order enemy's goods after November 4th shall be confiscated.

ARTICLE 3. Besides confiscating the enemy's goods, a fine equivalent to the value of the goods shall be imposed on those who sell the enemy's goods unregistered after November 15th.


ARTICLE 4. A double punishment shall be imposed on the members of this Association who violate any of the articles mentioned above.

ARTICLE 5. Those who are twice found guilty of the offence of ordering the enemy's goods or who indulge in corrupt practices after November 4th, besides receiving the punishment as prescribed above, shall be punished, according to circumstances, by being put in a cage, and making known their offence to the public by a parade through the streets; or they may be handed over to the Government for more severe punishment.

Since the publication of the foregoing articles on September 10, 1931, very few merchants of this district have dared to order Japanese goods. Foreign merchants in Yunnan, principally French, have also been warned not to attempt to import Japanese goods under penalty of seizure and confiscation.

In conclusion, it may be stated that the boycott of Japanese goods in the Yunnanfu consular district is, at present, very effective, and that there seems to be no present intention on the part of the local Government to interfere with the boycott activities of the Anti-Japanese Association.

Respectfully yours,


Harry E. Stevens,
American Consul.

In quintuplicate to the Department.
In duplicate to the Legation.

800
HES:LMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -


Sources of Information

The information given in this despatch was obtained from witnessing the activities of the boycotters, through personal interviews with members of the Anti-Japanese Association, as well as from reports in the vernacular press and posted proclamations.

1537

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 66




Handwritten initials: FEA

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

Tsinan, China, December 21, 1931.

PM RECD





JAN 16 32

SUBJECT: Anti-Japanese Boycott.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.



F/DEM

793.94/3534

SIR:

793.94
note
693.94/12

I have the honor to submit herein my first special fortnightly report on the anti-Japanese boycott situation in the Tsinan consular district, as required by the Legation's circular telegram of November 25th and its instruction of December 7, 1931.

As reported in my monthly political report, No. 60 of November 9, 1931, "while it still remains true that no boycott associations have come into existence in Tsinan, and that no campaign has been instituted for seizing, confiscating, or selling by auction any Japanese goods found in the possession of Chinese merchants, nevertheless, a true boycott of a popular nature has become very effective in bringing about a great decreases in Japanese trade."

In my monthly political report for November, despatch No. 67 of December 9, 1931, I reported:

"Hardly any change has taken place in the anti-Japanese boycott situation, due to the firm policy of the Provincial Government to keep all such activities within legal limits.

That does

FILED
FEB 16 1932

- 2 -

That does not mean that no boycott exists; on the other hand, a true boycott on an extensive scale is so widespread that Japanese trade is nearly at a standstill. Some Japanese products, for which there has been a good sale in the past, are practically off the market; at least they are not obtainable from Chinese dealers, and the Chinese will not buy them from Japanese.

"Only two instances of seizures of Japanese goods have so far been reported to the Japanese Consul General - both of cotton piece goods in cases to the total value of some \$10,000. One instance occurred at Weihsien and the other near Changchiu, some thirty miles east of Tsinan. At Weihsien a group of the local Tangpu men and students of the two middle schools were said to have been responsible for the seizure. After the Japanese Consul General took the matter up with General Han, military officers at Weihsien obtained the release of the goods. In the Changchiu case the goods had already been sold to Chinese, so that consular representations could not be made on the ground of Japanese ownership of the goods, which are believed still to be in possession of the unprosecuted thieves. Of course, no Chinese laws are enforced against such thieves who claim to do their evil deeds in the name of patriotism."

Since the reports quoted above were written very little change has taken place in the boycott situation. In general trade with the Japanese or in Japanese goods has been greatly curtailed. Because illegal methods have not been introduced to prevent such trade, it has continued to exist to a fair extent, but it is certainly far from brisk. On account of its uncertainties hard bargains have often been driven by the Chinese merchants participating therein, while the Japanese have felt compelled to dispose of their stocks at either an extremely low margin of profit or even at a loss. This condition has been reported particularly in the cotton goods trade, which is one of the most


important

- 3 -

important lines, but other lines similarly affected are sugar, electrical goods, cotton yarn and toys. For the past twelve days one of the Tsinan newspapers, the Min Kuo Jih Pao, has published a list of Japanese products, giving the brands or marks under which they are sold. The underlying idea in so doing is, of course, that the people may know for certain what goods are Japanese and thus avoid purchasing them, although the paper carefully refrains from openly advocating the boycott.

In the past Japanese merchants have been in the custom of travelling into the interior of the province in order to sell their merchandise or to buy Chinese produce for export. Because of the dangers of travelling in the interior at present on account of the hostility toward them, such journeys have almost entirely ceased. In a few instances attempts have been made to make such trips and the passports of Japanese have been sent to the local authorities for visas, which have thus far not been granted for reasons that are well understood, although the Chinese officials have carefully refrained from flatly refusing in writing to issue them; they have simply delayed and withheld the visas.

Respectfully yours,




C. D. Meinhardt,
American Consul.

In quintuplicate.


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154

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



REP



PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 16, 1932

Rec'd 10:55 a. m.

F/DEW

793.94/3535

Secretary of State,
Washington.

81, January 16, 5 p. m.,

Following from Reuter, Moscow, January sixteenth.

793.94
"The Tass Agency denies the report that M. Troianovisky,
the Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo, has discussed with Mr.
Inukai, the Japanese Prime Minister, the question of
concluding a Soviet-Japanese entente.

It says that on January twelve they discussed
Manchuria, particularly the presence of Japanese troops
in Northern Manchuria. The agency also says that
M. Troianovisky inquired regarding the attitude of
Inukai towards the proposal which M. Litvinoff made
Mr. Yoshizawa on December 31 in Moscow regarding the
conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese Pact of Non-Aggression.
M. Litvinoff emphasized the enormous importance which the
conclusion of a Pact of Non-Aggression would have at this
moment when various speculations are being made in certain
militarist and adventurous circles abroad regarding the
possibility of the deterioration of relations between the
Soviet

JAN 25 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #81, from Peiping, Jan. 16, 5 p.m.

Soviet and Japan. He drew attention of Mr. Yoshizawa to the negotiations conducted by the Soviet Government and its western neighbors regarding pacts or non-aggression, pointing out that Japan was now the only neighbor of the U. S. S. R. which had concluded no pact and was conducting no negotiations.

Mr. Inukai reassured M. Troianovisky repeating particularly former assurances regarding the absence of intention on the part of Japan to infringe the interests of the Soviet and of the Chinese Eastern Railway. With reference to the proposal for the conclusion of a Pact of Non-Aggression, however, Mr. Inukai said that it had not yet been studied by the Japanese Government."

JOHNSON

KLP


HPD

154
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WM. W. LANCASTER

55 Wall Street
New York January 14, 1932.

Hon. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington. D.C.



F/DEW

793.94/3536

Dear Mr. Hornbeck,

793.94/3493

Thank you for your letter of January 8th and the references concerning Manchuria which you have so thoughtfully looked up and called to my attention. I will see what I can get out of them.

It was with some qualms that I posed my question concerning the extent of the Japanese police power.

Sincerely yours,

Wm W Lancaster

WWL/sm


JAN 14 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
G. H. LANSBURY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 16, 1932

Rec'd 2 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

77, January 16, 10 a. m.

Following from Lieutenant Brown at Harbin:

793.94 "Representative opinion Manchuli area agreed present situation quiet with the general belief that there will be positive action by Japanese army contra Soviet within within a period of three months. Red Mongols recently actively engaged in driving out of border regions white Mongol bands, however, large scale activities among them thought impossible until this May.

Two. Soviet officials freely state that their own Government is prepared in case of attack but does not contemplate offensive action. Few Russian forces east of Irkutsk. Officers of the class of 1896 now mobilized, others notified be in readiness. Soviet press unanimously agreed necessary prepare against both Japan, Poland.

White partisans considered negligible quantity; however, Japanese Consul as well as agents have made recent trips into Mongolia from Manchuli.

Monday
Four. Head of the Harbin Japanese Military Mission/

last

F/DEW

793.94/3537

FILED

JAN 22 1932

) 5 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #77, from Peiping, Jan.16,10 a.m.

last cited need of clearing North Manchuria Chinese forces
then adopt measures which would stamp out Communistic
propaganda believing that (?) Soviet can carry out (?)
against them. He said that has assumed virulent form
explaining interference with his informers. Japanese
Consul General concurred.

Detailed report by mail."

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 18, 1932.

SKH:

In regard to Mukden radio station:

- I. Despatch, just received, from Myers dated December 21, 1931, states --
 - a - Radio station still occupied by Japanese.
 - b - Japanese military authorities are making plans to turn the station over to a new Chinese communications commission now in the process of formulation. This commission will undoubtedly be under the supervision of a Japanese adviser and Japanese technical men will be employed.
 - c - Radio experts sent from Dairen to repair the Mukden Station were incapable of doing so.
 - d - Two Japanese specialists have been sent from Tokyo to "try their hand".

RCM:AT

RCM

1546

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,
Mukden, China, December 21, 1931.

JAN 16 32
SUBJECT: The Mukden Radio Station.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

793.94
793.74
✓

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 508 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated December 19, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 508
to the Legation, reiping.

HTW
340



F/DEW

793.94/3638

FILED
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No. 308

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

December 19, 1931.

SUBJECT: The Mukden Radio Station.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's telegram of December 7, 5 p.m. relative to the Mukden Radio Station and the Radio Corporation of America's interest therein.

It is regretted that no official reply has yet been received from the Japanese Consul General relative to the plans for reopening the station. A copy of my last communication to Mr. Hayashi on the subject is enclosed for the Legation's information.

The radio station is still occupied by Japanese soldiers. However, Mr. Vincent was yesterday unofficially informed by the Japanese Consulate General that the Japanese military authorities are making plans to turn the station over to a new Chinese communications commission which is now in the process of formation. This commission, or administration, will without doubt be under the supervision of a Japanese adviser and it

also

- 2 -

also seems inevitable that Japanese technical men will be "employed" to assist in the operation of the station.

It is instructive to observe in connection with the above that the radio experts sent from Pairen to Mukden by the South Manchuria Railway Company to repair the station were incapable of accomplishing their mission. Two Japanese specialists have therefore been sent out from Tokyo to "try their hand". As they are probably connected with the radio station in Japan which is built with Radio Corporation of America equipment, it is likely that they will be successful in making the minor repairs necessary and in operating the station without having to ask for technical information relative to wave lengths, sending times, et cetera. With regard to this technical information, the Shanghai manager of the Radio Corporation of America stated in a recent letter that, in so far as he was aware, there was no secret about the operation of the station and that a radio expert could put the station in a condition for operation without difficulty and without having to depend upon outside sources for technical information.


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

1/ Enclosure: Copy of communication to Japanese Consulate General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

JCV:AAB
340.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

December 8, 1931.

Sir and dear Colleague,

I have the honor to refer to our correspondence and conversations concerning the closing of the Mukden Radio Station and the Radio Corporation of America's interest in this station.

Two and a half months have elapsed since the station was closed by the Japanese military authorities. This Consulate General's repeated requests that arrangements be made for the reopening and operation of the station have so far been unavailing. I have pointed out to you both by despatch and orally that the Radio Corporation of America's interest in the operation of the station is based upon its traffic agreement with the Northeastern communications authorities. Prior to the closing of the station the Radio Corporation was deriving an average income of United States \$300 daily from the radio service maintained between Mukden and San Francisco. Not only has the Radio Corporation been deprived of this income through the closing of the station but a very useful communications service between Manchuria and the United States has been interrupted, thereby inconveniencing firms and individuals in America and China.

The

M. Morishima, Esquire,

Acting Consul General for Japan,

Mukden, China.

- 2 -

The Japanese military authorities have requested through your Consulate General that I furnish them with certain technical information to enable them to resume the radio service between Mukden and San Francisco. I have informed you that this Consulate General is not in a position to furnish the information requested and I have also attempted to make it clear to you that this Consulate General is not requesting the Japanese military authorities to reopen and operate the station. I have requested on behalf of the Radio Corporation of America that the Japanese military authorities, who control the station, effect arrangements which would make possible the resumption of the Mukden-San Francisco service at the earliest possible date.


I regret that my requests have failed to secure the desired action and that I am therefore compelled to repeat my representations on behalf of the American corporation. It will be very much appreciated if you will again bring the matter to the attention of the Japanese military authorities, pointing out to them the losses and inconveniences which their continued disinclination to permit the reopening of the station are causing, and urging them to arrange for the resumption of the service as soon as possible.

Your courtesy in favoring me with an early reply will be appreciated.

I have the honor to be,
Sir and dear Colleague,
Your obedient servant,

John Carter Vincent.
American Consul.

JCV:AAB
340.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.1154 (M) Anderson, Meyer & Company/4 FOR #-
FROM Makden (Myers) DATED Dec 21, 1931.
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Antung Electric Light Plant. Copy of communication from
Japanese Consul General giving assurances that American
interests in the - will be accorded protection.

793.94/3539

3539

155
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
January 30, 1932.

ONI

MID

~~WHL:~~

~~SEL:~~

~~WHL:~~

This despatch from Mukden reports that ~~about twenty kilometers of track of the Chenchiatun-Tungliao Railway, which parallels the South Manchuria Railway on the west, have been~~ totally destroyed. Though not so stated, the inference is that the perpetrators of this sabotage were bandits or Chinese soldiers.

[Handwritten signature]

JEJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,

Mukden, China, December 24, 1931.

FE
a-c
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

JAN 16 32

SUBJECT: Destruction of Chengchiatun (Liaoyuan)-
Tungliao Railway.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

(X)

W. C. Rogers
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 16 1932
Department of State

F/DEM

793.94/3540

793.77
note
898.77

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 511 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated December 23, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

FEB 16 1932

FILED

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 511 to the
Legation, Peiping, China.

HTW
800

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 511

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Makden, China.

December 23, 1931.

SUBJECT: Destruction of Chengchiatun (Lisoyuan)-
Tungliac Railway.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Legation,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

793.94/2833

Referring to my confidential despatch No. 476 of November 2, 1931, under the subject "Recent Political Developments" in which conditions along the Chengchiatun-Tungliac Railway were briefly touched upon, I have the honor to enclose herewith a report concerning the damage done to this line which appeared in the Manchuria Daily News of December 21, 1931. This report is substantially the same as the one given out by Japanese headquarters here a few days ago. It will be seen that altogether about twenty kilometers of track have been totally destroyed.

The operation of this line ceased in the latter part of October and up to the present there has been no indication of an intention to repair it. In this connection it may be mentioned that the South Manchuria Railway Company now controls the Ssipingkai-Taonan and

Taonan

1555

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Taonan-Angangchi railways and possibly when conditions
in that region become more settled the line to Tungliac
may be reopened.


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Enclosure: Press report regarding destruction of
Chengchiatun-Tungliac Railway.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

MMK:ALB
800.



Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 511, of M. S. Myers,
American Consul General, Mukden, China, dated December
23, 1931, to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject
"Destruction of Chengchiatun (Liaoyuan)-Tungliiao Railway".

HAVOCS WROUGHT ON CHENGCHIATUN-PAIYINTALA LINE.

Under Expert Directions

A Matter Affecting Safety of Hundreds of Koreans

From The Manchuria Daily News, December 21, 1931.

Since the Japanese withdrew from the Chengchiatun-Paiyintala line early last November, the station buildings, railway track, tanks, wells, coal bins, etc. were wantonly demolished, and judging by the way the havocs were executed, the wreckers must have been directed by expert hands.

The devastation wrought has much to do with the safety of the hundreds of Koreans at the two farms at Chienchiatien and west of Paiyintala, the latter belonging to the Huahsing Kungssu.

(1) Railway Track

(a) Several breaches between Chengchiatun and Talin, altogether 1,000 meters long; a few between Talin and Chienchiatien 3 kilometers; 7 breaches between Chienchiatien and Paiyintala 16 kilometers.

(b) Sleepers at each breach collected and destroyed by fire. As to rails, none visible; either buried underground or carried off elsewhere.

(c) At comparatively high points on railway line, concrete walls, about 1 meter wide, raised across the railway track.

(d) In Paiyintala Station yard, two-thirds of rails removed together with sleepers.

(2) Watertanks, Pumps and Boilers

At Talin, Chienchiatien and Paiyintala, their wooden parts were destroyed by fire, while the rest was demolished. Such parts and as could not be destroyed got filled with earth and sand.

155
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

(3) Wells


Water feeding pipes, together with the wells at Chienchiattien and Paiyintala got filled with cement and mortar.

(4) Coal Bins

Those at Talin and Paiyintala were destroyed.

(5) At Paiyintala

Codowns, station buildings, residences with furniture and fixtures were destroyed.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE
 GENERAL,
 Mukden, China, December 24, 1931.

SUBJECT: Expansion of Japanese Military Headquarters
 at Mukden.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND A.I.D.

THE HONORABLE
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON.

SIR:

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 16 1932
 Department of State

F/DEW
 793.94/3541

793.94
 mto
 893.0146

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
 my despatch No. 512 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
 dated December 24, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectrully yours,

M. S. Myers
 M. S. Myers
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 512
 to the Legation at Peiping.

FEB 16 1932

FILED

HTW
 800

No. 512

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

December 24, 1931.

SUBJECT: Expansion of Japanese military Headquarters at Mukden.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report the reorganization of the headquarters of the Kuantung Army at Mukden by the addition of five departments, namely, administration, communications, financial, industrial and foreign intercourse. It is understood that these departments have been added for the efficient handling of the manifold duties which have fallen upon, or been assumed by, headquarters since the occupation of Manchuria. According to a Tokyo report in the Hanshu Nippo (Dairen), of December 17, 1931, officers of the South Manchuria Railway Company, the Kuantung government and the Consulate General (Consular Service) are eligible for appointment in these departments. My Japanese Colleague mentioned a few days ago that these departments are being staffed largely with civilians and that a member of his office had been suggested as the head of the

foreign

- 2 -

foreign affairs department. These departments are under the general direction of the Chief of Staff of the Kuantung Army.

An outline of the work to be undertaken by the different departments was published in the Tung San Sheng Min Pao, a local government organ, on December 22, 1931, and is of interest as showing the comprehensive range of the functions of headquarters. As the organization of these departments has evidently not yet been completed, it is possible that changes will be made. The following are the functions of the several departments as given in the above-mentioned press report: Administration - affairs of the different localities, police, and education; communications - railways, post, automotive vehicles and harbors; financial - supervision, tax system and currency; industrial - agriculture, commerce, labor and mining; foreign intercourse. It was also stated that under this plan general affairs, aviation, and affairs relating to the establishment of self government will be placed directly under the directing head of these departments who, apparently, is the Chief of Staff. The Manshu Nippo report stated in conclusion that this system shall be retained in the event of the establishment of a residency-General for Manchuria and Mongolia.

In this connection it should be recorded that General Minami, former Minister of War, arrived at Mukden at noon today for the purpose, as reported in the press, of

promoting

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

promoting close cooperation between the military authorities in Tokyo and those in Mukden. As shown in the nature of the press reports regarding the proposed establishment of a residency-general in Manchuria the following news item, taken from the Japan Chronicle of December 19, 1931, is of interest:

"General Minami, former Minister of War, will very shortly be ordered to Manchuria on the mission of promoting close conjunction between the military authorities in Tokyo and those in Manchuria. His impending visit to Manchuria is also regarded as connected with a plan which the military authorities are said to have in contemplation to initiate a system analogous to the former Residency-General of Kwantung province (leased territory). If the projected system is adopted, General Minami will be appointed the first Resident-General of Manchuria.


The military authorities are determined to clear Chinchow of the Chinese troops, and they hope that all military action can be brought to an end by the middle of January. After that, attention will be devoted to the constructive work of developing Japan's treaty rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. To this end, the military authorities contemplate inaugurating a new system along the lines of the former Residency-General of Kwantung, of which the Kwantung Garrison forms the nucleus, with eminent diplomats and business men within the system."

Respectfully yours,

M. C. Myers.
 American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
 Five copies to Department.
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
 Copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

MM:ABG
 800.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 18 1932

RECEIVED VIA AIR

Dated January 17, 1932

Rec'd 3:10 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

82, January 17, 11 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"January 16, 1 p.m. Telegram No. 32. Headquarters reports that a Japanese battalion occupied Tungliao January 14, noon, after ejecting three thousand Chinese partisans, losses Chinese 80, Japanese 0.

Reliable information is to the effect that these so-called partisans belonged to the Third Cavalry Brigade of which about 1000 were in Tungliao."

JOHNSON

F/DEW

793.94/3542

FILED

JAN 25 1932

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 note
 894.23


156

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY



PEIPING VIA NR

Dated January 17, 1932

Rec'd 3:10 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

83, January 17, noon.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"January 16, 1 p.m.

One. Local Chinese officials have received a telegram
 very early
 from Yushu stating that yesterday afternoon and at three
 p.m. aeroplane dropped nine bombs that town wounding
 several people and that it was feared bombing would be
 repeated today and requesting that an appeal be sent to
 Kirin asking for cessation of attacks in order to spare
 the lives of the inhabitants.

Two. Ohashi admits the bombing but states that he
 has no detailed report concerning it.

Three. It is reported that Chang Ching Hui yesterday
 sent telegram to Cheng Jun, Chairman of Pinhsien Government,
 asking him to come to Harbin for a conference".

JOHNSON

KLP

F/DEW

795.94/3543

RECEIVED

JAN 18 1932

1564

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

dx 7E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CIB

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via NR

Dated January 18, 1932

Recd 2:15 a.m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 18 1932
 Department of State
 [Handwritten initials and signatures]

Secretary of State
 Washington.

85, January 18, 11 a.m.

Following from Reuter, Nanking, January seventeenth:

"According to a statement made by Mr. Fu Ping Shan the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs China has decided to invoke Article sixteen of the Covenant of the League of Nations (involving economic sanctions) at the next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on January 25, sanction for this course having been given by the Central Executive Committee and the Central Political Council.

Mr. Fu Ping Shan added in his statement that China would also request calling conference of the signatories of Nine Power Treaty and he indicated that a severance of diplomatic relations with Japan was likely.

Dr. W. W. Yen will be China's chief delegate at the next meeting of the League Council."

JOHNSON.

CIB

793.94

F/DEW

793.94/3544

FILED

JAN 25 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

77

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

RECEIVED
JAN 18 1932
DIVISION OF
STATE

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated January 18, 1932

Rec'd 7:22 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 18 1932
U.S. Department of State
new

Secretary of State,
Washington.

16, January 18, 5 p. m.

793.94

Press comment on the Japanese reply to the American note has been mild in tone and limited in amount. The NICHU NICHU considers the reply reasonable as was the note to which it answered. The JIJI notes that Great Britain asked only for a verbal assurance in regard to the open door and states that the United States tried to induce the other powers party to the Nine Power Treaty to address notes to Japan. It feels that Japan should take further steps to make clear its Manchuria policy. The ASAHI refers to British and American reservations to the No War Pact and asks why Japanese similar insistence in regard to Manchuria should be rejected. It adds that the Japanese regard military operations in Manchuria as necessary and justifiable as Japan has an exceptional position there.

FORBES

WSB

F/DEM

793.94/3545

JAN 25 1932

FILED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Tokio

Dated January 18, 1932

Rec'd 12:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

15, January 18, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL.

RECEIVED

JAN 18 1932
DIVISION OF

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 18 1932

Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/3546

793.94
Competent observers comment on evident complete assurance and superiority complex pervading an important part of Japanese community - Army, official and individual - to a degree never before reached. The tendency is to cooperate with the Chinese soldiers as in Nicaragua and to view the Japanese uniform smashing successes in fighting as proof that they are super-men. There is no doubt this adds an element of danger to the situation.

FORBES

WSB-KLP

JAN 25 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
 American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

The Department encloses for your information and for transmission to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, for his very discreet use, confidential as to source, a summary of certain telegrams received by the Department bearing on the Manchuria situation. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in these messages.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
 Summary of telegrams
 (in duplicate).

793.94/3546

FE:RFB:LM

1/19/32

Jan. 22 1932

W. R. Castle, Jr.

SKH



793.94/3546

Digest of Information from American Official
Sources in Regard to the Manchuria Situation,
received from January 14 to January 18, 1932,
inclusive.

Lieutenant Aldrich, U. S. A., reports ³⁵¹³ from Shanhaikwan (January 13) that the Japanese troops and South Manchuria Railway operators between Shanhaikwan and Chinchow are withdrawing to Chinchow on account of the threat of Chinese cavalry operating against the Japanese in the Peipiao area; that at Suichung the Japanese have a brigade headquarters and two battalions of troops; that at Chinchow the Japanese have the headquarters of the Twentieth Division; that the Japanese desire to occupy Peipiao is attributed to the supply of railway coal in that area; that many troops are being returned to Mukden from Chinchow; that traffic east of Chinchow is still badly disorganized; that at Shanhaikwan there are one Japanese light cruiser and two small aircraft carriers; that at Chinwangtao there are two Japanese destroyers and a small transport; and that it is not believed that the Japanese have any present intention of occupying Shanhaikwan.

American Consul General Hanson at Harbin reports ³⁵¹⁷ (January 13) that the Japanese military, through the instrumentality of Hsi Hsia's new Kirin Government and Chinese troops, have commenced a drive to eliminate the remnant of the old Kirin Government now located at Pinhsien; that this caused the recent uneasiness of the Chinese Eastern Railway guards under General Ting Chao; that according to Secretary Chao of the Heilungkiang Government, Chang Ching-hui, Governor of Heilungkiang, is attempting to arrange an amicable settlement between the Kirin and

Pinhsien

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Pinhsien

- 2 -

Pinhsien Governments; and that General Ma also favors a peaceful settlement. The Consul General states that the Harbin Chief of Police was forced on January 12, by pressure from all sides, including Japanese, to resign; that with his resignation from office fell the last hopes of the local Kuomintang remnant.

Lieutenant Brown, U. S. A., at Harbin reports ^{/3537} (apparently on January 16) that the general belief in the Manchuli area is that there will be positive action by the Japanese army against the Soviet within a period of three months; that "Red" Mongols have recently actively been engaged in driving "White" Mongol bands out of the border region; that Soviet officials freely state that their Government is prepared in case of attack, but does not contemplate offensive action; that there are but few Russian forces east of Irkutsk; and that the Japanese Consul and Japanese agents have made recent trips into Mongolia from Manchuli.

The American Ambassador at Tokyo reports ^{/3546} (January 18) that, according to competent observers, the Japanese are afflicted with a superiority complex which has spread to an important part of the nation, including the army, the officials and individuals; and that the successes of the Japanese military are taken as proof that the Japanese are super-men.

AMBASSADE DE BELGIQUE

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 15 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIDE MEMOIRE

TRANSLATING BUREAU
206
JAN 16 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 19 1932

Le Gouvernement Belge a pris connaissance avec un vif intérêt de la note que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a adressée à la Chine et au Japon.

Le Gouvernement du Roi attache en effet une grande importance au respect des traités envisagés par le Gouvernement Américain dans sa communication et, à ce point de vue, il note particulièrement la déclaration du Gouvernement Américain de ne point reconnaître une situation qui serait créée par des moyens

contraires au Pacte Kellogg.

Au surplus, la Belgique a déjà manifesté aux représentants de la Chine et du Japon que l'action pacificatrice de la Société des Nations soit couronnée de succès, action qu'elle a suivie de près en déléguant un observateur aux sessions du Conseil à Genève et à Paris.

Le Gouvernement du Roi continue à suivre avec attention cette question qui est inscrite à l'ordre du jour de la session du Conseil de la Société des Nations qui s'ouvrira le 25 janvier.

WASHINGTON, le 15 janvier 1932.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 19 1932
Department of State

1572
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION
RECEIVED
JAN 18 1932
THE EMBASSY OF BELGIUM.
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
AIDE MEMOIRE



793.94
The Belgian Government has taken cognizance, with keen interest, the note that the Government of the United States has addressed to China and Japan.

The Government of His Majesty attaches, in fact, great importance to the respect for treaties shown by the American Government in its communication, and in this respect, it notes particularly the American Government's declaration that it will not recognize in any way a situation which might be created by means contrary to the Kellogg Pact.

Furthermore, Belgium has already informed the Representatives of China and Japan that the action taken by the League of Nations in the interests of peace must be crowned with success, which action she has followed closely by delegating an observer to the Sessions of the Council at Geneva and at Paris.


The Government of His Majesty continues to follow attentively this question which is inscribed on the agenda of the Session of the Council of the League of Nations which will open on January 25.

Washington, January 15, 1932.

TR:RGT:GES

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 330




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
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Canton, China, December 18, 1931.

SUBJECT: Anti-Japanese Boycott in Canton.



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Sir:

I have the honor to submit the following report on the anti-Japanese boycott in Canton. Reference is made to the following previous despatches having a bearing upon this subject which were addressed to the Legation:

- No. 77 of October 3, 1931, entitled "Reactions in Canton to Manchurian Crisis",
- No. 78 of October 5, 1931, entitled "Monthly Political Report for September, 1931",
- No. 80 of October 12, 1931, entitled "Canton Riots of October 10, 1931",
- No. 81 of October 15, 1931, entitled "The Student Riots, the Anti-Japanese Agitation and the Peace Movement", and
- No. 86 of October 7, 1931, entitled "Political and Military Developments in the Canton Consular District during October, 1931".

These reports outline briefly the developments of anti-Japanese sentiment in Canton, the anti-Japanese demonstration which resulted in casualties on October 10, 1931, and the gradual organization of an anti-Japanese boycott of considerable magnitude.

Immediately following the Japanese incursion into Manchuria, the local authorities were so occupied by the

political

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FILED

FEB 16 1932

- 2 -

political repercussions that little or no attention was given to the organization of a boycott during the latter part of September. It early became clear that the Cantonese were determined to prevent anti-Japanese outrages or threatened violations to the security of Japanese life and property in this area. This policy has been consistently pursued up to the present time, although, inspite of precautions, a number of students were killed and injured in the riot of October 10, 1931, which has already been reported in detail to the Department and the Legation. However, the organization of anti-Japanese boycott committees has been permitted and pickets have been tacitly allowed by the local regime to search the premises of local business establishments for Japanese goods for which registration with the boycott committee is now required. Numerous cases of confiscation have been alleged. In local press reports one million dollars Canton currency will be obtained from the sale at auction of confiscated Japanese goods, the proceeds of which are to be devoted to the conduct of the anti-Japanese campaign in Manchuria. Although the local authorities claim that the anti-Japanese boycott is a spontaneous movement on the part of patriotic Chinese merchants to express their disapproval of Japanese imperialism as demonstrated in the occupation of Manchuria, it actually appears that the boycott committee has been organized at the instance of local public officials, including the Mayor of Canton, and that the pickets function with the sanction of the local authorities and as semi-official representatives of the local authorities. The anti-British
boycott

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

boycott against Hongkong of 1925-1926 was operated on exactly similar lines to those now used against the Japanese.

For a number of reasons it is extremely difficult to obtain accurate information regarding the extent to which Japan has suffered from local boycott activities. As previously pointed out, the boycott movement was slow in developing, no important steps being taken to enforce it until the early of October, and it was not until October 20th that the merchants were prohibited from placing new orders with Japanese firms. Large stocks of Japanese goods were brought into Canton and Wuchow prior to the imposition of the boycott which theoretically may be disposed of without interference. Also large quantities of Japanese coal, cotton yarns and presumably other products are brought into Canton from Hongkong surreptitiously as North China products or without reference to their provenance. Another important fact which must be considered is that the Chinese Maritime Customs lists most articles arriving at this port from Hongkong as originating there whatever the country of origin, so that statistical information concerning the countries of origin of goods is limited to a few items. Because of this fact no information is obtainable concerning Japanese imports of matches, sulphate of ammonia, fish products and sundry goods which make up a large part of the total imports from Japan. It should also be observed that the British have been favored in their trade with China by the relinquishment of the gold standard, and that business generally shows an apparent decline in volume as compared with 1930 which is on a still lower level than

- 4 -

than during 1929. The limited time during which the boycott has been effective is also a handicap in determining the extent to which Japan trade may have been affected, since it is impossible to gauge the extent of new orders which might have been placed had the boycott not been imposed. It is the general consensus of opinion, however, that British and other European merchants, particularly the Germans, have been benefitted considerably at the expense of the Japanese. The effect on American trade would seem to be slight since only a few relatively unimportant items of Japanese and American imports are competitive.

The following figures may be helpful in showing the extent to which Japan has been affected in certain leading items by the activities of the boycott committee. During 1930 imports of Japanese wheat flour amounted to 14,458 piculs as against 45,613 piculs for the first nine months of 1931. During October and November, 1931, however, Japanese wheat flour imports dropped to 10 piculs. Imports of sulphate of ammonia during the first three quarters of 1930 amounted to 24,444 piculs and to 1,321 piculs in October and November in comparison with total imports of 840 piculs for the first nine months of 1931; there are no imports of sulphate of ammonia during October and November. Imports of spirits of wine totalled 85,760 gallons during the first nine months of 1931 as against only 3,201 during the months of October and November, showing a marked drop as compared with the average for the preceding nine months.

The following table shows imports of coal into Canton for the first three quarters of 1930 and 1931 and for

October

- 5 -

October and November of these two years respectively, in which it will be observed that arrivals of Japanese coal fell off heavily:

<u>Coal</u>	1930		1931	
	<u>1st 3 quarters</u>	<u>Oct. & Nov.</u>	<u>1st 3 quarters</u>	<u>Oct. & Nov.</u>
				tons
Honggay	54,113 tons	10,911 tons	56,001 tons	15,442
Japan	95,238	10,920	47,077	2,237
Asiatic*	75,198	16,846	39,243	12,367
Other	1,328	224	1,111	172
<u>Coal Dust</u>				
Japan	32,184	6,633	34,866	2,704
Asiatic*	7,112	1,559	9,634	629

*Dutch East Indies and India.

A similar situation is disclosed in the following table covering importations of cement:

Cement - Piculs.

Hongkong	148,675 piculs	31,334	250,683	70,099
Macao	971	--	636	4,303
French Indo-China	10,495	--	938	--
Japan	62,863	24,034	135,387	4,678

There also appears to be a marked decline in imports of common Japanese printing paper containing mechanical wood pulp, common printing paper free from mechanical wood pulp and M. G. Cap paper, the principal items used in this market.

It appears likely that the Japanese piece-goods business will be materially affected in the event that the boycott is prolonged, although available evidence is not sufficient to indicate that Japanese trade has suffered greatly in these lines. Canton newspapers report that local knitting mills have been closed down because of the shortage of Japanese cotton yarns. It is understood, however, that this commodity is brought into Canton from stocks maintained in Hongkong to a

certain

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

certain extent. The boycott against Japanese cement is also handicapping construction work in both Canton and Wuchow, since other producing centers have not been able as yet to bring shipments into this market in sufficient quantities to replace the Japanese cement and at a price which local users can afford to pay.

A Japanese member of the local staff of the Chinese Maritime Customs orally stated that in his observation Japanese trade had fallen off about 66% but that certain items, such as coal, have not been seriously affected.

Partially as a consequence of this decline in trade and partly because of possible threats to Japanese life, over one hundred members of the Japanese community were evacuated from Canton on October 27, 1931. Although a certain number of Japanese steamers have entered the port since the boycott became effective, they have been compelled to use their own crews to discharge cargo, some vessels being compelled to leave without landing goods destined for this port. The Bank of Taiwan has been subjected to heavy runs and the business of the Yokohama Specie Bank has also been curtailed, so that Japanese shipping and banking business is substantially at a stand-still. The firm, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Limited, the largest Japanese business establishment in this city, is practically out of the silk market and doing substantially no import or export trade. The business of other Japanese firms in Canton is also paralyzed. So long as the Manchurian situation remains unsettled, there is little expectation that Japanese trade will be an important factor in this market, although in previous years that country controlled

- 7 -

controlled from 20% to 25% of the total foreign import trade of the port. As yet available figures are insufficient to show the extent to which Japanese trade has been affected or how the Japanese share of local business has been distributed among European competitors. In certain lines, such as coal, competing interests have not been able to take advantage of the elimination of the Japanese from this market probably due to insufficient stocks and inadequate handling and carrying facilities. Nevertheless, it may be anticipated that should the boycott be prolonged, foreign competitors will absorb to a large extent that portion of the trade of Canton which formerly went to Japan. Although available information is fragmentary and in many cases without concrete evidence based on trade statistics, the facts recited above may be helpful in gauging the extent to which the Japanese have suffered as a consequence of local boycott activities.

Respectfully yours,

J. W. Ballantine
J. W. Ballantine,
American Consul General.

*
Copies sent:

- 5 to Department
- 1 to Legation
- 1 to Consul General, Nanking
- 1 to Consul General, Shanghai
- 1 to Consul General, Hongkong.

600

FWH:CCW

154
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
January 28, 1932.

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
In the attached despatch, as of December 22, 1931, Consul General Hanson reports a conversation with Mr. Jung Hou, until recently Chief of the Bureau of Finance at Kirin, whom Mr. Hanson has known for some years. According to Mr. Jung Hou the Japanese authorities are actively working for the establishment of independent governments in Manchuria.



1581

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, December 22, 1931

7E
a-c/k

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTING MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
WITH MR. JUNG HOU



F/DEW

793.94/3549

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information

- 1/ of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2297, of even date, forwarding to the Legation a copy of a memorandum of a conversation recently held by me with Mr. Jung Hou, until recently a member of the Kirin Provincial Government.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

1 enclosure as indicated

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TIL/t11

FEB 16 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2897

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, December 22, 1931

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTING MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
WITH MR. JUNG HOU.

The Honorable

Nelson Truax Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, as of possible
1/ interest to the Legation, a memorandum of a conversation I
recently held with Mr. Jung Hou and in which he expresses
his views relative to the political situation in Manchuria.
Mr. Jung Hou's acquaintance with me dates back to the years
when I was in charge of the American Consulate at Yingkou
and he was the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs there. Until
recently he was the Commissioner for Finance of the Kirin
Provincial Government, and resigned when the Japanese set up
Hsi Chia as Chang Kuan there.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hansen
American Consul General

1 enclosure as indicated

Copies have been sent to
the Department.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
 WITH JUNG HOU, UNTIL RECENTLY CHIEF OF THE
 BUREAU OF FINANCE AT KIRIN.

Mr. Jung Hou called upon Mr. Hanson at the Consulate General on December 10 at 4 p.m. The present situation in Manchuria was sized up by him as follows:

In occupying Manchuria, which is believed to be her long adopted plan, Japan has availed herself of three advantages: (1) An upset Europe confronted with international questions of her own, (2) A poor Russia still busy with her five-year plan and watched by her enemies, and (3) A wartorn China unable to meet foreign aggression. Judging by what Japan has done so far, it appears that Japan is working to have an independent government for an independent Manchuria organized from the bottom up, which will be completely controlled by Japan. She has already put up a puppet local government each at Mukden and Kirin, and is now endeavoring to have a similar government put up at Tsitsihar. It will then be left to the local government so formed to organize a central government with somebody most suitable to Japan to be placed at its head. It is expected that after a puppet government is formed at Tsitsihar a joint declaration will be issued by the three local governments to denounce the old Manchurian military authorities in particular and the Chinese Republican Government in general in an attempt to create a world impression that the formation of an independent government for an independent Manchuria is justified.

In regard to Mr. Hsu Wei Lun's project of gold mining in Manchuria with American capital, Mr. Jung said that it would be an inopportune time to proceed with such a project at this time, because it would be against Japan's policy of establishing a complete Japanese industrial monopoly in all of Manchuria and would certainly meet with Japanese opposition, which it would prove impossible to overcome now that Japan has been endeavoring to establish a firmer and firmer grip on this country.

American Consulate General, Harbin, China,
 December 14, 1931.

1584

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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


CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA,

December 22, 1931.

JAN 16 32



SUBJECT:

TRANSMITTING TRANSLATION OF INTERVIEW
WITH MR. WILL ROGERS.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

793.94/3053

1/

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy,
in translation, of an interview with Mr. Will Rogers
published in the local Russian newspaper "Rupor" in
regard to his visit to Harbin. Mr. Rogers stayed
but one day in this city and was entertained at
luncheon by Mr. Samuel Bitting, Manager of the National
City Bank of New York, and at dinner by me. At my
residence I arranged for him to meet the leading American
merchants in the city.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

MAR 14 1932

FILED

1 enclosure as indicated.

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793.94/3053

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gutzfelm NARS, Date 12-18-75

RUPOR, December 13, 1931.
 Translated by AY.

A VISIT TO HARBIN OF THE GAYEST OF ALL AMERICANS

Rupor's interview with the famous journalist
 and cinema actor - Will Rogers.

Yesterday morning Will Rogers, the famous American journalist and cinema actor, came to Harbin.

He is travelling in Japan and China, and will later go to Europe.

Stopping at the Modern Hotel, Will Rogers immediately went to the bar and started a conversation with his casual neighbours. His arrival was quite unexpected and there was no one at the station to meet him.

Thereupon he told the hotel administration that if anyone wanted to see him, they could find him in the "American Bar".

This goes to prove that Will Rogers knows our Harbin geography thoroughly.

The RUPOR representative directed himself to Mr. Unterberger's American Bar to attempt an interview with one of the most popular persons in America (we want to remind our readers that Will Rogers took the third place, immediately after Henry Ford and Owen Young, on the list of most popular Americans).

Those who think that Will Rogers is a smartly dressed and clean shaven American, - are greatly deceived.

Our representative discovered on one of the tall bar chairs an old man in negligent attire. His weather beaten ruddy face appeared from under a flat brown cap, he had a dark brown-reddish demi-season coat on his shoulders with the collar up.

A carelessly tied bright coloured scarf completed the curious appearance of the famous cinema comedian and renowned journalist.

Facing him on the bar counter stood cock-tails which he offered to his interlocutors.

But it was no easy task to obtain an interview from him.

A comedian by vocation and by nature Will Rogers replied to all questions by jokes and clever repartees and refused to give direct replies.

"I love to fly," said Will Rogers, "therefore, after 3 days in Tokio I flew to Osaka and then to Dairen."

"I came to Manchuria to see what is going on here and as I know very little about politics I cannot make any statement."

"The War Minister Minami asked me in Tokio what I came for and I told him that I did not know."

Will Rogers laughs heartily.

"He also asked me whether I want to see the war, but I told him that I would rather see the geisha girls."

He is so natural and gay that he laughs after every reply. And he also makes funny faces and draws his head into the shoulders.

Then he recounts how he flew together with Gibbons, the famous American newspaper man.

"From Osaka we flew very low because of the clouds. Gibbons was scared lest the Japanese hit the ground and changed into a train at Seoul."

-This was also-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

This was also an obvious joke, because Gibbons is considered as one of the bravest and most daring war correspondents in the world and lost one eye in Mexico where he went as a newspaper man during the revolution.

Gibbons will also visit Harbin in the near future.

When asked about the salaries in the moving pictures business, Will Rogers said:

"Not so much to speak of, but quite a lot in local dollars. Your dollar went up to-day, I think it's because of my arrival...I heard quite a good deal of Harbin: many roads and different interests come across each other here. Although I am a married man, but I still want to look at pretty girls and they say there is quite a lot of them here. By the way, you have more different nationalities here than there are at Hollywood," Mr. Rogers adds.

"Though you have not got much money you still live very gaily in Harbin", he says. "Bon Harbin", laughs Rogers.

"I can see many Russians here. I last was among the Russians in 1926, when I went to the USSR for an interview with Chicherin.

"To-morrow I will write to America about your city."

Of his extraordinary and momentous rising to fame Will Rogers says very little.

"Formerly I was a cow-boy," he says, "I am 11 years in the screen work. Besides, I write for the Saturday Evening Post and for 400 other newspapers in America.

"The last film where I acted was the 'Ambassador Bill'.

"The story takes place in an imaginary country which represents Rumania. It represents the king, the queen, their son and the intrigues of the court. There is quite a number of Russians in that picture who act the part of soldiers."

At this moment arrives Mr. Hanson, the American Consul General, Mr. von-Wiegen and several other foreign newspaper men and members of the local American community.

Will Rogers welcomes them all with much noise and profusion. Speaking of his further journey Rogers says:

"From Harbin I shall go to Mukden, Peiping, Shanghai, Hongkong and to Singapore through Manila. From there I will fly to Europe."

"Whom will you fly with?"

"Oh, I don't care as long as the airplane has a propeller, 'cause otherwise you cannot fly... I shall stay for 2 or 3 days in each city because I have to hurry on, I must be back in America next February. I shall stop over to see the King of Siam at Bangkok, he is a great friend of mine. To Peking I shall go through Chingchou, I am not afraid of anybody," Rogers smiles.

When bidding him good-bye our newspaper man handed over to Rogers a copy of our newspaper of December 13th, containing a whole article about him, and the last copy of RUBEJ which had a picture of Lillian Tashman, the famous Hollywood beauty on the cover.

When Rogers saw her picture, he exclaimed:

"Sure, I know her, we are working together in the Fox Studio."

When asked about his departure from Harbin, Rogers laughed and said:

"It is much too cold to fight and I am too old to run after your girls and, therefore, there is nothing to keep me here."

- "Will you be- .

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

"Will you be here to-morrow?"

"It depends on how long your cabarets stay open. I will hardly stay in Harbin after they close, I will choose a suitable plane and will hop off."

When the RUPOR representative bade good-bye to Mr. Rogers, the laughter of the famous American whose feuilletons are read all over America was still heard from the Bar.

* * * * *

(K. Zvantseff).

1588
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY February 1, 1932.

FEB 4 1932

SKH: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RSM:

In the attached despatch of December 16, 1931, Consul General Myers reports that according to the Japanese Consulate General in Mukden, there are now approximately 160 Japanese advisers attached to the various Chinese Government, public utility, railway and industrial organizations in South Manchuria. In addition there are also a number of military advisers.

The Consul General comments that the presence of so many advisers will naturally tend to give the Japanese a monopoly in the Manchurian field. He quotes one of the American correspondents as saying that the open door policy will be observed but that the open door "will be so crowded with Japanese that it will be very difficult for others to gain admittance."

[Handwritten signature]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,

Mukden, China, December 16, 1931.

JAN 18 1932

SUBJECT: Japanese Advisers in Chinese Organizations in
South Manchuria.

CONFIDENTIAL.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy
of my despatch No. 504 to the Legation, Peiping, China,
dated December 14, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours, ()

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 504 to the Legation,
Peiping, China, dated Dec. 14, 1931.

MSM:HTW
800

4 Carbon Copies

Received F. P.

F/DEW

793.94/3551

FILED

FEB 16 1932

No. 504

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

December 14, 1931.

SUBJECT: Japanese Advisers in Chinese Organizations in South Manchuria.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to request the Legation to refer to this Consulate General's despatch No. 501³⁴⁰³ of December 11, 1931, on the above subject, and to submit the following information pertinent to the subject matter of that despatch.

It has been learned from the Japanese Consulate General that there are now approximately one hundred and sixty Japanese advisers attached to the various Chinese government, public utility, railway, and industrial organizations in South Manchuria. These advisers, according to the Japanese Consulate General, are all employees of the South Manchuria Railway Company and as such receive their salaries from that company. In addition to these Japanese, there are also officers of the Kuantung Army who act in an advisory capacity to certain

local

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

local organs. This body of Japanese may be said to form the de facto administration of south Manchuria. Through their supervisory authority they control provincial and municipal government, railway operation, public utilities, banking, and industrial enterprise.

Assuming even a partial continuation of this system either under an independent Manchuria or a Manchuria loosely bound to China proper, it is not difficult to envision the monopolization of a large part of Manchuria's trade by the Japanese. The various government organizations, public utility companies, railways, mining companies, and other industrial enterprises are large buyers of foreign made goods. Railway equipment, industrial and agricultural machinery, electrical machinery and materials, and building materials are some of the products which come readily to mind as being products previously bought in not inconsiderable amounts from America and Europe. An influential body of Japanese advisers can without difficulty turn this trade to Japan.

During the course of a recent discussion concerning the possibility of an independent Manchuria, a prominent official of the South Manchuria Railway Company informed Mr. Vincent that the independence of this territory, such independence to be guaranteed by Japan, would be of great benefit to Manchurians and the world. "Can't you imagine a peaceful and prosperous Manchuria thrown open to world

trade

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -


trade and world investment?" The answer is obvious. One can much more easily imagine that Manchuria will become even more exclusively a field for Japanese investment than it has been for the past two decades and that trade conditions will as closely approximate those in Korea as possible. The door will be kept open but, as one of the American correspondents has aptly stated, "It will be so crowded with Japanese that it will be very difficult for others to gain admittance."

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
 American Consul General.

Original and one copy to legation.
 Five copies to Department.
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

JCV:ABG
 800.




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,


Mukden, China, December 16, 1931.




THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:



(G)



F/DEW

793.94/3552

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 505 to the Legation, Peiping, China,
dated December 15, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

FEB 16 1932

FILED

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 505
to the Legation, Peiping.

JCV:ABG
800

4" Carbon Copies
Received *F. P. ...*

No. 505

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

December 15, 1931.

SUBJECT: Interview Granted New York Times Correspondent by General Honjo.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Legation,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to submit for the Legation's information the following report of an interview granted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Kuantung Army, General Honjo, to Hallett Abend, correspondent for the New York Times. It is well to explain that Mr. Abend submitted his questions in writing to General Honjo the latter part of last week and that yesterday the General gave his replies similarly. This report is therefore made in the following question and answer form.

Mr. Abend: Will military necessity make it imperative that Chinese troops evacuate the Chinchow zone?

General Honjo: It will.

Chief of Staff: Chinese troops with their base at Chinchow are utilizing partisans in an attempt to attack the Japanese army. This policy has already been put into operation. They are evidently trying to disturb peace and order in the districts occupied by the Japanese army. Unless Chinese at Chinchow withdraw, peace and order in Manchuria and life and property of Japanese and Chinese

will

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

will be perpetually menaced. Character of Chinese troops at Chinchow is very bad, and it is considered that the existence of this body of troops at Chinchow is as dangerous as a cancerous growth to the health of the human body. As there is no food for them inside the wall, they are following the historical precedent.

Mr. Abend: Many reports are going out to the effect that the number of Japanese soldiers in Manchuria is much larger than the 16,600 permitted under treaty. I should like very much to carry a detailed statement from General Honjo explaining how, because of deaths, wounded, frost-bite cases, sickness, and the rumored transfer of one battalion to Tientsin, the Japanese force in Manchuria is still below treaty limitations.

General Honjo: The present number of officers and men, not excluding recent casualties, is 15,500. Casualties are: killed 210, including 14 officers; wounded 480, including 28 officers; frost-bitten, about 400. There are also 400 included in the above figure which have been sent to Tientsin.

Chief of Staff: With regard to the number of Japanese troops in Manchuria, we do not consider that we are now bound by the restrictions of the old treaty in this present situation.

Mr. Abend: As General Honjo probably knows, there is great uneasiness in foreign banking and business circles in Manchuria for fear that through various methods the Japanese will create a monopoly of trade here which would be equivalent to the closing of "the Open Door". I understand that this is not Japan's official intention, but nevertheless various Chinese officials have told foreign business men and foreign correspondents that, under duress, all purchases made by the present Manchurian government must be only Japanese products. I should be glad to quote General Honjo as flatly denying the use of military pressure to enforce the purchase of Japanese goods, and I should also be glad of a quotable statement reiterating Japan's "Open Door" policy.

General Honjo: There is absolutely no truth in the statement that the Japanese military have forced the purchase of Japanese merchandise.

Chief of Staff: Army Headquarters always give consideration according to equal treatment to Japanese and foreign merchants. For example, the Japanese ordinance department has changed from its past policy of

purchasing

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

purchasing only from Japanese firms and is now buying gasoline from the Standard Oil Company and The Texas Company. Army Headquarters attitude is the same as that stated in the Imperial Government's declaration concerning the "open door" and equal opportunity in Manchuria. The Army acts to make effective the Government's policy.

Mr. Abend: Does Army Headquarters have evidence that the Chinese regular troops this side of Chinchow supply arms, munitions, or money in order to influence irregulars or bandits to attack the South Manchuria Railway zone?

General Honjo: I can prove it.

Chief of Staff: On December 1st General Yu Hsi-hsun sent a car of ammunition from intramural China to Fun Iiao and it was distributed among the partisans. On December 5th, General Shi supplied sixty thousand rounds of rifle ammunition to partisans at Taichipu. The most powerful bandit chiefs now are Iao and Tsai. Their bands were recently incorporated into the "General Reserves of the Self Defence Corps" and were supplied with four trench mortars, four machine guns, and several tens of thousands of cartridges. This evidence was obtained from a letter addressed to the Chief of the Public Safety Bureau in Haichun District. There are also many other proofs. It is remarkable that although the irregulars fight many times, their ammunition is never exhausted.

Mr. Abend: Will General Honjo officially define for publication the present limits of what is, in a military sense, "The South Manchuria Railway Zone?" The Japanese Government, in several notes to Nanking has repeated that railways built with Japanese money which China has refused to repay "may be regarded as the property of the South Manchuria Railway". When the military now refer to the South Manchuria Railway zone do they include these railways referred to in diplomatic notes?

General Honjo: Up to now the Army Headquarters has not had the time necessary to make an explanation of this matter. Our interpretation of this matter is the same as that published by the Imperial Government.

Chief of Staff: However, we have no knowledge of the memorandum to the Nanking Government.

Mr. Abend: Ignoring entirely the question of the Chinchow area, what is to be the manner of dealing effectively with the bandit problem in Manchuria? As I understand it, the present Chinese administrations in Mukden and in Kirin do not have enough reliable

troops

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

troops to hunt down and exterminate the bandit gangs. Will the military forces of the Mukden and Kirin Chinese governments be increased and properly trained under Japanese advisers until they can eradicate banditry, or will the Japanese military forces now in Manchuria undertake this problem after the Chinchow problem has been settled? It is obvious that the Japanese cannot merely remain inside the railway zone for an indefinite period of time subject constantly to raids and attacks by bandits, but that the bandits must be pursued and entirely dispersed. A definite settlement of this bandit problem is necessary before prosperity can be revived in Manchuria, and a definite statement from General Honjo on this matter will be of the utmost importance.

General Honjo: I hope that the suppression of bandits will be in the future carried out by authorities under a Chinese administration but at the present they (the local Chinese authorities) cannot do it because of the old Northeastern militarists at Chinchow. These militarists incite bandits to activity and cause the provisional Manchurian government to be unstable. In order, therefore, to make Manchuria a "paradise of peace" it is imperative to sweep all the militarists at Chinchow out of Manchuria.

Mr. Abend: Various foreign firms which sold airplanes and other war equipment to Chang Hsueh-liang are worried about payment. Would it be correct to state that these war materials, captured by the Japanese on September 18th and 19th, will become the property of the new Manchurian Government and will be paid for by that Government?

General Honjo: Disposal of this matter is now being given consideration.

Mr. Abend: It is understood that the proposed new Manchurian government will have a standing army only about one eighth or one tenth the size of Chang Hsueh-liang's former army. A force of this size would not be sufficient for self-defense against China or other possible enemies. Would not a treaty guaranteeing military support from Japan be necessary in a military sense, for the stability of such a government?

General Honjo: Until such time as the new Manchurian regime has developed armed forces sufficient to handle the bandit problem and insure itself against attack by possible enemies, the Japanese military forces now here will, it is understood, be willing to shoulder the burden of maintaining stability.

Respectfully

1598
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 5 -

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

JGV:ABG
800.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

HT

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,
Mukden, China, December 21, 1931.

JAN 18 1932

SUBJECT: Political Conditions in South Manchuria.

CONFIDENTIAL.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 507 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated December 19, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 507
to the Legation, Peiping.

HTW
800

4 Carbon Copies

Received *F.P.*

F/DEW

793.94/3553

FT 6

FEB 13 1932

No. 507

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

December 19, 1931.

SUBJECT: Political Conditions in South
Manchuria.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Legation,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

As giving some sidelights on the present situation
1/ in Manchuria, I have the honor to enclose herewith a
confidential memorandum containing a resume of my con-
versation with Mr. K. Hayashi, Japanese Consul General
at Mukden, shortly after his return from Tokyo about a
week ago.

The two questions relating to Manchuria which ap-
pear uppermost in the minds of the Japanese and which
are closely related are the organization of independent
provincial governments and the withdrawal of the Chinese
forces from the Chihnsien area. The Japanese have been
making desperate efforts to secure suitable men to form
the different provincial governments and up to very re-
cently, at least, their efforts have not been very
successful. It is well known that both Tsang Shih-yi
and Yuan Chin-k'ai were repeatedly pressed to organize

- 2 -

a provincial government at Mukden, the most important of the provincial governments in Manchuria. Tsang Shih-yi, Chairman of the Provincial Government prior to September 19, finally accepted the post on December 15 but under circumstances which raise grave suspicion of extreme pressure, or coercion. At any rate, it is to be expected that this provincial government will now be completely organized with the assistance and under the supervision of Japanese advisers. The Heilungkiang post is still unsettled and according to reports Japanese efforts to interest Ma Chan-shan in that or another important post have so far failed. The report has been heard that even Chang Hsi-p'eng, the garrison commissioner at Taonan who had been under Japanese influence, is now under Japanese surveillance on account of intercepted communications with Chang Hsueh-liang.

The Japanese military headquarters at Mukden, aided by the local Japanese press, have been directing much attention to alleged military activities on the part of the Chinese forces in the neighborhood of Chinghsien and to bandit activities alleged to be instigated by the Chinghsien government. Both militarily and politically the presence of Chinese forces in the Chinghsien area has been a great drawback to Japanese plans for the establishment of independent governments in Manchuria. It is believed that the Japanese command very reluctantly withdrew its forces despatched in the direction of Chinghsien in the latter part of November. The official

press

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

press releases of Japanese Headquarters have indicated that the elimination of the Chinese forces from this area is a cardinal part of their plans and would be undertaken on the first suitable occasion. According to a Tokyo press report, published this morning in the local press, the War Ministry announced on December 18th that the bandits menacing the South Manchuria Railway shall be suppressed and that General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, may, at his discretion, demand that the Chinese troops in the Chihnsien area retire inside the Wall within a week or ten days and that should they refuse to comply he shall attack them.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

1/ Enclosure: Memorandum of conversation with Mr. K.
Hayashi, Japanese Consul General.

MSM.AAG
800.

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal.

Enclosure No. 1, to despatch No. 507, of M. S. Myers,
American Consul General, Mukden, China, to the Legation,
Peiping, dated December 19, 1931, on the subject "Political
Conditions in South Manchuria".

MEMORANDUM REGARDING CONVERSATION WITH CONSUL GENERAL HAYASHI.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Mr. K. Hayashi, Japanese Consul General at Mukden, re--
turned to his post on December 13th from a sojourn of one
month at Tokyo. It may be interpolated that he was pre-
viously Japanese Minister at Bangkok and has recently been
designated as Japanese Ambassador to Brazil. The follow-
ing is a brief resume of interesting parts of his conver-
sation with me at this Consulate General on December 16.

The induction of Tsang Shih-yi, until recently Chair-
man of the local provincial government, into the governor-
ship was naturally referred to. Mr. Hayashi stated that
the establishment of provincial governments in each of the
three provinces was a matter of extreme importance and that
naturally the governorship at Mukden was the most important
one. He referred to the esteem in which Tsang is held by
the Chinese and to the good fortune of the province in
again securing his services. Whether he will be a suit-
able man to head the proposed government for all Manchuria
is uncertain; his associations have been confined to this
province. In any case he expressed the opinion that the
government for the three provinces is less urgent than
that for the individual provinces. In this connection
the interesting statement was made that Chang Tso-hsiang
is still being considered as a possible head of this go-
vernment - this would seem to indicate that Chang is still
persona grata with the Japanese -; Chang Ching-hui of
Harbin, it may be added, was referred to as ambitious.

As regards Henry Pu-yi, the statement was made that
some Japanese military officials and others (Ronin were
mentioned) as well as some Chinese are in favor of the
restoration of the Manchu monarchy. He expressed the
view that although the restoration of the monarchy is
not entirely a dead issue it is an unlikely development.

The self government movement, of which considerable
has been heard recently, is looked upon as a natural out-
growth of the absence of a central administrative authority
at Mukden. Japan, he said, desires centralization and it
may be expected that the organization of a provincial go-
vernment will lead to the abolition of these self govern-
ment organs.

Mr.


- 2 -

Mr. Hayashi expressed the opinion, as it is understood he has on several previous occasions, that about 30,000, or 10,000 for each province, gendarmes or constabulary would be adequate to maintain peace and order within the three provinces. He said that a military force for the defence of the frontiers is not needed and that Chinese armies have never proved effective for that purpose. The Japanese army will no doubt look after that matter including the keeping of the Chinese forces out of Manchuria. In this connection it was stated that the arsenals at Mukden will not be needed and should be converted into industrial works, but what works he did not know. This office has heard reports, believed to be trustworthy, that some of the latest equipment has been removed from the arsenals by the Japanese.

Reference was made to the reports that negotiations were taking place at Peiping between the Japanese Legation and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang for the withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Manchuria. He stated that Marshal Chang is believed to be ready to withdraw his forces for the purpose of keeping them intact but that Chiang Kai-shih desired him to put up a fight.

Banditry, he admitted, is serious everywhere in Manchuria and its suppression is one of the first tasks that will have to be undertaken by the new government. He agreed that the provinces, especially Fengtien Province, had no adequate forces at present for this purpose and that no doubt the Japanese military would have to cooperate.

Mr. Hayashi stated that while in Tokyo he was asked by Japanese industrialists to indicate to them the type of enterprises that could be established in Manchuria. He suggested farming - large scale - sugar beet growing, cattle grazing, etc.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

RT

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE

GENERAL,

Mukden, China. December 28, 1931.

JAN 18 32

SUBJECT: Political Conditions.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 513 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated December 26, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 513
to the Legation, Peiping.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 513

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

December 26, 1931.

SUBJECT: Political Conditions.

The Honorable,

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my telegrams of December 21, 2 p.m.
December 23, 4 p.m., and December 24, 12 noon, in re-
gard to the campaign against bandits alleged by the
Japanese to be menacing the South Manchuria Railway,
I have the honor to report additional information.
The Japanese troops which were sent into Faku and neigh-
boring districts on December 21st were commanded by
Lieutenant General Mori, head of the railway guards.
According to press reports and information supplied by
Headquarters, the bandit punitive expedition comprised
one regiment from the Chosen mixed brigade and three
battalions of railway guards, or parts thereof. Air-
planes cooperated with this force which was supplied
with field artillery, trench mortars and machine guns.
The original announcement by Headquarters was to the

effect

- 2 -

effect that 7000 bandits and irregulars were operating in the Changtu-Faku region, but the scanty information which has appeared in the local press and been given out by Headquarters since the return of these punitive forces to their respective stations on December 24th makes mention of only two small bandit groups, one numbering 300 and the other 150, as having been met and dispersed with a total casualty list on the part of the Chinese of 120 killed. The Japanese losses were reported as 3 killed and 3 wounded. Furthermore, it was indicated at the outset that the drive might be extended to Changwu, a station on the Tahushan-Tungliac railway. It terminated, however, with the occupation of Faku on the 23rd by the Chosen brigade, from which it apparently immediately withdrew and returned to the railway zone. According to press reports, only in the district city of Hwaite, southwest of Changchun, have the Japanese left a small occupation force of one company. It would seem from the above that either the original plans of the Japanese have not been carried out or that the number of bandits in that area had been greatly over-stated. On December 24, Headquarters announced that the anti-bandit operations in that area had been brought to a successful conclusion.

So far little has been reported in regard to bandit operations south of Mukden in which troops of the Second Division at Liaoyang and the occupation force at Yingkou (Newchwang) are participating. The fight^{ing} with irregulars at Tienchwangtai, on the Koupangtzu-Newchwang branch of the Peking-Mukden Railway, and the exchange of shots

between

- 3 -

between a Japanese troop train and a Chinese armored train west of Tienchwangtai are the main features of this move thus far given out - it was announced today that when the Japanese forces entered this town on December 23rd they were subjected to a devastating fire by Chinese regulars and irregulars from roof tops and other places of concealment and that the fight was much more sanguinary than originally reported. Mewchwangcheng was occupied without resistance on December 24th. The spokesman of Headquarters last evening stated that the irregulars captured near Tienchwangtai wearing plain clothes over army uniforms have admitted that they are under the command of Huang Hsien-sheng, former Chief of Police at Mukden. In this connection, this morning's Japanese press carried an alleged photograph of several of these men with machine gun belts filled with cartridges around their necks. It is also alleged that these irregulars have testified that officers have been despatched, presumably on behalf of the Chinchow government, to make arrangements with bandit chieftains to recruit irregulars at a rate of silver \$30 per private with "pistols", the chiefs of 100 or more to be given the rank of captain and of 250 mounted men or 500 men on foot, the rank of major, et cetera.

The Japanese press this morning reported that troops of the Second Division at Liaoyang were moved to Yingkow yesterday in view of the menace at that point. This movement was not mentioned at this morning's press conference.

Respectfully

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 4 -

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

MSM:ARG
800.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 31, 1932.

~~MMH:~~

~~DSM:~~

~~DSM:~~

~~DSM:~~

With this despatch from Mukden, there is enclosed a copy of an article which appeared in THE JAPAN CHRONICLE which contains the outline of the Japanese plan for the development of Manchuria. Item No. 5 is interesting as it states:

"The doors of Manchuria and Mongolia are to be thrown open and foreigners are to be enabled to live in absolute security of life and property."



No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE

GENERAL,

Mukden, China, December 29, 1931.

SUBJECT: Political Conditions

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 515 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated December 29, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 515
to the Legation, Peiping.

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No. 515

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

December 29, 1931.

SUBJECT: Political Conditions.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Legation,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my despatch No. 512, of December 24, 1931, regarding the reorganization of Japanese military headquarters at Mukden, in which mention was made of the proposal to establish a Residency-General for Manchuria and Mongolia, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a news item which appeared in The Japan Chronicle, on December 24, 1931, in regard to this proposal.

In this connection, reference may be made to Japanese press reports early in the month to the effect that the government at Tokyo was considering the establishment of a commission at Mukden for handling non-military questions which, at the present time, fall within the province of military headquarters. The proposal provided for a commission composed of the Governor

of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of the Kuantung Leased Territory, the President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kuantung forces and the Consul General at Mukden (one report also mentions the Consul General at Kirin), of which the President of the South Manchuria Railway Company was suggested as the head. Consul General Hayashi in conversation with me mentioned that this plan had been discussed by the former cabinet - apparently he was one of its proponents - and that General Honjo had agreed to it in principle but recommended that its institution await the settlement of the military situation. Mr. Hayashi who had been at Tokyo for one month returned to Mukden on December 13 and on December 18 was transferred to Tokyo - he left here on the 25th. The establishment of an office - a commission and a Residency-General have been mentioned in the press - for handling the many problems arising out of the occupation of Manchuria seems to be one of the pressing questions before the Tokyo government at this time. The army, it should be pointed out, now completely controls affairs in Manchuria and through advisers and other contacts is supervising the independent governments of the Manchurian provinces. One of the purposes of the proposed commission seems to be to place the direction of Japanese interests in the hands of civilians who are acquainted with conditions in Manchuria.

Respectfully

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2
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Enclosure: News item regarding Residency-General
Scheme.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Harbin.
Copy to Consulate, Dairen.

MSM:KAB
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Enclosure No. 1, to despatch No. 515, of M. S. Myers,
American Consul General, Mukden, China, to the Legation,
Peiping, dated December 29, 1931, on the subject
"Political Conditions".

NEW MANCHURIA

Further Light on Alleged Residency-General Scheme

Military Incentive

From the Japan Chronicle, December 24, 1931.

The Yushin says that the military action of the Japanese Garrison in Manchuria will terminate with the conclusion of the present operations, and the stage of constructive work will be entered upon early next year. As this constructive work must be carried to a successful consummation, if the efforts hitherto made by the Japanese Garrison and others are to fructify, great energy is being put into the matter by the military and all other authorities concerned. No definite plans have yet been worked out, but it is agreed among all the authorities that a new Manchuria and Mongolia must form a special territory entirely independent of China proper.

The local journal believes that the plan the military authorities have in view is, in its essentials, as follows:-

- 1.- Special care to be used to prevent a section of capitalists monopolising interests. The whole nation must benefit by the future development of Manchuria and Mongolia. The South Manchuria Railway Company to be converted into a State organ, pure and simple.
- 2.- The profits accruing from Manchuria and Mongolia not to go into the national treasury but be used as the fund for the establishment of a new Manchuria and Mongolia on a perfect basis, and for the effectual development of the territory.
- 3.- The natives to be put in important posts as far as possible and the promotion of the happiness and interests of the 30,000,000 inhabitants to be made the keynote of administration, Japan rendering support to such administration.
- 4.- The Chinese military force, which has been the root cause of evils for many years, to be reduced to a minimum.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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5.- The doors of Manchuria and Mongolia to be thrown open and foreigners to be enabled to live in absolute security of life and property.

In the matter of maintaining peace and order effectually, it is further proposed that Japan should help the Chinese authorities in the task. The quick construction of all the prospective railway lines covered by the treaties in existence is also urged. Besides, such lines as are deemed necessary for the development of Manchuria and Mongolia should be laid; all these lines to be unified.

When all the ground work is finished two big Departments, Industrial and the Administrative, should be created. During the transitionary period, the headquarters of the Japanese Garrison should attend chiefly to these matters, but when some progress has been made, it is suggested that a Resident-General of Manchuria and Mongolia should be appointed.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




PM REC'D
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, December 14, 1931.

No. 1325

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to the Minister's telegram of November 30, 3 p.m., from Nanking to the Department concerning the proposed reorganization of the Chinese police force in the Chinese city at Tientsin, I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of Consul General Lockhart's despatches, No. 65 of November 30, and No. 73 of December 8, 1931, on this subject.

Inasmuch as the situation at Tientsin seems to have improved during the last few days the Consular

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Body at that place has not considered it necessary
to proceed further with the matter of the reorganiza-
tion of the Chinese police force.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Mahlon F. Perkins

MAHLON F. PERKINS,
Counselor of Legation.

✓
Enclosures:

1. From the American Consul
General, Tientsin, No. 65,
November 30, 1931.
2. From the American Consul
General, Tientsin, No. 73,
December 8, 1931.

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C O P Y

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 1348

No. 65

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, November 30, 1931.

**Subject: Proposed Reorganization of the
Chinese Police Force in the Chinese
City of Tientsin.**

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

- 1/ I have the honor to refer to my conversation of this morning with the Counselor of the Legation, Mr. Perkins, concerning a telegram addressed by the British Consul General at Tientsin to the British Minister at Nanking proposing a reorganization of the Chinese police force in the Chinese City at Tientsin, and to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram dated November 27, 1931, addressed to the British Consul General at Tientsin by the British Minister at Nanking directing that he consult with his American and French Colleagues and commandants and report whether there are any measures that can be suggested to alleviate the critical situation at Tientsin. There is
- 2/ ~~Also~~ enclosed a copy of a telegram addressed to me, under date of November 28, by the American Minister at Nanking, on the same subject.
- 3/ There is also enclosed a copy of a telegram addressed to the British Minister at Nanking on November 29, 1931, by the British Consul General at Tientsin giving the result

1625
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

result of a meeting between the American, French and British Consuls General with the British and French commandants on the evening of November 29, at which time it was agreed to propose a reorganization of the Chinese police force under a neutral board consisting of French, Italian and British concession police representatives and an American civilian. The enclosed telegram explains itself. While it is realized that the plan proposed might fall far short of relieving the situation, even if it were acceptable to the Nanking Government and to others concerned, it, nevertheless, represents the only plan which those participating in the conference here felt might offer a possible solution of the local difficulty. There is reluctance on the part of foreign consular and military authorities to become involved in the controversy, and there is a distinct feeling that if any effort whatever is made towards composing the differences between the Chinese and Japanese, it must be done without the assistance of the American, French, British or Italian military forces.

Colonel Taylor, the commandant of the American troops at Tientsin, with whom I have consulted since the enclosed telegram from the British Consul General was drafted, was informed of the action taken and states that while he would interpose no objections to a neutral board such as is described so long as it consists only of civilians, under no circumstances would he be willing to have a military officer appointed to the Board, nor would he be disposed

- 3 -

disposed to invoke any military force in strengthening the hand of the neutral board. It was made clear to Colonel Taylor that only civilian members would be considered eligible to take on the reorganization work, and that it was not anticipated that the military would be called upon at any time to assist in any way with the project either in its formative stage or later.

Colonel Taylor was not present at the meeting inasmuch as he was just arriving from Peiping when the meeting was called. For that reason Colonel Drysdale attended the meeting but was careful not to commit the American commandant to any support or disapproval of the plan.

I wish to make it clear that the proposal is offered simply as a possible basis for an amicable adjustment of the Sino-Japanese difficulties. The relations between the Chinese and Japanese growing out of the local disturbances, however, are so strained that little hope can be held out that any foreign intervention, however well intended or slight it may be, will prove acceptable or effective.


Respectfully yours,

(Signed) F. P. Lockhart
F.P.Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800

Enclosures:

- 1/ Copy of telegram to British Consul General at Tientsin.
- 2/ Copy of telegram to American Consul General at Tientsin.
- 3/ Copy of telegram to British Minister at Nanking.



COPY

Copy telegram to H.M. Minister, Nanking.

No. 25 of the 29th November, 1931.

Repeated to Peking No. 78.

Sent 12 midnight.

American, French, Italian Consuls and I have received a letter from the governor stating that as a serious situation will arise after the withdrawal of armed special police from area adjacent to the Japanese concession which he fears the ordinary city police will be inadequate to control he asks us to transmit a request to our ministers to devise some means of preserving peace in that area temporarily.

My American and French colleagues and I after discussion with the British and French Commandants, the American Commandant being absent, and with the agreement of those present submit the following proposal which appears to us to be the only plan offering a possible solution of the difficulty.

1. Chinese city police force to be reorganized under a neutral board consisting of French, Italian and British concessions police representatives and an American civilian.

2. The Nanking Government must give its consent to this proposal.

3. We consider that the consent of the Japanese authorities to be essential but their participation in the board undesirable.

4. The above agreement to be merely a temporary measure. to tide over the present crisis.

It is the unanimous opinion of us all that no proposal to patrol the area concerned with an international military force is feasible.

American and French Consuls ask you to be good enough to communicate the above message to their Ministers.

Consul-General.

Copied by
GL

162

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
TIENTSIN - CHINA

TRUE READING
OF
TELEGRAM RECEIVED.

Received via U.S. Army Radio

Dated at: Nanking.

Date: November 28, 1931.

Hour of despatch:

Date of Receipt: Nov. 28

Hour of Receipt:

Novem 28 - I asked my British Colleague to ask
British Consul General at Tientsin to furnish you
copy of his telegram of last night. Please report
whether it is possible for anything to be done at
this moment. Sending copy to Washington.

JOHNSON.

800

Copied by
GL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

Copy telegram from H. M. Minister.

No. 19.

Dated 27th November, 1931.

Sent 0150 28 November, 1931.

Received 0900 28 November 1931.

Addressed to Tientsin telegram No. 19
repeated to Paris for Foreign Office Tokyo G.O.C.
Hongkong Commander-in-Chief.

Please consult at once with your American and
French Colleagues and Commandants and report please
urgently whether there are any measures we can reasonably
take to alleviate this critical situation.

2. U.S. Minister asks that you will communicate
copy of this telegram to U.S. Consul-General and say
that he will confirm it on November 28th.

Copied by
GL

1625

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 73.

2
Enclosure No. 1325
No.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, December 8, 1931.

Subject: Proposed Reorganization of the Chinese
Police Force in the Chinese City at
Tientsin.

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 65 of
November 30, 1931, on the above-mentioned subject, and
to report further developments as follows:

The meeting described in the second paragraph of
my despatch No. 65 of November 30 discussed a letter
addressed on November 29 by the Chairman of the Hopei
Provincial Government to the British, French and American
Consuls General, and to the Italian acting Consul, con-
cerning the need for adopting some temporary measure for
the maintenance of peace and order within the area from
which the armed police in the Chinese City had been with-
drawn. A copy of the Chinese text of the letter in
1/ question, together with the English translation, is en-
closed herewith. On November 30 a telegram was received
by the Consulate General from the American Minister at
Nanking authorizing me to proceed provisionally with the
plan which had been proposed and on December 1 a further
telegram was received from the Minister stating that he
had received a telegram from the Department of State at

Washington

-2-

Washington approving his instruction to me of November 30.

At a meeting between the British, French and American Consuls General and the Italian acting Consul on December 1, 1931, at the British Consulate General, it was agreed that the British Consul General should hand to the Provincial Chairman's representative (Dr. Hwang Tzou-fah) an
2/ aide-memoire, a copy of which is enclosed, setting forth the proposal, and stating that before any of the details could be worked out it would be necessary to be notified in writing that the proposal has the approval in principle of the Governor of Hopei, the Mayor of Tientsin, and the National Government at Nanking.

My British colleague was later orally informed that the Chairman of the Provincial Government had approved the proposal and had referred it to the Central Government at Nanking through Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang at Peiping. On December 5 a reply was addressed to the British Consul General by Wang Shu-chang, Chairman of Hopei Province, and Chang Hsueh-ming, Mayor of Tientsin, a copy of the
3/ text of which is enclosed herewith, together with a translation. I may add that the seal of the Mayor of Tientsin was not attached to the original document.

At a meeting of the consular representatives concerned at the British Consulate General on December 7 the reply of the Provincial Governor and Mayor of Tientsin was discussed. The result of the meeting is set forth in the
4/ enclosed draft aide-memoire which it is proposed to hand to Dr. Hwang Tzou-fah on tomorrow, December 9. I have

suggested

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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suggested to my British colleague that the word "scheme" in the last paragraph be changed to "proposal". The words "as consuls" in the same paragraph will be changed to "in our official capacity."

It was the view of the four consuls concerned that the local situation had cleared to such an extent that the need for the reorganization of the police in the area between the Japanese concession and Hopei was no longer urgent, and that in any event the original proposal did not at any time contemplate the establishment of a "buffer zone" as described in Chairman Wang's reply, nor were the consuls prepared to give any guarantee as suggested by the resolution of the Central Political Council in Nanking. Accordingly, it was deemed advisable to notify the Chinese authorities of these considerations in the sense of the enclosed draft aide-memoire.

There is some likelihood that the question will not be pursued further inasmuch as conditions continue to improve and the need for a police reorganization appears to be steadily diminishing. The preliminary negotiations did not reach the point where it was necessary to consult with the Japanese authorities.

An extra copy of this despatch is being sent herewith in order that it may be referred to the Department, together with a copy of my despatch No. 65 of November 30, if that course is deemed advisable by the Legation.

Respectfully yours,

800

F. P. Lockhart,
 American Consul General.

FPL/DA

Enclosures:

1/ Letter of November 29 from Chairman of Hopei Provincial Government, and Chinese text thereof.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Enclosures (Continued):

- 2/ Aide-memoire.
- 3/ Reply of Chairman of Hopei Province, and Mayor of Tientsin.
- 4/ Draft aide-memoire.
- 5/ Copy of despatch No. 65 of November 30, to the Legation at Peiping.

Original and 3 copies to Legation.

A true copy of
the signed origi-
nal. *RB*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

河北省政府照會 字第 號

逕啟者敝主席頃接南京密電關於天津我國保安隊撤退區域內之治安問題現正與駐華各公使秘密商洽中現迭據津市商民之請求并經

貴總領事允予考量敝主席以為在敝國保安隊撤退後所餘崗警人數有限地方治安人民生命財產殊感危險深望

貴總領事乘此時機商請

貴國公使獲得暫時維持該區域內治安辦法是所盼禱再此事未決定以前并希守秘為荷此致

駐津美國總領事

中華民國二十年十一月 日

Enclosure No. 1.

Translation

Nov. 29, 1931.

Monsieur le Consul General,

I have the honour to inform you that I am in receipt of a private telegram from Nanking stating that with reference to the question of maintaining the peace and order in the area evacuated by the Pao An Tui (armed police), conferences are being held in camera with the various Ministers accredited to China.

Now that repeated applications are coming in from the civilian population in Tientsin, and moreover, you have been good enough to agree to give the matter your consideration; realising that after the Chinese Pao An Tui are withdrawn, only a limited number of police beats being left over, there will be real jeopardy to the peace and order of the locality in question, and consequently to the lives and properties of the people in the same locality; therefore, I sincerely hope that to meet such an emergency you will be so good as to request your Minister with the view of devising temporary measures for the maintenance of peace and order within the said area. Before anything is decided upon in this matter, you are requested to keep the herein communication as being confidential.

I avail, etc., etc.,

Seal of Hopei Province.

Enclosure No. 2.

Aide-memoire handed to Dr. Hwang Tzou-fah
by H. B. M. Consul General on 1 December, 1931.

The American, French, Italian and British Consular representatives in Tientsin have carefully considered the letter from the Governor of Hopei, dated 29 November, 1931, on the subject of the disturbed conditions in Tientsin City.

Being animated by the friendliest feelings towards China and being anxious to assist the Governor and Mayor in bringing to an end the difficulties which have arisen between the city authorities and the Japanese, they have studied many possible lines of action and have come to the conclusion that the first step to take after the withdrawal of the Pao An Tui to Hopei and the devolution on the ordinary police of the duty of maintaining order in the area from which the Pao An Tui had been withdrawn, was to restore the confidence both to the Chinese residents and to the Japanese military and civil authorities. The above Consular representatives now suggest that this end might be attained by the reorganization of the existing Chinese police forces in the area to the South of the Chin Kang Bridge and the Nan-Yun Ho by a neutral board of foreigners.

Before details of any such proposal can be worked out, it is necessary to know first whether the scheme meets with the approval in principle of the Governor of Hopei and the Mayor of Tientsin. Should this be the case, it is requested that the scheme should be submitted to the National Government for their approval.

So as to avoid future misunderstanding, the above Consular representatives ask that they may be sent a written reply.

Meanwhile it is suggested that this proposal should be treated as confidential.

(Signed) LANDELLOT GILES
H.M. Consul General.

1 December, 1931.

Enclosure No. 3.

Translation

Tientsin, December 5th
XXth Year of the Republic.

Monsieur le Consul-General,

We beg to acknowledge the receipt of your Memorandum of December 1st with reference to the matter of erecting a temporary buffer-zone out of the area to the South of Chin Kang Bridge.

The undersigned were deeply moved in their appreciation by the sentiments contained in the said Memorandum to the effect that you and your Colleagues were animated by the friendliest feelings towards China and were anxious to assist the undersigned in bringing to an end the difficulties existing in Tientsin.

We had at once forwarded the contents of your said Memorandum to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang for transmission to the Central Government from whom a telegraphic reply has been received, stating as follows:-

"With reference to the Tientsin affair the Central Political Council have passed a resolution under even date; that is to say, 'If efficacious guarantee is devised by neutral countries, the area contiguous to the Japanese Concession may be created a temporary buffer-zone for the purpose of avoiding conflicts,' etc., etc. Your negotiations carrying on in Tientsin, being in accordance with the object of the said resolution, are hereby approved. Furthermore, a written declaration may also be made to the effect that the buffer-zone is created temporarily to cope with the emergency arising out of the serious situation existing in Tientsin. As soon as the general situation in the Port of Tientsin is so improved that there is no need any longer of the herein measure, it will then be agreeable for either party to propose for the cancellation of the same," etc. etc.

Accordingly, therefore, we have the honour to communicate the above to you in writing and to request that you will be so good as to cause the Consular Representatives of the United States of America, France and Italy resident in Tientsin to be informed of the same.

We avail, etc., etc.

(Sgd) Wang Shu-chang
Chairman of Hopei Province.
(Sgd) Chang Hsueh-ming
Mayor of Tientsin.

(Sealed) Hopei Provincial Government.

Lancelot Giles, C.M.G., Esq.,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul General,
T i e n t s i n.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

逕啟者關於暫將自金鋼橋以南之地作為緩衝區域一節接准

貴總領事十二月一日節畧知

貴領事等對於中國咸懷善意均願與 敝主席等襄助為理 敝主席等閱悉之餘級感至深當經電陳

張副司令轉請中央核辦茲奉覆電內開查中央政治會議關於津事本日決議稱天津與日租界毗連處如有中立國切實保證得劃臨時緩衝地帶以避衝突云云尊處商定辦法既屬與此相符自可照辦惟須書面聲明此係應付天津目前嚴重狀況之臨時緊急辦法一俟津埠局勢和緩無此必要時得由任何一方之提議取消此項辦法等因相應函達即希查照并煩轉知駐津美法義各領事為荷此致

大英國駐津總領事翟

河北省政府主席王樹常
 天津市政府市長張學銘

中華民國二十年十二月五日

Enclosure No. 4.

Aide-memoire handed to Dr. Hwang Tzon-fah

by H. B. M. Consul General on December, 1931.

The letter from Governor Wang and Mayor Chang has been considered by the American, French, Italian and British consular representatives.

As the local situation has markedly improved since the date of the earlier communication from Governor Wang, on the subject of devising some temporary scheme for the preservation of peace and order in certain sections of the City of Tientsin, it would seem unnecessary at the moment to pursue the proposal made by the four consuls on 1 December.

To prevent any future misunderstanding, however, the consuls concerned wish to make it clear that their proposal differed fundamentally from that which has been approved by the Central Political Council.

Firstly, what was proposed was that the existing Chinese police forces in the area from which the Pao An Tui had been withdrawn should be reorganized by a neutral board of foreigners. There was never any idea that the area in question should be made into a buffer zone, a term which implies neutral control, but it was only intended that neutral foreigners should be engaged by the Tientsin Police Administration in the capacity of advisers, the Administration itself being entirely responsible for the adoption and execution of such advice as might be tendered.

Secondly, the suggestion that efficacious guarantees should be devised by neutral countries is one which is far beyond the scope of the consuls' proposals. It is not clear in any case what it is desired should be covered by the guarantees, but it must be emphasized that it is quite impossible for the consuls to give guarantees of any kind in regard to their scheme, as once it is accepted by the Chinese authorities and advisers engaged, the consuls, as consuls, will not be directly concerned with any steps which the Police Administration may then take.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5.

No. 65.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Tientsin, China, November 30, 1931.

Subject: Proposed Reorganization of the
Chinese Police Force in the Chinese
City at Tientsin.

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

- I have the honor to refer to my conversation of this morning with the Counselor of the Legation, Mr. Perkins, concerning a telegram addressed by the British Consul General at Tientsin to the British Minister at Nanking proposing a reorganization of the Chinese police force
- 1/ in the Chinese City at Tientsin, and to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram dated November 27, 1931, addressed to the British Consul General at Tientsin by the British Minister at Nanking directing that he consult with his American and French Colleagues and commandants and report whether there are any measures that can be suggested to alleviate the critical situation at Tientsin. There is
- 2/ also enclosed a copy of a telegram addressed to me, under date of November 28, by the American Minister at Nanking, on the same subject.
- 3/ There is also enclosed a copy of a telegram addressed to the British Minister at Nanking on November 29, 1931, by the British Consul General at Tientsin giving the

result

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of a meeting between the American, French and British Consuls General with the British and French commandants on the evening of November 29, at which time it was agreed to propose a reorganization of the Chinese police force under a neutral board consisting of French, Italian and British concession police representatives and an American civilian. The enclosed telegram explains itself. While it is realized that the plan proposed might fall far short of relieving the situation, even if it were acceptable to the Nanking Government and to others concerned, it, nevertheless, represents the only plan which those participating in the conference here felt might offer a possible solution of the local difficulty. There is reluctance on the part of foreign consular and military authorities to become involved in the controversy, and there is a distinct feeling that if any effort whatever is made towards composing the differences between the Chinese and Japanese, it must be done without the assistance of the American, French, British or Italian military forces.

Colonel Taylor, the commandant of the American troops at Tientsin, with whom I have consulted since the enclosed telegram from the British Consul General was drafted, was informed of the action taken and states that while he would interpose no objections to a neutral board such as is described so long as it consists only of civilians, under no circumstances would he be willing to have a military officer appointed to the board, nor would he be

disposed

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

disposed to invoke any military force in strengthening the hand of the neutral board. It was made clear to Colonel Taylor that only civilian members would be considered eligible to take on the reorganization work, and that it was not anticipated that the military would be called upon at any time to assist in any way with the project either in its formative stage or later.

Colonel Taylor was not present at the meeting inasmuch as he was just arriving from Peiping when the meeting was called. For that reason Colonel Drysdale attended the meeting but was careful not to commit the American commandant to any support or disapproval of the plan.

I wish to make it clear that the proposal is offered simply as a possible basis for an amicable adjustment of the Sino-Japanese difficulties. The relations between the Chinese and Japanese growing out of the local disturbances, however, are so strained that little hope can be held out that any foreign intervention, however well intended or slight it may be, will prove acceptable or effective.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800

FPL/DA

Enclosures:

- 1/ Copy of telegram to British Consul General at Tientsin.
- 2/ Copy of telegram to American Consul General at Tientsin.
- 3/ Copy of telegram to British Minister at Nanking.

Original and 1 copy to Legation.

1639
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy telegram from H. M. Minister
No. 19.

Dated 27th November, 1931.

Sent 0150 28 November, 1931.

Received 0900 28 November, 1931.

Addressed to Tientsin telegram No. 19
repeated to Paris for Foreign Office Tokyo G.O.C. Hongkong
Commander-in-Chief.

Please consult at once with your American
and French Colleagues and Commandants and report please
urgently whether there are any measures we can reasonably
take to alleviate this critical situation.

2. U. S. Minister asks that you will communicate
copy of this telegram to U. S. Consul General and say that
he will confirm it on November 28th.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dunigan NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
TIENTSIN - CHINA

TRUE READING
OF
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Received via U.S. Army Radio

Dated at: Nanking

Date: November 28, 1931

Hour of Despatch:

Date of Receipt: Nov. 28

Hour of Receipt:

November 28 - I asked my British Colleague
to ask British Consul General at Tientsin to furnish
you copy of his telegram of last night. Please report
whether it is possible for anything to be done at this
moment. Sending copy to Washington.

JOHNSON

800

Decoded by FPL.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy telegram to H. M. Minister, Nanking

No. 25 of the 29th November, 1931.

Repeated to Peking No. 78.

Sent 12 midnight.

American, French, Italian Consuls and I have received a letter from the governor stating that as a serious situation will arise after the withdrawal of armed special police from area adjacent to the Japanese Concession which he fears the ordinary city police will be inadequate to control he asks us to transmit a request to our ministers to devise some means of preserving peace in that area temporarily.

My American and French colleagues and I after discussion with the British and French Commandants, the American Commandant being absent, and with the agreement of those present submit the following proposal which appears to us to be the only plan offering a possible solution of the difficulty.

1. Chinese city police force to be reorganized under a neutral board consisting of French, Italian and British concession police representatives and an American civilian.

2. The Nanking Government must give its consent to this proposal.

3. We consider that the consent of the Japanese authorities to be essential but their participation in the board undesirable.

4. The above arrangement to be merely a temporary measure to tide over the present crisis.

It is the unanimous opinion of us all that no proposal to patrol the area concerned with an international military force is feasible.


American and French Consuls ask you to be good enough to communicate the above message to their Ministers.

Consul General.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, December 22, 1931.

No. 1337

JAN 18 32

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/DEW

793.94

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

[Handwritten signature]
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 19 1932
 Department of State

Sir:

1-5/

In continuation of the Legation's despatch
 No. 1317 of December 11, 1931, I have the honor
 to transmit herewith five additional editorials
 bearing upon the Manchurian situation, which
 appeared in THE LEADER of Peiping during the past
 two weeks.

Further editorials and news items on the
 events in Manchuria will be found in the press
 clippings being sent to the Department by the
 same pouch.

FILED

JAN 25 1932

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

[Handwritten signature of Mahlon F. Perkins]

Mahlon F. Perkins,
 Counselor of Legation.

Enclosures:
 1-5/ As noted
 800.
 RLB:MM

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1337
 Discreetly No. 1337

THE LEADER, Thursday, December 10, 1931.

DR. SZE AND THE LEAGUE

The action of a group of overseas Chinese in Paris, in demanding that China's delegate to the League of Nations should act in accordance with their program, was a most unfortunate thing, and unquestionably much hurt the cause of China. There was probably nothing that the Japanese enjoyed more, throughout the whole period of League meetings, than a demonstration of this kind, bearing out the Japanese contention that China is not an organized state as are other states. Certainly it is almost inconceivable that loyal citizens of any other state, resident in a foreign country, should call upon their diplomatic representative and demand that he act in a certain way, utterly regardless of any instructions he may have received from his home government. If the Chinese in Paris think that things were not being handled properly it was their duty to take up the matter energetically with the Chinese Government, but not to make demands upon a diplomatic representative who was carrying out his duties, under most difficult circumstances, in accordance with instructions from Nanking. There are reports that Dr. Sze was actually struck by these patriots. If so, it is simply disgraceful—to them. Things like this under present circumstances, in no way raise China's position in the eyes of the world, but tends to produce a reverse effect.

But while we cannot too severely condemn the action of this group of men, the Chinese Government should recognize that the continued supine policy of the Government has brought out some very unfavorable reactions everywhere in the country. The original policy of non-resistance to the Japanese invasion in Manchuria, depending upon the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact, was understandable, and was not in itself to be condemned. But China, loyally adhering to the Covenant of the League, had a right to demand that the League should back her up with something else than pious resolutions, had a right to demand that the other nations of the League should support their own Covenant with all the powers in their hands. And the Covenant of the League gives adequate punitive powers, which do not require the consent of the party breaking the peace, but only agreement among the non-disputants.

It is now nearly three months since the occupation began. In this time the Japanese have been steadily expanding their power and consolidating their administrations in Manchuria. At first they carried on military actions only while the League was adjourned. But more recently they have utterly ignored the League Council, starting their drive on Chinchow while the Council was in session and flatly refusing the League proposal of a "neutral zone."

China, again, was perhaps not unjustified in accepting the first Japanese pledge of withdrawal, at the end of September, and waiting to see what would come of it. But when, on the adjournment of the League at the beginning of October, the Japanese at once continued their aggression, it was up to China to demand drastic action. This was no time for a

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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cringing reluctance to annoy the League officials by such demands. This was a time to call for action in support of a loyal member against an invader. Such action was urgently needed. The great territory of Manchuria was being occupied bit by bit. And still Dr. Sze kept submitting reports to the League day by day, but never demanding what he had a perfect right and an absolute duty to demand—that the League taken action against Japan. Other League members were expecting it, journalists and observers the world over were expecting it, but the Chinese delegate continued to play the part of a mere information bureau on Chinese affairs.

The League might have refused to act. But it was necessary to find out. China had to know whether the League would act or not. If it would not act in behalf of a loyal member against a treacherous one, then China must recognize that her previous policy was wrong, and she must either fight, or submit, or reach an agreement with states or international organizations outside the League, which would not betray her and hand her over bound hand and foot to the enemy.

Now, at long last, it seems that China is taking the action she should have taken two months ago. She is demanding the evacuation of Japanese troops from Manchuria altogether, even from the railway zone. She has demanded the application of Article XVI against Japan. It is to be hoped that this will be followed by the demand that not only the South Manchuria Railway zone but all other Japanese Concessions in China be retroceded to China at once, and extraterritoriality as well as all these things are merely stepping-stones to armed conquest. Judging from reports reaching us yesterday from Paris, the League intends to adjourn without fixing a definite date for the complete evacuation of Japanese troops, although asking them to do so "at an early date", according to the *United Press*, while *Reuter* says that "the Council has provisionally washed its hands of the neutral zone question and is prepared to separate without reaching an official agreement regarding the Chinchow front." The question is now squarely up to the League—will they act against Japanese aggression or not? The question must be kept insistently before them, and they must definitely answer yes or no. The negative answer means that the League has betrayed China, and that China must look elsewhere for help.

It is this feeling of betrayal, this feeling that enemy forces have been permitted to occupy great areas of Chinese territory without any real opposition from the Chinese Government, that has inspired these attacks upon Government officials such as Dr. Sze. This must be remembered by the Chinese Government. But it must be remembered by the people that these officials are only doing their duty, and that it is cowardly and shameful, and lowers China in the eyes of the world, to attack them personally for loyally carrying out the work entrusted to them by their Government.

P. C. T.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE LEADER, Saturday, December 12, 1931.

STUDENTS AND THE CRISIS

On the same day that we learn from Paris that Japan has submitted a demand to the League of Nations that China withdraw her troops from such territory as remains under Chinese control in the Three Eastern Provinces, we receive advices from Shanghai that students there have wrecked the local headquarters of the Kuomintang, have wrecked a railway station close to the city and cut telephone and telegraph wires, and have attacked the Shanghai municipal building and virtually made a prisoner of the mayor of the city. What can be said of these things?

Most of these students, indeed, are inflamed with a hot loyalty to China, a detestation of Japanese invasion and of compromise with the invaders, which must be considered at all times. But worthy motives are not sufficient. It is an old truism that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The thing to be considered is the effects of the actions that are taken. Whatever the ultimate aim, there may be methods at times which defeat the aim itself.

It is a most serious matter for China that these troubled months, with an enemy invading, occupying, and consolidating herself in one of the richest areas of the country, there has been no Minister of Foreign Affairs at Nanking. Week after week, month after month, China has been carrying on with only an Acting Foreign Minister, at a time of as urgent need as ever faced a nation. Many opportunities have been lost, many chances missed. And who was responsible, at bottom?

The cowardly and disgraceful assault on Minister C.T. Wang was one of the most serious things that has happened. It deprived China of a Foreign Minister at a most critical period. The Japanese militarists undoubtedly rubbed their hands with glee at the news that China, at this period, was left without a fully empowered representative. We cannot say that a Japanese intrigue was responsible for the attack on Dr. Wang. We do not know. But there is no doubt that the assault played absolutely into Japanese hands, and that it could not have been done better had Tokyo actually organized the business.

There was no wrong in submitting the Japanese invasion to the League of Nations as China did. We have never been over-trustful of the League and its work, but still it must be given a chance. If there are covenants and treaties, if China is a member of an organization which forbids war among its members and provides for other methods of settlement, it is up to China to loyally observe her pledges, especially when the breaker of the peace is a fellow-member of the League. China did observe her pledges, did refrain from armed resistance, for week after week, waiting for the League to act in defence of a loyal member and in support of its own Covenant, waiting for America to say something in support of the Anti-War Pact of which the United States was the prime mover. China gave one of the most remarkable instances in the world of non-resistance, and by so doing undoubtedly saved much suffering. But the presentation of affairs to the League was not carried on properly, and for two months China never put the blunt question to the Council,—“Will you take punitive measures against outlaw Japan or not?”

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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This was the question which should have been put by the middle of October at latest. Dr. Sze, continually supplying the League with fresh news of invasions and intrigues and depredations by the Japanese, for many weeks never presented the question flatly: "We are loyal to the League and its Covenant. We are endeavoring to fight this invasion with an economic boycott. Will you join us in this, and if this is not adequate support us in more drastic measures?" There was no fully empowered minister in Nanking, and Dr. Sze had no instructions for drastic demands. Finally, a few weeks ago, he got instructions, and made demands. But in the meantime the Japanese occupation had assumed the nature of an established thing. The Japanese are already able to speak about government under their control as constituting the *status quo*. Their indefatigable propaganda campaign all over the world has had results, and now they are actually demanding that the League call on China to remove Chinese troops from Chinese territory to let Japan take over control.

The League, of course, will refuse. But China is at last on the defensive even at the League. Faced with a ruthless invasion by an unscrupulous enemy, she finds that the League to which she was so loyal has no stomach for a real conflict with Japan. The time when everyone was on China's side, the time of continued Japanese invasions and atrocities and depredations of all kinds, was lost. And now, perhaps, Manchuria is lost.

What are the students doing now? Do they feel the enormity of the crime which the Shanghai group committed against their country who they attempted to murder Dr. Wang, and deprived China of a Foreign Minister with authority for so many terrible weeks? Do they understand how necessary it is to think out a rational and intelligent course of action against aggression, and not be forced into a suicidal policy which may result in the complete subjection of China?

F. G.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE LEADER, Sunday, December 13, 1937. 5

PREPARING FOR ANOTHER DRIVE

The session of the League Council adjourned, with a pious resolution dutifully passed, Japanese troop movements along the Peiping-Mukden Railway are starting once more. The first drive was checked, two weeks ago, by a statement by Col. Stimson, but the colonel has since explained that he meant to say just what he did say, and nothing more. He merely intended to say that in view of Japan's assurances that Chinchow would not be attacked, he was at a loss to understand (or to "credit") the reports of the Japanese drive on the city. Mr. Stimson was simply more frank than diplomatic, as when the head of the foreign affairs of a Great Power is as candid as this it means, as Maurice Chevalier would say, that he wants to do something about it.

There can be no doubt, now, that Japan is apprehensive only of America, and utterly despises the League and its activities. The only question is just how seriously the Japanese Government will take Colonel Stimson's statement of December 10, which appears in another column today. This statement, while fully endorsing the Resolution of the League calling for cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of Japanese troops into the railway zone, and the appointment of a commission of inquiry, adds that "the adoption of these resolutions in no way constitutes an endorsement of any action hitherto taken in Manchuria. This Government as one of the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine Power Treaty cannot disguise its concern over the events which have there transpired. The future efficiency of the Resolution depends upon the good faith with which the pledge against renewed hostilities is carried out The American Government will continue to follow with solicitous interest all developments in this situation in the light of the obligations involved in the treaties to which this country is a party."

This is clearly a warning to Japan, though couched in the most diplomatic of language. How seriously it will be taken by the Japanese depends on many things which we here are not in a position to judge. America's utter unwillingness, at the beginning, to show any active interest in what was taking place in Manchuria, and Washington's extraordinary statement at that time that they did not see that the Kellogg Pact had been violated by the Japanese military offensive, gave rise to some very unpleasant suspicions. The United States was apparently indifferent until the League had long been working on the matter, and it was freely rumored that there was a secret agreement between the Japanese and American Governments. That there have, indeed, been secret negotiations, was made clear by the Stimson statement about the Japan-

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ese pledge concerning Chinchow, the Japanese authorities being furious at what they called his breach of faith in making public this pledge.

What the position of these secret negotiations is at present we have no idea, but we shall find out soon. If the Japanese start a second drive, it may be interpreted as meaning that an agreement has been reached with the United States, Washington promising not to interfere so long as American interests are not immediately affected.

With the ominous preparations in evidence along the Peiping-Mukden line, it would appear that the new drive is commencing. Let us make no mistake about the objective now. Japan has stated officially that Chinchow is only a way station, and that the aim is Tientsin. And Tientsin is the key to North China.

F. G.

THE LEADER. Friday, December 18, 1936.

TAKE BACK MANCHURIA!

Japan has now occupied most of Manchuria, China lacks the military strength to drive the invaders out by force, and no foreign state will intervene it appears. Manchuria is being ruled by a combination of Japanese and Chinese military and civil officials, fundamental control lying in the hands of the Japanese, who are assisted by Chinese. But does this mean the struggle is hopeless?

Twenty-two years ago all China was being ruled by a similar combination of foreigners and Chinese, the foreigners in that case being Manchus. But that regime was overthrown, and the revolution gradually fought its way up from the South. There was no military movement from outside to help the revolutionists. They depended upon their own strength, and they won. The task is not yet completed. Its magnitude is too great to be completed quickly. But it is going ahead. And in Manchuria now it must start right from the beginning.

The Chinese people of Manchuria can overthrow Japanese rule from within. In a military sense China lacks the strength of Japan. China must be sane enough—the Government has been sane enough—not to use the weapons selected by the enemy. There is nothing which would more delight Japan than a declaration of war by China. They have for months been trying to provoke this. But they have failed.

Does this mean that Chinese must not resist the invaders? No, it means that other weapons must be chosen. The people of Manchuria, with the sympathy and support of their fellows of the rest of China, must resist the invaders,—resist with boycott and strike, with non-cooperation and sabotage of every kind. Were the Chinese in Manchuria determined not to work with the enemy, not to support the enemy, not to have anything to do with the enemy or his works, it would be only a question of time till the Japanese would withdraw or be overthrown.

The Japanese are in Manchuria for what they can make out of the Chinese in the country. The Chinese are to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for their Japanese overlords. But suppose they refuse to hew wood and draw water? Military force, of course, can be applied. But how long would it be continued? Would Japan find it profitable to bring in 30,000,000 soldiers to watch the 30,000,000 Chinese in Manchuria? Force is a weapon which the revolutionary martyr can defy, but for the common people it may mean much. But even if the common people give in to force, suppose they quit again as soon as the force is removed? Would Japan find it worth while?

Let the people of Manchuria curtail bean production, coming down to their actual necessities, so that the S. M. R. will make not a cent of their previous profits. Let the Chinese workmen on the S. M. R. and on the lines which the Japanese have stolen show that they can work as badly as they have previously worked well. Let the railway servants show that unpleasant accidents can happen to Japanese officials and Chinese renegades when traveling. Let every servile Chinese taking military or government service under the Japanese understand that he may be signing his own death warrant, and that no quarter will be given to traitors. Let the bank employees in the Japanese banks show what extraordinary errors can occur. Let no Chinese buy a copper's worth of

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By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japanese goods of any kind. Let there be a campaign of non-cooperation, of sabotage, of bitter opposition which will make the Japanese despair of ever getting anything out of the country. And when they are compelled, in order to keep their position in Manchuria, to lay heavier and heavier taxes upon the Japanese people, to send more and more troops to Manchuria, they will find an opposition at home which will send them where Manchu garrisons of southern China went many years ago. They can be left to the Japanese revolutionists to attend to. The Japanese rebels have scores of their own to settle with these military butchers.

Remember what these brigands have done in Manchuria and elsewhere. Remember the plunder of Chinese houses, remember the seizure of Chinese railways and other property, remember the murder of non-resisting Chinese—workmen and peasants, police and soldiers—in Manchuria, remember the massacres in Korea and in Tokyo. Remember these things, and vow that they shall not go unpunished. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life. This must be the answer. But to achieve it, it is necessary to use the tools which China can handle. China must not fall into the enemy's trap and let him choose the weapons.

F. G.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE LEADER Tuesday, December 22, 1931.

CHINA MUST ARM!

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria has taught China a bitter lesson. China has placed complete faith and reliance upon the League of Nations, but now it is proved that that cumbersome talking club has given Manchuria over to Japan without raising a finger to reprimand the bully of the Far East.

Japan's forcible and illegal acquisition of the three provinces of Manchuria demonstrates the well-known axiom that God helps those who help themselves. The League could have immediately stopped rapacious Japan's military aggressions by the prompt application of Article XVI which would paralyze Japanese industry and commerce completely by a combined boycott of all the nations of the world who are members of the League, and would have brought such a reaction in Japan that the militarists may have been overthrown by this time. But events proved that the Powers are too selfish to resort to the boycott, thinking only of their own pockets and not of their high-sounding platitudes or the various pacts and agreements which were solemnly signed for the preservation of world peace. The League's reluctance to compel Japan to evacuate Manchuria shows that the imperialist Powers do not care which nation controls Manchuria, but throughout the sessions they merely looked upon the situation with "grave" concern when Japanese bombed Chinese cities and passenger trains and drove the Heilungkiang troops out of Tsitsihar. Only war between China and Japan on a large scale would have caused the League to take drastic action, but we are not sure that the Powers would not have accused China of violating the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact if this country had formally declared war against the aggressor.

Might still seems to be right in this troubled universe. And military and naval preparedness is the only means of commanding respect in this military-minded world. For centuries China had been unprepared and she had to pay for it dearly. During the last half century the Sleeping Giant was unable to withstand the series of territorial aggressions which were instrumental in bringing about the loss of certain sovereign rights as well as several dependencies and a number of strategic points and concessions. The Sino-Japanese War revealed the total unpreparedness of China in military equipment and naval strength. The Allied occupation of 1900 was a further demonstration that swords and spears and antiquated guns could not cope with modern weapons of warfare.

Today Chinese soldiers have become accustomed to the use of automatic rifles, machine-guns, trench mortars, tanks, hand grenades and bombing planes. But China still does not possess a sufficient quantity of these weapons of destruction. She has paid little heed to military preparedness, while her provocative neighbor has been preparing for years for the conquest of China by the feverish construction of warships and the building up of a strong compact military machine through the medium of conscription.

The leaders of the National Government knew the importance of conscription and of the necessity

of having educated soldiers when they passed the following resolution at the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924:

"The present system of recruiting for the army shall be changed into the system of conscription. At the same time attention must be directed to improving the economic conditions of the lower ranks of the officers and soldiers and to improving their legal positions. Agricultural and professional education shall be introduced into the army. The qualifications of the officers shall be strictly prescribed, and the methods of appointment and employment shall be removed."

It is absolutely necessary that the entire manhood of the country should be so familiar with military life as to enable rapid mobilization in case of war. It was for this reason that the Ministry of Education issued an order a few years ago for military training in all universities and colleges, but for some reason or another, the leading authorities of certain missionary colleges opposed this order on the ground that China should continue to maintain a philosophical disregard of force and that military training would be detrimental to this ancient civilization. The sudden and unannounced Japanese invasion of Manchuria has brought this question to the fore, and those who opposed military training were compelled willingly or unwillingly to give it hearty support to appease popular opinion.

The present invasion of a huge slice of territory equal in area to the whole of Europe demonstrates the value of military preparedness. If China had devoted herself years ago to strengthen her national defenses and applied the system of conscription so that at least one hundred million reserves would be prepared to fight for the preservation of the country from foreign aggression, we doubt whether Japan would have dared invade Manchuria.

E.B.-S.L.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 742

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

San José, Costa Rica

January 7, 1932

JAN 18 32

DIVISION OF
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 20 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 20 1932
Department of State

DISTRIBUTION - CHECK

To the File
In U. S.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington

Sir:-

793.94/2137

In despatch No. 631 of October 8, 1931, the Legation reported that the local Government disregarded the appeal of the Chinese Minister in Panama for the support of Costa Rica before the League of Nations in the matter of recent Japanese aggression, refusal being based on the fact that this Central American Republic is not associated with the Geneva Assembly. However, the reply to the Chinese Minister did not show the true attitude of Costa Rica in respect of the present Sino-Japanese conflict. The San José press, and individuals in conversation, devote much attention to the Far Eastern difficulty, and while they

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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have no opinion as to the rights and wrongs of the respective parties, they are all intensely interested in the affair.

I quote below a remark of don Tomás Soley Güell, former Minister of Finance and one of the leading economists of Costa Rica, which was made to me before three or four prominent personages (and concurred in by those present) when I was attempting to obtain an expression of opinion in Salvadorean matters:-

"Salvador and its recognition, as well as political events in the other Central American Republics, are of no interest to us. What really interests us and demands our attention is the Manchurian question. What is Washington going to do?"

The above statement is a clear example of the attention which people in San José and in the Provinces fix on Washington in such of its major international problems as are capable of committing it to some greater foreign policy or act. Don Tomás Soley Güell, in the above statement, gave the keynote of the positively incrementing local conviction that the American Government has shown a major interest in the Manchurian question, that it has involved itself to such an extent that positive physical steps will have to be taken, and that, therefore, Washington's ultimate action in the matter is one of importance second only to Costa Rica's internal political condition and its economic situation.

In line with the position in which Washington is now placed, especially since the reported attack upon

Consul

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Consul Chamberlain, LA TRIBUNA, San José daily, published an editorial in its daily column entitled "THE INTERNATIONAL MOMENT", which is keenly expressive of Costa Rica's interest. The clipping of this editorial and its translation are forwarded herewith.

Respectfully yours,

McKeney Werlich

McKeney Werlich
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

✓ Enclosures:-

1. Clipping from LA TRIBUNA of January 7, 1932;
2. Translation of enclosure No.1.

800 China-Japan

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1, despatch No.742, January 7, 1932

LA TRIBUNA
San José, Costa Rica
January 5, 1932

El momento internacional

LAS explicaciones que el gobierno japonés acaba de dar al de los Estados Unidos por el incidente ocurrido al cónsul de esta última nación, Cullver Chamberlain con soldados nipones en Manchuria, suceso que los cablegramas de esta misma edición explican a los lectores, han sido juzgadas insuficientes, según otro despacho, por los Estados Unidos. En cuanto pasó el incidente, hecha la representación del caso por los agentes de los Estados Unidos, las autoridades militares japonesas de Mukden dieron explicaciones por lo ocurrido y aplicaron un castigo a los dos soldados que ultrajaron al cónsul Chamberlain. Pero ni las explicaciones han satisfecho al departamento de estado, ni el castigo ha parecido lo suficientemente justo al mismo departamento y así lo expresa una nota de formal protesta que Stimson ha puesto en manos del embajador japonés en Washington. Tiene el Japón planteado un nuevo incidente internacional. Desde hace dos meses ha tenido fricciones con Rusia, con Inglaterra, con la Liga de Naciones y ahora con los Estados Unidos; mientras sus diplomáticos arguyen, explican, hacen un tejido de palabras para que las cancillerías de las naciones interesadas se entretengan, sus soldados prosiguen el avance sobre China; al norte llegaron hasta el río Nonni; ahora han tomado otro rumbo, hacia el corazón mismo de la grande y desordenada república, aprovechando la ocasión de su desbarajuste y la de que las grandes potencias mucho tienen que mirar dentro de la propia casa para ocuparse de lo que pasa fuera; ya ocuparon Chinchow y se teme - dice un despacho - que prosigan hacia Tien Tsin. ¿Hacia dónde va este avance y cuál será su fin?

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.2, despatch No.742, January 7, 1932

LA TRIBUNA
San José, Costa Rica
January 7, 1932

THE INTERNATIONAL MOMENT

The problem of the Far East continues to be the world's absorbing topic of the day; Stimson states that the declarations made to the Department of State by Japanese Ambassador Debuchi regarding the incident which occurred between North American Consul, Chamberlain, and Japanese soldiers in Manchuria, have been considered as explanations by the United States, but even after that, Washington considers that the matter has not ended; so that the controversy has not terminated in spite of Debuchi's explanations which were accepted by the United States.- In 1914, in the name of Austria, Berchtold declared that Serbia's explanations for the tragic occurrence of Serajevo were insufficient and that Austria did not consider the matter closed.- Twenty days later, war was imminent in Europe. The present incident is not quite as grave. But circumstances like a beginning and to Stimson's declarations must be added the following additional news which now has particular importance: the Japanese military element has manifested its lack of agreement with any attempt to inflict heavier punishment on the soldiers connected with the Chamberlain incident; Stimson has begun a maneuver - invoking the international treaties which guarantee the integrity of China, in order that France, England and the United States may carry out a joint action in the face of the Japanese advances into Manchuria and the threat to China properly speaking. There is also talk of a démarche which has been entrusted by the French Government to its Ambassador in Tokio in order that within the perfect friendship binding Japan and France the former may be made to see by the latter that Japanese activities are clashing with certain clauses of the 1907 Franco-Japanese Treaty concerning the integrity of China. - And, moreover Moscow; we must not forget that the Russians have large interests in Manchuria and that strong Japanese military reserves have been established in their own zone of influence after the victories on the Nonni river. The last word has not yet been said in the Far Eastern problem, which continues to perturb the present moment.

Translated by E.G.T.
Copied by B.Z.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 431.

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


EMBASSY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, December 29, 1931.

JAN 18 32



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793.94/3559

JAN 22 1932

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram
793.94/2941 CF
No. 239, November 28th, 3 P.M. in regard to the garbled
interview with the Secretary of State and to enclose a copy
1/. of a memorandum which I have received from the Military Attaché.

Respectfully yours,


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Enclosure: Copy of
memorandum.

Embassy's File No. 800-Manchuria. Cameron Forbes.
ELN/SR.

Cameron Forbes

1659

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



M E M O R A N D U M .

December 23, 1931.

Reference to our recent conversation, I wish to state that when in Harbin on December 1st, Mr. Hansen showed me a copy of a newspaper in the Russian language which had apparently devoted its entire front page to the discussion of Mr. Stimson's alleged statement to the press on November 27th.

Mr. Hansen stated that the Russian papers quoted Mr. Stimson as saying: that the Japanese Government had twice assured him that certain objectionable action would not be done and yet it was done, and now in spite of the fact that the Japanese Government had said that they would not move on Chinchow it appeared from all reports that this was about to be done; that under the circumstances it appeared that it was useless to try to deal with such a Government.

Mr. Hansen in talking with me about the above said that the articles in the Russian papers used strong language, bringing out the idea that Mr. Stimson had said words to this effect: "I have been lied to twice and apparently this is another, so how are we to deal with such a Government."

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, Japan, December 31, 1931.

No. 442

JAN 18 32

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793.94/3560



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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Supplementing my telegram No. 281 of December 27, 1931, reporting that the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs had delivered to me a statement and a memorandum relating to Japanese intention with respect to Chinchow, I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of these two documents. There are also enclosed, as of possible interest, copies in translation of editorials which appeared in the vernacular press

JAN 27 1932

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
- 2 -

press following my delivery of the Secretary's statement on this subject.

It will be noted that these editorials are surprisingly free from bitterness. The strongest term employed by the Osaka ASAHI regarding the statements of the United States, Great Britain, and France is "unwarranted"; by the Tokyo NICHU NICHU, "inconsistent" and "goes too far"; by the Tokyo JIJI, "premature"; and by the Tokyo ASAHI, "wish the three Powers to drop the scales from their eyes". The editorial of the Tokyo ASAHI is the only one that imputes selfish motives to the three countries. The JIJI fears it will encourage the Chinese in recalcitrance. This paper also recalls the three-power interference that followed the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, as something "still fresh in the mind of every Japanese". Not unnaturally, all the newspapers uphold the Japanese military from every point of view and place all blame on the Chinese.

793.71/3560

Respectfully yours,



W. Cameron Forbes

Enclosures:

- 1 - Statement by the Japanese Government, dated December 27, 1931.
- 2 - Translation of Memorandum from the Foreign Office, dated December 27, 1931.
- 3 - Translation of the Osaka ASAHI's editorial of December 26, 1931.
- 4 - Translation of the Tokyo NICHU NICHU's Editorial of December 25, 1931.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

- 5 - Translation of the Tokyo JIJI's
editorial of December 26, 1931.
- 6 - Translation of the Tokyo ASAHI's
editorial of December 29, 1931.

Embassy's File No. 800.-Manchuria

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Copy to Peking

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 442
From American Embassy
Tokyo.

STATEMENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

(December 27, 1931.)

1. The maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria is a matter to which the Government of Japan have always attached the utmost importance. They have on various occasions taken every lawful step in order to secure it, and to prevent Manchuria from becoming the battleground of militarist factions. Only if peace and order prevail, can the country be safe either for the Chinese or for the foreigner: in the absence of peace and order it is futile to speak of the Open Door or of equal opportunity for the economic activities of all nations. But the events of September last have, in spite of her wishes, created a new responsibility and a wider sphere of action for Japan. Attacked by Chinese violence, her acts of necessary self-protection resulted to her considerable embarrassment in her having to assume the duty of maintaining public order and private rights throughout a wide area. The local authorities might have been expected to co-operate in upholding law and order. But, in fact, they almost unanimously fled or resigned. It was Japan's clear duty to render her steps of self-defence as little disturbing as possible to the peaceable inhabitants of the region. It would have been a breach of that duty to have left the population a prey to anarchy- deprived of all the apparatus

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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apparatus of civilized life. Therefore, the Japanese military have, at considerable sacrifice, expended much time and energy in securing the safety of persons and property in the districts where the native authorities had become ineffective. This is a responsibility which was thrust upon them by events, and one which they had as little desire to assume as to evade.

2. But further than that, not only did the existing machinery of justice and civilized existence break down, but the criminal activities of the bandits who infest the country were naturally stimulated. The prestige and efficiency of the Japanese troops were for some time sufficient to keep them in check, and to maintain order wherever they were stationed. Since the beginning of November, however, a sudden increase in the activities of the bandits has been noted in the vicinity of the South Manchuria Railway Zone, and especially to the west of the Main Line, - and it has been established [to demonstration] by the examination of arrested individuals, by documents which have been seized, and from other sources of information, that their depredations are being carried on through the systematic intrigues of the Chinchow military authorities.

Reports have, indeed, been made by certain of the foreign military observers suggesting that they found no evidences of any preparations being made by the Chinese for an attack. But as a matter of fact the military authorities at Chinchow are maintaining large forces at various points, west of Takushan, on the Peiping-Mukden Railway and in the adjacent territory. Reconnaissances conducted by the Japanese Army have not only definitely confirmed the assurance that these forces

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 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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forces are engaged in making preparations for war, but have also revealed the fact that their outposts are stationed along a line connecting Tienchuantai, Tai-an, Peichipao, and other points on the right bank of the River Liao, well advanced from Chinchow. It will readily be admitted that such a situation in itself constitutes a constant menace to the Japanese contingents dispersed along the South Manchuria Railway and elsewhere, but the danger is even greater than it seems at first sight, if the further fact is taken into consideration that the Peiping-Mukden Railway places the cities of Mukden, Yinkao and Hopei within a short journey of three or four hours from Takushan and Kuopantsu (which are bases of the Chinese forces).

The bandit forces, (which include a large number of officers and men discharged from the Chinese army), are daily gaining strength. For instance, the number of bandits on the western flank of the main line of the South Manchuria Railway was estimated early in November at 1,300, whereas investigations conducted in early December revealed the fact that they then numbered over 30,000. Moreover, they are banded together in large groups comprising several hundreds, or even thousands, each equipped with machine guns and trench mortars; so that they can no longer be distinguished from regular troops. This points unmistakably to the existence of a state of things in which the so-called bandits are directed and provided with arms by the Chinchow military authorities. According to the statistics compiled in the Japanese Consulate-General at Mukden, the cases of bandit-raid in the vicinity

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vicinity of the Railway Zone numbered 278 during the first ten days of November, 341 during the second ten days, ²⁵⁸458 during the final ten days of the month, and 472 during the first ten days of December, thus reaching the astounding total of 1,529 in forty days. It is the usual strategy of these bandit-troops, when attacked by our men, to fly westward, or to take refuge on the right bank of the River Liao; where our army, anxious to avoid any collision with the Chinese Regulars, has made it a point to refrain from further pursuit.

3. On the 24th November, the Foreign Minister of China made an intimation to the Ministers at Peking of the principal Powers to the effect that the Chinese Government, in order to avoid any collision between Chinese and Japanese forces, were prepared to withdraw their troops to points within the Great Wall. Upon a proposal to that effect being officiallt made on the 26th, this Government signified their readiness to accept it in principle- at the same time instructing the Japanese Minister at Shanghai, and the Legation at Peiping, to open conversations on the matter with the Chinese Foreign Minister and with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, respectively.

The Japanese Minister in China had several conferences accordingly with the Chinese Foreign Minister between 30th November and 3rd December . In the midst of these conversations, the latter withdrew the overture, and declined further negotiation. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, with whom our representative at Peiping carried on negotiations from the 4th December onwards, either directly or through the Marshal's subordinates, expressed [on the 7th] his willingness to call in his Chinchow forces as a spontaneous move of withdrawal; and he has since given repeated assurances as to the speedy execution

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execution of his promise. In point of fact, however, there is no sign of any such withdrawal. On the contrary, the defences of Chinchow have since been strengthened.

4. Accordingly, at the present moment, now almost a month subsequent to the initiation of these negotiations for the withdrawal of the Chinchow troops, there appears no prospect of obtaining any tangible result, owing entirely to the want of good faith on the Chinese side. At the same time, the increased activity, above described, on the part of marauding bands, threatens to bring about a complete destruction of all peace and security throughout the whole extent of South Manchuria. In these circumstances, the Japanese forces have now begun a general movement with a view to a campaign against the bandits on a more extensive scale than hitherto. It is obvious, from what has been said above, that the Japanese army, if it is to achieve anything like adequate success, will have to advance to the points west of the River Liao where the bandits have their base. Certainly, the Japanese forces, in deference to the Resolutions of the League Council adopted on 20th September and 10th December, are not in the field against the Regular Chinese forces; but in the present abnormal conditions prevailing in Manchuria, the necessities of the case compel them to continue their operations against lawless elements. This is a point on which the Representatives of Japan at the recent session of the Council of the League held on the 10th December made a definite declaration. So long as the Chinchow military authorities, while simulating an unaggressive attitude, continue to instigate and manipulate the

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the movements of bandit organizations against the Japanese army as well as Japanese and other peaceable inhabitants, and so long as the officers and men of the Chinchow army mingle in large numbers with these bandits groups and so render it impossible to distinguish the latter from Regular troops, so long must the responsibility for the consequences of any action which may be entailed upon the Japanese Army in self-defence rest entirely with the Chinese.

5. During the course of the past month, in spite of the indignation aroused throughout the country by the behaviours of the Chinchow military authorities, and in accordance with the constant desire of the Japanese Government to abide scrupulously by the resolutions of the League Council, the operations of the Army against the bandits have been restrained within comparatively narrow limits, and the Government have done everything in their power to devise means for forestalling a collision between the forces of the two countries in the course of an eventual anti-bandit campaign. The Japanese Government are confident that their prolonged forbearance and their desire strictly to adhere to the stipulations of international engagements will not fail to command recognition by the public opinion of the world.

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Enclosure No. 2
Despatch No. 442
From American Embassy
Tokyo.

MEMORANDUM FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Translation.

(A/1 Ordinary No. 157)

December 27, 1931.

The Foreign Minister of the Imperial Government has carefully read the memorandum from the Secretary of State of America which was transmitted by the American Ambassador in Japan under date of December 24, 1931.

The Imperial Government deeply appreciates the friendly concern which the American Government has always had with regard to the present incident and at the same time has paid careful attention to the argument expressed in the statement of the Secretary of State on December 10th.

According to the memorandum of the Secretary of State, there is, judging from reports made by military officers in Manchuria of America and three other countries, no evidence of any preparations on the part of the Chinese for attack. The Chinchow military authorities are keeping great military forces in general at Tahushan, west of the Peiping-Mukden line, and in that vicinity, and they are not only steadily making military preparations by despatching advance forces to various places along the right bank of the Liao River, but are employing mounted bandits and other insubordinate elements and are systematically disturbing peace, as is clearly

shown

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shown in the attached statement of the Imperial Government of December 27th.

On December 10th, when the Council adopted a resolution, the Japanese delegate made a definite reservation that the Imperial Army will be obliged to start military operations against bandits and other insubordinate elements for the purpose of restoring peace and order. In the fear that in starting the above military operations on a large scale a collision will occur with the above-mentioned Chinese army, complete subjugation has been refrained from for a time. Toward the close of November, a proposal regarding the question of withdrawal from the vicinity of Chinchow was advanced by the Chinese side, conversations between Japan and China were conducted for about one month, but on account of insincerity on China's part the above-mentioned withdrawal has not been realized up to the present. Meanwhile, the activities of groups of bandits, instigated and employed by the Chinchow military authorities, became so serious that there was finally created a situation that is feared might bring about a fundamental bankruptcy of general peace and order in South Manchuria. Thereupon, the Imperial Army was recently obliged to move out simultaneously and begin the subjugation of bandit bands on a comparatively large scale. The fact that the Imperial Army did not take initiatory measures, such as attack on the Chinese army, willingly in defiance of the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and December 10th is explained in detail in the statement of the Imperial

Government

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Government above referred to.

The Imperial Government is determined to remain loyal to the League of Nations Covenant, the No-War Treaty, other various treaties, and the two resolutions adopted by the Council regarding the present incident. In spite of the fact that the Japanese people are greatly irritated over the systematic disturbance of peace by the Chinchow military authorities, the Japanese Army restricted the freedom of subjugation of bandits for a period of one month. In the meanwhile, the Government has endeavored, by resorting to all possible diplomatic measures, to prevent beforehand a collision between the Japanese and Chinese armies that is likely to occur when subjugation is carried out. The Imperial Government trusts that the American Government will surely understand that this sincerity and forbearance are in accord with the spirit of faithfulness to obligations based on the above-mentioned treaties and the resolutions adopted by the Council.

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Enclosure No. 3
 Despatch No. 442
 From American Embassy
 Tokyo.

Translation.

ANOTHER WARNING REGARDING THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT

(The Osaka ASAHI, December 26, 1931.)

The only way to prevent the Japanese army in Manchuria from attacking Chinchow at the present moment will be to cause China to withdraw her troops in Chinchow and its neighborhood without delay. The Chinese troops at Chinchow are not the objective of the Japanese army which is now engaged in the sweeping operations against bandits and other insubordinate elements in Manchuria. There is no doubt that the activities of bandits at this moment are due to instigations by the Chinese authorities at Chinchow. It is unavoidable that in the sweeping operations the Japanese army will ultimately come into collision with the Chinese troops at Chinchow. Japan has therefore warned China more than once to withdraw her troops at Chinchow to districts inside the Great Wall, contending that if China should resort to a policy of procrastination she alone would be held responsible for the occurrence of any unfortunate incident. If the various Powers are fully convinced of the actual conditions in Manchuria, they should give China warning to withdraw her troops from Chinchow in order to avoid a collision with the Japanese army.

The Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France are, however, assuming an attitude to cause Japan only to take measures for the prevention of a collision

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collision between the Japanese army and the Chinese troops in the direction of Chinchow. Such an attitude is really unwarranted. The operations of the Japanese army in Manchuria are in no way aimed at territorial aggrandisement. Under the treaties, Japan has stationed and is still stationing her troops in Manchuria and safeguarded the peace and order there with responsibility. It is, therefore, totally mistaken if any Power regards Japan as an aggressive country. If the three Powers of Great Britain, France and the United States are really concerned for the restoration of peace in Manchuria, they should place full confidence in the Japanese army which is now engaged in the sweeping operations with a view to establishing permanent peace in the Four Eastern Provinces for the future.

Japan's slogan to-day is "the various Powers should refrain from making any proposition regarding the Manchurian incident and place full confidence in Japan and her actions for a while". The military operations of Japan in Manchuria have a double purpose: One is the creation of a peaceful new region, and the other is the establishment of a paradise for the Japanese and other nationals for permanent living. In this connection, we call attention of the Powers to the fact that a diplomatic representative of a certain Power in China is busy protecting Chang Hsueh-liang. Even if the Chinese troops at Chinchow should withdraw automatically, the chaotic conditions in Manchuria will in no way be restored to normal so long as the diplomatic representative in question continue helping Chang Hsueh-liang. This is nothing but interference in China's internal affairs. We hope that the Japanese Government will draw the attention of the three Powers to the above interference and clearly explain the existing

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existing situation in Manchuria in response to the three
Powers' recent warnings.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Translation.

Enclosure No. 4
Despatch No. 442
From American Embassy
Tokyo.

THE TRIPLE INTERFERENCE .

Be Fair and Upright

Tokyo NICHU-NICHU Editorial,
December 25, 1931.

The Ambassadors of three Powers, Britain, the United States, and France, have approached the Japanese Foreign Minister with "friendly" advice- apparently as "friendly" Powers- concerning the action of the Japanese Army in Manchuria on its march to Chinchow. In this connection, we doubt in the first place whether the Three Powers are qualified to use in their advice the words "the opinion of the world", because the League of Nations Council has already recognized the standpoint of Japan to employ her right of self-defence in Manchuria in the resolution unanimously passed at its meeting. Not only that, but also in its recent session the Council has recognized Japan's reservation of free military action against the ravages of Chinese outlaws in the region. Thus the Japanese Army can take any action for chastising and sweeping away Chinese outlaws when necessity arises, in any part of Manchuria which is the zone covered by Japan's special rights and interests, so that up to the present the Japanese Army has been and is taking free action in different directions in Manchuria, and the three Powers have admitted such action of the Japanese Army as nothing extraordinary and unusual. It is the height of inconsistency that the three Powers should now give such advice as to stop Japan's military operations

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operations in Chinchow which is nothing but a portion of Manchuria. Why do the three Powers want to set apart Chinchow from Manchuria and check Japan's military operations directed against the Chinese outlaws assembled there? Even the League of Nations Council has not specified any exceptional zone for Japan's military operations in Manchuria, so that Japan is free to take any action at Chinchow in case the necessity of taking such a step arises. Thus viewed, the advice of the three Powers to try to check Japan's taking rightful action at Chinchow by using the words "the world's opinions" goes too far.

We cannot but wonder why the three Powers, Britain, the United States and France, are so nervous about Chinchow, but the fact that they are so nervous about Chinchow substantiates the reason why the Japanese Army must take the offensive against the Chinese at Chinchow. It is too well known a fact that Chinchow is the rendez-vous of the picked troops of General Chang-Hsueh-liang and the base of the Chinese irregular troops of various colors and denominations and bandit-soldiers who are constantly menacing peace and order in different parts of Manchuria and threatening the safety of Japanese residents and troops. It is also patent that unless Chang Hsueh-liang withdraws the troops under his command from Chinchow the influence of bandits and their ravages over Manchuria cannot be exterminated. Because of that patent fact Japan has agreed to China's proposal to create a neutral zone in Chinchow, but while it made such a proposal to the League's Council China later cancelled the proposal. Again, the Japanese Army in Manchuria has time and again demanded the withdrawal from Chinchow of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops, but while declaring he was doing this Chang Hsueh-liang has never carried out his repeated declarations to that effect. That Japan is not inclined

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inclined to resort to military action without reasonable cause for so doing is quite clear from the fact that she has been patiently waiting for China to carry out its repeated declarations and promises, notwithstanding Japan has meanwhile suffered from oft-repeated wanton assaults at the hands of the unprincipled Chinese bandit soldiers.

The situation in Manchuria, however, has assumed now a worse aspect than it had at the time of the last session of the League's Council. Should Japan, at this moment, stop, on account of the interference of the Powers, the operation of her right of self-defence and self-protection with respect to Chinchow, irrespective of circumstances, it will be tantamount to denying the action and attitude Japan has been taking vis-a-vis Manchuria up to the present and the result will be again to plunge into a chaotic condition the whole of Manchuria which is now on the way to perfect peace and order. Such a thing Japan can by no means bear. If the three Powers take any different view as to the action of the Japanese Army it is indeed a very deplorable matter, but we regret to say that Japan cannot change the opinion of the Japanese nation as to Japan's standpoint on account of such different views of the three Powers.

Thirty-six years ago, three powers (not the three referred to here) made a joint intervention in connection with the occupation of Manchuria. Though there was a difference of views between Japan and those three powers, Japan yielded to their interference, but the fine and splendid views expressed by those powers proved deceitful a few years afterwards. This historic event, spoiled by mean, despicable, subtle and underhand tricks, is still fresh in the minds of every Japanese. As far as Manchuria is concerned, the Japanese nation can never listen to any advice nor admit the interference of any other country

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country as to Japan's rightful action and attitude. The present Japanese Government- the Inukai Ministry- is fully cognizant that it is backed by this adamant determination of the Japanese nation. We do not entertain the least doubt or the least uneasiness as to the formal reply of the Government to the "friendly" advice of the three Powers, which should be the same as that given by Mr. Inukai to the verbal advice of the American Ambassador on the 24th and nothing else.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Translation.

Enclosure No. 5
Despatch No. 442
From American Embassy
Tokyo.

ANOTHER WARNING REGARDING THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT.

Tokyo JIJI, December 28, 1931.

With regard to warnings given the Japanese Government by the Governments of Great Britain and France through their Ambassadors in Tokyo on December 23rd and by the Government of the United States of America through its Ambassador in Tokyo on December 24th as to the possibilities of the Japanese Army's attacks on Chinchow, we fear that such a warning will encourage China and the Chinese to rely upon the three Powers for the solution of the Manchurian incident and thereby render a peaceful settlement of the incident more difficult than ever before. This triple warning seems to be somewhat premature because the Japanese Army has not yet started operations to attack the headquarters of the Chinese Army at Chinchow.

We would call attention of the three Powers to the fact that Chang Hsueh-liang has recently given a pledge to Mr. Yano, Counselor of the Japanese Legation at Peiping, that the Chinese Army now stationed at Chinchow will soon withdraw to districts inside the Great Wall. Chang Hsueh-liang has not only not carried out the pledge but is now assuming a challenging attitude toward the Japanese Army. The Japanese Government is, therefore, asking Chang Hsueh-liang to fulfill the pledge. The last Council of the League of Nations ended without definitely deciding a zone for the withdrawal of the Chinese Army. If the Council had decided this point during its recent session, the so-called Chinchow question would have been settled peacefully long ago.

It

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It seems that the three Powers misunderstand Japan's military operations in Manchuria and thus served on Japan the above warnings with an attitude similar to a sort of demonstration. Such attitude on the part of the three Powers will doubtless cause China to abandon her idea of withdrawing her Army from Chinchow and to continue to disturb peace and order in Manchuria as hitherto. The Chinese authorities at Chinchow are secretly manipulating bandits in Manchuria and always trying either to damage or destroy the South Manchuria Railway. Japan cannot tolerate such destructive operations on China's part. The existence of the Chinese authorities at Chinchow as the centre of the above operations is obviously inconsistent with Japan's desire for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria and also for the safeguarding of her rights and interests in that region. We hope that the three Powers will fully understand the above fact. If the three Powers are really concerned over the situation at Chinchow, they should approach the Chinese authorities at Chinchow with a warning to withdraw their army from that position.

It is a wonder that the three Powers, who are well aware of the conditions in China, still misunderstand Japan's true motives for starting her military operations in Manchuria. It is almost impossible for other nationals to establish a distinction between bandits and regular Chinese troops in Manchuria. An official statement issued by the Department of State at Washington, D.C. on December 24th indicates that regular Chinese troops at Chinchow are not assuming as challenging an attitude toward Japan. We would call attention on the part of the Washington Government to the fact that regular Chinese troops are soon transformed into bandits and vice versa, as
occasion

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occasion requires. It is, therefore, quite misleading to form any judgment on the mere actions of regular Chinese troops at Chinchow and the immediate neighborhood. We hope that the three Powers will thoroughly understand how necessary it is for Japan to sweep away bandits in districts west of the Liao River. In this connection, we highly appreciate the motives of the three Powers in closely watching the development of the situation at Chinchow and elsewhere in Manchuria. It is to be hoped that the three Powers will rely upon Japan's good faith and assume an attitude of mere on-lookers for the time being.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 6
Despatch No. 442
From American Embassy
Tokyo.

JAPAN'S REPLY TO THE THREE POWERS .

(Tokyo Asahi's Editorial, December 29).

The reply of the Japanese Government to the advice of the British, French, and American Governments, which was made public by the Government on Sunday evening, has on the whole exhausted what the Japanese nation wants to say. Whereas the notes previously issued by the Japanese Government in connection with the Manchurian affair were rather general in sense, the recent note is rather significant in that it minutely enumerates the various facts that occurred in Manchuria as evidence attesting to China's outrages and violation of treaty rights. This latter was necessitated by the unfair anti-Japanese attitude of the military officers of the three Powers (Britain, France and the United States, in Peiping who in their report, denied the undeniable activities of the Chinese Army in Chinchow. It is a sincere wish of the Japanese nation that the Governments of the nations abovementioned as well as the nations themselves shall clearly and perfectly understand Japan's stand in Manchuria through the recent statement.

This is not all. We further wish all the nations of the world, other than the three Powers, clearly to understand Japan's viewpoint. The Manchurian affair is now a question arresting the attention of the League of Nations, and as such the two countries, namely, Britain and France, who are members of the League, may have the freedom to approach

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approach Japan with such advice as may be considered to be in consonance with the principle of the resolutions passed by the League's Council on September 30 and December 10th. For further actions, they must wait for the initiative of the League itself or fresh activities of the League's Council, otherwise the two Powers, Britain and France, have to dare to encroach upon the functions of the League of Nations. With the United States, which is not a member of the League, circumstances are quite different, and since she mentioned in her recent advice to Japan that she would cooperate with the League in the matter she, too, has no more freedom than Britain and France to take any further step in the matter. Thus it is the proper function and duty of the League to judge Japan's action and doings vis-a-vis Manchuria and to consider proper counter measures therefor. In this connection, we, the Japanese nation, do wish all other nations, who are members of the League of Nations, to regard the recent note of the Japanese Government not only as the note replying to the three Powers' advice but also as a note addressed to all nations of the world.

Next, though the recent note of the Japanese Government did not refer to the so-called Open Door, respect of China's territorial integrity, etc., in Manchuria, we are called on to express our sincere wish to the nations of the world clearly to understand Japan's upright and fair intention in that respect. They are requested clearly to understand that Japan's action is not in the least imbued with such idea or intention as implies any territorial ambition or any other selfish aggressive design. We know that the reason why the three

Powers

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Powers are so seriously concerned about and attach so much importance to Chinchow lies in the fact that, in addition to Chinchow being the base of Chang Hsueh-liang's administration, it is an important point of the Peiping-Mukden Railway and also is closely situated in the neighborhood of Hulutao where there are large investments of British and Dutch capital. No less are Americans interested in Chinchow, where America had once acquired from China the railway concession (the construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway) which, however, being a parallel line to the South Manchuria Railway line and hence a violation of the Russo-Japanese-Chinese treaty with respect to Manchuria, was cancelled on account of a joint protest by Japan and Russia.

In these circumstances, the Japanese nation must call the attention of the world Powers clearly to understand and appreciate Japan's true intention. The advance of the Japanese Army on Chinchow is nothing but one step of Japan's self-reference measures and does not in the least imply any intention to monopolize for herself the opportunities of economic development in the region. Not only in Chinchow, but also in any and all parts of Manchuria, Japan is determined and prepared to respect the principle of the open door and equal opportunity, and Japan will be only glad to see British and American investments in Manchuria (at present estimated at 50 million and 27 million yen respectively) doubled and trebled in the future. At any rate, to make Manchuria a happy and safe place of residence both for natives and foreigners and to enable it to attain an economic development in future cannot but contribute to the happiness and welfare of Japan which must depend on Manchuria for supply

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
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of raw materials. We, the Japanese nation, do sincerely wish those three powers and all other nations of the world to drop the scales from their eyes and not fail to see in a true light the intention of Japan's military operations in Manchuria which she has been compelled to take.

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


JAN 1 1932

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, December 22, 1931

SUBJECT: ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT AT HARBIN



F/DEM

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
FEB 1 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STR:

I have the honor to report that although at the present
time Chinese public opinion is very much against
Japanese aggression
in Manchuria conditions at Harbin make a publicly conducted
anti-Japanese movement here very difficult. The local
Chinese authorities recently issued a warning to the association
of Chinese newspapers not to publish anything of a strong anti-
Japanese character and not to criticize General Chang Ching
hui, the Civil Administrator of the Special Area, should the
latter proceed to Tsitsikar, there to take over the Heilungchiang
provincial government under Japanese control.

Some of the large Chinese department stores at Harbin have
adopted the practice of marking their goods clearly as to
their origin, such as "native", "European", or "Japanese", thus
apparently giving the buying public the choice to boycott Japanese
made goods if it so desire. Anti-Japanese feeling finds expression
in minor ways by school children destroying Japanese made goods
found in the possession of their friends, by anti-Japanese slogans
being spread in the form of chain letters, dishes made from Japanese
products being eliminated from Chinese formal dinners, and in other

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ways.

Respectfully yours,



G. C. Hanson
American Consul General


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
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No. 50.



Tientsin, China, December 14, 1931.

SUBJECT: ^{JAN 18 32}
Japanese Patrols Outside Concession.



WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of
December 5 - 2 p.m., and to enclose herewith a copy,
in quintuplicate, of my despatch No. 83, of this
date, to the Legation at Peiping, on the subject of
Japanese patrols outside their concession.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
To Legation, Peiping, December 14, 1931.

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Original and 4 copies to Department.

F/DEW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 83

Enclosure No. 50 in Despatch
No. 50 D. O. Dec. 14/31
From the Consulate General
at Tientsin

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, December 14, 1931.

Subject: Japanese Patrols Outside Concession.

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of December 1/ 5 - 1 p.m., on the above-mentioned subject, and to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum prepared by Captain L. W. Brown of the 15th United States Infantry, giving an account of visits made by him to Nankai University on December 5 and 6 to investigate reports that Japanese soldiers were in the vicinity of the University. The memorandum explains itself.

While no explanation has been offered by the Japanese military authorities indicating the reason for sending the armored car and the patrols to the above-mentioned region, there is some likelihood that they were making investigations to determine whether any armed police were in the area visited or whether any Chinese troops were stationed in that vicinity.

2/ There is also enclosed herewith a copy, in translation, of a letter addressed to me under date of December 5, 1931, by the Tientsin Municipal Government, enclosing a copy of reports showing the presence of Japanese troops at other points

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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points outside the Japanese concession on December 2, 3
and 4. The last three items apparently refer to the case
described in Captain Brown's memorandum herewith enclosed.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.


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FPL/DA

Enclosures:

- 1/, Memorandum of Captain Brown, 15th U.S. Infantry.
- 2/, Copy, in translation, of letter from Tientsin
Municipal Government.

Original and 1 copy to Legation.
In quintuplicate to the Department.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HEADQUARTERS
 U. S. ARMY TROOPS IN CHINA
 TIENTSIN, CHINA.

December 5, 1931.

Memo. to The Commanding Officer.

In compliance with your instructions received about 10:00 a.m. this date to investigate and confirm the report that a Japanese armored car had proceeded to vicinity of Nankai University and set up a machine gun position, I submit the following.

I requested that a mount for myself and four enlisted men from the Mounted Detachment report to me at Morling's Corner on Race Course Road. I ordered an official car and with Pvt. English proceeded to the dyke just west of Villa West Lake Hotel. Here I could get a fair view of the country from the Japanese Barracks to Pa Li Tai. Here I could see nothing of particular interest.

I left word at Morling's Corner for the mounted patrol to report to me in Pa Li Tai and proceeded to that village in the official car. When I arrived there I got out and walked thru the village. Everything seemed quiet and normal. I went to the bridge that crosses the canal to Nankai University. Arriving there I found the bridge closed with barbed wire, and one police armed with a rifle on duty (Pao An Tui). While we were talking a well dressed Chinese man spoke, and said he could give me the situation as he had been on the spot. Prof. Frank L. Ho, Prof. of Economics.

He said that about twenty Japanese soldiers in charge of a Japanese officer came to the bridge at 9 a.m. this morning. First one armored Japanese car came to within one hundred yards of the bridge and just across the canal from the university. The armored car stopped and some men got out and set up one machine gun pointed in the direction of the university. Then the other Japanese soldiers with the officer came to the bridge. Nine of them stopped and about ten went into the village and took up guard on the street corners.

The Pao An Tui manned the bridge and were ready to fight. They were armed with rifles and hand grenades.

The Japanese came to the bridge with fixed bayonets and their rifles in position to fire. They wanted to enter the university. The Japanese could speak Chinese well. The police told them they could not come thru, but that if they would get authority from the Public Safety Bureau they would be welcome to inspect all the university buildings and grounds.

When asked what they wanted the Japanese said they were to inspect the area. They left about 10 A.M. saying that they would return tomorrow.

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Prof. Ho impressed me as being unusually intelligent and he spoke excellent English. I asked him if I could use a telephone and he took me to the police station on the west side of the bridge, from which place I telephoned the Commanding Officer at 11:50 A.M. Here I saw eight or ten Pao An Tui all armed with rifles and a good supply of hand grenades. The police were all very friendly and seemed anxious to tell me what they knew. They answered all questions very freely. They said there were no Pao An Tui in the village, only two ordinary police. That at present there were twenty-two Pao An Tui to guard the university. He said that on the day the Pao An Tui withdrew to Hopei, all had left. That on Nov. 30, some robbers had broken into one of the buildings. That every winter disorganized Chinese bandits from the countryside came and looted. That the President had asked the Mayor to send enough Pao An Tui back to guard the property. The Pao An Tui did return the next day.

Dr. Ho stated that to the best of his knowledge there had never been plain clothes men in that vicinity. They then showed me a new rifle and some ammunition, both of which carried the marks of the Fengtien or Mukden Arsenal. I inspected the rifle carefully and apparently it had never been fired. They said the rifle had been captured along with seventeen others of the same make and about one hundred rounds of ammunition of the same make on the night Nov. 10. At this time I dismissed the mounted patrol which was waiting at Pa Li Tai under the Corporal about 12:30 p.m.

Dr. Ho then asked me to inspect the university, which I did going over the entire campus and in some of the buildings. Originally they had four hundred fifty students. They had put notice in the papers that the university would reopen next Monday, Dec. 7th and they now had one hundred students. I asked if I might go on top of the tall building and take a look at the countryside. (Library with dome).

Here I could get an excellent view of the entire country from Villa West Lake to Nankai Girls Middle School some two miles away. The visibility was perfect and I could see Wang-Ming Middle School, Japanese Barracks, Nankai Middle School and all the villages west of the Native City. Here Dr. Ho pointed out the village Wan Teh Chuong north and west of the Japanese Middle School and about half mile west of the Japanese Barracks. Here he said most of the fighting or firing had taken place. (This statement is confirmed). That on the night of Nov. 10th a large group of the Pao An Tui left Pa Li Tai and went in a roundabout way west and north to Wan Teh Chuong to attack the plain clothes men. That when they got there they found all the village people much excited and talking about fighting for a new government. The Pao An Tui captured eighteen (18) of these new Mukden Arsenal rifles and some ammunition in houses. The people told them that anyone who went into the Japanese concession would be given a rifle and ammunition by this new Chinese Government. Dr. Ho said, "Our People and Pao An Tui are so ignorant and stupid they did not make further investigation of find out what the people mean by this Chinese Government". In his opinion there are and have been many plain clothes men. He thinks it is a Chinese secret Society of some kind. He said the Chinese authorities have no proof that the Japanese instigated this trouble but at least the Japanese did nothing to prevent it.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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At 12.45 p.m., while I was still on the roof of this building a Japanese mounted patrol came along the canal road (Road running north and south from Japanese barracks straight to Pa Li Tai). They came to the bridge at Pa Li Tai, dismounted, and wanted to come into the university. There was one junior Japanese officer and three men. They were fully equipped with arms and ammunition. They were told that they should have authority from the Public Safety Bureau, but that if they would leave their equipment behind an official of the university would take them any place they cared to go. The patrol then mounted and proceeded south thru the village Pa Li Tai, thence east on Wu Yao Road to a sub police station about 150 yards west of Race Course Road. The patrol turned back and was returning the same route when I passed them. I had no conversation with the Japanese.

I returned to the compound shortly before 2:00 p.m.

When I left Headquarters I asked Capt. Barrett to phone the Japanese Headquarters and ask them what they knew about the situation and to inform them I was going in the vicinity of Pa Li Tai. Upon my return Capt. Barret informed me that the Japanese had told him that an armored car had gone south on the road toward Nankai University but that it had not gone on a military mission. The driver of the armored car had gotten on the wrong road and did not realize where he was going. That the men were out for a little trip. They laughed at the report machine guns had been set up.

At 12.10 a Russian civilian came from the direction of the Japanese Concession and went thru Pa Li Tai. The Chinese said he was a Japanese spy. It is fairly well confirmed that the Japanese do employ Russians for this purpose.

At present the Nankai University faculty and families of one hundred students are on the campus. There are no students or teachers at Kwang-Ming Middle School.

LESLIE W. BROWN,
 Captain, 15th Infantry,
 Intelligence Officer.

Sunday, Dec. 6, 1931.

I went to Nankai University at 11.50 today where I was met by Dr. Frank Ho. The Japanese had told him yesterday that they would return today. Dr. Ho informed me that they had not done so and he did not expect them to return.

He also informed me that just a few minutes after I left yesterday the Japanese mounted patrol came back to the bridge. He advised the Chinese to invite them in. They dismounted and came into the university grounds. They inspected the grounds and several buildings. Here they made general observation of the country. They did not ask many questions but seemed quite friendly and joked about various things. They made several inquiries about a town ten li west of the university and wanted to know how to reach this village.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Yesterday about 5 p.m. a mounted patrol left the Japanese barracks and went about a mile due west and then returned.

The Public Safety Bureau ordered the Pao An Tui police to leave here. They left about 5 p.m. The people in the village became panic stricken and many of them left during the night. President Chuong had made arrangements with the Japanese Consulate yesterday afternoon to keep a few Pao An Tui here, consequently they returned at 9 p.m. last evening. The University will open Monday.

Dr. Ho studied for eight years in the United States and is a graduate of Yale University. He impresses me as being a very honest, intelligent man who is well informed on the local situation.

LESLIE W. BROWN,
Captain, 16th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION

From the Tientsin Municipal Government to the American
Consul General at Tientsin.

Dated December 5, 1931. No. 677.
Received December 7, 1931.

Sir:

We have the honor to refer to our previous despatch,
in which you were informed that the Peace Maintenance Corps
had been withdrawn, so that misunderstanding between the
Chinese and Japanese might be avoided .

The Japanese troops recently have, however, on several
occasions, conducted certain activities beyond their sphere
and encroached upon Chinese territory.

Having requested the Japanese Consul to take steps to
suppress such activities promptly, we enclose, for your
information, copies of reports received by this Government.

(Sealed) TIENTSIN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

Enclosures:

As stated.

FJCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES OF REPORTS

December 2, 3:30 p.m. - Wang Sung-ch'un, Officer in Charge of the 9th Branch Station, reports that three armed Japanese soldiers, accompanied by a Japanese in foreign attire, made a search for police and Peace Maintenance Corps at Hwai Ching Li and then crossed over the Ning Chia Bridge and went southward. At the same time, Wang Sheng-hsiang, Officer in Charge of the 8th Branch Station, has reported that six Japanese armed soldiers conducted a search for Peace Maintenance Corps at Pao Tai Chuang and later departed northward.

.....

Today (presumably December 3) at 12 o'clock, the policeman on duty at Yang Chia Ta Chiao, Nan Kwan Ta Chieh, reports that a tan armored car, on which Japanese flags were displayed, mounted with two guns and several machine-guns, in the shape of a boiler, arrived from Haikwangssu in our territory, stopped in front of the Keen Girls' School and returned to Haikwangssu after a few minutes stay.

.....

On the 4th instant, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, I (name not given), accompanied by Ma Chin-yuan, Kao Hsien-t'ing, police officers, and four policemen, proceeded to points beyond the International Bridge to inspect boats. When the two officers, who were later ordered to the West River on a similar mission, reached a point east of the Wei Sheng Bath House at the corner of Chien Wu and Jung Yeh Streets, Nanshih, where they were planning to take certain clothes which they had ordered from a tailor, were seen and suddenly taken by the Japanese soldiers on duty at the west end of Fuyo Road, Japanese Concession, from the Chinese territory.

.....

December 5th, 10 a.m. - Over ten Japanese soldiers, carrying a machine-gun, came from the Japanese Barracks at Haikwangssu in an armored car and made an inspection tour in the vicinity of Palaitai and returned to the Haikwangssu Barracks after 11 o'clock.

.....

5th, 11:20 a.m. - Over 20 Japanese soldiers, carrying a machine-gun, in an armored car, came from Haikwangssu to Palitai and parked the car near the transformer station, west of the Kwang Ta High School. They took down the machine-gun and placed it in front of the Branch Police Station at Palitai. They forced open the doors and inspected the premises. A Japanese officer then asked the Officer in charge of the Station, Ma, for entrance into the Nankai University. Ma informed the Japanese that there were only a few students in the University, that classes had been suspended, and that review of the place could not be made as no permission from his superior had been received. The Japanese officer declared that another visit

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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would be made the next day if he was not permitted to see the compound that day. He requested that the trenches, which the Japanese state are blocking motor traffic, be filled up, and warned the Chinese officer that whenever any attack is made by plain-clothes men advance notice must be given to the Japanese, so that misunderstanding might be avoided.

.....

5th, 2:40 p.m. - A Japanese officer, accompanied by three Japanese soldiers, mounted on ponies, came from Haikwangsu and made an inspection tour around Palitai, Tsai Chia Gardens, and Chu Chang Gardens and then went into the Nankai University compound. All Police Officer Ma's efforts to refuse the admittance were of no avail and they were finally shown by the Business Manager of the institution to every part of the compound. They then came to the Police Station and asked the number of troops stationed in that area. The Japanese officer was told that there had never been any soldiers. He directed that the defence works be removed at once in order to avoid misunderstanding.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 21, 1932.

~~OFF~~
~~MMH:~~
~~ESM:~~

Mr. Lockhart transmits herewith a mimeographed document gotten out by the Japanese authorities at Tientsin attempting to justify their action at Tientsin. Mr. Lockhart's comments found in his despatch to the Legation are interesting as he questions the correctness of certain statements made in this document.

I do not think that you need read the document. I am only calling it to your attention in case you should later desire to study both the Chinese and Japanese statements in regard to the Tientsin incident.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 55.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, December 15, 1931.

JAN 10 32
SUBJECT: Disorders at Tientsin.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 10 1932
THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON.

COPIES SENT TO
O.M.I. AND M.I.D.
FEB 10 1932
JAN 20 1932
JAN 19 1932
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
PUBLICATIONS SECTION

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my despatches Nos. 39
and 43, of November 21 and December 8, 1931, respectively,
on the above-mentioned subject, and to my despatch No. 50
of December 14, 1931, concerning Japanese patrols outside
their concession, and to enclose herewith a copy, in quin-
tuplicate, of my despatch No. 85, dated December 15, 1931,
addressed to the Legation at Peiping, on the subject of
disorders at Tientsin.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800

FPL/DA

Enclosure:

To Legation, Peiping,
December 15, 1931.

Original and 4 copies to the Department.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OUTLINE OF THE TIENTSIN AFFAIRS

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JAPANESE INFORMATION BUREAU

Tientsin,

9 December 1931.

798.94/3563

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OUTLINE OF THE TIENHSIN AFFAIRS

I. The First Occurrence.

1). The cause of trouble.

On November 8, the Chinese plain-clothes men suddenly created a disturbance near Tientsin. They seemed to have belonged to "The Association of Patriotic People's Autonomy of the Province of Hopei", and it was considered simply to be a display of anti-Chiang and Chang movements which were already started on the several occasions during the last few years.

These Chinese plain-clothes men seemed to have been organized mostly by a political group of people whose purpose is to deprive Chang Shueh Liang of his political powers, who extracted from the people the fruit of their labour and also responsible for the Manchurian Affairs, and to enforce a new system of autonomy in this Province by the people of Hopei.

On the night of November 8, the main force of the Chinese plain-clothes men seemed to have proceeded from a direction of Pa Li Tai in the west suburbs of Tientsin towards the native city, while the main points of the city were suddenly attacked by another group of the Chinese plain-clothes men who were supposed to have been hiding themselves at the various points of the native city. In the meantime, it was reported that fighting was taking place at the Public Safety Bureau, Chinese Telephone Administration Bureau, Kou I Chieh (business centre of the native city) and so forth.

The Japanese troops, owing to a heavy firing which was heard near the Japanese Concession and also in the native city as well, knew that a disturbance was created in the Chinese city and they immediately took the necessary steps for protecting their Concession as it was felt that the Japanese Concession might also be endangered.

2). Defensive measures taken by the Japanese troops and outline of the local Sino-Japanese clash.

On receipt of the information to the effect that on November 8, at 9.30 p.m., the rioters started a trouble and looting in the native city and that Pao An Tui - the armed Chinese police - and gendarmes were detailed along the border of the Japanese Concession in addition to the armoured cars which were taking their positions at Sam Pou Kuan and the Yamen Bridge, the Japanese troops were closely watching the change of the situation and at about 10.30 p.m., the firing was heard away in the native city but at 10.50 p.m., a heavy firing was started almost suddenly in the west and north-west of the Japanese Barracks.

The Japanese troops then considered it necessary to occupy the border of their Concession for protecting it and also their compatriots, and at 11.00 p.m., the orders were given by the Japanese military authorities to take the defensive measures for the Japanese Concession which, up to that moment, was still guarded by the police force under the control of the Japanese Consulate General.

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On November 9, between 1 and 2 a.m., the various units of the Japanese troops were ~~xxxxxx~~ able to occupy the border line of the Japanese Concession but prior to their occupation of the Concession border the fighting was already taking place between Pao An Tui and plain-clothes men in the several points in the native city in an immediate front of the Japanese positions which were naturally exposed to a great danger.

Prior to this, when the General Officer Commanding the Imperial Japanese Forces in China gave orders to defend the Japanese Concession he indicated the various units under his command a policy which they should carry out, instructing them at the same time to maintain strictly a neutral attitude and to avoid any unnecessary clash between the Chinese and themselves. These orders were carried out by the Japanese units and, through they were often fired on by Pao An Tui, especially at the Japanese defensive line which was established near the Japanese Bund they were incessantly made a target of the Chinese firing and a Japanese soldier, while he was posted there as sentry, was shot dead instantaneously by a Chinese bullet, the Japanese troops patiently kept silence and no firing was opened by them until 6 a.m. of November 9.

One of the Japanese soldiers being killed by a Chinese bullet, the Japanese military authorities immediately demanded General Wang Shu Chang, Chairman of Hopei, to withdraw at once the Chinese armed police 300 metres from the Japanese Concession border as it was considered absolutely necessary to do so in order to avoid a Sino-Japanese clash and a further unhappy event between the Japanese and Chinese forces.

The above demand was made at 2 a.m., but no answer being given by the Chinese military authorities until 4 a.m., the second demand was then made insisting upon the absolute necessity of the Chinese withdrawal, to which the Chinese authorities replied that the Japanese demand will be met by 6 a.m. On the other hand, the Chinese armed police continued to fire on the Japanese positions of their right wing, especially on that which was established near the Chinese Telephone Administration Bureau with the result that a Japanese section commander was again killed by a Chinese bullet at about 5 a.m.

The Japanese Concession was then exposed to a great danger and the two Japanese soldiers being killed by the Chinese. The Japanese troops who were ordered to take strictly a neutral attitude and not to fire on the Chinese side, were finally to compelled to prepare for opening an intimidating firing in order to protect themselves from any further dangers when General Wang Shu Chang answered to the Japanese military authorities that he will withdraw Pao An Tui by 6 a.m. as it was demanded.

Therefore, the Japanese troops again refrained from firing on the Chinese but a portion of Pao An Tui stationed near the Chinese Telephone Administration Bureau still remained there and continued to fire on the Japanese positions. Owing to the lack of sincerity on the part of the Chinese who did not carry out their promises, the Japanese troops were compelled to open fire, at about 7 a.m., on the Chinese who then started firing far heavier than before.

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However, the Japanese troops were ordered to stop their firing after a few minutes and the various units of the Japanese troops did not fire again, while Pao An Tui continued to fire on the Japanese from the various points until 10.30 p.m.

No firing was taken place on the both sides from noon of November 9 until early next morning but on the morning of November 10, firing was again started on the several points in the native city followed by the firing on the Japanese positions by both Pao An Tui and Chinese plain-clothes men.

On the night of November 10, starting at about midnight until early next morning, heavy rifle and gun firings were heard on the several points, far or near the Japanese positions, along the whole length of our defensive line, and during these times Pao An Tui often approached to the Japanese Concession border and fired on the Japanese positions. Many bullets reached not only our positions but also they fell in the Japanese Concession, but still the Japanese troops were ordered to keep silence.

General speaking, the Chinese, though the rioters were already expelled from the native city and there were not any ones to fight against, continued to take the provocative action and hostile attitude towards the Japanese troops who were not only a third party but always kept silence, even under a heavy firing started by Pao An Tui.

3). The Chinese apology and submission.

Since the outbreak of the local disturbances, the Chinese asked the Japanese authorities to stop firing on the Chinese as they will also stop firing on the Japanese but they still continued to fire on the Japanese positions and Japanese Concession day and night, and when protested they always replied that it was the Chinese plain-clothes men who fired on the Japanese but not Pao An Tui.

On November 11, General Wang Shu Chang, Commander of the Chinese 2nd Army and Chairman of Hopei, and Chang Shueh Ming, Martial Law Commander, proposed the Japanese authorities to stop firing from both sides and they promised not to fire from the Chinese side in order to avoid a Sino-Japanese clash.

According to the Chinese proposal, an arrangement was made between the Japanese and Chinese authorities to start the clearing of the Chinese plain-clothes men in the 300 metres zone which was established between the Japanese and Chinese positions and to remove the pretext of the Chinese firing on the Japanese by permitting the Chinese ordinary police to patrol the ~~xxxxxx~~ the above zone. On November 13, the above plan was enforced in the presence of the Sino-Japanese commission but during their tour it was revealed unexpectedly that the Chinese, contrary to their promise, established in the neutral zone the barricades and many other military constructions. A large number of Pao An Tui was also discovered there but none of the Chinese plain-

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plain-clothes men was found out. Thus, the Chinese breach of faith and their distrust were distrust were disclosed to the eyes of the world and it has become clear that Pao An Tui (including many soldiers of the Chinese regular army wearing the uniform of police), under the pretext that the plain-clothes men were hiding themselves in the neutral zone, fired on taking aim at the Japanese troops.

When notified of this, General Wang Shu Chang was thrown into confusion. On November 15, he called upon General Kashii personally at the latter's Headquarters and apologized to the Japanese Commander for the unjustified actions taken by the Chinese under his command since the outbreak of the local disturbances and also promised the Japanese military authorities to carry out the following conditions:

- (1) To control the insulting propaganda against the Japanese troops.
- (2) To remove the obstacles established on the line within 300 metres from the Japanese Concession border and also to demolish all the other obstacles newly established in the native city facing the Japanese positions.
- (3) Not to permit Pao An Tui enter into the above neutral zone.

In addition to these conditions, General Wang also agreed to recognize the protest rose by the Japanese Consul-General on the subject of 20 Li. Since then, the local situation was gradually ameliorated though the Chinese occasionally fired on the Japanese troops and Japanese Concession.

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OUTLINE OF THE TIENTSIN AFFAIRS

II. The Second Occurrence.

1) The origin of trouble.

According to promises made by the Chinese on November 15, they started to remove their barricades and also to stop their unjustified actions but any reasonable progress was not reported to this effect, while the Japanese authorities who were very anxious to restore the local orders tried to put every thing in its normal condition, including, for instance, traffic, trading, policing, etc., etc., by concentrating their troops far behind the defensive line, permitting the traffic to be opened and finally, on the afternoon of November 26, they disbanded the Japanese Volunteer Corps.

However, on the night of November 26, the Chinese who stationed themselves at the point facing the position of the Japanese left wing suddenly opened firing on the Japanese positions and after a few minutes the whole length of our defensive line was made a target of the Chinese firing.

Under such circumstances, the Japanese troops who were facing a surprise attack started by the Chinese were compelled to fire on them at 9.30 p.m., basing on the principle of self-protection, to punish the outrageous Chinese ^{whose} provocative action was really the most hatred one.

Existence of the plain-clothes men was always the pretext found by the Chinese whenever they started firing but it was absolutely untrue to say that the plain-clothes men again appeared and so the second Tientsin Affair occurred. Another striking example of the Chinese invention was given by them when they spread a rumour saying that these Chinese plain-clothes men were used by the Japanese. When protested later on by the Japanese authorities to this effect, the Commissioner of the Public Safety Bureau reflected very much on these unfounded propagandas and declared that he will enforce rigid control over the Chinese newspapers and the other similar organs.

As above mentioned, it was quite obvious that the second occurrence of the Tientsin Affair was originated by the Chinese intentional attack on the Japanese troops.

2) The progress of trouble.

The Japanese troops though once relieved of their action immediately occupied their positions once more and returned fire against the Chinese. Heavy firing was then exchanged between the Japanese and Chinese forces because the Chinese used big guns in addition to the rifle and light and heavy machine guns and the Japanese also used their guns for returning fire on the Chinese gun firings.

The Chinese continued to fire on the Japanese positions until November 27, when, therefore, the Japanese military authorities rose a strong protest to General Wang Shu Chang as it was obvious that the Chinese were taking hostile action against the Japanese troops.

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Since the first occurrence of the Tientsin Affairs, the Japanese Navy began to move by despatching a few destroyers to Tangkou and Chinwantao for protecting the Japanese on land and sea, and also the Japanese vessels on the Hai Ho. On the morning of November 27, the landing force of these destroyers arrived at Tientsin and joined the local Japanese garrison to protect the Japanese Concession.

Until the morning of November 28, heavy firing was still exchanged between the Japanese and Chinese, and the Japanese military authorities, fearing that damages might be done on the lives and properties of the foreigners living in the native city, advised the various foreign consuls to take necessary precautions, by the evening of November 28, for protecting these foreigners and their properties actually existing in the dangerous zone. The firing did not cease until the morning of November 28.

3). The Chinese surrender and the Japanese reinforcements.

The General Officer Commanding the Imperial Japanese Forces in China once protested the Chinese military authorities against their actions in order to avoid any unnecessary clash between the Japanese and Chinese forces but as the answer given by General Wang Shu Chang was not satisfactory another strong protest was made against his insincerity and warned him to meet the Japanese demand at once. On the morning of November 29, the Chinese military authorities sent their representative to the Japanese Headquarters and declared that they agreed to withdraw Pao An Tui to Hopei, beyond the Grand Canal - the Japanese military authorities protested, among others, against the existence in the native city of the armed Chinese police - and also to remove all the barricades established in the native city.

The clearing work of these barricades was promised to be started on the afternoon of November 29 and almost completed next day. But, as it was then reported to the Japanese military authorities from the various sources that many soldiers of the Chinese regular army in plain clothes entered into the native city or the Chinese soldiers and policemen exchanged their uniforms, the Japanese troops were naturally watching these movements on the part of the Chinese.

No settlement has yet been made on these affairs and the negotiations are still going on between the Japanese and Chinese authorities to reach a satisfactory settlement.

The strength of the local Japanese troops was numbered only 500 and they were trying their best for over a score of days to protect some 6,000 Japanese nationals residing in Tientsin and also to defend their Concession which measures 4 kilometres round. On the other hand, there were 3/40,000 Chinese regular troops stationed in the area, half a day's journey from Tientsin, in addition to about 6,000 armed Chinese police under the control of the Public Safety Bureau.

The Japanese troops had nothing to afraid of the Chinese forces, though they were far smaller in number than the Chinese, but taking into consideration of

- 7 -

the hard working of the Japanese soldiers for the past several days, one infantry battalion was despatched to Tientsin on the morning of December 1 as reinforcement of the local Japanese garrison. It was simply to give adequate protection to the Japanese residents in North China that the above reinforcements were despatched to Tientsin, and the total number of the Japanese troops - no restriction was established by the treaties to this effect - still remains to be smaller than that of the local French and American troops.

III. Conclusion.

The first Tientsin Affair was thoroughly a Chinese inner strife which took place between the Chinese troops and the reactive elements of their own nationality. The Japanese were once reported, however, to have had some connections with these Chinese reacting movement but it was simply one of the groundless propagandas which are very common in this country. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to give any explanation on this subject, because even the Chinese authorities recognized it untrue.

Examples of the Chinese breach of faith and their uncivilized actions ~~at~~ throughout the first and second Tientsin Affairs are too numerous to count. No such authorities, troops, police and people as those of this country have never existed in the world except in China, and therefore, it is a great mistake to give them a treatment equal to the authorities, troops, police and people of any civilized country.

Take the Chinese armed police, Pao An Tui, for example. They are called policing organ in this country but they have the special organisation and equipment, far better than those of the Chinese regular troops and, strange to say, it is more difficult to deal with these people than the Chinese bandits.

Without having some knowledge of these characteristics of the Chinese who become uncontrollable under certain circumstances, it is impossible for any one to clearly understand not only the Manchurian and Tientsin Affairs but also to give an impartial judgement on these problems.

Now, let us give some other striking examples of the uncivilized and unjustified actions taken by the Chinese during the local disturbances.

(I) The Chinese heavily fired on the Japanese under the pretext of the existence of the Chinese plain-clothes men. The Japanese authorities strongly protested the Chinese against their firing and demanded to stop it at once, but always they ignored our protest or demand and continued to fire under the same pretext. In view of the fact that no firing was heard since Pao An Tui were withdrawn to Hopei on November 29, it was easy to understand how they were unreliable, what was the real nature of Pao An Tui and what really were the plain-clothes men.

- 8 -

(2) Chinese responsible authorities often promised to stop firing of the Chinese under their control but these promises have never been carried out. The Chinese have no idea ^{at} all to keep their words and the orders given by higher authorities are easily broken by their subordinates who act against the wishes of their superior authorities.

(3) The Chinese pledged that all Pao An Tui and the barricades within the 300 metres zone will be removed but not only their promises were broken but more troops were sent into the native city and more barricades were established in the above zone.

(4) As to the question of withdrawal of the Chinese troops outside 20 Li, the Chinese authorities also promised to carry it out but these troops did not leave the city and many of them, wearing the uniform of Pao An Tui, still remained on the several points at an immediate front of the Japanese positions. The repeated protests made by the Japanese authorities to this effect were always ignored by the Chinese.

(5) A number of the Chinese armed police, carrying a flag of the red cross, once appeared on the point 2-300 metres from the Japanese defensive line and they started firing on our positions. This constituted a great infringement of the International Laws and the Chinese action of this nature was not only intolerable but it was really against the humanity.

(6) Scores of the Chinese armed police used some time an American flag without any authority in order to avoid firing from the Japanese positions and in other instance they constructed their positions deliberately very close to the building owned by the foreigners, thence they started firing on the Japanese line. The American Consular authorities already protested the Chinese against all these unjustified actions.

Another example of the Chinese infringement of the International Laws was reported when they suddenly started firing on the Japanese military representative from behind at the moment when he hardly stepped into the Japanese Concession border after having the negotiation with the Chinese representatives whom he met a certain point of the native city.

(8) Free passage of the Hai Ho was recognized to the Japanese vessels by the treaties but since the outbreak of the local disturbances the Chinese troops stationed at Kokou often ordered the Japanese vessels to stop and when their orders were ignored they fired on them. The Chinese troops also made forcible search of the Japanese vessels and Japanese passengers as well, and some time they threatened the Chinese crew of the Japanese vessels without any proper reasons.

- 9.-

(9) No treaties permit the Chinese authorities to restrain the liberty of the Chinese under the employment of the Japanese troops but some of these Chinese were executed at threatened by the Chinese authorities under the pretext that they were employed by the Japanese troops.

(10) The Japanese troops did not fire on November 28 in order to give the foreigners ample time to evacuate the native city where they were living but, taking advantage of the Japanese silence, the Chinese strengthened their positions or extended their barricades and started firing on the Japanese line. On the same day, at 11.15 a.m., a Japanese sentry was seriously injured by a Chinese bullet which was fired on him from the Chinese position established in front of the American Mission Compound. (11) In spite of the repeated protests ~~by~~ made by the Japanese, the Chinese never stopped firing from the Nankai Girls's Middle School to the direction of the Japanese Headquarters and many bullets thus fired on by the Chinese often fell near the French posts at Lao Si Kai and the several others reached the other foreign Concessions.

Attitude of the Chinese military and civil, in North China
towards the Japanese.

In June last when the Korean Affair and Nakamura case took place, the tendency of anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese in North China, both military and civil, was exceedingly deepened. Anti-Japanese movement in North China was almost died temporarily during the campaign Shih Yu Shan but when it was over the Tampo and other Chinese people again started violent movement to boycott the Japanese goods as it was expected but the Chinese authorities though often warned by the Japanese diplomatic authorities to this effect, never tried to stop it.

On the other hand, the Chinese authorities and troops began to show their insulting attitude towards the Japanese troops more openly than before and a large number of the Chinese soldiers went so far as to advocate a declaration of war against Japan. A good example ^{of the attitude} of the Chinese soldiers towards the Japanese soldiers was given by the fact that when the Japanese troops in charge of the railway protection approached to a railway bridge near Shanhaikuan to march through it they were checked by the Chinese troops who threatened the Japanese troops with their arms.

Such was the tendency of the Chinese troops who tried deliberately to infringe the proper treaty right recognized to the Japanese troops. Moreover, the Japanese soldier-messengers were insulted very often by the Chinese soldiers when they were travelling by train between Tientsin, Peking, Shanhaikuan, Chinwantao and Tangkou.

- 10 -

It was then anticipated that, unless some proper steps be taken, a clash between the Japanese and Chinese soldiers was unavoidable and the Japanese troops were insulted so often by the Chinese troops that the Japanese were finally compelled to increase the number of their soldier-messengers.

Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Affairs, more cases similar to the above examples were reported and the Chinese soldiers or Tampon or students cried out before the public the necessity of a declaration of war against Japan in order to inspire the masses with hostility against our country, and especially, their insult against the Japanese women and children were gradually increased.

The Chinese attitude of this nature was considered too much unfair to be taken towards the people of their neighbouring country as it constituted a declaration of financial war and an infringement of the treaties and also an insult of the honour of the Japanese Empire. The Tientsin Affairs were resulted from the situation outlined and the Chinese attitude towards the Japanese had never been changed even during the local disturbances. Under such circumstances, we can easily draw our conclusion on the Chinese attitude towards the Japanese in the future.

Extra Copies Sent To The Department Without Covering
Dispatch 12/16/31

Translation of a news item appearing in the
CHING PAO (PEKING PRESS) of December 5, 1931.

(Trans. EFS)

THE HISTORY OF THE QUESTION OF CHINCHOW

Chung Yang News Agency telegram--

NANKING, the 4th:--The correspondent called on the
Secretary-General of the National Government and made
inquiry as to the Chinchow incident. In reply he made
the following remarks:

"With respect to this question the Central
Government has now decided upon the three following
points: (1) China cannot accept the proposal for
delimitation of Chinchow as a buffer zone unless
the Council of the League of Nations and the group
of neutral Powers give definite and responsible
guarantees; (2) The existence of the Provincial
Government at Chinchow must be upheld, and it
cannot under any circumstances withdraw; and (3)
In case Chinchow is attacked, the Chinese Army
will of course take proper defensive measures
and hold the city at all costs.

"The above three points are fundamental
policies of the Government in regard to the
question of Chinchow. As regards the history
of this incident, when critical news concerning
the attack on Chinchow by the Japanese Army was
received on November 25th, Delegate Alfred Sze
submitted a memorandum to Sir Eric Drummond,
Secretary-General of the League of Nations, stating
in effect as follows:

" 'A conflict between the Chinese and
Japanese forces therefore impends, which China
earnestly wishes to avoid and it would seem
that it can be prevented only if the Council
of the League without delay interposes some
decisive action. The Chinese Government asks
the Council immediately to take steps to
establish a neutral zone between the present
stations of the Chinese and Japanese forces,
such zone to be occupied by British, French,
Italian and other neutral detachments under
the authority of the Council. China would
then, if requested by the Council in the

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F/DEW

793.94/3564

Extra Copies Sent To The Department Without Covering
Dispatch 12/18/75

FE

Translation of a news item appearing in the
CHING PAO (PEKING PRESS) of December 5, 1931.

(Trans. EFS)

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793.94/3664

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-2-

" 'interests of peace, withdraw her forces behind the Great Wall.'

"At the same time diplomatic officials of the National Government revealed this idea in conversations with the British and American Ministers, so that they may transmit it to the British and American Governments for reference. On the 26th M. Aristide Briand made the following formal proposal to various member states of the Council (including China and Japan):

" '(1) Any neutral government which sends observers to Chinchow shall instruct them to hold discussions as to the possibility of establishing a buffer zone and other measures that may avoid conflicts between the Chinese and Japanese forces. Observers shall also communicate with the Chinese and Japanese commanders from time to time.'

"M. Briand in his note particularly requested the Chinese Government to order the Chinese commanders to communicate information to the observers. Upon receipt of this note from M. Briand, the Chinese Government informed the Executive Yuan of the matter."

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EFS:T

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED

FROM

Tokio

Dated January 19, 1932

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 7:42 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

17, January 19, 5 p.m.

Mr. Yoshizawa received all chiefs of missions official-
ly this afternoon and briefly discussed the prevalent news-
paper comment here about the formation of an independent
Chinese Government in Manchuria, which he repeated as wholly
due to the initiative of resident Chinese officials. I
asked how an independent government in Manchuria would
square with Japanese repeated declarations respecting
Chinese sovereignty. He replied that he had not had
time to study this so as to state definitely what the position
of the Japanese Government would be but that although Man-
churia would remain Chinese soil, the government would be
independent as had been the case under Chang Tso Lin and
his son before his association with the Nanking authorities.
He was particularly cordial in tone. Mr. Yoshizawa took
occasion to speak in the highest terms of the part played
by

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 19 1932
Department of State
RAC

F/DEW

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JAN 20 1932

793.94
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#17 from Tokio, January 19,
5 pm.

by Ambassador Dawes in helping to bring about the form
and adoption of the resolution of the League of Nations.

Repeated to Peiping.

FORBES

RR-WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated January 19, 1933

Rec'd 10:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

94, January 19, 6 p.m.

The following although not confirmed is transmitted as
being put forth by the Rengo Japanese News Agency at Mukden:

"Preparations for establishing a new state in Manchuria
have been completed. Leading Chinese at Mukden, constitut-
ing the backbone of the political move, are holding an
important meeting at the Provincial Government office since
yesterday the fifteenth. The conference is expected to be
kept up until the end of the current month during which the
programme for the organization of the new government will
receive the final polishing and president, vice president
and chief of the various departments in the government will
be selected. These things accomplished, a joint conference
of Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungkiang Provinces will be held
and the new state of Manchuria and Mongolia will be formal-
ly established. (END PART ONE)

JOHNSON

CSB

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F/DEW

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note

893.01

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 19, 1932

Rec'd 10:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

94, January 19, 6 p.m. (PART TWO)

The inauguration of the new state is anticipated to take place on February 21st. Important points decided upon by leading statesmen of the three provinces are:

One. The territory, the ultimate object of the new state is to combine Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Jehol in autonomous Mongol domain but in consideration of the prevailing state of affairs Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungkiang will be included in the republic for the time being.

Two. People, the people of the new state will be called citizens, persons who lived in the territory for a certain designated period being admitted to the citizenship with equal rights and obligations without racial discrimination.

Three. Sovereign rights, the sovereignty of the state belongs to the citizens.

The

793.94/3566

172
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#94 from Peiping via N.R.,
January 19, 6 p.m. (PART TWO)

The President of the new republic will be elected by
unanimous vote of the heads of the three provinces.

(END PART TWO)

JOHNSON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

PLAIN

RECEIVED
JAN 19 1932
DIVISION OF

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 19, 1932

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

94, January 19, 6 p.m. (PART THREE)


Under the President, Executive, Judicial and Supervisory
Yuans will be established and Military, Diplomatic, Civil
Administration, Industrial and Educational departments
will be established under the Executive Yuan.

The three provinces maintaining the status quo for the
time being will carry out the administration of the respec-
tive provinces under the Executive Yuan. Besides a
Resources Committee and Communications Committee will
organize, the former to develop resources required especial-
ly for national defense and the latter to develop communica-
tions. These two committees will be placed under the direct
control of the president.

(END PART THREE END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

KLP-WSB



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Luitfsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. D-174

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

December 24, 1931.


JAN 19 1932

Sino-Japanese Controversy
in Manchuria.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 21 1932

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.



Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith five copies
of a pamphlet in English, entitled "HOSTILE ACTIVITIES
OF JAPANESE TROOPS IN THE NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES OF
CHINA, Volume One" and one copy of a collection of
reproductions of photographs entitled "PHOTOGRAPHS
SHOWING THE HOSTILE ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE TROOPS IN
THE NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES OF CHINA, No. 1".

These publications were sent to the American
Consulate General at Nanking on December 23, 1931, in
a wrapping which bore the stamp of the Department of
Intelligence and Publicity of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck
Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/ 5 copies of pamphlet, as stated. / copy to ONI + 1 to MID
- 2/ 1 copy of collection of reproduction
of photographs, as stated.

In quintuplicate

800
WRP:MCL

F/DEW

793.94/3567

JAN 26 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch to the Department
No.D-174 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul
General at Nanking, China, dated December 24,
1931, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy in
Manchuria".

HOSTILE ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE TROOPS
IN THE NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES
OF CHINA.

(From September 18th, 1931, to November 7th, 1931.)

VOLUME ONE

193.74/3567

HOSTILE ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE TROOPS
IN MANCHURIA

(From September 18, 1931, to November 7, 1931.)

LIAONING PROVINCE.

Shenyang (Mukden).	Sept. 18th, 10 p.m.	(1) Bombardment of Peitaiying (Northern Bar- racks), the Trench Mortar Arsenal, the Shenyang Arsenal, etc. (2) Machine gun attack from the city wall. (3) Disarming of Chinese soldiers and police. (4) Public and private buildings searched; of- ficials arrested. (5) Machine gun attack on police stations with- in and outside the city. (6) Raid on the Northeastern Provincial Bank, the Bank of China, the Bank of Communica- tions, and the Frontier Development Bank. (7) Occupation of the Shenyang Arsenal and the aerodrome. (8) Cutting of telegraphic Communications. (9) Release of prisoners from the jails. (10) Indiscriminate firing on pedestrians. (11) Detention of civil and military officials. (12) Coercing Chinese military authorities into admitting that Chinese soldiers fired first and destroyed the South Manchuria Railway bridge, etc. (13) Incineration of Chinese soldiers' corpses in order to destroyed the evidence. (Note: Number of casualties and amount of damage to public and private properties still under investigation.)
	Sept. 22nd, 11 a.m.	(1) Arrest and detention of Tsang Shih-yi, Chairman of Liaoning Provincial Govern-

72E
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch to the Department
No. D-174 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul
General at Nanking, China dated December 24,
1931, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy in
Manchuria".

日軍暴行圖

PHOTOGRAPHS

SHOWING THE HOSTILE ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE TROOPS
IN THE NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES OF CHINA

日軍暴行圖

Published November 20th, 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

目錄

(一) 十月八日午後二時

日本飛機十一架大炸錦州靈跡之一部

(二) 九月二十三日正十六日

日本飛機用機關槍掃射北寧火車實跡之一部

(三) 九月二十日日本飛機用機關槍掃射北寧鐵路沿北

寧鐵路管理局瀋陽辦事處副處長胡純廣簽字之北寧鐵路臨時使用協定


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

(一)

十月八日午後二時
日本飛機十一架大炸錦州實跡之一部

Figures 1 to 12-showing the
victims of and damages done by
an air raid conducted by eleven
Japanese aeroplanes on Chinchow
on October 8th, 1931, at 2 p.m.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(一) 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

0725

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75



二 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

1725

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


— 3 —



(三) 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

0725

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 5 -



(ii) 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -



(六) 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

0725

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 7 -



(七) 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

0725


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(七) 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -



(六) 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

0727

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(七) 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

0728

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (7)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8 —




八 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

0729

Milton O. Gustafson


12-18-75

— 9 —



九 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午廿八月十

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75




(十) 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

0731

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


-- 11 --



(一十) 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 12958, Sec. 3(E) and 3(F)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1989
By Milton O. Huntzsm DATE: 12-18-75

- 12 -



(十) 跡實之州錦炸大機飛本日時二後午日八月十

173
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(二)


九月二十三日 至 二十六日

日本飛機用機關槍掃射北甯火車實跡
之一部

Pictures showing the victims
of and damages done by machine-
gun attacks of Japanese troops
on the passenger trains of the
Peking-Mukden Railway during
the period from September 23rd
to September 26th, 1931.

1 734
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Fig. 1. An unidentified victim: who was Shot in the face.



(一)

面 前 (詳 不 名 姓) 者 死

0735

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.4 (b) and (c) or (E)
 Department of Justice, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NABT. 12-18-75

Fig. 2. Mr. Li Feng-nien, aged 27, member of the Finance Department of the Liaoning Provincial Government, was shot and killed on a passenger train.



(二)

在尚妻母員職廳政財寧遼歲七十二年豐李者死

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Fig. 4. A hole made in the steel plate on the side of the 3rd class coach No. 205 by a machine-gun cartridge. The shot penetrated through in an oblique way with the outside end higher than inside opening showing that the shot was fired from above.



(四)

外自板鋼外車等三號五〇百二第
 足寸英一低較孔鎗板木內入射
 下面上從係向方之彈槍證

Fig. 3. The 70 year old mother of the unfortunate victim Li Feng-nien (see fig. 2).



(三)

(歲十七年) 母之年豐李

1 0737

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Fig. 5. Another unidentified victim who met his tragic end at a shot which penetrated the back of his head.



五

腦後在口傷槍一詳不名姓者死

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson - NARS, Date 12-18-75

Fig. 7. The shattered window glass of
 the first class coach No. 218



七
 車等頭號八十四百二第
 窗玻璃之破擊槍火

Fig. 6. Two wounded passengers. The
 one dressed in black is Chang Lo-wei
 and the one in white is Chiao Chia-huei.



六
 客乘二傷受
 文樂張為者衣黑衣
 惠嘉魚為者衣白衣

1730
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A facsimile of the Agreement governing the provisional administration of the Peking-Mukden Railway. The Agreement was signed by Mr. Hu Shun-tsan, Assistant-Director of the Mukden Office of the Peking-Mukden Railway Administration under the duress of Nagano, staff officer of the Japanese Kwantung Army.

北甯鐵路臨時使用協定

滿洲鐵路管理局瀋陽辦事處副處長胡純讀簽字之

(三) 九月二十三日日本關東軍參謀中野大尉強迫北

- 1 -

案紙	北寧鐵道臨時使用ニ關スル協定	北寧鐵路側、日本軍ヲ當該鐵道ノ臨時軍事ノ目的ヲ以テ使用スルコトヲ認容ス	日本軍、北寧鐵路使用ノ範圍、軍事必要ノ最小限度ニ止メ該鐵路營業等ヲ妨クルコトナシ	北寧鐵路ニ沿フ通信等ニ關シテハ北寧鐵路側ハ所要ニ應ジ反應のニ要求ニ應スルコトヲ公約ス
----	----------------	-------------------------------------	--	--

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

<p>四軍布輸送ノ實施、北寧鐵路則ニ通告ノ後滿</p>	<p>鐵會社ノ材料ヲ以テ行フ</p>	<p>但小量ノ軍布輸送ハ北寧鐵路則ニ於テ擔任</p>	<p>無貨トス</p>	<p>昭和六年九月二十三日 民國二十九年九月二十三日</p>	<p>北東軍參謀 中野大輔</p>	<p>臨時鐵道線山官佐 佐伯中兵衛</p>	<p>北寧鐵路管理局 胡純</p>	<p>瀋陽辦事處 胡純</p>
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MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 19, 1932

FROM

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

95, January 19, 3 p.m.

Legation's 50, January 11, 5 p.m. regarding Japanese

793.94
reply to the American note, the SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO Peiping
January 17th states that although the reply is courteous in
its terms the sense of it is nevertheless very unyielding.
that
Japan not only maintains/she has not violated the Nine Power
Treaty, Anti War Treaty American rights but also indicates
her determination to control Manchuria and Mongolia and the
impropriety of American interference. Japan dares to take
this course because she has obtained the assistance of other
imperialists through diplomatic channels. It is feared that
the United States will be unable to make any further strong
statement and that upon the receipt of Japanese reply the
American Government will merely file a rebuttal reiterating
a determination to reserve the various points mentioned in
the first note for use in future negotiations. In that
event what policy will China adopt towards Manchurian contro-
versy?

(WSB-TR)

JOHNSON

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 19 1932

F/DEW

793.94/3568

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAPANESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

*Handed to Mr. Castle by
Japanese Ambassador
January 18, 1932*

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 18 1932
Department of State

ICR

REPLY OF THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER, DATED
JANUARY 16, TO THE NOTE OF THE AMERICAN
AMBASSADOR AT TOKYO.

*See also
793.94/3530*

F/DEW

793.94/3569

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note, dated January 8th, which has had the most careful attention of this Government. The Government of Japan were well aware that the Government of the United States could always be relied on to do everything in their power to support Japan's efforts to secure full and complete fulfillment in every detail of the Treaties of Washington and the Kellogg Treaty for the Outlawry of War. They are glad to receive this additional assurance of the fact.

As regards the question which Your Excellency specifically mentions of the policy of the so-called "Open Door", the Japanese

Government

JAN 19 1932

FILED

Government, as has so often been stated, regard that policy as a cardinal feature of the politics of the Far East and only regret that its effectiveness is so seriously diminished by the unsettled conditions which prevail throughout China. Insofar as they can secure it, the policy of the open door will always be maintained in Manchuria as in China proper.

They take note of the statement by the Government of the United States that the latter cannot admit the legality of matters which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens or which might be brought about by means contrary to the treaty of August 27, 1928. It might be a subject of academic doubt whether in a given case the impropriety of the means necessarily and always voids the ends secured but as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means that question does not practically arise.

It may be added that the treaties which relate to China must necessarily be applied

with

7 4 5
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

with due regard to the state of affairs from time to time prevailing in that country and that the present unsettled and distracted state of China is not what was in the contemplation of the high contracting parties at the time of the Treaty of Washington. It was certainly not satisfactory then: but it did not display that disunion and those antagonisms which it does today. This cannot affect the binding character or the stipulations of the treaties: but it may in material respects modify their application since they must necessarily be applied with reference to the state of facts as they exist.

My Government desire further to point out that any replacement which has occurred in the personnel of the administration of Manchuria has been the necessary act of the local population. Even in cases of hostile occupation — which this was not — it is customary for the local officials to remain in exercise of their functions. In the present case they for the most part fled or

resigned:

resigned: it was their own behavior which was calculated to destroy the working of the apparatus of government. The Japanese Government can not think that the Chinese people, unlike all others, are destitute of the power of self-determination and of organizing themselves in order to secure civilized conditions when they are deserted by the existing officials.

While it need not be repeated that Japan entertains in Manchuria no territorial aims or ambitions yet, as Your Excellency knows, the welfare and safety of Manchuria and its accessibility for general trade are matters of deepest interest and of quite extraordinary importance to the Japanese people. That the American Government are always alive to the exigencies of Far Eastern questions has already been made evident on more than one occasion. At the present juncture when the very existence of our national policy is involved it is agreeable to be assured that the American Government are devoting in a friendly spirit such sedulous care to a correct appreciation of the situation.

I shall

174
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

I shall be obliged if Your Excellency will
transmit this communication to your Government
and I avail, etc.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 20 1932

My dear Senator Borah:

I am sending you herewith copies of documents which have been assembled in response to Senate Resolution 87 of December 17, 1931. These documents are as follows:

A. The written communications, both formal and informal, including memoranda, which have passed between the Government of the United States and the Governments of China and Japan since September 18, 1931, relating to the controversy between China and Japan in Manchuria since that date.

B. The written communications which have been sent or have passed between the Government of the United States or its representatives and the League of Nations or representatives of the League in reference to the said controversy between China and Japan in Manchuria.

There are also included copies of various other documents transmitted to the Government of the United States

The Honorable

William E. Borah,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

793.94/3569A

See 793.94/3902H

-2-

States for its information by the Council of the League of Nations, such as resolutions adopted by the Council of the League and certain of the more formal communications which have passed between the Council of the League and the Chinese and the Japanese Governments. The latter documents have been selected on the basis of their pertinent relationship to documents accounted for in paragraphs A and B above. A complete set of the communications which have passed between the Council of the League and the Chinese and the Japanese Governments or their representatives, many of which in addition to the ones furnished herewith were transmitted to this Government for its information, may be found in the League of Nations documents which have already been published.

The documents transmitted herewith have been arranged in chronological order and there have been inserted at intervals brief statements of the events, to facilitate an understanding of the documents.

It is my understanding that these papers will not be made public without my consent.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMPSON

Enclosure:
Folder of Documents.

SA:ATK:VGM

FE
SEN
SKH

CR
1982. +

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-B-12

18 January 1932

Memorandum for the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
State Department

The following was received from the Naval Attache Peiping, dated
16 January 1932:

FOLLOWING FROM LIEUT BROWN NOW HARBIN HAVING JUST VISITED
MANCHULI. "REPRESENTATIVE OPINION MANCHULI AREA AGREED PRESENT
SITUATION QUIET WITH THE GENERAL BELIEF THAT THERE WILL BE POS-
ITIVE ACTION BY JAPANESE ARMY CONTRA SOVIET WITHIN A PERIOD OF 3
MONTHS. RED MONGOLS RECENTLY ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN DRIVING OUT OF
BORDER REGIONS WHITE MONGOL BANDS HOWEVER LARGE SCALE ACTIVITIES
AMONG THEM THOUGHT IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL THIS DAY.

TWO SOVIET OFFICIALS FREELY STATE THAT THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT
IS PREPARED IN CASE OF ATTACK BUT DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE OFFENSIVE
ACTION. FEW RUSSIAN FORCES EAST OF IRKUTSK. OFFICERS OF THE CLASS OF
1896 NOW MOBILIZED WOTERS NOTIFIED TO BE IN READINESS. SOVIET
PRESS UNANIMOUSLY AGREED NECESSARY PREPARE AGAINST BOTH JAPAN
AND POLAND.

WHITE PARTISANS CONSIDERED NEGLIGIBLE QUANTITY HOWEVER JAPANESE
CONSUL AS WELL AS AGENTS HAVE MADE RECENT TRIPS INTO MONGOLIA
FROM MANCHULI.

HEAD OF THE HARBIN JAPANESE MILITARY MISSION LAST MONDAY
CITED NEED OF CLEARING NORTH MANCHURIA CHINESE FORCES THEN ADOPT
MEASURES WHICH WOULD STAMPT OUT COMMUNISTIC PROPAGANDA"

✓
DGR
FE (RFB)

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 19 1932

F/DEW

793.94/3570

FILED
JAN 26 1932

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ROBERT RAMSPECK
5TH DIST. GEORGIA
421 HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.

HOME ADDRESS:
P. O. Box 1118
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

IN
DEPT. OF STATE
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

January 11, 1932.

THOMAS L. CAMP
SECRETARY
COMMITTEES:
CLAIMS
LABOR
CIVIL SERVICE

JAN 12 3 38 HISTORICAL ADVISER

JAN 12 1932

DEPT. OF STATE

Secretary of State,
State Department,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Sir:

I am handing you herewith a communication from
the Librarian, Fourth Corps Area Headquarters, Fort Mc-
Pherson, Georgia, requesting publications about the
Manchurian situation.

If the Department of State has anything available,
I will greatly appreciate your sending it to Miss Catherine P.
Walker, Corps Area Librarian, Fort McPherson, Georgia.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

M.C.

JAN 18 1932

FILED

F/DEW
793.94/3571

175
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOURTH CORPS AREA LIBRARY
FORT MCPHERSON, ATLANTA, GEORGIA


Honorable Robert Ramspeck
House of Representatives
U.S. Congress
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Ramspeck:

Due to the fact that General McCoy will probably go to Manchuria these Headquarters are especially interested in any publications relating to the situation there, either historical or political. If there are available any documents which you could send us, will you be kind enough to do so?

With many thanks for all your courtesies, I am

Sincerely,


Catherine P. Walker
Corps Area Librarian

1753
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 18 1932.

In reply refer to
HA

My dear Mr. Ramspeck:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 11, 1932, in which you request that publications concerning the Manchurian situation may be sent to Miss Catherine P. Walker, Corps Area Librarian, Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia.

There is enclosed for your information a copy of a letter upon the subject which has been sent to Miss Walker by the Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

H. L. SIMMONS

Enclosure:

To Miss Catherine P. Walker.

The Honorable

Robert Ramspeck,

House of Representatives.

100000

HA:EWS:JAA
CWS

FE
M.M.H.

793.94/3571

1754

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 18 1952.

In reply refer to
HA

Miss Catherine P. Walker,
Corps Area Librarian,
Fourth Corps Area Library,
Fort McPherson,
Atlanta, Georgia.

Madam:

The Department has been requested by the Honorable Robert Ramspeck, Member of Congress from Georgia, to send you any publications which may be available relating to the Manchurian situation.

The Department encloses as indicated below a number of publications which may be of interest to you. Your attention is especially invited to the entries "China: Occupation of Cities in Manchuria", "Sino-Japanese Situation" and "The Manchurian Situation" in the several tables of contents of the enclosed copies of "Press Releases".

As

793.94/3571

1 0755

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

As of possible interest there is enclosed a copy of price list 65, "Foreign Relations of the United States". Publications named in price list 65 are not distributed by the Department of State. They are purchasable from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, this city, and remittances should be sent direct to that office.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Edward C. Wynne
Edward C. Wynne,
Assistant Historical Adviser.

Enclosures:

Price list 65.

Mimeographed release of
January 7, 1932, giving
text of identic note to
Japanese and Chinese
governments.

Press Releases, publications
numbers 236, 238, 240, 245, 246,
252, 256, 258, 259, 260, 263, and
265.

Treaty Series No. 723.
The General Pact for the
Renunciation of War.



HA:EPS:JAA

Jan. 16, 1932.

FE
m. m. H.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/3572

SEE 611.008/1293 FOR #293

FROM Hong Kong (Putnam) DATED Dec.19,1931
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Copy of Chinese newspaper, RESONANCE, published in San Francisco, and containing material of a communistic nature. Articles in paper regarding Japanese-Chinese dispute in Manchuria.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.911/275 FOR Despatch #5303

FROM Harbin (Hanson) DATED Dec. 24, 1931.
TO _____ NAME _____ J-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Closing of the Chinese newspaper INTERNATIONAL:
It was closed by the Civil Administrator at
Harbin, principally for its criticism of recent
Japanese military movements in Manchuria.

fpg

793.94/3573

No. 5303

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, December 24, 1931.

SUBJECT: CLOSING OF THE CHINESE NEWSPAPER "INTERNATIONAL"

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the
information of the Department, a copy of my despatch
No. 2290, of even date, sent to the Legation on the
subject of closing of the Chinese newspaper INTERNA-
TIONAL at Harbin.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

1 enclosure as indicated.

891
SCG/sco

MC

No. 2299

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, December 24, 1931.

SUBJECT: CLOSING OF THE CHINESE NEWSPAPER "INTERNATIONAL"

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 2290, dated December 16, 1931, transmitting confidential press data on the local Chinese newspapers, and to report that the INTERNATIONAL, the leading and best Chinese daily in Harbin, was closed today by General Chang Ching Hui, Civil Administrator at Harbin, principally for its criticisms against the recent Japanese military movements in Manchuria. This paper, which was also the oldest Chinese newspaper in existence at Harbin, although believed to be a semi-official organ when first established, succeeded gradually to be more and more independent during the last ten years and, as the result, came to carry increasing weight with the Chinese reading public. As a business enterprise it also became a success.

Since the recent incidents took place in Manchuria, it apparently endeavored to strengthen its position as the leading Chinese organ in this section voicing Chinese

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

public opinion against the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, and thus won the enmity of the Japanese authorities, who are now working through General Chang Ching Hui to have the situation they desire in Harbin as in Mukden and Kirin. With the closing of this paper, the local vernacular press has been completely muzzled with the sole exception of the GREAT NORTHERN, a small Chinese daily owned and controlled by the Japanese.

Respectfully yours,

G. O. Hanson
American Consul General.

891
803/scc

Copies have been sent to the Department.

Mc

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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Respectfully yours,

G. G. Hanson
American Consul General.

891
SOG/sco

Copies have been sent to the Department.

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176
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01/455 FOR Despatch #-

FROM Mukden (Myers) DATED Dec. 24, 1931.

NAME 1-1127 ope

#510 to Legation, dated Dec. 22, 1931.

REGARDING: Non-display of Chinese National Flag in Mukden
since the Japanese occupation on Sept. 18th: Reports --
Japanese flags are still being displayed over some of
the government buildings. On occasion of celebration
of the formation of the Fengtien Provincial Government
a red flag, with characters signifying "Congratulations
on the Establishment of the Provincial Government of
Fengtien" was displayed above the Governor's house.
(Copy attached)

793.94/3574

frg

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. _____

AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL
 Mukden, China, December 24, 1931.

SUBJECT: Celebration of the Formation of the Fengtien
 Provincial Government.

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
 my despatch No. 510 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
 dated December 22, 1931, on the above subject.


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 510 to the
 Legation, Peiping, China.

HTW
 600



No. 510

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

December 22, 1931.

SUBJECT: Celebration of the formation of the
Lengtien Provincial Government.

The Honorable

Nelson Frusler Johnson,
American Legation,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to state that a reception was held yesterday at the governor's office in celebration of the formation of the new Lengtien Provincial Government, of which Tsang Shih-yi (臧式毅), the recent Provincial Chairman, formally assumed charge as Governor (Sheng Chang) on December 16, 1931. The reception was attended by some 200 guests, of whom about half were Japanese. The principal foreign guests were General Miyake, the Chief of Staff of General Honjo, Consul General Hayashi and the Soviet Consul General - the other Consuls did not attend. Speeches were made by Governor Tsang, the host, General Miyake, Consul General Hayashi and Yü Sh'ung-han, who is the head of the Self Government Direction Board. None of the speeches, as reported in the native press, is noteworthy. However, according to information supplied by a guest, Yü Sh'ung-

han

1

- 2 -

han, speaking for the people of Manchuria, characterized the old government (of Chang Kuang-liang) as base and venal and stated that its downfall was welcomed. Mr. Yu's close connection with Japanese interests - he is the Chinese head of the Chen Hsing Company, a Sino-Japanese concern which nominally operates the iron mines supplying ore to the Anshan Iron and Steel Works, an enterprise of the South Manchuria Railway Company - may explain his outspoken attack on the previous administration.


Mention may be made that the Chinese national flag has not been displayed in Mukden since the Japanese occupation on September 18th. On the occasion of this reception, above the governor's house a red flag bearing the characters signifying "Congratulations on the establishment of the Provincial Government of Fengtian" (慶祝奉天省政府成立) was displayed. Japanese flags are still being flown over some of the government buildings.

Respectfully yours,

K. G. Myers.
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MEM:ABG
800.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RADIOGRAM


BFS

January 7, 1932.

9:30 A. M.

From Paiping,

To The Adjutant General.



CONFIDENTIAL

Number 318. January 7th.

Reliable information [received from Tientsin 10:30 A.M.
January 7th that Japanese troops arrived two stations above
Shanhaikwan January 6th.] That Japan military reported taking
control of Shanhaikwan January 7th. [Japanese troops and warship
remain in present position.]

Margetts.

F/DEW

793.94/3575

EO. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
M. O. Gustafson
1973

JAN 25 1932

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176
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RADIOGRAM

BFS

January 7, 1932.

9:30 A. M.

From Tokio

To The Adjutant General.



CONFIDENTIAL

Number 208. January 7th.

[More like peace time atmosphere surrounding Japanese General Staff to-day.] Chinese troops retreated to area Shanhaikwan, Lan Chow, Tang Shan except 3d Cavalry Brigade to Jehol; [reference Japanese troops, 2d Division from Oyang to Kirin, 20th Division consisting of 37th, 39th and 8th Infantry Brigades from Suichun to Hsinmin, 4th Brigade Tsitsihar, Chan Chiatun;] Shanhaikwan occupied by troops from Tientsin; no military anti-Japanese movement expected in north China.

McIlroy

F/DEW 793.94/3576

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 20, 1932

Rec'd 4:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

100, January 20, 3 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"January 19, 3 p.m. In the course of desultory rifle firing by Chinese police last night Standard Oil Company storage tank was pierced by bullet. Resulting damage slight".

"January 19, 5 p.m.

One. Chinese officials confirm Chinese and Russian press reports of elimination of the Piphsien Government.

Two. Director of Radio and Telegraph Hsu Shih Fa, a prominent Kuomintang leader, resigned today due to Japanese pressure.

Three. Report confirmed that the staff of Japanese military mission in Harbin is being increased and will be headed by General Doihara within a week".

WSB-HPD

JOHNSON

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O.N.L. AND G.I.C.

F/DEW

793.94/3577

FILED

JAN 22 1932

793.94

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

FROM

MUKDEN

Dated January 20, 1932

Rec'd 2:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

January 20, 10 a. m.

Department's telegram January 15, 2 p. m.

URGENT. Harbor works account has not been settled.

In addition to four hundred thousand dollar check reported to
the Department, National City Bank now holds similar checks
aggregating two and a half million Chinese dollars. This
Consulate General is trying to secure payment of drafts
but the possibility of success is doubtful.

CONFIDENTIAL. National City Bank ^{estimated} ~~(having considered)~~
per cent of the reduction in gross business due to Japanese
occupation as follows: deposits 84 per cent, loans 90,
commercial credits 95, foreign exchange purchased 72,
foreign exchange sold 40 and sales of securities 100 per
cent. First two categories represent the gross fixed for
approximately five million yen. Under last four categories
bank estimates that the reduction in gross business will be
eight million seven hundred thousand dollars gold.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

Peiping

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated January 20, 1932

Rec'd 7:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

96, January 20, 11 a.m.

Following is summary of two telegrams from Consul

General, Nanking:

On 17th Peck and French Minister had interview with Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of which Chen said that former policy of Chinese Government was passive or even pro-Japanese policy and that certain members of Chinese Government, including himself, had now determined on an active policy. If carried out such policy would result in invoking Article sixteen of League Covenant, requesting conference of nine power signatories and rupture the diplomatic relations with Japan. He implied that a decision regarding all three measures was imminent and Peck inferred that these measures would be adopted and that Chen would resign unless diplomatic relations with Japan were severed.

Chen added that diplomatic questions would be decided by

the

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 20 1932
Department of State

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MET

3-#96 from Peiping, January 20,
11 a.m.

the emergency commission formed to act until the standing committee of the political council has been constituted.

On the following day Chen informed Peck that the Chinese Government had not yet definitely decided to take the three measures referred to above, as a rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan was strongly opposed by Chiang Kai Shek. Chen believed that Japan's occupation of Manchuria is intended to be permanent and that if China continues passive policy Japan will find pretexts for occupying Tientsin-Peiping and possibly other areas. Referring to financial matters Chen said that the gold conversion plan was being worked out but had not yet been fully decided. He would be surprised if Soong resumed his former post as Minister of Finance as Soong wanted to be Minister to France in order to promote large foreign loan. Chen was quite willing that he should have this appointment.

JOHNSON

RR-WSE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

Peiping

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated January 20, 1932

Rec'd 6:47 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

97, January 20, Noon.

Legation's 96, January 20, 11 a.m.

In conversation with Koo yesterday the latter asked me what chance there was of a conference under the Nine Power Treaty. I told him that I did not think there was any probability of the calling of such conference in the near future. He asked me if I did not think it wise for the Chinese to offer direct negotiations to the Japanese. I said I thought this was the thing that they should do. He asked me if I did not think it would put China in a more advantageous position, should such a conference be called, if the record showed that she had been willing to negotiate directly with the Japanese. I replied that I certainly thought the Chinese position in any case would be improved. He stated that it was his opinion that China should offer direct negotiations saying that if the Japanese should prove unreasonable in their demands China would still be in a position to appeal

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JAN 21 1932



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#97 from Peiping, January 20,
noon

to such a conference. Koo seemed pessimistic about the situation at Nanking and expressed himself as believing that those now in power were without any positive policy in this matter. He left for Nanking yesterday afternoon ostensibly to attend the funeral of his brother, but I believe with the idea that he is going to Hangohow to discuss the future with Chiang.

JOHNSON

RR-WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 20, 1932

Rec'd 3:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

99, January 20, 2 p.m.

Legation's 94, January 19, 6 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"January 19, 4 p.m.

A local Japanese newspaper reports this morning that the main points concerning the formation of the new government have been practically decided. They are briefly as follows:

One. The territory shall include the three northeastern provinces, Jehol and Mongolia, but for the present only the three northeastern provinces.

Two. Qualifications for citizenship.

Three. ^{Sovereignty} (4) shall rest with the people who shall elect a president.

The Government departments are Administrative, Justice and Inspectorate. Communications and Finance shall be

Chinese

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11 27 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#99 from Peiping via N.R.,
January 20, 1932.

Chinese directly responsible to the President, the selection of the President, it is thought, may be left to the three governors:

According to a press report Chang Ching Hui, Hsi Chia and Tang Yu Lin's representatives are expected to arrive at Mukden shortly to attend a conference regarding this matter.

Both Tsung Shih Yi and Chang Ching Hui are mentioned the ^{possible} ~~(2)~~ head of the new state. Indications seem to point to early developments in this connection.

JOHNSON

KLP-HPD

177
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated January 20, 1932

Rec'd 10:10 a. m.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 20 1932

Department of State

793.94
note
893.1025
Secretary of State,
Washington.

January 20, 5 p. m.

During the past week there have been at least three clashes between Chinese and Japanese, the most serious of which occurred early January 20th when a mob of Japanese set fire to a small Chinese factory just beyond settlement limits apparently as a reprisal for an attack on Japanese monks on January 18th. In the ensuing fracas one Chinese policeman of the International Settlement was killed and several wounded, also one Japanese killed and two others wounded. Japanese member of the Council has declared to council that Japanese were in the wrong and there will be probably no complications as regards the Settlement authorities but the presence in Shanghai of irresponsible elements among both Chinese and Japanese might easily provoke much more serious disobedience in the future.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

WSB

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JAN 26 1932

177
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 27, 1932.

~~MMH:~~
~~SKF:~~
~~RSM:~~

Mr. Peck transmits herewith memoranda of four conversations with various persons which took place in December about the time President Chiang Kai-shek resigned.

All four memoranda are interesting but if you do not have time to read them, I have tagged a few pages on which certain passages have been marked.

The page tagged "1" deals with Dr. Wellington Koo's views on the question of direct negotiations with Japan.

The page tagged "2" deals with Dr. Koo's remarks on the calling of a conference under the four power treaty rather than under the Nine Power Treaty.

The page tagged "3" deals with the fear of the foreign representatives sent by the League of Nations to China for their personal safety.

The page tagged "4" deals with a brief statement by a certain Dr. Loh of the five chief difficulties confronting the Nanking Government.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

No.D-173

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China.

JAN 19 32

December 24, 1931.

Subject: Difficulties Confronting the Chinese
National Government.

Copies hereof to be sent to Geneva

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Commercial Office (A-O/O)

Washington.

To

General

2/10/32

Sir:

As of possible interest to the Department, I have
the honor to enclose herewith Memoranda of conversations
held by me with various persons in regard to Chinese
political affairs, domestic and international, as follows:

- 1/ with Dr. Koo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, December 13;
the salient feature of this conversation was a suggestion
made by Dr. Koo (see pages 4, 5 and 6) that there be called
at Geneva, during the Disarmament Conference in February,
1932, a separate conference of representatives of the
signatories of the Nine Power Treaty, to settle the
controversy in regard to Manchuria;
- 2/ with various persons, December 14; this Memorandum
recounts the efforts made by the Consulate General to
verify a report that all the important officers of the
National Government were intending to leave the Capital
on the following day; in view of the fact that rather

General

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FEB 16 1932

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FEB 16 1932
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE

-2-

general credence was given to this report at the time,
I thought it worth while to go into considerable detail;

- 3/ with Dr. Loh Chia-luen, December 14; on page 1 are
set forth the principal difficulties confronting the
Chinese Government, which led many people to believe that
the officials of the Government might abandon their posts;
Dr. Loh's analysis of the Government's internal complica-
tions will probably interest the Department;
- 4/ with Dr. Loh Chia-luen; this Memorandum gives an eye-
witness account of the student fracas which attended the
resignation of President Chiang Kai-shek.

Respectfully yours,


Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:
Four, as already described.

Five copies to the Department.
Two copies to the Legation.

800
WRP-T

178

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No.D-173 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated December 24, 1931, on the subject: Difficulties Confronting the Chinese National Government.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 13, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Peck.

Mr. Peck said that Mr. Johnson was in Shanghai for the week-end and that he, Mr. Peck, was not acting for Mr. Johnson, but that a telegram had come from the Department which raised one or two points which he thought it desirable to mention to Dr. Koo.

Mr. Peck said that the Department was interested in the question of the neutral zone which it had been proposed to make near Chinchow. Mr. Peck said that he had observed press reports to the effect that the Chinese Government had more or less dropped this proposal. The Department might not be aware of this and Mr. Peck inquired of Dr. Koo what was, actually, the state of the proposal.

Dr. Koo said that Mr. Peck undoubtedly kept in close touch with public feeling in China and he confirmed the impression that the idea of a neutral zone had been dropped. Dr. Koo recalled that Mr. Peck had been present at the interview, on November 24, when Dr. Koo had outlined to the British, American and French Ministers the idea that Japan should give their Governments a guarantee, after which the Chinese would withdraw

their

- 2 -

their forces from this area. Mr. Koo and Mr. Peck then discussed, briefly, the circumstances of the misunderstanding which subsequently arose, to the effect that the Chinese Government had made a direct proposal to the Japanese Government in this connection. Mr. Koo said that the upshot of the whole matter was that the Chinese people were very strongly opposed to the idea of any neutral zone at all. The little corner of territory in which Chinchow is situated is all that remains in Manchuria under Chinese administration, and popular sentiment is unalterably opposed to any undertaking by the Chinese Government that its forces shall be withdrawn therefrom. Mr. Koo inquired of Mr. Peck, however, whether the State Department were especially interested in the idea of the neutral zone. Mr. Peck replied that the State Department was concerned over the possibility that there might be fighting in this area and the Department hoped very sincerely that some method might be arrived at which would prevent any hostilities around or concerned with Chinchow. Mr. Peck inquired of Mr. Koo whether he thought that the proposal might be revived with any prospect of success if the League of Nations were to be substituted for the three Governments first named in this connection.

Replying to Mr. Peck's question, Mr. Koo said that the Chinese people felt a greatly diminished confidence in the League of Nations and he thought they would not be inclined to place reliance on a guarantee given to the League.

Mr. Peck asked Mr. Koo what effect had been produced on the public mind in China by the publication of the League's resolution on December 9. Mr. Koo said the Chinese public was

not

- 3 -

not satisfied with the commission which the resolution provided should be sent to Manchuria, because the commission had merely power to report on the situation, and had no authority to decide anything. Mr. Koo said that China had been greatly disappointed by the resolution and by the handling of the Manchurian controversy by the Council of the League. He said that the question brought before the Council by China had been the military invasion of Manchuria by Japan, an action which was in violation not only of article XI of the League covenant, but also of the Kellogg Pact and of the Nine Power Treaty, which latter document guarantees the territorial integrity of China. Mr. Koo said that the Council, instead of dealing frankly with this issue, had apparently been swayed by the military power of Japan, and the resolution which it had passed on December 9 seems to have been framed with a view to providing the Council with a means of exit from its difficulty. The resolution did not deal with the question which had been brought before the Council by China at the beginning. Mr. Koo thought that the prestige of the League would have been greatly enhanced if it had expressed itself definitely in disapprobation of Japan's action, even though Japan subsequently had refused to abide by the Council's decision.

Mr. Peck then said that Mr. Koo might be interested in having a copy of some excerpts from a couple of messages sent by President Hoover to Congress, which excerpts related to the Manchurian controversy; also in a published statement made by the Secretary of State on December 10, relating to the same

subject.

- 4 -

subject. Mr. Peck observed that in giving a copy of these statements to Dr. Koo, as telegraphed by the Department, he was not giving him any confidential information, since these statements had been published, but still he thought Dr. Koo might like to have them. Dr. Koo said that he was glad to get the copy which Mr. Peck gave him, because the published accounts seemed rather fragmentary, and he then proceeded to read the copy handed to him by Mr. Peck. After reading the copy, Dr. Koo said that the statements made the position of the United States much clearer than it had been.

Dr. Koo asked Mr. Peck whether the Secretary of State really thought that China and Japan should negotiate directly for a settlement of the Manchurian controversy. Mr. Peck said that this evidently was the thought of the Secretary of State. He said that he had not seen any indication given by the Secretary of the precise method in which the negotiations might be initiated and conducted, but he thought that the Secretary was certainly of the opinion that Japan and China should find some way to discuss and settle the matter between themselves.

Dr. Koo observed that in the conversation with Mr. Peck he was merely following out lines of thought, and was not, of course, making any definite proposals. With this preface, Dr. Koo remarked that he carefully distinguished between the subjects which might come up in the course of discussions between China and Japan, if negotiations were to be opened. The first thing which would have to be discussed would be the matter of evacuation. When that had been settled doubtless there would be a number of other questions raised by Japan. It was anticipated

by

- 5 -

by the Chinese that the Japanese might take advantage both of their military occupation of Manchuria and of the opening of negotiations to raise many other issues, in addition to that of evacuation. Mr. Koo asserted that these other questions relating to Manchuria had a very profound and important interest for many nations besides China. They were in fact international questions and concerned especially international relations centering the Pacific area. For example, he said, if Japan were to remain in military occupation of Manchuria, far reaching effects would, or might, be produced on the relative situations of other nations in this area. Mr. Koo referred to the Four Power Treaty signed by the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan at Washington on December 18, 1921, relating to insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, and recalled that it was provided in that Treaty that if any controversy arose the contracting parties should convene a joint conference to consider and adjust the controversy. He said that the Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies had not provided so explicitly for a conference, but it seemed to him that this Manchurian controversy was of a type similar to the sort of difficulty foreseen in the Four Power Treaty and that it could best be settled by a joint conference of all the Powers concerned. Mr. Koo expressed the hope that this idea might be communicated to the Department of State for its consideration, not as a proposal, but simply as one of several possible methods of handling the matter.

Mr. Peck said that the Chinese had objected to the resolution of December 9 passed by the Council of the League, on the ground

that

- 6 -

that the procedure which it provided for would take a great deal of time to carry out, and that the lapse of time was advantageous to Japan, while disadvantageous to China. He asked whether it would not take a long time to convene the conference which Mr. Koo had suggested and whether, from China's standpoint, this would not be a disadvantage.

Mr. Koo remarked that in February, at Geneva, there would be held a disarmament conference, at which all the Powers concerned would be represented. He thought that it would be a comparatively simple matter to convocate a separate conference in Geneva at that time, just as was done at the Washington conference in connection with Pacific affairs. Mr. Koo said that it would greatly tend to pacify public opinion in China if the Chinese Government could announce that the controversy in Manchuria could be settled by a conference in Geneva, composed by representatives of nations having an actual interest in that region, instead of a merely academic interest, such as the League had.

Mr. Peck asked Mr. Koo to explain what he meant by the expression "the Powers concerned". He asked whether Mr. Koo meant those powers which might feel that they were economically interested in Manchuria, or whether he had some other classification in mind. Mr. Koo said that by "the Powers concerned" he meant those powers that are signatories of the Treaties mentioned by the President and the Secretary of State in their statements, of which a copy had just been handed to him.

(Note): While Mr. Koo thus included the Kellogg Briand Pact signatories in his classification, i.e., practically all the nations of the world, Mr. Peck inferred that he really had in mind the Nine Power Treaty signatories.)

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. D-173 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated December 24, 1931, on the subject: Difficulties Confronting the Chinese National Government.

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

December 14, 1931.

Subject: Possible Displacement of Present
Regime in Nanking.

On December 12, about 4 p.m. Mr. Dyer, an American adviser in the National Health Administration, called on Mr. Peck and informed him, confidentially, that Dr. J. Heng-liu, Director General of the National Health Administration, had told him and Dr. Borcie, of the same organization, that morning that practically all of the heads of the Government in Nanking had decided to resign their posts. Dr. Liu said that when this information was given to him, he had been told that he, Dr. Liu, must remain. Apparently he would be the only one thus remaining. All other important posts would be filled by appointees of the Canton faction.

Mr. Dyer said that it was rumored that this wholesale departure of political leaders from Nanking might take place on the day following, i.e., December 13, or possibly on December 14. Mr. Dyer said that he assumed Mr. Peck knew about this plan.

Mr. Peck said that he had not heard of this contemplated wholesale resignation, although he had been informed by a newspaper man (Reuters Bulletin Service W.R.P.) that the Canton Government leaders were meeting in Hongkong to discuss appointments to important posts in the Government at Nanking,

to

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to fill the place of the present incumbents. Mr. Peck said that he would at once endeavor to verify the report.

Mr. Dyer said that the immediate purpose of his call was to find out what plans for evacuation the Consulate General had made, since there might be disorders when the members of the Government left Nanking. Mr. Dyer said that the persons most alarmed were the foreign representatives sent by the League of Nations to assist the Chinese Government. He said that these representatives had been quartered in the building of the "Over-Seas Chinese Reception Hall", mainly so that they might easily be given police protection. Mr. Dyer said that it had been proposed to place some of these people in his residence, but he had succeeded in forestalling this.

Mr. Peck said that the Consulate General had an evacuation plan, of which Consul Meyer had charge, and he telephoned to Mr. Meyer's residence to ask him to come to the Consulate, but Mr. Meyer was out at the moment.

Mr. Peck excused himself from Mr. Dyer and arranged to call on the Mayor of Nanking, Mr. Wei Tao-ming.

Mr. Peck told the Mayor of the report which he had heard that practically all of the important members of the Government were about to resign, their places to be filled by Canton appointees, and he asked whether the Mayor thought this was true. The Mayor at first made a general denial of the report, but although he ultimately admitted that there was some basis for it, he insisted that nothing had been decided and that the members of the Government were still looking into the matter, with a view to deciding upon their

course

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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course of action. The Mayor said that, in any case, the change would not be a complete sweep, and would not be accompanied by any disturbance, since it would be a purely political measure, and not military. Mr. Peck remarked that he had a heavy responsibility in relation to the safety of American citizens in Nanking and he asked that the Mayor give him advance notice, if there seemed to be any prospect of trouble in Nanking. The Mayor promised to do this.

Mr. Peck said that he understood that General Chien Ming-shu had brought troops into the city. The Mayor said that not many of General Chien's troops were in the city, possibly a few thousand in or near the city, and that most of them were placed along the Shanghai-Nanking Railway.

On returning to the Consulate Mr. Peck telephoned to the French Minister, to inquire whether the latter had any information about the reported resignations. M. Wilden replied that he had heard on the morning of December 12, 1931, that these wholesale resignations were being considered, but he had no information to the effect that they had actually been decided upon. It was agreed that if either M. Wilden or Mr. Peck received definite information later, he would communicate with the other.

Mr. Peck likewise telephoned to the British Legation and talked with Mr. Price, Secretary to the British Minister. Mr. Price said that the British Minister had talked with Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo that morning, but that the Chinese

Minister

- 3 -

course of action. The Mayor said that, in any case, the change would not be a complete sweep, and would not be accompanied by any disturbance, since it would be a purely political measure, and not military. Mr. Peck remarked that he had a heavy responsibility in relation to the safety of American citizens in Nanking and he asked that the Mayor give him advance notice, if there seemed to be any prospect of trouble in Nanking. The Mayor promised to do this.

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Minister

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Minister for Foreign Affairs had made no reference to any proposed resignations. Mr. Price asked Mr. Teichman, Counselor of the British Legation, whether he had heard anything about the matter. Mr. Price told Mr. Peck that Mr. Teichman had not heard about the rumored resignations, and thought that the story might be merely a Chinese "face saving" device.

Mr. Peck tried to get in telephone communication with Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, or with his Secretary, Mr. M. Y. Tang, but was informed in English by the telephone operator at the Ministry of Finance central telephone exchange, that the Minister and everybody living in his house had gone to Shanghai that afternoon. Mr. Peck inquired whether Dr. Koo, or some of his secretaries, were not still living in Mr. Soong's residence, and was told that there was no one living in Mr. Soong's residence.

Mr. Peck telephoned to Dr. J. Heng-liu and without revealing to him the source of his information he asked Dr. Liu whether he might call upon him and discuss with him the report that certain members of the Government were about to leave Nanking. Dr. Liu hastily told Mr. Peck that he really knew nothing about the matter, that he had not heard of it. A little later, however, Dr. Liu said that the substitution of other officials for the present incumbents would not, in any case, be a substitution en bloc. Dr. Liu asked who had told Mr. Peck about the matter and Mr. Peck said that he had received information from several persons,

none

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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none of whom wished to be quoted. Mr. Peck said that the best informed of these persons had been a Chinese, who said that the matter of the resignations was "still under consideration". It was after this that Dr. Liu admitted that some such move was contemplated.

(Note: Mr. Peck felt that it was rather gratuitous for Dr. Liu to disclaim possession of the information which he had already given to Mr. Dyer and Dr. Borcic, but of course Mr. Peck did not show this irritation. W.R.P.)

Mr. Peck telephoned to Mr. Chao, Reuter representative in Nanking, and asked whether Mr. Chao had any confirmation of the rumored resignations. Mr. Chao said that he had heard that the matter was under consideration but he had not heard that it was so imminent as reported by Mr. Peck. He said that he would endeavor to look into the rumor and would inform Mr. Peck what he learned.

Mr. Peck telephoned to Dr. Borcic and the latter said that Dr. Liu had been told that the reported exodus of high officials was definitely going to take place. Dr. Borcic had heard nothing that would throw doubt on the credibility of the report.

Mr. Peck then sent a telegram to the Department summarizing the results of these investigations. The telegram was repeated to Mr. Johnson at Shanghai and to the Legation.

On Sunday December 13, Mr. Peck telephoned to Dr. Hsu Mo, of the Foreign Office and asked for an interview with Dr. Koo, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. After the lapse of considerable time Dr. Hsu Mo telephoned to Mr. Peck

saying

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saying that Dr. Koo would see Mr. Peck at 5 o'clock at the Officers' Moral Endeavor Association.

A separate memorandum has been prepared dealing with other subjects talked about in the conversation between Dr. Koo and Mr. Peck; but in regard to the rumored resignations Dr. Koo told Mr. Peck that the Canton faction had demanded that it be allowed to appoint certain important Government officials and that it was a possibility that the Nanking Government would "take in" some of the Southern leaders. Dr. Koo said that the Canton Government was, itself, split into two factions. In one of these factions Mr. Wang Ching-wei was the principal leader. The other faction was out principally for "Canton for the Cantonese". The latter faction was not especially interested in national affairs. He confirmed Mr. Peck's suggestion that General Chien Chi-tiang was the leader of the second faction, but he said that Hu Han-min was the most important person in it. If Southern leaders were taken into the Government at Nanking it would be from Mr. Wang Ching-wei's Party.

(Note: Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, accompanied by Dr. Rajchman, adviser from the League of Nations, and by other personnel, had left Nanking by airplane for Shanghai at 4 p.m. December 12. One theory propounded was that he had gone to Shanghai to meet the Southern representatives, Sun Fo and others, to arrange the distribution of the posts to be given to Canton. W.R.P.)

Mr. Peck asked Dr. Koo whether he, Dr. Koo, would be one of the persons replaced by a Southern appointee. Dr. Koo gave no definite reply to this question but did say that he had been told by some of the very persons who were fomenting

the

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the student agitations that although Dr. Koo was the principal target for their attacks, they had no particular grudge against him; that the attacks were designed to overthrow the Government, and were not intended to single out Dr. Koo, since he was merely utilized as a target for the attack on the Government as a whole.

Dr. Koo did not appear to be willing to discuss the political situation in concrete terms and he told Mr. Peck that he must not be quoted in reference to anything he had said about the "internal situation".

(Note: The whole subject of the contemplated resignations is being kept extremely secret and it is evident either that the plans have not been made, or that all those persons who may know about them are afraid to discuss them. W.R.P.)

Mr. Dyer dined at the Consulate on the evening of December 13. Questioned by Mr. Peck he said that Dr. J. Heng-liu still insisted that the wholesale resignations would take place, but Dr. Liu insisted that strict secrecy be observed by Mr. Dyer and Dr. Borcia, to whom Dr. Liu had given some information regarding the matter.

Mr. Vaughan, of the Standard Oil Company, likewise dined at the Consulate and told Mr. Peck privately that Mr. Perry Hutton, the American operator of the private airplane of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, had told Mr. Vaughan that there would be a wholesale departure of Government leaders from Nanking. Mr. Perry Hutton said that Mrs. V. K. Wellington Koo had come by airplane to Nanking from Peiping and had intended to return to Peiping, but on December 12 had suddenly changed her mind and gone to Shanghai instead. Mr. Perry Hutton told Mr. Vaughan that

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he had been sent back to Peiping, but he expected to be ordered to return to Nanking almost immediately and that he expected also to take away some of the important leaders from Nanking, when he should arrive.

About 11 a.m. December 14, Mr. Vaughan telephoned to Mr. Peck that the Standard Oil Company had just received a telegram from Mr. Perry Hutton stating that he would arrive in Nanking from Peiping on December 14. Mr. Vaughan said that he supposed Mr. Perry Hutton expected to take away some of the Government personnel and if he, Mr. Vaughan, received any further news he would at once inform Mr. Peck.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. D-173 of Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated December 24, 1931, on the subject: Difficulties Confronting
the Chinese National Government.

Memorandum of Conversation

December 14, 1931.

Subject: The Dangerous Situation of the Chinese
Government.

Dr. Loh Chia-luen, of the Central Political Institute,
Nanking.
Mr. Peck, Counselor of Legation.

Dr. Loh and Mr. Peck conversed for an hour and a
half. Observations made by Dr. Loh in regard to the
dangerous situation in which the Chinese Government
now finds itself may be summarized as follows:

The National Government (1) is practically with
out money, (2) it is menaced by well-organized Communism,
entrenched in the very heart of the country and working
relentlessly to overthrow the republican form of Govern-
ment, (3) it is struggling to overcome the effects of
a colossal flood in recent months, which has entailed
tremendous suffering and roused a feeling of mutinous
discontent among the masses, (4) it has struggled for
almost three months to recover its rights in Manchuria
and is now bearing the odium of having adopted a futile
policy, and (5) it is sinking under a nation-wide
political attack, undeserved, but carried out in a way
which practically precludes any measures in self-defense.

Dr. Loh elaborated each of these points as follows:

(1)

-2-

(1) Finances. Without going to the causes of the Government's financial stringency, Dr. Loh said that the Government had had to borrow from the Chinese public in the last few years between \$700,000,000 and \$800,000,000. Most of these bonds are outstanding and must be met. The necessary economies put in force by the Government have inevitably fomented discontent and disloyalty. For example, the pay of a Colonel in the army is not more than \$60.00 per month, and in the lower grades of commissioned officers, such as Captains and Lieutenants, goes as low as \$20.00 per month. On this scale of pay officers are unable to keep their heads above water, or to support their families, and are necessarily trying to "think a way out". This money difficulty hampers the Government in every sort of activity.

(2) Communism. Economic distress among the masses of the people, caused by floods, boycotts, wars, banditry, etc., renders them, just as in the case of the officers in the army, desperate. In this mood they instinctively blame the National Government and quite naturally are trying to find some way out of their distress. This makes them extremely receptive to Communist propaganda. Communism is well-organized, both in respect of those areas in which Soviet Governments have been set up and are functioning, as in Kiangsi and Hupeh, and in respect of the methods through which it injects its propaganda into the mass of the population, the student and working classes, etc.

(3) Floods. The tremendous difficulty which the Government is meeting in trying to alleviate the

destitution

-3-

destitution of tens of millions of flood sufferers is so well-known that Dr. Loh did not take time to go into that.

(4) The Manchurian Controversy. The military invasion of Manchuria by Japan has roused the people again to the danger to be feared from Japan's predatory designs on China. This fear and resentment would find natural expression in armed retaliation. The reasoning is that even if the Chinese should lose in their fight with Japan and the Japanese should, as a result, rob China of Manchuria, nevertheless to fight would be better than to suffer this loss without a struggle, for in the latter event Manchuria will be only the first of Japan's thefts. Japan will be undeterred by any consideration of caution, and Shantung will be the next occupied area, to be followed by Fukien, etc. As opposed to the policy of fighting for their just rights and national existence, the National Government has steadily adhered to a policy of trusting to the League of Nations to bring about the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the territory they have occupied. In so doing, in the popular estimation, the National Government has met with lamentable failure, for the Japanese troops have not withdrawn, nor is there a time limit set for their withdrawal. Not only that, Japan is even insisting that Chinese troops shall be withdrawn from the Chinchow area, the last remaining fragment of territory in Manchuria controlled by China.

(5) Political Attack. Utilizing the Manchurian

diplomatic

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diplomatic defeat as the pretext, various forces seeking the over-throw of the National Government have fomented a nation-wide attack on the Government, manifested principally through the student agitations. The Government has not lost its hope in the international method of protecting its rights in Manchuria, but it is impossible to convince the general public, who base their conviction of failure on the facts as they exist today in Manchuria, almost three months after the first Japanese invasion, at Mukden. The hordes of students are unarmed; generally they refrain from violence. If the Government were to shed their blood, it could not survive the indignation that would follow. The public feels that, somehow, the students are being utilized and may be deluded, but nevertheless their motives are patriotic, and they must not be wounded or killed. The thousands of students not only descend physically on the Capital and everywhere obstruct means of communication, etc., but they are fatally lowering the prestige of the Government by their fault-finding. The Government must have some respect from the people if it is to be able to function successfully. Now, in the eyes of a large portion of the public, so far as concerns Manchuria, it stands convicted of failure and stupidity, not to mention cowardice and readiness to allow Japan to continue robbing China until the nation is extinguished.

These five causes have so lowered the National Government in the respect and regard of the Chinese

people

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people that it would seem almost inevitable that the present leaders of the Government give up in despair, unless, in some way, that Government can get some credit in the eyes of the public. Apparently, the present leaders will not be able to bring this about themselves; the process of sinking has gone too far. If some assistance could come from the outside, the Government could then carry on again.

Dr. Loh, in reply to a question, said that he feared if President Chiang Kai-shek resigned there would be a nation-wide debacle. He feared that unified control of the armed forces throughout the provinces, already weak, would in that event completely disappear, and wars of all dimensions would ensue, producing chaos. Dr. Loh could not think of any other individual to whom the rank and file of the provincial military leaders would feel loyalty. He did not think the Government, itself, at this stage of the game would command their loyalty.

Dr. Loh said that President Chiang Kai-shek was debating the question of his resignation. Naturally, his own impulse was to step aside and let some one else, who might feel himself more capable, shoulder the burden. If they stepped aside at this juncture, under universal attack, President Chiang and his associates would save their reputations, since they would resign in deference to popular demand, whereas to continue meant only added difficulties and less appreciation.

WRP:MCL

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch No. D-173 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated December 24, 1931, on the subject: Difficulties Confronting the Chinese National Government.

Memorandum of Conversation.

December 15, 1931.

Subject: Resignation of President Chiang Kai-shek.

Dr. Loh Chia-luen, of the Central Political Institute.
Mr. Peck, Counselor of Legation.

At the invitation of Dr. Loh Mr. Peck called on him at 4 p.m.

Dr. Loh gave the following account of the resignation of President Chiang Kai-shek. On December 5, 1931, Mr. Hu Han-min, who had identified himself with the seceding faction at Canton and is now in Canton, sent a telegram to President Chiang Kai-shek saying that if the latter did not resign, the Cantonese would set up a separate government at Canton. President Chiang, after much consideration, then submitted his resignation to the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party and urged that it be accepted, on the ground that he wanted to bring about internal peace at any price. The Central Executive Committee met this morning at the Central Party Headquarters and after deliberating over the matter for two or three hours, decided to accept President Chiang's resignation and appoint Mr. Lin Sen, President of the Legislative Yuan as Acting President of the Government. This is in accordance with the Provisional Constitution, since President Chiang was also

President

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President

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President of the Executive Yuan, and that post having become vacant, the President of the Legislative Yuan is the next in succession. General Ch'en Ming-shu was appointed to be Acting President of the Executive Yuan.

Matters had reached this stage, about 11:30 a.m., when the students, after doing considerable damage to a part of the Foreign Office buildings, arrived in a great crowd at the Central Party Headquarters and demanded admittance. This was refused by the policemen at the main entrance, and these policemen were then overpowered by the students, who made their way into the main enclosure. There they were opposed by some of the officers of the Party Headquarters, the latter being unprovided with armed guards, at least at that time. The members of the Central Executive Committee, learning of the disturbance, sent two of their number, Dr. Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and General Ch'en Ming-shu, out to quell it. These two men were at once surrounded by the students and beaten. Dr. Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei suffered severe injuries and is now in the Central Hospital. General Ch'en, likewise, suffered an injury, from a blow on the head.

The students were armed with wooden clubs and iron bars and at least one revolver. This weapon was seized by the police who finally came in force and fired warning shots in the air, thus finally dispersing the students. In the meantime, however, at least three shots were fired by the students, presumably from the revolver in question, although the details have not been

learned

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learned as yet. It is significant to note that in the first ranks of the students were some with red arm bands and with a red flag, the latter, also, having been seized. These students professed themselves to be Communists. All the students were released. The object of the students seems to have been to bring about the arrest or injury of some of their number, so that the Government could be accused of perpetrating an "atrocious" on students.

WRP:MCL

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

793.94

NOTE

SEE 894.00/341 FOR # 440

FROM Japan (Forbes) DATED Dec 30, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Appointment of Prince Kanin, as Chief of the General Staff of the Japanese Army, it is thought will curb the activities of certain junior officers which has been difficult since the beginning of the Manchurian affair.

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By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Nanking/46 FOR #D-166

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Dec. 18, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: the Manchurian situation.

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3. MANCHURIAN CRISIS

The League of Nations Council met again on November 16 under the chairmanship of M. Briand, French Foreign Minister. Meetings, public and private, continued intermittently until the end of November with no resolution adopted. Before and during the session, information available in Nanking was to the effect that Japanese troops engaged in further aggressive acts in an attempt to seize the whole of Manchuria. Following November 8, the peace of the native city of Tientsin was disturbed, and the Japanese were suspected of having engineered the disturbances. The Chinese military authorities tried to restore order, but were not entirely successful.

General Ma Chan-shan, who was during the month appointed Vice-Commander of the Manchurian "Defence Army", and Acting Chairman and later Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, was greatly honored by people in the Nanking consular district and elsewhere as "the only military leader who had performed his duty by defending the country." With the interruption of traffic on the Taonan-Angangchi Railway, however, General Ma could receive no supply of munitions and food stuffs. He was also deprived of his principal source of revenue from that railway with which to pay his soldiers. Reinforcements, even if they were actually despatched, could not reach Heilungkiang without first engaging the Japanese forces or Mongolian bandits, and General Ma was, therefore, credited with having put up a good fight even after the loss of Tsitsihar on November 18.

A stream

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A stream of telegrams were received by the Government authorities in Nanking requesting that reinforcements be sent to General Ma. The telegrams stated that this could not be taken to mean that China was declaring war against Japan. It meant only that China was acting in self defence against the violation of her territories, which was entirely legitimate. Similar telegrams were reported to have been received by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, Vice Commander-in-Chief of the National Forces, who, also, took no action in the matter and who was thus denounced by the public for his disloyalty to the country. Unsuccessful in inducing the National Government to render immediate assistance to General Ma, a campaign for funds in aid of the Heilungkiang provincial troops was launched by Chinese public bodies in practically all of the cities in the Nanking consular district and elsewhere. The remittances were first made through the Bank of China and other Chinese-owned banks. Fearing that the remittances might be seized by Japanese troops in the same manner as the salt revenue was detained, the money was later remitted through the branches of the National City Bank of New York (American) and the Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation (British) at Harbin, so the reports said. All remittances were accompanied by messages "commending and comforting" General Ma for the gallant fight which troops under his command had put up against the Japanese invaders, and urging them to continue their resistance with a view to frustrating the attempt of the Japanese to seize the Three Eastern Provinces.

Simultaneously,

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Simultaneously, numerous student bodies from different parts of the country came to Nanking petitioning the Government to declare war against Japan and demanding that severe punishments be given to those high military officers who had allowed the Japanese invaders to seize Chinese territories, without offering resistance. The students also questioned the Chinese diplomatic authorities in regard to the truth of the rumors concerning "direct negotiations with Japan", "neutral area in Manchuria" and "foreign control of Tientsin." The students were on practically all occasions received. The uniform answers of the Government authorities were: (1) that the Government would take most effective measures to defend the country should the League of Nations fail to reach a fair and just settlement; (2) that the rumors referred to above were either Japan's proposals to the League or her propaganda; and (3) that students should continue to study hard in order to prepare themselves to serve the country at a future date. At the Fourth National Congress of Kuomintang Delegates, General Chiang Kai-shek stated that he would personally proceed to the North to cope with the situation. This gave rise to inquiries, by telegrams and in person, in respect of the exact date of Chiang's departure. His only reply, so far made public, has been that he will leave the Capital immediately after the adjournment of the forthcoming First Plenary Session of the new Fourth Central Executive Committee which will be convened in Nanking late in December, 1931, or early in January, 1932. It was understood that many other student bodies were to come to Nanking for the same purpose early in December.

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NOTE

SEE 893.00/11725 FOR #D-171

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Dec. 23, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING: Chinchow situation. Statement of General Wu
Tieh-cheng in regard to the attack on Chin-
chow by the Japanese. He stated that if Marshal
Chang Hsueh-liang should surrender Chinchow
without resistance he would be politically dead.

793.94/3586

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11725 FOR #D-171

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Dec. 23, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 o r o

REGARDING: Chinchow situation. Statement of General Wu Tieh-cheng in regard to the attack on Chinchow by the Japanese. He stated that if Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should surrender Chinchow without resistance he would be politically dead.

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D-171

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nankiang, China.

December 22, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Meeting of the Fourth Central
Executive Committee of the
Chinese Nationalist Party and
the General Condition of the
National Government.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

ir:

I have the honor to refer to my confidential
1/ telegram No. 131 of December 22, 1941, and to enclose
herewith a copy of my despatch to the Legation at
Peking, No. 131 of December 23, 1941, on the subject
"Meeting of the Fourth Central Executive Committee
of the Chinese Nationalist Party and the General
Condition of the National Government".

Respectfully yours,

Willis L. Beck.
American Consul General.

enclosure:

1/ As described.

In quintuplicate to the Department.

800

RP:ACH

L-151

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate General,
Nanking, China.

December 23, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Meeting of the Fourth Central Executive
Committee of the Chinese Nationalist
Party and the General Condition of the
National Government.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister,
Nanking.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my confidential
telegram of December 22, 1931, 11 p.m., repeating my
telegram No. 151 of the same date to the Department of
State, in regard to the meeting of the Fourth Central
Executive Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party
and the general condition of the National Government.

1/ In this connection I have the honor to enclose
a Memorandum of conversation held by me on the evening
of December 22, 1931, with Mr. C. H. Donald, British,
adviser to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, and with General
Ku Tieh-sheng, Member of the Central Executive Committee

21

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of the Nationalist Party of China, who has
been elected Secretary General of the present
sessions of the Committee. The telegram
refers to was based, in part, on the
conversation of which the enclosed Memorandum
is a summary.

Respectfully yours,

Willys L. Peck
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ as described.

In duplicate to the Legation.
In quintuplicate to the Department.

ROC

WLP:ECR

Memorandum of Conversation

December 22, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Meeting of the Central Executive Committee
of the Nationalist Party. Threatened
Japanese attack on Chinchow.

Mr. V. H. Donald.
General Wu Tieh Cheng.
Mr. Peck.

On the evening of December 22, 1931, Mr. Donald was in Nanking and dined with Mr. Peck. He informed Mr. Peck that Mr. V. C. Wellington Koo and Mr. Loh Wen-kan had left Nanking that day for Shanghai on the mail plane. He was very anxious to get in touch with General Wu Tieh-cheng, of the Central Executive Committee, in order to serve as a medium of communication between the latter and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, and by arrangement he called on General Wu and left a request from Mr. Peck that General Wu come to the Consulate General for dinner, or, in default of that, that he come to see Messrs. Donald and Peck after dinner.

General Wu arrived after dinner. He said that the Central Executive Committee had organized on December 22, the same day, by electing a presidium of seven members and had appointed six standing committees, to handle bills relating to the principal categories of subjects, such as Political, Military, Diplomatic, Financial, etc. He said that no decision had been made as to the choice of officials

for

- 2 -

for the reorganized Government, except that an "arrangement" had been come to whereby Dr. Sun Fo would be President of the Executive Yuan, and as such practically Prime Minister, since under the reorganization the President of the National Government would have little, if any, actual power. The President of the Executive Yuan would nominate the members of his Cabinet. He thought Dr. C. C. Ku might be the next Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said nothing had been decided about the other Ministers. He said that during the sessions of the Central Executive Committee, the National Government would not hold its usual meetings and he remarked, quite loudly, that there was at the moment in Nanking "no Government". He said that the Central Executive Committee would hold preparatory meetings on December 23, as it had on December 22, and that there would be three regular meetings on December 24, 25 and 26, after which the sessions would end. In the course of these sessions the Organic Law of the National Government would be altered and the personnel of the reorganized Government selected.

In regard to the attack on Chinchow by the Japanese, which seemed to be threatening, he said that if Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should surrender Chinchow without resistance he would be politically dead, and that the same thing was true of the National Government, for the sentiment of the entire country was bitterly opposed to such a course.

When Mr. Donald asked whether the National Government would send military assistance to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang

in

- 3 -

in case the latter had to defend Chinchow against a Japanese attack, General Ku asked what Japan would do if the National Government brought troops from the South to reinforce the Chinchow garrison. He inquired whether Japan would not consider it a declaration of war and blockade and seize all the sea ports of China. Mr. Donald remarks that China must under no circumstances declare war against Japan, but it would be justified in resisting in self-defense. General Ku called attention to the fact that the only route by which reinforcements could be sent to Chinchow from inside the Gobi would be by way of Jehol, for the Japanese naval vessels could easily destroy the railway at Shanhaikwan and Chinsungtoo by shell fire. Mr. Peck expressed some doubt whether the garrison at and near Chinchow, which Mr. Donald thought numbered about thirty thousand, would actually resist the Japanese to the extent of complete annihilation. General Ku thought they could be relied on to resist and Mr. Donald said they could retreat under pressure. In fact, he said, military considerations would compel the garrison to retreat some distance from Chinchow at the very outset, owing to the fact that at Chinchow the terrain was not favorable for making a defense.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 16, 1932
JAN 18 1932

Mr. Secretary:

In response to your inquiry
with regard to China's sovereignty
in relation to Manchuria, I submit
materials hereunder.

A revised and amended
memorandum will come forward later.

SKH-ZMF

SKH/ZMF


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 13, 1932.

Manchuria: Relation to China Proper
and China's Sovereignty thereover.



It is felt that recognition by Japan of China's sovereignty over Manchuria is adequately implied from point of view of formal evidence, in provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905, between Japan and Russia and the Treaty of Peking of December 22, 1905, between China and Japan.

Particular attention is invited to Articles III-VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth and, in connection therewith, Article I of the Peking Treaty. (Copies of these Articles appear hereunder.)

F/DEW

793.94/3587

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PORTSMOUTH TREATY

JAPAN-RUSSIA, SEPTEMBER 5, 1905.

"Art. III. Japan and Russia mutually engage:

1. To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of additional Article I. annexed to this Treaty; and

2. To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

"Art. IV. Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

"Art. V. The Imperial Russian Government transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and adjacent territory and territorial waters and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease and they also transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above mentioned lease.

The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

The Imperial Government of Japan on their part undertake that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

"Art. VI. The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Changchun (Kuancheng-tzu) and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all coal mines in the said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TREATY OF PEKING

CHINA-JAPAN, DECEMBER 22, 1905.

"Article I. The Imperial Chinese Government consent to all the transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan by Articles V and VI of the Treaty of Peace above mentioned."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 14, 1932.

MANCHURIA: SOVEREIGNTY

Reference to, at Washington Conference.

Examination of the proceedings of the Washington Conference does not disclose any specific statement on the subject of China's sovereignty in reference to Manchuria. However, in a statement made by Baron Shidehara in reference to the Sino-Japanese treaties and agreements of 1915, in reference expressly to those which relate to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, Baron Shidehara said:

"In coming to this decision, which I have had the honor to announce, Japan has been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation, having always in view China's sovereign rights and the principle of equal opportunity."

(Reference: CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF
ARMAMENT, page 328.)

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 14, 1932.

MANCHURIA: SOVEREIGNTY

Statements of Secretary of State Kellogg.

In 1928, the Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg,
made statements with regard to Manchuria, as follows:

At the press conference on May 19, 1928:

"The United States recognizes Manchuria
as Chinese territory."

At the press conference on May 21, 1928:

" Manchuria is a part of China
and we assume that when the Treaty (Nine-
Power Treaty) provided for the policies to
be pursued by the Powers as to China, it
covered Manchuria." ". . . . We have not
heard any country deny that Manchuria was
a part of China."

At the press conference on May 24, 1928:

"The correspondent observed that the
Secretary had stated he regarded Manchuria
as Chinese territory. The Secretary said
that the fact was generally conceded"

At the press conference on August 1, 1928:

"The Secretary stated he had merely
said that Manchuria was a part of China, and
that Japan conceded that there never was any
question about it."

FE:SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 14, 1932.

MANCHURIA: SOVEREIGNTY
Statements regarding --
Statement of Secretary of State Stimson

A. Manchuria has been recognized as part of the Nanking Government and the Nanking Government is suzerain, sovereign, so to speak, to Manchuria, but you know all China is in a state of flury. That is one of the elements of this problem.

Q. That sovereignty is purely nominal.

A. I don't know. I don't pass judgment. I don't think you could say purely nominal. It is tenuous.

Q. It is the only Government you and the League of Nations has been dealing with.

A. All anybody has been dealing with. The Government of Nanking is the only Government of China recognized by any nations of the world that I know of.

(SOURCE: Memorandum of Press Conference at Woodley, Wednesday, November 25, 1931, page 12.)

FE:SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 14, 1932.

MANCHURIA: SOVEREIGNTY

Statement of Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshizawa.

Recently the new Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yoshizawa, is reported to have expressed himself as follows:

Does "China" include "Manchuria"? Victor Keen, telegraphing from Mukden on January 9 to the NEW YORK HERALD-TRIBUNE (see Sunday, January 10, edition) gives the following account of his interview with Mr. Yoshizawa, who was passing through Mukden en route to Tokyo to assume the office of Japanese Foreign Minister:

"Does Japan still consider Manchuria part of China as respects the nine-power treaty and other pacts relating to it?" the correspondent asked Mr. Yoshizawa.

"Unhesitatingly and emphatically he replied: 'Certainly.'"

"Asked whether the Japanese army's recent operations in Manchuria constituted a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty in his opinion, he said he must have time for a thorough technical study of the treaty and other data before replying. 'It is a difficult and important question,' he said."

The NEW YORK TIMES (Sunday, January 10) carries an AP despatch from Mukden of the same date to the same effect.

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COPY:AT

MANCHURIA: SOVEREIGNTY

December 12, 1931.

Statements of Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg
in Regard to the Sovereignty of Manchuria. (CI Subject:
Japan's Right in Manchuria).

The following are excerpts from reports of Press

Conferences:

May 19, 1928. At the press conference today the Secretary said:

A correspondent inquired concerning the attitude of the United States toward Japan's assuming the power to exclude the Chinese Government from Manchuria. The Secretary replied that the Government of the United States had not taken any position on that question at all.

A correspondent asked concerning our past policy in Manchuria and inquired whether we recognized any special claim of Japan in that country. The Secretary replied in the negative. He added that Mr. Lansing, in his note, did recognize a certain claim, but that note was cancelled at the time of the Washington Conference. The United States recognizes Manchuria as Chinese territory. The Secretary further stated that of course we did not deny the legal ownership of the lease of the South Manchurian railroad, running from Dairen north to a junction with the Chinese Eastern, for a certain term of years. The exact number of years was not certain, the Japanese insisting it was for 99 years and the Chinese claiming the lease expired in 1936 or 1937.

May 21, 1928. At the press conference today the Secretary said:

At the press conference this morning a correspondent inquired whether the statement made by the Shanghai correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES that the Powers at the Washington Conference agreed that Manchuria was an integral part of China, was specifically true. The Secretary said he could not state whether there was

anything

- 2 -

anything bearing particularly on Manchuria in the discussions of the Washington Conference, since he had not examined those discussions for a long time. He added that Manchuria is a part of China and he assumed that when the treaty provided for the policies to be pursued by the Powers as to China, it covered Manchuria. A correspondent inquired whether the United States Government has brought to the attention of the Japanese Government the fact that it considers Manchuria Chinese territory. The Secretary replied in the negative.

A correspondent inquired whether, when Japan or any other country issues a warning to the warring factions in China that neither side can enter Manchuria while fighting, that would not be interference with the administrative control of that section of China. The Secretary declined to comment. A correspondent inquired whether, not for quotation but merely as a background, the Secretary could state whether the attitude of the United States in regard to Japan's right in Manchuria is the attitude of the other Powers as well, Great Britain and France in particular, or whether they support Japan's position. The Secretary said he had not heard any country deny that Manchuria was a part of China. He added that he did not know the attitude of the other Governments towards Japan's declaration and he did not care to speculate on the subject.

May 24, 1928. At the press conference today the Secretary said:

A correspondent observed that the Secretary had stated he regarded Manchuria as Chinese territory. The Secretary said that fact was generally conceded, but that from that statement someone must have drawn conclusions he did not make.

August 1, 1928. At the press conference today the Secretary said;

He said CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR PUBLICATION the attitude of the United States has not changed as to the legal position of Manchuria, that the attitude of the United States has never changed on this subject. The Secretary said that what he said before was entirely misunderstood in Japan. The Secretary stated that he had merely said that Manchuria was a part of China, and that Japan conceded that there never was any question about it. He added that his statement was twisted around
and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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and misquoted and it got out that he said they had no interests in Manchuria. The Secretary remarked that Chamberlain of the British Foreign Office said, of course, Manchuria was part of China, and that his statement had not attracted any attention. The Secretary said his remarks were not for publication because he did not want to get the matter stirred up again. The Secretary said there was no question but that the South Manchuria Railroad until 1939 belonged to Japan - that no one doubts that and that China does not.

RFB/REK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

14
THE UNDER SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 21 1972
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
I-20-32

French Reply

Endorsed I would take it that
(a) this has come by mail
or messenger, and
(b) it requires no



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acknowledgment
JAN 22 1972
W. L. H. S. K. 14
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMBASSADE
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
AUX ÉTATS-UNIS



JAN 21 32



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JAN 22 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

F/DEW

793.94/3588

The President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, agrees entirely with His Excellency the Secretary of State on the principles recalled by the American note of January 7th to the Japanese and Chinese Governments and on the treaties and pacts to which the note refers itself.

Mr. Briand himself, acting as President of the Council of the League of Nations, has taken advantage of the definitive constitution of the Commission of Inquiry to notify, on the 14th of this month, this decision to the members of the Council, including Japan and China. He recalled the important commitments stated in the two unanimous

resolutions

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JAN 27 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

resolutions of the Council indicating that those commitments remained a formal guarantee against the pursuing of all territorial ambitions in Manchuria and that they permit us to judge as strictly temporary an exceptional situation which must normally end as soon as possible under the conditions stated in the resolution of September 30th.

Concerning the question of the open door in Manchuria, the statement made on this subject by the representative of Japan on October 30th during the public sitting of the Council of the League of Nations is in accord with the stipulations of the treaty of February 6th, 1922 and the Japanese Government confirmed its terms in the declaration annexed to the note which it remitted on December 27th to the French Ambassador in Tokyo.

Under the circumstances, the notification made on January 14th to the members of the Council seems to be the best way to parallel the recent step of the Secretary of State. /.

Washington, January 19th, 1932.

P. H. B.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Hankow/54 FOR #76

FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED Dec. 12, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Feeling that the prolonged tranquillity in the treaty
ports of the Yangtze Valley is directly connected with
the Sino-Japanese controversy in Manchuria.

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793.94/3589

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

773,941
3. Manchurian Situation:

November, as already indicated, passed without serious incidents in the treaty ports of the Hankow consular district. One cannot escape feeling that this prolonged tranquillity in the treaty ports of the Yangtze Valley is directly connected with the Sino-Japanese controversy in Manchuria. It is probably due to the real effort which the Chinese authorities

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authorities in the various ports are making to avoid the possibility of any incidents that could give rise to military action by the Japanese.

Near the end of October the Japanese consuls at Kiukiang and Hankow requested detailed information on the subject of American residents in Kiangsi and Hupeh. The Japanese Consul General at Hankow requested the number and sex of Americans residing in the French Concession, and in each of the Special Administrative Districts, as well as in the Chinese city of Hankow and in Wuchang, Hanyang, and other ports of Hupeh. The Japanese authorities have not during past years asked for such information and the requests were considered to be of sufficient interest to be telegraphically reported to the Department and the Legation. It is of course possible that the requests had only a routine origin. But the detailed nature of the information desired also indicated that the Japanese might be envisaging the possibility of military action in this area. As was shown in last month's report, it appears at Hankow to be within the realm of reasonable surmise that conditions in Japan, the close economic bonds between China and Japan, and the painful pressure being brought to bear upon Japan by the struggles of the Chinese to sever these economic bonds, may force upon Japan the course of military action in the Yangtze Valley.

November plainly showed, however, that the Chinese in this area are themselves carrying a heavy financial

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TRANSFERRED TO 793.94 COMMISSION/34

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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burden as a result of their determined boycott of Japanese goods. Chinese banks in Wuhan, Shesi, Ichang, and Changsha were caught with a good many millions of dollars loaned on the security of unsalable Japanese goods. This embarrassing situation has been aggravated by the calling in by Shanghai Chinese banks of local and outport loans and by the withdrawal of silver from banks in the middle Yangtze region by depositors who fear for the safety of their funds, not only because of the situation in which the banks find themselves, but because of nervous uncertainty over the outcome of the present strained relations between China and Japan. The result has been a considerable number of Chinese bank failures in the four ports mentioned. The banks which were strong enough to survive have been forced to curtail severely their normal activities.

Japanese naval forces at Hankow at the end of November consisted of eight vessels as compared with nine at the end of October.

1837

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

JAN 21 1932

DIVISION OF

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 21, 1932

Rec'd 3:30 a. m.

COPIES SENT TO
O. N. I. AND M. I.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

102, January 21, 11 a. m.

Legation's 9⁰⁰, January 20, 4 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"January 20, 5 p. m. Supplementing my January 19,
4 p. m., a Japanese extra of yesterday published a hearsay
list of the officials of the new State which contained no
new names except Ma Chan Shan's as Heilungkiang divisions.
Tsung Shih Yi was listed as head of the Administration
Department as well as local Governor. No president was
named.

Inquiries have failed to elicit any definite information
regarding this movement which however is generally known to
be positive. Pu-Yi is also named as the possible head and
the date of inauguration is given as about February 11th."

JOHNSON

WSB

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JAN 21 1932

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 21 1932
DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 21, 1932

Rec'd 9:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

106, January 21, 7 p. m.

Legation's 68, January 14, noon

Information from Jehol does not indicate a likelihood of a Japanese advance into that area until the Chinese bandits and irregulars in Fengtien have been suppressed. In view of the recent comparative success of the guerilla warfare by irregulars it would be difficult for the Japanese to proceed against Jehol without considerable ^{recon}forcements. Winter conditions and poor communications are further obstacles to such a campaign at this time.

JOHNSON

RR

WSB

F/DEW

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JAN 27 1932

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CJH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED

JAN 21 1932

DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

SHANGHAI via N. R.

Dated January 21, 1932

Rec'd. 9:30 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,
Washington .

January 21, 5 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"November 21, 4 p.m.

My January 20, 6 p.m.

At Japanese mass meeting held on afternoon January 20th attended by about 12,000 Japanese, local Japanese Consul General was denounced for his failure to obtain satisfaction in various local incidents. The crowd demonstrated in front of Japanese Consulate General and then marched through streets of Settlement to Japanese Marine headquarters. They smashed windows in Chinese shops and assaulted several Chinese. The entire police force of the Settlement is mobilized but so far no disorders today. Chinese and Japanese members of Settlement police force are functioning harmoniously. Another Japanese mass meeting scheduled for the 23rd".

CUNNINGHAM

RR

WSB

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JAN 27 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 6 1932

W E
W E

Dated January 21, 1932

Rec'd 8:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

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JAN 21 1932
DIVISION OF

21 Jan 21/32
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 21 1932
Department of State
F/DEW

23, January 21, 10 a. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

By the Council's resolution of December 10, 1931, the Council remained seized of the question of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

I learn that by virtue of the invitation and the acceptance of the American Government to be represented on the Council in its consideration of this matter in which acceptance I was specifically named as representative and in view of the fact that no formal exchanges have since taken place between the American Government and League authorities in this matter from a purely technical (repeat technical) point of view I am still regarded by the League authorities as continuing in that capacity.

I am confident that I can so arrange matters privately through Drummond that this situation can be allowed to lapse and that the raising of this question can thus be entirely avoided. In view of the approaching meeting of the Council on January 25 which carries the Sino-Japanese question on its agenda, I would appreciate instructions.

GILBERT

RR - WSB

793.94
note
500C/112

793.94/3593

FILED
JAN 26 1932

1841

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$ This cable was sent in confidential Code.
 It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone.

Washington,

January 21, 1932.

40

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

20

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Your No. 23, January 21, 10 a.m.

793.94/3593

I consider it advisable that, as suggested in your
 final paragraph, you so arrange matters privately
 through Drummond that the matter of your technical
 relation to the Council be allowed to lapse and the
 question be not raised. I would wish you, however,
 to maintain cordial and intimate liaison with the
 Council, through Drummond or some other of the officers
 of the League, and continue to send me full reports of
 the Council's proceedings.

793.94/3593

Stinson

Wiley

Jan. 21, 1932

FE:RSM:EJL

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Notes
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 21, 1932

MANCHURIA SITUATION

Next Meeting of the Council of the League. JAN 22 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

JAN 22 1932

Referring to my memorandum of yesterday on this
 subject, --

In that memorandum, after referring to the impending
 meeting of the Council and the fact that the Manchuria
 question would probably come up, I said:

"In view of this, it is believed that we
 should give thought to the question of our
 liaison with the Council. It is believed that
 at the outset we might instruct Consul Gilbert
 to function for us in a liaison capacity. It
 may be desired, however, to send Mr. Wilson
 from Berne.

"Instructions are requested."

In the telegram just received, copy attached, Mr.
 Gilbert suggests that his relation to the Council, created
 by virtue of the invitation and acceptance of the American
 Government to be represented on the Council, needs to be
 straightened out; and that in view of the approaching meet-
 ing of the Council, which carries the Sino-Japanese question
 on its agenda, he would appreciate instructions.

FE:SKH/ZMF

RECEIVED

F/DEW

F.W. 793.94/3593

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JAN 29 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




REC'D

EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Lima, January 14, 1932.

No. 1412

JAN 21 32



F/DEW

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK Yes No

TO THE
 L. O. S. A.

793.94/3594

FILED

JAN 26 1932

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

- 1/ I have the honor to attach hereto a pamphlet which was published in Shanghai entitled JAPAN AND THE NEXT WORLD WAR, which is an English translation of an alleged secret Memorial presented by General Tanaka, Premier of Japan in 1927, to the Japanese Emperor, concerning the Manchurian situation.

This document was handed to Mr. Starrett by the Chinese Minister in Lima, with the request that it be transmitted to the Department of State for its information. Although the Department is undoubtedly

in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

in possession of copies of this document, nevertheless, it is being transmitted without comment in response to the Minister's request.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:



H. P. Starrett
Counselor of Embassy.

HPS:BJ

✓ Enclosure:

- 1/ Pamphlet entitled
JAPAN AND THE NEXT WORLD WAR
(Only copy sent to the Department)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAPAN

and the next

WORLD WAR

田中併吞滿蒙奏摺

中國評論週報社印行
上海北京路五十號

Published By
THE CHINA CRITIC
50 PEKING ROAD
SHANGHAI, CHINA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Secret
MEMORIAL
Concerning Manchuria, Mongolia, China,
U. S. A. & the World

Submitted by
GENERAL TANAKA

(The then Premier of Japan)

to

The Japanese Emperor

in

1927

(5TH EDITION)

5,000 (10-11-31)

HIGH LIGHTS OF THE MEMORIAL

1. For settling difficulties in Eastern Asia, Japan must adopt a policy of "Blood and Iron."
2. In order to conquer the world, Japan must conquer Europe and Asia; in order to conquer Europe and Asia Japan must conquer China, and in order to conquer China, Japan must first Conquer Manchuria and Mongolia, Japan expects to fulfil the above programme in ten years.
3. Japan regrets that she has signed the Nine-Power Treaty which was intended by England and America to crush her interests in Manchuria, for thereby she agrees that Manchuria and Mongolia are Chinese territory. This has greatly hampered the freedom of Japanese policy in Manchuria.
4. Japan believes wars in near future with U.S.A. and with Russia are inevitable, so in order to get militarily prepared, Japan must build the Kirin-Hweining and Changchun-Talai railways in Manchuria.
5. The South Manchuria Railway Co., act in Manchuria as the Governor-General in Korea. In order to blind the eyes of the world and forestall the disclosure of secrets at present, the Colonial office nominally controls affairs of Formosa, Korea, and Saghalian islands, only, while really it manages affairs of Manchuria.
6. Japan must take strong steps. on basis of Twenty-one demands, to secure priority for building railroads. right of timbering and exploiting 19 iron and coal mines in Fentien.
7. Japan should spend yen 1,000,000 from "Secret funds" of Army department in order to send 400 retired offices dis-

guised as teachers and traders, scientists, and Chinese citizens to Mongolia to influence the Mongolian princes to revolt against China.

8. Koreans should be utilized by Japan as vanguard for colonization of and as spearhead for penetration into, Manchuria and Mongolia.

9. Taking advantage of the local disorder in Fengtien, Japan should manipulate the situation so that the Fengtien Bank notes will depreciate to zero, and the Yen will take to its place.

10. Japan must enjoy monopoly of supplies of beans, bean cakes timber, coal, iron, fur, wool, and all other products of Manchuria and Mongolia and perfect control of transportation so that Chinese influence would be wiped out, and Europe and America, when in need of these supplies, would be at the mercy of Japan.

(From The China Critic)

TANAKA MEMORIAL

*Memorial Presented to the Emperor of Japan on July 25, 1927,
by Premier Tanaka, Outlining the positive
policy in Manchuria.*

(Reprinted from THE CHINA CRITIC Vol. IV No. 39,
Sept. 24, 1931.)

Since the European War, Japan's political as well as economic interests have been in an unsettled condition. This is due to the fact that we have failed to take advantage of our special privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia and fully to realize our acquired rights. But upon my appointment as premier, I was instructed specially to guard our interests in this region and watch for opportunities for further expansion. Such injunctions one cannot take lightly. Ever since I advocated a positive policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia as a common citizen, I have longed for its realization. So in order that we may lay plans for the colonization of the Far East and the development of our new continental empire, a special conference was held from June 27th to July 7th lasting in all eleven days. It was attended by all the civil and military officers connected with Manchuria and Mongolia, whose discussions resulted in the following resolutions. These we respectfully submit to Your Majesty for consideration.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The term Manchuria and Mongolia includes the provinces Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Outer and Inner Mongolia. It extends an area of 74,000 square miles, having a population of 28,000,000 people. The territory is more than three times as large as our own empire not counting Korea and Formosa, but it is inhabited by only one-third as many people. The attractiveness of the land does not arise from the scarcity of population alone: its wealth of forestry, minerals and agricultural products is also unrivalled elsewhere in the world. In

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order to exploit these resources for the perpetuation of our national glory, we created especially the South Manchuria Railway Company. The total investment involved in our undertakings in railway, shipping, mining, forestry, steel manufacture, agriculture, and cattle raising as schemes pretending to be mutually beneficial to China and Japan amounts to no less than Yen 440,000,000. It is veritably the largest single investment and the strongest organization of our country. Although nominally the enterprise is under the joint ownership of the government and the people, in reality the government has complete power and authority over it. In so far as the South Manchuria Railway Company is empowered to undertake diplomatic, police, and ordinary administrative functions so that it may carry out our imperialistic policies, the Company forms a peculiar organization which has exactly the same powers as the Governor-General of Korea. This fact alone is sufficient to indicate the immense interests we have in Manchuria and Mongolia. Consequently the policies of the successive administrations since Meiji towards this country are all based on this injunction, elaborating and continuously completing the development of the new continental empire in order to further the advance of our national glory and prosperity for countless generations to come.

Unfortunately, since the European War there have been constant changes in diplomatic as well domestic affairs. The authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces are also awakened and gradually work toward reconstruction and industrial development following our example. Their progress is astonishing. It has affected the spread of our influence in a most serious way, and has put us to so many disadvantages that the dealings with Manchuria and Mongolia of successive governments have resulted in failure. Furthermore, the restriction of the Nine Power Treaty signed at the Washington Conference have reduced our special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that there is no freedom left for us. The very existence of our country is endangered. Unless these obstacles are removed, our national existence will be in-

secure and our national strength will not increase. Moreover, the resources of wealth are congregated in North Manchuria. If we do not have the right of way there, it is obvious that we shall not be able to tap the riches of this country. Even the resources of South Manchuria which we won by the Russo-Japanese War will also be greatly restricted by the Nine Power Treaty. The result is that while our people cannot migrate into Manchuria as they please, the Chinese are flowing in as a flood. Hordes of them move into the Three Eastern Provinces every year, numbering in the neighbourhood of several millions. They have jeopardized our acquired rights in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that our annual surplus population of eight hundred thousand have no place to seek outlet. In view of this we have to admit our failure in trying to effect a balance between our population and food supply. If we do not devise plans to check the influx of Chinese immigrants immediately, in five years' time the number of Chinese will exceed 6,000,000. Then we shall be confronted with greater difficulties in Manchuria and Mongolia.

It will be recalled that when the Nine Power Treaty which restricted our movements in Manchuria and Mongolia was signed, public opinion was greatly aroused. The late Emperor Taisho called a conference of Yamagata and other high officers of the army and the navy to find a way to counteract this new engagement. I was sent to Europe and America to ascertain secretly the attitude of the important statesmen toward it. They were all agreed that the Nine Power Treaty was initiated by the United States. The other Powers which signed it were willing to see our influence increase in Manchuria and Mongolia in order that we may protect the interests of international trade and investment. This attitude I found out personally from the political leaders of England, France and Italy. The sincerity of these expressions could be depended upon. Unfortunately just as we were ready to carry out our policy and declare void the Nine Power Treaty with the approval of those whom I met on my trip, the Seiyukai cabinet suddenly fell and our policy failed of fruition. It was indeed

a great pity. After I had secretly exchanged views with the Powers regarding the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, I returned by way of Shanghai. At the wharf there a Chinese attempted to take my life. An American woman was hurt, but I escaped by the divine protection of my emperors of the past. It seems that it was by divine will that I should assist Your Majesty to open a new era in the Far East and to develop the new continental empire.

The Three Eastern Provinces are politically the imperfect spot in the Far East. For the sake of self-protection, as well as the protection of others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of "Blood and Iron." But in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison with poison. In the future, if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence.

The Nine Power Treaty is entirely an expression of the spirit of commercial rivalry. It was the intention of England and America to crush our influence in China with their power of wealth. The proposed reduction of armaments is nothing but a means to limit our military strength, making it impossible for us to conquer the vast territory of China. On the other hand, China's resources of wealth will be entirely at their disposal. It is merely a scheme by which England and America may defeat our plans. And yet the Minseito made the Nine Power Treaty the important thing and emphasized our *trade* rather than our *rights* in China. This is a mistaken policy—a

policy of national suicide. England can afford to talk about trade relations only because she has India and Austria to supply her with foodstuff and other materials. So can America because South America and Canada are there to supply her her needs. Their spare energy could be entirely devoted to developing trade in China to enrich themselves. But in Japan her food supply and raw materials decrease in proportion to her population. If we merely hope to develop trade, we shall eventually be defeated by England and America, who possess unsurpassable capitalistic power. In the end, we shall get nothing. A more dangerous factor is the fact that the people of China might some day wake up. Even during these years of internal strife, they can still toil patiently, and try to imitate and displace our goods so as to impair the development of our trade. When we remember that the Chinese are our sole customers, we must beware, lest one day when China becomes unified and her industries become prosperous. Americans and Europeans will compete with us: our trade in China will be ruined. Minseito's proposal to uphold the Nine Power Treaty and to adopt the policy of trade towards Manchuria is nothing less than a suicidal policy.

After studying the present conditions and possibilities of our country, our best policy lies in the direction of taking positive steps to secure rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia. These will enable us to develop our trade. This will not only forestall China's own industrial development, but also prevent the penetration of European Powers. This is the best policy possible!

The way to gain actual rights in Manchuria and Mongolia is to use this region as a base and under the pretence of trade and commerce penetrate the rest of China. Armed by the rights already secured we shall seize the resources all over the country. Having China's entire resources at our disposal we shall proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe. But to get control of Manchuria and Mongolia is the first step if the Yamato race wishes to distinguish themselves on Continental Asia. Final success

belongs to the country having food supply; industrial prosperity belongs to the country having food-supply; industrial prosperity belongs to the country having raw materials; the full growth of national strength belongs to the country having extensive territory. If we pursue a positive policy to enlarge our rights in Manchuria and China, all these prerequisites of a powerful nation will constitute no problem. Furthermore, our surplus population of 700,000 each year will also be taken care of. If we want to inaugurate a new policy and secure the permanent prosperity of our empire, a positive policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia is the only way.

MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA--NOT CHINESE TERRITORY

Historically considered, Manchuria and Mongolia are neither China's territory nor her special possessions. Dr. Yano has made an extensive study of Chinese history and has come to the positive conclusion that Manchuria and Mongolia never were Chinese territory. This fact was announced to the world on the authority of the Imperial University. The accuracy of Dr. Yano's investigations is such that no scholars in China have contested his statement. However, the most unfortunate thing is that in our declaration of war with Russia, our government openly recognized China's sovereignty over these regions and later again at the Washington conference when we signed the Nine Power Treaty. Because of these two miscalculations (on our part) China's sovereignty in Manchuria and Mongolia is established in diplomatic relations, but our interests are seriously injured. In the past, although China speaks of the Republic of five races, yet Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia and Manchuria have always remained special areas and the princes are permitted to discharge their customary functions. Therefore in reality the sovereign power over these regions resides with the princes. When any opportunity presents itself, we should make known to the world the actual situation there. We should also wedge our way into Outer and Inner Mongolia in order that we may reform the mainland. So long as the princes there maintain their former administrations, the sover-

eign rights are clearly in their hands. If we want to enter these territories, we may regard them as the ruling power and negotiate with them for rights and privileges. We shall be afforded excellent opportunities and our national influence will increase rapidly.

POSITIVE POLICY IN MANCHURIA

As to the rights in Manchuria, we should take forceful steps on the basis of the Twenty-One Demands and secure the following in order to safe-guard the enjoyment of the rights which we have acquired so far:—

1. After the thirty-year commercial lease terminates, we should be able to extend the term at our wish. Also the right of leasing land for commercial, industrial and agricultural purpose should be recognized.
2. Japanese subjects shall have the right to travel and reside in the eastern part of Mongolia, and engage in commercial and industrial activities. As to their movements, China shall allow them freedom from Chinese law. Furthermore, they must not be subject to illegal taxation and unlawful examination.
3. We must have the right of exploiting the nineteen iron and coal mines in Fengtien and Kirin, as well as the right of timbering.
4. We should have priority for building railroads and option for loans for such purposes in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia.
5. The number of Japanese political, financial and military advisers should be increased. Furthermore, we must have priority in furnishing new advisers.
6. The right of stationing our Police over the Koreans (in China).

7. The administration and development of the Kirin-Changchun Railway must be extended to 99 years.
8. Exclusive right of sale of special products—priority of shipping business to Europe and America.
9. Exclusive rights of mining in Heilungkiang.
10. Right to construct Kirin-Hueining and Changchun-Talai Railways.
11. In case money is needed for the redemption of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese Government must have the first option for making loans to China.
12. Harbour rights at Antung and Yingkow and the right of through transportation.
13. The right of partnership in establishing a Central Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces.
14. Right of Pasturage.

POSITIVE POLICY TOWARDS INNER AND OUTER MONGOLIA

Since Manchuria and Mongolia are still in the hands of the former princes, in the future we must recognize them as the ruling power and give them support. For this reason, the daughter of General Fukushima, Governor of Kwantung, risked her life among the barbarous Mongolian people of Tushiyeh to become adviser to their Prince in order that she might serve the Imperial Government. As the wife of the Prince Ruler is the niece of Manchu Prince Su, the relationship between our Government and the Mongolian Prince became very intimate. The princes of Outer and Inner Mongolia have all shown sincere respect for us, especially after we allured them with special benefits and protection. Now there are 19 Japanese retired military officers in the house of the Tushiyeh. We have acquired already monopoly rights for the purchase of wool, for real estate and for mines. Hereafter we shall send secretly more retired officers to live among them. They should wear

Chinese clothes in order to escape the attention of the Mukden Government. Scattered in the territory of the Prince, they may engage themselves in farming, herding or dealing in wool. As to the other principalities, we can employ the same method as in Tushiyeh. Everywhere we should station our retired military officers to dominate in the Princes' affairs. After a large number of our people have moved into Outer and Inner Mongolia, we shall then buy lands at one-tenth of their worth and begin to cultivate rice where feasible in order to relieve our shortage of food-supply. Where the land is not suitable for rice cultivation, we should develop it for cattle raising and horse breeding in order to replenish our military needs. The rest of the land could be devoted to the manufacture of canned goods which we may export to Europe and America. The fur and leather will also meet our needs. Once the opportunity comes, Outer and Inner Mongolia will be ours outright. While the sovereign rights are not clearly defined and while the Chinese and the Soviet Governments are engaging their attention elsewhere, it is our opportunity quietly to build our influence. Once we have purchased most of the land there, there will be no room for dispute as to whether Mongolia belongs to the Japanese or the Mongolians. Aided by our military prowess, we shall realize our positive policy. In order to carry out this plan, we should appropriate Yen 1,000,000 from the "secret funds" of the Army Department's budget so that four hundred retired officers disguised as teacher and Chinese citizens may be sent into Outer and Inner Mongolia to mix with the people, to gain the confidence of the Mongolian princes, to acquire from them rights for pasturage and mining and to lay the foundation of our national interests for the next hundred years.

ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF KOREAN IMMIGRATION

Since the annexation of Korea, we have had very little trouble. But President Wilson's declaration of the self-determination of races after the European War has been like a divine revelation to the suppressed peoples. The Koreans are no exception. The spirit of unrest has permeated the whole

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country. Both because of the freedom they enjoy in Manchuria due to incompetent police system and because of the richness of the country, there are now in the Three Eastern Provinces no less than 1,000,000 Koreans. The unlooked for development is fortunate for our country indeed. From a military and economic standpoint, it has greatly strengthened our influence. From another standpoint, it gives new hope for the administration of Koreans. They will both be the vanguard for the colonization of virgin fields and furnish a link of contact with the Chinese people. On the one hand, we could utilize the naturalized Koreans to purchase land for rice cultivation, on the other, we could extend to them financial aid through the Co-operative Society, the South Manchuria Railway, etc., so that they may serve as the spear-head of our economic penetration. This will give relief to our problem of food supply, as well as open a new field of opportunity for colonization. The Koreans who have become naturalized Chinese are Chinese only in name: they will return to our fold eventually. They are different from those naturalized Japanese in California and South America. They are naturalized as Chinese only for temporary convenience. When their numbers reach two million and a half or more, they can be instigated to military activities whenever there is the necessity, and under the pretence of suppressing the Koreans we could bear them aid. As not all the Koreans are naturalized Chinese, the world will not be able to tell whether it is the Chinese Koreans or the Japanese Koreans who create the trouble. We can always sell dog's meat with a sheep's head as sign-board.

Of course while we could use the Koreans for such purposes, we must beware of the fact that the Chinese could also use them against us. But Manchuria is as much under our jurisdiction as under Chinese jurisdiction. If the Chinese should use Koreans to hamper us, then our opportunity of war against China is at hand. In that event, the most formidable factor is Soviet Russia. If the Chinese should use the "Reds" to influence the Koreans, the thought of our people will change and great peril will befall us. Therefore, the present Cabinet

is taking every precaution against this eventuality. If we want to make use of the Koreans to develop our new continental empire, our protection and regulations for them must be more carefully worked out. We should increase our police force in North Manchuria under the terms of the Mitsuya Treaty so that we may protect the Koreans and give them help in their rapid advance. Furthermore, the Eastern Development Company (Totoku Kaisha) and the South Manchuria Railway Company should follow then to give them financial aid. They should be given especially favourable terms so that through them we may develop Manchuria and Mongolia and monopolize the commercial rights. The influx of Koreans into these territories is of such obvious importance both for economic and military considerations that the Imperial Government cannot afford not to give it encouragement. It will mean new opportunities for our empire. Since the effect of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement is lost after the Washington Conference, we can only recover our interests through the favourable development arising out of the presence of several millions of Koreans in Manchuria. There is no ground in international relations for raising any objection to this procedure.

RAILROADS AND DEVELOPMENT OF OUR NEW CONTINENT

Transportation is the mother of national defence, the assurance of victory and the citadel of economic development. China has only 7,200 to 7,300 miles of railroads, of which three thousand miles are in Manchuria and Mongolia constituting two-fifths of the whole. Considering the size of Manchuria and Mongolia and the abundance of natural products, there should be at least five or six thousand miles more. It is a pity that our railroads are mostly in south Manchuria, which cannot reach the sources of wealth in the northern parts. Moreover, there are too many Chinese inhabitants in South Manchuria to be wholesome for our military and economic plans. If we wish to develop the natural resources and strengthen our national defence, we must build railroads in Northern Manchuria. With the opening of these railroads, we shall be able

to send more people (Japanese) into Northern Manchuria. From this vantage ground we can manipulate political and economic developments in South Manchuria, as well as strengthen our national defence in the interest of peace and order of the Far East. Furthermore, the South Manchuria Railway was built mainly for economic purposes. It lacks encircling lines necessary for military mobilization and transportation. From now on we must take military purposes as our object and build circuit lines to circle the heart of Manchuria and Mongolia in order that we may hamper China's military, political and economic developments there on the one hand, and prevent the penetration of Russian influence on the other. This is the key to our continental policy.

There are two trunk lines in Manchuria and Mongolia. These are the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway. As regards the railroad built by Chinese, it will doubtless become very powerful in time, backed by the financial resources of the Kirin Provincial Government. With the combined resources of Fengtien and Heilungkiang Provinces, the Chinese railroads will develop to an extent far superior to our South Manchuria Railway. Strong competition will inevitably result. Fortunately for us, the financial conditions in Fengtien Province are in great disorder, which the authorities cannot improve unless we come to their succor. This is our chance. We should take positive steps until we have reached our goal in railroad development. Moreover, if we manipulate the situation, the Fengtien bank-notes will depreciate to an inconceivable degree. In that event, the bankruptcy of Fengtien will be a matter of time. The development of Manchuria and Mongolia will be out of the question for them. But we still have to reckon with the Chinese Eastern Railway. It forms a T with the South Manchuria Railway. Although this system is in a convenient shape, it is by no means suitable for military purposes. When the Chinese build railroads as feeders of the Chinese Eastern Railway, it is best that they run parallel to it, west and east. But with the South Manchuria Railway as main line, we must have these lines run north and

south. For the benefit of the Chinese themselves, there are also advantages for these lines to run in this direction. Consequently our interest does not necessarily conflict with the Chinese. Now that Russia is losing influence and is powerless to advance in Manchuria and Mongolia, it is certain that the Chinese must act according to our beckoning in the development of railways in the future. Much to our surprise the Fengtien Government recently built two railroads, one from Tahushan to Tungliao and the other from Kirin to Haining both for military purposes. Those two railroads affect most seriously our military plans in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as the interest of the South Manchuria Railway. We therefore protested strongly against it.

That these railways were built was due to the fact that our official on the spot as well as the South Manchuria Railway authorities miscalculated the ability of the Fengtien Government and paid no attention to it. Later when we did intervene the railways were already completed. Besides, the Americans have been anxious to make an investment in developing the port of Hulutao through British capitalists. Taking advantage of this situation, the Fengtien Government introduced American and British capital in these railways in order to hold our interest at bay. For the time being we have to wink at it and wait for the opportune moment to deal with China about these two railroads.

Recently, it is rumoured that the Fengtien Government is planning to build a railroad from Tahushan to Harbin via Tung Liao and Fu Yu, so that there may be a direct line between Peking and Harbin without touching either the South Manchuria Railway or the Chinese Eastern Railway. What is more astonishing is that another railway beginning at Mukden passing through Hailung, Kirin, Wuchang terminating at Harbin is also under way. If this plan be realized, then these two lines would encircle the South Manchuria Railway and limit its sphere of activity to a small area. The result is that our economic and political development of Manchuria and

Mongolia will be checked and the plan for curtailing our power provided by the Nine Power Treaty will be carried out. Moreover, the completion of these two railroads will render the South Manchurian Railway completely useless. The latter Company will be confronted with a real crisis. But in view of China's financial conditions today, she cannot undertake these two railroads unless she resorts to foreign loans. And on these two railways the transportation charges will have to be higher than on the South Manchuria Railway. These considerations give us some comfort. But in the event of these two railroads becoming an accomplished fact and the Chinese Government making especially low freight charges in order to compete with the South Manchuria Railway, not only we but the Chinese Eastern Railway will also sustain great losses. Japan and Russia certainly would not allow China to carry out such obstructive measures, especially as the Chinese Eastern Railway depends upon Tsitsihar and Harbin for the bulk for its business. The consequence would be even more serious to both Japanese and Russian interests when the new railways are completed.

Let us now consider more in detail the competitive railways projected in Manchuria and Mongolia.

China contemplates:

1. Suolun-Taonan Railway.
2. Kirin-Harbin Railway.

Soviet Russia proposes:

1. Anta-Potung Railway.
2. Mienpo-Wuchang-Potuna Railway.
3. Kirin-Hailin Railway.
4. Mishan-Muling Railway.

The Russian plans are designed to strengthen the Chinese Eastern Railway and thereby to extend its imperialistic schemes. For this reason the railways projected mostly run east and

west. For although the power of Soviet Russia is declining, her ambition in Manchuria and Mongolia has not diminished for a minute. Every step she takes is intended to obstruct our progress and to injure the South Manchuria Railway. We must do our utmost to guard against her influence. We should use the Fengtien Government as a wedge to check her southern advance. By pretending to check the southern advance of Soviet Russia as a first step, we could gradually force our way into North Manchuria and exploit the natural resources there. We shall then be able to prevent the spread of Chinese influence on the south and arrest the advance of Soviet Russia on the north. In our struggle against the political and economic influence of Soviet Russia, we should drive China before us and direct the events from behind. Meanwhile, we should still secretly befriend Russia in order to hamper the growth of Chinese influence. It was largely with this purpose in view, that Baron Goto of Kato's cabinet invited Joffe to our country and advocated the resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia.

Although we have an agreement with the Chinese Eastern Railway concerning transportation rates, according to which 45% go to the Chinese Eastern Railway and 55% to us, yet the Chinese Eastern Railway still grants preferential rates detrimental to the interest of the South Manchuria Railway. Moreover, according to a secret declaration of Soviet Russia, although they have no territorial ambition they cannot help keeping a hand in the Chinese Eastern Railway on account of the fact that north of the Chinese and Russian boundary the severe cold makes a railway useless. Furthermore, as Vladivostok is their only sea-port in the Far East, they cannot give up the Chinese Eastern Railway without losing also their foothold on the Pacific. This makes us feel the more uneasy.

On the other hand, the South Manchuria Railway is not adequate for our purpose. Considering our present needs and future activities, we must control railways in both North and South Manchuria, especially in view of the fact that the re-

sources of North Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia will furnish no room for expansion and material gains. In South Manchuria the Chinese is increasing at such a rate that it will surely damage our interests politically and economically. Under such circumstances, we are compelled to take aggressive steps in North Manchuria in order to assure our future prosperity. But if Soviet Russia's Chinese Eastern Railway should spread across this field our new continental policy is bound to receive a set-back which will result in an inevitable conflict with Soviet Russia in the near future. In that event we shall enact once more our part in the Russo-Japanese War. The Chinese Eastern Railway will become ours as the South Manchuria Railway did last time, and we shall seize Kirin as we once did Dairen. That we should draw swords with Russia again in the fields of Mongolia in order to gain the wealth of North Manchuria seems a necessary step in our program of national aggrandisement. Until this hidden rock is blown up our ship can have no smooth sailing. We should now demand from China the right of building all the important military railroads. When these railroads are completed, we shall pour our forces into North Manchuria as far as we can. When Soviet Russia intervenes, as they must, that is our opportunity for open conflict.

WE SHOULD BUILD THE FOLLOWING RAILWAYS

1. Tungliao-Jehol Railway. This line is 447 miles long and will cost Yen 50,000,000. When it is completed it will be of great value to our development of Inner Mongolia. As a matter of fact, this is the most important of all the railways in the whole undertaking. According to the careful surveys of the War Department, there are in Inner Mongolia large tracts of land suitable for rice cultivation. After proper development there will be room for at least 20 millions of our people. Besides there, is the possibility of turning out 2,000,000 head of cattle which may be transported by railways for food supply and for purposes of exporting to Europe and America. Wool also is a special product. While the sheep in Japan yield only

two catties of wool per head per year, the sheep in Mongolia can yield six catties. The South Manchuria Railway has made many experiments, all of which confirm this fact. Besides, the wool is many times better than that of Australia. Its low cost and high quality combined with its abundance in quantity make Mongolia a potential source of great wealth. When this industry is enhanced by the facilities of railway development, the total production will increase at least ten-fold. We have withheld this knowledge from the rest of the world, lest England and America compete with us for it. Therefore, we must first of all control the transportation and then develop the wool industry. By the time the other countries know about it, it would be already too late to do anything. With this railroad in our hands, we can develop the wool industry not only for our own use, but also for exporting to Europe and America. Furthermore, we can realize our desire of joining hands with Mongolia. This railway is a matter of life and death to our policy in Mongolia. Without it, Japan can have no part in Mongolia's development.

2. Suolun-Taonan Railway. This line is 136 miles long and will cost Yen 10,000,000. Looking into the future of Japan, a war with Russia over the plains of North Manchuria is inevitable. From a military standpoint, this line will not only enable us to threaten Russia's rear but also to curtail its re-inforcements for North Manchuria. From an economic standpoint, this road will place the wealth of the Tao Er Ho Valley within our reach, thereby strengthening the South Manchuria Railway. The princes nearby who are friendly to us can also use this road to extend our influence in order to open up their respective territories. Our hope of working hand in hand with the Mongolian princes, of acquiring land, mines and pasturage, and of developing trade with the natives as preliminary steps for later penetration, all depends upon this railway. Together with Tungliao-Jehol Railway, they will form two supplementary routes into Mongolia. When the industries are fully developed, we shall extend our interests into Outer Mongolia. But the danger of this line is that it might provide facili-

des for Chinese migration into a new region and spoil our own policy. Look at our experience with the South Manchuria Railway. Haven't that served the interest of China? The redeeming feature, however, is the fact that the land and mines along this railway are in the possession of Mongolian princes. If we can gain possession of them first, we need have no worries about Chinese migration. Moreover, we can make the princes pass laws discriminating against Chinese immigrants. When life there is made miserable for the Chinese, they naturally will leave for places afar. There are other methods to bar the Chinese. Only if we try hard enough, no Chinese foot-prints will be found on Mongolian territory.

3. A Section of Changchun-Taonan Railway. As this line runs from Changchun to Fuyu and Talai, the section between Changchun and Taonan is about 131 miles and costs approximately Yen 11,000,000. This line is immensely important from an economic standpoint, for the wealth of Manchuria and an easy access to North Manchuria on the one hand, and prejudice the Chinese Eastern Railway to the benefit of the South Manchuria Railway on the other. It runs through the upper valley of the Sungari River where the soil is fertile and agricultural products abound. Further, in the vicinity of Talai there is the Yuehliang Falls which could be harnessed for electric power. That this section of the railway will be a prosperous center for industry and agriculture, is beyond doubt. After the completion of this line, we shall be able to make Talai a base and advance on Siberia through three directions; namely, by ways of Taonan, Anshan and Tsitsihar. The wealth of North Manchuria will then come to our hands. This will also be the first line of advance to Heilungkiang. It will further form a circuit with the railway between Changchun and Taonan, which will serve well for military purposes when we penetrate into Mongolia. Along this whole line the population is sparse and the land is rich and extensive. No fertiliser will be required on the farms for fifty years. A possession of this railway will ensure the possession of all the wealth of North

Manchuria and Mongolia. In this region there is room for at least 30 million people more. When the Tunhua Railway is completed and joins up with the line running to Hueining in Korea, the products will be brought to the door of Osaka and Tokyo by a direct route. In time of war our troops could be despatched to North Manchuria and Mongolia via the Japan Sea without a stop, forestalling all possibilities of Chinese forces entering North Manchuria. Nor could American or Russian submarines enter the Korean Strait. The moment the railways between Kirin and Hueining and between Changchun and Talai are completed, we shall become self-sufficient in food-stuff and raw materials. We shall have no worries in the event of war with any country. Then, in our negotiations about Manchuria and Mongolia, China will be cowed to submission and yield to our wishes. If we want to end the political existence of Manchuria and Mongolia according to the third step of Meiji's plan, the completion of these two railways is the only way. The Changchun-Talai Railway will greatly enhance the value of the South Manchuria Railway, besides developing into a profitable line itself. It is an undertaking of supreme importance in our penetration into this territory.

4. Kirin-Hueining Line. While the Kirin-Tunhua Line is already completed, the Tunhua-Hueining Line is yet to be built. The narrow gauge of 2 ft. 6 inches of the tracks from Hueining to Laotoukow is inadequate for the economic development of the New Continent. Allowing Yen 8,000,000 for widening the tracks in this section and Yen 10,000,000 for completing the section between Laotoukow and Tunhua, the whole undertaking will cost approximately Yen 20,000,000. When this is done, our continental policy will have succeeded. Hitherto, people going to Europe have to pass through either Dairen or Vladivostok. Now they can go on the trunk line directly from Chingchinkang via the Siberian Railway. When we are in control of this great system of transportation, we need make no secret of our designs on Manchuria and Mongolia according to the third step of Meiji's plans. The Yamato Race is then embarked on the journey of world

conquest! According to the last will of Meiji, our first step was to conquer Formosa and the second step to annex Korea. Having completed both of these, the third step is yet to be taken and that is the conquest of Manchuria, Mongolia and China. When this is done, the rest of Asia including the South Sea Islands will be at our feet. That these injunctions have not been carried out even now, is a crime of your humble servants.

In history the people living in Kirin, Fengtien and part of Heilungkiang, are called Sushan. They are now scattered along the sea coast and in the basins of the Amur and Tumen Rivers. They were known as Kulai, Sushan, Hucibei, Palou, Wotsu, Fuyu, Kitan Pohai and Nuchen at different stages of history. They were of a mixed race. The forefathers of the Manchurian dynasty also began in this vicinity. They gained control of Kirin, first, and then firmly established themselves in China for 300 years. If we want to put into effect our Continental Policy, we have to note this historical fact and proceed to establish ourselves in this region first also. Hence the necessity of the Kirin-Hueining Railway.

Whether the terminus of Kirin-Hueining Line be at Chingchin or Lochin or even Hsiungchi, we are free to decide according to circumstances. From the standpoint of national defence at present, Lochin seems the ideal harbour and terminus. Eventually it will be the best harbour in the world. On the one hand it will ruin Vladivostok, and on the other it will be the center of the wealth of Manchuria and Mongolia. Moreover, Dairen is as yet not our own territory while Manchuria is yet not a part of our empire, it is difficult to develop Dairen. That being the case, we shall be in a precarious situation in time of war. The enemy could blockade the Tsushima and Senchima Straits, and we shall be cut off from the supplies of Manchuria and Mongolia. Not having the resources there at our command we shall be vanquished, especially as England and the United States have worked hand in hand to limit our action in every possible direction. For the sake of self-preservation and of

giving warning to China and the rest of the world, we must fight America some time. The American Asiatic Squadron stationed in the Philippines is but within a stone's throw from Tsushima and Senchima. If they send submarines to these quarters, our supply of food-stuff and raw materials from Manchuria and Mongolia will be cut off entirely. But if the Kirin-Hueining Railway is completed, we shall have a large circuit line through all Manchuria and Korea, and a small circuit line through North Manchuria. We shall have access in all direction gaining freedom for the transportation of soldiers and supplies alike. When our supplies are transported through this line to our ports at Tsuruga and Niigata, enemy submarines will have no way of getting into the Japanese and Korean straits. We are then entirely free from interference. This is what is meant by making the Japanese Sea the center of our national defence. Having secured the free transportation of food and raw materials, we shall have nothing to fear either from the American navy because of its size, or the Chinese or Russian army because of their number. Incidentally, we shall be in a position to suppress the Koreans. Let me reiterate the fact that if we want to carry out the New Continental Policy, we must build this line. Manchuria and Mongolia are the undeveloped countries in the East. Over this territory we shall have to go war with Soviet Russia sooner or later. The battle ground will be Kirin.

When we carry out the third step of Meiji's plans with regard to China, we shall have to do the following things:—

1. Mobilise the army divisions in Fukuoka and Hiroshima, and send them to South Manchuria via Korea. This will prevent the northern advance of Chinese soldiers.
2. Send the army divisions in Nagoya and Kwansei by sea to Chingchin, and thence to North Manchuria via the Kirin Hueining Line.
3. Send the army in Kwantung through Niigata to Chingchin or Lochin, and thence by Kirin-Hueining Line to North Manchuria.

4. Send the army divisions in Hokkaido and Sendai to embark the ship at Aomori and Hakodato, and sail for Vladivostok and thence, via the Siberian Railway, to Harbin. Then they can descend on Fengtien, seize Mongolia and prevent Russian forces from coming south.
5. Finally these divisions in all directions will meet and form themselves in two large armies. On the south, they will keep Shanhaikuan and close it against the northern advance of Chinese forces: on the north, they will defend Tsitsihar against the southern advance of the Russians. In this way we shall have all the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia at our command. Even if the war should be prolonged for ten years, we need have no fear for the lack of supplies.

Let us now analyze once more the Kirin-Hueining Railway from the standpoint of its access from our ports.

First, with Chingchin as starting point:

1. To Vladivostok130 miles
2. To Tsuruga475 miles
3. To Moji500 miles
4. To Nagasaki650 miles
5. To Fusan500 miles

Second, take Tsuruga as the port of entry and compare it with Dairen. In this case we should consider it from the point of view of Osaka an industrial center.

1. From Changchun to Osaka via Lochin, the distance is 406 miles by land and 475 miles by sea. In point of time the route will take 51 hours.
2. From Changchun to Osaka via Dairen and Kobe, the distance is 535 miles by land and 870 miles by sea. In point of time it takes 92 hours.

If Tsuruga instead of Dairen is made the connecting link, there is a saving of 41 hours. Calculated at the rate of 30 miles an hour on land and 12 miles an hour by sea, we can use fast boats and trains and cut the time in half.

Manchuria and Mongolia are the Belgium of the Far East. In the Great War, Belgium was the battlefield. In our wars with Russia and the United States, we must also make Manchuria and Mongolia suffer the ravages. As it is evident that we have to violate the neutrality of these territories, we cannot help building the Kirin-Hueining and Changchun-Talai Railways in order that we may be militarily prepared. In time of war we can easily increase our forces and in time of peace we can migrate thousands upon thousands of people into this region and work on the rice fields. This line offers the key to economic development as well as to military conquests.

In undertaking the Kirin-Hueining Railway, it is necessary to take advantage of the dry season and finish it at one stretch. The mountains it must go through are all granite. The tunneling would need modern and up-to-date machines. As to the sleepers and ballast required, there is an abundance all along the line. Limestone and clay for making tiles and brick are also to be had for the taking. Only rails, cars and locomotives have to be brought in. The cost of construction could therefore be reduced at least thirty per cent and the time required forty per cent.

Now, let us look into the economic interests along this line. According to the careful investigations of our General Staff and the South Manchuria Railway, the total reserve of timber is 200,000,000 tons. If one million ton is fallen and imported to our country each year, it will last two hundred years. This will stop the import of American timber which has been costing us Yen 80,000,000 to Yen 100,000,000 a year. Although our information is reliable we cannot make it known to the world; for if China or Russia learns that we get so much timber from America, they would try to interfere with the construction of

this line. Or else, the United States may buy from the Feng tien Government all the timber rights on the one hand to protect their own trade with us; on the other, to control the monopoly and incidentally kill our paper industry.

Kirin was known as the "ocean of trees" even in the days of Emperor Chien-Lung. Added to the original forests are the growths in the intervening years since that time. Imagine the vastness of the resources! To transport this timber from Kirin to Osaka via Changchun and Dairen, there is a distance of 1,385 miles. For every cubic foot, we have to spend 34 cents. Because of this high cost of transportation, we cannot compete with the United States. If the Kirin-Hueining Line is completed, the distance is reduced to about 700 miles. We can then ship timber to Osaka at the low rate of 13 cents per cubic foot. We can certainly defeat the timber importation from the United States then. Supposing we calculate the profit at Yen 5.00 per ton timber and supposing there are two billion tons of timber, the construction of the railway will bring to us the easy profit of 10 billion yen. we will bar the import of American timber into our country. Furthermore, the industry of paper manufacture furniture making, and wooden wares which the cheap timber makes possible will add 20 million yen more to our country's annual income.

There is also the Hsinchin coal mine, which has a reserve of 600,000,000 tons of coal. The quality of this coal is superior to that of Fushun coal, easy to excavate and suitable for the extraction of petroleum, agricultural fertilizers and other chemical by-products which we may both use at home and sell in China. There are numerous other advantages which will come to us from the building of the Kirin-Hueining Railway. It is all gain without labour. The coal will supplement the Fushun collieries. With both coal mines in our control, we hold the key to the industries of all China. Speaking of the Hsinchin coal, we shall reap a profit of Yen 5.00 on each ton when it is shipped to Japan. With additional chemical by-products, we shall reap a profit of Yen 16.00 from each ton of

coal. Taking an average profit of Yen 15.00 a ton, the total profit will amount to 200 billion yen. All this comes as a by-product from the operation of the Kirin-Hueining Railway. There are, besides, the gold mines along the Mutan River. The acquired rights of the South Manchuria Railway in the gold mines of Chiapikou in the province of Kirin and the timber in its neighbourhood will all be within reach of exploitation once the Kirin-Hueining line is in operation.

In the vicinity of Tunhua the agricultural products, such as oats, wheat, millet and kaoliang, yield an annual output of over a million catties. There are twenty distilleries of wines, thirty oil mills yielding an annual output of about 600,000 catties of oil and 600,000 of bean cakes, besides many places for making vermicelli. All these will depend upon the new railway. The trade along this road may be estimated at 4 million yen a year. The transportation charges of farm products alone will not only defray the running expenses, but also yield a net profit of Yen 200,000 a year. Including the profit from timber, coal and its by-products transported by the railway, we can safely count on a profit of Yen 8,000,000 a year. Besides, there are indirect benefits such as the strengthening of the South Manchuria Railway, the acquisition of rights over forests, mines and trade as well as the migration of large numbers of our people into North Manchuria. Above all, is the shortening of distance between Japan and the resources of wealth in North Manchuria. It only takes three hours from Chingchin to Hueining, three hours from Hueining to Sanfeng and three hours more from Tumen river to Lungchingsun. In 60 hours we can reach the wealth of North Manchuria. Hence the Kirin-Hueining Railroad alone can enable us to tap the immense wealth of North Manchuria.

4. *Hunchun-Hailin Railway.* This is 173 miles long and costs Yen. 24,000,000. All along this line are thick forests. In order to strengthen the Kirin-Hueining Railway and to exploit the forests and mines in North Manchuria, this line is needed. In order to transfer the prosperity of Vladivostok to Hueining, this line is also urgently needed. The greatest hope for

prosperity, however, is the fact that south of Naining and north of Tunhua there is Lake Chungpo which can be used to generate electric power. With this electric power, we shall have control over the agricultural and industrial undertakings of the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia. No amount of China's agitation can matter in the least to our industrial developments. According to the investigations of the South Manchuria Railway, the water power in the lake can generate at least 800,000 horsepower. With such an enormous quantity of electric power, the industrial conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia can be easily accomplished. In the neighbourhood of this immense power plant, there will be phenomenal growth of wealth. We must build this railway quickly, in order to provide facilities for transportation. Lake Hsingkai, which is owned jointly by China and Russia, can also be developed for the generation of electricity. In order that these two countries may not combine to frustrate our plans, we should introduce a resolution in the International Conference of Electrical Engineering to be held in Tokyo this year, to the effect that in the same area of electricity supply there should not be two power plants. Besides, in the vicinity of Niigata and Hailin, the Oju Paper Mill has acquired extensive rights of lumbering. They need the immediate establishment of the power plant at Lake Chingpo and the early completion of the Hunchun-Hailin Railway in order to bring to the factory at home the raw materials growing wild in Mongolia.

Moreover, the reason that the Fengtien-Kirin-Wuchang Railway and the Kirin and Fengtien authorities intend to build the Wuchang Railway and the Kirin-Mukden Railway, with Hulutao or Tientsin as sea-port, is that they want to recover to themselves the wealth of North Manchuria. By building the Hunchun-Hailin Railway we shall not only strengthen the Kirin-Hueining Railway, but also defeat the Chinese scheme and draw the wealth of Manchuria to Chingchin harbour. The transportation charges will be two-thirds less compared with the Chinese line and one-third less compared with the Siberian line. They cannot compete with us. Our victory is a foregone conclusion.

The total trade in Manchuria is seven or eight billion yen a year, all of which is in our hands. The business we do in wool, cotton, soybeans, bean cakes, and iron, forms one-twentieth of the total volume of world trade. And it is steadily increasing. But the Namihaya Machi at Dairen (the wealthiest street in the city) is still in Chinese possession. The sad story goes further. Oil is a basic industry in Manchuria. We control only 6 percent of it. Of the 38 oil mills in Yingkow, there is not one Japanese; of the 20 oil mills in Antung there is only one Japanese and of the 82 or 83 oil mills in Dairen there are only seven owned by Japanese. This is by no means an optimistic outlook for us. In order to recover the lost ground, we must first of all develop transportation. Then, by securing a monopoly on both finished products and raw materials, we shall be able to gain the upper-hand eventually. Furthermore, we ought to assist our people in oil business by extending to them financial credit, so that the oil industry of the Chinese will be forced out of the market. There are many Chinese on Kawaguchi Machi in Osaka who are dealers of our manufactured goods in Mongolia and Manchuria. They are strong competitors of our own business men in China. Our people are greatly handicapped because of their high standard of living which compels them to figure at a higher percentage of profit. On the other hand, the Chinese also have their disadvantages. The goods that they get are of an inferior quality, but the price that they pay is at least 10 percent higher than what our own people pay. Besides, they are also obliged to pay Yen 2.70 more than our people for every ton of goods transported, and yet they can undersell our merchants in Manchuria. It clearly shows the inability of our own people. When one thinks of it, it is really pathetic. The Chinese is single-handed, receiving no assistance from the government. But the Japanese in Manchuria has every protection from the government and long term credit at a low rate of interest. Still there are innumerable cases of failures. Hereafter, we should organize a cooperative exporting house to China. The steamship lines and the South Manchuria Railway should give it special discounts, and the government in Kwangtung should

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extend to it financial credit at a very low rate of interest. Then we can hope to beat the Chinese merchants and recover our trade rights, so that we may develop the special products of Manchuria and send them to all parts of the world.

The first step in gaining financial and commercial control of Manchuria and Mongolia lies in the monopoly sale of their products. We must have the rights of monopoly for the sale of Manchurian and Mongolian products before we can carry out our continental policy and prevent the invasion of American capital as well as the influence of the Chinese traders.

Although the products of Manchuria and Mongolia may go through any of the three ports, Dairen, Yingkow and Antung, nevertheless Dairen holds the key to the situation. Every year 7,200 ships pass through this port with a total tonnage of 11,565,000 tons. This represents 70 percent of the total trade of Manchuria and Mongolia. Fifteen navigation routes radiate out from it with definite sailing schedule. Most of it is coastal sailing. We have in our grasp the entire transportation system of Manchuria and Mongolia. The monopoly sale of Manchuria's special products will eventually come into our hands. When that come true, we can develop our oceanic transportation in order to defeat both Yingkow and Antung. Then the large quantities of beans which the central and southern parts of China consume, will depend upon us entirely. Moreover, the Chinese are an oil eating people. In time of war, we can cut off their oil-supply and the life of the whole country will become miserable. Bean-cakes are important as fertilizers for the cultivation of rice. If we have control of the source of supply as well as the means of transportation, we shall be able to increase our production of rice by means of a cheap supply of bean-cakes and the fertilizers manufactured as a by-product at the Fushun coal mines. In this way, we shall have the agricultural work of all China dependent upon us. In case of war, we can put an embargo on bean-cakes as well as the mineral fertilizers and forbid their exportation to Central and South China. Then China's production of food-stuff will be greatly reduced. This

is one way of building up our continental empire which we must not overlook. We should remember that Europe and America also need large quantities of beans and bean-cakes. When we have monopoly of the supplies and full control of transportation, both on land and sea, the countries which have need of the special products of Manchuria and Mongolia, will have to seek our good-will. In order to gain trade monopoly in Manchuria and Mongolia, we must have control of the complete transportation system. Only then can we have the Chinese merchants under our thumb.

However, the Chinese are adepts in learning our tricks and beating us at our own game. We have yet found no way by which we can compete successfully with them in oil-making and sail-boat transportation. After building up the new system of transportation, our policy should be two-fold. On the one hand, wreck the sail-boat trade by means of heavy investment in our own system. On the other hand, encourage our men to learn all they can from the Chinese about sail-boat business. Another thing we should be careful about is teaching the Chinese our industrial methods. In the past we have established factories in Manchuria and Mongolia, and carried on industries near the source of raw materials. This gave to the Chinese the opportunity of learning our secrets and establishing competitive factories of their own. Hereafter, we should ship the raw materials back home and do the manufacturing there, and then ship the finished products for sale in China and other countries. In this way we shall gain in three ways: (1) provide work for our unemployed at home, (2) prevent the influx of Chinese into Manchuria and Mongolia, and (3) make it impossible for the Chinese to imitate our new industrial methods. Then iron of Penhsihu and Anshan and the coal of Fushun should also be sent home to be turned into finished products.

For all these considerations, the development of ocean transportation becomes the more necessary. The Dairen Kisen Kaisha Company should be enlarged, and our government should extend to it loans at low interest through the South Manchuria

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Railway Company. By next year, we should complete 50,000 tons of new ships for oceanic transportation. That will be sufficient to dominate over the traffic of the East. For on the hand, we have the South Manchuria Railway for land transportation; on the other hand, we control the large quantities of products in Manchuria and Mongolia waiting to be transported. The success of this enlarged activities in oceanic transportation with Dairen as centre is assured by the iron laws of economics.

GOLD STANDARD CURRENCY NECESSARY

Although Manchuria and Mongolia are within our field of activities, yet the legal tender there is still silver. It often conflicts with our gold basis and works to our disadvantage. That our people have failed to prosper as they should in these places, is due to the existence of silver monetary system there. The Chinese have persistently upheld the silver basis, and therefore have made it impossible for us firmly to establish our colonization plans on a firm economic foundation. We have suffered from it the following disadvantages:

1. The money that we bring into Manchuria is of gold standard. When we use it either for daily livelihood or for industry and trade, it has to be exchanged into Chinese silver dollars. The fluctuation of exchange is not infrequently as much as 20 percent, resulting in serious loss to our people. Speculation becomes a regular business and investing money becomes a matter of gambling. When one plans an investment of two hundred thousand yen, one may suddenly find that his capital has been reduced to one hundred fifty or one hundred sixty thousand dollars due to the drop in exchange. The creditor would then have to call in the loan and business failures have often resulted.

2. The Chinese businessmen use silver money throughout and are free from the effects of exchange fluctuations. Therefore their "junk" trade is prosperous. Although they have no scientific knowledge of exchange value of gold and silver, they always gain in the transaction. They have a natural gift for

it, we suffer the more. And we lose in spite of our control of transportation and special backing of banking houses. Because of the handicap of monetary system, people in Central and South China always buy beans and bean-cakes from their own people. We have no chance against them. In consequence, we cannot conquer the whole of China.

3. With the silver standard in existence, the Chinese Government can increase their notes to counteract our gold notes. Consequently, our banks will fail to carry out the mission of extending our country's influence.

4. If the gold standard is adopted, we can issue gold notes freely. With the credit of the gold notes, we can acquire rights in real property and natural resources and defeat the credit of the Chinese silver notes. The Chinese will be unable to compete with us; and the currency of the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia will be in our control.

5. The Government Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, the Bank of Communications, the Frontier Development Bank and the General Credit & Finance Corporation have in circulation silver notes amounting to 38,000,000 dollars. Their reserve funds in the form of buildings and goods are estimated at 1,350,000 dollars. It is natural that the Chinese notes should depreciate. It is only by acts of the Government that these notes are still in circulation. Until we have entirely discredited the Chinese silver notes, we will never place our gold notes in their proper place in Manchuria and Mongolia, much less obtain the monopoly in currency and finance of these two countries. With the depreciated and inconvertible silver notes, the government of the Three Eastern Provinces buys all kinds of products, thus threatening our vested interests. When they sell these products, they demand gold from us which they keep for the purpose of wrecking our financial interests including our trade rights in special products. For these reasons, our gold notes are having a harder time and a gold standard for currency becomes the more urgently necessary.

In view of the above-mentioned considerations, we must overthrow Manchuria's inconvertible silver notes and divest the government of its purchasing power. Then we can extend the use of our gold notes in the hope of dominating the economic and financial activities of Manchuria and Mongolia. Furthermore, we can compel the authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces to employ Japanese financial advisers to help us gain supremacy in financial matters. When the Chinese notes are overthrown, our gold notes will take their place.

THE NECESSITY OF CHANGING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
SOUTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY

The South Manchuria Railway Company functions in Manchuria as the Governor-General of Korea did there before the annexation. In order to build up our new Continental Empire, we must change the organization of that Company so as to break away from the present difficulties. The functions of this Company are varied and important. Every change of Cabinet involves a change of the administration of the South Manchuria Railway, and conversely every activity of the South Manchuria Railway also has important consequences on the Cabinet. This is because the South Manchuria Railway is semi-governmental, with final authority resting in the Cabinet. For this reason, the Powers invariably look upon this railway as a purely political organ rather than a business enterprise. Whenever a new move is made for the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, the Powers would invoke the Nine Power Treaty to thwart the plans of the South Manchuria Railway. This has greatly damaged the interests of our empire.

Considered from the point of view of domestic administration, the South Manchuria Railway is subject to a quadruple control. There are the Governor of Kwantung, the Chief Executive of Dairen, the Consul-General at Mukden, besides the President of the South Manchuria Railway itself. These four officers must meet and exchange views at Dairen before anything is undertaken. What is discussed in the meeting held in

camera often leaks out to the Chinese authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces. They in turn would try to obstruct any forward movements of the South authorization, it again has to run the gauntlet at the Departments of Foreign Affairs, of Railways, of Finance and of Army. If these ministers do not agree, the matter is dropped. Therefore, although the present prime minister realizes his own incompetence, he has nevertheless taken concurrently the portfolio of foreign affairs, so that our movements in Manchuria may be kept confidential and the execution of our plans may be swift and decisive. On account of these reasons, the South Manchuria Railway should be radically re-organized. All appurtenant enterprises which are profit-making should be made independent companies under the wings of the South Manchuria Railway, so that we may take determined steps on the conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia. On the other hand, Chinese, Europeans and Americans should be invited to invest money in the South Manchuria Railway on the condition that we have a plurality of its stocks. In that event the control of the Company is in our hands, and our mission from the empire can be discharged more vigorously. In short, by inviting international participation in the South Manchuria Railway, we can blind the eyes of the world. Having achieved that, we can push our advance in Manchuria and Mongolia at our will, free ourselves from the restraint of the Nine Power Treaty and strengthen our activities in that country with foreign capital.

The important appurtenant enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway are:—

1. *Iron and Steel*

Iron and steel are closely connected with national development. Every country today attaches great importance to it. But because of the lack of ores, we have found no solution to this problem. Hitherto we have had to import steel from the Yangtze Valley and the Malay Peninsula. But according to a secret survey of our General Staff, a wealth of iron mines are found in many places in Manchuria and Mongolia. A conser-

vative estimate of the reserve is 10 billion tons. At first when there was a lack of technique, the Anshan Iron and Steel Works was involved in an annual loss of Yen 3,000,000. Later, new methods were discovered, and the technique developed so that during 1926 the loss was only Yen 150,000 and a year later there was a profit of Yen 800,000. If the furnace is improved, we ought to earn at least Yen 4,000,000 a year. The quality of the ore at Penhsihu is excellent. By amalgamating it with the Anshan Iron Works, we shall have the comfort of being self-sufficient in iron and steel.

The iron deposits in Manchuria and Mongolia are estimated at 1,200,000,000 tons; and coal deposits, 2,500,000,000 tons. This coal ought to be sufficient for smelting the iron ores. With such large amounts of iron and coal at our disposal, we ought to be self-sufficient for at least seventy years. At the rate of \$100.00 profit on each ton of steel, for 350,000,000 tons of steel we shall have a profit of Yen 35,000,000,000. This is a tremendous asset to our economic resources. We shall save the expense of Yen 120,000,000 which we pay for the importation of steel every year. When we can have sufficient iron and steel for our own industries, we shall have acquired the secret for becoming the leading nation in the world. Thus strengthened, we can conquer both the East and the West. In order to attain this goal, the iron works must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway. Such unified control will keep China from preventing us to become self-sufficient in iron and steel.

2. Petroleum

Another important commodity which we lack is petroleum. It is also essential to the existence of a nation. Fortunately, there lie in the Fushun Coal Mine 5,200,000,000 tons of shale oil, from every hundred cattles of which six cattles of crude oil may be extracted. By means of American Machinery, every hundred cattles will yield nine cattles of refined oil good for motor cars and battleships. At present, Japan imports from foreign countries 700,000 tons of mineral oils every year valued at Yen 60,000,000. These figures are on the increase. As there are 50 billion tons of shale in the Fushun Mines, the yield

calculated at five percent would be 250,000,000 tons; at nine percent, 450,000,000 tons of oil. Taking an average of the two, the yield would be 350,000,000 tons, and assuming the value of the oil to be fifteen yen a ton, the oil shale contained in the Fushun Mine would bring us Yen 2,250,000,000. This will be a great industrial revolution for us. From the standpoint of national defence and national wealth, petroleum is a great factor. Having the iron and petroleum of Manchuria, our army and navy will become impregnable walls of defence. That Manchuria and Mongolia are the heart and liver of our empire, is a truthful saying. For the sake of our empire, we should be congratulated.

AGRICULTURAL FERTILIZER—AMONIA SULPHATE

AND OTHER PRODUCTS

Agricultural fertilizer is a great necessity for the production of foodstuff. Chemical fertilizers depend upon the ammonia sulphate extracted from coal. The Fushun coal yields especially good results. At present, our total consumption of ammonia sulphate is 500,000 tons. Of this, only half is manufactured at home, using the coal from the Kailan or the Fushun Mining Companies. The remaining half is imported from abroad at the cost of Yen 35,000,000 a year. With our agricultural work daily increasing and in view of the development of our new empire in Manchuria and Mongolia, we shall easily need 1,000,000 tons of ammonia sulphate every year during the next ten years. From the soot gathered from the burning of Fushun coal connected with the manufacture of steel, we could produce large quantities of ammonia sulphate. If the yield is put at 300,000 tons a year, we shall add an annual income of more than Yen 40,000,000. In fifty years, this will mount up to Yen 2,000,000,000. This money could be used for the improvement of our agriculture. If there is any surplus, we can buy bean-cakes with it and then invade the farms all over China and in the South Sea Islands. In order to accomplish this, we must separate this enterprise from the South Manchuria Railway. We shall then be able to control the fertilizers of the Far East.

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SODA AND SODA ASH

We import 100,000 tons of Soda Ash at the cost of more than Yen 10,000,000 a year. Both soda and soda ash are valuable materials for military and industrial purposes. Soda is derived from nothing more than salt and coal, both of which are cheap and abundant in Manchuria and Mongolia. If we go into this manufacture, we can supply not only ourselves but can also sell it to China with a view to controlling its industrial products. We ought to gain from it a profit of at least Yen 15,000,000 a year. We can also supply our own military and chemical needs. Again this industry must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway.

MAGNESIUM AND ALUMINIUM

According to the independent surveys of the South Manchuria Railway Company and Dr. Honta of Tohoku University, magnesite and aluminium is a very promising business (in Manchuria). Magnesite is found in the surroundings of Tashichiao, and aluminium in the vicinity of Yentai. The deposit is one of the largest in the world. A ton of magnesite is worth Yen 2,000 and a ton of aluminium is worth about Yen 1,700. An estimate of the deposits of both minerals in Manchuria is Yen 750,000,000. These substances are especially useful for making aeroplanes, mess kits in the army, hospital apparatus and vessels, and other important industries. The United States alone has extensive deposits of these substances. The output of our country is one ton a year! Such materials are becoming more useful every day, but the supply is insufficient. Its price is growing high, as if never reaching a limit. The deposits in our territory of Manchuria and Mongolia, are nothing less than a God-given gift. The metal is really precious, being indispensable to both our industry and national defence. It also should be made in independent business, separate from the South Manchuria Railway. Its manufacture should be in Japan, so as to keep the Fengtien Government from imitating it on the one hand and to avoid the watchful eyes of the British and American capitalists on the other. After we

have gained control of it in the Three Eastern Provinces, we may harness the water power of the Yalu River to work on these metal ores. In view of the development of aircraft, in the future all the world will come to us for the materials necessary for aeronautics.

If all the enterprises mentioned above are made independent undertakings, they would make rapid progress and bring us at least a profit of 60 billion yen a year. The industrial development in South Manchuria means much to our national defence and economical progress. It will help us to build the foundation of an industrial empire. As to the cultural undertakings such as hospitals, schools and philanthropic institutions, they are our signal towers in the advance into Manchuria and Mongolia. They are the institutions for spreading our national prestige and power. More specifically, they are the baits for rights and privileges. Let us separate all these from the South Manchuria Railway in order that we may redouble our efforts and advance into North Manchuria to reclaim the sources of great wealth there.

When these important undertakings become independent and are free to develop without the interference of our officials, they will naturally become channels of national prosperity. On the wings of economic development, we could make rapid advance without either arousing the suspicion of the Powers or the anti-Japanese activities of the people of the Three Eastern Provinces. Such hidden methods would enable us to build the New Continent Empire with ease and efficiency.

The foreign loans for the South Manchuria Railway must be confined to those railroads already completed. Other railways built by us but nominally under Chinese control, can either be amalgamated with the completed lines or made independent according to the desire of the investing nations. The slogan of "Equal Opportunity" helps us to get foreign loans as well as to dispel suspicion of our designs in North Manchuria. At any rate, we shall need foreign capital to develop our continental empire. When the South Manchuria Railway is open

to foreign investments, the powers will be glad to lend more to us and China can do nothing to block it. This is an excellent way to further our plans in Manchuria. We should lose no time in doing it. As to the wealth concentrated in the northern part of Manchuria and Mongolia, we should be likewise. The two new railways from Kirin to Hueining and from Changchun to Talai, as well as the lumber and mining interests, should also be managed as separate institutions.

The South Manchuria Railway will also be greatly enriched by our exploits in North Manchuria. Already Chinese immigrants are pouring into South Manchuria in large numbers. Their position will become stronger every day. As the right of renting land in the interior is not yet secured, our immigrants are gradually losing ground. Even if our government's backing will maintain our people there, they cannot compete with the Chinese due to the latter's low standard of living. Our only chance now is to defeat the Chinese by heavy capitalization. This again necessitates the use of foreign loans. This is so, especially because the riches of North Manchuria are even not accessible to the Chinese immigrants. We must seize the present opportunity, and hasten the progress of immigration by our own people and take possession of all rights there so as to shut out the Chinese. But in order to encourage immigration, rapid transportation is essential. This will both afford facilities to our people and bring the natural resources there to the would be market. Moreover, both Russia and ourselves have been increasing armaments. On account of geographical positions, we have conflicting interests. If we want to obtain the wealth of North Manchuria and to build up the New Continent according to the will of Emperor Meiji, we must rush our people into North Manchuria first and seek to break the friendship between Russia and China. In this way, we can enjoy the wealth of North Manchuria and hold at bay both Russia and China. In case of war, our immigrants in North Manchuria will combine with our forces in South Manchuria, and at one stroke settle the problem forever. In case this is not possible, they can still maintain their own in North Manchuria and supply the rest of

us with food-stuff and raw materials. As the interests of North Manchuria and our country are so wrapped up, we should march directly into North Manchuria and pursue our settled policy.

THE NECESSITY OF ESTABLISHING A COLONIAL DEPARTMENT

Our exploitation of Manchuria takes a variety of forms. Often those in authority take such different views that even the most profitable undertaking for our country cannot be carried out. Because of the lack of speed, our secrets are often exposed and are made propaganda materials by the Mukden government much to the detriment of our country in international relations. Whenever a new undertaking is projected in Manchuria and Mongolia, it will become the subject of discussion of tens of meetings and conferences in Dairen. Not only the approval of the four-headed government there is necessary, but also the sanction of the cabinet at home has to be secured before anything can be carried out. Because of all these obstacles, any undertaking will take months and months before any definite results are seen. In the process it is possible for the Chinese to employ Japanese adventurers to steal our secrets so that before a project is launched it is often reported to the Chinese and in turn it becomes common property of the world. We are suddenly brought under the check of world opinion, and more than once we have incurred hardship in putting into practice our policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia. Furthermore, the opposition party has also made capital out of what they find in these regions in order to attack the government. All these have many serious have with our diplomatic relations. Henceforth, we must change our practice in order to proceed adroitly. The centre of control must be in Tokyo. That will (1) insure secrecy, (2) stop China from knowing before-hand our plans, (3) avoid the suspicion of the powers before a thing is done, (4) unify the multiple control in Manchuria and (5) bring the government agencies in Manchuria and Mongolia in close touch with the central government so as to deal with China with undivided power. For these reasons we should follow the original plan for absorbing Korea laid down by Ito and Katsura

and establish a Colonial Department, the special function of which is to look after the expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia. The administration of Formosa, Korea and Saghalien Island may be its nominal function, but our expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia is its real purpose. This will blind the eyes of the world on the one hand and forestall the disclosure of secrets on the other.

It is my personal conviction that the fact that the absorption of Korea could not be effected during the administration of Ito, is due to the lack of a special office for control. Therefore, there were always differences of opinion and secret policies were impossible. Such a state of affairs played into the hand of international obstruction and Korean opposition. Then a number of propagandists went to Europe and America as well as Korea itself, declaring that we firmly respected the independence of Korea and had no designs on an inch of Korean territory. The result of their work was the recovery of international confidence. After that, a colonial department was established under the pretence of Formosa, Then we seized the opportunity and the object was gained! It goes to prove that in order to undertake colonization and immigration, a special office for it is absolutely necessary. Moreover, the creation of a new empire in Mongolia and Manchuria is of utmost importance to the existence of Japan. It is necessary to have a special colonial office in order that the politics in that vast territory may be controlled from Tokyo. The officers in the field should only take orders: they should not interfere with the execution of policies where they please. This will insure secrecy; and the opposition nation have no chance of getting into the secrets of our colonial activities. Then our movements regarding Mongolia and Manchuria will be beyond the reach of international public opinion, and we shall be free from interferences.

As to the subsidiary enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway such as the Development Company, the Land Company, and the Trust Company, the power of supervision and planning should also be in the colonial office. They should all be under united control, in order that they may all help in the general

policy of expansion in Mongolia and Manchuria of the Imperial Government and complete the creation of the new empire.

TALING RIVER VALLEY OF PEKING-MUKDEN RAILWAY

The Taling River Valley is a wide area sparsely populated but infested with bandits. Many Koreans have made investments here, especially in rice field. Judging from its resources, this region is bound to be prosperous. It will also be an advantageous foothold for us if we want to expand into the Jehol region. We should give full protection to our Korean subjects here and wait for an opportunity to secure from China the right of colonization so that our immigrants may live here and act as our vanguards to Jehol and Mongolia. In case of warfare, this valley will be a strategic point to quarter large armies of soldiers. We shall then not only check the Chinese soldiers from advancing north but also hold the key to the immense wealth of South Manchuria. When Koreans come into this region we should finance them through our Trust and other financial organs with a view to gaining for these organs the actual ownership while the Koreans may satisfy themselves with the right of farming only. Ostensibly the ownership of land must reside with the Koreans. It is a convenient way of securing rights from the Chinese government. Henceforth the trust companies and financial organs should give them full backing when our own and Korean subjects wish to gain land ownership. If they need money to buy farms from the Chinese, the financial organs should also come to their aid. Unnoticeably we shall gain control of the better rice fields which we may give to our own emigrants. They shall displace the Koreans who in turn may go on opening new fields, to deliver to the convenient use of our own people. This is the policy with respect to the colonization of rice field and bean farms. As to the policy for herd farming, the Development Company should be especially entrusted gradually to expand, eventually placing all the wealth of herds at the disposal of our country. This same company may also take care of horse breeding and select the best out of Mongolia for the use of our national defence.

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policy of expansion in Mongolia and Manchuria of the Imperial Government and complete the creation of the new empire.

TALING RIVER VALLEY OF PEKING-MUKDEN RAILWAY

The Taling River Valley is a wide area sparsely populated but infested with bandits. Many Koreans have made investments here, especially in rice field. Judging from its resources, this region is bound to be prosperous. It will also be an advantageous foothold for us if we want to expand into the Jehol region. We should give full protection to our Korean subjects here and wait for an opportunity to secure from China the right of colonization so that our immigrants may live here and act as our vanguards to Jehol and Mongolia. In case of warfare, this valley will be a strategic point to quarter large armies of soldiers. We shall then not only check the Chinese soldiers from advancing north but also hold the key to the immense wealth of South Manchuria. When Koreans come into this region we should finance them through our Trust and other financial organs with a view to gaining for these organs the actual ownership while the Koreans may satisfy themselves with the right of farming only. Ostensibly the ownership of land must reside with the Koreans. It is a convenient way of securing rights from the Chinese government. Henceforth the trust companies and financial organs should give them full backing when our own and Korean subjects wish to gain land ownership. If they need money to buy farms from the Chinese, the financial organs should also come to their aid. Unnoticeably we shall gain control of the better rice fields which we may give to our own emigrants. They shall displace the Koreans who in turn may go on opening new fields, to deliver to the convenient use of our own people. This is the policy with respect to the colonization of rice field and bean farms. As to the policy for herd farming, the Development Company should be especially entrusted gradually to expand, eventually placing all the wealth of herds at the disposal of our country. This same company may also take care of horse breeding and select the best out of Mongolia for the use of our national defence.

PRECAUTION AGAINST CHINESE MIGRATION

Recently the internal disturbances in China have driven large hordes of immigrants into Mongolia and Manchuria, thereby threatening the advance of our migration. For the sake of our activities in this field we should not fail to take precautions. The fact that the Chinese government welcomes this migration and does nothing to hold back the tide oppresses our policy even the more seriously. A noted American sinologue has made the statement that the Mukden authorities are carrying out such effective government that all people are moving into their territory. Therefore, the influx of immigrants is looked upon as a mark of effective government of Mukden authorities. We, of course, are concerned. Unless we put a stop to it, in less than ten years our own policy of emigration will prove an instrument for China to crush us with. Politically we must use police force to check this tendency as much as possible and economically our financiers should drive the Chinese out with low wages. Furthermore, we must develop and expand electric power to displace human labor. This will keep out Chinese immigrants as well as monopolize the control of motor force as a first step toward controlling the industrial development of this vast region.

HOSPITALS AND SCHOOLS

Hospitals and Schools in Manchuria must be independent of the South Manchuria Railway. For the people have often considered these as institutions of imperialism and refuse to have anything to do with them. When these are separated and made independent institutions we shall be able to make the people realize our goodness so that they will feel thankful to us.... But in establishing schools emphasis should be laid on normal schools for men and women. Through these in educational work we may build up a substantial good-will among the people towards Japan. This is our first principle of cultural structure.

THE CHINA CRITIC,
Circulation Dept.,
50 Peking Road
Shanghai, China.

DATE 193 .

Gentlemen:

Please enter my subscription for a period of
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Vol. No. against my remittance of
Dollars (.....) herewith in
money order or check to THE CHINA CRITIC;

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1872
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REQUIRED

Prepared for Department of State, in compliance
 with Legation's telegraphic instruction of Novem-
 ber 25, 1931.



REPORT ON ANTI-JAPANESE BOYCOTT.

From A. S. Chase American Consul.
 A. S. Chase.

Tsingtao, China.

Date of Completion:
 December 2, 1931.

Date of Mailing:
 December 2, 1931.

General Situation.

In general, it may be stated that the boycott to
 date has affected Japanese commercial interests in
 Tsingtao seriously, but not desperately as in the
 larger ports of China.

On.....

F/DEW

793.94/3595

125 811 1932

- 2 -

On import and export activities combined, Japanese trade is probably losing from 20 to 25% as a direct result of the boycott. Imports and import shipping are the heaviest sufferers and are sustaining a loss due to boycott of from 40 to 45%. Export trade, while falling off in certain lines, is holding up well on the whole, and the boycott has affected exports in general, at the most, not more than 15%.

The important Japanese manufacturing industries here, particularly the cotton mills, are operating near capacity and disposing of their output. At the same time they have only retained their trade at the sacrifice of heavy price cutting, as a result of which they are operating at considerable loss, which, of course, cannot continue indefinitely.

Japanese passenger steamer service has completely lost its Chinese patronage and must accordingly be taking heavy losses.

Other less important Japanese activities are suffering somewhat, but far less than in the larger China ports.

The relatively mild effects of the boycott here may be ascribed primarily to the facts: that the Shantung Chinese population in general are not of excitable nature nor anti-Japanese in sentiment; that the Chinese Provincial and Municipal Authorities have seen fit to give little encouragement to the boycott and to prevent its enforcement by extreme means such as pickets and seizures; and that Japanese traders here are to a large.....

- 3 -

large degree in the fortunate position of being able to handle their products all the way to and from the interior- which, of course, means that, in the absence of actual obstruction by force, they can get out their exports and distribute their imports with comparative ease.

Import Situation.

It is in imports and import shipping that Japanese interests in this district are suffering most heavily. Even in these lines, however, the situation does not approach the desperate conditions reported elsewhere in China.

To trace briefly the course of the boycott with respect to imports to date, it may be said that incoming Japanese shipments actually rose above normal in August in anticipation of enforcement of the boycott, fell off badly through September and the first half of October due partly to boycott but also to temporary oversupply resulting from the heavy August deliveries, and have since then recovered somewhat- up to the point possible under the boycott, that is- as a result of new though limited orders which have been placed following consumption of the August surpluses.

According to statistics which may be taken as approximately correct, September imports from Japan and in Japanese bottoms from China coast ports were well under those of August and about 40% less than those of September, 1930.

October's record was even worse than September's as may be seen from the following statistics, expressed.....

- 4 -

pressed in freight tons:

	<u>October 1931</u>	<u>September 1931</u>	<u>October 1930</u>
Imports from Japan	17,900	15,200	36,000
Imports from China in Japanese bottoms	7,200	12,600	10,700
Total	<u>25,100</u>	<u>27,800</u>	<u>46,700</u>

On the other hand, within the month, October witnessed a distinct betterment in the situation, since a further analysis of the figures indicates that over seventy per cent of the 25,100 tons total is accountable to the last two weeks of the month.

Complete figures for November are not yet available, but, according to returns which should represent about two-thirds of the totals, imports from Japan and in Japanese bottoms from Chinese ports will be somewhat above those of October.

While other factors such as exchange may have contributed to the sudden late October increase, it is believed that the higher level of the past six weeks- October 15th to December 1st- has been due in some measure to the fact that as the preboycott surpluses have become completely consumed, new orders have been forthcoming, which, though not satisfactory from the Japanese point of view, at least prove that the boycott is progressing far less sensationally here than elsewhere in China.

While imports in general have been depressed for the past few months, a study of statistics indicates clearly that Japanese imports have slumped to a far greater degree than the market as a whole. The

following.....

- 5 -

following figures illustrate this convincingly:

	A) Total imports from all countries in- cluding China.	B) Total imports from Japan plus imports from China coast in Japanese bottoms	Ratio of B to A
September 1930	74,700	45,000	60%
October 1930	85,000	46,000	54%
September 1931	60,000	28,000	47%
October 1931	61,000	26,000	43%

After careful consideration of statistics and estimates by persons whose opinions should be authoritative, one may say with reasonable certainty, in summary of the import situation, that losses now being experienced here by Japanese imports and import shipping as a direct result of the boycott amount to between 40 and 45%.

Export Situation.

Japanese export activities here are showing far less effect from the boycott than import lines. In fact, unlike the import situation, there is no marked falling off of trade which may be with certainty attributed to the boycott. While Japanese exports for September and October have been dull, so has the export market in general, and it is difficult to distinguish boycott results from effects of general depression.

While the total volume of Japanese export trade appears to be holding up well against the boycott, certain lines are undoubtedly sustaining considerable losses. This applies particularly to products from the interior which have been accustomed to reach local Japanese exporters through the medium of Chinese traders operating on the local Produce Exchange.

A comparison of the two month period, September 1st to October 31st, for 1930 and 1931, shows that, while
total.....

- 6 -

total exports for the period were 124,150 freight tons in 1931 as against 81,500 freight tons in 1930 (an abnormally low figure), the percentages of the totals represented by exports to Japan plus exports to the China coast in Japanese bottoms were 48½% in 1930 and 45% in 1931. While not conclusive, this comparison would indicate that, even as regards total cargoes, Japanese export lines have suffered slightly from the boycott.

Complete export figures for November are not yet at hand, but from those received to date, it would appear that the situation for the month with respect to the boycott will be approximately that of October.

After considering various indications, the writer is inclined to take the opinion recently expressed to him by a high official in the Chinese Maritime Customs to the effect that, while certain lines are suffering considerably, Japanese export trade here as a whole has suffered a loss ascribable to boycott which cannot be more than 10 or 15%.

Situation of Tsingtao Japanese Mills.

Next to imports and shipping, the heaviest sufferers from the boycott here are probably the Japanese factories.

The Japanese cotton mills, which constitute by far the greatest part of Tsingtao's Japanese manufacturing interests and employ normally some 35,000 laborers, have been producing up to capacity or nearly so and are at present finding little trouble in disposing of their output. At the same time, according to good authority, they are taking heavy financial losses. This seeming paradox is explained by the

fact.....

- 7 -

fact that the factories have since the beginning of the boycott cut their prices below cost to the point where the average northern Chinese sacrifices patriotism to purse and buys. In general, this has meant their selling at a price at least 25% under that of the competing local Chinese cotton mill. By this means the Japanese factories are retaining or even increasing their volume of sales in Shantung and elsewhere in the north, though they have all but lost their former trade to South China, where a more effective boycott, proving impervious to their cheaper prices, has resulted in leaving the market entirely to their Chinese rivals.

A certain amount of labor force has been cut off by the Japanese mills within the past two months, which is estimated to amount to about 10% of total personnel, or in all some 3,500 men. This has been in the way of gradual elimination of the less capable workmen, however, and its chief effect on production has been that of increased efficiency. There have been no large lay-offs or walk-outs. This has been due not only to the desire of the mill operators to keep up production at all costs, but also to the persuasive efforts of the local Chinese Government officials, who have realized only too well what a potential menace to the orderly status quo of the port- and incidentally to their own tenure of office- large numbers of unemployed laborers would constitute.

One factor that has especially mitigated against the effectiveness of the boycott here as applied to Japanese.....

- 8 -

Japanese local factories has been the tolerant attitude of the Shantung Provincial Government, which has officially announced that goods produced in Japanese factories located in China shall not be considered as subject to the boycott.

How long the local Japanese mills can continue operating at a loss is difficult to foresee. Unless agitation against their products increases appreciably, however, it seems unlikely that the mills will shut down in the near future.

Other Effects of Boycott.

Japanese passenger shipping entering and leaving Tsingtao shows a practically complete loss of Chinese patronage, which, of course, means a very serious decrease of passenger revenues. Chinese travelers leaving for both northern and southern ports now use other than Japanese lines, or, as is more frequent, travel by train. This situation is due to existence of pickets and other extreme tactics by Chinese boycott agitators at other ports of arrival rather than obstructionist action at this end.

Other forms of Japanese commercial interests, such as restaurants and hotels, are all feeling their share of the boycott. As with the more important lines, however, agitation against them is far less vigorous than elsewhere in China, and their losses, while important, are not very serious.

In quintuplicate to Department of State,
Copy to Legation,
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.

800/610.21
ASC/FP

1 3 8 1
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

Confidential Note: Chief sources of information: ships' manifests, conversations with Commissioner of Maritime Customs, Director of local Chinese cotton mill, and other important local business men.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 22 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 18, 1932
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 16 1932
Department of State
CHINESE LEGATION
WASHINGTON
January 16, 1932.
Cox, L. C.

My dear Dr. Hornbeck:

In continuation of my letter dated January 14, 1932, I am enclosing to you for the information of the State Department three (3) copies of a cablegram which is an official translation of the note in reply to the note of the Secretary of State communicated to our Government on January 8, 1932, on the question of Manchuria, and which has just been received.

Very sincerely yours,

Hawking Yen

Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

3 Copies of cablegram
as above.

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State.

F/DEW

F.W. 793.94/3596

FILED

FEB 12 1932

188

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING

DATED JANUARY 15, 1932.

SKH
file

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note dated January 8, 1932, stating that (note of the United States Government delivered on January 8, 1932, to the Chinese Government).

It is amply evident that the American Government takes the most serious view of the lawless acts of the Japanese military forces in the 3 Eastern Provinces and that it upholds also the dignity of the international covenants and of the pact against war. The Chinese Government from the time that the present events in the Northeast began on September 18, 1931, and up to the present day, has in every respect fulfilled its duties as prescribed in the pact against war, and the Chinese Government therefore has taken no steps of any nature whatever calculated to aggravate the situation, but has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the existing international covenants, asked that Signatory Powers direct their special attention to these events. The Japanese military forces, on the contrary, following the adoption of the Resolution of the League of Nations on September 30, 1931, and the meeting of the Council on October 24, 1931, have still continuously extended the field of their invasion, and even after the passing of the League's Resolution on December 10, 1931, have openly invaded and seized Chinchow, the seat of the Chinese local government.

More

- 2 -

More recently Japan has occupied Suichung and advanced to Shanhaikwan, and has increased the numbers of the Japanese vessels and troops at Chinwangtao, Tientsin and other places. In addition to this, there are indications of the intention to attack Jehol.

These violations of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact against War, and this disregard of the repeated decisions of the League are facts which it has not been possible to conceal. The Japanese Government therefore must bear full responsibility for all the events involved.

With reference to the notification of Your Excellency's Government that in this matter it does not recognize as legal any situation de facto, I have the honor to state that the Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged with the Japanese Government gravest protests against the various invasions and lawless acts perpetrated by the Japanese troops since September 18, 1931, and has made it known internationally that the Chinese Government accords them no recognition whatsoever.

With regard to the treaties or agreements referred to in the note under reply, I have the honor to state that the Chinese Government, basing its position on its sovereignty and independence and on the principle of territorial and administrative integrity, has absolutely no intention of concluding any treaties or agreements of the categories described.

It is the sincere hope of the Chinese Government that Your Excellency's Government will continue to promote the effectiveness of the international covenants in order that their dignity may be conserved.

I have

1885

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

I have the honor to bring the above to the attention
of Your Excellency and express the hope that you will
transmit it to Your Excellency's Government for its infor-
mation and action.

Eugene Chen

188
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


January 16, 1932.

The text of the Chinese note
of January 12 herewith apparently
^{proper} takes account of the text of the
American Government's note of
January 7.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



See note of Jan. 16, 1932

For official translation

CHINESE LEGATION
 WASHINGTON

January 14, 1932.



My dear Dr. Hornbeck:

The Minister wishes to enclose to you for the information of the State Department three (3) copies of a translation of a cablegram which is a note in reply to the note of the Secretary of State on the question of Manchuria, and which has just been received.

Very sincerely yours,

Hawthorne Yen

Enclosure:
 Copies of cablegram
 as above.

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
 Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
 Department of State.

F/DEW

793.94/3596

FEB 13 1932

FILED

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM
FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING
DATED JANUARY 12, 1932.

We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 8th instant stating that with the recent military operations about Chinchow the last administrative authority of the Chinese Republic in Manchuria had been destroyed, and, however, the American Government continued confident that the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations would facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties between China and Japan; but in view of the present situation and of its rights and obligations, the American Government deemed it to be its duty to notify the Imperial Japanese Government and the Chinese Government that it could not admit the legality of any situation de facto, nor did it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments or agents thereof, which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, independence, or territorial and administrative integrity of China, or the open door policy, nor intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement contrary to the Covenant obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928.

We

- 2 -

We noted that the American Government was much concerned with the actions of the Japanese military forces in Manchuria, and we highly appreciate the attitude which the American Government has been taking to uphold the dignity and prestige of international treaties and the Kellogg Anti-War Pact.

Ever since the Manchurian incident took place on September 18, 1931, the Chinese Government steadfastly complying with the requirements contained in the Anti-War Pact, has never taken any step which might complicate the situation but acted in accordance with the stipulations of those international treaties, and requested all the Signatory Powers to give the matter their serious attention. The Japanese military forces however, in spite of the resolution passed and adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on the 30th of September and at the close of the Session of the Council of the League of Nations on the 24th of October, continued to take the most aggressive measures. Even after the Resolution, passed and adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on the 10th of December, they occupied Chinchow where the Chinese provincial administration was located. Recently they have advanced further and taken possession of Sui-chung and reached Shanhaikwan. They have also increased the naval and military forces at Tientsin and Chingwangtao. They are now planning to invade Jehol. That Japan has violated the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Anti-War Pact, and ignored the Resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations are undeniable facts, for which the Japanese Government must bear the entire responsibility.

It is

- 3 -

It is noted that the American Government will not admit the legality of any situation de facto, and it should be stated that the Chinese Government has repeatedly despatched strong protests to the Japanese Government concerning the various offensive measures and illegal actions of the Japanese troops since September 18, 1931, and also has notified the Council of the League of Nations that it will not recognize the same. The Chinese Government, standing firmly on the principle to maintain the complete sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity of China will not enter into any such treaty or agreement as was intimated in the note of the American Government.

The Chinese Government strongly cherishes the hope that the American Government will continue to strengthen the effective application of those international treaties in order to maintain their dignity and prestige. The Chinese Government hereby has the honor to communicate the note in reply to Your Excellency to be forwarded to the American Government for its information and action.

January 20, 1932.

Dear Mr. Yen:

I wish to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of January 14, 1932, with which you enclosed, for the information of the Department of State, three copies of a translation of a cablegram dated January 12, 1932, constituting the reply of the Chinese Government to this Government's note delivered to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 8; also the receipt of your supplementary letter of January 16 enclosing copies of an official translation of the Chinese Government's note above referred to.

Yours sincerely,


Wm. C. Clegg

Mr. Hawking Yen,

Chinese Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
Washington, D. C.

FE:RSM:EJL

JAN. 21 1932



793.94/3596

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
BY M. O. Smith
NARS, Date 12-18-75

1892


793.94/3596

Yours sincerely,

5-14-40

Washington, D. C.

JAN 21 1954



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00/343 FOR Tel. #19 5pm

FROM Japan (Forbes) DATED Jan. 21, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 o.s.

REGARDING: Speech by Foreign Minister regarding the Manchurian
situation, and expressing thanks of the Japanese
Government for the impartiality of the Soviet Republic.

793.94/3597

MET

GRAY

Tokio

Dated January 21, 1932

Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

19, January 21, 5 p.m.

894 800

The Diet was dissolved today after reassembling following the New Year recess. This action was expected as indicated in the Embassy's despatches 421, 458 and 460 when the political situation was discussed at some length. The general election will probably be set for February 20th. The Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and the Finance delivered addresses. The Foreign Minister's speech has been telegraphed to Washington and will be made public by the Japanese Embassy.

The Foreign Minister dwelt at some length on the Manchurian situation and expressed the thanks of the Japanese Government for the impartiality of the Soviet Republic. He also referred sympathetically to the forthcoming Arms Conference at Geneva. For the first time in some years there was no reference to the American immigration policy.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#19 from Tokio, January 21,
5 p.m.

The speeches of the three Ministers of State lose something of their importance because of the dissolution as the Government must necessarily mark time until the elections are over.

FORBES

RR-WSE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP

FROM

GRAY

Tokio

Dated January 22, 1932

Rec'd 7:49 a. m.

RECEIVED

JAN 22 1932

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington.

21, January 22, 6 p. m.

Japanese have despatched one cruiser, one airplane carrier and four destroyers to Shanghai with landing force of four to five hundred men.

The Government here state that they regard the disturbance as purely local like Tsingtau or Foochow but feel that some assurance may be necessary to prevent further rioting. Foreign Office states verbally that the Japanese Consul General has been instructed to take all questions up with the Chinese local authorities and/or with the Municipal Council. No representations are to be made at Nanking at least for the present.

Repeated Peiping.

FORBES

WSB

F/DEW

793.94/3598

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FEB 4 1932

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note
893.102-S

1897

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JAN 22 1932
DIVISION OF

FROM

REP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated January 22, 1932

Rec'd 10:05 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 29 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

25, January 22, 10 a. m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

I have acted on the instructions in your No. 20,
January 21, 4 p. m., and from my talk with Drummond venture
to express the opinion that no difficulty will be encountered
in the arrangement being carried out as suggested.

GILBERT

WWC

KLP


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JAN 30 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

PEIPING

Dated January 22, 1932

Secretary of State,
Washington.

109, January 22, 5 p. m.

Following is summary of information from Lieutenant

Brown at Harbin, January 15th.

One. Atamen Semenoff in daily conference with Japanese authorities and with several Mongol princes at Mukden. Japanese are working among both White Russians and Mongols with a view to employing them later this year.

Two. Japanese troops in Manchuria consist of seven full brigades of infantry, the six independent railway trains, cavalry, artillery, et cetera, in all about 30,000 regular troops.

Three. Japanese authorities at Harbin assert the existence of extensive Soviet propaganda in Northern Manchuria detrimental to Japanese interests and claim that only the sternest of positive measures will succeed in stopping it. It is maintained that this is the most serious present menace to Japan especially by reason of the ability of the Soviets to purchase the assistance of Chinese of all classes.

Japanese

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FEB 5 1932

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REP

2- #109, from Feiping, Jan. 22, 5 p.m.

Japanese military state that their first task is to clear Northern Manchuria of Chinese remnants and then eradicate all vestiges of Bolshevik propaganda.

Four. Japanese believe that the recent plot against the Emperor was the result of Russian intrigue in Harbin which centered there and extended over China as far as Shanghai.

Five. At Manchuli conditions were quiet. People believe that the Japanese will come at least as far as the Hingan range, and may possibly invade Soviet territory and that business will be better under their rule. Russians all believe that the Japanese are desirous of fighting them in which case the Russians would only act in self defense. There is a difference of opinion whether a Japanese advance will come immediately in the Spring or a year from now. It is agreed that Russians would not take the initiative even if possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway were at stake.

Six. Brown's general impression is that if there is to be fighting between the two countries it will be Japan which forces the issue after indirectly attempting to provoke a Soviet initiative through Mongol and White Russian intrigue. In the Spring Japan may move to the Hingan range, in order to better direct this campaign of mercenaries on the border.

JOHNSON

KLP - HPD



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


Tokyo, Japan, December 29, 1931.

RECEIVED

No. 435

JAN 28 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



F/DEW

793.94/3601

FEB 4 1932

FILED

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

An analysis of the bandit situation in South Manchuria reveals the following very interesting facts which of themselves constitute a pretty severe indictment of the methods pursued in Manchuria by both Japan and China in the matter of banditry. The figures in this table are taken from The South Manchuria Railway's Second Report on Progress in Manchuria,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Manchuria, dated April, 1931:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Raids</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Raids</u>
1906 - - - - -	9	1918 - - - - -	82
1907 - - - - -	32	1919 - - - - -	106
1908 - - - - -	30	1920 - - - - -	183
1909 - - - - -	46	1921 - - - - -	152
1910 - - - - -	34	1922 - - - - -	104
1911 - - - - -	57	1923 - - - - -	131
1912 - - - - -	33	1924 - - - - -	246
1913 - - - - -	69	1925 - - - - -	206
1914 - - - - -	64	1926 - - - - -	213
1915 - - - - -	86	1927 - - - - -	296
1916 - - - - -	71	1928 - - - - -	352
1917 - - - - -	99	1929 - - - - -	368

During part of this period a portion of the South Manchuria Railway was under construction and its area was extended considerably. The zone to be protected became larger with an increasingly proportionate risk of outlawry as the railroad reached less settled regions. As these regions became settled with immigrants the value of property along the line and in the railway warehouses increased and offered more opportunity for booty. Compare these figures of one bandit raid a day in 1929 with the number of raids which the Japanese Government gave in its statement to the representatives of the French, British and American governments, dated December 27th, which shows something like forty raids ^{a day} in the first ten days of December. The fact is that the Japanese Army, having scattered the Chinese forces and taken away their source of supplies without

- 3 -

without disarming them, have practically turned these large numbers of men loose without pay, sustenance or control to prey upon the community, which they are doing in groups more or less numerous and more or less organized, according to the degree of leadership they have maintained. The Japanese claim that these men are directed, supplied and encouraged from Chinchow; in fact, they charge that these forces are acting directly under orders from Chang Hsueh-liang and his Generals. Many of the Japanese claims, however, have been found by foreign military observers so widely at variance with the facts that it is difficult to place much credence in them. Just now the newspapers carry daily reports of attacks made by Japanese troops and they say that they can hardly distinguish between bandits and regulars, all of which is unquestionably calculated to stir up the public mind and to justify sending more troops and incurring greater expenses on the part of the Army, which will undoubtedly appear before the Government for an increased budget to meet the cost of the Manchurian campaign. The military authorities are resorting to every device they can to consolidate public opinion, - propaganda, flag-waving, patriotic displays in windows, including display of articles brought back as trophies from the "battlefields" of Manchuria, as they style them. Although the Japanese have not declared war on China nor severed diplomatic relations, yet in Manchuria the Military Attaché reports that they look upon the whole thing as nothing but war; the talk is all of war and they make no effort to camouflage it by placing pictures of the dove of peace on their military documents as they are figuratively doing

on

- 4 -

on their diplomatic ones. The newspapers speak of troops being sent "to the battle area" and yesterday both houses of the Diet passed a unanimous vote thanking the soldiers for their work in Manchuria. The fact is that while this war fervor is on and is at fever heat it is unpatriotic for anyone to speak against the Army or its policy in Manchuria and nobody dares to do it. You ask any Japanese and he will say that the people are unanimously back of the Government in regard to their policy in Manchuria. When they come to pay the bills the war fervor may have died down and there may be another story, but as both political parties have been party to it it can hardly now become a partisan matter.

Be all this as it may the turbulent conditions which the Japanese have stirred up in Manchuria make a real menace to the peace of every inhabitant, whether Chinese, Japanese, or foreign, and presents a problem that is taking on such serious proportions that the Japanese are constantly sending reinforcements to Manchuria. It looks as though the situation was going to require an army there to which the scant fifteen thousand allowed by treaty will be a mere handful. In other words, they have started something of a conflagration which will need drastic measures to extinguish.

Respectfully yours,

W. Cameron Forbes
W. Cameron Forbes

Embassy's File No. 800.-Manchuria
WCF/AA

1904

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 1 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 1 1932

January 26, 1932.

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FEB 4 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

In the despatch from Ambassador Forbes hereunder
(Tokyo Embassy's No. 435, December 29, 1931) the marked
increase in banditry in Manchuria is attributed to the

fact that:

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JAN 28 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

"The Japanese Army, having scattered the
Chinese forces and taken away their source of
supplies without disarming them, have
practically turned these large numbers of men
loose without pay, sustenance or control to
prey upon the community."

Mr. Forbes states that:

"The military authorities are resorting
to every device they can to consolidate public
opinion, - propaganda, flag-waving, patriotic
displays in windows, including display of
articles brought back as trophies from the
'battlefields' of Manchuria, as they style them";

and adds:

"The fact is that while this war fervor is
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matter."

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FEB 4 1932


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



203 SOUTH DEARBORN STREET



FE
file
290.

November 5, 1931.

To the Members and Friends of Japan America Society:

Because of the widespread interest in the present situation in Manchuria, it has occurred to me that you would perhaps care to have exact copies of the official statements of the Japanese Government concerning the same, and I enclose them herewith.

Very truly yours,

GEORGE F. POND, Secretary.

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The Statement of the Japanese Government.
September 24, 1931.

1. The Japanese Government has constantly been exercising honest endeavors in pursuance of its settled policy to foster friendly relations between Japan and China and to promote common prosperity and well being of the two countries. Unfortunately, the conduct of officials and individuals of China for some years past has been such that our national sentiment has frequently been irritated. In particular, unpleasant incidents have taken place, one after another, in regions of Manchuria and Mongolia, in which Japan is interested in especial degree, until impression has gained strength in the minds of the Japanese people that Japan's fair friendly attitude is not being reciprocated by China in like spirit.

Amidst an atmosphere of perturbation and anxiety thus created a detachment of Chinese troops destroyed tracks of the South Manchuria Railway in the vicinity of Mukden and attacked our railway guards at midnight of September 18th. A clash between Japanese and Chinese troops then took place.

2. The situation became critical, as the number of Japanese guards stationed along the entire railway did not then exceed 10,400, while there were in juxtaposition some 220,000 Chinese soldiers. Moreover hundreds of thousands of Japanese residents were placed in jeopardy. In order to forestall imminent disaster the Japanese army had to act swiftly. The Chinese soldiers garrisoned in neighboring localities were disarmed and duty of maintaining peace and order was left in

-2-

the hands of the local Chinese organizations, under the supervision of the Japanese troops.

3. These measures having been taken, our soldiers were mostly withdrawn within railway zone. There still remain some detachments in Mukden and Kirin and a small number of men in a few other places, but nowhere does state of military occupation as such exist.

Reports that Japanese authorities have seized customs or salt gabelle office at Yingkou or that they have taken control of Chinese railways between Ssuningkai and Chengchiatun or between Mukden and Sinmintun are entirely untrue, nor has the story of our troops having ever been sent north of Changchun or into Chientao any foundation in fact.

4. The Japanese Government at a special cabinet meeting on September 19th took decision that all possible efforts should be made to prevent aggravation of the situation and instructions to that effect were given to the commander of the Manchurian garrison. It is true that a detachment was dispatched from Changchun to Kirin on September 21st, but it was not with a view to military occupation but only for the purpose of removing menace to South Manchuria Railway on the flank. As soon as that object has been attained the bulk of our detachment will be withdrawn. It may be added that while a mixed brigade of four thousand men was sent from Korea to join the Manchurian Garrison the total number of men in the garrison at present still remains within the limit set by

-3-

treaty and that fact cannot therefore be regarded having any way added to seriousness of the international situation.

5. It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria. What we desire is that the Japanese subjects shall be enabled to safely engage in various peaceful pursuits and be given opportunity in participating in the development of that land by means of capital and labor.

It is the proper duty of a government to protect the rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by a nation or individuals. Endeavors of the Japanese Government to guard the South Manchuria Railway against wanton attacks should be viewed in no other light.

The Japanese Government, true to established policy, is prepared to cooperate with the Chinese Government in order to prevent the present incident from developing into a disastrous situation between the two countries and to work out such constructive plans as will once for all eradicate causes for future friction. The Japanese Government would be more than gratified if the present difficulty could be brought to a solution which will give a new turn to mutual relations of the two countries.

The Statement of the Japanese Government.
October 22, 1931.

1. On October 22, the Japanese representative in the Council of the League of Nations proposed certain amendments to the resolution then before the council with regard to two questions of (1) withdrawal of the Japanese troops to railway zone and (2) direct negotiations between China and Japan. However, these suggested amendments as well as the resolution itself fell through having failed to obtain the unanimous approval of the council.

2. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Japanese Government, the whole Manchurian affair was occasioned solely by the violent and provocative attack launched by the Chinese army on the railway zone. Certain small contingents of Japanese soldiers still remaining at few points outside that zone are insistently demanded by the danger to which the large population of the Japanese in that region are exposed in life and property. The presence of such a limited number of troops is quite incapable of being represented as a means of dictating to China Japan's terms for the settlement of the present difficulties. Nothing is farther from the thoughts of Japan than to bring armed pressure to bear upon China in the course of these negotiations.

3. The Japanese Government have on various occasions given expression to their firm determination to suffer no abridgment or diminution of the rights and interests of Japan, which are vital to her national existence and which are woven into the

-2-

complex fabric of her political and economic relations with China. Unfortunately the so-called "recovery of rights" movements in China have recently attained extravagant developments, while feelings antagonistic to Japan have been openly encouraged in text books used at various schools in China and have become deeply seated in the Chinese mind. In defiance of treaties and regardless of all the history, a vigorous agitation has been carried on in China with the object of undermining the rights and interests of Japan even most vital. As things stand at present, a complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the South Manchuria Railway zone under a mere assurance of the Chinese Government would create an intolerable situation exposing Japanese subjects to the gravest dangers. The risk of such dangers is clearly evidenced by past experience and by conditions which actually obtain in China.

4. The Japanese Government are persuaded that in the present situation the safety of the Japanese subjects in Manchuria can hardly be ensured without a provision being made to remove the national antipathies and suspicions existing in mutual relations of the two powers. With this end in view, they have already expressed, in the note of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of October 9th to the Chinese Minister in Tokyo, their readiness to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Government on certain basic principles that should regulate the normal interre-

-3-

relationship between the two countries. That note was communicated at the time to the Council of the League. Convinced that this method of procedure is alone calculated to open out a way to save the situation, the Japanese Government have consistently held to their proposals in that sense throughout the recent discussions at the Council of the League. The basic principles which they have had in mind relate to: (1) Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct. (2) Respect for China's territorial integrity. (3) Complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred. (4) Effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by the Japanese subject. (5) Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria.

The Japanese Government believe that all these points, being in entire accord with the aims and aspirations of the League of Nations and embodying natural basis upon which peace in the Far East must depend, will commend themselves to an approval of the public opinion of the world. The refusal by the Japanese representative to lay these points on the table of the council was due to the consideration that they should in their nature properly form the subject of negotiations between the parties directly involved.

5. With the future welfare of both nations in mind, the Japanese government feel that an urgent need at the present

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moment is to arrive at a solution of the problem by the cooperation of the two countries and thus seek a path of common happiness and prosperity. Their willingness remains unaltered and unabated to open negotiations with the Chinese Government on the subject of the basic principles above formulated relating to the normal relations between Japan and China and on the subject of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the South Manchuria Railway Zone.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**J A P A N
A M E R I C A
S O C I E T Y**

203 SOUTH DEARBORN STREET

November 6, 1931.

Dear Member:-

In spite of some fears which have been expressed that the Japan America Society was terminating all activities, the Board has had its initial meeting and outlined a tentative program for the year. It was intended that an announcement be sent to all members of the Society at the beginning of the summer regarding prospective plans, and the Treasurer assumes the blame for failure to have this done. The Board wishes all members to know the present status of affairs and hopes that an active interest will be maintained throughout the coming season.

Mr. Coleman, our former Executive Secretary, left on June first and expects to devote himself entirely to lecturing this year, and for that reason and because of the normal cessation of activities during the summer time, the rooms in the Palmer House were closed. The Board felt that because of business conditions, it was unwise to carry the overhead for quarters during this year and voted to dispense with permanent rooms until conditions warrant a change.

Through the courtesy of Mr. Muto, the Japanese Consul, we are hoping to secure the presence of Ambassador Debuchi as speaker at a dinner meeting some time this month. The Ambassador's plans are necessarily somewhat uncertain through the diplomatic situation, but he has expressed a willingness to address the Society at the first available date, and we are hoping to have him as the guest at our opening meeting of the year. Luncheon meetings with interesting speakers on topics connected with Japanese art, culture and commerce are also being tentatively arranged and definite announcement of them will be sent you shortly.

The Board felt that in view of the reduced cost of operation and the general tendency toward retrenchment, resident dues should be reduced to \$5.00, and passed a resolution to that effect. It also felt that because of the many misunderstandings which have arisen in the press and elsewhere regarding the Manchurian situation, the Society should function more actively than ever this winter, and we hope for your continued interest and co-operation to that end.

Faithfully yours,

Walter H. P. ...
Wes.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Mr. W. F. Durno
Chicago Daily News
Chicago, Illinois

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Mr. Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State,
Washington,
D.C.

THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS

DAILY NEWS PLAZA, CHICAGO



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1832


NO. 202.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL JAN 25 1932

Batavia - Java.

December 11, 1931

JAN 22 32




SUBJECT: Transmitting the Tanaka memorial.

1-1221 ...

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



F/DEW

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the "China Critic", dated September 24, 1931, containing what purports to be a memorial presented to the Emperor of Japan on July 25, 1927 by Premier Tanaka outlining the policy in Manchuria, together with eight reprints of the memorial supplied by the Chinese Consulate General, Batavia, and another reprint entitled "Japan and the Next World War".

The reprints above mentioned were furnished this office by the Chinese Vice-Consul in Batavia some weeks ago. At the request of this office the original copy of the "China Critic" was obtained by the Chinese Consulate General. For the Department's information it is pointed out that the editors of this magazine are understood to be prominent in Shanghai. The chancellor of the Chinese Consulate General at Batavia stated that Chang Hsin-Hai is counsellor of the Chinese Foreign Office, that Quentin Pan is a professor in the Shanghai University

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JAN 27 1932

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-2-

University, and that Wu Lien-Teh is a prominent editorial writer, and that all of the other members of the editorial staff are highly educated and well respected.

The Chinese Consulate General has distributed hundreds of these reprints to practically all foreign representatives and Dutch officials, as well as to the Chinese population. Both the Director of the Department of Education and the Acting British Consul General, after perusing the Memorial, expressed the opinion that it is a genuine document.

It is assumed that the Consulate General in Shanghai and the Legation at Peiping have already forwarded these documents to the Department, but it was thought advisable to transmit this information if only to show the extent of Chinese propaganda in this connection.

Respectfully yours,


K. S. Patton
American Consul General

WKA/hk

✓ Enclosures:

Copy of "China Critic".
8 copies of Tanaka Memorial.
1 copy of "Japan and the Next World War".

Original and 2 copies to Department.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAPAN

and the next

WORLD WAR

田中併吞滿蒙奏摺
中國評論週報社印行
上海北京路五十號

793.94/3603

Published By
THE CHINA CRITIC
50 PEKING ROAD
SHANGHAI, CHINA

THIS DOCUMENT
10-10-10

Secret
MEMORIAL

**Concerning Manchuria, Mongolia, China,
U. S. A. & the World**

Submitted by
GENERAL TANAKA

(The then Premier of Japan)

to
The Japanese Emperor
in
1927

(5TH EDITION)

HIGH LIGHTS OF THE MEMORIAL

1. For settling difficulties in Eastern Asia, Japan must adopt a policy of "Blood and Iron."
2. In order to conquer the world, Japan must conquer Europe and Asia; in order to conquer Europe and Asia Japan must conquer China, and in order to conquer China, Japan must first Conquer Manchuria and Mongolia, Japan expects to fulfil the above programme in ten years.
3. Japan regrets that she has signed the Nine-Power Treaty which was intended by England and America to crush her interests in Manchuria, for thereby she agrees that Manchuria and Mongolia are Chinese territory. This has greatly hampered the freedom of Japanese policy in Manchuria.
4. Japan believes wars in near future with U.S.A. and with Russia are inevitable, so in order to get militarily prepared, Japan must build the Kirin-Hweining and Changchun-Talai railways in Manchuria.
5. The South Manchuria Railway Co., act in Manchuria as the Governor-General in Korea. In order to blind the eyes of the world and forestall the disclosure of secrets at present, the Colonial office nominally controls affairs of Formosa, Korea, and Saghalian islands, only, while really it manages affairs of Manchuria.
6. Japan must take strong steps on basis of Twenty-one demands, to secure priority for building railroads, right of timbering and exploiting 19 iron and coal mines in Fentien.
7. Japan should spend yen 1,000,000 from "Secret funds" of Army department in order to send 400 retired officers dis-

guised as teachers and traders, scientists, and Chinese citizens to Mongolia to influence the Mongolian princes to revolt against China.

8. Koreans should be utilized by Japan as vanguard for colonization of and as spearhead for penetration into, Manchuria and Mongolia.

9. Taking advantage of the local disorder in Fengtien, Japan should manipulate the situation so that the Fengtien Bank notes will depreciate to zero, and the Yen will take to its place.

10. Japan must enjoy monopoly of supplies of beans, bean cakes timber, coal, iron, fur, wool, and all other products of Manchuria and Mongolia and perfect control of transportation so that Chinese influence would be wiped out, and Europe and America, when in need of these supplies, would be at the mercy of Japan.

(From The China Critic)

TANAKA MEMORIAL

*Memorial Presented to the Emperor of Japan on July 25, 1927,
by Premier Tanaka, Outlining the positive
policy in Manchuria.*

(Reprinted from THE CHINA CRITIC Vol. IV No. 39,
Sept. 24, 1931.)

Since the European War, Japan's political as well as economic interests have been in an unsettled condition. This is due to the fact that we have failed to take advantage of our special privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia and fully to realize our acquired rights. But upon my appointment as premier, I was instructed specially to guard our interests in this region and watch for opportunities for further expansion. Such injunctions one cannot take lightly. Ever since I advocated a positive policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia as a common citizen, I have longed for its realization. So in order that we may lay plans for the colonization of the Far East and the development of our new continental empire, a special conference was held from June 27th to July 7th lasting in all eleven days. It was attended by all the civil and military officers connected with Manchuria and Mongolia, whose discussions resulted in the following resolutions. These we respectfully submit to Your Majesty for consideration.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The term Manchuria and Mongolia includes the provinces Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Outer and Inner Mongolia. It extends an area of 74,000 square miles, having a population of 28,000,000 people. The territory is more than three times as large as our own empire not counting Korea and Formosa, but it is inhabited by only one-third as many people. The attractiveness of the land does not arise from the scarcity of population alone: its wealth of forestry, minerals and agricultural products is also unrivalled elsewhere in the world. In

order to exploit these resources for the perpetuation of our national glory, we created especially the South Manchuria Railway Company. The total investment involved in our undertakings in railway, shipping, mining, forestry, steel manufacture, agriculture, and cattle raising as schemes pretending to be mutually beneficial to China and Japan amounts to no less than Yen 440,000,000. It is veritably the largest single investment and the strongest organization of our country. Although nominally the enterprise is under the joint ownership of the government and the people, in reality the government has complete power and authority over it. In so far as the South Manchuria Railway Company is empowered to undertake diplomatic, police, and ordinary administrative functions so that it may carry out our imperialistic policies, the Company forms a peculiar organization which has exactly the same powers as the Governor-General of Korea. This fact alone is sufficient to indicate the immense interests we have in Manchuria and Mongolia. Consequently the policies of the successive administrations since Meiji towards this country are all based on his injunction, elaborating and continuously completing the development of the new continental empire in order to further the advance of our national glory and prosperity for countless generations to come.

Unfortunately, since the European War there have been constant changes in diplomatic as well domestic affairs. The authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces are also awakened and gradually work toward reconstruction and industrial development following our example. Their progress is astonishing. It has affected the spread of our influence in a most serious way, and has put us to so many disadvantages that the dealings with Manchuria and Mongolia of successive governments have resulted in failure. Furthermore, the restriction of the Nine Power Treaty signed at the Washington Conference have reduced our special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that there is no freedom left for us. The very existence of our country is endangered. Unless these obstacles are removed, our national existence will be in-

secure and our national strength will not increase. Moreover, the resources of wealth are congregated in North Manchuria. If we do not have the right of way there, it is obvious that we shall not be able to tap the riches of this country. Even the resources of South Manchuria which we won by the Russo-Japanese War will also be greatly restricted by the Nine Power Treaty. The result is that while our people cannot migrate into Manchuria as they please, the Chinese are flowing in as a flood. Hordes of them move into the Three Eastern Provinces every year, numbering in the neighbourhood of several millions. They have jeopardized our acquired rights in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that our annual surplus population of eight hundred thousand have no place to seek outlet. In view of this we have to admit our failure in trying to effect a balance between our population and food supply. If we do not devise plans to check the influx of Chinese immigrants immediately, in five years' time the number of Chinese will exceed 6,000,000. Then we shall be confronted with greater difficulties in Manchuria and Mongolia.

It will be recalled* that when the Nine Power Treaty which restricted our movements in Manchuria and Mongolia was signed, public opinion was greatly aroused. The late Emperor Taisho called a conference of Yamagata and other high officers of the army and the navy to find a way to counteract this new engagement. I was sent to Europe and America to ascertain secretly the attitude of the important statesmen toward it. They were all agreed that the Nine Power Treaty was initiated by the United States. The other Powers which signed it were willing to see our influence increase in Manchuria and Mongolia in order that we may protect the interests of international trade and investment. This attitude I found out personally from the political leaders of England, France and Italy. The sincerity of these expressions could be depended upon. Unfortunately just as we were ready to carry out our policy and declare void the Nine Power Treaty with the approval of those whom I met on my trip, the Seiyukai cabinet suddenly fell and our policy failed of fruition. It was indeed

a great pity. After I had secretly exchanged views with the Powers regarding the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, I returned by way of Shanghai. At the wharf there a Chinese attempted to take my life. An American woman was hurt, but I escaped by the divine protection of my emperors of the past. It seems that it was by divine will that I should assist Your Majesty to open a new era in the Far East and to develop the new continental empire.

The Three Eastern Provinces are politically the imperfect spot in the Far East. For the sake of self-protection, as well as the protection of others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of "Blood and Iron." But in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison with poison. In the future, if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence.

The Nine Power Treaty is entirely an expression of the spirit of commercial rivalry. It was the intention of England and America to crush our influence in China with their power of wealth. The proposed reduction of armaments is nothing but a means to limit our military strength, making it impossible for us to conquer the vast territory of China. On the other hand, China's resources of wealth will be entirely at their disposal. It is merely a scheme by which England and America may defeat our plans. And yet the Minseito made the Nine Power Treaty the important thing and emphasized our *trade* rather than our *rights* in China. This is a mistaken policy—a

policy of national suicide. England can afford to talk about trade relations only because she has India and Austria to supply her with foodstuff and other materials. So can America because South America and Canada are there to supply her needs. Their spare energy could be entirely devoted to developing trade in China to enrich themselves. But in Japan her food supply and raw materials decrease in proportion to her population. If we merely hope to develop trade, we shall eventually be defeated by England and America, who possess unsurpassable capitalistic power. In the end, we shall get nothing. A more dangerous factor is the fact that the people of China might some day wake up. Even during these years of internal strife, they can still toil patiently, and try to imitate and displace our goods so as to impair the development of our trade. When we remember that the Chinese are our sole customers, we must beware, lest one day when China becomes unified and her industries become prosperous. Americans and Europeans will compete with us: our trade in China will be ruined. Minseito's proposal to uphold the Nine Power Treaty and to adopt the policy of trade towards Manchuria is nothing less than a suicidal policy.

After studying the present conditions and possibilities of our country, our best policy lies in the direction of taking positive steps to secure rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia. These will enable us to develop our trade. This will not only forestall China's own industrial development, but also prevent the penetration of European Powers. This is the best policy possible!

The way to gain actual rights in Manchuria and Mongolia is to use this region as a base and under the pretence of trade and commerce penetrate the rest of China. Armed by the rights already secured we shall seize the resources all over the country. Having China's entire resources at our disposal we shall proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe. But to get control of Manchuria and Mongolia is the first step if the Yamato race wishes to distinguish themselves on Continental Asia. Final success

belongs to the country having food supply; industrial prosperity belongs to the country having food-supply; industrial prosperity belongs to the country having raw materials; the full growth of national strength belongs to the country having extensive territory. If we pursue a positive policy to enlarge our rights in Manchuria and China, all these prerequisites of a powerful nation will constitute no problem. Furthermore, our surplus population of 700,000 each year will also be taken care of. If we want to inaugurate a new policy and secure the permanent prosperity of our empire, a positive policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia is the only way.

MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA—NOT CHINESE TERRITORY

Historically considered, Manchuria and Mongolia are neither China's territory nor her special possessions. Dr. Yano has made an extensive study of Chinese history and has come to the positive conclusion that Manchuria and Mongolia never were Chinese territory. This fact was announced to the world on the authority of the Imperial University. The accuracy of Dr. Yano's investigations is such that no scholars in China have contested his statement. However, the most unfortunate thing is that in our declaration of war with Russia, our government openly recognized China's sovereignty over these regions and later again at the Washington conference when we signed the Nine Power Treaty. Because of these two miscalculations (on our part) China's sovereignty in Manchuria and Mongolia is established in diplomatic relations, but our interests are seriously injured. In the past, although China speaks of the Republic of five races, yet Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia and Manchuria have always remained special areas and the princes are permitted to discharge their customary functions. Therefore in reality the sovereign power over these regions resides with the princes. When any opportunity presents itself, we should make known to the world the actual situation there. We should also wedge our way into Outer and Inner Mongolia in order that we may reform the mainland. So long as the princes there maintain their former administrations, the sover-

eign rights are clearly in their hands. If we want to enter these territories, we may regard them as the ruling power and negotiate with them for rights and privileges. We shall be afforded excellent opportunities and our national influence will increase rapidly.

POSITIVE POLICY IN MANCHURIA

As to the rights in Manchuria, we should take forceful steps on the basis of the Twenty-One Demands and secure the following in order to safe-guard the enjoyment of the rights which we have acquired so far:—

1. After the thirty-year commercial lease terminates, we should be able to extend the term at our wish. Also the right of leasing land for commercial, industrial and agricultural purpose should be recognized.
2. Japanese subjects shall have the right to travel and reside in the eastern part of Mongolia, and engage in commercial and industrial activities. As to their movements, China shall allow them freedom from Chinese law. Furthermore, they must not be subject to illegal taxation and unlawful examination.
3. We must have the right of exploiting the nineteen iron and coal mines in Fengtien and Kirin, as well as the right of timbering.
4. We should have priority for building railroads and option for loans for such purposes in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia.
5. The number of Japanese political, financial and military advisers should be increased. Furthermore, we must have priority in furnishing new advisers.
6. The right of stationing our Police over the Koreans (in China).

7. The administration and development of the Kirin-Changchun Railway must be extended to 99 years.
8. Exclusive right of sale of special products—priority of shipping business to Europe and America.
9. Exclusive rights of mining in Heilungkiang.
10. Right to construct Kirin-Hueining and Changchun-Talai Railways.
11. In case money is needed for the redemption of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese Government must have the first option for making loans to China.
12. Harbour rights at Antung and Yingkow and the right of through transportation.
13. The right of partnership in establishing a Central Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces.
14. Right of Pasturage.

POSITIVE POLICY TOWARDS INNER AND OUTER MONGOLIA

Since Manchuria and Mongolia are still in the hands of the former princes, in the future we must recognize them as the ruling power and give them support. For this reason, the daughter of General Fukushima, Governor of Kwantung, risked her life among the barbarous Mongolian people of Tushiyeh to become adviser to their Prince in order that she might serve the Imperial Government. As the wife of the Prince Ruler is the niece of Manchu Prince Su, the relationship between our Government and the Mongolian Prince became very intimate. The princes of Outer and Inner Mongolia have all shown sincere respect for us, especially after we allured them with special benefits and protection. Now there are 19 Japanese retired military officers in the house of the Tushiyeh. We have acquired already monopoly rights for the purchase of wool, for real estate and for mines. Hereafter we shall send secretly more retired officers to live among them. They should wear

Chinese clothes in order to escape the attention of the Mukden Government. Scattered in the territory of the Prince, they may engage themselves in farming, herding or dealing in wool. As to the other principalities, we can employ the same method as in Tushiyeh. Everywhere we should station our retired military officers to dominate in the Princes' affairs. After a large number of our people have moved into Outer and Inner Mongolia, we shall then buy lands at one-tenth of their worth and begin to cultivate rice where feasible in order to relieve our shortage of food-supply. Where the land is not suitable for rice cultivation, we should develop it for cattle raising and horse breeding in order to replenish our military needs. The rest of the land could be devoted to the manufacture of canned goods which we may export to Europe and America. The fur and leather will also meet our needs. Once the opportunity comes, Outer and Inner Mongolia will be ours outright. While the sovereign rights are not clearly defined and while the Chinese and the Soviet Governments are engaging their attention elsewhere, it is our opportunity quietly to build our influence. Once we have purchased most of the land there, there will be no room for dispute as to whether Mongolia belongs to the Japanese or the Mongolians. Aided by our military prowess, we shall realize our positive policy. In order to carry out this plan, we should appropriate Yen 1,000,000 from the "secret funds" of the Army Department's budget so that four hundred retired officers disguised as teacher and Chinese citizens may be sent into Outer and Inner Mongolia to mix with the people, to gain the confidence of the Mongolian princes, to acquire from them rights for pasturage and mining and to lay the foundation of our national interests for the next hundred years.

ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF KOREAN IMMIGRATION

Since the annexation of Korea, we have had very little trouble. But President Wilson's declaration of the self-determination of races after the European War has been like a divine revelation to the suppressed peoples. The Koreans are no exception. The spirit of unrest has permeated the whole

country. Both because of the freedom they enjoy in Manchuria due to incompetent police system and because of the richness of the country, there are now in the Three Eastern Provinces no less than 1,000,000 Koreans. The unlooked for development is fortunate for our country indeed. From a military and economic standpoint, it has greatly strengthened our influence. From another standpoint, it gives new hope for the administration of Koreans. They will both be the vanguard for the colonization of virgin fields and furnish a link of contact with the Chinese people. On the one hand, we could utilize the naturalized Koreans to purchase land for rice cultivation, on the other, we could extend to them financial aid through the Co-operative Society, the South Manchuria Railway, etc., so that they may serve as the spear-head of our economic penetration. This will give relief to our problem of food supply, as well as open a new field of opportunity for colonization. The Koreans who have become naturalized Chinese are Chinese only in name: they will return to our fold eventually. They are different from those naturalized Japanese in California and South America. They are naturalized as Chinese only for temporary convenience. When their numbers reach two million and a half or more, they can be instigated to military activities whenever there is the necessity, and under the pretence of suppressing the Koreans we could bear them aid. As not all the Koreans are naturalized Chinese, the world will not be able to tell whether it is the Chinese Koreans or the Japanese Koreans who create the trouble. We can always sell dog's meat with a sheep's head as sign-board.

Of course while we could use the Koreans for such purposes, we must beware of the fact that the Chinese could also use them against us. But Manchuria is as much under our jurisdiction as under Chinese jurisdiction. If the Chinese should use Koreans to hamper us, then our opportunity of war against China is at hand. In that event, the most formidable factor is Soviet Russia. If the Chinese should use the "Reds" to influence the Koreans, the thought of our people will change and great peril will befall us. Therefore, the present Cabinet

is taking every precaution against this eventuality. If we want to make use of the Koreans to develop our new continental empire, our protection and regulations for them must be more carefully worked out. We should increase our police force in North Manchuria under the terms of the Mitsuya Treaty so that we may protect the Koreans and give them help in their rapid advance. Furthermore, the Eastern Development Company (Totoku Kaisha) and the South Manchuria Railway Company should follow then to give them financial aid. They should be given especially favourable terms so that through them we may develop Manchuria and Mongolia and monopolize the commercial rights. The influx of Koreans into these territories is of such obvious importance both for economic and military considerations that the Imperial Government cannot afford not to give it encouragement. It will mean new opportunities for our empire. Since the effect of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement is lost after the Washington Conference, we can only recover our interests through the favourable development arising out of the presence of several millions of Koreans in Manchuria. There is no ground in international relations for raising any objection to this procedure.

RAILROADS AND DEVELOPMENT OF OUR NEW CONTINENT

Transportation is the mother of national defence, the assurance of victory and the citadel of economic development. China has only 7,200 to 7,300 miles of railroads, of which three thousand miles are in Manchuria and Mongolia constituting two-fifths of the whole. Considering the size of Manchuria and Mongolia and the abundance of natural products, there should be at least five or six thousand miles more. It is a pity that our railroads are mostly in south Manchuria, which cannot reach the sources of wealth in the northern parts. Moreover, there are too many Chinese inhabitants in South Manchuria to be wholesome for our military and economic plans. If we wish to develop the natural resources and strengthen our national defence, we must build railroads in Northern Manchuria. With the opening of these railroads, we shall be able

to send more people (Japanese) into Northern Manchuria. From this vantage ground we can manipulate political and economic developments in South Manchuria, as well as strengthen our national defence in the interest of peace and order of the Far East. Furthermore, the South Manchuria Railway was built mainly for economic purposes. It lacks encircling lines necessary for military mobilization and transportation. From now on we must take military purposes as our object and build circuit lines to circle the heart of Manchuria and Mongolia in order that we may hamper China's military, political and economic developments there on the one hand, and prevent the penetration of Russian influence on the other. This is the key to our continental policy.

There are two trunk lines in Manchuria and Mongolia. These are the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway. As regards the railroad built by Chinese, it will doubtless become very powerful in time, backed by the financial resources of the Kirin Provincial Government. With the combined resources of Fengtien and Heilungkiang Provinces, the Chinese railroads will develop to an extent far superior to our South Manchuria Railway. Strong competition will inevitably result. Fortunately for us, the financial conditions in Fengtien Province are in great disorder, which the authorities cannot improve unless we come to their succor. This is our chance. We should take positive steps until we have reached our goal in railroad development. Moreover, if we manipulate the situation, the Fengtien bank-notes will depreciate to an inconceivable degree. In that event, the bankruptcy of Fengtien will be a matter of time. The development of Manchuria and Mongolia will be out of the question for them. But we still have to reckon with the Chinese Eastern Railway. It forms a T with the South Manchuria Railway. Although this system is in a convenient shape, it is by no means suitable for military purposes. When the Chinese build railroads as feeders of the Chinese Eastern Railway, it is best that they run parallel to it, west and east. But with the South Manchuria Railway as main line, we must have these lines run north and

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south. For the benefit of the Chinese themselves, there are also advantages for these lines to run in this direction. Consequently our interest does not necessarily conflict with the Chinese. Now that Russia is losing influence and is powerless to advance in Manchuria and Mongolia, it is certain that the Chinese must act according to our beckoning in the development of railways in the future. Much to our surprise the Fengtien Government recently built two railroads, one from Tahushan to Tungliao and the other from Kirin to Haining both for military purposes. Those two railroads affect most seriously our military plans in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as the interest of the South Manchuria Railway. We therefore protested strongly against it.

That these railways were built was due to the fact that our official on the spot as well as the South Manchuria Railway authorities miscalculated the ability of the Fengtien Government and paid no attention to it. Later when we did intervene the railways were already completed. Besides, the Americans have been anxious to make an investment in developing the port of Hulutao through British capitalists. Taking advantage of this situation, the Fengtien Government introduced American and British capital in these railways in order to hold our interest at bay. For the time being we have to wink at it and wait for the opportune moment to deal with China about these two railroads.

Recently, it is rumoured that the Fengtien Government is planning to build a railroad from Tahushan to Harbin via Tung Liao and Fu Yu, so that there may be a direct line between Peking and Harbin without touching either the South Manchuria Railway or the Chinese Eastern Railway. What is more astonishing is that another railway beginning at Mukden passing through Hailung, Kirin, Wuchang terminating at Harbin is also under way. If this plan be realized, then these two lines would encircle the South Manchuria Railway and limit its sphere of activity to a small area. The result is that our economic and political development of Manchuria and

Mongolia will be checked and the plan for curtailing our power provided by the Nine Power Treaty will be carried out. Moreover, the completion of these two railroads will render the South Manchurian Railway completely useless. The latter Company will be confronted with a real crisis. But in view of China's financial conditions today, she cannot undertake these two railroads unless she resorts to foreign loans. And on these two railways the transportation charges will have to be higher than on the South Manchuria Railway. These considerations give us some comfort. But in the event of these two railroads becoming an accomplished fact and the Chinese Government making especially low freight charges in order to compete with the South Manchuria Railway, not only we but the Chinese Eastern Railway will also sustain great losses. Japan and Russia certainly would not allow China to carry out such obstructive measures, especially as the Chinese Eastern Railway depends upon Tsitsihar and Harbin for the bulk of its business. The consequence would be even more serious to both Japanese and Russian interests when the new railways are completed.

Let us now consider more in detail the competitive railways projected in Manchuria and Mongolia.

China contemplates:

1. Suolun-Taonan Railway.
2. Kirin-Harbin Railway.

Soviet Russia proposes:

1. Anta-Potung Railway.
2. Mienpo-Wuchang-Potuna Railway.
3. Kirin-Hailin Railway.
4. Mishan-Muling Railway.

The Russian plans are designed to strengthen the Chinese Eastern Railway and thereby to extend its imperialistic schemes. For this reason the railways projected mostly run east and

west. For although the power of Soviet Russia is declining, her ambition in Manchuria and Mongolia has not diminished for a minute. Every step she takes is intended to obstruct our progress and to injure the South Manchuria Railway. We must do our utmost to guard against her influence. We should use the Fengtien Government as a wedge to check her southern advance. By pretending to check the southern advance of Soviet Russia as a first step, we could gradually force our way into North Manchuria and exploit the natural resources there. We shall then be able to prevent the spread of Chinese influence on the south and arrest the advance of Soviet Russia on the north. In our struggle against the political and economic influence of Soviet Russia, we should drive China before us and direct the events from behind. Meanwhile, we should still secretly befriend Russia in order to hamper the growth of Chinese influence. It was largely with this purpose in view, that Baron Goto of Kato's cabinet invited Joffe to our country and advocated the resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia.

Although we have an agreement with the Chinese Eastern Railway concerning transportation rates, according to which 45% go to the Chinese Eastern Railway and 55% to us, yet the Chinese Eastern Railway still grants preferential rates detrimental to the interest of the South Manchuria Railway. Moreover, according to a secret declaration of Soviet Russia, although they have no territorial ambition they cannot help keeping a hand in the Chinese Eastern Railway on account of the fact that north of the Chinese and Russian boundary the severe cold makes a railway useless. Furthermore, as Vladivostok is their only sea-port in the Far East, they cannot give up the Chinese Eastern Railway without losing also their foothold on the Pacific. This makes us feel the more uneasy.

On the other hand, the South Manchuria Railway is not adequate for our purpose. Considering our present needs and future activities, we must control railways in both North and South Manchuria, especially in view of the fact that the re-

sources of North Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia will furnish no room for expansion and material gains. In South Manchuria the Chinese is increasing at such a rate that it will surely damage our interests politically and economically. Under such circumstances, we are compelled to take aggressive steps in North Manchuria in order to assure our future prosperity. But if Soviet Russia's Chinese Eastern Railway should spread across this field our new continental policy is bound to receive a set-back which will result in an inevitable conflict with Soviet Russia in the near future. In that event we shall enact once more our part in the Russo-Japanese War. The Chinese Eastern Railway will become ours as the South Manchuria Railway did last time, and we shall seize Kirin as we once did Dairen. That we should draw swords with Russia again in the fields of Mongolia in order to gain the wealth of North Manchuria seems a necessary step in our program of national aggrandisement. Until this hidden rock is blown up our ship can have no smooth sailing. We should now demand from China the right of building all the important military railroads. When these railroads are completed, we shall pour our forces into North Manchuria as far as we can. When Soviet Russia intervenes, as they must, that is our opportunity for open conflict.

WE SHOULD BUILD THE FOLLOWING RAILWAYS

1. Tungliao-Jehol Railway. This line is 447 miles long and will cost Yen 50,000,000. When it is completed it will be of great value to our development of Inner Mongolia. As a matter of fact, this is the most important of all the railways in the whole undertaking. According to the careful surveys of the War Department, there are in Inner Mongolia large tracts of land suitable for rice cultivation. After proper development there will be room for at least 20 millions of our people. Besides there, is the possibility of turning out 2,000,000 head of cattle which may be transported by railways for food supply and for purposes of exporting to Europe and America. Wool also is a special product. While the sheep in Japan yield only

two catties of wool per head per year, the sheep in Mongolia can yield six catties. The South Manchuria Railway has made many experiments, all of which confirm this fact. Besides, the wool is many times better than that of Australia. Its low cost and high quality combined with its abundance in quantity make Mongolia a potential source of great wealth. When this industry is enhanced by the facilities of railway development, the total production will increase at least ten-fold. We have withheld this knowledge from the rest of the world, lest England and America compete with us for it. Therefore, we must first of all control the transportation and then develop the wool industry. By the time the other countries know about it, it would be already too late to do anything. With this railroad in our hands, we can develop the wool industry not only for our own use, but also for exporting to Europe and America. Furthermore, we can realize our desire of joining hands with Mongolia. This railway is a matter of life and death to our policy in Mongolia. Without it, Japan can have no part in Mongolia's development.

2. Suolun-Taonan Railway. This line is 136 miles long and will cost Yen 10,000,000. Looking into the future of Japan, a war with Russia over the plains of North Manchuria is inevitable. From a military standpoint, this line will not only enable us to threaten Russia's rear but also to curtail its re-inforcements for North Manchuria. From an economic standpoint, this road will place the wealth of the Tao Er Ho Valley within our reach, thereby strengthening the South Manchuria Railway. The princes nearby who are friendly to us can also use this road to extend our influence in order to open up their respective territories. Our hope of working hand in hand with the Mongolian princes, of acquiring land, mines and pasturage, and of developing trade with the natives as preliminary steps for later penetration, all depends upon this railway. Together with Tungliao-Jehol Railway, they will form two supplementary routes into Mongolia. When the industries are fully developed, we shall extend our interests into Outer Mongolia. But the danger of this line is that it might provide facili-

ties for Chinese migration into a new region and spoil our own policy. Look at our experience with the South Manchuria Railway. Hasn't that served the interest of China? The redeeming feature, however, is the fact that the land and mines along this railway are in the possession of Mongolian princes. If we can gain possession of them first, we need have no worries about Chinese migration. Moreover, we can make the princes pass laws discriminating against Chinese immigrants. When life there is made miserable for the Chinese, they naturally will leave for places afar. There are other methods to bar the Chinese. Only if we try hard enough, no Chinese foot-prints will be found on Mongolian territory.

8. A Section of Changchun-Taonan Railway. As this line runs from Changchun to Fuyu and Talai, the section between Changchun and Taonan is about 131 miles and costs approximately Yen 11,000,000. This line is immensely important from an economic standpoint, for the wealth of Manchuria and an easy access to North Manchuria on the one hand, and prejudice the Chinese Eastern Railway to the benefit of the South Manchuria Railway on the other. It runs through the upper valley of the Sungari River where the soil is fertile and agricultural products abound. Further, in the vicinity of Talai there is the Yuehliang Falls which could be harnessed for electric power. That this section of the railway will be a prosperous center for industry and agriculture, is beyond doubt. After the completion of this line, we shall be able to make Talai a base and advance on Siberia through three directions; namely, by ways of Taonan, Anshan and Tsitsihar. The wealth of North Manchuria will then come to our hands. This will also be the first line of advance to Heilungkiang. It will further form a circuit with the railway between Changchun and Taonan, which will serve well for military purposes when we penetrate into Mongolia. Along this whole line the population is sparse and the land is rich and extensive. No fertiliser will be required on the farms for fifty years. A possession of this railway will ensure the possession of all the wealth of North

Manchuria and Mongolia. In this region there is room for at least 30 million people more. When the Tunhua Railway is completed and joins up with the line running to Hueining in Korea, the products will be brought to the door of Osaka and Tokyo by a direct route. In time of war our troops could be despatched to North Manchuria and Mongolia via the Japan Sea without a stop, forestalling all possibilities of Chinese forces entering North Manchuria. Nor could American or Russian submarines enter the Korean Strait. The moment the railways between Kirin and Hueining and between Changchun and Talai are completed, we shall become self-sufficient in food-stuff and raw materials. We shall have no worries in the event of war with any country. Then, in our negotiations about Manchuria and Mongolia, China will be cowed to submission and yield to our wishes. If we want to end the political existence of Manchuria and Mongolia according to the third step of Meiji's plan, the completion of these two railways is the only way. The Changchun-Talai Railway will greatly enhance the value of the South Manchuria Railway, besides developing into a profitable line itself. It is an undertaking of supreme importance in our penetration into this territory.

4. Kirin-Hueining Line. While the Kirin-Tunhua Line is already completed, the Tunhua-Hueining Line is yet to be built. The narrow gauge of 2 ft. 6 inches of the tracks from Hueining to Laotoukow is inadequate for the economic development of the New Continent. Allowing Yen 8,000,000 for widening the tracks in this section and Yen 10,000,000 for completing the section between Laotoukow and Tunhua, the whole undertaking will cost approximately Yen 20,000,000. When this is done, our continental policy will have succeeded. Hitherto, people going to Europe have to pass through either Dairen or Vladivostok. Now they can go on the trunk line directly from Chingchinkang via the Siberian Railway. When we are in control of this great system of transportation, we need make no secret of our designs on Manchuria and Mongolia, according to the third step of Meiji's plans. The Yamato Race is then embarked on the journey of world

conquest! According to the last will of Meiji, our first step was to conquer Formosa and the second step to annex Korea. Having completed both of these, the third step is yet to be taken and that is the conquest of Manchuria, Mongolia and China. When this is done, the rest of Asia including the South Sea Islands will be at our feet. That these injunctions have not been carried out even now, is a crime of your humble servants.

In history the people living in Kirin, Fengtien and part of Heilungkiang, are called Sushan. They are now scattered along the sea coast and in the basins of the Amur and Tumen Rivers. They were known as Kulai, Sushan, Hueibei, Palou, Wotsu, Fuyu, Kitan Pohai and Nuchen at different stages of history. They were of a mixed race. The forefathers of the Manchurian dynasty also began in this vicinity. They gained control of Kirin, first, and then firmly established themselves in China for 300 years. If we want to put into effect our Continental Policy, we have to note this historical fact and proceed to establish ourselves in this region first also. Hence the necessity of the Kirin-Hueining Railway.

Whether the terminus of Kirin-Hueining Line be at Chingchin or Lochin or even Hsiungchi, we are free to decide according to circumstances. From the standpoint of national defence at present, Lochin seems the ideal harbour and terminus. Eventually it will be the best harbour in the world. On the one hand it will ruin Vladivostok, and on the other it will be the center of the wealth of Manchuria and Mongolia. Moreover, Dairen is as yet not our own territory while Manchuria is yet not a part of our empire, it is difficult to develop Dairen. That being the case, we shall be in a precarious situation in time of war. The enemy could blockade the Tsushima and Sanchima Straits, and we shall be cut off from the supplies of Manchuria and Mongolia. Not having the resources there at our command we shall be vanquished, especially as England and the United States have worked hand in hand to limit our action in every possible direction. For the sake of self-preservation and of

giving warning to China and the rest of the world, we must fight America some time. The American Asiatic Squadron stationed in the Philippines is but within a stone's throw from Tsushima and Sanchima. If they send submarines to these quarters, our supply of food-stuff and raw materials from Manchuria and Mongolia will be cut off entirely. But if the Kirin-Hueining Railway is completed, we shall have a large circuit line through all Manchuria and Korea, and a small circuit line through North Manchuria. We shall have access in all direction gaining freedom for the transportation of soldiers and supplies alike. When our supplies are transported through this line to our ports at Tsuruga and Niigata, enemy submarines will have no way of getting into the Japanese and Korean straits. We are then entirely free from interference. This is what is meant by making the Japanese Sea the center of our national defence. Having secured the free transportation of food and raw materials, we shall have nothing to fear either from the American navy because of its size, or the Chinese or Russian army because of their number. Incidentally, we shall be in a position to suppress the Koreans. Let me reiterate the fact that if we want to carry out the New Continental Policy, we must build this line. Manchuria and Mongolia are the undeveloped countries in the East. Over this territory we shall have to go war with Soviet Russia sooner or later. The battle ground will be Kirin.

When we carry out the third step of Meiji's plans with regard to China, we shall have to do the following things:—

1. Mobilise the army divisions in Fukuoka and Hiroshima, and send them to South Manchuria via Korea. This will prevent the northern advance of Chinese soldiers.
2. Send the army divisions in Nagoya and Kwansei by sea to Chingchin, and thence to North Manchuria via the Kirin Hueining Line.
3. Send the army in Kwantung through Niigata to Chingchin or Lochin, and thence by Kirin-Hueining Line to North Manchuria.

4. Send the army divisions in Hokkaido and Sendai to embark the ship at Aomori and Hakodato, and sail for Vladivostok and thence, via the Siberian Railway, to Harbin. Then they can descend on Fengtien, seize Mongolia and prevent Russian forces from coming south.
5. Finally these divisions in all directions will meet and form themselves in two large armies. On the south, they will keep Shanhaikuan and close it against the northern advance of Chinese forces: on the north, they will defend Tsitsihar against the southern advance of the Russians. In this way we shall have all the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia at our command. Even if the war should be prolonged for ten years, we need have no fear for the lack of supplies.

Let us now analyze once more the Kirin-Hueining Railway from the standpoint of its access from our ports.

First, with Chingchin as starting point:

1. To Vladivostok130 miles
2. To Tsuruga475 miles
3. To Moji500 miles
4. To Nagasaki650 miles
5. To Fusan500 miles

Second, take Tsuruga as the port of entry and compare it with Dairen. In this case we should consider it from the point of view of Osaka an industrial center.

1. From Changchun to Osaka via Lochin, the distance is 406 miles by land and 475 miles by sea. In point of time the route will take 51 hours.
2. From Changchun to Osaka via Dairen and Kobe, the distance is 535 miles by land and 870 miles by sea. In point of time it takes 92 hours.

If Tsuruga instead of Dairen is made the connecting link, there is a saving of 41 hours. Calculated at the rate of 30 miles an hour on land and 12 miles an hour by sea, we can use fast boats and trains and cut the time in half.

Manchuria and Mongolia are the Belgium of the Far East. In the Great War, Belgium was the battlefield. In our wars with Russia and the United States, we must also make Manchuria and Mongolia suffer the ravages. As it is evident that we have to violate the neutrality of these territories, we cannot help building the Kirin-Hueining and Changchun-Talai Railways in order that we may be militarily prepared. In time of war we can easily increase our forces and in time of peace we can migrate thousands upon thousands of people into this region and work on the rice fields. This line offers the key to economic development as well as to military conquests.

In undertaking the Kirin-Hueining Railway, it is necessary to take advantage of the dry season and finish it at one stretch. The mountains it must go through are all granite. The tunneling would need modern and up-to-date machines. As to the sleepers and ballast required, there is an abundance all along the line. Limestone and clay for making tiles and brick are also to be had for the taking. Only rails, cars and locomotives have to be brought in. The cost of construction could therefore be reduced at least thirty per cent and the time required forty per cent.

Now, let us look into the economic interests along this line. According to the careful investigations of our General Staff and the South Manchuria Railway, the total reserve of timber is 200,000,000 tons. If one million ton is fallen and imported to our country each year, it will last two hundred years. This will stop the import of American timber which has been costing us Yen 80,000,000 to Yen 100,000,000 a year. Although our information is reliable we cannot make it known to the world; for if China or Russia learns that we get so much timber from America, they would try to interfere with the construction of

this line. Or else, the United States may buy from the Fengtien Government all the timber rights on the one hand to protect their own trade with us; on the other, to control the monopoly and incidentally kill our paper industry.

Kirin was known as the "ocean of trees" even in the days of Emperor Chien-Lung. Added to the original forests are the growths in the intervening years since that time. Imagine the vastness of the resources! To transport this timber from Kirin to Osaka via Changchun and Dairen, there is a distance of 1,385 miles. For every cubic foot, we have to spend 34 cents. Because of this high cost of transportation, we cannot compete with the United States. If the Kirin-Hueining Line is completed, the distance is reduced to about 700 miles. We can then ship timber to Osaka at the low rate of 13 cents per cubic foot. We can certainly defeat the timber importation from the United States then. Supposing we calculate the profit at Yen 5.00 per ton timber and supposing there are two billion tons of timber, the construction of the railway will bring to us the easy profit of 10 billion yen. we will bar the import of American timber into our country. Furthermore, the industry of paper manufacture furniture making, and wooden wares which the cheap timber makes possible will add 20 million yen more to our country's annual income.

There is also the Hsinchin coal mine, which has a reserve of 600,000,000 tons of coal. The quality of this coal is superior to that of Fushun coal, easy to excavate and suitable for the extraction of petroleum, agricultural fertilizers and other chemical by-products which we may both use at home and sell in China. There are numerous other advantages which will come to us from the building of the Kirin-Hueining Railway. It is all gain without labour. The coal will supplement the Fushun collieries. With both coal mines in our control, we hold the key to the industries of all China. Speaking of the Hsinchin coal, we shall reap a profit of Yen 5.00 on each ton when it is shipped to Japan. With additional chemical by-products, we shall reap a profit of Yen 16.00 from each ton of

coal. Taking an average profit of Yen 15.00 a ton, the total profit will amount to 200 billion yen. All this comes as a by-product from the operation of the Kirin-Hueining Railway. There are, besides, the gold mines along the Mutan River. The acquired rights of the South Manchuria Railway in the gold mines of Chiapikou in the province of Kirin and the timber in its neighbourhood will all be within reach of exploitation once the Kirin-Hueining line is in operation.

In the vicinity of Tunhua the agricultural products, such as oats, wheat, millet and kaoliang, yield an annual output of over a million catties. There are twenty distilleries of wines, thirty oil mills yielding an annual output of about 600,000 catties of oil and 600,000 of bean cakes, besides many places for making vermicelli. All these will depend upon the new railway. The trade along this road may be estimated at 4 million yen a year. The transportation charges of farm products alone will not only defray the running expenses, but also yield a net profit of Yen 200,000 a year. Including the profit from timber, coal and its by-products transported by the railway, we can safely count on a profit of Yen 8,000,000 a year. Besides, there are indirect benefits such as the strengthening of the South Manchuria Railway, the acquisition of rights over forests, mines and trade as well as the migration of large numbers of our people into North Manchuria. Above all, is the shortening of distance between Japan and the resources of wealth in North Manchuria. It only takes three hours from Chingchin to Hueining, three hours from Hueining to Sanfeng and three hours more from Tumen river to Lungchingsun. In 60 hours we can reach the wealth of North Manchuria. Hence the Kirin-Hueining Railroad alone can enable us to tap the immense wealth of North Manchuria.

4. *Hunchun-Hailin Railway.* This is 173 miles long and costs Yen. 24,000,000. All along this line are thick forests. In order to strengthen the Kirin-Hueining Railway and to exploit the forests and mines in North Manchuria, this line is needed. In order to transfer the prosperity of Vladivostok to Hueining, this line is also urgently needed. The greatest hope for

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

prosperity, however, is the fact that south of Naining and north of Tunhua there is Lake Chungpo which can be used to generate electric power. With this electric power, we shall have control over the agricultural and industrial undertakings of the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia. No amount of China's agitation can matter in the least to our industrial developments. According to the investigations of the South Manchuria Railway, the water power in the lake can generate at least 800,000 horsepower. With such an enormous quantity of electric power, the industrial conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia can be easily accomplished. In the neighbourhood of this immense power plant, there will be phenomenal growth of wealth. We must build this railway quickly, in order to provide facilities for transportation. Lake Hsingkai, which is owned jointly by China and Russia, can also be developed for the generation of electricity. In order that these two countries may not combine to frustrate our plans, we should introduce a resolution in the International Conference of Electrical Engineering to be held in Tokyo this year, to the effect that in the same area of electricity supply there should not be two power plants. Besides, in the vicinity of Niigata and Hailin, the Oju Paper Mill has acquired extensive rights of lumbering. They need the immediate establishment of the power plant at Lake Chingpo and the early completion of the Hunchun-Hailin Railway in order to bring to the factory at home the raw materials growing wild in Mongolia.

Moreover, the reason that the Fengtien-Kirin-Wuchang Railway and the Kirin and Fengtien authorities intend to build the Wuchang Railway and the Kirin-Mukden Railway, with Hulutao or Tientsin as sea-port, is that they want to recover to themselves the wealth of North Manchuria. By building the Hunchun-Hailin Railway we shall not only strengthen the Kirin-Hueining Railway, but also defeat the Chinese scheme and draw the wealth of Manchuria to Chingchin harbour. The transportation charges will be two-thirds less compared with the Chinese line and one-third less compared with the Siberian line. They cannot compete with us. Our victory is a foregone conclusion.

The total trade in Manchuria is seven or eight billion yen a year, all of which is in our hands. The business we do in wool, cotton, soybeans, bean cakes, and iron, forms one-twentieth of the total volume of world trade. And it is steadily increasing. But the Namihaya Machi at Dairen (the wealthiest street in the city) is still in Chinese possession. The sad story goes further. Oil is a basic industry in Manchuria. We control only 6 percent of it. Of the 38 oil mills in Yingkow, there is not one Japanese; of the 20 oil mills in Antung there is only one Japanese and of the 82 or 83 oil mills in Dairen there are only seven owned by Japanese. This is by no means an optimistic outlook for us. In order to recover the lost ground, we must first of all develop transportation. Then, by securing a monopoly on both finished products and raw materials, we shall be able to gain the upper-hand eventually. Furthermore, we ought to assist our people in oil business by extending to them financial credit, so that the oil industry of the Chinese will be forced out of the market. There are many Chinese on Kawaguchi Machi in Osaka who are dealers of our manufactured goods in Mongolia and Manchuria. They are strong competitors of our own business men in China. Our people are greatly handicapped because of their high standard of living which compels them to figure at a higher percentage of profit. On the other hand, the Chinese also have their disadvantages. The goods that they get are of an inferior quality, but the price that they pay is at least 10 percent higher than what our own people pay. Besides, they are also obliged to pay Yen 2.70 more than our people for every ton of goods transported, and yet they can undersell our merchants in Manchuria. It clearly shows the inability of our own people. When one thinks of it, it is really pathetic. The Chinese is single-handed, receiving no assistance from the government. But the Japanese in Manchuria has every protection from the government and long term credit at a low rate of interest. Still there are innumerable cases of failures. Hereafter, we should organize a cooperative exporting house to China. The steamship lines and the South Manchuria Railway should give it special discounts, and the government in Kwangtung should

extend to it financial credit at a very low rate of interest. Then we can hope to beat the Chinese merchants and recover our trade rights, so that we may develop the special products of Manchuria and send them to all parts of the world.

The first step in gaining financial and commercial control of Manchuria and Mongolia lies in the monopoly sale of their products. We must have the rights of monopoly for the sale of Manchurian and Mongolian products before we can carry out our continental policy and prevent the invasion of American capital as well as the influence of the Chinese traders.

Although the products of Manchuria and Mongolia may go through any of the three ports, Dairen, Yingkow and Antung, nevertheless Dairen holds the key to the situation. Every year 7,200 ships pass through this port with a total tonnage of 11,565,000 tons. This represents 70 percent of the total trade of Manchuria and Mongolia. Fifteen navigation routes radiate out from it with definite sailing schedule. Most of it is costal sailing. We have in our grasp the entire transportation system of Manchuria and Mongolia. The monopoly sale of Manchuria's special products will eventually come into our hands. When that come true, we can develop our oceanic transportation in order to defeat both Yingkow and Antung. Then the large quantities of beans which the central and southern parts of China consume, will depend upon us entirely. Moreover, the Chinese are an oil eating people. In time of war, we can cut off their oil-supply and the life of the whole country will become miserable. Bean-cakes are important as fertilizers for the cultivation of rice. If we have control of the source of supply as well as the means of transportation, we shall be able to increase our production of rice by means of a cheap supply of bean-cakes and the fertilizers manufactured as a by-product at the Fushun coal mines. In this way, we shall have the agricultural work of all China dependent upon us. In case of war, we can put an embargo on bean-cakes as well as the mineral fertilizers and forbid their exportation to Central and South China. Then China's production of food-stuff will be greatly reduced. This

is one way of building up our continental empire which we must not overlook. We should remember that Europe and America also need large quantities of beans and bean-cakes. When we have monopoly of the supplies and full control of transportation, both on land and sea, the countries which have need of the special products of Manchuria and Mongolia, will have to seek our good-will. In order to gain trade monopoly in Manchuria and Mongolia, we must have control of the complete transportation system. Only then can we have the Chinese merchants under our thumb.

However, the Chinese are adepts in learning our tricks and beating us at our own game. We have yet found no way by which we can compete successfully with them in oil-making and sail-boat transportation. After building up the new system of transportation, our policy should be two-fold. On the one hand, wreck the sail-boat trade by means of heavy investment in our own system. On the other hand, encourage our men to learn all they can from the Chinese about sail-boat business. Another thing we should be careful about is teaching the Chinese our industrial methods. In the past we have established factories in Manchuria and Mongolia, and carried on industries near the source of raw materials. This gave to the Chinese the opportunity of learning our secrets and establishing competitive factories of their own. Hereafter, we should ship the raw materials back home and do the manufacturing there, and then ship the finished products for sale in China and other countries. In this way we shall gain in three ways: (1) provide work for our unemployed at home, (2) prevent the influx of Chinese into Manchuria and Mongolia, and (3) make it impossible for the Chinese to imitate our new industrial methods. Then iron of Penhsihu and Anshan and the coal of Fushun should also be sent home to be turned into finished products.

For all these considerations, the development of ocean transportation becomes the more necessary. The Dairen Kisen Kaisha Company should be enlarged, and our government should extend to it loans at low interest through the South Manchuria

extend to it financial credit at a very low rate of interest. Then we can hope to beat the Chinese merchants and recover our trade rights, so that we may develop the special products of Manchuria and send them to all parts of the world.

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Railway Company. By next year, we should complete 50,000 tons of new ships for oceanic transportation. That will be sufficient to dominate over the traffic of the East. For on the hand, we have the South Manchuria Railway for land transportation; on the other hand, we control the large quantities of products in Manchuria and Mongolia waiting to be transported. The success of this enlarged activities in oceanic transportation with Dairen as centre is assured by the iron laws of economics.

GOLD STANDARD CURRENCY NECESSARY

Although Manchuria and Mongolia are within our field of activities, yet the legal tender there is still silver. It often conflicts with our gold basis and works to our disadvantage. That our people have failed to prosper as they should in these places, is due to the existence of silver monetary system there. The Chinese have persistently upheld the silver basis, and therefore have made it impossible for us firmly to establish our colonization plans on a firm economic foundation. We have suffered from it the following disadvantages:

1. The money that we bring into Manchuria is of gold standard. When we use it either for daily livelihood or for industry and trade, it has to be exchanged into Chinese silver dollars. The fluctuation of exchange is not infrequently as much as 20 percent, resulting in serious loss to our people. Speculation becomes a regular business and investing money becomes a matter of gambling. When one plans an investment of two hundred thousand yen, one may suddenly find that his capital has been reduced to one hundred fifty or one hundred sixty thousand dollars due to the drop in exchange. The creditor would then have to call in the loan and business failures have often resulted.

2. The Chinese businessmen use silver money throughout and are free from the effects of exchange fluctuations. Therefore their "junk" trade is prosperous. Although they have no scientific knowledge of exchange value of gold and silver, they always gain in the transaction. They have a natural gift for

it, we suffer the more. And we lose in spite of our control of transportation and special backing of banking houses. Because of the handicap of monetary system, people in Central and South China always buy beans and bean-cakes from their own people. We have no chance against them. In consequence, we cannot conquer the whole of China.

3. With the silver standard in existence, the Chinese Government can increase their notes to counteract our gold notes. Consequently, our banks will fail to carry out the mission of extending our country's influence.

4. If the gold standard is adopted, we can issue gold notes freely. With the credit of the gold notes, we can acquire rights in real property and natural resources and defeat the credit of the Chinese silver notes. The Chinese will be unable to compete with us; and the currency of the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia will be in our control.

5. The Government Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, the Bank of Communications, the Frontier Development Bank and the General Credit & Finance Corporation have in circulation silver notes amounting to 38,000,000 dollars. Their reserve funds in the form of buildings and goods are estimated at 1,350,000 dollars. It is natural that the Chinese notes should depreciate. It is only by acts of the Government that these notes are still in circulation. Until we have entirely discredited the Chinese silver notes, we will never place our gold notes in their proper place in Manchuria and Mongolia, much less obtain the monopoly in currency and finance of these two countries. With the depreciated and inconvertible silver notes, the government of the Three Eastern Provinces buys all kinds of products, thus threatening our vested interests. When they sell these products, they demand gold from us which they keep for the purpose of wrecking our financial interests including our trade rights in special products. For these reasons, our gold notes are having a harder time and a gold standard for currency becomes the more urgently necessary.

In view of the above-mentioned considerations, we must overthrow Manchuria's inconvertible silver notes and divest the government of its purchasing power. Then we can extend the use of our gold notes in the hope of dominating the economic and financial activities of Manchuria and Mongolia. Furthermore, we can compel the authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces to employ Japanese financial advisers to help us gain supremacy in financial matters. When the Chinese notes are overthrown, our gold notes will take their place.

THE NECESSITY OF CHANGING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SOUTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY

The South Manchuria Railway Company functions in Manchuria as the Governor-General of Korea did there before the annexation. In order to build up our new Continental Empire, we must change the organization of that Company so as to break away from the present difficulties. The functions of this Company are varied and important. Every change of Cabinet involves a change of the administration of the South Manchuria Railway, and conversely every activity of the South Manchuria Railway also has important consequences on the Cabinet. This is because the South Manchuria Railway is semi-governmental, with final authority resting in the Cabinet. For this reason, the Powers invariably look upon this railway as a purely political organ rather than a business enterprise. Whenever a new move is made for the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, the Powers would invoke the Nine Power Treaty to thwart the plans of the South Manchuria Railway. This has greatly damaged the interests of our empire.

Considered from the point of view of domestic administration, the South Manchuria Railway is subject to a quadruple control. There are the Governor of Kwantung, the Chief Executive of Dairen, the Consul-General at Mukden, besides the President of the South Manchuria Railway itself. These four officers must meet and exchange views at Dairen before anything is undertaken. What is discussed in the meeting held in

camera often leaks out to the Chinese authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces. They in turn would try to obstruct any forward movements of the South authorization, it again has to run the gauntlet at the Departments of Foreign Affairs, of Railways, of Finance and of Army. If these ministers do not agree, the matter is dropped. Therefore, although the present prime minister realizes his own incompetence, he has nevertheless taken concurrently the portfolio of foreign affairs, so that our movements in Manchuria may be kept confidential and the execution of our plans may be swift and decisive. On account of these reasons, the South Manchuria Railway should be radically re-organized. All appurtenant enterprises which are profit-making should be made independent companies under the wings of the South Manchuria Railway, so that we may take determined steps on the conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia. On the other hand, Chinese, Europeans and Americans should be invited to invest money in the South Manchuria Railway on the condition that we have a plurality of its stocks. In that event the control of the Company is in our hands, and our mission from the empire can be discharged more vigorously. In short, by inviting international participation in the South Manchuria Railway, we can blind the eyes of the world. Having achieved that, we can push our advance in Manchuria and Mongolia at our will, free ourselves from the restraint of the Nine Power Treaty and strengthen our activities in that country with foreign capital.

The important appurtenant enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway are:—

1. Iron and Steel

Iron and steel are closely connected with national development. Every country today attaches great importance to it. But because of the lack of ores, we have found no solution to this problem. Hitherto we have had to import steel from the Yangtze Valley and the Malay Peninsula. But according to a secret survey of our General Staff, a wealth of iron mines are found in many places in Manchuria and Mongolia. A conser-

vative estimate of the reserve is 10 billion tons. At first when there was a lack of technique, the Anshan Iron and Steel Works was involved in an annual loss of Yen 3,000,000. Later, new methods were discovered, and the technique developed so that during 1926 the loss was only Yen 150,000 and a year later there was a profit of Yen 800,000. If the furnace is improved, we ought to earn at least Yen 4,000,000 a year. The quality of the ore at Penhsihu is excellent. By amalgamating it with the Anshan Iron Works, we shall have the comfort of being self-sufficient in iron and steel.

The iron deposits in Manchuria and Mongolia are estimated at 1,200,000,000 tons; and coal deposits, 2,500,000,000 tons. This coal ought to be sufficient for smelting the iron ores. With such large amounts of iron and coal at our disposal, we ought to be self-sufficient for at least seventy years. At the rate of \$100.00 profit on each ton of steel, for 350,000,000 tons of steel we shall have a profit of Yen 35,000,000,000. This is a tremendous asset to our economic resources. We shall save the expense of Yen 120,000,000 which we pay for the importation of steel every year. When we can have sufficient iron and steel for our own industries, we shall have acquired the secret for becoming the leading nation in the world. Thus strengthened, we can conquer both the East and the West. In order to attain this goal, the iron works must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway. Such unified control will keep China from preventing us to become self-sufficient in iron and steel.

2. Petroleum

Another important commodity which we lack is petroleum. It is also essential to the existence of a nation. Fortunately, there lie in the Fushun Coal Mine 5,200,000,000 tons of shale oil, from every hundred catties of which six catties of crude oil may be extracted. By means of American Machinery, every hundred catties will yield nine catties of refined oil good for motor cars and battleships. At present, Japan imports from foreign countries 700,000 tons of mineral oils every year valued at Yen 60,000,000. These figures are on the increase. As there are 50 billion tons of shale in the Fushun Mines, the yield

calculated at five percent would be 250,000,000 tons; at nine percent, 450,000,000 tons of oil. Taking an average of the two, the yield would be 350,000,000 tons, and assuming the value of the oil to be fifteen yen a ton, the oil shale contained in the Fushun Mine would bring us Yen 2,250,000,000. This will be a great industrial revolution for us. From the standpoint of national defence and national wealth, petroleum is a great factor. Having the iron and petroleum of Manchuria, our army and navy will become impregnable walls of defence. That Manchuria and Mongolia are the heart and liver of our empire, is a truthful saying. For the sake of our empire, we should be congratulated.

AGRICULTURAL FERTILIZER—AMONIA SULPHATE

AND OTHER PRODUCTS

Agricultural fertilizer is a great necessity for the production of foodstuff. Chemical fertilizers depend upon the ammonia sulphate extracted from coal. The Fushun coal yields especially good results. At present, our total consumption of ammonia sulphate is 500,000 tons. Of this, only half is manufactured at home, using the coal from the Kailan or the Fushun Mining Companies. The remaining half is imported from abroad at the cost of Yen 35,000,000 a year. With our agricultural work daily increasing and in view of the development of our new empire in Manchuria and Mongolia, we shall easily need 1,000,000 tons of ammonia sulphate every year during the next ten years. From the soot gathered from the burning of Fushun coal connected with the manufacture of steel, we could produce large quantities of ammonia sulphate. If the yield is put at 300,000 tons a year, we shall add an annual income of more than Yen 40,000,000. In fifty years, this will mount up to Yen 2,000,000,000. This money could be used for the improvement of our agriculture. If there is any surplus, we can buy bean-cakes with it and then invade the farms all over China and in the South Sea Islands. In order to accomplish this, we must separate this enterprise from the South Manchuria Railway. We shall then be able to control the fertilizers of the Far East.

SODA AND SODA ASH

We import 100,000 tons of Soda Ash at the cost of more than Yen 10,000,000 a year. Both soda and soda ash are valuable materials for military and industrial purposes. Soda is derived from nothing more than salt and coal, both of which are cheap and abundant in Manchuria and Mongolia. If we go into this manufacture, we can supply not only ourselves but can also sell it to China with a view to controlling its industrial products. We ought to gain from it a profit of at least Yen 15,000,000 a year. We can also supply our own military and chemical needs. Again this industry must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway.

MAGNESIUM AND ALUMINIUM

According to the independent surveys of the South Manchuria Railway Company and Dr. Honta of Tohoku University, magnesite and aluminium is a very promising business (in Manchuria). Magnesite is found in the surroundings of Tashichiao, and aluminium in the vicinity of Yentai. The deposit is one of the largest in the world. A ton of magnesite is worth Yen 2,000 and a ton of aluminium is worth about Yen 1,700. An estimate of the deposits of both minerals in Manchuria is Yen 750,000,000. These substances are especially useful for making aeroplanes, mess kits in the army, hospital apparatus and vessels, and other important industries. The United States alone has extensive deposits of these substances. The output of our country is one ton a year! Such materials are becoming more useful every day, but the supply is insufficient. Its price is growing high, as if never reaching a limit. The deposits in our territory of Manchuria and Mongolia, are nothing less than a God-given gift. The metal is really precious, being indispensable to both our industry and national defence. It also should be made in independent business, separate from the South Manchuria Railway. Its manufacture should be in Japan, so as to keep the Fengtien Government from imitating it on the one hand and to avoid the watchful eyes of the British and American capitalists on the other. After we

have gained control of it in the Three Eastern Provinces, we may harness the water power of the Yalu River to work on these metal ores. In view of the development of aircraft, in the future all the world will come to us for the materials necessary for aeronautics.

If all the enterprises mentioned above are made independent undertakings, they would make rapid progress and bring us at least a profit of 60 billion yen a year. The industrial development in South Manchuria means much to our national defence and economical progress. It will help us to build the foundation of an industrial empire. As to the cultural undertakings such as hospitals, schools and philanthropic institutions, they are our signal towers in the advance into Manchuria and Mongolia. They are the institutions for spreading our national prestige and power. More specifically, they are the baits for rights and privileges. Let us separate all these from the South Manchuria Railway in order that we may redouble our efforts and advance into North Manchuria to reclaim the sources of great wealth there.

When these important undertakings become independent and are free to develop without the interference of our officials, they will naturally become channels of national prosperity. On the wings of economic development, we could make rapid advance without either arousing the suspicion of the Powers or the anti-Japanese activities of the people of the Three Eastern Provinces. Such hidden methods would enable us to build the New Continent Empire with ease and efficiency.

The foreign loans for the South Manchuria Railway must be confined to those railroads already completed. Other railways built by us but nominally under Chinese control, can either be amalgamated with the completed lines or made independent according to the desire of the investing nations. The slogan of "Equal Opportunity" helps us to get foreign loans as well as to dispel suspicion of our designs in North Manchuria. At any rate, we shall need foreign capital to develop our continental empire. When the South Manchuria Railway is open

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to foreign investments, the powers will be glad to lend more to us and China can do nothing to block it. This is an excellent way to further our plans in Manchuria. We should lose no time in doing it. As to the wealth concentrated in the northern part of Manchuria and Mongolia, we should be likewise. The two new railways from Kirin to Hueining and from Changchun to Talai, as well as the lumber and mining interests, should also be managed as separate institutions.

The South Manchuria Railway will also be greatly enriched by our exploits in North Manchuria. Already Chinese immigrants are pouring into South Manchuria in large numbers. Their position will become stronger every day. As the right of renting land in the interior is not yet secured, our immigrants are gradually losing ground. Even if our government's backing will maintain our people there, they cannot compete with the Chinese due to the latter's low standard of living. Our only chance now is to defeat the Chinese by heavy capitalization. This again necessitates the use of foreign loans. This is so, especially because the riches of North Manchuria are even not accessible to the Chinese immigrants. We must seize the present opportunity, and hasten the progress of immigration by our own people and take possession of all rights there so as to shut out the Chinese. But in order to encourage immigration, rapid transportation is essential. This will both afford facilities to our people and bring the natural resources there to the world market. Moreover, both Russia and ourselves have been increasing armaments. On account of geographical positions, we have conflicting interests. If we want to obtain the wealth of North Manchuria and to build up the New Continent according to the will of Emperor Meiji, we must rush our people into North Manchuria first and seek to break the friendship between Russia and China. In this way, we can enjoy the wealth of North Manchuria and hold at bay both Russia and China. In case of war, our immigrants in North Manchuria will combine with our forces in South Manchuria, and at one stroke settle the problem forever. In case this is not possible, they can still maintain their own in North Manchuria and supply the rest of

us with food-stuff and raw materials. As the interests of North Manchuria and our country are so wrapped up, we should march directly into North Manchuria and pursue our settled policy.

THE NECESSITY OF ESTABLISHING A COLONIAL DEPARTMENT

Our exploitation of Manchuria takes a variety of forms. Often those in authority take such different views that even the most profitable undertaking for our country cannot be carried out. Because of the lack of speed, our secrets are often exposed and are made propaganda materials by the Mukden government much to the detriment of our country in international relations. Whenever a new undertaking is projected in Manchuria and Mongolia, it will become the subject of discussion of tens of meetings and conferences in Dairen. Not only the approval of the four-headed government there is necessary, but also the sanction of the cabinet at home has to be secured before anything can be carried out. Because of all these obstacles, any undertaking will take months and months before any definite results are seen. In the process it is possible for the Chinese to employ Japanese adventurers to steal our secrets so that before a project is launched it is often reported to the Chinese and in turn it becomes common property of the world. We are suddenly brought under the check of world opinion, and more than once we have incurred hardship in putting into practice our policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia. Furthermore, the opposition party has also made capital out of what they find in these regions in order to attack the government. All these have many serious have with our diplomatic relations. Henceforth, we must change our practice in order to proceed adroitly. The centre of control must be in Tokyo. That will (1) insure secrecy, (2) stop China from knowing before-hand our plans, (3) avoid the suspicion of the powers before a thing is done, (4) unify the multiple control in Manchuria and (5) bring the government agencies in Manchuria and Mongolia in close touch with the central government so as to deal with China with undivided power. For these reasons we should follow the original plan for absorbing Korea laid down by Ito and Katsura

and establish a Colonial Department, the special function of which is to look after the expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia. The administration of Formosa, Korea and Saghalien Island may be its nominal function, but our expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia is its real purpose. This will blind the eyes of the world on the one hand and forestall the disclosure of secrets on the other.

It is my personal conviction that the fact that the absorption of Korea could not be effected during the administration of Ito, is due to the lack of a special office for control. Therefore, there were always differences of opinion and secret policies were impossible. Such a state of affairs played into the hand of international obstruction and Korean opposition. Then a number of propagandists went to Europe and America as well as Korea itself, declaring that we firmly respected the independence of Korea and had no designs on an inch of Korean territory. The result of their work was the recovery of international confidence. After that, a colonial department was established under the pretence of Formosa, Then we seized the opportunity and the object was gained! It goes to prove that in order to undertake colonization and immigration, a special office for it is absolutely necessary. Moreover, the creation of a new empire in Mongolia and Manchuria is of utmost importance to the existence of Japan. It is necessary to have a special colonial office in order that the politics in that vast territory may be controlled from Tokyo. The officers in the field should only take orders: they should not interfere with the execution of policies where they please. This will insure secrecy; and the opposition nation have no chance of getting into the secrets of our colonial activities. Then our movements regarding Mongolia and Manchuria will be beyond the reach of international public opinion, and we shall be free from interferences.

As to the subsidiary enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway such as the Development Company, the Land Company, and the Trust Company, the power of supervision and planning should also be in the colonial office. They should all be under united control, in order that they may all help in the general

policy of expansion in Mongolia and Manchuria of the Imperial Government and complete the creation of the new empire.

TALING RIVER VALLEY OF PEKING-MUKDEN RAILWAY

The Taling River Valley is a wide area sparsely populated but infested with bandits. Many Koreans have made investments here, especially in rice field. Judging from its resources, this region is bound to be prosperous. It will also be an advantageous foothold for us if we want to expand into the Jehol region. We should give full protection to our Korean subjects here and wait for an opportunity to secure from China the right of colonization so that our immigrants may live here and act as our vanguards to Jehol and Mongolia. In case of warfare, this valley will be a strategic point to quarter large armies of soldiers. We shall then not only check the Chinese soldiers from advancing north but also hold the key to the immense wealth of South Manchuria. When Koreans come into this region we should finance them through our Trust and other financial organs with a view to gaining for these organs the actual ownership while the Koreans may satisfy themselves with the right of farming only. Ostensibly the ownership of land must reside with the Koreans. It is a convenient way of securing rights from the Chinese government. Henceforth the trust companies and financial organs should give them full backing when our own and Korean subjects wish to gain land ownership. If they need money to buy farms from the Chinese, the financial organs should also come to their aid. Unnoticeably we shall gain control of the better rice fields which we may give to our own emigrants. They shall displace the Koreans who in turn may go on opening new fields, to deliver to the convenient use of our own people. This is the policy with respect to the colonization of rice field and bean farms. As to the policy for herd farming, the Development Company should be especially entrusted gradually to expand, eventually placing all the wealth of herds at the disposal of our country. This same company may also take care of horse breeding and select the best out of Mongolia for the use of our national defence.

PRECAUTION AGAINST CHINESE MIGRATION

Recently the internal disturbances in China have driven large hordes of immigrants into Mongolia and Manchuria, thereby threatening the advance of our migration. For the sake of our activities in this field we should not fail to take precautions. The fact that the Chinese government welcomes this migration and does nothing to hold back the tide oppresses our policy even the more seriously. A noted American sinologist has made the statement that the Mukden authorities are carrying out such effective government that all people are moving into their territory. Therefore, the influx of immigrants is looked upon as a mark of effective government of Mukden authorities. We, of course, are concerned. Unless we put a stop to it, in less than ten years our own policy of emigration will prove an instrument for China to crush us with. Politically we must use police force to check this tendency as much as possible and economically our financiers should drive the Chinese out with low wages. Furthermore, we must develop and expand electric power to displace human labor. This will keep out Chinese immigrants as well as monopolize the control of motor force as a first step toward controlling the industrial development of this vast region.

HOSPITALS AND SCHOOLS

Hospitals and Schools in Manchuria must be independent of the South Manchuria Railway. For the people have often considered these as institutions of imperialism and refuse to have anything to do with them. When these are separated and made independent institutions we shall be able to make the people realize our goodness so that they will feel thankful to us....But in establishing schools emphasis should be laid on normal schools for men and women. Through these in educational work we may build up a substantial good-will among the people towards Japan. This is our first principle of cultural structure.

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TANAKA MEMORIAL.

(Reprinted from „The China Critic”,
Shanghai, September 24, 1931.)



Chinese Consulate General, Batavia.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TANAKA MEMORIAL.

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SINCE the European War, Japan's political as well as economic interests have been in an unsettled condition. This is due to the fact that we have failed to take advantage of our special privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia and fully to realize our acquired rights. But upon my appointment as premier, I was instructed specially to guard our interest in this region and watch for opportunities for further expansion. Such injunctions one cannot take lightly. Ever since I advocated a positive policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia as a common citizen, I have longed for its realization. So in order that we may lay plans for the colonization of the Far East and the development of our new continental empire, a special conference was held from June 27th to July 7th lasting in all eleven days. It was attended by all the civil and military officers connected with Manchuria and Mongolia, whose discussions result in the following resolutions. These we respectfully submit to Your Majesty for consideration.

General Consideration.

The term Manchuria and Mongolia includes the provinces Feng-

tien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Outer and Inner Mongolia. It extends an area of 74,000 square miles, having a population of 28,000,000 people. The territory is more than three times as large as our own empire not counting Korea and Formosa, but it is inhabited by only one-third as many people. The attractiveness of the land does not arise from the scarcity of population alone: its wealth of forestry, minerals and agricultural products is also unrivalled elsewhere in the world. In order to exploit these resources for the perpetuation of our national glory, we created especially the South Manchuria Railway Company. The total investment involved in our undertakings in railway, shipping, mining, forestry, steel manufacture, agriculture, and cattle raising, as schemes pretending to be mutually beneficial to China and Japan amount to no less than Yen 440,000,000. It is veritably the largest single investment and the strongest organization of our country. Although nominally the enterprise is under the joint ownership of the government and the people, in reality the government has complete power and authority. In so far as the South Manchuria Railway Company is empowered to

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undertake diplomatic, police, and ordinary administrative functions so that it may carry out our imperialistic policies, the Company forms a peculiar organization which has exactly the same powers as the Governor-General of Korea. This fact alone is sufficient to indicate the immense interests we have in Manchuria and Mongolia. Consequently the policies towards this country of successive administrations since Meiji are all based on his injunctions, elaborating and continuously completing the development of the new continental empire in order to further the advance of our national glory and prosperity for countless generations to come.

Unfortunately, since the European War there have been constant changes in diplomatic as well as domestic affairs. The authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces are also awakened and gradually work toward reconstruction and industrial development following our example. Their progress is astonishing. It has affected the spread of our influence in a most serious way, and has put us to so many disadvantages that the dealings with Manchuria and Mongolia of successive governments have resulted in failure. Furthermore, the restriction of the Nine Power Treaty signed at the Washington Conference have reduced our special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that there is no freedom left for us. The very existence of our country is endangered. Unless these obstacles are removed, our national existence will be insecure and our national strength will not develop. More-

over, the resources of wealth are congregated in North Manchuria. If we do not have the right of way here, it is obvious that we shall not be able to tap the riches of this country. Even the resources of South Manchuria which we won by the Russo-Japanese War will also be greatly restricted by the Nine Power Treaty. The result is that while our people cannot migrate into Manchuria as they please, the Chinese are flowing in as a flood. Hordes of them move into the Three Eastern Provinces every year, numbering in the neighbourhood of several millions. They have jeopardized our acquired rights in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that our annual surplus population of eight hundred thousand have no place to seek refuge. In view of this we have to admit our failure in trying to effect a balance between our population and food supply. If we do not devise plans to check the influx of Chinese immigrants immediately, in five years' time the number of Chinese will exceed 60,000,000. Then we shall be confronted with greater difficulties in Manchuria and Mongolia.

It will be recalled that when the Nine Power Treaty was signed which restricted our movements in Manchuria and Mongolia, public opinion was greatly aroused. The late Emperor Tasiho called a conference of Yamagata and other high officers of the army and the navy to find a way to counteract this new engagement. I was sent to Europe and America to ascertain secretly the attitude of the important statesmen toward it. They were all agreed that the Nine Power Treaty was initiated by the

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United States. The other Powers which signed it were willing to see our influence increase in Manchuria and Mongolia in order that we may protect the interests of international trade and investment. This attitude I found out personally from the political leaders of England, France and Italy. The sincerity of these expressions could be depended upon. Unfortunately just as we were ready to carry out our policy and declare void the Nine Power Treaty with the approval of those whom I met on my trip, the Seiyukai cabinet suddenly fell and our policy failed of fruition. It was indeed a great pity. After I had secretly exchanged views with the Powers regarding the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, I returned by way of Shanghai. At the wharf there a Chinese attempted to take my life. An American woman was hurt, but I escaped by the divine protection of my emperors of the past. It seems that it was by divine will that I should assist Your Majesty to open a new era in the Far East and to develop the new continental empire.

The Three Eastern Provinces are politically the imperfect spot in the Far East. For the sake of self-protection as well as the protection of others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of "Blood and Iron". But in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison with poison. In the future if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to

fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence.

The Nine Power Treaty is entirely an expression of the spirit of commercial rivalry. It was the intention of England and America to crush our influence in China with their power of wealth. The proposed reduction of armaments is nothing but a means to limit our military strength, making it impossible for us to conquer the vast territory of China. On the other hand, China's resources of wealth will be entirely at their disposal. It is merely a scheme by which England and America may defeat our plans. And yet the Minseito made the Nine Power Treaty the important thing and emphasized our trade rather than our rights in China. This is a mistaken policy — a policy of national suicide. England can afford to talk about trade relations only because she has India and Australia to supply her with foodstuff and other materials. So can America because South America and Canada are there to supply her needs. Their spare energy could be entirely devoted to developing trade in China to enrich themselves. But in Japan her food supply and raw materials

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decrease in proportion to her population. If we merely hope to develop trade, we shall eventually be defeated by England and America, who possess unsurpassable capitalistic power. In the end, we shall get nothing. A more dangerous factor is the fact that the people of China might some day wake up. Even during these years of internal strife, they can still toil patiently, and try to imitate and displace our goods so as to impair the development of our trade. When we remember that the Chinese are our sole customers, we must beware, lest one day when China becomes unified and her industries become prosperous. Americans and Europeans will compete with us: our trade in China will be wrecked. Minseito's proposal to uphold the Nine Power Treaty and to adopt the policy of trade towards Manchuria is nothing less than a suicidal policy.

After studying the present conditions and possibilities of our country, our best policy lies in the direction of taking positive steps to secure rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia. These will enable us to develop our trade. This will not only forestall China's own industrial development, but also prevent the penetration of European Powers. This is the best policy possible!

The way to gain actual rights in Manchuria and Mongolia is to use this region as a base and under the pretence of trade and commerce penetrate the rest of China. Armed by the rights already secured we shall seize the resources all over the country. Having China's entire resources at our disposal we shall proceed to conquer India,

the Archipelago Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe. But to get control of Manchuria and Mongolia is the first step if the Yamato race wishes to distinguish themselves on Continental Asia. Final success belongs to the country having food-supply; industrial prosperity belongs to the country having food-supply; industrial prosperity belongs to the country having raw materials; the full growth of national strength belongs to the country having extensive territory. If we pursue a positive policy to enlarge our rights in Manchuria and China, all these prerequisites of a powerful nation will constitute no problem. Furthermore our surplus population of 700,000 each year will also be taken care of. If we want to inaugurate a new policy and secure the permanent prosperity of our empire, a positive policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia is the only way.

Manchuria and Mongolia—Not Chinese Territory

Historically considered, Manchuria and Mongolia are neither China's territory nor her special possessions. Dr. Yano has made an extensive study of Chinese history and has come to the positive conclusion that Manchuria and Mongolia never were Chinese territory. This fact was announced to the world on the authority of the Imperial University. The accuracy of Dr. Yano's investigations is such that no scholars in China have contested his statement. However, the most unfortunate thing is that in our declaration of war with Russia, our government openly recog-

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nized China's sovereignty over these regions and later again at the Washington conference when we signed the Nine Power Treaty. Because of these two miscalculations (on our part) China's sovereignty in Manchuria and Mongolia is established in diplomatic relations, but our interests are seriously injured. In the past, although China speaks of the Republic of five races, yet Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia and Manchuria have always remained special areas and the princes are permitted to discharge their customary functions. Therefore in reality the sovereign power over these regions resides with the princes. When the opportunity presents itself, we should make known to the world the actual situation there. We should also wedge our way into Outer and Inner Mongolia in order that we may reform the mainland. So long as the princes there maintain their former administrations, the sovereign rights are clearly in their hands. If we want to enter these territories, we may regard them as the ruling power and negotiate with them for rights and privileges. We shall be afforded excellent opportunities and our national influence will increase rapidly.

Positive Policy in Manchuria

As to the rights in Manchuria, we should take forceful steps on the basis of the Twenty-One Demands and secure the following in order to safe-guard the enjoyment of the rights which we have acquired so far:—

1. After the thirty-year commercial lease terminates, we should be able to extend the term at

our wish. Also the right of leasing land for commercial, industrial and agricultural purpose should be recognized.

2. Japanese subjects shall have the right to travel and reside in the eastern part of Mongolia, and engage in commercial and industrial activities. As to their movements, China shall allow them freedom from Chinese law. Furthermore, they must not be subject to illegal taxation and unlawful examination.
3. We must have the right of exploiting the nineteen iron and coal mines in Fengtien and Kirin, as well as the right of timbering.
4. We should have priority for building railroads and option for loans for such purposes in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia.
5. The number of Japanese political, financial and military advisers and training officers must be increased. Furthermore, we must have priority in furnishing new advisers.
6. The right of stationing our Police over the Koreans (in China).
7. The administration and development of the Kirin—Changchun Railway must be extended to 99 years.
8. Exclusive right of sale of special products—priority of shipping business to Europe and America.
9. Exclusive rights of mining in Heilungkiang.
10. Right to construct Kirin—Hueining and Changchun—Talai Railways.
11. In case money is needed for

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the redemption of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese Government must have the first option for making loans to China.

12. Harbcur rights at Antung and Yingko and the right of through transportation.
13. The right of partnership in establishing a Central Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces.
14. Right of Pasturage.

Positive Policy Towards Inner and Outer Mongolia

Since Manchuria and Mongolia are still in the hands of the former princes, in the future we must recognize them as the ruling power and give them support. For this reason, the daughter of General Fukushima, Governor of Kwantung, risked her life among the barbarous Mongolian people of Tushiyeh to become adviser to their Prince in order that she might serve the Imperial Government. As the wife of the Prince Ruler is the niece of Manchu Prince Su, the relationship between our Government and the Mongolian Prince became very intimate. The princes of Outer and Inner Mongolia have all shown sincere respect for us, especially after we cultured them with special benefits and protection. Now there are 19 Japanese retired military officers in the house of the Tushiyeh. We have acquired already monopoly rights for the purchase of wool, for real estate and for mines. Hereafter we shall send secretly more retired officers to live among them. They should wear Chinese clothes in order to escape the attention of the Mukden Government. Scattered

in the territory of the Prince, they may engage themselves in farming, herding or dealing in wool. As to the other principalities, we can employ the same method as in Tushiyeh. Everywhere we should station our retired military officers to dominate in the Princes' affairs. After a large number of our people have moved into Outer and Inner Mongolia, we shall then buy lands at one-tenth of their worth and begin to cultivate rice where feasible in order to relieve our shortage of food-supply. Where the land is not suitable for rice cultivation, we should develop it for cattle raising and horse breeding in order to replenish our military needs. The rest of the land could be devoted to the manufacture of carned goods which we may export to Europe and America. The fur and leather will also meet our needs. Once the opportunity comes, Outer and Inner Mongolia will be ours outright. While the sovereign rights, are not clearly defined and while the Chinese and the Soviet Governments are engaging their attention elsewhere, it is our opportunity quietly to build our influence. Once we have purchased most of the land there, there will be no room for dispute as to whether Mongolia belongs to the Japanese or the Mongolians. Aided by our military prowess, we shall realize our positive policy. In order to carry out this plan, we should appropriate Yen 1,000,000 from the "secret funds" of the Army Department's budget so that four hundred retired officers disguised as teachers and Chinese citizens may be sent into Outer and Inner Mongolia to mix with the people,

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to gain the confidence of the Mongolian princes, to acquire from them rights for pasturage and mining and to lay the foundation of our national interests for the next hundred years.

Encouragement and Protection of Korean Immigration

Since the annexation of Korea, we have had very little trouble. But President Wilson's declaration of the selfdeterminations of races after the European War has been like a divine revelation to the suppressed peoples. The Koreans are no exception. The spirit of unrest has permeated the whole country. Both because of the freedom they enjoy in Manchuria due to incompetent police system and because of the richness of the country, there are now in the Three Eastern Provinces no less than 1,000,000 Koreans. The unlooked-for development is fortunate for our country indeed. From a military and economic standpoint, it has greatly strengthened our influence. From another standpoint, it gives new hope for the administration of Koreans. They will both be the vanguard for the colonization of virgin fields and furnish a link of contact with the Chinese people. On the one hand, we could utilize the naturalized Koreans to purchase land for rice cultivation, on the other, we could extend to them financial aid through the Co-operative Society, the South Manchuria Railway, etc., so that they may serve as the spear-head of our economic penetration. This will give relief to our problem of food supply, as well as open a new field of opportunity for coloniza-

tion. The Koreans who have become naturalized Chinese are Chinese only in name: they will return to our fold eventually. They are different from those naturalized Japanese in California and South America. They are naturalized as Chinese only for temporary convenience. When their numbers reach two million and a half or more, they can be instigated to military activities whenever there is the necessity, and under the pretence of suppressing the Koreans we could bear them aid. As not all the Koreans are naturalized Chinese, the world will not be able to tell whether it is the Chinese Korean or the Japanese Korean who create the trouble. We can always sell dog's meat with a sheep's head as sign-board.

Of course while we could use the Koreans for such purpose, we must beware of the fact that the Chinese could also use them against us. But Manchuria is a much under our jurisdiction as under Chinese jurisdiction. If the Chinese should use Koreans to hamper us, then our opportunity of war against China is at hand. In that event, the most formidable factor is Soviet Russia. If the Chinese should use the "Reds" to influence the Koreans, the thought of our people will change and great peril will befall us. Therefore, the present Cabinet is taking every precaution against this eventuality. If we want to make use of the Koreans to develop our new continental empire, our protection and regulations for them must be more carefully worked out. We should increase our police force in North Manchuria under the terms of the Mitsuya

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Treaty so that we may protect the Koreans and give them help in their rapid advance. Furthermore, the Eastern Development Company (Totoku Kaisha) and the South Manchuria Railway Company should follow then to give them financial aid. They should be given especially favourable terms so that through them we may develop Manchuria and Mongolia and monopolize the commercial rights. The influx of Koreans into these territories is of such obvious importance both for economic and military considerations that the Imperial Government cannot afford not to give it encouragement. It will mean new opportunities for our empire. Since the effect of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement is lost after the Washington Conference, we can only recover our interests through the favourable development arising out of the presence of several millions of Koreans in Manchuria. There is no ground in international relations for raising any objection to this procedure.

Railroads and Development of our New Continent

Transportation is the mother of national defence, the assurance of victory and the citadel of economic development. China has only 7,200 to 7,300 miles of railroads, of which three thousand miles are in Manchuria and Mongolia constituting two-fifths of the whole. Considering the size of Manchuria and Mongolia and the abundance of natural products, there should be at least five or six thousand miles more. It is a pity that our railroads are mostly in South Manchuria, which cannot reach the sources

of wealth in the northern parts. Moreover, there are too many Chinese inhabitants in South Manchuria to be wholesome for our military and economic plans. If we wish to develop the natural resources and strengthen our national defence, we must build railroads in Northern Manchuria. With the opening of these railroads, we shall be able to send more people (Japanese) into Northern Manchuria. From this vantage ground we can manipulate political and economic developments in South Manchuria, as well as strengthen our national defence in the interest of peace and order of the Far East. Furthermore, the South Manchuria was built mainly for economic purposes. It lacks encircling lines necessary for military mobilization and transportation. From now on we must take military purposes as our object and build circuit lines to circle the heart of Manchuria and Mongolia in order that we may hamper China's military, political and economic developments there on the one hand, and prevent the penetration of Russian influence on the other. This is the key to our continental policy.

There are two trunk lines in Manchuria and Mongolia. These are the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway. As regards the railroad built by Chinese, it will doubtless become very powerful in time, backed by the financial resources of the Kirin Provincial Government. With the combined resources of Fengtien and Heilungkiang Provinces, the Chinese railroads will develop to an extent far superior to our South Manchuria Railway. Strong com-

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petition will inevitably result. Fortunately for us, the financial conditions in Fengtien Province are in great disorder, which the authorities cannot improve unless we came to their succor. This is our chance. We should take positive steps until we have reached our goal in railroad development. Moreover, if we manipulate the situation, the Fengtien bank-notes will depreciate to an inconceivable degree. In that event, the bankruptcy of Fengtien will be a matter of time. The development of Manchuria and Mongolia will be out of the question for them. But we still have to reckon with the Chinese Eastern Railway. It forms a T with the South Manchuria Railway. Although this system is a convenient shape, it is by no means suitable for military purposes. When the Chinese build railroads as feeders of the Chinese Eastern Railway, it is best they run parallel to it, west and east. But with the South Manchuria Railway as main line, we must have these lines run north and south. For the benefit of the Chinese themselves, there are also advantages for these lines to run in this direction. Consequently our interest does not necessarily conflict with the Chinese. Now that Russia is losing influence and is powerless to advance in Manchuria and Mongolia, it is certain that the Chinese must act according to our beckoning in the development of the railways in the future. Much to our surprise the Fengtien Government recently built two railroads, one from Tahushan to Tungliao and the other from Kirin to Hailu both for military purposes. Those two railroads affect most seriously our military plans in

Manchuria and Mongolia as well as the interest of the South Manchuria Railway. We therefore protested strongly against it.

That these railways were built was due to the fact that our official on the spot as well as the South Manchuria Railway authorities miscalculated the ability of the Fengtien Government and paid no attention to it. Later when we did intervene the railways were already completed. Besides, the Americans have been anxious to make an investment in developing the port of Hu-lu-tao through British capitalists. Taking advantage of this situation, the Fengtien Government introduced American and British capital in these railways in order to hold our interest at bay. For the time being we have to wink at it and wait for the opportune moment to deal with China about these two railroads.

Recently, it is rumoured that the Fengtien Government is planning to build a railroad from Tahushan to Harbin via Tungliao and Fuyu, so that there may be a direct line between Feking and Harbin without touching either the South Manchuria Railway or the Chinese Eastern Railway. What is more astonishing is that another railway beginning at Mukden passing through Hailu, Kirin, Wuchang terminating at Harbin is also under way. If this plan becomes true, then these two lines would encircle the South Manchuria Railway and limit its sphere of activity to a small area. The result is that our economic and political development of Manchuria and Mongolia will be checked and the plan for curtail-

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ing our power provided by the Nine Power Treaty will be carried out. Moreover, the completion of these two railroads will render the South Manchurian Railway completely useless. The latter Company will be confronted with a real crisis. But in view of China's financial conditions today, she cannot undertake these two railroads unless she resorts to foreign loans. And on these two railways the transportation charges will have to be higher than on the South Manchuria Railway. These considerations give us some comfort. But in the event of these two railroads becoming an accomplished fact and the Chinese Government making especially low freight charges in order to compete with the South Manchuria Railway, not only we but the Chinese Eastern Railway will also sustain great losses. Japan and Russia certainly would not allow China to carry out such obstructive measures, especially as the Chinese Eastern Railway depends upon Tsi-tsihar and Harbin for the bulk for its business. The consequence would be even more serious to both Japanese and Russian interests when the new railways are completed.

Let us now consider more in detail the competitive railways projected in Manchuria and Mongolia.

China contemplates:

1. Suolun—Taonan Railway.
2. Kirin—Harbin Railway.

Soviet Russia proposes:

1. Anta—Potung Railway.
2. Mienpo — Wuchang — Potung Railway.

3. Kirin—Hailin Railway.
4. Mishan—Muling Railway.

The Russian plans are designed to strengthen the Chinese Eastern Railway and thereby to extend its imperialistic schemes. For this reason the railways projected mostly run east and west. For although the power of Soviet Russia is declining, her ambition in Manchuria and Mongolia has not diminished for a minute. Every step she takes is intended to obstruct our progress and to injure the South Manchuria Railway. We must do our utmost to guard against her influence. We should use the Fengtien Government as a wedge to check her southern advance. By pretending to check the southern advance of Soviet Russia as a first step, we could gradually force our way into North Manchuria and exploit the natural resources there. We shall then be able to prevent the spread of Chinese influence on the south and arrest the advance of Soviet Russia on the south. In our struggle against the political and economic influence of Soviet Russia, we should drive China before us and direct the events from behind. Meanwhile, we should still secretly befriend Russia in order to hamper the growth of Chinese influence. It was largely with this purpose in view that Baron Goto of Kato's cabinet invited Joffe to our country and advocated the resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia.

Although we have an agreement with the Chinese Eastern Railway concerning transportation rates, according to which 45% go to the Chinese Eastern Railway and 55%

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to us, yet the Chinese Eastern Railway still grants preferential rates detrimental to the interest of the South Manchuria Railway. Moreover, according to a secret declaration of Soviet Russia, although they have no territorial ambition they cannot help keeping a hand in the Chinese Eastern Railway on account of the fact that north of the Chinese and Russian boundary the severe cold makes a railway valueless. Furthermore, as Vladivostok is their only sea-port in the Far East, they cannot give up the Chinese Eastern Railway without losing also their foothold on the Pacific. This makes us feel the more uneasy.

On the other hand the South Manchuria Railway is not adequate for our purpose. Considering our present needs and future activities, we must control railways in both north and south Manchuria, especially in view of the fact that the resources of North Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia will furnish no room for expansion and material gains. In South Manchuria the Chinese is increasing at such a rate that it surely will damage our interests politically and economically. Under such circumstances, we are compelled to take aggressive steps in North Manchuria in order to assure our future prosperity. But if the Chinese Eastern Railway of Soviet Russia should spread across this field our new continental policy is bound to receive a set-back which will result in an inevitable conflict with Soviet Russia in the near future. In that event we shall enact once more part in the Russo-Japanese War. The Chinese Eastern Railway

will become ours as the South Manchuria Railway did last time, and we shall seize Kirin as we once did Dairen. That we should draw swords with Russia again in the fields of Mongolia in order to gain the wealth of North Manchuria seems a necessary step in our program of national aggrandisement. Until this hidden rock is blown up our ship can have no smooth sailing. We should now demand from China the right of building all the important military railroads. When these railroads are completed, we shall pour our forces into North Manchuria as far as we can. When Soviet Russia intervenes, as they must, that is our opportunity for open conflict.

We should insist on the building of the following railways:

1. Tungliao—Jehol Railway. This line is 447 miles long and will cost Yen 50,000,000. When it is completed it will be of great value to our development of Inner Mongolia. As a matter of fact, this is the most important of all the railways in the whole undertaking. According to the careful surveys of the War Department, there are in Inner Mongolia large tracts of land suitable for rice cultivation. After proper development there will be room for at least 20 millions of our people. There is besides the possibility of turning out 2,000,000 head of cattle which may be transported by railways for food supply and for purposes of exporting to Europe and America. Wool also is a special product. While the sheep in Japan yield only two cattles of wool per head per year, the sheep in Mongolia can yield six cattles. The South Manchuria Railway has

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made many experiments, all of which confirm this fact. Besides, the wool is many times better than that of Australia. Its low cost and high quality combined with its abundance in quantity make Mongolia a potential source of great wealth. When this industry is enhanced by the facilities of railway development, the total production will increase at least ten-fold. We have withheld this knowledge from the rest of the world, lest England and America compete with us for it. Therefore, we must first of all control the transportation and then develop the wool industry. By the time the other countries know about it, it would be already too late to do anything. With this railroad in our hands, we can develop the wool industry not only for our own use, but also for exporting to Europe and America. Furthermore, we can realize our desire of joining hands with Mongolia. This railway is a matter of life and death to our policy in Mongolia. Without it, Japan can have no part in Mongolia's development.

2. Suolun—Taonan Railway. This line is 136 miles long and will cost Yen 10,000,000. Looking into the future of Japan, a war with Russia over the plains of North Manchuria is inevitable. From a military standpoint, this line will not only enable us to threaten Russia's rear but also to curtail its reinforcements for North Manchuria. From an economic standpoint, this road will place the wealth of the Taor-ho Valley within our reach, thereby strengthening the South Manchuria Railway. The princes nearby who are friendly to us can also use this road to extend our

influence in order to open up their respective territories. Our hope of working hand in hand with the Mongolian princes, of acquiring land, mines and pasturage, and of developing trade with the natives as preliminary steps for later penetration, all depends upon this railway. Together with Tungliao—Jehol Railway, they will form two supplementary routes into Mongolia. When the industries are fully developed, we shall extend our interests into Outer Mongolia. But the danger of this line is that it might provide facilities for Chinese migration into a new region and spoil our own policy. Look at our experience with the South Manchuria Railway. Hasn't that served the interest of China? The redeeming feature, however, is the fact that the land and mines along this railway are in the possession of Mongolian princes. If we can gain possession of them: first, we need have no worries about Chinese migration. Moreover, we can make the princes pass laws discriminating against Chinese immigrants. When life there is made miserable for the Chinese, they naturally will leave for places afar. There are other methods to bar the Chinese. Only if we try hard enough, no Chinese foot-prints will be found on Mongolian territory.

3. A Section of Changchun—Taonan Railway. As this line runs from Changchun to Fuyu and Talai, the section between Changchun and Taonan is about 131 miles and costs approximately Yen 11,000,000. This line is immensely important from an economic standpoint, for the wealth of Manchuria and Mongolia lies all in North Manchuria. It

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will enable us to have an easy access to North Manchuria on the one hand, and prejudice the Chinese Eastern Railway to the benefit of the South Manchuria Railway on the other. It runs through the upper valley of the Sungari River where the soil is fertile and agricultural products abound. Further, in the vicinity of Talai there is the Lueh-Liang Falls which could be harnessed for electric power. That this section of the railway will be a prosperous center for industry and agriculture, is beyond doubt. After the completion of this line, we shall be able to make Talai a base and advance on Siberia through three directions; namely, by way of Taonan, Anshand and Tsitsihar. The wealth of North Manchuria will then come to our hands. This will also be the first line of advance to Heilungkiang. It will further form a circuit with the railway between Changchun and Taonan, which will serve well for military purposes when we penetrate into Mongolia. Along this whole line the population is sparse and the land is rich and extensive. No fertilizer will be required on the farms for fifty years. A possession of this railway will ensure the possession of all the wealth of North Manchuria and Mongolia. In this region there is room for at least 30 million people more. When the Tunhua Railway is completed and joins up with the line running to Hueining in Korea, the products will be brought to the door of Osaka and Tokyo by a direct route. In time of war our troops could be despatched to North Manchuria and Mongolia via the Japan Sea without a stop, forestalling all possibilities of Chinese forces entering

North Manchuria. Nor could American or Russian submarines enter the Korean Strait. The moment the railways between Kirin and Hueining and between Changchun and Talai are completed, we shall become self-sufficient in food-stuff and raw materials. We shall have no worries in the event of war with any country. Then, in our negotiations about Manchuria and Mongolia, China will be cowed to submission and yield to our wishes. If we want to end the political existence of Manchuria and Mongolia according to the third step of Meiji's plan, the completion of these two railways is the only way. The Changchun—Talai Railway will greatly enhance the value of the South Manchuria Railway, besides developing into a profitable line itself. It is an undertaking of supreme importance in our penetration into this territory.

4. Kirin—Hueining Line. While the Kirin—Tunhua Line is already completed, the Tunhua—Hueining Line is yet to be built. The narrow gauge of 2 ft. 6 inches of the tracks from Hueining to Laotoukow is inadequate for the economic development of the New Continent. Allowing Yen 8,000,000 for widening the tracks in this section and Yen 10,000,000 for completing the section between Laotoukow and Tunhua, the whole undertaking will cost approximately Yen 20,000,000. When this is done, our continental policy will have succeeded. Hitherto, people going to Europe have to pass through either Dairen or Vladivostok. Now they can go on the trunk line directly from Ching-chinkang via the Siberian Railway. When we are in control of this great system of transportation, we

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need make no secret of our designs on Manchuria and Mongolia according to the third step of Meiji's plans. The Yamato Race is then embarked on the journey of world conquest! According to the last will of Meiji, our first step was to conquer Formosa and the second step to annex Korea. Having completed both of these, the third step is yet to be taken and that is the conquest of Manchuria, Mongolia and China. When this is done, the rest of Asia including the South Sea Islands will be at our feet. That these injunctions have not been carried out even now, is a crime of your humble servants.

In history the people living in Kirin, Fengtien and part of Heilungkiang, are called Sushan. They are now scattered along the sea coast and in the basins of the Amur and Tumen rivers. They were known as Kulai, Sushan, Hueibei, Palou, Wotsu, Fuyu, Kitan, Pohai and Nuchen at different stages of history. They were of a mixed race. The forefathers of the Manchurian dynasty also began in this vicinity. They gained control of Kirin, first and then firmly established themselves in China for 300 years. If we want to put into effect our Continental Policy, we have to note this historical fact and proceed to establish ourselves in this region first also. Hence the necessity of the Kirin—Hueining Railway.

Whether the terminus of Kirin—Hueining Line be at Chingchin or Lochin or even Hsiungchi, we are free to decide according to circumstances. From the standpoint of national defence at present, Lo-

chin seems the ideal harbour and terminus. Eventually it will be the best harbour in the world. On the one hand it will ruin Vladivostok, and on the other it will be the center of the wealth of Manchuria and Mongolia. Moreover, Dairen is an yet not our own territory. While Manchuria is yet not a part of our empire, it is difficult to develop Dairen. That being the case, we shall be in a precarious situation in time of war. The enemy could blockade the Tsushima and Senchima Straits, and we will be cut off from the supplies of Manchuria and Mongolia. Not having the resources there at our command we will be vanquished, especially as England and the United States have worked hand in hand to limit our action in every possible direction. For the sake of self-preservation and of giving warning to China and the rest of the world, we must fight America some time. The American Asiatic Squadron stationed in the Philippines is but within a stone's throw from Tsushima and Senchima. If they send submarines to these quarters, our supply of food-stuff and raw materials from Manchuria and Mongolia will be cut off entirely. But if the Kirin—Hueining Railway is completed, we shall have a large circuit line through all Manchuria and Korea, and a small circuit line through North Manchuria. We shall have access in all direction gaining freedom for the transportation of soldiers and supplies alike.

When our supplies are transported through this line to our ports at Tsuruga and Niigata, enemy submarines will have no way of getting into the Japanese and Korean straits. We are then entirely free

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from interference. This is what is meant by making the Japanese Sea the center of our national defence. Having secured the free transportation of food and raw materials, we shall have nothing to fear either from the American navy because of its size, or the Chinese or Russian army because of their number. Incidentally, we shall be in a position to suppress the Koreans. Let me reiterate the fact that if we want to carry out the New Continental Policy, we must build this line. Manchuria and Mongolia are the undeveloped countries in the East. Over this territory we shall have to go war with Soviet Russia sooner or later. The battle ground will be Kirin.

When we carry out the third step of Meiji's plans with regard to China, we shall have to do the following things:—

1. Mobilise the army divisions in Fukueka and Hiroshima, and send them to South Manchuria via Korea. This will prevent the northern advance of Chinese soldiers.
2. Send the army divisions in Nagoya and Kwansei by sea to Chingchin, and thence to North Manchuria via the Kirin—Hueining Line.
3. Send the army in Kwantung through Niigata to Chingchin or Lochin, and thence by Kirin—Hueining Line to North Manchuria.
4. Send the army divisions in Hokkaido and Sendai to embark the ship at Aomori and Hakodato, and sail for Vladivostok and thence, via the Siberian Railway, to Harbin. Then they can descend on Fengtien, seize Mongolia and

prevent Russian forces from coming south.

5. Finally these divisions in all directions will meet and form themselves in two large armies. On the south, they will keep Shanhaikuan and close it against the southern advance of the Russians. In this way we shall have all the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia at our command. Even if the war should be prolonged for ten years, we need have no fear for the lack of supplies.

Let us now analyze once more the Kirin—Hueining Railway from the standpoint of its access from our ports.

First with Chingchin as starting point:

1. To Vladivostok — 130 miles
2. To Tsuruga — 475 miles
3. To Moji — 500 miles
4. To Nagasaki — 650 miles
5. To Fusan — 500 miles

Second take Tsuruga as the port of entry and compare it with Dairen. In this case we should consider it from the point of view of Osaka as industrial center.

1. From Changchun to Osaka via Lochin, the distance is 406 miles by land and 475 miles by sea. In point of time the route will take 51 hours.
2. From Changchun to Osaka via Dairen and Kobe, the distance is 535 miles by land and 870 miles by sea. In point of time it takes 92 hours.

If Tsuruga instead of Dairen is made the connecting link, there is a saving of 41 hours. Calculated at the rate of 30 miles an hour on land and 12 miles an hour by sea, we can use fast

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boats and trains and cut the time in half.

Manchuria and Mongolia are the Belgium of the Far East. In the Great War, Belgium was the battlefield. In our wars with Russia and the United States, we must also make Manchuria and Mongolia suffer the ravages. As it is evident that we have to violate the neutrality of these territories, we cannot help building the Kirin—Hueining and Chanchun—Talai Railways in order that we may be militarily prepared. In time of war we can easily increase our forces and in time of peace we can migrate thousands upon thousands of people into this region and work on the rice fields. This line offers the key to economic development as well as to military conquests.

In undertaking the Kirin—Hueining Railway, it is necessary to take advantage of the dry season and finish it at one stretch. The mountains it must go through are all granite. The tunneling would need modern and up-to-date machines. As to the sleepers and ballast required, there is an abundance all along the line. Limestone and clay for making tiles and brick are also to be had for the taking. Only rails, cars and locomotives have to be brought in. The cost of construction could therefore be reduced at least thirty per cent and the time required forty per cent.

Now let us look into the economic interests along this line. According to the careful investigations of our General Staff and the

South Manchuria Railway, the total reserve of timber is 200,000,000 tons. If one million ton is fallen and imported to our country each year, This will last two hundred years. This will stop the import of American timber which has been costing us Yen 80,000,000 to Yen 100,000,000 a year. Although our information is reliable we cannot make it known to the world; for if China or Russia learns that we get so much timber from America, they would try to interfere with the construction of this line. Or else, the United States may buy from the Fengtien Government all the timber rights on the one hand to protect their own trade with us; on the other, to control the monopoly and incidentally kill our paper industry.

Kirin was known as the „ocean of trees” even in the days of Emperor Chien-Lung. Added to the original forests are the growths in the intervening years since that time. Imagine the vastness of the resources! To transport this timber from Kirin to Osaka via Chanchun and Dairen, there is a distance of 1,385 miles. For every cubic foot, we have to spend 34 cents. Because of this high cost of transportation, we cannot compete with the United States. If the Kirin—Hueining Line is completed, the distance is reduced to about 700 miles. We can then ship timber to Osaka at the low rate of 13 cents per cubic foot. We can certainly defeat the timber from the United States then. Supposing we calculate the profit at Yen 5.00 per ton of timber and supposing there are two billion tons of timber, the construction of the railway will bring to us the easy profit of 10

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billion yen. Besides, we will bar the import of American timber into our country. Furthermore, the industry of furniture making, paper manufacture and other usages which the cheap timber makes possible will add 20 million yen more to our country's annual income.

There is also the Hsin Chin coal mine, which has a reserve of 600,000,000 tons of coal. The quality of this coal is superior to that of Fushun coal, easy to excavate and suitable for the extraction of petroleum, agricultural fertilizers and other chemical by-products which we may both use at home and sell in China. There are numerous other advantages which will come to us from the building of the Kirin—Hueining Railway. It is all gain without labour. The coal will supplement the Fushun collieries. With both coal mines in our control, we hold the key to the industries of all China. Speaking of the Hsin Chin coal, we shall reap a profit of Yen 5.00 on each ton when it is shipped to Japan. With additional chemical by-products, we shall reap a profit of Yen 16.00 from each ton of coal. Taking an average profit of Yen 15.00 a ton, the total profit will amount to 200 billion yen. All this comes as a by-product from the operation of the Kirin—Hueining Railway. There are, besides, the gold mines along the Mutan River. The acquired rights of the South Manchuria Railway in the gold mines of Chia-Pi-kou in the province of Kirin and the timber in its neighbourhood will all be within reach of exploitation once the Kirin—Hueining line is in operation.

In the vicinity of Tunhua the

agricultural products such as oats, wheat, millet and kaoliang, yield an annual output of over a million catties. There are twenty distilleries of wines, thirty oil mills yielding an annual output of about 600,000 catties of oil and 600,000 of bean cakes, besides many places for making vermicelli. All these will depend upon the new railway. The trade along this road may be estimated at 4 million yen a year. The transportation charges of farm products alone will not only defray the running expenses, but also yield a net profit of Yen 200,000 a year. Including the profit from timber, coal and its by-products transported by the railway, we can safely count on a profit of Yen 8,000,000 a year. Besides, there are indirect benefits such as the strengthening of the South Manchuria Railway, the acquisition of rights over forests, mines and trade as well as the migration of large numbers of our people into North Manchuria. Above all, is the shortening of distance between Japan and the resources of wealth in North Manchuria. It only takes three hours from Chingchin to Hueining, three hours from Hueining to Sanfeng and three hours more from Tumen river to Lung-Ching-Tsun. In 60 hours we can reach the wealth of North Manchuria. Hence the Kirin—Hueining Railroad alone can enable us to tap the immense wealth of North Manchuria.

4. Hunchun—Hailin Railway.

This is 173 miles long road costs Yen 24,000,000. All along this line are thick forests. In order to strengthen the Kirin—Hueining

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Railway and to exploit the forests and mines in North Manchuria, this line is needed. In order to transfer the prosperity of Vladivostok to Hueining, this line is also urgently needed. The greatest hope for prosperity, however, is the fact that south of Naining and north of Tunhua there is Lake Ching Po which can be used to generate electric power. With this electric power, we shall have control over the agricultural and industrial undertakings of the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia. No amount of China's agitation can matter in the least to our industrial developments. According to the investigations of the South Manchuria Railway, the water power in the lake can generate at least 800,000 horse-power. With such an enormous quantity of electric power, the industrial conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia can be easily accomplished. In the neighbourhood of this immense power plant, there will be phenomenal growth of wealth. We must build this railway quickly, in order to provide facilities for transportation. Lake Hsing Kai, which is owned jointly by China and Russia, can also be developed for the generation of electricity. In order that these countries may not combine to frustrate our plans, we should introduce a resolution in the International Conference of Electrical Engineering to be held in Tokyo this year, to the effect that in the same area of electricity supply there should not be two power plants. Besides, in the vicinity of Niigata and Hailin, the Oju Paper Mill has acquired extensive rights of lumbering. They need the immediate establishment of the power plant at Lake Ching-

po and the early completion of the Hunchun-Hailin Railway in order to bring to the factory at home the raw materials growing wild in Mongolia.

Moreover, the reason that the Fengtien authorities intend to build the Kirin-Wuchang Railway and the Kirin-Mukden Railway, with Hulutao or Tientsin as seaport, is that they want to recover to themselves the wealth of North Manchuria. By building the Hunchun-Hailin Railway we shall not only strengthen the Kirin-Hueining Railway, but also defeat the Chinese scheme and draw the wealth of Manchuria to Chingchin harbour. The transportation charges will be two-third less compared with the Chinese line and one-third less compared with the Siberian line. They cannot compete with us. Our victory is a foregone conclusion.

The total trade in Manchuria is seven or eight billion yen a year, all on which is in our hands. The business we do in wool, cotton, soybeans, bean cakes, and iron, forms one-twentieth of the total volume of world trade. And it is steadily increasing. But the Namihaya Machi at Dairen (the wealthiest street in the city) is still in Chinese possession. The sad story goes further. Oil is a basic industry in Manchuria. We control only 6 percent of it. Of the 38 oil mills in Yingkow, there is not one Japanese; of the 20 oil mills in Antung there is only one Japanese and of the 82 or 83 oil mills in Dairen there are only seven owned by Japanese. This is by no means an optimistic outlook for us. In order

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to recover the lost ground, we must first of all develop transportation. Then, by securing a monopoly on both finished products and raw materials, we shall be able to gain the upper-hand eventually. Furthermore, we ought to assist our people in oil business by extending to them financial credit, so that the oil industry of the Chinese will be forced out of the market. There are many Chinese on Kawaguchi Machi in Csaka who are dealers of our manufactured goods in Mongolia and Manchuria. They are strong competitors of our own business men in China. Our people are greatly handicapped because of their high standard of living which compels them to figure at a higher percentage of profit. On the other hand, the Chinese also have their disadvantages. The goods that they get are of an inferior quality, but the price that they pay is at least 10 percent higher than what our own people pay. Besides, they are also obliged to pay Yen 2.70 more than our people for every ton of goods transported, and yet they can undersell our merchants in Manchuria. It clearly shows the inability of our own people. When one thinks of it, it is really pathetic. The Chinese is single-handed, receiving no assistance from the government. But the Japanese in Manchuria has every protection from the government and long term credit at a low rate of interest. Still there are innumerable cases of failures. Hereafter, we should organize a cooperative exporting house to China. The steamship lines and the South Manchuria Railway should give it special discounts, and the government in Kwantung

should extend to it financial credit at a very low rate of interest. Then we can hope to beat the Chinese merchants and recover our trade rights, so that we may develop the special products of Manchuria and send them to all parts of the world.

The first step in gaining financial and commercial control of Manchuria and Mongolia lies in the monopoly sale of their products. We must have the rights of monopoly for the sale of Manchurian and Mongolian products before we can prevent the invasion of American capital as well as the influence of the Chinese traders.

Although the products of Manchuria and Mongolia may go through any of the three ports, Dairen, Yingkow and Antung, nevertheless Dairen holds the key to the situation. Every year 7,200 ships pass through this port with a total tonnage of 11,565,000 tons. This represents 70 percent of the total trade of Manchuria and Mongolia. Fifteen navigation routes radiate out from it with definite sailing schedule. Most of it is coastal sailing. We have in our grasp the entire transportation system of Manchuria and Mongolia. The monopoly sale of Manchuria's special products will eventually come into our hands. When that comes true, we can develop our oceanic transportation in order to defeat both Yingkow and Antung. Then the large quantities of beans which the central and southern parts of China consume, will depend upon us entirely. Moreover, the Chinese are an oil eating people. In time of war, we can cut off their oil-supply and the life of the whole country

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will become miserable. Bean-cakes are important as fertilizers for the cultivation of rice. If we have control of the source of supply as well as the means of transportation, we shall be able to increase our production of rice by means of a cheap supply of bean-cakes and the fertilizers manufactured as a by-product at the Fushun coal mines. In this way, we shall have the agricultural work of all China dependent upon us. In case of war, we can put an embargo on bean-cakes as well as the mineral fertilizers and forbid their exportation to Central and South China. Then China's production of food-stuff will be greatly reduced. This is one way of building up our continental empire which we must not overlook. We should remember that Europe and America also need large quantities of beans and bean-cakes. When we have monopoly of the supplies and full control of transportation, both on land and sea, the countries which have need of the special products of Manchuria and Mongolia, will have to seek our good-will. In order to gain trade monopoly in Manchuria and Mongolia, we must have control of the complete transportation system. Only then can we have the Chinese merchants under our thumb.

However, the Chinese are adepts in learning our tricks and beating us at our own game. We have yet found no way by which we can compete successfully with them in oil-making and sail-boat transportation. After building up the new system of transportation, our policy should be two-fold. On the one hand, wreck the sail-boat trade

by means of heavy investment, in our own system. On the other hand, encourage our men to learn all they can from the Chinese about sail-boat business. Another thing we should be careful about is teaching the Chinese our industrial methods. In the past we have established factories in Manchuria and Mongolia, and carried on industries near the source of raw materials. This gave to the Chinese the opportunity of learning our secrets and establishing competitive factories of their own. Hereafter, we should ship the raw materials back home and do the manufacturing there, and then ship the finished products for sale in China and other countries. In this way we shall gain in three ways: (1) provide work for our unemployed at home, (2) prevent the influx of Chinese into Manchuria and Mongolia, and (3) make it impossible for the Chinese to imitate our new industrial methods. Then iron of Fenhshih and Anshan and the coal of Fushun should also be sent home to be turned in to finished products.

For all these considerations, the development of ocean transportation becomes the more necessary. The Dairen Kisen Kaisha Company should be enlarged, and our government should extend to it loans at low interest through the South Manchuria Railway Company. By next year, we should complete 50,000 tons of new ships for oceanic transportation. That will be sufficient to dominate over the traffic of the East. For on the one hand, we have the South Manchuria Railway for land transportation; on the other hand, we control the large

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quantities of products in Manchuria and Mongolia waiting to be transported. The success of this enlarged activities in oceanic transportation with Dairen as centre is assured by the iron laws of economics.

Gold Standard Currency Necessary

Although Manchuria and Mongolia are within our field of activities, yet the legal tender there is silver. It often conflicts with our gold basis and works to our disadvantage. That our people have failed to prosper as they should in these places, is due to the existence of silver monetary system there. The Chinese have persistently upheld the silver basis, and therefore have made it impossible for us firmly to establish our colonization plans on a firm economic foundation. We have suffered from it the following disadvantages:

1. The money that we bring into Manchuria is of gold standard. When we use it either for daily livelihood or for industry and trade, it has to be exchanged into Chinese silver dollars. The fluctuation of exchange is not infrequently as much as 20 percent, resulting in serious loss to our people. Speculation becomes a regular business and investing money becomes a matter of gambling. When one plans an investment of two hundred thousand yen, one may suddenly find that his capital has been reduced to one hundred fifty or one hundred sixty thousand dollars due to the drop in exchange. The creditor would then have to call

in the loan and business failures have often resulted.

2. The Chinese businessmen use silver money throughout and are free from the effects of exchange fluctuations. Therefore their "junk" trade is prosperous. Although they have no scientific knowledge of exchange value of gold and silver, they always gain in the transaction. They have a natural gift for it, we suffer the more. And we lose in spite of our control of transaction and special backing of banking houses. Because of the handicap of monetary system, people in Central and South China always buy beans and bean-cakes from their own people. We have no chance against them. In consequence, we cannot conquer the whole of China.

3. With the silver standard in existence, the Chinese Government can increase their notes to counteract our gold notes. Consequently, our banks will fail to carry out the mission of extending our country's influence.

4. If the gold standard is adopted, we can issue gold notes freely. With the credit of the gold notes, we can acquire rights in real property and natural resources and defeat the credit of the Chinese silver notes. The Chinese will be unable to compete with us; and the currency of the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia will be in our control.

5. The Government Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, the Bank of Communications, the Frontier Development Bank and the General

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Credit & Finance Corporation have in circulation silver notes amounting to 38,000,000 dollars. Their reserve funds in the form of buildings and goods are estimated at 1,350,000 dollars. It is natural that the Chinese notes should depreciate. It is only by acts of the Government that these notes are still in circulation. Until we have entirely discredited the Chinese silver notes, we will never place our gold notes in their proper place in Manchuria and Mongolia, much less obtain the monopoly in currency and finance of these two countries. With the depreciated and inconvertible silver notes, the government of the Three Eastern Provinces buys all kinds of products, thus threatening our vested interests. When they sell these products, they demand gold from us which they keep for the purpose of wrecking our financial interests including our trade rights in special products. For these reasons, our gold notes are having a harder time and a gold standard for currency becomes the more urgently necessary.

In view of the above-mentioned considerations, we must overthrow Manchuria's inconvertible silver notes and divest the government of its purchasing power. Then we can extend the use of our gold notes in the hope of dominating the economic and financial activities of Manchuria and Mongolia. Furthermore, we can compel the authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces to employ Japanese financial advisers to help us gain supremacy in financial matters. When the Chinese notes are overthrown, our gold notes will take their place.

Encourage Investment From A Third Power

It has been our traditional policy to exclude from Manchuria and Mongolia investments of a third Power. But since the Nine Power Treaty is based on the principle of equal opportunity for all, the undertaking principle of the International Consortium which regards Manchuria and Mongolia as outside its sphere becomes anachronistic. We are constantly under the watchful eyes of the Powers, and every step that we take arouse suspicion. That being the case, we better invite foreign investments in such enterprise as the development of electric power or the manufacture of alkali. By using American and European capital, we can further our plans for the development of Manchuria and Mongolia. By so doing, we shall allay international suspicion and clear the way for larger plans on the one hand and induce the Powers to recognize the fact of our special position in that country on the other. We should welcome any power wishing to make investment, but we must not allow China to deal with the leading countries at her will. As we are anxious that the Powers recognize the fact of our special position in Manchuria and Mongolia in political as well as economical affairs, we are obliged to intervene and share all responsibilities with her. To make this a customary practice in diplomatic dealings, is another important policy for us.

The Necessity of Changing The Organization of the South Manchuria Railway.

The South Manchuria Railway Company functions in Manchuria

as the Governor-General of Korea did there before the annexation. In order to build up our new Continental Empire, we must change the organization of that Company so as to break away from the present difficulties. The functions of this Company are varied and important. Every change of Cabinet involves a change of the administration of the South Manchuria Railway, and conversely every activity of the South Manchuria Railway also has important consequences on the Cabinet. This is because the South Manchuria Railway is semi-governmental, with final authority resting in the Cabinet. For this reason, the Powers invariably look upon this railway as a purely political organ rather than a business enterprise. Whenever a new move is made for the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, the Powers would invoke the Nine Power Treaty to thwart the plans of the South Manchuria Railway. This has greatly damaged the interests of our empire.

Considered from the point of view of domestic administration, the South Manchuria Railway is subject to a quadruple control. There are the Governor of Kwantung, the Chief Executive of Dairen, the Consul-General at Mukden, besides the President of the South Manchuria Railway itself. These four officers must meet and exchange views at Dairen before anything is undertaken. What is discussed in the meeting held in camera often leaks out to the Chinese authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces. They in turn would try to obstruct any forward movements of the South authori-

zation, it again has to run the gauntlet at the Departments of Foreign Affairs, of Railways, of Finance and of Army. If these ministers do not agree, the matter is dropped. Therefore, although the present prime minister realizes his own incompetence, he has nevertheless taken concurrently the portfolio of foreign affairs, so that our plans may be swift and decisive. On account of these reasons, the South Manchuria Railway should be radically re-organized. All appurtenant enterprises which are profit-making should be made independent companies under the wings of the South Manchuria Railway, so that we may take determined steps on the conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia. On the other hand, Chinese, Europeans and Americans should be invited to invest money in the South Manchuria Railway on the condition that we have a plurality of its stocks. In that event the control of the Company is in our hands, and our mission from the empire can be discharged more vigorously. In short, by inviting international participation in the South Manchuria Railway, we can blind the eyes of the world. Having achieved that, we can push our advance in Manchuria and Mongolia at our will, free ourselves from the restraint of the Nine Power Treaty and strengthen our activities in that country with foreign capital.

The important appurtenant enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway are:—

1. Iron and Steel

Iron and steel are closely connected with national development.

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Every country today attaches great importance to it. But because of the lack of ores, we have found no solution to this problem. Hitherto we have had to import steel from the Yangtze Valley and the Malay Peninsula. But according to a secret survey of our General Staff, a wealth of iron mines are found in many places in Manchuria and Mongolia. A conservative estimate of the reserve is 10 billion tons. At first when there was a lack of technique, the Anshan Iron and Steel Works was involved in an annual loss of Yen 3,000,000. Later, new methods were discovered, and the technique developed so that during 1926 the loss was only Yen 150,000 and a year later there was a profit of Yen 800,000. If the furnace is improved, we ought to earn at least Yen 4,000,000 a year. The quality of the ore at Penhsihu is excellent. By amalgamating it with the Anshan Iron Works, we shall have the comfort of being self-sufficient in iron and steel.

The iron deposits in Manchuria and Mongolia are estimated at 1,200,000,000 tons; and coal deposits, 2,500,000,000 tons. This coal ought to be sufficient for smelting the iron ores. With such large amounts of iron and coal at our disposal, we ought to be self-sufficient for at least seventy years. At the rate of \$ 100.00 profit on each ton of steel, for 350,000,000 tons of steel we shall have a profit of Yen 35,000,000,000. This is a tremendous asset to our economic resources. We shall save the expense of Yen 120,000,000 which we pay for the importation of steel every year. When we can have sufficient iron and steel for our own industries, we shall have acquired the secret

for becoming the leading nation in the world. Thus strengthened, we can conquer both the East and the West. In order to attain this goal, the iron works must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway. Such unified control will keep China from preventing us to become self-sufficient in iron and steel.

2. Petroleum.

Another important commodity which we lack is petroleum. It is also essential to the existence of a nation. Fortunately, there lie in the Fushun Coal Mine 5,200,000,000 tons of shale oil, from every hundred cattles of which six cattles of crude oil may be extracted. By means of American Machinery every hundred cattles will yield nine cattles of refined oil good for motor cars and battleships. At present, Japan imports from foreign 70,000 tons of mineral oils every year valued at Yen 60,000,000. These figures are on the increase. As there are 50 billion tons of shale in the Fushun Mines, the yield calculated at five percent would be 250,000,000 tons; at nine percent, 450,000,000 tons of oil. Taking an average of the two, the yield would be 350,000,000 tons, and assuming the value of the oil to be fifteen yen a ton, the shale oil contained in the Fushun Mine would bring us Yen 2,250,000,000. This will be a great industrial revolution for us. From the standpoint of national defence and national wealth, petroleum is a great factor. Having the iron and petroleum of Manchuria, our army and navy will become impregnable walls of defence. That Manchuria and Mon-

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golia are the heart and liver of our empire, is a truthful saying. For the sake of our empire, we should be congratulated.

Agricultural Fertilizer—Ammonia Sulphate and other Products

Agricultural fertilizer is a great necessity for the production of foodstuff. Chemical fertilizers depend upon the ammonia sulphate extracted from coal. The Fushun coal yields especially good results. At present, our total consumption of ammonia sulphate is 500,000 tons. Of this, only half is manufactured at home, using the coal from the Kailan or the Fushun Mining Companies. The remaining half is imported from abroad at the cost of Yen 35,000,000 a year. With our agricultural work daily increasing and in view of the development of our new empire in Manchuria and Mongolia, we shall easily need 1,000,000 tons of ammonia sulphate every year during the next ten years. From the soot gathered from the burning of Fushun coal connected with the manufacture of steel, we could produce large quantities of ammonia sulphate. If the yield is put at 300,000 tons a year, we shall add an annual income of more than Yen 40,000,000. In fifty years, this will mount up to Yen 2,000,000,000. This money could be used for the improvement of our agriculture. If there is any surplus, we can buy bean-cakes with it and then invade the farms all over China and in the South Sea Islands. In order to accomplish this, we must separate this enterprise from the South Manchuria Railway. We shall then be able to control the fertilizers of the Far East.

Soda and Soda Ash

We import 100,000 tons of Soda Ash at the cost of more than Yen 10,000,000 a year. Both soda and soda ash are valuable materials for military and industrial purposes. Soda is derived from nothing more than salt and coal, both of which are cheap and abundant in Manchuria and Mongolia. If we go into this manufacture, we can supply not only ourselves but can also sell it to China with a view to controlling its industrial products. We ought to gain from it a profit of at least Yen 15,000,000 a year. We can also supply our own military and chemical needs. Again this industry must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway.

Magnesium and Aluminium

According to the independent surveys of the South Manchuria Railway Company and Dr. Honta of Tohoku University, magnesite and aluminium is a very promising business (in Manchuria). Magnesite is found in the surroundings of Tashichiao, and aluminium in the vicinity of Yentai. The deposit is one of the largest in the world. A ton of magnesite is worth Yen 2,000 and a ton of aluminium is worth about Yen 1,700. An estimate of the deposits of both minerals in Manchuria is Yen 750,000,000. These substances are especially useful for making aeroplanes, mess kits in the army, hospital apparatus and vessels, and other important industries. The United States alone has extensive deposits of these substances. The output of our country is one ton a year! Such materials are becoming more useful every

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day, but the supply is insufficient. Its price is growing high, as if never reaching a limit. The deposits in our territory of Manchuria and Mongolia, are nothing less than a God-given gift. This metal is really precious, being indispensable to both our industry and national defence. It also should be made in independent business, separate from the South Manchuria Railway. Its manufacture should be in Japan, so as to keep the Fengtien Government from imitating it on the one hand and to avoid the watchful eyes of the British and American capitalists on the other. After we have gained control of it in the Three Eastern Provinces, we may harness the water power of the Yalu River to work on these metal ores. In view of the development of aircraft, in the future all the world will come to us for the materials necessary for aeronautics.

If all the enterprises mentioned above are made independent undertakings, they would make rapid progress and bring us at least a profit of 50 billion yen a year. The industrial development in South Manchuria means much to our national defence and economical progress. It will help us to build the foundation of an industrial empire. As to the cultural undertakings such as hospitals, schools and philanthropic institutions, they are our signal towers in the advance into Manchuria and Mongolia. They are the institutions for spreading our national prestige and power. More specifically, they are baits for rights and privileges. Let us separate all these from the South Manchuria Railway in order

that we may redouble our efforts and advance into North Manchuria to reclaim the sources of great wealth there.

When these important undertakings become independent and are free to develop without the interference of our officials, they will naturally become channels of national prosperity. On the wings of economic development, we could make rapid advance without either arousing the suspicion of the Powers or the anti-Japanese activities of the people of the Three Eastern Provinces. Such hidden methods would enable us to build the New Continent Empire with ease and efficiency.

The foreign loans for the South Manchuria Railway must be confined to those railroads already completed. Other railways built by us but nominally under Chinese control, can either be amalgamated with the completed lines or made independent according to the desire of the investing nations. The slogan of „Equal Opportunity” helps us to get foreign loans as well as to dispel suspicion of our designs in North Manchuria. At any rate, we shall need foreign capital to develop our continental empire. When the South Manchuria Railway is open to foreign investments, the powers will be glad to lend more to us and China can do nothing to block it. This is an excellent way to further our plans in Manchuria. We should lose no time in doing it. As to the wealth concentrated in the northern part of Manchuria and Mongolia, we should be likewise. The two new railways from Kirin to Hueining

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and from Changchun to Talai, as well as the lumber and mining interests, should also be managed as separate institutions.

The South Manchuria Railway will also be greatly enriched by our exploits in North Manchuria. In undertaking this, we must permit foreign investment on the South Manchuria Railway so that any profit that it makes is shared by other nations. When they share in the profits, no one will interfere with our activities in North Manchuria. Already Chinese immigrants are pouring into South Manchuria in large numbers. Their position will become stronger every day. As the right of renting land in the interior is not yet secured, our immigrants are gradually losing ground. Even if our government's backing will maintain our people there, they cannot compete with the Chinese due to the latter's low standard of living. Our only chance now is to defeat the Chinese by heavy capitalization. This again necessitates the use of foreign loans. This is so, especially because the riches of North Manchuria are even not accessible to the Chinese immigrants. We must seize the present opportunity, and hasten the progress of immigration by our own people and take possession of all rights there so as to shut out the Chinese. But in order to encourage immigration, rapid transportation is essential. This will both afford facilities to our people and bring the natural resources there to the would be market. Moreover, both Russia and ourselves have been increasing armaments. On account of geographical positions, we have conflict-

ing interests. If we want to obtain the wealth of North Manchuria and to build up the New Continent according to the will of Emperor Meiji, we must rush our people into North Manchuria first and seek to break the friendship between Russia and China. In this way, we can enjoy the wealth of North Manchuria and hold at bay both Russia and China. In case of war, our immigrants in North Manchuria will combine with our forces in South Manchuria, and at one stroke settle the problem forever. In case this is not possible, they can still maintain their own in North Manchuria and supply the rest of us with food-stuff and raw materials. As the interests of North Manchuria and our country are so wrapped up, we should march directly into North Manchuria and pursue our settled policy.

The Necessity of Establishing a Colonial Department

Our exploitation of Manchuria takes a variety of forms. Often those in authority take such different views that even the most profitable undertaking for our country cannot be carried out. Because of the lack of speed, our secrets are often exposed and are made propaganda materials by the Mukden government much to the detriment of our country in international relations. Whenever a new undertaking is projected in Manchuria and Mongolia, it will become the subject of discussion of tens of meetings and conferences in Dairen. Not only the approval of the four-headed government there is necessary, but also the sanction of the cabinet at home has to be se-

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cured before anything can be carried out. Because of all these obstacles, any undertaking will take months and months before any definite results are seen. In the process it is possible for the Chinese to employ Japanese adventurers to steal our secrets so that before a project is launched it is often reported to the Chinese and in turn it becomes common property of the world. We are suddenly brought under the check of world opinion, and more than once we have incurred hardship in putting into practice our policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia. Furthermore, the opposition party has also made capital out of what they find in these regions in order to attack the government. All these have many serious problems (?) with our diplomatic relations. Henceforth, we must change our practice in order to proceed adroitly. The centre of control must be in Tokyo. That will (1) insure secrecy, (2) stop China from knowing before-hand our plans, (3) avoid the suspicion of the powers before a thing is done, (4) unify the multiple control in Manchuria and (5) bring the government agencies in Manchuria and Mongolia in close touch with the central government so as to deal with China with undivided power. For these reasons we should follow the original plan for absorbing Korea laid down by Ito and Katsura and establish a Colonial Department, the special function of which is to look after the expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia. The administration of Formosa, Korea and Saghalien Island may be its nominal function, but our expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia is its real purpose. This

will blind the eyes of the world on the one hand and forestall the disclosure of secret on the other.

It is my personal conviction that the fact that the absorption of Korea could not be effected during the administration of Ito, is due to the lack of a special office for control. Therefore, there were always differences of opinion and secret policies were impossible. Such a state of affairs played into the hand of international obstruction and Korean opposition. Then a number of propagandists went to Europe and America as well as Korea itself, declaring that we firmly respected the independence of Korea and had no designs on an inch of Korean territory. The result of their work was the recovery of international confidence. After that, a colonial department was established under the pretence of Formosa. Then we seized the opportunity and the object was gained! It goes to prove that in order to undertake colonization and immigration, a special office for it is absolutely necessary. Moreover, the creation of a new empire in Mongolia and Manchuria is of utmost importance to the existence of Japan. It is necessary to have a special colonial office in order that the politics in that vast territory may be controlled from Tokyo. The officers in the field should only take orders: they should not interfere with the execution of policies where they please. This will insure secrecy; and the opposition nations have no change of getting into the secrets of our colonial activities. Then our movements regarding Mongolia and Manchuria will be beyond the

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reach of international public opinion, and we shall be free from interferences.

As to the subsidiary enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway such as the Development Company, the Land Company and the Trust Company, the power of supervision and planning should also be in the colonial office. They should all be under united control, in order that they may all help in the general policy of expansion in Mongolia and Manchuria of the Imperial Government and complete the creation of the new empire.

Taling River Valley on Peking— Mukden Railway

The Taling River Valley is a wide area sparsely populated but infested with bandits. Many Koreans have made investments here, especially in rice field. Judging from its resources, this region is bound to be prosperous. It will also be an advantageous foothold for us if we want to expand into the Jehol region. We should give full protection to our Korean subjects here and wait for an opportunity to secure from China the right of colonization so that act as our immigrants may live here and act as our vanguards to Jehol and Mongolia. In case of warfare, this valley will be a strategic point to quarter large armies of soldiers. We shall then not only check the Chinese soldiers from advancing north but also hold the key to the immense wealth of South Manchuria. When Koreans come into this region we should finance them through our Trust and other financial organs with a

view to gaining for these organs the actual ownership while the Koreans may satisfy themselves with the right of farming only. Ostensibly the ownership of land must reside with the Koreans. It is a convenient way of securing rights from the Chinese government. Henceforth the trust companies and financial organs should give them full backing when our own and Korean subjects wish to gain land ownership. If they need money to buy farms from the Chinese, the financial organs should also come to their aid. Unnoticeably we shall gain control of the better rice fields which we may give to our own emigrants. They shall displace the Koreans who in turn may go on opening new fields, to deliver to the convenient use of our own people. This is the policy with respect to the colonization of rice field and bean farms. As to the policy for herd farming, the Development Company should be especially entrusted gradually to expand, eventually placing all the wealth of herds at the disposal of our country. This same company may also take care of horse breeding and select the best out of Mongolia for the use of our national defence.

Precaution against Chinese Migration

Recently the internal disturbances in China have driven large hordes of immigrants into Mongolia and Manchuria, thereby threatening the advance of our migration. For the sake of our activities in this field we should not fail to take precautions. The fact that the Chinese government welcomes

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this migration and does nothing to hold back the tide oppresses our policy even the more seriously. A noted American sinologue has made the statement that the Mukden authorities are carrying out such effective government that all people are moving into their territory. Therefore, the influx of immigrants is looked upon as a mark of effective government of Mukden authorities. We, of course, are concerned. Unless we put a stop to it, in less than ten years our own policy of emigration will prove an instrument for China to crush us with. Politically we must use police force to check this tendency as much as possible and economically our financiers should drive the Chinese out with low wages. Furthermore, we must develop and expand electric power to displace human labor. This will keep out Chinese immigrants as well as

monopolize the control of motor force as a first step toward controlling the industrial development of this vast region.

Hospitals and Schools

Hospitals and Schools in Manchuria must be independent of the South Manchuria Railway. For the people have often considered these as institutions of imperialism and refuse to have anything to do with them. When these are separated and made independent institutions we shall be able to make the people realize our goodness so that they will feel thankful to us..... But in establishing school emphasis should be laid on normal schools for men and women. Through these in educational work we may build up a substantial good-will among the people towards Japan. This is our first principle of cultural structure.

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
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
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Special Notice

Almost six months ago we found occasion to warn the public of the imminent danger in Manchuria. Unfortunately our prediction has come to pass. In presenting this special issue we have been guided by the principle that truth speaks louder than propaganda. The following pages contain undisputable facts which, in our belief, would assist the public in understanding the present crisis so dramatically precipitated by Japan's invasion of Manchuria.—The Editors.

Peace At All Cost

NEWS has reached us from Canton, stating that the Canton authorities led by Messrs. Sun Fo, Koo Ying Feng and Chen Chi Tang have expressed themselves in favor of peace so as to bring about a united China against the Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Needless to state, this is the most heartening news that we have heard for the past week, amidst the nation's trials and tribulations. We have always been pleading for peace and have expressed our opinions thus on several occasions. Only last week, we commented on the Canton situation and made the statement that all our hopes for peace between Nanking and Canton were shattered. We are now however ready to withdraw the statement, in view of fact that the Canton officials have shown their willingness to meet Nanking more than half way, in order that a united front might be presented by China against Japanese vandalism. In fact, this is a case wherein we are glad that we have been wrong!

Cowardice of the Japanese Militarists

THE forceful occupation of Mukden and other cities in Manchuria by the Japanese is without doubt the most cowardly act in the record of human history. It is besides without equal in its malignity and murderous intent in international relationship of this decade. At the present time sixteen out of the twenty-eight provinces in China are severely flooded and some seven hundred million people are threatened by starvation and death. This gigantic disaster following in the wake of the ravages of the red bandits over a large part of the country and a long series of internal wars marks the darkest moment in the Chinese national life injured as we are to all sorts of famines and internal disturbances. To chose this hour to strike a mortal blow to the nation will necessarily slacken the efforts in the famine relief work and result in millions

of deaths. This gross cowardice can be better realized if we suppose that some foreign power should choose to send an invading army and navy to Japan after the earthquake of 1925. To be sure the invading nation will meet with the least resistance; but such an action will bring no glory to the invading nation, nor will it reflect any credit on her military organization. Nor should the Japanese think that the end will justify the means and that because they have met with no open resistance so far, the Chinese people will put up with their outrages with complacency. For the reason above stated, we may not deal with the Japanese militarists in kind; we may not be able to hail the invading murderers with fire and sword; but we surely can resort to some means none the less effective and ruinous. The only way that a weak country can even her score with a militaristic country like Japan is non-cooperation. For years past we have been using boycott to add weight to our argument with the unreasonable and aggressive Japan. But mere boycotting is now not enough. We must carry out a nation-wide campaign of non-cooperation like the similar movement which accelerated in not a small measure the Indian Independence Movement. Henceforth let all the Chinese people sever their dealings and relationships with the Japanese in totality! Let no food or other commodities be supplied to the Japanese civilians as well as militarists in this country! Let no person buy a cent's worth of goods of any kind from the Japanese! Let all those who are now in the Japanese employ leave their service! The idea is to make the Japanese living in this country uncomfortable and their business unprofitable. This movement should be made organized as well as individualistic—organized, so that it may gain momentum and become widespread in the shortest time; individualistic, so that it may be carried out voluntarily without any compulsion. There shall not be any slackening of this movement, until the majority of factories in Japan cease functioning; until a great part of the Japanese residents in this country find it unprofitable to stay and leave for home; and above all until the Japanese troops have by necessity been withdrawn. No one is foolish enough to feed the hand that promises to murder him, so why should we cooperate with the Japanese for our own destruction!

Tokyo's Views

ON the 20th, a *United Press* report came from Tokyo, stating that "Today Mr. Morshima of the Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Office left Tokyo for Mukden. He is carrying important instructions to Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden. Mr. Hayashi will be informed that Japan has taken the action she has in Manchuria as a matter of self-defense". How wonderful the Japanese Foreign Office must be in order to be able to appreciate the situation

in Manchuria from Tokyo even better than the Japanese Consul-General who is there in person and right in the midst of the trouble. And what a wonderful Consul-General they have that needs to be informed from Tokyo that he and the other Japanese in Manchuria are in need of self-defense! A *Reuter* report later, though under the same date, stated that "official circles here appear to have changed their views to some extent. . . . They now seem inclined to the belief that the action taken by the Japanese troops was merely bravado on the part of a number of hot-headed junior officers, who were angered at what they considered the weakkneed policy of their superiors over the alleged murder of Captain Nakamura. It was reported a few days ago from Mukden that General Young Chen, the chief of Staff of the Manchurian Army had informed Mr. Morioka, the Japanese Consul at Mukden that. . . . "a detachment of cavalry had been sent to arrest General Kwan Yu-heng and eleven others who were supposed to have been directly concerned with the shooting (of Captain Nakamura), and the idea got abroad that the Japanese authorities would be satisfied with the punishment of these men and would not demand further satisfaction or other penalties." Do we not have here the plain language of the Japanese official circles that they desire, besides the punishment of the guilty, some "further satisfaction" from the Nakamura case? As to what that "further satisfaction" is, the whole world knows it by now, since it has already been expressed in action. But one might inquire why such a sudden change. The cause is not far to seek. The *Reuter* report from London stated that *The Sunday Times* advised the powers "to keep their weather eye on these developments" which, it says, are in no way lacking in danger. "This is not the first time", *The Sunday Times* adds, "that a moment, when Western eyes have been distracted by other events, has been seized by Japan to further her own policies." Despite the Japanese attempt to localize the issue, the *Berlin Lokal-Anzeiger* believes that it "is of concern to the whole world and confronts the League of Nations with a serious task". The Chinese delegation to the League of Nations issued in the night of the 19th "a statement, charging the Japanese military authorities with all responsibility of the affair". And last but not the least, the Japanese press is unanimously regretting the incident, and all Japanese stocks declined sharply last Saturday. Both the Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges opened in the morning of the 21st only for one hour and their "closure was ordered to avoid panic". Evidently Japan is already feeling the "pinch" of glory.

Credulity of Chinese Officials

TWO weeks ago, Mr. Shigemitsu in presenting his credentials to President Chiang Kai-shek at Nan-king expressed the sentiment that "the friendly relations between China and Japan are not only of mutual benefit to the two countries but are also the key

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to the peace in the Orient and the cornerstone of the world." Not long after that, rumors were circulated that the Japanese officials were secretly mobilizing and were planning for a two route advance into Manchuria. The rumor, for it was so-called, was subsequently denied by the Japanese Minister, who branded it as "entirely groundless and absurd." The apparent sincerity in his attitude was endorsed by other responsible officials in Tokio, most of whom, we had been led to believe, were not over-anxious for war. Even General Minami, the Chauvinistic War Minister, came out with the statement that "the army will do as the nation wills", which announcement indicated that the military would not take any rash steps without having first of all consulted the nation at large. All in all then, the news for the past week had been so optimistically assuring that it actually had the effect of having misled the whole Chinese officialdom into thinking that Japanese invasion of Manchuria was totally out of question. Subsequent events, however, proved that they had been mistaken, or at any rate, that their credulity had been capitalized to advantage by the Japanese. But we cannot blame the officials. The fact that on that fatal night, Nanking's mind was busily engaged in planning for the reception of Col. and Mrs. Lindburgh who were to arrive on the next day and that Mukden officials were having a good time, dancing at the Mukden Club (According to a news report in *The Shanghai Times*, a Chinese General was "killed by a machine-gun bullet just outside the Club, where dancing was proceeding.") only indicates that we were in no wise ready for war, or to be exact, that we had not been purposely planning to start the trouble ourselves.

Give and Take

THE Chinese National Flood Relief Commission recently acknowledged with thanks the generous contributions from Japan among which are noted the 100,000 Yen from the emperor and provisions valued at 300,000 Yen from the Japanese Flood Relief Commission. As a more concrete expression of sympathy and helpfulness, the latter Commission sent to China a delegation of 16 members headed by Baron R. Fukao to render assistance to relief work in the flooded areas. The arrival of this commission was on last Friday, when a reception was given by the Minister of Industries, Dr. H. H. Kung. The sentiment expressed on that occasion was appreciation and gratitude on the part of China, profound sympathy and willingness to serve on the part of Japan. What amity and goodwill! On the same day, Friday the 18th, the Japanese army invaded and occupied Mukden. There were bombardment and killing. The Chinese offered nonresistance. Indeed, the situation is difficult to understand. While realizing that the former benevolent acts came from the Japanese people and not the Japanese Government, we are nevertheless forced to view the above gift in a different light. We cannot see the way clear to reconciling the giving of a total of 400,000 Yen and the taking or "robbing" by the same nationals of life and property at the same time. Why save the lives of flood victims when you have to make victims of their

brethren? To love and to hate concurrently is not an art which the Chinese can manipulate. Let us, therefore, return Japan her gold and riches, as generously as she has given. If we have to die of Japanese bullets, we prefer to die honorably of starvation.

From Hangchow to Mukden

FOR some months since the organisers fixed our beautiful and historical city of Hangchow as the venue of the next Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations to begin on October 21, there has been loud and persistent opposition to the proposed gathering being held at all. The main reason is that, to the uninitiated, the Institute of Pacific Relations is merely a cloak for Imperialism, comprising not perhaps active officials of their respective countries but actually influential persons who might tomorrow become their most aggressive agents. To substantiate, they point to Mr. T. Matsuoka, one of the rare Japanese who can speak English eloquently. This man served for several years in the diplomatic service of his country, stayed for a long time in Peking, where his only oily tongue won numerous admirers, then became Vice-President of the South Manchuria Railway, where he was the foreign mouth-piece of the President Yamamoto—that notorious brother-conspirator of General Tanaka, who as Premier of Japan issued the secret memorandum for swallowing up China which we have the opportunity to publish in full in this special number. When Tanaka died before his nefarious designs were accomplished, the Minseito under Hamaguchi and now Wakasutki came into power, and the suave Matsuoka attended the Kyoto Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1929 as chief non-official spokesman for Japan. At this gathering he did his utmost to convince his audience of the importance and necessity of attaching Manchuria and Mongolia to the Japanese Empire! This same ex-official coined the term "weak-kneed policy" for attacking the apparently friendly policy of Baron Shidehara toward China and has been the most persistent advocate of the mailed fist in Japan's dealings with this country. If and when Wakasutki resigns, Matsuoka expects to be appointed Foreign Minister under a Seiyukai Government. Up to the recent outrageous action of Japan in forcibly occupying strategic points of South Manchuria, while her civilian ministers in and out of the country were denying mobilisations and spreading false news of pacific intentions to fool the world, we have followed our usual liberal cosmopolitan attitude, hoping against hope that the responsible and sensible elements of the present Japanese government might eventually convince the chauvinistic militarists of a changed and more friendly world, where nations as well as people could live and let live, and that China and Japan, as the two most important nations in the orient, could live in harmony and help each other so as to contribute toward the peace and happiness of the world. But evidently the Japanese militarists have learnt and unlearnt nothing since the World War and still believe in primitive methods of barbarism for conquering their huge neighbor, to whom their empire

owed so much of its culture and civilisation in times past. In other words, they are determined to attain their ends by any means, however, foul. That being so, we venture to suggest that the Institute officials either expel the Japanese from membership or call off the Conference altogether. For as far as the Chinese are concerned, we must henceforth consider Japan as the outcast, the untouchable land of the East, with whose people we could not and would not associate or do business with. We cannot be hosts to the representatives of a nation without soul or any sense of honour. Even at this eleventh hour we should not

hesitate to withdraw our invitation for the Conference. It would be better for China to suffer embarrassment as host country than for the institute to betray its avowed object by allowing Japan to further perpetrate her malicious designs under friendly disguise. As for those who are already *en route*, we would suggest that they proceed to Mukden which Japan has succeeded in occupying by reason of treachery. There the promoters of "*Pacific Relations*" may see with their own eyes how the Island Empire fulfills her promises of peace in wanton destruction of Chinese lives and property.

Japanese Invasion of Manchuria

BY the time we go to press, the Japanese outrage in Manchuria should have become known to the whole world. Briefly summarized, the grave situation was said to have been created by the alleged blowing up of a section of the South Manchuria Railway at Huan-kutun by the Chinese soldiers. Following this supposed event the Japanese troops immediately staged surprised attacks upon the Chinese soldiers and marched into Mukden. According to the latest reports, Japanese soldiers have also occupied Yingchow, Nanling, Tungtating Changchun and Kwauchengtze. Furthermore, Nipponese military forces are reported to have landed in Tsingtao, much to the consternation of the Chinese population.

Immediately after the news of the Japanese invasion had reached here, Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister, gave out an interview to *The China Press*, and made the statement that the "unfortunate incident" was entirely started by the Chinese, and as "no war was expected by the Japanese troops, no special preparation had been made for the trouble." He also said that the Japanese officials are trying to "localize the incident" which he hopes will be "serious only in Shengyang."

While we share the opinion of Mr. Shigemitsu that what happened was indeed an "unfortunate incident", yet we would like to point out that it was neither, as the Japanese Minister has optimistically stated, a "local" affair for China; nor, as he has diplomatically intimated, a surprised event for Japan.

To take the latter point first. It is an open secret that the Japanese Government has, since the War with Russia, looked upon Manchuria as a potential colony. Ultimate conquest of Manchuria has always been uppermost in the minds of all Japanese militarists and politicians. The only point upon which they seem to disagree is whether they should adopt a "moderate" or "positive" policy. The late Tanaka, for instance, was a strong advocate of the latter, for it was he who authorized Japan's ignominious Twenty-One demands as well as the dispatch of troops to Tsinan in the summer of 1928. The recently disclosed Tanaka Memorial, published elsewhere in this issue, on which we already commented last week testifies eloquently to the malicious intentions towards the world at large as entertained by the Japanese jingoists in general and Tanaka in particular.

Ever since the death of Tanaka and the loss of power of Seiyukai, of which he was its leader and prophet, things seemed to have turned apparently for the better, and for a while we were almost led to believe that the Japanese officials had really been solicitous of Chinese friendship. But subsequent events have proved conclusively that we had been deluded with vain hopes. In the beginning of July the Wanpaoshan affair happened, and a considerable number of Chinese farmers were ruthlessly slaughtered by Japanese soldiers. Not long after, more than a hundred Chinese residents of Korea were killed by the Koreans. Before these incidents could be settled, the alleged murder of Mr. Nakamura, Captain and "Doctor of Philosophy", was magnified and capitalized by the Japanese Military and press, and Japanese troops were being secretly mobilized and sent into Manchuria. Japanese diplomats, it is true, had been vigorously denying that Japan was contemplating a forceful seizure. Mr. Shigemitsu himself, for instance, made the statement on September 17 that the report of Japanese troop movements was entirely false, but what happened two days later proved that he had been either too optimistically cocksure, or deliberately misleading.

It was Lincoln who said that we cannot deceive all the people all the time, and this saying applies in the present case. The Wanpaoshan affair, the Korean Massacres and the Nakamura case, we now begin to see, are but curtain raisers. The Truth is finally out! The man who says that Japan was totally unprepared for the whole business had better "tell it to the Japanese Marines."

According to an official statement issued by the Tokyo Foreign Office, it was necessary for Japan to take "self protecting measures" since she could not "overlook such act of the Chinese troops to destroy Japanese Railway". But, let us ask, the S. M. R. is always carefully guarded and policed how could the Chinese soldiers have had the opportunity to get near the line, not to say to blow up the tracks? The fact is that, as the Chinese Government had expressed the correct attitude toward the culprits in the Nakamura case, the Japanese jingoists had to invent another case and exploit it quickly, before diplomatic negotiations would become possible.

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Furthermore, even granted that the report was true, why could not the Japanese disarm these soldiers first, secure the necessary proofs and then wait until the next morning to protest to the Chinese authorities and to ask for whatever satisfaction they might deem proper? Why could it not be, in other words, settled by diplomatic means and why must they immediately resort to the occupation of Manchuria by the military without warning? And why must they seize the Chinese Government buildings, imprison an important Chinese official and take possession of the Mukden Arsenal and the wireless station! Again why should they send troops to Tsingtao, since

according Mr. Shigemitsu, it was purely a "local" incident?

Whatever else it may be, we are convinced that Mr. Shigemitsu is mistaken to call the outrage a "local" incident. To say that "its effects will not go beyond Shenyang" when most of the strategic points in Manchuria have been taken by the Japanese soldiers, when a Chinese gunboat has been disarmed by the Japanese naval authorities, when troops have been rushed to Tsingtao and else where is, to say the least, to grossly misrepresent the situation and openly insult the intelligence of the world.

The Shanghai Times Shows Its Color

IN commenting upon the Japanese occupation of Mukden and other parts of Manchuria, our contemporary, *The Shanghai Times*, (Sept. 20) attempts to white-wash the indefensible acts of the Japanese military. The merits of the case are dealt with elsewhere in this issue, and it is our intention to point out here only the fallacies apparently being indulged in by this journal in question.

It is asserted that "those who have followed with any intelligent interest the course of Sino-Japanese politics within recent months will have been struck by the extraordinary spirit of sympathy, friendliness and patience shown by the Japanese Government towards the Nanking regime even in the face of grave provocation, such as the organised boycott of Japanese goods, tantamount to an act of war. There is an obvious limitation, however, to forbearance, and in the present case the limit seems to have been overstepped."

Let us begin with the so-called "sympathy, friendliness and patience" of the Japanese. They consist of nothing but the Wanpaoshan Affair, the anti-Chinese riots in Korea, the audacity in refusing to pay adequate compensation and the open agitation of war with China by the military. Where is the sympathy? Where is the friendliness? Where is the patience?

The "sympathy" may be the few handfuls of money sent for flood relief. But this, when viewed in the latest developments, is but a ruse to direct public attention in Central China from Japan's aggression in Manchuria.

The "friendliness" is shown in Japan's refusal to protect Chinese lives in Korea and readiness to spread terror in Mukden in the darkness of night and destroying city after city as the latest reports indicate.

The "patience" is eloquently shown by the use of force at a time when a settlement of the so-called Nakamura case, in the words of *The Times*, "seemed to be in sight."

This eminent journal, further, denounces the recent anti-Japanese boycott and styles it as "tantamount to

an act of war," the same words which were used by the Japanese military. Is boycott such a new thing that it was never employed by Japan when she was trying to shake off the foreign yoke in the way of extraterritoriality? Is the editor so ignorant of Japanese history that he does not know this single fact?

If the Japanese are justified in resorting to military force to impose their will on China, is China not justified in adopting the boycott which is but a form of passive resistance? What would *The Times* editor advise us to do? Would he have us suffer our compatriots to be butchered by Koreans inspired by the Japanese and welcome this atrocity with heart-felt gratitude?

It is further asserted that "there is an obvious limitation to forbearance." What beautiful balderdash! The fact is there is considerable chicanery on Japan's part but never forbearance. The limit is not reached of her forbearance but of her ingenuity of creating more cases which might justify the dispatch of troops to Manchuria. The Japanese military are forced to adopt the latest design of blowing up a part of the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway and then placing the blame on the Chinese. Is the editor not aware of the fact the no Chinese soldier is ever allowed to approach within 20 li of the railway zone? With the vigilance of the Japanese garrison as it is, it is hardly possible for a single soldier, let alone a group of soldiers, to damage the tracks.

Without waiting for definite confirmation but choosing to believe in the veracity of Japanese statements, this journal has gone the length of accepting them as if they were final without publishing Chinese versions already available. It is most noteworthy that two other local newspaper refrained from comment on this latest outrage pending the arrival of further information. And yet this journal which is usually slow in grasping current events should jump at the opportunity to defend Japan's act. Is this a mere coincidence or something more?

The Times is known as a British journal, but its attitude would seem to warrant an investigation into its avowed nationality. We do not begrudge a Japanese

paper known as a Japanese paper the privilege of disseminating false news against China to its heart's content, but we do despise any one for dispensing "public opinion" for Japanese interest by hiding behind a British mask!

Furthermore, England is admittedly on friendly terms with this country. It is only common decency that a journal deriving protection from its government and

enjoying the hospitality of China should at least maintain a policy of truthfulness in relation to facts, or abstinence from twisting facts.

The Times in concluding the ill-advised leader, hands out a piece of cheap advice for "calmness". It may be welcome from any other sources but not from irresponsible quarters. The journal tells us to be "calm", but it has yet to learn to be "honest."

Japanese Aggression in Manchuria*

By W. H. Wang (王維新)

JAPAN is at present directing her energies to effect a settlement of a whole group of issues now outstanding. She is now negotiating directly with the powers at Mukden. Her program in Manchuria comprehends:

(1) the acquisition by Japan of the right to participate in the future financing of the Tahushan-Tung-liao railway and the Mukden-Hailuocheng-Kirin railway;

(2) a definite and comprehensive railway agreement to permit Japan to complete the Kirin-Kainei railway project to Chosen, and now completed as far as Tunhua;

(3) the sanction both by Mukden and Nanking of the opening of a Japanese branch consulate at Maoershan (Linkiang) in Linkianghsien on the Chinese side of the Yalu River in the Chientao district;

(4) the removal of restrictions to the right of Japanese nationals—a right conceded "legally" in the agreements of 1915—to lease land outside the present restricted areas, and, in fact, impeded even within Mukden, for example;

(5) the removal of impediments to Japanese trade in the form of exceptional and arbitrary taxation; and

(6) the stabilization of Manchurian currency through some arrangement with Japanese banks, the plan now proposed being a Japanese loan to Mukden.

All these things Japan has long wished to achieve; her ways of going about to further her ends have varied according to changing conditions in Peking and in Manchuria, but never for the instant has she lost sight of them.

It is generally conceded, for the sake of world peace as well as for commercial interests, that Sino-Japanese cooperation will speedily be brought about. However, Baron Tanaka has come forward (November 14, 1928) to state that railway negotiations in Manchuria were progressing satisfactorily. At once suspicion is aroused that Baron Tanaka will maintain Japan's economic hold on South Manchuria by an effective control of the railway. Baron Tanaka is suspected of trying to squeeze out of the very much harassed young Marshall Chang

at Mukden some favorable agreement which Japan can use to advantage later on in opening negotiations with Nanking. In this connection the *China Critic* remarks, "This might have been good diplomacy a century ago but young China will not stand for such nonsense. The sooner Premier Tanaka realizes this the sooner may a settlement be reached."⁽¹⁾

The Japanese government permits Japanese patent medicine dealers to operate in the Three Eastern Provinces, with the object of recruiting more opium fiends among the natives, so as to destroy their vitality.

The recent bold activities of bandits in Manchuria are ascribed to a great extent to Japanese instigation. Some of the gangs are actually led by Japanese. "We often hear how young, ambitious Japanese come to Manchuria simply to join the bandits. The Japanese authorities are shutting their eyes to the smuggling of arms and ammunition to supply these denizens of the road that they may raise disturbances in Manchuria.

Civil wars among the war lords have been incited more or less by the Japanese press.

Japan authorizes the Bank of Chosen to issue notes on a rather flimsy specie reserve to make them circulate in the Three Eastern Provinces. None of these notes circulates in Japan proper, unless first converted into Bank of Japan notes.

Japan has laid a double track along the full length of the South Manchuria Railway without consulting China about it.

We should go on enumerating, but sufficient number of points have been presented to show that any expectation of whole-hearted Japanese cooperation must end in disappointment.

The divine-given right of man to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" is talked about *ad infinitum* in Japan but she does not appear to contribute to any such Utopia in Manchuria. On the contrary "Tanakaism" has become an international menace. When the Nationalists advanced to the north and when it seemed that there would be a sharp clash of arm in Shantung; Japan's rush of an armed force to Tsinan to protect her citizens and her interests was deemed perfectly natural by Baron

*This article was written immediately after Marshal Chang Haueh-liang joined the Nationalist Government, but the facts set forth still hold true today.—Editors.

(1) *The China Critic*, Nov. 22, 1928.

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Tanaka. He announced over and over again that Japanese troops would be withdrawn as soon as he considers conditions safe. There was serious disorder, to put it mildly, in this Japanese armed occupation of Tsinan, and for this disorder the soldiers themselves could not have been responsible since it is a matter of common knowledge that Japanese troops typify the very last word in military discipline.

Baron Tanaka pledged his word that he would withdraw Japanese troops when the threatened territory was safe. Why does he now seek to "negotiate" a withdrawal? Japan is pledged to respect the territorial integrity of China. When, therefore, he flatly refuses to allow Manchuria to come under Nationalist rule, he affronts every Western Power pledged, and he insults the Chinese nation.

Japan's future policy in Manchuria after the downfall of the northern warlords is a burning question to the home government, or, we may say more specifically, to the Tanaka Cabinet.

In the event of an open conflict between the Fengtien and Nationalist forces in Manchuria, the public seems of one mind that the Japanese government should exercise care to avoid complications with Nanking without sacrificing the special privileges now enjoyed by Japan in Manchuria. The more thoughtful Japanese have shown no hesitation to demand the settlement of the Manchurian question by their government, not with the Fengtien remnants but with the Nationalist government. Yet the Japanese unanimously agree that their interests in Manchuria must be protected at any cost.

Following the appointment to office of Baron Tanaka as premier and foreign minister with his much publicized "strong" policy, the liberal leaders in Japan and the Japanese press began to express apprehension because General Tanaka was a military man, a former minister of war, and largely responsible for the Twenty-one Demands of 1915.

Early in his premiership, Baron Tanaka summoned two conferences of Japanese diplomats familiar with Chinese affairs. Baron Tanaka was chairman of the Tokyo conference. The other conference was held at Mukden. When the Japanese consul-general at Mukden returned home after the Tokyo conference, he presented certain demands to the civil governor of Fengtien Province.

(1) Owing to the difficulty of settling the question of leasing land to the Japanese in Manchuria, it was desired as an alternative, that the Chinese grant land ownership to the Japanese.

(2) The Chinese must abandon their construction of a railway line parallel to the South Manchuria line, and the Chinese must pledge themselves to construct no parallel line in the future.

(3) The Chinese authorities must speedily agree to an extension of the Kirin-Hainyang line for a distance of 60 miles.

(4) Japan was to be allowed to open at once a new consulate at Linkiang near the Korean frontier for the purpose of watching Korean agitators and of protecting trade interests.

In addition to the above matters, there were hints that Japan had previously entered into negotiations with Soviet Russia regarding a division of interest in Manchuria which would effectually silence Soviet Russia, should she raise her voice in protest against Japan's consummating her purpose to convert South Manchuria into a Japanese protectorate. Without doubt the Tanaka policy was correctly termed "positive."

During the desperate fighting between the Peking and Nanking governments in the spring of 1928, Japan contemplated re-investing the ex-Emperor of the Manchus with imperial authority. This would bear out Japan's stand that Manchuria is not China's land but the property of the Manchus. With Yung Pung on the throne at Mukden, Manchuria would be a sovereignty distinct from China. Japan's "support" of the new Manchuria would, no doubt, be a repetition of her support of Korea, and would inevitable have the same results.

Baron Tanaka's notorious acts are unmatched in present-day diplomacy. Even that faithful subject and seasoned diplomat, Baron Shidehara, calls the Tanaka policy "a mass of trickery". Baron Tanaka has missed his vocation; he should have stepped into the late Mr. Houdini's shoes! Anyway, Baron Tanaka is a militarist. He is not a diplomatic either by training or by nature. He may send afield as many propagandists as he pleases (as Count Uchida to Europe and Baron Kaneko to America) but while he continues to perform as he does at home the efforts of his emissaries will be all in vain. Meanwhile all China is behind the Nationalist government and no threats will raise the boycott that pinches Japan so painfully. Moreover, Tanakaism is a menace to international interests in the Far East. It has ceased to concern merely China. The powers should move in concerted action at once and block the Tanakaism of 1929 as they put aside the Twenty-one Demands in 1915.

In the opinion of many thoughtful persons following up Sino-Japanese matters, to effect a compromise between the rival policies so as to satisfy both parties seems impossible. For instance, the economic development of Manchuria with Japanese capital may not be entirely devoid of good for the Chinese. At the same time to solve Shantung's over-population by moving into Manchuria need not threaten Japanese interests there.

It has been suggested that the entire Manchurian question be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. But would Japan and China agree to this? The chances are against it. As Sir Herbert Ames, Representative of Canada at the League of Nations pointed out, if that very complex thing, Manchuria, was too knotty for the Washington

Conference to untie, would it meet with a better fate at The Hague whose ability to deal with Far Eastern questions had not yet been demonstrated? The only thing in favor of presenting the cause to The Hague would be some agreement on the part of China and Japan. This prospect has been blighted by the rather strong policy of the present Nanking government, which indicates that the party in power is less likely to make concessions than was the government that preceded it.

Whatever China's shortcomings, she has never shown any tendency to seize lands properly belonging to another nation. Her aim is to utilize what she already has. For Japan it may be well to bear in mind that international autocracy as well as national autocracy is out of date—it has lost its charm for individuals and for nations. To treat China on anything like a satisfactory basis, Japan must inculcate democratic ideas. Japanese scholars already see Japan tending to a philosophical democracy. It is surprising that a country so up-to-the-minute in every thing else should be so backward in governmental conceptions. As *The China Weekly Review* admirably phrases it, "Japan must give up the idea of being the Ruler of the Pacific, and accept that of being the equal among equals, with a view to sharing with others whatever the Pacific has to offer to the building up of human life."

The juxtaposition of China and Japan, their similar language and similar race, their interdependence in industry, all point to the necessity of a policy of mutual and equal benefit rather than one of one-sided domination. Whether Japan in the future specializes in commerce, or in industry, or in agriculture, China will always remain an important factor in her national economy.

Japan has only to study history to see the ultimate fate of a capitalist-controlled country. England, formerly a capitalistic country is exceedingly prosperous since her Industrial Revolution. The Great War has not crushed Germany, today full of vigor.

The author feels that until the yellow races cooperate and establish permanently friendly relations, the Orient will never be free commercially of the Occident. Finally, he feels that with China and Japan working together as brothers, the idea of white supremacy will have passed away, but that Japan should take the initial step toward concession since she is more industrialized than China.

Meanwhile Nationalist China is unwilling to wait until 2022 for the return of the Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway system.

What will ultimately transpire between China and Japan no one can predict. Everyone can advise of course, but advice is what everyone wants to give and no one wants to take. Whether Japan is willing to take the first step toward concession, as the author feels she must, or whether the stage is set for a Titanic clash of arms no one can foretell. If the latter, not only will the peace of the Far East be broken but conflict may take on a world-wide character. (The Italics are the Editors').

As far as Manchuria is concerned, if Japan throws down the gauntlet and invades that portion of China, she will have to exterminate the Chinese to the last man before her dream of annexing Manchuria can ever take form.

The Korean Peril In Manchuria

By Frederick Hung (洪紱)

AMID our enthusiasm in the reunification of wartorn China and in the ambitious reconstruction program of the National Government we are apt to center our attention on Nanking and Shanghai, neglecting quite unconsciously the problems of our remote provinces, whose news reach but intermittently and incompletely the big papers of Shanghai. One of these problems which merits particular attention is the smuggling of Koreans into Manchuria, which has assumed enormous proportions the last few years. Many of these are communist refugees driven out of Korea and are attracted by the fertile ground for subversive activities in Northern Manchuria where Soviet agents plot and sow revolution in broad day light. Others, and this class represents thousands of immigrants, are driven or smuggled into Manchuria, in order to give room for the Japanese settlers in Korea on the one hand, and to fill up Manchuria with Japanese subjects on the other. Still others are ambitious farmers and craftsmen attracted by the fertility of the Manchurian soil and the richness of her forest and mines. All of them live under

the protection of the Japanese flag, enjoy extraterritorial rights, and are therefore completely independent of Chinese law.

These Japanese Koreans are adventurers and opportunists. They come and see and grasp the land and usurp the Chinese worker's job. Tens of thousands of Chinese famine victims are thus prevented from immigrating into Manchuria and left to die of starvation simply because the Japanese Koreans are occupants of the land and there is no more room for Chinese settlers. The Japanese authorities are as usual deaf to Chinese protests, and pretend to know nothing of the business.

The reason why Koreans like coming into Chinese Manchuria is obvious. In Korea they are a subdued people, downtrodden by Japanese cruelty and arrogance, and crushed by the grinding wheel of economic exploitation. They need only to cross the frontier and step into paradise. As colonists

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under the flag of the Rising Sun, they are free to overrun Chinese farm lands without bothering about Chinese law or taxes. They can trade without paying the imposts, and can dump into Chinese market Japanese goods, thus reaping enormous profits. The more adventurous individuals smuggle into Manchuria drugs and narcotics and arms for the local bandits. With everything to gain and nothing to lose it would indeed be unnatural if they didn't flood into Manchuria. On the Japanese side the situation is more than desirable, for on the one hand, the exodus of Koreans releases the population pressure of Chosen, and on the other hand it offers a means of economic and political penetration into the coveted Manchuria. Their presence in Chinese territory always affords an excellent pretext for military and police intervention.

The exact number of Koreans in the Manchurian provinces is unknown to the Chinese authorities, as majority of them do not have authentic passports. According to the Manchurian correspondent of *The Shun Pao* whose report appeared on April 2 of this year, no less than 3,700,000 Koreans were driven or persuaded to go into Manchuria in the ten year's period 1920-1930, and plans are underway to smuggle in 400,000 more the current year. According to figures supplied by the same source, these Koreans now occupy more than 20,000,000 mows (roughly 3,000,000 acres) of cultivated land, or about one third of the total cultivated land in Kiangsu Province. These lands occupied by Japanese Koreans produce annually 15,000,000 piculs of rice of which 11,000,000 piculs are exported to Japan, thus causing a serious shortage of food in China. The lands usurped by these Japanese subjects and their annual crops would therefore easily support a Chinese farming population of ten million persons with a surplus that would go a long way toward diminishing China's food importation which went up to \$400,000,000 last year. The Japanese-Korean invasion into Manchuria thus indirectly causes the death of millions of famine-stricken farmers in North China. The situation is no longer ridiculous, it is tragic! Need it be emphasized that this state of affairs must cease? At all cost we must save Manchuria from the menace of Korean peril, which cannot but strengthen Japan's posi-

tion in Manchuria. We have no right to let aliens occupy our land by illegal means while our own people starve to death!

The question naturally arises as to how we can cope with the situation amid the multitude of international difficulties in Manchuria. As China is entirely unprepared for an armed assertion of her national rights, many officials have a tendency to be pessimistic on the prospects of diplomatic approach of the question, past experiences have shown that Japan would never render justice to us unless forced to do so. However, if we examine more closely the question, we don't see how Japan can refuse our demand for limiting Korean immigration without being looked upon as an encroacher of Chinese territory. All sovereign nations enjoy the right to limit immigration and to expel those aliens without passports or permits of residence. May our Foreign Office and its agents in Manchuria be more energetic! and that they approach Japan at once for opening negotiations to readjust the present dangerous situation. And should Japan refuse to accord satisfaction to our legitimate demand we may of course ask the League of Nations for arbitration.

On the other hand, through our Manchurian police authorities we can execute many legitimate schemes that would get rid of the more undesirable elements of the Korean population, such as the communists, contrabandists of opium and arms, vagabonds, and in general those who are smuggled into China without a pass-port. Identity cards should be established in order to keep track of all subjects and aliens, and these cards examined as frequently as necessary and as they do in Europe.

Lastly, the Korean menace in Manchuria ought to be able to demonstrate to our legislation the absolute necessity of an immigration limitation act. Every immigrant is a burden to the poverty-stricken Republic, and drains away a part of the food and resources which our own people so sorely need. When one remembers that we who make a quarter of the world's population are crowded into one sixteenth of the Earth's land surface, it will be easy to understand why we are forced to refuse hospitality to immigrants, especially those who are above our law.

"Hail! The Sungari River's Time Is Coming"

By Ishimoto Keiketsu (石本恵吉)

Translated by T. King (金子剛)

At this moment, the attention of our people is wholly focussed on things and developments in our northeast as a result of the startling and high-handed actions so suddenly taken in Manchuria by the Japanese Army. Have our people clearly and fully grasped the meaning of what the Japanese call the "Manchuria Question"? Today, the period for the consolidation and preservation of the rights and privileges secured by Japan during and after the Russo-Japanese war has passed; while the time for the completion of the Kirin-Huining Railway, from the Tunhua Station of which a branch line effects a connection with the Hailin Station of the Chinese Eastern Railway so that a speedy and direct route by rail may become available

from Korea to the most fertile and rich basins of the Sungari River, embracing the vast plains of Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liaoning (Fengtien) and Jehol, is coming. What remains still unconstructed of the Kirin-Huining Railway is merely a gap of 180 Chinese li. No wonder, the Japanese should show so great a satisfaction by shouting vociferously: "The Sungari River's time has come (or is coming)". In spite of the fact that these regions are inhabited by our brethren to the number of twenty-eight millions, the Japanese will know how to humour their whims and respect their susceptibilities and how to show them small favour and secure their meek submission in the hope of gradually reducing them to a state of serfdom. Our readers

may, perhaps, laugh at the boastfulness of the Japanese. If they do, let them make a tour through the South Manchuria Railway's annexed territory, the so-called railway zone; and, if they have time, also Formosa. They will find either place an eye opener. Oh! Wake up; Oh! rouse yourselves instantly, our countrymen!

If our readers desire further proof of our allegation regarding Japan's ambitious designs on Manchuria, they may find it abundantly in the article written by a Japanese named Ishimoto Keiketsu (石本恵吉) under the very caption of "The Sungari River's Time Is Coming", which is translated and reproduced below:—

(1) No such terms as vast plains and spacious virgin land can convey adequately the impression of the stupendous greatness of the Continent of Manchuria. Agricultural products are grown in such profusion everywhere there that one wonders where they will end. Of all things created in this world, this tract of rich virgin land may alone deserve to be called "limitless." One can hardly help heaving a sigh of gratitude at the bountifulness of the "mother earth" in providing a limitless supply of food-stuffs for mankind to meet their seasonal wants. Then, as far as the eye can see, jungles of respectable sizes are dotting the plains here and there, gold ores and sands are produced from rivers and streams, and large deposits of coal are found underneath the ground.

As regards its area, the four provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liaoning and Jehol cover approximately 74,000 square miles, or about twice the size of the whole of Japan. But Manchuria has a population of only 28,000,000. Within these 74,000 square miles, level land, incomparably rich and fertile, is found in the northern part, that is, in the Sungari Valley, covering more than one-half of the whole area. If we want to seek any place of an identical nature elsewhere on this globe, we can only point out "The Mother of Mankind," the name borne by the rich plains watered by the Nile River, and the Mesopotamia Plains catered for by the two rivers of Euphrates and Tigris, as at all comparable with the Sungari plains. If this valley is fully developed, it will be able to feed a population exceeding 200,000,000 quite easily.

The Sungari Valley should be regarded as a valuable asset not only to Manchuria, but to the whole world as well. There can be no doubt that the Sungari River will constitute the root point in the settlement of the Manchuria question. In other words, the question will simply resolve itself into "finding out ways and means of securing the power to control the markets of the vast plains along the Sungari River. But our first step should be to struggle as energetically as possible for the possession of a speedy route leading from a sea-port to the very centre of these fertile plains."

I have heard that the great war in Europe was chiefly caused by the keen contention between Great Britain, Germany and France for the gratification of their desire to secure the right to control the Mesopotamia plains, at least economically. Germany wanted to build a railway from Berlin to Baghdad via Constantinople. Britain wanted to do the same, starting from Koweit west of the Per-

sian Gulf to Baghdad by way of Basra. The present case is similar in scope, as Japan wants to use Dairen as a base from which to reach Liaoning and thence to Harbin via Changchun. She may use the South Manchuria Railway to attain her object. China is intensively engaged in the construction of the Hulutao Harbour, from which a railway may be built by way of Tahuwan and Tungliao to Taonan, and thence, by crossing right over the Chinese Eastern Railway, extended to Tsitsihar, the Capital of Heilungkiang. A branch line may lead from Liaoning to Kirin, by means of which products and capital in north Manchuria may be tackled. As regards Russia, she has already built the Chinese Eastern Railway which runs right across these vast plains from west to east and which terminates at Vladivostok, a port easily accessible from sea.

The above-mentioned three Powers, China, Russia and Japan, respectively occupying Hulutao, Vladivostok and Dairen, are all striving to reach the Sungari River basins as their goal, and to reach there by the quickest and shortest possible route. That they will play the leading parts in the near future in a drama that will become the greatest problem the world has ever witnessed, goes without saying.

(2) The Manchuria Question has recently come to the fore in Japan. It has become the most popular topic, whether in writing or in conversation or cinema pictures. The Japanese people seem to be intensely interested in this question. Although hundreds are discussing it every month and thousands every year, I have scarcely met anyone who can intelligently and convincingly answer the question "What is the so-called Manchuria Question?" The answers have always been more of a commentary than of an informative character. Some declare that the system of a four-headed government must be abolished (probably in reference to the Council of Elder Statesmen, the military clique, the Cabinet represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the S. M. R.); some say that competitive railway lines, whether parallel to or surrounding the existing Japanese lines, should not be permitted; while others express dissatisfaction at Japan's weak foreign policy, or regret for the dearth of Japanese public opinion, or indignation at China's haughty attitude, more or less in a general and vague manner. Certain people are merely repeating the parrot-cry that we should uphold and protect what rights and privileges that have been secured during and since the Russo-Japanese war. As regards any mode of procedure to be followed or what would be the best plan for us to adopt in order to achieve success, no one has even made any suggestion. Why has there been no concrete proposal ever made? Because no one has yet taken pains to study carefully this Manchuria problem, and, therefore, no one really understands it clearly.

I have prepared a paper on "How to administer the Sungari Valley in North Manchuria which, in richness of resources, is comparable to the Mesopotamia plains." Having grasped the question fully, I am able to put down my conclusions in a concrete form in the following paragraphs.

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(3) The Sungari River basin contains 40,000 square miles of fertile land. But how can this region be speedily reached from the sea? And how can the goods and products of that locality be conveniently and cheaply transported elsewhere? These two questions must be clearly understood before we can make our route compete successfully with any other route. The first point to be studied and settled is the length of the route. Unfortunately, the South Manchuria Railway controlled by Japan and stretching from Dairen to Harbin would be about 580 miles long, that is, it would cover the greatest distance. China's projected line from Hulutao to Tsitsihar would be about 100 miles shorter than the S.M.R., while Russia is operating a line from Vladivostok bin, a distance of about 480 miles only. Thus, for the purpose of competition in railway traffic, the Vladivostok-Harbin line would occupy the most advantageous position, the Hulutao-Tsitsihar line next and the Dairen-Harbin line the last and worst of the three. In other words, the S.M.R. would be in a very disadvantageous position in the matter of distance, as far as a competitive war for supremacy in the Sungari Valley is concerned.

But there is one line that has not yet attracted much attention. This is the line that starts from Hsiungchi, a seaport in Korea and, after passing Hunchun, Wangching and Ningan, could effect a connection with the Hailin Station of the C.E.R., whereby it would be the shortest railway when completed, as the distance from Hsiungchi to Harbin would approximately be 450 miles only and, in addition, it would enjoy the further advantage of having a seaport that will never be frozen up all the year round, and that seaport in Korea too, a very important point of advantage in the eyes of Japan in view of her Manchuria policy. This line would score over one of its competitors, viz, the Russia line, whose seaport is Vladivostok which is ice-bound during the cold season.

In conclusion, since in the matter of distance, the S.M.R. would be in the worst position when struggling for supremacy in the Sungari Valley, relief had to be sought in building a line from Hsiungchi to Hailin. To accelerate the completion of this new route of communication is, then, the guiding spirit and driving force that have shaped Japan's new Manchuria policy; it is also a concrete reply to the query "What is the so-called Manchuria question?"

(4) Since the new policy with the Sungari Valley as the goal has been decided upon, and since the S.M.R. has to cover the greatest distance before reaching a seaport, other methods must be devised to counteract this drawback: either to adopt a method to ensure a

speedier and cheaper transportation of goods and products to and from North Manchuria than any other line; or to change the original policy of tackling North Manchuria by concentrating our efforts on making Changchun as a centre for marketing and distributing all agricultural products; or to encourage the promotion of industries all along the line, with a view to living up to the reputation of the S.M.R. as the principal carrier of passengers and goods in that great Continent. All these are, it is true, but methods of a passive nature; still they are practical methods.

During this time of crisis, one cannot help recollecting the number of theoretical plans evolved at the time of the inception of the S.M.R., and the difficulties encountered in trying later to carry them into practice. At that time, farmers were scarce in North Manchuria, and all political and economical measures were taken with Liaoning as the centre of activity in view. Later, the S.M.R. had always endeavoured to transfer the centre of activity northward by gradual degrees, in accordance with its original policy. After the European War, the conditions throughout the world changed so greatly and so suddenly that if its old policy were adhered to, it would have been impossible for it to march with the times. However, a good opportunity presents itself today for a change of policy. But if we did not clearly understand our wants, we could only blindly adopt a new policy, whereby we would not only lose a unique and rarely-met opportunity in a whole century, but might even create an everlasting regret for generations afterwards!

(5) To put our new Manchuria policy into effect requires a new guiding spirit. A colonization scheme without an ideal working plan would be doomed to failure. The assimilation of a people without culture would be worse than useless. To rule without philosophy would incur the resistance of an alien people. Many such instances can be cited in the history of colonization. Spain's colonization scheme failed in Mexico, because of her lack of ideals. France has been governing Annam by disregarding the importance of culture and by practising the policy of an extortionist; she is, therefore, sinking deeper and deeper in the mire. The British Government of India stands out as a good example of ruling people without the wisdom of a philosopher. Therefore, unless we proceed to the region of the Sungari with a full complement of new ideas and ideals, culture and philosophy, we shall fail in the end although we may succeed for a moment to reach our goal.

(6) Manchuria is the fatherland of the Manchu people who are of the same race as the Japanese and Koreans. It is only right that Manchuria should be the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

sovereign territory of the Manchus. It was during the latter half of the nineteenth century that the Manchus forgot their own ideals, forsook their own philosophy and kowtowed to the philosophical shibboleths of their subject people, the Chinese, with the result that their fatherland was penetrated by the Chinese. At present, 90% of the population in Manchuria is composed of Chinese. But this does not matter at all. What we should do is to study and ascertain the Chinese social system and the Chinese characteristics and their inherent nature, and use our knowledge thus gained as a basis on which to carry out our new policy. Has the S.M.R. directorate been fully prepared in this respect? By merely living in a warm and cozy house situated in the leased territory, how can they learn to know the Chinese people? By chiefly cultivating an acquaintanceship with the militarists, how can they hope to know anything? The Chinese know and care nothing apart from self-interest and personal desires; nor do they like the militarists and politicians.

The Chinese people would never willingly mingle with any officials, much less with the politicians. They will devote themselves to producing the food they eat and procuring the water they drink. In ancient times, great men in China used to make every effort to meet the wishes of the populace which they had ascertain through various channels. They swept away what the people disliked, They introduced what the people wanted. In the execution of our new Manchuria policy, we should handle all matters in a broadminded manner and from a lofty viewpoint, adopting tactics with due regard to the psychology and susceptibilities of the Chinese people and without violating the principles of human rectitude as are universally practised in every part of the world.

(7) In this concluding paragraph, I would finally emphasize the necessity of adopting reforms in the Japanese Empire itself as an essential condition for carrying out our new policy in Manchuria. I do not mean that I want our people to support "a strong foreign policy". I want a proper adjustment of all home questions being first made, in order that our whole energy may be devoted to achieving progress abroad.

Only think! The Sungari River, whose greatest depth is 2,000 feet and whose flow stretches away to an immense distance, is watering a limitless expanse of rich land!

"Come, Brethren! Let us construct an ideal society at this spot; let us introduce a glorious culture here." I have often heard this outcry.

From times immemorial, fertile land along the banks of large rivers and canals has invariably served as the seat on which for mankind to create and develop

culture and civilization, besides giving them an opportunity to attain the highest pinnacle of fame and glory. The peoples living in the basins of the Nile, the Mesopotamia, the Yellow River, the Ganges, etc., have one and all succeeded in building up for each a distinct and independent civilization, and in rendering certain kinds of signal and lasting service for the benefit of mankind in general. In the position occupied by Japan today, it is assuredly her duty to create a kind of new civilization. This is not a van-saying, certainly. Let us, the peoples of Japan, Korea, Manchuria and Mongolia, together with peoples of all other countries, unitedly establish a new civilization for the twenty first century, both spiritually and materially, as a new era has just now dawned!

"The Sungari River's Time Is Coming!" "The Sungari River's Times Is Coming!"

Notice

The attention of our readers is called to the Tanaka Memorial published in the column reserved for "Official Documents".

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OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

TANAKA MEMORIAL

Memorial Presented to the Emperor of Japan on July 25, 1927, by Premier Tanaka, Outlining the positive policy in Manchuria.

Since the European War, Japan's political as well as economic interests have been in an unsettled condition. This is due to the fact that we have failed to take advantage of our special privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia and fully to realize our acquired rights. But upon my appointment as premier, I was instructed specially to guard our interests in this region and watch for opportunities for further expansion. Such injunctions one cannot take lightly. Ever since I advocated a positive policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia as a common citizen, I have longed for its realization. So in order that we may lay plans for the colonization of the Far East and the development of our new continental empire, a special conference was held from June 27th to July 7th lasting in all eleven days. It was attended by all the civil and military officers connected with Manchuria and Mongolia, whose discussions result in the following resolutions. These we respectfully submit to Your Majesty for consideration.

General Considerations

The term Manchuria and Mongolia includes the provinces Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Outer and Inner Mongolia. It extends an area of 74,000 square miles, having a population of 28,000,000 people. The territory is more than three times as large as our own empire not counting Korea and Formosa, but it is inhabited by only one-third as many people. The attractiveness of the land does not arise from the scarcity of population alone: its wealth of forestry, minerals and agricultural products is also unrivalled elsewhere in the world. In order to exploit these resources for the perpetuation of our national glory, we created especially the South Manchuria Railway Company. The total investment involved in our undertakings in railway, shipping, mining, forestry, steel manufacture, agriculture, and cattle raising, as schemes pretending to be mutually beneficial to China and Japan amount to no less than Yen 440,000,000. It is veritably the largest single investment and the strongest organization of our country. Although nominally the enterprise is under the joint ownership of the government and the people, in reality the government has complete power and authority. In so far as the South Manchuria Railway Company is empowered to undertake diplomatic, police, and ordinary administrative functions so that it may carry out our im-

perialistic policies, the Company forms a peculiar organization which has exactly the same powers as the Governor-General of Korea. This fact alone is sufficient to indicate the immense interests we have in Manchuria and Mongolia. Consequently the policies towards this country of successive administrations since Meiji are all based on his injunctions, elaborating and continuously completing the development of the new continental empire in order to further the advance of our national glory and prosperity for countless generations to come.

Unfortunately, since the European War there have been constant changes in diplomatic as well as domestic affairs. The authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces are also awakened and gradually work toward reconstruction and industrial development following our example. Their progress is astonishing. It has affected the spread of our influence in a most serious way, and has put us to so many disadvantages that the dealings with Manchuria and Mongolia of successive governments have resulted in failure. Furthermore, the restriction of the Nine Power Treaty signed at the Washington Conference have reduced our special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that there is no freedom left for us. The very existence of our country is endangered. Unless these obstacles are removed, our national existence will be insecure and our national strength will not develop. Moreover, the resources of wealth are congregated in North Manchuria. If we do not have the right of way here, it is obvious that we shall not be able to tap the riches of this country. Even the resources of South Manchuria which we won by the Russo-Japanese War will also be greatly restricted by the Nine Power Treaty. The result is that while our people cannot migrate into Manchuria as they please, the Chinese are flowing in as a flood. Hordes of them move into the Three Eastern Provinces every year, numbering in the neighbourhood of several millions. They have jeopardized our acquired rights in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that our annual surplus population of eight hundred thousand have no place to seek refuge. In view of this we have to admit our failure in trying to effect a balance between our population and food supply. If we do not devise plans to check the influx of Chinese immigrants

immediately, in five years' time the number of Chinese will exceed 6,000,000. Then we shall be confronted with greater difficulties in Manchuria and Mongolia.

It will be recalled that when the Nine Power Treaty was signed which restricted our movements in Manchuria and Mongolia, public opinion was greatly aroused. The late Emperor Taisho called a conference of Yamagata and other high officers of the army and the navy to find a way to counteract this new engagement. I was sent to Europe and America to ascertain secretly the attitude of the important statesmen toward it. They were all agreed that the Nine Power Treaty was initiated by the United States. The other Powers which signed it were willing to see our influence increase in Manchuria and Mongolia in order that we may protect the interests of international trade and investment. This attitude I found out personally from the political leaders of England, France and Italy. The sincerity of these expressions could be depended upon. Unfortunately just as we were ready to carry out our policy and declare void the Nine Power Treaty with the approval of those whom I met on my trip, the Seiyukai cabinet suddenly fell and our policy failed of fruition. It was indeed a great pity. After I had secretly exchanged views with the Powers regarding the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, I returned by way of Shanghai. At the wharf there a Chinese attempted to take my life. An American woman was hurt, but I escaped by the divine protection of my emperors of the past. It seems that it was by divine will that I should assist Your Majesty to open a new era in the Far East and to develop the new continental empire.

The Three Eastern Provinces are politically the imperfect spot in the Far East. For the sake of self-protection as well as the protection of others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of "Blood and Iron". But in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison with poison. In the future if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence.

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The Nine Power Treaty is entirely an expression of the spirit of commercial rivalry. It was the intention of England and America to crush our influence in China with their power of wealth. The proposed reduction of armaments is nothing but a means to limit our military strength, making it impossible for us to conquer the vast territory of China. On the other hand, China's resources of wealth will be entirely at their disposal. It is merely a scheme by which England and America may defeat our plans. And yet the Minseito made the Nine Power Treaty the important thing and emphasized our *trade* rather than our *rights* in China. This is a mistaken policy—a policy of national suicide. England can afford to talk about trade relations only because she has India and Austria to supply her with foodstuff and other materials. So can America because South America and Canada are there to supply her needs. Their spare energy could be entirely devoted to developing trade in China to enrich themselves. But in Japan her food supply and raw materials decrease in proportion to her population. If we merely hope to develop trade, we shall eventually be defeated by England and America, who possess unsurpassable capitalistic power. In the end, we shall get nothing. A more dangerous factor is the fact that the people of China might some day wake up. Even during these years of internal strife, they can still toil patiently, and try to imitate and displace our goods so as to impair the development of our trade. When we remember that the Chinese are our sole customers, we must beware, lest one day when China becomes unified and her industries become prosperous. Americans and Europeans will compete with us: our trade in China will be wrecked. Minseito's proposal to uphold the Nine Power Treaty and to adopt the policy of trade towards Manchuria is nothing less than a suicidal policy.

After studying the present conditions and possibilities of our country, our best policy lies in the direction of taking positive steps to secure rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia. These will enable us to develop our trade. This will not only forestall China's own industrial development, but also prevent the penetration of European Powers. This is the best policy possible!

The way to gain actual rights in Manchuria and Mongolia is to use this region as a base and under the pretence of trade and commerce penetrate the rest of China. Armed by the rights already secured we shall seize the resources all over the country. Having China's entire resources at our disposal we shall proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe. But to get control of Manchuria and Mongo-

lia is the first step if the Yamato race wishes to distinguish themselves on Continental Asia. Final success belongs to the country having food-supply; industrial prosperity belongs to the country having food-supply; industrial prosperity belongs to the country having raw materials; the full growth of national strength belongs to the country having extensive territory. If we pursue a positive policy to enlarge our rights in Manchuria and China, all these prerequisites of a powerful nation will constitute no problem. Furthermore our surplus population of 700,000 each year will also be taken care of. If we want to inaugurate a new policy and secure the permanent prosperity of our empire, a positive policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia is the only way.

Manchuria and Mongolia—Not Chinese Territory

Historically considered, Manchuria and Mongolia are neither China's territory nor her special possessions. Dr. Yano has made an extensive study of Chinese history and has come to the positive conclusion that Manchuria and Mongolia never were Chinese territory. This fact was announced to the world on the authority of the Imperial University. The accuracy of Dr. Yano's investigations is such that no scholars in China have contested his statement. However, the most unfortunate thing is that in our declaration of war with Russia, our government openly recognized China's sovereignty over these regions and later again at the Washington conference when we signed the Nine Power Treaty. Because of these two miscalculations (on our part) China's sovereignty in Manchuria and Mongolia is established in diplomatic relations, but our interests are seriously injured. In the past, although China speaks of the Republic of five races, yet Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia and Manchuria have always remained special areas and the princes are permitted to discharge their customary functions. Therefore in reality the sovereign power over these regions resides with the princes. When the opportunity presents itself, we should make known to the world the actual situation there. We should also wedge our way into Outer and Inner Mongolia in order that we may reform the mainland. So long as the princes there maintain their former administrations, the sovereign rights are clearly in their hands. If we want to enter these territories, we may regard them as the ruling power and negotiate with them for rights and privileges. We shall be afforded excellent opportunities and our national influence will increase rapidly.

Positive Policy in Manchuria

As to the rights in Manchuria, we should take forceful steps on the basis

of the Twenty-One Demanda and secure the following in order to safe-guard the enjoyment of the rights which we have acquired so far:—

1. After the thirty-year commercial lease terminates, we should be able to extend the term at our wish. Also the right of leasing land for commercial, industrial and agricultural purpose should be recognized.
2. Japanese subjects shall have the right to travel and reside in the eastern part of Mongolia, and engage in commercial and industrial activities. As to their movements, China shall allow them freedom from Chinese law. Furthermore, they must not be subject to illegal taxation and unlawful examination.
3. We must have the right of exploiting the nineteen iron and coal mines in Fengtien and Kirin, as well as the right of timbering.
4. We should have priority for building railroads and option for loans for such purposes in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia.
5. The number of Japanese political, financial and military advisers and training officers must be increased. Furthermore, we must have priority in furnishing new advisers.
6. The right of stationing our Police over the Koreans (in China).
7. The administration and development of the Kirin-Changchun Railway must be extended to 99 years.
8. Exclusive right of sale of special products—priority of shipping business to Europe and America.
9. Exclusive rights of mining in Heilungkiang.
10. Right to construct Kirin-Hueining and Changchun-Talai Railways.
11. In case money is needed for the redemption of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese Government must have the first option for making loans to China.
12. Harbour rights at Antung and Yingko and the right of through transportation.
13. The right of partnership in establishing a Central Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces.
14. Right of Pasturage.

Positive Policy Towards Inner and Outer Mongolia

Since Manchuria and Mongolia are still in the hands of the former princes, in the future we must recognize them as the ruling power and give them support. For this reason, the daughter of General Fukushima, Governor of Kwan-

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tung, risked her life among the barbarous Mongolian people of Tushiyeh to become adviser to their Prince in order that she might serve the Imperial Government. As the wife of the Prince Ruler is the niece of Manchu Prince Su, the relationship between our Government and the Mongolian Prince became very intimate. The princes of Outer and Inner Mongolia have all shown sincere respect for us, especially after we allured them with special benefits and protection. Now there are 19 Japanese retired military officers in the house of the Tushiyeh. We have acquired already monopoly rights for the purchase of wool, for real estate and for mines. Hereafter we shall send secretly more retired officers to live among them. They should wear Chinese clothes in order to escape the attention of the Mukden Government. Scattered in the territory of the Prince, they may engage themselves in farming, herding or dealing in wool. As to the other principalities, we can employ the same method as in Tushiyeh. Everywhere we should station our retired military officers to dominate in the Princes' affairs. After a large number of our people have moved into Outer and Inner Mongolia, we shall then buy lands at one-tenth of their worth and begin to cultivate rice where feasible in order to relieve our shortage of food-supply. Where the land is not suitable for rice cultivation, we should develop it for cattle raising and horse breeding in order to replenish our military needs. The rest of the land could be devoted to the manufacture of canned goods which we may export to Europe and America. The fur and leather will also meet our needs. Once the opportunity comes, Outer and Inner Mongolia will be ours outright. While the sovereign rights, are not clearly defined and while the Chinese and the Soviet Governments are engaging their attention elsewhere, it is our opportunity quietly to build our influence. Once we have purchased most of the land there, there will be no room for dispute as to whether Mongolia belongs to the Japanese or the Mongolians. Aided by our military prowess, we shall realize our positive policy. In order to carry out this plan, we should appropriate Yen 1,000,000 from the "secret funds" of the Army Department's budget so that four hundred retired officers disguised as teachers and Chinese citizens may be sent into Outer and Inner Mongolia to mix with the people, to gain the confidence of the Mongolian princes, to acquire from them rights for pasturage and mining and to lay the foundation of our national interests for the next hundred years.

Encouragement and Protection of Korean Immigration

Since the annexation of Korea, we have had very little trouble. But President Wilson's declaration of the self-

determination of races after the European War has been like a divine revelation to the suppressed peoples. The Koreans are no exception. The spirit of unrest has permeated the whole country. Both because of the freedom they enjoy in Manchuria due to incompetent police system and because of the richness of the country, there are now in the Three Eastern Provinces no less than 1,000,000 Koreans. The unlooked-for development is fortunate for our country indeed. From a military and economic standpoint, it has greatly strengthened our influence. From another standpoint, it gives new hope for the administration of Koreans. They will both be the vanguard for the colonization of virgin fields and furnish a link of contact with the Chinese people. On the one hand, we could utilize the naturalized Koreans to purchase land for rice cultivation, on the other, we could extend to them financial aid through the Co-operative Society, the South Manchuria Railway, etc., so that they may serve as the spear-head of our economic penetration. This will give relief to our problem of food supply, as well as open a new field of opportunity for colonization. The Koreans who have become naturalized Chinese are Chinese only in name: they will return to our fold eventually. They are different from those naturalized Japanese in California and South America. They are naturalized as Chinese only for temporary convenience. When their numbers reach two million and a half or more, they can be instigated to military activities whenever there is the necessity, and under the pretence of suppressing the Koreans we could bear them aid. As not all the Koreans are naturalized Chinese, the world will not be able to tell whether it is the Chinese Koreans or the Japanese Koreans who create the trouble. We can always sell dog's meat with a sheep's head as sign-board.

Of course while we could use the Koreans for such purposes, we must beware of the fact that the Chinese could also use them against us. But Manchuria is as much under our jurisdiction as under Chinese jurisdiction. If the Chinese should use Koreans to hamper us, then our opportunity of war against China is at hand. In that event, the most formidable factor is Soviet Russia. If the Chinese should use the "Reds" to influence the Koreans, the thought of our people will change and great peril will befall us. Therefore, the present Cabinet is taking every precaution against this eventuality. If we want to make use of the Koreans to develop our new continental empire, our protection and regulations for them must be more carefully worked out. We should increase our police force in North Manchuria under the terms of the Mitsuya Treaty so that we may protect the

Koreans and give them help in their rapid advance. Furthermore, the Eastern Development Company (Totoku Kaisha) and the South Manchuria Railway Company should follow then to give them financial aid. They should be given especially favourable terms so that through them we may develop Manchuria and Mongolia and monopolize the commercial rights. The influx of Koreans into these territories is of such obvious importance both for economic and military considerations that the Imperial Government cannot afford not to give it encouragement. It will mean new opportunities for our empire. Since the effect of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement is lost after the Washington Conference, we can only recover our interests through the favourable development arising out of the presence of several millions of Koreans in Manchuria. There is no ground in international relations for raising any objection to this procedure.

Railroads and Development of our New Continent

Transportation is the mother of national defence, the assurance of victory and the citadel of economic development. China has only 7,200 to 7,300 miles of railroads, of which three thousand miles are in Manchuria and Mongolia constituting two-fifths of the whole. Considering the size of Manchuria and Mongolia and the abundance of natural products, there should be at least five or six thousand miles more. It is a pity that our railroads are mostly in south Manchuria, which cannot reach the sources of wealth in the northern parts. Moreover, there are too many Chinese inhabitants in South Manchuria to be wholesome for our military and economic plans. If we wish to develop the natural resources and strengthen our national defence, we must build railroads in Northern Manchuria. With the opening of these railroads, we shall be able to send more people (Japanese) into Northern Manchuria. From this vantage ground we can manipulate political and economic developments in South Manchuria, as well as strengthen our national defence in the interest of peace and order of the Far East. Furthermore, the South Manchuria was built mainly for economic purposes. It lacks encircling lines necessary for military mobilization and transportation. From now on we must take military purposes as our object and build circuit lines to circle the heart of Manchuria and Mongolia in order that we may hamper China's military, political and economic developments there on the one hand, and prevent the penetration of Russian influence on the other. This is the key to our continental policy.

There are two trunk lines in Manchuria and Mongolia. These are the Chinese

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Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway. As regards the railroad built by Chinese, it will doubtless become very powerful in time, backed by the financial resources of the Kirin Provincial Government. With the combined resources of Fengtien and Heilungkiang Provinces, the Chinese railroads will develop to an extent far superior to our South Manchuria Railway. Strong competition will inevitably result. Fortunately for us, the financial conditions in Fengtien Province are in great disorder, which the authorities cannot improve unless we come to their succor. This is our chance. We should take positive steps until we have reached our goal in railroad development. Moreover, if we manipulate the situation, the Fengtien bank-notes will depreciate to an inconceivable degree. In that event, the bankruptcy of Fengtien will be a matter of time. The development of Manchuria and Mongolia will be out of the question for them. But we still have to reckon with the Chinese Eastern Railway. It forms a T with the South Manchuria Railway. Although this system is a convenient shape, it is by no means suitable for military purposes. When the Chinese build railroads as feeders of the Chinese Eastern Railway, it is best that they run parallel to it, west and east. But with the South Manchuria Railway as main line, we must have these lines run north and south. For the benefit of the Chinese themselves, there are also advantages for these lines to run in this direction. Consequently our interest does not necessarily conflict with the Chinese. Now that Russia is losing influence and is powerless to advance in Manchuria and Mongolia, it is certain that the Chinese must act according to our beckoning in the development of railways in the future. Much to our surprise the Fengtien Government recently built two railroads, one from Tahushan to Tungliao and the other from Kirin to Haining both for military purposes. Those two railroads affect most seriously our military plans in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as the interest of the South Manchuria Railway. We therefore protested strongly against it.

That these railways were built was due to the fact that our official on the spot as well as the South Manchuria Railway authorities miscalculated the ability of the Fengtien Government and paid no attention to it. Later when we did intervene the railways were already completed. Besides, the Americans have been anxious to make an investment in developing the port of Hu-lu-tao through British capitalists. Taking advantage of this situation, the Fengtien Government introduced American and British capital in these railways in order to hold our interest at bay. For the time being we have to wink at it and wait for the

opportune moment to deal with China about these two railroads.

Recently, it is rumoured that the Fengtien Government is planning to build a railroad from Tahushan to Harbin via Tung Liao and Fu Yu, so that there may be a direct line between Peking and Harbin without touching either the South Manchuria Railway or the Chinese Eastern Railway. What is more astonishing is that another railway beginning at Mukden passing through Hailung, Kirin, Wuchang terminating at Harbin is also under way. If this plan becomes true, then these two lines would encircle the South Manchuria Railway and limit its sphere of activity to a small area. The result is that our economic and political development of Manchuria and Mongolia will be checked and the plan for curtailing our power provided by the Nine Power Treaty will be carried out. Moreover, the completion of these two railroads will render the South Manchurian Railway completely useless. The latter Company will be confronted with a real crisis. But in view of China's financial conditions today, she cannot undertake these two railroads unless she resorts to foreign loans. And on these two railways the transportation charges will have to be higher than on the South Manchuria Railway. These considerations give us some comfort. But in the event of these two railroads becoming an accomplished fact and the Chinese Government making especially low freight charges in order to compete with the South Manchuria Railway, not only we but the Chinese Eastern Railway will also sustain great losses. Japan and Russia certainly would not allow China to carry out such obstructive measures, especially as the Chinese Eastern Railway depends upon Tsitsihar and Harbin for the bulk for its business. The consequence would be even more serious to both Japanese and Russian interests when the new railways are completed.

Let us now consider more in detail the competitive railways projected in Manchuria and Mongolia.

China contemplates:

1. Suolun-Taonan Railway.
2. Kirin-Harbin Railway.

Soviet Russia proposes:

1. Anta-Potung Railway.
2. Mienpo-Wuchang-Potuna Railway.
3. Kirin-Hailin Railway.
4. Mishan-Muling Railway.

The Russian plans are designed to strengthen the Chinese Eastern Railway and thereby to extend its imperialistic schemes. For this reason the railways projected mostly run east and west. For

although the power of Soviet Russia is declining, her ambition in Manchuria and Mongolia has not diminished for a minute. Every step she takes is intended to obstruct our progress and to injure the South Manchuria Railway. We must do our utmost to guard against her influence. We should use the Fengtien Government as a wedge to check her southern advance. By pretending to check the southern advance of Soviet Russia as a first step, we could gradually force our way into North Manchuria and exploit the natural resources there. We shall then be able to prevent the spread of Chinese influence on the south and arrest the advance of Soviet Russia on the north. In our struggle against the political and economic influence of Soviet Russia, we should drive China before us and direct the events from behind. Meanwhile, we should still secretly befriend Russia in order to hamper the growth of Chinese influence. It was largely with this purpose in view, that Baron Goto of Kato's cabinet invited Joffe to our country and advocated the resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia.

Although we have an agreement with the Chinese Eastern Railway concerning transportation rates, according to which 45% go to the Chinese Eastern Railway and 55% to us, yet the Chinese Eastern Railway still grants preferential rates detrimental to the interest of the South Manchuria Railway. Moreover, according to a secret declaration of Soviet Russia, although they have no territorial ambition they cannot help keeping a hand in the Chinese Eastern Railway on account of the fact that north of the Chinese and Russian boundary the severe cold makes a railway valueless. Furthermore, as Vladivostok is their only sea-port in the Far East, they cannot give up the Chinese Eastern Railway without losing also their foothold on the Pacific. This makes us feel the more uneasy.

On the other hand the South Manchuria Railway is not adequate for our purpose. Considering our present needs and future activities, we must control railways in both north hand south Manchuria, especially in view of the fact that the resources of North Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia will furnish no room for expansion and material gains. In South Manchuria the Chinese is increasing at such a rate that it surely will damage our interests politically and economically. Under such circumstances, we are compelled to take aggressive steps in North Manchuria in order to assure our future prosperity. But if the Chinese Eastern Railway of Soviet Russia should spread across this field our new continental policy is bound to receive a set-back which will result in an inevitable conflict with Soviet Russia

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in the near future. In that event we shall enact once more our part in the Russo-Japanese War. The Chinese Eastern Railway will become ours as the South Manchuria Railway did last time, and we shall seize Kirin as we once did Dairen. That we should draw swords with Russia again in the fields of Mongolia in order to gain the wealth of North Manchuria seems a necessary step in our program of national aggrandisement. Until this hidden rock is blown up our ship can have no smooth sailing. We should now demand from China the right of building all the important military railroads. When these railroads are completed, we shall pour our forces into North Manchuria as far as we can. When Soviet Russia intervenes, as they must, that is our opportunity for open conflict.

We should insist on the building of the following railways:

1. Tungliao-Jehol Railway. This line is 447 miles long and will cost Yen 50,000,000. When it is completed it will be of great value to our development of Inner Mongolia. As a matter of fact, this is the most important of all the railways in the whole undertaking. According to the careful surveys of the War Department, there are in Inner Mongolia large tracts of land suitable for rice cultivation. After proper development there will be room for at least 20 millions of our people. There is besides the possibility of turning out 2,000,000 head of cattle which may be transported by railways for food supply and for purposes of exporting to Europe and America. Wool also is a special product. While the sheep in Japan yield only two catties of wool per head per year, the sheep in Mongolia can yield six catties. The South Manchuria Railway has made many experiments, all of which confirm this fact. Besides, the wool is many times better than that of Australia. Its low cost and high quality combined with its abundance in quantity make Mongolia a potential source of great wealth. When this industry is enhanced by the facilities of railway development, the total production will increase at least ten-fold. We have withheld this knowledge from the rest of the world, lest England and America compete with us for it. Therefore, we must first of all control the transportation and then develop the wool industry. By the time the other countries know about it, it would be already too late to do anything. With this railroad in our hands, we can develop the wool industry not only for our own use, but also for exporting to Europe and America. Furthermore, we can realize our desire of joining hands with Mongolia. This railway is a matter of life and death to our policy in Mongolia. Without it, Japan can have no part in Mongolia's development.

2. Suolun-Taonan Railway. This line is 136 miles long and will cost Yen 10,000,000. Looking into the future of Japan, a war with Russia over the plains of North Manchuria is inevitable. From a military standpoint, this line will not only enable us to threaten Russia's rear but also to curtail its re-inforcements for North Manchuria. From an economic standpoint, this road will place the wealth of the Tao-er-ho Valley within our reach, thereby strengthening the South Manchuria Railway. The princes nearby who are friendly to us can also use this road to extend our influence in order to open up their respective territories. Our hope of working hand in hand with the Mongolian princes, of acquiring land, mines and pasturage, and of developing trade with the natives as preliminary steps for later penetration, all depends upon this railway. Together with Tungliao-Jehol Railway, they will form two supplementary routes into Mongolia. When the industries are fully developed, we shall extend our interests into Outer Mongolia. But the danger of this line is that it might provide facilities for Chinese migration into a new region and spoil our own policy. Look at our experience with the South Manchuria Railway. Hasn't that served the interest of China? The redeeming feature, however, is the fact that the land and mines along this railway are in the possession of Mongolian princes. If we can gain possession of them first, we need have no worries about Chinese migration. Moreover, we can make the princes pass laws discriminating against Chinese immigrants. When life there is made miserable for the Chinese, they naturally will leave for places afar. There are other methods to bar the Chinese. Only if we try hard enough, no Chinese foot-prints will be found on Mongolian territory.

3. A Section of Changchun-Taonan Railway. As this line runs from Changchun to Fuyu and Talai, the section between Changchun and Taonan is about 131 miles and costs approximately Yen 11,000,000. This line is immensely important from an economic standpoint, for the wealth of Manchuria and Mongolia lies all in North Manchuria. It will enable us to have an easy access to North Manchuria on the one hand, and prejudice the Chinese Eastern Railway to the benefit of the South Manchuria Railway on the other. It runs through the upper valley of the Sungari River where the soil is fertile and agricultural products abound. Further, in the vicinity of Talai there is the Yueh-Liang Falls which could be harnessed for electric power. That this section of the railway will be a prosperous center for industry and agriculture, is beyond doubt. After the completion of this line, we shall be able to make Talai a base and advance on Siberia through three

directions; namely, by way of Taonan, Anshan and Tsitsihar. The wealth of North Manchuria will then come to our hands. This will also be the first line of advance to Heilungkiang. It will further form a circuit with the railway between Changchun and Taonan, which will serve well for military purposes when we penetrate into Mongolia. Along this whole line the population is sparse and the land is rich and extensive. No fertiliser will be required on the farms for fifty years. A possession of this railway will ensure the possession of all the wealth of North Manchuria and Mongolia. In this region there is room for at least 30 million people more. When the Tunhua Railway is completed and joins up with the line running to Hueining in Korea, the products will be brought to the door of Osaka and Tokyo by a direct route. In time of war our troops could be despatched to North Manchuria and Mongolia via the Japan Sea without a stop, forestalling all possibilities of Chinese forces entering North Manchuria. Nor could American or Russian submarines enter the Korean Strait. The moment the railways between Kirin and Hueining and between Changchun and Talai are completed, we shall become self-sufficient in food-stuff and raw materials. We shall have no worries in the event of war with any country. Then, in our negotiations about Manchuria and Mongolia, China will be cowed to submission and yield to our wishes. If we want to end the political existence of Manchuria and Mongolia according to the third step of Meiji's plan, the completion of these two railways is the only way. The Changchun-Talai Railway will greatly enhance the value of the South Manchuria Railway, besides developing into a profitable line itself. It is an undertaking of supreme importance in our penetration into this territory.

4. Kirin-Hueining Line. While the Kirin-Tunhua Line is already completed, the Tunhua-Hueining Line is yet to be built. The narrow gauge of 2 ft. 6 inches of the tracks from Hueining to Laotoukow is inadequate for the economic development of the New Continent. Allowing Yen 8,000,000 for widening the tracks in this section and Yen 10,000,000 for completing the section between Laotoukow and Tunhua, the whole undertaking will cost approximately Yen 20,000,000. When this is done, our continental policy will have succeeded. Hitherto, people going to Europe have to pass through either Dairen or Vladivostok. Now they can go on the trunk line directly from Chingchinkang via the Siberian Railway. When we are in control of this great system of transportation, we need make no secret of our designs on Manchuria and Mongolia according to the third step of Meiji's plans. The Yamato Race is then embarked on the journey of world conquest! Ac-

cording to the last will of Meiji, our first step was to conquer Formosa and the second step to annex Korea. Having completed both of these, the third step is yet to be taken and that is the conquest of Manchuria, Mongolia and China. When this is done, the rest of Asia including the South Sea Islands will be at our feet. That these injunctions have not been carried out even now, is a crime of your humble servants.

In history the people living in Kirin, Fengtien and part of Heilungkiang, are called Sushan. They are now scattered along the sea coast and in the basins of the Amur and Tumen rivers. They were known as Kulai, Sushan, Hueibei, Palou, Wotsu, Fuyu, Kitan, Pohai and Nuchen at different stages of history. They were of a mixed race. The forefathers of the Manchurian dynasty also began in this vicinity. They gained control of Kirin, first, and then firmly established themselves in China for 300 years. If we want to put into effect our Continental Policy, we have to note this historical fact and proceed to establish ourselves in this region first also. Hence the necessity of the Kirin-Hueining Railway.

Whether the terminus of Kirin-Hueining Line be at Chingchin or Lochin or even Hsiungchi, we are free to decide according to circumstances. From the standpoint of national defence at present, Lochin seems the ideal harbour and terminus. Eventually it will be the best harbour in the world. On the one hand it will ruin Vladivostok, and on the other it will be the center of the wealth of Manchuria and Mongolia. Moreover, Dairen is as yet not our own territory. While Manchuria is yet not a part of our empire, it is difficult to develop Dairen. That being the case, we shall be in a precarious situation in time of war. The enemy could blockade the Tsushima and Senkaku Straits, and we will be cut off from the supplies of Manchuria and Mongolia. Not having the resources there at our command we will be vanquished, especially as England and the United States have worked hand in hand to limit our action in every possible direction. For the sake of self-preservation and of giving warning to China and the rest of the world, we must fight America some time. The American Asiatic Squadron stationed in the Philippines is but within a stone's throw from Tsushima and Senkaku. If they send submarines to these quarters, our supply of food-stuff and raw materials from Manchuria and Mongolia will be cut off entirely. But if the Kirin-Hueining Railway is completed, we shall have a large circuit line through all Manchuria and Korea, and a small circuitine through North Manchuria. We shall have access in all direction gaining freedom for the transportation of soldiers and supplies alike. When our

supplies are transported through this line to our ports at Tsuruga and Niigata, enemy submarines will have no way of getting into the Japanese and Korean straits. We are then entirely free from interference. This is what is meant by making the Japanese Sea the center of our national defence. Having secured the free transportation of food and raw materials, we shall have nothing to fear either from the American navy because of its size, or the Chinese or Russian army because of their number. Incidentally, we shall be in a position to suppress the Koreans. Let me reiterate the fact that if we want to carry out the New Continental Policy, we must build this line. Manchuria and Mongolia are the undeveloped countries in the East. Over this territory we shall have to go war with Soviet Russia sooner or later. The battle ground will be Kirin.

When we carry out the third step of Meiji's plans with regard to China, we shall have to do the following things:—

1. Mobilise the army divisions in Fukuoka and Hiroshima, and send them to South Manchuria via Korea. This will prevent the northern advance of Chinese soldiers.
2. Send the army divisions in Nagoya and Kwansei by sea to Chingchin, and thence to North Manchuria via the Kirin-Hueining Line.
3. Send the army in Kwantung through Niigata to Chingchin or Lochin, and thence by Kirin-Hueining Line to North Manchuria.
4. Send the army divisions in Hokkaido and Sendai to embark the ship at Aomori and Hakodate, and sail for Vladivostok and thence, via the Siberian Railway, to Harbin. Then they can descend on Fengtien, seize Mongolia and prevent Russian forces from coming south.
5. Finally these divisions in all directions will meet and form themselves in two large armies. On the south, they will keep Shanhaikuan and close it against the northern advance of Chinese forces; on the north, they will defend Tsitsihar against the southern advance of the Russians. In this way we shall have all the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia at our command. Even if the war should be prolonged for ten years, we need have no fear for the lack of supplies.

Let us now analyze once more the Kirin-Hueining Railway from the standpoint of its access from our ports.

First with Chingchin as starting point:

1. To Vladivostok — 130 miles
2. To Tsuruga — 475 miles
3. To Moji — 500 miles
4. To Nagasaki — 650 miles
5. To Fusan — 500 miles

Second take Tsuruga as the port of entry and compare it with Dairen. In this case we should consider it from the point of view of Osaka as industrial center.

1. From Changchun to Osaka via Lochin, the distance is 406 miles by land and 475 miles by sea. In point of time the route will take 51 hours.
2. From Changchun to Osaka via Dairen and Kobe, the distance is 535 miles by land and 870 miles by sea. In point of time it takes 92 hours.

If Tsuruga instead of Dairen is made the connecting link, there is a saving of 41 hours. Calculated at the rate of 30 miles an hour on land and 12 miles an hour by sea, we can use fast boats and trains and cut the time in half.

Manchuria and Mongolia are the Belgium of the Far East. In the Great War, Belgium was the battlefield. In our wars with Russia and the United States, we must also make Manchuria and Mongolia suffer the ravages. As it is evident that we have to violate the neutrality of these territories, we cannot help building the Kirin-Hueining and Changchun-Talai Railways in order that we may be militarily prepared. In time of war we can easily increase our forces and in time of peace we can easily increase our forces and in time of peace we can migrate thousands upon thousands of people into this region and work on the rice fields. This line offers the key to economic development as well as to military conquests.

In undertaking the Kirin-Hueining Railway, it is necessary to take advantage of the dry season and finish it at one stretch. The mountains it must go through are all granite. The tunneling would need modern and up-to-date machines. As to the sleepers and ballast and ballast required, there is an abundance all along the line. Limestone and clay for making tiles and brick are also to be had for the taking. Only rails, cars and locomotives have to be brought in. The cost of construction could therefore be reduced at least thirty per cent and the time required forty per cent.

Now, let us look into the economic interests along this line. According to the careful investigations of our General Staff and the South Manchuria Railway, the total reserve of timber is 200,000,000 tons. If one million ton is fallen and imported to our country each year, it will last two hundred years. This will stop the import of American timber which has been costing us Yen 80,000,000 to Yen 100,000,000 a year. Although our information is reliable we cannot make

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 24, 1931

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it known to the world; for if China or Russia learns that we get so much timber from America, they would try to interfere with the construction of this line. Or else, the United States may buy from the Fengtien Government all the timber rights on the one hand to protect their own trade with us; on the other, to control the monopoly and incidentally kill our paper industry.

Kirin was known as the "ocean of trees" even in the days of Emperor Chien-Lung. Added to the original forests are the growths in the intervening years since that time. Imagine the vastness of the resources! To transport this timber from Kirin to Osaka via Changchun and Dairen, there is a distance of 1,385 miles. For every cubic foot, we have to spend 34 cents. Because of this high cost of transportation, we cannot compete with the United States. If the Kirin-Hueining Line is completed, the distance is reduced to about 700 miles. We can then ship timber to Osaka at the low rate of 13 cents per cubic foot. We can certainly defeat the timber from the United States then. Supposing we calculate the profit at Yen 5.00 per ton of timber and supposing there are two billion tons of timber, the construction of the railway will bring to us the easy profit of 10 billion yen. Besides, we will bar the import of American timber into our country. Furthermore, the industry of furniture making, paper manufacture and other usages which the cheap timber makes possible will add 20 million yen more to our country's annual income.

There is also the Hsin Chin coal mine, which has a reserve of 600,000,000 tons of coal. The quality of this coal is superior to that of Fushun coal, easy to excavate and suitable for the extraction of petroleum, agricultural fertilizers and other chemical by-products which we may both use at home and sell in China. There are numerous other advantages which will come to us from the building of the Kirin-Hueining Railway. It is all gain without labour. The coal will supplement the Fushun collieries. With both coal mines in our control, we hold the key to the industries of all China. Speaking of the Hsin Chin coal, we shall reap a profit of Yen 5.00 on each ton when it is shipped to Japan. With additional chemical by-products, we shall reap a profit of Yen 16.00 from each ton of coal. Taking an average profit of Yen 15.00 a ton, the total profit will amount to 200 billion yen. All this comes as a by-product from the operation of the Kirin-Hueining Railway. There are, besides, the gold mines along the Mutan River. The acquired rights of the South Manchuria Railway in the gold mines of Chia-Pi-kou in the province of Kirin and the timber in its neighbourhood will all be within reach of exploitation once the Kirin-Hueining line is in operation.

In the vicinity of Tunhua the agricultural products such as oats, wheat, millet and kaoliang, yield an annual output of over a million catties. There are twenty distilleries of wines, thirty oil mills yielding an annual output of about 600,000 catties of oil and 600,000 of bean cakes, besides many places for making vermicelli. All these will depend upon the new railway. The trade along this road may be estimated at 4 million yen a year. The transportation charges of farm products alone will not only defray the running expenses, but also yield a net profit of Yen 200,000 a year. Including the profit from timber, coal and its by-products transported by the railway, we can safely count on a profit of Yen 8,000,000 a year. Besides, there are indirect benefits such as the strengthening of the South Manchuria Railway, the acquisition of rights over forests, mines and trade as well as the migration of large numbers of our people into North Manchuria. Above all, is the shortening of distance between Japan and the resources of wealth in North Manchuria. It only takes three hours from Chingchin to Hueining, three hours from Hueining to Sanfeng and three hours more from Tumen river to Lung-Ching-Tsun. In 60 hours we can reach the wealth of North Manchuria. Hence the Kirin-Hueining Railroad alone can enable us to tap the immense wealth of North Manchuria.

4. *Hunchun-Hailin Railway.* This is 173 miles long and costs Yen. 24,000,000. All along this line are thick forests. In order to strengthen the Kirin-Hueining Railway and to exploit the forests and mines in North Manchuria, this line is needed. In order to transfer the prosperity of Vladivostok to Hueining, this line is also urgently needed. The greatest hope for prosperity, however, is the fact that south of Naining and north of Tunhua there is Lake Ching Po which can be used to generate electric power. With this electric power, we shall have control over the agricultural and industrial undertakings of the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia. No amount of China's agitation can matter in the least to our industrial developments. According to the investigations of the South Manchuria Railway, the water power in the lake can generate at least 800,000 horse-power. With such an enormous quantity of electric power, the industrial conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia can be easily accomplished. In the neighbourhood of this immense power plant, there will be phenomenal growth of wealth. We must build this railway quickly, in order to provide facilities for transportation. Lake Hsing Kai, which is owned jointly by China and Russia, can also be developed for the generation of electricity. In order that these two countries may not com-

bine to frustrate our plans, we should introduce a resolution in the International Conference of Electrical Engineering to be held in Tokyo this year, to the effect that in the same area of electricity supply there should not be two power plants. Besides, in the vicinity of Niigata and Hailin, the Oju Paper Mill has acquired extensive rights of lumbering. They need the immediate establishment of the power plant at Lake Chingpo and the early completion of the Hunchun-Hailin Railway in order to bring to the factory at home the raw materials growing wild in Mongolia.

Moreover, the reason that the Feng-Kirin-Wuchang Railway and the Kirin-Hueining authorities intend to build the Wuchang Railway and the Kirin-Mukden Railway, with Hulutao or Tientsin as sea-port, is that they want to recover to themselves the wealth of North Manchuria. By building the Hunchun-Hailin Railway we shall not only strengthen the Kirin-Hueining Railway, but also defeat the Chinese scheme and draw the wealth of Manchuria to Chingchin harbour. The transportation charges will be two-thirds less compared with the Chinese line and one-third less compared with the Siberian line. They cannot compete with us. Our victory is a foregone conclusion.

The total trade in Manchuria is seven or eight billion yen a year, all of which is in our hands. The business we do in wool, cotton, soybeans, bean cakes, and iron, forms one-twentieth of the total volume of world trade. And it is steadily increasing. But the Namihaya Machi at Dairen (the wealthiest street in the city) is still in Chinese possession. The sad story goes further. Oil is a basic industry in Manchuria. We control only 6 percent of it. Of the 38 oil mills in Ying'ow, there is not one Japanese; of the 20 oil miles in Antung there is only one Japanese and of the 82 or 83 oil mills in Dairen there are only seven owned by Japanese. This is by no means an optimistic outlook for us. In order to recover the lost ground, we must first of all develop transportation. Then, by securing a monopoly on both finished products and raw materials, we shall be able to gain the upper-hand eventually. Furthermore, we ought to assist our people in oil business by extending to them financial credit, so that the oil industry of the Chinese will be forced out of the market. There are many Chinese on Kawaguchi Machi in Osaka who are dealers of our manufactured goods in Mongolia and Manchuria. They are strong competitors of our own business men in China. Our people are greatly handicapped because of their high standard of living which compels them to figure at a higher percentage of profit. On the other hand, the Chin-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Although the products of Manchuria and Mongolia may go through any of the three ports, Dairen, Yingko and Antung, nevertheless Dairen holds the key to the situation. Every year 7,200 ships pass through this port with a total tonnage of 11,565,000 tons. This represents 70 percent of the total trade of Manchuria and Mongolia. Fifteen navigations routes radiate out from it with definite sailing schedule. Most of it is coastal sailing. We have in our grasp the entire transportation system of Manchuria and Mongolia. The monopoly sale of Manchuria's special products will eventually come into our hands. When that come true, we can develop our oceanic transportation in order to defeat both Yingko and Antung. Then, the large quantities of beans which the central and southern parts of China consume, will depend upon us entirely. Moreover, the Chinese are an oil eating people. In time of war, we can cut off their oil-supply and the life of the whole country will become miserable. Bean-cakes are important as fertilizers for the cultivation of rice. If we have control of the source of supply as well as the means of transportation, we shall be able to increase our pro-

For all these considerations, the development of ocean transportation becomes the more necessary. The Dairen Kisen Kaisha Company should be enlarged, and our government should extend to it loans at low interest through the South Manchuria Railway Company. By next year, we should complete 50,000 tons of new

3. With the silver standard in existence, the Chinese Government can increase their notes to counteract our gold notes. Consequently, our banks will fail to carry out the mission of extending our country's influence.

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4. If the gold standard is adopted, we can issue gold notes freely. With the credit of the gold notes, we can acquire rights in real property and natural resources and defeat the credit of the Chinese silver notes. The Chinese will be unable to compete with us; and the currency of the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia will be in our control.

5. The Government Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, the Bank of Communications, the Frontier Development Bank and the General Credit & Finance Corporation have in circulation silver notes amounting to 38,000,000 dollars. Their reserve funds in the form of buildings and goods are estimated at 1,350,000 dollars. It is natural that the Chinese notes should depreciate. It is only by acts of the Government that these notes are still in circulation. Until we have entirely discredited the Chinese silver notes, we will never place our gold notes in their proper place in Manchuria and Mongolia, much less obtain the monopoly in currency and finance of these two countries. With the depreciated and inconvertible silver notes, the government of the Three Eastern Provinces buys all kinds of products, thus threatening our vested interests. When they sell these products, they demand gold from us which they keep for the purpose of wrecking our financial interests including our trade rights in special products. For these reasons, our gold notes are having a harder time and a gold standard for currency becomes the more urgently necessary.

In view of the above-mentioned considerations, we must overthrow Manchuria's inconvertible silver notes and divest the government of its purchasing power. Then we can extend the use of our gold notes in the hope of dominating the economic and financial activities of Manchuria and Mongolia. Furthermore, we can compel the authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces to employ Japanese financial advisers to help us gain supremacy in financial matters. When the Chinese notes are overthrown, our gold notes will take their place.

Encourage Investment From A Third Power

It has been our traditional policy to exclude from Manchuria and Mongolia investments of a third Power. But since the Nine Power Treaty is based on the principle of equal opportunity for all, the underlying principle of the International Consortium which regards Manchuria and Mongolia as outside its sphere becomes anachronistic. We are constantly under the watchful eyes of the Powers, and every step that we take arouse suspicion. That being the case, we better invite foreign investments in such enter-

prise as the development of electric power or the manufacture of alkali. By using American and European capital, we can further our plans for the development of Manchuria and Mongolia. By so doing, we shall allay international suspicion and clear the way for larger plans on the one hand and induce the Powers to recognize the fact of our special position in that country on the other. We should welcome any power wishing to make investment, but we must not allow China to deal with the leading countries at her will. As we are anxious that the Powers recognize the fact of our special position in Manchuria and Mongolia in political as well as economical affairs, we are obliged to intervene and share all responsibilities with her. To make this a customary practice in diplomatic dealings, is another important policy for us.

The Necessity of Changing The Organization of the South Manchuria Railway

The South Manchuria Railway Company functions in Manchuria as the Governor-General of Korea did there before the annexation. In order to build up our new Continental Empire, we must change the organization of that Company so as to break away from the present difficulties. The functions of this Company are varied and important. Every change of Cabinet involves a change of the administration of the South Manchuria Railway, and conversely every activity of the South Manchuria Railway also has important consequences on the Cabinet. This is because the South Manchuria Railway is semi-governmental, with final authority resting in the Cabinet. For this reason, the Powers invariably look upon this railway as a purely political organ rather than a business enterprise. Whenever a new move is made for the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, the Powers would invoke the Nine Power Treaty to thwart the plans of the South Manchuria Railway. This has greatly damaged the interests of our empire.

Considered from the point of view of domestic administration, the South Manchuria Railway is subject to a quadruple control. There are the Governor of Kwantung, the Chief Executive of Dairen, the Consul-General at Mukden, besides the President of the South Manchuria Railway itself. These four officers must meet and exchange views at Dairen before anything is undertaken. What is discussed in the meeting held in camera often leaks out to the Chinese authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces. They in turn would try to obstruct any forward movements of the South au-

thorization, it again has to run the gauntlet at the Departments of Foreign Affairs, of Railways, of Finance and of Army. If these ministers do not agree, the matter is dropped. Therefore, although the present prime minister realizes his own incompetence, he has nevertheless taken concurrently the portfolio of foreign affairs, so that our movements in Manchuria may be kept confidential and the execution of our plans may be swift and decisive. On account of these reasons, the South Manchuria Railway should be radically re-organized. All appurtenant enterprises which are profit-making should be made independent companies under the wings of the South Manchuria Railway, so that we may take determined steps on the conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia. On the other hand, Chinese, Europeans and Americans should be invited to invest money in the South Manchuria Railway on the condition that we have a plurality of its stocks. In that event the control of the Company is in our hands, and our mission from the empire can be discharged more vigorously. In short, by inviting international participation in the South Manchuria Railway, we can blind the eyes of the world. Having achieved that, we can push our advance in Manchuria and Mongolia at our will, free ourselves from the restraint of the Nine Power Treaty and strengthen our activities in that country with foreign capital.

The important appurtenant enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway are:—

1. Iron and Steel

Iron and steel are closely connected with national development. Every country today attaches great importance to it. But because of the lack of ores, we have found no solution to this problem. Hitherto we have had to import steel from the Yangtze Valley and the Malay Peninsula. But according to a secret survey of our General Staff, a wealth of iron mines are found in many places in Manchuria and Mongolia. A conservative estimate of the reserve is 10 billion tons. At first when there was a lack of technique, the Anshan Iron and Steel Works was involved in an annual loss of Yen 3,000,000. Later, new methods were discovered, and the technique developed so that during 1926 the loss was only Yen 150,000 and a year later there was a profit of Yen 800,000. If the furnace is improved, we ought to earn at least Yen 4,000,000 a year. The quality of the ore at Penhsihu is excellent. By amalgamating it with the Anshan Iron Works, we shall have the comfort of being self-sufficient in iron and steel.

The iron deposits in Manchuria and Mongolia are estimated at 1,200,000,000 tons; and coal deposits, 2,500,000,000 tons. This coal ought to be sufficient for smelting the iron ores. With such large amounts of iron and coal at our disposal, we ought to be self-sufficient for at least seventy years. At the rate of \$100.00 profit on each ton of steel, for 350,000,000 tons of steel we shall have a profit of Yen 35,000,000,000. This is a tremendous asset to our economic resources. We shall save the expense of Yen 120,000,000 which we pay for the importation of steel every year. When we can have sufficient iron and steel for our own industries, we shall have acquired the secret for becoming the leading nation in the world. Thus strengthened, we can conquer both the East and the West. In order to attain this goal, the iron works must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway. Such unified control will keep China from preventing us to become self-sufficient in iron and steel.

2. Petroleum

Another important commodity which we lack is petroleum. It is also essential to the existence of a nation. Fortunately, there lie in the Fushun Coal Mine 5,200,000,000 tons of shale oil, from every hundred cattles of which six cattles of crude oil may be extracted. By means of American Machinery, every hundred cattles will yield nine cattles of refined oil good for motor cars and battleships. At present, Japan imports from foreign countries 700,000 tons of mineral oils every year valued at Yen 60,000,000. These figures are on the increase. As there are 50 billion tons of shale in the Fushun Mines, the yield calculated at five percent would be 250,000,000 tons; at nine percent, 450,000,000 tons of oil. Taking an average of the two, the yield would be 350,000,000 tons, and assuming the value of the oil to be fifteen yen a ton, the oil shale contained in the Fushun Mine would bring us Yen 2,250,000,000. This will be a great industrial revolution for us. From the standpoint of national defence and national wealth, petroleum is a great factor. Having the iron and petroleum of Manchuria, our army and navy will become impregnable walls of defence. That Manchuria and Mongolia are the heart and liver of our empire, is a truthful saying. For the sake of our empire, we should be congratulated.

Agricultural Fertilizer--Ammonia Sulphate and other Products

Agricultural fertilizer is a great necessity for the production of food-stuff. Chemical fertilizers depend upon the ammonia sulphate extracted from coal. The Fushun coal yields especially good results. At present, our total consumption of ammonia sulphate is 500,000

tons. Of this, only half is manufactured at home, using the coal from the Kailan or the Fushun Mining Companies. The remaining half is imported from abroad at the cost of Yen 35,000,000 a year. With our agricultural work daily increasing and in view of the development of our new empire in Manchuria and Mongolia, we shall easily need 1,000,000 tons of ammonia sulphate every year during the next ten years. From the soot gathered from the burning of Fushun coal connected with the manufacture of steel, we could produce large quantities of ammonia sulphate. If the yield is put at 300,000 tons a year, we shall add an annual income of more than Yen 40,000,000. In fifty years, this will mount up to Yen 2,000,000,000. This money could be used for the improvement of our agriculture. If there is any surplus, we can buy bean-cakes with it and then invade the farms all over China and in the South Sea Islands. In order to accomplish this, we must separate this enterprise from the South Manchuria Railway. We shall then be able to control the fertilizers of the Far East.

Soda and Soda Ash

We import 100,000 tons of Soda Ash at the cost of more than Yen 10,000,900 a year. Both soda and soda ash are valuable materials for military and industrial purposes. Soda is derived from nothing more than salt and coal, both of which are cheap and abundant in Manchuria and Mongolia. If we go into this manufacture, we can supply not only ourselves but can also sell it to China with a view to controlling its industrial products. We ought to gain from it a profit of at least Yen 15,000,000 a year. We can also supply our own military and chemical needs. Again this industry must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway.

Magnesium and Aluminium

According to the independent surveys of the South Manchuria Railway Company and Dr. Honta of Tohoku University, magnesite and aluminium is a very promising business (in Manchuria). Magnesite is found in the surroundings of Tashichiao, and aluminium in the vicinity of Yentai. The deposit is one of the largest in the world. A ton of magnesite is worth Yen 2,000 and a ton of aluminium is worth about Yen 1,700. An estimate of the deposits of both minerals in Manchuria is Yen 750,000,000. These substances are especially useful for making aeroplanes, mess kits in the army, hospital apparatus and vessels, and other important industries. The United States alone has extensive deposits of these substances. The output of our country is one ton

a year! Such materials are becoming more useful every day, but the supply is insufficient. Its price is growing high, as if never reaching a limit. The deposits in our territory of Manchuria and Mongolia, are nothing less than a God-given gift. This metal is really precious, being indispensable to both our industry and national defence. It also should be made in independent business, separate from the South Manchuria Railway. Its manufacture should be in Japan, so as to keep the Fengtien Government from imitating it on the one hand and to avoid the watchful eyes of the British and American capitalists on the other. After we have gained control of it in the Three Eastern Provinces, we may harness the water power of the Yalu River to work on these metal ores. In view of the development of aircraft, in the future all the world will come to us for the materials necessary for aeronautics.

If all the enterprises mentioned above are made independent undertakings, they would make rapid progress and bring us at least a profit of 60 billion yen a year. The industrial development in South Manchuria means much to our national defence and economical progress. It will help us to build the foundation of an industrial empire. As to the cultural undertakings such as hospitals, schools and philanthropic institutions, they are our signal towers in the advance into Manchuria and Mongolia. They are the institutions for spreading our national prestige and power. More specifically, they are the baits for rights and privileges. Let us separate all these from the South Manchuria Railway in order that we may redouble our efforts and advance into North Manchuria to reclaim the sources of great wealth there.

When these important undertakings become independent and are free to develop without the interference of our officials, they will naturally become channels of national prosperity. On the wings of economic development, we could make rapid advance without either arousing the suspicion of the Powers or the anti-Japanese activities of the people of the Three Eastern Provinces. Such hidden methods would enable us to build the New Continent Empire with ease and efficiency.

The foreign loans for the South Manchuria Railway must be confined to those railroads already completed. Other railroads built by us but nominally under Chinese control, can either be amalgamated with the completed lines or made independent according to the desire of

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the investing nations. The slogan of "Equal Opportunity" helps us to get foreign loans as well as to dispel suspicion of our designs in North Manchuria. At any rate, we shall need foreign capital to develop our continental empire. When the South Manchuria Railway is open to foreign investments, the powers will be glad to lend more to us and China can do nothing to block it. This is an excellent way to further our plans in Manchuria. We should lose no time in doing it. As to the wealth concentrated in the northern part of Manchuria and Mongolia, we should be likewise. The two new railways from Kirin to Hueining and from Changchun to Talai, as well as the lumber and mining interests, should also be managed as separate institutions.

The South Manchuria Railway will also be greatly enriched by our exploits in North Manchuria. In undertaking this, we must permit foreign investment on the South Manchuria Railway so that any profit that it makes is shared by other nations. When they share in the profits, no one will interfere with our activities in North Manchuria. Already Chinese immigrants are pouring into South Manchuria in large numbers. Their position will become stronger every day. As the right of renting land in the interior is not yet secured, our immigrants are gradually losing ground. Even if our government's backing will maintain our people there, they cannot compete with the Chinese due to the latter's low standard of living. Our only chance now is to defeat the Chinese by heavy capitalization. This again necessitates the use of foreign loans. This is so, especially because the riches of North Manchuria are even not accessible to the Chinese immigrants. We must seize the present opportunity, and hasten the progress of immigration by our own people and take possession of all rights there so as to shut out the Chinese. But in order to encourage immigration, rapid transportation is essential. This will both afford facilities to our people and bring the natural resources there to the world market. Moreover, both Russia and ourselves have been increasing armaments. On account of geographical positions, we have conflicting interests. If we want to obtain the wealth of North Manchuria and to build up the New Continent according to the will of Emperor Meiji, we must rush our people into North Manchuria first and seek to break the friendship between Russia and China. In this way, we can enjoy the wealth of North Manchuria and hold at bay both Russia

and China. In case of war, our immigrants in North Manchuria will combine with our forces in South Manchuria, and at one stroke settle the problem forever. In case this is not possible, they can still maintain their own in North Manchuria and supply the rest of us with food-stuff and raw materials. As the interests of North Manchuria and our country are so wrapped up, we should march directly into North Manchuria and pursue our settled policy.

The Necessity of Establishing a Colonial Department

Our exploitation of Manchuria takes a variety of forms. Often those in authority take such different views that even the most profitable undertaking for our country cannot be carried out. Because of the lack of speed, our secrets are often exposed and are made propaganda materials by the Mukden government much to the detriment of our country in international relations. Whenever a new undertaking is projected in Manchuria and Mongolia, it will become the subject of discussion of tens of meetings and conferences in Dairen. Not only the approval of the four-headed government there is necessary, but also the sanction of the cabinet at home has to be secured before anything can be carried out. Because of all these obstacles, any undertaking will take months and months before any definite results are seen. In the process it is possible for the Chinese to employ Japanese adventurers to steal our secrets so that before a project is launched it is often reported to the Chinese and in turn it becomes common property of the world. We are suddenly brought under the check of world opinion, and more than once we have incurred hardship in putting into practice our policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia. Furthermore, the opposition party has also made capital out of what they find in these regions in order to attack the government. All these have many serious have with our diplomatic relations. Henceforth, we must change our practice in order to proceed adroitly. The centre of control must be in Tokyo. That will (1) insure secrecy, (2) stop China from knowing before-hand our plans, (3) avoid the suspicion of the powers before a thing is done, (4) unify the multiple control in Manchuria and (5) bring the government agencies in Manchuria and Mongolia in close touch with the central government so as to deal with China with undivided power. For these reasons we should follow the original plan for absorbing Korea laid down by Ito and Katsura and establish a Colonial Depart-

ment, the special function of which is to look after the expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia. The administration of Formosa, Korea and Saghalien Island may be its nominal function, but our expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia is its real purpose. This will blind the eyes of the world on the one hand and forestall the disclosure of secrets on the other.

It is my personal conviction that the fact that the absorption of Korea could not be effected during the administration of Ito, is due to the lack of a special office for control. Therefore, there were always differences of opinion and secret policies were impossible. Such a state of affairs played into the hand of international obstruction and Korean opposition. Then a number of propagandists went to Europe and America as well as Korea itself, declaring that we firmly respected the independence of Korea and had no designs on an inch of Korean territory. The result of their work was the recovery of international confidence. After that, a colonial department was established under the pretence of Formosa. Then we seized the opportunity and the object was gained! It goes to prove that in order to undertake colonization and immigration, a special office for it is absolutely necessary. Moreover, the creation of a new empire in Mongolia and Manchuria is of utmost importance to the existence of Japan. It is necessary to have a special colonial office in order that the politics in that vast territory may be controlled from Tokyo. The officers in the field should only take orders: they should not interfere with the execution of policies where they please. This will insure secrecy; and the opposition nation have no chance of getting into the secrets of our colonial activities. Then our movements regarding Mongolia and Manchuria will be beyond the reach of international public opinion, and we shall be free from interferences.

As to the subsidiary enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway such as the Development Company, the Land Company, and the Trust Company, the power of supervision and planning should also be in the colonial office. They should all be under united control, in order that they may all help in the general policy of expansion in Mongolia and Manchuria of the Imperial Government and complete the creation of the new empire.

Taling River Valley on Peking-Mukden Railway

The Taling River Valley is a wide area sparsely populated but infested with bandits. Many Koreans have made investments here, especially in rice field. Judging from its resources, this region

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

is bound to be prosperous. It will also be an advantageous foothold for us if we want to expand into the Jehol region. We should give full protection to our Korean subjects here and wait for an opportunity to secure from China the right of colonization so that our immigrants may live here and act as our vanguards to Jehol and Mongolia. In case of warfare, this valley will be a strategic point to quarter large armies of soldiers. We shall then not only check the Chinese soldiers from advancing north but also hold the key to the immense wealth of South Manchuria. When Koreans come into this region we should finance them through our Trust and other financial organs with a view to gaining for these organs the actual ownership while the Koreans may satisfy themselves with the right of farming only. Ostensibly the ownership of land must reside with the Koreans. It is a convenient way of securing rights from the Chinese government. Henceforth the trust companies and financial organs should give them full backing when our own and Korean subjects wish to gain land ownership. If they need money to buy farms from the Chinese, the financial organs should also come to their aid. Unnoticeably we shall gain control of the better rice fields which we may give to our own emigrants.

They shall displace the Koreans who in turn may go on opening new fields, to deliver to the convenient use of our own people. This is the policy with respect to the colonization of rice field and bean farms. As to the policy for herd farming, the Development Company should be especially entrusted gradually to expand, eventually placing all the wealth of herds at the disposal of our country. This same company may also take care of horse breeding and select the best out of Mongolia for the use of our national defence.

Precaution against Chinese Migration

Recently the internal disturbances in China have driven large hordes of immigrants into Mongolia and Manchuria, thereby threatening the advance of our migration. For the sake of our activities in this field we should not fail to take precautions. The fact that the Chinese government welcomes this migration and does nothing to hold back the tide oppresses our policy even the more seriously. A noted American sinologue has made the statement that the Mukden authorities are carrying out such effective government that all people are moving into their territory. Therefore, the influx of immigrants is looked upon as a mark of effective government of Mukden authorities. We, of

course, are concerned. Unless we put a stop to it, in less than ten years our own policy of emigration will prove an instrument for China to crush us with. Politically we must use police force to check this tendency as much as possible and economically our financiers should drive the Chinese out with low wages. Furthermore, we must develop and expand electric power to displace human labor. This will keep out Chinese immigrants as well as monopolize the control of motor force as a first step toward controlling the industrial development of this vast region.

Hospitals and Schools

Hospitals and Schools in Manchuria must be independent of the South Manchuria Railway. For the people have often considered these as institutions of imperialism and refuse to have anything to do with them. When these are separated and made independent institutions we shall be able to make the people realize our goodness so that they will feel thankful to us. But in establishing schools emphasis should be laid on normal schools for men and women. Through these in educational work we may build up a substantial good-will among the people towards Japan. This is our first principle of cultural structure.

An Appeal to an American Senator

A TELEGRAM SENT TO SENATOR BORAH BY LEADERS OF SHANGHAI CHINESE COMMUNITY

Senator Borah, Washington, D. C.

Greetings. In midst of our most difficult campaign against communist bandits, and our catastrophic floods in sixteen provinces most seriously affecting more than 16,000,000 of our people, and shortly after assurances of friendship by minister Shigemitsu recently presenting his credentials in Nanking, the militarists in Japan on Sept. 19th deliberately broke Kellogg Peace Pact, and altogether unprovoked and in a lightening fashion poured Japanese troops into Manchuria, disarmed Chinese troops, drove away Chinese police, killed Chinese civilians, bombarded Chinese arsenal, seized Chinese radio station, telegraph administration, and railway communications and

occupied Chinese government headquarters in Mukden. Japanese forces have occupied and are now controlling strategic centers of Changchun, Mukden, Antung, and Yingkow, virtually controlling entire south Manchuria. Repeating her strategy successfully used in foreign, by threat of war, China's acceptance of Twenty-one Demands in 1915, Japan announced she would not tolerate friendly mediation in order fully and freely to carry out her exploiting designs on Manchuria and Mongolia. Thus far, our people and especially Chinese leaders and troops in Manchuria are straining themselves under self-control. We sincerely appeal to you and through you the American Government and people for your understanding and sympathy in our advocacy of and determined fight for justice, righteousness and peace in Far East. (Sept. 21.)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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INDUSTRIAL BANK

Capital\$10,000,000

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Facilities for development of industry
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
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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
標題醒目...故時間經濟
提綱絜領...故腦力經濟
報價低廉...故費用經濟

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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
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By Milton O. Huntzsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY



MEMORANDUM OF ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
THE COUNSELOR OF THE JAPANESE EMBASSY, MR. SOTOMATSU KATO.

Publication of Correspondence.

Mr. Kato came to my house at 9:15 this morning. I told him that I had sent for him because I understood that the Japanese Ambassador was away in Cuba, and I asked him how long the Ambassador would be gone. Mr. Kato replied that the Ambassador would probably be gone about ten days.

I told him that I was sending to the Senate all of the written correspondence, including the formal notes and the unofficial memoranda, which had passed between the two governments, and that these would undoubtedly become public in that way, sooner or later; that it might not be for some days, but I did not know. I said that the Senate had requested the papers, and reminded him that I had told Ambassador Debuchi in November that I must reserve the right to make public this correspondence, if necessary, and that now, on this request of the Senate, the occasion seemed to have come. He said he remembered that.

I told Mr. Kato that I had been over the papers very carefully myself and saw nothing which, so far as I could

tell,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

tell, would be embarrassing to have published now in
regard to their connection with the immediate relations
of the two governments.

HLS.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated January 22, 1932

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

107, January 22, 1932

Following from Lieutenant Brown at Mukden:

"Preparations being made Tsitsihar for increase in Japanese forces there, commanding officer states necessary in order to clear bandits. Chinese forces recently brought there from the South now withdrawn. Control Koshan Railway reported purchased from ~~directions~~ ^{own} by the Japanese for two million yen.

Through Railway traffic operating Tsitsihar to Mukden via Taonan with a mixed Chinese-Japanese staff and equipment which it is planned to use competition channels. This line guarded by the Japanese and a new Chinese army, Meng Ning special army, Japanese equipped. Outstanding impression gained was the degree of understanding which has apparently been reached by the Japanese and Chinese military in that area".

WSB_HPD

JOHNSON

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

JAN 22 1932

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Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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JANUARY 21 1932.

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

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Sir:

I desire to convey to you an expression of my appreciation of the earnest and efficient services which you and the members of your staff rendered in connection with the negotiations arising out of the Sino-Japanese controversy in Manchuria. The suddenness of the crisis and the extremely delicate character of the negotiations which ensued intensified the strain under which you worked. I particularly wish to assure you of the Department's appreciation of the thoroughness with which you kept it informed of developments, and of your prompt and untiring response to its instructions during those difficult weeks.

Please convey to the members of your staff an expression of my sincere appreciation of their loyal efforts.

Very truly yours,

HENRY D. STIMSON

Jan. 18 CR
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

RECEIVED
JAN 22 1932
DIVISION OF

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated January 22, 1932

Rec'd 10:30 am

Secretary of State,

Washington

January 22, 6 pm.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My telegram of January 21, 5 p.m., last sentence.

Chairman of Shanghai Municipal Council called on me
this morning and informed me that he intended to call
once on the Japanese Admiral and request him to arrange to
preserve order at the Japanese mass meeting tomorrow after-
noon. I told him emphatically that the Japanese Consul
was the one who should be consulted rather than the Admiral
that it was better for the police to handle the situation
if possible and I strongly suggested that he consult with
the Japanese Consul General and leave it to the latter to
determine whether to call on the Japanese military. I told
him also that if conditions become such as to render it
impossible for the Municipal Council including the volunteers
to control the situation I thought the Council should apply
to the

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 22 1932
Department of State
1 day to
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MET

2-from Shanghai via N.R., January
22, 6 pm.

to the Senior Consul for the assistance of all the powers. He said he believed it would be better to have the Japanese meet an emergency and if there were any shooting for them to do it rather than the Shanghai Municipal Council. I thought that in my opinion the Shanghai Municipal Council was better qualified to handle the situation than the Japanese military. That if it became a question of handling a Chinese mob the police would delay firing longer and possibly would be able to handle the situation. After some further remarks the Chairman stated that he would call on the Japanese Consul General and ask him to use his best offices to preserve order at the meeting and would later call on the Japanese Admiral and express the hope that he would work in coordination with the Japanese Consul General.

Press reports today that Japanese Admiral issued a statement that in case the Mayor fails to comply with the demands of the Japanese Consul General in connection with various anti-Japanese cases he, the Admiral, would take appropriate steps to protect the rights and interest of Japan.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB-KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,
January 25, 1932.

AMCONSUL

SHANGHAI (CHINA)

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

Your January 23, 6 p.m.

One. The Department approves the interpretation placed by you upon the functions and responsibilities of (a) the Shanghai Municipal Council, (b) the Consular Body and (c) the various powers concerned in relation to the administration of the International Settlement, in connection with the problems presented by the current situation at Shanghai. The Department also approves the action taken by you and commends you for your prompt and able handling of the situation. Such interpretation and action conform with the Department's existing instructions (see Department's telegram to Legation No. 47, February 5, 1930, 6 p.m., circularized as enclosure to Legation's circular No. 7, February 14, 1930, section three, in reference to the International Settlement), which were based upon the international character of the International Settlement and were directed toward preserving the administrative integrity of that area..

Enciphered by

Two.

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138


Printed on Efficiency Records
M. O. D.

793.94/3606

793.94/3606

note
123 991

This cable was sent in confidential Code
It should be carefully paraphrased and
communicated to anyone.



1997

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

- 2 -

Two. Department regards insistence upon rights and
~~responsibilities~~ responsibilities of the Consular Body and the
Municipal Council in the field of administration as fully
warranted and constantly desirable.

Three. Repeat this telegram to Peiping and to Nanking.

Four.

Stimson

Five. Department will send special
instruction to Legation shortly in
relation to the above.

FE:JEJ/VDM

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1936 1-138

1998

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNDER SECRETARY

JAN 25 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 23, 1932.

Reference: Shanghai's Telegram of January 22, 6 p.m.

SMH:

I concur in the stand which Mr. Cunningham has taken in regard to the situation impending at Shanghai.

Whenever the maintenance of peace and order in the International Settlement at Shanghai appeared to be getting beyond the means at the disposal of the Municipal Council, the practice has been for the authorities of the Municipal Council to approach the Consular Body, through the Senior Consul, for advice and assistance. The Senior Consul thereupon consulted with his colleagues, who decided upon what should be done in the emergency. This decision usually took the form, in serious emergencies, of requesting the Senior Admiral present to consult with the other naval forces at Shanghai for the purpose of landing sailors and marines.

Prior to the Shanghai incident in 1925, serious emergencies seldom arose and no coordinated defense plan had been worked out. Subsequent to that date, however, the naval and military commanders at Shanghai in collaboration with the Settlement authorities worked out an elaborate defense plan for Shanghai.

If, therefore, a serious emergency now exists at Shanghai or if the Council feels that one is impending, the

793.94/3606

JAN 28 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the Chairman of the Council should by all means consult with the Senior Consul rather than directly with the Japanese Admiral, as ^{contemplated} in the present case. To do otherwise will, in my opinion, lead to the breaking down of the long-standing system of international control and cooperation in matters concerning the International Settlement of Shanghai. If this practice is to be destroyed, we shall soon find the Japanese taking over control of Shanghai as they have other parts of China and thus destroying forever its international status.

Correct.

Cunningham
did
well.


GJ/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 25 1932

January 19, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MANCHURIA SITUATION

JAN 21 1932

Rumor of Japanese Inquiries for Loans.

It is reported as a "Wall Street rumor" that the Japanese are feeling about with regard to the possibility of a loan either for the South Manchuria Railway or for Japanese enterprises in general in Manchuria.

No authentic information with regard to this has as yet, so far as I know, reached this Department. (Note: We have heard of an earlier effort to obtain a credit).

It is easily conceivable that something of this sort is going on. It is the estimate of officers of this Division that such an attempt on Japan's part would be logical, whether or not the Japanese inquirers expected to be successful -- as an essential part of an organized propaganda directed toward winning for Japan's position in Manchuria a favorable opinion in influential circles in this country.

This Division suggests that, in case inquiries or proposals in regard to a possible loan to Japan are brought to the attention of the Department, the inquirers be told that this Government is of the opinion that no encouragement should be given to such proposals pending the development of more satisfactory evidence than has yet appeared with regard to Japan's methods and intentions in the handling of the

Manchuria

F/DEW

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note
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MAY 14 1932

- 2 -

Manchuria problem.

(NOTE: Economic considerations - principal among which are the fact that Japan is "hard up" - give us a potential weapon in the diplomatic contest in which we are engaged which we should not hesitate cautiously but effectively to use. The success or failure of Japan's military venture will probably depend in the long run on commercial and financial factors. We can at least refrain from contributing toward the success of their venture those weapons which they at present most need.)

Approved
HVS

SKH/REK



PM RECD





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2155.

Paris, January 11, 1932.

JAN 22 32



F/DEW

793.94/3608

FILED

JAN 26 1932

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from December 22, 1931, to January 11, 1932, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

Walter E. Edge

Enclosures.....

- 2 -

Enclosures (single copy):

Clippings from the following newspapers:

December 22, 1931.

No. 1 - L'HUMANITE

December 25, 1931.

No. 2 - L'HUMANITE

3 - LE POPULAIRE

December 26, 1931.

No. 4 - L'HUMANITE

December 27, 1931.

No. 5 - L'HUMANITE

December 28, 1931.

No. 6 - L'HUMANITE

December 31, 1931.

No. 7 - L'HUMANITE

January 3, 1932.

No. 8 - L'HUMANITE

9 - LE JOURNAL

January 6, 1932.

No. 10 - L'HUMANITE

January 7, 1932.

No. 11 - L'HUMANITE

January 8, 1932.

No. 12 - L'HUMANITE

January 9, 1932.

No. 13 - L'AMI DU PEUPLE

14 - L'HUMANITE

15 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS

16 - LE POPULAIRE

January 10, 1932.

No. 17 - LE JOURNAL

18 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS

19 - LA REPUBLIQUE

January 11, 1932.

No. 20 - L'HUMANITE

21 - LE QUOTIDIEN

In quintuplicate.

710.

RS/jdk

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, December 22, 1931.

DÉFENDONS L'U.R.S.S. ET LES SOVIETS CHINOIS !

De nouveau la guerre fait rage en Mandchourie

*Pour briser le mouvement de masse
contre le brigandage impérialiste en Extrême-Orient
le gouvernement français
inculpe de complot contre la sûreté de l'Etat
les militants communistes dénonçant le rôle de la France*



Des ouvriers chinois antiimpérialistes viennent d'être arrêtés par les troupes japonaises qui, après les avoir brutalisés, les ont amenés, ligotés, à Moukden

La nouvelle offensive des troupes japonaises en Mandchourie se poursuit présentement. De nombreux combats sont livrés aux détachements antiimpérialistes. Des avions bombardèrent la ville de Tounghao, tuant et blessant de nombreuses personnes.

L'attaque a été déclenchée simultanément, nous l'avons déjà signalé, à l'ouest et au nord de Moukden, à Sypsinghaï, Chang-Tou, Koyren, Tich-Ling, Tehang-Tchia-Tun. Ce front de l'offensive japonaise est commandé par le général Mori et le but est « pour le Japon » de se rendre définitivement maître de toute la bande de territoire voisine de la Mongolie où la résistance des masses à l'occupation n'est pas encore brisée. La pénétration en Mongolie doit succéder à ces opérations de guerre.

Sur le front de King-Tchéou, l'offensive nippone n'est plus qu'une question de jours, peut-être d'heures. Le commandement général de l'armée d'occupation a décidé de « chasser les Chinois de Mandchourie ». Et l'agence Reuter communique que la prise de King-Tchéou est prévue pour avant Noël, jour où d'importants renforts arriveront encore. Le retrait des troupes chinoises au delà de la Grande-Muraille, est considéré comme imminent, laissant le champ libre aux forces japonaises.

De plus, les renforts japonais récemment envoyés à Tien-Tsin et Changhaï-Kouan sont une menace constante dans la Chine du Nord.

Un fait encore, qui démontre que l'impérialisme japonais considère désormais la Mandchourie comme son bien, c'est le départ de l'ex-ministre de la guerre japonais, le général Minami, pour la Mandchourie. Sa mission officielle est d'étudier les possibilités de prospection des puits et « de passer en revue les problèmes intéressant le nouveau gouvernement mandchou » (que l'on sait être entièrement soumis à Tokiol). Le principal de ces problèmes est le renforcement et l'extension des chemins de fer en Mandchourie et en Mongolie.

Les opérations de guerre de l'impérialisme français

Dans la Chine méridionale, malgré les démentis « inévitables » du gouvernement, les forces de l'impérialisme français continuent les incursions en territoire chinois et tout est prêt pour des opérations de guerre de grande envergure contre les Soviétiques chinois.

Les révélations de la presse étrangère ne sont pas sans gêner les bandits qui auraient voulu perpétrer leur mauvais coup à l'improviste. Mais les intérêts impérialistes qui s'opposent en Chine font que chacun des antagonistes ne veut laisser libre l'adversaire : le but recherché est l'action commune des impérialistes contre la révolution chinoise pour le dépècement du pays.

De son côté l'impérialisme français qui a tout mis en œuvre pour faire avalliser la guerre de conquête du Japon en Mandchourie, est disposé à tenter le coup de force qui doit le rendre maître des provinces méridionales. Le rassemblement de troupes coloniales à la frontière du Yunnan, au Kouangsi et les combats qui se sont déjà déroulés entre les forces opérant des incursions et les détachements de partisans rouges, constituent la première phase dans l'exécution du plan criminel de l'impérialisme français en Chine et contre l'Union soviétique.

Briand dément avec duplicité, mais le gouvernement s'emploie à renforcer la répression contre notre Parti communiste, dévoilant impitoyablement les projets sanglants de la bourgeoisie française, qui voit avec terreur s'approfondir la crise. C'est ainsi que l'on apprendait hier qu'un militant de Béziers venait d'être inculpé de complot contre la sûreté de l'Etat, pour avoir, en réunion publique, dénoncé le rôle et les plans de l'impérialisme français en Extrême-Orient à propos de la guerre en Mandchourie.

Cette inculpation honteuse, si elle confirme tout ce que nous avons dévoilé du rôle et des projets de l'impérialisme français dans les événements d'Extrême-Orient — pour le partage de la Chine et pour l'agression antisoviétique — montre aussi la crainte de la bourgeoisie devant le mouvement de masse croissant contre la guerre impérialiste, pour le soutien des Soviets chinois menacés, pour la défense de notre patrie socialiste.

Les canailles impérialistes veulent mater l'action organisée des travailleurs français pour pouvoir réaliser leurs projets d'intervention sanglante en Chine et de guerre contre l'U.R.S.S.

Une nouvelle ignominie de Vandervelde

Et, à ce propos, il nous faut dénoncer le rôle infâme des leaders de la II^e Internationale qui soutiennent de toutes leurs forces ces plans de guerre et de brigandage.

A l'heure où les campagnes redoublent dans la presse bourgeoise contre l'U.R.S.S., où le Japon s'installe en Mandchourie et va s'emparer de la Mongolie, à l'heure où la France impérialiste porte la guerre en Chine et que l'intervention des puissances contre la révolution chinoise pour le partage du pays est un fait incontestable, où la menace grandit contre l'U.R.S.S., la II^e Internationale s'engage à nouveau dans le défilé et M. Vandervelde se livre, dans la *Vie Socialiste*, à une agression nouvelle, mais plus odieuse encore que les précédentes contre la patrie socialiste des travailleurs.

« Mes sympathies, dit M. Vandervelde, vont à la Chine. » A quelle Chine ? A celle des coupeurs de tête. Le leader socialiste nous coule avec attendrissement que les membres du Kuomintang établis en Belgique lui ont témoigné leur gratitude. Suivent une série d'affirmations que l'on peut cataloguer dans le tableau suivant :

1^o Justification (décidément M. Vandervelde récidive) du coup de force japonais et insinuation criminelle contre les Soviets : « J'écrivais récemment qu'il était difficile de se défendre contre l'impression que, comme jadis les Russes et les Anglais en Perse, le gouvernement japonais et les Soviets étaient d'accord pour se partager la Mandchourie en zone d'influence. »

M. Vandervelde, d'ailleurs, falsifie son propre texte. C'est bien au Japon, et à lui seul, que, dans un article récent, il reconnaissait quelques titres à la conquête de la Mandchourie.

2^o Exaltation de la politique des dépeceurs français de la Chine : « Depuis le début, le président en exercice, M. Briand, n'a cessé de faire, en faveur de la paix, un effort d'autant plus courageux qu'à Paris de grosses difficultés s'efforcent de le contrecarrer. »

(Ces éloges s'adressent au gouvernement qui concentre à cette heure ses troupes à la frontière indochinoise et dans le Kouangsi.)

3^o Attaque vénimeuse contre l'U.R.S.S. : « Les Japonais, par des traités qu'ils ont dictés à la Chine, sont maîtres de la Mandchourie du Sud. Les Soviets en y mettant plus de forme ont le contrôle de la région du Nord. Pour être camouflé, leur impérialisme en définitive ne diffère pas de l'autre. »

Voilà comment le parti socialiste participe à la préparation idéologique de la guerre contre les ouvriers et les paysans de l'Union Soviétique.

Dans leur travail sans relâche au sein des masses ouvrières, nos camarades du Parti doivent dénoncer ce rôle abominable de la II^e Internationale et de ses leaders : Vandervelde, Blum, Grumbach, etc., etc.

Dans la lutte contre l'impérialisme français, les coups les plus rudes doivent être portés au social-impérialisme, son meilleur laquais.

M. MAGNIEN.

Hum. 25

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, December 25, 1931.

Défendons l'U. R. S. S.
et la Révolution chinoise

LE GOUVERNEMENT DE CANTON CONFIRME L'INCURSION DES TROUPES FRANÇAISES EN CHINE MÉRIDIONALE

Les forces japonaises
livrent de sanglants combats
dans le sud de la Mandchourie

Le sang coule en Mandchourie et l'impérialisme japonais affirme de nouveau sa volonté de poursuivre ses opérations de brigandage.

Les troupes japonaises livrent des combats incessants aux Chinois au nord et au Sud de Moukden. Les forces nippones ont occupé hier la citadelle de Tien-Ching-Tai et le fort de Nieu-Tchang. Près de Tching-Tchia-Toun, une escadrille d'avions japonais a bombardé des rassemblements de forces antiimpérialistes évaluées à environ 2.000 hommes; on estime les victimes à des centaines de morts et blessés.

Près de Tien-Ching-Tai (en direction de King-Tchéou), un train blindé japonais a attaqué un train blindé chinois. Après un combat à coups de canons et de mitrailleuses, les Japonais se retirèrent, mais revinrent à la charge avec un fort détachement d'infanterie et des pièces d'artillerie. Le combat dura plusieurs heures.

Un engagement s'est produit également entre les forces régulières chinoises et japonaises à Fakoumen, au nord de Moukden, à l'ouest du fleuve Lio-Ho.

Comme on voit — et les dépêches ne parlent que des engagements les plus sérieux — la guerre fait rage en Mandchourie. Par le fer et par le feu, l'impérialisme nippon poursuit l'occupation de territoires toujours plus étendus.

Et des renforts sont envoyés régulièrement sur le théâtre des opérations. En plus du porte-avion et du croiseur dont nous signalions le départ hier pour Port-Arthur, le cabinet Inukai a dépêché encore deux contre-torpilleurs et un bâtiment auxiliaire dans le port chinois de Tching-Ouang-Tao. Ces cinq bâtiments, venant renforcer les quelques trente navires de guerre qui se trouvent déjà dans les eaux chinoises, font prévoir une action militaire de grande envergure contre la Chine du Nord, après l'occupation préparée de King-Tchéou.

Tchang Shue Liang louvoie entre Tokio et Nankin pour mettre des formes à l'abandon de cette dernière ville. Il a suggéré hier à M. Yana, conseiller de la légation du Japon, de lui remettre par écrit une demande d'évacuation. Ce dernier a refusé d'en référer à son gouvernement estimant que l'ultimatum du général Honjo garde toute sa force. C'est donc aujourd'hui que l'offensive japonaise sur King-Tchéou peut être déclenchée par les troupes japonaises.

Le Japon impose ses volontés

A ce sujet une démarche hypocrite des ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre et une intervention intéressée de l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis ont été effectuées avant-hier, par les premiers au ministère des Affaires étrangères japonais et, par le second, au chef du gouvernement, M. Inukai.

Les deux premiers ont remis un aide-mémoire exprimant l'inquiétude (?) que cause à leurs gouvernements respectifs la possibilité d'un prochain engagement entre les troupes chinoises et japonaises à King-Tchéou.

On sait d'autre part que l'impérialisme français soutient de toutes ses forces l'impérialisme japonais (au même moment Briand avait une entrevue confidentielle avec M. Yoshizama, nouveau ministre des Affaires étrangères, au sujet de la situation en Mandchourie et de la politique d'agression antisoviétique et que l'Angleterre voit d'un bon œil l'expansion nipponne en Mandchourie et l'extension du conflit en Extrême-Orient. Cette démarche n'est donc qu'une manœuvre destinée à cacher la collusion des impérialistes et à fournir à la nouvelle clique de Nankin des possibilités d'une politique démagogique auprès des masses en révolte.

La démarche de l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis est, par contre, dictée par les intérêts de l'impérialisme américain qui sont menacés par les visées japonaises sur la Chine du Nord et Washington s'oppose violemment à l'occupation de King-Tchéou.

Mais M. Inukai a répondu à l'ambassadeur américain que les Japonais ne faisant pas de différence entre les « bandits » et les troupes régulières chinoises, il faut que ces dernières évacuent King-Tchéou de bon gré pour éviter toute rencontre...

Par la suite, une note officielle fut publiée par laquelle le gouvernement de guerre à outrance déclare que « le Japon ne se propose pas d'occuper King-Tchéou, mais d'y supprimer (le mot ne prête pas à confusion !) les éléments de désordre ». C'est au Japon, ajoute la note, qu'incombe en Mandchourie le maintien de la paix (?) et de l'ordre.

C'est là une réaffirmation du « droit » du Japon à se rendre maître du pays, « droit » consacré par la S.D.N. sous l'impulsion de Briand. Et le général Honjo faisait au même moment une déclaration à Moukden — approuvée par les autorités — disant catégoriquement qu'« aucune ingérence ne sera admise dans la campagne engagée contre les « bandits », les hors-la-loi, les irréguliers ou les réguliers débandés, de quelque côté d'ailleurs qu'une intervention puisse venir ». C'est une mise en demeure à l'Amérique d'avoir à ne pas tenter de contrecarrer les plans de conquêtes du Japon. Ceci démontre en outre que les antagonismes impérialistes ne font que s'exacerber en Extrême-Orient, bien que contre l'U.R.S.S., le front uni des puissances de proie soit un fait, menaçant pour le pays du socialisme.

1007

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Le Kuomintang et l'intervention française dans le sud

Dans le sud de la Chine la menace de la part de l'impérialisme français n'est en rien affectée par sa dénonciation par les feuilles chinoises et américaines. Les déplacements et concentrations de troupes se poursuivent à la frontière du Yunnan et du Kouangsi.

On se rappelle que Briand avait démenti la nouvelle de l'incursion de forces françaises et de combats en territoire chinois. Le gouvernement de Canton lui-même se voit obligé de reconnaître que les troupes françaises ont envahi la Chine Méridionale. Il vient, pour dissimuler son accord secret avec les impérialistes français sur la lutte commune contre l'Armée Rouge chinoise, d'adresser un simulacre de protestation au consul de France à Canton, contre le passage de la frontière du Kouangsi par les troupes coloniales françaises.

Mais, vils laquais, les hommes de Canton « veulent conserver l'assurance que les nouvelles parvenues à leur connaissance ne concernent que des manœuvres régulières des troupes françaises ». On ne peut avec plus de cynisme faire le jeu des impérialistes qui entendent se partager la Chine pour « mettre en valeur les chemins de fer et les richesses minérales », comme le dit si bien M. Margaine.

Il importe donc au prolétariat français de prendre au plus vite en mains la défense des travailleurs chinois qui luttent pour leur indépendance. Le soutien effectif des Soviets chinois, c'est la lutte contre l'intervention impérialiste, contre le partage de la Chine ; c'est le combat accentué pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S., contre la guerre impérialiste.

M. MAGNIEN.

1008

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PaP. 25

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, December 25, 1931.

LA GUERRE EN MANDCHOURIE

L'INQUIÉTUDE des grandes puissances

Il y a à peine quinze jours que le Conseil de la Société des Nations a clos sa session extraordinaire de Paris, consacrée au « règlement » du conflit sino-japonais. Et voilà que les ambassadeurs de France et de Grande-Bretagne se voient obligés d'effectuer une démarche auprès du gouvernement de Tokio, pour lui exprimer « la vive inquiétude que cause à leurs gouvernements respectifs la possibilité d'un prochain engagement entre les troupes chinoises et japonaises à Tchén-Tchéou ».

De son côté, l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis a fait part au ministre japonais des affaires étrangères des « craintes de son gouvernement ».

Avant même de répondre par la voie diplomatique, le gouvernement de Tokio a publié une déclaration officielle. La voici, telle qu'elle a été transmise par l'Agence Reuter :

On déclare officiellement que contrairement à l'opinion générale, le Japon ne se propose nullement de s'emparer de Tchén-Tchéou, l'activité des troupes nippones ayant uniquement pour but de supprimer les éléments de désordre existant dans cette ville.

Par suite de la suspension temporaire du pouvoir administratif en Chine, ajoute-t-on, c'est au Japon qu'il incombe de maintenir la paix et l'ordre dans le pays.

Cette déclaration est interprétée comme une réponse aux notes récemment remises par les gouvernements français, britannique et américain au Cabinet de Tokio qui adresse à ces derniers vraisemblablement le 26 courant sa réponse officielle.

Il faut le reconnaître : en l'occurrence, c'est le Japon qui est plus logique que les trois grandes puissances. Le délégué du Japon au Conseil de la S.D.N., tout en acceptant la résolution finale du 10 décembre, avait déclaré formellement que son gouvernement se réservait le droit de prendre toutes les mesures militaires nécessaires pour combattre le « banditisme » en Mandchourie.

Le Conseil n'a pas protesté. Les représentants de la France et de l'Angleterre n'ont pas relevé cette déclaration insolente et hypocrite à la fois. Le Conseil et les grandes puissances ont par conséquent admis la thèse japonaise. De quoi se plaignent-ils donc à présent ?

Voilà donc les grandes puissances obligées de se déjuger en l'espace de quelques semaines. Certes, elles le font d'une manière très timide. A en croire l'Agence Reuter, qui est l'agence officielle du gouvernement japonais, « l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, M. Forbes, a attiré l'attention du gouvernement japonais sur l'émotion que pourrait éprouver l'opinion publique mondiale si les troupes japonaises venaient à entrer en conflit avec les troupes régulières de Tchén-Tchéou ».

On rapporte, ajoute le communiqué, que le memorandum américain exprime le désir que les troupes japonaises engagées dans les opérations contre les bandits le soient de telle façon que tout incident entre elles et les troupes chinoises soit minutieusement évité car il aurait sur l'opinion à l'étranger un effet fâcheux.

En formulant cette représentation dans l'esprit de la résolution de la S. D. N. en date du 10 décembre dernier, les Etats-Unis insistent pour que le gouvernement japonais conserve avec le plus grand soin la haute main sur la situation.

M. Inukai, dans sa réponse verbale, a répété que les troupes japonaises actuellement engagées contre les bandits, les hors la loi et les irréguliers, n'ont pas une intention quelconque de marquer une action agressive contre les réguliers et Tchén-Tchéou. Le président du Conseil, cependant, a attiré l'attention de l'ambassadeur sur la difficulté extrême qu'il y a pour les Japonais, à distinguer les bandits des réguliers.

Il a suggéré que la meilleure manière de faire disparaître les risques d'incidents serait que les troupes chinoises fussent retirées en accord de la Grande-Muraille.

La réponse du Japon se passe de commentaires. Ses troupes sont en Mandchourie. Elles y resteront et étendront encore leur zone d'occupation.

C'est là le fait brutal qu'on pouvait prévoir et qu'on devait prévoir. Les manœuvres savantes de la bureau-

cratie de la S.D.N., les tractations secrètes des membres du Conseil, les résolutions bâtardees ne servent à rien. Une guerre, une violation flagrante des traités de paix, une agression ne peuvent être prévenues ou arrêtées que par une action publique et hardie.

Le Conseil de la S.D.N. n'a pas voulu faire appel à l'opinion publique. Il n'a pas su mobiliser, contre l'agresseur, la volonté de paix des peuples. Il n'a pas osé entreprendre une action énergique contre celui qui trouble la paix parce que les grandes puissances sont liées au Japon par la solidarité de leurs intérêts impérialistes en Chine.

Mais la solidarité des impérialistes n'est qu'apparente. A tout moment elle peut être brisée par la rivalité entre eux.

Le conflit sino-japonais porte en lui les germes d'une nouvelle guerre dans laquelle toutes les puissances ayant des « intérêts » en Chine seront entraînées.

O. ROSENFELD.

Hum 26

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, December 26, 1931.

DÉFENDONS LA PATRIE SOCIALISTE

L'attaque japonaise sur King-Tchéou est prête à se déclancher!

A Moscou, les agents provocateurs nippons préparaient un attentat qui devait entraîner la guerre avec l'U. R. S. S.

Dans la journée d'hier aucune nouvelle n'est parvenue à Paris sur le développement de l'offensive japonaise en Mandchourie. Ce silence peut être gros de menace.

En effet le ministère des affaires étrangères du Japon a cablé au conseiller de la légation japonaise de Pékin l'instruction de mettre Tchang-Shue-Liang en demeure d'évacuer King-Tchéou sans retard, ce dernier n'ayant pas obtempéré à l'ultimatum l'adjoignant d'abandonner la ville avant le 25 décembre. La situation reste donc des plus graves.

On peut rapprocher l'absence de nouvelle de la démarche de l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, M. Forbes, auprès du président du conseil japonais que nous signalions hier. Malgré la volonté belliqueuse de l'impérialisme japonais et le soutien sans réserve de l'impérialisme français, dans la préparation de l'agression antisoviétique le gouvernement de Inukai cherche à éviter, à l'heure actuelle, un conflit ouvert avec les Etats-Unis.

Immédiatement après que M. Forbes eût formulé à Inukai les craintes de son gouvernement, le cabinet de Tokio, pour soutenir la réponse verbale de son président, envoyait au secrétaire de S.D.N. une note dans laquelle il est dit que « l'activité des bandits s'étend de plus en plus en Mandchourie » que 20.000 hommes de troupes régulières chinoises sont concentrées à King-Tchéou (le Japon a lui 60.000 hommes en territoire chinois) et que « la situation critique. (!) des forces japonaises est accentuée par les agissements des bandes d'irréguliers ». Afin de justifier la « nécessité » pour les troupes japonaises d'avancer sur King-Tchéou, la note ajoute qu'il n'y a pas « l'ombre d'un doute sur les relations étroites des « bandits » avec les réguliers chinois ».

Sur cette note, le Japon se couvre et, comme il fut déclaré officiellement avant-hier qu'aucune immixtion de quelque puissance qu'elle vienne ne sera acceptée, les opérations de guerre ne seront en rien ralenties.

D'ailleurs les Etats-Unis, intéressés à ce qu'un conflit avec l'Union Soviétique éclate le plus rapidement possible, en protestant contre l'occupation préparée de King-Tchéou ne font — nous l'avons à maintes reprises montré — que défendre leurs intérêts dans la Chine du nord. Mais, dans le memorandum remis par M. Forbes à M. Inukai, il est précisé

que « les Etats-Unis insistent pour que le gouvernement japonais conserve avec le plus grand soin la haute main sur la situation » en Mandchourie. La rédaction de cette phrase, quand on connaît les buts ultérieurs de l'occupation de la Mandchourie, ne laisse pas de doute sur l'entente de tous ces coquins — rivaux quant à leurs propres visées — contre le pays du socialisme.

Les intrigues japonaises en Mongolie

Et, il faut le répéter, les visées japonaises ne s'arrêtent pas à la Mandchourie, mais à l'Extrême-Orient soviétique et à la Mongolie (intérieure et extérieure soviétisée). La guerre des impérialistes contre l'U. R. S. S. donnerait au Japon ces immenses contrées déjà travaillées par les intrigues et complots des gardes blancs et des japonais eux-mêmes.

L'impérialisme japonais en envahissant la Mandchourie prépare une attaque contre la République populaire de la Mongolie extérieure.

Les militaristes chinois, les princes de la Mongolie intérieure, les gardes blancs russes et bouriates, en liaison avec les féodaux, le haut clergé de la Mongolie extérieure, organisent et préparent activement, sous la direction de l'impérialisme japonais, des bandes armées en vue d'une intervention contre la République populaire de Mongolie.

Pour arriver à leurs fins, les impérialistes japonais se servent comme agent du fugitif tibétain Pantchen-Bogdo, qui n'est pas sans liaison avec l'agent de l'Intelligence service Trebitsch-Lincoln...

Le long de la frontière mongole, à l'est et au sud-est, se concentrent des forces réactionnaires qui doivent exécuter, sous la direction du Japon et de son agent Pantchen-Bogdo, le programme de l'impérialisme de Tokio : l'asservissement des Arcades mongoles et la transformation de la République populaire mongole en une colonie japonaise.

Les tentatives de soulèvement découvertes et réprimées au cours des deux dernières années (Oulankou, Baian-zurkhé, un complot des princes de l'Eglise et des féodaux (Manzouchéri, Iogodzir) ont démontré que les féodaux et les fonctionnaires réactionnaires, sentent leur impuissance d'abattre eux-mêmes le pouvoir révolutionnaire des masses travailleuses mongoles, voient leur unique salut dans l'intervention du Japon, du Kuomintang et des gardes blancs. L'occupation de la Mandchourie facilite la réalisation des projets impérialistes du Japon de conquête de la République mongole qui se trouve ainsi, avec ses sœurs de toute l'U. R. S. S. sous la menace directe d'une guerre. La présence et les déclarations du général Minami en Mandchourie, les opérations guerrières vers l'ouest font ce danger imminent.

La provocation de Moscou

Notre camarade Molotov, au cours de son discours du 22 décembre à la session du comité exécutif central de l'U. R. S. S., dans la partie relative à la politique de paix du gouvernement soviétique, fit allusion aux innombrables provocations des impérialistes destinées à entraîner l'Etat ouvrier dans la guerre voulue par ses ennemis.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

L'attentat — dont l'*Humanité* signalait hier la découverte — préparé par une personnalité d'une ambassade étrangère contre l'ambassadeur du Japon à Moscou fait partie des plans suivis de l'impérialisme. Cet attentat devait précipiter l'ouverture du conflit souhaité entre le Japon et l'U.R.S.S., qui serait le signal de l'attaque conjuguée des vassaux de la France à la frontière occidentale. Les dépêches disent que les fomentateurs payés du complot ont quitté le territoire soviétique.

Mais ce fait, entre cent autres, montre quelle insistance diabolique mettent les puissances impérialistes à provoquer la guerre contre les ouvriers et les paysans construisant victorieusement le socialisme sur 1/6 du globe, en face du monde capitaliste en pleine crise.

Ce fait montre encore que l'U.R.S.S. est menacée aujourd'hui comme aux heures les plus graves de la guerre civile et de l'intervention, plus qu'elle ne le fut en 1929. Et avec notre patrie socialiste, la révolution chinoise, les Soviets chinois sont menacés de la même manière par les impérialistes travaillant au dépècement de la Chine.

Répondons aux complots, aux provocations, à la préparation de l'intervention contre l'U. R. S. S. et, en Chine, par l'accentuation de la lutte contre l'impérialisme français et contre son meilleur laquais, le socialfas-cisme.

En faisant pénétrer dans les larges masses ouvrières les mots d'ordre de lutte de classe sur tous les terrains du Parti Communiste.

M. MAGNIEN.

Hum 27

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, December 27, 1931.

Défendons l'U.R.S.S.
et la Révolution chinoise!

LE SANG CONTINUE A COULER EN MANDCHOURIE

Et M. Yoshizawa
ministre des Affaires Etrangères
du Japon
est allé hier s'entendre avec Laval
sur la politique antisoviétique
et les plans
de partage de la Chine

D'après les dépêches de Tokio, la presse japonaise est remplie, depuis trois jours, de violentes vitupérations contre la démarche de l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis auprès de M. Inukai. Le ton général est l'exigence d'une action militaire plus accentuée en Mandchourie contre les masses en révolte contre l'envahisseur et pour une offensive décisive contre King-Tchéou. Certains journaux suggèrent qu'au lieu de s'adresser au Japon, les puissances doivent « persuader Nankin de retirer les troupes chinoises de



Voici, dans les rues de Tientsin, un tank « français ». Sauvegarde des intérêts de la concession française ? Menace directe de l'impérialisme international contre l'U.R.S.S. !

King-Tchéou » et de laisser la place libre aux forcés japonaises.

Mais, par ailleurs, on apprend que Nankin a donné — ne serait-ce pas une suggestion américaine ? — l'ordre à Tchang Shue Liang d'organiser au plus vite la défense de la région de King-Tchéou pour résister à l'attaque japonaise prévue. Il est à noter que jusqu'à présent l'ex-dictateur de Moukden agissait en pleine indépendance. Ce fait est assez significatif : il montre que Tchang Shue Liang n'a pas exécuté l'ultimatum de l'état-major japonais d'avoir à évacuer la ville ; ensuite cet « acte » de Nankin a pour but de tenter de calmer l'effervescence révolutionnaire — en premier lieu chez les étudiants — contre la politique de trahison du Kuomintang.

Mais les Japonais sont décidés à occuper cette région coûte que coûte...

D'autre part, la résistance et la guerrilla des détachements antiimpérialistes en Mandchourie continue contre les occupants. Vendredi matin, dans la banlieue de Moukden, un groupe de travailleurs chinois (ceux que l'on a, à Tokio et à la S. D. N., appelés « bandits ») a tiré sur un détachement de police japonaise commandé par deux officiers.

A Luchuntun, près de Moukden, un autre groupe de partisans a attaqué les forces d'occupation à coups de mitrailleuses. Un violent combat eut lieu.

Dans la région de Tuen-Chouang-Ti de sérieux combats se poursuivent entre les troupes chinoises et japonaises.

Ainsi le sang continue à couler en Mandchourie. La guerre fait rage dans ce pays conquis par l'impérialisme nippon qui vient par ailleurs, d'envoyer encore des renforts d'artillerie, de cavalerie et d'infanterie à Tien-Tsin.

Pendant ce temps, le gouvernement de guerre à outrance qui a pris le pouvoir au Japon entend conserver ce pouvoir.

Le cabinet Inukai, qui représente le parti militaire-fasciste *Seiyukai*, s'est présenté hier devant le Parlement pour y lire le discours du trône. On ne sait encore quelle a été l'attitude du parti *Minseito* « débarqué » et qui a la majorité. Mais on savait que si un amendement refusant la confiance était présenté par les anciens ministres, M. Inukai était décidé à dissoudre la Diète et à refaire des élections sous le règne de la terreur.

C'est que l'alliance avec l'impérialisme français pour l'agression antisoviétique et dans les plans de partage de la Chine exige le renforcement de la politique de guerre de l'impérialisme japonais.

Hier, M. Yoshizawa, ex-ambassadeur du Japon à Paris et nommé ministre des Affaires étrangères, a eu un long entretien avec Laval, avant de quitter la France. Cette entrevue est grosse de menaces en ce qui concerne l'attitude du Japon à l'égard de l'U.R.S.S., car nul doute que c'est cette question — avec celle de l'appui à la France pour l'intervention dans les provinces méridionales de Chine — qui a été le point central de la conversation comme l'indique une déclaration d'adieu de Yoshizawa.

Tous ces faits doivent inciter nos camarades à redoubler d'activité dans leur travail d'agitation et de propagande auprès des larges masses pour dénoncer les préparatifs de guerre contre l'U.R.S.S. et pour le soutien actif des travailleurs chinois aux prises avec les impérialistes.

L'intervention contre la révolution chinoise a déjà été commencée par la France impérialiste par les incursions dans le Kouangsi. Les troupes japonaises répandant le sang en Mandchourie constituent l'avant-garde des armées impérialistes dont on prépare le rassemblement sous l'égide de la S.D.N.

Il faut accentuer notre riposte aux actions de brigandage et aux préparatifs de guerre de l'impérialisme français. Il faut entraîner les ouvriers de tous les partis, les inorganisés et les ouvriers sous l'uniforme dans la lutte derrière les mots d'ordre du Parti, confirmés par le dernier Comité central :

Abolition des traités inégaux — qui asservissent la Chine.

Evacuation de la Chine et rappel immédiat des troupes et forces navales françaises d'Extrême-Orient (Chine et Indochine) ;

Solidarité révolutionnaire des ouvriers soldats et marins avec les Soviets chinois et les travailleurs de l'U.R.S.S.

Il faut affaiblir notre propre impérialisme.

Et cela sur tous les terrains. La lutte des marins, des dockers, des ouvriers de chez Renault, contre l'attaque de leurs salaires, les manifestations de chômeurs et leur organisation pour la lutte en liaison avec leurs camarades encore occupés, etc., sont autant de coups portés aux fauteurs de guerre, sont autant d'actions de masse qui contribuent à la défense de l'U.R.S.S. et de la révolution chinoise.

M. MAGNIEN.

La vague révolutionnaire qui a emporté le gouvernement de Nankin, le mouvement soviétique qui se développe dans le Sud ont, de toute évidence, contrarié le plan des puissances imperialistes.

Aussi assistons-nous, depuis quelques jours, à un redoublement de fureur des campagnes interventionnistes. Depuis longtemps déjà, la France, sous la plume du professeur Maspero, a préconisé une politique du partage de la Chine en sphères d'influences. « *Le jour où la Chine ne serait plus capable de respecter ni de faire respecter ses engagements, c'est à nous seul qu'incomberait le soin de ramener l'ordre et la sécurité dans ces régions... Nous ne pourrions, en effet, permettre que les régions chinoises limitrophes du Tonkin tombent aux mains d'une puissance étrangère* ».

La France impérialiste au premier rang.

Ces lignes ont été écrites, il y a plusieurs années déjà. Mais avant-hier, dans le *Figaro*, le docteur Legendre proclamait : « *De graves dangers nous menacent en Chine* », et comme le professeur Maspero, M. Legendre prônait l'intervention armée dans les provinces chinoises.

Or, dès maintenant, — les démentis du Quai d'Orsay ne changeant rien à l'affaire, — des troupes françaises ont envahi le Kiangsi et un traité franco-japonais règle les modalités du partage chinois entre Paris et Tokio.

Rapprochez ce fait de l'appréciation suivante imprimée il y a quelques jours dans le supplément colonial du *Temps*, à propos des travaux de la base navale de Saïgon :

« *Les événements de Mandchourie et la grande tension politique qui s'ensuivent dans tout l'Extrême-Orient, mettent au premier plan la question de la défense de l'Indochine. Dans l'hypothèse d'un grave conflit qui menacerait le monde du Pacifique, il semble, en effet, difficile que notre grande colonie d'Asie ne soit pas appelée à jouer un certain rôle dans ce conflit* ».

Observez au surplus que le provocateur arrêté à Moscou cette semaine, au moment où il allait perpétrer un attentat qui devait déclencher la guerre appartenait à la mission diplomatique de la Tchécoslovaquie, c'est-à-dire d'un pays ami et allié de la France.

Notez enfin que la plupart des généraux et amiraux promus avant-hier à la Légion d'honneur appartiennent ou ont appartenu à des formations indochinoises, et vous vous convaincrez de la justesse du jugement qu'exprimait, il y a quelques jours, notre Comité Central lorsqu'il affirmait que la guerre de Mandchourie c'était « le démembrement de la Chine, le commencement de l'attaque contre l'Union Soviétique et de la nouvelle tentative de l'impérialisme pour le partage du globe ».

Contre cette entreprise de rapine, notre Parti dressait la politique du prolétariat : Abolition des traités inégaux, retrait des forces militaires et navales françaises d'Extrême-Orient, solidarité avec les Soviétiques chinois et avec l'U.R.S.S. Et ajoutait que c'était dans la mesure où nous organiserions notre contre-offensive économique, où nous prendrions la tête de l'immense armée des sans-travail, où nous renforcerions notre action antimilitariste que nous ferions reculer les forces de guerre.

Ces recommandations n'ont rien perdu de leur valeur, au contraire. Les manifestations de Montmartre, jeudi dernier, l'action résolue des ouvriers de chez Renault démontrent que l'alerte lancée par notre Parti a été entendue.

Mais les choses vont vite. Nous n'avons plus le droit d'attendre. Amplifions et précipitons notre riposte.

Gabriel PERI.

Hum 26

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Pour arriver à leurs fins, les impérialistes japonais se servent comme agent du fugitif tibétain Pantchen-Bogdo, qui n'est pas sans liaison avec l'agent de l'Intelligence service Trebitsch-Lincoln...

Le long de la frontière mongole, à l'est et au sud-est, se concentrent des forces réactionnaires qui doivent exécuter, sous la direction du Japon et de son agent Pantchen-Bogdo, le programme de l'impérialisme de Tokio : l'asservissement des Arcades mongoles et la transformation de la République populaire mongole en une colonie japonaise.

Les tentatives de soulèvement découvertes et réprimées au cours des deux dernières années (Oulankom, Baian-zurkhé) un complot des princes de l'Eglise et des féodaux (Manzouchéri, logodzir) ont démontré que les féodaux et les fonctionnaires réactionnaires, sentent leur impuissance d'abattre eux-mêmes le pouvoir révolutionnaire des masses travailleuses mongoles, voient leur unique salut dans l'intervention du Japon, du Kuomintang et des gardes blancs. L'occupation de la Mandchourie facilite la réalisation des projets impérialistes du Japon de conquête de la République mongole qui se trouve ainsi, avec ses sœurs de toute l'U. R. S. S. sous la menace directe d'une guerre. La présence et les déclarations du général Minami en Mandchourie, les opérations guerrières vers l'ouest font ce danger imminent.

La provocation de Moscou

Notre camarade Molotov, au cours de son discours du 22 décembre à la session du comité exécutif central de l'U. R. S. S., dans la partie relative à la politique de paix du gouvernement soviétique, fit allusion aux innombrables provocations des impérialistes destinées à entraîner l'Etat ouvrier dans la guerre voulue par ses ennemis.

H 28

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, December 28, 1931.

Défendons l'U. R. S. S. et les Soviets chinois

LA FRANCE EST A LA TÊTE DE L'ENTREPRISE DE DÉPÈCEMENT DE LA CHINE

Les districts soviétiques du Kiangsi consolident leurs positions

Nanti de la grand'croix de la Légion d'honneur que lui décernèrent MM. Briand et Laval, l'ambassadeur Yokishawa s'en est allé vers Tokio où il doit prendre possession du portefeuille des affaires étrangères. Cependant, l'on est depuis trois jours sans nouvelle aucune des opérations militaires que le Japon prépare vers King-Tchéou.

L'offensive est-elle déclanchée déjà et attend-on pour nous informer que la ville soit tombée entre les mains des Nippons ? Le cabinet de Tokio a-t-il au contraire jugé préférable d'ajourner son attaque ? Nul ne sait. Mais cette imprécision même ne laisse pas d'être inquiétante.

Deux faits ont dominé la chronique de ces dix derniers jours et leur importance est telle qu'il convient d'y insister avec beaucoup de force. Le premier, c'est le renversement de Tchang Kai Shek et de son équipe, aujourd'hui balayés par la vague révolutionnaire ; le second, c'est

l'intervention militaire de la France dans les provinces méridionales de la Chine.

Les Wellington Koo, les Sze, les Soong qui exerçaient le pouvoir à Nankin ont dû céder la place. Ils ont à leur actif les massacres en masse des ouvriers et des paysans chinois, la ruine du pays, l'invasion étrangère. Ce sont les révoltes d'ouvriers et d'étudiants qui ont culbuté le Napoléon chinois. Mais la contre-révolution n'a pas fini de manœuvrer. A la place de Tchang Kai Shek, définitivement



WANG CHIN WEI
ancien bourreau de la Commune de
Canton, chef de la « gauche » du
Kuomintang

démonétisé, elle pousse au gouvernement les politiciens de la gauche du Kuomintang, les Wang Chin Wei, les Eugène Chen, ceux qui appartiennent à la clique cantonaise. La rivalité de ces deux factions ne date pas d'hier. Wang Chin Wei s'est mis sur les rangs chaque fois que le Kuomintang a été menacé dans son prestige. Aujourd'hui, il lui faut se livrer à une manœuvre plus complexe encore. Pour étrangler plus sûrement le mouvement révolutionnaire, il fait mine d'adopter quelques-unes de ses revendications. Mais le truc est par trop grossier. Le clan cantonais, qui s'intitula longtemps parti des réorganiseurs, mériterait plus légitimement le nom de parti des exterminateurs, au même titre que la clique nankinoise aujourd'hui déchu. Wang Chin Wei, en particulier, a compté parmi les bourreaux les plus sauvages de la glorieuse insurrection de Canton, en décembre 1927.

Les victoires de l'armée rouge et les paysans

Cela, les ouvriers de Chine ne sont pas près de l'oublier. Ils savent que dans les tragiques épreuves de l'Extrême-Orient, il n'y a qu'une force d'émancipation et de libération, c'est celle des Soviets chinois. Ainsi s'explique le renforcement continu des districts soviétiques et les succès de l'armée rouge. La dernière en date des victoires des révolutionnaires est la consolidation de Sui-Djin, qui est devenu la capitale de la région soviétique du Kiangsi méridional, et la menace rouge sur la grande ville de Nanchang.

Sur ces événements, la presse dite d'information reste naturellement muette. 70 à 80 millions d'hommes vivent organisés suivant le système soviétique et les journaux bourgeois et socialistes passent sous silence ce... détail !

Quelle instructive illustration dont nos camarades des Comités de défense de l'Humanité doivent tirer profit dans leur agitation et dans leur propagande.

Hum 31


Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, December 31, 1931.

Luttons contre le dépècement de la Chine!

TRAINS BLINDÉS, TANKS, ARTILLERIE ET AVIONS DE L'IMPÉRIALISME JAPONAIS SÈMENT LA MORT A KING-TCHÉOU

Rosenfeld craint le « péril jaune »...



Dans Tien-Tsin en état de siège : une rue de la concession japonaise barrée de réseaux de fils de fer barbelés dans lesquels passe un courant électrique

Les dépêches, avant-hier soir, annonçant l'entrée des forces japonaises à King-Tchéou, avaient un peu devancé le fait qui ne peut tarder. En réalité, les troupes du général Tannon sont aux portes de la ville et Tchang Shue Liang a retiré ses forces qui reculent vers la Grande Muraille et Tien-Tsin.

Mais des combats continuent à se dérouler autour de King-Tchéou ; la brigade du général Kimura, qui de Hsilitun s'était dirigée vers l'ouest, a occupé cet après-midi la ville de Tahushan, entre Kou-Pan-Tze et Sin-Min-Fou, après un violent combat.

A Pi-Tchou-Yi, un engagement a eu lieu entre les Japonais et les détachements antiimpérialistes.

Hier, à l'aube, des troupes japonaises ont avancé simultanément de Hsinmintun et de Panshan vers un important embranchement de la voie ferrée, à Kou-pangtzu. Les autos blindées venant de Hsinmintun ont également attaqué les Chinois près de Paichiapao.

Les hostilités entre les réguliers chi-



Le général japonais
YAHIMICHI SUZUKI
qui commande les forces nippones de Tsitsikar et par conséquent dirige les provocations antisoviétiques et commandera les forces destinées à engager la guerre contre l'U.R.S.S.

nois et les Japonais ont commencé aujourd'hui à Tawa, entre Koupantze et Newchang.

Les Japonais ont attaqué avec huit canons, dix-huit autos blindées, des mitrailleuses et huit avions qui ont lancé 80 bombes.

Les pertes sont inconnues.

On mande de Sin Min à l'agence *Reijo* que les chars d'assaut japonais se dirigeant sur cette localité sont entrés en conflit avec les troupes chinoises près de Pai Tchi Pao hier matin, à 8 heures.

D'autre part, selon l'*Asahi Shimbun*, plusieurs croiseurs et un destroyer nippons ont quitté Port-Arthur pour une destination inconnue.

Des troupes japonaises ont, en outre, quitté Port-Arthur à bord d'un transport qui a appareillé en direction de Tchou-Ouang-Tao, au sud de Tchou-Tchéou.

Enfin, des avions japonais amenés au large de Tchou-Ouang-Tao par un navire porte-avions, ont bombardé la ville de Lien-Shan.

Voilà de quelle façon l'impérialisme japonais exécute les « mesures de police nécessaires » en Mandchourie, comme la S.D.N., sous la direction de l'impérialisme français, lui en a donné mandat.

Rosenfeld découvre la guerre en Chine

C'est dans ces conditions que le *Populaire* découvre que le Japon porte la guerre en Chine. Rosenfeld vient de publier dans le journal de M. Blum deux articles, par lesquels il semble changer de position quant au « conflit sino-japonais ».

Il vitupère contre la S.D.N. qui s'endort et s'aperçoit que la presse parisienne mène campagne pour le soutien des opérations de brigandage de l'impérialisme nippon en Mandchourie. Mais, lors de notre dénonciation de l'intervention des troupes françaises en Chine méridionale, le journal de M. Blum a su garder un silence d'or.

C'est que si maintenant Rosenfeld s'élève démagogiquement contre les crimes du Japon en Chine, c'est que le mouvement de masse contre le dépècement de la Chine et pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S., sous l'impulsion de notre Parti communiste, se développe dans le pays.

Le Parti socialiste soutient tous les plans de brigandage colonial et de guerre antisoviétique de l'impérialisme français. Les clameurs de Ziromsky et de Rosenfeld n'ont d'autre but que de détourner les ouvriers de la lutte véritable, le combat révolutionnaire de classe contre l'impérialisme français et par là même, faciliter l'exécution des plans de partage de la Chine et les préparatifs de guerre contre les ouvriers et les paysans de l'Union Soviétique.

Rosenfeld salue la formation du nouveau gouvernement du Kuomintang à Nankin. Il le peut, car ce sont les principaux agents de l'impérialisme français qui ont pris le pouvoir en Chine et... Tchang-Kai-Sek fait partie du Comité de contrôle du gouvernement ! Ce sont les mêmes fusilleurs d'ouvriers qui vont œuvrer à livrer en détail la Chine aux puissances !

Le « péril jaune »

Mais Rosenfeld s'« élève » contre l'avance des troupes japonaises en Chine parce qu'il sait que l'intervention est le signal d'une recrudescence de l'essor révolutionnaire parmi les masses chinoises. Et il craint qu'à la « révolution nationale démocratique » (celle du Kuomintang) ne succède la révolution prolétarienne, que le pouvoir des Soviétiques chinois s'étende à toute la Chine, « ruinant définitivement le commerce extérieur et l'industrie coloniale ». Sa frayeur — la frayeur des impérialistes — il l'exprime ainsi :

« La guerre la plus nationale et révolutionnaire conduit fatalement à l'établissement d'un fort pouvoir militaire.

Et si le Japon impérialiste et militariste pouvait sombrer dans la guerre contre la Chine, en mourrait-il pourrait donner au monde le militarisme encore plus redoutable d'un peuple de quatre cents millions d'habitants. »

Rosenfeld a conscience de la victoire définitive de l'armée rouge chinoise, de la victoire des 400 millions de travailleurs de Chine qui chasseront leurs oppresseurs impérialistes. Il voit là un nouveau « péril jaune ». La Chine soviétique unie à l'U.R.S.S. ! Quel danger pour le monde capitaliste !

En face de la manœuvre socialiste, renforçons notre lutte contre l'impérialisme français, soutenons activement de toutes nos forces la révolution chinoise, défendons avec encore plus d'énergie l'U.R.S.S. menacée. Et contre le social-impérialisme portons nos coups les plus rudes. — M. M.

Hum 3

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, January 3, 1932.

**Luttons contre le dépècement
de la Chine !**

LES JAPONAIS DANS KING-TCHEOU

L'impérialisme japonais sera bientôt maître de toute la Mandchourie. Hier matin, les troupes nippones sont entrées à King-Tchéou, évacuée par Tchang Shue Liang. Ce dernier avait demandé aux autorités japonaises que toute facilité lui soit donnée pour cette évacuation. On voit clairement, par ce fait, l'hypocrisie du Kuomintang dont le nouveau gouvernement avait déclaré théâtralement que King-Tchéou serait « opiniâtrement défendue ».

Les autorités japonaises ont immédiatement placé des fonctionnaires nippons à tous les postes d'administration de la ville, comme dans tous les points conquis ces derniers jours dans la Mandchourie du Sud.

Et leur avance ne s'arrêtera d'ailleurs pas là : les forces concentrées à Tien-Tsin démontrent que l'impérialisme japonais est prêt à poursuivre ses opérations de guerre dans la Chine du Nord.

Mais cela n'ira pas sans heurts entre les puissants rivaux qui s'opposent dans le Pacifique.

« Nous sommes à la veille d'une guerre mondiale dans le Pacifique ».

C'est sous ce titre que le journal japonais *Nihon* publiait il y a quatre jours un article dans lequel il était dit :

Que nous le voulions ou non, nous sommes à la veille d'une nouvelle guerre mondiale dans le Pacifique. Les Japonais ont prédit que les Etats-Unis inciteront à la guerre en intervenant dans les affaires japonaises à Baïren ou en Mandchourie. Les Japonais ont concentré toute leur attention sur la Chine et ont négligé les tâches historiques du Japon dans le Pacifique. Maintenant, au moment de l'intervention de trois puissances, qui n'est, proprement dit, qu'une intervention de deux puissances

Voilà comment la presse impérialiste nipponne prépare idéologiquement la guerre dans le Pacifique, continuant alors l'exécution du fameux plan du baron Tanaka.

Voilà le danger de guerre mondiale devant lequel dès le début de l'affaire mandchoue, nous avons alerté les travailleurs et contre lequel toute la politique de paix de l'Union soviétique, résistante à toutes les provocations, est tendue. — M. M.

La prise de King-Tchéou, en renforçant la position du Japon en Mandchourie, constitue un accroissement du danger de guerre contre l'Union Soviétique. Maître à Moukden depuis le 19 septembre, l'impérialisme japonais s'est ensuite emparé de Kirin, puis de Tsitsikar et, maintenant, avec l'occupation de King-Tchéou, il tient dans ses griffes le district de Jehal.

Poursuivant l'annexion définitive du pays il a constitué un gouvernement central « autonome » à Moukden. Les nationalistes qui y sont placés par les Japonais ont décidé de publier une déclaration solennelle par laquelle la Mandchourie se détachera de la Chine et se placera sous la « protection » du Japon. Son drapeau portera les trois couleurs des provinces du Seng-Tien (Moukden), du Heilungkiang (Tsitsikar) et de Kirin. Les douanes maritimes seront « autonomes », c'est-à-dire passeront aux mains des Japonais ; les revenus de la gabelle également.

Mais l'impérialisme japonais entend s'adjoindre, en plus de la Mandchourie, la Mongolie également. Nous avons déjà dévoilé les intrigues et complots dirigés par le Japon et la France tant en Mongolie intérieure que sur le territoire de la République populaire mongole (soviétisée). Les autorités militaires ont arrêté le plan de conquête de la Mongolie et le ministre de la guerre Araki, à la suite d'une conversation avec le conseiller du parti Seiyukai, Yamoto (ancien président du Sud-Mandchourien), déclarait le 27 décembre que « le nouvel Etat mandchou-mongol ne devra avoir aucun rapport avec la Chine ».

Et il ajoutait :

En Mandchourie, parallèlement avec les entreprises privées, il faut créer une série d'entreprises japonaises. Les cercles militaires estiment indispensable que ce soit l'armée du Kouan-toun qui aie la direction des affaires politiques, administratives, industrielles et des transports en Mandchourie pour que le programme japonais puisse être réalisé.

Ce programme d'annexion de la Mandchourie et de la Mongolie, comme on l'a vu par le cours des événements de ces quatre derniers mois, est réalisé avec méthode et avec l'entier soutien de l'impérialisme français.

Des armements sont envoyés au Japon par le trust Schneider-Creusot-Skoda, tant de France que de Tchécoslovaquie. L'état-major japonais est en étroite liaison avec l'état-major français pour l'établissement des plans de l'agression anti-soviétique. Ce n'est pas pour rien que trois aérodromes ont été édifiés à des rythmes records dans la Mandchourie du Nord, le long de l'Est Chinois.

Les troupes n'occupent pas encore Kharbine, mais l'impérialisme japonais commence à agir tout à fait ouvertement comme si Kharbine avait subi déjà le sort de King-Tchéou.

Mais il y a plus. Intéressé à la constitution d'une solide place d'armes japonaise contre l'Union Soviétique, l'impérialisme français déploie une grande activité pour que soient employés avec profit les gardes-blancs russes en Mandchourie et en Mongolie.



L'inquisition japonaise à Tien-Tsin

(Angleterre et Etats-Unis), le Japon doit définir qui est l'ennemi des peuples asiatiques. Les Etats-Unis se contenteront jusqu'ici des phrases contre le Japon. Mais ils ajoutent maintenant leurs phrases par des manœuvres navales.

La guerre qui vient dans le Pacifique sera une bataille entre des pays asiatiques et la race blanche pour l'hégémonie mondiale. Sous ce rapport, l'incident mandchourien n'est qu'un prélude de la collision nipponne avec la race blanche. Le Japon doit être prêt à toute éventualité.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Sans aucun doute, après une intervention de l'impérialisme français et sur la demande des organisations militaires russes de Paris, Tokio a donné l'ordre à Tchang Tsin Hui de remettre en liberté les leaders de l'organisation des Cosaques de l'Amour, Ouchakov, Krioukov, Lalélin, etc., et d'arrêter toutes poursuites concernant ces canailles.

On se rappelle — l'Humanité l'a signalé — qu'Ouchakov avait été arrêté dans la partie occidentale du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois et que sur lui avait été trouvée une lettre de la mission militaire japonaise à Kharbine. Il est intéressant de noter la libération de ces agents de l'impérialisme qui vont continuer avec plus de célérité l'élaboration de complots et de provocations destinés à provoquer la guerre contre le pays du socialisme.

Et pendant que le Japon accentue son emprise sur la Mandchourie, renforce ses unités militaires pour entrer en Mongolie, alors que les troupes françaises ont déjà commencé la guerre dans les provinces méridionales contre les Soviets chinois, la presse blanche de Paris publie, sous la protection du gouvernement français, des articles appelant à la guerre contre notre patrie socialiste.

La Renaissance, l'organe de Miller, écrit que « les émigrés russes doivent être aux côtés du Japon, car l'avance japonaise sur l'Extrême-Orient soviétique peut mener à la guerre avec l'U.R.S.S. et la

victoire du Japon dans cette guerre sera un appui aux tâches nationales de l'émigration ».

Et le gouvernement français non seulement tolère, mais aide (Magniot et Rolin patronnent la fourniture d'armes aux garde-blancs), ces ignobles provocations à la guerre contre l'Union Soviétique.

L'impérialisme français appuie de toutes ses forces la guerre du Japon en Mandchourie. Il dirige les plans d'agression antisoviétique et de partage de la Chine.

En plus de toute notre action de masse dans tous les domaines qui doivent affaiblir notre ennemi, l'impérialisme français faisons comprendre aux travailleurs de France la nécessité d'exiger avec force l'expulsion des canailles russes-blancs du territoire français.

C'est une des tâches du prolétariat dans la lutte sans répit pour la défense de l'Union Soviétique.

M. MAGNIEN.

3
Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, January 3, 1932.

LES GRANDS TROUBLES de l'Asie

En Chine comme dans l'Inde
les passions méconnaissent
les principes d'ordre
les plus élémentaires

L'année commence bien mal en Asie: rébellion dans l'Inde, confusion anarchique en Chine. Dans les deux cas, soulèvement des passions contre l'ordre.

Rien de plus logique que l'attitude du vice-roi de l'Inde. Lord Wellington n'a pas du tout refusé de recevoir Gandhi et de maintenir des rapports avec les chefs nationalistes. Il entend seulement que chacun reste à sa place. Il est tout disposé à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour accélérer l'évolution constitutionnelle, mais n'admet pas que Gandhi prétende traiter avec lui d'égal à égal et discuter des ordonnances de police provoquées par des attentats.

En répondant à ces déclarations fermes mais conciliantes par la reprise de la campagne de désobéissance et de boycottage, les nationalistes assument la responsabilité des désordres et des répressions qui vont suivre.

Gandhi ne pourra pas dire qu'on l'arrêtera une fois de plus pour en faire un martyr. L'Angleterre lui a prodigué assez d'égards pour montrer qu'elle était disposée à aller plutôt au delà de ce que recommandait la prudence.

De même, les nationalistes chinois devraient comprendre, s'ils n'étaient pas aveuglés par les passions, qu'ils font exactement tout ce qu'il faut pour justifier l'attitude du Japon. Ce qui légitime l'action japonaise, c'est qu'elle est apparue comme le seul moyen possible d'assurer le respect des traités et de rétablir l'ordre.

Les Japonais n'ont pas été les seuls à faire l'expérience de l'interprétation très particulière que la Chine donne au respect des engagements. Le 4 mai 1931, à une époque où l'on ne parlait pas d'opérations en Mandchourie, le gouvernement de Nankin a déchiré purement et simplement tous les traités qui assuraient aux étrangers des garanties d'exterritorialité. Ce n'est pas une raison parce que les dirigeants chinois ont battu en retraite avant l'échéance du 1^{er} janvier pour crier au miracle. Les Chinois ont cédé uniquement parce que les événements les ont obligés à reconnaître qu'ils ont besoin du concours des puissances. Là où ils se trompent, c'est quand ils s'imaginent que ce concours pourrait aller jusqu'à les aider à violer les engagements pris envers les Japonais.

Pour invoquer leurs droits, les nations doivent se montrer capables d'assumer leurs devoirs. Les Chinois comme les Indiens ont beaucoup de chemin à faire avant d'en arriver là.

Hum 6
Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, January 6, 1932.

DÉFENDONS L'U. R. S. S. ET LES SOVIETS CHINOIS !

Maître de la Mandchourie le Japon veut envahir la Chine

La tension s'accroît entre Tokio et Washington



L'impérialisme nippon, comme l'impérialisme français en 1914-18, a constitué son théâtre au front. Voici des « artistes » de Tokio distribuant des programmes de la représentation qu'elles vont donner. Cabotinage, mensonge et mouchardage, c'est ça l'art capitaliste !

Nous avons annoncé hier l'envoi d'une escadre japonaise dans le port chinois de Fou-Tchéou et le débarquement d'un détachement de troupe. Le prétexte est l'assassinat d'un instituteur japonais, qui est, très probablement, une vulgaire provocation.

Le Japon a plusieurs régiments concentrés à Tien-Tsin. Plus de 30 bâtiments de guerre sont stationnés dans les ports chinois. L'impérialisme nippon veut encore débarquer des troupes dans les grands ports de Chine afin de renforcer sa position en Mandchourie, préparer l'avance de ses forces en Chine du Nord et participer à l'intervention des puissances contre les Soviets chinois. Comme le signale le télégramme qu'on lira par ailleurs, l'armée rouge chinoise continue à enregistrer de brillants succès. Les soldats du Kuomintang passent à l'armée rouge. Il faut alors précipiter l'expédition contre-révolutionnaire, car les plans de partage de la Chine sont menacés. C'est là le sens du coup de force de Fou-Tchéou.

Le mouvement antiimpérialiste s'étend avec rapidité en Chine. Les manifestations se succèdent dans toutes les villes contre les résidents japonais, anglais, français — et contre les traîtres du Kuomintang. Pendant que les troupes de l'impérialisme français font des incursions dans les provinces méridionales, que les canonnières anglaises remontent le Yang-Tsé-Kiang, le Japon a pour mandat de provoquer l'intervention ouverte, de justifier l'envoi du corps expéditionnaire qui fut l'objet de débats au Conseil de la S. D. N.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C'est ainsi que le gouvernement japonais de guerre à outrance a don-



M. SCHNEE
 délégué de l'Allemagne à la
 commission d'étude en Mandchourie

né à son chargé d'affaires à Nankin des instructions pour « protester auprès du gouvernement chinois contre les attaques dont sont fréquemment victimes les Japonais et leurs biens à Canton, Fou-Tchéou, Amoy et Soua-Teou ».

Le gouvernement chinois serait avisé que le Japon « se verrait dans l'obligation » de débarquer des détachements en vue de « protéger ses nationaux » si le Kuomintang n'arrive pas à mettre fin à l'agitation antimpérialiste.

Les mêmes arguments étaient employés par Tokio avant les combats sanglants qui ont permis aux troupes nippones de s'emparer de King-Tchéou.

L'intervention des puissances contre la révolution et les Soviets chinois, comme on voit, est en bonne voie d'exécution.

L'antagonisme nippo-américain

Mais, par ailleurs, la situation est de plus en plus tendue entre le Japon et les Etats-Unis. Le consul américain, M. Culver Chamberlain, qui se rendait à Kharbine, a essuyé des coups de feu tirés à Moukden contre son automobile par des sentinelles japonaises. Cet événement n'est pas fortuit.

Washington exigea des réparations et la punition des fautifs. Le gouvernement de Tokio présenta bien hier ses excuses à celui des Etats-Unis, mais les sentinelles, qui agissent que par ordre, restent impunes ; ce qui donne tout son caractère à cet attentat. A Washington on estime que l'affaire n'est pas close par les excuses hypocrites de M. Inukai, car les résidents américains en Mandchourie continuent à être persécutés par les postes japonais.

C'est dans cette atmosphère de doute à poudre que la Commission d'Etudes de la S. D. N., enfin constituée, va partir ce mois-ci pour la Mandchourie. La Mandchourie est entièrement aux mains du Japon qui, s'emparant de King-Tchéou, applique l'idée de la « zone neutre ». La Commission, avec le général Claudel à la tête, n'aura donc qu'à enregistrer la situation ; mais aussi son rôle véritable est de préparer les bases communes de l'intervention des puissances en Chine et mettre au point les conditions de l'agression contre l'U. R. S. S.

Le rôle de l'impérialisme français

L'attentat de Moscou a avorté. A Prague, on est près d'étouffer l'enquête sur les agissements criminels de Vanek, agent de l'impérialisme français qui est le véritable instigateur de ce complot. Il importe donc aux stratèges de guerre de se presser avant que la tension entre Tokio et Washington soit arrivée au point critique. Car il faut l'union de tous pour mener la guerre contre le pays du socialisme victorieux et contre le pouvoir soviétique se renforçant en Chine.

C'est ainsi qu'on pouvait lire hier dans le *Matin* :

Partant du principe que les Japonais sont les seuls qui peuvent actuellement assurer l'ordre et la sécurité en Mandchourie, il est bien évident que les autres nations pourront commencer plus librement qu'auparavant, non seulement avec les provinces de l'Est, mais encore avec celles du Centre. La Chine est assez vaste pour redevenir, quand elle sera sortie de son anarchie, un marché profitable à tous et à ses habitants eux-mêmes.

Il est inutile d'ergoter à ce sujet et de diviser les Occidentaux en deux camps. Une telle incompréhension ou une telle erreur, comme on voudra, ne serait avantageuse qu'aux Soviets, qui, tôt ou tard, se heurteraient au Japon.

Les deux idées de l'intervention en Chine et de la guerre contre l'U. R. S. S. sont contenues dans cette citation. La guerre des puissances en Chine est indispensable aux impérialistes pour « faire sortir la Chine de l'anarchie » et se rendre maîtres des provinces du Centre, où 80 millions de Chinois vivent sous le régime soviétique (C'est la thèse défendue aussi par le radical-socialiste Margaine). Il faut réaliser le front uni des « Occidentaux » dans ce but et pour aider le Japon à soutenir la guerre qui « tôt ou tard » éclatera avec les Soviets.

Et, comme toujours, c'est la presse de l'impérialisme français qui dicte la marche à suivre, parce que c'est l'impérialisme français qui dirige tous ces plans de guerre et de contre-révolution.

Les agissements des gardes blancs

Le complot de Moscou, éventé par la vigilante Guépéou, a échoué. Mais déjà des dépêches de Moukden signalent laconiquement que des incidents assez graves ont éclaté à Kharbine, provoqués par les Russes blancs qui ont attaqué des Chinois.

Ces nouvelles méritent une attention toute particulière.

Les impérialistes veulent enlever l'Est-Chinois à l'influence de l'U. R. S. S. L'impérialisme japonais, maître de Tsitsikar, occupe une position de commande sur cette voie ferrée. Les Russes blancs, d'après les directives de l'impérialisme français, ont pour tâche de provoquer des incidents — attaques de l'administration du chemin de fer et du Consulat, etc. — qui doivent entraîner l'occupation de Kharbine par les Japonais. Les citoyens soviétiques, fonctionnaires de l'Est-Chinois, seront chassés de Mandchourie. Le cas de guerre sera trouvé. Les *Dernières Nouvelles* du blanc Milioukov publiaient, hier, à ce sujet, des renseignements intéressants sur lesquels il nous faudra revenir.

Le danger qui menace l'U. R. S. S. se précise de plus en plus. C'est alors que ce serait une grave faute d'affaiblir notre lutte de masse contre l'impérialisme français, pour la défense de notre patrie socialiste, contre la guerre impérialiste. Accentuons sans relâche le combat sur tous les terrains de classe, économique, politique, antimilitariste. Il n'y a pas une minute à perdre.

M. MAGNIEN.

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, January 7, 1932.

**DÉFENDONS L'U. R. S. S.
ET LES SOVIETS CHINOIS !**

**Les troupes japonaises
poursuivent
leur avance
en direction
de la Chine du Nord**

Pendant que sont préparées
la prise de l'Est chinois
et l'expulsion
des fonctionnaires soviétiques
avec l'aide des Russes-blancs

Menaçant d'occuper Fou-Tchéou et envoyant un croiseur à Canton, l'impérialisme japonais continue sa guerre en Mandchourie.

Dans toute la région de King-Tchéou, des combats se déroulent journellement entre les troupes japonaises et les détachements de partisans antiimpérialistes.

A Sin-Min, une violente rencontre a eu lieu. Les Japonais ont eu treize tués.

Près de la gare de King-Tchéou, un poste japonais a été attaqué par les partisans. Et de nombreux faits analogues montrent l'acuité de la lutte que mènent les travailleurs mandchous contre l'envahisseur.

Mais l'impérialisme japonais entend briser cette résistance. Les expéditions punitives se succèdent sans interruption, tant au Nord qu'au Sud de Moukden. Le Japon veut assurer son arrière pour préparer l'invasion de la Mongolie.

En attendant, l'avance continue vers la Grande-Muraille, en direction de la Chine du Nord — pendant que la nouvelle clique du Kuomintang au pouvoir à Nankin, par l'intermédiaire d'Eugène Chen, se prépare à ouvrir des négociations avec Tokio pour « régler » l'annexion de la Mandchourie par le Japon.

Les troupes japonaises ont occupé Sten-Chan, qui se trouve à 54 kilomètres au Sud de King-Tchéou et de nouvelles troupes sont envoyées pour renforcer les régiments japonais qui marchent vers la Chine du Nord.

L'impérialisme japonais, qui reçoit le blanc-seing du conseil de la S.D.N., poursuit donc avec méthode l'exécution

de ses plans de conquêtes, avec l'appui sans réserves de l'impérialisme français.

Une conférence à Washington

La commission d'études s'apprête à partir pour l'Extrême-Orient. Mais déjà les chancelleries travaillent à lui faciliter sa tâche d'organisme de dépècement de la Chine et de préparation de l'agression antisoviétique.

En effet, le 5 janvier, M. Stimson, secrétaire d'Etat américain, a convoqué les ambassadeurs de France, M. Claudel, et d'Angleterre, sir Ronald Lindsay, pour discuter du développement des événements en Mandchourie.

Le but de cette conférence secrète est clair : la tension est de plus en plus grande entre le Japon et les Etats-Unis surtout après l'attentat de Moukden contre le consul américain.

Dans les conditions actuelles, malgré les désirs belliqueux du Japon, une guerre entre ces deux puissances n'est pas désirable : il faut au plus vite réaliser les projets de partage de la Chine, il faut tâcher de mettre en sourdine les rivalités impérialistes pour perpétrer l'agression contre l'U.R.S.S.

Mais les intérêts de l'Amérique sont trop menacés par l'emprise chaque jour plus étendue et plus menaçante du Japon en Chine.

L'impérialisme américain qui pousse, parallèlement à la France, à la guerre contre l'Union Soviétique, entend avoir une large part du butin chinois, surtout dans la Chine du Nord que menacent les visées japonaises.

Au conseil de la S.D.N., on est arrivé à un compromis bâtarde. Il faut aujourd'hui renforcer ce compromis contre la révolution chinoise et l'U.R.S.S.

La conférence de Washington a donc pour but d'éviter l'éclatement du conflit nippo-américain et sceller le bloc des puissances pour l'intervention contre les Soviets chinois et pour préciser les modalités de la guerre contre l'Etat ouvrier.

**L'activité provocatrice
des Russes-Blancs**

Et pour la préparation de cette guerre, les Russes-blancs sont des agents précieux de Paris et de Tokio. Si, en France, ils préparent les cadres des bandes qui envahiront l'U.R.S.S., à l'Est ou à l'Ouest, dans leurs écoles militaires patronnées par l'état-major français, s'ils s'arment fébrilement avec l'appui de De-terding et des ministres du commerce et de la guerre, si leur presse appelle chaque jour à la guerre contre les ouvriers et les paysans de l'Union Soviétique, en Mandchourie ils jouent un rôle encore plus actif.

Nous signalions hier les sanglants événements que les Russes-blancs ont provoqués à Kharbine. Bien que les agences ne donnent aucun détail sur ces événements mêmes, elles signalent avec célérité que les Russes-blancs ont demandé aux autorités japonaises d'assurer leur protection à Kharbine.



Une vue de King-Tchéou

On voit très bien la manœuvre. C'est l'appel à l'occupation de Kharbine par les troupes japonaises, occupation rendant virtuellement l'impérialisme japonais maître du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois. Et déjà on cherche à mettre en cause les fonctionnaires soviétiques du chemin de fer.

« Chassez les Soviets de l'Est chinois »

Ces faits font partie d'un plan bien préparé. Dans le numéro de mardi des *Dernières Nouvelles*, qui s'éditent en russe à Paris, fut publiée une « lettre de Kharbine » jetant une lumière crue sur la préparation de la guerre contre notre patrie socialiste. Le correspondant du blanc Milioukov écrit :

Onang-Tsin-Kaï, président du nouveau gouvernement de Moukden, déclara ouvertement dans une conversation avec les représentants de la presse à Moukden, qu'il faut rompre avec les Soviets.

L'ordre régnant sur le chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois ne satisfait pas les maîtres de fait de la Mandchourie.

Sur l'Est Chinois doivent être effectués des changements radicaux. Comme écho de l'état d'esprit du Japon les déclarations d'un membre influent et actif du comité de Moukden — U-Tchoun-Haun — sont également très sympathiques. « Une telle situation (sur l'Est Chinois) ne peut être tolérée. »

« Sur ce chemin de fer, explique-t-il, le travail communiste est mené sur une extraordinairement grande échelle, les communistes se sentent comme chez eux sur l'Est Chinois. » A Moukden, le gouvernement a un vaste plan de lutte contre le Komintern. « Il est décidé que la lutte contre le communisme sera menée jusqu'à ce qu'il soit rejeté hors des frontières de la Mandchourie. Tous les communistes seront expulsés de Mandchourie. »

Et les *Dernières Nouvelles* traduisent en clair :

Naturellement, il s'agit de l'expulsion des citoyens soviétiques. Et le premier coup sera porté sur le chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois. Ici sera démontrée la décision du nouveau gouvernement mandchou de mener la lutte contre le bolchevisme. Sur l'Est Chinois sera effectuée une épuration générale ayant pour but l'éloignement des bolcheviks.

... Toutes les personnes envoyées d'U. R. S. S. sur l'Est Chinois, tous les citoyens soviétiques de nouveau engagés au chemin de fer après le conflit sino-soviétique seront licenciés et expulsés comme éléments nuisibles, comme porteurs de la contagion communiste.

Ce plan, ouvertement exposé par la feuille du « démocrate » Milioukov, c'est le plan du Japon, préparé en accord avec l'aris et les organisations des canailles Russes-blancs.

L'attaque au printemps

Actuellement, les trop grands froids empêchent la réalisation immédiate de ce plan, retiennent des opérations militaires des troupes japonaises. Mais le correspondant des *Dernières nouvelles* qui suit à quoi s'en tenir, écrit en conclusion de son article (envoyé de Kharbine à la fin de décembre) :

« Au début de l'année prochaine, dans les mois où reviendront le beau temps et le printemps mandchourien, sera une intéressante saison politique... Ici à Kharbine, presque tous les hommes politiques et les habitants sont convaincus que l'affaire va bientôt se dénouer ».

C'est donc le printemps 1933 que la France et le Japon ont choisi pour agresser l'Union soviétique. C'est pourquoi sont poussés avec une telle célérité l'occupation de la Mandchourie, la réalisation du front uni des puissances en Chine, les complots, les provocations ignobles des gardes-blancs. C'est pourquoi les campagnes de presse contre l'U.R.S.S. (*Je suis partout*) sont renforcées.

La lutte contre l'impérialisme français, pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S. est plus que jamais la tâche primordiale de nos camarades du Parti. En entraînant les ouvriers dans la lutte contre la diminution des salaires, en groupant les chômeurs dans la lutte avec les travailleurs encore occupés, en renforçant le travail antimilitariste du P.C. et des J.C., etc., il faut accentuer l'action de masse qui doit, sur tous les terrains affaiblir l'impérialisme français. Le danger gaudit. La tâche est urgente.

M. MAGNIEN.

Hamm. 8


Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, January 8, 1932.

Défendons notre patrie socialiste

APRÈS LA PROVOCATION DE MOSCOU LA PROVOCATION DE KHARBINE

L'impérialisme français et son allié
japonais sont résolus à précipiter
l'attaque contre l'U. R. S. S.



Lord LYTTON
délégué de l'impérialisme britannique
à la commission de Mandchourie

La loi martiale est proclamée à
Kharbine.

Voilà un événement capital dans
la préparation de la guerre contre
l'Union Soviétique.

D'après les nouvelles, on ne peut
plus impréciser, parvenues hier à
Paris, les événements qui se sont
déroulés à Kharbine sont des plus
graves. Des bagarres sanglantes,
provoquées de concert par les gar-
des-blancs russes et la police chinoi-
se, ont eu lieu entre la police et
des Russes émigrés. D'après la *Koel-
nische Zeitung*, des barricades au-
raient même été élevées dans une
rue de la ville. Il y eut 7 tués (6 Rus-
ses et 1 Chinois) et 20 blessés — tous
Russes, d'après l'*Echange Tele-
graph*.

Et naturellement on parle de ci-
toyens soviétiques, fonctionnaires de
l'Est chinois, qui auraient été mêlés
à ces bagarres. Dans l'état actuel
des informations, on ne peut définir
exactement les phases de la provoca-
tion évidente des Russes-blancs.

Si parmi les morts et les blessés
se trouvaient des citoyens de l'Union
Soviétique, on se trouverait en pré-
sence de la répétition de l'attentat
manqué contre l'ambassadeur du
Japon à Moscou.

L'appel des gardes-blancs à la
« protection » du Japon et pour l'oc-
cupation militaire de Kharbine par
les Japonais est bien significatif.

Le fait que des événements si gra-
ves se produisent à Kharbine, illus-
tre la façon dont les impérialistes
savent utiliser tous leurs atouts dans
le mystère dont ils entrent la
naissance de la guerre.

Kharbine, ville consulaire en
Mandchourie, siège de la direction
mixte de l'Est chinois, centre des
bandes organisées des gardes-blancs,
est le lieu choisi pour provoquer les
événements qui doivent accélérer le
déclenchement de l'agression contre
l'Union Soviétique.

Le renouvellement du crime de Se-
rajevo a échoué à Moscou. Le secré-
taire de la mission tchécoslovaque
Vaneek, payé par les cercles français
qui poussent à la guerre contre l'U.
R. S. S., avait pour mission de créer
le prétexte à l'attaque des troupes
japonaises.

Les impérialistes de Paris vou-
laient perpétrer à nouveau le crime
de Serajevo, qui fut le prétexte de
la guerre impérialiste mondiale. Le
« Serajevo » de Moscou devait être
le prétexte de la guerre des puissances
impérialistes contre le pays du
socialisme, pendant que serait en-
trepris, par le feu et par le fer, le
dépècement de la Chine.

Le Guépéou ayant démolé ces plans
criminels, l'impérialisme français et
son allié, le Japon, cherchent autre
chose sur l'Est-Chinois.

Les extraits de la presse blanche
de Paris, que nous publions hier,
montrent quelle ardeur est manifes-
tée par les agents chinois et russes-
blancs du Japon contre l'U. R. S. S.
Il est caractéristique que les provo-
cations de Kharbine soient effec-
tuées au même moment où la feuille
de Milionkov publie le plan d'expul-
sion des citoyens soviétiques de
l'Est-Chinois et de « guerre contre
le bolchevisme » en Mandchourie.

Les impérialistes de Paris et de
Tokio préparent l'attaque de l'U. R.
S. S. POUR LE PRINTEMPS. Et,
comme on voit, tout est mis en œu-
vre dans cette préparation. Les in-
cidents de Kharbine vont être utili-
sés, sur l'ordre des gouvernements,
par toute la presse afin de préparer
l'« opinion » pour l'occupation de
Kharbine et du chemin de fer de
l'Est-Chinois par les Japonais. Les
complots des gardes-blancs vont se
multiplier, ainsi que leurs provoca-
tions. Comme en 1929, il faut s'atten-
dre à des expéditions des bandes de
Semenov en territoire soviétique,
pendant que l'avance des troupes ja-
ponaises se poursuivra vers la fron-
tière de l'U. R. S. S.

Le danger est si grand que ce se-
rait un crime de ne pas accentuer,
par tous les moyens, notre lutte de
masse contre l'impérialisme fran-
çais, principal instigateur de l'agres-
sion, contre la guerre impérialiste,
tant en Chine qu'en Mandchourie,
pour la défense de l'U. R. S. S.

Dans les usines et sur les chan-
tiers, à l'atelier comme à la campa-
gne, partout il faut être à la tête des
mouvements contre la réduction des
salaires, organiser la lutte de masse
chômeurs, renforcer notre tra-
vail anti, exiger l'expulsion des gar-
des-blancs ; il faut dans tous les do-
maines porter les coups qui affaiblis-
sent l'impérialisme français.

Le 13 janvier, en assistant en mas-
se au grand meeting de la Grange-
aux-Belles contre la guerre en Mand-
chourie, contre l'intervention fran-
çaise en Chine, les travailleurs de la
région parisienne affirmeront leur
volonté de défendre la révolution
chinoise et l'U. R. S. S. menacées.

M. MAGNIEN.

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AMI DU PEUPLE, January 9, 1932.

EN MANDCHOURIE

PIRATES ET BANDITS

Le général Honjo, commandant en chef des forces japonaises en Mandchourie, avait promis, vers le 20 décembre, de planter le drapeau japonais à Kin-Tchéou le 1^{er} janvier 1932. Un arrêt de ses avant-gardes devant une position plus solide qu'il ne le pensait, la nécessité de faire intervenir l'artillerie, de rapprocher le gros de ses troupes, a retardé d'un jour l'événement prévu. C'est le 2 janvier au matin que l'emblème du Soleil Levant a flotté sur la ville si disputée.

Malgré tous les discours du Conseil de la S. D. N., les Japonais ont atteint leur but. Kin-Tchéou dans leurs mains, leur détachement de Chan-Hai-Kouan renforcé, tenant l'origine de la Grande Muraille, la frontière même de la Mandchourie, il n'y a plus d'armée chinoise en terre mandchoue. L'autonomie des Trois Provinces, dont le drapeau à trois bandes — vert, blanc, jaune — est déjà choisi, va être proclamée. Un gouvernement régulier se constitue à Moukden, sous le protectorat japonais. L'événement historique est accompli! La Chine — qui n'a pas voulu se battre — perd trois de ses plus belles provinces et le Japon s'enrichit d'un immense territoire, fertile et peuplé. Plus tard, la partie est de la Mongolie se joindra aux provinces mandchoues et les objectifs japonais seront pleinement atteints.

La morale de cette affaire, c'est que les « projets de résolution » d'une assemblée de juristes, sans moyens de coercition, même adoptés à l'unanimité, sont sans valeur devant la « résolution » personnelle d'un homme d'action énergique pourvu des moyens nécessaires. Et ceci nous rappelle qu'une agression brusquée se repousse par la force et non par des cris de désespoir et des appels aux pactes les plus variés! Avis à nos Unions nationales d'anciens combattants pacifistes...!

Le document qui a clôturé la soixante-cinquième session de la S. D. N. avait été adopté à l'unanimité, mais le Japon avait fait la réserve que les troupes japonaises — qui ne devaient pas combattre les armées chinoises — conservaient le droit de guerroyer contre les « bandits ».

La Chine, nous l'avons expliqué ici à plusieurs reprises, est, en raison de la faiblesse — ou de l'inexistence — du Pouvoir Central, un pays où les bandits ont toujours pullulé. Nous sommes plus que fixés sur la question, nous, Français, qui avons mis plus de vingt ans à débarrasser notre Indo-Chine des bandes de coquins chinois qui venaient piller et razzier, en permanence, nos populations paisibles. Il nous a fallu de longues années d'efforts, d'énormes sacrifices d'argent et des flots de sang pour venir à bout de bandes, dont les chefs se nommaient Lu'u Ky, Bakky, Hoang Man, Hoang Than Loi, Mac Que An... etc., et qui comptaient souvent dans leurs rangs un grand nombre de soldats réguliers chinois des postes de la frontière, venant, casaque d'uniforme retournée, participer au pillage. Tragique période qui a fait le bonheur de l'Indo-Chine et dont le souvenir a disparu, hélas! de la mémoire des jeunes intellectuels annamites modernisés...! Ces bandes de pirates, restes des armées chinoises de la révolte des Taï-Pings, débris des forces chinoises qui, sous le nom de « Pavillons Noirs », défendirent contre nous, en 1883, sous les ordres de Liou Vinh Phuoc, les citadelles de Son-Tay et de

Bac-Ninh, furent en partie détruites, en partie refoulées en Chine où elles devinrent des troupes régulières (Yun-Nan). Le métier de chef de bande, convenablement exercé, mène loin. La majorité des puissants généraux chinois n'a pas d'autre origine. Le « maréchal » Tchang So Lin, le maître de Moukden pendant des années, était un ancien « bandit ».

Des bandes analogues ont existé de tout temps, en Mandchourie. Pendant la guerre russo-japonaise, les Russes eurent à défendre leur chemin de fer contre ces irréguliers, qu'ils nommaient des « Khoungouzes ». Les petits postes, les isolés, les convois mal gardés, étaient la proie des Khoungouzes qui connaissaient l'art de faire dérailler les trains pour les piller plus facilement.

Au traité de Portsmouth, le Japon hérita des droits de la Russie en Mandchourie et de son chemin de fer... y compris les Khoungouzes, que les Japonais baptisèrent « bandits » et dont l'activité incessante causa, aux nouveaux propriétaires, les pires ennuis.

Tchang Sue Liang, après la prise de Moukden par les Japonais, concentra son armée à Kin-Tchéou en lui défendant de se battre, mais, en même temps, il prit à sa solde et ravitailla en armes et munitions toutes les troupes de bandits qui « travaillaient » sur les confins de la Mongolie et les lança contre le chemin de fer sud-mandchourien (japonais). Puis, il renforça leur action en camouflant des détachements de son armée que les Japonais baptisèrent « bandits » et traitèrent comme tels et, peu à peu, l'armée chinoise qui, plaçant « pacifiste » à Genève, ne pouvait combattre en face, s'engagea dans la guérilla sans uniforme. Les Japonais ne s'y trompèrent jamais... et le leur montrèrent sans ménagements.

Ce fut une des nombreuses fictions de cette guerre qui ne peut pas en être une. Et en voici une autre : l'Amérique, l'Angleterre et la France ayant manifesté le désir que Kin-Tchéou ne fût pas pris, les Japonais ont traversé triomphalement la ville, puis l'ont évacuée pour cantonner tout autour, à l'extérieur. Ainsi Kin-Tchéou est pris — et ne l'est pas. Ils avaient agi de même à Tsi-Tsi-Kar!

Il n'y a eu qu'un accroc au scénario. Pour accélérer la retraite des 9^e, 12^e et 19^e brigades chinoises et les rejeter sur la Mongolie, l'escadre japonaise, mouillée à Chi-Van-Tao, près de Chan-Hai-Houan, a bombardé et détruit par le canon la voie ferrée Tien-Tsin-Moukden qui, dans cette région, suit le bord de la mer. Or, ce n'est plus là de la terre mandchoue, mais province du Pe-Tchi-Li. Il y a là une faute de jeu...!

Pour le Japon, la « manœuvre » est finie! Or, la commission d'enquête de la S. D. N. n'est pas partie, elle se constitue avec difficulté. Le gouvernement français a désigné, pour le représenter, le général Claudel, inspecteur général de l'armée coloniale, membre du Conseil supérieur de la Guerre. Il ne pouvait faire un meilleur choix et il conviendrait de s'en réjouir si cette désignation n'éloignait de France, à la veille du 2 février, un de nos meilleurs chefs d'armée!

Mais cette commission n'a plus rien à faire en Mandchourie. Elle évoquerait le souvenir des carabiniers d'Offenbach! Il faut souhaiter sa suppression.

Général Henri NOGUES.

Hum 9

Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, January 9, 1932.

TOUT EST PRÊT POUR LA GUERRE

Attentats, provocations tout est mis en œuvre par la France et le Japon pour déclencher l'attaque contre l'U.R.S.S.

*Les rivalités s'aggravent
entre les impérialismes
américain et nippon*

Le danger de guerre contre l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques devient chaque jour plus menaçant. Et c'est à l'est que *présentement* la menace est la plus grave.

Mais parallèlement les préparatifs de l'agression sont effectivement poussés à l'ouest, dans les pays de l'Europe orientale vassaux de la France.

Déclencher la guerre antisoviétique à l'Extrême-Orient et pousser ensuite l'attaque à la frontière européenne de l'Union est le plan des impérialistes, de l'impérialisme français, puisque c'est Paris qui a la direction de toute cette immonde préparation guerrière contre les ouvriers et les paysans soviétiques.

Pour déclencher l'agression, toute une série de provocations est mise en chantier, afin de « justifier » le crime par un événement « fortuit » qui doit entraîner le conflit recherché.

Après les accusations de la prétendue fourniture d'armes par l'U.R.S.S. au général chinois Ma Tchang Tchan (qui s'est révélé ensuite soudoyé par le Japon), après les complots des gardes blancs découverts à Kharbine, surgit l'affaire Vanek. L'attentat préparé par ce diplomate tchécoslovaque devait provoquer la déclaration de guerre par le Japon à l'U.R.S.S.

A Kharbine

Le « Serajevo » de Moscou n'ayant pu aboutir, c'est maintenant les provocations de Kharbine, devant entraîner l'occupation de la ville par les troupes japonaises qui aideront le « gouvernement » des laquais de l'impérialisme nippon de Moukden à chasser les citoyens soviétiques de l'Est chinois. Il faut s'attendre à des raids des blancs contre le consulat soviétique. Ces opérations sont prévues, bien agencées, entre Paris et Tokio, pour provoquer la protestation du gouvernement soviétique.

Ce serait le signal du déplacement des troupes japonaises, appuyées par les escadrilles concentrées dans les nouveaux aérodromes de Tsitsikar, Kharbine et Kirin, vers la frontière de l'Union pendant que les bandes de Kouzmine et Semenov opéreraient leurs incursions de brigands en territoire soviétique. A l'heure présente, la presse des gardes blancs de Kharbine et de Paris est remplie de considération et de discussion sur l'opportunité et les modalités de l'incursion des armées de l'Empire du Soleil Levant dans l'Extrême-Orient soviétique, du Baïkal au Kamchatka.

Et, hier, on apprenait qu'une bombe avait été jetée contre le carrosse du mikado devant son palais de Tokio. L'auteur de l'attentat est un Coréen qui fut aussitôt arrêté.

Attendons-nous à apprendre que cet individu est un « révolutionnaire à la solde des Soviets ». Mais ce fait se produisant quinze jours après la découverte du complot Vanek à Moscou est extrêmement symptomatique de la célérité manifestée par les impérialistes pour précipiter le déclenchement de la guerre contre l'Union Soviétique.

La Mandchourie est presque entièrement aux mains des Japonais qui s'apprêtent à s'emparer de Tien-Tsin — où la garnison française est continuellement sur le pied de guerre — et qui débarquent des troupes à Fou-Tcheou. Les troupes de l'impérialisme français massées au sud de la Chine ont commencé l'intervention contre les Soviets chinois. Les canonnières britanniques sont postées dans le Haut Yang-Tsé-Kiang et on apprenait hier que quatre destroyers anglais ont quitté Malte jeudi soir à destination de la Chine. En Pologne, Tchécoslovaquie et Roumanie tout est prêt pour la mobilisation des armées sous la direction des officiers de l'état-major français.

Toutes les conditions sont donc réunies pour le déclenchement de la guerre contre l'Union Soviétique et le journal de Milioukov était bien informé qui annonçait, mardi dernier, l'agression contre notre patrie socialiste pour le printemps prochain.

Cette situation confirme l'appréciation du comité central du P.C.F. sur la lutte pour le repartage du monde et l'imminence de la guerre impérialiste contre l'U.R.S.S.

Comme on lira par ailleurs, la situation est extrêmement tendue entre le Japon et les Etats-Unis au sujet du partage de la Chine. Mais la lutte contre le pays du socialisme, la nécessité pour les puissances capitalistes en pleine crise de tenter d'abattre l'Etat ouvrier en plein essor doit — momentanément — apaiser les rivalités sordides des forbans impérialistes pour réaliser le front commun du monde capitaliste dépérissant contre le monde socialiste florissant et menaçant par sa signification historique. Et dans cette tâche l'impérialisme français joue le premier rôle.

C'est pourquoi, dans des conditions si menaçantes pour tout le prolétariat international et les masses travailleuses d'Extrême-Orient, *notre tâche urgente est d'accentuer, accentuer encore, la lutte contre l'impérialisme français.*

L'exemple de la résistance et des mouvements courageux des ouvriers de Renault doit être multiplié dans les usines, les chantiers et les ports. Pour lutter contre la guerre impérialiste, pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S. il faut affaiblir sur tous les terrains de la lutte de classe notre propre impérialisme.

M. MAGNIEN.

L'impérialisme japonais entend défendre ses « droits » en Chine contre les États-Unis

Nous avons signalé hier l'avance des troupes japonaises jusqu'à la grande muraille de Chine et les desseins de l'impérialisme nippon de s'emparer de Tien-Tsin et se rendre maître de la Chine du Nord.

Des nouvelles de Tokio signalent l'intention de l'impérialisme japonais de débarquer des détachements de marins en Chine et d'entreprendre le blocus des principaux ports chinois si le boycottage continue.

Cela n'est pas sans inquiéter grandement les États-Unis. L'attentat de Moukden n'a fait qu'exacerber l'antagonisme entre le Japon et les États-Unis. L'avance actuelle des troupes japonaises et l'occupation qui ne fait aucun doute d'une partie de la Chine du Nord va encore aiguïser la lutte des deux impérialismes.

L'atmosphère est de plus en plus surchauffée en ce qui concerne leurs rapports.

C'est ainsi qu'avant hier soir le gouvernement des États-Unis adressait au Japon une note informant le gouvernement du Mikado de sa décision d'invoquer le traité des 9 puissances signé à Washington en 1922 par les États-Unis, la Belgique, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, la Hollande, l'Italie, le Portugal, la Chine et le Japon.

Tous d'accord contre l'U.R.S.S.

Mais si la tension s'accroît entre ces deux puissances pour l'hégémonie dans le Pacifique, contre l'Union Soviétique dont l'invasion de la Mandchourie et le partage de la Chine constituent la première manche, il n'y a pas de désaccord, au contraire. Les impérialistes de Wall-Street poussent de toutes leurs forces à la guerre antisoviétique. Écoutez ce que dit le *New-York Times* du dimanche 27 décembre :

Bien qu'il soit possible que le Japon n'engage point les hostilités avec la Russie présentement, il est presque certain que le principal motif de son attitude présente, n'est point son intention de réviser les traités ou de régler ses conflits avec la Chine, mais plutôt le désir urgent de s'établir lui-même en Mandchourie, de façon à être en position, pour affronter la Russie, avec des chances de succès, si un conflit éclatait.

De nombreux observateurs étrangers et un certain nombre d'hommes influents japonais eux-mêmes, persuadés que le Japon poussera à la guerre contre la Russie dans le proche avenir, croient que, si une telle guerre est inévitable, le Japon devrait pousser davantage maintenant, au lieu d'attendre que la Russie ait complété son Plan Quinquennal et ne devienne plus forte.

Voilà l'opinion des cercles dirigeants des États-Unis que représente le *New-York Times*.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Debats 9

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, January 9, 1932.

Les Etats-Unis prennent position contre le Japon

WASHINGTON INVOQUE LE TRAITE DES NEUF PUISSANCES

Depuis quelques jours, nous laissons prévoir, dans ces colonnes, que le conflit sino-japonais, au sujet de la Mandchourie, allait entrer dans une phase nouvelle. La note que Washington a envoyée, hier, à la Chine et au Japon ainsi qu'aux autres signataires du traité des neuf puissances, souligne le rejet, par les Etats-Unis, de toutes les concessions et de tous les accords que, sous la pression des troupes nippones, le gouvernement de Nankin pourrait être amené à souscrire.

M. Stimson a convoqué séparément les représentants des neuf puissances signataires du traité de 1922 afin de se concerter sur la situation. On annonce que les puissances intéressées ont décidé de procéder à une action bien définie, « d'un caractère décisif et sans équivoque ». D'autre part, on dit que le gouvernement américain aurait pris également une décision d'un caractère plus décisif, dont on ignore encore les détails.

Il faut attribuer cette initiative du gouvernement américain à l'avance japonaise à l'ouest de Tchén-Tchéou, et à l'occupation de Chang-Hai-Kouan, au pied de la Grande Muraille.

Bien qu'on ne connaisse pas encore l'accueil que le Japon réservera à la note américaine, certains indices laissent supposer que le gouvernement nippon, sans se heurter formellement à Washington, s'élèvera contre cette intervention. Le Japon ayant déclaré explicitement qu'il n'avait aucune visée territoriale sur la Chine.

Il convient d'établir un lien entre le déclenchement de l'action des Etats-Unis et l'arrivée à Washington du général Dawes, l'observateur américain dont on connaît l'activité qu'il développera parallèlement aux efforts déployés par le Conseil de la S.D.N. lors de sa dernière réunion à Paris, d'une part, et la nomination du nouveau ministre de Chine à Washington, M. W. Yen, comme délégué chinois au Conseil de la S.D.N. Ceci signifie que, dorénavant, les Etats-Unis désirent diriger eux-mêmes les négociations au sujet de l'évacuation de la Mandchourie. Le discours que le président Hoover a prononcé en réponse à l'allocution de M. Yen, lorsque le nouveau ministre de Chine lui a présenté, hier, ses lettres de créance est significatif à cet égard.

Le gouvernement américain, a dit M. Hoover, conscient des engagements qu'il a pris en signant les traités, se propose de suivre de très près le développement de la situation. Je vous prie de transmettre, Monsieur le ministre, l'assurance que le gouvernement et le peuple américains continueront à suivre avec le plus profond et le plus sympathique intérêt la lutte de la nation chinoise pour la réalisation de ces principes qui forment la base d'un Etat démocratique.

En prenant ainsi ouvertement parti pour la Chine, le président Hoover a marqué nettement la volonté des Etats-Unis, après l'échec de la S.D.N., d'assurer l'indépendance chinoise. L'initiative de Washington ne manquera pas de pro-

duire une grande impression, mais exercera-t-elle une influence bienfaisante sur le développement de la situation en Extrême-Orient ? C'est vraisemblablement une conférence internationale qui sera chargée de réaliser les principes énoncés dans la note américaine, qui a toute l'allure d'un ultimatum. — M. L.

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, January 9, 1932.

LA RIVALITÉ DES IMPÉRIALISMES

Le gouvernement de Washington vient de découvrir... le pacte Kellogg!

On se rappelle qu'au commencement de l'invasion japonaise, les Etats-Unis s'étaient empressés de déclarer que le conflit sino-japonais ne mettait pas en cause le pacte Kellogg. Pour être juste, je dois ajouter que le Conseil de la S.D.N., de son côté, n'a pas vu, dans l'action agressive des troupes nippones, une violation du Covenant.

Durant bientôt quatre mois, le Conseil de la S.D.N. et les Etats-Unis n'ont cessé d'affirmer qu'il n'y a, en Mandchourie, ni guerre, ni agression, et que tout se réduisait à un simple incident entre le Japon et la Chine.

Brusquement, tout est changé. Le gouvernement américain, après avoir consulté les ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre, a adressé hier une note au Japon. En voici le texte :

« Les récentes opérations militaires opérées à Kin-Tchéou ont détruit les derniers vestiges de l'autorité administrative de la République chinoise dans le sud de la Mandchourie tels qu'ils existaient avant le 18 septembre.

« Le gouvernement américain continue à avoir confiance que l'œuvre de la Commission neutre récemment instituée par le Conseil de la S.D.N. facilitera la découverte d'une solution aux difficultés qui existent entre la Chine et le Japon, mais en raison de la présente situation et de ses propres droits et obligations dans cette zone, le gouvernement américain estime qu'il est de son devoir de notifier à la fois à la Chine et au Japon qu'il ne peut admettre la légalité d'aucune situation « de facto ». Il n'a pas l'intention de reconnaître aucun traité ou accord intervenu entre ces gouvernements ou leurs agents susceptibles de porter atteinte aux droits des Etats-Unis ou de ses nationaux en Chine, y compris ceux de la souveraineté, de l'indépendance ou de l'intégrité territoriale ou administrative de la Chine, connus sous le nom de politique de « la porte ouverte ».

« Il n'a pas l'intention de reconnaître une situation, traité ou accord qui pourrait avoir été amené par des moyens contraires au Covenant ou aux obligations découlant du Pacte de Paris auquel la Chine et le Japon ainsi que les Etats-Unis sont parties. »

Comment s'explique ce revirement soudain ? Quel événement nouveau s'est produit ?

Aussi longtemps que les puissances impérialistes croyaient naïvement — ou feignaient de croire — que l'action du Japon aurait pour résultat de consolider les « droits » de tous les Etats capitalistes intéressés, elles se sont bornées à des déclarations vagues et refusées à toute action. Mais à présent, elles se rendent compte que le Japon veut se créer en Chine une situation privilégiée, au détriment des autres. En effet, maître de la Mandchourie, grâce à la complaisance de toutes les grandes puissances, y compris l'U.R.S.S., le Japon ne cache plus son intention d'annexer définitivement les régions occupées. Il ne veut même plus s'arrêter devant la Grande Muraille. Il vise Tien-Tsin. Il menace Changhaï, où il veut envoyer des bateaux de guerre et des troupes. Il se prépare à imposer à la Chine de nouveaux traités, à son unique profit, à l'exclusion des autres Etats impérialistes.

L'âme généreuse du capitaliste yankee ne peut pas supporter cela. De là la nouvelle attitude de M. Hoover. Mais, tout en se souvenant du pacte Kellogg et même du Covenant, Washington pense surtout au Traité des Neuf, signé en 1922 par les Etats-Unis, l'Angleterre, la France, la Belgique, le Portugal, l'Italie, les Pays-Bas, le Japon et la Chine. Ce traité a établi une sorte d'équilibre en Chine — équilibre des intérêts impérialistes, s'entend. C'est pour protéger cet équilibre, et non pas pour protéger la Chine attaquée, que les Etats-Unis interviennent dans le conflit.

C'était à prévoir, et le *Populaire* n'a pas cessé pendant toute la durée du conflit sino-japonais de rendre l'opinion publique attentive à cette conséquence de l'invasion de la Mandchourie. Et c'est pour l'éviter que nous avons réclamé du Conseil de la S.D.N., des Etats-Unis et de l'U.R.

S.S., une action énergique et commune. Au début, cette action *toute morale* pouvait être suffisamment efficace pour arrêter le Japon, d'autant plus qu'elle aurait été accompagnée d'une véritable mobilisation de l'opinion publique universelle.

A présent, l'intervention de Washington ne fait qu'élargir le conflit. *Demain, le conflit deviendra mondial, car Washington et Londres — pour ne nommer que les principaux intéressés — sont loin d'être d'accord.*

D'autre part, le Japon ne perd pas de vue le port de Vladivostok, qui appartient à la Russie. De ce côté aussi, une complication peut se produire d'une minute à l'autre.

Nous l'avons dit et répété ici. Mais nous avons eu tort d'avoir raison trop tôt.

Espérons que l'opinion publique va se réveiller à présent et qu'il n'est pas trop tard pour mettre fin à l'incendie allumé dans l'Extrême-Orient.

Oùqu'il fût — é laoin elaoi nelacni aoin
O. ROSENFELD.

jour. 10

Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, January 10, 1932.

L'ACTION AMÉRICAINE dans l'affaire de Mandchourie

Comme la Société des nations
les Etats-Unis visent à faciliter
un règlement direct
entre la Chine et le Japon

Le gouvernement de Washington s'est vu dans la nécessité de préciser par des communications officielles le caractère de la démarche qu'il vient de faire au sujet de la Mandchourie. L'éclaircissement est d'autant plus opportun que la diplomatie américaine a mis les autres puissances au courant de son action. S'il faut éviter l'interprétation d'une pression individuelle, à plus forte raison celle d'une pression collective, surtout lorsqu'il n'y a pas pression du tout.

On ne pourrait commettre une plus grande erreur que celle d'imaginer que les Etats-Unis critiquent la méthode japonaise. Cette méthode n'est-elle pas exactement celle que les Etats-Unis pratiquent couramment dans l'Amérique centrale ? Depuis le début du conflit, l'action de Washington s'est exercée avec beaucoup de prudence en faveur de toutes les solutions raisonnables. Jamais l'effort de modération n'est apparu plus clairement que dans le récent incident survenu entre un agent consulaire américain et une sentinelle japonaise, incident qui a été réglé par la bonne volonté des deux parties. N'est-ce pas même cet incident qui, en surexcitant les éléments américains défavorables au Japon — il y en a beaucoup et de très ardents — a déterminé le gouvernement de Washington à préciser sa position ?

Quoi de plus naturel, d'ailleurs, et de plus logique que les principes posés par le gouvernement américain ? Premier principe : un état de fait ne saurait créer un état de droit. C'est le bon sens même. Personne ne peut concevoir que l'action japonaise puisse modifier l'état de droit consacré par les accords des neuf puissances conclus à Washington en 1922. Ces accords consacrent l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, le principe de la porte ouverte et l'engagement réciproque de tous les contractants de ne pas chercher de nouveaux privilèges. Quelles que soient les garanties données à maintes reprises par le Japon, on comprend très bien que les Etats-Unis aient jugé opportun de rappeler la situation au lendemain de l'occupation de Tchin-Tchéou. Second principe : aucun accord ne peut être reconnu que s'il est conclu dans le cadre des engagements internationaux. Cela signifie que le conflit ne peut être résolu que par un accord librement conclu entre la Chine et le Japon.

Est-ce à dire que la démarche américaine facilite cet arrangement direct ? Cela est une autre affaire. Tandis que la démarche est interprétée très raisonnablement par le Japon et les autres puissances, elle est considérée en Chine comme une invite à la résistance. Nous retrouvons là l'inconvénient de la diplomatie sur la place publique. — SAINT-BRICE.

Enclosure No. 18 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, January 10, 1932.

APRÈS L'ENVOI DE LA NOTE AMERICAINE

**L'attitude des signataires du traité
des neuf puissances**

**LE CABINET JAPONAIS
LA DEMARCHE AMERICAINE**

La situation s'est compliquée en Extrême-Orient tant au point de vue intérieur japonais qu'au point de vue extérieur général, sans qu'il y ait, du reste, de lien direct entre les événements du dedans et ceux du dehors. La démission du cabinet Inukai ne paraît pas être la conséquence de ces derniers. Elle s'explique par l'attentat dirigé par un Coréen contre l'empereur; le gouvernement a cru devoir s'excuser en quelque sorte auprès du souverain de n'avoir pas su empêcher cette tentative d'assassinat. L'empereur n'a d'ailleurs pas accepté la démission. On verra bientôt si ces incidents doivent avoir une action sur l'évolution de la politique japonaise. Le cabinet Inukai, qui a succédé vers le milieu de décembre au ministère Wakatsuki, est encore en présence d'une Chambre où l'opposition (Minseito) possède 273 sièges, tandis que le gouvernement (Seiyukai) n'en a que 174. S'il veut subsister, le gouvernement devra prochainement dissoudre l'Assemblée, dont la session s'ouvre dans dix jours. La question monétaire semble être pour lui une grande cause d'embarras.

En ce qui concerne la situation extérieure, le fait nouveau est l'initiative prise par les Etats-Unis, qui, on le sait, ont adressé au Japon et à la Chine, en même temps qu'à tous les signataires du traité dit des neuf puissances, une note les avisant qu'il n'acceptera aucune situation de fait et aucun arrangement qui porteraient atteinte aux droits que l'Amérique et ses ressortissants tiennent des traités, y compris les droits concernant la souveraineté, l'indépendance ou l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine ou la politique internationale concernant la Chine, politique communément dite de la « porte ouverte »; la note déclare aussi que l'on ne reconnaîtra pas une situation, un arrangement ou un traité dus à des moyens interdits par le pacte Kellogg. Cette démarche a naturellement causé une certaine sensation. Il ne semble pourtant pas qu'il faille en exagérer la portée pratique immédiate. Le gouvernement américain a soin de dire qu'il continue à avoir confiance dans la commission que la S. D. N. va envoyer sur les lieux. Cela indique qu'il s'en tiendra pour l'instant à cet avertissement et qu'il a voulu surtout se réserver pour plus tard un moyen d'intervenir, dans le cas où le Japon organiserait la Mandchourie dans des conditions qui lésaient les droits de l'Amérique. La note a, en outre, pour objet de déterminer le gouvernement de Tokio à surveiller de plus près l'action des chefs militaires qui opèrent en Mandchourie. Le département d'Etat a en effet reçu de nombreuses pétitions de maisons américaines qui se plaignent d'être gênées dans leur commerce. Il faut sans doute voir là une des causes principales de la démarche américaine. Celle-ci peut avoir par la suite, bien entendu, des conséquences d'une certaine importance. Mais il n'est guère possible de les prévoir actuellement.

PIERRE BERNUS.

Enclosure No. 19 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, January 10, 1932.

LE PROBLÈME DU PACIFIQUE

Amérique et Japon face à face

Le conflit mandchou fut d'abord un conflit sino-japonais. Il a failli devenir un conflit russo-japonais. Et voici qu'il pourrait bien tourner au conflit américano-japonais. C'est-à-dire que pourrait se poser dans un avenir très proche le redoutable problème du Pacifique.

On nous dira qu'il se pose déjà. Assurément. Et depuis une pièce de vingt-cinq ans. Mais chaque année qui s'écoule le rend plus grave, dresse un peu plus nettement l'une contre l'autre l'Amérique et le Japon.

Le Japon avait des droits dans les trois provinces mandchoues. Sous le prétexte de les défendre, il a conquis la Mandchourie. Conquête qui fut entreprise et poursuivie non sans finesse, puisqu'à aucun moment, le Japon ne déclara la guerre ou même n'admit qu'il pouvait la faire. Ses armées ont avancé peu à peu, fort lentement, prétendant ne combattre que les seuls bandits, et traitant tout naturellement les troupes chinoises de troupes de bandits. A l'heure actuelle, elles tiennent plus d'un million de kilomètres carrés avec 30 millions d'habitants, et l'on ne voit pas qui pourrait leur faire lâcher prise.

Conquête, qui malgré son allure pacifique et peut-être à cause de cette allure justement, n'a pas manqué de troubler l'opinion américaine. Si bien qu'après avoir terriblement tardé, le gouvernement des Etats-Unis s'est décidé à envoyer une note à Tokio et puis à la publier. Il y souligne que *les récentes opérations militaires de Kin-Tchéou ont détruit les derniers vestiges de la République chinoise dans le sud de la Mandchourie*. De cela d'ailleurs tout le monde s'était aperçu.

Le cabinet de Washington assurément n'y peut rien, mais il montre son mécontentement. Il n'admettra pas, dit-il, *la légalité de la situation de fait*. Il ne reconnaît pas au Japon le droit de conquête. Bien plus, il maintient les droits

des Etats-Unis et de leurs nationaux en Chine. Or, la Mandchourie fait partie de la Chine. Enfin, très poliment, il rappelle le pacte de la Société des Nations et le fameux pacte Kellogg, sans parler du traité, dit des neuf puissances.

Tout cela d'ailleurs est bel et bon, mais n'empêchera pas le Japon de garder ce qu'il a pris. Le Japon a toujours affirmé qu'il ne comptait pas annexer un kilomètre carré en Mandchourie. Pas si sot. Il n'annexe pas, il occupe. Comme d'autres protègent. Mais l'on entend bien qu'annexion, occupation ou protectorat, c'est tout un. Pour le reste, on pense bien que le Japon saura ménager les droits des Etats-Unis ; cela n'ira jamais très loin.

L'irritation grandira sans doute aux Etats-Unis contre le Japon, mais les cuirassés japonais ont un tonnage total d'un peu plus de 300.000 tonnes contre 500.000 à l'Amérique ; la proportion pour le tonnage des croiseurs est encore plus favorable pour les Japonais, dont, par ailleurs, l'archipel est une position défensive de premier ordre. Ce sont là de remarquables arguments.

Sans doute la situation militaire n'est pas tout et les Japonais ont besoin du concours financier de l'Amérique, pour ne citer que celui-là, mais n'empêche qu'ils ont le temps pour eux et qu'ils peuvent digérer la Mandchourie à loisir en négligeant les notes américaines, à condition bien entendu de répondre poliment. Jusqu'au jour où l'Amérique se fâchera. Mais ce jour-là, le vainqueur des deux ne sera peut-être pas celui qui aura la plus grosse voix.

Nous n'avons d'ailleurs pas le droit de parler légèrement de ces choses, car s'il y avait bagarre dans le Pacifique, l'Indochine pourrait bien être bousculée. Or, la bagarre se prépare, nous ne pouvons guère en douter.

Pierre DOMINIQUE.

Anna 11

Enclosure No. 20 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, January 11, 1932.

La guerre en Extrême-Orient

LES TROUPES JAPONAISES MARCHENT SUR KHARBINE ET BOMBARDENT UNE VILLE DE L'EST CHINOIS

Cependant que la France
renouvelle ses excitations
contre l'U.R.S.S.

Nous avions écrit ces jours-ci que, survenant après la provocation franco-tchécoslovaque de Vaneh, les événements de Kharbine devaient être suivis avec le plus grand soin et retenir au plus haut degré l'attention des travailleurs.

Kharbine est le siège de l'administration du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois. On se souvient que c'est dans cette ville qu'en 1929 les généraux réactionnaires de Mandchourie accomplirent leur raid de sinistre mémoire qui fut suivi quelques semaines après des incursions armées sur le territoire de l'U.R.S.S.

Qu'est-ce que Kharbine ?

Kharbine est aussi un foyer de l'émigration contre-révolutionnaire russe. Il y a quelques semaines, les Russes blancs de Kharbine ont soumis au gouvernement de Tokio un plan détaillé qui prévoit la prise de Kharbine et le massacre de tous les citoyens soviétiques !

Le plan qui, est-il besoin de le dire, a été accepté par le Japon, avait été préparé à Paris.

Les contre-révolutionnaires de Kharbine sont en effet en rapports directs avec les conjurés de Paris, lesquels sont les collaborateurs du général Weygand, de l'état-major du gouvernement français.

Aujourd'hui, ce plan a déjà reçu un commencement d'exécution.

L'attaque a commencé

Une dépêche de Londres arrivée dans la nuit à Paris signale que « les troupes japonaises de Guirin marcheraient actuellement en direction de Kharbine. Un avion militaire japonais aurait lancé deux bombes sur Won-Chanü, situé sur le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois, à 150 kilomètres à l'est de Kharbine ».

Les Nippons marchent sur Kharbine, où les Russes blancs se préparent à massacrer les citoyens soviétiques.

Une ville de l'est chinois est bombardée, tel est le double fait. Il a une signification précise. Désormais les puissances, la France en tout premier lieu, sont passées de la menace aux actes.

On avait cru que la provocation de Vaneh, préparée par des agents français à Moscou, déclancherait l'explosion — comme autrefois l'attentat de Sarajev — et « légitimerait » la déclaration de guerre à l'U.R.S.S.

Le mauvais coup a été préparé en France

Le mauvais coup a été exécuté. La France et le Japon jettent le masque et passent à l'attaque ouverte contre les Soviétiques.

Dans le même temps les dépêches d'urgence annoncent :

1° Qu'un sanglant engagement s'est livré près de King-Tchéou. 20 Japonais ont été tués ;

2° Que, pour sanctionner sa conquête de la Mandchourie et rendre inopérantes les interventions diplomatiques des Etats-Unis, le Japon proposerait l'abolition du traité des neuf puissances.

Excitations françaises

Enfin, tandis que la guerre — la guerre contre les Soviétiques — est commencée déjà, tandis que les citoyens soviétiques de Kharbine sont menacés d'extermination, les excitations redoublent de fureur dans la presse française.

Voici en quels termes s'expriment les Petites Affiches du Centre, dont un Rabcor nous communique un récent numéro :

Il semble donc que le Japon ait les mains libres pour opérer. Il se défend, en l'espèce, contre la propagande bolchevique et réalise son rêve de mainmise sur la Mandchourie.

On peut s'attendre vraisemblablement à ce que des troubles éclatent en Sibérie et que des armes soient fournies par les Japonais aux révolutionnaires antibolcheviques qui opéreront contre les armées russes et en arrière de celles-ci en coupant les ravitaillements, en gênant le trafic de l'unique ligne de chemin de fer dont disposent les bolcheviques.

Les événements vont certainement se précipiter maintenant.

De son côté la Liberté d'hier nous informe de ce que cette opinion exprimée, parait-il, par M. Mac Chaulourne.

Si l'on considère le problème sous son aspect politique, on ne peut pas ne pas reconnaître que le Japonais représente plus même, encore, l'ordre : il est le chien de garde vigilant, impitoyable, de l'Extrême-Orient.

« Les événements vont se précipiter ». Tel est le souhait ouvertement formulé par les feuilles du gouvernement français.

Précipitons, quant à nous, notre réponse.

Par la préparation des luttes ouvrières, par l'organisation des sans-travail, par la participation aux meetings du Parti développons notre combat contre la guerre impérialiste : Pour l'abrogation des traités illégaux, pour le retrait immédiat des forces militaires et navales françaises d'Extrême-Orient, pour l'expulsion des Russes blancs, pour la solidarité avec l'U. R. S. S. et les Soviets chinois.

L'avance victorieuse de l'armée rouge chinoise

Shanghai, 10 janvier. — (Humanité.) — L'armée rouge chinoise continue son avance victorieuse. Les dernières nouvelles annoncent que l'armée rouge a cerné les villes de Huanang et Huantsi dans la province de Houpei. Les autorités locales ne sont plus maîtresses de la situation. Au cours des combats pour la prise des villes susmentionnées, le commandant des troupes gouvernementales a été tué.

Une autre partie de l'armée rouge s'approche de la ville de Paola-Tchau (au sud de Hankéou).

Des troupes opérant dans la province de Kiangsi avancent vers la ville de Kinté-Tcheng, siège de la fabrique de porcelaine renommée. La majorité écrasante des ouvriers de la fabrique s'associe à l'armée rouge.

L'avance de l'armée rouge a provoqué une véritable panique parmi les organes gouvernementaux. Dans les villes Kinkiang et Nantchang (cette dernière est la capitale de la province Kiangsi) l'état de siège a été proclamé. Dans les rues de Nantchang, des manifestes communistes ont été affichés se dressant contre le gouvernement nankinois et invitant à la lutte pour une Chine soviétique sous la direction communiste. La découverte que de nombreux agents de police ont pris contact avec les organisations communistes qu'ils ont soutenues activement provoqua la plus grande consternation.

Enclosure No. 21 to Despatch No. 2155
of January 11, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, January 11, 1932.

L'imbroglie de Mandchourie

DEPUIS le début de l'année, les événements en Extrême-Orient ont singulièrement devancé l'action des diplomates chargés de trouver la solution du problème de Mandchourie.

La commission dite de Mandchourie n'a pas encore pris le départ !

Le 2 janvier, un agent consulaire américain était attaqué à Karbine par trois soldats japonais. En période de tension entre deux pays, un tel incident prend immédiatement une importance démesurée.

Les autorités japonaises et même le gouvernement de Tokio exprimèrent leurs regrets, mais M. Stimson n'en persista pas moins, dans une seconde note, à indiquer sa résolution de maintenir le point de vue de son pays sur l'intégrité administrative du territoire chinois.

Cependant les Japonais occupaient Kin-Tchéou et refoulaient les « bandits » au delà des frontières chinoises, c'est-à-dire de la Grande Muraille.

Ainsi, depuis les recommandations et les décisions de la Conférence de Paris, le conflit sino-japonais, loin de s'aplanir, se complique et s'élargit.

Les positions demeurent les mêmes, depuis l'origine de ce grave différend.

Les Nippons prétendent seulement veiller à la sécurité des biens et des personnes de leurs ressortissants.

Les Chinois offrent d'assurer le calme dans la région du chemin de fer de l'Est asiatique et réclament l'évacuation des territoires occupés. Ils invoquent la garantie de leur souveraineté accordée par neuf puissances, dont la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Amérique.

Il est fort malaisé d'apprécier de loin la valeur des arguments de chacune des parties.

Un proverbe chinois dit : « Qu'est-ce qu'un soldat ? C'est un ancien brigand. Qu'est-ce qu'un brigand ? C'est un ancien soldat. »

Cela est peut-être exact dans le pays des Célestes. Quoi qu'il en soit, il est difficile de distinguer, sous ces latitudes, les méfaits des troupes de ceux des bandes armées aux ordres de généraux, trop souvent stipendiés par divers intérêts.

Pour nous, ce qui importe, c'est le rétablissement de la paix, pour laquelle M. Briand a fait de généreux mais vains efforts au Conseil de la S. D. N.

C'est, en second lieu, le respect des conventions visant, au moins, l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire chinois.

C'est, enfin et surtout, le principe inviolable de la « porte ouverte », c'est-à-dire de la liberté du commerce international en Chine.

Si la question de droit peut sembler assez claire, il n'en est pas de même de l'appréciation des faits.

La volonté d'expansion des Japonais est certaine, mais elle ne peut manquer d'avoir pour limites des traités qui sont la sauvegarde de la Chine, et des intérêts qu'il importe de ne point menacer inconsiderément.



LE QUOTIDIEN.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NAME, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Riga, Latvia.

January 8, 1932.



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No. 8381

Jan 29 1932

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit hereto attached a
1-2/ translation of articles from two issues of the Moscow
PRAVDA which deal with Manchurian events. In the
first, the American press is culled for references to
the action of Japan. In the second, it is predicted
that Japan will assimilate Manchuria, organize an all-
Manchurian government, and extend its action to northern
China.

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These utterances seem to have been made in order to have something to say upon the subject.

A cartoon in the Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, No. 337, of December 30, 1931, represents the United States as observing the action of Japan in Manchuria from the deck of a man-of-war, labeled "Pacific Ocean Maneuvers." A Japanese soldier, with gory bare arms, is represented as saying, "Don't you worry, Uncle, there'll be something left over for you!"

The occasion of the cartoon was a citation from an utterance of the Japanese Prime Minister that the Japanese will employ foreign capital in the exploitation of Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole

Felix Cole,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosures:

1. A Sharp Aggravation of Japanese-American Contradictions.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 1, January 1, 1932.)
2. The Door Leading Into Manchuria has been Slammed.
(Leningrad PRAVDA, No. 4, January 4, 1932.)

(In triplicate.)

710 R — Japan — China (Manchuria.)

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Enclosure ~~1~~ 1 to despatch No. of JAN 8 1932
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 1,
January 1, 1932,
Page 1,
American press review.

A SHARP AGGRAVATION OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN
CONTRADICTIONS.

(Translation.)

Japanese-American contradictions are being sharply aggravated. A squadron of 300 American flying machines has already left for the Hawaiian Islands. This squadron is to be followed by the entire Navy and Air Fleet of the United States. The American press is full of direct threats against Japan. It is especially characteristic that the press of the United States is constantly drawing analogies between events in Manchuria and the events that preceded the outbreak of the world War.

"For cunning and cleverness of plot," writes the NEW YORK EVENING POST, "the Japanese sally recalls the policy of the former rulers of ancient Nippon (the Japanese Empire.) The bombardment of Chinchow is an act of barbarism which may be compared to the bombardment of Scarborough by the Germans at the beginning of the world War."

"Without awaiting a diplomatic settlement of the problem," writes the NATION, "and without even presenting such an ultimatum as was presented by Austria to
Serbia

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Serbia after the Sarajevo incident, the Japanese army has without any warning, under cover of night, attacked the Chinese army barracks, occupied them, captured the Mukden arsenal and the Chinese quarters, and despatched its forces to occupy other large Chinese cities. There is no justification for such a sudden attack upon Chinese cities. This is precisely that aggression which the Kellogg Pact has in view, and it is very much like that process of 'assimilation' which was carried through in the case of Korea. China cannot but protest against that."

"If the Washington Government," writes the NEW YORK WORLD TELEGRAM, "will not take immediate steps to restore the inviolability of its treaty with respect to Manchuria, everything that has been created after the World War will lose all value. If this happens, the international situation will become extremely serious."

"China," writes the CHICAGO TRIBUNE, "will get nothing at the League of Nations. It is sufficient to cast a glance at the League of Nations to realize that not one of the countries belonging to the League will come out against Japan in any way except through diplomatic notes."

"To be sure," writes the D. M. REGISTER, "for Europe and America it is at the present time exceedingly difficult to bestow their attention on the Far East. They have a large number of urgent problems of their own. Nevertheless it is already becoming perfectly obvious

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obvious that the behavior of Japan toward China will not be left without its proper consequences."

(From our own correspondent.)

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Peiping, December 29 (TASS.) The PEKIN AND TIENTSIN TIMES, an American newspaper appearing in China, warns Japan against the seizure of Chinchow.

The paper points out that an aggravation of the Manchurian crisis may lead to serious international consequences, and that it may, particularly, discredit definitely the pending disarmament conference. This, in turn, may hasten a revolutionary explosion in China and Germany.

* *
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New York, December 30 (TASS.) The Paris correspondent of the CHICAGO DAILY NEWS writes that the recent announcement by Japan, that it aims to "preserve peace and order in Manchuria," represents a frank proclamation of a Japanese protectorate over Manchuria.

"Such," writes the correspondent, "have been the concrete results of the actions of the League of Nations since September 18. The 'Commission of Inquiry' is not yet formed, owing to the impossibility of finding Americans and Englishmen willing to participate in the commission."

The correspondent further writes that, in the opinion of European political spheres, the American naval maneuvers in the Pacific ^{have} "may/some significance as

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a diplomatic symbol."

The Washington correspondent of the NEW YORK HERALD-TRIBUNE reports that Stimson had refused to comment upon the news of the offensive of the Japanese troops in Manchuria, having confined himself to "pointing out that further American action is bound up with the contemplated occupation of Chinchow by the Japanese."

The Department of Commerce of the United States continues to publish reports stressing the economic and financial crisis of Japan. Commenting on the considerable shipments of gold from Japan, the Department of Commerce states in its report: "The immediate prospect is for a further drop of the yen rate of exchange."

Yesterday the yen rate dropped sharply in New York.

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Enclosure ^{**}No. 2 to despatch No. 8381 of JAN 8 1932
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Leningrad PRAVDA,
No. 4,
January 4, 1932.

THE DOOR LEADING INTO MANCHURIA HAS BEEN
SLAMMED.

(Translation of leading editorial.)

Chinchow has fallen. Japanese imperialism has there-
by consummated the occupation of Southern Manchuria, and
settled the fate of the northern part of that region. All
that is left for the Japanese occupiers to do is to let
the retreating Chinese troops pass through the narrow pas-
sage connecting the Chinchow district with Inner China,
i.e., through the so-called Shanhaikwan Gate, and then
slam that gate for good.

With the key to Shanhaikwan in their pocket, the
Japanese robbers will then begin to "assimilate" ^{Manchuria} /as some-
thing under their sole and unlimited rule. The creation
of an All-Manchurian "government" may be expected, which
will embrace the various "independent" political formations
that have been created at the point of the Japanese bayonets
in sundry parts of the territory occupied by the Japanese.

Simultaneously the Japanese military will set to
work to establish "good order." In the conquered regions
special detachments of police will be formed, a dense
network of Japanese agencies will be established, and also
the long contemplated Manchurian vice-royalty will be
called

-2-

called into being, the guardianship exercised over the South Manchurian railway will be extended, a central emission bank will be established, and new industrial concerns will be founded.

Japanese imperialism will concentrate in its hands all levers of military-political and economic rule, as well as the feudal exploitation of the much-suffering masses of toilers in Manchuria.

The capture of the small town of Chinchow is therefore an event of ^{the} greatest political importance. That is why the bombardment of Chinchow early in October immediately caused the international atmosphere to grow dense, while the first attack upon Chinchow at the end of November had to be temporarily discontinued by the Japanese robbers.

At that time America, supported by England and even France, lodged through its Ambassador in Tokyo a protest couched in terms of the well-known "sincere regret," and at the same time concentrated attention on what was practically a closing of the "open door," that is, upon the obstacles created by Japan in the way of foreign trade, and upon the losses sustained by the foreign creditors of the Mukden Government. As regards this latter point, the Japanese made haste to give full satisfaction. All Mukden debts will be paid immediately — of course, out of the means obtained from the said Mukden Government through the seizure of the banks, railways, and other enterprises. But in the Chinchow question, Japanese imperialism, as could not

be

-3-

be expected otherwise, declines to make any concessions whatsoever, and did not stop half way. This was so perfectly clear before the event itself that the American Government undertook its demarche only in order to have something for further reference in future.

American capitalism has been unable to prevent the seizure of Chinchow, which inevitably will be followed by the closing of the door leading from Inner China into Manchuria, notwithstanding the fact that the inevitable consequences of that event were clearly foreseen. American capitalism is not even in a position to apply economic sanctions, for owing to the most severe crisis, it is deprived of the maneuvering possibilities required for this. The outcome of the Chinchow events has shown once more that the world crisis of capitalism is in a situation which is temporarily in favor of the predatory plans of Japan. But this success scored by Japan means, of course, the further intensification of the struggle for Manchuria and for China. In spite of all the promises of the Japanese, the seizure of Manchuria means practically the expulsion of foreign capital from Manchuria. This time the "open door" will be closed securely.

After Manchuria, undoubtedly, will come Northern China, whose vital centers are situated dangerously near the new boundary line of the Japanese sphere of rule, but what is still more important is that the seizure of Manchuria means the acquisition of a large raw material base for creating in those parts a

Japanese

-4-

Japanese heavy industry. This circumstance sharply influences the balance of forces in the struggle of the imperialists in China and in the Pacific — in favor of Japan.

The seizure of Manchuria by Japan brings to the fore the question of compensation to the other imperialistic Powers. This question in its turn brings within reach the outlook of imperialistic intervention in China proper, and of the division of China. Since such a division cannot be carried out by pacific means, the new turn which events have taken in the Far East announces an inevitable colossal clash between the imperialists, and the increased menace of a new war in the Pacific Ocean — a possibility which the Japanese fascist newspaper, NIHON, announced so confidently a few days ago. The seizure of Chinchow, which is the consummation of the Japanese occupation of Southern Manchuria, signifies at the same time also the increasing danger of new attempts on the part of the imperialists at averting the threatened clash between them in the Pacific — by some arrangement at the expense of the U.S.S.R., by letting the Manchurian adventure in its further progress develop into an anti-Soviet intervention.

But the Japanese occupation is under a menace just from that side at which Japan, together with the united front of all imperialists, is aiming its principal blow. The forces of Soviet China are on the increase. The latest telegrams bring news of large successes achieved
by

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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by the Chinese red army, whose units encircle from all sides the largest industrial and administrative center of Middle China — Hankow. The new victories of the Chinese red army have already met with broad response throughout all China; they will undoubtedly play a revolutionizing role, they will raise new millions of Chinese toilers for struggle under the banners of the communist party against the foreign raiders and domestic counter-revolution, and for a Soviet China.

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