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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 14

1930-39

793.94/4451-4621
Feb.-Mar. 1932



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

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The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

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Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

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In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Sofia, Bulgaria, February 2, 1932.




No. 356

Subject: FAR EASTERN SITUATION AND ALLEGED STATEMENT OF
MR. MARINKOVITCH.

PM REC'D



FEB 26 1932



F/LS

793.94/4451

MAR 28 1932

FILED

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform the Department that Bulgaria's somewhat flagging interest in the Far Eastern situation was recently given a fillip by a report in the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN to the effect that Mr. Marinkovitch, the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, had declared to its Geneva correspondent that he approves the measures taken by Japan in China and Manchuria, and that the Far Eastern precedent should make it easier for Yugoslavia ultimately to deal effectively with the Macedonian situation.

This alleged statement of the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs has evoked editorial comment of a caustic nature

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nature at the expense of Yugoslavia, and at the same time there has been a noticeable increase in editorial comment on the activities of Japan both at Shanghai and in Manchuria. Without exception the Bulgarian press expresses doubt as to the honesty of Japan's intentions. At the same time the press in general finds the inability of the League of Nations to deal effectively with Japan and China as a cause for serious concern for the future of that institution. A parallel has been drawn between the Petrich incident of 1925, when the League forced Greece to withdraw from Bulgarian territory, and the action of Japan in China. In this parallel Bulgarian opinion finds proof of the contention that the League adopts one policy when small states are concerned and quite another when the problem in hand involves major powers.

Respectfully yours,

Henry W. Shoemaker,
Henry W. Shoemaker.

Copy sent to E.I.C.

PM RECD

NO. 236 Political

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, February 17, 1932

FEB 26 32

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
LEAGUE OF NATIONS SECTION


FEB 29 1932

1-1007-100000

SUBJECT:

Sino-Japanese Conflict -
Transmitting Documents

1-1005 GPO



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

793.94 / 4228

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's
Despatch No. 221 Political of February 2, 1932 and previous
despatches transmitting documents relating to the appeal
of the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, and to transmit herewith the
1/ documents mentioned on the enclosed list issued during the
interim from January 25, 1932 to February 15 inclusive,
which have been furnished me by the Secretary-General
pursuant to the Council's resolution of September 22,
1931.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

No. 1 - List of Documents enclosed

Original and five copies to Department of State
One copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland

F/LS

793.94/4452

MAR 1 1932

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100

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. /
with No. 236 of
Feb. 17, 1932

LIST OF DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Transmitted with Geneva Consulate's Des-
patch No. 236 Political of February 17, 1932.

Council Minutes (Printed):

C./66th Session/P.V.2(1)

C./66th Session/P.V.5(1)

Council Minutes (Mimeographed Provisional):

C./66th/P.V.6

C./66th/P.V.7

C./66th/P.V.8

C./66th/P.V.10

Miscellaneous Documents:

C.M.48

C.M.49

C.M.51 to C.M.53

C.M.56 to C.M.60

C.M.62 to C.M.76

C.M.78 to C.M.82

C.M.84 to C.M.93

C.M.95

C.M.96

C.M.108

C.M.111

C.M.113 to C.M.115

C.M.117

C.M.118

C.M.120 to C.M.124

C.M.128

C./66th Session/P.-V.2(I).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

SECOND MEETING (PUBLIC).

Held on Monday, January 25th, 1932, at 5.30 p.m.

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General.

2987. **Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant.**

The PRESIDENT : I would point out that this meeting is being held at the request of the representative of China. This request was acceded to by the Council in agreement with the representative of Japan, who intimated, however, that he might not be in possession of the necessary information to give an immediate reply to certain questions that might be raised.

Before calling upon the representative of China, I would ask permission to give a very brief outline of the situation, since December 10th.

On that date, the Council separated after holding a series of meetings in Paris under the chairmanship of M. Briand. The fact that the French representative presided over these meetings was due to the friendly act of the young Spanish Republic in October. In his final declaration, the President of the Council expressed the hope that, although the negotiations for the creation of a neutral zone in the Chinchow area had not been successful, the two parties, in accordance with the terms of the resolution that had just been adopted, would observe the truce that had in effect been arrived at and would not move any troops or take any new step likely to aggravate the situation.

When informing his colleagues of the composition of the Commission of Enquiry which the Council had just decided to set up, M. Briand made it clear that the existing situation was a temporary one, and the Council has no doubt that the Japanese Government, faithful to its undertakings, will make it a point of honour to withdraw its troops within the railway zone as rapidly as possible, in conformity with the terms of the resolution of September 30th.

In accordance with the powers conferred on him by the Council, M. Briand, in agreement with the Secretary-General, set up the Commission of Enquiry provided for in Article 5 of the resolution adopted on December 10th. With regard to the constitution of this Commission, I should like to say, in complete agreement with the Secretary-General and, I am sure, with the Council, that although, with the exception of a citizen of the United States of America, the Commission consists entirely of nationals of Powers permanently represented on the Council, the course followed in this particular case cannot in any way be regarded as implying the deliberate adoption by the Council of a procedure which would place the settlement of certain matters exclusively in the hands of its permanent Members.

The Commission held a preliminary meeting at Geneva on January 21st. The American member was unable to attend in person, but was represented by the Consul of the United States at Geneva. The Commission elected Lord Lytton as President, and decided to leave for the Far East at the beginning of February. M. Briand pointed out in his letter to the Council that "the information which the Commission will send us when it arrives on the spot will constitute evidence that will gain incontestable value from the authority of the eminent men who have been appointed members of the Commission. In helping the Council to carry out its task, they will enable it, we feel sure, to hasten the final settlement of the dispute." I, in my turn, would point out that, subject to its purely advisory character, the terms of reference of the Commission are extremely wide. In principle, no question which it feels called upon to study will be excluded, provided that the question relates to any circumstance whatever which—in the terms of Article 11 of the Covenant—affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends. The Commission will have full discretion to determine the questions upon which it will report to the Council, and will have power to make interim reports when desirable. If the undertakings given by the two parties according to the resolution of September 30th, 1931, have not been carried out by the time of the arrival of the Commission, the latter should as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation. The Commission's faculty of investigation is not in any way limited. It will enjoy full liberty of movement in order to obtain the information it may require for its reports.

In this commentary, I have reproduced almost word for word the observations made by M. Briand at the meeting held on December 9th, and these observations, I repeat, were unanimously approved by the Council.

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Having given this very objective summary, which I believe is an accurate account of what has occurred since December 10th, I call upon the representative of China.

M. YEN: An event which to the ordinary observer may have had the appearance of a local incident occurring in a region far from the great centres of Europe and America has, within the brief period of four months, grown to be a problem fraught with the gravest danger to the entire peace organisation of the modern world. My country at once appreciated the significance of this event, and brought it instantly to the notice of the League of Nations. Everybody now knows that what happened in Manchuria on the eighteenth day of September last was but the initial step in a deliberately planned and ruthlessly executed programme of unjustifiable aggression by one nation against the territorial and administrative integrity of another with whom she was at peace. To-day, about two hundred thousand square miles of Chinese territory with a Chinese population of more than twenty million have been seized and occupied by Japan by military force. I think this fact is undisputed.

At the very outset China had the choice between preparing for her own defence and placing her faith in treaties and in the League. China to-day is not a military nation. She chose to come to the League, especially when it was in session. This Council has patiently and earnestly devoted six weeks of its time at twenty meetings to a conscientious effort to adjust the matter. Two resolutions have been unanimously passed. Each one of them was predicated upon a solemn promise by Japan to withdraw her troops as rapidly as possible. The promise has been broken. In place of progressive withdrawal, there has been progressive advance. Since the Council adjourned six weeks ago the aggression has been relentlessly continued until, in the words of the American Secretary of State, "the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed". Chinchow and the territory to the south including Shanghaikwan have gone the way of Mukden, Changchun, Antung, Yinkow, Kirin, Tsitsihar and a score of other cities. Japan is now invading the province of Jehol hundreds of miles from the railway from Mukden to Peiping and endangering cities in north, central, and even south China, as witness the latest threats to occupy Foochow, Tsingtao and Shanghai—points far away from the borders of what hitherto has been known as Manchuria. In short, every hope and expectation that the situation would not be aggravated has been defeated by the consistent development and forceful assertion of Japan's aggressive policy, first, to force China to submit to Japanese annexation or practical annexation of Manchuria, and, secondly, to compel the central and local authorities of China to suppress what is termed a "dangerous thought"—namely, all manifestation of national feeling provoked by Japan's acts of force and intolerable violence against China. Nobody can pretend that since December 10th the conditions have not from day to day become worse. I venture to say that history offers few parallels to such a cynical defiance of treaty obligations, plighted word and world opinion.

I do not intend at this time to go over the ground which my predecessor has so ably covered in previous discussions on this subject. Suffice it to say that China has founded her appeal to the League not only upon the most elementary principles of justice and international law, but also upon the precise terms of the League Covenant, which declare that any war or threat of war is a matter of concern to the whole League. This position has been made clear over and over again. What I do feel bound to emphasise with the utmost solemnity is that the problem is rapidly approaching, if it has not already arrived at, the point at which broken promises and specious excuses from the respondent in this proceeding cease to have any virtue. Something more than the conciliatory functions of the League must, therefore, be contemplated, if progress towards a solution is to be made.

The programme formulated early in December was comparatively simple. It comprised the following terms:

- (1) Japan undertook to effect withdrawal of her invading army within the railway zone "as speedily as possible".
- (2) A Commission was to be forthwith appointed by the Council to study the situation *on the spot* and to report; the appointment and deliberations of such Commission being expressly stipulated not to prejudice in any way the undertaking mentioned in item 1. If the withdrawal operations had not been carried out by the time the Commission arrived, the President's declaration enjoined upon it the duty of reporting upon the situation "as speedily as possible".
- (3) The Council was to remain continuously seized of the matter.

This programme in its letter as well as in its spirit provided, as the President said, for action on two separate lines: first, to put an end to the immediate threat to peace; and, secondly, to facilitate the final solution of the dispute. During the past six weeks, the threat to peace has been enormously enhanced by advances of Japanese forces hundreds of miles beyond the positions they occupied when the Council last met. M. Briand has within the past week drawn attention to the fact that the conditions in which the Commission is about to approach its task are not at all the same as the Council had the right to hope when it separated. The first line of action as laid down by the Council has completely failed. As to the second, the Commission of Enquiry has not left, and it is announced that when it does leave it will not go directly to examine into the situation "on the spot", as stipulated in the resolution, and will not arrive in Manchuria until some time in April, at the earliest. I may say, here and now, that my Government cannot but

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view with the keenest disappointment both the delay in starting and the declared intention not to proceed by the quickest possible route to the invaded and devastated territory. The Japanese occupation has, it is to be noted, entered the stage where the familiar puppet government device is being employed. In our judgment, the Commission should begin and pursue its investigation on the spot, while the evidence of what has occurred and of what is now going on can still be procured.

China, as you know, has appreciated fully the desirability of working for a solution under Article II, so long as that course holds any real prospect of success. Frankness, however, compels me to state to you that the necessity for proceeding to the exhaustion of all rights and remedies available in the circumstances to China under other articles of the Covenant becomes daily more pressing.

In conclusion, permit me to say, the Manchurian crisis as it now presents itself is one which not merely concerns China, but also puts in gravest jeopardy the entire conception of the settlement of international disputes by pacific means. It is therefore incumbent on the Council to see that its own resolutions are executed without any further delay, and that the Covenant of the League of Nations is duly respected.

M. SATO: I anticipated from the Chinese representative the strong observations he has just made. Once again China is represented at the Council table by a person of eminence, and I realised that I must expect the Chinese delegation to make a vigorous attack.

I should have preferred not to discuss the substance of the dispute which unfortunately exists between our two countries, seeing that we are on the eve of the Conference which is to open in Geneva next week. However, since I am bound to reply to the Chinese representative's observations, I shall lay before the Council what Japan has done since the last session, in order to justify my Government's attitude. I regret to say that I shall be obliged to go into the facts at some length if I am to furnish detailed explanations which will enable the Council to understand fully what has occurred and the situation in which we are now placed.

The representative of China has just said that a vast area was in Japanese military occupation and that, contrary to the resolution adopted by the Council, Japan had invaded the whole of Manchuria, which was completely occupied by Japanese troops.

That is not the situation. Is it conceivable that so vast a territory as Manchuria could be occupied by our troops, numbering 25,000 men at the most? That is not possible: Manchuria is still Manchuria, with its Chinese population. The Mukden authorities alone have felt the results of the recent events. There is therefore no complete occupation by our troops. The Chinese authorities remain, although changes have occurred to some extent in the local authorities.

In order to reply to all the points raised, I shall examine them one by one, and I would apologise in advance for the length of my observations.

I will begin by explaining the events which have occurred round Chinchow. Since October, the Japanese Government has drawn attention on several occasions to the danger to the Japanese forces and to our nationals constituted by the presence of a large body of very hostile Chinese troops, as well as by the presence of bandits and very large parties of well-armed fugitive soldiers. Encounters soon took place between our troops and the latter, who endeavoured to enter the railway zone. The Chinese military authorities immediately entered into relations with these elements of disorder. General Chang-Hsue-Liang sent two staff officers to the centre of activity of the irregulars; his emissaries tried to stir up trouble in the zone and at strategic points.

Towards the end of October, the forces of disorder became much more active. Where there were in normal times only small bands who maintained themselves with difficulty by raiding villages, bodies of men now appeared, numbering from one to two thousand, well organised, well armed and well fed, who directed their main efforts against Japanese nationals and the Japanese forces. These groups, whose principal activities extended into the vast plain of the Liao, were frequently commanded by officers of the regular Chinese Army, and the names they bore (such as the Anti-Japanese Patriotic Legion and the Anti-Japanese Blood and Iron Group) testified to their object: incessant guerilla warfare against the Japanese troops and Japanese nationals.

During November, these elements of disorder, whose numbers in the Liao area were estimated at about 85,000, might be divided into (a) bands of irregulars, soldiers of the regular army and police forces; (b) "voluntary" armies, irregulars commanded by Chinese officers; and (c) groups of real bandits numbering perhaps five to six thousand men at the most.

The bands of irregulars, which harassed our troops and attacked various points in the zone and the railway itself, were thus obviously supported by the Chinese Army. It became, indeed, more and more difficult to distinguish between the regular and the irregular forces.

The military authorities feared that, in the course of police expeditions, the necessity for which was becoming urgent, collisions might occur with the Chinese forces stationed in the neighbourhood.

Meanwhile, Mr. Wellington Koo proposed to the representatives of the three Powers that the Chinese troops should be withdrawn beyond the Great Wall. This proposal was communicated to the Japanese Government, in particular by the French Ambassador at Tokio. My Government hastened to avail itself of this opportunity of preventing the danger of a serious conflict, and while accepting the proposal in principle, asked the President of the Council of the League of Nations

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to be good enough to use his influence to hasten the conclusion of such an agreement, as the situation might at any moment take an extremely dangerous turn.

At the request of the President, the Japanese Government indicated the lines along which it considered an agreement could be concluded. As a proof of goodwill and to facilitate the withdrawal of the Chinese troops, the Japanese troops in the Liao area were even brought back within the railway zone.

Unfortunately, the Council of the League of Nations was unable to accept the request of the Japanese Government. The latter greatly regretted this decision, which might have had very serious consequences. It persevered in its conversations on this subject with the Chinese authorities, but meanwhile attacks by the forces of disorder increased in violence, spreading even in the direction of the Antung line and the neutral zone, while the attitude and position of the Chinese troops caused it the most serious anxiety.

On December 20th, the Japanese military authorities undertook an expedition on a large scale against the forces of disorder, and several columns set out from various points in the railway zone to clear the Liao district of dangerous elements. During these operations, the Japanese forces encountered the regular Chinese forces on several occasions.

Marshal Chang-Hsue-Liang, realising the seriousness of the situation, finally decided to withdraw his troops towards the Great Wall. It is most regrettable that this decision was not taken earlier, for it would then have prevented unfortunate bloodshed and demonstrations of hostile feeling.

Since then, the Japanese troops have continued their advance and have reached Chinchow, the occupation of which was, both geographically and strategically a logical and essential measure for the proper accomplishment of their task. This occupation, however, is only provisional. It will be maintained only as far as it is necessary to safeguard order and peace. For this purpose, steps have been taken, in agreement with the Chinese local authorities, and it is to be hoped that our troops will soon complete the task imposed upon them by circumstances.

These events explain the advance of our troops towards Chinchow. I will now give you a few particulars with regard to the situation in Chinchow and its neighbourhood.

At Chinchow and in the neighbouring district order is at present being maintained in co-operation with the Chinese authorities. When our forces entered Chinchow, some of the officials of Marshal Chang-Hsue-Liang were withdrawn. However, the notables showed no animosity on the arrival of our troops and offered to work with us. They formed of their own accord, with the officials remaining on the spot, a Committee of Public Security, the Chairman of which was the prefect of the district. The former officials remaining in Chinchow have all resumed their duties. When our troops entered Chinchow, the Chinese police forces were temporarily disarmed, but shortly afterwards all their weapons were returned to them and they are now responsible for the maintenance of order.

Japanese sentries are posted only at certain important points of the town, in particular at the gates and the station. We have in Chinchow a divisional staff and a brigade staff; they are housed by the municipality in buildings previously occupied by the Chinese military authorities.

The banks and other Chinese credit-institutions, which had been closed, re-opened after the entry of our troops, and business has been resumed.

It is absolutely untrue that we are making use of banditry in Manchuria as a pretext to enable us to pursue military designs.

I was called to Japan last year for a consultation with regard to the Disarmament Conference. I went and returned by the Trans-Siberian route, and passed through Manchuria. Consequently, I was able twice to stop at Mukden, where I conferred with our military commander, General Honjo, and other Japanese authorities. I obtained a good deal of information with regard to banditry and other questions with which we are now concerned.

You probably know from the information we have communicated to the Council that, even before our troops advanced from Yinkow to Chinchow, there were constant disturbances and attacks by bandits. The same is true of Hsi-Min-Toun.

As soon as our troops left Yinkow to push forward to Chinchow for the purpose of clearing the territory, they encountered very large and very well-organised forces. These were "voluntary" troops, constituted by the Chinchow authorities and recruited from among undesirable elements—in fact, bandits. These "volunteers" operated side by side with the regular Chinese troops and were a source of disturbance in the districts west of the Liao. They took advantage of the situation to draw near to the South Manchurian Railway. This district has always caused Japan great anxiety. We therefore had to advance towards Chinchow. On the way we had several encounters with the "voluntary" troops—that is to say, with bandits and irregulars. In these engagements we suffered appreciable, though not heavy, losses.

We entered Chinchow. The commanding officer explained to me the special situation in which he was placed. If the town were not occupied, engagements with the Chinese police could be avoided. This he obviously desired. However, to leave the town without any authority in control would have been to expose it to the danger of immediate pillage. For that reason the Japanese cavalry, on the withdrawal of the Chinese troops, entered the town for the purpose of maintaining order. This was a police measure necessary to maintain security.

All these areas are unfortunately in a state of complete disorder. As an example, I might mention that my train, which left on January 1st, narrowly escaped the fire of the bandits on several occasions. This will show the present state of affairs in Manchuria.

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These explanations indicate why we were unable to withdraw our troops within the railway zone in as short a time as we should have desired. We undertook operations for clearing the territory, and these operations have to be completed. To leave the work unfinished would mean beginning all over again in the near future if order is to be restored in the vast territory of Manchuria.

The Chinese representative said that our operations are not confined to Manchuria and that they are constantly being extended. He said that the towns of Foochow, Shanghai and Tsintao have been occupied by the Japanese. Nothing of the kind has occurred. We have never occupied any of these places. At Foochow, certain very regrettable events occurred. We communicated information on this matter to the Council, and there is therefore no need for me to deal with the subject here. With regard to Shanghai, I realise that the situation is extremely grave, but the responsibility is not ours. I will give the Council particulars with regard to recent events at Shanghai. The official information we possess has already been circulated to the Members of the Council by the Secretariat.

At M. Sato's request the following summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation was read:¹

" 1. An article which appeared on January 10th in a Chinese newspaper of Shanghai which is an organ of the Nationalist Party, concerning the outrage against His Majesty and bearing the sub-title 'Unfortunately, another carriage hit . . .', caused profound irritation among the Japanese population of Shanghai.

" The Japanese Consulate-General immediately protested to the mayor of the Chinese town, drawing his attention once more to the dangers of the situation created by the violent and illegal campaign conducted by the anti-Japanese organisations.

" 2. Such was the position when, on January 18th, at about 4 p.m., two Japanese monks, accompanied by three of the faithful, were attacked by some fifty workmen, who were coming out of a factory situated in the vicinity of the Concession, and known as a centre of anti-Japanese agitation. Other Chinese soon joined the assailants, and three of the Japanese had to be taken to hospital in a very serious condition.

" The Japanese Consul-General asked the Chinese mayor that apologies should be made concerning the attack against the Japanese monks, that the offenders should be sought and punished, that an indemnity should be paid to the victims, that the anti-Japanese manifestations should be energetically put down, and that the anti-Japanese associations should be immediately dissolved.

" 3. The danger of a collision between Chinese and Japanese feared by the Consul-General was soon to be realised. On January 20th, at dawn, a group of Japanese set fire to the Chinese factory in question by way of reprisals. An encounter also took place between the Chinese police and the demonstrators.

" The Japanese colony has held several meetings, vehemently protesting against the proceedings of the authorities and of the anti-Japanese associations and asking for the suppression of the latter. It has applied with this end in view to the Consul-General and to the Commander of the Japanese forces stationed at Shanghai.

" 4. A fresh riot occurred in the afternoon of the same day between Japanese and Chinese and, despite the efforts made by the Japanese police and the marines, the Japanese demonstrators sacked several Chinese shops, from which different projectiles had been thrown at them.

" 5. Two members of the municipal police having been wounded during the riot (one has died as a result of his wounds), the Consul-General expressed his regrets to the municipal council. Three demonstrators are being prosecuted by the latter. The Consul-General induced four other demonstrators to give themselves up on January 23rd.

" 6. The Japanese Government has decided to send a cruiser and several destroyers, with about 400 men as reinforcements, to Shanghai."

The following telegrams received by the Japanese delegation were also read:²

" 1. During his interview with the mayor of the Chinese town, on January 21st, the Japanese Consul-General renewed his request that vigorous action be taken to put a stop to anti-Japanese measures, owing to the possible consequences of the feeling that might be engendered on both sides. He assured the mayor that the Japanese offenders involved in the burning down of the factory would be traced and punished in accordance with the law.

" 2. On January 21st, the commander of the naval forces in China published a declaration in support of the protest made by the Japanese Consul-General against the assaulting of Japanese monks by members of the anti-Japanese Association. He declared that, if necessary, he would take suitable measures to protect Japanese rights and interests.

" 3. Our nationals are constantly being subjected to new forms of intimidation. The practice of interfering with their telephonic communications has been resumed. The Japanese Consul-General is endeavouring to allay the prevailing irritation, but feeling still

¹ Document C.103.M.49.1932.VII.

² Document C.105.M.51.1932.VII.

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runs very high in the Japanese colony, which is clamouring for vigorous action, the measures taken by the authorities being regarded as inadequate."

Official telegram received by the Japanese Delegation (January 25th, 1932).

"An attempt to set fire to the house of the Japanese Minister at Shanghai was discovered on the 24th instant at about 7 p.m. A Chinese mattress soaked in paraffin had been placed against the house and set alight. It was removed before the house caught fire. A revolver was found as well as two coats marked in Chinese with the inscription 'Member of the Anti-Japanese Shock Association for the Safeguarding of the Nation', and bearing the seal of that association. To one of the doors of the house a poster had been affixed bearing the stamp of the association and declaring that recourse was being had to direct action to punish the Japanese."

The Japanese Government has frequently denounced the hostile agitation carried on in China under the Government's direction. It has refuted the Chinese allegation that this agitation consists only of spontaneous acts on the part of the population, for we have seen how the anti-Japanese organisations imposed their will on Chinese citizens under the threat of barbarous punishments which recall the Middle Ages. The deep discontent created among Chinese merchants by these measures is a further proof of the compulsion to which they are exposed.

My Government has often drawn attention to the disastrous consequences of the anti-foreign agitation and education which are at present directed against Japan, but from which other Powers, in their turn, have suffered or will suffer in future. Possibly this systematic incitement of the masses serves the purposes of domestic policy. In its international aspect, it must be regarded as absolutely contrary to the spirit which governs the relations of modern nations. For several months past, we have been exposed to vexatious and definitely hostile measures. Japanese nationals even in remote provinces of China have had to flee in haste, and several of our consultates have had to be evacuated. Japanese nationals have been deprived of the means of livelihood, and even food has often been refused them. They have suffered enormous losses, their business has been brought to a standstill, and their houses have frequently been pillaged. Nevertheless, hoping that the Chinese authorities would revert to a sound understanding of their duty, we have shown the greatest patience; but the anti-Japanese agitation, instead of being suppressed, has constantly been encouraged. Latterly, the attacks upon us have become more violent, endangering the very lives of our nationals. The recent incidents in Shanghai are only one result of this dereliction of duty on the part of the Chinese authorities, or rather of their ill-will.

One newspaper, an organ of the Nationalist Party at Shanghai, even went so far as to express regret that, on the occasion of the attempt against my Sovereign, another carriage only had been damaged. These disgraceful words caused profound emotion in Japan, particularly in the Japanese colony in Shanghai. As I have just stated, Japanese monks were attacked a few days later and were nearly killed by a Chinese crowd. The feeling of exasperation of the Japanese nationals, which for a long time had been kept in check, broke out in spite of the efforts of the authorities to calm them, and thus occurred the unfortunate incidents which I communicated to the Council this morning.

I have just received further information, relating in particular to an attempt to set fire to the house of the Japanese Minister in China. The Members of the Council will realise the seriousness of the situation caused by the anti-Japanese campaign and the heavy responsibility resting on those who are inspiring it.

The Japanese Government cannot allow its nationals to be molested and their lives and property to be attacked. While it is prepared, in accordance with the law, to punish severely any of its own nationals who are guilty of illegal acts, it must once again insist that the Chinese authorities take speedy and effective measures to remedy the present state of affairs.

With regard to the sending of warships and reinforcements to Shanghai, I need not remind the Council that, in view of the situation in China, all the Powers have stationed warships there, even in the interior of the country, and that there are military and naval forces of all countries at many points in China for the protection of their respective nationals.

That is all I have to say regarding recent events in Shanghai. I do not wish to make further observations, but I would nevertheless refer to the important question of the principle of the open door in Manchuria. It has often been stated that we were about to occupy Manchuria and to close the door on the rest of the world. That is not the intention of the Japanese Government.

Japan has rights in Manchuria derived from lawfully concluded treaties and agreements and many acquired interests. It is absolutely essential to her existence that her rights and interests should be respected, and that her nationals should be allowed to live and work in peace and safety in this territory. By their campaigns for the unilateral denunciation of treaties, by their anti-foreign agitation and by their systematic violation of undertakings solemnly entered into, the Chinese central authorities and the rulers of Manchuria, particularly Marshal Chang-Hsue-Liang, have attempted and are still attempting to destroy all the work of the Japanese in Manchuria. For years Japan has suffered and borne, with incredible patience, innumerable vexations and acts of provocation, while by this very fact the arrogance of the Chinese authorities has increased. The Nakamura and Wanpaoshan incidents, and finally the incident of September 18th, brought the irritation to its highest point. The Japanese nation was unanimous in demanding that its rights should be safeguarded.

All the events that followed are simply the consequence of that situation. Japan suggested a free exchange of views with China in order that agreement might speedily be reached as to the

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essential elements of a lasting settlement of the question. China refused this opportunity of bringing about a real and final improvement in the situation, and let loose the most violent anti-Japanese agitation which had ever occurred. For his part, Marshal Chang-Hsue-Liang, from his headquarters at Chinchow, pursued his hostile activities and sent large irregular forces against our troops and our nationals. It was essential for our safety that these elements of disorder should be dispersed. Our troops advanced to Chinchow, while the Marshal withdrew his troops beyond the Great Wall.

Such is the position to-day. Japan is defending rights and interests on which her very existence depends. I cannot define her policy better than by repeating the words of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Japanese Parliament on January 21st:

"Japan harbours no territorial designs in Manchuria and she will uphold the principles of the open door and equal opportunity as well as all existing treaties relating to that territory. What Japan desires is only to secure peace and order for Manchuria and to make that region safe both for Chinese and foreigners and open to all for economic development."

One word in conclusion. If I have rightly understood the representative of China, he is dissatisfied at the delay in the departure of the Commission of Enquiry to China and Manchuria, and he pointed out that the Commission would not proceed direct to Manchuria, but would take a roundabout route.

My Government to some extent took the initiative in proposing this Commission, and I am very glad that it has been set up and duly constituted. It is now about to leave Europe. The future will show whether the results of its investigations in China and Manchuria are favourable to Japan's case or not. In a few months' time the Commission, having studied the situation on the spot, will provide us with a very important report for the settlement of the dispute.

We must wait until the Commission, which has only just been created, has completed its mission. Consequently, this is not the time to contemplate the creation of another commission such as the representative of China has in mind, to be sent to the spot immediately to investigate the situation. I do not think there can be any question of that at the present moment.

M. YEN: I would like to say a few words in reply to the remarks of the distinguished delegate from Japan.

He began by complimenting me on being very emphatic and eloquent. We have a saying in China that when a man has a righteous cause to defend he is always eloquent.

The important point for us to remember is that Chinchow, which Japan promised again and again not to occupy and which she did not occupy for a while because of the *démarche* made by Great Britain, France and the United States, was ultimately taken because the military got the upper hand.

The excuses given by Japan for the invasion of Manchuria have changed from day to day, so that it is very difficult for me to argue.

At first it was the excuse that a stretch of railway was destroyed. Mukden was therefore bombarded.

Then it was a matter of self-defence; so a Chinese territory of about 200,000 square miles has been occupied. May I ask the Japanese delegate if there is a single Chinese soldier on Japanese territory? This would be more like self-defence.

The next excuse was the security of Japanese subjects and Japanese property. Chinchow, however, did not contain many Japanese or much Japanese property, so banditry is now the excuse.

You may be interested to know that I have just come from Washington and that in America all the newspapers when they publish the word "banditry" in Manchuria use quotation marks. Manchuria was one of the most secure places before the Japanese invasion. Many a foreign friend has told me again and again that it was safest to live in Manchuria. There were a certain number of bandits, but these have been greatly increased since the Japanese invasion, perhaps to the extent of twenty or thirty times as many. May I say that the Japanese army in Manchuria to-day is in the same position as a man who has set a house on fire and spends a long time standing by to put the fire out.

Chinchow was attacked because it was said the Chinese were concentrating troops there. We have the impartial evidence of Colonel Margett, Military Attaché of the American Legation, at Peiping, who said there was no concentration of Chinese troops, that there were only three Chinese infantry brigades, and there was no intention on the part of the Chinese to take the offensive.

"Banditry" exists not only in China, but in Europe and America. I trust soldiers will not try to put down "banditry" in Europe or America. All these things are quibbles and amount to nothing. May I read the remarks of M. Gonzalez-Prada at the twentieth meeting of the Council held at Paris on December 10th last:

"The exercise of the right possessed by each State to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its nationals must be limited by respect for the sovereignty of the other

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State; no State being entitled, in order to provide such protection, to authorise its military forces to penetrate into the territory of the other for the purpose of carrying out police operations."

It is true that Japan has not literally occupied 200,000 square miles of Chinese territory. In twenty years Japan has settled only 200,000 of her citizens in Manchuria, while we have settled over 20 millions of our people in Manchuria, proving that our Japanese friends are not very good at colonising.

The Japanese delegate has mentioned petty incidents. I could relate hundreds of them to you in China itself, in Chosen and Japan, against our people if I had time. To my mind, it is remarkable that, owing to the terrible aggression on the part of the Japanese, more unfortunate incidents have not taken place in China. The Japanese delegate has referred so frequently to the three Japanese monks that I suppose they will become as famous in history as the Christian martyrs.

I have already stated in my speech that the idea of Japanese military demonstration is to suppress the boycott. Boycotting, let me remind you, is not an Asiatic weapon, but a European weapon. It is the military belief that you must use force to succeed, and if you do not succeed, you must use more force, and still more. No Government in the world, however, can force a people to buy that which they do not want to buy.

The Japanese delegate spoke of Japan having no ambition or desire to encroach on the territorial integrity of China. May I remind you all that the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington says not only territorial integrity but also administrative integrity; and, as to the open door, someone said to me the other day that the door would be so filled up with our Japanese friends that no other nationals would be able to get in.

I did not say that the Japanese had occupied Shanghai, etc., but that they had threatened to do so.

I do not want to take up too much of the Council's time now, but I reserve the right to reply in detail perhaps to-morrow, and I would like to end my remarks this evening by stating that this is the third time that Japan has invaded our country; the first time was in 1914, under the pretext of taking Kiachow, and it took eight years and the Washington Conference to make her troops leave Shantung. About five years ago, they made another attack, and it took a year to get the soldiers out, and this is the third time our territory has been violated by a foreign army. Therefore, do you wonder that our people are exasperated, and angry beyond words of expression?

I am here to represent our cause, which I hope will receive adequate treatment from the Council.

The PRESIDENT: When the representative of China asked the Council this morning for an opportunity to make an urgent communication with regard to a question on its agenda, the Council felt that, in accordance with its aims and the spirit which has always animated it, the parties to the dispute should be allowed to make their statements at a public meeting. Having heard them, it will, however, certainly desire time to consider these statements and to decide what action it should take.

Without laying down any definite conclusion, I would at present point out that some of the facts referred to by the parties occurred before the resolution of December 10th, and, as was inevitable, the parties do not agree as to their interpretation. In regard to these facts, the Council itself abides by the resolution of December 10th and will no doubt think that there is no need to re-examine them.

Other facts, while relating to Manchuria—that is to say, to the territory with which the resolution of December 10th is mainly concerned—are subsequent to the adoption of the resolution, and the Council will have to decide to what extent they are or are not compatible with the intentions expressed therein.

Among these facts I would include the programme and itinerary of the League of Nations Commission. The representative of China has expressed his regret at the time taken by the Commission of Enquiry referred to in the resolution to proceed to the spot. It will be for the Council to consider whether any other arrangement is materially possible.

Another category of facts, which is quite new, relates to the incidents or, more accurately, the fears and threats to which our attention has been drawn in connection with Shanghai. I can say that, in spite of the many disagreements between the parties, they are at least agreed that these incidents and threats are serious in view of the special situation of Shanghai and of the international character of certain concessions.

The Council has not yet studied the question and considered what measures can be taken, but I believe—though I have not consulted it, I know what its views will be—that I am interpreting its unanimous desire in suggesting that the parties who have just spoken with regard to these incidents and—I repeat—who agree that they are serious and that the menacing situation at Shanghai may lead to grave events, should urge their Governments, on behalf of the Council, immediately to take all the necessary measures to prevent Shanghai from becoming a new centre of trouble.

C./66th Session/P.V.5(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

FIFTH MEETING (PRIVATE)

Held on Thursday, January 28th, 1932, at 3.30 p.m.

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General.

3002. **Prolongation of the Term of Office of the Members of the Fiscal Committee and Appointment of the Corresponding Members.**

M. COLBAN presented the following report: ¹

"The members of the Fiscal Committee were appointed by the Council at its session in June 1929 for a period of three years, in conformity with the resolution of December 14th, 1928. The period of office of these members, and of those appointed subsequently, expires therefore on June 30th, 1932.

"In the ordinary course of events the Fiscal Committee would have held its fourth session before that date—in May 1932—if precedents were followed. For reasons of economy, the Twelfth Assembly decided that the fourth session of the Fiscal Committee should not be held this year; it was postponed until 1933. Such being the case, it would seem desirable to enable the present members of the Committee, who should normally have met this year, to continue, in 1933, the important investigations already begun, more especially with reference to the apportionment of the profits of concerns operating in several countries and the conclusion of a multilateral convention for the abolition of double taxation.

"With this object, I propose that the term of office of all members and corresponding members of the Fiscal Committee be extended for one year. In order that the Secretariat may be as free as possible to choose the most suitable date for the meeting of the Committee in the first half of 1933, I suggest that September 30th, 1933, be fixed as the date of expiry of the present Committee's term of office. The appointments for the next period of three years could then be made at the Council's session in September 1933.

"I desire also to propose the appointment of the following three corresponding members:

"*For Albania:* M. Rrok GERA, General Secretary to the Ministry of Finance (in succession to M. Llamb Aleks, resigned).

"*For Mexico:* M. Manuel Gomez MORIN, Economist (Mexico has not as yet had a corresponding member on the Fiscal Committee).

"*For New Zealand:* Mr. Ernest John Robert CUMMING, Commissioner of Taxes (in succession to Mr. R. E. Hayes, deceased)."

The conclusions of the report were adopted.

3003. **Slavery: Appointment of the Members of the Committee of Experts provided for in the Assembly Resolution of September 25th, 1931.**

Lord CECIL presented the following report and draft resolution: ²

"Under the terms of its resolution of September 29th, 1931, the Council has to appoint at the present session the Committee of Experts on Slavery provided for by the Assembly resolution of September 25th, 1931.

¹ Document C.117.1932.II.A.

² Document C.120.1932.VI.

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" My present task is simply to submit to the Council suggestions as to the composition of the Committee. Its terms of reference are already defined by the Assembly resolution of September 25th and the Council resolution of September 29th, 1931.

" The Assembly resolution speaks of a 'small' committee, and for this reason I venture to propose that the membership of the committee should not exceed six. I suggest that one member should be a woman. I feel it essential that the members of the Committee should be selected for their personal qualifications apart from any consideration of nationality. I would propose that, in addition, the Director of the International Labour Office be authorised to appoint one of his colleagues to follow the Committee's work as an observer.

" As my colleagues are aware, the credit of 11,500 francs in the League budget for 1932 is not sufficient to cover the expenditure which the appointment of the Committee of Experts will involve. It was announced during the Council meeting of September 29th, 1931, that a contribution of 10,000 Swiss francs had been offered from a private source. Since then a formal offer of this sum has been received¹ and I suggest that it should be accepted by the Council under the terms of Article 23 (a) of the Financial Regulations. The total sum available for the Committee's work thus amounts to 21,500 francs. At the time of the Assembly the expenses were estimated at 25,000 francs and we now have 21,500 francs only at our disposal. I venture therefore to think that this is a further argument in favour of a small committee, more especially as, even with the small funds at our disposal, such a committee might be able to meet more than once. I consider it very desirable to make provision for two meetings if possible, so as to give an opportunity for resolving any difficulties which might arise at the first meeting.

" As regards the procedure to be followed by the Committee, I would recall the following passage from the report which I had the honour to submit to the Council at its meeting of September 29th:

" ' . . . The method of work of the Committee must be left to be determined by that body. They will no doubt give full consideration to the precedents of 1924.'

" Accordingly, the Council will doubtless wish to ask the Secretary-General to communicate to the experts all the relevant material and to place the Secretariat's services at the Committee's disposal.

" Further, in order to allow enough time for the preparation of the Committee's report for submission to the Assembly at its next session, I think the Committee should be asked to meet at Geneva on April 4th.

" If my colleagues accept the various suggestions I have just made, I would propose the adoption of the following resolution:

" ' The Council;

" ' Decides to accept the gift of 10,000 Swiss francs offered by a client of the Friends' Provident and Century Life Office, London, as a contribution towards the expenses of the Slavery Committee to be set up in accordance with the terms of the Assembly resolution of September 25th, 1931;

" ' Instructs the Secretary-General to request the Friends' Provident and Century Life Office to convey to their client the warm appreciation of the Council for this generous gift;

" ' Decides that the Committee of Experts provided for in the Assembly resolution of September 25th, 1931, shall be composed as stated in the schedule attached to the present resolution;

" ' Invites the Director of the International Labour Office to appoint an observer to follow the work of the Committee;

" ' Instructs the Secretary-General to invite the Committee to meet at Geneva on April 4th, 1932;

" ' Requests the Secretary-General to communicate to the experts all the material referred to in the Assembly resolution of September 25th, 1931, and to place the Secretariat's services at the Committee's disposal.' "

Schedule.

M. ANGOULVANT, Honorary Governor-General of the Colonies, Former Governor of French West Africa, Former Governor of French Equatorial Africa.

Mlle. DE CASTRO A ALMEIDA, Delegate of Portugal to the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. Author of works on education and on humanitarian subjects.

M. GOHR, Former Director-General at the Belgian Ministry for the Colonies and ex-Member of the Committee of Experts for Native Labour. Ex-Chairman of the Temporary Slavery Commission.

Lord LUGARD, Member of the Permanent Mandates Commission. Former Governor of Nigeria. Former Member of the Temporary Slavery Commission.

M. NEYTZELL DE WILDE. Ex-President of the Legislative Assembly of the Dutch Indies; at present Chief of the Division for League of Nations and Legal Affairs at the Ministry for the Colonies, The Hague.

Comm. ZEDDA, former Secretary-General to the Government of Erythrea (after having completed his career in the Italian colonies).

¹ See document C.104.1932.X.

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M. DE ZULUETA accepted the Rapporteur's view that the members of the Committee should be selected for their personal qualifications apart from any consideration of nationality. He considered, however, that nationality should be taken into account to a certain extent. To make his idea clearer, he would take an extreme case. Supposing, for instance, competent men were found belonging to only one nationality or to two, it would be generally agreed in that case that that was not the best composition for a committee.

The men best qualified to deal with this subject naturally belonged to the countries which were faced with problems in Africa or in territories where conditions as regards slavery were similar. It was for this reason that the list of members proposed included nationals of France, Portugal, Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Italy—in other words, representatives of all the countries, or almost all the countries, with interests in Africa. It would be remembered that Spain had asked that a Spanish national should be a member of the Slavery Committee. That request had not been granted. Spain was the only country with interests in Africa which did not appear on the list submitted to the Council. M. de Zulueta expressed his regret at this omission. He ventured to believe that there were in Spain men whose intellectual and moral qualities could not be questioned and whose competence in colonial questions entitled them to a place on the Committee. He would therefore renew the request that Spain should be represented. He would ask Lord Cecil and the members of the Council to reconsider the matter so that a Spanish national would be able to take part in the Committee's work. He attached the greatest importance to this desire, but he expressed it with the utmost cordiality.

Lord CECIL said that he would be pleased to comply with M. de Zulueta's request, but if a Spanish member were to be added to the Committee, he would be glad to know his name immediately, since the persons whose names were proposed in his report had been selected for their personal merits and not specially because they belonged to any particular nation. Lord Cecil desired also to be assured that the money at the Council's disposal would suffice for two sessions of the Committee. His experience of committees showed that it was very important to have the possibility of two sessions. At the first one, difficulties often arose which, after an adjournment of a few weeks, were overcome at a second. Otherwise the work might be held up for months.

M. DE ZULUETA did not think that the addition of one member to the Committee of Experts would make any very great difference to the cost. He did not think it would be necessary to seek very far for a Spanish member and proposed the name of M. López Oliván, formerly Director-General of Morocco and the Colonies. M. Oliván was an enlightened and able man and had lived in Africa. He was extremely competent, absolutely impartial and entirely conversant with slavery problems and colonial questions. He had retired from his post a short time previously and therefore was more than ever in an entirely independent position. The Spanish representative accordingly requested the Rapporteur and members of the Council to accept M. Oliván's candidature.

Lord CECIL asked whether the Secretary-General thought that with this addition it would be possible to have two sessions.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL thought that there was just enough money for two sessions provided they were not of extraordinary length; he believed that the funds were sufficient for an ordinary session.

Lord CECIL said that in that case, so far as he was concerned, he accepted M. de Zulueta's proposal.

The PRESIDENT said that the Council was very glad to associate itself with what Lord Cecil had said.

M. DE ZULUETA thanked Lord Cecil and the members of the Council for accepting the suggestion to include a Spaniard in the Committee.

The draft resolution and list of members of the Committee of Experts, with the addition proposed by M. de Zulueta, were adopted.

3004. **Appeal of the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant: Expenses of the Commission set up in Virtue of the Resolution adopted by the Council on December 10th, 1931.**

M. MATOS presented the following report and draft resolution.¹

"The Secretary-General has requested the Chinese and Japanese Governments to assume responsibility each for half of the expenses of the Commission set up in virtue of the resolution adopted on December 10th, 1931.

"As in the next few months it will be necessary to have recourse on various occasions to the Working Capital Fund, it seems desirable that the two Governments should agree to spread over a comparatively short period the repayment of the Commission's expenses. The two Governments might be requested, in the first place, to refund within a period which might be fixed in agreement

¹ Document C.121.1932.X.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C/66 Session/P.V.6.

Geneva, January 29th, 1932.

Note by the Secretary-General.

In order to save time the following
verbatim record of the Council proceedings is
issued at once. It contains the original speeches
in English or French and the interpretations
delivered at the meeting.

A copy of this text revised by the Secretariat
and with full translations will be submitted to the
delegates who have spoken, before the text is sent to
be printed as the official minutes.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE SIXTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

VERBATIM REPORT

of the

SIXTH MEETING

(Public - then Private)

Held at Geneva, Friday, January 29th, 1932, at 3.45 p.m.

The Members of the Council were represented as follows:-

FRANCE.....M. KAUL-BONCOUR (President)
BRITISH EMPIRE.....Hiscount CECIL
CHINA.....Dr. W.W. YEN
GERMANY.....M. von WEIZSACKER
GUATEMALA.....M. MATOS
IRISH FREE STATE.....M. Séan LESTER
ITALY.....M. ROSSO
JAPAN.....M. SATO
NORWAY.....M. COLBAN
PANAMA.....M. GARAY
PERU.....M. BAPRETO
POLAND.....M. ZALESKI
SPAIN.....M. de ZULUETA
YUGOSLAVIA.....M. FOEITCH

Secretary-General: Sir Eric DRUMMOND.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHINESE DELEGATION

The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): I will call on the Secretary-General to communicate to the Council a letter which he has received from the Chinese Delegate

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. President, this morning I received the following letter from the Chinese delegate

"Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour hereby to give notice as follows:

1. A dispute between two Members of the League of Nations, to wit: China and Japan, arising from the aggression of the latter against the territorial and administrative integrity and political independence of the former in violation of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, exists.

2. This dispute has not been submitted to arbitration or to judicial settlement in accordance with any of the Articles of the Covenant.

3. The said dispute has now reached a stage when it is likely to lead to an immediate rupture between China and Japan.

4. China hereby invokes the application (not in derogation of the measures taken, or which may be taken by the League in the exercise of its functions under Article XI, but in addition thereto) both of Article X and of Article XV of the Covenant to said dispute and formally submits the said matter to the Council for all appropriate and necessary action under both of said Articles.

5. For this purpose China begs leave to refer to, and hereby adopts as and for the statement of its case comprising the relevant facts and papers in relation to said matter, all the statements and papers heretofore made and submitted by China in the proceedings of the Council taken in said controversy under Article XI of the Covenant from September 18th, 1931, to the date hereof.

(Signed) W.W.YEN."

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The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): Before calling upon any of my colleagues who desire to speak with reference to the very important document that has just been read, I should like to point out that from the very outset of our session here the Council has been determined to follow the matter in dispute. It has realised its duty; it has been attentive to all the events that have taken place; it has done everything within its power to prevent those events taking the turn which, unfortunately, they have now taken.

After an exchange of views between all the members of the Council who are not directly concerned in this dispute a statement was drafted which even yesterday it was hoped would conclude this matter, at all events as far as the present session is concerned.

This statement affirmed that the resolutions taken on September 30th and December 10th were still valid. I would like to point out that when this question was first raised I stated that the Council, in so far as matters which were then before it were concerned, was guided entirely by the resolution adopted on December 10th, and that with regard to those matters no new resolution would be called for at all events until a first Report had been received from the Commission of Enquiry that was appointed.

In the statement we had prepared we said that we had no intention of relaxing those continuous efforts which, with the co-operation of the Parties and the invaluable

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support of the United States we had pursued during the last four months to bring about a just solution as speedily as the complicated nature of the facts permitted. We went on to point out that so long as the present situation remained unchanged, not only was there an incessant threat to the maintenance of peace on the Far East, but that also the feeling of uncertainty and suspense which was inevitably engendered in the minds of the citizens of China and Japan, as well as in those of the foreigners settled in the Far East, would remain unallayed. That situation, we said, was deplorable in itself; deplorable also because it added to the difficulties which are hindering the whole world in its efforts to recover from the present economic depression.

In that depression we ventured to point out to both countries that, entirely irrespective of solemn undertakings which constituted juridical obligations, good relations between states could only be secured by co-operation and mutual respect, and that no permanent solution could be achieved by force, whether military or merely economic, and that the longer the present situation continued, the wider the breach between the two peoples would become and the more difficult the solution would be, with all the disasters that would mean not only to the two nations directly involved but to the world in general.

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We also felt that we ought not to under-estimate the efforts put forth by the League of Nations in this matter and the results that have been achieved by those efforts, and we said in that statement that we derived considerable encouragement and found grounds for hope in the declaration of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, which declaration was quoted in the Council by the delegate of Japan. The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs said: "Japan harbours no territorial designs in Manchuria and she will uphold the principles of the open door and equal opportunity, as well as all existing treaties relating to that territory."

We also stated that we were ^{acquainted} with the text of the Note addressed to both Governments on January 8th by the Government of the United States and I may be allowed to express our appreciation of the reference which that Note contains to the confidence of the United States Government ^{that} the work of the Commission which has been nominated by the Council will facilitate the solution of the present difficulties. But in that Note the United States Government called the attention of the two Parties to the treaties which are binding upon them. For our part, we felt bound to assert in the statement that we had prepared that a settlement of the difficulties between two Governments, Members of the League of Nations, could not be sought in arrangements inconsistent with their international obligations, more especially those arising out of Article 10 of the Covenant, by which they had undertaken to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of all Members of the League, and we concluded the

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statement which had been prepared in these words: "It
would be impossible for the League to ^{endorse} a settle-
ment secured by means contrary to the obligations above
referred to."

If now that Note has lost a good deal of its interest compared with what it would have had yesterday, I have nevertheless ventured to read it because we are now faced with a new request. The new request which has been put before us imposes upon the Council new duties; the Council is placed upon new ground, the ground of Article 15 of the Covenant. We desire, of course, to be faithful to the spirit of the League of Nations, and we are bound to be guided by what is accepted as a legal interpretation ^{of the situation,} given in 1927 and on other occasions when this statement was made and considered to be a valuable guide for the League of Nations, when we say that the procedure under Article 15 cannot prevent the continuation of efforts for conciliation and prevention which the Council may think it desirable to put forth under Article 11.

After having made that reservation, I desire to state that the Council cannot and would not in any sense desire to escape its duty. We feel that in the Covenant which guides it we are furnished with a guarantee that is a common guarantee for the benefit of all. According to the Covenant, as soon as the application of Article 15 is requested, that Article must be applied. That is a matter with which my colleagues are well acquainted and if they desire to do so they can express their views upon it later. As regards paragraph 1 of that Article, I would remind you of its terms, namely; "Any Party to the dispute may effect

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such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof."

I shall presently call upon the Secretary-General to explain to the Council what proposal he desires to put before it. As the request was made by the Chinese delegate, I will now call on him to speak.

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Dr. YEN (China): My Government is sincerely appreciative of the efforts which the Council of the League of Nations, while proceeding since September 18th last under Article XI of the Covenant, has made to bring about a satisfactory adjustment of the pending controversy between China and Japan. It is with profound disappointment and regret that China is obliged to recognise that these efforts have thus far proved ineffectual. As the victim of persistent external aggression in one of its most violent forms, China can no longer refrain from seeking remedies under other provisions than those of Article XI. The territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China has been destroyed, and its political independence gravely threatened, by external aggression. The fact is not and cannot be challenged. The Covenant is explicit and emphatic on the subject. A specific solemn obligation has been imposed and accepted by us all to respect and preserve against external aggression (and even the threat or danger of it) the territorial integrity and political independence of every Member of the League. I beg to quote Article X:

"The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

China respectfully submits that the obligation specified in the first sentence of Article X has become operative beyond any question, and that it remains only for the Council now to "advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." As to the means to be employed, the choice is plainly one for the

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Council to make. It goes without saying that they must be adequate and effective, otherwise the obligation will not be fulfilled.

Japan's disregard of her engagements under the Covenant is flagrant. The use of armed force without submitting the entire matter to arbitration or judicial settlement and without awaiting the outcome of enquiry by the Council is in direct violation not only of the spirit but of the letter of the Covenant.

The time has now come when the Chinese Government must, in justice to her cause, take affirmative steps to strengthen the hands of the League by placing the League in possession of this controversy not only under Article XI, but also under other Articles of the Covenant where her rights and remedies as a Member of the League of Nations are more specifically defined. It was therefore my duty, acting under instructions from my Government, to present this morning the following notice which has just been read by the Secretary-General.

In conclusion, I beg to read a telegram from the "Waichiaopu" Nanking, dated 29th January, 1932, which relates to the incidents which have recently taken place in Shanghai:

"The reply of the Chinese Municipal Government (regarding the Shanghai Incident of Sino-Japanese collision in the past few days) was received by the Japanese Consul-General with satisfaction at 1 p.m. of the 28th instant, and the situation was much moderated in its tension. At 11.20 p.m. the Municipal Government and the Bureau of Public Safety received an ultimatum from the Japanese Naval Commander demanding the withdrawal immediately of Chinese troops. While the Chinese authorities were protesting against such an ultimatum, the Japanese troops commenced firing with Machine guns on the Chinese troops in the Chapei Jiuksiang Road district. This took place at 12.20 a.m.

All responsibility for such provocative action and the results arising therefrom must be borne by Japan.

At 1.30 p.m. of the 28th instant, 12 Japanese torpedo boats of the 22nd, 23rd and 24th Squadrons, four from each Squadron, steamed into Shanghai through Woosung.

Japanese marines from all the warships in the port were landed and rushed to the North Szechuen Road district at 1.20 a.m. on the 29th. Our garrison resisted in self-

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defense and there was severe fighting at Paoshan Road in the Chapei district.

Several Japanese planes hovered over Shanghai at 4.00 a.m. and it is reported several bombs were dropped. Fighting still continues.

A letter has just been received from the Japanese Consul at Nanking stating that the whole staff of the Consulate and all the residents had moved to the Japanese steamer anchored at Hsiakwan which means that the attack on Shanghai was pre-meditated and carefully executed."

You, of course, know that newspapers have published even more terrible news than that which I have just read to you, but pending official confirmation I shall not say anything more just now.

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M. SATO (Japan) (Interpretation): I too regret to have to note at the Council table that the development which has taken place has not been of such a character as to allow the Council to dispose of the dispute between China and Japan even for the time being. The President just now read a statement which he would have liked to have made to close this question as far as the present session of the Council is concerned. Had it been possible to adopt that procedure I personally should very much have preferred that this should have been the case. Unhappily the development in events does not make that procedure possible any longer. That however is not a matter for which Japan is responsible.

The Chinese delegate has given us news which he has received from his Government, and according to his information it might have seemed that it is the Japanese Marines who were at fault in the most recent developments. I too would like to read a telegram of no less official character which I have received since yesterday. I think you will agree that this telegram gives an entirely different picture. It reads as follows:

"On January 27th the Commandants of the foreign forces (I would stress the fact that this is in the plural) at Shanghai divided up the protection zones as follows:

- a) Japan: the region east of North Kiangsi Road and north Soochow Road as far as Yantsepoo

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- "b) Volunteers: the former Concession from the Bund to the racecourse;
- c) United States: the Macao Road as far as Kiaochow Road;
- d) Great Britain Kiaochow Road to Jessfield;
- e) France: the French concession.

The Consuls-General of England and America advised their nationals living outside the concession to return within it. The Municipal Council ordered the assembling of the volunteer troops.

The Japanese Consul-General asked the Chinese Mayor for a reply to his note of protest before the 28th at 6 p.m. In the meanwhile the Chinese took refuge in large numbers in the concession. On the 28th there was consequently a great confusion in the direction of North Szechuan Road and Dixie Road, where there are about 6,000 Japanese. Meanwhile agitators and soldiers in disguise were mingling with the crowd. Several were discovered and have been arrested. It was learned that Chinese troops were advancing along the railway line from Woosung and were putting up new barricades near the Japanese quarter. At 4 o'clock the Municipal Council declared a state of siege. During the night Chinese police officers abandoned their post in the Japanese quarter.

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In view of the critical situation in which our nationals found themselves the Commandant of the Naval forces declared his intention to guarantee their protection by setting up posts of marines, and he notified the Chinese authorities to this effect. In the zone indicated by the Municipal Council he applied the state of siege which the latter had proclaimed and ordered that the marine riflemen should take up positions assigned to them in order to protect the quarter of Chapei.

When the marines were going to the posts which had been indicated to them Chinese regular forces drew near and attacked them. About 10 o'clock the Chinese soldiers in disguise had already begun to create disorder within the protection zone and street fighting had started.

The Consul-General at once applied to the Chinese authorities and informed them that our forces had no intention of advancing north of the railway line and asked that the regular Chinese troops should be withdrawn from Chapei and should cease their attacks on our forces.

On the Chinese side a request was made that our marine riflemen should withdraw from the Chinese town. At the same time offensive measures were taken by Chinese troops and an armoured train was brought to the north station.

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At 11.40 p.m. Chinese troops appeared in the rear of the headquarters of the marine riflemen near the Woosung railway station where the Chinese during the last few days had set up barricades of barbed wire and sacks of earth and they attacked the Japanese marines. Disorders were increasing around North Szechuan Road and the marine riflemen's post established at the Japanese school was attacked, and reinforcements were therefore sent shortly before midnight. Those reinforcements occupied the Chinese quarters near North Szechuan Road."

The Chinese delegate has now appealed under Article 11, and he has also mentioned Article 10. I have given you the latest information I have, and this information shows that it was not the Japanese marines who themselves took a decision to land. Their landing was preceded by advice and a request from the Commanders of the foreign forces, who allotted to each nation the zone that it had to protect. It was in virtue of this decision by the Commander of the foreign forces that the Japanese Commander decided to send marine riflemen. Thus it was these marine riflemen who were the object of attack by the Chinese troops. This was the immediate cause of the incident that occurred at Shanghai, and which has undoubtedly aggravated the situation.

It is said that the Council cannot discuss the question under Article 11. This is the incident that has made it possible for the Chinese delegate to ask that the Council should now apply Article 15, and he has also

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referred to Article 10 in his request. He has stated that Japan has never submitted this conflict to arbitration or to pacific settlement, as is required in accordance with Article 10. That is perfectly true; but it is a well-known fact that Japan is not prepared to accept arbitration with every country irrespectively. It is for that reason that Japan has hitherto been unable to accede to Article 36 of the Statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The Chinese delegate also drew attention to the fact that the Japanese Consul and the Japanese Residents in Nanking had left the town and fled to a Japanese ship at sea off Nanking. That, he said, proved that the attack by the Japanese marines was the execution of a premeditated plan. I refuse to accept any such assertion; and I would remind you that for several years past in the district around the river Yangtze our nationals have been the object of very great anxiety. Disorders have been so frequent there that it has been necessary to contemplate special measures, and for a long time past arrangements have been made by which a pontoon should be available at Nanking which would be ready if events called for its use as a place of refuge for the Japanese Colony. Once this disturbance had arisen in Shanghai it was only natural that the Consul should advise the Colony to take refuge in the way that had been prepared. It may be said that this was a premeditated action. Premeditated perhaps, but it was a matter of precaution; it was the result of plans which had to be followed in view of the situation there.

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It certainly does not establish in any way that what is alleged to have been an attack of Shanghai was a premeditated one.

The Chinese delegate moreover accused the Japanese of having committed acts which are contrary to the principles of the respect of territorial integrity. On that point I would like to say at once that unhappily we have in the Far East several precedents for incidents of this character. It is not the Japanese who introduced such actions. I would remind you that in 1927 there was a cannonade. Japan did not take part in that cannonade, and if now, four years later, we are accused, we must say that we ought not to be the first to be accused in this connection.

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Unfortunately, in order to protect our own nationals resident in China, we have had to prepare a means of legitimate defence and to take measures of precaution. That concludes my reply to the remarks made by the Chinese delegate.

As regards the new request that is put forward by the Chinese delegate, I have a rather long statement to make. The Chinese representative has just brought the Sino-Japanese question before the Council under Article 15 of the Covenant. Up to the present, this matter has been before the Council under Article 11, and it is in virtue of that Article that the Council has carried on its discussions during the last three meetings. If the matter were now to be considered under Article 15, the very basis of the discussions in the Council would have to be radically changed. Under Article 11 we deal with cases of war, or threats of war, or any circumstance likely to affect international relations constituting a threat to peace and to a good understanding between nations. In Article 15, on the contrary, we are concerned with disputes likely to lead to a rupture. The very foundations of the provisions of these two Articles are therefore entirely different and in view of this, I have certain doubts, with regard to which I should like to ask the opinion of my colleagues.

In the first place, as the Council has so far discussed the matter under Article 11, can it now deal with it at the same time under Article 15, as the Chinese delegate asks it to do? I have very grave doubts on that point, particularly since the very character of the provisions of these two Articles is fundamentally different. If the

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Council deals with the matter under Article 15, any decision which it takes will affect the decisions already taken under Article ~~11~~. For instance, under Article 15 the Secretary-General can make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration of the matter. For this purpose the Secretary-General might proceed to enquiries on the spot, but such enquiries would not be of the same character as those to be undertaken by the Commission of Enquiry set up by the Council Resolution of December 10th last. In my opinion, it would perhaps be better to contemplate postponing the departure of the Commission of Enquiry which has been decided upon until the Council has finally settled the point which I have ventured to put before it.

*Secondly, the representative of China claims that there is a dispute likely to lead to a rupture, and he informs us that the statement of his case is already embodied in the statements and documents submitted by China at previous sessions of the Council, when the Council was discussing the question under Article 11 of the Covenant. In view of the difference of the basis of discussion under Article 15 and Article 11, I do not well see how the statements and documents which have been presented by China at earlier sessions can reasonably constitute a complete statement of the dispute which the Chinese representative desires to see examined by the Council under Article 15. In my opinion, the representative of China would do better to submit a new statement of his case, with all the pertinent facts and necessary information, so that the Council might clearly

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consider the nature of the dispute brought before it.

In the third place, I do not intend or claim to give any legal analysis of the provisions of Article 15. You will, however, allow me to say that under that Article we are concerned with a dispute likely to lead to a rupture. Even if we admit that the representative of China has clearly stated the nature of the dispute, is he quite certain that his Government intends to proceed to an immediate rupture, as he says in his letter to the Secretary-General? The dispute, if there is one, was originally caused by an act of destruction committed by Chinese soldiers against our railway in Manchuria, so that, all the measures which have been taken by our authorities are for us in the nature of acts of self-protection which are necessary in regions where, contrary to conditions existing normally, there is no legal protection from the authorities. In these circumstances, we have certain difficulties in admitting the existence of a dispute which may be subject to a settlement provided for under Article 15 of the Covenant. Moreover, I am not ^{sure} / that this dispute has already reached a stage which might lead to an imminent rupture in the relations between our two countries. I do not request that the Council should consider all these points, but I do venture to draw attention to them because for me they are of very great importance.

Fourthly, if we admitted the existence of a dispute likely to lead to a rupture, is any Member of the League justified in bringing a question before the Council before it has tried to settle the matter by diplomatic means with the Government concerned? Direct negotiations constitute

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the first stage in the pacific settlement of a question between two countries. My Government, ever since the month of September, has continued to propose that negotiations should be entered into with the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government has never stated that it was prepared to meet our wishes. It is the repeated refusal of the Chinese Government which has prevented direct negotiations from taking place between the two Governments. The Chinese Government, without endeavouring to have recourse to direct negotiations, suddenly brings the matter before the Council under Article 15. In my opinion, the procedure of Article 15 constitutes the very last means of recourse for Members of the League of Nations. Before adopting this last method, every Member of the League of Nations would do better to exhaust the procedure open to it. In this case, that procedure is direct negotiation with the Government concerned. As I have said from the outset, I do not intend to enter upon a legal discussion of the question here and now. Moreover, I do not claim that the Council should examine whether or not there is a difference likely to lead to a rupture, but in my opinion the Council, if it so desires, has the right to consider whether in the present case it is desirable to proceed to an examination of the question under Article 15. Ever since September last, the Council has examined this question under Article 11, and by its Resolution of December 10th, it reached a point at which a Commission of Enquiry was to be set up. That Commission, it seems, is about to leave at once for its destination. In the circumstances, is it advisable

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for the Council to entirely change the basis of the examination of the problem? I am of opinion that the Council would act wisely if it continued to examine this problem, as it has done up to the present, under Article 11 of the Covenant.

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Translation/

The PRESIDENT: / I would like to reply to one or two points which have been raised by the Japanese Delegate.

He made certain observations to which I should like to refer. I am not in any way settling the substance of the matter, because on that point it is not for me to reply, but I would like to deal with the question of procedure.

I venture to point out that contrary to what the Japanese Delegate appeared to think, this is not a matter on which the Council is free to act as it will. If a question is brought before the Council under Article XV, then it is not for the Council to decide whether it will discuss the matter under that Article, because under Article XV any Member of the League can bring a question before the Council, and the Secretary-General has immediately to make arrangements for securing information, and for taking action in that way. Therefore, under the present circumstances I think there can be no doubt as to the application of that Article. But I would go further and remind the Japanese Delegate that all doubts will be removed by the findings of a committee, which was appointed to consider this question, and which was presided over by a distinguished fellow-countryman of the Japanese Delegate, M. Adachi, who is now a member of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Committee met on September 28th, 1923, and gave an opinion which was subsequently confirmed by the unanimity of the Council on March 13th, 1924. The paragraph to which I would like to draw the Japanese Delegate's attention is as follows:

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"The Council when seized, at the instance of a Member of the League of Nations, of a dispute submitted in accordance with the terms of Article XV of the Covenant, by such a Member as 'likely to lead to a rupture' is not bound, either at the request of the other party or on its own authority, and before enquiring into any point, to decide whether in fact, such description is well founded.

The Council may at all times estimate the gravity of the dispute and determine the course of its action accordingly."

Therefore it is quite clear that it is not the Council's duty, if a matter is brought before it by one of the Parties under the Article, to say whether the matter is one likely to lead to a rupture. It would be hard to form an opinion, as the question is a psychological one, and opinions are bound to vary. However, this is an opinion which has been accepted as a precedent by the League. Therefore it is clear that the Council cannot reject the request that the matter be considered under that Article.

Another question of procedure was raised by the Japanese Delegate, namely, whether procedure taken under Article XV ^{would} ~~is~~ automatically cancel procedure taken under Article XI of the Covenant. There again we can look to previous decisions of the League. I refer to this matter because the Japanese Delegate said he expressed some doubts. Moreover, the question is so important that we must be sure of the principles by which our actions are guided. The action of the Council under Article XV is clearly defined. The Council has to make enquiries and to prepare a report, and has to make such recommendations as are likely to settle a dispute. It may be said that that procedure is not incompatible with the measures already taken under Article XI with a view to preventing disturbances between Members of the League, and I do not see how it can be claimed that a conclusion under Article XV would automatically cancel considerations taken under Article XI. That is a question which has already been settled in practice by the League of Nations. At the VIth meeting of the Council a note from the

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Czechoslovak Government was considered and the Council was asked that Articles XI and XV should be applied. In that case the Council did not think it needed to go further into the question, but no objection was raised to Articles XI and XV being applied at the same time. I need hardly call the attention of the Japanese Delegate to this, as we have worked in close collaboration for so many years. The Resolution of September 26th 1927 which invoked Article XI ~~which~~ showed that the procedure under that Article was not exclusive of previous Articles of the Covenant, and since I understand the feelings of the Japanese Delegate I am assured that at the present moment when it is the duty of the Council to consider such a serious matter, he would not desire to suggest anything to deprive the Council of means which would lead to conciliation between the Parties even though they are taken under Article XI of the Covenant. As regards Article XV the Parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General as promptly as possible statements of their case with all the relevant facts, and the Council will endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute. I was very much impressed by the statement made by the Japanese Delegate. I am sure that what we have heard shows the possibility of contradictory interpretations of some of the events. The interpretation of an event will be contradictory according to the circumstances known or unknown, which preceded that event, and I was impressed by the explanation given by the Japanese Delegate, which was in direct opposition of the Chinese Delegate as to the landing of Japanese marines. According to one statement that matter was not a unilateral action taken by Japan, but the landing was effected as the result of an international agreement for mutual protection. I mention that as an instance which shows us the need for securing exact information.

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It is the first duty of the League, particularly in such a serious circumstance as the present, to discharge the task allotted to it. It must get information by the means that it chooses, and the value of which it will be able to estimate and appreciate. That is laid down in Article 15. Under Article 15 it is the duty of the Secretary-General, in the absence of the Council, immediately to commence securing such information as is necessary. It is obvious that this information must be secured by the most rapid means, and here I have to ask the Secretary-General for his suggestions and guidance. This is one of his fundamental duties, which he has so conscientiously discharged during his years of office, to which the Council has recently paid a tribute. Therefore I ask the Secretary-General whether he has had time to reflect on the means which should be adopted in the present circumstances.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Article 15 states that "If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration as above, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof."

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An investigation is clearly to be made by the Secretary-General but the consideration thereof is necessary to be undertaken by the Council, which has to make a final Report according to Article 15. Also, according to Article 15, the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General as promptly as possible a statement of their case, with all the relevant facts and papers. The Chinese delegate states that he has already presented the relative facts and papers in reference to the said matter. With all deference to the Chinese delegate's remarks I think he has not furnished all the relevant facts and papers which I should expect under Article 15, but I hope that in due course of time he will be able to furnish me with these comprehensive papers.

Apart from the statements made by the two Parties it seems to me of the greatest importance that I should be able to obtain for the Council impartial and speedy information as to the origin and the development of the dispute, and I think this is particularly the case with regard to the recent unhappy incidents at Shanghai to which the Chinese delegate's telegram referred, and on which he ^{has laid} alleged particular stress. As I have said, it falls to the Secretary-General to make all necessary arrangements for the investigation, but the Report has to be considered by the Council, and I feel it may be necessary for me to obtain the aid of members of the Council in order to secure that immediate information which I think ought to be obtained on the spot.

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The appeal from the Chinese delegate was only received by me today, and I should be grateful, Mr. President, if the Council would allow me until tomorrow morning in order to inform them what I should propose in this respect. I shall probably ask the Council to give me certain help (and I feel sure they will accord it to me), in order that the information acquired locally may be correct, and that ultimately I may be in a position to present the Council with a full report of the facts, which it will then consider.

M. SATO (Japan) (Translation): The President has explained the procedure which should be adopted under Article 15. He has quoted reports which were adopted, in one case by a small Committee under the chairmanship of M. Adachi, and the resolution of the Council of September 26th, 1927. I am aware of these facts, and the contents of the report referred to, also the resolution of the Council, but I must say that I am not sure whether I entirely agree with the President as to his interpretation of the contents of those documents. I would like to study this point myself and possibly to submit a further observation on the matter. Therefore I would like to say that I reserve to myself the right to do that. The situation is a serious one, and the Council is contemplating assuming heavy responsibilities. If this matter had not been so serious I would not have attached a great deal of weight to the question of procedure. The Council desires to follow the path

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indicated in the Covenant, but we must consider the possibilities of differences of view with regard to procedure. This question is so serious that it might even affect the peace of the world, and therefore it is of great importance that we should pay the greatest attention to the question of procedure. Therefore I feel bound to say that I should like time to study this point, and I reserve the right, if necessary, to submit observations at a later stage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation): I would like to assure the Japanese delegate that any observations he wishes to submit to the Council, whether on matters of procedure or on other points, will be welcomed by the Council, and they will receive the attention they deserve. Moreover it is clear that it will be impossible to conclude the meeting of the Council tomorrow. Therefore M. Sato will have ^{few} a/ days in which to submit any observations he may desire to the Council. Tomorrow morning we shall hope to hear from the Secretary-General a proposal for consideration by the Council, and in the meantime I would like to address the representatives of China and Japan. I have not consulted my colleagues on the Council as to what I am about to say but if my remarks do not agree with their views, they will be able to put me right.

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Both Parties agree that the present situation is a very serious one. Therefore I urge them both to telegraph to their Governments reporting the emotion with which the Council is following the present grave events, and that the Council will not terminate its sitting until, in accordance with the Covenant, it has discharged the heavy duties which fall upon it.

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Moreover, I would remind the two Parties of their duty to do everything to avoid if possible any further loss of human life, to avoid any acts that may become irreparable. Therefore, I would ask the delegates of the two countries to be good enough, if they can see their way to do so, to send such a message to their Governments today.

M. SATO (Japan) (Interpretation): If the Council unanimously desires that I should send such a message as the President has suggested then I shall of course feel it my duty to act in accordance with the Council's wishes and send the telegram.

I would, however, like to add one or two words. I do not know what impression will be produced in Japan by the new step which the Chinese delegation has taken. I fear that the relations between our two countries - relations which are tense enough already and which give sufficient difficulties - will not at all events, be improved by the new step that the Chinese delegation has taken. You may however be sure that I shall do my best so far as I am concerned to do everything possible to ensure a satisfactory settlement of this matter. That would be my supreme duty as a representative of my Government and as a member of the Council.

The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): The Council is very grateful to the representative of Japan for having acceded to its request and appreciate the willingness with which he has done so.

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Dr. YEN (China): It will also give me the
greatest pleasure and honour to transmit your message to
my Government.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.66/Session/ P.V. 7.
(2nd Part).

Geneva, January 30th, 1932.

Note by the Secretary-General.

In order to save time the following verbatim record of the Second Part of the Council proceedings is issued at once. It contains the original speeches in English or French and the interpretations delivered at the meeting.

A copy of this text revised by the Secretariat and with full translations will be submitted to the delegates who have spoken, before the text is sent to be printed as the official Minutes.

The Minutes of the first part of the proceedings will be issued later.

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APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN VIRTUE OF THE COVENANT.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I promised the Council that I would submit to them proposals which would enable me with their help to obtain information on the spot with regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute in general and particularly with regard to the recent events at Shanghai and in the neighbourhood.

As regards the latter, I would propose that those Governments represented on the Council, other than the Parties to the dispute, which have official representatives who were at Shanghai during the period when these events took place, should instruct such officers to form a committee to send me a report for consideration by the Council on the incidents themselves - their causes and development. The formation of such a committee - on which I should like to have the possibility of inviting other persons holding a similar position to serve - would allow information with regard to the incidents to be obtained on the spot and without delay.

I do not propose for the moment any further measures since it would appear to me that those already taken by the Council are sufficient.

Dr. YEN (China): The Chinese delegation notes with satisfaction that the Secretary-General is beginning to take vigorous steps in the settlement of the Manchurian

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question by proposing to appoint a Commission that will deal with the Sino-Japanese collisions at Shanghai. As I said once before, Shanghai is a very important city with a large Chinese and foreign population and an enormous amount of Chinese and foreign capital is invested there. The effort of the League to put an end as soon as possible to the aggressive acts of the Japanese is a laudable one in the saving of human lives and property. But while dealing with the outbreak in Shanghai on the same principles and along the same line of action as embodied in the Resolutions of September 30th and December 10th of last year, it will be imperative for the Council to go to the root cause and endeavour to eradicate it. So long as the poison fungus which is in Manchuria is not effectually dealt with, violent eruptions and symptoms will, it is feared, continue to appear in other parts of China and cause serious trouble not only to that country and the Chinese people, but also to the foreign residents and their very large interests.

May I also make it clear that the Chinese Government has not invoked Article 15 because of the Shanghai incidents. With or without their occurrence, Article 15 would have been invoked, and the reasons for the invocation were enumerated in the notice communicated to the League and in my introductory remarks, both of which had been prepared before we received news of the attack on Shanghai.

Shanghai is important to China - very important - but Manchuria is even still more important. It is true that

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in attacking Shanghai Japan has also violated Article 10,
which you will recall has also been invoked. Put in
Manchuria, 200,000 square miles of ^{Chinese} territory and 30
million Chinese people are involved, so that the situation
is much graver.

May the Chinese delegation hope soon to be in a
position to report to its Government on the measures
that the Secretary-General proposes to take under the
provisions of Article 15 to put an end to the occupation
of Manchuria by the Japanese army?

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The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I cannot help feeling that the Chinese representative is under some misapprehension as to the rôle of the Secretary-General in this matter. If he will look at Article 15, which he himself has invoked and which I am sure he is therefore thoroughly acquainted with, he will see that the duties of the Secretary-General are confined to making the necessary arrangements for a full investigation of the dispute and consideration thereof. It is not for him to propose measures to settle it. That is the duty of the Council under paragraph 3 of Article 15, which definitely suggests that the Council should take measures to effect a settlement of the dispute. The Secretary-General is only entitled to obtain information.

I did not make these proposals to the Council as a whole; I made them, within my rights, to those Members who had representatives at Shanghai during the period when the events occurred, and I asked them if they would agree to their representatives forming a Committee to send me information for ultimate consideration by the Council.

As regards the rest of the question, there is no idea of dissociating the events at Shanghai from the rest of the question. I simply said - and I think that is within my competence - that the measures already taken by the Council in that connection are sufficient.

The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): I should like to say that the Council is in entire agreement with the statement made by the Secretary-General. From the time when Article 15 was invoked the Secretary-General took

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the necessary steps to provide means for securing information, and I would point out that whatever be the Article invoked in this connection, it is the first duty of the Council and of the League to secure reliable information. It appears natural to the Council that those countries represented on it who have representatives at Shanghai should be invited to provide information through their representatives in that city; the Secretary-General has therefore suggested that that course should be taken and that those representatives at Shanghai should form a Committee to furnish him, and through him the Council, with exact information on the situation.

I may add that some of the Governments so represented are already prepared to offer the services of their representatives in Shanghai. That is the case with my Government, and I am quite sure that other Members of the Council will be able to assure us that the position is the same in their own case. I therefore feel that we cannot in any way reproach the Secretary-General for the action he has taken but that on the contrary the Council will desire to thank him and to congratulate him for what he has done so far.

M. ROSSO (Italy) (Interpretation): I desire to inform the President of the Council that I have received information to the effect that my Government has given its

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representative at Shanghai authority to join his colleagues and to supply information, as desired by the proposal of the Secretary-General.

Lord CECIL (British Empire): I have been instructed by my Government to say that they thoroughly agree with the proposal made by the Secretary-General, and that they will instruct their representative in Shanghai to do everything he can to assist in the Enquiry and in the object which the Secretary-General has in view.

M. WIESZACKER (Germany) (Interpretation): I desire to state that my Government would also be prepared to appoint a representative to take part in the work suggested.

M. de ZULUETA (Spain) (Interpretation): I desire to state that I agree with the proposal made by the Secretary-General and to add that the Spanish representative at Shanghai will hold himself at the disposal of the League of Nations and will be prepared to join the Committee as suggested.

M. COLBAN (Norway) (Interpretation): Last evening I telegraphed to my Government, and I wish to inform the Secretary-General that my Government will certainly accept the proposals he has made. I hope to receive their reply very shortly.

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The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): I would ask the representatives of those Governments to inform their Governments that the Council very highly appreciates their willingness to undertake that task.

M. SATO (Japan) (Interpretation): With reference to what has just been stated by various members of the Council I shall, of course, cable to my Government, and I can assure the President that all the help the Japanese Government can give at Shanghai will be gladly given.

There are several questions to which I would like to make reference.

It has been suggested that my Government has been guilty of an infraction of Article 10 of the Covenant. A breach of Article 10 would occur if a country occupied the territory of another Power with the idea of remaining in that territory; that is, if the country which occupied the territory had clear territorial ambitions.

After the statement I made to the Council the other day, after the words of the Japanese Foreign Minister in the Japanese Parliament, you may be sure that Japan has no territorial aims either in Manchuria or in any other part of China.

We accepted the Resolution of September 30th and that of December 10th. When the Council passed those Resolutions it gave us the possibility of proceeding with our work of defending the lives and property of our nationals in China and in Manchuria. That is the only object we have - the legitimate protection and self-defence

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of our nationals in those districts. That right was recognised by the Council. It is regrettable that the measures taken by the Japanese Government for that purpose have had to be prolonged; it is regrettable that Japan could not evacuate the territory as soon as she would have liked to have done so; but the idea of my Government is still unchanged. Our view is that as soon as the territory has been cleared of undesirable factors, as soon as the lives and property of Japanese subjects in that territory are adequately guaranteed, as soon as the possibility of trouble on our railway line has been removed, then we shall be able to withdraw our troops within the Railway Zone. Contrary to our wishes, however, the time has been prolonged. Nevertheless, that does not justify any statement to the effect that we have acted contrary to the Resolution taken, or contrary to Article 10 of the Covenant.

The Council has explicitly recognised the Japanese right to protect its nationals and we cannot therefore be charged with a breach of Article 10. The exercise of this right of self-defence has been recognised by the Council and the Council was therefore of opinion in doing that that there could be no infringement of Article 13, because had the Council thought that Article 10 had been violated by the Japanese Government, it would not have allowed us to continue to act in this way in order to protect the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the vast area of Manchuria. The Council must be consistent. It has allowed the Japanese Government to exercise this right of

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self-defence and the exercise of that right cannot be deemed to constitute an infringement of Article 10 of the Covenant.

The same reasoning applies to the incidents that have occurred at Shanghai. The sole object of what has been done there was to defend our own nationals. We have no territorial aims and we have no wish to occupy Shanghai.

I should like to communicate to the Council a statement which I have received from the Japanese Consul-General last night, and to a very large extent it confirms the explanations I gave yesterday with reference to the incidents that have occurred at Shanghai and the reasons for the landing of Japanese marines in that city.

This is the declaration made by the Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai on January 29th:-

" It is true that the Mayor of Greater Shanghai conceded late on January 28th to all demands contained in my note of January 20th, and we were anxiously watching for the development in view of various rumours and questionable ability of the local Chinese authorities to control the situation, particularly the undisciplined soldiers and dissatisfied elements. By four o'clock the Shanghai Municipal Council declared a state of emergency. Meanwhile, the excited refugees, most of whom were Chinese, poured into the settlement from all directions. The rumour of surreptitious entry of the plainclothed corps gained wide circulation. To make the situation worse, when it was already bad, the Chinese constables fled from the Chapei district, where

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about 7,000 Japanese reside. The excitement of the populace grew to fever-point. As an emergency measure of protecting the Japanese lives and property in Chapei, a Japanese landing force was despatched in accordance with a previous arrangement with authorities of the municipality, and British, American and other forces and in conformity with former precedents in similar cases. The territory in question is a strip of land in Chapei, on the East side of the Shanghai Woosung Railway, which, by the above-named agreement, was assigned to the Japanese. No sooner had the Japanese landing force appeared on the emergency duty near its headquarters than the Chinese soldiers in plain clothes attacked them with hand-grenades in the neighbourhood of the Shanghai Woosung Railway. This attack served as a signal for the Chinese regulars to open fire on the Japanese force, whereupon the latter was forced to return fire. At about the same time, these disguised outlaws commenced shooting at the Japanese at random in the area mentioned above. They have already claimed a number of Japanese lives in the same area. I made it a special point to ask Mr. Yui, Secretary-General of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, to withdraw the Chinese troops from the section in question, when I received the Mayor's reply yesterday to which he gave his ready assent and assured me that it would be done. Had the Mayor been able to bring the military to co-ordinate speedily with him, we might have averted

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the unfortunate incident. I am demanding again for an immediate withdrawal in view of what took place and is now taking place. If the Chinese authorities are unable to stop the assault and complete the withdrawal from this section, I see no other alternative but to enforce it by force. I should like to make it clear that this clash is to be distinguished from the question contained in my note of January 20th, which was solved for the time being. At any rate, I would also like to point out that the wild story about the Japanese attack on the Moosung Fort is groundless. This Chapei incident is entirely a matter of self-defence in emergency in an effort to protect Japanese life and property and, indeed, those of other nationals, including the Chinese themselves. I am hoping for a speedy co-operation from the Chinese side to avoid any further conflict or sacrifices, and to that end to withdraw its troops."

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I now come to another point. Yesterday I submitted certain observations on the interpretation which you have given to certain texts and in view of which you were not prepared to accept the view which I submitted to the Council. I made it quite clear that in my opinion the Council would do well to continue to consider the Sino-Japanese question under Article 11 of the Covenant. That meant that my Government would not welcome any change in the Article on which the Council is basing its considerations. I have no desire to prevent any Member of the League from exercising the rights which he has under the Covenant, but it is for the Council to consider whether it is advisable to accept the request that this right should be exercised. We have expressed certain objections to the Council accepting, without a thorough study, the request from a Member that the examination of certain questions should be proceeded with under Article 15, when the same questions are already the object of consideration by the Council under Article 11. The President quoted the Council Resolution of 1927 in support of his view. That Resolution said: "It would be well to point out that procedure taken under Article 11 is in no way exclusive of procedure which might be taken under other provisions in the Covenant". The exact meaning of this phrase is that procedure under Article 11 is not incompatible, for instance, with procedure under Article 15, but this phrase leaves the Council freedom to decide as to the advisability of applying the two procedures simultaneously.

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The above passage merely states that the simultaneous application of the two procedures is not excluded once it has been decided that it is expedient to employ them both. The Council nevertheless has full opportunity to consider the expediency of applying both procedures simultaneously. For this reason I venture to express my doubts as to the advisability of applying both procedures at the present time.

The President then went on to recall the opinion expressed by the Committee of Jurists in 1924. The exact interpretation which should be given to reply No.1 is as follows: The Council is not bound to consider whether a dispute is likely to lead to a rupture, but has the right to consider this point if it thinks it advisable to do so. I informed the Council of my views. They are to the effect that the Council should use this right in the present case, because recourse to Article 15 might lead to undesirable consequences. You did not think it necessary to go into the reasons which I ventured to put forward and you dealt with the question as though it were a matter which had been settled beforehand.

In support of a view which is opposite to your own, Mr. President, I venture to draw attention to reply No.2 given by the same Committee of Jurists. The case under consideration there is not exactly the same, but the spirit of the reply is certainly in favour of the view which I ventured to put forward yesterday.

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For these reasons I should like to ask you to assure me whether the Members of the Council are unanimously determined not to use the right which the Council has in virtue of its resolution of 1927 to which I have referred. As I said yesterday, a very bad impression will be created in my country if it is learned that the Council decided on a question of such extreme importance in such a precipitate way, without even taking the trouble to examine the arguments which my country's representative ventured to submit.

Lord CECIL (British Empire): I wish to say a few words in answer to the very interesting observations made by my Japanese colleague. We all welcome the reiteration of his previous declarations that the Japanese Government have no territorial ambitions in China, whether in Manchuria or elsewhere.

I take note with interest of his argument that Article 10 only applies to a case where there is an intention to permanently annex or attack the territorial integrity of another country. It is not for me to express any judgment as to what has happened in Manchuria because we have appointed a Commission, one of whose duties will be to examine exactly the state of affairs and until it has reported it is impossible to say what is the true signification of the events that have there occurred. Unquestionably a very important element in that examination will be the declarations which the Japanese Government have made upon the subject.

The Japanese representative has said that the Council has always given Japan permission to take action to defend its nationals in Manchuria. I do not know that

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I should have described the action of the Council in those words. I think it would be a rather more accurate statement to say that the Council recognised that the obligation to withdraw was dependent upon the safety of Japanese nationals.

My Japanese colleague will doubtless remember the very precise terms of the Resolution of December 10th - "Considering that events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council met on October 24th, notes that the two Parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life." It is quite true that in accepting the Resolution the Japanese representative said that he did so on the understanding "that this paragraph is not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria." Speaking in concert with some of my colleagues I said: "It may well be that circumstances may arise there which will cause danger to Japanese lives and property from elements of the population out of control, and if an emergency of that kind should arise it might become inevitable that Japanese

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forces in the neighbourhood should take action against bandits and the like." I concluded by saying: "In saying this I do not mean to suggest that the Japanese declaration weakens the obligation set out in paragraph 2 of the Resolution to avoid any action which will lead to a recrudescence of fighting between the Chinese and Japanese troops, or a further aggravation of the situation. That was the way in which the dispute was left in December last and it will be for the Commission of Enquiry to ascertain whether the steps taken by the Japanese comply with that resolution.

I express no opinion on the subject except to register my regret that it should have been necessary, if it was necessary, for the Japanese troops to move to over 100 miles from the zone of the railway. That is a matter which will be investigated by the Commission.

For similar reasons I do not express any opinion on the very interesting telegram from the Japanese Consul for Shanghai which my Japanese colleague has been good enough to read. This is also a matter which will be investigated by the Secretary-General, acting through the Commission of Enquiry which he has taken means to appoint.

I passed to the juridical matter raised by the Japanese representative, namely, the question of what is the duty of the Council when an application is made to it under Article 15. I confess that on reading that Article the duty of the Council appears to be quite plain. The Article says "If there should arise between

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Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture.....the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any Party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General. Therefore it is quite clear that in order to bring any matter before the Council under Article 15, all that is necessary is that a Party to the dispute should bring that matter to the notice of the Secretary-General, whereupon, automatically he is required to make all necessary arrangements for full investigation and consideration thereof. As I read the Article, there is no question of discretion on the part of the Secretary-General to agree or refuse to make the investigation. Obviously the Council can regulate that investigation as they would regulate any other procedure of their officers, and if either by a majority or unanimously they should decide that the investigation should be carried on in a particular way, no doubt the Secretary-General would comply with that direction. That is all that is implied by the passage read by my Japanese colleague. The Report of the Committee of Jurists of September 1923 says quite definitely that the Council shall not be bound to enquire as to whether a dispute is really one which will lead to a rupture, but it is bound to accept the view of the Party making the submission. It may, however, having done that, attempt at all times to estimate the gravity

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of the dispute and determine the course of its action accordingly. That is to say, it is bound to entertain the dispute and an investigation has to be made, but the Council remains lord and master of the methods by which that dispute shall be investigated. That seems to me the clear meaning of that Article and of the replies of the Committee of Jurists. It is obvious that we could not have adopted, even had we desired to do so, any different course. No motion was submitted to us, and I do not think it would have had any chance of success, directing the Secretary-General to refrain from the steps which he suggested as the proper way of carrying out the investigation.

The Japanese representative says that we are already investigating this matter under Article 11 and that we ought not to duplicate our procedure. But the procedure under Article 15 is entirely different and from the terms of that Article it is again quite clear that we should have had no right to say that we could not act thereunder because the matter was already the subject of investigation under Article 11. In Article 15 there is no power given to the Council to make any such reply and I think the observation of the Committee of Jurists in 1927 was perfectly well founded that the adoption of Article 11 does not permit the Council to refuse to accept a submission under Article 15.

My Japanese colleague claimed, in support of his view, the reply given by the Jurists to question No.2.

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But the question there raised is, where a matter is already under arbitration by another means should there be a fresh investigation under Article 15? That is precisely provided for in Article 15, which says, "if there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration" (or to judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13), then it is to come up under Article 15. In that particular case, and in that case only, the Council are directed to refuse to adopt the procedure of Article 15. In the case to which reference was made in 1923 there had been an acceptance of arbitration by another body, and that was the reason why the question was put. But in the present case, there has been no such acceptance and therefore the Council is not in a position to refuse to adopt the procedure under Article 15.

For these reasons I do not see what other course we could have adopted. Certainly it was not from any want of respect of the arguments put forward by the Japanese representative that the President - I think quite rightly - decided that the application of Article 15 was precise and unequivocal and that the Secretary-General was bound to institute the investigation which he is there directed to institute. The consequences of that investigation may of course be entirely different, but the first step is to investigate what has happened and that duty seems to me obligatory on the Council on any subject without any discretion of their part.

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M. MARINKOVITCH (Yugoslavia) (Interpretation):

Article 15 is such an important matter that I should regret any light or hasty decision as to its applicability in this case. Article 15 does confer a very great right on every Member of the League of Nations. It is a discretionary right, it is the right to bring a matter before the Council without the Council deciding even that it will consider it. The procedure is quite definite and categorical. The Secretary-General may act immediately, even without reference to the Council. The Secretary-General has, on this occasion, referred to the Council because he desired to secure authority to use the agents of Governments represented on the Council who happen to be at Shanghai, where there are no agents of the League of Nations. If there were agents of the League of Nations in that city, the Secretary-General would no doubt have instructed them at once and without reference to the Council.

Moreover, according to Article 15, the Parties have each to state their case, and it is only when the Council is in possession of a report from the Secretary-General and a statement of the case of each of the two Parties that it can take any decision at all. Only at that moment can it decide whether the appeal is well-founded or not.

The Secretary-General has started his enquiry, it is true, but that in no way prejudges the decision. It does not say that the appeal is well-founded or ill-founded. The Covenant - and I would urge this point - must be applied and

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employed with discretion, otherwise the most unfortunate results might follow. It is quite possible that the Assembly might be called for within, say, the next fortnight, and if the request were made we should be bound under Article 15 to accede to it. If this practice were lightly embarked upon, then, there would be very great difficulties both for the Council and for the Assembly, and no doubt it would lead to an amendment of the Article, which might be regrettable, because it does confer precious rights upon all Members of the League, and it would be regrettable if those rights were lost because they had been abused. Nevertheless, while the Article remains as it is, we can but follow the procedure laid down, and I would therefore urge the Japanese delegate not to insist upon the point of view he has stated.

The Japanese nation can be certain that there is no intention to do anything disobliging to them by applying this procedure; the procedure does not in any way imply that the Council has already decided that the application under Article 11 is to be abandoned. We must not confuse the two forms of procedure; to do so would be dangerous. Otherwise we must consider another possibility. The Japanese delegate might appeal under Article 12 in the near future, and according to our present constitution we should be bound to make a separate decision on each of those appeals.

That is our constitution; it is a well-devised constitution which confers certain rights upon Members, and, of course, a constitution, like everything else, may be

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well or ill used. But we must not for the time being abandon rules which have been laid down for good, solid reasons, rules which do confer great guarantees upon all Members of the League of Nations. We must observe those rules, even if their application in particular cases seems to be inconvenient. I hope, therefore, that the Japanese delegate will not insist, and that he will be able to reassure his countrymen that there is nothing disobliging to them in the application of the procedure that has been proposed. We are not prejudging the issue. The Council is merely proposing, in accordance with the rules laid down, to secure reports in the first place from the Secretary-General and in the second place from the two Parties concerned. Then, and then only, can it take a decision.

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M. de ZULUETA (Spain) (Interpretation): I merely desire to say that I agree with the proposal that has been made by the Secretary-General and I am also in agreement in general with what was said by Lord Cecil.

I quite agree with the Yugoslav representative that when the Council has before it an appeal under Article 15 of the Covenant it ought not - indeed, perhaps it would be true to say it cannot - refuse to consider the matter. This in no way prejudges the ultimate solution of the matter. The Council must arrange, through the Secretary-General, for an enquiry to be made as soon as possible. That is what is proposed, ^{with} and that I entirely agree. The Council will secure the information in that way, and will then endeavour to settle the difference. It will endeavour, of course, to settle the dispute impartially in agreement with the principles underlying the League of Nations and with the most scrupulous respect for treaties.

M. SATO (Japan) (Interpretation): I am grateful to those of my colleagues who have expressed their views on this very important question. The explanations given have been clear, they have been full of wisdom and have impressed me very much. Nevertheless, I still feel I was right in raising this point and I feel that I have the right to bring it again to the notice of the Council.

I am not sure that Article 15 ought to operate automatically in the way suggested by ^{the} British delegate. There was a similar case before us quite recently. The gravity of the two cases is not perhaps the same, but in essentials they are similar. This morning we discussed

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■ report by the Spanish Representative relating to the dispute between the Finnish and the British Governments concerning the use of Finnish ships. I drew particular attention to a certain passage in that report in which the Rapporteur said that several articles which had been quoted by one of the Parties might be eliminated, and procedure might be taken only under certain of those articles. If it were true that Article 11 is to be automatically applied, as has just been explained by the Yugoslav Delegate, for example, that procedure should have been applied at once in the dispute which we were considering early this morning. When I drew attention to this passage no one raised the question of the automatic application of Article 15.

M. MARINKOVITCH (Yugoslavia) (Interpretation): I would have raised that point if M. Colban had not explained that Finland did not insist upon the application of that procedure.

M. SATO (Japan):(Interpretation): The Report of the Spanish Representative has been adjourned for consideration and I hope that the interval will make it possible to confirm the view I have stated. In my view, procedure under Article 15 should always have the same characteristics and should not differ according to the case under consideration. If Article 15 should be automatically applied, the same procedure should always be followed. In the other case with which we were concerned, however, a procedure was contemplated which was equivalent to making a choice

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either by the Rapporteur or by the Council between the various methods of procedure open for the settlement of the case. If that is correct, the same principle should apply to our own case.

I shall, of course, transmit a report of this morning's proceedings to my Government and I shall add to that Report my own observations, because I am not yet fully convinced, in spite of the clear explanations that have been given, particularly by Lord Cecil; and possibly it may be necessary for me to submit a further observation on this point myself. If so, I should like to reserve the right to do so.

M. de ZULUETA (Spain) (Interpretation): I would like to clear up one point. When the Finnish claim against Great Britain was stated, it was based upon the Covenant and was not with special reference to Article 15. The cases are not therefore the same, and it is quite clear that the circumstances are different.

Lord CECIL (British Empire): The point really is that a country which wishes to appeal under Article 15 must be prepared to assert that the dispute is likely to lead to a rupture. That was never asserted by the Finnish Government; on the contrary, they were good enough to say - with my full assent - that nothing was less likely than a rupture.

The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): I would like to point out to my Japanese colleague that, as is clear from

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the various remarks that have been made, my decision yesterday merely expressed the common view of the Council. We note the observations and the reservations made by the Japanese Delegate and he will be in a position to submit further observations in the form in which he deems most suitable. It is, I think, clear that the Council will not be able to close its present session this morning and that a later meeting may have to be convened. In that case, the date will be announced in due course.

On behalf of the Council, I would, however, urge the Japanese Delegate to assure his Government that in acting as it has the Council has done nothing more than strictly interpret the Covenant which furnishes a common guarantee for us all. The personal co-operation of the Japanese Delegate, which we have enjoyed in the past, and the co-operation of his great country in the work of the League have shown their interest in the League of Nations, and I am therefore quite sure that they will take no offence from the application of an Article of the Covenant, although that application is really quite apart from their own will or their own decision.

As I said yesterday, there are many precedents for the course we are taking. There was, for instance, the Committee of Jurists, presided over by one of the most eminent jurists, M. Adatci, - a countryman of M. Sato - and it is quite clear that once an appeal is made under Article 15 that Article has to be applied. Of that there can be no question.

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The Council will later have to decide the substance of the question. At present, it is only paragraph 1 of Article 15 that comes into action. When a Party appeals under Article 15, the Secretary-General - not even the Council - is bound to secure information at once as a basis for any ultimate decision which the Council may take. It is not in any case a prejudging of the issue; but it is certainly an imperative duty under paragraph 1 that this information should be secured.

The Japanese Delegate and the Japanese Government have always been so careful of the interests of the League that they will I am sure realise that it is the first condition of the League's work that information should be rapidly secured, and that this in no sense prejudges the question under consideration.

I would therefore venture to put it to my colleague that the rapidity that is desired has in this case been achieved by the application of the suggestion made this morning by the Secretary-General, and thanks also to the rapidity with which Governments who have representatives on the spot have been good enough to place them at the disposal of the League.

Dr. YEN (China): The hour is already late, so I shall not take up much of your time. I wish only to assure the Secretary-General that although this is my first visit to the League I believe I know sufficient about the Covenant to prevent me making any reproach or trying to encroach upon his powers.

My only object was to emphasise the fact that Shanghai should be associated with Manchuria. I shall not endeavour to reply once more, as my predecessor has done over and over again, to the excuses presented by the Japanese Delegate.

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I do not know who ultimately will be the judge of the rights and wrongs of the case; but I certainly will not be drawn into a debate on procedure, as I am quite prepared to leave that to the wise decision of our distinguished President. I do think, however, that as the situation is so very serious it is rather regrettable, although interesting, to have to listen to many learned speeches on the question of technicalities and procedure.

The Council went into private session.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C/66 Scssion/P.V.6.

Genova, February 2nd, 1962.

Note by the Secretary-General.

In order to save time the following verbatim record of the Council proceedings is issued at once. It contains the original speeches in English or French and the interpretation delivered at the meeting.

A copy of this text revised by the Secretariat and with full translations will be submitted to the delegates who have spoken, before the text is sent to be printed as the official minutes.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE SIXTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

VERBATIM REPORT

of the

EIGHTH MEETING

(Public)

Held at Geneva, Tuesday, February 2nd, 1932, at 2.30 p.m.
The Members of the Council were represented as follows:

FRANCE.....M. André TARDIEU (President)
BRITISH EMPIRE.....Mr. J.H. Thomas
CHINA.....Dr. W.W. YAN
GERMANY.....M. von WEIZSÄCKER
GUATEMALA.....M. MATOS
IRISH FREE STATE.....Mr. Séan LESTER
ITALY.....M. GRANDI.
JAPAN.....M. SATO
NORWAY.....M. COLBAN
PANAMA.....M. GARAY
PERU.....M. BARROTO
POLAND.....M. ZALESKI
SPAIN.....M. de ZULUSTA
YUGOSLAVIA.....M. MARINKOVITCH

Secretary-General: Sir Eric DRUMMOND.

- 1 -

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

M. TARDIEU (France)

Interpretation: I should like, in the first place, to express regrets and apologies on behalf of my friend, M. Paul-Boncour, who is detained through illness at Paris. M. Paul-Boncour hopes to be able to be in Geneva the day after to-morrow.

The present meeting has been called at the request of the British delegation.

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Mr. J.H. THOMAS: (British Empire): His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feels it is impossible that the present position in the Far East should be allowed to continue. Every day brings news of some fresh incident of the utmost gravity. Fighting over a wide area is practically continuous. Shanghai is the scene of a series of conflicts in which rifles and machine guns, artillery and aeroplanes, are taking part. War in everything but name is in progress.

To such a state of things the Members of the League of Nations cannot be indifferent. If it is allowed to go on, the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty, must inevitably lose the confidence of the world.

It is not without significance to Members of the League that the United States Government take entirely the same view of the situation. In all the efforts for peace put forth by the Council during the last four months we have been happy to receive the whole-hearted sympathy and support of the United States. On several recent occasions the Council have pressed its Members to second its efforts by diplomatic representations to the two Governments concerned. His Majesty's Government and other Governments Members of the League have shown themselves ready to respond to that appeal. Unfortunately, these efforts have been so far unsuccessful. His Majesty's Government therefore, in concert with the Government of the United States, have decided to make a further effort to bring the present lamentable state of things to an end, and they trust that other Governments will see their way to take similar action. They have accordingly presented at Tokio and Nanking a formal request:

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(1) That all acts of violence and preparations for hostilities shall be brought to an end;

(2) That in the Shanghai area both sides shall withdraw their troops and that as a further protection to the International Settlement a neutral zone shall be arranged;

(3) That negotiations shall then be immediately begun to settle outstanding differences in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the Council resolution of the 9th December last.

I propose to read to the Council the following statement which is being made to the House of Commons this afternoon:-

I regret to state that hostilities of a very serious nature broke out on the night of the 28th January between Chinese and Japanese forces at Shanghai. His Majesty's Government regard these events with grave concern both in the general interests of peace and owing to the proximity of the International Settlement, with consequent danger to the lives and property of British nationals. We have lost no time in making pressing representations, more than once repeated, and have urged the Japanese and Chinese Governments and their Commanders on the spot to accept a scheme, which has been put forward as a result of the efforts of the British and United States Consuls General at Shanghai, for the establishment of a neutral zone between the Chinese and Japanese forces. This zone would have to be occupied by troops of the neutral Powers which have forces in the International Settlement. Instructions have been given for British troops to co-operate if the zone can be established. Owing to the efforts of the Consuls-General, a truce was arranged on the evening of the 28th January, but I regret to see in the latest press report that fighting appears to have broken out again. His Majesty's Government have, however, urged upon both Governments with utmost earnestness to do what lies in and upon them to remedy the existing situation.

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As regards the military and naval position, in addition to the three British battalions already in Shanghai, His Majesty's Government decided on Sunday to despatch a warship from Hongkong carrying a battalion of infantry and a battery of artillery as a reinforcement. The naval forces consisting of H.M.S. "Cornwall", H.M.S. "Sandwich", together with two gun-boats, will shortly be reinforced by H.M.S. "Kent", and H.M.S. "Suffolk" arrived on Sunday.

His Majesty's Government has throughout kept in the closest consultation with the other Powers primarily concerned. This course is being and will be actively maintained. His Majesty's Consul General at Shanghai is similarly co-operating closely with the representatives of the other Powers.

About 11 p.m. last night Japanese men-of-war on the River opened fire with several rounds of live shell in the direction of the city of Hanking. Our latest information is that all is quiet for the moment and that all British subjects are safe.

In bringing their action in this matter to the notice of the Council His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are satisfied that it will receive the approval and support of their colleagues.

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The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): Before calling upon any Members of the Council who desire to speak, I have a communication to make.

The French Government, when it received notice of the British communication which has just been read, immediately sent to its representatives at Tokio and Nanking instructions to take the steps to which reference has been made. The reinforcement of the French forces, both naval and land, will be carried out forthwith.

M. GRANDI (Italy) (Interpretation): I desire to inform the Members of the Council that the Italian Government has also taken steps in approaching the Japanese and Chinese Governments in the way that has just been indicated by the British representative.

I am confident that these two Governments will find means to prevent new difficulties being added to those which the League of Nations has hitherto been trying to settle.

May I once more express the hope that we may soon have news of an appreciable improvement in the situation.

M. WEIZSACKER (Germany) (Interpretation): I will at once inform my Government of the statements that have been made to the Council so that my Government will be able to take any measures that are necessary in order forthwith to convey adequate instructions to its diplomatic representatives in the two capitals. No Government can be more desirous than is my Government of seeing a pacification brought about in the Far East.

Dr. YEN (China): It goes without saying that China is deeply appreciative of the very important steps which have been taken by Great Britain and the United States, with whom France, Italy and Germany have associated themselves. I shall immediately transmit a report of the proceedings of this session to my Government.

M. SAITO (Japan) (Interpretation): We have just heard a very important statement made by the British delegate. That statement has been supported by several members of the Council who have also added their own statement. For my part I would like to say I am very glad to have heard this important declaration by the British Government. I am particularly glad because it was we ourselves, the Japanese Government, who asked the representatives of Great Britain, France and the United States of America at Tokio to take concerted action such as was required at Shanghai. In view of the very serious situation that exists at Shanghai my Government asked the representatives of those three governments to take any necessary measures at once. My Government put forward that request without any hesitation. We felt this was a time which called for exceptional measures. We now hear that the Italian Government associates itself with the statements that have been made by other members of the Council. I can therefore merely express my own satisfaction at this fact.

I would like to give to the Council a statement I made last night to the Secretary-General. I handed it in at seven o'clock last night and it makes clear the measures taken since the day before yesterday.

(This statement will be found in document C.161).

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You will already, Mr. President, understand the origin of the incidents that have occurred and that are occurring, because this origin has been clearly explained in the statements made to the foreign ambassadors by the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and also in other statements made by the same Minister and by myself in the Council.

I would merely like to draw your attention to the information conveyed in the last paragraph of the statement that has just been read where it says it was the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Tokio who asked the representatives of the three Powers to transmit to their governments a request that decisive measures should be considered with a view to stopping hostilities at Shanghai.

I would assure you further that the idea of a neutral zone between the two forces at Shanghai was also put forward by our representatives at Shanghai at a meeting which took place between the commanders and the Consuls General of the various countries. Therefore, in the British proposal to set up such a neutral zone my Government will find complete satisfaction.

I would like to add a slight rectification to the communication made by the British representative, and in particular with regard to the bombardment of Nanking this morning. I sent the Secretary-General information on this point which I would now like to repeat.

"Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation. On February 1st at 11 p.m. the Shih Tzutai at Nanking fired three cannon-shot. At the same moment Chinese soldiers suddenly attacked a detachment of Japanese marines who were stationed on the pontoon of the Nisshin Navigation Company.

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The detachment called for help and our officials stood by and shots were fired at intervals from the "Tsushima", eight shots and from the "Tenryu" two shots, a little to the rear of the pontoon. The firing stopped at 11.15 p.m. At 12.50 a.m. the guard detachment was brought back on board whilst the ship in which the Japanese had taken refuge was taken three miles up stream".

Those are the details that I desire to bring to the notice of the Council and that for the moment concludes my statement.

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The SECRETARY-GENERAL: You will remember it was agreed that certain members of the Council who, by their official representatives, would be at Shanghai at the time the incidents took place, should report to me on those incidents and on their causes. I feel sure the Council would wish to await that report. I have asked for it urgently before considering the matter further. I have indeed received news from Mr. Haas who is a member of the Secretariat, as you know, and happens to be at Shanghai, whom I have asked to be Secretary of that Committee - to the effect that the Committee will probably hold a meeting to-day. I am sorry to say that some expenditure will have to be incurred in connection with the work of the Committee. I hope this will be comparatively small, but that expenditure would fall within the category for which the Assembly annually votes a credit of 500,000 francs under the heading of "Unforeseen Expenditure" (subject to special vote of the Council)".

I therefore venture to propose to the Council the following resolution to enable those expenses to be met:-

"The Council,

"Decides to charge to Item 3 of the Budget for 1932 - "Unforeseen Expenditure (Subject to special vote of Council)" up to a maximum sum of 25,000 francs, the expenses incurred in connection with the Committee set up to report on the events in Shanghai and the vicinity."

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The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): If there is no objection to the proposals of the Secretary-General, I shall consider them as adopted.

At the conclusion of this meeting I desire to make two statements. First of all, with regard to local events, the Council is bound to await the report of the Committee which has been set up at the request of the Council and for which a credit has just been voted.

Secondly, as regards the general object of this meeting, the proposal of the British representative has been supported by representatives of several other countries. The object of that proposal is to associate the authority of the Council with the steps that have been taken by the different countries for a pacific settlement of this question. Having accorded that authority, I hereby declare the meeting closed.

The Council rose at 3.35 p.m.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C/66/Session/P.V.10.

Geneva, February 9th, 1932.

Note by the Secretary-General.

In order to save time the following
verbatim record of the Council proceedings is issued
at once. It contains the original speeches in
English or French and the interpretations delivered
at the meeting.

A copy of this text revised by the
Secretariat and with full translations will be
submitted to the delegates who have spoken, before
the text is sent to be printed as the official
Minutes.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

THE SIXTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL.

VERBATIM REPORT

of the

TENTH MEETING

(Public)

held at Geneva, Tuesday, February 9th, 1932, at 6 p.m.

The Members of the Council were represented as follows:

FRANCE	M. PAUL-BONICOUR (President)
BRITISH EMPIRE	Sir John SIMON
CHINA	Dr. W. W. YEN
GERMANY	Herr von BÜLOW
GUATEMALA	M. MATOS
IRISH FREE STATE	Mr. Séan LESTER
ITALY	M. GRANDI
JAPAN	M. SATO
NORWAY	M. COLBAN
PANAMA	M. GARAY
PERU	M. BERRETO
POLAND	M. ZALESKI
SPAIN	M. de ZULOETA
YUGOSLAVIA	M. MARINKOVITCH

Secretary-General: Sir Eric DRUMMOND.

- 1 -

APPEAL PRO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
IN VIRTUE OF THE COVENANT

The PRESIDENT called on the delegate for China.

Dr. W.V. YEN: At the meeting of the Council on February 2nd it was reported that the British Government, acting in unison with other Members of the League and with the United States of America, was taking certain measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities and warlike preparations and to prepare the way for a settlement of the whole controversy. The British delegate on that occasion said:

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feels it is impossible that the present position in the Far East should be allowed to continue. Every day brings news of some fresh incident of the utmost gravity. Fighting over a wide area is practically continuous. Shanghai is the scene of a series of conflicts in which rifles and machine-guns, artillery and aeroplanes, are taking part. War in everything but name is in progress.

To such a state of things the Members of the League of Nations cannot be indifferent. If it is allowed to go on, the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty, must inevitably lose the confidence of the world."

A week has passed and the language used by the British delegate has received tragic and sinister confirmation. Fighting continues; Japan's warlike preparations have assumed far more menacing proportions, her troops are flowing in steadily increasing numbers to the Shanghai area, and her operations in Manchuria have extended to include the important city of Harbin.

Here may I pause for a moment to read to you a telegram concerning the Japanese reinforcements. According to this telegram the latest information is that there are 75,000 or more Japanese soldiers in Manchuria, while the number round about Shanghai is over 25,000. According to a telegram received

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to-day 27 ships of war left for China yesterday, with destination Liu Ho, a city near Woosung. Another telegram says that the Japanese Government despatched two divisions as reinforcements on the 6th, one for Shanghai and the other for an unknown destination.

There is as yet no sign of the slightest alteration of Japan's aggressive policy. On the contrary, since our last meeting a situation already critical has become even more critical.

Let me review with you the events of the past few days. You will recall that some Japanese nationals were attacked in Shanghai on January 13th, and that the Chinese police did their best to arrest the assailants. The action of the Japanese on the 20th was much more serious, for they deliberately set fire to a factory and even attacked the International Settlement police and seriously wounded three Chinese constables on duty, one subsequently dying from wounds. The first clash was an ordinary street fight that might happen every day in any large city, but the second was a deliberate criminal act of arson. Be that as it may, the Chinese Mayor of Greater Shanghai was presented, as you know, with five most unreasonable demands. They were, however, accepted and the Japanese Consul-General expressed entire satisfaction. At this point the Japanese Admiral entered the scene, demanding the immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from Chapei, a district under the control of Chinese authorities, to permit his men to come in. Even were the Chinese willing to withdraw, it is stated in the report we have received from Shanghai: "It would have been impossible in so short a time at their disposal to arrange for the actual withdrawal of Chinese troops from that area." In short, the Japanese Admiral was determined to attack the Chinese troops

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no matter what happened. With his superior armament he therefore bombarded, on January 28th, the railway station, destroyed trains by aeroplanes and set fire to residences, industrial plants and cultural institutions such as the Commercial Press, the largest printing house in the Orient, with a countless number of priceless books stored in its library and the Chinan University, one of Shanghai's foremost educational institutions. Hundreds of civilian lives have been lost and tens of thousands rendered homeless. The entire industry and commerce of the world city of Shanghai has been paralysed and its economic structure undermined. The latest outrage, as you have already been informed, has been the bombing of an ambulance and the wounding of an American lady physician who was on an errand of mercy in the devastated region.

Will you permit me again to read a telegram I have received from the President of the Union of Universities in China:

"Le massacre délibéré d'innocents et le bombardement aérien de la population sans défense par les Japonais en territoire chinois à Shanghai continuent journellement depuis le 28 janvier. La Commercial Press, la Bibliothèque Orientale, les temples chinois, l'Hôpital des Marchands de Canton et beaucoup d'écoles ont été réduits en cendre. Des prêtres, des instituteurs et des étudiants ont été emprisonnés. D'autres actes inhumains innombrables ont été commis. Le dernier de ces actes a été l'occupation de l'école Tche-tse dont les domestiques ont été tués et les bâtiments mis en feu. Au nom de la justice et de l'humanité, nous vous demandons de déployer tous vos efforts pour arrêter ces actes de vandalisme japonais et pour préserver les institutions culturelles chinoises."

G. H. LI,

PRESIDENT DE L'UNION DES UNIVERSITES
DE CHINE, SHANGHAI.

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I have another telegram which I have received from the leading citizens of Shanghai. It is signed:

Wong, Chairman Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce,
Liming, Chairman Shanghai Bankers' Association,
Zing Zung Ching, Chairman Shanghai Native Bankers' Guild,
Yung Chun Ching, Chairman Chinese Cotton Mill Owners
Association,
G. H. Li, Chairman Shanghai Universities Union,
C.S. Lu, Chairman Shanghai Labour Union,
Ling Kong Hou, Chairman Associate Chambers of Commerce,
K. P. Chen, Chairman China Committee, International Chamber
of Commerce,
Yu Yaching, Chairman Ship Owners Association,
H. U. Moh, Chairman Shanghai Exchanges Association.

I will read one paragraph from this telegram:

"Aerial attacks are being maintained daily and Japanese civilians have been permitted to inflict inhuman treatment on Chinese men, women and children and indulge in other forms of frightfulness.

Such aerial attacks cannot be condemned too severely. Characterised by Lord Robert Cecil as the most barbarous form of warfare what they have accomplished is the burning and the devastation of the populous city, the destruction of priceless treasures, valuable life and property, rendering homeless and destitute tens of thousands of innocent non-combatants, paralysing all industries and commerce and undermining the entire economic structure of China's commercial metropolis."

I have a further telegram concerning the fighting that is going on. It is as follows:

"The Mayor of Shanghai reported that from 11 p.m. of the 6th instant till dawn of next day the Japanese troops along North Szechuen Road district bombarded the Chinese line with heavy guns, firing over 50 shells.

The first engagement with 9000 of the Japanese troops took place at Woosung on Sunday (7th inst.) night. Heavy losses on both sides. Japanese losses over a thousand.

On Monday, the 8th, at noon Japanese troops attacked West Paoshan Road. Attack lasted two hours. Japanese losses 400. The Chinese soldiers are holding the line firmly."

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At one of its recent sittings, the Council was told by the Japanese delegate that the landing of Japanese troops and their penetration into Chinese territory were the outcome of previous arrangements with the commanders of the other foreign contingents in Shanghai. This assertion has now been proved to be absolutely groundless, for the Japanese Consul-General had to admit that the measures taken by the Japanese forces were initiated by the Japanese command and that Japan would bear the whole responsibility.

The bombardment of Nanking has already been alluded to by the British delegate during one of the previous meetings of the Council. Suffice it to say here that the act was committed without the least notice or provocation. The fort on Lion's Hill did not even return the fire, having no orders to do so. Added to this list is the bombardment of the Woosung fort since February 4th. That such an act should be committed at a time when the Powers were actually using their good offices to conciliate the two parties shows what regard the Japanese have for efforts to bring about peace.

It is no exaggeration to say that the state of affairs is, in fact, an intolerable one not only for China but for the League and the Powers which have taken the initiative reported upon by the British delegate. The very essence of the formula presented by the Powers to Japan has been rejected. Meanwhile the Chinese are desperately resisting the advance of the Japanese war machine on their territory. The gallant defence of Chapei and of the Woosung

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Forts must challenge admiration.

The self-restraint and moderation of China under these conditions need no emphasis here. I can only say that there is a limit beyond which no nation can go. China cannot yield further without compromising her national existence. While faithfully adhering to the solemn engagements which she has taken with other nations, she has been compelled, in the exercise of the unquestioned right of self-defence inherent in every sovereign State, to take such measures of self-defence and self-preservation as lie within the compass of her man-power and natural resources; if need be, her people will not hesitate to make the supreme sacrifice.

In conclusion let me say that it is farthest from my desire or intention to complicate unnecessarily a situation already discouragingly complex. In this spirit I come to you to-day, before considering other steps, and invite a frank expression of your views on the possibility of bringing about under the measures now in course the immediate cessation of Japan's hostile action, and the prompt withdrawal of her armed forces from Chinese territory.

In the words of my letter to the Secretary-General two days ago: "All the horrors and cruelties of war have been and are being enacted by the Japanese army and navy in their aggression. Every minute's delay in action on the part of the League means more loss of human life and property, and the responsibility on us all is very great".

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M. SATO (Japan) (Interpretation): The Council has just heard a statement of facts as reported by the Chinese delegate. For my part I must say that we are not agreed on some of these facts. I must add, unhappily, that on several points there appears to be in the Chinese statement what might be termed exaggerations. This is particularly the case with reference to the numbers of soldiers in Manchuria. The number mentioned was very much greater than the number of soldiers really in that region.

In connection with all these facts, however, I have communicated to the Council all the information and all the details at my disposal. It is the wish of my Government - my Government has indeed entered into an undertaking in this connection - that the Council should be informed as quickly and as accurately as possible of all facts connected with this question. I think, therefore, there is no need for me to report here and refer to the communications and telegrams which I have already communicated to the Secretary-General. That I think would involve an unnecessary waste of time. I would merely suggest if the President of the Council or the Council desire to have the details of this question, then they might refer again to the documents which I have already submitted.

As regards the events which have occurred at Shanghai and at the request of the Chinese Delegation the Secretary-General has set up a special Commission of Enquiry on the spot at Shanghai. Two days ago we received the first report from that Committee. The object of that report is to inform the Council of all that has occurred at Shanghai. The delegate of China did not refer to this report in his remarks. I feel, however, that I must mention it myself, because this report is

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the result of steps taken by the Secretary-General. I would like to say that in my view the Report appears to be quite impartially drawn up. It appears to give facts accurately; it appears to give the explanation of all that has occurred at Shanghai. For the greater part the Report confirms the information which I myself have given the Council, that is to say, in so far as concerns events that occurred prior to the 31st January, which is the date at which the Report stops. As regards the facts happening up to that date I think it may be said that for the greater part the Report does confirm the information I have already placed before the Council. Now we have this first Report from the Commission of Enquiry and the supplementary report will, I suppose, be received by the Council in due course if the Commission on the spot thinks a supplementary report need be sent. Under those circumstances, therefore, it would seem superfluous for me to communicate information now from the Japanese point of view or to reply to the various points raised just now in the Chinese statement.

I should, however, venture to add that with regard to the events that are occurring in the Shanghai region, the Japanese Government has just decided to send a body of troops to Shanghai to replace the marine riflemen who are at present there. On this point I sent the President of the Council a statement made a few days ago by the Japanese Government. This statement explains the reasons why the Government was led to take this decision, and I would ask the President and the Members of the Council to refer to that document which I handed in.

At Shanghai recently negotiations have been entered upon between the authorities representing the different Powers there. The object of those negotiations was to effect a

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cessation of hostilities and restore peace and quiet in the Concession. The other day in the Council my colleagues were informed of proposals made by the different Governments to both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments, and I explained to the Council all that I knew at that time. Since then further negotiations have been entered into at Tokio and my Government has quite recently given instructions to its representatives at Shanghai. The object of those instructions was to enable the Japanese representatives at Shanghai to negotiate with the representatives of the different countries concerned. Those negotiations are still proceeding. I cannot of course guarantee that they will be immediately successful, but it is a fact that they are now in progress. The instructions refer to two or three points which I think are very important.

In the first place, my Government has no intention to continue hostilities at Shanghai. It desires that hostilities at Shanghai should stop as soon as possible. Up to the present our acts have been prompted by provocation that we have received from our opponents. To put an end to the hostilities at Shanghai my Government are proposing that our forces should not advance beyond a line which has been given to us as a zone for protection. At the same time of course we must insist that the opposing forces should withdraw with the object of avoiding the possibilities of direct contact between the two forces. Thus, between the two opposing forces a neutral zone would be set up. This zone would be under the guardianship and supervision of neutral authorities. Which neutral authorities shall be chosen?

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That is a question which we propose should be decided on the spot. At Geneva we are not sufficiently in touch with the present circumstances in the international establishment or in the Chinese city at Shanghai. Therefore it is only natural that this question of the neutral zone and the supervision of the neutral zone should be examined where it can best be examined, that is to say on the spot in Shanghai.

On the essential points our local representatives at Shanghai are receiving instructions. I hope that as a result of those instructions the matter will be so arranged on the spot that hostilities may cease, if not at once, at all events as soon as possible.

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I would venture to add that Admiral Nomura, the Admiral of the Third Fleet, reached Shanghai yesterday, and he bears instructions from his chief the object of which instructions is to bring about the cessation of hostilities.

I am quite sure the Council will derive satisfaction from this information, and I can only repeat my earnest hope that through this action on the spot a way will be found to stop hostilities as soon as possible.

(Interpretation):

The PRESIDENT: I would like to ask the British Representative whether he is in a position to give the Council any information with regard to the steps that have been taken by the Powers in Shanghai in accordanced with the information that was laid before the Council at an earlier meeting by the British Representative, On that occasion it will be remembered the Council expressed its sympathy and interest in the steps that were taken, and I am sure we shall be glad to have any information on that point.

Sir John SIMON (British Empire): Mr. President, I very willingly comply with your request, so far as I am able to do so, and contribute on this most anxious and delicate matter the information which I have in my possession.

As you have just said, and as our Chinese colleague observed in his opening observations, the British Representative, my colleague Mr. Thomas, a week ago gave to the Council some particulars regarding^a certain démarche, which was just at that moment being made by the British Government in consultation with the Government of the

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United States and with the collaboration of the Governments of France and of Italy.

My information is that the proposals first put forward in the exercise of their good offices by those associated Powers were not, unhappily, the means of bringing about immediate agreement; but, on the other hand, I believe from the information before me it is certainly the case that these efforts are not to be regarded as entirely fruitless and without result. The information which we have just received from our Japanese colleague as to Admiral Nomura's arrival yesterday with new instructions as to the negotiations which are proceeding on the spot between the local representatives of the Powers there principally concerned, the effort which is being made to define and guard a neutral zone - all these matters of which we have just been informed by him are, I should inform my colleagues of the Council, confirmed by the information which I am in a position to put before them, and the efforts which are now being made are, therefore, definitely related to the situation which was, if not brought about, at any rate contributed^{to}/by the démarche of the past.

The Council, of course, has fully in mind that the local negotiations which are, as I believe, now going on are being conducted not only by the local representatives of Powers sitting around this table, but that there is also there present the local representative of the United States. I therefore submit the view to the Council that this extended use of influences for peace involved in the cooperation on the spot of the local representatives of the Powers there represented, including the United States, should be regarded

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as a valuable, and I trust with all my heart a hopeful, sign.

I would like to repeat on behalf of the British Government that the démarche with which they were associated, and which was announced here a week ago, and all the efforts that have been made on the spot in the meantime down to the present moment, are directed to the object at which the Council also aims. I trust most sincerely that they may supplement effectively the purpose which we all have at heart.

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I would ask, Mr. President, to be allowed to make two final observations. In the first place, I feel sure that my colleagues as well as myself take note of the assurance of our colleague from Japan that Japan is aiming at the termination of hostilities at the earliest possible moment. Secondly, I would venture to observe that the British Government itself feels the gravest anxiety and concern at the present situation. It believes that that anxiety and concern are shared by public opinion in many parts of the world and it is our most earnest desire to see the cessation of the slaughter and the end of this conflict without delay. We put the whole of our local influence, in co-operation with that of the other Powers, at the service of the Council in order, as far as we can, to assist to that end.

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The PRESIDENT:

(Interpretation):

I would like to tell the delegate of China that we have listened to the information which he desired to place before the Council. I will not say that we listened to it with interest, because "interest" would be a word that might under these tragic circumstances seem ironic, if not actually unseemly. I will say that we have heard with anxiety the information that has been laid before us by the Chinese delegate. The Council will give that information its very careful consideration and will certainly use it when contemplating and deciding upon its further action.

I would like, however, to remind the delegate of China that the statement which he has made does not replace that full statement of his case, with all the relevant facts and papers, which is required under Article XV of the Covenant - the Article under which he himself appealed to the Council.

It will be remembered that it was at our meeting on January 28th last that the Secretary-General asked that such a statement should be handed to him. That is part of the procedure - I might say it is the second part of the procedure laid down by Article XV. The first part of the procedure under that Article has already been carried out; it was carried out as quickly as possible. I say this because as President in office and on behalf of my colleagues in the Council I am anxious to maintain the prestige of the League of Nations, in spite of suggestions that have been made in certain quarters

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that it seems powerless under certain circumstances. I should like it to be realised that from the very first moment when the appeal was received by the Council, the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council took action immediately, and that within twenty-four hours, in spite of the fact that the centre where the difficulties had arisen was very far distant, a Commission of Enquiry had been set up. The composition of this Commission, the authority conferred upon it by its membership, the guarantees of its impartiality, are well-known; and I would stress the fact that it was set up within twenty-four hours. And now its first report has been received.

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That report informs us that a further report will follow in due course. The present report stops at the date of January 31st. Since that time events have occurred with great rapidity and it is therefore certain that we shall soon be in possession of a report with reference to events that occurred in the early days of February.

The report we have already received shows, as is often the case - as has been the case, indeed, in conflicts going much farther than we hope the present conflict will ever go - that there may be a misunderstanding at the origin of the dispute, and if that misunderstanding is removed it may be possible to restore better relations between the two parties concerned. That is the ardent hope of the Council.

At our last meeting we heard a statement by the British delegate expressing the anxiety that he himself felt and that was entertained in his country. He pointed to the need of action and said that, in agreement with the Government of the United States of America, the British Government - and subsequently, as it proved, the Governments of my own country and of Italy - had taken certain steps, since they had more direct interests on the spot than the other Governments on the Council and also had more effective means with which to protect their interests. The League of Nations realises that if it is to be effective mere wishes are not enough; it must have means at hand to carry out those wishes. Therefore, the League viewed with sympathy the action taken, which was devised to ensure the opening up of negotiations with the intention of securing the cessation of hostilities and the clearing up of the misunderstanding that had arisen - obviously a serious

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misunderstanding since its results had been so serious. The Governments entered into this action with the approval of the Council of the League and in association with it. That was why I ventured just now to ask the British representative whether he was in a position to give us any information. I think my colleagues will agree with me that the way in which I am speaking bears out a statement I made at an earlier meeting that the League of Nations can only exist in the truth and through the truth, and it is our desire that the truth should never be hidden. We are also anxious that results achieved should not be under-estimated. We shall therefore continue to follow the negotiations now proceeding with the greatest sympathy; but in saying that I should like at the same time to add that the Council is not in any sense abdication the rights it holds under the Covenant of the League of Nations. Nevertheless we do feel bound to await the result of the negotiations already in progress. We are now told - and perhaps we knew already from the Press - that those negotiations did not have an immediately satisfactory result. We are nevertheless glad to hear that they are far from being closed.

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The essential point - that is to say, the cessation of hostilities and the constitution of a neutral zone - is a point in which the Council is extremely interested, and we are very glad to hear from the Japanese representative words which enable us to entertain the hope that very soon hostilities will cease, that a neutral zone will be set up and that the proposals which are now being considered will prove acceptable to both parties, and indeed, that it is only a question of settling the details. If that hope is realised and realised very soon, as we desire - because in such a matter as this time presses - the Council of the League of Nations associating itself with the negotiations of the Powers that have already taken steps to bring about this result, that, I think, will conclude the present stage of our procedure. But I am quite sure that the Council will agree that it must remain vigilant, it must carefully and conscientiously follow all the developments that take place; but for to-day I think it is clear that a continuation of the discussion would add nothing to the information that has already been given.

I therefore suggest that we await further reports. We are expecting supplementary reports from the Committee in Shanghai, and when those reports come to hand it is clear, I think, that the Council will be in a position to do its duty and to do it conscientiously.

Dr. W.W. YEN (China): Mr. President, I have heard what you have been good enough to say regarding

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procedure under Article XV, and I should like to take this opportunity to inform the Council that, in accordance with precedent, the Chinese Delegation will be sending in some time to-night a statement submitted by the Republic of China in compliance with paragraph 2 of Article XV of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This will be a preliminary statement; a complete and fuller statement will be sent in in due course. In the last paragraph of this preliminary statement it is written that China respectfully submits that the elementary facts of the situation as above stated plainly call for the exercise of the full powers of the League under its Covenant to bring about an immediate cessation of hostile and aggressive action by Japan, the prompt evacuation of Chinese territory by Japanese forces and a settlement of the entire controversy between China and Japan by peaceful means.

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You have been good enough to point out to me the negotiations that are now going on in Shanghai regarding a neutral zone, but may I be permitted to say that it is not only in Shanghai that hostilities have been continued by Japan. I mentioned briefly in my statement the capture of the city of Harbin in Manchuria. It is therefore not possible for me to limit myself to the lamentable events that are taking place in Shanghai.

I am also very happy to be able to say that the report of the Shanghai Committee has almost entirely corroborated the different communications that I have had the honour to send to the Council. There is, however, one point which has been very much emphasised and on which I am of opinion a few words from me would be opportune. I refer to the first few paragraphs in the report on the question of the boycott. We must all remember that the boycott is not the cause of the dispute between China and Japan; it is rather the effect of the Japanese aggression in Manchuria and elsewhere. It is the natural reaction of the Chinese people to the acts of aggression of the Japanese Government and its army and navy. No Government, no power on earth, can compel the Chinese people to buy Japanese goods so long as Japanese troops are on Chinese soil. In this connection I beg leave to quote the reply of my Government to the Japanese memorandum of 9th October, in which the Chinese Delegation said:

"Freedom to choose one's purchases is an individual right with which no government can interfere, and while it is the duty of every government to protect foreign nationals, it is bound neither by any recognised standard of governance, nor by any principle of international law, to prohibit or

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punish the exercise of an elementary right of citizenship. If there be any responsibility at all in the matter it entirely lies with Japan, since the Wampaoshan incident which created this general prejudice against Japanese merchants."

I think I am justified in saying that there never was any special animosity against Japanese merchandise till the commencement of the aggressions on the part of Japan. This is proved by the fact that Japan's trade with China before the recent invasion and other disagreeable incidents was increasing at a most rapid rate and that the decline commenced only within the last few months. The boycott will die a natural death when troops are withdrawn and good relations restored.

With regard to the negotiations being carried on in Shanghai in connection with a neutral zone, it is not within my competence to discuss that matter. It is a matter between the local and foreign authorities at Shanghai and therefore I do not desire to say anything on the subject. I do wish to say, however, that the Chinese Government accepted the proposals of the Powers as a whole, while the Japanese rejected the essence of them, and indeed, accepted only two.

As to the final result of the negotiations, I again wish to say that it is a matter to be decided by my Government.

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M. SATO (Japan) (Interpretation): In the statement we had just now from the Chinese Delegate there is none passage which I cannot allow to pass in silence. He referred to the sending of Japanese troops to Harbin. I have already supplied the Council with full information upon that matter, and it is quite clear that the Japanese Government was bound to take the step which it did. The city of Harbin was in a state of complete disorder as the result of there being two opposing groups of Chinese soldiery there. The Japanese Government is responsible for the protection of its own nationals, ^{and} the number of Japanese nationals in the city of Harbin was more than six thousand. We were, therefore, bound to send a certain force there, and with regard to that matter I have, as I have said, given the fullest information to the Council through the President.

There is another point I would like to refer to, and to this point I attach very great importance - that is the question of the boycott. The Delegate of China seemed to regard this as a sort of legitimate reprisal for Japanese action in Manchuria. If that were really the case, I should not say much about it, because I realise that China is free to decide whether or not it should adopt this form of reprisal, and she has to take the responsibility for her decision. But the situation is not quite so simple as it appears. The boycott is a weapon which has long been employed in China not only against the Japanese nation but against other nations. Other nations have also been subjected to such a movement in the past. Freedom to buy or not to buy may be regarded as an economic question, but even on that ground objections may be raised. For my part,

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I think we should have a legitimate cause to object if there were discrimination made against our goods. The right to employ such a discrimination is a thing which we could not admit. But leaving aside altogether the economic aspect of this question, we are quite unable to disregard the fact that the boycott is connected with the action of the Government itself in China, and therefore the boycott has political implications and consequences. It is not merely a question of excluding Japanese goods; this is an action which is directed against the Japanese people who live in Chinese territory, the object being to drive those Japanese nationals out of that territory. The Delegate of China told us that the boycott was the result of events in Manchuria. I think you will agree with me when I say that that cannot be the case. My predecessor has already given you details on this question. This anti-Japanese movement in this particular case is a procedure that has for long been employed in China. Even the very school text-books which the children are given to read contain extraordinary passages, the result of which is to arouse anti-foreign and anti-Japanese feeling.

Several years ago, and therefore long before the Manchurian trouble arose, this weapon was first employed, and we have to say that we cannot tolerate such a movement. It is against that movement that we have felt bound to struggle. In the Shanghai Concession we have tens of thousands of my fellow-countrymen; and they are suffering as the result of this anti-Japanese policy. The Japanese Government is bound to protect its nationals, and if we were to withdraw our nationals from Shanghai it would be equivalent to admitting that this anti-Japanese movement was right, and no Government would assume the responsibility

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for any such action.

This procedure by China against my country is an action which I hope will receive careful attention by public opinion. I know that there is a tendency for public opinion to be opposed to my country, but I hope that public opinion will judge what is happening in China and will endeavour to do so impartially and fairly. If my Government had withdrawn the Marines defending the zones in which my nationals live without previously arranging the conditions on which they were withdrawn, the consequences might have been disastrous. We might, indeed, have won the sympathy of that public which sympathises with China; but, for us, such an action would have been equivalent to leaving our nationals at the mercy of this hostile movement, and would have exposed them to consequences of the most serious character extending, perhaps, even to massacre. That is an action for which no Government could bear the responsibility.

We, therefore, were compelled to leave our Marines where they were to defend the zone which was allocated to them and to defend our colony, and we know only too well if we had not taken firm action in this connection what the result might have been.

In 1927, only four years ago, we were suffering a great deal at Hankin, and the country which Sir John Simon represents had at that time great difficulty with the Chinese Government, as also had the Government of the United States of America. At that time there was an anti-foreign movement directed particularly against those countries. My country was also the victim of that anti-foreign movement, but it did not make any active protest then in spite of the fact that my

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fellow-countrymen were suffering greatly at the hands of Chinese soldiers treatment which might have been thought to be dishonourable; but, as I have said, we made no protest.

This recent action, however, on the part of China was such that we could not allow things to take their course. We realised how serious the results might be unless energetic measures were taken to protect our nationals at Shanghai, and we sent cruisers there. We have the right by treaty to send cruisers to Chinese waters, and we are not the only nation which send ships to those waters. There are several other nations who send their warships there to defend their nationals should danger arise. If the Government there were in a state of perfect organisation and were able to maintain order, there could be no question of sending foreign warships or reinforcements to Chinese waters, but we were bound to take such action in order to defend our own interests and our own nationals.

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It is painful for me to say this but I desire to speak quite frankly - I have to say, therefore, if we do not succeed in defending our nationals at Shanghai on this occasion, if we do not defend our nationals' rights to stay in Shanghai, to live there and trade there, then I do not know what the result will be. Four years ago two countries suffered in this way. Now it is Japan which is the object of this anti-foreign movement. Whose turn will it be tomorrow? No one can tell. Nevertheless the matter is certainly a very serious one and I should urge that it should not be lightly considered; it should be given the most careful reflection.

The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): The Delegate of Japan may rest assured - indeed I am quite sure he knows this already - that the Council will give its most impartial attention to this matter in continuing its work on the question. In what the Japanese Delegate has said and from the first Report we have received - I might call it the first impartial document put before the Council - we note the situation is very much more complex and difficult than those who make up public opinion perhaps realise. It is the advantage of our procedure, slow though it may sometimes appear, that we are careful to be impartial, to base our decisions upon impartial documents. I am quite sure that in that way the Council will still continue to do its duty. This procedure is very useful, particularly of course in such disputes, but if it is to be usefully pursued it is essential that violence should cease.

I know and appreciate the care which the Japanese Delegate has taken to transmit to his Government the wishes of

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the Council and I would urge most earnestly that this neutral zone should be set up as rapidly as possible, that it should be occupied by the neutral forces at Shanghai, and in that way that the cessation of hostilities should be ensured and also the restoration of good order, which is in the interests particularly perhaps of the Japanese themselves, and also of course of those other countries who are concerned in the life of Shanghai.

The Chinese Delegate has said that the establishment of a neutral zone will not settle the whole matter. There of course we entirely agree. We have, however, a proverb which says that each day's task must be sufficient for itself, and I am quite sure that the Council will be glad when this part of its task is satisfactorily carried out.

(The Council rose.)

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Communiqué au Conseil et
aux Membres de la Société.

C.93.M.46.1932.VII.

Genève, le 25 janvier 1932.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS EN VERTU DE L'ARTICLE 11 DU PACTE.

Communication de la délégation chinoise.

Note du Secrétaire général.

Le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de transmettre au Conseil la communication suivante, en date du 23 janvier 1932, qu'il a reçue de la délégation chinoise.

Réf.179.

TRADUCTION DU TÉLÉGRAMME DU MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES
DE NANKIN, PORTANT LA DATE DU 12 JANVIER 1932.

On trouvera ci-après, le texte de notre réponse à la note du gouvernement américain portant la date du 7 janvier 1932. (signé) Waichiaapu, le 12 janvier 1932.

Nous avons l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre note du 8 courant, ainsi conçue:

"A la suite des récentes opérations militaires aux environs de Tchén-Tchéou, la dernière autorité administrative du gouvernement de la République de Chine qui restât encore en Mandchourie méridionale telle qu'elle était avant le 18 septembre 1931, a été supprimée. Le gouvernement américain demeure convaincu que les travaux de la Commission neutre récemment autorisée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations contribueront à faciliter la solution des difficultés qui existent à l'heure actuelle entre la Chine et le Japon.

"Toutefois, en raison de la situation actuelle, des droits qu'il détiendrait et des obligations qui lui incombent, le gouvernement américain croit de son devoir de porter ce qui suit à la connaissance du Gouvernement impérial du Japon et du gouvernement de la République de Chine.

Il ne saurait admettre la légalité d'aucune situation de facto et il n'a pas l'intention de reconnaître aucun traité ou accord (conclu entre ces gouvernements ou leurs agents et de nature à compromettre les droits que les États-Unis ou leurs ressortissants détiennent en Chine en vertu des traités), y compris tous traités et accords concernant la souveraineté, l'indépendance ou l'intégrité territoriale et administrative de la République de Chine, ou la politique internationale à l'égard de la Chine généralement connue sous le nom de politique de la porte ouverte.

De plus, il n'a pas l'intention de reconnaître aucune situation, traité ou accord qui pourraient être dus à des moyens contraires aux engagements et obligations du Pacte de Paris du 27 août 1928, auquel la Chine et le Japon sont Parties aussi bien que les États-Unis."

Nous avons pris acte que le gouvernement américain éprouve de vives préoccupations en ce qui concerne l'action des forces militaires japonaises en Mandchourie, et nous sommes très heureux de voir l'attitude que le gouvernement américain a adoptée en vue de maintenir la dignité et le prestige des traités internationaux et du Pacte Kellogg contre la guerre.

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Depuis que l'incident de Mandchourie s'est produit le 18 septembre 1931, le gouvernement chinois respectant constamment les stipulations du Pacte de renonciation à la guerre, n'a jamais pris aucune mesure de nature à compliquer la situation, mais a agi conformément aux stipulations de ces traités internationaux, et il a prié toutes les Puissances signataires d'examiner attentivement la question. Toutefois, les forces militaires japonaises, malgré la résolution adoptée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations le 30 septembre et le 24 octobre à la fin de la session, ont continué à prendre des mesures d'un caractère extrêmement agressif. Même après la résolution adoptée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations le 10 décembre, elles ont occupé Tchén-Tchéou où se trouvait l'administration provinciale chinoise. Tout récemment, elles ont accentué leur avance, ont pris possession de Souitchéoung et ont atteint Chanhaikouen. Elles ont également accru le nombre des soldats et des marins à Tien-Tsin et à Tchingouangtao. Elles envisagent à l'heure actuelle d'envahir le Jehol. Il est indéniable que le Japon a violé le Pacte de la Société des Nations, le traité des neuf Puissances et le Pacte Kellogg de renonciation à la guerre, et le gouvernement japonais doit en assumer l'entière responsabilité.

Le gouvernement chinois a pris acte que le gouvernement américain n'admettra la légalité d'aucune situation de facto, et il y a lieu de déclarer que le gouvernement chinois a, à maintes reprises, adressé de vives protestations au gouvernement japonais au sujet des diverses mesures offensives et actions illégales des troupes japonaises depuis le 18 septembre 1931, et qu'il a également fait savoir au Conseil de la Société des Nations qu'il ne reconnaîtra pas les dites mesures et actions. Le gouvernement chinois, maintenant fermement le principe de la complète souveraineté et de l'intégrité territoriale et administrative de la Chine, ne concluera aucun traité ou accord de la nature indiquée par la note du gouvernement américain.

Le gouvernement chinois espère vivement que le gouvernement américain continuera à renforcer l'application effective de ces traités internationaux, afin de maintenir leur dignité et leur prestige. Le gouvernement chinois a l'honneur par les présentes de transmettre la présente note en réponse à celle de Votre Excellence, en vous priant de bien vouloir la communiquer au gouvernement américain, à titre d'information et pour qu'il puisse prendre les mesures nécessaires.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.103.M.49.1932.VII.

Geneva,

January 25th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the Japanese Delegation's request, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication dated January 24th, 1932.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation.

1. - An article which appeared on January 10th in a Chinese newspaper of Shanghai which is an organ of the Nationalist Party, concerning the outrage against His Majesty and bearing the sub-title: "Unfortunately, another carriage hit" caused profound irritation among the Japanese population of Shanghai.

The Japanese Consulate General immediately protested to the Mayor of the Chinese town, drawing his attention once more to the dangers of the situation created by the violent and illegal campaign conducted by the anti-Japanese organisations.

2. - Such was the position when, on January 18th, at about 4 p.m., two Japanese monks, accompanied by three of the faithful, were attacked by some 50 workmen who were coming out of a factory situated in the vicinity of the Concession, and known as a centre of anti-Japanese agitation. Other Chinese soon joined the assailants, and three of the Japanese had to be taken to hospital in a very serious condition.

The Japanese Consul General asked the Chinese Mayor that apologies should be made concerning the attack against the Japanese monks, that the offenders should be sought and punished, that an indemnity should be paid to the victims, that the anti-Japanese manifestations should be energetically put down, and that the anti-Japanese associations should be immediately dissolved.

3. - The danger of a collision between Chinese and Japanese feared by the Consul General was soon to be realised. On January 20th, at dawn, a group of Japanese set fire to the Chinese factory in question by way of reprisals. An encounter also took place between the Chinese police and the demonstrators.

The Japanese colony has held several meetings, vehemently protesting against the proceedings of the authorities and of the anti-Japanese associations and asking for the suppression of the latter. It has applied with this end in view to the Consul General and to the Commander of the Japanese forces stationed at Shanghai.

4. - A fresh riot occurred in the afternoon of the same day between Japanese and Chinese and, despite the efforts made by the Japanese police and the Marines, the Japanese demonstrators sacked several Chinese shops, from which different projectiles had been thrown at them.

5. - Two members of the municipal police having been wounded during the riot (one has died as a result of his wounds), the Consul General expressed his regrets to the Municipal Council. Three demonstrators being prosecuted by the latter. The Consul General induced four other demonstrators to give themselves up on January 23rd.

6. - The Japanese Government has decided to send a cruiser and several destroyers, with about 400 men as reinforcements, to Shanghai.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.105.M.51.1932.VII.

Geneva,

January 25th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication, dated January 25th, 1932.

INCIDENTS AT SHANGHAI.

Summary of official Japanese telegrams
received by the Japanese Delegation.

I. During his interview with the mayor of the Chinese town, on January 21st, the Japanese Consul-General renewed his request that vigorous action be taken to put a stop to anti-Japanese measures, owing to the possible consequences of the feeling that might be engendered on both sides. He assured the mayor that the Japanese offenders involved in the burning down of the factory would be traced and punished in accordance with the law.

II. On January 21st, the Commander of the naval forces in China published a declaration in support of the protest made by the Japanese Consul-General against the assaulting of Japanese monks by members of the Anti-Japanese Association. He declared that, if necessary, he would take suitable measures to protect Japanese rights and interests.

III. Our nationals are constantly being subjected to new forms of intimidation. The practice of interfering with their telegraphic communications has been resumed. The Japanese Consul-General is endeavouring to allay the prevailing irritation, but feeling still runs very high in the Japanese colony, which is clamouring for vigorous action, the measures taken by the authorities being regarded as inadequate.

INCIDENTS AT SHANGHAI.

Official telegram received by the Japanese
Delegation. (January 25th, 1932).

An attempt to set fire to the house of the Japanese Minister at Shanghai was discovered on the 24th instant at about 7 p.m. A Chinese mattress soaked in paraffin had been placed against the house and set alight. It was removed before the house caught fire. A revolver was found as well as two coats marked in Chinese with the inscription "Member of the Anti-Japanese Shock Association for the Safeguarding of the Nation", and bearing the seal of that association. To one of the doors of the house a poster had been affixed bearing the stamp of the association and declaring that recourse was being had to direct action to punish the Japanese.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.110.M.52.1932.VII.

Geneva, January 26th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication from the Chinese Delegation.

18 rue Charles Galland,

Ref. 4/180.

Geneva.

January 26th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate to you the following telegraphic reports, dated January 22, 1932, which have been received from Nanking by the Chinese Delegation.

1. Japanese troops, in their recent military operations along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway and during their occupation of Chinchow and Shanhaikwan, interrupted the traffic on the section of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway outside the Great Wall and on its branch lines, replaced all the station-masters with officials of the South Manchuria Railway, stationed soldiers at various stations, and drove out the entire railway staff, including all guards and workmen. When the dismissed foreign employees protested, the Japanese referred them to the Headquarters of the Japanese Army at Shenyang (Mukden), which replied that the question would be settled by the self-appointed "New Government" and "Committee of Communications".

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2. On the 21st of January, one of the Foochow local newspapers published the news of the attempted assassination of the Japanese Emperor. Thereupon the Japanese Consul sent a note to the Fukien Provincial Government demanding that the correspondent should be punished and that the circulation of the paper should be forbidden; he also verbally demanded a reply within four hours, failing which Japan reserved freedom of action.
3. On the 12th of January, the Japanese in Tsingtao assembled over a thousand hooligans, attacked and burned down the local Kuomintang Headquarters. The Chinese Government lodged a strong protest with the Japanese Minister.
4. On the 18th of January, five Japanese monks came into conflict with some Chinese workmen near Chapei, in the northern part of Shanghai. Three of the monks were injured. The Municipal Government of Greater Shanghai and the Japanese Consulate have been negotiating to settle the matter.
5. On the 20th of January, a number of Japanese set fire to the San Yu Weaving Factory in Shanghai. Armed police was immediately rushed to the spot, where numerous empty alcohol bottles and opened packages of inflammable substances of Japanese make were found.

Immediately the Factory was fired, the policeman on duty at the first police-box at the bottom of Ward Road in the International Settlement was surrounded and attacked by a number of Japanese as he was on the way to the telephone box to raise the fire alarm. Three of his fingers were cut off and he was badly injured.

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The Japanese at the same time cut the wire of the telephone box. A second policeman, who was running towards Lin Ching Road in the Settlement in another attempt to get into touch with police and fire stations, was attacked by the Japanese from behind and killed.

As the Japanese were escaping to the International Settlement, they were met by a group of Chinese police. In the conflict one was killed and two were injured on each side.

The fact that the incendiaries were Japanese hooligans was later confirmed by the Shanghai Municipal Council police.

6. It is reported that a number of Japanese warships, carrying numerous bombing planes are on the way to China and are expected in Shanghai on January 25th.

(signed) W.W. YEN

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League

C.112.M.53.1932.VII.

Geneva, January 26th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated January 26th, 1932.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS

Summary of Official Telegrams received by the
Japanese Delegation.

26-1-32.

I. The organ of the Chinese Nationalist Party in Shanghai having printed a statement on January 21st to the effect that the attack on the Chinese factory by Japanese nationals had been made under the protection of the marines, the Commander of the Japanese naval forces demanded an apology and a correction. The correction appeared on January 23rd, but no apology has yet been made for the insult to the Japanese navy.

II. One of the monks attacked on the 18th died of his wounds on January 24th.

III. The mayor of the Chinese City sent a note to the Japanese Consul-General requesting that action should be taken against the Japanese demonstrators who were concerned in the recent incidents. The Japanese Consul-General called the mayor's attention to the fact that the recent incidents were solely due to repeated provocation on the part of the Chinese, who were entirely responsible.

IV. The Japanese Colony had for some time been manifesting great discontent because the Japanese spinning works in Shanghai, which were virtually at a standstill, were continuing to pay and feed some 20,000 Chinese workers, while the anti-Japanese agitation was depriving thousands of Japanese of their livelihood.

The Federation of Japanese Master Spinners has decided in consequence of recent events to enforce a lock-out and to close down all the affiliated factories. When notifying the mayor of the Chinese City of this decision, the Federation pointed out that it had been rendered inevitable by the attitude of the Chinese authorities, and demanded the dissolution of all the anti-Japanese groups, expressing the hope that normal economic relations would soon be re-established.

V. The funeral of one of the Japanese demonstrators killed by the police in the affray of January 20th took place on the 23rd, at the expense of the Japanese Colony. The Consul-General succeeded in persuading the organizers not to make any demonstration. The Japanese police, the marines and the municipal police were present in force to maintain order.

VI. In view of the firm attitude adopted by the naval authorities and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Colony has decided temporarily to postpone the meeting which was to have been held on January 23rd.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.133.M.56.1932.VII.

Geneva, January 28th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11

OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Incidents in Shanghai.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated January 27th from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./183.

TRANSLATION OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY THE CHINESE

DELEGATION FROM NANKING DATED JANUARY 27, 1932.

1. Japan has continued sending a large number of war vessels to Shanghai among which is the warship "Ohi" carrying about five hundred marines, 12 heavy guns with over 500 cases of ammunitions, 20 hand machine-guns and 17 machine-guns with over 700 cases of ammunitions and over 100 cases of rifle bullets. All these have been transported to the Japanese Headquarters on Kiangwan Road in Chinese territory. Up to date, the Japanese war vessels in the port of Shanghai are 2 gun-boats, 5 cruisers, 5 destroyers, and 1 aeroplane carrier.
2. The Japanese Consul-General presented the Chinese Municipal Government of Greater Shanghai with the following demands in connection with the molestation of the Japanese monks: (1) Apology, (2) Speedy arrest and punishment of culprits, (3) Medical treatment and compensation to the victims, and (4) Suppression of all boycott activities and dissolution of all boycott organizations in Shanghai.

The Mayor agreed that culprits mentioned in point (2) will be dealt with according to law, and promised that points (1) and (3) will be taken into due consideration; but, as to point (4),

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he replied that he had no right to suppress such activities so long as they were within the law. Despite the above reply of the Mayor, the Japanese Consul-General insisted that, upon China's failure to accept the demands in full, the Japanese would exercise freedom of action.

The Commanding Officer of the Japanese troops made it known that, in case the demand of dissolution of the boycott organizations received no satisfactory reply, he would despatch troops to occupy the Chinese South City, the Chinese North City and the Arsenal. Simultaneously more war vessels and troops would be sent to Shanghai.

According to a report from the Chinese Legation at Tokyo, the Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai was instructed by his Government to deliver his ultimatum to the Chinese authorities.

3. It is reliably reported that Japanese troops and ruffians attempted to occupy the International Wireless Station, the largest wireless station in China communicating directly with America and Europe, at Chenju near Shanghai, on the night of the 25th of January. Through the energetic protest of the American Consul-General, the Japanese replied that the execution of the plan depended upon the result of the negotiation with the Chinese Mayor.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to
the Council and
Members of the League.

C.138.M.57.1932.VII.

Geneva,

January 29th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to
circulate to the Council the following communi-
cation from the Chinese Delegation.

18, rue Charles Galland,
Geneva.

January 29th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

Under instructions from my Government, I have the
honour hereby to give notice as follows:

1. A dispute between two Members of the League of Nations, to wit: China and Japan, arising from the aggression of the latter against the territorial and administrative integrity and political independence of the former in violation of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, exists.
2. This dispute has not been submitted to arbitration or to judicial settlement in accordance with any of the Articles of the Covenant.
3. The said dispute has now reached a stage when it is likely to lead to an immediate rupture between China and Japan.
4. China hereby invokes the application (not in derogation of the measures taken, or which may be taken by the League in the exercise of its functions under Article XI, but in addition thereto) both of Article X and of Article XV of the Covenant to said dispute and formally submits the said matter to the Council for all appropriate and necessary action under both of said Articles.
5. For this purpose China begs leave to refer to, and hereby adopts as and for the statement of its case comprising the relevant facts and papers in relation to said matter, all the statements and papers heretofore made and submitted by China in the proceedings of the Council taken in said controversy under Article XI of the Covenant from September 18th, 1931, to the date hereof.

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.141.M.58.1932.VII.

Geneva, January 29th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communications, dated January 28th, 1932.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS AND BRIGANDAGE IN MANCHURIA.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of official telegrams received
by the Japanese Delegation.

1) On January 26th, one cruiser and twelve torpedo-boats with about 600 marines were sent to Shanghai as reinforcements in case of emergency.

The Ministry of Marine has published a statement pointing out that, notwithstanding frequent provocation and hostile action against Japan, the Japanese Navy has been careful not to depart from an attitude of extreme patience. The increasingly definite threat to Japanese nationals and property in Shanghai has caused the despatch of reinforcements/ to that town. The statement concludes with the hope that illegal acts on the part of China will cease and that a peaceful settlement will be arrived at. If such illegal acts should unfortunately not cease, the naval authorities will be obliged to take steps to protect Japanese nationals and their interests.

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2) The Japanese consul informed the mayor of the Chinese city of Shanghai by telephone on the evening of January 27th that he expected a definite answer to his note of protest before 6 p.m. on the following day.

3) Some 30,000 Chinese troops have been moved from Nanking and Suchow in the direction of Shanghai to reinforce the forces stationed at Woosung and along the railway. There are also 6,000 men of the police force; trenches have been dug and barbed-wire entanglements and sandbag breastworks put up at various points. All traffic is forbidden after nightfall. Alarmed by these preparations, many Chinese are taking refuge in the Concessions. On January 26th the Chief of Police issued a statement in the hope of calming public opinion.

It is understood that the municipal authorities have decided, in concert with the officers commanding the English and American troops, to take steps to prevent Chinese soldiers and the Chinese mob from entering the Concession in the event of fighting.

4) The municipality caused the offices of the organ of the Nationalist Party at Shanghai to be closed on January 26th.

BRIGANDAGE IN MANCHURIA.

Summary of official telegrams received by
the Japanese Delegation.

Hsienmin Area.

1) On January 4th, about 8.30 p.m., there was an attack and looting in the town of Hsienmin by a body of about 1,000 brigands. The looting continued throughout the night, despite the efforts of the Chinese and Japanese authorities to drive out the brigands. The attack was directed against the Japanese, who had four houses looted, one set on fire, and four damaged. Five Japanese (including one policeman) were killed and seven (including four soldiers) wounded. One man, one woman and one child were carried

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off as hostages. Two Chinese policemen were killed.

2) On the same evening the brigands blew up 15 ^{metre} / of railway track between Paochipu and Liuhokou, and destroyed a bridge east of Hsinmin on the Kaotaitze road.

Chinchow Area.

1) On January 9th a detachment of Japanese cavalry was surrounded by about 2,000 brigands north-east of Chinchow. We lost four officers, including the colonel commanding the regiment, and fifteen men, and had twenty wounded.

2) On January 10th a body of about 300 brigands and irregulars attacked Tahushan. They were repulsed after two hours' fighting. Our casualties were two officers killed and six ^{men} / wounded.

3) On January 25th a body of about 600 brigands attacked Talingho station, on the line from Mukden to Shanhaikwan. One railway official and a captain of infantry were killed, and two men were wounded. Ten rails were torn up on the Taijiang railway bridge and four telegraph poles cut down by the brigands.

Antung Area.

1) On January 19th, about 7 p.m., brigands attacked the railway zone at Kaolimen. Seventeen Japanese policemen and seven Japanese soldiers fought with them for an hour and succeeded in repulsing them.

2) On January 21st, about 1 a.m., a train travelling in the direction of Antung found the track blocked by huge fires a little before Pen Siu. A heavy fire was opened upon the train. One Korean woman was killed. The train returned to Shichiaotzu, whence an armoured train with about ninety men was sent forward. The damage caused by the fire on the track was repaired by about 4 a.m.

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Northern Manchuria.

1) Four hundred policemen from a place on the Peiho having mutinied and joined the local brigands, General Machanshan sent his first cavalry group and two infantry regiments on January 22nd to reduce these disorderly forces, who are armed with machine-guns and mortars. The Chinese troops in the town of Peiho are standing by.

2) On January 22nd about 1,300 men of the Chinese forces guarding the Kirin railway line were sent eastwards of Changchun in the direction of Hsia Chiutai, Tehli and Yaomen (15 km. ^{from} the Chinese Eastern Railway) to deal with the brigands and others hostile to the Government of the Province of Kirin. The Chinese forces are approaching Harbin. Our authorities have requested that our nationals, of whom there are a great many in this area, should receive proper protection during the operations.

Further, it is announced that 400 men of the 52nd cavalry group and 650 men of the 54th cavalry group of the Hoilungkiang army have entered Tsitsihar by arrangement with the Japanese military authorities. General Ma is also to return to Tsitsihar shortly.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.142.M.59.1932.VII

Geneva, January 29th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Incidents in Shanghai.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated January 28th from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref: 185.

Telegram from the Waichicopu, Nanking. January 28th, 1932.

In spite of the fact that the Mayor of the Shanghai Municipal Government exerted his best to settle the so-called Shanghai controversy by all possible pacific means, it is now reported that the Japanese admiral Shiosawa published a proclamation at half past nine to-night which announced that Japanese troops would occupy Chapei (Northern Chinese) District. The Japanese began landing troops at 10 p.m. from warships in the harbour. According to another report, Japanese troops entered Chapei at ten minutes after eleven o'clock, and fired forty shots at the Woosung forts.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.143.M.60.1932.VII.

Communicated to
the Council and
Members of the League.

Geneva, January 28th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour
to circulate to the Council the following
communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./184.

16 rue Charles Gelland,
Geneva,
Switzerland.

January 28th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General,

I have the honour to transmit to you the following
translation of a telegram just received by the Chinese
Delegation from Nanking:

The number of the Japanese troops now occupying
Manchuria amounts to about one hundred thousand. The
regular forces composing the 2nd division under the
command of General Tamen, the selected division from
the 19th and 20th divisions led by General Kanagi (?),
the two brigades under the command of Generals Suzuki
and Marayi, together with six independent groups of
gendarmes, and marines and artillery corps from Dairen
and Port Arthur make a total of more than seventy
thousand. Besides, there are more than twenty thousand
retired soldiers, who are serving as volunteer corps
to maintain order along the Antung-Mukden Railway and
the South Manchuria Railway lines.

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.147.M.62.1932.VII

Geneva, January 29th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Council the following communication dated January 29th,
1932.

Geneva, January 29th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have just received a telegram informing me that
through the good offices of the British and American
Consuls General an agreement has been reached with the
Chinese at Shanghai to establish a line of demarcation,
formed by the Woosung railway line, and to cease
hostilities from 3 p.m. on January 29th.

(Signed) S. SATO

Representative of Japan on the Council.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the
League

C.149.M.63.1932.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, January 31st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Note from the Chinese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication, dated January 30th, which he has received to-day from the Chinese Delegation.

(Ref.137)

Note from the Chinese Government.

Since the military occupation of Mukden and the Three Eastern Provinces of China, Japan has been committing atrocities and outrages and pursuing her aggressive and positive military policy. Shanghai, the most important Chinese port, the centre of international trade, is now being invaded by the Japanese army and navy. On January 28th at 1.41 p.m. the reply of Mayor Wu Tieh-cheng of the Shanghai Municipality, in reference to Japan's four demands, was accepted by the Japanese Consul General with satisfaction. Nevertheless at 11.20 p.m. Admiral Shu Shiosawa, commander of Japan's overseas First Squadron presented an ultimatum to the Shanghai Municipality demanding immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from the Chinese Chapai district, which Japanese forces would occupy. At the same time Japanese marines took the initiative and attacked Chinese troops with machine guns and have since been continuously directing their attack on the Chinese army. Twenty Japanese aircrafts have been bombing incessantly and indiscriminately all along Chapai, a thickly populated district in Shanghai, which has been in a state of conflagration, resulting in the killing of countless civilians. Furthermore, Chinese offices, transportation facilities, the Chi-nan University, cultural organisations and the principal shops have been destroyed. Up to this moment the Japanese forces are still continuing their hostile action and Shanghai is suffering bitterly under shell fire. Under such circumstances, the Chinese authorities, in order to exercise their sovereign rights, have been compelled to employ force for self-defence by energetically resisting the attack on the part of Japanese forces.

This attempt to invade and occupy Shanghai by Japan is again a violation of the League Covenant and Resolutions, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty which China has been observing. China has been enduring patiently Japan's aggressive acts which are continuously extending. The attack upon Shanghai endangers the capital Nanking. The situation is very critical and is rapidly affecting other places also. China hereby requests the League to take prompt and effective measures in order to prevent further Japanese aggressive actions, so that the Covenant may be preserved and the peace of the world maintained. China reserves the right to claim suitable reparations for damage done by Japan.

(s) W.W. Yen.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.150.M.64.1932.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Geneva, January 31st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Telegram from Nanking with regard to the situation at Shanghai.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication, dated January 30th, which he has to-day received from the Chinese Delegation.

Geneva, January 30th, 1932.

(Ref.188)

To the Secretary-General.-

Sir,

With reference to the communication of the Japanese Delegation, dated January 29th, 1932 (C.147.M.62.1932.VII.) I have the honour to transmit to you the following translation of a telegram which has just been received by the Chinese Delegation from Nanking:

1. The Chinese authorities, upon the proposal of the Japanese naval commander at Shanghai, agreed that both sides would cease hostilities from 8 o'clock in the evening of January 29th. But the Japanese failed to keep their promise by attacking our soldiers at the said hour. They commenced a fierce attack on us with the help of armoured cars and many guns at 1 o'clock this morning. Fighting is continuing.
2. This afternoon, a reinforcement of four Japanese war vessels arrived at Shanghai.

In submitting the above to you, I beg that you will be good enough to circulate it to the Members of the Council.

(s) W.W. Yen.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League

C.151.M.65.1932.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Geneva, January 31st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Telegram with regard to the situation at Shanghai and Harbin.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication, dated January 31st, which he has received to-day from the Chinese Delegation.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation from Nanking, dated January 31st, 1932.

(Ref.189)

1. In addition to the atrocities already committed by the Japanese at Chapei, they deliberately fired houses on North Szechuen Road yesterday afternoon, with kerosene. A great conflagration is now raging over an extensive area, destroying thousands of houses and rendering some five thousand people homeless. The fire brigade of the International Settlement rushed there with full equipment to try to extinguish the fire, but the Japanese Admiral refused to allow them to operate. Eventually he agreed that they could attack the fire, only after it had reached a certain area to the south, but definitely refused to allow them to operate to the north west where the densely populated area of Chapei is situated. Such an action is staggering even during the time of war.

2. There is disorder at Harbin on account of the fact that the Japanese are sending troops of the Kirin puppet government to that city and these troops were defeated by the local Chinese forces. Under the pretext of protecting her subjects, Japan intends to occupy the Changchun-Harbin branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway in order to transport her troops to capture Harbin. The Soviet Government has protested against this action.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.

Communiqué au Conseil
et aux membres de la
Société.

C.152.M.66.1932.VII.

Genève, le 1^{er} février 1932.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS EN VERTU DE L'ARTICLE 11 DU PACTE.

Communications de la Délégation japonaise relatives aux
incidents de Shanghai.

Note au Secrétaire général.

Le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de communiquer au Conseil les notes ci-après qui lui ont été transmises par la Délégation japonaise le 31 janvier.

I.

I. Situation à la veille des incidents.

Le Gouvernement japonais avait jusqu'ici attiré l'attention du Gouvernement chinois de la manière la plus conciliatoire sur les actes illégaux anti-japonais dont les Chinois avaient été coutumiers depuis de nombreuses années. L'irritation de la population japonaise de Shanghai avait atteint un degré extrême par l'agitation menée avec une rare violence ces mois derniers. Le 18 janvier, se produisit l'attentat contre les religieux japonais et la patience de nos ressortissants se trouvait enfin lassée.

A notre demande de dissoudre les associations anti-japonaises, le maire chinois invoqua l'impossibilité d'y procéder immédiatement et tandis qu'il faisait attendre sa réponse, les associations anti-japonaises ne faisaient qu'augmenter leur agitation. Des préparatifs de combat étaient faits par les Chinois et des travaux de défense étaient secrètement préparés le long du chemin de fer de Woosung et à d'autres endroits importants. Une atmosphère lourde de menace s'étendait sur toute la ville et, parmi les étrangers, beaucoup considéraient que, même si les autorités civiles chinoises admettaient nos demandes, il existait un sérieux danger de trouble provenant de l'indiscipline notoire des troupes chinoises.

Le 28 janvier, à 5 heures de l'après-midi, le maire de Shanghai acceptait enfin toutes nos demandes. Le Conseil général du Japon demandait au maire, afin d'éviter une collision, le retrait des troupes chinoises se trouvant à proximité de nos forces. Nos autorités se disposaient à contrôler l'accomplissement effectif des conditions acceptées par les Chinois, lorsque de grandes foules se rassemblèrent aux environs de la mairie chinoise. Les événements prenaient une tournure critique. Des rumeurs alarmantes étaient propagées. Les forces de police chinoise de la région de Chapei s'enfuyaient et déjà beaucoup d'habitants se réfugiaient vers la Concession. Le Conseil municipal de la Concession internationale proclamait l'état de siège le 28 janvier à 4 heures de l'après-midi. A 5 heures, les troupes étrangères gagnaient leurs postes de protection. A 6 heures et demi, le commandant des forces navales japonaises annonçait qu'il prenait à son tour les mesures envisagées et en notifiait les autorités chinoises. A 9 heures 30, les fusiliers marins débarquaient des navires mouillés devant Shanghai et se joignaient aux troupes navales déjà stationnées dans cette ville.

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2. Les incidents du 26 janvier.

Le 28 janvier à minuit les fusiliers marins japonais occupaient les postes qui leur avaient été assignés en vue d'assurer la sécurité de la vie et des biens de nos ressortissants dans la zone qu'ils étaient chargés de protéger selon le plan établi par le Commandant des forces internationales. Cette zone s'étendait à l'est et à l'ouest de la North Szechuan Road. Nos forces avaient pour ordre de ne pas engager d'hostilités avec les forces chinoises à moins d'être attaquées par celles-ci. Il ne se présenta rien du côté du secteur est, mais dans le secteur ouest, lorsque nos troupes s'engagèrent dans les rues du quartier chinois de Chapei, elles furent accueillies par une fusillade des troupes chinoises. C'est ainsi que s'engagèrent les combats.

3. Il est ainsi clair que les incidents des 28 et 29 décembre ont pour origine une agression préparée par les troupes régulières chinoises. Le fait que les forces de police chinoises s'étaient enfuies de Chapei le 28 dans la soirée paraît indiquer qu'elles étaient au courant de ce qui se préparait.

La nécessité d'établir des postes de protection dans les quartiers de la North Szechuan Road où résident de très nombreux ressortissants japonais est depuis longtemps reconnue par les autorités militaires internationales. C'est en allant assurer la protection de ces quartiers que nos forces ont subi l'agression des troupes chinoises.

Par ailleurs toutes les précautions avaient été prises de notre part pour prévenir un conflit, le maire de la Ville chinoise, les autorités de la police etc., ayant été informés de la proclamation du Commandant des forces navales japonaises. Le fait que l'agression de la part des troupes chinoises a eu lieu malgré la demande faite le jour précédent par notre Consul général auprès des autorités en vue d'éloigner les troupes chinoises suffirait à démontrer que cette agression était préméditée.

Nous avons été obligés par la suite de faire une démonstration aérienne contre les troupes chinoises concentrées à proximité des nôtres. Le plus grand soin a été pris d'éviter d'endommager les bâtiments publics et si des dégâts ont été causés à la gare, c'est qu'un train blindé y avait été amené d'où un feu nourri était ouvert contre nos forces.

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II.

Résumé de télégrammes officiels reçus par la Délégation japonaise.

29 janvier matinée.

1. Nos troupes ont occupé le 29 janvier à 5 heures du matin la ligne de protection qui leur avait été assignée.

2. De violentes rencontres s'étaient produites auparavant. les combats se sont poursuivis au cours de la journée; d'après les informations reçues au quartier général à 14 heures de l'après-midi, nos pertes étaient de 11 morts et 88 blessés, dont 64 grièvement.

3. Un grand nombre d'agitateurs et de soldats déguisés chinois tentaient de créer du désordre à l'arrière de nos lignes et un certain nombre de nos soldats ont été tués ou blessés par eux. Des civils ont également été tués par ces agitateurs dont nous avons pu capturer une grande partie.

4. Nos avions ont survolé le théâtre des opérations depuis l'aube et ont bombardé les points de concentration des forces chinoises.

5. Les forces régulières chinoises ont amené un train blindé près de la gare du nord et ont tenté de s'en servir contre nous. Une escadrille a bombardé ce train.

6. En prévision d'une recrudescence d'activité pendant la nuit des troupes déguisées, des dispositions de protection ont été envisagées par la police japonaise du Conseil municipal, notre corps de volontaires et les groupes de volontaires de chaque quartier.

7. Les Concessions internationales et françaises sont relativement calmes mais les banques chinoises sont toutes fermées.

8. Nos filatures ont toutes été fermées dans la matinée mais aucun désordre ne s'est produit de la part des ouvriers.

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29 janvier après-midi.

1. A la suite du bombardement aérien, la gare du Nord et divers autres bâtiments de Chapei sont en flammes. Une grande confusion paraît régner dans les environs.

2. Nos escadrilles avaient reçu l'ordre d'éviter, autant que possible, de causer des dommages à la gare du Nord, mais nous avons été contraints de la bombarder à 13 heures et demi à la suite de l'arrivée d'un train blindé dans la gare même et du rassemblement de troupes.

3. A 17 heures, des ouvrages de défense ont pu être établis sur toute la ligne et nos troupes se trouvaient en mesure de repousser les contre-attaques chinoises éventuelles.

4. Le bruit de la canonnade provenant de Shansen a diminué vers 3 heures de l'après-midi. Nos avions ont pu constater qu'il ne restait plus de grandes forces chinoises à proximité de notre ligne de défense. Cependant, à l'intérieur de nos lignes, dans tous les quartiers où résident les Japonais, et jusque dans la Concession internationale, de nombreux soldats en civil continuent leur activité. L'un d'eux a été abattu dans la Woosung Road. Des journalistes étrangers ont vu des soldats réguliers chinois se déguisant pour entrer dans nos lignes.

5. A 4 heures et demi, deux Japonais, dont un journaliste, ont été assaillis dans la concession internationale à proximité des usines de filature de soie. Ils ont été gravement blessés.

6. De nombreux réfugiés arrivant dans la concession internationale et dans la concession française, il commence à y régner une grande confusion.

7. Les communications ferroviaires sont interrompues, de même que les communications télégraphiques avec Nankin, Suchow, etc. Les communications téléphoniques à l'intérieur de la ville sont difficiles.

8. Les membres du Consulat japonais, dont les demeures sont pour la plupart dans la zone des combats actuels, se sont réfugiés à l'intérieur de la Concession.

9. Une rumeur avait couru qu'une bombe lancée par un avion japonais était tombée dans la concession française. Il a été établi qu'il s'agissait d'un canon anti-aérien tiré par les Chinois.

10. Pendant la nuit du 29 des groupes de soldats déguisés, armés de revolvers, sont apparus à une quarantaine d'endroits et ont attaqué, notamment, le Consulat général japonais et le marché de Woosung Road.

11. Le 29 vers 22 heures, un individu a tiré deux coups de revolver dans la demeure du ministre du Japon située dans la concession française. Il n'a pu être appréhendé malgré les efforts des agents de police français et japonais.

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III.

1. Shanghai, le 30 janvier. Une réunion aura lieu le 31 janvier à 10 heures en vue de conclure un accord pour la suspension des hostilités. Du côté chinois, le général commandant la 19ème armée et le Maire de ville de Shanghai, de notre côté, l'amiral commandant les forces navales japonaises et le Consul du Japon, prendront part aux pourparlers.

2. Le 30 janvier, le Consul du Japon à Nankin a demandé au Gouvernement de Nankin, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, de donner aux forces chinoises des ordres stricts de ne pas se livrer à des mesures hostiles contre les forces japonaises, afin d'éviter un conflit.

3. Violant l'accord intervenu pour la suspension des hostilités, les forces chinoises, rassemblées à la gare du Nord, ont soudain attaqué nos lignes le 31 janvier à 1 h.20 et à 4 h.40 du matin. Les volontaires anglais qui défendent la région à l'ouest de la North Honan Road sont également aux prises avec les troupes chinoises.

Nos avions survolent de nouveau les positions chinoises.

4. A la suite des pourparlers engagés à 10 heures entre les autorités japonaises et chinoises, il a été décidé que les forces japonaises se retireraient aux positions sur lesquelles elles se trouvaient avant les combats actuels (soit sur la limite de l'Extension de la Concession).

Par contre, les forces chinoises se retireront de leurs positions actuelles et la zone intermédiaire sera occupée par des forces d'autres puissances.

Une nouvelle conférence doit avoir lieu à 3 heures, avec le concours des autres commandants des forces étrangères.

31.1.32. 14.30

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IV.

DECLARATION DU GOUVERNEMENT JAPONAIS, EN DATE DU
29 JANVIER 1932

I. Le Gouvernement japonais, par son memorandum en date du 9 octobre de l'année dernière, a attiré l'attention du Gouvernement nationaliste chinois sur le fait que la violente agitation anti-japonaise, menée sous la direction directe et indirecte du parti nationaliste chinois, dont les pouvoirs ne peuvent ni du point de vue de l'organisation, ni en fait, être distingués du Gouvernement chinois, constitue, bien que sans avoir recours à des mesures belliqueuses, des actes caractérisés d'hostilité ayant pour but la poursuite d'une politique nationale.

Il a demandé au Gouvernement chinois de réprimer l'activité des diverses associations anti-japonaises dirigées par les sections dudit parti et par les municipalités et aussi de réprimer les mouvements anti-japonais et de prendre les mesures nécessaires et efficaces pour assurer la protection de la vie, des biens et des intérêts des ressortissants japonais. Par la suite, il a, à de nombreuses reprises, réitéré ces demandes aux autorités centrales et locales chinoises en attirant sur ce point leur profonde attention.

2. Or, le Gouvernement chinois n'a témoigné aucun désir sincère de répondre aux demandes sus-exprimées du Gouvernement Impérial et il a été jusqu'à soutenir que les actes illégaux des autorités et de la population chinoise contre le Japon et les Japonais étaient une expression du sentiment patriotique chinois. Au contraire, il a, par cette attitude, encouragé l'agitation anti-japonaise qui est devenue de plus en plus violente et a eu pour suite le meurtre des ressortissants japonais à Canton, Tsingtao, Fuchow, etc.. ainsi que des insultes aux fonctionnaires du Gouvernement japonais. La presse chinoise s'est même permise de manquer gravement de respect envers notre Maison Impériale.

3. L'agitation menée à Shanghai par l'association centrale anti-japonaise et d'autres organismes anti-japonais a été particulièrement violente. Récemment, l'affaire de l'article de l'organe du parti nationaliste et l'attentat contre les religieux japonais avaient amené une grave tension.

Le Consul général du Japon avait adressé aux autorités chinoises des demandes comportant, notamment, la répression des actes anti-japonais. Bien que ces demandes aient été équitables et appropriées, les autorités chinoises ont fait longtemps attendre leur réponse, tout en rassemblant des troupes autour de Shanghai. Cette attitude extrêmement menaçante a créé une vive émotion parmi nos ressortissants.

4. Pourtant les autorités chinoises finirent par accepter nos demandes, le 28 janvier à 3 heures. Notre longue connaissance de la manière d'agir des Chinois nous commandait cependant de surveiller la manière dont les autorités chinoises exécuteraient leurs engagements. Des mesures de protection devaient également être prises à l'égard des éléments indésirables dont l'activité avait été constatée. Le Conseil municipal, de son côté, en considération de l'attitude indisciplinée des troupes chinoises se trouvant à proximité de la Concession internationale, avait établi l'état de siège à 4 heures du même jour.

30.1.32.19.

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En conséquence, les diverses forces étrangères ont pris leurs positions selon les mesures de protection arrêtées en commun. Nos marins ont commencé à occuper les positions qui leur avaient été assignées de chaque côté de la North Szechuan Road, le 28 janvier à minuit. Ils furent soudain l'objet d'une agression des forces régulières chinoises contre laquelle ils se virent contraints de se défendre. Nos autorités sont actuellement en pourparlers pour obtenir le retrait des troupes chinoises des quartiers où résident nos ressortissants.

5. L'action de nos forces navales a pour unique but, de même que l'action à laquelle les diverses Puissances ont souvent eu à recourir dans cette région, la protection de la vie et des biens de nos ressortissants, ainsi que de nos droits et intérêts. Le nombre des fusiliers marins japonais stationnés à Shanghai était de beaucoup inférieur aux forces maintenues par la Grande-Bretagne, les Etats-Unis, la France etc....et nous n'avons fait que les renforcer en vue des événements actuels.

Nous sommes décidés à agir en accord avec les Puissances et nos autorités sur place maintiennent des relations étroites avec les autorités consulaires des autres pays, avec le Conseil municipal de la Concession internationale et avec les forces militaires étrangères. Il est superflu de dire que nous n'avons dans la région de Shanghai aucune ambition politique, aucune intention de porter la moindre atteinte aux droits et aux intérêts des Puissances.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.154.M.67.1932.VII.
Geneva, February 28, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

The Secretary-General has the honour to forward to the Council the following communications he has just received from the Japanese Delegation.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of Official Telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation

January 28th, 1932, 4 p.m.

The Mayor of the Chinese town at Shanghai gave the order to dissolve the anti-Japanese association on January 28th. The order to this effect addressed to the police forces says notably that although the anti-Japanese associations had been formed with a patriotic object their activities had not always been conducted with sufficient moderation, and numerous complaints had been made to the Mayor by popular groups in the town.

In a communication to the Chinese Press, the Mayor stated that he could not allow illegal activities even by patriotic associations. Since their foundation, however, the anti-Japanese associations had formed an organisation outside the law, had caused numerous incidents by seizing goods and imprisoning private individuals, and had inflicted penalties like veritable tribunals. Numerous complaints had been addressed to the Mayor by the Chamber of Commerce and groups of traders as a result of repeated destructions or confiscations of goods. In conclusion, the Mayor recommended the population not to disturb order.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of Official Telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation

on January 29th, 1932, at 2 p.m.

1. On January 27th the Commanders of the foreign forces assigned the zones of protection as follows:

-2-

- (a) Japan: the district to the east of the North Kiangsi Road; and to the North of the Soochow Road as far as Yantsepo.
- (b) Volunteers: the Old Concession (From the Bund to the Racecourse.
- (c) United States: the Macao Road as far as Kiaochow Road.
- (d) Great Britain: Kiaochow Road as far as Jessfield.
- (e) France: French Concession.

The Consuls-General of Great Britain and America advised their nationals living outside the Concession to return to the latter. The Municipal Council ordered the calling up of the volunteer forces.

2. As a result of the communication of the Japanese Consul-General asking the Chinese Mayor for a reply to his note of protest before 6 p.m. on the 28th, the Chinese took refuge en masse in the Concession. On the 28th there was accordingly great confusion in the direction of the North Szechuan Road and Dixie Road, where there are about 6,000 Japanese. Meanwhile agitators and disguised soldiers had mingled with the crowd (several were discovered and arrested); and it was learned that the Chinese troops were advancing along the Woosung Railway and were raising fresh barricades in the vicinity of the Japanese quarters. At 4 o'clock the Municipal Council proclaimed a state of siege. At nightfall the Chinese police of the Japanese quarters abandoned their posts.

3. In view of the critical situation in which our nationals were thus placed, the Commander of the naval forces declared his intention of providing for their protection by establishing posts of marines, and notified the Chinese authorities of this intention. He applied in the zone indicated by the Municipal Council the state of siege which the latter had proclaimed, and ordered the marines to take up the positions which had been assigned to them to protect the Chapei quarter.

4. While the marines were proceeding to the stations assigned to them, the Chinese regular forces approached and attacked them. Towards 10 o'clock disguised Chinese soldiers had already begun to create disorder within the zone of protection and street fighting had begun.

The Consul-General immediately informed the Chinese authorities that our forces had no intention of advancing north of the railway line, and asked that the Chinese regular troops should withdraw from Chapei and cease attacking our forces.

-3-

The Chinese demanded that our marines should withdraw from the Chinese quarters. At the same time offensive measures were taken by the Chinese troops and by an armoured train which had been brought to the Northern Station.

5. At 11.40 p.m. the Chinese troops appeared behind the headquarters of the marines near the Woosung Railway station, where several days before the Chinese had set up barricades of barbed wire and sand-bags, and attacked the Japanese soldiers. The state of disorder increasing in the neighbourhood of the North Szechuan Road, and the post of marines stationed at the Japanese school having been attacked, reinforcements were sent shortly before midnight. They are occupying the Chinese quarters along the North Szechuan Road.

SHANGHAI INCIDENT.

Official Telegram received by the Japanese

Delegation, January 30th, 1932, 6.30 p.m.

Our Consul has asked the United States Consul-General to intervene in order to induce the Chinese to remove the offensive and defensive works they had constructed and to stop the more and more threatening concentration of their troops, who continue to arrive since yesterday evening, particularly from the direction of Nanking. This concentration of hostile forces might have the most regrettable consequences.

DECLARATION OF THE JAPANESE CONSUL GENERAL AT SHANGHAI.

It is true that the Mayor of Greater Shanghai conceded late on January 28th to all demands contained in my note of January 20th and we were anxiously watching for the development in view of various rumours and questionable ability of the local Chinese authorities to control the situation particularly the undisciplined soldiers and dissatisfied elements. By four o'clock, the Shanghai Municipal Council declared a state of emergency. Meanwhile, the excited refugees, most of whom were Chinese, poured into the settlement from all directions. The rumour of surreptitious entry of the plainclothed corps gained wide circulation. To make the situation from bad to worse all the Chinese constables fled from the Chapel district, where about 7000 Japanese reside. The excitement of the populace grew to feverpoint. As an emergency measure of protecting the Japanese lives and property in Chapel, a Japanese landing force was despatched in accordance with a previous arrangement with authorities of the municipality and British, American, and other forces and in conformity with former precedents of similar cases. The territory in question is a strip of land in Chapel, on the east side of the Shanghai Woosung Railway which, by the above named agreement, was assigned to the Japanese. No sooner had the Japanese landing force appeared on the emergency duty near its headquarters than the Chinese soldiers in plain clothes attacked them with hand grenades in the neighbourhood of the Shanghai-Woosung railway. This attack served as a signal for the Chinese regulars to open fire on the Japanese force, whereupon the latter was forced to return fire. At about the same time these disguised outlaws commenced shooting at the Japanese at random, in the area mentioned above. They have already claimed a number of Japanese lives in the same area. I made it a special point to ask Mr. Yui, Secretary general of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai to withdraw the Chinese troops from the section in question, when I received the Mayor's reply yesterday to which he gave his ready assent and assured me that it would be done. Had the Mayor been able to bring the military to co-ordinate speedily with him, we might have averted the unfortunate incident. I am demanding again for an immediate withdrawal in view of what took place and is now taking place. If the Chinese authorities are unable to stop the assault and complete the withdrawal from that section, I see no other alternative but to enforce it by force. I should like to make it clear that this clash is to be distinguished from the question contained in my note of January 20th, which was solved for the time being. At any rate, I would also like to point out that the wild story about the Japanese attack on the Woosung Fort is groundless. This Chapel incident is entirely a matter of self-defence in emergency in an effort to protect that Japanese life and property and indeed those of other nationals, included Chinese themselves. I am hoping for a speedy co-operation of the Chinese side to avoid any further conflict or sacrifices and to that end to withdraw its troops.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

C.155.M.68.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 1st 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council, at the request of the Japanese Delegation, the following communication dated January 30th, 1932, which he has just received.

GENEVA, January 30th, 1932.

JAPANESE DELEGATION
TO THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

To the Secretary-General:

With reference to the agreement regarding the suspension of hostilities, which I had the pleasure of communicating to you yesterday, I have the honour to inform you that I have now received a telegram stating that hostilities were suspended as from 8 p.m. on January 29th.

At 6.20 a.m. next day, however, the Chinese suddenly opened fire with a considerable number of field guns which they had concentrated near the North Station. In consequence of this treacherous attack, our troops fell back from the positions where they were stationed, and the United States and British Consuls and the Mayor of the Chinese City were notified of the Chinese breach of the agreement. The Commander of the Japanese forces intimated that unless the Chinese attack was stopped he would be obliged to counter-attack.

The Chinese are continuing to collect troops, and a Reuter telegram states that 40 aeroplanes have been despatched urgently from Chenchow to Nanking.

I would request you to bring to the notice of the President and Members of the Council this latest breach of their engagements by the Chinese and this new provocative measure on their part, and I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) S. SATO

Representative of Japan
on the Council of the League
of Nations.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.156.M.69.1932.VII.

Geneva,

February 1st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour
to transmit to the Council the following
telegram, dated February 1st, 1932, which
he has received from the Chinese Govern-
ment.

RANKING.

1st February, 4 o'clock.

Information having reached me that press reports
are current abroad to effect that Chinese Government is
preparing to declare war upon Japan I hasten state
categorically that such reports are entirely groundless
China has not declared war upon Japan but is only exer-
cising right of self-preservation which is inherent in
sovereignty of Chinese State. While Japan is relent-
lessly pursuing her policy of violence and aggression
China faithfully adheres to obligations she has assumed
under League Covenant Paris Peace Pact and Nine Power
Treaty in face of persistent and merciless attack
Chinese Government has been compelled adopt necessary
measures of self-defence. So long as Japanese forces
refrain from acts of violence and aggression against
China Chinese Government will not take any actions
hostile to them

LO WEN KAN

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Republic of China

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

C.157.M.70.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 1st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication which he has just received.

Ref./190.

TEXT OF A RELEGRAM RECEIVED BY THE CHINESE
DELEGATION FROM NANKING, DATED JANUARY 31, 1932.

1. General Ting Chiao, the Commander of the railway guards of the Chinese Eastern Railway, reported that on January 28th, Japanese troops occupied Kuan-chen-tze Station (north of Changchun Station) of the Chinese Eastern Railway, arrested the station master, shot some members of the staff, detained wagons and passenger cars and commandeered trains for the transportation of Japanese troops.

One troop train, loaded with one thousand Japanese soldiers with Harbin as destination, was derailed halfway to Harbin.

The Chinese forces, organized by General Ting Chiao, are maintaining order in Harbin. The situation in that city is calm, but Japanese aeroplanes have recently dropped many bombs in the neighbourhood of the city.

2. Regarding the assertion of Mr. Sato, the Japanese Delegate, that the landing of Japanese marines and the measures taken by the Japanese forces at Shanghai were the result of arrangements with the commanders of the other foreign contingents at Shanghai, the Chinese authorities at Shanghai reported as follows: the International Settlement Defence Conference, in which the Settlement authorities and the British, American and French Commanders took part, demarcated areas for defence by the different contingents, but the result was not announced and not communicated to the Chinese authorities. The Japanese Consul claimed that the Conference designated the area east of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway to the Japanese troops, but the Conference could not have entrusted to the Japanese the defence of an area like Chapei, which is situated outside the International Settlement.

Commander Tai of the Shanghai garrison force reported that the district in the International Settlement south of the Soochow Creek in the western district was usually patrolled by the British and American troops, and, since the proclamation of the state of emergency, it had also been patrolled by the British troops. But, since the afternoon of the 20th, the defence of that district was taken over by the Japanese forces, without the previous consent of the Settlement authorities.

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3. According to a report received on the night of the 30th from the Chinese Municipal Government of Shanghai, Japanese planes kept on bombing Chapei, the North Railway Station, factories, shops and residences near by. The streets were strewn with corpses. Japanese plain-clothes men set fire to Chinese residences along the North Szechuen Road. The No. 6. police station at Chacchiatu (Jessfield), another police station at Lampson Road very near Chanju, where the International Wireless Station is situated, and Chinan University have been occupied by the Japanese forces.

Another report from the Shanghai garrison headquarters says that heavy fighting is raging at Boone Road in the International Settlement. Japanese civilians fired over the North Szechuen Road from the American line into the Chinese area, and killed two Chinese civilians in the American area and many in the Chinese area. It is reported also that five more Japanese warships carrying marines and over forty aeroplanes have arrived in Shanghai.

All banks in the International Settlement, the French Concession and the Chinese city remain closed.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and
the Members of the League.

C.158.M.71.1932.VII.

GENEVA, February 1st, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication dated January 29th, 1932.

EVENTS AT HARBIN.

Summary of official telegrams received
from the Japanese Delegation.

1) The elements hostile to the Kirin Provincial Government occupied Fuchiatién (the northern part of Harbin) on the morning of the 26th and brought all communications to a standstill. Disturbances are feared as the result of collisions between the opposing Chinese forces. The police of the Japanese Consulate and volunteers are endeavouring to ensure the safety of our nationals. The Chinese have given an assurance that order will not, in any case, be disturbed.

2) In view of this situation, the Japanese Consulate has advised Japanese and Koreans in Fuchiatién and the neighbourhood to take refuge in Harbin. On the afternoon of January 27th, Chinese soldiers fired on a motor coach which was removing Koreans; one Japanese and three Koreans were killed. Some 10 Koreans were taken to the Chinese headquarters and two were shot there. Another Korean who was walking to Harbin was seriously wounded by Chinese soldiers.

3) At about 8 p.m., the offices of the newspaper "Taihoku Shimpō" and a Korean clinic were looted by about 100 cavalrmen wearing armlets with the inscription "First Home Defence Army". Other Korean houses were also looted.

4) On the 28th, fighting, which was visible from the Japanese Consulate, took place between the Chinese forces at Fuchiatién and confusion reigned at Harbin. Communications with Changchun were interrupted.

5) In view of the critical turn of events in the neighbourhood of Harbin where there are about 5,600 Japanese nationals, a detachment of troops left Changchun for Harbin on January 28th, but had not yet arrived by the following day, owing to the refusal of the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway to convey them. The track seems to have been cut at several points, and the railway officials are apparently in flight.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to
the Council and
Members of the
League.

C.159.M.72.1932.VII.

Geneva,

February 1st, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication, dated February 1st:

To the Secretary-General.

I have just received a telegram informing me that, despite the efforts made by our authorities, with the co-operation of the foreign Consuls in Shanghai, the Chinese have not ceased the attacks they have been making constituting breach of the agreement reached with a view to a suspension of hostilities, as I had the honour to inform you in my previous communications.

Since yesterday, the Chinese forces have intensified their enveloping movement directed against the headquarters of our landing troops. The activity of the disguised soldiers is continually growing.

Last night at about 11 p.m. the Chinese opened a fresh bombardment, and shells from the Chinese guns fell around our flagship, which is anchored in the river. In view of these developments, our authorities made further representations to the British and United States Consuls and to the Municipalities of the International Concession and the French Concession, and the Chinese Mayor, with a view to the Chinese offensive movements being brought to a standstill. The Commander of the Japanese naval forces informed them that unless the Chinese action was stopped, he himself would be obliged to take the offensive.

I beg to call your attention to this fresh breach of their engagements by the Chinese, following upon the original attack by their regular troops, which was the cause of the present unfortunate incidents.

(Sgd.) S. SATO.

Representative of Japan
on the Council of the League of Nations.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.160.M.73.1932.VII.
Geneva, February 1st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication by the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to forward to the Council the following communication he has just received from the Japanese Delegation.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of Official Telegrams Received by the Japanese
Delegation.

(Translation).

January 31st.

1. During the morning troops of the Chinese 19th Army were transported from the Chinese town towards the station. Large quantities of ammunition were also transported.

2. At 8.40 a.m. three Chinese field-gun shells burst in Range Road in the Concession. At 10.30 the Chinese troops opened fire in the vicinity of the Japanese elementary school (North Szechuan Road) and attacked the headquarters of the marines, killing two Japanese sentries; they were repulsed by our forces. Great confusion reigns in the town. Chinese sharpshooters are continuing to operate in the quarters of the Concession in which the Japanese reside.

3. At the meeting which took place at 3 o'clock in the presence of General Fleming, commander of the international troops, the latter stated that it would be difficult to arrange for the occupation of the neutral zone between the Chinese and Japanese forces by soldiers of a third Power. He proposed that the Japanese troops should withdraw within the Concession and that foreign troops should take their place in the zone thus evacuated.

The Chinese commander accepted this proposal, but the Japanese commander pointed out that in ordinary times such a measure would perhaps be practicable, but that in the present situation it would be equivalent to ordering the evacuation of this zone by all the Japanese. This in no way implied a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the protection of the foreign troops, but was due to quite special circumstances.

General Fleming requested the Japanese authorities to ask for instructions from their Government, to which the latter willingly agreed, while repeating their opinion that these measures would be impracticable.

In the case of an unfavourable reply the Chinese were also to refer to the central authorities; until the arrival of a reply hostilities were to be suspended.

The Chinese asked as a condition of this suspension of hostilities for a promise to cease aerial bombardments, for the removal of the Japanese guns and for the cessation of the despatch of reinforcements. The Japanese commander was unable to acquiesce in these requests, but he stated that no offensive action would be taken by the Japanese troops if no attack was made by the Chinese.

Translation.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Distributed to the Council
and to Members of the League.

C.161.M.74.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 1st, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Incidents at Shanghai.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit
to the Council the following communication dated February 1st,
1932, which he has received from the Japanese delegation.

To the
Secretary-General.

Geneva, February 1st, 1932.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith the translation of a telegram which I have just received from Tokio, with instructions to bring it to the special notice of Members of the Council.

It relates to an interview which the Minister for Foreign Affairs had on January 31st with the Ambassadors of Great Britain, the United States and France, at which he supplied them with information concerning the origin and development of the present incidents at Shanghai.

In the light of the facts set forth by the Minister, it is quite clear that, as I had the honour to explain to the Council, the action which the Japanese forces were obliged to resort to at Shanghai was the outcome of an attack by the Chinese, followed by repeated violations of the agreements concluded through representatives of third Powers.

I should be grateful if you would be good enough to communicate this letter and the translation of the telegram in question to the President and Members of the Council, and have the honour, etc.

(Signed) S. SATO

Representative of Japan on the
Council of the League of Nations.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Official telegram received by the Japanese Delegation.

On January 31st, the Minister for Foreign Affairs received the Ambassadors of Great Britain, the United States and France with a view to informing them as to the present serious situation in Shanghai. He drew the attention of the foreign powers to the facts and asked for their friendly consideration of the same. He submitted to the ambassadors the following considerations.

1. The Japanese Consul-General and the Officer commanding the Naval Forces at Shanghai have always been at pains to maintain close collaboration with the representatives of the other Powers. On January 21st, for example, the points which we submitted to the Mayor of Greater Shanghai included a demand for the suppression of the anti-Japanese agitation. On January 25th, after a meeting of the members of the Municipal Council who are nationals of third Powers, the Council unanimously decided to give orders for closing the office of the Chinese Nationalist Party organ at Shanghai and the headquarters of the Anti-Japanese Association. On January 26th, the Council proceeded to close the office of the newspaper. As regards the headquarters of the Anti-Japanese Association, it decided to co-operate with Japan in the event of the latter taking action in this connection. At the same time, our authorities informed the Municipal Council of the steps which we considered necessary to this end and our Naval authorities came to an understanding with the Municipal Council police in regard to the details of the action to be taken. On January 27th, our Consul-General and the members of the Consulate gave the Consuls-General of Great Britain, the United States and France detailed explanations of our position and of the steps taken by us. On the same day the officers in command of the various foreign forces adopted a common defence scheme.

2. The question has been raised why hostilities broke out in spite of the acceptance by the mayor of Shanghai of our demands. The two things are entirely distinct. When the mayor of Shanghai informed us at 3 p.m. on January 28th that all our demands were accepted, the Japanese Consul-General and the officer commanding the naval forces expressed their satisfaction, and were preparing to supervise the execution of the conditions accepted. At this moment large crowds assembled in the neighbourhood of the town hall. Alarming rumours spread and created a dangerous state of feeling. The Chinese police forces in the district of Chapel deserted their posts. In the face of this disquieting situation the Municipal Council declared a state of siege at 4 p.m. When our marines set about taking up their defence posts in the zone assigned to them by agreement between the officers commanding the foreign forces, the Chinese suddenly opened fire on them. Our forces were thus compelled to reply and conflicts occurred. These incidents therefore have nothing to do with the acceptance of our demands by the mayor of the city.

We have not in any sense made use of the international concession as a basis for attack on the Chinese. Our forces were taking up their posts in the zone assigned to them when they were attacked by the Chinese and replied.

-2-

An arrangement was made through the agency of the Consuls-General of Great Britain and the United States for the cessation of the fighting between our troops and the Chinese forces and groups of soldiers in disguise after 8 p.m. on January 29th. But the Chinese broke this agreement and opened fire on our forces in the morning of January 30th from an armoured train, a number of shells falling in the districts inhabited by the Japanese within the concession.

At the same time Marshal Chiang-Kai-Shek was bringing up the 19th Army and the Third Defence Division to the neighbourhood of Shanghai. The concentration of these troops was to be concluded on January 31st. 40 aeroplanes had been sent from Honan to Nankin and Suchow. We were also informed that other forces had been sent from Honan, and that the Chinese had decided to open a general offensive as soon as the concentration of their troops was complete.

This attitude is in clear contradiction to the representations made by the Chinese to the League of Nations. For our part we are anxious that the Chinese Army should suspend its attack and withdraw from zones in which its presence constitutes the most serious threat to us.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs accordingly asked the Ambassadors of the three Powers to invite their Governments to give instructions to their several representatives in Shanghai with a view to inducing the Chinese to cease hostilities and withdraw their troops.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.162.M.75.1932.VII.
Geneva, February 2nd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

INCIDENTS IN SHANGHAI.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council, at the Chinese Delegation's request, the following communication, dated February 1st, 1932.

Ref./192.

Geneva, February 1, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that, in connection with point 2 of my communication of to-day (Ref. 190 - Document C.157.M.70.1932.VII), I have further received the following telegram from my Government:

"Mr. Wu Tieh-chen, the Mayor of the Shanghai Municipality, reported that, on the 30th of January, when a conference was held in the office of the British Consul-General, the Japanese Consul-General in the presence of the British and American Consuls-General admitted that the penetration of the Japanese troops into the Chinese district had not been in conformity with the original decision reached at the International Settlement Defence Conference, but was an action taken under the initiative of the Japanese troops for the protection of their nationals, and that Japan would bear the whole responsibility. This proves conclusively that the Japanese Delegate's assertion at the Council Meeting that the landing of Japanese marines and the measures taken by the Japanese forces at Shanghai were the result of previous arrangements with the other foreign contingent commanders was without the least foundation."

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and to the Members of
the League of Nations.

C.163. M.76. 1932. VII.

Geneva, February 2nd, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General

At the request of the Japanese Delegation the
Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council
the following communication dated February 2nd :

Summary of Official Telegrams received by
the Japanese Delegation.

1. On February 1st at 11 p.m. the guns of the Shih Tzutsi forts at Nanking fired three rounds. At the same time Chinese soldiers suddenly attacked the detachment of Japanese sailors on sentry duty on the pontoon of the Nisshin Navigation Company. The detachment having asked for assistance our vessels were given the alarm and a series of rounds were fired by the "Tsu-hima" (8 rounds) and by the "Tenryu" (2 rounds) slightly astern of the pontoon. Firing stopped at 11.15. At fifty minutes after midnight the detachment of sentries were brought back on board whereas the vessel in which the Japanese have taken refuge was moved three miles upstream.

2. The Japanese Government has ordered its Consul General at Shanghai to make every endeavour to persuade the foreign Officers Commanding to hasten the conclusion of an agreement concerning the suspension of hostilities, according to the plan which the Japanese and Chinese Commanding Officers had primarily drawn up, i.e. that foreign troops should take up positions in the space intervening between the two forces which are facete face.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.165.M.78.1232.VII.

Communicated to
the Council and
members of the
League.

Geneva,

February 3rd, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication, dated February 2nd.

Ref./193.

Geneva, February 2nd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that, with reference to the Japanese Delegate's remark at the Council Meeting this afternoon in answer to the British Delegate's statement regarding the bombarding of Nanking by the Japanese war vessels, I have just received a telegram dated to-day from my Government to the following effect:

- "1. On February 1st soon after 11 P.M., the Japanese warships anchoring at Haikwan (Fort of Nanking) suddenly fired eight shots at and directed their search-lights on Sze-tashan (Lion Hill), Nanking Railway Station, Teichikuo (Temple Hill, where the National Observatory is situated), Taingling Hill and Mofu Hill. Simultaneously, they started machine-gun and rifle firing. The firing ceased after midnight. In order not to precipitate another conflict, our troops did not return the fire. Japan showed an utter disregard to the Council Resolutions, Nine-Power Treaty and the Paris Pact, when the Japanese troops attacked Shanghai. While our people were still at the height of indignation, they launched another attack on our National Capital. It is manifest that the Japanese are bent on further aggravation of the present situation. We have already lodged a strong protest with the Japanese Government, reserving the right to demand suitable reparation later, and are instructing all legations abroad to make representations with the respective governments to which they are accredited.

-2-

"2. A Japanese aide-memoire has just been received stating that the bombardment of Nanking was necessitated by the fact that our forces started to fire upon them first, etc. We have already refuted this allegation, as according to the report of the fort authorities at Szetseshan (Lion Hill), during the bombardment of Nanking by the Japanese war vessels, the fort did not even return fire as they had received no orders to do so. This proves conclusively the groundlessness of the Japanese assertion that we commenced firing upon them first."

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.166.M.79.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 3rd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the Japanese delegation's request the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication dated February 3rd, 1932.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese delegation.

I The activities of snipers in the Japanese zone of protection are continuing. On the 29th alone, 46 persons were wounded by them. On the 31st two Japanese civilians were killed and four seriously wounded. In the night of January 31st to February 1st there were numerous cases of pillage by Chinese soldiers, who at 11 o'clock on February 1st set fire to several Japanese houses. On the same date a Japanese was shot with a revolver. During the day of February 1st other cases of murder and pillage were reported. Measures to put a stop to the activities of snipers are being studied with the Municipal Council.

II On January 31st towards midnight, the Chinese again opened fire. A shell fell near the Consulate and another destroyed the principal building of the Hongwanji temple.

III On February 1st at half-past two the Chinese forces opened general fire in the vicinity of the Yokohama Road.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.167.M.80.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 3rd, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication dated February 3rd, 1932.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese delegation.

1. On February 3rd, at 11 a.m., the destroyers "Nire", "Kaki" and "Kuri", leaving Shanghai to regain their base at Sasebo, came under shell and machine-gun fire from the Woosung forts at the confluence of the Yangtze and the Wangpoo. These forts command the entrance to the Shanghai river and can hold up all traffic.

The three ships attacked replied, but as the Chinese fire continued, the admiral commanding our naval forces decided to silence the forts. He notified the authorities concerned, namely the foreign representatives at Shanghai, the commander-in-chief of the foreign forces, municipal and port authorities, etc. A flight of naval air-craft and several Japanese ships accordingly opened fire on the forts, which ceased fire at 1.50 p.m. The forts on the opposite bank were silenced at 4.30 p.m.

2. As it had proved impossible to establish a feasible plan for the interposition of foreign forces between the Chinese and Japanese forces, and as the repeated Chinese violations of the previous agreements for a truce (shelling with field gun and rifle fire) were continuing, the Japanese Consul-General made fresh representations to the Chinese mayor requesting that the Chinese should cease these attacks and withdraw their troops who were concentrated near the quarters in which Japanese are resident.

- 2 -

3. In consequence of conversations between the representatives of the Powers, the commander of the naval forces decided to withdraw the posts placed forward of the Japanese protection zone to guard various Japanese buildings. The commander of the international forces undertook to protect the Japanese outside the zone in question, especially those who were still in the spinning works. The Japanese posts are to be withdrawn on the 4th.

N.B. There are at present nearly 30,000 Japanese residents in Shanghai, almost all of whom live in the eastern part of the Concession and in the Extension along the North Szechuan Road, on the near side of the Shanghai-Woosung railway line and to the west of the Chinese quarter of Chapei, where the Chinese troops are concentrated. Some factories, the Japanese school and the naval headquarters are also situated in this area.

The Chinese forces that have been brought up close to the Japanese quarters numbered 30,000 men on January 29th, and have been steadily reinforced since then. The Japanese forces, whose duty it is to protect Japanese residents and the zone assigned by the municipality, are about 3,600 strong.

Any serious attack by the Chinese troops, whose indiscipline and threatening attitude may be seen in the constant breaches of the truce, might lead to the annihilation of the marines, who are scattered over posts covering a wide area, and to the extermination of the Japanese population, as well as to violent attacks upon the lives and property of other foreigners.

EVENTS IN NORTHERN MANCHURIA.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese delegation.

1. Following upon negotiations with the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the latter has had the damaged sections of track repaired and has placed rolling-stock at the disposal of the Japanese troops.

2. Fighting took place at dawn on January 31st between the Japanese soldiers encamped some 50 km. from Harbin and the Chinese forces. Our casualties were 12 killed and 30 wounded.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to
the Council and
Members of the
League.

C.168.M.81.1932.VII.
Geneva, February 4th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.
AND SITUATION IN MANCHURIA.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication, dated February 3rd:

Ref./194.

18, rue Charles Galland,
GENEVA.
February 3rd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate to you the following telegram, dated February 2, 1932, which has just been received by the Chinese Delegation from Hanking:

1. Mr. Wu Tiek-Chen, Mayor of the Shanghai Municipality, reported that, at the conference, at which the establishment of a neutral zone between Chinese and Japanese forces was discussed, it was first proposed that the Japanese troops should withdraw to their original positions and that the Chinese troops should withdraw to a certain distance. Later, the British and American Consuls-General proposed that the Japanese troops should be withdrawn within the International Settlement and that, pending the settlement of the dispute through diplomatic channels, the area thus evacuated should be occupied by neutral troops. The Japanese objected to such proposal, but agreed to refer the question to the Japanese Government for instructions. They agreed, however, to a three day truce.

Although the truce was accepted, the Japanese troops opened fierce attacks on Chaplin and fighting is going on at Range Road and Haining Road, both situated in the International Settlement near the Chinese district. A fight took place between Chinese and Japanese forces at Tsaochiatu (Jessfield) in the western part of Shanghai. The Municipal Council of the International Settlement has decided to abandon its defence of the district north of the Soochow Creek.

2. The Japanese are repairing a bridge north of Changchun to facilitate the transportation of their troops from Changchun to Harbin.

(Sgd.) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and to the Members of the
League.

3.169.M.62.1932.VII.

Geneva, 4th February 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication dated February 3rd.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation.

1. Shelling and rifle fire were resumed several times by the Chinese in spite of agreements for the suspension of hostilities. The bombardment which took place at 11 a.m. on January 31st. was followed at 1 p.m. on February 1st by another bombardment of the area surrounding the North Station, which lasted until 5 p.m. The Chinese are continuing to bring up reinforcements and the position of our sailors and our nationals would be extremely critical if the Chinese were to launch a general attack. It was decided to make an aeroplane reconnaissance to determine the exact position of the Chinese forces, and the Commander of the Naval forces informed the Mayor, the foreign Consuls General and the Municipality accordingly. At 10 a.m. on the 2nd, the Chinese guns again opened fire and 6 aeroplanes sent to reconnoitre were also fired at.

2. On January 3rd, about 9 a.m., the Chinese opened fire on the northern part of the North Szechuan Road with field guns and mortars. A dozen shells fell near the Japanese Girls Secondary School. Our forces began to reply with field guns at 10 a.m. During the morning and afternoon, Chinese shells fell inside the Concession, killing and wounding civilians; 2 women were seriously wounded. At 2 p.m. a flight of 4 aeroplanes succeeded in silencing the Chinese mortar batteries.

The threat from the Chinese forces is becoming more and more serious, and in view of the small strength of our forces the Japanese nationals are gravely apprehensive of a general attack on the part of the Chinese and are demanding more effective protection. The activities of snipers in civilian dress are causing great excitement among the Japanese population. As all of the available marines have been sent to the line of defence, bodies of volunteers have undertaken to maintain order and deal with the snipers. The highly excited state of popular opinion is making the situation extremely difficult.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.

Communiqué au Conseil
et aux Membres de la
Société.

C.173.M.84.1932. VII.

Genève, le 5 février 1932.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS.

Communication du Représentant de l'Italie au Conseil.

Note du Secrétaire Général.

Le Secrétaire Général a l'honneur de transmettre au
Conseil la communication suivante en date du 3 février.

Genève, le 3 février 1932.

Je crois opportun de porter à votre connaissance
que le Gouvernement Royal a pris des dispositions pour que
le croiseur "Trento" (10.000 tonnes) et le contre-torpilleur
"Espero" partent immédiatement pour l'Extrême-Orient, pour
se joindre aux forces navales qui se trouvent déjà sur place
et qui comprennent le croiseur "Libia" et les canonnières
"Caboto" et "Carlotto".

Avec lesdits navires, partiront aussi des troupes
de débarquement.

(s) GRANDI.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.173.M.84.1932. VII.

Geneva, February, 5th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Italian Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the
Council the following communication dated February 3rd.

Translation.

Geneva, February 3rd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that the Italian
Government has ordered the cruiser "Trento" (10,000 tons)
and the destroyer "Espero" to leave immediately for the Far
East to reinforce the naval forces which are already on the
spot and which consist of the cruiser "Libia" and the gun-
boats "Caboto" and "Carlotto".

These vessels will also carry a landing-party.

(Signed) GRANDI.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.177.M.85.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 5th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council
the following communication dated February 5th.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of official telegrams received
by the Japanese delegation.

1. On February 4th at 12.30 a.m. the fort of Woosung re-
opened fire on our ships. The latter immediately replied
and a flotilla bombarded the fort which immediately ceased
fire. The commanders of two of our destroyers were
wounded during the combat.
2. On the 4th at dawn the Chinese forces at Chapei made
a fresh attack. The Japanese marines made a
general counter-attack supported by two aeroplanes. At
1.15 p.m. the Japanese right wing had reached Yokohama
creek and taken several trench mortar batteries. The
extreme right reached the Japanese cemetery.

4-2-1932.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.178.M.86.1932.VII

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

GENEVA, February 5th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Representative of China
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The following telegram, dated February 5th, from the Chinese
Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai, is circulated at the request of the
Chinese Representative, for the information of the Council.

"Agreeing to suspension of hostilities but not
warlike preparations, Japan rushes reinforcements,
bombards Shanghai and Liuhc and is determined to
crush China before negotiations begin. If such acts
were not crushed, China would be paralyzed for years.
China has expressed readiness to accept the Four Power
peace proposals."

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and to Members of the
League.

C.180.M.87.1932.VII.
Geneva, February 5th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following telegram, dated February 4th, and communicated by the Chinese Delegation on February 5th.

"The Commander of the Woosung Fortress reported that four Japanese gunboats assisted by over ten aeroplanes bombarded the Eastern Forts yesterday morning. For self-defence we returned fire and severe fighting ensued for two hours beginning from 10.05 a.m. Japanese planes also reconnoitered and bombed Chapel thus breaking the truce agreement."

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.191.M.86.1932.VII.

Geneva,

February 6th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour
to transmit to the Council the following
dated February 4th, 1932, which he has
received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./195

16 rue Charles Galland,

Geneva.

February 4th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General,

I have the honour to enclose copy of a telegram
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking, referring
to the proposals made to the Chinese Government by the
American Government, through Minister Johnson, for the
cessation of all acts of violence and the terms in con-
nection therewith. According to the same telegram the
Chinese Government has accepted the proposal.

In communicating the telegram to you I have the
honour to request that you circulate the same among the
Members of the Council.

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

Ref./195.

- 2 -

TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM WAICHIAOPU, NANKING,
DATED FEBRUARY 3, 1932.

We have received to-day from Mr Johnson, the American Minister, a communication containing the proposal of the powers for the cessation of the conflict as follows:

1. Cessation of all acts of violence on both sides;
2. No further mobilization or preparation whatever for further hostilities between the two nations;
3. Withdrawal of both the Japanese and Chinese combatants from all points of mutual contact in the Shanghai area;
4. Protection of the International Settlement by the establishment of neutral zones to divide combatants, these zones to be policed by neutrals according to arrangements set by consular authorities;
5. Upon acceptance of these conditions, prompt advances to be made in negotiations to settle all outstanding controversies between the two nations in the spirit of the Paris Pact and the League Resolution of December tenth without prior demand or reservation and with the aid of neutral observers or participants.

We have already accepted the proposal but suggested the substitution of peace areas and third Powers for neutral zone and neutrals, which terms are objectionable to our people. We are expecting similar communications from France and Britain.

Communicated to the
Council and the Members
of the League.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.183.V.29.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 6th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communications from the Chinese
Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council
the following communications dated February 6th, which he
has received from the Chinese Delegation.

I.

Ref./198

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate herewith a
telegram, dated February 5th., which I have just received
from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai and to
request that you will be good enough to circulate the same
among the Members of the League and to the Press:

"1. In spite of the fact that the Chinese had
yielded to all the Japanese demands on January
28th, the Japanese suddenly attacked a large
Chinese section and part of the International
Settlement, mercilessly bombed non-combatants,
killing thousands, burned colleges, churches, the
Commercial Press and Library of priceless value.
The Japanese continue using the Settlement as base
for attacking Chinese. Japanese civilian gunmen

- 2 -

unite with the military in lawless aggression, contemptuous of international morality or Settlement regulations with all the ruthlessness of barbaric warfare plus free use of airplanes without declaration of war, placing lives of civilians in the gravest continual danger. They have bombarded the Woosung forts and started aerial warfare again to-day. Japan in controlling the news channels perpetrates inexcusable distortion of facts, blaming China for aggression and provocation, when Japan has actually been carrying out her fixed policy of occupation. Urge the League to avail itself of the opportunity for signal service to China and world peace.

2. The Chinese won the first aerial fight, destroying one Japanese bomber. There has been the heaviest fighting which lasted two days, the Chinese holding their position. Japanese warships blockaded Woosung; forts damaged but not lost. The Nineteenth Route Army is optimistic and determined to fight to the last man and the populace is responding with full strength. Foreign opinion is sympathetic, provoked by the Japanese using Settlement as base and enraged by atrocities on civilians."

(sgd.) W.W. YEN.

- 3 -

Ref. /199

II.

Ref./199

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate to you the following telegram, dated February 5th, which has just been received from Nanking by the Chinese Delegation:

- "1. At 9.0 a.m. on January 3rd, Japanese Troops assisted by aeroplanes shelled and bombarded Chapei, killing and wounding many Chinese civilians and soldiers and burning a great number of buildings in North Szechuen Road and Pac-Shan Road.
2. At 6.30 a.m. on January 4th, there were a British and three Japanese war vessels lying off Woosung. Shortly afterwards a reinforcement of over ten Japanese war vessels arrived and the British man-of-war left. Right after the departure of the British vessel, the Japanese bombarded the Woosung forts.
3. On the same morning, Japanese armoured cars attacked our troops in Chapei; when repulsed by us they attacked our left flank."

(Sd.) W. W. YEN.

III.

Ref./200. To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate herewith the following telegram, dated February 5th, which I have just received from Nanking and to request that you will be good enough to circulate

-4-

it among the Members of the Council.

"According to a telegraphic report from the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, dated February 3rd, the Japanese are still using the International Settlement as a base of operations for attacks on us and the said Settlement still permits the passage of Japanese troops towards the Western and other districts, thus increasing the anxiety of our troops. As regards the Japanese conducting their military operations from the International Settlement, we had on January 31st sent a note to the British and American Ministers requesting them to take immediate steps to stop the said operations by the Japanese, and we have now sent another note on the basis of the previous note, insisting on strong action being taken in the matter.

Furthermore, both in the International Settlement, in the extra-concessional area and the Chapel district, the Japanese forcibly arrested numerous Chinese civilians, a number of whom have been tortured and others murdered.


Up to date several hundreds of Chinese are still unlawfully held in prison. The Waichiao has already lodged a strong protest with the Japanese Minister.

According to another telegraphic report from the said Municipality, the Chinese banks, exchange shops and rice shops have been re-opened to-day and other shops will follow also."

(Sd.) W. W. YEN.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

File Copy ✓



Enclosure No. 6 in List No. 25

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League

C.185.11.90.1932.VII

Geneva, February 8th, 1932

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council as an element of information in the dispute between China and Japan, a first report which he has received from the Committee, on which certain members of the Council were good enough to allow their officers to serve, in regard to events occurring in Shanghai and the neighbourhood up to January 31st.

The members of the Council will observe that a further report is promised as promptly as possible.

SHANGHAI

6.2. (desp. 9.16 pm.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS GENEVA

Committee appointed by Secretary-General of the League of Nations to report on events in Shanghai and neighbourhood has established, on the basis of its own information, following first report, which may require subsequent correction in detail or amplification, and will be followed by report on subsequent events. Committee met with the cooperation of Mr. Cunningham Consul General United States.

Present Committee has been asked to report on causes, facts developments events Shanghai and neighbourhood.

Anti-Japanese boycott existing since July result of

- 2 -

Korean affairs increased by occupation Manchuria and stringently enforced, caused enormous damage to Japanese business. Boycott, fostered by the anti-Japanese Boycott Association(s) formed by various Chinese collaborating organisations, included picketing shops, seizure Japanese manufactures, fining, imprisonment of Chinese using or dealing in such goods and other illegal acts for which no redress obtainable through courts. Spirit bitter hostility was developed. Student manifestations and demand for war declaration against Japan increased Chinese feeling against Japan. In this state great tension incidents of violence frequently occurred. There was in addition derogatory references by Chinese to the Emperor of Japan which infuriated Japanese, and demands by Japanese to their Government to take direct action to put end to intolerable position became insistent.

"18th January 5 Japanese, some of them being Buddhist monks, whilst passing in front of Sanye Towel Factory in Chapei were attacked by Chinese, some of assailants being probably members of organised anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps. Chinese police arrived too late to arrest culpables. Two Japanese seriously wounded one of them, Buddhist monk dying from wounds subsequently.

On January 20th about 50 members of Japanese Youth Protection Society with knives and clubs, proceeded to Sanye Towel Factory, set building on fire and on the way home clashed with Settlement Municipal police. Three Chinese police seriously wounded, one of them dying from wounds, three Japanese shot by police, one dying from wounds.

Same day mass meeting Japanese residents held at Japanese Club protested against attack against monks and against disparaging references by the press to the Japanese Emperor. Meeting passed a resolution asking Japanese Government send war vessels and military units for complete suppression anti-Japanese movement. About half of them proceeded first to Japanese Consulate then to the naval headquarters in order to present resolution. After seeing Japanese Consul who asked them leave matter with him clashed with International Settlement police on the way to naval

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headquarters one British probation police wounded. Japanese authorities expressed regret. Seven Japanese subsequently surrendered to the Japanese authorities and were arrested by them to be tried for the offences in Nagasaki in accordance with Japanese law.

Afternoon of the same day Japanese Consul presented the Chief Secretary of the Mayor of Greater Shanghai following demands concerning events occurring 18th January.

First, formal apology by Mayor,

Second, immediate arrest culpable,

Third, payment indemnity hospital bills,

Fourth, adequate control of anti-Japanese movement,

Fifth, immediate dissolution all anti-Japanese organisations actively engaged in fostering hostile feelings and anti-Japanese riots and agitation.

During the morning of January 21st the Mayor of Greater Shanghai communicated to the Japanese Consul readiness to consider first three points but had difficulty in complying with last two. Later during the day communication from Admiral commanding Japanese naval forces published in the press, sent copies to Settlement authorities, Public Safety Bureau Greater Shanghai, stating that should the Mayor of Greater Shanghai fail to give satisfactory reply to Japanese and fulfil demands without delay Admiral was determined take necessary steps in order to protect Japanese Imperial rights interests.

On January 24th Japanese naval reinforcements arrived at Shanghai. Rumour also current Chinese troops in Chapei were being reinforced. Same day Japanese Consul communicated to Mayor that if no reply was forthcoming within reasonable time or if reply unsatisfactory Japanese Government reserved right to take action as required by circumstances. Meanwhile Mayor, who had expressed to neutrals his intention making every possible concession to avoid clashes, was trying to induce leaders of local Chinese to stop anti-Japanese boycott associations and agree to delete words "anti-Japanese" from the title other body, these words being considered by Japanese as national offence. Resulted association was closed and various offices were seized by Chinese police during the night 27/28 January.

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On January 27th Japanese Consul notified Mayor of Greater Shanghai that without fixing definite date he would expect preliminary reply by January 28th.

January 27th Japanese Consul informed Mayor that he must have satisfactory reply to demands by 6 p.m. next day failing which Japanese would take necessary steps in order to enforce them.

January 28th 7.30 a.m. Japanese Admiral notified Commanders other national defence forces he proposed to take action following morning if no satisfactory reply been received from Chinese. Municipal Council of International Settlement held meeting during the morning and decided that state of emergency should be declared as from 4 p.m. This decision was taken by the Municipal Council on their responsibility. Declaration of state of emergency is effective notice to Commanders of various national forces that they are expected to be prepared to defend their sections.

Same day early afternoon Mayor of Greater Shanghai transmitted to Japanese Consul reply accepting entirely Japanese demands. At 4 p.m. Japanese Consul informed Consular body of receipt this reply which said entirely satisfactory. He added that it remained to be seen whether Mayor would be able to enforce terms accepted but he admitted that demands had been carried out to a large extent and for the time being no action would be taken. In spite of this change in the diplomatic situation there was a popular belief that the Japanese Naval authorities were determined to take direct action in any event. Inflammatory statements were appearing Japanese press Union Bulletin to the effect that Chinese did not intend to carry out their promise and that they were preparing to attack Japanese. It was also anticipated that there might be a

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revolt amongst Chinese population against acceptance by the Mayor of the Japanese demand. These considerations made it advisable in the eyes of the Defence Committee that the State of Emergency should be nevertheless enforced as from 4 p.m.

It is to be noted that the International Settlement Defence Committee composed of garrison commanders, Chairman Shanghai Municipal Council (?) Shanghai Municipal Police and Commandant Shanghai Volunteer Corps and presided by the Senior Garrison Commander, is not considered to give orders to the various commanders as to detailed measures they are expected to take in defending their sections. It simply allots sections, helps in coordinating action taken by various commanders, and fixes main principles defence.

British and American troops started to occupy their respective sections soon after declaration State of Emergency. Italian troops occupied their section 29th January.

Japanese section consisted of whole North Eastern area of the Settlement, limited on the Western side by North Honan Road. Comprised also, from the point of view Shanghai defence Committee area outside Settlement limited on the West by North Kiangsi Road and Woosung Railway, on the North by the Northern border of Hongkew Park, on the East by a line joining roughly North East corner of Hongkew Park and Harbin Road Police Station.

Many Japanese live in the region of Hongkew Park. The park itself and North Szechwan Road, Dixwell Road, although outside Settlement are properties Shanghai Municipal Council and normally policed by it. Does not appear that the

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Chinese authorities previous to events starting at 11 p.m. had received any communication about this outside Japanese section. Japanese made no attempt to occupy extra Settlement Section when state of emergency came into force, but it must be understood that Japanese marines have always maintained posts along above mentioned Municipal road in this area for the protection of their nationals and their naval headquarters are situated towards the end of this salient.

11 p.m. Japanese admiral issued two proclamations copies of which were served on the Mayor who declared he had received them at 11.15 p.m. One of these referred to State of emergency and said Imperial Navy, feeling very anxious regarding situation in Chapel, where Japanese nationals lived in large numbers, decided to send troops to this section for the enforcement of law and order in the area. Under the circumstances he hoped Chinese authorities would speedily withdraw Chinese troops stationed at Chapel to the West of railway and remove all hostile defense in that area. Other proclamations stated that in the area given to Japanese in order to preserve order in the Settlements any action considered necessary for the proper execution of duties involved in State of Emergency would be taken.

Japanese marine and armed civilians having mobilised (one word undecipherable)
/at naval headquarters forces advanced along North Szechwan Road, dropping parties at entrances to alley ways as they went along, and at midnight at a given signal all these parties advanced Westwards and Northwards in the direction of railway. The final party of about 100 marines, accompanied by armoured cars, attempted to pass through gates dividing Settlement from Chinese territory at the end of Henan Road but were prevented by Shanghai volunteer corps in whose section gate situated. This gate leads to railway station.

Chinese military authorities had not complied with Japanese admiral's demands to withdraw their troops.

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Would appear moreover even had they decided to comply with this demand, would have been impossible in short time at their disposal to arrange for the actual withdrawal of Chinese troops in that area. One should take into account also tension created by situation of previous days which would induce Chinese authorities to interpret measures taken by Japanese naval authorities as representing part of larger military operations. Japanese marines consequently met with resistance on the part of Chinese regular troops. They succeeded in reaching railway line so far south as Taoting Road, but do not appear to have succeeded in reaching line south of that point and their line then ran east of railway until it reached Settlement boundary between North Honan and North Szechwan Roads. Japanese were harassed by Chinese armoured train which issued from station and patrols Woosung line. Subsequently it took refuge in the station, which was also strongly defended by Chinese troops. Thereupon Japanese during January 29th bombarded station and destroyed train by aeroplanes. Other buildings along Taoting Road also burned by incendiary bombs and it is generally thought this was done deliberately in order to destroy vantage post overlooking Japanese lines casualties not known but believed considerable loss of life resulted.

Mayor Greater Shanghai had lodged protest against the Japanese action with Consular authorities. Japanese authorities contended that their action was not connected with demand they had made and which had been accepted, but was based necessity protecting Japanese population living in part of area occupied. Also maintained that action, which met with armed resistance, and for which they took full responsibility, was within limits admitted, if necessity arose, by the International Settlement defence plans. Fighting continued during greater part of January 29th.

In the afternoon of January 29th at the request of the Mayor of Greater Shanghai American British Consuls succeeded in

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arranging for truce which started from January 29th at 8 p.m.
Truce amounted only to an agreement to refrain from further
firing.

On January 31st, at a meeting held between Japanese
Consul Admiral commanding Japanese naval forces, Mayor Greater
Shanghai and Commander local Chinese troops in presence of
American and British Consuls it was agreed that Japanese Consul
should report to Japanese Government a suggestion that Japanese
troops should be withdrawn from the salient. If reply was
unfavourable Chinese would refer to their Government and until
final reply was received both sides agreed that they would not
fire unless first fired upon.

Ciano, Chairman Committee.

Report ends.

Signed HAAS.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.186.L.91.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 6th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council
the following communication dated February 7th.

Ref./205

Geneva, Feb. 7. 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

Having heard that at last the first part of the
Report of the Shanghai Committee appointed by you under
Article XV of the Covenant has arrived at the Secretariat,
I have the honour to request that a meeting of the Council
of the League be called at once so that the contents of the
Report may be communicated to the Members and discussed.

Very terrible things have happened at Shanghai in
the past ten days and are still happening. Innocent men,
women and children have been killed and wounded by the
thousands through aerial bombing and heavy gunfire of the
Japanese troops, while thousands of houses have been
destroyed through Japanese incendiarism. All the horrors
and cruelties of war have been and are being enacted by
the Japanese army and navy in their aggression. Every
minute's delay in action on the part of the League means
more loss of human life and property, and the responsibility
on us all is very great. Under these circumstances if
nothing else could be done, the least that should be done
would be to make public to the world the results of the
investigation by your Committee, however incomplete it
might be.

Again, therefore, urging you to call a meeting of the
Council at the earliest moment.

(sgd) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.187.M.92.1932.VII

Geneva, February 8th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Statement by the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation.

Geneva, 7th February 1932.

To the Secretary-General,

Pursuant to instructions from Tokio, I take pleasure in sending you herewith a copy of a statement of the Japanese Government published in Tokio on the 7th instant, in regard to the despatch of troops to Shanghai. I shall be obliged if you will be good enough to transmit copies of the same to the President and members of the Council.

(Signed) S. SATO.

STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

February 7, 1932.

It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure by all means in their power, the tranquility of the Far East and to contribute to the peaceful progress of the world. Unfortunately in late years, internal discord and unsettled political conditions prevailing in China, coupled with rampant anti-foreign agitation, have given cause for serious concern to all other Powers especially Japan which, because of her geographical proximity and vast interests of hers which are involved, has been made to suffer in a far greater degree than any other. While the Japanese Government, in their solicitude for neighbourly amity and international good understanding, have exerted every effort to maintain conciliatory attitude, China, taking advantage of our moderation, has resorted, in frequent infringements of our rights and interests, to various acts of violence towards Japanese residents and to intensification of vicious anti-Japanese movement which is without parallel elsewhere, as

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it is under the direct or indirect guidance of the Nationalist Party which is identified with the Nationalist Government itself.

2. It is under these circumstances that the Shanghai incident has broken out. It is similar to numerous outrages and insults that had previously been perpetrated at Tsingtao, Foochow, Canton, Amoy and elsewhere in that they are all characterized by Chinese contempt for Japan and Japanese and by the acts of physical violence. The Shanghai incident only happens to be the most flagrant case. On the 9 January last, a vernacular journal, the "Minkuo Daily News" published an article insulting the honour of our Imperial House. Shortly afterwards, on the 18 a party of Japanese priests and their companions, five persons in all, were subjects of unprovoked attack by Chinese desperadoes. As the result, three of the victims were severely wounded and one was killed. The shock of these events was sufficient to explode the long pent-up indignation felt by Japanese residents in Shanghai who had suffered many years past from, and had exercised the utmost restraint in the face of, increasing Chinese atrocities and affronts.

3. Noting the extreme gravity of the situation, the Japanese Consul-General, under instructions from the Government and in order to do all that was possible to prevent by a local solution of the question any aggravation of the case, presented to the Mayor of Shanghai on January 21, a set of four demands including one for the dissolution of anti-Japanese societies. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, the Mayor's reply acceding to the above demands was received. The Japanese authorities, hoping that the tension might then relax, decided to wait and watch the performance of their promise on the part of Chinese. However, soldiers belonging to the 19th army then concentrated

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in the vicinity of Shanghai began, for reasons connected with internal politics, to display signs of recalcitrance towards the Nanking authorities and appeared to be making hostile preparations in spite of the Mayor's acceptance of our terms, thus creating a new source of danger. In the meantime, Chinese soldiers in civilian costume and various lawless elements had stolen into the International Settlement, creating a source of danger to quarters in the vicinity of the municipal offices. Many alarming rumours were in circulation and residents were plunged into agony of terror, the police of the Chapei district having taken flight. Thereupon, on the 28 at 4 o'clock the authorities of the Settlement proclaimed a state of siege and armed forces of the Powers were ordered out to duty in accordance with a plan that had been previously agreed upon. It was when Japanese marines were proceeding to their assigned sector in Chapei that Chinese opened fire upon them, precipitating the conflict between the Chinese and Japanese armed forces of which the present situation is the outcome.

4.- As is clear from what has been said, the incident of Chinese assault upon Japanese priests, and the incident of armed Sino-Japanese conflict were entirely separate affairs. With regard to the armed collision as it was entirely contrary to every intention of ours and as British and American Consuls-General offered the tender of their good offices, the Japanese authorities sought to effect cessation of hostilities and in fact succeeded on the 29 in arriving at an agreement for truce. But on the following day, Chinese, in contravention of their pledge, opened fire once more. At a conference summoned on the 31, it was agreed that the opposing forces should cease from all hostile actions during the progress of negotiations for the establishment of a neutral zone. However, Chinese resuming the offensive, are continuing the concentration of troops in the neighbourhood of Shanghai. So far, the Japanese navy, desiring, in view of the international character of Shanghai, not to aggravate the situation, has refrained from taking any drastic action, while the Chinese, spreading news of Japanese defeats, are manifesting even greater vehemence in their actions.

5.- In the existing state of affairs in China uncontrolled and uncontrollable and in view of historical precedents in such case, we can have no assurance as to the possible behavior of vast armies congregated in the Shanghai area, should unscrupulous politicians care to incite them. Our marines, opposed to Chinese forces outnumbering them by more than ten to one, are being wearied to exhaustion while the predicament of Japanese residents facing imminent danger as they do is beyond description. In order to meet the absolute necessity of at once despatching adequate military reinforcements (as there are obvious limitations to naval units which can be landed) so as to put an end to the menace of Chinese armies, to restore Shanghai to normal conditions, and to relieve inhabitants of all nationalities from the strain of fear and disquiet, a decision was taken to order necessary military forces to Shanghai.

6.- It should be stated that this despatch of military forces carries no more significance than the despatch of marines in accordance with practice on several previous occasions and that the Japanese government are prompted by no other motive than that of discharging their international duty and of safeguarding a large number of Japanese nationals and Japanese property worth many hundreds of millions involved in the affair.

The expeditionary force has been therefore limited to a strength absolutely required for the above purposes and its action will be guided solely by the policy of protecting common interest of all Powers. Unless Chinese, by continuing hostilities or by obstructing our army in attaining the above

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ends, compels it to take necessary action, there is of course no intention whatever that it should enter upon an aggressive campaign. The Japanese Government have already declared that they cherish no political ambitions in the region of Shanghai nor any thought of encroaching there upon rights and interests of any other Powers. What they desire is to promote safety and prosperity of that region by cooperation with other powers and mutual assistance and so to contribute to the peace and wellbeing of the East.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.186.M.93. 1932. VII.

Geneva, February 8th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communications, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref. No. 201.

I.

Geneva, February 6, 1932.

I have the honour to communicate herewith a telegram, dated February 6th, which I have just received from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai and to request that you will be good enough to circulate the same among the Members of the League and to the Press:

"Our troops are still holding the Woosung forts at 4 P.M. Saturday. At 6 P.M. four Japanese warships were moving from Shanghai in the direction of Woosung. A third bombardment of the forts is expected. More Japanese forces have been landed. Nomura replaces Shicsawa. American and British forces have been increased."

(Sd.) W. W. YEN.

II.

Ref. No. 202.

Geneva, February 6, 1932.

I have the honour to communicate herewith a telegram, dated February 5th, which I have just received from Waichinopu and to request that you will be good enough to circulate the same among the Members of the League of Nations and to the Press :

"A report from Shanghai said a severe bombardment of Chapei by Japanese troops began at 1.30 A.M. for twelve hours yesterday. Our troops are still holding the line. Yesterday morning the Japanese fleet concentrated attack on the Woosung forts and communication between Woosung and Shanghai was cut. The report that one Japanese gunboat was sunk and two damaged during the engagement was confirmed."

(Sd.) W. W. YEN.

Ref./204.

III

Geneva.
February 7th, 1932.

I have the honour to communicate to you the following telegram, dated February 7th, which has just been received from Shanghai by the Chinese Delegation:

"There has been general Japanese evacuation from Soochow, Hangchow, Nanking and Shanghai. The total number of the Japanese naval and land forces is reported to be 23,000 including 9,000 which arrived Sunday. In answer to Mayor Wutehchen's protests the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council blames the Japanese forces, saying "Such a condition of neutrality can therefore be only maintained by the same Powers and States of which Japan is one. It is these Powers and the Japanese Government and not the Shanghai Municipal Council that is solely responsible for acts of the Japanese armed forces in the Settlement." An American woman doctor, Love Ranklin, was wounded while the Japanese aeroplanes were bombing an ambulance near Chinan University. Hostilities have been most severe since Saturday. The Chinese troops are still holding their position."

I request you to be good enough to have the above circulated to the Members of the Council.

(Sd.) W. W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and members
of the League.

C.191.M.95.1932.VII
Geneva, February 9th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese
Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated February 8th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General :

Geneva,
February 8th, 1932.

I have the honour to communicate to you herewith the following translation of a telegram, dated February 6, 1932, which has just been received from Nanking by the Chinese Delegation :

- "1. On January 4th, Japanese troops again bombarded Chapei and attacked our troops, who were compelled to put up a strong resistance. There has, therefore, been severe fighting. The Consular corps in Shanghai decided, for the sake of maintaining the peace of the International Settlement, to lodge a strong protest with the Japanese Consul-General.
2. At 1.0 a.m. on the following day, severe fighting however broke out again. Our troops were still holding the line and captured one of the Japanese armoured cars.
3. On the same day, Japanese aeroplanes bombarded Chenju, killing many Chinese civilians. One of them was brought down by our planes.
4. The Woosung Forts are still defended by our troops.
5. It was reliably reported that another division of the Japanese troops had left Japan on the 5th, and intended to land near Woosung, so as to envelope our troops along the Settlement".

(signed) W.W.YEN

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and the
Members of the League.

C.192.M.96.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 9th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate the following communications for the information of the Council.

I.

Letter from the Chinese Representative on the Council to the Secretary-General.

Rf./206.

Geneva, February 8th,
1932.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of to-day's date, and I am indeed gratified to learn that the report* of the "Shanghai Committee", to which I referred in my previous letter to you, has been circulated to the Members of the Council for information and also given to the Press.

In view, however, of the fact that the situation in China, arising from the Japanese invasion, has daily become more serious, resulting in further heavy loss of Chinese life and property, and that I have received many telegraphic despatches from my Government on the subject since the last meeting of the Council, I have the honour to request that you will arrange for a meeting of the Council at the earliest possible moment, so that I can communicate the same to the Members of the Council.

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

II.

Letter from the Secretary-General to the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Geneva, February 8th, 1932.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 7th,** which I have communicated to the Acting President and to the Members of the Council. As Your Excellency is aware, the report of the "Shanghai Committee", to which your letter refers, has been circulated to the Members of the Council for information, and given to the Press.

(Signed) ERIC DRUMMOND.

* See document C.185.M.90.1932.VII.

** See document C.186.M.91.1932.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.207.M.108.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 10th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication which he has just received:

Ref./208.

TELEGRAM FROM SEVERAL ORGANISATIONS IN SHANGHAI

DATED FEBRUARY 8th, 1932.

In utterly disregarding the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg Pact, and the Nine Power Treaty Japan has occupied Manchuria and waged an undeclared war upon China. Unsatisfied in flouting the world's public opinion, she has now perpetrated the Shanghai outrage as the culmination of her unabated acts of aggression and defiance of the Resolutions of the League.

On the afternoon of January 28th, the demands of the Japanese Consul-General of Shanghai were accepted by the Mayor of Greater Shanghai and said acceptance was declared satisfactory by said Consul-General. At 11.25 p.m. the same evening, the local Japanese naval commander suddenly notified the Chinese authorities to withdraw their forces from Chapei and thirty-five minutes later proceeded to occupy the Chinese controlled territory. Acting in self-defence the Chinese forces resisted the advance of the Japanese marines and other armed contingents.

Thus frustrated the Japanese naval forces have been landing reinforcements in the International Settlement and employing said Settlement for belligerent operations against the Chinese troops. Aerial attacks are being maintained daily and Japanese civilians have been permitted to inflict inhuman treatment on Chinese men, women and children and indulge in other forms of frightfulness.

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Such aerial attacks cannot be condemned too severely. Characterised by Lord Robert Cecil as the most barbarous form of warfare what they have accomplished is the burning and the devastation of the populous city, the destruction of priceless treasures, valuable life and property, rendering homeless and destitute tens of thousands of innocent non-combatants, paralyzing all industries and commerce and undermining the entire economic structure of China's commercial metropolis.

Therefore, it is self-evident that in seeking to aggravate the situation Japan is motivated on the one hand by passion to strike terror into the hearts of the Chinese in Shanghai, as in Manchuria and elsewhere, and to coerce China into submission and, on the other hand to secure for herself a predominate position in north and central China to the prejudice of other Powers.

The present Shanghai outrage had its origin in the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. Any attempt to liquidate the Shanghai outrage as a local and isolated incident without attempting a settlement of the whole situation arising from Japanese occupation of Manchuria will inevitably defeat its purpose and encourage Japan to perpetrate similar outrages in other parts of China.

It may be recalled that Japan invaded Manchuria when the League Assembly was in session, she extended such occupation to the threshold of Tsitsihar when the League Council adopted the second Resolution, and she planned the capture of Chinchow - last vestige of China's administrative authority - when the League Council adopted the third Resolution on the subject. Added to the present Shanghai outrage these facts reveal Japan's cynical disregard of world's public opinion and contempt of the League.

The Chinese Government and people have always reposed confidence in the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty to adjust disputes between nations. In face of Japan's unabated aggression, the Chinese people are entitled to ask if China's co-signatories in these international engagements intend to condone Japan's repudiation of her plighted word or undermine the sanctity of international treaties.

While appreciating the efforts of the friendly Governments to solve the crisis between China and Japan with their latest formula, we earnestly appeal to your Government to encourage said friendly Governments to stand firm on their five proposals. Japan's continued occupation of Manchuria will always be a threat to the peace of the world if not also to the security of other Powers whose efforts at mediation are magnified into interference to Japan's

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detriment. We appeal to your Government to counsel Japan to honour her plighted word and collaborate with your Government and other co-signatories in the establishment of durable peace in the Far East or, if she cannot be persuaded to listen to reason, courageously to join other friendly Governments and other co-signatories in the application of economic sanctions or other speedy and more effective measures to preserve the peace of the world. Failure now boldly to do the right thing and insist on doing the just and honourable thing in defence of the sanctity of treaties will expose the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty to public ridicule and to subject the present situation to imminent danger of drifting into actuality of a world catastrophe.

(Signed) :

S.L. Wong, Chairman, Shanghai General
Chamber of Commerce;

Liming, Chairman, Shanghai Bankers' Association;

Zing Zung Ching, Chairman, Shanghai Native
Bankers' Guild;

Yung Chun Ching, Chairman, Chinese Cotton Mill
Owners' Association;

C.L. Li, Chairman, Shanghai Universities Union;

C.S. Lu, Chairman, Shanghai Labour Union;

Ling Kong Hou, Chairman, Associate Chamber of
Commerce;

K.P. Chen, Chairman, China Committee, Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce;

Yu Yacching, Chairman, Ship Owners' Association;

H.Y. Moh, Chairman, Shanghai Exchanges Association.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.214 M.111.1932.VII

Geneva, February 11th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated February 10th, 1932.

The Japanese Representative on the Council presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the League, and has the honour to communicate for the information of the Council and of the Press, a brief statement showing the number of Japanese nationals at Shanghai, and the extent of Japanese interests therein.

Japanese nationals and property at Shanghai.

Some idea of the importance of the Japanese Colony at Shanghai and of its interests in this area may be gained from the following figures:

I. Eastern District (from the east of Hongkew as far as Woosung)

1.- Number of nationals, 5,000.

The majority of the Japanese nationals living outside the Concession and in the Extension have taken refuge within the Concession, while the women and children have been sent to Japan. The total number of refugees is about 3,500.

2.- Capital invested: Taels 145,000,000

Principal undertakings:

Shanghai Spinning Works,	Taels	36,000,000
Taikô	"	18,000,000
Kôdai	"	18,000,000
Yûhō	"	16,000,000
Tôkwa	"	10,000,000
Dôkô	"	9,000,000
Nikkwa	"	2,000,000
Meikwa Sugar Works		5,000,000

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Shipping Companies (wharves and warehouses)	
Yusen Shipping Company	Taels 8,000.000
Dairen Kisen "	5,000.000
O.S.K. "	5,000.000
Seihan Printing Works	2,000.000
Kôtai Hosiery Factories	2,000.000
Mitsui "	1,000.000
Shanghai warehouse	1,000.000
Tôhâ Ice Factories	500.000
Zuihâ " "	500.000
Miscellaneous	6,000.000

II. Hongkew-Chapei District:

1.- Number of nationals: 18,000

Nearly all our nationals have taken refuge in the Concession on the advice of the Japanese Consul-General.

2.- Capital invested : Taels 36,000.000

Principal undertakings and buildings:

Yusen Kaisha Dependencies	15,000.000
Hongkew Building Company	7,000.000
Tôa Industrial Company	4,000.000
Shanghai Printing Works	1,000.000
Hôzan Glass Works	1,000.000
Japanese Consulate building	2,000.000
Japanese Club	1,000.000
Miscellaneous	5,000.000

III.- Centre (Former British Concession)

1.- Number of nationals: 500

The Centre being a commercial area, our nationals chiefly own offices there, many of which have had to be closed as a result of the attitude of the Chinese.

2.- Capital invested: Taels 41,800.000

Principal undertakings:

Nisshin Shipping Company	18,000.000
Yusen "	2,200.000
Banks:	
Yokohama Specie Bank	6,000.000
Mitsui	5,000.000
Mitsubishi	3,000.000
Bank of Taiwan	3,000.000
Sumitomo	1,800.000
Bank of Chôsen	1,000.000
Nihon Menka Company	1,000.000
Miscellaneous	1,000.000

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IV. Western District (area at the head of Soochow Creek, French Concession, Extension and zone outside the Concession)

1.- Number of nationals: 4,000

Many Japanese living in the Hongkew District have taken refuge on this side.

2.- Capital invested: Taels 137,000.000

Principal undertakings:

Naigai Spinning Works	53,000.000
Nikkwa " "	30,070.000
Toyoda " " (outside the Concession)	20,000.000
Dôkô " "	9,000.000
Shanghai Silk Spinning Factory	5,000.000
Tôa Linen Thread Works	3,800.000
Chûkwa Leather Factory	1,500.000
Oriental Institute	4,500.000
Dôbun Institute	3,000.000
Miscellaneous	7,200.000

V. Putong (outside the Concession)

1.- Number of nationals: 500

The majority have taken refuge in the Concession.

2.- Capital invested: Taels 21,000.000

Principal undertakings:

Nikkwa Spinning Works	6,000.000
Mitsui wharves	4,500.000
Yusen " "	2,000.000
Nisshin " "	2,000.000
Okura " "	1,000.000
O.C.K. " "	1,000.000
Ryôkwa warehouses	3,000.000
Miscellaneous	1,500.000

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.218.M.113.1932.VI.

Geneva, February 12th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication, dated February 11th, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./212.

Geneva, February 11th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the following telegram, dated the 10th of February, which has just been received from Hanking by the Chinese Delegation, and to request you to be good enough to circulate it among the members of the Council.

"Over five thousand Japanese soldiers from the cruisers 'Sanas' and 'Sawarabi' landed on the 8th of February by way of the O.E.K. Jetty and joined the Japanese lines in Woosung and Chapei.

"On the 9th and 10th, Japanese naval, army and aerial forces launched a general attack against our troops in Woosung and a vigorous attack in Chapei. All were however repulsed with over a hundred Japanese casualties.

"After receiving the reply from the Shanghai Municipal Council to our protest that the Japanese Government should alone be responsible for the military activities of the Japanese troops in the International Settlement, Mr. Wu Tieh-Chen, Mayor of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, requested all the Consuls to order the Shanghai Municipal Council to employ effective measures to bring to an end the Japanese activities in the Settlement, otherwise the Chinese Government would not be responsible for any loss of life and property of foreign nationals, if Japanese troops should use the settlement as a base of military operations."

(Signed) W. W. YEN

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.219.M.114.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 12th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated February 12th, which he has just received from the Chinese Delegation.

Rf./213.

Geneva,
February 12, 1932.

“ With regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute, of which the Council has been seized under Articles X, XI and XV of the Covenant of the League of Nations, I have the honour to observe that according to Article XV, paragraph 9, of the said Covenant, it is within the competence of the Council to refer the case to the Assembly. At the same time it is also provided that the dispute shall be so referred provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

In view of the time limit imposed, the Chinese Government is constrained hereby to request that the said dispute be referred to the Assembly. If, however, it should be the pleasure and intention of the Council to refer the said dispute at its own initiative to the Assembly or in virtue of the general powers vested in it to summon the Assembly for consideration of the dispute, the Chinese Government will then be prepared to withdraw the request on its part. ”

(signed) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.220.M.115.1932.VII

Geneva, February 12th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation,
the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Council the following communication dated February 11th.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of official telegram received
by the Japanese Delegation.

Shanghai, February 11th.

At the request of Father Jacquinct of the
Shanghai Catholic Mission, the Doyen of the consular corps
asked the Japanese authorities whether they would be
prepared to accept a suspension of hostilities to evacuate
the civilians and wounded from the fighting zone in
Chapei. The Japanese command immediately acceded to this
request and after an agreement with the Chinese authorities
the suspension of hostilities was fixed for February 12th
from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.

The civilians will be evacuated by the
Shanghai volunteers and the priests of the Catholic Mission.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Circulated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.222.M.117.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 12th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication dated February 12th.

Shanghai Incidents.

Summary of Official Telegrams received by
the Japanese delegation.

The truce for the evacuation of refugees from the Chapel zone was put into force on February 12th from 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. (1). During this period, however, the Chinese several times fired rifle shots at our lines. The Japanese troops did not reply but this violation of the agreement was immediately notified to the British and United States Consuls-General.

At 11.30 the Chinese asked, through the United States Consul-General, for a prolongation of the truce for six hours. In view of the above-mentioned violation of the agreement concluded, and of the information which had reached us concerning the hostile preparations made by the Chinese (including the news, from American sources, of the advance of the 65th and 68th Divisions sent from Nankin as reinforcements) the Japanese authorities were unable to accept this prolongation, but they stated their willingness to declare a further truce at a subsequent date. Orders were given to the troops to avoid hostilities as far as possible in the zone which has not yet been entirely evacuated by the civilian population. The British and American authorities have drawn the attention of the Chinese to this situation.

(1) The period mentioned in the previous communication, from "8 a.m. to 4 p.m." was an error. 4 p.m. should read 12 p.m.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.223.M.118.1932.VII

Geneva, February 13th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated February 12th.

Ref./214

Geneva, February 12, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate to you herewith the following telegram, dated February 12, 1932, which I have just received from my Government and to request you to be good enough to circulate it among the Members of the Council.

"Japanese airplanes bombed the Wingon Cotton Mill at Markham Road, within the International Settlement, on February 11th, killing five, including three women and one sixteen year old girl, as witnessed by the American Marine Detachment stationed therein. The American Consul-General protested strongly, whereupon the Japanese military apologized, explaining that the bombing was entirely accidental. Bombers also dropped bombs at the Markham Road Railway Yard, destroying the same. A four hour truce was arranged this morning to enable the Red Cross and other relief workers to rescue Chinese refugees in the Chapei-Woosung area.

"Ten thousand land forces arrived from Japan on Thursday. It is generally believed that the Japanese military are planning a big scale offensive along the Woosung, Chapei and Nantao fronts this week-end, when they will muster twenty thousand regulars, with thousands of marines, scores of gunboats, participating in the renewed drive into Chinese territory.

"Chinese Red Cross workers report that during the bombardment of the Woosung Forts on February 7th and 8th, the Japanese troops employed dumdum bullets, as evidenced by the wounds inflicted upon Chinese soldiers.

"Unofficial mediation is proceeding without avail. China is determined to continue her resistance.

"On Thursday noon, February 11th, the Japanese Consul-General telephoned to Mayor Wu Tieh-Cheng, falsely accusing the Chinese police of firing on Japanese destroyers opposite the French Bund, and also threatening to take necessary action."

(Sgd) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members of the League.

C.225.M.120.1932.VII
Geneva, February 13th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated February 13th.

Ref./216
To the Secretary-General.

Geneva, Feby. 13th.1932.

I have the honour to enclose copy of a Statement, issued by my Government on the 12th of February, and to request that you will be good enough to circulate it among the Members of the Council.

(Signed) T.T.YEN.

STATEMENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

With full realisation of its responsibility to the civilised world and willingness to submit the accuracy of these statements to impartial international inquiry and adjudication, the Chinese National Government presents the following summary of the Sino-Japanese conflict from its inception.

At no time since the Russo-Japanese War has the Chinese Government doubted the purpose of Japan to seize Manchuria whenever an opportune occasion arose. At the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war which was fought chiefly on China's soil against China's protests, Japan put strong pressure on China to implement Japan's gains from Russia and to grant Japan additional special privileges impairing China's sovereignty and contravening the open door policy in Manchuria. China resisted those demands to the utmost of her ability.

When the world war arose Japan took advantage of the pre-occupation of the powers and China's military weakness to present twenty-one demands which if conceded would have destroyed China's sovereignty not only in Manchuria but in other parts of China as well. Under Japan's ultimatum China was forced to concede some of those demands which she did under protest and so notified all friendly powers.

At the Paris Conference, at the Washington Conference, before the League of Nations China reiterated her protests against those exactions of Japan and repudiated them all at suitable occasions. At the Washington Conference China refused to conduct separate negotiations with Japan and insisted that Sino-Japanese questions must be discussed in purview of whole conference. By signing Nine Power Treaty at Washington China's territorial integrity and administrative autonomy was guaranteed by all the Powers and it was definitely stated that Manchuria is an integral part of China's territory. That treaty also provided for appeal to the Signatory powers in the event of disagreement about the interpretation of treaty and the infraction of its terms.

Subsequent to signing the Nine Power Treaty the Chinese Government has invariably in its relations with Japan and other Powers insisted upon observing the terms and principles of that treaty, but owing to Japan's continuously trying to step outside the treaty and to insist upon having special rights in China, especially in Manchuria, the Chinese Government has been unable to avoid disputes and frictions with Japan which when serious China tried to refer to the League of Nations and the Court of International Justice. China gladly became party to the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing force as means to settle international disputes and obtain political objectives and has associated herself with all similar plans to secure peace. On several occasions China sought without success to invoke provisions of the League of Nations Covenant that obsolete and unsatisfactory treaties might be revised.

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That broadly was situation last September when without provocation justifying such action Japanese troops attacked Chinese troops at Mukden and usurped control there. Careful analysis shows without doubt that Japan's military coup was premeditated and carefully planned. Dispositions were commenced days before September eighteenth.

It is scarcely necessary to review events in Manchuria since then. Using various pretexts Japanese army overturned Chinese authority in Manchuria, has taken control almost of the whole of those provinces while China appealed in vain to the League of Nations and peace pacts.

At times since Mukden attack Japan tried to draw the Chinese Government into separate negotiations but China, following precedents set at Paris, Washington and Geneva, has refused to negotiate without presence or participation of neutral powers, knowing full well that she cannot singly resist Japan's pressure backed by unbridled military force which aims at the annexation of Manchuria.

Those tactics failing to frighten Chinese Government Japan decided to carry military action into the heart of China showing her contempt for and indifference to world opinion with the purpose of convincing the Chinese that it was hopeless to appeal for outside help. During four months of continuous Japanese military aggression the indignation of the Chinese people was aroused to the highest pitch while the Chinese Government already harassed by natural calamities was faced with the task of dealing with invasion from without and restraining popular feelings within.

Having sent naval forces to Shanghai with stated purpose of protecting Japanese residents and property there, the Japanese Government presented through the Japanese Consul-General certain demands to the Chinese local authorities at Shanghai requiring complete acquiescence by six o'clock p.m. January twenty-eight. At two o'clock that afternoon the Chinese replied fully accepting Japan's demands and were assured by the Japanese Consul-General that the reply was satisfactory. Nevertheless at midnight that night Japanese naval forces advanced into Chinese territory, attacked the Chinese police and garrison troops. The Chinese Government has no doubt that disinterested foreigners on the scene have more or less correctly informed the world of events at Shanghai since January twenty-eight but the Chinese Government wishes to emphasize the following points.

Japanese naval and military forces have used the International Settlement at Shanghai both as base for their attacks on Chinese police and troops and as sanctuary where they can retire when repulsed and for recuperation and re-supply.

Chinese troops defending China's soil from ruthless invaders have been unable to reply effectively to Japanese attacks without endangering the lives and property of thousands of friendly neutral foreigners residing in the International Settlement and surrounding suburbs and have been unable to pursue their Japanese attackers without risking a conflict with friendly neutral foreign police and troops protecting the Settlement.

Japanese naval and military forces have used river-front docks within the International Settlement to land troops, artillery and supplies. Japanese warships anchored in the Whangpoo River alongside the International Settlement fire over the Settlement at Chinese forces resisting Japanese attacks in

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Chinese territory outside the Settlement and Chinese artillery cannot reply effectively without gravely endangering scores of neutral vessels in port. Japanese flagship with Japanese admiral and staff directing attacks lies alongside wharf near the center of the Settlement.

Japanese airplanes bombed all parts of Chinese sections of Shanghai also parts of International Settlement then withdrew over the midsection of the International Settlement.

Japanese military forces and civilian un-uniformed elements have killed and injured presently large number of Chinese peaceable unarmed men, women, children, estimated between one and two thousand and imprisoned, maltreated many others and executed many without trial.

Japanese bombings and fires started by bombs already have destroyed property roughly estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars.

Japanese Government excuses these atrocities by alleging military peril due to proximity of Chinese troops. Chinese Government solemnly declares that such excuse is a transparent pretext as it is impossible to send Japanese troops anywhere in China without being surrounded by Chinese population and near Chinese troops occupying their regular stations. Japanese military forces have pushed forward into China's territory always making the excuse that nearby Chinese troops constitute a menace. It is evident that such reasoning provides excuse for complete conquest of China by Japan.

When the United States of America and Great Britain supported by France, Germany and Italy recently presented to Japan and China a note in five points designed to end hostilities and to bring about the liquidation of this situation worse than war, the Chinese Government without hesitation accepted proposals of Powers in full.

In flatly turning down first the proposals of the International Shanghai Defence Committee, then the Powers' five proposals and more recently still British Admiral Kelly's scheme, Japan is thus closing every avenue to peace, leaving China no alternative but to continue to adopt appropriate measures for self-defence to the best of her ability.

The Chinese Government asks world to contrast known facts of Japan's acts in China during months with the Japanese Government's latest statement that "It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure tranquillity in the Far East." Also to contrast Japan's statement that "her troops in China are only to discharge international duty" with the efforts of the League of Nations and Washington Treaty Powers to induce Japan to withdraw troops from China and cease warfare. Also contrast Japan's frequent declarations that she has no territorial ambitions vis-à-vis China with her refusal to submit Manchuria and other Sino-Japanese questions before a conference of treaty powers. Also contrast Japan's acts at Shanghai causing immense destruction of the property of all nationals and loss of lives with her statement that she acted in Shanghai only to protect lives and property. Also contrast Japan's latest statement that she acted in Shanghai in co-operation with other foreign defence forces and foreign municipal authorities with the latest statement of the Shanghai foreign Municipal

- 4 -

Council that "Japanese Government and not the Municipal Council is solely responsible for act of the Japanese armed forces in Shanghai."

The Chinese Government positively denies that the Chinese violated the temporary truce arranged on January twenty-ninth. Because of the suddenness of armistice it was not possible to get orders to all outposts resulting during night in desultory firing between outposts of both sides. The Japanese command resumed attacks at daybreak of January thirtieth.

Since Japan's astounding action in Mukden last September it has been the unswerving policy of the Chinese Government to avoid by all means at its command a state of war and to that end it endured intense humiliation, risked its own existence in face of popular feeling in hope that world-wide pacific measures might check Japan's reckless course. Despite the failure so far of pacific agencies the Chinese Government adheres to its faith in world justice but cannot passively submit to Japan's invasion of China's territory and slaughter of Chinese people therefore it solemnly declares to the world that she will continue to resist in self-defence to Japan's attacks at all points and with all forces at its command.

The Chinese Government further declares that it is China's desire to settle issues in connection with the present crisis in purview of interested powers and in accordance with principles guaranteeing world peace and sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~File Copy~~

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

FEB 15 1932

Enclosure No 5 in List No 42 ✓

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

COMMUNAL
COUNCIL
of the League.
POLITICAL SECTION

C.227.M.121.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 14th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council as an element of information in the dispute between China and Japan, a second report which he has received from the Committee, on which certain members of the Council were good enough to allow their officers to serve, in regard to events occurring in Shanghai and the neighbourhood.

SHANGHAI.

12.2.1932.

I am requested to transmit following second report Shanghai Committee.

By 8 p.m. 29th January, that is, after beginning of arranged truce, firing had died down, but next day Japanese Admiral protested to American and British Consuls General that Chinese armoured train in the railway station re-opened fire. This Chinese denied, alleging, on the other hand, that it was Japanese who had fired.

During the morning of 31st January, 17 Japanese aeroplanes flew over Shanghai and Chinese positions but without any bombardment. Japanese naval authorities contended this demonstration was effected as a result of fresh breach of truce by Chinese. This was warmly denied by the Chinese. On this day took place the meeting referred to in last paragraph of first report, at which suggestions for a neutral zone were made, and it was agreed that the truce should continue, pending final reply both sides.

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February 1st. Truce was more or less observed, though there was again some intermittent firing.

February 2nd. Japanese Commander again alleged breach of truce by the Chinese on previous days, adding that as it seemed clear that Chinese were assembling forces with a view to surrounding Japanese, he was going to send up aeroplanes to reconnoitre.

About midday Japanese aeroplanes flew over Shanghai and Chinese positions. They were fired upon by the Chinese, whereupon aeroplanes dropped bombs and in a short time general firing both sides recommenced. About 3 p.m., that is, after fighting had recommenced, Japanese Consul-General informed consular authorities that the Japanese Government had rejected proposal for neutral zone referred to above.

Same day, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai sent to consular authorities a letter, received by them 3rd February, referring to request for an armistice meeting 31st January, and stating Japanese had repeatedly broken this agreement by bombarding them from the air as described in the preceding paragraph.

3rd February. Japanese naval authorities announced, as the Chinese authorities had consistently failed display sincerity in the carrying out of their engagements, Chinese troops must be withdrawn sufficient distance from Chapei, and to effect that object Japanese aeroplanes might be forced to bombard Chinese positions. Later on same day Japanese Consul-General informed consular authorities that three Japanese destroyers had been fired upon from the Wocsung forts, and Japanese therefore intended occupy forts. This was again denied by the Chinese.

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Since 3rd February state of open war exists, any pretence truce being abandoned. Firing continues intermittently, both in Chapei and Wocsung area, with the use of artillery and, on the side of Japanese, by aerial bombardment. (ffensive is entirely in the hands of Japanese whose declared object is to capture Wocsung forts and drive all Chinese troops considerable distance from Shanghai.

It must be noted, in relation to any question of breach of truce, that complete truce never really existed, and also that, in the absence of foreign observers in the fighting lines, it is impossible to establish which side should be held responsible for breaking truce. Individual units on either side, even "agents provocateurs" may have been responsible.

Apart from question of resumption of hostilities between regular troops on the fighting line, it is necessary to recall briefly events, internationally important from the point of view of the status of settlement, which during this period were occurring inside Japanese section.

From the beginning of the Japanese movement on the night of 28th January, Japanese section was invaded by Chinese plain clothes troops, who concealed themselves inside, or on roofs of houses, whence they fired on the Japanese patrols in the streets with automatic pistols. It should be mentioned that the Japanese, who seem to have had insufficient regular forces for the defence of the area they occupied, had mobilised and armed all their so-called reservists, who were civil clothes distinguished by brassards.

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Marine and reservists responded to the sniping of the Chinese plain clothes soldiers by machine gun fire, and also by house-to-house search in order to locate snipers, in course of which very considerable damage was done, houses even being set on fire in order to get rid of snipers.

Japanese naval authorities took complete control Hong-kew district, inside Settlement, barricaded streets, disarmed police, and paralysed all other municipal activities of the Settlement authorities, including fire brigade. Police posts were prevented from all communications with their headquarters. Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to evacuate schools and hospitals. Numerous excesses, including summary executions, were committed by marines/reservists and..... last mentioned, who had not official standing, being actuated probably merely by spirit of revenge against Chinese for earlier anti-Japanese activities. Reign of terror resulted, and almost entire non-Japanese population of fled away.

Owing to large number of Chinese who were believed to have been arrested or put to death by the Japanese, and of whom no trace could be found, Municipal Council 5th February asked Consular Body to approach Japanese authorities with a view to enquiry. Japanese Consul admitted that excesses had been committed by his nationals at a time when feeling was running high and chaotic conditions prevailed, but the situation was greatly improved and he agreed that persons arrested as suspect by the naval authorities within the Settlement should be handed over to municipal police. This was accordingly done, but the number of Chinese still unaccounted for is very large. Municipal police have already collected details of about 100 cases.

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Shiping has been now greatly reduced but Japanese control is still severe and police and other municipal functions can only assert themselves. Japanese authorities were much concerned at the excesses committed by their nationals, and considerable number of undesirables have been deported to Japan.

Shanghai Committee do not propose for the time being to send any further reports unless they come in possession of some fresh information which will necessitate corrections of previous statements, or until it is required to amplify or supplement any particular point in statements made in their first and second reports.

CIAFO (Chairman)

END REPORT.

Haas.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members of
the League.

C.228.M.122.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 13th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council
the following communication dated February 13th.

Ref./215.

To the Secretary-General,

I have the honour to communicate to you the following
telegram, dated February 12th, which has just been received by
the Chinese Delegation from my Government and to request that
you will be good enough to circulate it among the Members of
the Council:

"On the 11th of February, the Japanese
authorities at Shanghai declared to foreign
authorities that, by Sunday (February 14th), they
would have 20,000 regulars as well as 7,000 marines
and forty gun-boats participating in the offensive
including, according to the report of the 'North
China Daily News,' a British-owned newspaper, two
cavalry and four infantry regiments, with 9,600
rifles, 120 machine-guns. It is now certain that
the Japanese military is determined to level Chapei
by bombardment in order to clear the way for their
advance.

"The Japanese charge that the Chinese have
violated the truce is absolutely unfounded. That
the Chinese have not fired during the truce can be
confirmed by Major Bell and Father Jacquinet, who
led rescue parties. The Japanese fired some shots
from Tientungan, which is within the truce area, but
the Chinese did not retaliate. During the truce,
Japanese forces prevented refugees from entering
their homes to remove their personal effects from
the North Szechuen Road area.

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.229.M.123.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 15th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated February 13th.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation.

Since the beginning of the current incidents, numerous Japanese civilians have been the victims of Chinese irregular snipers and soldiers.

1. During the night of January 31st, H. Takagi, merchant, was killed in the Wuchang Road, and S. Nakamura, restaurant proprietor, was killed in the North Szechuan Road. J. Tanabe and T. Tokisawa, employees of the Mitsui Company, and Ikeda, employee of the Anglo-American Tobacco Company, were wounded in Dixwell Road, and S. Sakai, merchant, in the Wuchang Road. (All these roads are in the Japanese protected zone.)

2. Inside the protected zone, about a thousand Chinese regular soldiers looted the Takarayama Glassworks on the night of the 31st, and set fire to it next day. They also looted a Thermos flask factory and the shop of a wine-dealer, J. Tsukazaki; the latter was shot, and one of his employees, who was seriously wounded, succeeded in escaping further into the protected zone.

3. On February 5th, about 1 a.m., N. Okada, a clerk, and K. Yuki, were attacked by the Chinese mob and seriously injured. They escaped death owing to the arrival of a lorry driven by Japanese.

4. Chinese shells falling inside the protected zone have killed or wounded numerous civilians and damaged several buildings, including the Hongwandji Buddhist temple, which has been destroyed.

5. On February 5th, the Kojic-Jinja temple at Chapel was looted and set on fire by Chinese regular soldiers.

6. On February 9th, towards 4 p.m., H. Takahashi, Captain of the "Taikichi Maru" of the Nissin Company, while visiting another of the Company's ships, was heavily fired upon by Chinese regular soldiers, and died of his wounds shortly afterwards.

On the same day, two Koreans were attacked by the Chinese mob, but were saved by the intervention of the French police. Two Japanese newspaper correspondents also escaped death only through the devotion to duty of French policemen.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation.

Proclamation by the General commanding the Ninth Division.

General Ueda, commanding the Ninth Division, arrived at Shanghai on February 13th and issued a proclamation in which he said: "I have come here to protect Japanese nationals living in Shanghai. The hostilities initiated by the Chinese army against our marines have caused anxiety and disquietude in the Shanghai concession. The position of Japanese nationals is really deplorable, and I shall make every effort, in concert with the Navy, to remedy their situation.

"I propose to do everything in my power to achieve this by peaceful means and to avoid any unnecessary hostilities. At the same time, I shall not hesitate to take energetic steps if this Division meets with any obstacle in the performance of its duties.

"I shall endeavour, in close contact with the foreign authorities concerned, to dispel the anxieties of the International Concession. I wish to put on record my sincere sympathy with that section of the Chinese population which is not hindering my troops in the discharge of their duty, and I can assure them that they will not be molested in their peaceful occupations."

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation.

The Japanese Consulate-General was informed on February 6th that on the previous day M. Fujii, owner of a coppersmith's workshop, accompanied by 3 workmen, visited a Chinese customer in the Chinese city, near the French Concession, at about 10 a.m., but that none of them had since been seen. The Consulate was also informed by certain Chinese that some Japanese had been seen being attacked by the mob, who had killed two of them. The others were believed to have been taken away by the Chinese police.

The authorities of the French Concession were approached for news of the missing men; but since the beginning of the recent incidents the atmosphere in the Chinese city had been such that the officials of the French municipal council could no longer go into the Chinese quarters, and it has not been possible to obtain any information.

Further steps will be taken in concert with the French authorities to trace the missing men.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.230.M.124.1932.VII.
Geneva, February 15th 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated February 14th.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Official telegram received by the Japanese delegation.

On February 14th the Japanese Government instructed all Japanese consulates in China to urge Japanese nationals to remain calm, and to see that no incidents occur through their fault.

The instructions emphasise the Japanese Government's anxiety to regulate the present situation as speedily as possible, so that it may not be further aggravated.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and to the Members of the
League.

C.235.M.128.1932.VII.

Geneva, February 15th, 1932.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation regarding the French translation of Document C.227.M.121.1932.VII. (Second Report of the Shanghai Committee).

At the request of the Japanese Delegation the Secretary-General has the honour to forward to the Council the following communication dated February 14th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

With reference to the Second Report of the Shanghai Committee which you were good enough to forward to me to-day, I venture to draw your attention to a few points of translation which appear to be in need of correction, as they might leave an impression which is not conveyed by the English text. It would be extremely regrettable if the remarkably impartial and objective work of the Committee were to suffer in any way.

It will be understood that my remarks refer only to questions of translation. I reserve the right to submit further explanations of the words used in both reports should such explanations appear necessary.

English text.

Page 1, paragraph 3, line 4: "Contented" has been translated "ont prétendu que". The word "affirmé" would appear more appropriate.

Page 1, paragraph 3, line 7: "on this day" should apparently be translated "le même jour".

Page 2, paragraph 3, line 2: "whereupon". It would be advisable to add to the French text (page 2, line 2) "et alors ont jeté".

Page 2, penultimate line: "This was again denied" is translated "Cette allégation également ..." which appears to express an opinion on the declaration made by the Japanese authorities.

Page 3, penultimate line: "so-called reservists", The translation "prétendus réservistes" gives a shade of meaning which does not exactly correspond to the sense of the sense of the English text.

Page 4, second paragraph, penultimate line: "Reign of terror resulted". The translation "Ainsi s'établit le règne de la terreur" is noticeably stronger than the English text.

I should be much obliged if you would, if possible, arrange for the incorporation of the corrections which I have ventured to suggest.

(Signed) S.SATO,
Representative of Japan on the Council.

1221

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 581

PM RECD




AMERICAN CONSULATE

Stuttgart, Germany.

February 12, 1932.

FEB 20 32



SUBJECT: Attitude of German Businessmen toward Events
in the Far East.

1-1055

CONFIDENTIAL

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to report that many businessmen in this district have adopted an attitude towards events in the Far East which may best be summarized by the blunt statement reported to me of a local manufacturer of optical goods to the effect that a war between the United States and Japan would be the best means of reestablishing the former business activity of his factory. This view, I regret to find, appears to be prevalent among industrialists whose products may increase considerably by reason of military operations anywhere in the world. Reference in this connection is made to my despatches Nos. 578 and 579 of February 12 relative to press reports regarding the manufacture of ammunition and textile goods for both

the

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-2-

the Chinese and Japanese military establishments.

Reference may also be made here to a press item in the local Communist paper of yesterday's date according to which Rhine river shipmasters held a meeting at Duisburg-Ruhrort in which they decided to prevent the transportation of munitions or war material to the full extent of their ability.

Respectfully yours,



Leon Dominian,
American Consul General in charge.

Despatch in quintuplicate
Copy to Embassy, Berlin
Copy to Consulate General, Berlin
824
LD-VB

4 Carbon Copies

Received

JM

122

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD
No. 579.

793.94

AMERICAN CONSULATE
Stuttgart, Germany,

FEB 26 32

February 12, 1932.

SUBJECT: ALLEGED INCREASED MANUFACTURE OF WAR MATERIALS
AT THE I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith extracts
and translations thereof from the Süddeutsche Arbeiter-
Zeitung of February 10, 1932, concerning the increased
production of sodium nitrate and picrine for use in
the manufacture of explosives at the works of the
I.G. Farbenindustrie at Ludwigshafen-Oppau. It is
also alleged that the increased production of arti-
ficial silk at the I.G. Dye Works is a measure pre-
paratory to the manufacture of war materials for use
in the Far East.

As stated in my Despatch No. 580 the Süddeutsche
Arbeiter-Zeitung is the official publication of the
German Communist Party in Württemberg.

Respectfully yours,

Leon Dominian
Leon Dominian,
American Consul General in charge.

Enclosures:

F/LS
793.94/4454

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MAR 3 1932

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 29 1932

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MAR 3 1932

1 2 2
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

✓
Enclosures:

Press extracts and translation
thereof.

Despatch in quintuplicate.

Copy to Embassy, Berlin.

Copy to Consulate General, Berlin.

Copy to Consulate General, Frankfurt-on-
Main.

800/866.18/866.16

PJG:PVB.

Enclosure No.1
To Despatch No.579.
Stuttgart, Germany,
February 12, 1932.

Süddeutsche Arbeiter-Zeitung.

February 10, 1932.

I.G.FARBEN LIEFERN SPRENGSTOFF.

I.G. Farben liefern Sprengstoff

Arbeiterkorrespondenten enthüllen

Mannheim, 9. Febr. (Eig. Ber.) Von Arbeiterkorrespondenten erhält die „Arbeiter-Zeitung“ Mannheim die ungeheuerliche Meldung, daß seit einigen Tagen in der I.G. Farben Ludwigshafen-Opau die Produktion von Kriegsmaterial ungeheuer gesteigert wurde. Folgende Einzelheiten dienen als Beweise:

In der Anilin-Bau 26, 127 und 128 ist eine außerordentlich gesteigerte Natron-Salpeter- und Pikrin-Produktion eingetreten. Beides sind Materialien, die zur Produktion von hochwertigem Sprengstoff dienen. Das bisher zur Verwendung gekommene Quantum Soda reicht nicht mehr aus. Es werden jetzt zusätzlich zwei Schiffe Soda bezogen. Wie wir weiter erfahren, wird die Verladung der Produkte in Silo Opau Bau 9 vorgenommen. Die Verladung wird durch zwei französische Beamte überwacht. Wie wir weiter hören, soll in der I.G. Opau in der nächsten Zeit die Kunstseiden-Produktion erheblich gesteigert werden. Jeder weiß, daß die Kunstseiden-Produktion binnen kurzer Zeit zur Kriegsproduktion umgewandelt werden kann. Diese Tatsache ist um so bedeutsamer, weil allgemein bekannt ist, daß gerade die Kunst-

seiden-Produktion mit am schwersten unter der Wirtschaftskrise zu leiden hat. Trotzdem steigert die I.G. diesen Produktionszweig.

Im Zusammenhang mit den Enthüllungen der Hamburger Arbeiter-Korrespondenten über die Munitionstransporte im Hamburger Hafen sind diese Mitteilungen der Ludwigshafener Arbeiter-Korrespondenten von außerordentlicher Bedeutung. Es besteht kein Zweifel, daß die Pläne vom I.G. Farbentrust schon mitten im Geschäft mit den japanischen Imperialisten sind und es ist wahrscheinlich, daß die Sprengstoffe, die im Hamburger Hafen verladen werden, zum großen Teil aus Opau stammen.

Bezeichnend ist auch die Mitteilung, daß französische Beamte die Verladung der Sprengstoffe überwachen, tritt doch in dieser Tatsache die Verflechtung der Interessen der japanischen und französischen Imperialisten besonders deutlich zutage.

Enclosure No.2
To Despatch No. 579.
Stuttgart, Germany.
February 12, 1932.

SÜDDEUTSCHE ARBEITER-ZEITUNG

February 10, 1932.

TRANSLATION.

The "Arbeiter-Zeitung" Mannheim has received from worker correspondents the startling news that for the passed several days the production of war materials has vastly increased at the I.G. Dye Works in Ludwigshafen-Oppau. The following instances serve as examples:

In the Aniline Building Nos. 26, 127 & 128 there is a very large increased production of sodium nitrate and picrine. Both materials which are valuable in the manufacture of explosives. The quantity of soda which was on hand for ordinary use was not sufficient, therefore two further ship loads have been purchased. As we have further learned the storing of it is to take place in Silo Oppau, Building 9. It is watched over by two French officials. As we have further learned the production of artificial silk will be largely increased in the immediate future at the I.G. Works at Oppau. Everyone knows that the manufacture of artificial silk can be changed within a short time to the production of war material. This fact is all the more important as it is generally known that the artificial silk industry is one of the most effected by the economic depression. Notwithstanding this branch of the I.G. Works is increasing.

In connection with the disclosures of the Hamburg worker correspondents regarding the shipments of munitions from the Hamburg harbor these statements of the Ludwigshafen worker correspondent are of extreme importance. There is no doubt that the hyenas of the I.G. Dye Trust are doing business with the Japanese imperialists, and not unlikely that the greater part of the explosives shipped from Hamburg originated in Oppau.

The information that French officials oversee the shipment of explosives, shows clearly the fact that the interests of the Japanese and French imperialists are interlaced.

1227

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

NO. 580.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Stuttgart, Germany

February 12, 1932.

FEB 27 1932

Department of State

FEB 26 32

SUBJECT: ALLEGED SALES PROMOTION OF AMBULANCES BY
DAIMLER-BENZ COMPANY IN THE FAR EAST.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith extracts
and translations thereof from the Süddeutsche Arbeiter-
Zeitung of February 10, 1932, in which it is alleged
that the Daimler-Benz Automobile Company at Gaggenau
is attempting to capitalize the present situation in
the Far East by promoting the sale of its ambulances.

The Süddeutsche Arbeiter-Zeitung is the official
publication of the German Communist Party in Württem-
berg and it is believed its sources of information,
particularly in matters of this kind, come from mem-
bers of the Party employed in local manufacturing
plants.

While full credence cannot be given to the
reports it is believed that the strong desire to

stimulate

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- 2 -

stimulate business on the part of local manufacturers
at least lends color to the allegation.

Respectfully yours,



Leon Dominian,
American Consul General in charge.

Enclosure:

Press extract, and translation
thereof, in duplicate.

Despatch in quintuplicate.

Copy to Embassy, Berlin.

Copy to Consulate General, Berlin.

800/866.16

PJG:PVB.

122

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
To Despatch No. 580.
Stuttgart, Germany.
February 12, 1932.

SÜDDEUTSCHE ARBEITER-ZEITUNG

FEBRUARY 10, 1932.

DAIMLER WILL JAPAN AUTOS LIEFERN

Daimler will Japan Autos liefern

Das Wettrennen um die Kriegsgewinne

Gaggenau, 9. Februar. (Vlg. Bericht.) Beim Wettrennen um die Kriegsgewinne ist auch das Daimler-Benz-Unternehmen beteiligt. Wie wir erfahren haben, telegraphierte die Direktion von Daimler-Benz Gaggenau an die Auslandsvertretung Japans in Tokio, ob bei der ausgedehnten kriegsähnlichen Lage auf Lieferung von Krankenwagen für Heereszwecke zu rechnen sei. Gleichzeitig werden in den Autos schon die Frachtkosten anfallend.

So soll der japanisch-chinesische Krieg für die bankrotten deutschen Kapitalisten zu einem grandiosen Geschäft werden. Die Arbeiterklasse muß durch diese Rechnung einen dicken Strich machen!

123
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2
To Despatch No. 580.
Stuttgart, Germany.
February 12, 1932.

SÜDDEUTSCHE ARBEITER-ZEITUNG

FEBRUARY 10, 1932.

Translation.

DAIMLER WISHES TO DELIVER AUTOMOBILES
TO JAPAN.

In the race to make war profits the Daimler-Benz concern is also participating. As we have learned the management of the Daimler-Benz Works at Gaggenau has telegraphed to the foreign representative in Japan at Tokio as to whether in view of the extensive war situation the supply of motor ambulances for the use of the Army could be calculated upon. At the same time freight charges are being figured out in the offices.

In such a manner the bankrupt German capitalists are using the Chinese-Japanese War to recover their fortunes. The working classes must prevent this.

1231

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, SIR RONALD LINDSAY.

League of Nations - Sino-Japanese Conflict.

During the call of the British Ambassador today our conversation passed to the situation in Geneva. I took the occasion to point out that the attempts which were being made to sound out our position were premature; that the League of Nations was the only group possessing the machinery for an investigation and report upon an international controversy; that they had had this controversy before them for over four months and had not yet made any report as to the right or wrong of even the most elementary and cardinal features which stood out. I said I did not mean a report upon all the ultimate and difficult issues, but the plain ones which were staring us in the face; that until that was done - until the court had rendered a decision - it would be premature to discuss punishment, particularly with an outsider; that this country was so far ahead of them that they could not complain that we were standing in their path.

The Ambassador said something about the difficulties and inevitable character of sanctions under Article XVI. I replied that my analysis of the League covenant did not indicate that, and I pointed out that under Article XV

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

I thought the Council ^{or} of the Assembly to whom a case had been referred had the right to investigate and report and make recommendations which might include a set of sanctions which would be quite separate and distinct from the sanctions of Article XVI. I also pointed out that the sanctions of Article XVI did not constitute punishment for a controversy or offense which had been committed in the past and referred to the Council but solely to the new and separate offense which would be committed by a declaration of war after a report upon a party which had complied with the report; that in my opinion it would be quite possible for the Council ^{or} of the Assembly in its report to devise sanctions which were not like an embargo, liable to lead to war, but yet which would be very effective upon a country like Japan, and I said that in my letter to Senator Borah I had suggested one of them - the sanction of my note of January 7th - and I felt that the brains of the League could devise many other sanctions which would be effective and yet not war-like. After I had finished, he said that he thought he understood the analysis which I had pointed out.

HLS.

S HLS:EMS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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THE UNDER SECRETARY

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 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SECRETARY OF STATE
 FEB 24 1932
 SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 FEB 25 1932
 Department of State

W. W. H. 8 FE HCR

Memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador,
 February 23.

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The Ambassador said that he had a telegram from his Government asking him to inform the Department that reinforcements were being sent to Shanghai "for the protection of Japanese life and property." I told him that this was confirmation of what the papers had already said. He said that the Japanese were in very bad position in Shanghai and that it was necessary for them to get themselves out of this position, that they had supposed Chiang Kai-shek was more or less indifferent and that it had been a surprise to them to find his troops among the defenders. I said that it seemed to me quite natural that this should be the case, that possibly Chiang Kai-shek's indifference, as he called it, meant merely that he had to move very carefully as he hoped the dispute could be settled without violence, that on the other hand after the Japanese had delivered an ultimatum which had been fully accepted and then, in spite of the acceptance, had proceeded to attack the Chinese, Chiang Kai-shek might well have thought that there was no use any longer in temporizing. The Ambassador said that he did not see how the

Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

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Japanese troops could get out at the present moment because the Chinese would kill Japanese residents remaining near Shanghai. I told him that I appreciated this, but that I, nevertheless, had no sympathy with it for the reason that when the Japanese had told the Chinese to retreat for 20 kilometers leaving that space as a neutral zone, the Chinese said they would do this on condition that the Japanese Army also moved away. I said this had given the Japanese an opportunity to get out and to clear up the situation which they had not taken and that now it was, of course, difficult to see how they could retreat. I told him, further, that the apparently indefensible actions of the Japanese in Shanghai seemed to me to be having the almost unbelievable effect of really uniting China, that China was being united against Japan and that the result of this would presumably last for a long time.

The Ambassador asked me what I thought the future would bring. I said, of course, that it depended largely on Japan's actions, that it seemed to me that this sending of new troops would probably have a very disastrous effect from Japan's point of view at the meeting of the Assembly

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

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of the League. The Ambassador said that he fully agreed to this. I said that I thought the League would declare that Japan was carrying on aggressive warfare and that they might then proceed to sanctions. He asked me whether in that case he was not right in thinking that, whether or not the Congress declared a boycott on Japan, it would not lead to a virtual boycott. I told him I thought he was undoubtedly right and I said also that the whole thing made me unhappy, liking Japan as I did, because it would mean a world united against Japan on account of the utterly unwarranted actions of its military and that the result would be to put Japan back for a generation in the progress which had been so encouraging and really inspiring. The Ambassador said that when I was in Tokyo I had used the phrase "that Japan was the stabilizing influence in the Far East," that he felt this to have been a happy phrase at the time and that we must look forward to the Japan of the future as still a stabilizing influence. I told him that I thoroughly believed that I was telling the truth at the time, that I hoped it might be so once more in the future, but that at the present moment Japan was not only not the stabilizing influence, but was the most utterly disturbing influence. He said that the

Shanghai

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

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Shanghai incident was, he knew, an accident not in any way part of the plan of his Government, that the commanding officer of the Naval Forces had landed troops which had immediately got themselves into a bad position and had to be helped out. I said that, so far as I knew anything about it, I agreed with this, but that it seemed to me that one of the most tragic aspects of the whole, miserable matter was that there was no strong government in Japan. I said that a government was hardly worth their name which could allow itself openly to be defied by the military, especially when this defiance was not apparently the action of the entire military, but merely of the younger officers. The Ambassador had nothing to say to this except that he could not refute a just observation.

As to the political situation, he said that, although the Seiyukai Party was full of die hards, he was, nevertheless, glad that Seiyukai now had a real majority in the Diet. He was glad of this for the reason that while they did not have a majority they were trying to make all the trouble possible, that now, having a majority, they would feel the weight of responsibility and would probably be more reasonable. I told him that naturally I hoped this

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

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was the case, but that I thought reasonableness was not
enough, that there ought to be also courage to oppose
and punish those who were in the long run working against
the best interests of Japan.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 11 1982.

No. 715

CONFIDENTIAL. For Staff use only.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which took place on February 23rd between the Japanese Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State concerning the Sino-Japanese controversy.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

JAMES H. DUFFY

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
February 23.

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WE
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Feb. 26 1982.

A true copy of
the signed orig-
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 11 1932.

No. 270

CONFIDENTIAL. For Staff use only.

793.94/4457

The Honorable
W. Cameron Forbes,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which took place on February 23rd between the Japanese Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State concerning the Sino-Japanese controversy.

793.94/4457

Very truly yours,
For the Secretary of State:
JAMES H. JOHNS

1 enclosure:
Copy of memorandum of
February 23.

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Feb. 28 1932.

A true copy of
the signed orig-
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
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

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THE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL



February 25, 1932.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
 THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR, HERR FRIEDRICH W. VON PRITZWITZ
 UND GAFFRON.

Sino-Japanese Situation

The German Ambassador came and told me that he had reported to his Government the conversation that he had with me last, in respect to the ratification by the German Parliament of the Nine Power Treaty, and he read to me from a reply which he received from Chancellor Bruening which was in substance to the effect that the coming session of the Parliament was a very brief one, at which there were a number of critical political questions to come up and it therefore would be practically impossible to bring up any new subject; that there was then to be another short session in April which was expected to be devoted also to critical economic problems so that it would probably be impossible to have the question of the ratification of the Nine Power Treaty come up before next Fall. The Ambassador told me, however, that Doctor Bruening was strongly in favor of it. I said I realized quite well the difficulties of bringing up new subjects at short sessions from our own experience here and would understand perfectly

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MAR 7 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

perfectly any delay in regard to this.

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The Ambassador then brought up the subject of my letter to Senator Borah and the coming meeting of the Assembly and we had a talk on that subject. I told him first that I wanted his Government to be sure that, far from having any desire or intention to block or make difficult any action by the League, I regarded that the path our Government was following was not at variance but quite in harmony with that of the League but I said smilingly that I thought we were rather ahead of the League than behind it and that they were not yet in a position to ask us any question as to our policy as to sanctions. I pointed out that they were the only group of nations in the world which had a constitution of machinery designed to investigate and report on international issues, and that they had not yet used that machinery in order to clarify the issue between China and Japan. They have taken no step to indicate who is in the wrong and that until they had reached that position they were hardly in a position where they could discuss the question of punishment among themselves let alone ask outsiders about it. I pointed out to him very clearly that I did not intend by anything that I said to intimate that I was in favor of any forcible measures

or

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

or anything that would lead to more hostility than was already in existence. He said he agreed with me on all of this. In the course of his remarks, the Ambassador said something which made it seem appropriate for me to say that the situation in the Chinese-Japanese trouble seemed to me to be particularly easy and favorable for the use of the League machinery, in that the issue between the two powers seemed to be fairly simple in the opinion of the rest of the world. I pointed out that we rarely had a case of a controversy between two nations where one of them had a large army already on the soil of the other and, when he mentioned something about the possibility of a solution, I said that, so far as the cessation of hostilities was concerned, I was inclined to think that if the Japanese would stop attacking, the Chinese could be made stop hostilities in three hours. The Ambassador laughed and said he thought that was right.

HLS.

S HLS:CBS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
 SECRETARY STIMSON AND MR. HUGH WILSON AT GENEVA, FRIDAY,
 FEBRUARY 26, 1932, AT 12:05 P.M.

MR. WILSON: Hello, Mr. Secretary. Briefly, I had a telephone call from Mr. Rich of the World Peace Foundation.

SECRETARY: I know who you mean.

MR. WILSON: He stated that he had consulted you before initiating the movement for an economic boycott. He stated that he had learned at the State Department that the Department was very much in favor of the boycott and hoped that the Assembly would adopt a boycott.

SECRETARY: He said I said that?

MR. WILSON: No, that he learned that at the State Department.

SECRETARY: Well, he is a damned liar.

MR. WILSON: He further said that at a Cabinet meeting all the members of the Cabinet were in favor of an economic boycott except the President who is wavering on the matter.

SECRETARY: The matter has never been discussed in Cabinet.

MR. WILSON: I want to say, Mr. Secretary, that Sweetser came at once to me and we think he handled this very discreetly. We have discouraged him from making any use of this so-called information.

SECRETARY: Every statement he made, as you reported it to me, is false and you can tell Sweetser so. I was just on the point of sending you a telegram and I think I had better do it by telegram rather than by telephone, except I can say this, that you are correct in your statement about the law in respect to embargoes. The President has no authority except in America and in the countries with which we have capitulatory arrangements which would be China and
 which

793.94/4458 1/2

Confidential File

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

which would not include Japan.

MR. WILSON: Thank you very much.

SECRETARY: One other thing - I will say what else I have to say by telegram. I will try to get something off to you today.

MR. WILSON: All right.

SECRETARY: Good-bye.

124

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


REP

GRAY


London

Dated February 27, 1932

Rec'd 9:10 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.



90, February 27, 1 p. m.

Department's 74, February 26, 4 p.m.

Copies of the Secretary's letter to Senator Borah
have been forwarded by open mail and where possible by
airmail to all American missions in Europe and the
/ Near East.

ATHERTON

RR

KLP

F/LS 793.94/4459

MAR 3 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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3 21 1932

DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY AND PLAIN

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 27, 1932

Rec'd 9:36 a. m.


Secretary of State,

Washington.

121, February 27, 5 p. m.

Secretary of State's letter to Senator Borah was published in full in English language press of Shanghai on February 26th and Chinese translation made by this office was published in leading Chinese newspapers February 27th. No important Chinese editorial comment has yet appeared. (END GRAY).

Two. Juo Min News Agency published statement issued by Sun Fo and Eugene Chen regarding letter. Following is paraphrase of certain portions; most significant passage is that Nine Power Treaty must be considered in conjunction with agreement relating to disarmament in which United States willingly surrendered its then commanding lead in battleships construction and left its position in Guam and the Philippines without further fortifications. At this moment no single power can compel Japan to honor any treaty or international obligation to which she is a party. Neither America nor England alone can compel her though she can be coerced



F/LS 793.94/4460

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MAR 3 1932

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REP

2-#121, from Shanghai, Feb. 27, 5p.m.

coerced by Anglo-American naval combination. Should this combination be impracticable this last (*) of restraining Japan in her course of violence must eventually fall upon America and America must set about to retain her commanding lead to naval construction. On this view the eventual armed intervention of the United States in the present war is a necessity not only because America's honor and prestige deeply involved in Japan's contemptuous violations of the covenants of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact but because the safety and security of the United States and its nationals and possessions in the Pacific are under peril by the rulers of Japan.

Three. Commenting on Stimson's letter the SHANGHAI EVENING POST and MERCURY, American in editorial, February 26th states/ⁱⁿpart: "One need not be jingo or alarmed to perceive that nations which have relied upon the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, and which now see Japan calmly tearing these documents into scraps of paper, can hardly subscribe to any Japan made theory that 'the present situation effects only China and Japan'.

The situation involves us all, both personally and from an international point of view.

If Japan, heretofore highly vociferous in matters of honor and treaty observance, is definitely to subscribe to a

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REP

3-#121, from Shanghai, Feb. 27, 5p.m.

to a policy of outlawing her covenants with other powers, these powers will feel compelled to take steps of some sort. We go beyond Mr. Stimson's letter in pointing its logical implication.

Even Japan herself can have small stomach for a fresh international armament race; Japan at this moment is least prepared of all major powers for any such expensive policy. Japanese revenues are dwindling daily, Japanese expenses are mounting, and Japanese credits at least getting no better in the money marts of the world.

Why then persist in an attitude which Mr. Stimson has clearly defined and the consequences of which are equally clear?

We trust this question will be well pondered in Tokio, without delay and without further reckless moves down the skeleton bordered roads to disaster."

Four. The China press in editorial on February 26th commenting on Stimson's letter and reply of Japanese Government to appeal of twelve powers represented on Council of League of Nations states in part:

"The Chinese may be comforted by the fact that even if they should lose a military victory, their case will not be lost as the powers have made it sufficiently clear in their attitude which has been reiterated by Colonel
 Stimson

REP

4-#121, from Shanghai, Feb. 27, 5p.m.

Stimson in his open letter in which he emphasizes the restoration of the rights and territory that may have been lost to China."

(GRAY) Copy to the Minister, repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

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KLP

(*) Apparent omission

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FILE

793.94
note
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494.11 - Glasgow

RECEIVED
JUN 27 1932
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Rec'd 10:50 a. m.

ec'd 10:50 a.m.
Division of
FEB 27 1962
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4461

FILED

MAY 3 1932

Two. A later report is to the effect that the Japanese have been bombing a fort near Paoshan village. The Japanese now report that they have completely enveloped Kwanwan village making it impossible for the Chinese defenders to hold out much longer. They also claim

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REP

2-#123, from Shanghai, Feb. 27, 7p.m.

claim to have straightened their lines opposite Tazieng
village.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking. Copy to
Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

HPD

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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FEB 27 1932

DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 27, 1932

Rec'd 10:40 a. m.

FK

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

122, February 27, 6 p.m.

My telegram No. 73, February 18, 7 p.m.

Replies have been received to Senior Consul's letter
 February 18 to Mayor and Japanese Consul General regard-
 ing maintenance of trade and shipping.

Japanese reply dated 24th states inter alia:

"It has been the policy of the Japanese Government
 to cooperate with other powers concerned in keeping
 the trade and shipping of the port of Shanghai not
 interfered with, and the present crisis causes no
alternative in this policy of my Government."

Chinese reply also dated 24th states: (END GRAY)

"So far as the necessity of devising ways and means
 to keep up the commerce and shipping of Shanghai is
 concerned, the interested Chinese authorities and myself
 are in sympathy with you and your colleagues. This
 is why China has spared no effort in the maintenance
 and protection of the commercial and shipping interests
 of

793.94/4462

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MAR 3 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#122, from Shanghai, Feb. 27, 6p.m.

of Shanghai since the outbreak of local hostilities and it is presumed that you are aware of the exertion on her part. The Chinese authorities sincerely and deeply regret, however, that the utilization of the Settlement area by the Japanese troops as a base of attack on the Chinese forces and the carrying out of their aggressive policy have already produced a most disastrous effect upon the commerce and shipping of the powers at Shanghai. It is a matter of record that I have definitely and repeatedly told you and the representatives of the other friendly powers with whom the responsibilities should rest.

In view of your letter under acknowledgment, besides communicating with the Chinese authorities concerned so that they may continue the effort to maintain and protect the commerce and shipping of Shanghai, I have to transmit this reply for your information."

(GRAY) Copy to the Minister. Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

RR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.115 China National FOR telegram #71, 5pm
Aviation Corporation/4

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Feb.18,1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Protection of interests in China of the China National
Aviation Corporation,
Planes of the Company are now flying so as to avoid the
danger zone, and Japanese authorities have been so
informed.

793.94 / 4463

HSM


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Geneva

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone

Dated February 27, 1932

Rec'd 5:35 p.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

40, February 27, 8 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I discussed the substance of your 23, February 26,
7 p. m., with Drummond this afternoon who told me that
he was personally opposed to any invitation being issued
for the United States to take part in the Assembly and
was dubious whether the Assembly legally had such power.
He felt that should the question be raised in the Assembly
it would have to go to a legal committee for an opinion
and if the opinion was favorable he expects debate would
follow as to whether it was desirable and whether all
other non-member states should be invited. Thus a great
deal of time would be consumed.

He felt that there had been much loose talk on the
subject of severance of trade and financial relations

mostly

793.94/4464

FILED

#40, February 27, 8 p. m., from Wilson, Geneva

-2-

mostly from countries with nothing to lose and that it was certainly most important to avoid giving Japan any pretext to declare war either on the League as a whole or on any member thereof. Nevertheless, everything should be done short of giving an excuse for such extreme action. It was his opinion that at the present moment the Japanese state of mind might be ready to go to war with even Great Britain "should economic sanctions be undertaken." For these reasons, he did not feel that any proposal of such a nature would obtain support and would surely be rejected. One danger was that the Assembly might try to pass judgment on Japan to the effect that she had violated the Covenant which would seem to entail the application of Article 16. The Secretary-General agreed, however, that it would be an error to punish a prisoner before sentence was passed and thus it would be better to avoid passing any judgments till all the facts were at the disposal of the body, since the Covenant provides that the judgment itself would entail the immediate punishment.

Drummond's personal opinion was that the Assembly
would

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#40, February 27, 8 p. m., from Wilson, Geneva

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would probably adopt a resolution whereby all states undertook not to recognize solutions reached in this matter which were contrary to existing treaties and after that to set up an Assembly committee for executive action and eventually to report to the Assembly.

WILSON

FW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET _____ Tokio
This telegram must be _____
closely paraphrased be- Dated February 27, 1932
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone. Rec'd 11 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

RECEIVED
FEB 27 1932
DIVISION OF
FEB 29 1932
Department of State

793.94/4465

83, February 27, 10 p.m.

793.94

The French and British Ambassadors have both called
today the purport of their call being to express the hope
that the program indicated in my numbers 61 and 66 (last
paragraph) could be adhered to. They feel that the effect
of the Secretary's letter to Senator Borah has been extreme-
here
ly injurious/and has made the situation much more tense,
bringing it nearly to the danger point and has resulted
in a feeling of pressure being exerted upon the Japanese
from the outside such as we had hoped could be avoided for
the reason given in the second point raised in my telegram
No. 70. The effect of the publication here of the letter
certainly will tend to silence for the present the influ-
ences working from within for the correction of this diffi-
cult situation. The Japanese officials and the Japanese
public interpret the Secretary's letter as being distinctly
provocative. Many of the daily papers are talking now of
war,

MAR 5 1932

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MEC

2-#83 from Tokio, February 27,
10 p.m.

war, some refer to it as another world war; but it is undeniable that the United States is looked upon as the probable enemy. An economic boycott such as is suggested in the United States by people looked upon here as responsible is openly regarded as tantamount to war.

The feeling of tension which in my telegram No. 64 /4141 last paragraph I indicated as having been allayed, has become greatly increased again. And while none of the ~~some~~ heads here want war or failed to see how disastrous it would be they are not entirely in control ^{IN} and the [^] present state of public feeling and war frenzy an apparently small matter might precipitate a serious situation.

de Martel had a long talk yesterday with Yoshizawa whom he found greatly disturbed about the Secretary's ^{reports} letter which the Foreign Minister/has been very badly received.

Lindley also feels that the leading position the United States has taken in the publication of repeated protests and the vigorous tone of our expression of disapproval of

Japan's

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MET

3-#83 from Tokio, February 27,
 10 p.m.

Japan's course, and especially the Borah letter, has made the Japanese public feel that the United States is their enemy, the result may be that ~~the United States of America~~ ^{we would be} the last of the big nations Japan would turn to as a mediator or conciliator. Lindley is advising his Government again urging a waiting attitude. Both he and de Martel express the hope that no further official expressions of the United States of the sort that ~~Russian situation~~ ^{the Japanese} will interpret as provocative will be forthcoming until the present wave of resentment has died down and time given for the war frenzy now controlling the situation to subside. I strongly advocate this policy.

FORBES

KLP-RR

File No.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
 SECRETARY STIMSON AND HUGH WILSON, AT GENEVA, SUNDAY,
 FEBRUARY 28, 1932, AT 1:40 P.M.

MR. WILSON: Hello, Mr. Secretary, have you received my
 telegram No. 51?

SECRETARY: I have your 41, yes, but not 51.

MR. WILSON: The draft proposal---

SECRETARY: Well, now, wait a moment. Let me say something
 to you first. In the first place, I want to caution you
 against too much telephoning. Send what you can by cable.
 It is much more satisfactory. The connections are not good
 enough.

MR. WILSON: Yes.

SECRETARY: Now, the next thing, I want to give you the three
 points that I have had to consider in regard to the thing
 you telephoned me yesterday from Simon and also your reports
 before you give me the new matter. I want to give you these
 points. Simon's letter does not cover the details of the
 cessation of hostilities and it does not cover matters which
 will be the points on which there will be differences and
 trouble. I understand from that that he intends to leave
 those matters to be settled in Shanghai. Is that right?
 Have you got your proposed Simon letter again before you?

MR. WILSON: Yes.

SECRETARY: Well, now, No. 1 point reads as follows: "An
 immediate cessation of hostilities consolidated by arrange-
 ments made between the commanders in consultation with the
 military and naval authorities ----." I suggest that you
 put in there "the military, naval and civilian authorities".

MR. WILSON: Quite right.

SECRETARY:

793.94/4465 1/2

Confidential File

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SECRETARY: Now I understand that that leaves such details as the extent of the withdrawal of the Chinese to be arranged there.

MR. WILSON: Correct. Yes, sir.

SECRETARY: Subject to such instruction as may be given to our Minister there. Now I want to make this clear. You must be very careful and tell Sir John that we are unwilling to put ourselves in a position of bringing pressure upon the Chinese by the four powers to accept a manifestly unfair settlement in these respects. Do you see what I mean?

MR. WILSON: I understand that perfectly.

SECRETARY: The two powers - China and Japan - have been quarreling over how much each one shall withdraw. Each power is trying to save its face at the expense of the other. Now our people must be extremely careful not to bring the pressure of the four powers behind Japan and against China or vice versa. That arrangement must be manifestly fair on its face. Do you see?

MR. WILSON: Yes.

SECRETARY: Because that is the thing that is going to make more trouble than anything else. Now turn to No. 3 of Simon's draft. Have you got that?

MR. WILSON: Yes.

SECRETARY: "A declaration by China that she would enter into negotiations on the basis that the International Settlement must be preserved in tact." I am afraid that that will look to the Chinese as if the four powers were trying to take advantage of the Japanese attack on Shanghai to settle up some old scores of their own against China.

MR. WILSON: Yes, I understand.

SECRETARY: I don't like the word "intact". If Sir John means merely that China will make a declaration that she will enter into negotiations on the basis of securing life and

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and property in the Settlement, preserving them from danger, that would be different. But I am afraid that as he has drawn it, China will think that we are trying to force a settlement in our favor on the extraterritoriality system.

MR. WILSON: I see. I hadn't thought of that.

SECRETARY: Well you must think of it and tell Simon he must think of it. Now, in the next place, get this. I don't want anything in this proposed truce or settlement - there must be no understanding that this settlement which we are trying to make between China and Japan will by implication promise that the Assembly will not act in the way of giving notice that they will not recognize any settlement in violation of treaties. In other words, there must be no implication in this settlement that we agree that the Assembly shall not follow the suggestion that I made in my letter to Borah. Is that understood?

MR. WILSON: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY: Well, now, in the fourth place, after consideration of it, I rather like Sir John's original No. 4 about the other powers associating themselves with Great Britain better than the one which you proposed. I want to throw all the initiative upon Great Britain. You see?

MR. WILSON: Yes. Mr. Secretary, do you mind the initiative coming from the Council as I told you in my 41?

SECRETARY: No, if I understand it correctly. I understand from your 41 that the Council will simply express its willingness or its invitation to have the four powers act.

MR. WILSON: That it does. I have the draft of their proposal here.

SECRETARY: Read it to me slowly so that the stenographer can get it.

MR. WILSON:

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 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MR. WILSON: This is proposed to be read at a meeting of the Council tomorrow by the President of the Council.

"The imminence of hostilities ⁷lies still in the Shanghai region between Chinese and Japanese forces and its inevitable consequence, heavy loss of life and further embitterment of feeling, makes it at this critical moment the duty of all of us to lose no opportunity of seeking means ^{by} to which this armed conflict by two members of the League may be suspended and a way to peace may be found and followed.

The President called together his colleagues on the Council for the purpose of laying before them a proposal which might serve to this end. For its effective execution, this proposal will require solely acceptance of the Governments of China and Japan ^{and} by the cooperation on the spot of the other Governments who have special interests in the Shanghai settlement and whose representatives are therefore thoroughly available to make the local contribution of their friendly aid which is no less necessary than the positive and sincere agreement of the Chinese and Japanese authorities to the plans proposed.

It is as follows: An immediate cessation of hostilities consolidated by arrangements made between the commanders in consultation with the military and naval authorities---
 SECRETARY: Put in there civilian.

MR. WILSON: Yes. ---of the other principal powers represented in Shanghai who would render all possible assistance. 2. A conference to be immediately set up in Shanghai composed of representatives of China and Japan, together with representatives of the powers above referred to for the purpose of
 bringing

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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bringing about a final conclusion of fighting and the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Shanghai area.

3. The conference to be undertaken on the basis (a) that Japan has no political or territorial designs in this region and no intention of establishing a Japanese settlement in Shanghai or of otherwise advancing exclusive interests of the Japanese and (b) that China enter the conference on the basis that ^{Satisfy her independence of the} the International and French Settlements ^{maintain under arrangements which will preserve them for} must be preserved intact under arrangements which will secure ^{future danger} these areas and their residents from future danger."

Now I will make a note of your suggestion which will apply to that.

"Now this proposal, which is aimed at the immediate reestablishment of peace in the Shanghai area without prejudice to or qualification of the position previously taken up by any power in relation to Sino-Japanese affairs, the President desires in the name of himself and his colleagues to invite the adherence and cooperation both of China and Japan and of the other powers referred to whose local position enables them to make a special contribution to the common purpose of stopping armed conflict and to restoring peace."

That is the end of that document. Now we have been thinking here that Sir John Simon in supporting that document and seconding the proposal of the President, Paul Boncour, makes it clear that he has been in consultation with the American Government and is glad to be able to communicate the assurance that the American Government is prepared to associate itself with this step and to instruct its representatives in the Shanghai area to cooperate with the other interested powers. We have also drafted a letter which I might give to Drummond after the proposal has been accepted

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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accepted by the Council. Of course I will give it to him when the whole Council has adjourned - nothing public about it.

"My dear Sir Eric:

In reply to your letter of today's date in which you inform me of the proposal made by the Council which the Chinese and Japanese representatives have promised to transmit immediately to their respective Governments concerning the cessation of hostilities in the Shanghai area and a conference for the restoration of peace within that zone, I have to inform you that the Government of the United States is happy to associate itself with this effort - the reestablishment of peace.

The Government will instruct its representatives in Shanghai in the event that this offer is acceptable to the Chinese and Japanese Governments to cooperate with the representatives of the other powers. "

Now that is the whole program, Mr. Secretary. See if you don't think that paragraph No. 4 - my last paragraph on the draft proposal - takes care of your preoccupation regarding the excluding of the Manchurian matter.

SECRETARY: Well I thought it was rather weak as you read it.

MR. WILSON: May I read it again to you? "Now this proposal, which is aimed at the immediate reestablishment of peace in the Shanghai area without prejudice to or qualification of any position previously taken up by any power--

SECRETARY: No, No. There is a weakness right there because the Council of the League has taken up just as strong a position on Manchuria as we have and I will not let them duck out of it.

MR. WILSON:

- 7 -

MR. WILSON: "Previously taken up by the Council or any powers"?

SECRETARY: Yes, "by the Council of the League of Nations or any power".

MR. WILSON: "previously taken up by the Council of the League of Nations or any power". Yes, that strengthens it.

SECRETARY: You bet. You have got to watch that every time. The other would be too weak. I would not accept it. Well, now, I think you have got to let me have time to think this over, and I would like to know what answer they make to my suggestions that I read to you first.

MR. WILSON: I am almost certain that they will accept those, Mr. Secretary. There won't be any difficulty about that.

SECRETARY: Well, I will look over it with every effort to agree. I may have one or two suggestions that I can cable you.

MR. WILSON: Mr. Secretary, can't you telephone again because it is acting tomorrow morning.

SECRETARY: I know, but if I cable you, won't my cable get to you for tomorrow morning?

MR. WILSON: Not in time to take action with all the interested powers. You see, it is now here half-past seven and that means that if I get a telegram from you, I won't be able to have it until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning, if then, probably 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, and it does not give us time to do anything.

SECRETARY: What time do they meet?

MR. WILSON: It is not set definitely. They want to meet at 11, if possible. It is a question of saving hours before the fighting starts again.

SECRETARY:

- 8 -

SECRETARY: I know, but they are not going to start in any such hurry as they think. What I mean is that if the Japanese are in the frame of mind which makes this matter a successful possibility and if they know that we are conferring on this subject, I can hardly conceive of their rushing ahead with a new attack. But I will do it as quickly as I can, but I must have time to think and I must have time to confer here.

MR. WILSON: Yes, sir, of course, but I wonder if you couldn't telephone me this evening.

SECRETARY: I will try to telephone this afternoon.

MR. WILSON: If you could do that, I will stay in any time. I want to see Sir John, of course tonight.

SECRETARY: I will try to telephone you before four o'clock this afternoon - that's ten o'clock your time.

MR. WILSON: Mr. Secretary, Simon is very anxious to summon Matsudaira and to have me present. He is under the impression that pressure on Japan is apt to be effective and he feels that Matsudaira must be convinced of the unity of purpose of Great Britain and America and of the grave danger to Japan which the Assembly might possess if they have done nothing before hand. Do you care to have me do that with him?

SECRETARY: No, I would not. It is enough for Sir John to assure him that he has conferred with us. No, I don't think you had better go, and I don't want any implication, as I told you before, that if this thing is done, the Assembly will not act at least to the extent of giving notice that they will not recognize any settlement which is made in the violation of a treaty. That must be absolutely clear, otherwise I won't go in. I want you to say that to Sir John and watch his reaction.

MR. WILSON:

- 9 -

MR. WILSON: Just repeat that to me.

SECRETARY: That in going into these negotiations, there is no implication that if such a settlement is made, the Assembly will not act in respect to making a resolution that they will not recognize any situation or settlement which is in violation of the existing treaties.

MR. WILSON: Yes.

SECRETARY: Well, now, look at my Borah letter. You have got it - you see what the thing is.

MR. WILSON: There is one other point. Matsudaira has not yet received definite instructions from his Government. There are, therefore three hypotheses which you might contemplate: (1) that he will be instructed to accept for Japan; (2) that he will be without instructions but will be willing to transmit the proposal; and (3) that he will be instructed to decline the proposal. Under the third assumption, you would not want the United States to be associated?

SECRETARY: No, no.

MR. WILSON: Just a minute, sir. Yen called this afternoon to see me, and he told me that he would be entirely satisfied with the proposed arrangement if we expressed ourselves satisfied. I spoke, of course, to Sir John Simon regarding it.

SECRETARY: We can't tell until we see what the proposals are.

MR. WILSON: He is entirely trusting that if we come in with this, he will be reassured.

SECRETARY: He means any proposals in these original letters that we are discussing now.

MR. WILSON: No, he means this idea of the Council putting it up.

SECRETARY:

- 10 -

SECRETARY: I know what you mean. That is what I mean. But the real trouble will come at Shanghai and I can't pass on that until that comes. Do you understand?

MR. WILSON: Yes, and I won't say a word to Yen, of course, until I hear from you again.

SECRETARY: All that you can assure Yen is that we see no objection to the present proposals so far as they have gone. Do you see that?


MR. WILSON: Yes.

SECRETARY: The real danger of the controversy will come in the details which are to be settled at Shanghai.

MR. WILSON: Of course. All right.

SECRETARY: All right. Good Bye.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
 AND HUGH WILSON, AT GENEVA, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1932, AT
 4:45 P.M.

SECRETARY: Hello, Wilson. I have been over that and it is all right. I am sending you a cable of confirmation, which repeats for greater certainty the things I told you over the telephone.

MR. WILSON: Say that again, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY: I say that I am sending you also a cable which confirms my present notification to you, and in that cable I repeat the conditions which I told you over the telephone.

MR. WILSON: Yes.

SECRETARY: That will go as quickly as possible. The telephone conversation has been written up and if you got it as clearly as we have at this end, it seems to me all right.

MR. WILSON: Yes. I have something to say to you Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY: So far as your letter associating us with the proposal is concerned, I am inclined to think it would be better to have it made public than to keep it unpublished. You may, therefore, publish it if you want to.

MR. WILSON: I have seen the Tokyo with reference to your apprehension action to the assembly from concurring. It will not recognize the treaties. Sir John is strongly of the opinion that the assembly will adopt it but does not think that this action will in any way impede - also, Sir Drummond says that he does not think the action will in any way affect the situation one way or the other. He proposes to convoke the assembly.

SECRETARY: All right.

MR. WILSON:

793.94/4465 3/4

Confidential File

-2-

MR. WILSON: Now, in paragraph 1 you suggest the insertion of the words "and civilian".

SECRETARY: Yes, that is, the civilian authorities.

MR. WILSON: In paragraph 4, the final paragraph, you suggest the insertion of the words "the League of Nations".

SECRETARY: Yes.

MR. WILSON: Sir John accepts. With reference to the Chinese undertaking paragraph 3, subheading (b), Sir John suggests very tentatively that it might read as follows: "That China enter the conference on the basis that the safety and integrity of the international and French settlements must be preserved under arrangements which will secure these areas and their residents from further danger."

SECRETARY: I am inclined to think that is pretty good. Something further?

MR. WILSON: Now, Mr. Secretary, just one thing more. I only telephoned you because of the question of time, and I must send a cable myself.

SECRETARY: Yes, it has been pretty hard to answer these questions by telegram because they are so important.

MR. WILSON: Yes, I know they are. I will cable the text in toto as revised.

SECRETARY: I think that answers my questions all right, and I am satisfied as you state them.

MR. WILSON: Just one thing more. This evening it was suggested to postpone the meeting, but whether or not this will be done, I do not know. Speaking in a personal capacity, Matsudaira likes the truce very much. Sir John has had a despatch from the British Ambassador in Shanghai relating

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

relating that direct conversation is now going on between the Chinese and Japanese and it may be that Matsudaira is in on these conversations.

SECRETARY: Well, is that all?


MR. WILSON: Yes.

SECRETARY: All right. I think that you have done very well. Good night.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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


This telegram must be _____ GENEVA
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated **FROM** Dated February 27, 1932
to anyone.

Rec'd 11:40 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington



VERY URGENT

41, February 27, midnight.

CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY

Telephone communication apparently impossible
tonight.

I have seen Sir John Simon and have spoken to him
regarding your views.

Point one. Regarding the proposals that the action
contemplated is not to be construed as a waiver of the
position heretofore taken by the Powers in their former
notes and statements Sir John is in hearty accord and
thinks the suggestion of value.

Two. Regarding the necessity for a further intima-
tion from Matsudaira as to the acceptability of this
action to the Japanese Government Sir John suggested
that we are on the edge of a serious battle, that any-
thing

F/LS 793.94/4466

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man

2- #41, from Geneva, February 27,
1932

anything that he can do with even moderate hope of success is worth the effort and that ^{certainly} / our public would approve our action in any endeavor to prevent such a catastrophe. Matsudaira had told him of Debuchi's demarche and this strengthened the conviction of Sir John that the Government was at least hopeful that such a demarche would put them in a position to make their desire prevail for a cessation of hostilities.

Point three. Since speaking to me this afternoon Sir John had seen Boncour and Grandi and found them, he thought, very favorable to the idea but his own ideas after talking to them have undergone some change. He points out that he would like, if possible, not to disassociate the Council from this attempt and what he would like to do would be to have a meeting of the twelve Monday morning, present to them a draft of a letter to Matsudaira and Yen. He is convinced that he can get approval to any draft which he proposes, that the Council members will be delighted at Great Britain taking the initiative in the Council in this respect and he envisages this letter to contain a suggestion from

man

3- #41, from Geneva, February 27,
1932

from the Council that the negotiations regarding the cessation of hostilities and the subsequent negotiations for the reestablishment of peace in Shanghai be left to the Powers directly interested, at the same time making it known that the United States is ready to cooperate in this step for the reestablishment of peace.

Point four. Simon suggests that he, Drummond, Norman Davis and myself meet for lunch tomorrow and draft text of resolution to be presented to Council by Simon as well as a letter from me to Drummond stating that the United States would be happy to cooperate with the other powers principally interested in Shanghai who have been designated by the Council to restore peace. The intention is that the text should be ready to be handed in the moment the resolution is passed.

Point five. Your suggestion which I have discussed in point one will, of course, be incorporated in the Council resolution.

Point six. I will telephone tomorrow evening at approximately twelve o'clock Washington time to submit to you drafts of Council resolution and my proposed letter.

KLP

WILSON

7

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 5 1932

Geneva

DIVISION OF

AFRICA

FROM Dated February 29, 1932

Rec'd 9:20

11:38th

FAR EASTERN

FEB 29 1932

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

43, February 29, 1 a. m.

For confirmation. The following is the text of the note which I read to you over the telephone and which I propose sending to Sir Eric Drummond after he has informed me of Council action with reference to cessation of hostilities in Shanghai:

"My dear Sir Eric:

In reply to your letter of today's date in which you inform me of the proposal made by the Council (which the Chinese and Japanese representatives have ~~projected~~ ^{promised} to transmit immediately to their respective governments) concerning the cessation of hostilities in the Shanghai area and a conference for the restoration of peace with- in that zone, I have to inform you that the Government of the United States is happy to associate itself with this effort for the reestablishment of peace.

My Government will instruct its representatives in

F/LS

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WE

123
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 43 from Geneva

in Shanghai, in the event that this offer is acceptable
to Chinese and Japanese Governments, to cooperate with
the representatives of the other powers.

Believe me my dear Sir Eric very sincerely yours".

WILSON

OIB

128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
CJH

GRAY

SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

Dated February 28, 1932

Rec'd. 9:35 a.m.



FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.


126, February 28, 11 a.m.

FOLLOWING FROM CAPTAIN MAYER.

For the War Department.

15.

About four hundred replacements for 24th Brigade landed from SHANGHAI MARU last night, note 24th brigade has hitherto erroneously been called 12th Brigade. Japanese report some 900 arrived on 26th. Also said Kiangwan completely occupied 27th probably true and that their casualties since January 28th total about 1,100 probably more. Excepting Kiangwan line practically unchanged. Japanese using Woosung railway from Changwahpang to Kiangwan for supply. Repeated visits to Japanese headquarters evidence poor police and wire discipline. Two thousand troops of 21st Route army old Feng troops under Lian Kwan Ying reported in Nading twenty miles west of Shanghai on 23rd, more expected. 87th and 88th Divisions organization is regiments of three battalions of five companies,



F/LS

793.94/4468

MAR 5 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 2 - # 126 from
Shanghai.

companies, three rifles, one machine gun, six
guns and one artillery, three thirty-seven
millimeter guns. Whereabouts of 11th Japanese
Division still uncertain.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

ARL


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM

GRAY

Geneva

Dated February 29, 1932

Rec'd 9:05 a.m.

F/LS

793.94/4469

Secretary of State,

Washington

VERY URGENT, TRIPLE PRIORITY.

45, February 29, 2 p.m.

In view of situation outlined in my 44, February 29, 1 p.m., of which Simon thinks Matsudaira has knowledge, it is desired by Simon and Drummond slightly to alter phraseology of the proposal to be made by the President of the Council in respect only of paragraph three.

It is proposed that that point two shall become point one, point three shall become point two, and that then follows a paragraph in which the Council welcomes the news of negotiations which are proceeding for the immediate cessation of hostilities, offers assistance if desired of civilian, military and naval authorities of interested powers to consolidate the arrangements.

Drummond and Simon are now very anxious to hold the

Council

FILED
 MAR 1 1932

MET

2-#45 from Geneva, February 29,
2 p.m.

Council meeting late this afternoon and are now seeing Matsudaira for this purpose. I shall, therefore, feel obliged to telephone you as soon after 10 o'clock, Washington time, as I can reach you in order to lay before you the proposed text of the new point three. The other procedure remains as already agreed upon. We believe here as do Drummond and Sir John that the changed phraseology will not affect the situation except perhaps for the better and that the whole arrangement should stand.

We believe, as we feel sure you will, that advantage should be taken of this matter as urgently as possible but before giving final approval we hope to hear from you.

WILSON

HPD

KLP

1285

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
33 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

GRAY

SHANGHAI

FROM

Dated February 28, 1932

Rec'd. 10:58 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 29 1932
Department of State

124, February 28, 5 p.m.

F/DEW

793.94/4470

FILED

MAR 5 1932

One. Continuing my daily report. Continued aerial raids, cursory bombardment Chapei, sporadic fighting along entire line, arrival of both Japanese and Chinese reinforcements, great destruction property by numerous fires in Chapei, heavy casualty lists are prominent features of 31st day of Sino-Japanese conflict. Thirty-one days of successful defense by Chinese forces in vicinity of Shanghai has astounded and aroused the admiration of all observers. The arrival of Japanese reinforcements, their aircraft, superior and heavier armament, their adequate supply of ammunition, greater discipline and military efficiency, complete unity of purpose must prevail over Chinese in a very short time. Pin pricks will follow for a very long time the major conflict. The 19th route Army has won for itself the gratitude of the mass of Chinese and while its commander has constantly declared that

CJH

Page 2 - #124 from
Shanghai.

declared that it was a part of the National Army the well informed have not yet been able to accept without reservation that such assurance carries with it the support of any large number of the commands of other divisions who unquestionably jealous of his successful defense. There are many evidences that both disputants are weary of the hostilities and this gives hope of the correctness of the views expressed in today's news from Tokyo that there is hope for a mutual agreement for evacuation and withdrawal.

Two. The restoration of the International Settlement to Municipal authorities has advanced considerably during recent days and an officer of the Settlement states that functioning is "quite a bit better". Much remains to be done, however, before it will come completely under the control of the municipality, nor will it be complete until the withdrawal of Japanese forces whose continued occupation has resembled that of a dictator.

Three. American evacuation plans were issued last night, hoping to allay the nervous tension aroused by the issuance of the first notice cards for evacuation to the British subjects some days since. I am satisfied that the likelihood

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 3 - #124 from
Shanghai.

that the likelihood of a state of extreme emergency is very remote and the publication of plans may inspire the thousands of Americans with confidence imprecipitating arrangements that have been made. Obviously shells will continue to fall in the foreign area so long as hostilities continue in environs. We have been quite lucky so far and it is certain that both disputants are making some effort to prevent serious harm from outside the Settlement to that part of the Settlement which is south of Soochow Creek. The internal precautions taken by the police authorities and foreign military forces are as good as can be made. Those in charge are prepared to evacuate Americans in event of extreme emergency but I have confidence such extreme emergency is very unlikely indeed.

Repeated to Legation and Nanking.

CUNNINGHAM

ARL

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MET

GRAY

FROM Geneva

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 5 1932

Dated February 29, 1932

Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

URGENT. TRIPLE PRIORITY.

44, February 29, 1 p.m.



F/LS

793.94/4471

Sir John Simon has received a message from his Foreign Office stating that Admiral Kelly in Shanghai reports that at 7 p.m. Sunday, Shanghai time, at the request of the Japanese Admiral Nomura a meeting was held on his flagship between Matsuoka and Nomura for Japan, and Wellington Koo and General Gaston Wang for China in the presence of Kelly. The meeting was of the most friendly spirit and lasted two and one half hours. During the meeting the principle of a simultaneous and mutual evacuation was agreed to also it was agreed that neutral observers together with Chinese and Japanese should control evacuated area.

The results of the conversation have been referred to the respective Governments but it is not expected that a

reply

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#44 from Geneva, February 29,
1 p.m.

reply can reach Shanghai from Tokyo until Wednesday,
Shanghai time. Further telegram follows.

WILSON

WSB

HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FEB 29 1932

MR. ROGERS

Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 29, 1932

Rec'd 5:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

285, February 29, 1 p. m.

Following from Reuter, Shanghai, February 28:

"Determine to complete the destruction of the Hangchow
airdrome, three Japanese bombing machines flew there this
morning and loosened bombs containing high explosives.
The hangars were blown, fire destroying what remained.
No Chinese aeroplanes were there, all having been
removed following the previous attacks. The Japanese
pilots on their return reported that not a single
Chinese soldier was to be observed nor were they fired
on by anti-craft guns.

Fifteen hundred men, the advance guards of the
Japanese Eleventh Division, arrived at Woosung at five
p. m. this afternoon on board a flotilla of destroyers
from Japan. They passed the Woosung forts under a
covering fire and landed at the wharves of the Shanghai
Woosung Railway. They will spend the night at Woosung
and it is understood that they will be thrown into the
Japanese line at Kiangwan early tomorrow morning. The
main

F/LS

793.94/4472

FILED

MAR 5 1932

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REP

2-#285, from Peiping, Feb. 29, 1p.m.

main body of the Eleventh Division is expected tomorrow. The first transport bringing the main body of the Eleventh Division tied up at the Japanese wharf inside the International Settlement at eight fifteen p. m. and is now unloading troops. Other transports are expected up the river tomorrow morning.

The Chinese troops no longer hold Kiangwan. After fighting to retain it for more than a week they have voluntarily relinquished because of the intolerable conditions within the town. It is stated that the streets are littered with dead civilians killed by Japanese bombing planes. Chinese officials declared that in the streets alone sixteen hundred dead civilians have been counted while the debris of what was once a town undoubtedly cover hundreds more. These bodies have polluted the water supply and the stench makes it impossible to continue there, while Japanese constant attacks with artillery and from the air makes it impossible to bury them. Therefore the Chinese have evacuated to a line of entrenchments immediately west of Kiangwan. The Japanese formally occupied the town this morning. There was fighting along the front all the afternoon but the Japanese attacks failed to dislodge

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-#285, from Peiping, Feb. 29, 19.m.

dislodge the Chinese from their new positions. One
Japanese transport has gone alongside Wayside Wharf
in the International Settlement."

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

WSB

123

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
GRAY MAR 5 1932
Geneva DIVISION OF
Dated February 28, 1932

Recd 10:40 p.m.


Secretary of State
Washington.

42, February 28, midnight.

Confirming telephone conversation this evening
text follows herewith of the draft proposal to be read
by the President of the Council and handed to the Japanese
and Chinese representatives at the meeting of the Council
presumably Monday:

"One. The imminence of hostilities on the largest
scale in the Shanghai region between Chinese and Japanese
forces with the inevitable consequence of heavy loss of
life and further embitterment of feeling makes it at this
critical moment the duty of all of us to lose no opportunity
of seeking means by which this deplorable armed conflict
between two members of the League may be suspended and a
way to peace may be found and followed.

Two. The President has therefore called together
his colleagues on the Council for the the purpose of laying
before



F/LS 793.94/4473

FILED

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-3- 42 from Wilson, Bergues, Geneva.

before them a proposal which might serve to this end. For its effective execution, this proposal will require not only the acceptance of the Governments of China and Japan, but later cooperation on the spot of the other principal powers who have special interests in the Shanghai Settlements and whose representatives are therefore readily available to make the local contribution of their friendly aid which is no less necessary than the positive and sincere agreement of the Chinese and Japanese authorities to the plan proposed.

Three. This plan is as follows:

(1) An immediate cessation of hostilities consolidated by arrangements to be made between Japanese and Chinese Commanders in consultation with the military naval and civilian authorities of the other principal powers represented in Shanghai who would render all possible assistance.

(2) A conference to be immediately set up in Shanghai composed of representatives of the Governments of China and Japan together with representatives of the other powers above referred to for the purpose of bringing about a final conclusion of fighting and the restoration of
of

-3- # 42, from Wilson, Bergues,
Geneva.

of peaceful conditions in the Shanghai area.

(3) The conference would be undertaken on the
basis

(a) That Japan has no political or territorial
designs in this region and no intention of establishing
a Japanese settlement in Shanghai or of otherwise advancing
the exclusive interest of ~~the~~ Japanese, and

(b) That China enter the Conference on the basis
and
that the safety/integrity of the International and French
Settlements must be preserved under arrangements which will
secure these areas and their residents from further danger.

(4)- To this proposal, which is aimed at the immediate
reestablishment of peace in the Shanghai area, without
prejudice to or qualification of any position previously
taken by the League of Nations or any power in relation
to the Sino-Japanese affairs, the President desires in
the name of himself and his colleagues to invite the
adherence and cooperation both of China and Japan and of
the other powers referred to, whose local position enables
them to make a special contribution to the common purpose
of stopping armed conflict and restoring peace."

WILSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

FROM

Undated

Rec'd February 29, 1932
9:30 a.m.

FEB 29 1932
Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

130.

Japanese Consulate General informed me by telephone this afternoon that Consulate General is sending letter to Mayor of Shanghai municipality informing him that Japanese have information that Chinese military are concentrating reinforcements in and around Shanghai by means of railways; that if this concentration continues Japanese forces in self-defense may be forced to destroy railway lines and military trains between Kashing and Shanghai on the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway and between Soochow and Shanghai on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway on and after March 2nd. Japanese Consulate General states this period of grace is given to allow Chinese civilians to evacuate the areas along railway lines.

Repeated to the Legation, Nanking and Tokyo for information. Copy to the Minister. Warning is being sent by me to places along railways where there are Americans.

WSB - RR

CUNNINGHAM

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
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
 SECRETARY STIMSON AND HUGH WILSON, AT GENEVA, MONDAY,
 FEBRUARY 29, 1932, AT 10:00 A. M.

MR. WILSON: Hello, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY: Yes, is that you Hugh?

MR. WILSON: Yes, Have you got my 44 and 45 of this morning?

SECRETARY: Yes, I have them here.

MR. WILSON: You have them. The Council of Twelve is now sitting. The public session will meet at six o'clock Geneva time: in two hours. In the President's proposal a slight alteration has been made to the effect in the first paragraph that the news that we have received from the British representative that conversations actually took place yesterday at Shanghai with a view to making arrangements for a cessation of hostilities and that the proposed arrangements be referred to their respective governments is welcomed by us all and the Council of the League is ready to make its contribution to the work of ~~making~~ the consolidation of peaceful conditions in the way and at the time which is most useful.

SECRETARY: Well, then that takes the place of the paragraph beginning "The imminence of hostilities---"?

MR. WILSON: No sir, that is intact down to the words "a way to peace may be found and followed".

SECRETARY: Oh, yes. Then the new paragraph follows that.

MR. WILSON: Here is the text. It is paragraph 3, subheading 3. In my telegram No. 45 I explained that in paragraph 3 point 1 becomes point 2 and point 2 becomes point 1, and point 3 becomes point 2.

SECRETARY: Yes, I have that before me. The trouble is that in the dictating of this yesterday we did not get down the paragraph exactly as you evidently have it so that it is hard to follow you on the stenographic record of the talk.

All

793.94/4474 1/2

Confidential File

- 2 -

All I want to know is what is the new part, and is that what you have just read to me.

MR. WILSON: That is new, but it is not important. "The President has therefore called together his colleagues, etc."- that is still intact.

SECRETARY: Down to "to the plans proposed".

MR. WILSON: That is intact, yes.

SECRETARY: What follows that, No. 1 or No. 2?

MR. WILSON: That is the third paragraph, and then follows point 1.

SECRETARY: And that begins "An immediate cessation of hostilities".

MR. WILSON: The second paragraph takes the place of point 1.

SECRETARY: Don't say point 2 and point 1. The last words I have before me are "the positive and sincere agreement of the Chinese and Japanese authorities to the plans proposed".

MR. WILSON: "This plan is as follows: 1. A conference to be immediately set up in Shanghai composed of representatives of the Governments of China and Japan. "

SECRETARY: Yes, I have that. What has become of the paragraph headed "An immediate cessation of hostilities consolidated by arrangements made between the commanders in consultation with the military and naval authorities---". It comes after "the conference to be set up"?

MR. WILSON: No, sir. "The conference to be undertaken on the basis (a)" comes next, and then follows this paragraph. Are you ready? "The meeting of this conference is of course subject to the making of local arrangements for a cessation of hostilities. The assurance is that this will very speedily be brought about. It is proposed that the military, naval and civilian authorities of the other principal powers represented

- 3 -

resented in Shanghai will all possible assistance in consolidating the arrangements." Is that clear?

SECRETARY: Yes. Well, I don't see that that makes any material change in what you had before, does it?

MR. WILSON: No, it simply coincides with the new information.

SECRETARY: Yes, the new information.

MR. WILSON: Mr. Secretary, Yen tells us that his Government has agreed to the terms of an armistice; that the Japanese have confirmation that negotiations are going on and they feel very hopeful about them.

SECRETARY: Yes, I see. In other words, China has already agreed and we are waiting for Japan?

MR. WILSON: That is it. This afternoon the Japanese delegates will accept the proposal and referendum.

SECRETARY: Yes, I see.

MR. WILSON: The Chinese delegation will recommend ~~to~~ its acceptance to its Government. Now that is all I have to tell you, with one exception. My letter to Sir Eric - have you a copy before you?

SECRETARY: Yes, I have it right here.

MR. WILSON: Well, now it reads as follows:

"My dear Sir Eric:

In reply to your letter of today's date in which you inform me of a proposal made by the Council (which the Chinese and Japanese representatives have promised to transmit immediately to their respective Governments) concerning a conference for the restoration of peace within the Shanghai area and the negotiations now going on towards the immediate cessation of hostilities in that zone, I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States is happy to associate itself with this effort towards the re-establishment

of

- 4 -

of peace." The second paragraph is the same as before.

Have you got that?

SECRETARY: Yes, I get that. Wait a minute. I assume that the reservation about the Manchurian matter is still in the Council's proposal?

MR. WILSON: Certainly. That is right intact.

SECRETARY: Yes, I see, and nothing has occurred to change my wishes about the Assembly's freedom?

MR. WILSON: No, on the contrary, that is stronger than ever. It is the impression that that must be done.

SECRETARY: All right, that is first rate. Go ahead, I am very glad to hear it.

MR. WILSON: Yen has sent this telegram over to us, which he received from his Government.

SECRETARY: A new telegram you are going to read me?

MR. WILSON: Yes, it says that "the British Admiral Kelly invited Koo and other Chinese and Japanese authorities to a meeting on his flagship. Here he proposed cessation of hostilities and simultaneous withdrawal of troops of both sides to be supervised by neutrals. This is to be followed by the Japanese embarking. We find the proposal reasonable and are inclined to accept, though the Japanese, who are referring it to their Emperor, may reject". Is that all, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY: That seems to be all right. You can go ahead.

MR. WILSON: All right. Goodbye.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM


GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 29, 1932

Rec'd 8:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



PRIORITY.

February 29, 10 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I learn on what appears to be reliable authority that Japanese are extending feelers for conference with Chinese on the basis of mutual withdrawal. Japanese are understood to be suggesting in addition a round table conference of all powers to discuss future of Shanghai. At such a conference it is stated Japanese will propose a demilitarization of 20 kilometer area and that area covered by Chapei both south and north of railway and area between Woosung Railway and Whangpoo River north of Yangtzepoo to be added to area of International Settlement. Japanese state they desire no concession of their own.

Above obviously is a bid for foreign support of Japanese terms.

I am informed authoritatively that a meeting of both sides

F/LS 793.94/4475

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-from Shanghai, Feb. 28, 10 a.m.

sides participated in by Matsuoka and Wellington Koo actually took place last night on His Britannic Majesty's ship KENT but I am still trying to get confirmation of above proposals. I have no doubt, however, that above represents military idea of suitable settlement of what Japanese are pleased to term the Shanghai question. As a Government I suggest that we will have to consider our attitude toward this or some similar set of proposals in light of our known policy in regard to Shanghai. Proposal to add suggested area to International Settlement would be a blow to Chinese pride as area in question is place where they were planning to establish administrative center of new and greater city of Shanghai. My informant Hallett Abend, who I understand ^{telegraphed} telephoned above to NEW YORK TIMES, states that above proposals were laid before Chinese last night who referred them to Nanking and Lo Yang.

JOHNSON

WSB

KLP

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 29, 1932

Rec'd 9:45 a. m.

Division of
 Affairs
 FEB 29 1932
 Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4476

793.94
 893.102
 793.94119

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

February 29, 2 p. m.

My February 29, 10 a. m.

At the request of Admiral Nomura two and a half hour conference held on H. M. S. KENT beginning one p. m. February 28th. Japanese representatives Maturoka and Nomura; Chinese representatives Koo and Gaston Wong; neutrals Admiral Kelly and Commodore Leighton.

The principle of mutual and simultaneous evacuation agreed to. The Japanese, Chinese and neutral Commission to control evacuation and Chinese to police. No agreement made on 20 kilometer demand. The Japanese resisting because it was in their original demands. Chinese likewise resist. They discussed various proposals including the temporary evacuation of Woosung. A proposal to make the radius 10 miles or the Chinese to withdraw to Jenrude and the Japanese to the Settlement and then Chinese withdraw to Nanchang until Japanese embark.

Both sides have forwarded proposals to their Governments. Chinese reply expected today. Japanese reply expected

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- from Shanghai, Feb. 29, 2p.m.

expected on March 2nd when the next meeting will take place and will include military commanders.

JOHNSON

KLP

WSB

1305

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM-SENT

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Collect
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OR
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Department of State

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

Washington,
February 29, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL,
SHANGHAI (China) FEB 29 32

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER.

Your February 29, 10 a.m. and 2 p.m.

Wilson has informed me from Geneva of a project which the Council has under consideration in support of the plan for a conference on cessation of hostilities. I have authorized the association of this Government with the project but with express stipulation that advantage is not to be taken of the present situation to advance proposals which would be unfair to China and which would involve the seeking of special advantages for Japan and/or the other foreign powers and that the whole matter shall be without prejudice to any position which has hitherto been taken by the League or by any power in relation to the current dispute between China and Japan. I have also specified that at the proposed conference, if and when held, there must be present civil officials of the powers represented.

Please keep me posted as fully as possible with regard to developments in relation to this project.

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by
Sent by operator M., 19

Stinson
SKH

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1306

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 3, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (China).

CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE MINISTER.

Reference my numbers 60 of February 29, 4 p.m.,
65 of March 1, 11 p.m., and 66 of March 1, 12 p.m. / 452^c / 4587a

Until you receive further instructions, I do not wish to have either you or any civil or military representative of this Government participate in the round table conferences which are now in prospect under the recent suggestion of the League of Nations. I consider that the situation has been obscured by the fact that the Japanese, after having initiated this movement and having accepted the proposals of the ^{Council of the League} ~~four powers~~, have carried through a major offensive, and I do not wish to participate in the conference until I am more clear as to what will be proposed there. As intimated in my previous instructions above referred to I do not wish to get drawn into proposals which will appear as an endorsement of Japan's position or as unfair to China.

S HLS/RSM:AT

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department
OR

Department of State

to

Washington,

March 3, 1932.

American Consul
AMLEGATION,

SHANGHAI, (CHINA).

CONFIDENTIAL (FOR JOHNSON).

From the Secy to the Minister
Reference my Nos. 66, 65, 66
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as intimated in my previous instructions at Shanghai

S HLS:EMS

by _____

erator _____ M., _____, 19____

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON, February 19, 1932.

No. 2600



FEB 27 32



F/LS 793.94/4477

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

1-2/

I have the honor to enclose a copy of Hansard's reports of the discussions in Parliament yesterday of the situation in China, referred to in my telegrams No. 75, February 19, 11 a.m., and No. 76, February 19, 12 noon.

The statement of Lord Hailsham is in line with the following statement made in the House of Commons by Sir John Simon in reply to a member who asked whether the Foreign Secretary would consider proposing to the League of Nations the establishment of a blockade on the Japanese seaboard:

"Sir/

MAR 7 1932

FILED


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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- 2 -

"Sir J. SIMON: No, Sir. The question of responsibility for the unhappy situation at Shanghai was taken into consideration by the Council of the League of Nations under the provisions of Article 15 of the Covenant. Before the Council had received the statements of the parties, the Government of China claimed to withdraw the question from the Council and to submit it for decision to the Assembly. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government would regard it as most improper to form a judgment upon a matter which is under the judicial consideration of a tribunal in which they form a part, and they would deprecate any suggestion that they have reached any premature conclusion."

Respectfully yours,


Ray Atherton,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures:

1. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES. Feb.18. EVENTS IN THE FAR EAST.
(House of Lords).
2. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES. " " CHINA AND JAPAN.
(House of Commons).

PAPER PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
(House of Lords)

NUMBER

CITY

LONDON

DATE Feb. 18, 1932.

631 Northern Ireland

[18 FEBRUARY 1932]

Far East.

636

GREY SEALS PROTECTION BILL.
[H.L.]

Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.

LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, this Bill is in substantially the same form as that which passed this House last Session. The Bill introduced in November, 1930, was amended in certain respects during its passage through this House and provisions were introduced to enable the appropriate Minister to regulate the method of slaughter of grey seals in breeding places. These provisions will be found incorporated in subsection (2) of Clause 1 of the Bill. The only difference of substance between the present Bill and last Session's Bill as it left this House, is that in accordance with an Amendment made in another place the close season is to extend from 1st September to 31st December in each year, instead of from 1st October to 15th December. The Bill of 1930 was introduced to follow the Act of 1914 in this matter, but when the point was raised it was agreed by expert opinion that the longer period was more appropriate.

Last year the Bill failed to get through owing to the exigencies of other Parliamentary business and the subsequent Dissolution of Parliament. The Government hope, however, that it may be possible to secure the passage this year of this useful measure and so enable the act of 1914 to be removed from the schedule of the annual Expiring Laws Continuance Act. In view of the debate which took place on the previous Bill I have not thought it necessary to explain again to your Lordships in detail the scope and objects of this Bill: but I shall, of course, be ready, either now or on the Committee Stage, to deal with any points which noble Lords may wish to raise. I beg to move.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 2^d.—
(Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.)

THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, I wish to say only one word in support of this Bill, which I hope your Lordships will pass. I agreed when it was introduced last year, or the year before last,

thought that the one foremost interest was their own trade interest in China, and the ignoring of the far more serious matters mentioned in the Note of the United States was, if I may venture to say so, a very serious error. Moreover, the United States have shown a desire to co-operate with the other Powers and with the League of Nations. Their readiness to do so is a matter for congratulation, and every opportunity should have been taken to co-operate as closely as possible with them.

Now with regard to the second point, the neutrality of the Settlement. Protests, I think, have been made, which have been quite ineffective, against the use of the Japanese section of the International Settlement as a base for the Japanese operations. The fact that the Japanese have done this has placed the Settlement in a very dangerous position. Those of your Lordships who are familiar with the area known as the Settlement will understand that the Japanese position is now of such a character that a section of the Settlement—and that for which the British are mainly responsible—now finds itself in the direct line of fire between the combatants, and, as we know, there has been loss of life in consequence. The danger in which our nationals are placed seems to be getting graver and graver as time goes on.

I would read to your Lordships a message which has been received from four British subjects in the Settlement in the last two days, and which gives us a very clear idea of the extreme difficulty of the situation. They say:

"The geographical conditions are such that the further use of the International Settlement as a base by Japan must almost certainly result in disaster."

House in Committee accordingly:

[The EARL OF ONSLOW in the Chair.]

Clauses 1 to 4 agreed to.

Clause 5:

Provision as to office of Land Purchase Commissioner.

5. It shall be lawful for a judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Northern Ireland to hold the office of Land Purchase Commissioner for Northern Ireland, but he shall not receive any remuneration in respect of that office.

LORD MOUNT TEMPLE had given Notice to move to leave out Clause 5.

PAPER PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
(House of Lords)

NUMBER

CITY

LONDON

DATE Feb. 18, 1932.

DS 1

Far East.

634

the situation has changed. My reason for putting the Question down was that the country might have fuller information than it has at present regarding the course of events in Shanghai and the Far East. I think your Lordships will agree that it is of the utmost importance, when matters of such gravity as are taking place in that part of the world occupy public attention, that the fullest possible information should be given by the Government in order that we may realise the position and judge the dangers that attend it. Moreover, it has another beneficial effect. It prevents people from swallowing alarmist rumours which may appear from time to time in the Press, which may not be authentic, which may unnecessarily arouse popular indignation and which, therefore, ought to be corrected. It has not been possible recently to raise this question in another place, and it is hardly fair in a matter of such gravity as this that the Government should only be able to give the information which can be extracted from them by Question and Answer across the floor of the House. Therefore my reason really for putting down this Question was that your Lordships' House should perform one of the functions which it can very properly perform—namely, to have a debate on an important public question, for which the time cannot be found in another place.

I want in the remarks that I make not for one moment to say anything which will embarrass the Government, or which will rouse animosity on one side or the other. But I think it is necessary to make some survey of the situation which has culminated in such a very grave dilemma as we see in Shanghai at the present moment. Great Britain is involved to a very great extent in the events which are taking place in China. Our obligations seem to fall into four categories. I will first of all just enumerate them, and then say a word about each.

We have an obligation for the defence of our nationals and for the safeguarding of our trade interests. Secondly, as partners in the preservation of the neutrality of the International Settlement at Shanghai, we have certain duties to perform. Thirdly, we are co-signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, and of the Peace Pact of 1928. And, lastly—and

EVENTS IN THE FAR EAST.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give any information with regard to the serious situation in Shanghai and the policy which is being adopted by His Majesty's Government for the protection of life and property, and whether any decision has been reached by the League of Nations in view of the present position. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I placed this Question on the Paper two days ago. Even since then events have moved very rapidly and

Lord Mount Temple.

635

Events in the

on this I shall lay particular stress. We have very special obligations of the Covenant of the Nations.

With regard to the defence of our nationals, that is a matter which I shall deal in more detail when I come to the question of our obligations under the International Settlement. With regard to the safeguarding of our trade interests, that is a matter to which I shall also refer. It may appear to have paid little attention, and on that point I shall refer to your Lordships' attention a Note which was sent to the Japanese Government on January 7 by the United States. That Note contained a passage which I will now read. I am obliged to make several corrections. I feel it is very necessary, because that in what I may call the jargon of to-day people refer to Articles of treaties and to Articles of agreements by numbers, and the general public are not fully aware of the actual facts, which, as events have proved, are necessary that they should have cognisance. In this Note the United States Government said that

"it cannot admit the legality of the situation *de facto*, nor does it intend to recognise any treaty or agreement between those Governments or which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens including those which relate to sovereignty or independence and administrative integrity of the public of China, or their internal relations relative to China, commonly known as open-door policy."

"The United States does not recognise any situation or agreement which may be brought about by means of the covenants and obligations of the Peace Pact of August 27, 1928, to both Japan and China, as well as the United States, are parties."

That was a forcible Note. The Japanese Government obligations both under the Treaty and under the Pact of 1928. His Majesty's Government support the United States Government in this Note. They addressed a Note to the Japanese Government which is dated January 9, in which I refer to either of the two points, they merely pressed the open-door policy should be maintained in Japan. I venture to say that it has made a very bad impression. It has made the British Government at

PAPER PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
(House of Lords)

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Feb. 18, 1932.

Far East. 634

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635 Events in the [18 FEBRUARY 1932]

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cluding those which relate to the
sovereignty or independence or territorial
and administrative integrity of the Re-
public of China, or their international policy
relative to China, commonly known as the
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Far East. 636

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will understand that the Japanese posi-
tion is now of such a character that a
section of the Settlement—and that for
which the British are mainly responsible
—now finds itself in the direct line of
fire between the combatants, and, as we
know, there has been loss of life in con-
sequence. The danger in which our
nationals are placed seems to be getting
graver and graver as time goes on.

I would read to your Lordships a
message which has been received from
four British subjects in the Settlement
in the last two days, and which gives us
a very clear idea of the extreme difficulty
of the situation. They say:

"The geographical conditions are such
that the further use of the International
Settlement as a base by Japan must almost
inevitably drag us all into active military
operations to protect our nationals. We feel
sure that morally and materially the con-
sequences of this must in the end be
disastrous all round. Almost equally deplor-
able would be the position wherein we may
also drift by becoming beneficiaries of mili-
tary measures which we ourselves avoided
despite great provocation."

Before I leave that point I would ask
the noble Viscount the Leader of the
House, who will reply to me, whether
His Majesty's Government have come to
any decision with regard to the evacua-
tion of the Settlement by British
nationals, or whether they consider that
danger is past.

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Now I come to the two Treaties, and here, with your Lordships' permission, I will read out the articles, because I think it is of the utmost importance that public attention should be drawn to the actual text of these instruments that have been signed. Article I of the Nine-Power Treaty, 1922, says: The Powers agree

"to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."

That is quite categorical and clear. The Pact of Paris, 1928, says in Article 2:

"The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

I think we all agree that the validity of these collective Treaties is now in danger, and if one of the signatories is at liberty to repudiate them their whole value is lost.

I now come to the Covenant of the League of Nations, and this is to my mind the most important of all the considerations which we have before us. The Covenant of the League produced the League. On the Covenant the League of Nations must stand, and the non-observance of the Covenant of the League of Nations must not only undermine the authority, but destroy the very existence of the League. There are three relevant Articles to which I would draw your Lordships' attention. They are often referred to, but always by number, and the text is not given. It is supposed everybody knows the text, but everybody does not, and it is very necessary that they should be reminded what these Articles say. Article 10 says:

"The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

Article 12 reads:—

"The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report of the Council."

There is an obligation on all the signatories to carry out these Articles, and I

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think at any rate the first paragraph of Article 16 is relevant to the present situation and should be remembered. It says:

"Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its Covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not."

Anybody surveying the various stages of the negotiations that have taken place, the various protests and Notes until the last one which was sent two days ago, would not find that the Foreign Secretary has shown any very great disposition to champion the cause of the League Covenant, and to put first and foremost the authority of the League. I cannot help thinking that the right honourable gentleman, although his hands must be very full with his anxious work, would even now perhaps be in a better position to continue the negotiations if he were with the other Members of the Council of the League of Nations in Geneva rather than remaining here, but no doubt he will return there very shortly.

At any rate we have here a test case which seems by its extreme nature to be one that is easier to resolve than a very complicated and difficult and involved case about which there was a considerable difference of opinion. One must remember that the very serious situation which has arisen in Shanghai is the natural consequence of the League of Nations handling of the situation in Manchuria. There again there was an absence of any firm lead—a lead which Great Britain could very easily and very properly take, considering her position on the Council of the League of Nations—and the consequence has been that the Japanese, finding that they could behave with only a protest, as they did in Manchuria, have taken advantage of the situation to go a great deal further in the neighbourhood of Shanghai. There is no question that if the Covenant of the League of Nations is going to be set aside, it will not only undermine the authority of the League but, by forming a very unfortunate prece-

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dent, it is calculated to encourage any other nation on a future occasion to flout the League with impunity.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Will the noble Lord forgive me interrupting him to ask whether he will say what he thinks the League could have done in Manchuria?

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: If the noble Viscount will allow me to continue my argument. I will make very humble suggestions later in my remarks as to what might have been done. For the time being I only want to point out, what I think is obvious, that the latitude which was allowed to Japan in her actions in Manchuria encouraged her to believe that she could go a good deal further in the present situation in Shanghai. Before I come to more recent events I want in all fairness to say that I believe the people of Japan are being misled. I think the facts are being hidden from them. I think they are in entire ignorance of the proceedings in their true light, and that the militarists of Japan have for the time being got the upper hand. But I for one believe that there is still in Japan a great deal of right feeling which might be appealed to. I am strengthened in that belief by the utterance of Baron Shidehara, who was then Foreign Minister, on January 21, 1926. He has made utterances more recently than that. I will not trouble your Lordships by making a further quotation but his utterance was of such a character as to show that there was in Japan, and I believe there still is, a desire to respect international instruments and an opposition to the high-handed measures which have been recently taken by the militarists.

In the last twenty-four hours a Note has been addressed by the Twelve Powers to Japan. There we have a reference both to the two Treaties that have been broken and also to Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. There is still a note of appeal and a certain reticence on the part of the Powers who are addressing Japan, but undoubtedly it carries the matter a good deal further. The regret is that a step of this sort was not taken very much earlier in the day. I think that that is how I should answer the noble Viscount who just now interrupted me. When a resort to arms has been taken, as was the case in Manchuria, when there was a refusal to sub-

mit the dispute to the League—all these eventualities are taken into account in the Covenant—the Articles of the Covenant ought automatically to come into operation. It is not a matter of standing in judgment over any nation. It is a matter of a nation which infringes certain instruments being subject to a course of procedure to which that nation itself has agreed. There can be no question that had the League acted with greater promptitude, and had such a declaration as has now been made at the eleventh hour been made at a very much earlier date, we should not have seen the extremely dangerous situation which has arisen in Shanghai to-day.

I do not know if the noble and learned Viscount will be able to tell us what reply the Japanese Government has made to the Note. Perhaps it has not yet been received. We have seen in to-day's news that there has been a breakdown in the negotiations between the Chinese and the Japanese. When we recall the attitude of the Japanese Government in their reply to the five points which were presented on February 4 by the British and American Governments, we may perhaps feel some doubt as to what will be the reply to this very formal and strong appeal from the Twelve Powers. But may I suggest to the noble and learned Viscount who will reply that in further negotiations—and I hope they will continue in spite of everything; we should never relax our endeavours—no attempt will be made to bargain with the Japanese Government, allowing them a free hand to do what they like in Manchuria provided they relax their stranglehold from Shanghai. I think that would be a very unfortunate method of negotiation and I sincerely hope that His Majesty's Government will not entertain such an idea.

I would ask the noble and learned Viscount whether any decision has been come to with regard to a meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations. The Chinese Government throughout this business have endeavoured to keep in very close touch with the League of Nations. They have appealed to it at every opportunity and they have asked now for the Assembly to deal with the question. Perhaps the noble and learned Viscount will be able to tell us what decision has been come to on that point.

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A further question I should like to ask is with regard to the supply of munitions—whether the League of Nations or the Powers watching these proceedings have come to any decision as to the continued supply of munitions by the Western Powers to either one or other or both of the combatants. I do not know if any decision has been come to on that point, but it is an important point because people are apt to say that in the Far East wars will always arise because undeveloped nations have the combatant instinct so strongly developed and will always settle quarrels in this way. It is often forgotten that the undeveloped nations are supplied with their munitions, with their weapons and with their new inventions by the Christian Western nations in this part of the world. The supply of munitions, therefore, is not a question that can be overlooked.

I have been as careful as I possibly can not to say anything to aggravate the delicate situation in which the Government find themselves. My object has not been in any way to embarrass the Government, but to strengthen their hands, and to ensure that they may be aware of the large body of feeling in this country that is watching the proceedings and is hoping, I trust not against hope, that the League of Nations will succeed in stopping hostilities. I want also to press that the Government may go forward more boldly and more surely in taking the lead more than they have in raising their voice in the League of Nations, as the outstanding champion of the League, and in order that the nations of the world may insist on the establishment of the rule of law, may condemn the barbarity and what is proved to be in the long run the futility of force, and be ready to penalise any nation, however powerful, which disregards and breaks its pledge.

LORD ADDINGTON: My Lords, having lived at Shanghai from 1920 to 1928 I should like to make one or two observations, and in doing so to ask for the indulgence always accorded to those addressing your Lordships' House for the first time. It is not, I think, necessary for me to go into the extreme gravity and delicacy of the present situation. It almost seems at the moment as if we

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ought to refrain from general comment or criticism. We ought to be most careful to avoid trying to deal with what is essentially an Eastern situation by Western ideas and methods. It is extremely important for us to realise the effect any of our criticisms or remarks may have in Japan or China, and that criticisms are apt to make a settlement more difficult than before. I think it is possible that the situation has become a little more difficult because we in the West did not at the initial stages take into sufficiently sympathetic account the grave underlying causes which have given rise to recent events.

I have a great many friends who are still in Shanghai and I shall be very anxious to learn from the noble and learned Viscount what are the possibilities now that further conflict may be avoided, because any conflict that arises, should hostilities be renewed, will have extremely serious consequences. I shall also be glad to learn whether anything can be done regarding co-ordination between the different Forces at present in Shanghai. We have had a similar situation before—to some extent in 1925 and again in 1927, when the situation was very ably dealt with by the British Expeditionary Force which was sent out there. I should like also to learn whether the municipal services, such as police and fire brigades, have again been able to function freely in the northern sector of the Settlement. It is impossible to over-emphasise the danger of the situation and I hope we shall have reassuring news from the noble and learned Viscount.

VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, your Lordships will appreciate that in answering the Questions on the Paper and those which have been addressed to me this afternoon, I am speaking under a considerable sense of responsibility which is not lessened by the fact that the Department which is charged with the administration of these matters is not that for which I am directly responsible. The noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition began his remarks by justifying his action in raising these matters in debate in this House. I do not desire to quarrel with what he said on that head. I quite agree that these grave matters deserve the careful consideration of Parliament and that there can be no

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better tribunal in which they can be discussed than your Lordships' House, provided always, of course, that they are discussed with discretion and moderation. At the same time your Lordships will appreciate that when a matter has reached the acute stage which the present controversy unhappily has attained one has to be very cautious in the use of language lest anything is said that might, even unintentionally, tend to exacerbate or extend the area of the dispute.

The situation which has arisen in Shanghai is naturally one which has given the very gravest concern to His Majesty's Government, and it has done so on two quite distinct grounds. Taking them more or less in the order adopted by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, there is first the immediate effect upon British interests in Shanghai itself. Your Lordships are well aware that Shanghai is a Settlement which owes its inception to British enterprise and which, thanks largely to the energy and ability of our traders and great commercial houses, has grown to its present position as one of the greatest ports in the world and the centre of commerce in the Far East. To-day it must be true to say that the International Settlement contains British property which is worth many millions of pounds, and that within its borders there is a large number of British subjects who are lawfully carrying on their business there under the Treaty provisions which entitle them to commence and to maintain their trading operations within its borders. Anything which imperils the safety of British lives and risks the British property so engaged is naturally a matter of grave concern to His Majesty's Government.

There is also, as the noble Lord has quite rightly pointed out, another aspect which engages our most serious interest. The state of affairs which now prevails in Shanghai is one which it is very difficult to reconcile with the provisions of the Pact of Paris or of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Peace is the greatest interest of the British Empire to-day. The League of Nations is an institution to which we have contributed and upon which we rely as a bulwark of international peace, and anything which tends to throw doubt on the sanctity of the Covenant and to bring the League

of Nations into disrepute must necessarily be a matter of the gravest importance to the Government and to the people of this country. It is on both those grounds that His Majesty's Government have viewed the position with grave concern and have made every effort to protect the Settlement, to prevent its becoming involved in the area directly affected by the hostilities which, unhappily, have taken place, and to effect a cessation of acts of violence on either side.

It would be difficult within any reasonable limit of time to give in detail the steps which His Majesty's Government have taken to this end. Indeed, most of those steps have been made public property almost as soon as they have happened. In Tokyo His Majesty's Ambassador has made repeated representations to the Government of Japan. In China His Majesty's Minister, who was actually starting for a very well-earned holiday in this country, cancelled his leave and returned first to Peking and then to Nanking and ultimately went to Shanghai in order to make similar representations to the Government of China. In Shanghai itself the Consul-General worked in collaboration with the Brigadier and later on with the Commander-in-Chief of our naval forces in China and with the cordial and close co-operation of the civil and military representatives of other Powers, all devoting their efforts to protecting the safety of the Settlement and to bringing about, if it were possible, a cessation of hostilities between China and Japan.

Perhaps I may be allowed to say as one of the satisfactory features in this melancholy situation, that the relations between those responsible civil, military and naval authorities alike of all the foreign Powers in Shanghai—the relations between all those persons have been of the most cordial and friendly character, and they have been working in complete accord and in the greatest possible harmony to carry out whatever steps they thought were possible or expedient. We have now at Shanghai, in addition, the Military Attachés to China and to Japan, both there in order to ensure that any communications to the respective forces of China and Japan should be made by persons who are familiar with the language and are in the closest possible personal relationship

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with the Chinese and Japanese authorities respectively.

So far as the protection of the Settlement itself is concerned we have, as your Lordships have no doubt seen in the newspapers, increased our naval and military forces, and the British Forces at Shanghai now consist of four cruisers, one gunboat, a destroyer, and four battalions of troops and a mountain battery which has been brought from Hong Kong. I was asked a specific question by my noble friend Lord Addington with regard to the co-ordination which was taking place in Shanghai. May I say in answering him how pleased the whole of your Lordships' House I know is that he should have taken part in our debates for the first time. We hope that this certainly will not be the last time, and we are particularly fortunate in that he is able to ask questions based on personal experience and personal knowledge of the place in which these events are happening. The co-ordination, as I have told him, is very close and very complete.

He asked me as to the functioning of the municipal services in the northern portion of the Settlement, in what is sometimes called the Hongkew salient. I have not any specific information with regard to that, but, in view of the fact that this is a part of the Settlement, or a part outside the Settlement to be more accurate, which is held by the Japanese Forces and which has been the subject of very considerable fighting, I do not think it is probable that the municipal services are able to function there at the present time. I am afraid I cannot be more definite in my answer than that. That is the situation and those are the efforts which we are making and have been making so far as the Far East is directly concerned. But while carrying on those efforts in the Far East His Majesty's Government throughout has been keeping in the closest possible touch with the Government of the United States and with the friendly Powers which form our colleagues on the Council and in the Assembly of the League of Nations.

The noble Lord opposite criticised the action of His Majesty's Government in January last in not signing the same Note as that which was despatched by the United States Government to Japan on January 7 and in only sending a Note of

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our own on January 9, and he suggested, if I understood him aright, that the Powers ought to have taken sterner action at an early stage—I suppose he means in September last when there was trouble in Manchuria; and he suggested that if we had taken action under certain Articles, which he specified, in the Covenant of the League of Nations some more fortunate results would have been attained.

With regard to the first of those two criticisms, I would point out that the position of His Majesty's Government is not quite the same as that of the Government of the United States, for the reason that we are Members of the League of Nations and the Government of the United States is not. We have throughout this unhappy controversy been working in very close touch with the United States Government. So far as I have heard, there has been no suggestion of a complaint or criticism from them with regard to any action or inaction upon our part, and, on the other hand, of course it is necessary to remember that it would not be wise or, I think, proper for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to take action which would seem to separate it from the other Members of the League of Nations, and to identify it with the United States in any sort of opposition to other Members of the League to which we belong. Our effort has rather been, while keeping in the friendliest touch with the United States, and while acting in every way in collaboration with that Government, at the same time to remain constant to our own duty to the League of Nations, and to endeavour to ensure that the Council of the League should as a whole be the body which was co-operating with the United States in the endeavour to put a stop to the situation which has arisen in Manchuria and Shanghai.

And I would also point out to the noble Lord that the suggestion which, I gather, he hinted at, that the right course would have been automatically to put into operation the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, would be most improper and highly dangerous. It would be improper because it involves prejudicing an issue which the Council of the League of Nations, and now the Assembly of the League of Nations, have to determine. You do not put into operation the sanctions of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By *Milton O. Gustafson* NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Article 16 until you are satisfied which is the nation which is to blame and against which those sanctions have to be invoked. The noble Lord knows that it is the contention of the Japanese that in the action that they have taken they have been fully justified; that no legitimate criticism can be levelled against them and that no breach of their obligations can be imputed to them. That is a matter which the Council was taking into consideration in regard to Shanghai under the provisions of Article 15 of the League of Nations, and which, for reasons which I shall indicate in a few moments, is as yet undetermined. And therefore any suggestions of a threat to either of the parties of this controversial character which the noble Lord suggests would, in my judgment at any rate, be as improper as it would be unwise.

But there is a further criticism which I venture to make to that suggestion. The noble Lord has alleged—I am not accepting it as accurate, but I am assuming for this purpose that it is accurate—that the militarists in Japan have got the upper hand and are taking a high-handed action, and that the people of Japan as a whole have been misled. If that were true, and if this country were thereupon to take the action which he suggests under Article 16 that would be a declaration that this country deemed Japan to have committed an act of war against the other Members of the League. Does the noble Lord really think that to suggest that Japan has committed an act of war against this country would be a way of limiting or moderating the scope of the hostilities which are taking place at this moment? Might it not well be that it would have a most serious effect in extending that scope, instead of limiting it, as the noble Lord, I know, desires? That was the first criticism—the non-participation in the Note of January; and I would only observe in passing that that dealt with a period anterior to the commencement of the situation in Shanghai. It dealt simply and solely with the position in Manchuria, because the Shanghai trouble did not begin until, I think, January 29, and it is only with regard to Shanghai that the Question at any rate purports to deal.

Then I was asked a question with regard to the evacuation of British

nationals in Shanghai. At present at any rate I certainly cannot say, as the noble Lord would like me to say, and as I would be glad to be able to say, that the danger with regard to those in the Settlement is past. If necessity should arise evacuation would no doubt be considered, as the situation might demand, but evacuation would be a very difficult process. It would be a very disastrous process, because it would mean the abandonment of the British property and interests—sometimes the whole livelihood—of those who were taken away, and I should doubt whether a great many of our nationals would be willing to be evacuated, even if they were so advised. At any rate at present I have no reason to believe that any such course is either practicable or prudent, and I hope that circumstances will not render any such desperate course necessary.

Then I was asked whether any date had been fixed for the meeting of the Assembly. What has happened with regard to that is this. The Council of the League of Nations had taken this matter into their consideration in accordance with the provisions of Article 15 of the Covenant, and, having taken the matter into consideration, they had invited each party to the dispute, China and Japan respectively, to submit a statement of their case; and, in addition, the Secretary-General, with the co-operation of the Members of the Council who had officials available in China, had asked for an emergency report from those officials in Shanghai in order to assist the Council in coming to a determination as to the responsibility for the dispute. Your Lordships probably know that two reports have been received, each of which has been published in the public Press, on February 9 and 15 respectively. Last week the representative of China claimed the right under Article 15 to refer the matter from the Council to the Assembly. The Japanese representative challenges the validity of that reference, and I believe that what has happened is that the Council of the League has remitted the question to a Committee of Jurists who are expected to report within a day or two, and that the Council will take that report into consideration either to-morrow or on Monday—at the earliest possible moment. I cannot of

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course predict what the report will be or what the decision will be, but until that report has been received and until that preliminary question is determined, it is impossible to say when the Assembly will be summoned. I have no doubt myself that, assuming that the reference is valid, the Assembly will met at as early a date as can conveniently be arranged. That is only my personal opinion. I am not speaking with the authority of the Council.

If the claim to refer the matter to the Assembly is upheld, it follows that the jurisdiction of the Council to decide the question is automatically concluded. Its jurisdiction is ousted when the matter is removed from it to the Assembly, and accordingly the Council has been very careful to come to no decision upon the merits of the matter, on which it has not yet heard the contentions of the two sides, with regard to which its power to determine the question has been taken, or is alleged to have been taken, from it by the action of one of the two sides. If the matter falls to be determined by the Assembly, or if on the other hand it has to be determined by the Council, in either event the representatives of this country will form part of the tribunal before whom it falls to be determined, and I think your Lordships will agree with me when I say that His Majesty's Government would regard it as a breach of their duty to the League of Nations, as well as a breach of their duty to their fellow members—China and Japan, who are the disputants in this case—if they were to express any opinion or come to any decision as to the responsibility for the situation which has arisen, until they have heard the contentions of both sides and investigated the evidence which will be laid before them by one side or the other. Therefore it is that I cannot answer the third part of the Question which the noble Lord asks—if any decision has been reached by the League of Nations in view of the present position—except to say that the British Government, and I believe all their colleagues, are most anxious to avoid reaching any decision until they have given both sides a fair opportunity of being heard, and until they have examined the evidence which either side is in a position to adduce.

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The noble Lord referred to the appeal which has been addressed to Japan by the twelve Members of the Council. I want to make it quite clear—as no doubt your Lordships will appreciate if you have studied the terms of the appeal in the Press this morning—that that appeal does not involve any condemnation of Japan. It does not involve the uttering of anything in the nature of a threat to Japan. It is, as it purports to be, merely an appeal from friendly Members and collaborators with Japan in the League of Nations, to a friendly sister nation, to do all in her power to assist in what ought to be, and what I hope is, the object of everyone of us—namely, to preserve the peace and to maintain the sanctity of the covenants to which we have affixed our signatures.

The noble Lord is quite right in supposing that whatever may be the issue of our present endeavours we shall not relax our efforts to attain a peaceful and satisfactory solution, and to put an end to whatever hostilities are going on. Only this morning it was found possible to arrange for a meeting between the Chinese and Japanese military authorities in the hope of achieving a settlement for the time being. I have no official information as to the outcome of that meeting, but such reports as have reached us indicate that unhappily it has not proved successful, and that there is at any rate a serious risk of a recommencement of hostilities. If that unhappily should prove to be the case, I can only say that that failure is not going to discourage us from going on with our efforts, but I do hope, in fact I feel confident, that every member of this House, as well as anybody in a place of responsibility in this country or in another place, will abstain from affirming or expressing any opinion as to where the responsibility lies for the situation which has arisen, until a full opportunity has been given for the Council or for the Assembly to determine that issue.

I am quite sure that nothing would be less likely to bring about peace and to bring an end to the position of tension, indeed of active violence, which unhappily prevails than the feeling by either side that it was being unfairly treated by its colleagues in the League of Nations, or that its case was being prejudged before it had had a

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full opportunity of stating what it had to say. We are appealing to both those nations on the basis that they are as determined as we are to act in good faith and to carry out the obligations upon which they have entered. We shall do our very best to bring the present state of affairs to an end, to prevent unnecessary damage to British property, to protect as far as may be the safety of our own nationals, and we believe that we are more likely to achieve that end by methods of conciliation, trust and confidence than by anything in the nature of threat or of partisanship in a dispute which we deeply deplore.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE:
May I ask the noble Viscount if he could say whether any reply has been received from the Japanese Government to the

Powers' Note and, if not, whether when it is received it will be immediately published?

VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: So far as I know no reply has yet been received, and indeed I think the Note was only handed to the representative of the Japanese Government yesterday, so that there really has hardly been time for their reply. The reply will no doubt be addressed to the Council of the League of Nations from whom the appeal emanated, and the decision as to publication must rest with them and not with this Government, but I should be very much surprised if they do not give the reply the same publicity as has already been given to the appeal.

House adjourned at twenty minutes past six o'clock.

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SHANGHAI (COMMISSION'S REPORT).

96. Dr. SALTER asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will arrange for the publication, as a White Paper, of the report to the secretary-general of the League of Nations of the Shanghai consular committee of inquiry?

Mr. EDEN: As the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Bow and Bromley (Mr. Lansbury) was informed on the 15th of February, my right hon. Friend cannot undertake to make public on his own motion a document submitted to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. The two reports rendered to the League Council by the local commission which it constituted at Shanghai have been summarised in the Press of the 9th and 15th of February respectively.

Dr. SALTER: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the document in question has actually been published in Geneva and circulated to all the other Governments concerned?

Mr. EDEN: Geneva is the place where it should first be published.

Mr. LANSBURY: If it has been printed there, is there any reason why this House should not possess an official copy?

Mr. EDEN: My right hon. Friend hopes that a copy will be made available for publication by all the Governments as soon as possible.

JAPAN (LOANS).

97. Dr. SALTER asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he has any information as to whether any loans to Japan have recently been arranged either in this country or elsewhere?

Mr. EDEN: I have no information on this subject.

ROYAL NAVY.

CANTEEN FUNDS.

98. Mr. McENTEE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what proportion of naval canteen profits is given to the Royal Naval Benevolent Trust; and what is the representation of the lower deck on the administration of the Trust?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Lord Stanley): The contributions payable to the Royal Naval Benevolent Trust are subject to periodical review in the light of reports obtained from the Fleet. At present they are:—

(a) One-fifth of the amount of rebate on purchases, which is payable by Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes to Ships' or Establishment funds, or one-fifth of the rent payable by canteen tenants on the China Station.

(b) 40 per cent. of any amount that may be available for distribution annually in respect of surplus revenue accruing to the Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes from Naval canteen trading.

The Central Committee of the trust includes 15 representatives of the lower deck out of a total of 25 members.

LOSS OF SUBMARINE M 2 (PENSIONS).

100. Mr. GORDON MACDONALD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will consider the desirability of granting pensions to the widows, children, and parents of the officers and ratings who lost their lives in Submarine M 2 at the rates payable under the warrants and Orders in Council governing pensions following death from injuries in the Great War?

Lord STANLEY: The scale of pensions referred to in the question is not applicable to dependants of those who have lost their lives subsequent to the period of the War, and I regret I can hold out no prospect of its being granted in the case of the M 2.

CHINA AND JAPAN.

Mr. MAXTON (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is able to state whether British troops have been in action in Shanghai or its vicinity; whether any casualties have been suffered, and what branch of the Service has been involved?

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon): The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. I regret to state, however, that two British naval ratings, who were part of a guard on duty at Hongkew Wharf at Shanghai, were wounded by shell fire early yesterday

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAPER PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
 (House of Commons)

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Feb. 18, 1932.

1829

Oral Answers.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Oral Answers.

1830

[Sir J. Simon.]

morning and subsequently died of their wounds. From the direction of the shells it seems almost certain that they were fired from Chinese guns. His Majesty's Minister has accordingly addressed a note to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs calling his attention to these facts, and requesting that strict instructions be issued to the Chinese military authorities concerned with a view to preventing any possible recurrence of such incidents, and reminding His Excellency that His Majesty's Government must, in this unfortunate conflict between China and Japan, hold each side responsible for any loss to British life and property that may be caused by their respective armed forces.

Mr. MAXTON: If casualties like those can occur among the Forces, is the Secretary of State satisfied that all proper steps have been taken to safeguard the civilian population?

Sir J. SIMON: I am sure that that was one of the first concerns of the most competent and trustworthy British authorities on the spot.

Mr. THORNE: Are representations being made to the Chinese Government for compensation in the case of the loss of these two lives?

Sir J. SIMON: My answer is all that I can state. Of course, one has to see what the answer of the Chinese Government may be.

Mr. LANSBURY (*by Private Notice*) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he had any further statement to make on the situation in Shanghai?

Sir J. SIMON: There is some further information on various points which I am able to give to the House to-day. We have information from Shanghai that a meeting was to take place this morning between representatives of the Chinese and Japanese military authorities with a view to trying to arrange for a cessation of hostilities. The meeting was largely brought about by the efforts of our Minister, Sir Miles Lampson, and was, I understand, fixed for nine o'clock this morning, Shanghai time. I have not yet received any official information as to what, if any, was the result of this meet-

ing. But the House will have regretted to observe that the latest Press messages indicate that it has not secured agreement.

I have already stated, in answer to the question addressed to me by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Bridgeton (Mr. Maxton) what is known of the serious incident at the Hongkew wharf.

On a point which was raised in the House yesterday, I am glad to state that His Majesty's Consul-General at Shanghai reports that Mr. H. G. Parkes, who is not a schoolmaster, but the proprietor of a small business, was interfered with, but was not assaulted by Japanese civilians. He was subsequently assisted by a Japanese naval officer to whom he applied for help.

Then, the most recent news from Geneva connected with the Sino-Japanese dispute is as follows:

Japan has raised certain legal points in connection with the Chinese request for a reference of the dispute from the Council to the Assembly. These points have been referred by the Council to a committee of jurists, who are meeting in Geneva this morning, and are expected to report to-day. As soon as this committee has reported it is anticipated that the Chinese application will be dealt with by the Council without delay.

Mr. LANSBURY: Has the right hon. Gentleman any information as to the truth or otherwise of the report in the Press about a very heavy explosion in the centre of the International Settlement?

Sir J. SIMON: I have noticed a reference to it in the Press, but I have no information about the matter myself.

Mr. LANSBURY: May I also ask the right hon. Gentleman whether any steps can be taken to evacuate our nationals from the Settlement if the negotiations have broken down? Is it not obvious that if hostilities continue, neither side, with the best will in the world, can prevent non-combatants coming within the range of fire, seeing that the operations are taking place from the International Settlement?

Sir J. SIMON: I think that the right hon. Gentleman gives a very proper description of the risks that are involved

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAPER PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
(House of Commons)

NUMBER

CITY

LONDON

DATE Feb. 18, 1932.

1831 *Business of the House.* 18 FEBRU

and the matter which he has mentioned is naturally one of those which is being very carefully considered. I do not think I can give any further answer other than that. Of course, the practical difficulties of the matter have to be examined on the spot.

Mr. MANDER: Is not the best thing to do to stop the war?

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RSM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS *m.m.H.*

February 13, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Difficulties

✓ Mr. Scott of the Board of Foreign
Missions of the Presbyterian Church
from New York called and showed Mr. Ham-
ilton the text of a cablegram from the
National Christian Council of Japan to
the Chairman of the International Mission-
ary Council in New York and of a cable-
gram sent from Geneva to Dr. John R.
Mott quoting the text of a cablegram
sent from the Geneva office of Christian
world organizations to the Christian
Council of Japan. Copies of these
cablegrams are attached.

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m.m.H.

MMH:AT

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY: EMU

Copy of Cablegram dated Tokyo, February 6th, 6.35 P.M.

To Chairman of I. M. C., New York.

"JAPAN NCC FACING THREAT TO WORLD PEACE IN FAR EAST
REQUESTS I. M. C. IMPORE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO
USE FORBEARANCE SETTLE DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS
RENOUNCING USE OF FORCE FURTHER THAT SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS TO RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS BE URGED UPON
CHRISTIAN BODIES IN EACH COUNTRY."

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:EMU

Copy of Cablegram sent to Dr. Mott, dated Geneva, February 4,
1932.

The following cablegram just forwarded Christian Council

Japan: Quote:-

"SECRETARIATS CHRISTIAN WORLD ORGANIZATIONS GENEVA
URGE YOU USE INFLUENCE CONVINCE AUTHORITIES AND
PUBLIC OF GROWING VOLUME MORAL WORLD OPINION
AGAINST JAPAN INCREASING USE MILITARY ACTION.
OUR LOVE FOR JAPAN AND RESPECT FOR HER MORAL STAND-
ING IN WORLD AFFAIRS IMPELS THIS MESSAGE." Unquote.

Unite in urging you cable National Christian Council similar
sense. Also suggest you study with Axling and Koo wisdom
and possibility united measures Christian Councils Japan,
China.

(Signed) Gethman, Nevin, Davis, T'hooft.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 13, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Difficulties

Mr. Scott of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church from New York called and showed Mr. Hamilton the text of a cablegram from the National Christian Council of Japan to the Chairman of the International Missionary Council in New York and of a cablegram sent from Geneva to Dr. John R. Mott quoting the text of a cablegram sent from the Geneva office of Christian world organizations to the Christian Council of Japan. Copies of these cablegrams are attached.

MMY:AT

1328

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY: MAU

Copy of Cablegram dated Tokyo, February 6th, 6.35 P.M.

To Chairman of I.M.C., New York.

"JAPAN MCC FACING THREAT TO WORLD PEACE IN FAR EAST
RE U.S. I. M. C. IMPLORING GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO
USE FORBEARANCE SETTLE DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS
REFRAINING USE OF FORCE FURTHER THAT SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS
TO RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS BE URGED UPON
CHRISTIAN BODIES IN EACH COUNTRY."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY: EMU

Copy of Cablegram sent to Dr. Mott, dated Geneva, February 4, 1932.

The following cablegram just forwarded Christian Council Japan: quote:-


"SECRETARIATS CHRISTIAN WORLD ORGANIZATIONS GENEVA
 URGENT YOU USE INFLUENCE CONVINCE AUTHORITIES AND
 PUBLIC OF GROWING VOLUME MORAL WORLD OPINION
 AGAINST JAPAN INCREASING US MILITARY ACTION.
 OUR LOVE FOR JAPAN AND RESPECT FOR HER MORAL STAND-
 ING IN WORLD AFFAIRS IMPELS THIS MESSAGE." Unquote.

Unite in urging you cable National Christian Council similar
 sense. Also suggest you study with Axling and Koo wisdom
 and possibility united measures Christian Councils Japan,
 China.

(Signed) Gettman, Nevin, Davis, T'hooft.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 29, 1932.

SHANGHAI SITUATION.

Subject: International Settlement as a Base of Japanese Operations.

Reference: Shanghai's Telegram January 29, 6 p.m.

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The Consul General reports that the Chinese members of the Council are entering a protest against the use of the International Settlement as a base of Japanese operations. This is an indication that the Chinese authorities also object.

Strictly speaking, if Shanghai is to be a neutral area at all times, the Japanese should not use the Settlement as a base of operations for war measures. However, the Japanese allege (see Shanghai's telegram January 29, 4 p.m., paragraph 2) that these operations are (1) "for the protection of their nationals" and (2) "a part of the general defense scheme of the Settlement."

With regard to (1), while we may disagree with the Japanese that it is necessary for them to take military action of the kind now under way for the purpose of protecting their nationals, it is not believed that the powers participating in the administration of the

International

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

393.00
International Settlement could object to any one of those powers using the Settlement as a base of operations to protect its nationals in the surrounding Chinese territory. To deny Japanese this right might also at some time compromise us if we should be compelled to use the Settlement as a base to protect our nationals in surrounding Chinese areas.

With regard to (2), however, we cannot agree with the Japanese. We have had no word that the defense scheme of the Settlement called for such action as they have taken. Our armed forces at Shanghai should not, therefore, be permitted to participate ⁱⁿ and the Consul General at Shanghai should refuse to lend his support to such a scheme.

After ten years experience in Shanghai, I do not believe that it was necessary for Japan to take "for the protection of Japanese nationals" the action which it has taken at Shanghai. There are other motives back of these operations. It is impossible to state exactly what these motives may be but it is believed that probably the following three motives all have a bearing on the situation:

592.00
(1) Japan, suffering from the adverse effects of the boycott, is becoming frantic, and, losing its sense of proportion, is using sterner measures at Shanghai

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Shanghai than is necessary to suppress the Chinese anti-Japanese boycott;

(2) Japan, realizing that she must suffer considerable loss as a result of the anti-Japanese boycott, is determined to embroil Shanghai in the general mêlée and thus deliberately destroy, or at least seriously restrict, the trade between China and the other powers;

(3) The Japanese Navy is deliberately stirring up an affair in Shanghai in order that they may appear before the Japanese people at home as fighting for the "glory of Japan", the role which the Japanese Army, operating in Manchuria, has had the monopoly. A recent telegram from Tokyo intimating that the Navy was somewhat restless because of the popularity of the Army would seem to be some basis for assuming that this is one of the motives behind the present operations at Shanghai.

Events at Shanghai are moving too rapidly to enable the Department to give very specific instructions to the Minister and to the Consul General at Shanghai. A telegram to the Legation and to Shanghai has, therefore, been drafted along the above lines and is attached hereto.


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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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February 28, 1932.

TOKYO SITUATION.

"Do nothing" recommendations of the Ambassador.

The British, the French, and other ambassadors at Tokyo appear to be going somewhat out of their way to impress upon the American Ambassador that the American Government should desist from action which they affirm is "provocative" to the Japanese; and Forbes seems to be impressed with those views.

It looks as though either: (1) the Japanese are trying to frighten the foreign powers, particularly the United States, or (2) the foreign Ambassadors at Tokyo are nervous, or (3) the British and the French ambassadors there, either with or without instructions from their governments respectively, are attempting to assist Japan by persuading all the foreign governments, particularly the American, to "let up".

So far as Forbes is concerned, a careful study of his telegrams discloses no evidence of consideration by him of factors other than those which he finds or thinks he finds in the internal situation in Japan; in other words the one point which he harps on, that pressure from without makes it more difficult for the "saner" element in Japan to

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

make their influence effective. He does not discuss at any time the situation at Shanghai or the problem with which we and other powers are wrestling in relation thereto; nor does he discuss the general problem of peace or of world policy or of their treaty rights or obligations or of Japan's obligations.

In Geneva's telegram No. 40, Wilson attributes to Drummond the opinion "that at the present moment the Japanese state of mind might be ready to go to war with even Great Britain 'should economic sanctions be undertaken.'" Drummond's opinion must presumably be founded on reports which have been made by the foreign ambassadors at Tokyo or on statements made by Japanese representatives.

It may with warrant be questioned whether Japan would be willing to go to war with the whole world.

I think that with reason it may be assumed that, with or without the help of one or more other powers or representatives thereof, the Japanese Government is now attempting to bluff both the League and the League powers and the United States.

At the same time, I have no doubt whatever but that Japan's leaders feel themselves now confirmed in the view which many of them have long since held that the principal

- 3 -

opponent in relation to Japan's China policy is and more and more will be the United States. And I have no doubt but that an increasing number are entertaining and will entertain the idea that, sooner or later, for success in that policy they (Japan) will have to fight the United States.

FE:SKH:AS:SS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO:
Mr. Castle:

Mr. Jules Henry called up this morning somewhat exercised about the Harold Horan story on pages one and two of the WASHINGTON POST which states that:

"A certain quality of authority was given the tentative Japanese counter-proposals when the Counselor of the French Embassy, Jules Henry, expressed the sufficiency of the first four points of the peace plan and suggested the advisability of eliminating entirely the fifth point to which the Japanese also object. This is exactly the Japanese counter peace proposal. M. Henry was a caller at the State Department to see Under Secretary of State William R. Castle, jr."

Henry says that the correct story of what he said is contained in Drew Pearson's article on page one of the BALTIMORE SUN. I attach this article. The headings "Other Powers Take Different View" and "British Circles Embarrassed" on page two of the SUN in the Pearson article are characteristic.

Henry says that when he came out of your office he was met by a small blond newspaperman, to whom Henry made the statement that he thought the Japanese refusal to accept the fifth point did not destroy hope for a peace agreement.

He

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[Signature]

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From the Baltimore Sun FEB 4 1932

Washington Expects Accord With Japanese On Far East

U. S. May Yield On Point To Which Tokyo Takes
Exception—Stimson Confers With Ambassa-
dor Debuchi And Other Diplomats

By DREW PEARSON

[Washington Bureau of The Sun]

Washington, Feb. 3—Secretary Stimson conferred privately with Katsujirō Debuchi, Japanese Ambassador, at the former's home at Woodley this afternoon and afterward reported to President Hoover.

The subject of the conversation was understood to be some compromise on the basis of which Japan can accept the peace proposals made at Nanking and Tokyo yesterday by the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy.

Although Japan has not yet officially made known what her reply will be, enough information already has reached Washington to make it reasonably sure that the Japanese counter-plan will be accepted.

China Accepts Proposals

These indications were:

Unconditional acceptance of the peace proposal by China.

A call by Sir Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador, on Secretary Stimson, after which he said he thought something could be worked out on the basis of the reported Japanese counter-plan.

A call at the State Department by Jules Henry, counselor of the French Embassy, after which he expressed the same opinion as the British Ambassador.

M. Henry also said that Foreign Minister Yoshizawa had informed the French Ambassador in Tokyo that Japan could not possibly accept the fifth point of the peace proposals, although it would accept the first four.

Holds Fifth Point Important

The fifth proposal provides for the settlement of all outstanding questions between China and Japan in the spirit of the Kellogg pact and in the presence of neutral observers.

The State Department considers this fifth point one of the most important made to Japan and China as it includes a settlement of the Manchurian question. It is for this reason, how-

ever, that Japan is reported to be opposing the fifth point, since its objects to the settlement of the Manchurian dispute with neutrals participating.

Other Powers Take Different View

With Great Britain and France failing to attach the same importance to point five, however, it seems possible that the Japanese counter-plan, if made in the form expected, will be accepted.

President Hoover, it is known, is especially anxious to bring about an adjustment of the Sino-Japanese conflict and fears that too strong a position taken by the United States might result in a more serious situation in the Far East. It was President Hoover himself, it was confirmed today, who inspired the quieting reports put out by the Administration yesterday. Mr. Hoover went so far as to order Secretary Stimson to hold a press conference for the purpose of toning down the idea put forward by J. H. Thomas, British Cabinet member at Geneva, that the United States and Great Britain had "demanded" the cessation of hostilities in Shanghai.

British Circles Embarrassed

This "soft-pedaling" attitude caused some embarrassment in British circles here, as the British Ambassador had given definite assurances to London that if Great Britain joined the United States in representations to Japan, this country later would not recede from this position, leaving the British to act alone. The statements given out here, yesterday admittedly were intended as replies to Mr. Thomas, and were interpreted to mean that Anglo-American unity was not as complete as pledged last week. Secretary Stimson is known to believe that the United States should maintain a united front with the British.

Situation In Shanghai Easier

Several encouraging developments in China were reported to the State and Navy Departments today, a report that the Japanese troops, which had been patrolling the section of the International Settlement supposed to be patrolled by American marines, would evacuate.

"British will finish taking over tonight at midnight," Col. R. S. Hooker, commanding the marines, informed the Navy Department. "Japanese retiring to central barracks, marine sector, where full evacuations will take place."

A clash between Japanese and American marines had been greatly feared here.

Agreement Made In Swatow

In Swatow, where a clash threatened between Japanese and Chinese, Leonard M. Green, American consul, reported that an agreement had been reached and "the three Japanese vessels in port would, therefore, take no action against the city."

"It is generally believed that for the present there will be no conflict in Swatow," Mr. Green added.

Threatened trouble in Foochow caused the evacuation of all Japanese

women and children, Gordon L. Burke, American Consul, reported.

"Conditions are quiet," he reported. Commissioner Chen Pei-kun informed the consuls of the United States, France and Great Britain that every precaution had been taken to maintain order. "It is reported that the Japanese men are holding a meeting to determine whether they will evacuate."

The details regarding the evacuation of American women and children from Nanking because of an attack on the city by Japanese warships were given today by Willis R. Peck, American Consul-General. More than thirty women and children are being evacuated, he reported.

"Rifle shots had been fired along the waterfront near the hulk at which was moored the steamer housing the Japanese consul," Mr. Peck reported. "The American destroyer Simpson was anchored about 600 yards distant between this and the Japanese naval vessel."

"The rifle fire was followed by machine-gun fire and one minute later by fire toward shore of a three-inch gun from the above-mentioned Japanese naval vessel. Intermittent firing of the gun and naval vessel continued for about twenty minutes."

Pratt Sends Message To Nomura
Admiral William V. Pratt, chief of naval operations, followed his complimentary statement regarding Vice-Admiral Nomura with another message asking Admiral M. M. Taylor to express the confidence which the Navy Department has in the new Japanese commander. The message read:

"Department understands that Vice-Admiral Nomura has been appointed to command the Japanese naval forces in the Yangtze area. In exchanging calls with him please present my compliments and state with reference to the present tangled situation around Shanghai that I have every confidence in his ability and your own to find some happy solution which will guarantee the neutrality and the safety of the International Settlement in that city."

Instructions Taylor To Cooperate
In another message to Admiral Taylor Admiral Pratt directed him in conferences with neutral naval and military authorities to assure them of "one hundred per cent. naval and military cooperation" in preserving the neutrality and safety of the International Settlement.

The Navy Department announced the destroyer Edsall, Lieut.-Com. Byron S. Dague, commanding, is en route from Shanghai to Nanking to join forces with the U. S. S. Simpson. The Black Hawk, destroyer tender, is en route from Manila for Shanghai and is expected to arrive there February 9.

Final punishment to the Japanese who attacked Culver B. Chamberlain, American consul, in Mukden, last month was announced by the State Department today. Sakakibara, chief offender, was given three months' imprisonment and is at the Army Prison at Kokura, while the two soldiers were given a severe reprimand.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 29, 1932

Rec'd 10:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



131, February 29, 7 p. m.

Continuing my report of yesterday's date.

One. Except for occasional short bursts of rifle and machine gun fire Chapei remained comparatively quiet. Early this morning the Paoshan Road sector was heavily shelled by Japanese artillery to which the Chinese replied with machine gun fire.

Two. Kiangwan village appears to have been definitely occupied by the Japanese. Japanese claim that they have captured numerous Chinese prisoners in Kiangwan. It is expected they will be executed.

Three. Air raids continue along all fronts. Bombing back of the lines also continues. It is understood that the vanguard of the 6th, 9th and 14th Chinese divisions has already arrived in Chapei. It is understood that these were ordered to the front by General Chiang Kai Shek.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking. Copy to Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

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
Index Bureau:

Please record and route
with previous papers to the
office indicated and add
usual routings, if any.


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE
 WASHINGTON

793.94



February 27, 1932



SECRETARY'S OFFICE

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am sending you a telegram which I
 have just received from former Secretary Kellogg.

Yours faithfully,

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
 Secretary of State.

FILED
 MAR 4 1932

March 8 1932.

Handwritten: letter to
 Frank B. Kellogg

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM

The White House Washington

Ka 2 JM 320 N.L.

PASADENA, Calif., Feb. 26, 1932.

The President,
Washington, D. C.

Pasadena STAR NEWS quoted last night statement of
spokesman of Foreign Office of Japan as follows:

"But what were the United States and Great Britain
doing bombing Nanking in nineteen twenty seven, he
asked. Japan's present action was held to be the same,
although on a larger scale."

You probably will remember that the United States did
nothing of the kind. It did not bomb Nanking. What was
done was simply this. A part of the Chinese army, apparently
not under control, destroyed the American consulate, and all
the Americans and British, perhaps some other nationals,
took refuge in the Standard Oil buildings on a hill known as
Socony. The Chinese were besieging them, in fact one American
was killed, when British and American gunboats threw a barrage
around the buildings where the foreign nationals had taken
refuge and thereby prevented the Chinese from carrying out
their apparent design of killing all foreigners. The United
States did not bomb or bombard the Chinese army. All it did
was temporarily protect its citizens until they could later
be taken out of Nanking. Not only that but the United States
refused thereafter to apply military sanctions to bombard

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM

The White House
Ka 2 JM 320 N.L.
Pasadena 2-26-32. *Washington* Sheet 2.

the Chinese forces, to destroy their forts to take any similar action. All that was done was to protect American citizens until they could be taken out of Nanking. The United States did demand an apology and reparations, both of which were granted. I could not discover that Chan Kai Shek, in command of invading army, was in any way responsible. It is true that the British insisted on military action to punish the Chinese, but the United States could not see anything to be gained by this as it was impossible for us to determine who was responsible for the attack and it was considered wrong to punish innocent parties. This bears no relation to what is now being done.

Frank B. Kellogg.

1344

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED 12 18 75

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/4482

Dear Mr. Kellogg:

The President has sent me your telegram to him of February 26, 1932, pointing out the dissimilarity between the action taken by the United States at Nanking in 1927 and the present action taken by Japan.

I have been pleased to have the opportunity to read your statement. There is of course no basis in fact for the reported contention by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office that Japan's present action is in any way similar to the action taken by the United States at Nanking in 1927.

Sincerely yours,

E. L. STIMSON



The Honorable

Frank B. Kellogg,

Pasadena, California.

FE:MMH:REK
3/2/32

MMH
FE
M. M. H.


793.94/4482

1345

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department
OR
Charge to



1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

February 26, 1932.

FEB 26 32

AMEMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND).

74 Department's 72, February 24, 1 p.m.

Please transmit at once by open mail and, where possible, by air mail copies of my letter to Senator Borah to all American missions in Europe and in the Near East.

Stinson
JGR

WE:NHF:EFB

Feb. 26 1932. PM
Vuk
MVB

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/4482A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:REK

CLARENCE W. NOBLE
 A.M. AM. SOC. C.E.
 A.M. CAN. SOC. C.E.

Consulting Engineer

662 E. 21st St. Brooklyn, N.Y.
 February 23d, 1932.

Senator Chas. L. McNary,
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:-

Although I am writing you from New York, I am a resident of Oregon. You may remember me as being the owner of the Skyline Walnut Orchard, near Salem.

I am writing on behalf of a group of friends, four of whom are Oregon voters, to express our views on the present duty, as we see it, of the United States to support the efforts of the League of Nations to establish peace in the Far East. If necessary to compel Japan to cease her aggression, we believe that the League should resort to an economic boycott. This, however, would be a failure without the cooperation of the United States.

If the League fails now in this its greatest test, it will demonstrate to the world that this new method of preventing war is a failure, and the hope that the nations can finally evolve a higher type of civilization, free from organized murder, will die. The tremendous sacrifice of treasure and life we made in the War to End War will have been in vain.

The responsibility, should this occur, will rest clearly on the United States. If we are diverted from our aim to develop a better world by the fear of temporary loss of trade, then we must no longer boast of our disinterested moral leadership.

On the other hand, should all nations, including the United States, join in the economic boycott, our Japanese trade would be interrupted for a few weeks, but would eventually flow on as before. Japan could withdraw from the present situation without loss of face, and the peace party in Japan would have a clear victory over the military party. The world would learn that a war of aggression cannot be undertaken with assurance of success and Civilization will have taken a definite step forward.

But this is idealism. Now let us talk selfishly.

The writer for many years was engaged in export work, and for some time was in charge of the Far Eastern territory for the General Fireproofing Co. He knows thoroughly by personal contacts the cities and peoples that have occupied so prominent place in recent news. He has studied on the spot the history of the Japanese occupation of Korea and Manchuria, and knows the economic results arising from

these

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

these events.

Briefly, the Japanese hope of finding here an outlet for their increasing population has been completely disappointed. Japanese peasants, even though generously aided by their Government, cannot survive on the Asiatic mainland in competition with natives.

The revised aim of Japan is to keep her population at home and feed them there with imported food paid for by exports. They control Korea, and aim to control Manchuria, and eventually China, in order to control the trade of these countries.

Diplomatically speaking, the Open Door to Korea has not been closed. When Japan seized Korea there were many American business men there, mostly engaged in trade and mining. None of them were driven out. Business, however, was so successfully diverted from them to the Japanese that Americans were compelled to return because they could not make a living. There are now only two American traders remaining in Seoul, and the last mining engineer left in 1926. The Door still remains Open but the "Welcome" sign on the door mat has been removed. Americans doing business in Korea must now work through Japanese agents, and submit to having their samples and quotations sent to Japanese manufacturers for imitation. The trade we still have in Korea consists now of the limited requirements of missionaries and the few manufactured articles that Japan cannot imitate. It is constantly decreasing.

When Japan succeeds in controlling Manchuria we can look for the same conditions there, and eventually, if they control the ports of China, this market also will suffer the same fate. Fair Trade, which is what the Open Door means to us, can only be maintained in China by avoiding Japanese domination.

We (this little group of friends) believe therefore that the interest of the United States would best be served by intimating to the League at once that, should they decide that their members should boycott Japan, we would join in such action.

This letter is not a part of any organized propaganda.

Cordially yours,

CLARENCE W. NOBLE.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
(MIN)

March 11 1932.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/4483

My dear Senator McNary:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 27, 1932, enclosing for my consideration a letter addressed to you under date February 23 by Mr. Clarence W. Noble in reference to the present difficulties between China and Japan and mentioning particularly Mr. Noble's view that the United States should intimate at once to the League of Nations that, if the League should decide to impose a boycott upon Japan, the United States would join in such action.

I have read Mr. Noble's letter with care and with interest and I appreciate your courtesy in forwarding it to me.

As you know, the attitude and policy followed by the Administration since the beginning of the present unfortunate situation in the Far East have been set forth in various documents that have been made public. As of possible convenience

The Honorable

Charles L. McNary,

United States Senate.

793.94/4483

note ✓
6/11/94/12
P.C. ✓
006.612 ✓
006.500C ✓

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

convenience to your correspondent in this connection, I enclose a copy of Senate Document No. 55 entitled "Conditions in Manchuria" as well as a number of statements issued by this Department to the press. I can assure you that the Administration purposes to continue to give its best efforts to the many problems presented by the present situation in the light of the treaties to which the United States is a party and to the end that the existing difficulties between China and Japan may be settled by peaceful means; also that any proposal or program which may seem likely to further that end will be examined and weighed with care.

Referring specifically to Mr. Noble's view that the United States should intimate at once to the League of Nations that, if the League should decide to impose a boycott upon Japan, the United States would join in such action, it seems to me that the question of the imposition of a boycott upon Japan is a matter which calls for consideration in the first instance by the League of Nations. The dispute between China and Japan was referred to the League and the League, under its covenants and the machinery prescribed therein, has undertaken measures of conciliation between the disputants. The machinery which the League has set in motion provides, in certain contingencies, for the imposition of economic sanctions. It therefore seems logical that any question relating to the subject of an economic boycott against Japan should be discussed and decided upon by the League itself,

after

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
after which this Government may be called upon to define its attitude toward cooperating with the League in any measures that the League may decide to undertake. Of course, no official boycott of Japan by the United States could be undertaken without Congressional action.

As requested I return herewith Mr. Noble's letter to you; I have taken the liberty of having made a copy for the Department's files.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Enclosures:
Senate Document No. 55;
Press Releases;
Letter from Mr. Clarence W.
Noble, February 23, 1932.



FE:MMH:REK
3/10/32

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SK*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHARLES L. MCNARY, OREG., CHAIRMAN
GEORGE W. NORRIS, NEBR.
ARTHUR CAPPER, KANS.
PETER NORBECK, S. DAK.
LYNN J. FRAZIER, N. DAK.
JOHN THOMAS, IDAHO
H. D. HATFIELD, W. VA.
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FREDERIC C. WALCOTT, CONN.
HENRIK SHIPSTEAD, MINN.
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GEORGE MCGILL, KANS.
JOHN H. BANKHEAD, ALA.
W. J. BULOW, S. DAK.
HATTIE W. CARAWAY, ARK.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ONE
AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

February 27, 1932

FEB 23 32

March 11 1932

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

At the request of Mr. Clarence W. Noble, an Oregonian
at present residing in Brooklyn, New York, I am submitting, for
your consideration, a letter he has written me giving his views
concerning an economic boycott against Japan in connection with
the League of Nations.

When you have had an opportunity to give the matter
your consideration, I should be glad to hear from you, and with
your reply, may I have the return of the enclosure for my files.

Very sincerely yours,

Charles McNary

MB.

enc.

F/DEW

793.94/4483

MAR 21 1932

FILED

793.94
6/1/94

(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1932

At the press conference this afternoon Secretary Stimson announced the issuance of press releases concerning the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva and the situation at Kwangchow, Honan, China, which has been threatened by a large force of communists.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Referring to a letter of today's date, from the Secretary of State to the Honorable William E. Borah, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, concerning the situation in China and concerning the policy of the United States Government pertaining thereto, which communication was released to the press at 10:00 o'clock this morning, a correspondent said that he wished to express his appreciation for the way in which the release was handled by the Department. He added that he especially appreciated the fact that the letter was released by the Department instead of at the Capitol. Mr. Stimson thanked the correspondent for his statement of appreciation.

Asked if he expected any similar pronouncements from any of the other powers, the Secretary replied in the negative and added that he at least had no knowledge of any such statements by other governments.

A correspondent asked if any particular incidents, circumstances or situations had caused the Secretary to write the letter above referred to. In reply, Mr. Stimson said that the letter had not been prompted by any particular circumstances, but that there has been much obscurity in this country as to what the whole controversy was about and what the Nine Power Treaty and the Open Door Policy were; and that he had felt for a long time that someone ought to explain them and our policy pertaining thereto.

793.94/4484

FILED
FEB 29 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

A correspondent here asked if Japan had actually violated the Nine Power Treaty. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said that he would let the correspondents draw their own conclusions after reading the communication to Senator Borah.

Asked if the Department had any information concerning the American aviator who was alleged to have been serving with the Chinese aviation forces and who was said to have been shot down recently by a Japanese aviator, the Secretary replied in the negative.

M. J. McDermott.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.48/519 FOR Tel #- lpm

FROM Shanghai (Johnson) DATED February 27, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING:

War has dispersed flood refugees and now war and flood refugees are undistinguishable. Estimates that there are 5,000 in the Settlement at Shanghai that are in need of care. Asks permission to use American flour at Shanghai, for the use of flood refugees, for the relief of both classes.

ek

793.94/ 4485

135
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated February 27, 1932

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

February 27, 1 p.m.

Following is quoted from a letter addressed to me by
T. V. Soong as Minister of Finance and Chairman National
Flood Relief Commission. Letter dated February 26th.
Letter mentions fact that prior to Japanese-Chinese con-
flict at Shanghai there were some seventy or eighty
thousand flood refugees being sheltered and maintained by
the Flood Relief organization. With a result of present
conflict flood refugees have been dispersed and are now
undistinguishable from refugees from assassins of conflict.
He estimates that there are probably at least 5,000 of these
refugees in the Settlement, the majority of whom are desti-
tute. He concludes "the Flood Relief Commission has large
quantities of flour in warehouses at Shanghai and the
National Government will be grateful if the American

Government

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Shanghai via N.R.,
February 27, 1 p.m.

Government will authorize the use of some of this flour up to a limit of 5,000 tons for relief of the refugees in Shanghai irrespective of whether they are flood refugees or war refugees as it is impossible to distinguish one class from the other. The application of 5,000 tons of flour for this purpose will not interfere with the accepted programme of flood relief as a certain reserve was arranged for when the flood relief programme was adopted".

Department's instructions are urgently requested.

JOHNSON

KLP-RR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

5wu wx. 36 DL 2x

Chicago Ill, Feb 26-32

Dr Stanley K Hornbeck

State Dept

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 29 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 27 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

F/LS

793.94/4486

Is there available for editorial use complete summary of
diplomatic exchanges between Japan and United States since
September (stop) Am mailing advance copy our issue March
two which supports in strongest terms American policy

Paul Hutchinson

Managing Editor The Christian Century

11.25am

FILED
MAR 1 1932

1358

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Department of State

23 urgent

Washington

February 26, 1932.

FEB 26 32

Mr. Paul Hutchinson,

Managing Editor,

THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY,

Chicago, Illinois.

Reference your telegram February 26.

Have mailed you copy of Senate Document 55 contain-
information relating to subject of your inquiry.

793.94/4486

Stanley Hornbuckle

EGC
FE:EGC

FE
m.m.h.

CF
Feb. 26 1932 P.M.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

12 CD P-74

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

1356

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REQUIRED.

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 EA

(Prepared for Department of State, in compliance with
 Legation's telegraphic instruction of November 25, 1931).

hereof to be sent to
 also to

Copy into
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 1 - 1932
Department of State

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 1 - 1932
Department of State

F/LS 793 94/4437

793.94
 note
 692.9412

Office of Economic Adviser
MAR 16 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REPORT ON ANTI-JAPANESE BOYCOTT.

From A. S. Chase, American Consul.
 A. S. Chase.

Tsingtao, China.

Date of Completion:
 January 29, 1932.

Date of Mailing:
 January 29, 1932.

MAR 17 1932
 FILED

GENERAL SITUATION.

Since the Consulate's report of December 31, 1931,
 there has been little change in the general boycott
 situation. In the early half of January several fac-
 tors contributed to stir up anti-Japanese sentiment

in.....

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Dunstons NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in the area. Chief of these were the taking of Chin-
 chow, student efforts to spur the local Tangpu to
 greater activity, and the unfortunate incidents of Janu-
 ary 12th, which involved the gutting and firing of Tsing-
 tao Kuomintang offices by a Japanese mob. It is too
 early to measure the practical effects of these factors,
 it is doubtful if they have been important. Moreover,
 the dispersal of the Kuomintang local officers follow-
 ing the trouble of the 12th has removed- temporarily at
 least- the chief weapon of anti-Japanese agitation; and
 it would seem reasonable to anticipate a decline of boy-
 cott effectiveness in consequence.

IMPORTS.

As previously predicted, December direct imports
 from Japan showed an improvement over November, though
 not to the extent anticipated. Figures for December, to-
 gether with those of the preceding boycott months and
 with the corresponding months of 1931 are given below:

	A) <u>TOTAL IMPORTS FROM ALL COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CHINA</u>	B) <u>TOTAL DIRECT IMPORTS FROM JAPAN</u>	<u>RATIO OF B TO A</u>
	<u>Freight Tons</u>	<u>Freight Tons</u>	
<u>1931</u>			
September	60,000	15,200	25.3%
October	58,000	17,900	30.8%
November	59,200	15,400	26.0%
December	58,000	16,700	28.8%
Total	235,200	65,200	27.7%
<u>1930</u>			
September	74,700	24,500	32.8%
October	85,000	35,000	41.2%
November	65,000	26,000	40.0%
December	72,000	38,400	53.3%
Total	296,700	123,900	41.7%

Comparing the above last column percentage figures
 for.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Mitt O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

for 1931 and 1930, it would appear that from the beginning of the boycott to through December Japanese direct import trade has with relatively slight variations remained at about 35% under normal. While the figures on which this final deduction is reached are merely unofficial estimates of cargo tonnage calculated from ships' manifests, a good means of verifying the deduction's approximate correctness is now at hand in the form of quarterly returns expressed in Haikwan Taels furnished by the Maritime Customs. Analysis of these returns is as follows:

	<u>A) VALUE OF ALL DIRECT FOREIGN IMPORTS</u>	<u>B) VALUE OF DIRECT IMPORTS FROM JAPAN</u>	<u>RATIO OF B TO A</u>
	<u>Haikwan Taels</u>	<u>Haikwan Taels</u>	
1930-12 mos.	46,770,272	21,623,421	46.2%
1931-1st			
3 quarters	37,137,620	18,636,760	50.2%
	<u>83,907,892</u>	<u>40,260,201</u>	<u>48.0%</u>
1931-4th or boycott quar- ter	9,115,763	3,223,206	35.4%

In preparing the above table it has been considered fair to regard the quarterly returns for the last quarter of 1931 as exactly covering the boycott period, since the month of September, while also a boycott month, may be held to be practically offset by August with its abnormally heavy preboycott Japanese importations. Comparing the last column respective percentages for the boycott quarter and the preceding seven non-boycott quarters, one finds an apparent decline in value of Japan direct imports of slightly over 26%. This compares with the estimate of 35% arrived at from a study of tonnage sheets. Without attempting to state whether the estimate based on tonnage sheets or that based on Customs evaluation should be taken as the more accurate,

one.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

one may, on the basis of the two estimates, with safety summarize the effect of the boycott on Japanese imports for the months September through December with the statement that loss from boycott during that period has averaged in the neighborhood of 30%.

Complete tonnage statistics for January are not yet obtainable, but on the basis of partial returns, one may predict with practical certainty that December's total of imports from Japan will be considerably bettered.

EXPORTS.

Exports to Japan have been relatively good and show no effects of boycott.

COAST SHIPPING.

Japanese China coast shipping, as recorded at this port, did very badly during December. On the basis of tonnage sheets, it appears that Japanese bottoms carried but 17.1% of total imports and exports to and from China coast ports, as compared with 39.4% for December, 1930.

LOCAL JAPANESE INDUSTRIES.

There is no change to report in the situation with respect to the local Japanese textile mills, which continue to dispose of good outputs- but at a loss due to heavily cut prices.

In quintuplicate to Department of State,
 Copy to Legation,
 Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.

800/610.21
 ASC/FP

CONFIDENTIAL NOTE: Chief sources of information: ships' manifests and conversations with important local business men, and quarterly Chinese Maritime Customs Returns.

4 Carbon Copies
 Received F.P.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.E.

FE
a-g/c

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,
Mukden, China, February 3, 1932.

FEB 29 32
SUBJECT: Political Conditions.

Q

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

Copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 1 - 1932
Department of State

F/LS
793.94/4488

SIR:

793.94
note
873/61-Annex

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 530 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated February 1, 1932, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

MAR 14 1932

FILED

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 530
to Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quitsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 530

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

February 1, 1938.

SUBJECT: Political Conditions.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Beiping, China.

Sir:

193.94/4183

Referring to my despatch No. 524, of January 22, 1938, under the subject "Proposed Independent Government for Manchuria and Mongolia", I have the honor to report that the movement for a new state has been given considerable space in the local Japanese and Chinese press (the latter is Japanese controlled) during the past week. Although these reports indicate that the movement is making rapid progress and that the new government will shortly be organized, February 11, 1938, being the date usually given, they are still of an indefinite character. It is stated that the constitution and the proclamation regarding the founding of the state have been drafted; private information, however, is to the effect that the translation from the original Japanese text into Chinese is not yet completed. According to another report the government shall consist of three yuan, namely, State Affairs

(Kuo

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

(Kuo Yu Yuan), Legislature (Li Yu Yuan) and Inspectorate or Censorate (Chien Ch'a Yuan) and that the Kuo Yu Yuan will have the following boards: Civil Administration, Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, Finance, Justice, Industry and Education. Even the location of the national capital has been discussed, as given in some reports, Changchun being favored by many persons but Mukden being considered as the most likely choice in view of the availability of the necessary government buildings. 'u Yi still seems to be most frequently mentioned for the presidency but the names of Chang Ching-hui and even Yuan Chin-k'ai are also heard. It is not believed by observers that owing to recent developments at Harbin and Shanghai the formation of the new government will be postponed. Certainly it will not be possible to hold the proposed meeting of the three provincial heads and Kuo Yao-p'u, head of the Young Mongol party in Bulunbur, before February 6, 1932.

Concerning the Japanese advance on Harbin from Changchun for the purpose of "protecting the Japanese residents there" which began on January 28 as reported in my telegram of that date, this move seems to have met with far more resistance than had been anticipated. After four days the Japanese forces are still about thirty miles south of Harbin (at Chuangcheng) and proceeding cautiously on foot due, it is stated, to many acts of sabotage on the railway. On January 29 the
 headquarters

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

headquarters of the 2nd division under General Tamon was transferred from Linoyang to Changchun and troops and supplies have been moving northward ever since. It is expected that General Tamon will move his headquarters to Harbin and that the Japanese army will undertake the suppression of all recalcitrant troops in North Manchuria. The occupation of Harbin will, it is believed, necessitate Japanese operation of the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway at least temporarily as a military measure for the safety of its communications and this in turn may necessitate still further measures in "self-defence". South Manchuria Railway staff and railway repairing materials, etc., it is reported, have already been sent northward to Changchun.

It is of interest to note according to reports appearing in the Japanese press that instructions have already been issued by Tokyo for the early withdrawal from Manchuria of the heavy artillery corps detailed from the Imperial Body guard Division and the 12th Division and also of the Medical corps detachment from the 1st and 4th Divisions.

Reports have been heard from time to time that T'ang Yü-lin, Chairman of the Jehol Government is expected to affiliate with the Three Eastern Provinces and that negotiations to that end have been taking place. Be that as it may, it should not be overlooked that T'ang Yü-lin has considerable property at Mukden

which

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

which was seized by the Japanese troops immediately after the occupation on September 18, and no doubt offers of its restoration would prove a very tempting inducement for him to come to terms with the Japanese and thus escape elimination at their hands were a military expedition sent into that province. It seems extremely probable that the Jehol question will remain in the background until the situation in North Manchuria is more settled.

At the summons of the Fengtien Government, the commanders of its principal military forces, two in number, were recent visitors at Mukden and very naturally paid their respects to and dined the Japanese Commander-in-Chief as well as the Chinese Governor. Chang Hai-p'ang (張海鵬), Director of Mongolian Frontier Affairs at Tsouen, whose failure to capture Tsitsihar in October last induced the Japanese to undertake it themselves for the alleged purpose of restoring traffic on the Pao-ang Railway and thereby relieving the agricultural population in that region and Yu Chih-shan (于芷山), the Commander of the Peace Preservation Force in the eastern districts, were the officers in question. Some speculation existed in regard to their resumption of duty because of the reported appropriation of tax funds and receipts during the past four months for the support of their troops, usually given at around 3000 and 6000 respectively. They returned to their respective posts a few days ago with promises of the Government to remit funds regularly for their support and with instructions to provide guards

1368

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

guards for the railways in their districts and to engage in banditry suppression. General Yu whose headquarters are at Shaochengtzu and whose appointment in of several years standing has maintained a fair degree of order throughout the disorders following September 18th.

Wang Tien-ch'ung (王殿忠), a brigade commander in the Kailunghiang forces, has been brought south by the Japanese together with his following of about 3000 men and they have recently been cooperating with the Japanese troops west of the Ilse in the campaign against the bandits. General Wang's force has been assigned as the guard for the Wengtien-Shanhai-kuan railway.

Information from a reliable source has been received that to date the salt revenue has constituted practically the only income of the local government. It is claimed that the loan quota is not being touched and that it is the remainder less administrative expenses that is being turned over to the bank of the Three Eastern Provinces. Another sizable income which has been available to the local government since about the middle of January is the cigarette tax (the consolidated tax) paid by the British-American Tobacco Company on the output of their local factory. For some time prior to that date, the company had been unable to supply dealers with stocks because of its refusal to pay the tax to this government, from which stand the company finally receded. Receipts from other taxes since September 18, 1931, have been almost nil.

Respectfully

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 6 -

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

MMH:MMH
900



137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

41801

Office of Economic Adviser
MAR 8 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FE
EA
a/c/c

No.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Swatow, China, January 22nd, 1932.

MAR 29 32
SUBJECT: Anti-Japanese Boycott in Swatow.

793.94
693/412

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's telegraphic instruction of November 25th, 1931, 9.00 A.M., and to submit the following summary of developments in the anti-Japanese boycott movement in Swatow:

The anti-Japanese boycott was instituted at Swatow almost immediately after the first difficulties in Manchuria on September 16th, 1931. It has not been accompanied by violence of any sort and it seems to have very general support from the public and is very effective from the point of view of the stoppage of Japanese trade.

During the past month a somewhat bitter dispute has arisen between some of the Chinese students and the local Kuomintang but this has resulted for the most part in only a profusion of words without much action.

JAPANESE SHIPPING:

Prior to the institution of the boycott the Japanese took a considerable share of the Swatow carrying trade. The Osaka Shosen Kaisha operates a line of three steamers between Formosan ports and Hongkong via Amoy and Swatow and these ships have

copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 11 1932
Department of State

F/LS

793.94/4489

FILED
MAR 14 1932

-2-

ships have ordinarily carried a considerable number of passengers as well as some freight, with of course a practical monopoly of the carrying trade between Formosa and the other three ports mentioned above. Since the institution of the boycott however these ships have been very strictly boycotted by the Chinese. They are reported to be working under a subsidy from the Japanese Government for carrying the mails and therefore still call at Swatow but no passengers, other than an occasional foreigner, travel on them and they neither bring any freight to Swatow nor take any away. In fact it is impossible for them to work cargo here since they cannot secure the services of lighters or cargo coolies.

In addition to the Japanese ships calling regularly at this port there were a considerable number of Japanese tramp steamers and seasonal cargo carriers bringing coal from Formosa and other points to Swatow and also engaging in the transportation of bean cake from Manchuria to Swatow for use as fertilizer. The boycott has absolutely stopped all of this trade. At least one Japanese ship carrying coal has entered Swatow since the boycott was instituted but has found it impossible to discharge her cargo and has accordingly left port again. For the past three months practically the only Japanese vessels to be seen in Swatow have been the three ships of the O. S. K. and a Japanese destroyer.

I have been reliably informed that most of the cheap freight formerly carried by Japanese tramp steamers is now

-3-

is now carried by Chinese steamers and while all of the British ships trading here are at present carrying full capacity cargoes they are by no means the only benefactors as a result of the boycott.

JAPANESE BUSINESS IN SWATOW:

Before the institution of the boycott the Japanese and Formosan Japanese subjects did a considerable amount of trade in Swatow but they all, including the local branch of the Bank of Taiwan, have been boycotted very strictly and have done no business for several months.

An example of the situation of the Japanese merchants in Swatow is one local Japanese merchant who ordinarily sells Japanese coal and does quite a good business but can do nothing now since he is unable to deliver the coal. There has been no attempt on the part of the Chinese to seize the coal which this merchant holds in his storage yard but the Chinese coolies peacefully decline to deliver the coal and so stop all business.

The local branch of the Bank of Taiwan is completely tied up by the boycott since no Chinese bank will cash its checks and all foreign merchants who otherwise would have no objection to dealing with the Bank of Taiwan find it impossible to do their local business through this bank. This phase of the boycott evidently receives the ardent support of the local branch of the Bank of China since the elimination of the Bank of Taiwan leaves the Bank of China a monopoly of the foreign exchange banking at this port.

From my

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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From my own observation and from inquiries among the merchants of all nationalities at Swatow I am of the opinion that all Japanese business in the Swatow district is at a standstill. The Chinese are absolutely refusing to purchase anything Japanese or to sell anything to the Japanese, other than necessary food stuffs for their personal use, or to do any business whatever with the Japanese even in goods not originating in Japan.

GENERAL:

It seems to be generally believed here that British merchants have been profiting very greatly by the anti-Japanese boycott. The managers of several of the local British firms have informed me that this point of view is incorrect. There would undoubtedly be very little regret on the part of the British merchants and shippers in Swatow if they could take over completely the Japanese business here, since the beginning of Japanese ascendancy in Swatow trade dates practically from the anti-British boycott of 1925 when the Japanese took full advantage of the British embarrassment to push their trade.

The greatest conflict between British and Japanese merchandising in Swatow during recent years has been in cotton piece goods. After the anti-British boycott of 1925 and until the beginning of the present anti-Japanese boycott, the Japanese had gained ground steadily in the Swatow piece goods market at the expense principally of the British.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

the British. At the present time however practically no Japanese piece goods is being sold in the Swatow district but this does not mean the boon to British piece goods merchandising that it would at first seem. At the beginning of the boycott the local piece goods merchants had very large stocks of Japanese goods on hand. These piece goods have been sequestered by the Boycott Committee and the Chinese piece goods merchants find themselves with all of their money invested in the Japanese goods which they are unable to move. These merchants are now unable to realise on their stock and hence cannot buy British piece goods in any quantities, with the result that the trade in British piece goods is very slow.

In addition to the financial difficulties of the local merchants which prevent the British piece goods merchants from taking full advantage of the Japanese embarrassment, the Chinese piece goods manufacturers in Shanghai have entered the market here. It has been the custom during recent years for the Shanghai merchants to purchase cheap and plain Japanese cotton goods and bleach, dye, print and otherwise prepare these goods for the Chinese market. These Shanghai merchants apparently no longer deal in Japanese goods but they purchase the same quality material from the Lancashire mills and, after having prepared the cloth in Shanghai, sell it in the Swatow market, and presumably elsewhere in China. For this reason the British manufacturers of

-6-

manufacturers of cotton goods seem to profit considerably more from the boycott than do the local British firms engaged in the selling of cotton piece goods on the Swatow market.


One development of the local anti-Japanese boycott has been a rather heated dispute between the local Kuomintang and certain of the students and their teachers. From the beginning of the boycott the local Kuomintang headquarters assumed control and direction of the movement. Certain of the teachers in the local schools decided that the Kuomintang was not administering the boycott correctly and that the students should be permitted to take a hand in it. To this the Kuomintang objected and were supported in their stand by the Mayor of Swatow and the General commanding the troops in this area. The matter was then referred to Canton and the Provincial Government sent a representative to Swatow who decided that the direction of the boycott should be left in the hands of the Kuomintang. As a result there have since been very frequent and noisy parades about the streets by the students. These parades are seemingly very closely watched by armed police and soldiers however and the only incident has been the destruction of a certain amount of furniture in the Kuomintang headquarters on one occasion when the students called there and found that all the Kuomintang officials were absent.

The present boycott seems to be remarkably
honestly directed

-7-


honestly directed and there seems to be an almost total absence of squeeze and blackmail involved. This state of affairs seems to be directly due to the fact that the boycott is very popular with all classes and there is little inclination on the part of the natives to purchase articles known to be of Japanese origin. It is ordinarily stated that the dispute between the students and the Kuomintang was fostered by a group of teachers who hoped to get control of the boycott movement for their own personal gain. It also appears that the Chinese themselves profit most from the boycott through their efforts to find native substitutes for Japanese products and services.

Respectfully yours,


David C. Berger,
American Consul.

Five Copies to the Department.
Copy to Legation, Peking.
" " Consulate General, Canton.

800
DCB/LCM



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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Riga

Dated February 29, 1932

Rec'd 1:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

31, February 29, 7 p. m.

IZVESTIA, February 26th, reports that (Russian

Minister) for Foreign Affairs asked Japanese Ambassador
has the Japanese Government knowledge of the request
of Japanese military commander in Harbin to the
Chinese Eastern, first, to transport troops to Imianpo
and to Pogradichnia on the Soviet frontier; second,
fifty percent fare reduction for these troops and free
for the railroad guards; third, Japanese protection
and direct support to White Guards in Manchuria disagrees
with the previous assurances; fourth, information also
asked for concerning free state newly created in
Manchuria.

SKINNER

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F/LS

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

MAR 7 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must
be closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone.



Washington.

46 February 29, 4 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.



According to competent official of Foreign Office
Soviet Government has become anxious in respect to Far
Eastern situation, particularly concerning possibility
of Japanese designs on Vladivostok. Considerable
Soviet military material comprising tanks and
aeroplanes is being despatched eastward as well as three
cooperating "staffs" of officers. Reserves east of
Baikal are being kept on active service but no troop
movements are being made. German Government does
not share Soviet anxiety believing that Japanese
will be content to expand sphere of influence in
Manchuria and Mongolia without incurring risk of
hostilities with Russia.

SACKETT

WSB

RR

F/LS 793.94/4491

MAR 8 1932

FILED

151
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Chefoo/53 FOR to Leg'n.

FROM Chefoo (Webber) DATED Jan. 30, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Effect of News of fighting at Shanghai upon Chinese public
and authorities at Chefoo during December 1931.

jr

793.94 / 4492

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

193.94
Shanghai Revelations:

News of the fighting at Shanghai was received calmly by the Chinese public and authorities and, although feeling ran high, no anti-Japanese demonstration or manifestation of public feeling took place. Two Japanese naval vessels arrived here on the morning of January 28th and are still in port. A sort of martial law prevails after sunset, and General Liu has taken extra precautions to police all Japanese residences and places of business.

1381

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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PM REC'D
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Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

February 28, 1932.

This code was sent in confidential code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA, (SWITZERLAND).

TRIPLE PRIORITY. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

24/ In view of delay in getting telephone connection, I am sending this to answer your questions of today by telephone. Provided that the suggestions which I made to you by telephone are acceptable, I think that the proposed program is satisfactory and you may proceed accordingly. For greater certainty, I repeat the amendments on which I insisted this morning.

1. That the civilian authorities shall be associated with the military authorities of the four powers at Shanghai. I wish to be sure that we are represented there by our Minister Johnson.

2. It must be carefully understood that we shall press for no conditions of the truce at Shanghai which are manifestly unfair to either side. In particular we must carefully avoid putting ourselves in the position of bringing pressure by the four powers upon the Chinese in favor of an arrangement

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/4492A

1382

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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Washington,

- 2 -

especially benefiting either the Japanese or ^{the other foreign powers} ~~ourselves~~. In ^{Skay} particular I am afraid of the present language in Simon's article three to the effect that the International and French Settlements must be preserved intact. This may be understood by the Chinese as an attempt to foreclose extraterritorial negotiations in ~~the~~ favor of ^{the powers}.

3. The reservation as to Manchuria must apply to the position previously taken by the Council of the League of Nations as well as that taken by any power.

4. Throughout these negotiations there must be no implication which will relieve the Assembly from the responsibility, if it chooses, of adopting a resolution whereby all nations undertake not to recognize solutions reached in this matter which are contrary to existing treaties.

5. I not only have no objection but should prefer to have your proposed letter associating us with the proposed démarche published.

Stimson

S HLS:EMS

Enciphered by

FE
 Skay

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1949 1-138

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GENEVA

Dated February 29, 1932

Rec'd 8:10 p.m.



FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

46, February 29, 10 p.m.

Following letter received from Drummond dated

February 29th:

"I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of a communication made by the President of the Council to his colleagues setting out certain proposals which the Chinese and Japanese representatives have promised to submit immediately and to recommend to their governments with a view to bringing about the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Shanghai area.

May I be allowed to call your special attention to the request made in paragraphs two and three of the communication for the collaboration of the United States Government in the steps which the Council proposed in order to effect the above mentioned aims?"

The text of the communication enclosed with Drummond's letter is being telegraphed by Gilbert in his 92,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 5 1932

DIVISION OF

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAR 1 - 1932

Department of State

793.94/4493

MAR 7 1932

FILED

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mam

2- #46, from Geneva, February 29,
1932

92, February 29, 7 p.m.

My reply to Drummond, which I read to you over
the telephone, is as follows:

"In reply to your letter of today's date in which
you inform me of the proposal made by the Council
(which the Chinese and Japanese representatives have
promised to transmit immediately to their respective
governments) concerning a conference for the restora-
tion of peace within the Shanghai area, and the nego-
tiations now going on toward the immediate cessation
of hostilities in that zone, I have to inform you that
the Government of the United States is happy to asso-
ciate itself with this effort for the reestablishment
of peace.

My Government will instruct its representatives
in Shanghai, in the event that this offer is accept-
able to the Chinese and Japanese Governments, to co-
operate with the representatives of the other powers".

Drummond gave immediate publicity to this ex-
change of letters.

FW OX

WILSON

1385

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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
GRAY



FROM Tokyo

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 1:58 a. m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

84, March 1, 1 p. m.

On February 26 I delivered a memorandum to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with the Department's instructions requesting that the Japanese move their men of war to a point which would not be likely to draw fire from the Chinese to the danger of the Settlement and I am now in receipt of a reply reading in translation as follows:

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the American Ambassador and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Ambassador's memorandum dated February 26, 1932. In this memorandum the American Ambassador by direction of his Government expresses the desire that the landing of Japanese reinforcements at Shanghai be carried out at such points outside of the Settlement as will not draw fire from

the

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FILED

MAR 5 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 84 from Tokio

the Chinese troops to the danger of foreigners resident in the Settlement or the ships of other nationals and that the Japanese men of war at Shanghai be moved from their present position to a position down the river to prevent the danger of fire from the Chinese troops.


In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs has the honor to state that although the Japanese Government has the right to land troops at the International Settlement and to anchor warships at the present position, it desires most earnestly to prevent as far as possible any danger to the Settlement or to foreigners and has transmitted the message of the American Government to the authorities of the army and navy, who will give as favorable consideration to this matter as possible.

FORBES

JS-CIB

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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
FROM

GRAY

Peiping

Dated March 1, 1932

Recd 2:55 a.m.



793.94
893.102
861.77 C. 2

Secretary of State
Washington.

287, March 1, 10 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"February 29, 4 p.m.

One. Takigawa has informed me that the Chinese Eastern Railway has received from Moscow authorization to furnish a small amount of rolling stock for the transportation of Japanese troops as far as Imienpo in general and as far as Hailin in case of exceptional need, that the railway administration has already agreed with the Japanese military to place three trains at the disposal of the latter and that the Japanese command has not yet decided upon the time of despatching these troop trains because there is hope of reaching a compromise with Ting Chao with whom the Japanese military are negotiating."

For the Minister,

PERKINS.

JS CIB

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MAR 7 1932

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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JS

Plain



PEIPING.
FROM

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 6:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

291, March 1, 1 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Shanghai, March 1st:

"The main body of the Eleventh Japanese Division about twelve thousand strong is landing today five miles to the North of Lioho on the Yangtze estuary beyond Woosung.

The Japanese forces launched a heavy offensive on the Kiangwan front this morning. Aeroplanes and artillery are carrying out a vigorous bombardment while Japanese troops at Chapei are waiting the success of their comrades at Kiangwan before trying to storm the Chinese lines. A spasmodic exchange of firing on that front continues."

For the Minister

PERKINS

JS CIB

F/DEW

793.94/4496


FILED

MAR 5 1932

494.11 Shanghai

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



GRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via NR

Dated March 1, 1932

Recd 2:55 a.m.

F/DEW

Secretary of State

Washington.

288, March 1, 11 a.m.


Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"Although railway is functioning normally on eastern line, there is no doubt but that the Chinese peasants residing in the district between Imienpo and Ashiho are suffering at the hands of the Chinese smartly. Many are fleeing toward Harbin. Chinese refugees from Pinhsien region have stated to missionaries that Japanese aeroplanes visit this region daily and bomb various villages where it is thought there are old Kirin troops.

Much rolling stock of Chinese Eastern Railway is being sent into Siberia, Pogramichina."

PERKINS.

WSB




793.94/4497

FILED

MAR 7 1932

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
note
893.102 S
893.0146
REP



Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

139

FOLLOWING FROM CAPTAIN MAYER FOR WAR DEPARTMENT:

"17. Japanese have landed undetermined number of troops at Liuholauchen reported to be 20 miles from Woosung. Believe them to be part of 11th Division. Two attempts to damage Japanese ships HONGHOA and OYI by mines this afternoon failed."

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

HPD

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
FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Undated

Rec'd March 1, 1932
8:50 a. m.



F/DEW

793.94/4498

FILED

MAR 5 1932


1391

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY



Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 8:35 a.m.


Secretary of State

Washington

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O.N.I. AND M.I.B.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

March 1, 11 a.m.



One. Admiral Kelly furnishes me this morning with following and informs me that the five items listed represent terms proposed by the Chinese which were handed by him last night to Admiral Nomura who seemed hopeful that they might form a basis for discussion. He requests that they be treated as confidential for the time being.

Two.

"(1) - Mutual and simultaneous evacuation by both sides.

(2) - No question to be raised of permanent dismantling of Woosung or Lion forts.

(3) - Joint commission with neutral observers to supervise evacuation on both sides.

(4) -

F/DEW

793.94/4499

MAR 5 1932

FILED

MET

2-from Shanghai via N.R.,
March 1, 11 am.

(4) - Evacuated area to be administered by Chinese
as usual and policed by Chinese police.

(5) - Chinese to withdraw to Chenju and Japanese to
withdraw to settlement and extra concession roads, after
which Chinese to withdraw to Nanziang. Withdrawal of
Japanese to ships to be taken up at the next conference.

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD

13

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 7:18 a. m.

793.94
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893 01.00
REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
1 MAR 1 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

292, March 1, 4 p. m.

FOLLOWING FROM THE UNITED STATES SHIP TULSA AT HSINHO.

"February 26th steamship TENCHO MARU landed 550 rifles,
12 field guns, 80 machine guns, 3150 cases ammunition,
this morning Monday at Tangku. Chinese troops at Hsinho,
Tangku and Taku total 3000 Japanese, at Tangku 150.
Rumored same ship will land 1000 troops at Tangku on next
trip from Dairen. Tientsin and vicinity quiet, no troop
movements."

FOR THE MINISTER
PERKINS

KLP
WSB

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
mf

F/DEW

793.94/4500

FILED

MAR 5 1932

1394

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/4501

SEE 793.94114-Wang Keng/1 FOR Tel. 7pm

FROM Shanghai (Johnson) DATED Feb. 28, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ope

REGARDING: Shanghai situation. General Wang Keng, Chinese, taken prisoner
of war on British property in International Settlement of
Shanghai, by Japanese, while taking message to American
Legation.

tfv

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

GRAY

SHANGHAI via N.R.

Dated February 28, 1932

Rec'd. 10:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

February 28, 7 p.m.

Japanese naval authorities arrested General Wang Keng in premises of Astor House Hotel, British property, on Whang Poo Road inside Settlement, and are now holding him. I am reliably informed that he was captured on his way to see Captain Mayer when taken into custody. Will the Department consider it useful to instruct Tokyo to make representations to Foreign Office to have him released on the ground that he was bringing message to American Legation when arrested. He knew we were at Consulate and thought Consular clerk was at old location near Astor House.

JOHNSON

ARL

KLP

793.94114-5
894.102-5

FE
412

793.94114-5 Wang Keng

135F


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Original

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
AMBASSADOR AND THE SECRETARY, FEBRUARY 1932



793.94
note
893.102-S
611.042

The Japanese Ambassador came to my house at Woodley at 12:15. He told me, first, about troop movements. He had told Mr. Castle that one new division was being sent, but he now said that instead of sending the divisions one by one, they were sending two, the 11th and the 14th, so that they will have in all at Shanghai $3\frac{1}{2}$ divisions.

He told me that he was instructed by his Government to assure me that Japan had no intention to obtain any exclusive Japanese concession at Shanghai; also that Japan appreciated the great step of civilization that had been made by the British, the Americans, the French, and the other nations in the creation of the International Settlement and desired to preserve that. He then spoke of the representations which had just been made by the foreign governments, and I explained to him that those had been made in order to remove the danger which was caused by the Japanese fleet lying immediately opposite the middle of the International Settlement, so that when it was fired at by the Chinese across the Settlement, the Settlement was likely to be injured, if shots fell short, and I pointed out that the same thing had happened when the Japanese were landing troops. He said that he appreciated that, and that he had word

F/DEM
793.94/4502

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

that the Japanese Government would do everything they could to avoid that danger. He did not, however, say specifically that they would remove the ship.

He said that all the Japanese were trying to do was to move the Chinese back 20 kilometers, and that they thought now that the Chinese morale was getting low and this could be done without much fighting. I told him that they might be mistaken in this as they had been before, and that the thing to do was to stop the blow rather than to trust that it would be a light blow. I told him that I believed that if the Japanese would stop their attack, the Chinese could be induced to withdraw a safe distance, which would be sufficient so as not to endanger the Settlement, and that in such case both faces could be saved. This point came up several times in the conversation, and I always repeated it, and he always said that he agreed with me that the thing to do was to stop the blow. But it was evident from his attitude that he knew that his Government was insisting upon going ahead to deliver the blow. I told him that I was not making any offer, but that if ever the Japanese Government wanted our good offices or assistance, they knew that they could have them. Our friendship for Japan remained. He said he knew that.

He then brought up the question of boycott and the movement started by President Lowell, and he said that it was necessarily very dangerous and if persisted

1611.2412

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

in might cause great irritation in Japan. I said that that movement had not been in any way encouraged by the Government; that I, myself, whenever people spoke to me about it, pointed out the danger of such a movement; but that he must recognize the fact that public opinion in this country had been greatly shocked by the action of the Japanese, and when people of the standing of Dr. Lowell, who was one of our foremost historians, and Mr. Baker started such a movement, they had great influence and it meant that the country was greatly shocked.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADDRESS REPLY TO
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
AND REFER TO INITIALS

En3-11 (Peiping, China)/
P16-3(320224)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 3 1932

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

PM RECD

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

MAR 1 1932

FEB 29 1932

MAR 3 1932



F/DEW

793.94/4503

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Acknowledgment is made of your letter of 24 February, file FE 793.94/4288, transmitting copy of a telegram dated 19 February from the American Minister to China requesting that the tour of duty of Captain C. C. Hartigan as Naval Attaché be extended to cover the present emergency in China and until about 1 June, 1932.

I am glad to inform you that the Navy Department will be glad to accede to the suggestion made by the Minister.

Sincerely yours,

C. C. Hartigan

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of State.

793.94
note
121.5593

MAR 4 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 3:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,


Washington

67, March 1, 11 a.m.

Your service regarding this office's 62, February
27, 5 p.m.

One. For the sake of the record this telegram is
repeated to you as follows: "62, February 27, 5 p.m.

One. My 61, February 25, 4 p.m. The letter from
the Japanese Consul has made the American citizens
concerned very anxious and they would be greatly
reassured if the trenches and artillery positions in
question were removed from the way of the Standard Oil
Company property. These positions do not appear to be
of great importance in the defense of Nanking against
the six Japanese vessels still anchored opposite the
city for such defense would apparently have to be made
by airplanes or by large guns. Would the Department
think



F/DEW

793.94/4504

FILED

MAR 5 1932

793.94
393.11
393.115

MET

2-#67 from Nanking via N.R.,
March 1, 11 a.m.

think it advisable to take up with the Chinese Foreign Office and/or military authorities the need of removing the military positions of which the Japanese Consul complains? A possible ground might be the injustice of subjecting American property and life to the danger inherent in being within a fortified area.

Repeated to the Legation and Minister".

Two. Apparently no action by this office is now required because the Standard Oil Company reports that on February 29 all work on trenches and gun positions within 200 yards of the Standard Oil Company's residence was stopped and mounds were leveled although the trenches were not filled until February 29th. About 80 soldiers were stationed in this locality. They were removed.

note
393.115

PECK

WSB-HPD

First sentence of above "your service regarding this office's 62, February 27, 5 p.m." is in reply to request for repetition of serial number which was not previously received.

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS.

140
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 842.9111/70 FOR Despatch #706

FROM Canada (..... Riggs) DATED Feb. 26, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese crisis. Recent events at Shanghai have
greatly disturbed Canadian press. Far Eastern situation
has finally been subject of inquiry in House of Commons.

793.94 / 4505

fp

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

3. SINO-JAPANESE CRISIS.

Recent events at Shanghai have greatly disturbed the Canadian press. The results of the Japanese elections were, of course, fully expected, but the fact that the militant policy of the government has now been given the approval of the voters is looked upon as a sure sign that this policy will be followed to a decisive conclusion. Further, while the recent unexpected resistance of the Chinese forces has aroused widespread sympathy, the setback to the Japanese is regarded as an additional threat to world peace, since it greatly reduces the chances of Japan's withdrawing her forces without loss of prestige, even if she were so inclined.

The possibility of the application of economic sanctions against Japan by the League of Nations is looked upon with disfavor and many papers are busily printing statistics showing the loss of trade which such action would bring to Canada. Apart from this motive, the underlying fear of opponents of a boycott is that in some way or other Great Britain, Canada and other members of the League will be swept into a boycott; that the United States will refuse to join in any such movement; and that the latter will, consequently, be in a position to increase her trade with Japan at the expense of the boycotting nations. To quote the Liberal Toronto GLOBE:

"It is not only possible but probable that an attempt by the League to boycott and blockade Japan would lead to serious difficulties with the United States.

"Any

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

"Any attempt to take any such action without the co-operation of the United States should be promptly and strenuously opposed by Canada's representatives at the League.

"It is the height of folly to ignore the possibility that the United States may refuse to be a party to such a blockade. It is true that the League Covenant is itself a United States product. It is equally true that long after the United States had withdrawn from the League she arranged another international pact--the Kellogg Treaty, which was designed to outlaw war. But the United States has never committed herself as to her course of action in case war refused to be outlawed. After the Kellogg Pact was signed President Hoover again urged the old Wilson formula -- freedom of the seas in peace and war. This formula is the very negation of Article XVI of the League Covenant."

If definite assurances could be given that the United States would cooperate in the application of economic sanctions against Japan, it seems likely that much of the present opposition in Canada would disappear.

The Far Eastern situation has finally been the subject of inquiry in the House of Commons. On February 19th, a member asked the Prime Minister, in view of the Government's obligations under the covenant of the League of Nations, what Canada's policy is in regard to the present situation in China. In reply, Mr. Bennett said that because of the importance of the matter, he had prepared an official statement which reads as follows:

"The Canadian government has followed with grave concern the situation in China, of which it has been kept fully informed by cablegrams. Our friendly relations of long standing with both parties to the dispute, and our position on the Pacific, give an especial interest in the success of the efforts for the preservation of peace which the council of the league has undertaken. These efforts have not yet succeeded but they will not likely be given up. The Canadian government is hopeful that ultimately they will result in the restoration of that good understanding between the peoples,

upon

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

upon which the peace of the world depends. In view of the fact that the council of the league is still continuing its efforts at mediation, and the possibility that a special session of the assembly may be called to deal with the situation, in which Canada would be represented, I think I am within the judgment of the house when I suggest that it would be premature to attempt to make a statement now as to what would be the policy of the Canadian government in the event of failure of these efforts for settlement. If a special meeting of the assembly is called it will be the duty of the Canadian government to instruct its representatives as to the position to be taken in the light of the situation as it will have developed at that time. I need hardly add that every step that His Majesty's government in Canada can take for the maintenance and preservation of peace will be taken."

Another local event which has been viewed with considerable interest occurred here last week. Due to economies which the Canadian Government plans to put into effect, a large number of officers and mechanics of the Royal Canadian Air Force are to be dropped from the service on April 1st. On February 18th a delegation of these men, representing 50 officers and 200 mechanics, called upon the Chinese Consul General in this city and offered their services in the Chinese army. The proposal calls for the expenditure of about \$13,000,000. \$9,000,000 for one year and \$4,000,000 for the second, in return for which the delegation promised to have 2 squadrons, of 18 machines each, ready for almost immediate service. The delegation wisely demanded that the money should be paid in advance.

The matter was brought up in the House of Commons on February 18th by a member of the Opposition who demanded that the Government take steps to relieve these men from the necessity of seeking employment under a

foreign

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By M. J. O. Gutzkow NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 10 -

foreign flag. In reply, the Prime Minister refrained from making public the Government's intentions, but he read the following telegram from the Canadian Commercial Attaché at Shanghai:

"Reference Reuters Ottawa despatches which state airmen offering to come to China absolutely no chance of employment. Five who came to Shanghai stranded."

The local press is up in arms at the proposal and the Liberal Ottawa CITIZEN of February 28th protests against it in the following words:

"It would be a national shame to allow the men of the Royal Canadian Air Force to go abroad in such a forlorn search for the means of livelihood."

"Parliament should face this situation squarely. The government is going too far with drastic economy. It should hardly be necessary to have a foreign legion of Canadian airmen butchered by the Japanese before the people of Canada are aroused to protest against such consequences of retrenchment."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 4 d/203 FOR letter

~~FROM~~ () DATED Feb. 23, 1932.
TO Borah, William E. USS NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Nine Power Treaty. Outline of this Government's policy toward the suggested modification of the -, in connection with the Sion-Japanese situation. (Copy attached)

MN

793.94/4506

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

February 24, 1932

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR AFTERNOON NEWSPAPERS WHICH DO
NOT APPEAR ON THE STREETS BEFORE 10 A.M.,
EASTERN STANDARD TIME, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24,
1932. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED
FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY.

TEXT OF LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE HONORABLE
HENRY L. STIMSON, TO THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. BORAH,
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES
SENATE, FEBRUARY 24, 1932.

February 24, 1932.

The Honorable
William E. Borah,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

My dear Senator Borah:

You have asked my opinion whether, as has been sometimes recently suggested, present conditions in China have in any way indicated that the so-called Nine Power Treaty has become inapplicable or ineffective or rightly in need of modification, and if so, what I considered should be the policy of this Government.

This Treaty, as you of course know, forms the legal basis upon which now rests the "Open Door" policy towards China. That policy, enunciated by John Hay in 1899, brought to an end the struggle among various powers for so-called spheres of interest in China which was threatening the dismemberment of that empire. To accomplish this Mr. Hay invoked two principles (1) equality of commercial opportunity among all nations in dealing with China, and (2) as necessary to that equality the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity. These principles were not new in the foreign policy of America. They had been the principles upon which it rested in its dealings with other nations for many years. In the case of China they were invoked to save a situation which not only threatened the future development and sovereignty of that great Asiatic people, but also threatened to create dangerous and constantly increasing rivalries between the other nations of the world. War had already taken place between Japan and

-2-

China. At the close of that war three other nations intervened to prevent Japan from obtaining some of the results of that war claimed by her. Other nations sought and had obtained spheres of interest. Partly as a result of these actions a serious uprising had broken out in China which endangered the legations of all of the powers at Peking. While the attack on those legations was in progress, Mr. Hay made an announcement in respect to this policy as the principle upon which the powers should act in the settlement of the rebellion. He said

"The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

He was successful in obtaining the assent of the other powers to the policy thus announced.

In taking these steps Mr. Hay acted with the cordial support of the British Government. In responding to Mr. Hay's announcement, above set forth, Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister expressed himself "most emphatically as concurring in the policy of the United States."

For twenty years thereafter the Open Door policy rested upon the informal commitments thus made by the various powers. But in the winter of 1921 to 1922, at a conference participated in by all of the principal powers which had interests in the Pacific, the policy was crystallized into the so-called Nine Power Treaty, which gave definition and precision to the principles upon which the policy rested. In the first article of that Treaty, the contracting powers, other than China, agreed

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.
3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.
4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.

This Treaty thus represents a carefully developed and matured international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interests in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain among the peoples of this earth. At the time this Treaty was signed, it was known that China was engaged in an attempt to develop the free institutions of a self-governing republic after her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government; that she would require many years of both economic and political effort to that end; and that her progress would necessarily be slow. The Treaty was thus a covenant of self-denial among the signatory powers in deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development. It was believed - and the whole history of the development of the "Open Door" policy reveals that faith - that only by such a process, under the protection of such an agreement, could the fullest interests not only of China but of all nations which have intercourse with her best be served.

-3-

In its report to the President announcing this Treaty, the American Delegation, headed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Charles E. Hughes, said

"It is believed that through this Treaty the 'Open Door' in China has at last been made a fact."

During the course of the discussions which resulted in the Treaty, the Chairman of the British delegation, Lord Balbour, had stated that

"The British Empire delegation understood that there was no representative of any power around the table who thought that the old practice of 'spheres of interest' was either advocated by any government or would be tolerable to this conference. So far as the British Government were concerned, they had, in the most formal manner, publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation."

At the same time the representative of Japan, Baron Shidehara, announced the position of his government as follows:

"No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way of China to work out her own great national destiny."

The Treaty was originally executed by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal. Subsequently it was also executed by Norway, Bolivia, Sweden, Denmark and Mexico. Germany has signed it but her Parliament has not yet ratified it.

It must be remembered also that this Treaty was one of several treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference by the various powers concerned, all of which were interrelated and interdependent. No one of these treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety. The Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament conference, aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the world not only through the cessation of competition in naval armament but also by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the world, particularly in the Far East. These problems were all interrelated. The willingness of the American government to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its positions at Guam and in the Philippines without further fortification, was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine Power Treaty, which assured the nations of the world not only of equal opportunity for their Eastern trade but also against the military aggrandizement of any other power at the expense of China. One cannot discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating those provisions of the Nine Power Treaty without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent.

-4-

Six years later the policy of self-denial against aggression by a stronger against a weaker power, upon which the Nine Power Treaty had been based, received a powerful reinforcement by the execution by substantially all the nations of the world of the Pact of Paris, the so-called Kellogg Briand Pact. These two treaties represent independent but harmonious steps taken for the purpose of aligning the conscience and public opinion of the world in favor of a system of orderly development by the law of nations including the settlement of all controversies by methods of justice and peace instead of by arbitrary force. The program for the protection of China from outside aggression is an essential part of any such development. The signatories and adherents of the Nine Power Treaty rightly felt that the orderly and peaceful development of the 400,000,000 of people inhabiting China was necessary to the peaceful welfare of the entire world and that no program for the welfare of the world as a whole could afford to neglect the welfare and protection of China.

The recent events which have taken place in China, especially the hostilities which having been begun in Manchuria have latterly been extended to Shanghai, far from indicating the advisability of any modification of the treaties we have been discussing, have tended to bring home the vital importance of the faithful observance of the covenants therein to all of the nations interested in the Far East. It is not necessary in that connection to inquire into the causes of the controversy or attempt to apportion the blame between the two nations which are unhappily involved; for regardless of cause or responsibility, it is clear beyond peradventure that a situation has developed which cannot, under any circumstances, be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants of these two treaties, and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed such a situation could not have arisen. The signatories of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact who are not parties to that conflict are not likely to see any reason for modifying the terms of those treaties. To them the real value of the faithful performance of the treaties has been brought sharply home by the perils and losses to which their nationals have been subjected in Shanghai.

That is the view of this Government. We see no reason for abandoning the enlightened principles which are embodied in these treaties. We believe that this situation would have been avoided had these covenants been faithfully observed, and no evidence has come to us to indicate that a due compliance with them would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of those treaties and their nationals.

On January 7th last, upon the instruction of the President, this Government formally notified Japan and China that it would not recognize any situation, treaty or agreement entered into by those governments in violation of the covenants of these treaties, which affected the rights of our Government or its citizens in China. If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived.

In the past our Government, as one of the leading powers on the Pacific Ocean, has rested its policy upon an abiding faith in the future of the people of China and upon the ultimate success in dealing with them of the principles of fair play, patience, and mutual goodwill. We appreciate the immensity of the task which lies before her statesmen in the development of her country and its government. The delays in her progress, the instability of her attempts to secure a responsible government, were foreseen by Messrs. Hay and Hughes and their contemporaries and were the very obstacles which the policy of the Open Door was designed to meet. We concur with those statesmen, representing all the nations in the Washington Conference who decided that China was entitled to the time necessary to accomplish her development. We are prepared to make that our policy for the future.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 MAR 7 1932
 DIVISION OF
 GENEVA
 Dated February 29, 1932

FROM

Rec'd 8:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

URGENT

92, February 29, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

The important features of the Council meeting
 which was held at six o'clock today were

(A) The acceptance of a "proposal" by all the
 members of the Council present other than China and
 Japan which, however, was personally endorsed by the
 representatives of these two countries and transmitted
 by them to their governments.

(E) Statement by Sir John Simon outlining a
 text of proposal as read by President of the Council.

One. The imminence of hostilities on the largest
 scale in the Shanghai region between Chinese and Japa-
 nese forces with the inevitable consequence of heavy
 loss of life and further embitterment of feeling makes
 it at this critical moment the duty of all of us to lose
 no opportunity of seeking means by which this deplorable
 armed

F/DEW

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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 MAR 1 1932
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 MAR 1 - 1932
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

man

2- #92, from Geneva, February 29,
 1932

armed conflict between two members of the League may be suspended and a way of peace may be found and followed. (Information was here furnished by Simon respecting meeting at Shanghai on board British ship) The news that we have received from the British representative that conversations actually took place yesterday at Shanghai with a view to making arrangements and that the proposed arrangements for a cessation of hostilities have been referred to the respective governments is welcomed by us all and the Council of the League is ready to make its contribution towards the consolidation of peaceful conditions in the way and at the time which is most useful.

Two. The President has, therefore, called together his colleagues on the Council for the purpose of laying before them a proposal which might serve to this end. For its effective execution this proposal will require not only the acceptance of the Governments of China and Japan but the cooperation on the spot of the other principal powers who have special interests in the Shanghai settlements and whose representatives are therefore readily available to make the local

man

3- #46, from Geneva, February 29,
1932

the local/contribution of their friendly aid which is no less necessary than the positive and sincere agreement of the Chinese and Japanese authorities to the plan proposed.

Three. This plan is as follows:

(One). A conference to be immediately set up in Shanghai composed of representatives of the Governments of China and Japan together with representatives of the other powers above referred to for the purpose of bringing about a final conclusion of fighting and the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Shanghai area. (Two). The conference would be undertaken on the basis

(a) That Japan has no political or territorial designs and no intention of establishing a Japanese settlement in Shanghai or of otherwise advancing the exclusive interests of the Japanese, and

(b) That China enters the conference on the basis that the safety and integrity of the International and French Settlements must be preserved under arrangements which will secure these areas and their residents from danger. (Three) The meeting of
this

man

4- #46, from Geneva, February 29,
1932

this conference is of course subject to the making of local arrangements for a cessation of hostilities. The Council trusts that this will very speedily be brought about. It is proposed that the military, naval and civilian authorities of the other principal powers represented in Shanghai will render all possible assistance in consolidating the arrangements.

Four. To this proposal, which is aimed at the immediate reestablishment of peace in the Shanghai area, without prejudice to or qualification of any position previously taken by the League of Nations or any power in relation to Sino-Japanese affairs, the President desires, in the name of himself and of his colleagues, to invite the adherence and cooperation both of China and Japan and of the other powers referred to, whose local position enables them to make a special contribution to the common purpose of stopping armed conflict and restoring peace.

Text of statement by Sir John Simon:

The proposal placed before the Council by the President is one to which the British Government gives
its

man

5- #46, from Geneva, February 29,
1932

its fullest support. We shall instruct our representa-
tives in Shanghai to cooperate in the fullest way with
the other powers and we shall do so in our character
as a member of the League of Nations resolved to sup-
port its moral authority and sustain its influence
in the work of maintaining and restoring peaceful
relations.

So much for the support of the British Government
for whom I have the honor to speak. But there is
another government whose citizens have great interests
in the International Settlement and whose devotion
to the cause of peace and desire to promote a just
conclusion for the Sino-Japanese conflict is known
to us all. I refer to the United States of America.
America is not a member of the League of Nations but,
none the less, I am happy to be able to announce here
at meeting of the Council of the League that I have
been in close consultation with the American Government
and I am authorized to communicate the assurance of
the United States that it is prepared to associate
itself with the step which we are now taking and to
instruct

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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6- #46, from Geneva, February 29,
1932

instruct its representatives in the Shanghai area to
cooperate with us who are members of the League of
Nations in the fullest measure in carrying out the
proposals which the President has put before us and
which we are about to adopt.

Details of the meeting will follow.

(END SECTION ONE)

GILBERT

FW OX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
GREEN

Geneva

FROM

Dated February 29, 1932

Rec'd March 1st, 8:25 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

92, February 29, 7 p. m. (SECTION TWO).

C. Sir John Simon added to his presentation of the proposal the statement that "if there is no cessation of hostilities there cannot be a meeting of this Conference".

D. Grandi announced that the President's proposal met with the "fullest approval" of the Italian Government and that its collaboration was definitely assured.

E. Boncour informed the Council that the French Government would accord the same approval and support. He also expressed his satisfaction at the announced collaboration of the United States.

F. With regard to Simon's communication respecting an arrangement for a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, Sato stated that he had not yet been authorized to inform the Council as to the details but that he would do so as soon as instructions were received. He added that the Japanese authorities had at once submitted the proposed arrangement to Tokyo.

With

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#92, from Geneva, Feb. 29, 7p.m.

With respect to the President's proposal he accepted it subject to the approval of his Government and would transmit it immediately. In connection with this proposal he made the following statement:

One. In the Shanghai question the sole aim of the Japanese Government is to remove from the International Concession and also from its own nationals all imminent danger and to restore peaceful conditions.

Two. The Japanese Government will be prepared to cooperate with other powers with a view to settling the situation at Shanghai as soon as calm is reestablished under conditions such as will guarantee the security of the Concession and the Japanese nationals. For this purpose and particularly with a view to insuring the future security of foreigners in the Shanghai region the Japanese Government will have no objection to the opening in that city of a round table conference at which there will be represented foreign powers who have interests at Shanghai.

Y Three. The Japanese Government has no intention of taking advantage of the present situation in order to realize political or territorial ambitions in that region. It has no wish to establish a Japanese concession at Shanghai or to obtain exclusive privileges there for the Japanese. It desires to maintain and strengthen the international character of Shanghai.

Four. News has been published in the press according to which the Japanese Government is stated to be contemplating the establishment of neutral zones around some of the chief Chinese cities. This in no wise represents the intentions of the Japanese Government."

G. Yen then read a telegram which virtually repeated the information Simon had given regarding an arrangement for the cessation

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-#92, from Geneva, Feb. 29, 7p.m.

cessation of hostilities and which stated that the "Chinese authorities find the proposal reasonable and acceptable".

With regard to the President's proposal, he would transmit it immediately and would strongly urge its acceptance.

H. The German representative expressed his satisfaction at the possibility of the cessation of hostilities and the hope that the prospective negotiations would meet with immediate success.

I. Expressing the opinion that all members of the Council desired to contribute to the success of the efforts now under way, Madariaga stated that for some time the contribution would consist of "setting aside our special preference to see powers other than those with immediate interest on the spot being associated with these efforts". In his opinion political problems may be local from one point of view but universal from another.

With regard to the United States, he said that while that country is not unfortunately represented on the Council "We know that the spirit and the aims of that power are so closely in line with us that the United States might indeed be amongst us and the difference would hardly be noticeable from

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4-#92, from Geneva, Feb. 29, 7p.m.

from that point of view".

J. In a concluding declaration the President noted that no one had opposed the proposal and thanked his colleagues who had explicitly acceded to the proposition. He emphasized that the proposed conference at Shanghai was entirely dependent upon the cessation of hostilities.

(END OF MESSAGE).

GILBERT

HPD

142

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Washington,

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before March 1, 1932.
being communicated to anyone.

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (Switzerland)

Confidential

Your No. 92, February 29, 7 p.m.

Consulates

One. I have received from Minister Johnson under date Shanghai March 1, 9 p.m., a telegram in which he states that he has been shown by his British colleague, Lampson, a telegram from London describing the proposal for holding a round table conference to deal with the QUOTE problem of Shanghai UNQUOTE. Johnson reports that he was informed that the Japanese idea was that such a conference should deal with the question of security and protection of foreigners at Shanghai and the security of the International Settlement.

Commenting on this proposal, Johnson states that neither he nor Lampson know of any question involving the security of foreigners' lives and property or security for the Settlement which needs to be laid before such a conference provided hostilities cease and both Japanese and Chinese troops evacuate.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1924 1-135

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Washington,

- 2 -

Johnson further states that he and Lampson believe that the only question that could be laid before such a conference would be in regard to enlarging the area of the Settlement and that they believe that it would not be wise ~~to~~ to become involved in a discussion of such a proposal. He gives reasons, of which he says that the same are being telegraphed by Lampson to the British Government.

Johnson states QUOTE the crying need of Shanghai is to obtain a cessation of hostilities UNQUOTE and that it is his opinion and that of the Commander-in-Chief that QUOTE to link negotiations in regard to the future of the International Settlement would unduly delay this most desirable end UNQUOTE.

Two. In this connection please refer to the record of our telephone conversations of February 27, 12:50 p.m. and February 28, 1:40 p.m. and to my telegram No. 24, 4492a February 28, 5 p.m. and note my observations with regard to the original third paragraph of proposals. It is apparent that both the American and British Ministers to China ~~share the~~ ^{felt} apprehension ^{similar to that} which I expressed that

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Enciphered by JSSent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1970 1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

- 3 -

it would be hazardous to link up with proposals the primary object of which is to bring hostilities to an end other proposals which may appear designed to take advantage of the military situation for the furthering of objectives not strictly related to the problem of cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peaceful conditions.

In making note of this at this moment, I take into account the fact that the text of the plan as adopted yesterday, as reported in your telegram under reference, differs substantially, by virtue of amendments, from the text or outline which was in Lampson's hands and was made the basis of Johnson's and Lampson's comments.

Three. The foregoing is for your confidential background information. Unless and until instructed, take no action on the basis of it. In case Simon approaches you on the subject and discloses that he has received information from Lampson, you are at liberty to let him know that you have been informed of Johnson's views and that you have been given to understand that Johnson's and Lampson's views coincide; otherwise you need not mention that you have this information.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1970 1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

- 4 -

In case you find any indication of discrepancies,
please report them.

RSM
FE: SKH: CLS
JEJ

[Handwritten signature]

Stinson
SKH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1919 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 8:40 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

PRIORITY.

March 1, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"March 1, 3 p. m. The TENCHO MARU from Dairen,
 by
 specially chartered/Japanese military, landed 550 rifles,
 12 field pieces, 80 machine guns and 3,150 cases of
 ammunition at Tangku yesterday and returned immediately
 to Dairen. The landing of so much Japanese war material
 under present circumstances has caused great concern at
 Tangku and considerable speculation at Tientsin. There
 are reported to be 2,000 Chinese troops at Tangku, 500
 at Hsinho and 500 at Taku and 150 Japanese troops at
 Tangku. Martial law is being enforced at night at Tangku.

Repeated to the Department and Shanghai."

LOCKHART

KLP

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
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
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MAR 5 1932

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 O.N.I. AND M.I.A.
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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REP

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

Tokyo

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 9:40 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 1 1932
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Secretary of State,
Washington.

85, March 1, 5 p. m.

In its editorial this morning the Tokyo NICHU NICHU commented favorably on reports that an international^{al} meeting will be held at Shanghai to effect a solution of the situation there. The papers stated that if the meeting is really for this purpose it welcomes it gladly and that the proposal of such a meeting should have been made by Japan. At such a meeting Japan will be able to ~~accept~~^{explain} with proof her military actions at Shanghai.

711.94

Since my telegram No. 82, February 27, 4 p. m., three important editorials have commented on the excited state of feeling in the United States with respect to Japan. The Tokyo ASAHI'S editorial was conciliatory in tone explaining that to be easily excited is a characteristic of Americans and that the Japanese should remain calm. It expressed the fear that excited public opinion might lead to an unexpected result. The JIJI fears that the Japanese sentiment in America might jeopardize friendly relations

F/DEW 793.94/4509

FILED

MAR 5 1932

REP

2-#85, from Tokyo, Mar. 1, 5p.m.

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relations, it fears advocacy of an economic blockade and other imprudent utterances will imperil amicable relations. Unhappy relations between Japan and America would be in its opinion a far greater misfortune than the present Shanghai affair. The OSAKA KAI NICHI in a similar editorial stated that if the American nation takes any action against Japan without studying the true aspects of the facts and merely driven by sentiment it fears the result may be eventual destruction of peace in the Orient.

Yesterday four leading papers published editorials welcoming the League Commission. No comment of significance was contained in them.

FORBES

WSB

KLP

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
GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 11:05 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.



138, March 1, 6 p. m.

Continuing my daily report 131, February 29, 7 p.m.

One. The Japanese forces claimed to have advanced their positions along the Chapei front near the Paoshan Road sector after a heavy artillery and aerial bombardment.

Two. Along the Kiangwan front the Japanese claim to have advanced in the direction of Tazang village about 1000 yards.

Three. Timed depth bombs were set afloat last night and at 1:25 p. m. today one exploded within 60 feet of the Japanese flagship IDZUMO. The latter did no damage but thoroughly shook the City of Shanghai. Fifteen minutes earlier another exploded quite near another Japanese warship.

Four. Intermittent artillery activity continues at Woosung. From Japanese sources it is stated that the 11th Division landed at Liuho at 8:30 this morning. The bulk of the remaining reenforcements were landed by lighter at the railway wharf at Changwahpang. The Japanese forces will face

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FILED

MAR 5 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#138, from Shanghai, Mar. 1, 6p.m.

face approximately 58,000 Chinese soldiers.

Five. The 19th Route Army issued a statement today that they would not evacuate Shanghai or its environs. Any such demands must be referred to the National Government.

Six. The majority of Chinese shops remain closed. Native banks continue to refuse to pay cash against orders drawn upon them. Thus far the position remains as it has since the commencement of the trouble, a complete stagnation of trade.

Repeated to the Legation, Nanking. Copy to Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

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143 -

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

PEIJING

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.



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Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

293, March 1, 5 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.



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793.94/4511

MAR 7 1932

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One. North China remains quiet. I am very reliably informed that the Chinese plan is to exhaust the Japanese in the Shanghai area and to give them no pretext for intervention in this vicinity. This policy is based on the knowledge that the Japanese have very complete military plans for the occupation of North China which they could execute with comparative ease whereas there are no such detailed arrangements for the occupation of the Yangtze basin. At the same time dispositions of Chinese troops have been made with a view to resistance in case the Japanese take the initiative.

Two. If this information is correct there would seem small likelihood of any Chinese military activity in the direction of Manchuria at the present time especially in view of the shortage of munitions in Marshal Chang's forces. The action of the Chinese Government toward the independence

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#293, from Peiping, Mar. 1, 5p.m.

independence movement in Manchuria will perhaps be limited to a manifesto, which, by declaring the existence there of a state of rebellion, will serve to prevent the case at this time from going by default and to lay a basis for any action thought advisable at a later date.

Repeated to the Minister.

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

KLP

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 10:10 a. m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

132, March 1, 11 a. m.

Following from Captain Mayer for War Department;

"16. 22nd Japanese infantry from 11th Division, strength about 2000, landed at Changwahpang last night and joined 9th Division today. MISAKA MARU hospital ship, with troops and pontoons berthed at South Manchurian Railway wharf since yesterday. Japanese troop arrivals surrounded with secrecy but except for replacements landed February 27th, no troops are known to have been landed in Settlement this time. Military supplies, however, continue to land. Believe Japanese straightened their line south of Kiangwan today also some activity in Chapei but no major gain. Japanese bombing continues and they have warned Mayor Wu today that unless military use ceases they will bomb Shanghai-Kashing and Shanghai-Soochow Railways after March 2nd. Time limit is for evacuating non-combatants from danger zones. British report 89th Chinese Division in area, 529th regiment at Tazang and Kiangwan, 530th at Lunghua and 531st at Nanziang. Revised estimate

F/DEW


793.94/4512

FILED

MAR 5 1932

793.94
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474.11
 Shanghai
 893.77



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #132, from Shanghai, Mar. 1, 11a.m.

estimate casualties to date Japanese about 2100, Chinese
about 6000."

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

KLP

143


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP




FROM GRAY AND PLAIN

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 11:20 a. m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

133, March 1, noon.

My telegram 130, February 29, 6 p. m.

Following is communique issued by Japanese Consulate
General afternoon February 29th: (END GRAY)

"Consul General K. Murai addressed a letter this
morning to Mayor Wu Te Chen of Greater Shanghai which says
in part as follows:

'The Chinese military authorities are at present con-
centrating reinforcements in and around Shanghai and these
forces are being transported mainly by railways.

This action on the part of the Chinese military
authorities is liable to result in the extension of the
scope of hostilities. Therefore if the concentration should
be continued, the Japanese forces, in their self-defense,
might be forced to destroy the railway lines and military
trains between Kashing and Shanghai and between Soochow and
Shanghai on and after March 2, 1932.

Under the circumstances while I will take steps to bring
to the

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F/DEW 793.94/4513

FILED

MAR 5 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#133, from Shanghai, Mar. 1, noon.

to the notice of the public the above in the hope that non-combatants in general may take all necessary precautions to avoid any possible danger, it is urgently hoped that you also will take appropriate measures in way of notifying the Chinese residents."

Two. Press publishers this morning translation of reply from Mayor as follows:

"Mr. K. Murai, Japanese Consul General, Shanghai.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 29th, the contents of which are duly noted. In reply I should state that since the night of January 28 the Japanese forces have repeatedly invaded our territory and murdered our people; and their atrocities committed in violation of all international law and international treaties and against humanity have formed the subjects of my former protests to you. The action of the Chinese troops on the other hand have all been confined to self-defense. That the situation should have been aggravated has been due to the fact that your country has repeatedly sent reinforcements here, thereby adding to the catastrophe already endured.

If the Japanese forces should continue to attack our
troops

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#133 from Shanghai, March 1,
noon.

troops the latter could not but be compelled to adopt
appropriate measures for self-defense and all responsi-
bilities in this connection must rest entirely with you.

to

I have the honor/be, et cetera, Wu Te Chen". (GRAY)

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking for information.

Copy to the Minister.

GUNNINGHAM

KLP

HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Geneva

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 11:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,


Washington

47, March 1, 2 p.m.

Sweetser reports as follows concerning the meeting of the twelve yesterday before the public session of the Council:

"At a meeting of the twelve today preparatory to the public session Simon explained the Shanghai negotiations and the suggested program. After stating that Britain and France had agreed to cooperate he said that what was of greater interest was the attitude of the United States. He had taken the liberty of discussing the matter in great detail with some of the representatives of the United States in Geneva who were in close touch with Washington. America had shown the greatest interest in all the details in fact the plan respecting the position already taken by the League or

by



793.94/4514

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MAR 7 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#47 from Geneva, March 1,
 2 p.m.

by any government had been worked out by Mr. Stimson,
 and felt that this would result in a united front.

Boncour after expressions of appreciation by himself
 and others expressed disquietude lest after tonight's
 meeting hostilities might still continue tomorrow and
 felt that in order to avoid another unpleasant surprise
 more formal assurance should be secured as to their
 termination. Simon fully sharing this anxiety, urged that
 the Council must run a certain risk and take a step even
 if a bold one rather than merely wait on events. If
 the United States could be brought to cooperate with
 the nations around the table he thought it would greatly
 increase the influence of the Council with Japan.

Madariaga agreeing as to the risk felt that the best
 aspect of the situation was that the United States would
 cooperate more fully with the League than hitherto. He
 had always felt that the absence of the United States
 made a huge gap in the peace procedure. He wondered,
 however, if the Council could strengthen the League of
 Nations' aspect, (first), by specifically stating that

the

MET

3-#47 from Geneva, March 1,
2 p.m.

the Conference be held under the League; (second), by opening it to all the powers on the original Shanghai Commission rather than to the great powers only; (third), by entrusting the arrangements to the Secretariat as previously done and, (fourth), by assuring that the Conference report to the Assembly.

Simon emphasized that he had set himself the object of associating the United States in the Shanghai work. The present arrangement gives closer association by the United States than ever before. The only difficulty about accepting the above proposals was that Washington had already accepted the original text; indeed he had just had a message from Mr. Wilson that the Secretary of State had agreed by telephone to the text as it stood. He was afraid now to ask for any change in the text, given the physical difficulty of negotiating with the United States at such great distance. For himself he would be glad to state that Great Britain was acting on behalf of the League and suggested that the French and Italian representatives might do the same for their countries.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-#47 from Geneva, March 1,
 2 p.m.

countries. It was very difficult, however, to ask America to act on behalf of the League and he consequently urged leaving the text as it was. Drummond added as regards the Assembly that any report from the Conference was sure to come before the body as part of its information and documentation and that therefore it was unnecessary as well as unwise to make a special point of it.

Boncour fully agreeing as to the necessity of proceeding with all prudence and not embarrassing the United States, asked if it would not be possible to emphasize the armistice more by putting it in the opening paragraph. Simon replied that his first draft had done exactly that but had been altered in order to avoid the appearance of two rival efforts going on from opposite ends of the world. He did not want to take any step which would encourage either China or Japan to procrastinate nor, having secured American acceptance to the text, would he want to create new difficulties there. Madariaga expressed the view that one of the heavy sacrifices caused by

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

5-#47 from Geneva, March 1,
2 p.m.

caused by American cooperation was that the Council was confronted with texts which it could not change. This had happened not once but several times; it was a difficulty which the Council must accept in order to secure a larger agreement. Simon appreciated this objection but urged that pressure of time and the extreme difficulty of the long range negotiations with America justified an action which in no way could constitute a precedent".


WILSON

WSB

HPD

144

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


February 25, 1932.

Count Marchetti, of the
Italian Embassy.

Mr. Hornbeck.

RECEIVED

FEB 26 1932



SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Subject: Shanghai Situation: Proposed
Joint Representations at
Tokyo.

F/DEW

793.94/4515

Count Marchetti read to me in translation from telegram received by his Embassy to the effect that the Italian Government had instructed the Italian Ambassador at Tokyo to cooperate with other Ambassadors in asking that the Japanese remove their war vessels at Shanghai from points where they are at present stationed opposite the International Settlement to points further down the river; also, in case they land more troops, to land them down the river. Count Marchetti asked whether our Ambassador had been given similar instructions. I informed him that such instructions were given to our Ambassador yesterday.

SKH

MAY 11 1934

FE:SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INDEXES AND ARCHIVES

February 25, 1932.

FE

Mr. Hamilton:

DCR merely handled the
other letters from Mr. Forbes'
Boston office inasmuch as they
related to State Department codes.
This type of communication should
be handled in FE.

N.H.S.
DCF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Feb. 24

DCR:

*Would you please
acknowledge or would
you prefer that
FE do so?*

M.M.H.

44
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

J. M. FORBES & CO.
614 SEARS BUILDING
BOSTON, MASS.

February 10, 1932.



RECEIVED

FEB 11 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

The Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

By direction of Ambassador Forbes
I am forwarding you a cablegram received in his private
code this morning from Tokyo, as follows:

"Henry L. Stimson: At the request of Chinese
Legation, Tokyo, passport has been vised by my
office for Chiang Kai-Shek. At the request
of Chinese Legation must be kept secret."

W. Cameron Forbes".

Very truly yours,

L. H. Dowson.

F/DEW

793.94/4516

MAR 1 - 1932

1447

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
FE

February 28 1932.

Mr. L. H. Dowson,
J. M. Forbes and Company,
614 Sears Building,
Boston, Massachusetts.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
February 10, 1932, forwarding the text of a cablegram
received by you from Ambassador Forbes at Tokyo in
further reference to the visa of a passport for Chiang
Kai-shek.


Your courtesy in forwarding to the Department the
text of this message is appreciated.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. M. H.
Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Feb. 28 1932.
FE:MMH:FGB:SS




793.94/4516
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

J. M. FORBES & CO.

614 SEARS BUILDING
BOSTON, MASS.



*Letter to Mr. Salmon
Feb. 29, 1932
File 27*

February 29, 1932.

1
David A. Salmon, Esq.,
Chief, Division of Communications and Records,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

2-25/817

Thank you for your February 26th acknowledgment
of my letters of Feb. 6th and 9th to the Secretary
of State.

However, in my letter of the 20th to Mr.
Hornbeck I also asked whether or not my letter to
the Secretary of State dated Feb. 10th was received.
It contained the following message received from
Ambassador Forbes in Tokyo:

"Henry L. Stimson: At the request of
Chinese Legation, Tokyo, passport has
been vided by my office for Chiang
Kai-shek. At the request of Chinese
Legation must be kept secret."

Very truly yours,

L. H. Dowson
L. H. Dowson.

FILED

MAR 1 1932

FW 793.94/4516

*79394/4516
F.W.*


144

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY



FROM


Tientsin via N. R.

Dated March 2, 1932

Rec'd MAR 2 1932

Secretary of State,

Washington.



March 2, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation today:

"March 2, 3 p. m. The war materials described in my March 1, 3 p. m. were brought up to Tientsin by lighter yesterday afternoon. Japanese military authorities minimize importance of shipment but the large number of machine guns and field pieces would seem to place the shipment outside the category of normal additions to the equipment of the local garrison although it might well be intended merely to meet any eventualities that may arise in or near Japanese concession.

Repeated to the Department and Shanghai."

WSB - KLP

LOCKHART

F/LS

793.94/4517

FILED

MAR 7 1932


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

CORRECTED COPY
 FROM




GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 2, 1932

Rec'd 8:30 a.



Secretary of State,
 Washington.



PRIORITY.

March 2, 5 p. m.

Following from Captain Mayer for War Department.

"20. Chinese army now in full retreat, believe that they will go beyond Nanchiang. Retreat apparently orderly and unpressed except for Japanese planes which are using incendiary bombs and machine guns over countryside. Tachiang reported captured at March 2, noon, believe Chinese left earlier. Chapei many fires and snipers. At Chenchu March 2, 3 p. m. no Chinese troops but shot at by snipers. Lunghua deserted. Eleventh Japanese Division is reported to be marching in two columns, one south on Chiatingyuan and one southeast on Liuhang.

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD

FW 793.94/4518

FILED

MAR 5 1932


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


GRAY



Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 2, 1932

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PRIORITY.

March 2, 5 p. m.

Following from Captain Mayer for War Department.

"20. Chinese army now in full retreat, believe that they will go beyond Nanchiang. Retreat apparently orderly and unpressed except for Japanese planes which are using incineration bombs and machine guns over country side. Tchiang reported captured at March 2, noon, believe Chinese left earlier. Chapei many (*) and snipers. At Chenchu March 2, 3 p. m. no Chinese but shot at by snipers. Lunghua deserted. Eleventh Japanese Division is reported to be marching in two columns, one south on Chiatingyuan and one southeast on Liuhang.

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD

(*) Apparent omission

F/LS 793.94/4518

MAR 5 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75


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PLAIN


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via NR

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 500.0112



Dated March 2, 1932



Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

297, March 2, 6 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, March second:

"Although a final decision has not yet been made, it is intimated in authoritative circles that instructions are likely to be sent to Mr. Sato at Geneva within a day or two authorizing acceptance of M. Paul Boncour's proposals for a conference between China and Japan and the interested powers, to which conference Japan would come with no territorial or political ambitions in China and China would come to it pledged to protect foreigners.

The army and the navy are understood to have expressed readiness to agree to M. Boncour's proposals ^{be} it is expected that Mr. Sato will/instructed almost immediately to accept them although it is necessary to 'complete the local arrangements at Shanghai for a cessation of hostilities' before prospective conference meets."

CIB JS

For the Minister,
 PERKINS

F/LS

793.94/4519

FILED


MAR 5 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY



FROM Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 2, 1932

Rec'd 6:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington


PRIORITY.

140, March 2, 11 a.m.

FOLLOWING FROM CAPTAIN MAYER FOR WAR DEPARTMENT.

"18. In addition to landing about 8,000 11th Division troops near Liuho, Japanese advanced their 18th Brigade one and one half miles west along Kiangwan-Tazang Road. North of Kiangwan and Chapei sectors little change. 18th Brigade south flank appears exposed and considerable movement of Chinese troops in and out of Chapei tonight may presage an attack there. Conditions of Chinese defenses in Liuho are believed to be fairly strong and soft ground will favor defense. Japanese employment of artillery improving. While Chinese have total of two artillery regiments, have heard their fire only in Chapei sector. Tsai told foreign correspondent Sunday that Chang Kai Shek had not

(repeat



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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/LS 793.94/4520

MAR 5 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEF

2-#140 from Shanghai via N.R.,
March 2, 11 a.m.

(repeat not) sent any ammunition so far. Believe Japan-
ese casualties today heavy".

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Translated by SCC)

From Chinese furnished by Mr. Hsu of the Telephone Admin.

 Translation of an article in the January
 16th issue of the Harbin Nichinichi (in
 the Japanese language)

**TINGCHAO'S CAR FOUND PARKED IN FRONT OF THE
 AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL.**

**SECRET CONVERSATIONS HELD DAILY;
 THEIR NATURE NOT KNOWN.**

Behind Ting Chao there are found the Finhsien Government, Ma Chan-shan, Li Tu and other old militarists. The following is a picture of their political activities.

These days Ting Chao's car has been found almost daily parked in front of the American Consulate General, which stands resolutely and composedly on Bolshoi Prospect in New Town, so the reports say, which are attracting attention from all quarters. The car is sometimes found parked there for hours.

Ting Chao, a military leader in North Manchuria, and the American Government representative, Mr. Hanson, who has been watching around glaringly, have these days held frequent meetings in a room deep in the consulate building, the nature of which is not known. Ting Chao, who is seeking the help of a third Power; the American Consul General, who is playing off the old militarist remnants against Japan; and Consul Chamberlain, who was assaulted on the 3rd instant by Japanese soldiers at Mukden, and who has not as yet been able to rid himself of his resentment -- they form a trio who must have a motive for their secret meetings. Now that Ting Chao's activities are all directed by the American Consul General is not a mere guess. At this time when the clouds from the west are spreading over the political horizon of North Manchuria, the public opinion is that attention cannot but be attracted to their activities.

TH

1456

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 1 1932.

No. 1776

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,
American Minister,
Berne.

Sir:

The Department encloses, for your information, copies of telegrams, as listed below, received by the Department from the Consul General at Shanghai, in regard to developments in that area for the period January 20 to February 25, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your communicating the information contained in the enclosure to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in these messages.

Very truly yours,


For the Secretary of State:

JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS

Enclosures:

Telegrams from Shanghai:
January 20, 5 P.M.
January 21, 5 P.M.
January 25, 2 P.M. (Extract)
January 25, 5 P.M.

MAR 1 1932



793.94/4520A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Mullen O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

January 28, noon.	(73) February 18, 3 P.M.
January 28, 1 P.M. (Extract)	(78) February 19, 3 P.M.
January 28, 2 P.M. (Extract)	(81) February 19, 6 P.M.
January 28, 6 P.M.	(82) February 19, 7 P.M.
January 29, 7 A.M.	(83) February 19, 10 P.M.
January 29, 10 A.M.	(90) February 20, 6 P.M.
January 29, 4 P.M.	(91) February 20, 7 P.M.
January 29, 7 P.M.	(92) February 21, 11 A.M.
January 30, 7 P.M.	(95) February 21, 5 P.M.
January 29, 8 P.M.	(Extract)
January 31, 4 P.M.	(97) February 22, 5 P.M.
January 31, 5 P.M.	(101) February 23, 6 P.M.
January 31, 11 P.M. (Extract)	(103) February 24, 5 P.M.
January 31, 12 P.M.	(106) February 24, 11 P.M.
February 1, 1 A.M.	(107) February 25, 9A.M.
February 1, 2 P.M. (Extract)	
February 1, 7 P.M.	
February 2, 6 A.M.	
February 2, 7 P.M.	
February 3, 2 A.M.	
February 3, 3 A.M. (Extract)	
February 3, 11 A.M.	
February 3, 2 P.M.	
February 3, 6 P.M.	
February 3, 9 P.M.	
February 4, 9 P.M.	
(3) February 5, 5 P.M.	
(4) February 5, 6 P.M.	
(5) February 5, 7 P.M.	
(8) February 6, 5 P.M.	
(9) February 6, 6 P.M.	
(10) February 7, 11 A.M.	
(11) February 7, 5 P.M.	
(12) February 7, 6 P.M.	
(13) February 8, 10 A.M.	
(18) February 8, 7 P.M.	
(19) February 9, 10 A.M.	
(20) February 9, noon.	
(21) February 9, 1 P.M.	
(25) February 9, 8 P.M.	
(26) February 10, 8 P.M.	
(33) February 11, 4 P.M.	
(34) February 11, 5 P.M.	
(36) February 11, 7 P.M.	
(37) February 12, 3 P.M.	
(38) February 12, 4 P.M.	
(40) February 12, 6 P.M.	
(44) February 12, 2 P.M.	
(45) February 12, 4 P.M. (Extract)	
(46) February 13, 7 P.M.	
(48) February 14, noon.	
(50) February 14, 6 P.M.	
(55) February 15, 5 P.M.	
(56) February 15, 6 P.M.	
(61) February 16, 6 P.M.	
(64) February 17, 5 P.M. (Extract)	
(72) February 18, 6 P.M. (Extract)	

Feb. 22, 1982

FE:RFB:KC
 2/26/32

FE:RFB:KC
 m.m.f.

FE:RFB:KC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

CORRECTED PAGE ONE

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated January 25, 1932

Rec'd 4:30 a.m., 26th.

EXTRACT

Secretary of State,
Washington

January 25, 2 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 25, 5 p.m. Referring to my telegram of
January 23, Noon.

One. I learn that the demands presented Mayor by the
Japanese Consul General in connection with assault on
Japanese monks (my January 20, 5 p.m.) were:

- (1) - that Mayor tender an official apology;
- (2) - that the assailants be arrested and punished;
- (3) - that compensation and hospital bills be paid;
- (4) - that all anti-Japanese activities be suppressed and all anti-Japanese organizations dissolve at once.

In my conversation with Mayor on Saturday he stated that first three demands could probably be satisfactorily settled but that he could not suppress anti-Japanese activities and associations so long as they remain within the law but that he would suppress their illegal activities. I learn this morning from the Mayor's office that the demands are still under consideration. One of the Japanese monks assaulted
has died.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- from Shanghai via N.R.,
Jan. 25, 2 p. m.

has died. (These monks, five in number, were assaulted January 18th by Chinese Workers in Chinese territory near the settlement).

Two. Japanese squadron arrived January 23rd and landed approximately 500 marines in the settlement with equipment.

Three. The MINKUO POA, a Chinese paper published in the settlement, has been closely guarded by Municipal police for two days as a result of demands for apology, et cetera, made on paper by Japanese Navy in connection with articles published.

Four. Shanghai was very excited yesterday. An explosion occurred at 3:30 p. m. which broke many windows in various parts of the settlement and French concession 5 or 6 miles away. Two lighters carrying explosives from Pootung to Kiangnan arsenal blew up apparently accidentally because of faulty handling."

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY; EMU

MET

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated January 28, 1932

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.

EXTRACT

Secretary of State,
Washington

January 28, 1 p.m.

Following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 28, 1 p.m.

Confidential. My January 27, 2 p.m.

I learn both from Mayor and Japanese Consulate General that Japanese Consul General has given Mayor until six o'clock tonight to answer satisfactorily the Japanese demands. Mayor issued a proclamation last night suppressing the anti-Japanese National Salvation Association. In conversation this morning the Mayor informed me that he had ordered the five branches of this association to close; that this was the only association which was actively seizing Japanese goods; that yesterday Japanese Consul General had insisted that all associations containing in their names the words "anti-Japanese" must be closed; but that he, the Mayor, could not do this as many of them were not doing anything illegal and that if he were to close them there would be riots and disturbances. He added that he had prepared the way so that he looked for no disturbances to come from the present closing.

Chinese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-From Shanghai via N.R.,
January 28, 1 p.m.

Chinese troops are continuing to erect barricades and are stopping motor cars, et cetera, on outlying roads and I have caused a notice to be published in the newspapers this morning that American residents in exposed districts should be prepared to act immediately and on their own initiative if and when conditions seemed to justify it".

CUNNINGHAM

HPD

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY: EMU

MET
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

Shanghai

Dated January 28, 1932

Rec'd 4:27 a. m.

EXTRACT

Secretary of State,

Washington

January 28, 2 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

I learn on reliable authority that the Japanese military
 authorities intend to take action tomorrow morning January
 29th. This is confirmed by Secretary General of Council who
 was asked by Japanese (?) whether in event of prolonged
 Japanese occupation of Chinese territory contiguous to Settle-
 ment, Settlement police would undertake policing thereof.
 Japanese Admiral has waived his rights as senior officer in
 defense
 connection with Settlement deference and Brigadier Franklin, (?)
 British commander, is senior officer.

Repeated to the Legation.

WSB

CUNNINGHAM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY: EMU CJH

This telegram must be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

SHANGHAI

Dated January 31, 1932

Rec'd. 12:03 p.m.

EXTRACT

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

January 31, 11 p.m.

Continuing my January 31, 4 p.m., the Committee of Defense stated that the proposal contained in my telegram was not feasible and that they could not execute it. The committee stated that the only feasible plan about a complete withdrawal of the Japanese from the (*) into the International Settlement and the placing of the tongue under the control of a neutral power and the Chinese moving their line two thousand yards to the west of the railway. This was accepted for the Chinese but declined (*) the Japanese who refused to (*) removed from the tongue. The meeting was a disappointment because of the very strong attitude of the Japanese against continuing the truce without the withdrawing of the Chinese military line but was eventually accepted, therefore, the truce continues until further notice. The Japanese Consul General agreed to submit the proposal of the Defense Committee to his Government for consideration, and upon the receipt of a reply if unfavorable the Chinese would then submit matter to their Government.

(*) APPARENT OMISSIONS.
 KLP

CUNNINGHAM

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY: EMU

MET

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 1, 1932

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

EXTRACT

Secretary of State,
 Washington

PRIORITY.

February 1, 2 p.m.

Referring to my telegram of February 1, 1 a.m., the truce continues in about the same manner that it has for some days. This morning the firing was exceedingly violent and it appeared that the truce had become ineffective. Both Chinese and Japanese with excitement emphasized the breach of the agreement but I am glad to say it continues to obtain.

Every day the truce continues is of very great value to the Settlement and defense forces as time assists them in tranquilizing the mass of Chinese rushing into the emergency and also those who madly but wisely flee from the Japanese to other sectors of the Settlement. The present disturbances present new and different difficulties from previous ones. Practically every man is armed and therefore sniping is evident and widespread. Firearms have replaced the propaganda circular. Sniping at present is directed particularly against the Japanese. The Japanese sector is fast being evacuated by Chinese.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking.

WSB

CUNNINGHAM

COPY: EMU

REP

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 3, 1932

Rec'd 6:47 a. m.

EXTRACT

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

February 3, 3 a. m.

Refugees continued to pour into the Settlement all day. The Hongkew and Yantzepoo districts are being rapidly evacuated despite the fact that a truce was supposed to prevail, sporadic rifle and machine gun fire continued throughout the day. At 12 o'clock the Hongkew (?) and Yantzepoo districts were closed. Aeroplanes began to reconnoitre Chinese positions at 2:10 p.m. without any cause firing occurred between heavy guns on the Japanese ships and field pieces ashore near the rifle butts in an attempt to smash a Chinese battery located near Markham Road. During the last two days no effort has been made by police to patrol sections of Settlement under rifle and machine gun fire from the opposing sides. For the first time since Japanese forces seized control of the Chapei and neighboring districts, Ronins took over command of the area usually patrolled by the Municipal

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- from Shanghai, Feb. 3, 3 a.m.

Municipal Council police from Hongkew station. These armed independent civilian Japanese patrols continued to hold up pedestrians in the Hongkew district. There is no doubt that the Japanese are being subject to almost continuous attack by snipers, a gun nest on the top of a building on Seward Road having been smashed by the Japanese last night. It is assumed that there are no less than sixty thousand refugees in the Settlement.

The Japanese have no less than ten headquarters located throughout the Hongkew and Yengtzepoo districts. The Japanese naval marines maintain no less than 38 machine guns.

The 19th Route Army of some three divisions numbering thirty thousand strong, are scattered between Shanghai and Soochow. The Chinese residents of Shanghai are showing a good deal of patriotism in coming to the assistance of the Chinese army in their defense against Japanese invaders. Special patriotic societies contributing money and food supplies to assist the Chinese soldiers. An anti-Japanese "dare to die" corps has been formed to support the 19th Route Army. Various anti-Japanese patriotic societies are being formed. Some of these are now functioning for defense purposes.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- from Shanghai, Feb. 3, 3 a.m.

purposes. These societies are issuing circulars exhorting the people to come to the defense of the country.

All Chinese banks remained closed but were expected to be opened on Wednesday. (?) Chinese bankers, the breaking of today's truce may influence them to remain closed. There is a great demand for silver and most of the Chinese banknotes are discounted anywhere from ten to twenty percent.

Although they declare in the Japanese mills are out of work, so far no major labor disturbances occurred.

As a result of the fighting Chapei, all hotels and lodging houses in the Settlement and French concession are packed with refugees. The increase in charges has been one hundred percent.

The American Saint Luke's Hospital in the Hongkew District was given considerable trouble by the Japanese patrols today, who insisted on entering the hospital and searching for snipers. They also prevented the hospital nurses and cooks from coming to their duties to the hospital from their homes nearby. This matter was subsequently adjusted by this Consulate General. Further fighting is expected.

Repeated to the Department, the Legation and Nanking.

KLP
HPD

CUNNINGHAM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated February 13, 1932

Rec'd 10:45 a.m.

EXTRACT

Secretary of State,

Washington

45, February 13, 4 p.m.

Continuing my daily report No. 40 of February 12,
6 p.m.

One. So far the situation both along the Chapei sector and along the Woosung front remains unchanged. Last night a heavy bombardment of the Chinese lines took place during the early part of the evening. Early this morning Japanese planes in reconnoitring the Chinese artillery positions dropped about 8 bombs.

Two. I was informed by the Japanese Consulate General that Japanese troops are on the way from Japan. Five transports are scheduled to arrive tomorrow or Monday with seven transports to follow. Some of these troops are to be landed at the Nippon Yusen Kaisha wayside wharf in the International Settlement. It is estimated that this force will number anywhere from ten to fifteen thousand.

Three. I have been reliably informed that out of 33,000 Japanese who were in Shanghai at the beginning
of the

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MET

2#45 from Shanghai via N.R.,
 February 13, 4 p.m.

of the trouble some 20,000 have left for Japan and other
 (*).

Four. Generally speaking during the past sixteen days Shanghai residents in the foreign areas have never experienced such a tense period intermittently broken by the crash of artillery fire and the detonation of aerial bombs. While residents in the Settlement and the French concession are in comparative safety, it cannot be denied that many shells have fallen within the Settlement. Outside the immediate Settlement boundaries American residents living in the areas controlled by the Chinese under its command are being treated with every consideration. It is in striking contrast to the situation that existed in 1925 and 27.

...Except that the Japanese have landed, reinforcements near Woosung and have augmented their military, naval and aerial forces, there has been very little change in the last sixteen days in the situation which threatens the Settlement. The Chinese military are constantly being reinforced and their entrenchments are being strengthened but no one can furnish any reasonably accurate estimate of the Chinese troops in the vicinity. These reinforcements by each side are by no means reassuring to the Settlement, as the more strong the resistance the more determined the offensive. . . Local foreign officials are
 directing

MET

3- 45 from Shanghai via N.R.,
February 13, 4 p.m.

directing their efforts towards the defense of the Settlement and their nationals. While refugees are crowding into the Settlement it is also true that with the arrival of Chinese New Year and the consequent closing down of factories and shops thousands of laborers have proceeded to their country homes throughout this and adjacent provinces. This has acted as a safety valve in what otherwise might have eventually developed into a serious labor (*). This latter factor is an element which has not previously entered into the troubles in the Settlement. Ordinarily it would be regarded as a serious matter by employers.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking.

CUNNINGHAM

HPD-RR

(*) apparent omissions.

man

GRAY

SHANGHAI VIA NR

Dated February 17, 1932

Rec'd 7:40 p.m.

EXTRACT

Secretary of State

Washington

64, February 17, 5 p.m.

Continuing my daily report 61, February 16, 6 p.m.

One. Last night at 11:30 the heaviest artillery bombardment yet opened by the Japanese began in the Chapei sector and continued for some time. Since then things have been relatively quiet on all fronts. It is known that the 19th Route Army is very short of ammunition. The Japanese infantry took over the front line position in the Chapei sector from the naval landing forces yesterday afternoon. Japanese troops are reported to be advancing along the Hsiangying Road with Kiengwan as their objective.

Two. Since the last report some eighteen shells have fallen within the Settlement boundaries. One fell on the Shanghai-Hongkew wharf pontoon in the vicinity of Chaoufontng Road killing a Chinese female and seriously wounding two British naval guards and six Chinese.

Five. The financial situation in Shanghai among the Chinese native banks continues in a parlous state. The modern and native bankers have formed a sort of super-

banking

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mam

2- 64, from Shanghai, February 17,
 1932

banking organization with a capital of \$75,000,000 for the purpose of preventing the native banks from going to the wall. Many native shops have not reopened because it is believed that they are financially unable to do so. For this same reason foreign firms are finding it impossible to cash native drafts.

Six. Shanghai consignees are refusing drafts unless merchandise has immediate sale. Advise further shipments only against irrevocable letter of credit. This situation is the result of the attitude adopted by Chinese native banks in refusing to release any hard cash. The congestion upon piers and in warehouses continues without perceptible abatement.

Seven. It is understood that T. V. Soong and certain other government officials have approached the Chinese banks with a proposal that the period for all domestic bonds be extended three years, and that the period of amortization of all loans be extended for three years and that a flat rate of six per cent be set. This would naturally give the government a larger income and it is believed that there is an implied threat back of this that if it is not agreed to a moratorium will be declared.

Eight

- 3 - 64, from Shanghai, February 17,
1932

Eight. On February 15th the American marines reported that eight 75 mm. high explosive shells with time fuses fired from the Hongkew rifle range struck in the first battalion area near post number five and passed the wall of the Foufoong go own (?) exploding in a high stack of flour. Two others exploded nearby and others struck in the Soochow Creek. One missed a marine patrol by fifteen or twenty feet, another a sentry squaed by about fifty feet and all struck within 100 yards of two officers and thirty-one men. When the Japanese army headquarters were communicated with they said they would correct their range.

Nine. The Standard Oil Company reports that their ship the MEITUNG, when proceeding from Shoochow to Shanghai by Setai Lake and the Whangpoo River, was fired upon by soldiers near the Zahweikong Railway Station and was forced to turn about and proceed towards Minghong.

Ten. It is reported that the first and second divisions of the Chinese Emergency Corps have been reorganized into the 87th and 88th divisions and will be sent to Shanghai to assist the 19th Route Army. The Tax Police Corps formerly under the direct command of the Ministry of Finance has been incorporated into the 88th division as an independent brigade consisting of nine regiments.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking.

DAS FW

CUNNINGHAM

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 18, 1932

Rec'd 10:28 p.m.

EXTRACT

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

72, February 18, 6 p.m.

Continuing my daily report No. 64, February 17, 5 p.m.

One. According to best information available, the situation remains quiet along both the Woosung and Chapei fronts. The Japanese Marine Headquarters, however, have complained to newspaper men that the Chinese have been firing upon their positions. It has been learned, however, that Japanese soldiers on duty at sand bag emplacements and machine gun posts west of North Szechuan and on Paoshing Road were walking about quite openly this morning. At these points there were no signs of Chinese troops. I feel Japanese troops at these points have used every precaution against snipers and the opposing Chinese Troops. Furthermore, the Japanese military forces have not come into the lines in any great numbers. They are still billeted in the Wangtzapoo district.

Two...A conference between Lieutenant-General Uyeda and General Tsa i Ting-Kai began at 9 o'clock this morning. . .

Three. Yesterday some 10 airplanes and parts were landed at Wayside Wharf from the Japanese Naval transport and were later wheeled by Japanese soldiers to the new air field near the Shanghai Baptist College mentioned in a previous telegram. Five torpedo boats arrived at the Japanese Wayside Wharf loaded where

they

1475

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

they stored the ordnance. It is reported that Chinese soldiers are digging trenches on the South side of Siccawei Creek beyond Siccawei observatory. Numerous shells continue to fall within the Settlement limits. With reference to paragraph two of my yesterday's daily cable, the two British naval guards died last night.

Four. Reference paragraph eleven of yesterday's daily cable, an American reported yesterday to this Consulate General that 5 of his servants had been

detained

MET

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated February 21, 1932

Rec'd 11 a. m.

EXTRACT

Secretary of State,

Washington

95, February 21, 5 p. m.

Continuing my daily report number 91, February 20, 7 p. m. Except for a heavy artillery bombardment at Chapei about 1 a. m. the military situation in Shanghai has been relatively quiet. At the present moment as mentioned in paragraph two of my yesterday's report Kiangwan Village is the center of the Japanese military drive but up until 1 p.m. had not been captured although it was being outflanked to the north and south. The Chinese are putting up a stout resistance . . . in the face of the superior mechanical equipment possessed by the Japanese. The exploding of land mines by Chinese has offered considerable opposition to the advance of the Japanese tanks. The Japanese military headquarters is located at Futan University behind which the Japanese six inch howitzers are blasting the Chinese

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
REP

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 2, 1932

Rec'd 6:35 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

142, March 2, 2 p. m.

FOLLOWING FROM CAPTAIN LAYER FOR WAR DEPARTMENT.

11 a. m. March 2. "18. Chinese have withdrawn from
Chapei front line positions, not yet followed by Japanese.
British report large movement Chinese troops southwest
last night. Liuho defense reported retiring. Chinese
may make stand along Chenju-Tazang-Liuhang strong
defensive position."

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP - WSB

F/LS

793.94/4521

FILED

MAR 5 1932

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147
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 761.93/1435 FOR Tel. #290 1 p m

FROM China (Perkins) DATED March 1, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING: Russian military preparations for possible war with Japan.

Advises that - are proceeding, by the concentration of troops, manufacture of poison gas and the construction of new forts along the frontier.

kfc

761.93/4522

FE
EE

cib

PLAIN

Peiping via NR

Dated March 1, 1932

Recd 5:25 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

290, March 1, 1 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, February 29th:

not 793.94

"Approximately two army corps of Soviet troops are concentrated around Vladivostok and about one hundred thousand men in the Ussuri District according to a Japanese consular report received by the Foreign Office. Stating that his information is obtained from a reliable source, the Consul declared that numbers of troops have been arriving from European Russia since December. The Consul adds that foodstuffs and munitions are being transported by day and night, that three new forts are hurriedly being constructed at Sedanka and on the Amur Bay, that an iodine factory on Olga Bay is being constructed into a poison gas factory and that Communist volunteers are guarding the Ussrian Railway.

761.93/1435

Although not expressing ^{an} interpretation of these

REP

2-#290, from Peiping, Mar.1,1p.m.

these activities the Consul asserts that the Russians consider a clash with Japan inevitable sooner or later over either the Manchurian or the fishery question. He also declared that the Russians characterized the Japanese as 'detestable as cholera bacteria'.

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
REP

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated March 2, 1932

Rec'd 6:26 a. m.



FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

86, March 2, 5 p. m.

Three leading Tokyo newspapers commented favorably this morning on proposed conference at Shanghai to end hostilities. The JIJI welcomes the conference and hopes for its success. The CHUCAI is glad it has been proposed but with limited optimism for the causes of the Shanghai affair are deep and of long standing and unless China changes its views toward Japan fundamentally it fears another such incident may occur in the future. The conference must render the despatch of troops in the future unnecessary and this the paper apparently feels will be difficult to achieve. The HOCHI welcomes the proposal and says that from the beginning Japan has desired and made efforts for a peaceful solution but these were not reciprocated by the League or the United States, they rather purposely misinterpreted Japan's action and extending partial support to China as is evidenced by the League's recent appeal to Japan and the Secretary's letter to Senator



F/LS 793.94/4523

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MAR 5 1932

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#86, from Tokyo, Mar. 2, 5p.m.

to Senator Borah. Proposal for a conference at Shanghai shows that at last the powers have a better understanding. The OSAKA ASAHI yesterday in an editorial on the same subject welcomed the proposed conference particularly because of the approach of the general meeting of the League at which many minor countries will be represented and will make statements unfavorable to Japan because they are under the influence of stronger aggressive countries. The conference will clear away their suspicions and will also help lessen the misunderstanding of the United States and Great Britain.

FORBES

KLP

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 2, 1932

Rec'd 9:15 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY

143, March 2, 3 p. m.

It is learned from Jun Ke Choy that the 19th Route Army has retired voluntarily to Chenju. From other sources it is learned that Chapei has been evacuated and that Eugene Chen has informed newspaper men that the retirement was necessary because of non-support by the National Government and absence of ammunition. This was distinctly denied by Mr. Choy. The retirement places Chapei so far as the Chinese are concerned in exactly the same position as Hongkew and Yangtzepoo vis a vis the Shanghai Municipal Council.

Two. Mr. Choy transmitted to me the following official message from the Mayor which he requested me to transmit to the Shanghai Municipal Council and at my discretion to the members of the Consular Body. The information was that the Mayor has sufficient police in Nantao to maintain peace and order

F/LS 793.94/4524

FILED

MAR 5 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#143, from Shanghai, Mar. 2, 3p.m.

order; that there were in Nantao 2600 volunteers; that
there was no occasion for any concern in regard to that
district.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking. Copy to Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

KLP


1435

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FEZ

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


79394
893102
89374
393115-R.C.A.
REP



GRAY
FROM Shanghai via N. R.
Dated March 2, 1932
Rec'd 9:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Telegram to Shanghai



144, March 2, 4 p. m.

137196

Department's telegram of January 27, 5 p. m. regarding
radio station at Chenju. Yesterday afternoon I received
following from Japanese Consul General dated February 29th:

"In deference to your recent verbal request for the
protection of the plant of the radio station in Chenju,
we have so far effectively tried to comply with your
wishes. The reports, however, have reached the Japanese
military authorities to the effect that Chinese have
dug trenches and established their headquarters approximately
within 200 meters covering above named plant. The self-
imposed restraint, on the part of Japanese forces, were
to be based on the expectation that you would see to it
that such state of affairs would not be allowed to exist.
We, therefore, would like to verify the above reports
from you. At the same time we request, that you will take
such effective precautions immediately as will keep a
(radius of at least 500 meters around the aforesaid plant,
free

F/LS 793.94/4525

FILED

MAR 7 1932

1 4 3 -
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#144, from Shanghai, Mar. 2, 4p.m.

free from any Chinese combatant or base or channel of his military activities, so as to ensure that no fragments of shells or bombs might by chance, endanger the safety of the plant or any part thereof."

I am seeing Mayor Wu this afternoon and will point out that the request of the Japanese Consul General appears reasonable and express hope that an arrangement in this sense may be mutually agreed to by both sides. I shall, however, state I can naturally assume no responsibility for either side carrying agreement into effect.

Repeated to the Legation, copy to Minister

CUNNINGHAM

WSB


KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

Shanghai via N.R.



Dated March 1, 1932

FROM

Rec'd 2nd, 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

March 1, 9 p.m.

Your 0039, February 29, 4 p.m. I have just seen my

British colleague who has shown to me message from London describing proposal which apparently originated there for the holding of a round table conference intended to deal "problem of Shanghai". Proposal appears to be made contingent upon immediate cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, mutual evacuation by Japanese and Chinese troops, and undertaking on the part of Japan that she does not seek territory or political advantage. I am informed that Matsudaira told British Foreign Minister that the Japanese idea was that such a conference should deal with question of security and protection of foreigners at Shanghai and the security of the International Settlement. In this connection please see my telegram of yesterday reporting proposal given to Aben of NEW YORK TIMES.

Neither Lampson nor I know of any question involving security



F/LS 793.94/4526

FILED
 MAR 5 1932

793.94
 793.1525
 393.11
 793.94119

Telegrams to
 Shanghai &
 Geneva.

MET

2--from Shanghai via N.R., March 1,
9 p.m., rec'd 2nd, 9:30 a.m.

security of foreign lives or property nor security to settlement which needs be laid before such a conference. This is in case hostilities cease and Japanese and Chinese troops evacuate. There has been no attack upon the security of the settlement and we apprehend no danger to nationals here or to the integrity of the settlement if hostilities cease and troops evacuate. Place where they met Chinese resistance and attack was outside Settlement boundaries and in Chinese policed and controlled and thickly populated area of Chapei.

So far as concerns security, we therefore believe that the only question that could be laid before such a conference would be with respect to enlarging the area of the Settlement, and we believe that it would not be wise for us to become involved in any discussion of such a proposal. Our reasons for this belief are as follows:

(A) Such a proposal would be directly contrary to the policies followed by the two governments with regard to the future of the settlement.

(B) Such a proposal would not be acceptable to the *Japanese Government* ***** in getting such a subject before them.

(C) A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-from Shanghai via N.R., March 1,
 9 p.m., rec'd 2nd, 9:30 a.m.

(C) A suggestion for the enlargement of the settlement area would no doubt meet with considerable support from British and American interests in Shanghai. However, such support coming from the Japanese, who are now in military occupation of the settlement under discussion, would ultimately mean that we were merely turning over the municipality ~~area~~ of the international settlement at Shanghai to ~~the~~ ^{the} Japanese who would of course demand and obtain a majority in the council.

(D) Even assuming that it were advisable to have a conference regarding Shanghai, under the present circumstances, with feeling between the Japanese and the Chinese at such heat that it is doubtful whether anything could be accomplished, we both feel that to hold such a conference at this time or in Shanghai would be most unwise.

My British colleague is telegraphing his own Government somewhat along above lines. This evening I saw Koo and asked if he had heard anything of a proposal for a conference on the security of foreigners at Shanghai. He said he believed

something

143
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-from Shanghai via N.R., March 1,
9 p.m., rec'd 2nd, 9:30 a.m.

something of the sort was contemplated but he had not heard anything so definite from Geneva. His opinion regarding such a proposal was that the Chinese would not be able to accept it.

The crying need of Shanghai is to obtain a cessation of hostilities, and to link negotiations in regard to the future of the International Settlement would unduly delay this most desirable end. This is my opinion and the Commander-in-Chief shares my views.

JOHNSON

***** (Undecipherable group)
(#) (Translation doubtful)

Above message is presumed to be a paraphrase of telegram received by Chief of Naval Operations.

1491

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By *Milton O. Gustafson* NARS, Date *12-18-75*

1-135
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

PM 8:30
TELEGRAM SENT
COM 6
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Department of State

1-135
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

March 1, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China)

65 Confidential for the Minister.

793.94/4526 Your March 1, 9 p.m. from Shanghai.

A full summary of your comment has been telegraphed to Wilson at Geneva for his confidential background information. ^{in latest form} Text of project is being sent you by naval radio. You will note from the Department's No. 60, ⁴⁴⁷⁶ February 29, 4 p.m. that I have authorized the association of this Government with the project but with the express stipulations mentioned in that telegram.

793.94/4526

FE: JEJ:CLS

FE

Stinson
SCH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-135

No. 5320

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, January 21, 1932

SUBJECT: JAPANESE PRESS ON GENERAL TING CHAO AND
AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information

1/ of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2313, with
sub-enclosure as mentioned therein, sent to the Legation on
the subject of an alleged conspiracy between General Ting
Chao and myself.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

1 enclosure as indicated

800
TLL/tll

F/LS 735.94/4527

MAR 10 1932

FILED

14

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2313

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, January 21, 1932

SUBJECT: ALLEGED CONSPIRACY BETWEEN GENERAL TING CHAO
AND AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL AND CONSUL.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson

American Minister,

Peiping, China

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy, in translation,
1/ of an article which appeared in the January 16th issue of a
local Japanese newspaper on the subject of the alleged daily
visits of General Ting Chao to this Consulate General. The
Japanese controlled Russian newspaper THE HARBIN TIMES and a
Chinese newspaper carried similar but shorter articles.

I have not seen General Ting Chao since the latter part
of October. A week ago he returned Consul Chamberlain's call
at the Consulate General. This was the only time he has been
here for a very long time.

I called the attention of the Japanese Consul ^{ante} General to
this article with the request that I be informed, if possible,
as a matter of curiosity why it was published and how it came
to be published. In the absence of Mr. Ohashi, Mr. Takigawa,
Japanese Vice Consul, informed me that he had reprimanded the
editor of this newspaper for publishing this article and a
Japanese police official who is responsible for censoring articles
published in this newspaper.

-It is-

1494

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

It is possible that it is propaganda to cause General
Ting Chao more quickly to accede to the wishes of the Japanese
military. I consider that the article is not to be taken
seriously but as a matter of amusing interest.

Respectfully yours,


G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

1 enclosure as indicated

Copies have been sent
to the Department.

800
GCH/TLL



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Commission/127 FOR Tel. #94.3pm

FROM Geneva (Gilbert) DATED Mar. 1, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 0 0 0

REGARDING: observations of the Japanese delegation on the third
report of the Shanghai Commission.

1s

793.94/4528

REP

GRAY

Geneva

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 11:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

94, March 1, 3 p. m.

The Secretary General has circulated the following observations presented to him by the Japanese delegation on the third report of the Shanghai Commission:

One. The text of the demands addressed on February 18th by the officer commanding the Japanese forces to the officer commanding the 19th Army does not appear to have been taken from the official communication of the Japanese authorities but from a document probably of Chinese origin. It is not in exact accordance with the demands in question, e. g. in the case of the limits of the zone to be evacuated. (The text of the Japanese demands is attached. If the Department desires text please instruct).

Two. The last paragraph of the report suggests that all the Japanese forces had made the concession their basis of operations. The report omits to state that a large part of the Japanese forces were stationed outside the concession, and commenced operations from Woosung.

WSB -KLP

GILBERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 73

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Tsinan, China, January 21, 1932.

SUBJECT: Anti-Japanese Boycott.

1-1005 GPO

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



SIR:

I have the honor to report that no change whatever has been apparent during the past half month in the general situation relative to the anti-Japanese boycott. From a Japanese point of view their trade in this province seems to be suffering far less than that in some other parts of the country, particularly the Yangtze valley.

However, the difficulty of trade is evidenced in the fact that cotton yarn manufactured in Japanese mills in Tsingtao or Shanghai is being sold in this area at a price \$20. Chinese currency, or about \$4.50 U. S. currency, per bale lower than that made in Chinese-owned mills. This condition exists, too, in spite of the fact that the quality of the former is conceded to be superior to the latter.

One shipment of cotton yarn manufactured in a Japanese mill at Tsingtao or Shanghai was being shipped at the end of last month to places on the Shantung-Hopei border and had nearly arrived at its destination, when it was held up by some kind of a local boycott association at Tehping, directly north of Tsinan and not far from the provincial border. The Japanese Consul General

took ...



F/DEW

793.94/4529
693.94/2223

FILED

FEB 25 1932

Dr
793.94
note
693.94/2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

took the matter up with General Han Fu Chü, who ordered the release of the goods, but the local Magistrate found difficulties in dealing with the matter because of not receiving full cooperation from the local militia. Actually it is reported that smaller previous shipments had been allowed to pass upon the payment of one or two hundred dollars as "squeeze" or protection fees. In this instance a thousand dollars was demanded, as the shipment was worth \$15,000. local currency. Finally the Chinese purchasers are said to have paid half the amount demanded, but it is expected that the Japanese seller will have to stand half of the extortion. A final payment of \$5,000. was to have been made to the Japanese upon the arrival of the goods at their destination.

In cases like the one just cited the local boycott association is really composed of the same men who control the local Tangpu - men who are not classed among the better elements of the population, but who carry on their activities without much let or hindrance. Because of their so-called patriotic work their illegal acts are often condoned or connived at by the authorities.

One other curious fact has come to light in connection with the boycott. Owing to the demand for cotton goods in Shansi province and to the greater interference with Japanese trade in Tientsin, Shanghai, and other distributing centers, cotton goods are being sent to Taiyuan from Tsinan by parcel post in increasing quantities, in spite of the greater cost of shipment by

that method. ...

143
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

that method. How long this procedure can continue is
another question. .

Respectfully yours,

G. D. Meinhardt

G. D. Meinhardt,
American Consul.

In quintuplicate.


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
NO. 408

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, February 26, 1932.



MAR 1 1932



SUBJECT: Attitude of the Mexicans in the
Guadalajara Consular District in
the Japanese-Chinese War.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, the translation of a newspaper article, taken from the February 23rd edition of the local paper "HOY", regarding the Japanese-Chinese war, as of interest in studying a certain attitude of the people in this district of Mexico. A great deal of interest is taken through the district as to the possibilities of the United States entering the conflict.

The laboring classes, who are the principal readers of the "HOY", feel in somewhat the same manner as indicated in the article mentioned.

Amongst the educated classes, especially the lawyers, hacienda owners, and the important business men, there is a decided Pro-Japanese feeling, but at the same time they do not feel that their feelings should carry them too far in case the United States

F/LS

793.94/4530

MAR 3 1932

FILED

- 2 -

States should enter the conflict. The feeling that there is a possibility of the United States entering the war, has been received from the character of the local newspaper headings, since the articles themselves are furnished by the regular accredited news service bureaus.

On the part of the smaller business men, and office workers, there is also a decided Pro-Japanese feeling, due to their antipathy for the Chinese. This feeling was brought about through the Mexican Government's attacks and accusations against the Chinese in Sonora and Sinaloa, and is not due to any deep thinking on the part of this class.

The military and political leaders, in the district, seem anxious to see the United States enter the conflict, since they seem to consider that they would be of assistance to the United States, and in this manner, a better understanding for the future would result between the two nations.

The thoughts and ideas of these political and military classes, are of the greatest importance, since the other classes would swing to their opinions immediately.

Very respectfully yours,



Raleigh A. Gibson,
American Consul.

Enclosure:
Translation
Newspaper article.

RAG/aml.

800

In quintuplicate to the Department.

CC: Direct to Embassy

CC: Consulate General.

VERA CRUZ AND SHANGHAI

Mexico must not forget that Japan, in its intervention in China, is doing no more than what Uncle Sam, pretending to protect the lives and interests of his nationals, has done in Mexico, Nicaragua and the other weak countries who also resented his undesirable presence. Japan invades Manchuria and other parts of China, with the same pretexts and with the same greediness that our very dear cousins have shown in the past and will probably show again.

It must not be forgotten that in both interventions, asiatic or occidental(American) the same reasons have been given to excuse impudent outrages against the sovereign of the invaded country. It is very interesting for us Mexicans commenting on the cabled news items from China, to contrast the Yankee intervention that was completed with the violent and bloody occupation of Vera Cruz during the preatorian government with the occupation of Shanghai, which the Japanese have also entered by force of arms. The main difference is that in Mexico all the people fought against the invaders, not caring who was the head of state.

The Chinese government cannot count, as did the government of General Huerta on the support of the people, and has had to stand alone against the invaders, who, ~~has~~ shown by news paper pictures from some towns, have been cheerfully received by the inhabitants.

We foolishly applaud and comment favorably upon the Japanese advance without studying the case and without measuring the consequences that will result to the world, due to the connivance of France and Russia with Japan in dividing China and making that nation a spoil of war divided among stronger nations. This will be the result of the Japanese intervention unless the Chinese people, now split by internal politics, do not rally together and, forgetting all personal prejudices, drive out the Japanese invaders, the executors of the inspired trickery of gold hoarding France coupled with Russian strength.

Mexico, as at present China, played into the hands of the Yankee invaders in 1914 for the simple reason that General Huerta was President of Mexico, and the people in order to depose him bowed under the humiliation of the invasion of their country, and accepted from the invaders hands as a gift the city of Vera Cruz, once they had defeated their president.

The ambitions of politicians are so great all over the world that they are willing to forget for the time the interests of their own country if, through foreign intervention they are able to secure the reins of government for themselves.

Vera Cruz and Shanghai -- two very cruel but revealing examples of this failing!

Chinese boys are now fighting at the front against the Japanese as did the youth of Mexico against the Yankee invaders of Veracruz. This sacrifice of youth against the invaders does not strengthen the support ~~of~~ by the people of China of their government because, as we know so well here in Mexico, governments who rely on the "Levy" do not last long.

China must make a prompt readjustment and forget all internal discord, in order to successfully confront her present situation, if she does not want to be divided as a spoil of war and disappear forever, ambushed by pirates.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Mutan O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
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893.1022
893.50

MET

FROM

GRAY



Shanghai via DNVST 01

Dated March 2, 1932

Rec'd 11:45 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington

145, March 2, 5 p.m.

Continuing my daily report No. 138, March 1, 6 p.m.

One. As stated in my No. 143, March 2, 3 p.m. the Chinese began a withdrawal all along the line at 2 o'clock this morning concealing offensive on the part of the Japanese which began in the morning of March 1st. This withdrawal extended from the western sector of Miaochangchen to Hanchiatang west of Kiangwan along the upper reaches of the Hongkew Creek. By the afternoon the Japanese had pushed back the Chinese lines approximately one kilometer. Information from Chinese sources is to the effect that the retirement was occasioned by the terrific loss of life (?) suffered within the past few days. It is believed, however, that the landing of the 11th Japanese Division at Liuho forced a strategic retirement. Japanese report that Tazang was occupied early this morning and the Chinese are

in

F/LS 793.94/4531

FILED

MAR 7 1932

MET

2-#145 from Shanghai via N.R.,
March 2, 5 p.m.

in retreat toward Chenju. They may even fall back on
Nanziang.

Commerce
Two. The business situation in short appears to be
easier, about 60 per cent of the shops including some
large stores having resumed business. In Nantao about
40 per cent of the shops are open. The situation regard-
ing the inability to cash native bank orders continues.
However, by the payment of a fluctuating commission foreign
banks have assumed to cash native orders in medium sized
amounts. The present situation is extremely awkward for
importers who cannot get money to retire foreign acceptances.
Both foreign and foreign style Chinese banks are greatly
incommoded by the attitude of native banks especially when
it is believed the latter have increased their cash re-
sources by 10,000,000 taels in the last month. It is the
belief of the bankers, however, that the atmosphere at the
present moment is much better than it has been and that the
situation may clear up within the next few days. Foreign
employers are finding some difficulty in getting their people
back to work. The nonpayment of rent and taxes has raised
some difficulties.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking, copy to Minister.

WSB-HPD


CUNNINGHAM

1505
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

March 9, 1932



Memorandum.

I called Senator Capper's
Secretary on the telephone and asked
him to tell the Senator that the Sec-
retary is giving every attention to
the attached letter dated March first
and that we would get in touch with
him again concerning it in the near
future.

HAMCB-

A handwritten signature or set of initials, possibly "HMCB", written in ink.

The Secretary Advise Senator
Capper in person W. H. C.

MAR 17 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

file
 March 3, 1932.

✓
 SKH:

The letter hereunder was left by Mr. McBride with the statement that the Secretary desired some competent person in FE, in consultation with Mr. Hackworth and Dr. Hunter Miller, to draw up an outline covering as fully and with as much ingenuity as possible the various aspects of the question raised by Senator Capper's letter.

study I gathered that the Secretary wished a *statement* which would cover as comprehensively and convincingly as could be drafted ~~of~~ the various points which might be made in support of the doctrine of "non-validity".

(on the effect of)

RMM
 RSM:CLS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

March 2, 1932.

Mr. Secretary:

Shall I make an appointment
for Senator Capper of Kansas to see
you some time the early part of next
week?


A handwritten signature, likely of the Secretary, is written in ink below the typed text.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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W. H. SOUDERS, CLERK
JAMES RING, ASST. CLERK

IN
UNITED STATES SENATE

COMMITTEE ON
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Washington, D. C. 20540
March 1, 1932



MAR - 2 32

RECEIVED

MAR 2 - 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Honorable H. L. Stimson,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:--

I enclose you a letter I have just received from Dr. James T. Shotwell, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, indicating a desire to have certain information relative to your recent note on the non-validity of Japan's arrangements in Manchuria. I am not asking you to reply to this letter at this time but would like an opportunity in the near future to discuss the subject with you for a few moments if agreeable to you.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur Capper

MAR 17 1932

FILED

F/LS 793.94/4532

DA
793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

DIVISION OF ECONOMICS AND HISTORY
405 WEST 117TH STREET, NEW YORK CITY

JAMES T. SHOTWELL, DIRECTOR

February 26, 1932

Dear Senator Capper:

In confirmation of my telephone conversation with you today, I am writing to suggest that it might be helpful at this critical juncture if you were to secure from the Department of State in the form of a reply from an inquiry from you a measured opinion and a somewhat detailed description of what might actually be involved in the application of the "Stimson doctrine" of the non-validity of Japan's arrangements in Manchuria and with China, in view of the fact that in the judgment of this country it has violated Article 2 of the Kellogg Pact, and the Nine Power Treaty. Just what legal régime would Manchuria, for instance, be under? How would it affect our business relations with Japan? How would it affect the floating of securities for Manchurian enterprise, or for enterprises of Japanese trade with China?

Would this whole thing be a case for the World Court, first, with reference to whether or not the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty had been violated; second, with reference to the legal régime consequent upon violation?

I am sure that a clarification upon these points would very considerably help to unify public opinion in support of the administration policy.

Sincerely yours,

James T. Shotwell

Senator Arthur Capper
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/4533

SEE 761.93/1434 FOR Tel #289 Noon

FROM China (Perkins) DATED March 1, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING: Resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviets.

Advises of - which were broken off in 1929.

kfc

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
793.1025
793.94/119

oib



FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated March 3, 1932



Secretary of State

Washington.

88, March 3, 5 p.m.

Japanese General Staff announces that further forward advance of Japanese Army at Shanghai will in general cease after today's movements are completed.

The papers announce complete general withdrawal of Nineteenth Chinese Route Army.

Repeated to Shanghai.

FORBES.

JS CIB

F/LS 793.94/4534

FILED
MAR 5 1932

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM GRAY



Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd 6:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

147, March 3, 3 p. m.

FROM ABEND, NEW YORK TIMES.



793.94

It was learned that hostilities had been stopped and that the Japanese Minister had so informed him. I have confirmed this from the Japanese Consul General who stated that hostilities were stopped because they had attained their object; that the Chinese had retired sufficient distance and unless the Japanese were attacked hostilities would not be resumed. No other particulars available although I was informed by Japanese Consul General that a statement would be issued this afternoon.

Repeated to the Legation, copy to Minister.
CUNNINGHAM

WSB

F/LS 793.94/4535

MAR 5 1932

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.

FROM

GENEVA

Dated March 2, 1932

Rec'd. 7.43 pm



SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

48, March 2, 9 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

Matsudaira called on Gibson and me this afternoon and outlined to us the events of the past few days at Shanghai. His account of the meeting on Admiral Kelly's flagship showed some difference from the report which Kelly had cabled. It will be remembered that Kelly's statement declared that "the principle of mutual retirement had been agreed upon". This Matsudaira was unable to confirm and intimated that the Japanese Admiral's acceptance had been predicated on previous retirement by the Chinese. He then stated that in his private opinion their military leaders had undertaken too big a task, for the forces at hand had been checked by the Chinese and this put them and the country in a state of mind in which it was very difficult to make any concession or even to cease hostilities especially in view of the wide publicity which had been given by the Chinese to Chinese victories. Matsudaira said that Nomura had received instructions



F/LS

793.94/4536

FILED

MAR 8 1932

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893.1025
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rh #2 of No. 48 from Geneva

instructions to renew negotiations and that he, Matsudaira, felt the situation much more hopeful because, now that the Chinese troops had retired, hostilities might be arrested on the status quo.

He appeared distinctly ill at ease and gave a rather pathetic impression of an honorable man trying to make the best of a bad case.

In view of the fact that Matsudaira is to speak tomorrow in the Assembly we thought it was a friendly act to disillusion him as to the conviction carried by his statement and therefore pointed out that events this week succeeded Sato's acceptance of the Council's proposal on Monday followed by his government's ratification of Sato's act had made everybody here expect an immediate cessation of firing. No argument other than such immediate cessation would avert the storm of criticism that is likely to break in the meeting of the Assembly; that it has never been more urgent in the interest of Japan itself than it is at the present moment that hostilities should cease and cease at once.

Matsudaira told us that he and ^{Sato}~~Holaday~~ were doing everything that was humanely possible in this sense and it was obvious that he realized the vulnerable position that he now occupies.


WILSON

FW

KLP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET



Secretary of State,

Washington

96, March 3, noon.


Secretary General has circulated a communication from Yen dated March 1st addressed to the Secretary General citing a telegram setting forth the Chinese understanding of the "exchange of views" which took place on board the KENT and that Chinese Government's acceptance of the ^{terms of} ~~the~~ ^{arrangement} this ~~as~~ as stated. The text of the communication follows:

"I have the honor herewith to communicate to you a telegram dated March 1 which I have just received from Messrs. T. V. Soong and Wellington Koo at Shanghai and to request that you will be good enough to circulate the same among the members of the Council and of the League.

"The Sino-Japanese exchange of views on board the KENT in the presence of Admiral Kelly yielded the following five points:

- (1) - Mutual simultaneous evacuation of troops.
- (2) - No question of the permanent dismantling of the forts at Woosung to be raised.
- (3) - A Sino-Japanese commission with neutral observers to supervise the evacuation on both sides.
- (4) - The evacuated area to be administered by Chinese authorities with Chinese police as heretofore.
- (5) - The Chinese forces to withdraw to Chenju, a station on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway 10 miles

west



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#96 from Geneva, March 3,
noon

west of Shanghai; the Japanese forces to withdraw to the Settlement and Extra-Settlement roads, after which the Chinese forces to withdraw to Nanziang, a station on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway about 15 miles west of Shanghai and the Japanese forces to embark.

Both parties were to refer to their respective Governments for approval. If approved a formal meeting with accredited diplomatic and military representatives will be held. Nanking has approved the terms as above set forth and Admiral Kelly was informed to this effect yesterday."

GILBER

WSB-HPD

Have asked for repetition of garbled groups.

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd 9:20 a.m. on 3/3/32



Secretary of State
Washington.

151, March 3, 7 p. m.

FOLLOWING FROM CAPTAIN MAYER FOR WAR DEPARTMENT.

"22. Woosung captured after severe fight this morning, garrison survivors reported retreating toward Liuho. Japanese 11th Division has reached Taisang and Chiating Yuan. Ninth Division advanced point at Wangtu headquarters at Nanziang. 19th Route Army headquarters at Itsshan east of which defensive position is preparing. Chinese report landing of units of 14th Japanese Division at Liuho and Woosung and that reenforcements under Chiang Ting Wen and Yung Hsiang have reached Kunshan. Japanese announced that with retirement of Chinese from announced zone, hostilities over at 2 p. m. March 3rd unless again attacked."

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

WSB

F/LS 793.94/4538

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MAR 5 1932

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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY AND PLAIN

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd 5:15 a. m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

March 3, 10 a. m.

My March 1, 11 a. m.

One. Following represents Japanese reply to Chinese terms for immediate cessation of hostilities here. I am reliably informed that document containing this text was handed Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs last night shortly after midnight by Matsuoka on His Majesty's Ship KENT in presence of Admiral Kelly. (END GRAY)

"(1)- Should China give assurance for the withdrawal of her troops to a certain distance from Shanghai (distance to be determined by the Japanese and Chinese authorities) Japan will agree to the cessation of hostilities for a certain period (to be agreed upon between the Japanese and Chinese authorities), and pending subsequent arrangement the Japanese and Chinese forces shall hold their respective positions. Details relating to the cessation of hostilities shall be arranged by the Japanese and Chinese military authorities.

(2)- During the period of the cessation of hostilities, a round table conference between Japan and China shall be held at Shanghai, in which the representatives of the principal

F/LS 793.94/4539

FILED

MAR 5 1932

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REP

2-from Shanghai, Mar. 3, 10a.m.

principal powers interested shall participate, and the conference shall discuss with a view of reaching an agreement upon the methods for the withdrawal of both the Chinese and Japanese forces on such terms as are set out in the following paragraph, together with the measure for the restoration and maintenance of peace and order in and around Shanghai and for safeguarding the International Settlement and French concessions in Shanghai and the foreign lives, property and interests therein.

(3)- The withdrawal of troops shall be commenced by the Chinese troops (including plain clothes gunmen) to a specified distance and upon ascertaining the withdrawal of the Chinese forces, the Japanese forces will withdraw to the Shanghai and Woosung areas. As soon as the normal conditions will have prevailed, the Japanese army shall be withdrawn from these areas.

(4)- Should either of the parties infringe any of the terms of the cessation of hostilities, the other party shall have freedom of action. Both parties have the same freedom of action upon expiration of the period agreed upon under paragraph one."

(GRAY) Two. Chinese retired in good order from Chapei and other fronts night before last. Japanese forces began
occupation

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-from Shanghai, Mar. 3, 10 a.m.

occupation of area evacuated by Chinese yesterday
afternoon. I am informed that forces at Woosung were still
holding out this morning having been cut off and that
Japanese are landing balance of newly arrived reinforcements
in neighborhood of Liuho and Woosung under the protection
of naval guns this morning.

JOHNSON


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RR

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RH



SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

FROM

GRAY

SHANGHAI VIA NR

Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd. 9:45 am



F/LS

793.94/4540

FILED

MAR 5 1932

793.94
893.10-5
494.11. Shanghai
tl 148 March 3, 4 pm

Continuing my daily report No. 145, March 2, 5 pm.

One. The general retirement of the Chinese troops on all fronts continued throughout March 2nd and General Tsai's headquarters are now said to be located at Quinsan. Large areas in Chapei are said to have been set on fire by the retreating troops. The Japanese have established their headquarters in the North Station and have taken over possession of Chapei in order to prevent looting. In following the Chinese troops, Japanese aircraft dropped bombs and destroyed a railway bridge near Quinsan. Woosung reported to have been captured this morning at 10:30. This claim is confirmed by British and American naval authorities.

Two. As a result of Chapei large numbers of refugees have been pouring into the Settlement. Refugees are also pouring into the French concession from Nantao.

Chinese

1-2
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #2 of Shanghai; March 3, 4 pm

Chinese trains removed considerable machinery from
Kiangnan arsenal and its branch at Lunghwa destined for
Hangchow.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking. Copy to
Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



GRAY
Geneva

Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd by [initials]
Division of



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 5 1932

Secretary of State,
Washington.

95, March 3, 11 a. m.

Consulate's 92, February 29, 7 p. m.

Secretary General has circulated; (1)- reply dated March 1st to the "proposal" adopted in the Council meeting of February 29th addressed by Sato to the President of the Council; (2)- a communication dated March 2nd addressed by Boncour to Sato in response to the foregoing. The texts of these communications follow:

One. "I have the honor to inform you that the Japanese Government willingly accepts the plan which Your Excellency submitted to me yesterday at the Council meeting."

Two. "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 1st by which you inform me that the Japanese Government willingly^{ly} accepts the plan which I submitted to the Council on February 29th."

I have taken immediate steps to bring Your Excellency's letter to the knowledge of my colleagues on the Council.

While I am extremely happy to note the acceptance by

the Japanese

F/LS
793.94/4541

FILED

MAR 7 1932

152

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#95, from Geneva, Mar. 3, 11a.m.

the Japanese Government of the plan, I venture to point out that the proposals set out therein are "subject to the making of local arrangements for a cessation of hostilities", and that the Council expressed the hope that such a cessation would be brought about very speedily. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the execution of the plan is dependent on the final cessation of all fighting, and I should, therefore, be glad to learn whether Your Excellency is in a position to give me any assurances or information on this point, which not only I, but my colleagues, consider to be of primary importance."

GILBERT

WSB

RR

2


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By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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


GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd 7:28 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington

299, March 3, 4 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"March 2, 5 pm. No. 26. Takigawa has informed me confidentially that negotiations between Ting Chao and Japanese military are progressing but slowly; that Ting had been told by the latter to come to Harbin two days ago but refused; that the Japanese nationals who evacuated to Harbin from the Eastern Line cannot go back and that 20,000 Koreans in that section are unable to continue their work on account of the dangerous conditions existing there; that therefore the Japanese command has decided to send three echelons of Japanese troops and one armored train east as far as Imienpo and possibly to Hailin tomorrow morning.

Two. Soviet officials have stated that they have received

F/LS 793.94/4542

FILED

MAR 5 1932

MET

2-#299 from Peiping via N.R.,
March 3, 4 p.m.

received no reports of disturbed conditions on the Eastern Line and that they understand the Japanese troops are going as far as Mulin.

Three. Railway officials stated echelon will move east tonight for unknown destinations on trains placed at the disposal of, and orders of, the Japanese command and that conditions are quiet on the Eastern Line".


For the Minister

RR-WSB

PERKINS

152

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



March 3, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
SECRETARY STIMSON AND HUGH WILSON, AT GENEVA, THURSDAY,
MARCH 3, 1932, AT 3:50 P.M.

SECRETARY: Hello, who is this?

MR. WILSON: This is Wilson speaking.

SECRETARY: Wilson, I wanted to find out what the situation is in Geneva just at present in regard to our proposed non-recognition policy being adopted by the Assembly.

MR. WILSON: What happened today, Mr. Secretary, was this. The Constitutional Assembly elected Hymans, the Prime Minister of Belgium, as President. They they called on Yen to make a statement. His statement lasted about an hour. Matsudaira then replied for forty minutes. They then voted to turn the Assembly into a general commission of the Assembly which will meet tomorrow afternoon at three o'clock. I have found no opposition to your idea that they must make a declaration in the sense that you state. In fact, everybody seems agreed and that is the minimum that the Assembly must do. We keep working on that problem and to everyone who talks to us we speak of the necessity and possibility of establishing that principle of law - that recognition of anything accomplished by force in violation of the treaties must not be admitted.

SECRETARY: I see. Hugh, that is very important and it has been brought up again by some very unpleasant press articles coming from London indicating that some influential members of the British Government, and this one this morning was a statement of the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons that he did not intend to follow that policy and so I want to know what attitude Great Britain has been taking in the Assembly.

MR. WILSON:

793.94/4542 1/2

Confidential File

- 2 -

MR. WILSON: Sir John Simon has not yet spoken. I must say that the attitude of Sir John is a little bit suspicious to us. I am trying to see him tomorrow morning and I am going to remind him of the conversation which I had with him before I telephoned you a few days ago.

SECRETARY: Now, I have one further thing to say that may have bearing. Until that is clear I don't intend to take part in these conferences in Shanghai. The situation there, as I understand it, has been such that the action of Japan in going ahead with the major offensive after she had accepted the proposition of the League of Nations in which we had joined has so altered the situation that I want very much to go slow before I commit myself to any further step.

MR. WILSON: I think you are very wise, Mr. Secretary. I like that. I will see that Simon understand that.

SECRETARY: And I would like to know that Simon understands that.

MR. WILSON: I will see that he does.

SECRETARY: I have done everything that I could to help them so far in their major interest, which is Shanghai, but I don't intend to get involved in a situation which may appear to the Chinese to be backing up the interests of Japan and other foreign powers against legitimate Chinese interests. I don't intend to do this at all and I don't intend to get committed in these conferences until I am sure no such move is intended and I am also, of course, interested in the attitude of the Assembly. I don't intend or mean to be dragged into a position where I have to go in and deliver my goods until I see what I am going to get in return. Is that clear?

MR. WILSON:

- 3 -

MR. WILSON: Yes, very clear and I like it very much, Mr. Secretary. I think that is an excellent thing and it puts us in a good position to say that.

SECRETARY: We have played perfectly clearly and, so far as the League of Nations is concerned, we have put our cards on the table and we have made our position perfectly clear and I think it is a cooperative position and I don't think anyone can criticize it, but there have been other elements of confusion introduced by other nations into this situation which are not our fault, and I should like to go a little slow.

MR. WILSON: I shall take great pleasure in conveying these facts; it will give me great satisfaction.

SECRETARY: Be careful - I don't want to have any threatening done. It is only a policy of wisdom.

MR. WILSON: Would you want to speak to Gibson too?

SECRETARY: I did want to ask this. In respect to the cable No. 55, which Gibson sent me, you remember it about the plans for some speeches at the Disarmament Conference on this subject.

MR. WILSON: Yes.

SECRETARY: I don't quite understand when that is likely to come up.

MR. WILSON: We don't know, Mr. Secretary. It all depends upon how continuous the efforts of the Assembly are. In a day or two they will probably call the General Commission.

SECRETARY: I can see some danger in that program which Gibson outlined to me coming on before the Assembly is committed to this nonrecognition plan.

MR. WILSON: I think so too.

SECRETARY:

* 4 *

SECRETARY: Because it might be used to sidetrack that subject over into the Disarmament Conference where it would not have any real effect instead of taking place in the League of Nations.

MR. WILSON: We will bear that in mind, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY: I think that should be very carefully put in Gibson's mind before he makes the speech that he proposed in his telegram No. 55.

MR. WILSON: He is listening now and he will bear that in mind.

SECRETARY: His proposed statement there would seem to push that program in the Disarmament Conference along a little faster. It would seem to push it too fast and I think if he said anything at all he should not say it until we are sure of what goes on in the Assembly.

MR. WILSON: Yes, I understand.

SECRETARY: Or if he has to say it before anything comes on the Assembly he should have some very cautionary remarks. I don't think he ought to commit himself unqualifiedly in the Disarmament Conference - what I mean is it does not amount to anything at all unless the nations of the world are committed to it.

MR. WILSON: Right.

SECRETARY: Even the language of the resolution which was adopted by the Council was extremely wishy-washy.

MR. WILSON: Yes, it was very weak.

SECRETARY: It was very weak and I don't know whether you saw the statement which William Hard made over the radio the other night. He pointed out very forcibly the difference between the language which they used and the language which we used.

MR. WILSON:

- 5 -

MR. WILSON: No, I haven't seen it.

SECRETARY: I wish you would see Hard and cable me the full language of his statement. It is not here in print at all. I happened to hear it over the radio. I wish you would cable it to me because it would be very useful here. That is the line which I think Gibson will have to have in mind if this thing comes up. I would rather not have it come up at all until it is settled in the Assembly, and if it does come up I think he ought to see that nothing in the Conference ought to be done to off-set the work of the Assembly on that point.

MR. WILSON: Certainly.

SECRETARY: I talked with the President this morning about it and he thinks we ought to really try to do our best to get a forward movement in that.

MR. WILSON: Yes, Mr. Secretary. The Turkish Delegate is quite ready, I think, to follow our advice in this connection.

SECRETARY: I am very glad to have his speech if it were made in the Assembly.

MR. WILSON: He is not a member, of course.

SECRETARY: That is true, he is not a member. I would be very glad to have it wherever he does make it, but I don't want to have it in a way which would sidetrack it. In regard to Gibson's speech, I am a little worried about that situation in the Disarmament Conference. I would really rather have it held back altogether rather than before the Assembly has to face that problem.

MR. WILSON: I think we can hold it back entirely until the Assembly has acted.

SECRETARY: All right, that is the main thing.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MR. WILSON: All right, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY: Give my affectionate regards to Gibson and
that is all I had to say about it. Good-bye.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
GRAY
Geneva

Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd 9:10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 5 1932



Secretary of State,
Washington.

49, March 3, 1 p. m.

A few minutes before the opening of the Assembly
meeting Sato handed me the following message:

"In view of the retreat of the Chinese forces beyond
20 kilometers to the north of Shanghai the Japanese troops
stopped on a line situated at about that distance. The
Japanese troops will abstain from all acts of hostilities
except those of a strictly defensive nature and will
take all measures necessary to the security of inhabitants.
The Japanese commanders have made public a declaration to
this effect (evening of March 3rd local time)."

WILSON

RR - WSB

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MAR 7 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 15 a 4/649¹/₂ FOR Memo

FROM State Dept. U (Castle) DATED Dec. 15, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Rumor to effect that there is an agreement between France
and Japan that Japan should have a free hand in Manchuria
and France in the southern part of China.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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
PM. RECD



MAR 2 32

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rome, February 18, 1932



F/LS

793.94/4545

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 1263 of February 5, 1932, regarding the Sino-Japanese difficulties, I have the honor to inform the Department that the Italian press continues to follow with some interest the development in the situation in and around Shanghai, although not departing from its attitude of neutrality.

The MESSAGGERO in an editorial of February 18th, commenting on the reopening of negotiations between

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MAR 7 1932

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the Chinese and Japanese military commands at Shanghai for a solution of the immediate difficulty, remarks that the outcome has a double importance, since it might establish the truce not only necessary for a local settlement but equally necessary for the success of any activity of the League of Nations. The newspaper offers the opinion that the appeal of the League Council to Japan is in no sense a belittling of Japan's right to defend her interests in China, but seeks only that the defense of these rights may be accomplished without bloodshed and consequent peril to the peace of the world.

Referring to China's appeals to the League and to the Pope, the L'ESPRESSO states that these show China's fear that Japan's action will be greatly increased and extended on her territory unless some settlement is now reached, and the newspaper adds that such a prospect does not allay alarm in America. The GIORNALE D'ITALIA comments ironically on China's appeal to the Vatican after the maltreatment that Catholic missionaries have received in the interior, but expresses the hope that such an appeal is founded on a realization of the high moral value of the Catholic Church and on a determination to extend protection to missionaries and to make amends to the Holy See and to the various countries whose nationals have been maltreated. The OSSERVATORE ROMANO, while publishing the text of Dr. Yen's appeal to the Pope, has offered no comment. The Vatican organ states, however, that the Cardinal Secretary of State in acknowledging

receipt

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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receipt of the appeal assured Dr. Yen of the Pope's hopes and prayers for a peaceful settlement between the two nations.

With regard to the attitude of the various nations, the *MESSAGGERO* states that although the conflict has assumed large proportions, it has as yet created "no special international complication" and consequently the western nations have assumed a position of strict neutrality. The *MESSAGGERO* and *GIORNALE D'ITALIA* are in agreement, however, that the possible development of new political action in Washington is to be watched for most carefully. Says the *MESSAGGERO* in this connection:

"It is evident that the new American move (a reported note to Tokio now in preparation, charging Japan with responsibility for any eventual loss in American life or property at Shanghai), not yet confirmed and of whose terms we are ignorant, will tend to define a more precise attitude on the part of some of the nations signatory to the Treaty of the Pacific."

Signor Gayda, in the *GIORNALE D'ITALIA*, concludes:

"As far as Italy is concerned, her attitude, even while her ships are speeding toward the Pacific, remains that which we defined several days ago: neutrality, defense of a peace founded on justice and right, protection of the numerous, well identified national interests in Chinese territory, especially those in the zones where the conflict rages most freely."

Respectfully yours,


John W. Garrett.

Enclosures: Clippings.

Copies to E.I.C. Paris.

SC/eh

710.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

IL MESSAGGERO, Rome.
 February 18, 1932.

page 1.

Despatch No. 1285

Nuova fase?

La giornata di oggi dovrebbe segnare una nuova fase, secondo le probabilità, nella vicenda che si giuoca con le armi in Estremo Oriente fra Cina e Giappone e che continuiamo a chiamare con questo eufemismo per escludere il nome di guerra che ufficialmente vuole ancora essere evitato finchè non sia guerra dichiarata. Infatti è nella giornata di oggi che dovrebbe avvenire il primo contatto diretto — da che sono cominciati gli atti di ostilità — fra autorità cinesi e giapponesi e tale contatto dovrebbe avvenire fra il comandante della diciannovesima armata cinese ed il comando giapponese di Sciangai. L'esito di tale incontro merita di essere atteso con interesse non solo per ciò che può seguirne in Estremo Oriente, dove non appare facile ma nemmeno impossibile una nuova tregua che sia più proficua di quella che fu recentemente interrotta quasi appena decisa, ma anche perchè dall'incontro dei due comandi militari può dipendere il proseguire o l'interrompersi di quella più energica attività della Società delle Nazioni, diretta ad infrenare il conflitto, che si è delineata con l'appello rivolto al Governo di Tokio da parte del Consiglio di Ginevra e con il quale si richiama il Giappone all'osservanza degli impegni assunti con i vari trattati contro la guerra, mentre una Commissione composta di tre giuristi dovrà decidere, ormai fra ventiquattr'ore, se la domanda della Cina di convocare la Assemblea della Società sia giuridicamente fondata o meno.

La nuova azione del Consiglio di Ginevra e l'eventuale decisione favorevole all'accettazione della domanda cinese per la convocazione dell'Assemblea non costituiscono alcuna menomazione dei diritti del Giappone a difendere i suoi interessi in territorio cinese. Infatti si tratta soltanto di cercare i mezzi migliori in potere della Società per impedire che questa difesa di diritti avvenga ulteriormente con spargimento di sangue e con conseguente pericolo per la pace del mondo. Ma, ciò malgrado, il Giappone non sembra disposto ad accettare eventualmente un dibattito nuovo dinanzi alla Assemblea finchè la Cina non abbia accolto le sue condizioni per una tregua, e fra le quali è compreso il ritiro delle sue truppe oltre un certo limite di territorio. Inoltre, se le notizie provenienti da Tokio sono esatte, una forte corrente della opinione pubblica nipponica se non già il pensiero delle sfere dirigenti della politica di Tokio sarebbe orientata verso un possibile ritiro del Giappone da Ginevra se la domanda cinese fosse accettata. Ma, ripetiamo, molto dipende dall'odierno contatto fra i comandanti dei due eserciti in urto, poichè è da ritenere che se questo contatto lasciasse adito alla speranza di un inizio di vere e proprie trattative diplomatiche dirette, la convocazione della Assemblea potrebbe essere ritardata anche se il giudizio dei tre giuristi prescelti dal Consiglio di Ginevra, l'italiano, il francese e il canadese, si pronunciasse favorevole a questa convocazione.

Per seguire intanto da un punto di vista di cronaca la vicenda cino-giapponese nei suoi riflessi internazionali, bisogna registrare una più attenta vigilanza, da qualche giorno, da parte del Governo di Washington. E' evidente che lo sviluppo delle operazioni che si annunzia

IL MESSAGGERO, Roma.
February 18, 1952.

Despatch No. 1285

page 1.

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E', tuttavia, da ritenere probabile che, nei prossimi giorni, la situazione sia per subire delle chiarificazioni tanto se abbia un risultato positivo per un avviamento del conflitto verso una tregua l'incontro fra i Capi militari, quanto se la Società delle Nazioni sviluppi l'attività che le è tracciata dal suo statuto.

IL GIORNALE D'ITALIA, Rome.
February 17, 1962. page 1

Despatch NO. 1285

ALLA VIGILIA DI NUOVI EVENTI A SCIANGAI

I giapponesi hanno compiuto lo sbarco dei rinforzi e si apprestano ad iniziare una grande offensiva

Situazione complessa

La situazione quale si presenta a Sciangai e in genere negli sviluppi del conflitto cino-giapponese appare più che mai complessa e torbida. Ma appunto per questa sua complessità consiglia di astenersi dalle premature valutazioni e prognosi e di limitare i compiti informativi alle oggettive constatazioni di fatto.

Procediamo dunque nella nuova serie di constatazioni fatte negli ultimi giorni.

A Sciangai s'è compiuto lo sbarco della divisione giapponese ed è quindi imminente l'offensiva nipponica su tutto il fronte della città se i cinesi non si sottometteranno all'ordine di ritirarsi al di là di quindici miglia da Sciangai. Si tratta di migliaia cinesi che contano solo per un terzo di quelle inglesi. I giapponesi intendono con questo ordine di liberare Sciangai da ogni pressione e minaccia di truppe e banditi cinesi. Ricordiamo che questa loro proposta, divenuta ora *ultimatum*, di creare una zona neutra a torno Sciangai, è stata formulata, prima che dal Giappone, da un giudice sud-africano, Feetham. La sua attuazione verrebbe a creare in certo modo uno stato di isolamento della città di Sciangai dal rimanente territorio cinese. Que-

sto regime temporaneo, che consentirebbe, secondo il pensiero giapponese, un più tranquillo ambiente di trattative fra Tokio e Nanchino, prospetta intanto un nuovo ordine di sviluppi politici sui quali viene in questi giorni richiamata la nostra attenzione. Da parte giapponese, insistendosi sul valore dei vari interessi internazionali stanziati o gravitanti a Sciangai, si indica infatti la possibilità di un nuovo assetto internazionale della città nel quale questi interessi potrebbero trovare miglior protezione e sviluppo. Si tratta, come si vede, di un problema nuovo che si rileva oggi solo come parte attuale della cronaca politica.

La situazione torbida di Sciangai sembra frattanto estendersi di nuovo alla Cina settentrionale investendo anche Pechino e la zona di Tien Tsin dove sono, come è noto, rappresentati tanti interessi stranieri fra i quali — non fra gli ultimi — figurano quelli italiani. Qui si delineano nuovi movimenti antinipponici, con la minaccia di nuovi interventi giapponesi, e turbamenti d'ordine politico ed economico, di provenienza cinese e bolscevica, che investono gli interessi internazionali. Il sistema delle concessioni internazionali di Tien Tsin è attualmente difeso, oltre che dalle rispettive truppe dei Paesi concessionari, italiane, francesi, inglesi e giapponesi, anche da un contingente nord-americano accasermato nella concessione britannica. Queste forze difensive possono apparire sufficienti per le prime eventuali sorprese. Ma la situazione dovrà ora anche qui essere seguita con intensificata attenzione.

Mentre resiste militarmente come può, la Cina sviluppa con rinnovato ardore una sua singolare azione diplomatica su tutti i fronti. E' del 12 febbraio il passo compiuto dal suo rappresentante a Ginevra, Yen, per la convocazione di un'assemblea plenaria straordinaria della Società delle Nazioni. Già nello scorso settembre il Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni s'è occupato del conflitto cino-giapponese a proposito della Manchuria, sulla base dell'articolo 11 del Patto che fa obbligo al Consiglio di intervenire con misure atte a salvaguardare la pace là dove si delinea la minaccia di una guerra. Più recentemente il Consiglio s'è occupato del caso di Sciangai, sempre su domanda della Cina che ha invocato l'articolo 15 del Patto, più importante nelle sue conseguenze in quanto

Spagna non trova in questa occasione molti altri consensi.

Più singolare ancora appare l'appello che lo stesso signor Yen ha diretto al Sommo Pontefice per un suo intervento. Diciamo: singolare — perché esso segue a solo poche settimane di distanza una serie di nefandi misfatti compiuti in territorio cinese contro missionari cattolici, catturati, martirizzati e massacrati senza alcun intervento anche postumo del governo cinese. Vogliamo ora considerare questo appello cinese al Papa come il riconoscimento dell'alto valore spirituale del cattolicesimo e come un duplice impegno del governo cinese a proteggere meglio per l'avvenire la vita e la opera dei missionari cattolici e a prestare intanto le dovute riparazioni per i misfatti compiuti in passato che, se la Santa Sede non domanda perché non dà prezzo al sangue dei suoi ministri, i singoli Stati, fra i quali è oggi in prima linea l'Italia, hanno il diritto di pretendere per la giusta indennità dovuta ai loro cittadini.

L'attitudine delle grandi Potenze è ormai conosciuta e bene evidente. Il conflitto cino-giapponese vale senza dubbio a creare alquanto tensione fra Washington e Tokio per il suo riflesso sulla ben nota situazione del Pacifico e sui possibili sviluppi delle posizioni giapponesi che interessano direttamente i rapporti fra i due Paesi. L'azione diplomatica del governo americano rivela dunque in questi giorni una particolare intensità.

Quanto all'Italia la sua attitudine, mentre le sue navi si avanzano rapidamente verso il Pacifico, rimane quella che abbiamo definito nei giorni scorsi: neutralità, difesa della pace con rispetto alla giustizia e ai diritti, protezione dei numerosi interessi nazionali bene individuati nel territorio cinese e soprattutto nelle zone nelle quali oggi più infierisce il conflitto.

Questa attitudine è fondamentale: ma si adeguerà, come si conviene, agli sviluppi degli avvenimenti e alle loro risolvibili.

v. g.

IL GIORNALE D'ITALIA, Rome.
February 17, 1952.

page 1

Despatch NO. 1286

ALLA VIGILIA DI NUOVI EVENTI A SCIANGAI

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Mentre resiste militarmente come può, la Cina sviluppa con rinnovato ardore una sua singolare azione diplomatica su tutti i fronti. E' del 12 febbraio il passo compiuto dal suo rappresentante a Ginevra, Yen, per la convocazione di un'assemblea plenaria straordinaria della Società delle Nazioni. Già nello scorso settembre il Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni s'è occupato del conflitto cino-giapponese a proposito della Manciuuria, sulla base dell'articolo 11 del Patto che fa obbligo al Consiglio di intervenire con misure atte a salvaguardare la pace là dove si delinea la minaccia di una guerra. Più recentemente il Consiglio s'è occupato del caso di Sciangai, sempre su domanda della Cina che ha invocato l'articolo 15 del Patto, più importante nelle sue conseguenze in quanto impegna il *Segretariato generale* a prendere tutte le disposizioni necessarie per un'inchiesta ed un completo esame. Ed è appunto per questo nuovo intervento ginevrino che i consoli di Sciangai, presieduti dal nostro incaricato d'affari, conte Galeazzo Ciano, hanno redatto e presentato il loro rapporto sui fatti di Sciangai, pubblicato in due riprese nei giorni scorsi dal nostro giornale.

Ma la Cina domanda ora di più. Essa si richiama al paragrafo 9 dell'articolo 15 del Patto che prevede la possibilità del Consiglio di «portare la controversia dinanzi l'assemblea della Società delle Nazioni» e aggiunge che «l'assemblea su richiesta di una delle parti dovrà essere investita della controversia». Con questa ultima richiesta del cinese Yen, la Società delle Nazioni è chiamata ad assumersi una non lieve responsabilità ed un compito che non appare né facile né utile ai fini della pacificazione cino-giapponese e del prestigio del Consesso ginevrino. A Tokio si sono già formate correnti favorevoli al ritiro del Giappone dalla Società delle Nazioni se essa dovesse intervenire nel caso di Scianga sulla base dell'articolo 15 come domanda la Cina. In Giappone si accusa la Cina di favorire un movimento antinipponico che ha preso pericolosi caratteri offensivi per tutti gli interessi giapponesi. Il boicottaggio antinipponico, organizzato dai gruppi nazionalisti, non costituisce solo più un fatto discutibile dal punto di vista internazionale, ma...

Spagna non trova in questa occasione molti altri consensi.

Più singolare ancora appare l'appello che lo stesso signor Yen ha diretto al Sommo Pontefice per un suo intervento. Diciamo: singolare — perché esso segue a solo poche settimane di distanza una serie di nefandi misfatti compiuti in territorio cinese contro missionari cattolici, catturati, martirizzati e massacrati senza alcun intervento anche postumo del governo cinese. Vogliamo ora considerare questo appello cinese al Papa come il riconoscimento dell'alto valore spirituale del cattolicesimo e come un duplice impegno del governo cinese a proteggere meglio per l'avvenire la vita e la opera dei missionari cattolici; e a prestare intanto le dovute riparazioni per i misfatti compiuti in passato che, se la Santa Sede non domanda perché non dà prezzo al sangue dei suoi ministri, i singoli Stati, fra i quali è oggi in prima linea l'Italia, hanno il diritto di pretendere per la giusta indennità dovuta ai loro cittadini.

L'attitudine delle grandi Potenze è ormai conosciuta e bene evidente. Il conflitto cino-giapponese vale senza dubbio a creare alquanto tensione fra Washington e Tokio per il suo riflesso sulla ben nota situazione del Pacifico e sui possibili sviluppi delle posizioni giapponesi che interessano direttamente i rapporti fra i due Paesi. L'azione diplomatica del governo americano rivela dunque in questi giorni una particolare intensità.

Quanto all'Italia la sua attitudine, mentre le sue navi si avanzano rapidamente verso il Pacifico, rimane quella che abbiamo definito nei giorni scorsi: neutralità, difesa della pace con rispetto alla giustizia e ai diritti, protezione dei numerosi interessi nazionali bene individuati nel territorio cinese e soprattutto nelle zone nelle quali oggi più infierisce il conflitto.

Questa attitudine è fondamentale: ma si adeguerà, come si conviene, agli sviluppi degli avvenimenti e alle loro risolvimenti.

V. G.

IL GIORNALE D'ITALIA, Rome.
February 17, 1932.

page 1

Despatch NO. 1286

ALLA VIGILIA DI NUOVI EVENTI A SCIANGAI

I giapponesi hanno compiuto lo sbarco dei rinforzi e si apprestano ad iniziare una grande offensiva

Situazione complessa

La situazione quale si presenta a Sciangai e in genere negli sviluppi del conflitto cino-giapponese appare più che mai complessa e torbida. Ma appunto per questa sua complessità consiglia di astenersi dalle premature valutazioni e prognosi e di limitare i compiti informativi alle oggettive constatazioni di fatto.

Procediamo dunque nella nuova serie di constatazioni fatte negli ultimi giorni.

A Sciangai s'è compiuto lo sbarco della divisione giapponese ed è quindi imminente l'offensiva nipponica su tutto il fronte della città se i cinesi non si sottometteranno all'ordine di ritirarsi al di là di quindici miglia da Sciangai. Si tratta di miglia cinesi che contano solo per un terzo di quelle inglesi. I giapponesi intendono con questo ordine di liberare Sciangai da ogni pressione e minaccia di truppe e banditi cinesi. Ricordiamo che questa loro proposta, divenuta ora *ultimatum*, di creare una zona neutra a torno Sciangai, è stata formulata, prima che dal Giappone, da un giudice sud-africano, Feetham. La sua attuazione verrebbe a creare in certo modo uno stato di isolamento della città di Sciangai dal rimanente territorio cinese. Que-

sto regime temporaneo, che consentirebbe, secondo il pensiero giapponese, un più tranquillo ambiente di trattative fra Tokio e Nanchino, prospetta intanto un nuovo ordine di sviluppi politici sui quali viene in questi giorni richiamata la nostra attenzione. Da parte giapponese, insistendosi sul valore dei vari interessi internazionali stanziati o gravitanti a Sciangai, si indica infatti la possibilità di un nuovo assetto internazionale della città nel quale questi interessi potrebbero trovare miglior protezione e sviluppo. Si tratta, come si vede, di un problema nuovo che si rileva oggi solo come parte attuale della cronaca politica.

La situazione torbida di Sciangai sembra frattanto estendersi di nuovo alla Cina settentrionale investendo anche Pechino e la zona di Tien Tsin dove sono, come è noto, rappresentati tanti interessi stranieri fra i quali — non fra gli ultimi — figurano quelli italiani. Qui si delineano nuovi movimenti antinipponici, con la minaccia di nuovi interventi giapponesi, e turbamenti d'ordine politico ed economico, di provenienza cinese e bolscevica, che investono gli interessi internazionali. Il sistema delle concessioni internazionali di Tien Tsin è attualmente difeso, oltre che dalle rispettive truppe dei Paesi concessionari, italiane, francesi, inglesi e giapponesi, anche da un contingente — ma la Cina domanda ora di più.

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La domanda cinese non ha avuto del resto buona accoglienza in più di una Cancelleria. Segnaliamo l'articolo del *Temps* del 13 febbraio che la condanna con franco linguaggio e l'attribuisce ad iniziative che andrebbero al di là della volontà del governo di Nanchino. Solo la Spagna ha manifestato subito il suo favore giungendo sino a proporre, per quanto ci risulta, un boicottaggio universale delle merci giapponesi e il ritiro dal Giappone di tutte le rappresentanze diplomatiche. Ma la

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V. G.




IN
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2607

London, February 23, 1932.

UM. & M.

MAR - 2 32



F/LS

793.94/4546

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram
No. 79, ⁴³⁶⁴February 23, 12 noon, regarding British policy in
the Far East, and to forward herewith the full text of
/ Sir John Simon's remarks in the House of Commons last
evening.

MAR 16 1932

FILED

Respectfully yours,

Ray Atherton
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

"China and Japan", PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (House of Commons)
February 22, 1932.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
(House of Commons).

LONDON

Feb. 22, 1932.

statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

5. Mr. JONES asked the Secretary of State for India as to the present situation in regard to the disturbances in Burma?

Sir S. HOARE: I am circulating a statement for the week ending the 20th February.

Following is the statement:

The situation is generally satisfactory. Shan Byu, the main organiser of the recent attempted rising in the Zigon subdivision, has been captured, and one of his principal supporters has surrendered. No casualties among Government forces have been reported. Seventeen under trial prisoners were released during the week and 383 are reported as still in custody, but some returns have not yet been received. The price of paddy continues to rise and is now about 100. Satisfactory progress continues to be made in the collection of taxes.

CHAMBER OF PRINCES.

8. Mr. FREDERICK HALL asked the Secretary of State for India which Indian States are not represented, either directly or indirectly, in the Indian Chamber of Princes?

any agreement. The Japanese General thereupon delivered an ultimatum to the commander of the Chinese troops at Shanghai on the 19th February, demanding, amongst other conditions, that these troops should begin to evacuate their positions in the vicinity of Shanghai before 7 a.m. on the 20th February, Shanghai time. This ultimatum was not accepted by the Chinese General, and an offensive was launched by the Japanese early on the 20th of February. As has been reported in the Press, the Japanese troops have somewhat advanced their line in the neighbourhood of Kiangwan, between Chapei and Woosung, and fighting still continues. Up to the present, there has been little fighting at Chapei or elsewhere in the immediate neighbourhood of the International Settlement.

It is not anticipated that the evacuation of British women and children from Shanghai will become necessary; detailed arrangements have, however, been made against this eventuality. The only danger to the International Settlement at present is from stray shell-fire. Sir Miles Lampson, in concert with his United States, French and Italian col-

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Oral Answers.

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leagues, has made representations to the Japanese and Chinese authorities protesting against action which might lead to damage being inflicted on foreign life or property, and making every reservation in the matter. As regards the second part of the question, the two reports of the Committee of Consuls at Shanghai are being laid as a Parliamentary Paper, and I hope that this will be in the hands of Members on Thursday next.

Mr. LANSBURY: On that reply may I ask the Foreign Secretary whether it would be possible for him, in reply to some questions which I would like to put to him at a more convenient time than now, to make a more detailed statement than is possible in the circumstances of Question hour? If there is time to-night, I would like to put those questions then; if not to-night I would like to put them to-morrow on the Motion for the Adjournment.

Sir J. SIMON: I am disposed to agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the method of imparting information by question and answer is not adequate for a situation of this gravity. I would be glad, on behalf of the Government, to make a rather fuller statement, say on the Adjournment to-day or to-morrow, if this can be arranged through the usual channels, and I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for his suggestion.

Sir AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: Would the Foreign Secretary say whether the General in command of the Chinese Forces in action at Shanghai recognises the authority of any Chinese Government, and, if so, what Government?

Sir J. SIMON: Perhaps my right hon. Friend would allow me to dwell upon that question, which is an important one, and I will endeavour to answer it in the course of any statement that I make later in the day.

FLOODS, CHINA (RELIEF).

33. Mr. MORGAN JONES asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what response has been made by other Governments to the appeal by the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations for material and financial assistance in

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
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MANCHURIA.

Mr. COCKS asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has information regarding the proclamation of an independent state of Manchuria under Japanese auspices; and whether he is taking any steps in the matter?

J. SIMON: The latest information I have received from His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo is that he has been formally informed that if, as is probably true, an independent State of Manchuria has been proclaimed by the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government was no more likely to recognise it than any other Government. The second part of the question is based on an assumption which my information does not enable me to confirm.

COCKS: Seeing that the Government were warned for months about this being likely to happen—the proposition as an independent State—has the right Gentleman taken no steps to protest against its happening?

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CHINA AND JAPAN.

32. Mr. COCKS asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Government will take steps to approach the United States of America and the Powers members of the League of Nations with a view to exerting diplomatic and economic pressure upon the Japanese Government in order to secure respect for the sanctity of international obligations?

Sir J. SIMON: The hon. Member put this question to me, in substance, on Wednesday last, and I have nothing to add to the answer he then received.

Mr. LANSBURY (*by Private Notice*) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any statement to make on the situation in Shanghai, and if he can now state whether the Consuls' report can be published?

Sir J. SIMON: I deeply regret that, as reported in the Press, serious fighting has broken out between the Chinese and Japanese forces, despite all the efforts that have been made to prevent hostilities. The negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese military authorities at Shanghai, of which I informed the House on the 18th of February, failed to secure any agreement. The Japanese General thereupon delivered an ultimatum to the commander of the Chinese troops at Shanghai on the 19th February, demanding, amongst other conditions, that these troops should begin to evacuate their positions in the vicinity of Shanghai before 7 a.m. on the 20th February, Shanghai time. This ultimatum was not accepted by the Chinese General, and an offensive was launched by the Japanese early on the 20th of February. As has been reported in the Press, the Japanese troops have somewhat advanced their line in the neighbourhood of Kiangwan, between Chapei and Woosung, and fighting still continues. Up to the present, there has been little fighting at Chapei or elsewhere in the immediate neighbourhood of the International Settlement.

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Oral Answers.

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[Mr. Jones.]

the flooded areas of China; what response has been made by His Majesty's Government; and, if no response has been made, what is their intention in the matter?

Sir J. SIMON: As I promised the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) in reply to his supplementary question on the 17th of February, I am making inquiries regarding the response to the League of Nations appeal. As regards the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave on the same day to another question by the hon. Member for Westhoughton.

Earl WINTERTON: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider publishing a White Paper showing the extent to which it has been possible to help the sufferers from this terrible calamity, by the joint efforts of the Powers?

Sir J. SIMON: I will consider the suggestion of the Noble Lord, with pleasure, but I do not think that I can give an undertaking.

Mr. MAXTON: Can the Leader of the House say when the House will have a better opportunity of discussing the whole matter than by question and answer across the Floor of the House?

TRADE AND COMMERCE.

EXPORT CREDITS (RUSSIA).

34. Mr. LEWIS asked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department whether any export credits were granted in connection with the exportation of 40 tanks and 26 light armoured vehicles to Russia for which licences were granted in 1930 and renewed in 1931?

Major COLVILLE (Secretary, Overseas Trade Department): No guarantees have been given under the Export Credits Guarantee Scheme in respect of any munitions of war, which are excluded by Statute from the scope of the scheme.

Captain CROOKSHANK: Is it a fact that the Russians had to pay cash for these tanks, but they have to have credit for these commercial operations?

Major COLVILLE: It is a fact, I believe, that they had to pay cash.

37. Sir W. DAVISON asked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department whether his attention has been called to the shortage of wheat and flour in Soviet Ukraine; and whether he will consider varying the instructions given to the Export Credits Guarantee Committee to enable them to take this fact into consideration when granting credits for the import of Ukrainian wheat and flour?

Major COLVILLE: The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. As regards the second part, my hon. Friend seems to be under a misapprehension as to the functions of the Export Credits Guarantee Scheme, which is concerned only with the export of United Kingdom goods. The Department has no power to give guarantees for the importation of foreign goods into this country.

SOUTH AMERICA (PRESS SERVICE).

35. Mr. HANNON asked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department whether, in view of the importance of an effective Press agency in the interests of British trade in South America, he contemplates any measures of improvement in the Press service between this country and Brazil?

Major COLVILLE: I agree with the hon. Member that an improvement in the Press service between this country and Brazil is much to be desired. Owing to the competition with which they are faced British news organisations have hitherto been unable to establish themselves in Brazil, but the British Official Wireless is always available to the Brazilian Press should they care to make use of it.

Mr. HANNON: Is the hon. and gallant Member going to leave the matter there? Cannot he take some steps in co-operation with the Chambers of Commerce at Rio and elsewhere to develop the Press service between this country and Brazil?

Major COLVILLE: The matter will be watched, but it must be remembered that this is primarily a matter for private enterprise.

Mr. HANNON: Is the hon. and gallant Member aware that in South America our trade is suffering all the time because of the want of more intelligence?

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Somerset, Thomas
Somerville, Donald Bradley
Somerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)
Somerville, D. G. (Willesden, East)
Soper, Richard
Sotherton-Estcourt, Captain T. E.
Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.
Spears, Brigadier-General Edward L.
Spencer, Captain Richard A.
Stanley, Lord (Lancaster, Fylde)
Stanley, Hon. O. F. C. (Westmorland)
Stones, James
Storey, Samuel
Stourton, Hon. John J.
Strauss, Edward A.
Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)

Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart
Sutcliffe, Harold
Tate, Mavis Constance
Templeton, William P.
Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)
Thompson, Luke
Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles
Thorp, Linton Theodore
Todd, Capt. A. J. K. (B'wick-on-T.)
Touche, Gordon Cosmo
Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Turton, Robert Hugh
Wallace, John (Dunfermline)
Ward, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Ward, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)
Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.

Wedderburn, Henry James Scrymgeour-
Wells, Sydney Richard
Weymouth, Viscount
Whiteside, Borras Noel H.
Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Wills, Wilfrid D.
Wilson, Clyde T. (West Toxteth)
Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George
Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl
Wise, Alfred R.
Womersley, Walter James
Wood, Sir Murdoch McKenzie (Banff)
Young, Rt. Hon. Sir Hilton (S'v'noaks)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. Lambert Ward
and Mr. Bindell.

NOES.

Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)
Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S.
Balfour, George (Hampstead)
Batey, Joseph
Boulton, W. W.
Boyce, H. Leslie
Braithwaite, J. G. (Hillsborough)
Clayton, Dr. George C.
Daggar, George
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)
Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)

Groves, Thomas E.
Hall, F. (York, W.R., Normanton)
Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)
Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry
Hicks, Ernest George
Knox, Sir Alfred
Lamb, Sir Joseph Quinton
Mills, Sir Frederick (Leyton, E.)
Nunn, William
Peat, Charles U.
Reimer, John R.

Russell, Hamer Field (Shef'ld, B'tside)
Salter, Dr. Alfred
Steel-Maitland, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur
Strickland, Captain W. F.
Taylor, Vice-Admiral E.A. (P'dd'g't'n, S.)
Thorne, William James
Watts-Morgan, Lieut.-Col. David

TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Mr. Louis Smith and Major
Beaumont Thomas.

Motion made, and Question, "That the
Chairman do report Progress and ask
leave to sit again," put, and agreed to.—
[*Captain Margesson.*]

Committee report progress; to sit
again To-morrow.

*The remaining Orders were read, and
postponed.*

CHINA AND JAPAN.

Motion made and Question proposed,
"That this House do now adjourn."—
[*Captain Margesson.*]

Mr. LANSBURY: I would have pre-
ferred, as I expect the House would have
preferred, that the subject which I am
going to ask it to consider for a few
minutes should have been dealt with at
an earlier part of the day and have had
a longer time devoted to it, but I under-
stand there is very little likelihood of our
getting a day for its discussion for some
little time, at least, and also that the
Foreign Secretary may have to leave
England to go to Geneva, and I felt, as
I think the Foreign Secretary does, that
a rather fuller statement than is possible
at Question Time ought to be made at
the earliest possible moment. We are all
aware of the difficulties of the situation,
and we want the House to understand
that we are leaving the responsibility to

the Government. I shall state our own
view about the matter, but in the last
resort responsibility for whatever action
is taken must rest with the Government.
We as an Opposition cannot accept any
responsibility. There is one point on
which I wish to ask the Foreign Secre-
tary if he can give us any information.
A good many people in this country and
elsewhere are concerned to know whether
there is any real Red Cross organisa-
tion—

Mr. GEORGE BALFOUR: May I ask
the right hon. Gentleman what subject
he is talking about?

Mr. LANSBURY: If the hon. Member
does not mind I will—

Mr. BALFOUR: But you have not
mentioned the subject.

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thought everyone knew that the subject
was Shanghai, and the difficulties that
have arisen there. I gave notice of it at
Question Time, and I took it for granted
that everyone knew. I would like, if
possible, to hear whether there are any
Red Cross hospitals or units out there,
and also whether the Foreign Secretary
can say whether any effort has been
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and children, from the area of the fight-
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read in some Press telegrams, though I
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Somerset, Thomas
Somervell, Donald Bradley
Somerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)
Somerville, D. G. (Willesden, East)
Soper, Richard
Sotheron-Estcourt, Captain T. E.
Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.
Spears, Brigadier-General Edward L.
Spencer, Captain Richard A.
Stanley, Lord (Lancaster, Fylde)
Stanley, Hon. O. F. C. (Westmorland)
Stones, James
Storey, Samuel
Stourton, Hon. John J.
Strauss, Edward A.
Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)

Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart
Sutcliffe, Harold
Tate, Mavis Constance
Templeton, William P.
Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)
Thompson, Luke
Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles
Thorp, Linton Theodore
Todd, Capt. A. J. K. (B'wick-on-T.)
Touche, Gordon Cosmo
Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Turton, Robert Hugh
Wallace, John (Dunfermline)
Ward, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)
Ward, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)
Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.

Wedderburn, Henry James Scrymgeour
Wells, Sydney Richard
Weymouth, Viscount
Whiteside, Borras Noel H.
Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Wills, Wilfrid D.
Wilson, Clyde T. (West Toxteth)
Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George
Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl
Wise, Alfred R.
Womersley, Walter James
Wood, Sir Murdoch McKenzie (Banff)
Young, Rt. Hon. Sir Hilton (S'v'noaks)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. Lambert Ward
and Mr. Blindell.

NOES.

Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)
Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S.
Balfour, George (Hampstead)
Batey, Joseph
Boulton, W. W.
Boyce, H. Leslie
Braithwaite, J. G. (Hillsborough)
Clayton, Dr. George C.
Daggan, George
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)
Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)

Groves, Thomas E.
Hall, F. (York, W.R., Normanton)
Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)
Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry
Hicks, Ernest George
Knox, Sir Alfred
Lamb, Sir Joseph Quinton
Mills, Sir Frederick (Leyton, E.)
Nunn, William
Peat, Charles U.
Remer, John R.

Russell, Hamer Field (Shef'ld, B'tside)
Salter, Dr. Alfred
Steel-Maitland, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur
Strickland, Captain W. F.
Taylor, Vice-Admiral E.A. (P'dd'gt'n, S.)
Thorne, William James
Watts-Morgan, Lieut.-Col. David

TELLERS FOR THE NOES—
Mr. Louis Smith and Major
Beaumont Thomas.

Motion made, and Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress and ask leave to sit again," put, and agreed to.—
[*Captain Margesson.*]

Committee report progress; to sit again To-morrow.

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

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Motion made and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—
[*Captain Margesson.*]

Mr. LANSBURY: I would have preferred, as I expect the House would have preferred, that the subject which I am going to ask it to consider for a few minutes should have been dealt with at an earlier part of the day and have had a longer time devoted to it, but I understand there is very little likelihood of our getting a day for its discussion for some little time, at least, and also that the Foreign Secretary may have to leave England to go to Geneva, and I felt, as I think the Foreign Secretary does, that a rather fuller statement than is possible at Question Time ought to be made at the earliest possible moment. We are all aware of the difficulties of the situation, and we want the House to understand that we are leaving the responsibility to

the Government. I shall state our own view about the matter, but in the last resort responsibility for whatever action is taken must rest with the Government. We as an Opposition cannot accept any responsibility. There is one point on which I wish to ask the Foreign Secretary if he can give us any information. A good many people in this country and elsewhere are concerned to know whether there is any real Red Cross organisation—

Mr. GEORGE BALFOUR: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman what subject he is talking about?

Mr. LANSBURY: If the hon. Member does not mind I will—

Mr. BALFOUR: But you have not mentioned the subject.

Mr. LANSBURY: I am sorry. I thought everyone knew that the subject was Shanghai, and the difficulties that have arisen there. I gave notice of it at Question Time, and I took it for granted that everyone knew. I would like, if possible, to hear whether there are any Red Cross hospitals or units out there, and also whether the Foreign Secretary can say whether any effort has been made to remove non-combatants, women and children, from the area of the fighting. I ask that question because I have read in some Press telegrams, though I am not taking it for granted that it is

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[Mr. Lansbury.]
true, that women and children were being killed during the fighting. The fundamental question to which everything I say will lead is: What actual immediate means do the Government intend to take—

It being Eleven of the Clock, the Motion for the Adjournment lapsed without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—
[Captain Margesson.]

Mr. LANSBURY: I want to ask the Foreign Secretary what actual immediate means the British Government intend to take through the League of Nations to bring about an Armistice and a conference for ending the dispute. Whatever any of us may say or think, that is the most important question both to-day and to-morrow. I want also to say—and I beg the House to bear with me, even if hon. Members thoroughly disagree with what I am saying; I am going to try to say nothing of a provocative character if I can help it—I want to state our position if I may, and to put a question to the Foreign Secretary as it is my duty to do as a Member of the House. I am also speaking for my hon. Friends behind me. We acknowledge to the full that the fighting area is a dangerous and difficult one, and that that danger and difficulty arise because of its nearness to the international settlement. The right hon. Gentleman who was Foreign Secretary in the late Conservative Government will remember that when a similar difficulty arose in regard to the British Government and our own troops, we took the line, quite definitely, that the best and most pacific measures to take were to evacuate, not only civilians, but the troops as well. We—and I say this after a very great deal of consideration—would prefer to leave the bricks and mortar and property to take care of themselves, rather than that at any period our soldiers, our sailors, or our civilians should be involved.

I believe, and I think the Foreign Secretary will agree with me, that there is a very large body of opinion that feels that the League of Nations should bring into operation some of the powers which we believe rest in the Covenant of the League. I do not want to say which of the powers or what of the powers should be used; nor am I going to say that I

wish them to be used at this moment, but only that the British Government and the other Governments connected with the Council of the League must freely make up their minds whether they are ever going to consider taking some action, drastic action, in order to bring the conflict to an end; whether by economic measures or by withdrawing Ambassadors is for the Government to consider.

I do not think that the civilised world can stand still and see this thing that is happening carried right through to the bitter end without any protest. I would point out that the League of Nations last week, through its Council, has put it on record clearly and distinctly—I am not bringing up anything that is not public knowledge and that is not officially put on record—that Japan has refused arbitration, and disregarded her obligations under the Covenant, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact.

Then I want to say that we who sit here—and I hope that this applies to everyone in the House—are neither pro-Japanese nor pro-Chinese; we are pro-humanity. We are internationalists, and in this matter our interest is not to gain an advantage for one country over the other—not even for our own country over another. I would like to say this, and I would like to say it to the Japanese people. The people of China, as the people of Japan did years ago, have suffered very considerably through the interference of foreign nations in their affairs. I think the people of Japan ought to remember that Japan herself, not so many years ago, got rid of the power of foreign nations to act in her ports as we are able to act in certain treaty ports now, and I think that the Chinese people have a right—an inalienable right—to say that the day must come, and ought to come soon, when China's ports and her territory shall be under her own control.

There is one thing in that connection that I would like to put to the Foreign Secretary, and I do so without a shred of suspicion on my part that what I am going to put to him is true, but I want him publicly to contradict it here. There is a very widespread belief in China, and I have had this brought to me on the very best authority, that some of the Powers are in alliance with Japan, that

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some of the Great Powers have encouraged Japan to take the action she has taken, telling her that in the end the Great Powers would not interfere with her. I cannot believe for a moment that anything of that kind can be true, but I hope that the Foreign Secretary will stand up and tell us the truth about it, and categorically deny it.

Th other thing that I want to say in that connection is with regard to something that was raised by the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) this afternoon. I would remind him that, when the ultimatum was delivered to the Chinese General, the Chinese General replied that he had sent the ultimatum to the Government in China at Nanking, from whom he took his orders. The question was raised this afternoon as to which Government in China the General was responsible to. He himself has put that on record. I would ask the House to remember that, when the right hon. Gentleman was Foreign Secretary in 1926, he took a line which I hope will be taken to-day. I cannot believe that the present Foreign Secretary will take any different line from that which the right hon. Gentleman took then. It will not take me a minute to put it to the House.

Let me first say that Japan undertook, in the Nine-Power Treaty signed in Washington, to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government; and in 1926, when our British goods were boycotted and British lives and property were in danger, the British Government adopted a policy of liberal and friendly co-operation with the new China; and, in a memorandum by the right hon. Gentleman to China on the 28th May, he laid down the principle which I now recall, and to which I hope the right hon. Gentleman will still subscribe, that all the Powers should abandon the idea that the economic and political development of China can only be secured under foreign tutelage, and that it should be the policy of the Powers to endeavour to maintain harmonious relations with China, without waiting for or insisting on the prior establishment of a strong central Government. I have recalled that because I think that is the central doctrine which needs to be kept in mind at this moment.

I am not, as the House knows, acquainted with foreign affairs as hon. Members are. I have had no experience of them, directly or indirectly. I should like, if I have the power, to say to the Japanese Government and nation what I am saying to this House. In private life, in public affairs, or in international affairs, when people rely on brute force, and break their word, and do the sort of things which are not usually done between man and man, it produces Dead Sea fruit. The Japanese military forces may overwhelm the Chinese forces, but they will reap Dead Sea fruit as a result. That is the lesson of all Imperialist domination, and I beg the House to remember, I beg the so-called civilised world to remember, that this great struggle is the old economic struggle of one Power against another in order to obtain either raw materials or markets. We want peace at home and abroad and we want it on the only lines that it ever can be secured, that is, on the basis of co-operation between men and women for the good of one another. We believe that, if the Western world has anything to give to the Eastern world, it must give them the law of co-operation and not the law of fighting, the law of brotherhood and not the law of death.

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon): I warmly agree with the Leader of the Opposition that it is desirable to take such opportunity as is open to the House for a rather more continuous statement about the very serious situation that has developed and is now existing in the Far East. I told the House to-day, in answer to a question, that in a day or two there will be available in a White Paper the reports that have been sent from Shanghai to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in connection with the investigation that the League of Nations is making. Perhaps it would be convenient if I occupy two or three minutes in placing before the House as clearly as I can how it appears this struggle at Shanghai actually arose. The House is aware, of course, that the international settlement, spreading along the north side of the river, is a very large area, something like eight miles in length and an average of a mile, perhaps, in depth, and it is occupied in common by a large number of foreign nations. There

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[Sir J. Simon.]
is no division of it up between Americans, British, Italians, Japanese and so forth. We are aware, of course, also that outside the international settlement there is a large part of the Chinese population of Shanghai. It was on 18th January, according to this report which the House will receive to-morrow or the next day, that the immediate trouble began, but before that date, for a long time, certainly running back into the middle of last year, there had been a very intense anti-Japanese boycott operating in this great Chinese city. It was a boycott of the most severe kind, including not only the refusal to buy, but including penalties and punishments of all sorts imposed upon all those concerned with Japanese trade. On 18th January there was an attack on some five Japanese, not inside the settlement, but just to the north of it, in the suburb with which we are all now familiar. I mean the suburb of Chapei. A few days later there came the counter-blow. Fifty Japanese youths armed, we are told, with knives and clubs, went to the place where this attack occurred, set a factory on fire, and on the way back came into very serious collision with the police of the Settlement. There was killing on both sides.

Thereupon, the Japanese Consul presented five demands to the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, that is to say, the Chinese Mayor. He demanded an apology, compensation, punishment of the wrongdoers, the stopping of the boycott, and so on. That was on the 20th January. On the next day, a Japanese admiral, who was a commander of some Japanese ships in the river, declared that unless a satisfactory reply was given, he was going to protect his Japanese Nationals. Japanese reinforcements arrived in the river some three or four days afterwards, and a week elapsed from the first demands when on 27th January the Japanese Consul announced that there must be a satisfactory reply by 6 p.m. the next day. In that situation the Municipal Council of the Settlement—the Settlement has its own municipality and to a large extent governs itself—considered that a situation arose which justified declaring a state of emergency, and various guards and troops therefore took up their places, and it so happened, for the purposes of defending the Inter-

national Settlement, a portion of the lines of advance extend outside the boundary of the International Settlement, and project into the Chinese town. There may be strategical reasons for that, but it is an unfortunate circumstance. Just as a decision was reached that there must be a state of emergency proclaimed—in fact, the same afternoon that the state of emergency was to come into operation—the Chinese Mayor announced that he accepted all demands made upon him.

That, I think, is stating quite impartially how the matter arose. The view taken by the Japanese Admiral was that he was not satisfied with these promises. The view taken by the Municipal Council was that the emergency really continued and that the Settlement must be protected, and the consequence was that very shortly afterwards some Japanese marines were landed and the trouble began. I am not attempting to apportion the blame, but it is desirable to understand how the matter began, because it has now reached dimensions which everybody who cares for the authority of the League of Nations, for the maintenance of peace, and for the preservation of good relations between the different nations of the world must regard with the most profound disquiet. Here perhaps I may be allowed to say without offence that I greatly appreciate the public spirit and moderation with which the right hon. Gentleman has brought these matters before the House.

The House is familiar with the way in which the thing developed. It has reached very serious dimensions. The actual situation is this: In spite of the fact that the League of Nations appointed a commission which very promptly went on its way and will very soon be on the spot, a commission which, let the House observe, was appointed with the assent of the Japanese representatives in order to investigate the relations between China and Japan which were calculated to produce disturbance and conflict; in spite of the fact that the four Governments of the United States, France, Italy and ourselves, the four principal foreign Powers immediately interested in the Settlement, made proposals on 2nd February to the Japanese Government, which it is fair to say the Chinese authorities said they would accept but to some of which the Japanese authorities took exception; in spite of the fact

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that the League of Nations, through its council, unanimously addressed a note of appeal to the Japanese Government on 17th February, we are faced with the situation which is now before us. We are faced with the lamentable fact that, in spite of all these efforts which have been made to establish on a firm foundation a new world order and to secure that disputes between members of the League shall be solved peaceably, by methods of conciliation; in spite of the fact that the Kellogg Pact and the Pact of Paris, which both these nations have signed, and to which America and ourselves and other nations were parties, denounced war as an instrument of policy—in spite of this fact fighting is actually going on at this moment on Chinese soil, between the forces of two members of the League and, indeed, of two members who, as it happens, at the present time are both members of the council of the League.

I should like to state what I conceive to be the principles of British policy in facing this most disastrous and dangerous state of affairs. I will try to formulate them under three heads. First of all, let me advance this proposition—I am sure for the general acceptance of the House—that the British Government will direct the full influence of Britain, in conjunction with other Powers, whether they are members of the League or not, to support the moral authority of the League of Nations. However disappointing it is to find that in this instance—in some respects, a very very difficult case—the League of Nations has not been able to prevent the outbreak of fighting, let us recognise that the League is the organised expression of public opinion of a very large part of the world. I say on behalf of the British Government, and on my own behalf, with deep conviction, that it is only by affirming with boldness and sincerity the principles of the League that we shall find the best means of restoring peace. Japan and China both remain members of the League. Representatives speaking in their name are at present at the Council table, and, if we show ourselves devoted to the purposes of the League, the time may soon come, notwithstanding the wreckage of our hopes, when the moral authority of the League will be seen to exercise its influence on the side of peace. To my way of thinking that is a proposi-

tion which we all may affirm. Great Britain has, from the beginning of this unhappy trouble, shown that she is ready to lend her good offices, whether in combination with other members of the League or in association with the United States of America, or in any other way that is most practical. Our Minister, Sir Miles Lampson, our Consul-General, Mr. Brenner, and our Ambassador at Tokio, Sir Francis Lindley, have all exerted themselves to the utmost, and we stand ready, at the first moment which offers itself as a useful and practical occasion, to serve the cause of peace and help in any arrangements which may put an end to this horrible conflict between two nations, with both of whom Great Britain remains in friendly relations.

The third proposition is this: The British Government are in a very special degree charged with the protection and defence of British interests, and there is no part of the world in which it can be said with more complete truth than in the Far East that British interests are summed up in the words "Peace and trade." We do not seek to secure trade through the boycott of other people. We have made, we believe, the most complete arrangements for the safety of life and property in the International Settlement, and the right hon. Gentleman may consider, as a matter of fact, that those in the International Settlement are feeling quite secure. I deplore the incidents which have occurred and while we have made it plain to both parties that we must reserve our rights, we look to them to continue their efforts to avoid injuring innocent neutrals in any way possible. But this is far from being the full extent of our duties, because I agree that the duty of the British Government and the duty of its representatives at Geneva, as well as of the whole of this House, is above all to use its influence in the best way it can to get the fighting stopped and the bloodshed ended. I am quite aware that in some quarters there is a desire, as is only natural, to discuss other aspects of this matter, and apportion blame, but I must point out what is really the nature of the duty which the League of Nations has been called upon to discharge. This dispute has been brought before the Council and before the Assembly, and the duty of the League is to collect as rapidly as possible

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[Sir J. Simon.]

all the information, and to hear both sides. As I have already said, and must repeat, it would be quite improper for anyone to attempt to pronounce a partial or interim judgment in a matter where everything depends on the report which will have to be made by the League of Nations, recognised on both sides as proceeding from a complete sense of impartiality. In this matter, therefore, I feel sure that the House, in supporting the Government, will reflect the opinion of the country.

Sir AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: As one who has held the same responsible office which is filled by the Foreign Secretary, and held it in less but still in critical times in the Far East, I desire, for what my support may be worth, to assure him of my whole-hearted approval of the statement he has just made. I am sure that in this matter it is unwise to show a preference until the League's investiga-

tion has taken place, and until we have its report and its advice; and that for this House and hon. Members to advocate the cause of one or other of the parties in the meantime must be injurious to the authority of the Covenant and the authority of the League. I accept the statement of the right hon. Gentleman as the proper policy for the Government to pursue and I hope we may leave it at that.

Sir J. SIMON: I intended to say to the Leader of the Opposition that, of course, I most gladly do what he asks, that is to give the most absolute contradiction, as far as any knowledge of mine goes, to the suggestion that there is any secret contract or understanding whatever.

It being half-past Eleven of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 7, 1932.


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London Embassy's despatch No. 2617,
February 23, 1932 (F/LB 793.94/4547)

This despatch (11 pages) deals with British thought on the Chinese-Japanese dispute, principally with regard to strong action against Japan, such as the boycott.

"Some weeks ago a Special Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to deal with the situation in Shanghai. This Committee is composed of Mr. Baldwin, Lord Hailsham (Secretary for War), Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell (First Lord of the Admiralty), and Sir Samuel Hoare (Secretary for India), who are all Conservatives, in addition to Sir John Simon (Liberal) whose inclusion as Foreign Secretary was imperative, and Mr. J. H. Thomas (National Labor), Secretary for the Dominions, who is in the Committee to represent the Dominions interests" ".....their joint view must largely reflect the opinion of the predominant Conservative element in the National Government, even if it does not echo to the last letter the militant Toryism of Lord Hailsham and Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell."

This despatch is worth reading. May it not indicate that Sir John Simon's position of speaking for the British Government may at some point be questionable or at least subject to modification?

RPB/
M



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Mr. Secretary
Please with
the digest, as
marked.



Memo.

Copies of TIMES editorial
to follow in next pouch.

- American Embassy, London
February 23, 1932



PM RECD

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London, February 23, 1932.

No. 2617

MAR 2 1932

RECEIVED



MAR 8 - 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

793.94
note
6/1.9412



F/LB



793.94/4547

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

see 793.94/4307

With reference to future Anglo-American relations in the Far East, the question most often asked here is, Would the United States participate in an economic boycott of Japan if one were ordained by the Assembly of the League of Nations?

Those Englishmen who have for many weeks past--in fact, since before the situation in Shanghai arose--been pressing for the full employment of the League's machinery, have largely been recruited from that substantial element whose instinctive response to such stimuli as the grave events taking place in the Far East is a quickening of their sense of idealism.

Those/

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Those to whom I refer, who comprise that substantial element which forms the liberal wing in British politics, have, from the very beginning of the conflict, been concerned entirely with the wider considerations involved,-- the sanctity of collective treaties and the peaceful settlement of disputes--rather than with the practical difficulties of finding a solution of the immediate issue; and it was the growing imminence of the collapse of the prestige of the League, which they conceived to be a palpable expression of their idealism, which undoubtedly explains the fact that they have been ahead of the weight of public opinion in calling for the immediate application of severe measures. They accepted the issue of a Japanese ultimatum to the Chinese forces at Shanghai as a "notification of intent to commit an act of naked military aggression", when the majority of their countrymen were more concerned in the effect of hostilities upon the foreign lives and interests in Shanghai. They appear to be convinced that nothing short of the certainty of incurring the sanctions contemplated in Article XVI of the Covenant would restrain Japan from carrying out its plans for an extensive offensive operation.

The League of Nations Union has been in the forefront of this agitation. Its views are set forth in the following flambant letter to the TIMES, which appeared over the joint signatures of Lord Cecil and other leading members/

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members of the Union.

"Sir:-

"It is time that British opinion faced the fact that the Japanese Government has committed itself to a course which seems to be directed towards the military domination of China as a whole. This fact, even were it not accompanied by unpardonable atrocities upon the civil population--of which the bombing of the League of Nations Refugee Hospital for the victims of the Yangtze floods is but one instance--has created a situation of the utmost gravity.

"It is sometimes said that no British interest is involved in this crisis. On the contrary, apart from the general truth that the greatest of British interests is peace, there are special issues vitally important for the British Empire. If Japanese policy cannot be checked or modified by the disapproval of the world, it is clear that other countries with interests in the East must expect to hold them in future at the mercy of the one dominant Power. The destruction of the collective peace in the East and submission to the military dictatorship of Japan must have disastrous repercussions in India and would cause the gravest anxieties in Australia and Canada.

"If we do not in the present instance do all in our power to secure joint action with other countries in honouring our common engagements to defend international order, at a time when we may have the cooperation of practically the whole world to restrain Japanese aggression, we must not hope to benefit from this system in a case where British Imperial interests were even more directly threatened; for example, if Japan demanded a free entry for Japanese colonists into Australia.

"The time, then, is critical both for the British Empire and for the League of Nations. The Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and other collective treaties are at stake. If, in the case of a really serious issue between two Great Powers, this system fails, the/

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the peace of the world will be imperilled, and belief in the validity of collective treaties will have been undermined.

"What then should be the dominant purpose of British policy in the Far East? It should be to secure the cooperation of the United States with the League as a whole in order to exert all the diplomatic and economic pressure which may be necessary to secure from Japan respect for the collective system and the sanctity of treaties. A special meeting of the League Assembly would be a valuable means of promoting this end.

"There is certainly no escape from danger by neglect of our honour and duty."

It will be observed that in addition to the alarm expressed in this letter over the effect upon the British Empire of a tolerant attitude--a point to which I will refer in a subsequent portion of this despatch--the Union expresses the feeling of this element as a whole that the occasion must be seized to test the efficacy of the League, and to see whether the reliance now placed upon it to save civilisation from another destructive war is justified.

1/ How these sentiments affect the ultra-Conservative is graphically illustrated by the enclosed editorial from the DAILY MAIL. As I had the honor to point out in my telegram No. 76 of February 19, 12 noon, the Tories ascribe the loss of Britain's prestige in the Far East to its faltering policy since 1922 in permitting the advantages of the status quo particularly in China to go by the board in favor of a general misjudged enthusiasm for nationalism

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in the East generally but without acceptance of any principles of responsibility. There is, however, more to it than meets the eye, as the Department may have realized. There is a strong residue of friendliness toward Japan as a former partner in an alliance that yielded England tangible benefits, not the least valuable of which was that it enabled England to bring back a fleet from the Orient and concentrate its naval forces in home waters at a time of supreme need. This profitable alliance in the English mind was abandoned at the urgent insistence of the United States; but the Tory feels that the United States has given nothing commensurate with Britain's concession to American wishes. To discuss war debts and security in Europe would be to stray too far afield at this moment, but the events of 1927 in China strengthened the conviction of the Tory that the doctrine of keeping free from foreign entanglements is too firmly implanted in the American mind to expect collaboration from the United States except in circumstances where collaboration would redound to its own advantage. In this relation I quote the following remarks reported to have been made by General Sir Ian Hamilton, the President of the British Legion, in the course of an address last Saturday:

"I implore you to keep an eye on these well-meaning fanatics or something may happen to our cruisers, and we know what/

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what happened between Spain and the U.S.A. when the U.S.A. cruiser MAINE mysteriously went under. All the trouble in the Far East is the fault of those who forced us to break our alliance with the Japanese.

"The League of Nations have done much (unwittingly no doubt) to blow this fire into a blaze by first of all irritating the Japanese and then by encouraging the Chinese. Now they want to make us--as usual--pull out their chestnuts."

Just after the situation at Shanghai became serious, official quarters in London discouraged the press from giving undue prominence to reports from the Shanghai area, as they were obviously anxious that the British public should not prematurely take sides in the controversy; and as it has since become clear that English lives and vested interests in China, more particularly in Shanghai, are in danger, the immediate emphasis has been laid on affording the necessary measure of protection. To the average British mind, this conflict between China and Japan is a remote affair which these two nations must settle eventually between themselves. It is what he calls a "yellow war"; and as British interests in Shanghai have not demonstrably suffered thus far, he is not entirely convinced by the logic of League enthusiasts who would hazard a war with Japan rather than pay, in the words of the editor of the ECONOMIST, "the price of exposing ourselves to the risk of a far greater evil in the not distant future." It has therefore been intensely

interesting/

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7-

interesting to observe the effect upon his mind of the two predominant forces--the intense idealism of the liberals and the shrewd materialism of the reactionaries. The note sent to Japan by the so-called Committee of Twelve of the Council of the League, studiously conciliatory in tone though it was, was admirably calculated to reveal to such a mind the consequences involved in further aggression. As set forth in the enclosed editorial from the London TIMES of February 18, British public opinion has thus far stood out strongly for moderation and conciliation, as "it has felt--as the last League note rather tardily recognizes--that justice is not altogether on one side; that Japan in fact was entitled to expect more satisfaction from China than China was prepared to give"; but the TIMES now warns Japan in the sternest language not to imagine that "the comparative moderation of the protests and appeals so far made in Tokyo represents the last word of the League and of the foreign countries having definite and palpable interests in China." The consolidation of sympathy on the side of China, it suggests, will now give the League that support which it has thus far lacked to take effective measures to end the conflict. This sharpening of the position taken by the TIMES, which is regarded as the very oracle of Conservatism,

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has a significance which should not be overlooked. I venture to think that it has generally expressed the Foreign Office viewpoint, and I should not be surprised if its views may become in this case, as they often have done in the past, the focal point of pre-dominant shades of public opinion.

I have thus briefly outlined the trends of British thought, not only to supply the background for the policy pronounced by Lord Hailsham in the House of Lords on February 16 (see my telegrams No. 75 and 76 of February 19), but to indicate in some degree the reasons for the extraordinary hesitancies which one may have noticed recently in the attitude of the British Government. Some weeks ago a Special Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to deal with the situation in Shanghai. This Committee is composed of Mr. Baldwin, Lord Hailsham (Secretary for War), Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell (First Lord of the Admiralty), and Sir Samuel Hoare (Secretary for India), who are all Conservatives, (Liberal) in addition to Sir John Simon/whose inclusion as Foreign Secretary was imperative, and Mr. J. H. Thomas, (National Labor), Secretary for the Dominions, who is in the Committee to represent Dominions interests. No profound knowledge of the temperament and of the political/

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political doctrines of these members is necessary to realize that their joint view must largely reflect the opinion of the predominant Conservative element in the National Government, even if it does not echo to the last letter the militant Toryism of Lord Hailsham and Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell.

Returning to the letter above quoted of Lord Cecil and his associates in the League of Nations Union, it will be observed that they state that if Japanese policy cannot be checked, the Far East would be at the mercy of a dominant Power; and that if the sanctity of collective treaties were not maintained, the British Empire could not hope to benefit from this system were "its interests even more directly threatened; for example, if Japan demanded a free entry for Japanese colonists into Australia." The full implication of this reference to Australia is expressed by Sir Walter Layton in the ECONOMIST when he said that British Dominions in the Pacific area would be driven by fear of Japanese imperialism to leave the Empire and to seek the shelter of the United States. The letter above mentioned also makes a very brief reference to the effect upon India of Japan becoming dominant in the Far East. I cannot at this conjuncture pretend to say precisely what the views of the Cabinet are on the points raised; but it is obvious, by the presence in the so-called

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Far Eastern Cabinet Committee of Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. Thomas, that they are being given full consideration.

It is understood on credible authority that the British Government is somewhat uneasy over the consequences of China's request for a convocation of the Assembly of the League, and that France shares this feeling. It is anticipated that many minor Powers, who would profit by the creation of a precedent which they might invoke in case of need, will be insistent upon the convocation of the sanctions of Article XVI of the Covenant. For the most part their interests in the Far East are negligible, and they would be unable to make material contribution towards the prosecution of a course upon which they have insisted. The consequences will, therefore, fall in large part on Britain and in a somewhat lesser measure on France.


The realism which has marked French policy in the Far East no less than in Europe should not find distasteful an Asiatic Power able to lend its influence towards the maintenance of order. France can count only on Japan to check the advance of communism through Manchuria into China, where the disturbances to foreign vested rights by the Wuhan régime gave a foretaste of what would happen were the country entirely proselytized. The seepage of radical thought from China into French

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Indo-China is, of course, of even more direct concern to France. Quite apart from the fact that France is not overlooking the possibility that it may feel some day compelled to act in Europe as Japan has in Manchuria, it is not extravagant to assume that France is not anxious to have the League apply punitive measures to a country which it is to France's advantage to keep influential in this region. These considerations largely apply mutato nomine to present British views regarding Far Eastern policy, which fact gives significance to Lord Hailsham's statement in the House of Lords on the 18th instant, that Great Britain did not think it proper to take any "action which would seem to separate it from the other members of the League of Nations and to identify it with the United States in any sort of opposition to other members of the League to which we belong."

Respectfully yours,



Ray Atherton,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures:

1. Editorial from the DAILY MAIL, February 18, 1932.
2. " " " TIMES, February 18, 1932. (Single copy)

Copy sent to E.I.C. Paris.

PAPER DAILY MAIL

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Feb. 18, 1908.

OUR FIRE-EATERS AND JAPAN

THE text of the Note which the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations has addressed to Japan is published to-day. It is couched in friendly terms and is rather an appeal than an expostulation, so that it can do little harm.

Its diplomatic defect is that it treats China as if she were a State with a responsible, effective Government, whereas everyone knows that the Government there is a sham and that a condition of complete anarchy prevails.

Repeatedly in the past Japan has applied to the Chinese Government for satisfaction in the case of injury to her subjects or interests, and has time after time been put off with worthless promises.

The boycotting of Japanese trade, the destruction of Japanese property, and attacks on Japanese subjects have continued.

Some part of Japan's trouble arises from the fact that in the immediate past Chinese mobs and bandits have been permitted with almost complete impunity to attack British property and British nationals, and to force the abandonment of British concession rights at Hankow.

No Crusading!

Realists understand that Japan, in employing force to restore order and protect her interests in China, is taking the only possible course.

Yet there are fire-eating pacifists in London and Geneva who would drag Great Britain into war with Japan.

They are clamouring for the application of "sanctions" to Japan if she does not promise immediately to abandon her claims in Manchuria and to leave Shanghai. By "sanctions" they mean the blockade and economic boycott of Japan, which, again, means nothing but war on the most formidable scale.

In no circumstances must our British authorities allow themselves to be manœuvred by these reckless visionaries into a great conflict.

"Keep out of Asiatic entanglements" is the golden rule for Downing-street.

Our National Government was placed in office to rescue Great Britain from bankruptcy, not to go crusading in the Far East.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAPER THE TIMES

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DATE Feb. 18, 1932.

SHANGHAI AND THE LEAGUE

During most of the last forty-eight hours the trouble in Shanghai has been growing ever more sharply accentuated. Shells fired by both of the combatant parties have fallen in the International Settlement. Two British naval ratings and an unknown number of civilians have been killed; and the artillery battle was believed to be the forerunner of an engagement on a large scale, for which Japanese and Chinese troops had been massing for ten days. But in war it is the unexpected that happens, and that is particularly true when the war is in China. Last night it became known that the preparations for battle would be followed, not by a battle, but by an amicable meeting of Chinese and Japanese military representatives at nine o'clock this morning; and with the help of foreign diplomacy a neutral zone does seem actually to be in course of formation. But, even if at the last moment the situation has improved, it remains none the less serious; and the immediate responsibility for the destruction of life, the devastation of part of Shanghai, the heavy commercial losses of foreign communities, and acute international anxiety, local and general, must be placed squarely on the shoulders of Japan. She has gravely abused the privilege, which she shares in common with other countries, of having a Settlement at Shanghai by making it a starting-point for military operations—an abuse which involves other countries, and against which Great Britain and the United States have particularly and repeatedly protested. The impartial report of the League Commissioners in Shanghai revealed no adequate reason for the original entry of Japanese marines into Chapei and for the subsequent ruthless bombing of that quarter by Japanese aeroplanes. From that moment the general situation has steadily deteriorated and grown more complicated. The conduct of Japanese policy—naval, military, and political—has cast doubts upon the good faith of the Japanese Empire; it has shaken the pillars of the new edifice for the peaceful settlement of international disputes which all nations have for ten years been laboriously building at Geneva; and it has cast a shadow across the proceedings of the Conference in that place which is now trying to diminish by common agreement the costly burden of armaments.

The Note therefore which the Council Committee of the League has addressed to Japan is as opportunely dispatched as it is sensible in purport. Its terms were jointly considered by all the States on the Council except China and Japan, and they are known to be in close accordance with the views of the United States Government. Its most important clause is no more than an indication of the attitude which the world will take towards changes brought about by forcible action. It is not in any sense an ultimatum. But it is significant in that for the first time the League Council has made its representations solely to the Japanese Government, and not to both parties in the dispute. The League Note, of which the text is printed on the opposite page, is in fact a dignified and sincere appeal to the better nature of the Japanese people, in which their friends have not yet ceased to believe. It does not disregard the fact that at the outset of the dispute Japan advanced grievances that may be legitimate; but it plainly reminds her that the League provides precisely the machinery required for the peaceful settlement of differences between one country and another. It further recalls the terms of the Article of the Covenant under which every member undertakes to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other members. Japan is doubly pledged to maintain the integrity of China, for she is also a signatory of the Nine-Power Treaty. After a reference to that instrument the League Note appeals to Japan to justify herself before the public opinion of the world, and to honour her

effect only when it has the moral support of massed opinion behind it. Recent Japanese action has driven opinion wholesale to the side of China; and the League supported by united opinion must at any time be a far more effective body than when opinion is divided.

It is a moment for moderation. The Council of the League, which is gathering strength, has shown it. Japan, whose position is still strong, must show it now; and China, it may be hoped, will also give proof of a reasonable temper. If the Chinese, whose soldiers have exhibited splendid bravery, make no unreasonable conditions and do not procrastinate, Japan can have no excuse for not reaching at once a temporary settlement, which must ultimately become recognized as international. Meanwhile the BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY is obviously working for a settlement both with Japan and with China rather than for a settlement against either; and his cool handling of a most complicated problem has the general approval of his countrymen. It is also undoubtedly right that he should keep in the closest possible touch with Parliamentary and public opinion at home, while concerting collective international action, and following the more important phases of the Disarmament Conference, by repeated visits to Geneva.

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Copies of enclosure #2 to despatch

2617 to Department, February 23, 1932

JIMBER

on situation in the Far East.

793.94/4547 DATE Feb. 10, 1932.

- American Embassy, London

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The Japanese nation—and more particularly its soldiers and its sailors—will make a great mistake if they imagine that the comparative moderation of the protests and appeals so far made in Tokyo represents the last word of the League and of the foreign countries having definite and palpable interests in China. The reason why public opinion has so far refused as a whole to follow those who demand drastic action against Japan is that popular sympathies have been divided between the two disputants. It has felt—as the last League Note rather tardily recognizes—that justice, in the fundamentals, is not altogether on one side; that Japan, in fact, was entitled to expect more satisfaction from China than China was prepared to give. But it has deeply regretted that Japan did not at the beginning take the League into her confidence; and it has lately been still more disturbed by the methods of terrorism which have been employed by the Japanese Navy. Sympathies which were gained to Japan are now lost to her. Public opinion is being consolidated more and more on the side of China. And the effectiveness of League action depends almost entirely upon the solidity of public opinion in any international dispute. Not merely is unanimity necessary in the Council itself, but it can obviously act with

effect only when it has the moral support of massed opinion behind it. Recent Japanese action has driven opinion wholesale to the side of China; and the League supported by united opinion must at any time be a far more effective body than when opinion is divided.

It is a moment for moderation. The Council of the League, which is gathering strength, has shown it. Japan, whose position is still strong, must show it now; and China, it may be hoped, will also give proof of a reasonable temper. If the Chinese, whose soldiers have exhibited splendid bravery, make no unreasonable conditions and do not procrastinate, Japan can have no excuse for not reaching at once a temporary settlement, which must ultimately become recognized as international. Meanwhile the BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY is obviously working for a settlement both with Japan and with China rather than for a settlement against either; and his cool handling of a most complicated problem has the general approval of his countrymen. It is also undoubtedly right that he should keep in the closest possible touch with Parliamentary and public opinion at home, while concerting collective international action, and following the more important phases of the Disarmament Conference, by repeated visits to Geneva.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 124.936/99 FOR Tel # -, 8AM

FROM Shanghai (Johnson) DATED Mar. 3, 1932
~~SEE~~ and NAME 1-1127 o.p.
China

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: review on -, being prepared by Engert,
will be ready as soon as his duties permit.

wb

793.94/4548

793.94/

MET

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd 7:28 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

March 3, 8 a.m.

Your telegrafam No. 66, February 24, 7 p.m. to Peiping.

The reason it was recently found impracticable to submit monthly reports was that between October and December I was in the South, Perkins was on leave till the end of November and Engert's time was completely taken up with current business which he handles most efficiently. Moreover the kaleidoscopic changes in Chinese internal and external affairs since September made it extremely difficult to comment on events which by the time the report was written, and even more so by the time it reached the Department, had already been entirely superseded^{by}/fresh events.

The Legation has endeavored to keep the American Government fully informed by telegraph but it occurs to me that perhaps a fortnightly telegraphic summary may also be desirable at least until the present crisis has passed.

Does

153
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Shanghai via N.R.,
March 3, 8 a.m.

Does the Department approve?

Engert is now preparing a comprehensive review of
the Sino-Japanese relations which will be ready as soon
as his duties here permit.


JOHNSON

WSB

KLP



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd 3:03 p. m.



793.94
893.1025
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REP

Secretary of State,
Washington.

98, March 3, 5 p. m.

The Secretary General has circulated the following text of a letter dated March 2nd from Yen to Boncour:

"As I have already notified the Council, my ~~friends~~ ^{government} accepted on February 29 the armistice proposals resulting from an exchange of views on February 28th between the representatives of the two parties in the presence of Admiral Kelly on board the British flagship. These proposals, as stated by the British representatives on the Council on February 29th, were based on the principle of mutual simultaneous evacuation.

Since these proposals were forwarded for the consideration of the Chinese and Japanese Governments, the Japanese Government has made no reply but landed strong reenforcements in the International Settlement of Shanghai and launched an offensive on a larger scale. This was done in spite of the announcement that the Japanese Government had accepted the proposals made by the President of the Council

F/LS 793.94/4549

MAR 7 1932

FILED

REP

2-#98, from Geneva, Mar. 3, 5 p.m.

the Council on February 29 for the cessation of hostilities and restoration of peace in the Shanghai area.

In spite of these developments which throw serious doubt on the sincerity of the Japanese Government's acceptance of the Council's proposal I have the honor to state that my Government is as always ready to accept an armistice based on the principles outlined above. If this armistice is accepted and carried out the Chinese Government is further prepared to accept the proposal which Your Excellency made at the Council meeting on February 29th and to participate in the conference at Shanghai recognizing that the safety of the International Settlement at Shanghai and the French Concession is essential to the maintenance of peace in and around Shanghai and on the understanding that this conference is concerned only with the restoration of peace in Shanghai and that all questions arising out of the Sino-Japanese conflict in any part of China will be settled in accordance with the procedure invoked by China before the League.

It is, of course, understood that participation in this conference is subject to agreement between participating governments as to its agenda."

GILBERT


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET



GREEN & GRAY

Geneva


Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd 3:49 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 5 1932

DIVISION OF



Secretary of State,

Washington

97, March 3, 4 p.m.

Consulate's 95, March 3, 11 a.m.

The Secretary General has circulated the following text of a letter dated March 2 from Sato to Boncour in reply to the latter's communication of the same date:

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of March 2nd concerning the acceptance by the Japanese Government of the proposal put forward by the Council on February 29th.

The Japanese Government firmly intends to secure the cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible moment whatever may be the turn taken by the military operations. But it is quite obvious that the agreement can only be concluded in the area of hostilities itself. The

/ Japanese Government has therefore issued appropriate instructions

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MAR 7 1932

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2- #97, from Geneva, March 3, 1932

instructions to the Japanese Minister at Shanghai: negotiations are being actively pursued and I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency the information which I have lately received on this subject".

The information referred to in the closing sentence of the letter quoted above is contained in the following text of an annex to that letter based on telegrams received by Sato from Shanghai under date of March 2nd:

"Admiral Nomura and M. Matsuo. . . proceeded at 9 p.m., to the KENT and informed Admiral Kelly of the general conditions on which the Japanese Government would be prepared to agree to a suspension of hostilities. Admiral Kelly immediately transmitted this information to the Chinese.

Following on this action it was decided that a new meeting of the Japanese and Chinese delegates should take place tomorrow at 1 p.m., in the KENT.

"The conditions on which the Japanese Government will be prepared to agree to a cessation of hostilities and which were communicated to the Japanese Minister in China are as follows:

'One.

man

g- #97, from Geneva, March 3, 1932

'One. The Japanese forces to suspend hostilities and not to advance beyond the positions they are occupying for a certain time to be determined on the spot between the officers commanding the two armies if China gives an assurance that the Chinese troops will withdraw from Shanghai to a certain distance to be determined on the spot.

Two. The representatives of the powers having interests at Shanghai to meet in round table conference after hostilities have been suspended as above to discuss the question of the withdrawal of the two armies and specific measures for insuring tranquillity in the Shanghai area.

With regard to the withdrawal of the combatant forces Japan proposed: (a), as soon as the withdrawal of the Chinese forces (including soldiers in civilian clothing) has been officially noted the Japanese army will withdraw to the close proximity of Shanghai and Woosung.

(b), The Japanese land forces will leave Chinese territory as, and to the extent that, tranquillity is restored.

MEMO

4- 487, from Geneva, March 3, 1932

restored.

Three. The violation by either of the parties of the conditions for the suspension of hostilities will entitle the other to resume hostilities as soon as the truce period has expired."

GILBERT

WJC HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAF

MAR 5 1932

Geneva

DIVISION OF

Dated March 3, 1932

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

MAR 4 1932


DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS AND C. W.

Secretary of State

Washington.

Recd 12:50 a.m., 4th.



E/LS

793.94/4551

50, March 3, 12 p.m.

Herewith follows the pertinent portion of the
broadcast made by William Hard on February 28th.

"Hello America. This is Geneva, Switzerland,
your reporter tonight William Hard.

Last Sunday night at this hour from this micro-
phone I expressed to you a certain view. It was that the
United States would advantage itself if it would declare
its Far Eastern policy firmly and frankly to the League of
Nations. I am glad to find that I was not out of harmony
with the thoughts and impulses of our Government at
Washington.

Last Thursday our Minister to Switzerland, Mr.
Hugh Wilson, who is now here in Geneva as an American
delegate to the Disarmament Conference transmitted to Sir
Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League of Nations,
a full official text of the already famous letter of
Secretary

MAR 7 1932

FILED

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-2- # 50 from Wilson, Bergues, Geneva.

Secretary of State Stimson to Senator William Edgar Borah
on the Far Eastern situation and on our Government's
attitudes and intentions towards it. I cannot exaggerate
to you the clarification of ideas which thereupon has taken
place here. Nor can I exaggerate to you the impetus which
thereupon has been given here to United States prestige.

First, as to the clarification. Last week a
member of the Council of the League remarked to me in a
very friendly but a very pointed manner. 'I hate to have to
guess what your country is going to do through happening
to meet some American diplomat at a dinner table or in a
corridor of the League of Nations building. How can I
know whether what he says is authorized from Washington or
simply his own idea? Why don't your diplomats either **not**
talk to us at all or else talk to us with the authority of
their Government'.

It was a legitimate question. That is, it was
legitimate last week. Now that member of the Council and
every other League delegate or official is obliged to admit
that he fully, officially, precisely knows the present
principles of American Far Eastern diplomacy. The gain
to us nationally is immeasurable. No longer are we charged
with

-3- # 50 from Wilson, Bergues,
Geneva.

with prosecuting our policies at Geneva through tentative hints and through unrecorded revocable whispers. We are credited here tonight with openness and manliness of method.

That clarification would in itself constitute a gain of prestige. But the gain goes farther, much farther.

Last week it was feared in some quarters here and hoped in others that the approaching League Assembly would adopt some drastic policy of its own and would thereupon be able perhaps to drag the United States along after it in its wake. The Assembly would be the initiator. The United States would be the imitator. The primacy of world command in the Far East would rest with Europe.

The official circulation here among the members of the League of Mr. Stimson's letter to Mr. Borah has basically changed that state of mind. Immediate world leadership in the Far East has been shifted from Geneva to Washington. What one hears in Geneva now is 'let us hope that we can be as clear and as definite as the Americans'. On that point I must read you two sentences, the first is from the communication which was sent to Japan on the sixteenth of this month by the President of the Council of the League.
It said

cib

-4- # 50 from Wilson, Bergues, Geneva.

It said 'it appears to the twelve members of the Council (excluding Japan and China) that it follows from Article Ten of the League Covenant that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any member of the League brought about in disregard of that article ought to be recognized as valid and effectual by the members of the League of Nations'.

Note the word "ought" just ought, a quite weak word. Now let me read to you a sentence - or rather two sentences - from Mr. Stimson's letter to Mr. Borah. The second of the two has given Geneva a drastic urge toward deep thought.

'On January 7th last, says Mr. Stimson, the American Government formally notified Japan and China that it would not recognize any situation in violation of the covenants of treaties'. Note that "would not". Perfectly explicit. A pledge.

Then Mr. Stimson in his letter to Mr. Borah continues into further explicitness and suggests - in so many words - 'A similar decision by the other governments of the world'.

That is, he in effect suggests that the League should change its weak 'ought not' into a strong an American 'will'

-5- # 50 from Wilson, Bergues, Geneva

'will not'.

Thereupon a new lead has been submitted to the plans here for the work of the special League Assembly which will convene here next Thursday morning. Many of the smaller powers who will be represented in the Assembly have been hoping to push the larger powers into measures such as a severance of diplomatic relations with Japan and into measures such as the severance of economic relations with Japan. The larger powers which have most to lose from such measures and which would have to provide the soldiers and sailors if the pressure of such measures should provoke Japan into war against those adopting them have been in favor of following milder courses for at least the time being. They now are able to say to the smaller powers:

'The United States has now told us its resolves. We cannot exceed them with success. The United States is nearer to Japan geographically than any great League power. Be sensible. Be practical. Go along with this object:

The result of such admonitions is that the behavior of the Assembly may be much moderated. The result is that
it may

REP

-6- # 50 from Wilson, Bergues, Geneva.

it may not be the United States that will swim in the wake of the Assembly but the Assembly that will swim in the wake of the United States.

It is frankly currently said here tonight that the Assembly will have done a great deal if it persuades each of the 55 governments represented in it to join the United States in pledging itself not by an 'ought' but by a 'will' to refuse to recognize any territorial or political results gained in the Far East by arms.

I hope you will realize that I am making no comment of my own upon the wisdom or unwisdom of such a policy. I am only reporting the consequences upon Geneva of the direct announcement of it here by the United States Government. And I venture to report/now in prospect a fact of the future.

Let the United States just keep on telling Geneva fully officially what it means to do and the approaching special League Assembly will be most unlikely to do anything embarrassing to the United States.

Already largely because of the official delivery here of the Stimson-Borah letter it seems that we shall be spared the embarrassment of being asked to sit as a collaborative

REP

-7- # 50, from Wilson, Bergues, Geneva

collaborative member of the Special Assembly. People here are saying "We have already heard from the United States, Why plunge the United States into diplomatic difficulties by sending it an invitation which it could neither happily reject nor happily accept".

In sum Mr. Stimson's transmission here of his Borah letter and the subsequent circulation of it here by Sir Eric Drummond has achieved for the United States and for our national American interest a colossal diplomatic triumph."

WILSON

JS
CIB

1597

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department ☒
OR

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\$

AM REC TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-138

gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
PLAIN

March 4, 1932.
noon

~~MAP 4 22~~

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA, (SWITZERLAND)

793.94/4551

26

see 793.94/4551

Please deliver following as a personal message to
William Hard from the Secretary: QUOTE I have just re-
ceived from Wilson a copy of your broadcast of Sunday and
wish to express my thanks and appreciation. UNQUOTE.

793.94/4551

Stinson
(HHC)

S HSC: CBS

Enciphered by *PT*

Sent by operator

M.

19

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1938 1-138


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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY & PLAIN

793.94
note
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FROM


Shanghai via N.F.

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 5:30 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 5 1932



Secretary of State,

Washington

152
162, March 4, noon.

The following is a Japanese translation of an official Japanese communique issued by the Japanese Consulate General on March 3rd: (END GRAY)

"Basic condition of immediate cessation of hostilities. One. Should Chinese give assurances for the withdrawal of her troops to a certain distance from Shanghai (distance to be determined by the Japanese and Chinese authorities), Japan will agree to the cessation of hostilities for a certain period (to be agreed upon between the Japanese and Chinese authorities), and pending subsequent arrangements the Japanese and Chinese forces shall hold their respective positions. Details relating to the cessation of hostilities shall be arranged by the Japanese and Chinese military authorities.

Two. During the period of the cessation of hostilities, a round table conference between Japan and China shall be held

793.94/4552

MAR 7 1932
FILED

MET

2-#163 from Shanghai, March 4,
noon

held at Shanghai, in which the representatives of principal powers interested shall participate, and the conference shall discuss with a view to reaching an agreement upon the methods for the withdrawal of both the Chinese and Japanese forces on such terms as are set out in the following paragraph, together with the measures for the restoration and maintenance of peace and order in and around Shanghai and for safeguarding the International Settlement and French concession in Shanghai and the foreign lives, property, and interests therein.

Three. The withdrawal of troops shall be commenced by the Chinese troops (including plain clothes gunmen) to a specified distance, and upon ascertaining withdrawal of the Chinese forces, the Japanese forces will withdraw to the Shanghai and Woosung areas. As soon as the normal conditions will have prevailed, the Japanese army shall be withdrawn from these areas.

Four. Should either of the parties infringe any of the terms of the cessation of hostilities, the other party shall have the freedom of action. Both parties have the same freedom of action upon expiration of the period agreed

upon

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#162 from Shanghai, March 4,
noon

upon under paragraph one".

(GRAY) Repeated to the Legation. Copy to the Minister.

JS

FOR THE DIRECTOR
CUNNINGHAM

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 222

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Batavia - Java.

February 11, 1932

AM RECD
DEPT OF STATE
MAR 3 3 32
1-1221 470

SUBJECT:

Curtailment of Visit of H.M.S. "Kent"
and its Unexpected Departure for Shanghai

RECEIVED
MAR 4 1932
DEPT OF STATE
MAR 5 1932
E/L S

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to report that the British
cruiser, H.M.S. "Kent", under the command of Admiral
Sir Howard Kelly, arrived at Tandjong Priok, the port
of Batavia, on the morning of January 27, 1932.

The plans called for the departure of this man-
of-war on February 2, 1932, presumably for Manila. Dur-
ing the evening of January 29, 1932 orders were received
for H.M.S. "Kent" to proceed at full speed for Shanghai
at the earliest possible moment. The officers, who
were being entertained at a dance at the Batavia Cricket
Club, a local British organization, were hastily re-
called to the vessel which left the harbor of Tandjong
Priok at 6 a.m. on January 30, 1932. While the des-
tination of the H.M.S. "Kent" was not officially dis-
closed, officers of the cruiser privately stated that
it was proceeding to Shanghai.

That this departure was entirely unexpected is
further indicated by the fact that invitations were
issued


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FILED
MAR 8 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

issued on January 29, 1932 for a reception and dance to
 be held on board the H.M.S. "Kent" on February 1, 1932
 at 9.15 p.m.

Respectfully yours,

 K. S. Patton
 American Consul General

KSP/hk
 833

Original and two copies to Department.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY & GRAY MAR 5 1932

Geneva

DIVISION OF


Date: March 4, 1932

Rec'd 11:38 a.m.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAR 4 - 1932

Department of State



Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

99, March 3, 9 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

The first meeting of the extraordinary session of the Assembly to consider the Sino-Japanese conflict took place at 11 a. m., today with Boncour, President of the Council, as Chairman. This first meeting was devoted solely to Boncour's opening speech, the election of the President and Vice Presidents and other matters of procedure.

In his opening address Boncour gave a brief history of the conflict, particularly the League's procedure in treating the problem with several cordial allusions to the cooperation of the United States. He emphasized the great difficulties of the present case and defended the Council's handling of the problem. No new elements were brought forward and the text of the speech will be forwarded by mail.

After the verification of the full powers of the delegates, Hymans of Belgium was elected President of the Assembly

F/LS

793.94/4554

FILED

- 2 - No. 99 from Geneva

Assembly with forty-five out of a total of forty-seven votes cast.

After a brief speech by Hymans, the Assembly proceeded to the election of the Vice Presidents. Under the general rule with regard to method of procedure, the Assembly usually elects six Vice Presidents but at the suggestion of the President it was considered desirable in this case on account of its importance that the number should be increased to eight. The following were elected as Vice Presidents:

✓
Boncour, France.
✓
Motta, Switzerland.
✓
Ramel, Sweden.
✓
Simon, Great Britain.
✓
Grandi, Italy.
✓
Ortega, Mexico.
✓
Bruning, Germany.
✓
Sepah Podi, Persia.

At 4:30 p. m., the Assembly met again. The President announced that the Bureau of the Assembly, consisting of the President and the Vice Presidents, had decided to propose the setting up of a General Committee of the

Assembly

- 3 - No. 99 from Geneva

Assembly on which all delegations would be represented. This Committee would have before it on its agenda the whole question which appears on the agenda of the Assembly and would report to the Assembly. This proposal was approved and the General Committee is to hold its first meeting tomorrow afternoon at 3:30 p. m.

The remainder of the meeting was devoted to the statements of the Chinese and Japanese representatives. Yen spoke first and before proceeding with his general statement made an announcement to the effect that the negotiations at Shanghai for an armistice had broken down and that hostilities were continuing due to the aggressive action of the Japanese forces. Yen then read the conditions which the Japanese had laid down for the cessation of hostilities (see Consulate's 97, March 3, 4 p. m.) and stated that these conditions could not be accepted by the Chinese as they were the terms of a conqueror to a vanquished country and their acceptance would be tantamount to surrender. He then referred to a statement circulated today by the Japanese delegation to the effect that the Japanese forces have received orders to advance no further, at least for the present, unless

- 4 - No. 99 from Geneva

unless the Chinese forces resort to further hostile action. Yen then read telegrams alleging that the Japanese forces were continuing their advances and had already grossly gone beyond the limit at which they had given assurances they would stop. He then appealed to the Assembly to undertake as its most urgent task the establishment of an armistice between the parties on the basis of the discussions which took place on the British flag ship KENT.

Yen then proceeded with a general statement of the Chinese case which consisted mainly of a chronological resume of the conflict from its inception and introduced very few new elements. The following is a brief summary of the points covered:

One. A tribute to the Council for its untiring efforts.

Two. Reasons for transferring the dispute to the Assembly.

The main thesis of this argument was that "it became more and more apparent that the issues involved are so momentous and so vitally concern every party to the Covenant, and not merely those governments represented in the Council, the necessity for bringing the maximum authority of the League of Nations to bear could not be ignored".

- 5 - No. 99 from Geneva

ignored".

Three. A summary of the events in Manchuria showing that Japanese action there had been systematically carried out in accordance with a premeditated and carefully calculated plan. In this connection he quoted the United States' note of January 7th to Tokyo and cited the declaration read by the President of the Council on January 29th (see Consulate's No. 55, January 29, 8 p. m., paragraph three). He gave as his understanding of this declaration that the members of the Council consider it would be a violation of Article 20, paragraph one of the Covenant to recognize any arrangement which violates Article 10 of the Covenant or Article one of the Nine Power Treaty.

Four. A summary of the events at Shanghai and the negotiations relating thereto. He called attention to the efforts made by the Council and by the powers through their representatives at Shanghai and the stubborn resistance of the Japanese to all appeals for a cessation of hostilities. He protested vigorously against the use by the Japanese of the International Settlement as a base for the landing of troops and operations against Chinese forces there by placing the latter in an extremely disadvantageous position inasmuch as they could not attack the
the

- 6 - No. 99 from Geneva

the invaders without at the same time endangering the safety of the Settlement. He disclaimed responsibility for any damage which might be done there.

Five. Yen then recapitulated his charges against Japan as follows:

(A) The defiance of the Council by Japan in completely ignoring the terms of the resolutions of September 30th and December 10th concurred in by the Japanese Government.

(B) Violation of the Covenant: Article 10 through the seizure of Manchuria and the attack on Shanghai; Article 12 by refusing to submit the dispute to arbitration or judicial settlement.

(C) Violation of the Pact of Paris by refusing to arbitrate and by resorting to war.

(D) Violation of the Nine Power Treaty. In this connection after citing the terms of Article one of this treaty, he quoted that portion of the Secretary's letter to Senator Borah dealing with the interdependence of the treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference and with the sacrifices consented to by the United States predicated on those agreements.

Six. He then called upon the Assembly for action
in

- 7 - No. 99 from Geneva

in the following terms:

"(A) We urge this extraordinary Assembly which is now seized of the whole dispute between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan to explore and exhaust the possibilities of effecting a settlement in conformity with the provisions of our Covenant.

(B) China asks you to do everything in your power,
First. To bring about the cessation of all hostile action on her territory and the withdrawal of the invading forces and,

Second. The peaceful settlement of the entire Sino-Japanese controversy within the scope of the Council's resolutions and the spirit of the Covenant.

Naturally no measure, taken in relation either to Shanghai or to Manchuria, which encroaches upon China's sovereign rights or is contrary to the general principles of international law or her existing treaty obligations to third parties, can be regarded as a settlement.

(C) We ask you to recognize that the Covenant has been broken.

(D) We ask you solemnly to declare that for the present terrible state of affairs which prevails in

Manchuria,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 - No. 99 from Geneva


Manchuria, Shanghai and other parts of China, my country bears no shadow of responsibility. When the Assembly has made this declaration it will have begun to mobilize those moral forces by which, we still believe, this conflict may be solved and ended." (END OF SECTION ONE).

GILBERT

FW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



FROM

GRAY

Geneva

Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd 4th, 6.48 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

99, March 3, 9 p. m. (SECTION TWO).

Matsudaira's statement may be divided into four parts
as follows:

- (1)- In reply to Yen's preliminary statement a declaration that the Japanese forces had been instructed to cease hostilities;
- (2)- Defense of Japanese measures respecting Shanghai intervention;
- (3)- declaration of policy regarding Shanghai;
- (4)- Japanese attitude with regard to Manchuria.

One. Matsudaira read a telegram which he had just received announcing that the Japanese commander in the Shanghai area today at 4 p. m., Shanghai time, had ordered the Japanese forces "to stop for the present at the positions they are actually occupying and cease all fighting, provided that the Chinese took no further hostile action". The Japanese Admiral had given similar orders.

Two. Although the necessary stability and organization
of China

REP

3-#99, from Geneva, Mar. 3, 9 p.m.
Section Two.

of Chinese guns thereby removing imminent danger to Japanese residents. This was refused and the Chinese resumed the offensive. With regard to the negotiations with Admiral Kelly he declared that the tentative arrangement did not meet with the approval of Japanese Government but that the negotiations have been continued. He then referred to the announcement he had made at the beginning of his speech.

Three. The policy of the Japanese Government regarding Shanghai is as follows:

(a)- "If the danger to the Japanese residents and the International Settlement, a portion of which is entrusted to the Japanese forces for protection, could be removed the Japanese forces are prepared to cease hostilities immediately. According as the situation in the Shanghai area becomes pacified the Japanese expeditionary land forces will be withdrawn from Chinese territory.

(b)- The Japanese Government is prepared to hold a "round table conference" with the representatives of the powers intimately interested in Shanghai to deliberate upon means of safeguarding in the future the rights and interests of the powers concerned.

(c)- The Japanese Government has no intention whatever to promote any political or territorial ambition in the
Shanghai

REP

2-#99, from Geneva, Mar. 2, 9p.m.
Section two.

of China since the revolution of 1911 has not sufficiently developed to protect foreigners, the growth of Chinese nationalism has led to the adoption of the subversive policy of unilateral repudiation of treaty obligations. The disorder was aggravated by military dictators who in order to strengthen their position encouraged the anti-foreign movement. It is the Japanese who have suffered most severely from this disorder and anti-foreign movement in recent years which has been most pronounced in the Shanghai region. Matsudaira then gave a detailed account of agitation against Japan which had led to the present intervention and summary of Japanese action to protect its nationals. The general tenor of this account did not deviate from previous Japanese declarations stating among other things that it was the Chinese who had broken the truce agreed upon on January 29th and again on January 31st when the negotiations for the establishment of a neutral zone were under way. After explaining that the reinforcements sent to Shanghai were only intended to relieve the exhausted troops and would be limited to a number absolutely required to protect Japanese nationals and property, he recalled that in the middle of February Japan again attempted to effect an agreement when it offered to stop fighting if the Chinese forces would retire to distance beyond the range of Chinese

REP

4-#99, from Geneva, Mar. 3, 9p.m.
Section Two.

Shanghai region, availing itself of the present situation. We have no desire to establish a Japanese settlement in Shanghai or in any other way to advance the exclusive interests of the Japanese." In view of these principles Matsudaira declared that Japan readily accepted the proposal of the President of the Council of February 29 for a cessation of hostilities, subject to local arrangements. The Japanese made an earnest attempt to effect such arrangements but before it was successful "the Chinese forces were forced to retreat".

Four. With regard to Manchuria Matsudaira confined himself to quoting extensively Yoshizawa's speech in the Diet on January 21st and to declaring that discussion should not be reopened on Manchuria pending the report of the Commission of Inquiry.

(END OF MESSAGE).

GILBERT

WSB

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 9:25 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

304, March 4, 5 p. m.

Following received by the Japanese Legation, Peiping:

"The declaration of the Commander of the Japanese Army
at Shanghai.

The Imperial Army strained its efforts, in cooperation
with the Imperial Navy, to attain the end of protecting
Japanese residents by peaceful means here since it was
despatched to the neighborhood of Shanghai. But unfortunate-
ly the request of our army base on this viewpoint to being
accepted by the Nineteenth Route Army of China, hostilities
were brought about. Now that the Chinese Army has retreated
to a distance beyond what the Imperial Army first demanded,
the safety of the Japanese subjects and peace of the
Shanghai Settlement have been placed on way of restoration,
I hereby declare that the hostile operations shall be
suspended, by keeping the army, for the time being, on the
line now occupied by it, so long as the Chinese Army does
not resort to warlike actions. March 3, 1932, Yoshinori
Shirakawa, Commander of the Japanese Army."

FOR THE MINISTER
PERKINS

RR - KLP

F/LS 793.94/4555


FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


793.94
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893.102 Harbin
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM



Geneva

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 7:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

100, March 4, 9 a. m.

The Secretary General has circulated the following
letter from Yen dated March 2:

"I have the honor to communicate to you the following
three official telegrams:

One. The press reports that China will associate
herself with Russia and the Chinese Government will revive
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government are
incorrect. They are only the ideas of some individuals
and have not been taken into consideration by the Govern-
ment.

Two. General Ting Chao who was once defending the
city of Harbin against the invasion of the Japanese troops
was obliged to retreat to Fangtseng, a city about 110
miles east of Harbin, on the northern border of the
Kirin Province. All our forces under his command are
concentrating in that area and ready to resist if they
be pursued by the Japanese.

Three.

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WE

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793.94/4556

MAR 5 1932

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761.93

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#100, from Geneva, Mar. 4, 9a.m.

Three. The report that General Ma Chan Shan, who once defended Tsitsihar, the capital of the Province of Heilungkian, against the Japanese invasion has been assassinated is without foundation."

GILBERT

KLP

WWC

gustafson

Confidential

MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
SECRETARY STIMSON AND HUGH WILSON, AT GENEVA, FRIDAY,
MARCH 4, 1932. AT 4:00 P.M.

SECRETARY: Hello, is that you Wilson?

MR. WILSON: Yes, this is Wilson.

SECRETARY: Well, I have received your No. 51. It has just come. I want to say something in clarification of what I told you yesterday.

MR. WILSON: Yes, Sir.

SECRETARY: My holding back in Shanghai is not predicated upon a desire to wait until the Assembly has acted, although I am naturally anxious to be sure that that matter is going on just as fast as we are on the matter which the others want.

MR. WILSON: I think if there is one thing humanly sure, it is that the Assembly will act along the lines you want.

SECRETARY: Well, I am glad you feel that way now. Yesterday when you called you were a little bit doubtful.

MR. WILSON: I was then, but I am assured now by conversations I have had today.

SECRETARY: Well, I am glad to hear that, but here is the real point. Are you listening? Here is the situation which is controlling my attitude in regard to the Shanghai conference.

MR. WILSON: Yes.

SECRETARY: We made an offer last Sunday or Monday on the suggestion of Japan, really coming to us through the British and the League of Nations and it was predicated in general upon an immediate cessation of hostilities.

MR. WILSON: I am sorry I did not get that, will you repeat it?

SECRETARY:

753.94/4556 1/2

Confidential File

- 2 -

SECRETARY: I said our proposal was predicated upon an immediate cessation of hostilities. At the very time when we were drawing it up, the Japanese Admiral, Nomura, had called a conference on Sunday on Admiral Kelly's warship and they were advocating an immediate mutual simultaneous truce - cessation of hostilities. On that basis we went into this and the Japanese Government formally accepted this on Tuesday, the first of March. ~~XXXX~~ In spite of all that/they went on with a very large general attack, the largest one that has been made, and absolutely disregarded -----

MR. WILSON: In spite of the general attack, after that what did you say?

SECRETARY: The Japanese went on with the general attack after they had instigated this movement and after they had accepted it when it had been formulated, so that the very foundation of what we acted on has been knocked out by them and I am naturally very careful to see that if we go on with this part they want that it is going on under the necessary safeguards to protect China. Do you see?

MR. WILSON: Yes.

SECRETARY: I am unwilling to go into any conference until I am sure that the Chinese are willing, otherwise the presence of the four powers will be used as a club to club the Chinese into coming in. In the second place, now that Japan has shown her readiness to go back on the understanding of the cessation of hostilities, I want to be sure that the other limitations on this discussion are also rigidly adhered to.

MR. WILSON: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY:

- 3 -

SECRETARY: Now, particularly I want to be sure that no matters are discussed which would be outside of the limitations we put in to the offer of the League of Nations.

MR. WILSON: I am afraid I lost that, will you repeat it?

SECRETARY: You remember last Sunday when this proposal of the League of Nation was formulated we had certain conditions. Japan agreed that she had no political or territorial designs and no intention of establishing a Japanese Settlement in Shanghai or otherwise advancing the exclusive interests of Japan, and you will remember in the discussion that I had with you over the telephone, I also wanted it to be clear that the other foreigners should not be trying to enlarge the Settlement under the cover of Japan's offensive.

MR. WILSON:—Yes, Sir.

SECRETARY: I am very much afraid that if this conference comes on without these restrictions being agreed to beforehand, when they get together Japan will bring up those things and will likely be backed up by powers in the International Settlement, so that they will be trying to get something out of China.

MR. WILSON: The action of the Assembly this afternoon has clarified that situation.

SECRETARY: Tell me what it is.

MR. WILSON: They have adopted a resolution reading as follows:

The Assembly recalling the suggestions made by the Council on February 29, and without prejudice to the other
therein
measures/envisaged:

One, calls upon the Governments of China and Japan to take immediately the necessary measures to insure that
the

- 4 -

the orders which, as it has been informed, have been issued by the military commanders on both sides for the cessation of hostilities, shall be made effective;

Two, requests the other powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to inform the Assembly of the manner in which the invitation set out in the previous paragraph has been executed.

Three, recommends negotiations be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the powers mentioned above for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities, and to regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The Assembly will be glad to be kept informed by the powers mentioned above of the developments of these negotiations.

That is the end, Mr. Secretary. You see that under this resolution the Assembly is concentrating only on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.

SECRETARY: Yes. Well now, I understand that but it does not get what I am talking about.

MR. WILSON: The Assembly called for the resolution of February 29th.

SECRETARY: Say that again.

MR. WILSON: This resolution concentrates on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. Those are conditions precedent to the adoption of the measures called for in the Council's proposal of February 29th.

SECRETARY: Well now, just let me make this further step clear to you. When this conference comes on I don't want anything taken up there of a permanent nature of interests

like

- 5 -

like the enlargement of the Settlement, because I think that it is only fair to China that any such propositions as that should be taken up at the same time that her own claims against Japan are taken up of a permanent nature.

MR. WILSON: Mr. Secretary, yes I understand that and have so explained to Simons. Your insistence on a fair deal with China to enlarge the Settlement is fully understood by him and Drummond and Paul Boncour.

SECRETARY: I do not think it would be a fair deal to China to take up matters of that nature at the time when you could not also take up Manchuria, you see?

MR. WILSON: Yes, certainly.

SECRETARY: In other words, there are two classes of matters which must be settled. First, the steps which the Assembly is on now, cessation of hostilities and the clearing up of this actual conflict at Shanghai.

Secondly, there are other controversies of a general nature between Japan and China which must be taken up separately from the first class of cases.

MR. WILSON: I agree and it is understood here.

SECRETARY: When they are taken up they must include the claims which China is interested in as well as the ones of Japan. Of course, one of the most important things that China is interested in is Manchuria. You understand that?

MR. WILSON: Does that mean that you want ⁱⁿ any discussion as to the eventual settlement in Shanghai that the Manchurian thing should be discussed as well.

SECRETARY: Yes. It is a question of this nature, not relating to this fighting, but relating to general controversies

- 6 -

controversies between the other two.

MR. WILSON: It is only a question of the protection of the Settlement that can be discussed at Shanghai, without bringing in the Manchurian problem.

SECRETARY: Yes, it is a pure question of military protection and not of any commercial interests. If Japan is trying to get limitations on a peaceful boycott, for instance, not for protection of nationals which is a military matter, but a commercial boycott, why she has got to discuss that at the same time China discusses Manchuria.

MR. WILSON: I understand perfectly.

SECRETARY: Otherwise, we will have China left out on the limb.

MR. WILSON: Mr. Secretary, Yen has fully approved this resolution of the Assembly.

SECRETARY: Yen has? Well, one thing more Wilson-----

MR. WILSON: Mr. Secretary, may I inform Drummond that you are instructing our officials in Shanghai to help in this negotiation called for by the Assembly resolution that I read you?

SECRETARY: I think I shall probably be able to do that, but you better not do it now.

MR. WILSON: I will wait a telegram from you.

SECRETARY: You can tell him what my attitude is. I am not going to instruct my people to go ahead until I am sure it is not going to be used as means of a pressure on China. I understand what you told me about Yen but I want to be absolutely sure.

MR. WILSON: I think this is illuminating. Sato wanted to insert the words to regulate the details and the conditions of the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. He was fought vigorously by the entire Assembly and finally withdrew

his

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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his request for the insertion of the words "and conditions" so that no condition in the sense of a political agreement or commercial agreement would be attached to the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.

SECRETARY: Yes, I see. Well Wilson, I want to say one thing more that this attitude I am taking in regard to the boycott in Manchuria is made necessary by the recent notice that Japan has served that she proposes to take up the boycott matter now in Shanghai.

MR. WILSON: I will not leave any misunderstanding on that.

SECRETARY: No. Remember this, when I speak of the boycott I am speaking of the boycott pure and simple. I am not speaking of violence which made necessary the landing of troops to protect nationals, but I don't want to have China segregated from her legitimate claims by the action of the four powers.

MR. WILSON: I understand, Sir.

SECRETARY: Now, I think you can tell Drummond that you have had this talk with me and you can explain my position and tell him I am going to help along as far as I can, but I don't say unequivocally that our people will join entirely on what I now hear.

MR. WILSON: I have telegraphed the details on this thing which you ought to have in an hour or two, so I shall wait for further instructions from you about instructions of the officials at Shanghai.

SECRETARY: I shall instruct my officials directly.

MR. WILSON: Of course, but notify me you have instructed them when you do it so that I can notify Drummond.

SECRETARY:

- 8 -

SECRETARY: All right, I am very much obliged. I wanted you to understand the real reasons which are controlling our policy in regard to this conference now at Shanghai.

MR. WILSON: You can be convinced that the whole temper of the Assembly was in line with your thought and everyone had the same preoccupation that it must not be done under the shadow of Japanese guns and China must not be put in an unfair position in carrying out these.

SECRETARY: Assure them of my utmost desire to cooperate as far as I can be assured that China's interests are not being jeopardized.

MR. WILSON: That is right.

SECRETARY: All right. Good-bye.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P.R./219 FOR desp. #2599

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED Feb. 15, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Conflict.

Attitude of the British press
toward -.

fc

793.94 / 4557

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The manner in which the unconcern of the British press to the situation in Shanghai developed into a feeling of alarm over the dangers inherent in the situation has been described in one of the preceding Weekly Reports. During the week under review this

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tendency has accelerated, due in some part to the growing scale of the hostilities, and to the increasing imminence of the threat to British interests within the International Settlement. The direct concern of the country in these most serious events has been brought to a sharp focus by the efforts of British Diplomatic and Consular officers in China to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and by discussions in Parliament. The debates in the House of Commons have been largely initiated by members of the Opposition, who would apparently have the British Government take a more forceful position. Mr. Baldwin, replying for the Government, stated on one or two occasions that the British Government had presented thus far three protests to the Japanese Government against the use of the International Settlement for other than defensive purposes.

There is, however, support in all quarters for the recent joint proposals of England and the United States to China and Japan for the termination of hostilities. Even the League of Nations Union, which has sharply resented criticisms of the ineffectiveness thus far of the League, adopted a resolution proffering its support of the above mentioned proposals, and strongly urging the British Government to secure the collaboration of the United States with the Council

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of the League in insuring their acceptance.

A mild sensation occurred by the publication of a report by one of the newspapers to the effect that suspicions of the existence of a Franco-Japanese secret treaty were greatly strengthened by recent sharp increases in the price of French munition shares. On the following day the same paper stated that Russia and Japan had recently arrived at an important secret agreement which will give Japan undisputed dominion over the whole of Manchuria and parts of Mongolia. This was denied by the Soviet Embassy in London, which stated that the rumor probably arose from a misunderstanding of the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact made by the Soviet Foreign Secretary to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs when he passed through Moscow in December en route to Japan.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 858.00 P.R./108 FOR desp. #441

FROM Sweden (Morehead) DATED Feb. 19, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Conflict.
Swedish attitude toward -.

Swedish interest in the Sino-Japanese conflict continued, but lagged somewhat as it became increasingly evident that neither the League Council nor the Great Powers were going to take an effective stand. The official attitude publicly voiced by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron Kamel, in his speech at the Disarmament Conference on February 11, in which he expressed his regret concerning the way in which the Council had handled the Manchurian conflict, may be regarded as representative of Swedish opinion in general on the entire situation.

793.94/4558

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A15 A4 General Committee/8 FOR Tel. # 55, 10 pm

FROM General Disarmament (Gibson) DATED Mar. 2, 1932
TO Conference, AMDEL NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Tevfik Rustubey, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Chief delegate to the Disarmament Conference proposes to discuss the
Far Eastern Question before the next meeting of the General Commission.
Text of proposed speech by Gibson at the same time.

MN

793.94 / 4559

rh

This telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated March 2, 1932

Rec'd. 8.30 pm

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

55, March 2, 10 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The plans for the meeting of the Assembly tomorrow
make it possible to say definitely when the General
Commission of the Disarmament Conference will hold its
next meeting. It may be within a day or two. At the
opening of the next meeting Tevfik Rustubey, Turkish
Minister for Foreign Affairs and chief delegate, proposes
to make a statement to the effect that while his country
is not a member of the League of Nations it is a signa-
tory to the Kellogg Pact and thus shares in the common
interest for such measures as may be taken to safeguard
peace in the Far East; that he feels the Disarmament
Conference, at which all nations are represented, con-
stitutes a useful supplement to the meeting of the
Assembly and affords an opportunity to express the common
concern

550.0 150 4 General Committee

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #2 of No. 55 from Geneva

concern of the world for the observance of their common obligations under the Kellogg Pact; furthermore, for the Disarmament Conference to remain silent in a matter of such gravity would give a false impression to the world of the lack of concern of its members in this condition in the Far East which so intimately affects our work. He will then on behalf of Turkey express his good wishes and sincere hopes that the Assembly may be successful in solving this problem. It is impossible at this time to foresee the situation which will exist both in the Far East and in the Assembly when the General Commission meets, but if it seems appropriate Tevfik Rustubey will probably urge the General Commission as a body, which comprises all signatories to the Kellogg Pact, to go clearly on record to the effect that their governments will decline to recognize or acquiesce in any modification of treaty rights brought about by force in contravention of the Pact.

He has arranged with Politis that the latter who is one of the most ardent League advocates shall reply to this statement expressing the gratification of League members at this evidence of world solidarity in efforts for the maintenance of peace.

We are

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rp #2 of No. 55 from Geneva

We are convinced that if this matter is thus brought up both by member and non-member states, silence on our part would be deplorable. We feel that we should make no statement until after both Tevfik Rustu Bey and Politis have spoken and possibly one or two others, according to developments. At the present uncertain juncture we cannot submit a definite text for your approval but to show what we have in mind offer the following text which contains the maximum within the general lines of which we should like your general authority to proceed, this to be modified in accordance with circumstances.
(END SECTION ONE).

GIBSON

KLP

WWO

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

GRAY

Geneva

Dated March 2, 1932

Rec'd 10:41 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

55, March 2, 10 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

I welcome the statements which we have heard from the delegates of Turkey and of Greece, setting forth that in the Kellogg-Briand Pact we have no mere pious aspiration but a distinct and world-wide treaty obligation. The Turkish chief delegate has pointed out that in this treaty exists a framework which unites the nations of the world in a common concern for the maintenance of peace. I need hardly say that this is in full accord with the conception of the American Government which has been made clear in every step it has taken in the present crisis in the Far East.

If in carrying out the suggestion of the chief delegate for Turkey the nations assembled at Geneva decide to go on record to the effect that they will not recognize or acquiesce in any modification of treaty rights brought about by force, this will I am convinced have a profound effect in buttressing the strength of international engagements.

I am

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#55, from Geneva, Mar. 2, 10p.m.
Section Two.

I am happy to note from the collocation of the speeches of my friends Twefik Rustu Bey and Mr. Politis that the question of method by which this end shall be achieved is not of as great importance as that the world should be united to aid in the solution of this problem and in particular to put on record the views of the largest number of states united by a single treaty, namely, the signatories to the Briand-Kellogg Pact, in support of a prompt and just settlement. My country, as you all know, has welcomed and has cooperated in every way with the efforts of the Council of the League of Nations of which it is not a member, in this direction, and is equally happy thus to associate itself with this larger group in which it has a part, and therefore I welcome the suggestion that we avail of the fortunate circumstance of the meeting here in Geneva at this time of all the nations signatory to the General Pact for the Renunciation of War and that we choose the time which may seem most opportune to make what contribution we may to the reestablishment of peaceful conditions and the respect for international obligations.

(END MESSAGE).

GIBSON

WSB
HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.24/24 FOR Tel #- Noon

FROM Shanghai (Johnson) DATED March 3, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING:

Chinese belief that U.S. is prompted by ulterior rather than
friendship motives in her emphasis on the Manchurian question.
The Chinese also believe that the U.S. has sold to the Japanese
munitions.

ek

793.94/4560

cib

GRAY

Shanghai via NR

Dated March 3, 1932

Recd 4:40 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

March 3, noon.

Following from Consul General at Nanking:

"March 2, 10 a.m.

One. A reliable Chinese informant tells me that the Chinese generally believe that the American Government has recently sold to the Japanese Government \$180,000,000 worth of munitions. They resent such a sale while Japan is seeking to oppress China and one explanation offered is that the United States is trying to bring about the duplication of the Asiatic pyretic through promoting international wars. I inquired whether the pronouncements of the American Government regarding the current controversy had not convinced the Chinese of the friendship of the United States for China and the reply was that unfortunately many Chinese are inclined to interpret American emphasis on Manchuria as prompted by large American financial interests

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- from Shanghai, Mar. 3, noon.

interests there actual or punative and to interpret
 incidence^{tel} activity of the British in trying to end
 hostilities at Shanghai as prompted under those greater
 interests of Great Britain in Central China.

Two. I explained to my informant that the arms business
 in the United States is entirely in private hands and that
 the American Government itself purchases most of its
 munitions and never sells munitions. I said I knew of
 no law under which the American Government could forbid
 the sale of munitions by American firms to the Japanese
 Government but I thought it unlikely that so large a sale
 as reported above had taken place.

Three. I do not know the origin of these malicious
 rumors and absurd interpretations but if the American
 Minister or the Department has any statements to make
 which I might give out as coming from an authoritative
 source particularly regarding the rumored large
 purchase of arms by Japan they would prove useful at
 this junction."

JOHNSON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
EE

JS

Plain

PEIPING

Dated March 1, 1932

Rec'd 2:55 a.m.

703.94

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

289, March 1, noon.

Following from Reuter, Nanking, February 29:

"The Foreign Affairs Commission of the National
Government today decided to resume relations with
Soviet Russia, which relations were broken off in
1929 at the time of the fighting between China and
the Soviet in North Manchuria."

For the Minister

PERKINS

JS CIB

761.93/1434

File No. ...

ENCLOSURE	CHARGE TO—
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4513	AP-Reid
4561	
4562	

793.94


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

1947

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
893.1025
793.94119
393.00
REP



FROM GRAY


COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 9:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



154, March 4, 5 p. m.

Continuing my daily report number 148, March 3, 4 p.m.

One. When the Japanese ordered cease firing they stated that they would hold a line Liuho, Taisang, Nanziang and Chenju, but it is now reported that fighting is continuing between Nanziang and Quinsan to the northwest. It may be that the troops that are engaging the Japanese are discontented Chang Ting Wen's forces which are recently supposed to have reenforced the 19th Route Army but this has not been confirmed. This is beyond the so-called 20 kilometer limit set by the Japanese.

Two. There is considerable excitement in Nantao because the Chinese are afraid that the Japanese are liable to take over that section of Greater Shanghai. The Japanese have stated that they will not land in Nantao unless Japanese property is molested. Thousands of refugees are pouring into the adjacent concession and the Settlement.

Three.

F/LS 793.94/4562

FILED

MAR 9 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#154, from Shanghai, Mar. 4, 5p.m.

Three. The Japanese are still patrolling Chapei and the situation there has ^{not} been stabilized as yet. In view of the fact that remnants of the Chinese troops may have remained in Chapei and that dangerous objects such as mines, hand grenades and other explosives may have been left behind by the Chinese troops, the Japanese authorities have warned the public not to go into the district of Chapei for the time being until all danger will have been removed by the military authorities temporarily occupying the district. It is pointed out that it will take a few days before Chapei can be restored to order.

393.00
 Four. Shanghai is returning to a peaceful state. Residents of the districts north of Garden Bridge extending right up to Dixwell Road area may now return to their abandoned homes with comparative safety. The municipal police officers attached to Dixwell Road station are returning to their station today. Also certain of the public schools in that district are reopening on Monday. Barbed wire entanglements are being removed from along north Szechuan Road.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP
 HPD


1644

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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REP




FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 4, 1932.

Rec'd 10:35 m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

March 4, 6 p. m.

FOLLOWING FROM CAPTAIN HAYER FOR WAR DEPARTMENT.

"22. Despite conflicting reports and minor engagements believe that line indicated yesterday unchanged. Chinese definitely refuse local peace parley. Estimate of military casualties to date Chinese 12,000, Japanese 3,500. Unless definite Chinese military information comes through may go to Tsai's headquarters, probably via Nanking soon."

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD

F/LS 793.94/4563

FILED

MAR 9 1932

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET


FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 6:10 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington

301, March 4, 1 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 68, February 25, 6 p.m.

Following from the American Consul General, Harbin:

One. "March 1, 3 p.m., No. 25.


(1)- Your February 27, 11 a.m. Paragraph

One. (a) and (b). Neither the Consular Body nor

any American native immediately prior to the present
situation participated in the municipal affairs at Harbin.

(c). The Japanese Consul General some years ago made a
temporary agreement with the Chinese authorities whereby
local Japanese would pay municipal taxes in return for
Japanese representation on the Taxation Committee of the
Municipality but Vice Consul Thimigawa has informed me that
his Consulate General desires to have the Chinese authorities

reorganize



793.94
note
893.102-Harbin

F/LS

793.94/4564

MAR 12 1932

FILED

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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2-#301 from Peiping via N.R.,
 March 4, 1932, 1 p.m.

reorganize the municipality so that its status will be similar to the status created by the Anglo-Russian municipal agreement of 1914 and believe that the Consular Body should make representations to the Chinese authorities to bring this about. Contemplated that the Consular Body or extraterritorial consuls would act upon their own initiative.

(2). The present Mayor Pao Kuan Cheng was officially appointed on January 23rd of this year by the Civil Administrator Chang Ching Hui, but was really installed in office by Colonel Doihara, who is directing and controlling municipal affairs, the police and the press. Although the Civil Administrator informed me in writing on February 18 last in reply to a query of mine that there is no plan to revise the regulations of the Harbin Municipality, it is evident that the Japanese will secure the form of government, which undoubtedly will also control the native City of Fuchiatien and suburbs besides the present Harbin municipality, they desire. This new municipality, if organized, will undoubtedly last for a long time irrespective of whether Manchuria becomes an independent state or remains a part of China under Japanese domination. In it local Russians, who number about

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



FE

MET

CORRECTED 3RD PAGE

#301 from Peiping via NR
 March 4, 1 p. m.

about 100,000 many of whom are clamoring for municipal representation, and Japanese who number about 5,000 exclusive of the troops, will be given much more voice in municipal affairs than they have at present.

(3). If there is a possibility of other foreigners securing municipal representation either direct or through the Consular Body should Americans avail themselves of it?"

Two. The Legation does not believe that the Consul General should take the initiative in calling for a reorganization of the Harbin Municipal Government but, if as appears inevitable, a reorganization is to be effected under which foreign residents, chiefly Russians and Japanese, will be given a greater voice in municipal affairs than formerly, there would seem to be no sufficient reason why the American Consul General in association with his colleagues should not seek to obtain equitable and non-discriminatory treatment for American residents and American rights and interests, particularly in regard to all matters relating to taxation. It has been the practice to give American consular officers the greatest latitude in protecting the local interests of Americans irrespective of the

actual

793.94/4564

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

CORRECTED 4TH PAGE

#301 from Peiping via NR
March 4, 1 p.m.

actual status of the local governments with which they have had to deal, and it would seem that any other principle of action would constantly prejudice the protection of American interests throughout the whole of China. The Department's instructions are requested.

For the Minister,

PERKINS

WSB

HPD

1001

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#301 from Feiping via N.R.,
 March 4, 1 p.m.

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seem

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-#301 from Peiping via N.R.,
March 4, 1 p.m.

seem that any other principle of action would constantly
prejudice the protection of American interests throughout
the whole of China. The Department's instructions (*).

For the Minister,

PERKINS

(*) apparent omission.

WSB

HPD

1651

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

March 9, 1932.

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (China)

CONFIDENTIAL

Your 301, March 4, 1 p.m., in regard to the Harbin
municipal government.

One. You should instruct the Consul General at Harbin
that in the premises he should neither take the initiative
himself nor participate with his colleagues in any effort
to bring about a reorganization of the Harbin municipal
government.

Two. If a reorganization of the municipal government
of Harbin is attempted by others and it would appear that
such reorganization would result in a discrimination
against American nationals, the Department will then
take under advisement the Legation's and Consul General's
recommendations, based upon facts existing at the time,
in regard to the problem of obtaining for American
nationals at Harbin treatment on the basis of equity
and non-discrimination similar to that accorded to other
foreign nationals there.

Three. Keep Department informed of developments.

Enciphered by FE 301/VDM

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/4564

793.94/4564
note
893.101-Harbin
893.102-Harbin

This document is not to be released to the public
or being communicated to the public before
it is cleared by the Department of State.

57m

5
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, February 12, 1932.

No. 490

MAR 4 32

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL



FE
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F/L S 793.94/4565

793.94
note
811.111-
Diplomatic-93

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that on February 10, 1932, a secretary of the Chinese Legation called at the Embassy and requested that diplomatic visas be affixed to passports made out in the names of General Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. The accompanying written request of the Chinese Legation stated that General Chiang Kai-shek is the ex-president of China and a member of the Central Executive Committee, that he is going abroad in his

MAR 9 1932

FILED

See
793.94/4565




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, February 12, 1932.

No. 490

MAR 4 32

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL



F/LS 793.94/4565

793.94
no to
811.111-
Dy.omatic-93

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See
793.94/4516

MAR 9 1932

FILED

155

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

his official capacity, and that he and Mrs. Chiang intend to proceed to the United States. The passports stated that they intend to travel in various foreign countries. In view of these circumstances, the Embassy granted Visas (Nos. 10 and 11) under section 3 (1) of the Immigration Act of 1924. I have already informed the Department of this.

The request was made that the utmost secrecy be maintained in this regard because of possible serious consequences that might follow any publicity. For that reason, the secretary stated, the passports had been issued, under instructions, by the Chinese Consulate General at Yokohama. The Embassy was further informed that General and Mrs. Chiang's plans as to date of departure and route of travel were not yet known to the Legation.

I am informed that the British Embassy has also visased these passports.

Respectfully yours,



W. Cameron Forbes.

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Received F.P.



1654

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 224

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Batavia - Java.


February 2, 1932.



SUBJECT: Censorship of Press Despatches to the Sino-Japanese Situation and the Reasons Impelling the Netherland Indian Government to Such an Action.

793.94
note
856d.918
6939412

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.



SIR:

I have the honor to report that press despatches from Shanghai and Japan relating to the present events in Shanghai and Manchuria are being censored by the Netherland Indian Government, the object of which is to so tone down the news as to avoid inciting the large Chinese population of this country to an aggressive boycott of Japanese goods. Chinese merchants are, nevertheless, refusing to purchase Japanese imports and Chinese tailors will no longer use Japanese textiles.* Furthermore, the publication of uncensored despatches in regard to the Sino-Japanese situation would, without doubt, lead to strong anti-Japanese articles in the local Chinese press.

Since the reasons assigned by the Japanese government for their action in Shanghai were the boycotting of Japanese goods and the publication in the Chinese press of articles derogatory to Japan and its government, the government of Netherland India is naturally
anxious

793.94/4566

MAR 7 1932

165+

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 224

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Batavia - Java.

February 2, 1932

AM RECD
DEPT. OF STATE
MAR 3 1932
SUBJECT: 1-1221

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 5 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 7 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN AFFAIRS

Censorship of Press Despatches
to the Sino-Japanese Situation and the
Reasons Impelling the Netherland Indian
Government to Such an Action.

793.94
note
8562.918
6939412

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 7 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN AFFAIRS

793.94/4566

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
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

anxious not to permit any action in this country which would afford a pretext for Japanese intervention of any kind. It must be remembered in this connection that the Chinese element here is for the most part of Netherland Indian nationality, a factor which would not be without its consequences in the event of any difficulty with Japan.

Respectfully yours,


K. S. Patton
American Consul General

891
KSP/hk

Original and four copies to Department.

1658

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 16, 1932

(Reference: Tokyo Embassy's despatch No. 492, dated February 13, 1932 - File No. 793.94/4567)

~~M:~~
~~SKH:~~

The attached despatch brings out the fact that the Japanese public look upon the Shanghai and Manchuria actions by the Japanese armed forces in a different light. The Shanghai situation is evidently considered a local disturbance, and the press expressed little enthusiasm for Japanese action other than that necessary to quiet the disturbance.

A newspaper clipping from the February 8 edition of the JAPAN ADVERTISER gives the official English translation of the Japanese Government's statement of February 7, in regard to the Shanghai disturbances. This statement (issued at the time when Japan's land troops were being sent to Shanghai) says: "It is similar to the numerous outrages and insults that had been previously perpetrated at Tsingtao, Foochow, Canton,

Amoy,

1650

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

Amoy, and elsewhere, in that they are all characterized by Chinese contempt for Japan and the Japanese and by acts of physical violence. The Shanghai incident only happens to be the most flagrant case." The statement then proceeds to justify Japan's action at Shanghai, stating that "the Japanese Government are prompted by no other motive than that of discharging their international duty."


RPB:KC




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, Japan, February 13, 1932.

No. 492

NR 432



F/LS 793.94/4567

793.94
893.102-S
893.30

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that recent Japanese naval (and military) action at Shanghai would seem to differ radically in certain aspects from the Japanese military action in Manchuria since September 18th and that this difference appears to be reflected in the attitude of the Japanese public.

For some days following reports of Sino-Japanese fighting at Shanghai, many Japanese and foreigners at
Tokyo

MAR 24 1932

FILED

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Tokyo were apprehensive that the Japanese navy had embarked on an ambitious offensive in China Proper comparable in scale to and perhaps imitative of the comprehensive strategy of the Japanese military in Manchuria. It is not unnatural that the combination of lack of adequate information and the recent example of the Japanese military in Manchuria should create the fear that the navy had been infected by the military's enthusiasm for conquest, despite the fact that it had always been regarded as the more tactful of the two. With recent comprehension that the civil government can be disregarded with impunity, the fear was not uncommon that the Navy, perhaps instigated by the ambitious army, would not stop short of aggression which might precipitate an international conflict. The appointment of Prince Fushimi, of the Imperial Family, - following closely the appointment of Prince Kanin as Chief of the Army General Staff - seemed to give another reason for such fear.

Within the last few days, however, apprehension seems distinctly to have lessened. The feeling seems to be that the Navy has not "broken loose", as did the army; that the navy was more or less forced upon its present course of action by insistence on the part of the Japanese civilian population at Shanghai, supported - some think - by important traders of the Osaka district who have been gravely affected by the boycott. It is more widely felt now that the real object of the navy has been the separation of Chinese officials from this boycott movement and an improvement of the situation of Japanese residents in the Shanghai area. If there are other aims, resembling

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in character those of the army in Manchuria, they are not yet evident here. There is apparently no parallel in the navy to the usurpation of control in the army by junior officers; naval affairs, it is believed, are directed by those officers invested with the right of direction of operations. The first fear that the action of the navy resulted from pressure brought to bear upon it by the army seems now to have been dissipated. The appointment of Prince Fushimi as Chief of the Navy General Staff may have had no more significance than preparation for possible eventualities which might arise but for which the navy did not plot, whereas the appointment of Prince Kanin seems to have been in preparation for eventualities which the army was determined to effect, the first of these having been the occupation of Chinchow.

There are a number of reasons why the action of the Navy at Shanghai has not aroused as widespread enthusiasm as the Manchurian adventure did and has seemed to create misgiving in a larger section of the Japanese public. The peculiar traditional attitude of the Japanese toward Manchuria as of vital economic importance to Japan's very existence does not extend to China Proper. A growing realization of the financial obligations, which military action in Manchuria has entailed, may have brought quicker realization to a part of the public that the Shanghai situation is adding to the financial burden. The Manchurian affair evoked in a large section of the public a pleasant dream of empire which is absent from the Shanghai incident. Belief in any permanent success in China Proper - other than what may affect Japanese residents

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residents there and trade - is much less widespread in the present instance. The initial absence of understanding of the reasons for the naval action at Shanghai, as well as some realization of possible international implications, may also have had its effect. A clearer understanding seems to have been largely brought about by the official explanation published in the press on 1/. February 8th, a copy of which is enclosed.

The editorials of the press reflect the comparative lack of enthusiasm on the part of the public. For a period of ten days, from February third, only eighteen editorials on the subject of the Shanghai situation have appeared in the fifty editions published during that time by the five leading Japanese Tokyo dailies. One third of this number appeared in the Tokyo ASAHI, which may be due to the fact that this paper is under the same management as the Osaka ASAHI, a large part of whose readers are vitally interested in trade with China. The tone of the editorials is more moderate than might have been expected.

Brief résumés of these editorials were transmitted to the Department in my telegrams Nos. 38/, 40/, 45/, 52/, and 60/.

Respectfully yours,

W. Cameron Forbes

W. Cameron Forbes

✓ Enclosure:

Official Statement.

Embassy's File No. 800.-China

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Japan Advertiser,

Tokyo, Monday, February 8, 1932.

STATEMENT IS MADE REVEALING DISPATCH OF TROOPS TO CHINA

Cabinet Decides on Measure to
 End Menace and Restore Nor-
 mal Conditions in Shanghai

LIMITED TO THIS PURPOSE

No Intention to Enter on Ag-
 gressive Campaign Unless Op-
 ponents Continue Hostilities

POLITICAL AIMS DENIED

The dispatch of Japanese land forces to strengthen the bluejackets already engaged in combat against the Chinese at Shanghai was announced by the Government yesterday in a lengthy statement giving the reasons and assuring there is no intention to enter upon an aggressive campaign. The decision to send the troops was reached by the Cabinet on Tuesday of last week and re-affirmed on Friday.

Silence on the matter was enforced until yesterday, it was said at the Foreign Office, at the request of Japanese Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu in Shanghai, who feared the news would stir the Chinese to launch immediately a determined onslaught, overwhelming the Japanese bluejackets with sheer force of numbers. When Ambassador Katsuji Debuchi denied to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson in Washington that troops were going, he was "honestly telling a lie," it is understood, for he was not informed until later. Despite caution, the news was generally known abroad several days ago.

Policy to Ensure Peace
 The official English translation of the statement follows:

"It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure by all means in their power the tranquillity of the Far East and to contribute to the peaceful progress of the world. Unfortunately, of late years the internal discord and unsettled political conditions prevailing in China, coupled with rampant anti-foreign agitation, have given cause for serious concern to all the Powers, especially to Japan, which because of her geographical proximity and the vast interests of hers which are involved, has been made to suffer in a far greater degree than any other. While the Japanese Government, in their solicitude for neighborly amity, and international good understanding, have exerted every effort to maintain a conciliatory attitude, China, taking advantage of our moderation, has resorted to frequent infringements of our rights and interests, to various acts of violence towards Japanese residents and to an

intensification of the vicious anti-Japanese movement, which is without a parallel elsewhere, as it is under the direct or indirect guidance of the Nationalist Party, which is identified with the Nationalist Government itself.

Contempt for Japan Charged

"It is in these circumstances that the Shanghai Incident has broken out. It is similar to the numerous outrages and insults that had previously been perpetrated at Tsingtao, Foochow, Canton, Amoy and elsewhere, in that they are all characterized by Chinese contempt for Japan and the Japanese and by acts of physical violence. The Shanghai Incident only happens to be the most flagrant case. On January 9, a vernacular journal, the Minkuo Daily News, published an article, insulting the honor of our Imperial House. Shortly afterwards, on January 18, a party of Japanese priests and their companions, five persons in all, were the subjects of an unprovoked attack by Chinese desperadoes. As a result, three of the victims were severely wounded and one was killed. The shock of these events was sufficient to explode the long pent-up indignation felt by the Japanese residents in Shanghai, who had suffered for many years past from, and had exercised the utmost restraint in the face of, increasing Chinese atrocities and affronts.

Dissolution Demanded

"Noting the extreme gravity of the situation, the Japanese Consul-General, under the instructions of the Government, and in order to do all that was possible to prevent, by a local solution of the question, any aggravation of the case, presented to the Mayor of Shanghai on January 21st a set of four demands, including one for the dissolution of anti-Japanese societies. At three o'clock in the afternoon of January 28th, the Mayor's reply acceding to the above demands was received. The Japanese authorities, hoping that the tension might then relax, decided to wait and watch the performance of their promise on the part of the Chinese. However, soldiers belonging to the 19th Army, then concentrated in the vicinity of Shanghai, began, for reasons connected with internal politics, to display signs of recalcitrance toward the Nanking authorities, and appeared to be making hostile preparations in spite of the Mayor's acceptance of our terms, thus creating a new source of danger. In the meantime Chinese soldiers in civilian costume and various lawless elements had stolen into the International Settlement, creating a source of danger to the quarter in the vicinity of the Municipal Offices. Many alarming rumors were in circulation and the residents were plunged into an agony of terror, the police of the Chapei district having taken flight. Thereupon, on the 28th, at 4 o'clock, the authorities of the Settlement proclaimed a state of siege, and the armed forces of the Powers were ordered out to duty in accordance with a plan that had been previously agreed upon. It was when the Japanese Marines were proceeding to their assigned sector in Chapei that the Chinese opened fire upon them, precipitating a conflict between Chinese and Japanese armed forces, of which the present situation is the outcome.

Truce Ineffective

"As is clear from what has been said, the incident of the Chinese assault upon Japanese priests and the incident of

the armed Sino-Japanese conflict were entirely separate affairs. With regard to the armed collision, as it was entirely contrary to every intention of ours, and as the British and American Consuls-General offered a tender of their good offices, the Japanese authorities sought to effect a cessation of hostilities, and, in fact, succeeded on the 29th in arriving at an agreement for a truce. But on the following day the Chinese, in contravention of their pledge, opened fire once more. At a conference summoned on the 31st, it was agreed that the opposing forces should cease from all hostile action during the progress of negotiations for the establishment of a neutral zone. However, the Chinese, resuming the offensive, are continuing the concentration of troops in the neighborhood of Shanghai. So far, the Japanese navy, desiring, in view of the international character of Shanghai, not to aggravate the situation has refrained from taking any drastic action, while the Chinese, spreading news of Japanese defeats, are manifesting even greater vehemence in their actions.

"In the existing state of affairs in China, uncontrolled and uncontrollable, and in view of historical precedents in such cases, we can have no assurance as to the possible behavior of the vast armies congregated in the Shanghai area, should unscrupulous politicians care to incite them. Our marines, opposed to Chinese forces outnumbering them by more than ten to one, are being wearied to exhaustion, while the predicament of the Japanese residents, facing imminent danger as they do, is beyond description. In order to meet the absolute necessity of at once dispatching adequate military re-inforcements, (as there are obvious limitations to the naval units which can be landed), so as to put an end to the menace of the Chinese armies, to restore Shanghai to normal conditions and to relieve the inhabitants of all nationalities from the strain of fear and disquiet, the decision was taken to order the necessary military forces to Shanghai.

Duty Only Motive

"It should be stated that this dispatch of a military force carries no more significance than the dispatch of marines in accordance with the practice on several previous occasions, and that the Japanese Government are prompted no other motive than that of discharging their international duty and of safe-guarding the large number of Japanese nationals, and the Japanese property worth many hundreds of millions, involved in the affair.

"The expeditionary force has been therefore limited to the strength absolutely required for the above purposes, and its action will be guided solely by the policy of protecting the common interests of all the Powers. Unless the Chinese, by continuing hostilities or by obstructing our army in attaining the above ends, compels it to take necessary action, there is of course no intention whatever that it should enter upon an aggressive campaign. The Japanese Government have already declared that they cherish no political ambitions in the region of Shanghai, nor any thought of encroaching there upon the rights and interests of any other Powers. What they desire is to promote the safety and prosperity of that region by co-operation with other Powers and mutual assistance, and so to contribute to the peace and well-being of the Far East."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tokyo, February 10, 1932.

No. 486.

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July 11 1932.



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Instructions to
Paiping, Harbin, Mukden
and Sairen
July 8, 1932

793.94

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/. I have the honor to transmit herewith a list, in chronological order, of treaties, notes, agreements, and other documents relating to Manchuria which may be of interest to the Department at such time as Japan and China may enter into negotiations with regard to a settlement of questions relating to Manchuria.

A careful search of published Japanese documents has been made by the Embassy. All documents discovered, with the exception of five, are to be found in MacMurray's TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA. For reference

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reference purposes, when the document is to be found in that publication, the page number has been put opposite the title of the document in the enclosed list. Copies in 2-5. translation of four agreements which do not appear in MacMurray's work are enclosed herewith. No copy of the Sino-Japanese Tariff Agreement of May 6, 1930, is enclosed, as a copy of it was transmitted to the Department in the Embassy's despatch No. 131^{6939431/46} of May 16, 1930.

Respectfully yours,

W. Cameron Forbes

W. Cameron Forbes.

Enclosures:

List of treaties, notes, et
cetera relating to Manchuria.

Copies in translation of four
agreements as listed in enclosure one.

Embassy's File No. 800. Manchuria.

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Enclosure No. 1
 Despatch No. 486
 From American Embassy
 Tokyo.

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO MANCHURIA

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July 21, 1896	Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation	68
October 19, 1896-	Protocol concerning Japanese settlements, inland navigation, taxes on manufactures, etc.	91
March 27, 1898-	Russo-Chinese Convention for the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula....	119
July 6, 1898-	Agreement between Chinese Eastern Railway and China concerning Southern Branch of Chinese Eastern Railway	154
February 17, 1899-	First Supplement to Charter of Chinese Eastern Railway.....	157
May 31, 1899-	Chinese Eastern Railway and China(Kirin Province)- Agreement regarding jurisdiction over Chinese subjects in Railway Zone.	277
August 11, 1899-	Imperial Russian Order for building Dalny and creating it a free port.....	121
December 2, 1899-	Chinese Eastern Railway and China (Heilungkiang Province)- Agreement regarding jurisdiction over Chinese subjects in Railway Zone(Reference only)	321
January 30, 1901-	Russo-Chinese Preliminary arrangement in regard to Manchuria.	329
February -, 1901-	Russo-Chinese " Secret Treaty" concerning Manchuria.....	330
July 18, 1901 -	Chinese Eastern Railway and China(Kirin Province) - Agreement re jurisdiction over Chinese subjects in Railway Zone.	274
August 2, 1901-	Russian Ukaz re Jurisdiction in Chinese Eastern Railway Zone.....	88
January 14, 1902-	Chinese Eastern Railway and China-Heilungkiang Province) - Agreement regarding jurisdiction over Chinese subjects in Railway Zone.	321
January 14, 1902-	Chinese Eastern Railway and China-Agreement for coal-mining in Heilungkiang Province.....	661

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April 8, 1902-	Sino-Russian Convention in regard to Manchuria	526
July 11, 1902-	Chinese Eastern Railway and China- Agreement for Kirin Changchun Railway	629
October 8, 1903-	Sino-Japanese Supplementary Treaty of Commerce and Navigation(with annexes).	411
September 5, 1905-	Russo-Japanese Treaty of Peace.	522
December 22, 1905-	Sino-Japanese Treaty, and additional and subsequent agreements, relating to Manchuria, and Minutes.	549
	(Summary of alleged Secret Protocols to foregoing treaty).	554
	(Arrangement for conveyance of Chinese Government Stores by Antung-Mukden Railway, October 30, 1911).	574
December 5, 1906-	Sino-Japanese Agreement for the rendition of Yinkou(Newchwang).	612
April 15, 1907-	Sino-Japanese Convention regarding the Hsinmin-Mukden and Kirin-Changchun Railways.	627
May 27, 1907-	South Manchuria Railway Company and China. Agreement for handing over by Japan of the Mukden-Hsinmintun Railway, together with the rolling- stock and equipment.	632
May 30, 1907-	Sino-Japanese Agreement for the establishment of a Maritime Customs Office at Dairen and for inland waters steam navigation.	634
May 14, 1908-	Sino-Japanese Agreement for a Chinese- Japanese Joint Stock Lumber Company for the exploitation of the Yalu Timber.	731
September 11, 1908-	Sino-Japanese Regulations for Sino- Japanese Yalu Timber Company.	733.
November 12, 1908-	Sino-Japanese Supplementary Agree- ment for a loan for the Hsinmintun- Mukden and Kirin-Changchun Railways.	767
August 18, 1909-	South Manchuria Railway Company and China. Detailed agreement for the Hsinmintun-Mukden Railway loan. ...	782
August 18, 1909-	South Manchuria Railway Company and China. Detailed Agreement for Kirin- Changchun Railway Loan.	785

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August 19, 1909-	South Manchuria Railway and China- Memorandum concerning Re-construction of Antung-Mukden Railway	787
September 4, 1909-	Sino-Japanese Agreement concerning mines and railways in Manchuria...	790
September 4, 1909-	Sino-Japanese Agreement relating to the Chientao region	796.
May 22, 1910-	Okura and Company and China- Agree-ment for Penhsiuh Coal Mining Company, Ltd.	793
May 12, 1911-	Sino-Japanese Detailed Regulations for Fushun and Yentai mines.	792
September 2, 1911-	Sino-Japanese Agreement for Extension of Peking-Mukden Railway into Mukden	795
November 2, 1911-	Sino-Japanese Convention relating to railway connections at Antung.	914
May 29, 1913-	Sino-Japanese Agreement concerning special duty reduction treatment of goods imported into Manchuria from or through Chosen, and exported from Manchuria to or through Chosen, by rail via Antung.	1039
October 5, 1913-	Sino-Japanese Exchange of notes in regard to the construction of certain railways in Manchuria.	1054
January 18, 1915-	Summary of Group II of Twenty-one Demands.	1231
May 25, 1915-	Sino-Japanese Treaty, and Exchange of Notes, respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.....	1220
December 27, 1915-	Yokohama Specie Bank and China- Agreement for the building of the Ssupingkai-Chengchiatun Railway....	1249
June 9, 1916-	Bank of Chosen and Fengtien Province- Agreement for Loan of Yen 1,000,000.	1418
August 1, 1916-	Bank of Chosen and Fengtien Province- Agreement for loan of Yen 2,000,000.	1419
October 16, 1916-	Okura and Company and Fengtien Pro-vincial Government- Contract for the extension of a loan for- Yen 1,500,000.	1335

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January 20, 1917-	Industrial Development Bank, Bank of Taiwan and Bank of Chosen, and China(Bank of Communications,- Agreement for a loan of Yen 5,000,000.	1345
January 22, 1917-	Sino-Japanese Exchange of Notes re- garding Settlement of Chengchiatun Affair, Employment of Japanese Mili- tary Advisers, etc.	1347
July 16, 1917-	Agreement between Chinese and Japanese Chambers of Commerce at Mukden regarding Redemption of Chinese Small-Coin Bank notes.	1420
August 28, 1917-	Yokohama Specie Bank and China-Agreement for an advance of Yen 10,000,000 upon the proposed supplementary reorganiza- tion loan.	1382
September 28, 1917-	Industrial Development Bank, Bank of Taiwan and Bank of Chosen, and China (Bank of Communications)- Agreement for a supplementary loan of - Yen 20,000,000	1387
October 12, 1917-	South Manchuria Railway and China- Agreement for a loan for the Kirin- Changchun Railway.	1390
January 6, 1918-	Yokohama Specie Bank and China- Agreement for a Second Advance of Yen 10,000,000 upon the proposed Supplementary Reorgani- zation Loan.	1400
April 22, 1918-	Bank of Chosen and Fengtien Provincial Government- Agreement for a Loan for the Readjustment of the Reserves of the Provincial Government Bank of Manchuria.	1416
April 30, 1918-	Exchange Bank of China, in association with the Japanese Banking Syndicate con- sisting of the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Bank of Chosen and the Bank of Taiwan, and China- Agreement for a loan for the improvement of the telegraphs.	1424
June 18, 1918-	Industrial Bank of Japan, Bank of Chosen and Bank of Taiwan and China- Preliminary Agreement for a loan for the Construction of the Kirin-Hueining Railway.	1430.

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- July 19, 1918- Yokohama Specie Bank and China-
 Agreement for the renewal of the
 Chinese Government treasury bills... 1385
- August 2, 1918- Exchange Bank of China, in asso-
 ciation with the Japanese Banking
 Syndicate, consisting of the
 Industrial Bank of Japan, the
 Bank of Chosen and the Bank of
 Taiwan, and China- Agreement for
 a loan for gold mining and forestry
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- September 28, 1918- Industrial Bank of Japan, represen-
 ting a syndicate consisting of the
 Industrial Bank of Japan, the Bank
 of Taiwan and the Bank of Chosen,
 and China- Preliminary Agreement
 for a loan for railways in Manchuria
 and Mongolia. 1448
- September 24, 1918- Exchange of Notes Regarding Four
 Railways in Manchuria and Mongolia... 1450.
- May 3, 1919- Notes relating to Reduction of
 Frontier Customs Duties in Chientao.
 Signed by the Chinese Minister for
 Foreign Affairs and the Japanese
 Minister at Peking.
- November 8, 1922- Contract regarding Construction of
 Tienpaoshan-Tumen River Railway.
 Signed by the Chinese Consul, the
 representative of Kirin Provincial
 Government, the Japanese Consul, and
 the representative of shareholders of
 the Tienpaoshan-Tumen Light Railway
 Company.
- October 24, 1925- Contract for the Construction of the
 Kirin-Tungsha Railway. Signed by the
 South Manchuria Railway and the Chinese
 Minister of Communications.
- June 9, 1926- Agreement regarding Bridging of the
 Tumen River. Signed by Japanese Consul
 General at Chientao and Chinese Com-
 missioner of Kirin and Yentih.
- May 6, 1930- Sino-Japanese Tariff Convention.
 (Text transmitted to the Department
 in the Embassy's despatch No. 131
 of May 16, 1930.)

Enclosure No. 2
Despatch No. 468
From Amoy Embassy
Tokyo.

Notes Relating to Reduction of
Frontier Customs Duties in Chientao.

1. Note from the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister at Peking, dated May 3, 1919.

His Excellency

The Minister:

In reply to Your Excellency's note containing the proposal of the Imperial Japanese Government regarding the application of the most favoured nation treatment to be accorded to the overland trade between Japan, Chosen, and Manchuria by way of Chientao, under the provisions of Article 11 of the Annex of the Treaty concerning Manchuria of 1895, and the consequent reduction by one-third of both export and import duties on goods passing through the aforementioned Chientao-district, according to the Agreement concerning goods carried on the Antung-Mukden Railway and those carried by other overland routes, I have the honor to state that I believe the Chinese Government had previously arranged for the reduction of such duties on the overland frontier trade between Chosen and Manchuria, as in the case of goods carried by the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently the Chinese Government will be ready to agree to the proposal of the Imperial Japanese Government in that connection and accord similar treatment as proposed by your Government on such goods.

To make the matter clear, I have the honor to declare herewith, in reply to Your Excellency's note, that on and after the date of the enforcement of the Revised Customs Tariff of China arranged in 1919 all kinds of goods exported to north Chosen by overland routes through the Aunchun Customs and the Yentih Customs from Chientao and Aunchun districts in Manchuria adjacent to north Chosen, and all kinds of goods imported to Chientao, Aunchun and other districts in Manchuria from north Chosen through the Aunchun Customs and the Yentih Branch Customs shall be treated according to the agreement arranged and signed between the Governments of Japan and China in the 2nd Year of Minkuo (1913), which provides for the reduction of Customs duties on railway goods imported to Manchuria from Chosen and/or exported from Manchuria to Chosen via Antung.

(name not mentioned)*

Signed May 3rd, 1913, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
of the Government of the Chinese Republic

* Translator's note.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

2. Note from the Japanese Minister in Peking
to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs,
dated May 10th, 1919.

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note under date of May 3rd concerning the overland trade between north Chosen and the Chinese districts bordering on north Chosen, in which Your Excellency, on behalf of your Government, declares that on and after the day of the enforcement of the Revised Customs Tariff of China of 1919 all kinds of goods transported by overland routes from Chientao, Aunchun and other districts adjacent to north Chosen through the Aunchun Customs and the Yentih Branch Customs to north Chosen and vice-versa shall receive reduction of customs duties in accordance with the agreement of 1913, signed by Japan and China, concerning the reduction of customs duties on railway goods going from Chosen to the Three Eastern Provinces and vice versa via Antung.

I have the honor to express my appreciation of Your Excellency's courtesy in acquainting me with the intention of your Government which, I fully understand, and, in the meantime, I understand that the words "Chientao and Aunchun districts", as mentioned in Your Excellency's note, are not intended to limit the sphere of the reduction of freightage, et cetera, to the two districts of Chientao and Aunchun, but cover a wider sphere including other districts than those two districts from and to which various sorts of goods are exported to and imported from Chosen through the Aunchun Customs and the Yentih Branch Customs. Although I trust I am justified in so interpreting the above quoted expression I am very anxious to have the matter clarified lest it should give rise to some misunderstanding in the future.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

May 10th, 1919

(Name not mentioned)*

The Japanese Minister Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, at Peking.

* Translator's note.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3
 Despatch No. 486
 From Chinese Embassy
 Tokyo.

Contract for construction of the Tienpaoshan-Tumen
River Railway. (Signed November 8, 1922.)

Note.-

A formal contract was concluded and duly signed on March 16, 1918, in connection with the laying of a light railway from Tienpaoshan to the bank of the Tumen River as a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise, the contracting parties being Wen Lu and Nobutaro Iida, representatives of the Chinese and Japanese shareholders respectively. Official permission of the Ministry of Communications was duly obtained, but later owing to the occurrence of some dispute the matter was in suspense for several years. To effect a solution of the long pending question a new contract, modeled on the basis of the former contract, has been concluded between the Provincial Office of Kirin and Nobutaro Iida, the representative of the Japanese shareholders of the projected railway company. The provisions of the revised contract follow:

Art. I.- The railway concern is named the Tienpaoshan-Tumen River Light Railway Company of Kirin Province, and the offices of the railway company are established at Lungtsingsun in Yenchi. The establishment of the company, the articles of association, et cetera, shall be submitted to the Central Government from the Provincial Office, and the same shall become effective after the sanction of the Central Government is obtained.

Art. II.- The railway consists of the trunk line extending from Tienpaoshan to the left bank of the Tumen River via Laotoukow, Tungfohsze, Yenchi and Lungchingsun, and a branch line from the Chaoyang River to the right bank of the Puluhatu River. The length of the trunk and the branch lines is 66 and 6 English miles, respectively.

Art. III.- The object of the present railway is the transportation of the mineral products of the Tienpaoshan silver and copper mines, Laotoukow coal mines and other mines, and also general export and import of goods. When in the future the extension of the railway is deemed necessary by the provincial authorities of Kirin for facilities of through traffic as well as of exploiting local resources, the railway may increase its capitalization and construct extension lines or branch lines, for which permission of the Chinese Government shall be obtained.

Art. IV.- The object of the present company is the construction of the railway lines mentioned in Art. 2 of this contract. The total capitalization is fixed at Yen 4,000,000, to be taken up by the Kirin Provincial Office and the Japanese

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Japanese partners in equal portions. The amount of each share and the form of share certificate shall be determined by the company at the time of issuance of the share certificates.

In case the Kirin Provincial Office is unable to raise the funds necessary for taking up the portion of capital shares assigned to it the Japanese capitalists interested in the enterprise shall temporarily furnish the required funds in place of the Provincial Office in order to expedite the work of construction of the railway. In that case the rate of interest on the loan thus furnished by the Japanese capitalists shall be fixed at six per cent. per annum. The funds thus supplied and interest thereon shall be deducted from the annual income of the Provincial Office accruing from the business profits of the railway.

Art. V.- The business term of the present railway company is fixed for thirty years commencing March 16, 1918. However, the Chinese Government may purchase the railway at a reasonable price any time before the aforementioned business term matures. In case the opinions of both parties do not agree as to the amount of the price of purchase referred to in the preceding paragraph the price shall be fixed on the basis of the fair value assessed by a third party. Any unpaid item shall be refunded by the Provincial Office.

Art. VI.- For the control of the railway company and protection of its interests, the Kirin Provincial Office shall appoint the Chief Magistrate of Yenchi as the Superintendent of the railway, who shall control all affairs of the company. All affairs that require negotiations with different government offices shall be conducted through the superintendent. The Provincial Office and the Japanese capitalists concerned shall conjointly designate three Chinese and three Japanese directors, from among whom two directors-general, one Chinese and one Japanese, shall be appointed. All business of the company shall be under control of the directors-general, who are authorized to appoint or dismiss principal officials of the company with the permission of the Superintendent. All important affairs relating to business technical matters and accounts of the company shall be decided by the directors-general and their decision shall be submitted to the Superintendent, whose signature and seal are necessary for the effectiveness of such decision.

Art. VII.- All such matters as are judged to have serious bearing upon the interests of the company shall be first negotiated between the Superintendent and the directors-general, and then submitted to the deliberations of the council of directors. A decision on such matters reached by the council of directors shall not be carried out unless it is approved by a unanimous vote. In case the opinions of the directors are divided the decision on the matter shall be made by a conference between the superintendent and the directors-general. The regulations governing the council of directors and the scope of its authority shall be determined separately.

Art. VIII.- For all accounts of the company the directors-general shall be held responsible. Regarding all accounts

counts of the company the Superintendent may examine with the directors-general the account books of the company at any time when occasion requires.

Art. IX.- For the settlement of revenue and expenditures of the company's railway business Chinese currency only shall be used. All receipts shall be deposited with the official bank of Kirin Province according to the regulations specifically provided for. When withdrawing deposits from the bank the same regulations shall be observed.

Art. X.- With regard to the making of entries in the account books of the company, the Revised Account Regulations drafted by the Department of Communications shall apply mutatis mutandis. The entries shall be made on the basis of the silver standard.

Art. XI.- All matters relating to the stipends and allowances of officials from the superintendent and directors downwards shall be fixed by the council of directors.

Art. XII.- The settled accounts of the company shall be rendered in proper form and reported to the Provincial Office twice a year, i.e., in June and December.

The Tienpaoshan Silver and Copper Mining Company shall, after the completion of the present railway and at the time of its being opened to traffic, make a monetary contribution towards the public welfare funds of Kirin Province, the amount thereof being fixed at Yen 15,000 in the first and second business years and Yen 25,000 in the third business year (the money being in Chinese currency). The public welfare funds referred to shall be placed at the disposal of the Provincial Office. When the business of the mining company develops and its business revenue increases in the future, the amount of the contribution referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be increased upon further negotiations.

Art. XIII.- The land for the use of the railway shall be leased by the Superintendent and be placed under his control. The government-owned land through which the railway lines pass shall also be leased from the Government and the company shall pay proper rent therefor, the rate thereof to be determined in due proportion to the rate on private-owned land for lease.

Art. XIV.- The Chinese police officers detailed from the Provincial Office for the protection of the railway grounds and the maintenance of the railway lines shall be placed under control of the Superintendent. The company shall pay their salaries from its business expense account but has no right to control those police officers.

Art. XV.- The company shall strictly abide by all laws and regulations pertaining to the control of government railways. Regarding all matters to be reported to the Chinese (Central) Government the company shall attend to them with the utmost care and in case the Central Government despatches officials for inspection of the railway and its affairs

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affairs the company shall extend the greatest possible courtesies to them. All regulations and rules of the railway, excepting those that are based on similar regulations and rules enacted by the Government, shall be submitted to the Provincial Office by the superintendent for sanction, otherwise they must obtain the permission of the Central Government.

Art. XVI.- The members of the staff of the company shall be appointed from among Chinese and Japanese in equal number. The appointment shall be made by the directors-general with the approval of the superintendent. The Chiefs of general affairs and railway departments shall be appointed from among Chinese and the chiefs of construction and account departments from among Japanese.

Art. XVII.- Those who are incompetent, or disobedient, those of unprincipled conduct or those who do not observe rules or violate laws and regulations or insult superiors shall be dismissed by the Superintendent.

Art. XVIII.- When purchasing machinery and other supplies necessary to the maintenance and operation of the railway, domestic manufactures shall be preferred to foreign manufactures in case there is no difference between them in quality and price. When making such purchases the officials in charge shall first prepare a price list of the goods, whether they be home-made articles or imported ones, and shall submit it to the directors-general. No purchases can be made without obtaining a permit from the directors-general.

Art. XIX.- In transportation, precedence shall be given to the conveyance of Chinese troops and army supplies. The transportation of the troops and army supplies shall be conducted according to the regulations that apply to all Chinese Government railways, and the fee for their transportation shall be charged at fifty per cent. less than the tariff to be fixed by the company hereafter. For the transportation of provisions and other relief goods at the time of famine the company shall reduce and remit the charges for conveyance of such goods.

Art. XX.- All rights concerning the policing, administration, justice, taxation, etc., on the railway and within the railway grounds are reserved to the Chinese Government.

Art. XXI.- Without the consent of shareholders, both Chinese and Japanese, as well as the permission of the Chinese Government, the railway company cannot transfer to any other party all its properties and rights. Nor can the company take such steps as to create the right of offering them as mortgage.

Art. XXII.- In case the troops of the Chinese (Central) Government or those of the Province (Kirin) are employed for the protection of the railway's interests the salaries and wages of those troops shall be paid by the Central Government or the Provincial Office as the case may be. On such an occasion the company shall provide special treatment

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treatment for those troops.

Art. XXIII.- The present contract, when duly concluded, shall be submitted by the Provincial Office to the Department of Communications, and the same shall take effect on and after the permit of that Department has been obtained. The former agreement concluded between Wen Lu and Nobutaro Iida, respectively, on behalf of the Chinese and Japanese shareholders of the present enterprise under date of March 16, 1918, shall become void as soon as the present contract becomes effective.

Art. XXIV.- The present contract shall be rendered in duplicate copies, one to be held by the Kirin Provincial Office and one by Nobutaro Iida, representative of the Japanese shareholders of the company. Three more copies shall be deposited with the (Chinese) diplomatic commissioner's office (of Kirin), the Japanese Consulate-General at Kirin, and the Japanese Consulate-General at Mukden, respectively.

Signed November 8, 1922.

Tsai Unsheng,
 On behalf of the Kirin Provincial Office.

Shosuke Akatsuka,
 Japanese Consul-General at Mukden.

Tanai Noguchi, proxy for
 Nobutaro Iida, representing the Japanese
 Shareholders of the Tienpaoshan-Tumen
 River Light Railway Company.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosed 4
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J. Edgar Hoover

Contract for the Construction of the
Kirin-Tunghua Railway.

(Signed October 24, 1925)

The Minister of Communications of the Government of the Republic of China(to be hereafter mentioned simply as Chinese Minister of Communications) and the South Manchuria Railway Company, Ltd., (to be hereafter mentioned simply as the Railway Company) have herewith concluded a contract relating to the construction of the railway line from Kirin to Tunghua on the terms as mentioned hereunder:-

ARTICLE 1. The Chinese Minister of Communications agrees to entrust to the Railway Company the work of construction of the railway line from Kirin to Tunghua. The work of construction mentioned in the foregoing paragraph shall be begun within the period of one year after the signing of the present contract and shall be completed in about two years. The work of construction of each divisional line of the said railway line shall be conducted under the supervision of the Director of the Railway Bureau to be appointed by the Chinese Department of Communications.

ARTICLE 11. The amount of the cost of construction and equipment of the railway provided for in the present contract is fixed at 18,000,000 yuen (Japanese currency) payable in exact amount and without any discount. Under unavoidable circumstances, the said amount may be increased or decreased upon mutual agreement. All necessary expenses required for the construction of the railway line and cars and the completion of equipment thereof, et cetera, shall be borne by the Railway Company on behalf of the Railway and be defrayed by the Company any time when requested by the Director of the Railway Bureau (Kirin-Tunghua Railway).

On the money paid by the Railway Company in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing clause interest at the rate of 9 per cent. per annum, i.e., 9 yen per hundred yen, shall be paid for the period from the date of the completion of the work of construction of each divisional line and the delivery of such completed line after its inspection till the date of the completion of the refundment of the expenditure involved in the construction of the railway line which is to be borne by the Railway Company.

ARTICLE 111. The Director of the Railway Bureau shall attend to his duties at his office all the time, and control and supervise all affairs connected with the present railway. The work of construction of the present railway line shall be carried out after the sanction of the Director of the Railway Bureau is obtained.

The Director of the Railway Bureau shall engage one Japanese expert thoroughly informed about and well experienced in railway construction from among the members of the staff of the Railway Company and appoint him Chief Engineering

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Engineering expert of the present railway line during the period of its construction. On the completion of the work of construction he shall retire from the office. The chief engineer shall manage and control, under direction of the Director of the Railway Bureau, affairs connected with the planning, estimates and construction of the present railway line; he shall also countersign all documents concerning the revenue and expenditure of the present railway.

The terms of the contract for the engagement of the chief engineer shall be settled by the Director of the Railway Bureau and the Railway Company, and the contract thereof shall be concluded by the Directors of the Railway Bureau after the sanction of the Department of Communications is obtained.

The chief engineer may request the Director of the Railway Bureau to employ a few Japanese in connection with the construction of the present railway, in case such is necessary in the execution of his duties.

ARTICLE IV. The Director of the Railway Bureau shall, after the signing of the present contract, take in hand the preparatory arrangements for the construction of lines, the purchase of land and the laying in of rolling stocks and other materials, articles, et cetera. The money required for the said purpose shall be paid by the Railway Company any time in compliance with the request of the Director of the Railway Bureau, who shall send in to the Company an application therefor, the application being countersigned by the Director and the Chief Engineer.

In case the construction materials and other articles required in the construction of the present railway are to be purchased, the estimate thereof shall be presented by the Chief Engineer to the Director, and after the approval of the Director is obtained the purchase shall be made by bidding, or they may be purchased on the market in a manner specifically designated for that purpose, special care being taken to choose goods of the best quality and moderate price. When materials produced in China or goods manufactured in China are the same as those of Japanese origin or other foreign origin in quality and price, preference shall be given to the home products as a means of encouragement of the domestic industry of China. The purchase of foreign-made materials for use in the present railway shall be made upon negotiations between the Director of the Railway Bureau and the Railway Company in accordance with the procedure and manner mentioned in the foregoing paragraph. The work of construction of the present railway line shall be undertaken as contract-work to be taken up by sub-contractors, who shall be Chinese in as many cases as possible.

All procedures concerning the purchase of railway materials and articles, contracts of construction work, inspection of purchased materials and construction work, et cetera, shall be conducted in accordance with the general rules governing the state-owned

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state-owned railways.

ARTICLE V. The Director of the Railway Bureau shall appoint a special railway guard for the protection of the work of construction and the maintenance of safety and order of the present railway. The numerical strength of the said railway guard shall be determined by the Director and the expenses involved in its maintenance be borne by the Railway Bureau.

ARTICLE VI. When the work of construction of each divisional line of the present railway is completed and the official inspection thereof is gone through the Directors of the Railway Bureau shall take steps to open the line to traffic speedily and conduct the traffic business with full authority entrusted to him in accordance with the General Rules of the State Railways. The revenue accruing from the traffic business of the railway shall revert to the Railway Bureau.

When the whole line of the present railway is open to traffic the Director of the Railway Bureau shall engage a Japanese well acquainted with the business of accounts from among members of the staff of the Railway Company and have him take charge of the financial affairs of the present railway in the capacity of Chief Accountant till the time when the liabilities the railway owes to the Railway Company in the form of construction and other expenses borne by the latter on behalf of the former are reimbursed.

The Chief Accountant referred to in the foregoing paragraph shall control exclusively the accounts of the railway under the control of the Director of the Railway Bureau and shall countersign with the Director all papers and documents pertaining to the revenue and expenditure of the railway. All entries in the books of the present railway shall be made according to the rules set forth in the State Railway Accounts Regulations.

The contract for the engagement of the Chief Accountant shall be arranged and signed by the Director of the Railway Bureau and the sanction of the Department of Communications shall be obtained. In case the person thus engaged proves incompetent the Director may at any time cancel his engagement. On such occasion the cancellation of the engagement shall be made in the same manner as the engagement.

For the business receipts of the present railway Chinese currency alone shall be used. Business receipts shall be deposited with reliable Chinese and Japanese banks in equal portions, on which the respective banks shall allow interest at their current rates.

The Chief Accountant may request the Director of the Railway Bureau to adopt and appoint one or more Japanese as his assistants, when such necessity arises in the execution of his duties.

ARTICLE VII

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ARTICLE VII. When the construction of the present railway line is thoroughly completed and the matter is reported to the Department of Communications by the Director of the Railways Bureau after he has inspected the whole line and taken delivery of it, the Minister of Communications shall refund to the Railway Company the funds expended by the Company in the construction of the present railway on behalf of the latter. In case the whole or part of the money is not paid after the lapse of one full year from the date of the completion of the inspection of the finished lines the Minister of Communications may arrange for the extension of the period of refundment after going through due negotiations with the Railway Company to that effect. The Minister of Communications may take over the railway any time with the funds necessary for so doing. Against the expenditures borne by the Railway Company, on behalf of the Railway Bureau, both original and interest thereon, all movable and immovable properties belonging to the Railway, as well as railway revenue shall be made security of the first order. The security mentioned in the foregoing paragraph cannot be made the security for liabilities other than the liability mentioned in and forming the object of the present contract.

ARTICLE VIII. In case the Railway Company desires to transfer to a third party the whole or part of the right it enjoys by virtue of the present contract the company shall obtain the sanction of the Minister of Communications.

ARTICLE IX. When the construction of the present railway line is completed and the line is open to traffic the line is to be placed under joint operation with the Kirin-Changchun Railway Line and the Minister of Communications shall enter upon negotiations with the Railway Company in that connection previous to the completion of the present railway.

The present contract shall become effective on the day of its signing and loses validity at the time when the funds expended by the Railway Company on behalf of the Railway for its construction as mentioned in Article 7, are completely refunded.

ARTICLE X. The present contract is rendered in duplicate both in Japanese and Chinese, a copy being held by the Minister of Communications and a copy by the Railway Company. In case any doubt arises as to the interpretation of the clauses of the present contract it shall be defined according to the Chinese and Japanese texts.


Signed October 24, 1925.

By: Yen Kung-cho, Minister of Communications, representing the Government of the Chinese Republic.

and-

Yosuke Matsuoka, Director of the South Manchuria Railway Company, representing the South Manchuria Railway Company, Ltd.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Sino-Japanese Agreement Concerning the
Construction of the Tumen River Bridge.

(1) The bridge across the Tumen River shall be owned jointly by Japan and China. The structure shall be divided into two sections with the centre as the boundary line and each section shall be placed under control of the respective countries.

(2) The land required for the construction of the said bridge shall be supplied gratis by the Governments of the respective countries. In case, however, the land required for that purpose is a private-owned estate, the land shall be purchased at a proper price.

(3) As regards the construction of the bridge, the work of planning shall be entrusted to such engineering expert or experts as may be deemed competent by the Japanese Consul General at Chientao and the Magistrate of Yenchi. The work of construction shall be entrusted to a contractor with proper qualifications by bid and shall be carried on under the control and supervision of the engineering expert who made the plan.

(4) The cost of construction shall not exceed 300,000 yen (in Japanese currency), the amount to be borne by Japan and China in equal parts.

(5) The bridge shall be built as strong and rigid as possible, with the abutment and piers made of steel and reinforced concrete. The girders shall be made of steel plates.

(6) All detailed items concerning the policing, customs inspection, control, maintenance and repairs, etcetera of the bridge shall be specifically provided for in separate arrangements after the completion of the structure.

(7) The construction of the Tumen River bridge is intended for increase of traffic facilities and for provision of convenience for transportation of goods, so that in case the Tienpaoshan Tumen River Company and Tumen River Railway Company apply for use of the bridge for the purpose of establishing through traffic on their respective lines such application may be granted according to circumstances.

(8) Any important matters connected with the construction of the Tumen River bridge, which are not provided for herein, shall be settled by negotiations between the Japanese Consul-General at Chientao and the Magistrate of Yenchi.

(Signed) June 6, 1926

By Yotaro Suzuki,
 Japanese Consul General at Chientao
 And Tao Pin, (Chinese) Taoyin of Yenchi
 and Diplomatic Commissioner for Kirin and
 Yenchi.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 11 1932.

To the American Consul,

Dairen, Manchuria.

The Department encloses copies in translation of
three Sino-Japanese agreements as follows:

1. A contract for the construction of the Tienpaoshan-Tumen River Railway, signed November 8, 1922, by Tsai Unsheng, on behalf of the Kirin Provincial Office, Shosuke Akatsuka, Japanese Consul General at Mukden, and Tanai Noguchi, proxy for Nobutaro Iida, representing the Japanese shareholders of the Tienpaoshan-Tumen River Light Railway Company.

2. A contract for the construction of the Kirin-Tunhua Railway, signed October 24, 1925, by Yen Kung-cho, Minister of Communications, representing the Government of the Chinese Republic, and Yosuke Matsuoka, representing the South Manchuria Railway Company, Limited.

3. An agreement concerning the construction of a bridge across the Tumen River, signed June 6, 1926, by Yotaro Suzuki, Japanese Consul General at Chientao, and Tao Pin, Taoyin of Yenchi and Diplomatic Commissioner for Kirin and Yenchi.

There are also enclosed copies in translation of
two notes relating to reduction of frontier duties in
Chientao, as follows:

1. A note of May 3, 1919, from the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister at Peiping.

2. A note of May 10, 1919, from the Japanese Minister at Peiping to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

These are documents which do not appear in
MacMurray's TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING

CHINA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

CHINA 1894-1919, nor, apparently, in other publications in English of a similar nature, and which were obtained from Japanese sources by the Embassy at Tokyo. It is believed that they may be of possible interest for purposes of reference.

Enclosures,
as described above.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 11 1932.

To the American Consul General,
Mukden, China.

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three Sino-Japanese agreements as follows:

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 11 1932.

To the American Consul General,
Harbin, China.

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Noguchi, proxy for Nobutaro Iida, representing
the Japanese shareholders of the Tienposhan-
Tumen River Light Railway Company.

2. A contract for the construction of the
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representing the Government of the Chinese
Republic, and Yosuke Matsuoka, representing the
South Manchuria Railway Company, Limited.

3. An agreement concerning the construction
of a bridge across the Tumen River, signed June 6,
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Diplomatic Commissioner for Kirin and Yenchi.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
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Enclosures,
as described above.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 11 1932.

No. 808

To the American Minister,
 Peiping.

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 three Sino-Japanese agreements as follows:

1. A contract for the construction of the
 Tienpaoshan-Tumen River Railway, signed
 November 8, 1922, by Tsai Unsheng, on behalf of
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 Japanese Consul General at Mukden, and Tanai
 Noguchi, proxy for Nobutaro Iida, representing
 the Japanese shareholders of the Tienpaoshan-
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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 8.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Taihoku, Taiwan, Japan, February 5, 1932.

SUBJECT: Repercussions of the Sino-Japanese
Situation in Taiwan.



THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

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I have the honor to report the present situation in Taiwan as affected by the Sino-Japanese hostilities in Manchuria and China. Until the outbreak of actual fighting in Shanghai in the latter part of January everything remained calm in Taiwan, but since the so-called Shanghai incident there has been manifested a certain uneasiness among the Chinese residents of the island, who number about 46,000.

On February first the Chinese Consul General at Taihoku, under instructions from the Chinese Legation at Tokyo, sent out notices to the various Chinese Associations throughout Taiwan that Chinese residents should remain quiet and refrain from any demonstrations or conversations regarding the Sino-Japanese situation. Any Chinese who wished to return to China would be facilitated in taking their departure.

Most of the Chinese residents have remained, only a comparatively small number having left for China, and to date there have been no incidents reported of any molestation of the Chinese either at the hands of Japanese or

Formosan

F/LS 793.94/4569

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MAR 7 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Formosan Chinese owing allegiance to Japan.

However, it is reported that on the night of February third about forty Chinese were rounded up and held in detention by the police on the ground that they were talking too much and spreading unfounded rumors. It is understood that they will be held in jail for about two weeks, although nothing has been published in the newspapers about this matter. These men were arrested in accordance with a police order promulgated in the press that anyone spreading unfounded rumors calculated to disturb the peace of Taiwan would be severely dealt with. It is believed that the rumors referred to "a great victory of Chinese troops over Japanese marines," and was probably the result of Chinese propaganda sent out over the government radio station at Nanking, as there are many Chinese here who own radios and are in touch with this station.

On February third the Osaka Shosen Kaisha steamer "Chosen Maru" brought 378 Japanese residents from Foochow to Keelung. Of these refugees 116 were Japanese and 212 were Formosan Chinese owing allegiance to Japan, mostly being women and children. Owing to the threatening situation in South China resulting from the Shanghai fighting the Japanese Consul General at Foochow ordered the evacuation. More refugees are expected to arrive from South China ports to Keelung.

The Taiwan Government General is extending in cooperation with civilians, facilities and assistance to the refugees. Reductions in fares on ships and

trains

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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trains have been arranged for the accomodation of these people.

So far as can be ascertained there has been no unusual concentration of troops in Taiwan. The present and normal garrison is believed to be about 8,000 troops, which are concentrated in a northern contingent of infantry stationed at Taihoku and a southern infantry contingent stationed at Tainan. In addition there are garrisons of heavy artillery at Keelung and at the Pescadores Islands, a Japanese naval base. One battalion of mountain artillery is also based at Taihoku.

Respectfully yours,

John B. Ketcham

John B. Ketcham
American Consul.

File No. 840.1
JBK:TKH


In quintuplicate to the Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consul General, Tokyo.

169


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 BY Milton O. Stutts NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



February 25, 1932.

SHANGHAI SITUATIONFurther Consideration of Question of Good Offices.

It is noted that Sir John Simon has suggested (in conversation of February 24) that "as soon as the prestige of both sides is clear we may have an opportunity jointly with the other powers of offering our good offices to stop this awful business."

If there is thought of seizing an "opportunity" to "offer" good offices, it may be worth while to ask whether the present moment is not as favorable as any that is likely for some time to develop. The Japanese have received two distinct and definite set-backs at the hands of the Chinese armed forces. They have aroused against themselves the wrath of many Governments and many peoples. Statements of representative Japanese, both official and unofficial, indicate that they realize that they have made a "mess" of their case and have gotten themselves into both a military and diplomatic jam, and that they would welcome some way out. They are sending reinforcements of at least two divisions (probably war strength); one News Service has it that they expect to assemble 100,000 men at Shanghai. This is expensive, and it does not ~~insure~~^{assure} them real military success.

Even

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Even if they drive the Chinese back, they will not have disposed of the Chinese armies, and they will probably have to remain in position -- in which case they will be subject to sporadic attacks from the Chinese for a long time to come. They cannot completely recover, by any apparent victory achieved with overwhelming forces, the prestige to their armies which they have lost in the encounters which have already occurred. At each step they face new hazards, and at all times they run the risk of further embroilment of one type or another with the others powers. Continuation of military operations in which the public abroad is now convinced that they are the aggressors will increasingly add to their general unpopularity.

All of this, they must be beginning to understand. Certainly their diplomatic representatives are reporting a part of it to them.

Today's news dispatches state that the Chinese authorities have asked the foreign consuls at Shanghai to get their nationals out of all sections adjoining the Hongkew bases. This is suggestive of a possible intention of the Chinese to assume the offensive before the Japanese reinforcements arrive. Although it does not seem likely that the Chinese would attempt an infantry attack on the Japanese positions on the river, it might happen, if the Chinese have sufficient artillery ammunition, that they would shell Hongkew; and it is conceivable that they might inflict

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

inflict on the Japanese what would amount to a definite (though temporary) defeat.

Such being the situation, it is conceivable that the Japanese would be more willing now than they are likely to be later, to listen to proposals for cessation of hostilities at Shanghai. Speculation on that point leads to the inquiry: how might such proposals be made?

It is conceived that it might be possible at this stage for the authorities of the International Settlement (that is, the Municipal Council) to take the responsibility of making to the Chinese and Japanese a proffer of good offices. The worst that could happen would be that they might meet with a rebuff. The best that could happen would be success.

The Chairman of the Municipal Council is a British national, General MacNaughten.

It is suggested that consideration be given to the possibility of instructing our Minister to broach this subject to the British Minister, with the idea that, if the British Minister's reaction is favorable, the British Minister suggest to the Chairman of the Municipal Council that the Chairman, on his own initiative, endeavor to arrange for action in the nature of an offer

by

793.94119

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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by him or by the Municipal Council of good offices or mediation in regard to the local situation. (Note: Such action would make it possible to concentrate on the local problem without prejudice to the peace proposals advanced by the Four Powers some two weeks ago and without compromising any Government's position with regard to the Manchuria question or treaties, etc.)

SKH:AT

1640
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
March 7, 1932.

MMH:

GEG:

Mr. Cunningham's conversations with the Chairman of the Municipal Council in regard to preserving order among the Japanese at Shanghai just prior to the outbreak there.

[Handwritten mark]

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 8099

Confidential.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE (4)

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, January 25, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Political
Situation in Shanghai.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a self-
1/ explanatory despatch No. 7119 of this date, with
enclosures, from this Consulate General to the Amer-
ican Legation at Peiping in regard to the subject
above mentioned.

Respectfully yours,



Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Shanghai Consulate
General despatch No. 7119,
with enclosures.

PRJ MB
800

In Quintuplicate.



F/LS
793.94/4671

MAR 9 1932

FILED

No. 7119

Confidential

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, January 25, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Political
Situation in Shanghai.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this office's
telegrams of January 22, 5 p.m. and January 23, 12
noon, regarding the political situation in Shanghai
1/ and to enclose memoranda of two conversations, one
between the American Consul General and General
Macnaghten, Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council,
2/ and the other between the Consul General and Mr.
Stirling Fessenden, Secretary General of the Council,
both held on January 22, 1932.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal.

RMJ MB B
200

In Triplicate.
In Quintuplicate.

Memorandum of conversation
with General Macnaghten.
Memorandum of conversation
with Mr. Fessenden.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 7119 by Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, on the subject
of Sino-Japanese Political Situation in Shanghai, dated January
25, 1932.

Memorandum of Conversation.

January 22, 1932.

Consul General Cunningham
General Macnaghten, Chairman
Shanghai Municipal Council.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Political Situation in Shanghai.

General Macnaghten stated that it was his intention to immediately go off to the Japanese Flagship and inform the Admiral that he must make arrangements to preserve order at the mass meeting at 3 p.m. tomorrow afternoon at the Japanese Club. He pointed out the possible trouble in the event that they should become unruly and riotous, and he stated that this was not unlikely. He said the Japanese members of the Settlement Police alone, nor jointly with the Russians, could not control a mob of that size and that the Chinese Police of the International Settlement should not be placed so that they would come in contact with an unruly mob since they had an inadequate force to guarantee complete safety. Macnaghten would, therefore, inform the Japanese Admiral that he must become responsible for tomorrow's mass meeting.

I asked General Macnaghten if he had consulted with the British Consul General and he stated that he had and that Mr. Brennan agreed with him in regard to seeing the Admiral. I inquired if he had seen Mr. Murai, the Japanese Consul General, and he said he had not and that Mr. Brennan said he should see him as an act of courtesy. I expressed as delicately as possible and yet with emphasis that I thought it was only right that Murai be consulted rather than the Admiral. I pointed out that it would be far better for the civil rather than the military forces to be called upon for a case of this kind, and leave it to the Consul General to determine whether it was desirable to call on the military forces for assistance.

General Macnaghten, after inquiring whether the walls had ears, said the Japanese had no regard for the consular authorities and that one had only to look at Manchuria to see they had disregarded the Foreign Office, and because of this Macnaghten intended to see the Admiral and ask for assistance at tomorrow's mass meeting. I expressed as delicately as possible but again strongly the opinion that if there is such complete want of cooperation between the Consul General and the military authorities, then this illustrates definitely the wisdom of consulting with Mr. Murai before calling upon the Japanese Admiral to take charge of tomorrow's meeting. I inquired what provision he was going to make in order to get the Admiral to withdraw his forces from the Japanese

Club

1703

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Club. General Macnaghten stated that there would be difficulty there, that if they declined to withdraw he would be helpless. I pointed out that his statement confirmed as in my opinion that he should act through the civil authorities (Consul General) rather than through the military. I suggested that if conditions became such as to render it impossible for the Shanghai Municipal Council to control the situation after mobilizing their entire forces, including the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, they should then apply through the Senior Consul for the assistance of all powers indiscriminately and not single out one power, particularly if, as in this case, that power arouses China's antagonism more than any of any other nationality would. It was Macnaghten's belief that it would be far better for the Japanese to meet an emergency and if there were any shooting, for them to do it, rather than for the Shanghai Municipal Council or any other power. I told him I hesitated to subscribe to this view because I was of the opinion that the Shanghai Municipal Council were better qualified to handle a mob of Chinese than the Japanese military, who would undoubtedly handle the situation by firing at the first possible opportunity. I hoped it would not be necessary to fire and I was distinctly of the opinion that firing would be delayed longer and yet be done in abundant time if the situation were in the hands of the Shanghai Municipal police authorities. I told him I had every confidence in their coolness and deliberation but I did not feel that the Japanese were so deliberate or so calm as the Shanghai Municipal police. He concurred in this view. I regret to record the fact that General Macnaghten seemed to be of the opinion that it was better that the Japanese should fire, and therefore they should be in command rather than have an incident created by the Shanghai Municipal Council police taking lives.

General Macnaghten said he saw my point and that he would immediately call upon Consul General Murai and ask him to use his best offices to preserve order at the meeting tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m. He stated that he would later on call on the Japanese Admiral and inform him of what he had done and express the hope that he would work in coordination and cooperation with the Consul General. I told him that would be far better than his original proposition, in my opinion.

I then took occasion to point out that it was very undesirable, should the condition get beyond the control of the Shanghai Municipal Council, for him to call upon one power rather than as per established custom on the powers to assist in maintaining order. Here again General Macnaghten quibbled and said "Supposing a bunch of unruly Japanese should break into the American sector of the Settlement, if the Americans tried to control them it would result in a conflict between the Japanese and Americans." I told him I had no fear of that but even were that fear well founded, it would not relieve him, in

MY

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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my opinion, to call upon all powers, particularly when that one power was in such complete disharmony with the Chinese people.

I think it is only fair to emphasize by repeating General Macnaghten's statement that he had no intention of calling upon the Japanese to do more than to take charge of the mass meeting at 3 p.m. tomorrow afternoon at the Japanese Club. He disclaimed any knowledge that the Japanese should extend their protection beyond the Japanese Club for the people who constitute the meeting.

Edwin A. Cunningham.

REC J

Copied by MB *B*
Compared with NIN #11

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 7119 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated January
25, 1932, on the subject: "Sino-Japanese Political Situ-
ation in Shanghai."

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum of Conversation

January 22, 1932.
5 o'clock p.m.

Consul General Cunningham
Secretary General Fessenden

Subject: Sino-Japanese Political
Situation in Shanghai.

General Macnaghten having telephoned to Mrs.
Fessenden this afternoon that Mr. Fessenden should see
me to report on the events of today after he (Mac-
naghten) had called upon me, both Fessenden and myself
made repeated efforts to get together but were un-
successful until five o'clock.

Mr. Fessenden then stated that upon the return
of General Macnaghten from his interview with me this
morning he immediately said to him, at which time both
Colonel Toms, Commandant of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps,
and Major Gerrard, Commissioner of Police, were present,
that possibly he was mistaken in regard to the action
which should be taken toward calling upon the Japanese
Admiral; that he had had a conversation with me after
which he was of the opinion it would be unwise to
request the Admiral to take charge of the meeting to-
morrow, and stated that he was going to call upon
Consul General Hurai. He then asked Mr. Fessenden if
he would go with him to call upon the Admiral today;
Fessenden says he replied that he would, provided the
mission was to inform the Admiral that the Municipal
Council was able to maintain law and order in the Set-
tlement without any interference on the part of the
Japanese military authorities. Fessenden states that
this was the undertaking before they left, otherwise
he says he informed General Macnaghten that it would
be necessary to have a meeting of the British and
American members of the Municipal Council in order to
get their views. With this understanding, General
Macnaghten proceeded to call upon Consul General Hurai,
with the undertaking on behalf of Fessenden that he
would meet General Macnaghten at the Customs Jetty at
11:30 a.m. for the purpose of calling upon the Japanese
Admiral to express the views above set forth. Mr.
Fessenden stated that Colonel Toms and Major Gerrard
both informed General Macnaghten that his announced
purpose to ask the Japanese Admiral to take charge of
the meeting tomorrow afternoon was exceedingly unwise
and Colonel Toms was quoted as saying that once the

Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Japanese military are within the Settlement it will be impossible to get them out.

At 11:30 General Macnaghten, Consul General Caird and Mr. Fessenden went aboard the Japanese flagship to call upon the Admiral. At that time General Macnaghten made inquiry as to the manner in which the ultimatum the Admiral had given the Chinese might affect the Settlement authorities. The Admiral stated, according to Mr. Fessenden, that it was his intention to occupy every place in and out of the Settlement which had any indication of being anti-Japanese or was displaying any anti-Japanese posters. General Macnaghten informed him that the Municipal Council could not consent to his undertaking to perform such duties in the Settlement and that the Shanghai Municipal Council were perfectly capable of maintaining order within the Settlement. General Macnaghten stated that if the Admiral had information regarding the existence of anti-Japanese headquarters or the illegal display of anti-Japanese sentiments, the Council would see what steps could be taken to suppress them. He emphasized that it would be impossible to permit him, the Admiral, to take the steps he proposed. After considerable discussion a very satisfactory agreement was reached and the Admiral stated that he would not in any way interfere with the peace and order of the Settlement or take any steps of the nature indicated in the first part of the interview without first consulting with the municipal authorities. This was considered by the municipal authorities as a splendid arrangement and they departed feeling they had accomplished a great deal in getting the Admiral to agree to this arrangement.

I inquired of Mr. Fessenden regarding arrangements which had been made to keep the meeting tomorrow afternoon within reasonable limits and he informed me that 500 Japanese policemen had been detailed especially for the maintenance of order at the Japanese Club and that 300 Russian policemen were also detailed to support them, and Mr. Fessenden was under the impression that Major Gerrard's arrangements were adequate to maintain order.

Just at this point the telephone rang and Major Gerrard reported to Mr. Fessenden that he had succeeded in convincing the Japanese authorities and the Japanese Consul General and Admiral that it would be unwise to have a huge demonstration at the time of the burial of the Japanese who was killed on the morning of the 20th and that there would be a small procession of motorcars only accompanying the funeral party. Major Gerrard also was able to report that both the Admiral and Consul General had recommended to the Japanese that the meeting planned for three o'clock tomorrow afternoon should be abandoned and that he (Gerrard) believed there would be no mass meeting tomorrow afternoon.

From the foregoing it will be seen that this has been an extremely active day for the municipal authorities and that the result of their activity has been satisfactory.

Avin S. Cunningham

ENC 18 B

No. 8104

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, February 5, 1932.

Subject: Japanese Naval Activities.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of
February 3, 6 p.m., transmitting the translation
of a communication dated February 2, 1932, from
the Mayor of the Municipality of Shanghai, General
Wu Te-chen, with regard to the alleged invasion of
1/ Chapel by the Japanese Navy. There is transmitted
herewith a translation of the letter in question, to-
2/ gether with a translation of a previous letter from
the Mayor dated January 28, 1932, on the same subject.
3/ A copy of this office's acknowledgment of these letters
is also enclosed.

Respectfully yours,



Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/- Copy of letter from Mayor Wu
dated February 2, 1932.
- 2/- Copy of letter from Mayor Wu
dated January 28, 1932.
- 3/- Copy of letter to Mayor Wu
dated February 5, 1932.

PRJ MB
800

In Quintuplicate.
In Duplicate to Legation.
Copy to Minister at Nanking.



F/LS 793.94/4572

FILED

MAR 9 1932

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8104 of Edwin S. Cunningham
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated February
5, 1932, on the subject: "Japanese Naval Activities."

COPY

Letter from Wu Te-chen, Mayor of the Municipality of
Shanghai, to American Consul General, Shanghai.

February 2, 1932
(Received February 3rd a.m.)

Subject: Breach of Faith and Resumption
of Hostilities by Japan.

Sir:

It is a matter of record that I have communicated with you on the subject of invasion of Chapei by the Japanese navy. Subsequently, with a view to preservation of peace and avoidance of hostilities, your good self and the British Consul General invited the Chinese and Japanese authorities as well as the commanders of foreign defense forces to a conference at the residence of the British Consul General on January 31st, when after the commander of the British defense force suggested the ways and means of avoiding conflict between the opposing armies, it was agreed that the Japanese Consul General should ask the Japanese government for instructions in three days; that, in the event of the Japanese government being unable to accept the suggested terms, this Municipality should seek the instructions of my government; and that, during the period when instructions are to be sought, neither part should attack the other. These are all on record which is open to inspection. Since that conference was held, however, the Japanese troops have repeatedly attacked the Chinese forces by surprise. This state of affairs continued until 2.50 p.m. today when my office received suddenly a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate General informing me of the inability of the Japanese government to accept the suggested terms as indicated above. This has caused me no little astonishment. Furthermore, the Japanese troops resumed offensive on the Chinese forces in Chapei even an hour before the Japanese Consulate General's notice was received by this Municipality and they arbitrarily bombarded that area by the use of airplanes. Inasmuch as Japan has violated her pledge and resumed offensive regardless of the safety of the lives and property of the Chinese people and foreign residents within the Municipality of Shanghai, it is the government of Japan that should undertake all responsibilities. Having lodged a protest with the Japanese Consul General, I have to bring the foregoing to your attention. It is trusted that you will take note accordingly and uphold justice.

(Signed) Wu Te-chen,
Mayor

Edwin S. Cunningham, Esquire,
American Consul General,
Shanghai.

Copied by MB
Compared with LSI

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 8104 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated February
5, 1932, on the subject: "Japanese Naval Activities."

COPY

A letter from Wu Te-chen, Mayor of the Municipality
of Shanghai, to American Consul General, Shanghai.

January 28, 1932.

Subject: Japanese naval activities.

Sir:

With reference to the latest local issue under negotiation between China and Japan, I have the honor to inform you that, in order to seek an amicable settlement and with a view to protection of local order and peace, I have accepted in toto the four conditions brought up by the Consul General for Japan. Despite the fact that the Japanese Consul General has already expressed satisfaction with my reply which, the record shows, was transmitted at 1.45 p.m. today, the Public Safety Bureau of the Municipality of Shanghai received at 11.25 p.m. today (the 28th) a letter from the Japanese Consulate General enclosing two official notifications addressed, respectively, to the Commissioner of Public Safety and myself by the Commander of the 1st Japanese Expeditionary Fleet. The notification reads briefly as follows:

"In view of the large number of Japanese nationals residing in the vicinity of Chapei and with the object of maintaining peace, it is the desire of the Imperial Navy to assume the responsibility for preservation of order by distributing and furnishing that area with military forces. I entertain the hope that China will withdraw as soon as possible all the Chinese troops and their hostile arrangements on the side of Chapei."

Subsequently, at 12 o'clock in the same evening, the Public Safety Bureau received information from Chapei to the effect that the landing forces of the Japanese Navy had commenced independent military operations in that district and were launching attack on the Chinese territory. Since the Japanese Consul General has already expressed satisfaction with the reply of this Municipality, the above military action taken all of a sudden by the Japanese navy is astonishing, indeed. It is Japan that should be held responsible for breach of peace and disturbance of local order. In addition to filing an emphatic protest with the Consul General for Japan, I have to transmit this letter in the hope that you will familiarize yourself with the contents thereof and stand for justice. Your courtesy in this regard would be appreciated.

(Signed) Wu Te-chen, Mayor
Edwin S. Cunningham, Esquire,
American Consul General,
Shanghai.

Copied by MRB *two copy of*
Compared with LSI *1 cri-*
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 804 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated February
5, 1932, on the subject: "Japanese Naval Activities."

COPY

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, February 5, 1932.

Subject: Japanese Naval Activities.

General Wu Te-chen,
Mayor of the Municipality of Shanghai,
Shanghai.


Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
your two communications of January 28 and February
2, 1932, with reference to the present situation in
Shanghai. The subject matter of your letters is
receiving my earnest attention.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my high
consideration.

Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Copied by MR. 9
Compared with LSI



1711

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

GENEVA

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 10:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

51, March 4, 2 p. m.

URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL.



Last evening Simon told Davis he had received a cable from Admiral Kelly which made him feel rather confident that the time had now come when hostilities could actually be stopped and that the British and Americans must keep in constant touch and that he wished to see Davis and myself to continue cooperation.

Thus after talking on the telephone with you last night Davis and I called on Simon and subsequently on Sir Eric Drummond and Massigli in the temporary absence of Paul Boncour.

Regarding your preoccupation as to the Assembly not taking a declaration concerning the non-recognition of rights acquired by violence and in conflict with treaties, Sir John was emphatic in his declaration that he is in entire agreement with you, that this is the minimum which the Assembly should do and he had no reason to doubt that they

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PM MAR 10 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS



F/LS 793.94/4573

MAR 11 1932

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793.94/119

REP

2-#51, from Geneva, Mar. 4, 2p.m.

they would do so but that if by any chance it failed he would make a pronouncement on behalf of the British Government. He charged me to assure you of his entire accord and invited your attention to the resolution come to of the twelve on February 16th as well as the declaration by Briand on January 29th which is more vigorous in tone than that of February 16th. He added that the twelve could for juridical reasons act only as individuals but that now the States represented on the Assembly could make more emphatic declarations as States. He said that he had not confided his thoughts to London but had only reported acts, that even if some declaration to the contrary had been made it should be disregarded as he himself was directing foreign policy and no one there was authorized to say what was in his mind nor was he responsible for the various currents of opinion that might arise from divergent party views.

(END SECTION ONE)

WILSON

WSB
RR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM


Geneva

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 12:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington



51, March 4, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

with respect to his attitude. I only touched very lightly on the possibility of non-cooperation in Shanghai in connection with awaiting the Assembly's action but explained to him that it would facilitate American cooperation with the League to have the League manifest its cooperation as early as possible because both of us were convinced of Sir John's determination and because we are unwilling to do anything which would jeopardize the cooperation between Great Britain and America. We feel strongly that any hesitancy on our part now to cooperate in Shanghai would be lamentable and it must be borne in mind that the Assembly machinery is cumbersome and that it may take some days to arrive at a decision.

We then saw Drummond and he was of the same opinion and was candid in his assertion that he had not the slightest doubt that the Assembly would go at least this far. From a strategic

MET

2-#51 from Geneva, March 4, 2 pm
(SECTION TWO)

strategic point of view he thinks it would be a mistake to introduce a resolution to this effect at the early stages of the General Commission's debate as it might give the impression to the more violent members of the Assembly that there was an endeavor to choke them off. However, it might be said by some speaker in the early stages that such a resolution was the minimum the Assembly could attempt and must certainly be one of the steps which it would take.

Regarding Massigli. He was also in complete accord and recognizes that the least the Assembly must do is this step nor had he heard anyone offer objection. Last night Massigli stopped Davis, told him the French were uncomfortable about status of negotiations for the cessation of hostilities; that it put France and the other powers who had associated themselves with proposal of the Council in an unsatisfactory position as long as the British Admiral is attempting to negotiate a cessation alone and said it would not only be more satisfactory for the other powers concerned to sit in but that it would increase the possibilities of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#51 from Geneva, March 4, 2 p.m.
(SECTION TWO)

of success by having them show a united front. When we met Simon this morning we conveyed this to him. He immediately said this was undoubtedly true and that he would at once instruct Lampson to suggest to Kelly that in any further parleys the latter invite representatives of the other principal powers to be present. We have subsequently so informed Massigli who was quite pleased.


(END MESSAGE)

WILSON

WSB-HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM

GRAY

GENERAL

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 7:40 pm



SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

TRIPLE PRIORITY

52, March 4, 6 pm

In first stage afternoon meeting of the General Commission of the Assembly conflict was precipitated on the question of fact concerning the cessation of hostilities and proposal made that the qualified military authorities of the principal interested powers should be instructed to report immediately as to the facts. Simon, Boncour and the Italian representative agreed so to do. If you approve please send instructions to Shanghai immediately and notify me. Also furnish me, as urgently as possible, any reply received for transmission to the Secretary General.

Should the military authorities decide to cooperate in one report I suggest appropriate instructions be sent to our representative. Naturally I have made no commitment on this subject.

WILSON

RPF
KLP

F/LS

793.94/4574

MAR 12 1932


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM

GRAY

GENEVA

Dated March

Rec'd 5:25 p.m.



Secretary of State

Washington

URGENT

101, March 4, 9 p.m.

Consulate's 99, March 3, 9 p.m.


Following the meeting of the General Committee

this evening the President called a meeting of the
Plenary Assembly which passed unanimously (including
both parties to the dispute) the following resolution:

"The Assembly recalling the suggestions made by
the Council on the 29th February and without prejudice
to the other measures therein envisaged;

One. Calls upon the Governments of China and Japan
to take immediately the necessary measures to ensure
that the orders which, as it has been informed, have
been issued by the military commanders on both sides
for the cessation of hostilities, shall be made effective;

Two. Requests the other powers which have special
interests



F/LS 793.94/4575

FILED

MAR 10 1932

mam

2- #101, from Geneva, March 4, 1932

interests in the Shanghai Settlements to inform the Assembly of the manner in which the invitation set out in the paragraph has been executed;

Three. Recommends that negotiations be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the powers mentioned above for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The Assembly will be glad to be kept informed by the powers mentioned above of the development of these negotiations".

Details of the meeting of the Committee and of the Plenary Assembly will follow.

GILBERT

FW OX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

man



FROM

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 5 p.m.



Secretary of State

Washington

53, March 4, 9 p.m.

With reference to resolution of the Assembly adopted this afternoon transmitted by Gilbert, I have received following letter from Drummond dated today:

"The Assembly this afternoon adopted the accompanying resolution regarding the cessation of hostilities in the vicinity of Shanghai which, as you will see, invites the cooperation of the powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements.

The British, French and Italian representatives accepted this suggestion for cooperation in so far as the respective governments are concerned. I should be very grateful if you could inform me if the American Government would also be able to cooperate"

In this connection see my 52, March 4, 6 p.m.

Simon informed me during course of debate that the first words in the paragraph "and without prejudice to the other

F/LS 793.94/4576

FILED

MAR 12 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

man

2- #53, from Geneva, March 4, 1962

other measures therein envisaged" had been inserted at
his instance because he thought this would be more sat-
isfactory to you.

WILSON

FW OX

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
• PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

• Collect
Charge Department

OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT **PM REGM REC**
Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

March 4, 1932. *Gray*

11 pm
~~MAR 4 1932~~ ~~MAR 4 1932~~

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (Switzerland)

27 Your 52/4574, March 4, 6 p.m. and 53/4576, March 4 7 p.m.

Have telegraphed Shanghai requesting that American
military authorities cooperate. *Inform Drummond.*

793.94/4576

Stinson

SKH

FE:MMH:CLS

pm
FE

SKH
793.94/4576

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department

OR

Charge to
\$

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.
March 5, 1932.
10pm
MAR 5 32

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

29. FOR YOUR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. 4576

With further reference to your 53, March 4, 9 p.m.

In addition to instructions sent to Minister
Johnson based on your 52, March 4, 6 p.m., relating to
the report on the question of fact concerning the
cessation of hostilities, I have today telegraphed
Johnson as follows:

QUOTE

4589a full
(Telegraph Room: Insert text of telegram
to American Consul, Shanghai, confidential
from the Secretary for the Minister, dated
March 5, copy attached.)
9pm

UNQUOTE

Use the original

Stimson
(HRC)

FE:RSM:EJL FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/4576

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via NR

Dated March 5, 1932

Recd 5:28 a.m.



Secretary of State

Washington.

308, March 5, 2 p.m.

Following from Kuo Wen, Shanghai, March third:

"Sixteen members of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang including Mr. Sun Fo and Mr. Eugene Chen addressed a joint telegram to Mr. ^{Wang} Jag Chang Wei and General ^{Chiang} Kai Shek today blaming them for their alleged failure to send adequate reinforcements to the Nineteenth Route Army thereby resulting in the latter's retreat from Shanghai and Woosung.

Quoting recent circular telegram of the Nineteenth Route Army to the effect that its retreat ^{from Shanghai} was partly necessitated by the lack of adequate reinforcements the sixteen Canton leaders asserted that it is evident that the central authorities cannot escape their responsibility.

It is impossible for us to describe adequately the effects of the Shanghai situation in the country. In our opinion the imperative task of the Government is to
rush

F/L/S 793.94/4577

MAR 11 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- # 308 from Peiping

rush reinforcements to Shanghai and Woosung at once to effect the recovery of lost territories. On the other hand the Government should formulate a positive policy so as to carry on a prolonged resistance against Japan. This is the only way of salvation for China. If the authorities still waver and vacillate then the danger ahead will be too grave for us to describe. Upon your shoulders rest the duty of retri^eving the situation."

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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793.94
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893.77

REP



FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 5, 1932

Rec'd 7 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



157, March 5, 2 p. m.

FOLLOWING FROM CAPTAIN MAYER FOR WAR DEPARTMENT.

"23. Chinese first line astride Nanking Railway along creek west of Wangtu, second line just west of Loukapang where Japanese successfully bombed railway bridge March 2nd. Japanese occupation of Taisang unconfirmed. Announced Chinese intention is under no conditions to relinquish sovereignty on invaded territory, to retire under pressure and to advance east upon Japanese retirement thus necessitating expensive retention here of large Japanese forces. Chinese retirement well executed and forced by lack of Government support as well as threat from Liu Ho." Repeated to the Legation.

WSB

CUNNINGHAM

F/LS 793.94/4578

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
MAR 11 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 5, 1932

Rec'd 5:28 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

307, March 5, 1 p. m.

Following from Rengo News Agency, Tokyo, March third:

"The Japanese Foreign Office appears to be planning to face the Shanghai round table conference, keeping the undermentioned items before it:

First. There is the necessity of concluding a military agreement between China and Japan in place of an agreement for suspending hostilities.

Second. Although the ultimatum of February 28th is used as the basis of discussion, in view of the extension of the battle line, the foremost line of the Japanese Army shall be slightly advanced.

Third. A neutral zone shall be established between the Chinese and Japanese armies, and an international force shall be stationed therein.

Fourth. Japan has no territorial and political ambitions in Shanghai and China proper, neither has she any intention of monopolizing interests exclusive to Japan,

nor

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793.94/4579

FILED

MAR 11 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RET

2-#307, from Peiping, Mar. 5, 1p.m.

ncr has she any desire of establishing her own concession
in Shanghai.

Fifth. Japan shall reserve the right of demanding
an indemnity.

Sixth. Anti-Japanese activities shall be strictly
suppressed.

Seventh. Although the round table conference is
desired to discuss emergency remedial measures in principal,
should the powers have the intention of considering matters
relating to the protection of the future of the Settlement
and the people residing therein, Japan is prepared to
study permanent measures there anent."

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

CIB

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1728

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAR 4 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
MAR 5 1932

CONFIDENTIAL THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 5 1932
Department of State

Sino-Japanese Situation.

The Japanese Ambassador came in to give me an announcement ~~of~~ the cessation of hostilities, and he handed me the copy which is annexed. He then handed me a set of the basic conditions of the immediate cessation of hostilities, which is also annexed. He did not make it clear what these represented or who they came from. He said that the Japanese army occupied the line as follows: Kasing, Naziang, Chenju, and that the Woosung Forts were captured at 8:10 a. m. March 3rd. He then said that his Government was very anxious that we should participate in the round table conference mentioned in the basic provision above-mentioned to arrange the details of the truce; that as soon as these were arranged the Japanese army would withdraw. He also said something about a neutral zone around Shanghai.

I then took up the situation and I pointed out that on February 29 the League of Nations, on the request of Japan, had suggested a proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the various steps, including a conference; that

F/LS
793.94/4580

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793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

that this was immediately accepted personally by the Japanese representative, Sato, on February 29, subject to the approval of his Government, and that the approval of the Government was given on March 1 (see No. 95 from Geneva). The Japanese Ambassador agreed to each of these dates. I said that this having been done, I was greatly shocked and I thought a great many other people were shocked by the fact that after this proposal for immediate cessation of hostilities had been made and accepted, Japan had made the largest attack of the entire Shanghai operation on March 2 and 3, in which a great many Chinese and Japanese had lost their lives. I told the Ambassador that was not the way that we ceased hostilities in the Great War, when, so far as I knew, there was not a shot fired after 11 o'clock on November 11, the time that we agreed to cease. The Ambassador was much embarrassed.

He said ^{first} that the Chinese had not accepted the immediate cessation of hostilities at the time of Admiral Kelly's meeting. I replied that this was contrary to my understanding; that my understanding had been that the Chinese Government had accepted the proposal for cessation of hostilities even before the Japanese had accepted. He then said that it was very hard to stop troops when they

were

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

were in combat. I referred to the situation in the Great War where it was stopped.

The Ambassador said that when he came in he hoped that I would be pleased by his announcement of the cessation now of hostilities and the firing of guns. I told him that I was glad that the guns had stopped firing, but I begged him to remember that so far as our nationals had been concerned, they had not been in any danger at all until the Japanese troops came to Shanghai on January 29 and got into a fight with the Chinese forces on Chinese territory. I said that I did not enter into the question of the safety of Japanese nationals; that was a matter which I did not profess to know, but I did know that our nationals had been perfectly safe until the Japanese had come here as aforesaid and got into a fight with the Chinese army. The Ambassador was very much agitated and said he hoped that we would join the round table conference because the success would be impossible without the presence of America. I pointed out that I could not allow my Government to be drawn into a position where we might be thought to be seeking extensions of foreign rights at the expense of China; that we did not claim any such extensions

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

extensions and we would not participate in negotiations which might result in getting them; but that I would consider the question of our participation and decide that later. I said that the situation had, however, entirely changed in my opinion since our original proposal.

HLS.

S HLS:BMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DECLARATION

The Imperial Japanese land forces since their arrival in Shanghai and its vicinity had, in conjunction with the Imperial Naval forces, made every effort to achieve the object of protecting Japanese residents by peaceful means. However, proposals based on such a desire were not, to their regret, acceded to by the nineteenth route army of China and at last hostilities were started.

Chinese forces have now retreated to positions beyond the distance originally requested by the Imperial forces, and signs are seen of peace of the Shanghai settlements being recovered and safety of Japanese residents being reassured.

I have therefore decided to order the forces to halt for the time being at points actually held and to stop fighting, provided, that the Chinese forces will not resort to further hostile actions.

General Yoshinori Shirakawa

Chief of Imperial Japanese Land Forces

Shanghai, March 3, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

from ARBucher Mch 3

Basic conditions of the immediate cessation of hostilities.

1. Should China give assurances for the withdrawal of her troops to a certain distance from Shanghai (distance to be determined by the Japanese and Chinese authorities), Japan will agree to the cessation of hostilities for a certain period (to be agreed upon between Japanese and Chinese authorities), and pending subsequent arrangements the Japanese and Chinese forces shall hold their respective positions. Details relating to the cessation of hostilities shall be arranged by the Japanese and Chinese military authorities.


2. During the period of the cessation of hostilities, a round-table conference between Japan and China shall be held at Shanghai, in which representatives of the principal powers interested shall participate, and the conference shall discuss, with a view to reaching an agreement upon, methods for the withdrawal of both the Chinese and Japanese forces on such terms as are set out in the following paragraph, together with measures for the restoration and maintenance of peace and order in and around Shanghai and for safeguarding the International Settlement and French Concession in Shanghai and foreign lives, property and interests

therein.

3. The withdrawal of troops shall be commenced by the Chinese troops (including plain-clothes gunmen) to a specified distance, and upon ascertaining the withdrawal of the Chinese forces, the Japanese forces will withdraw to the Shanghai and Woosung areas. As soon as normal conditions prevail, the Japanese army shall be withdrawn from these areas.

4. Should either of the parties infringe any of the terms on the cessation of hostilities, the other party shall have freedom of action. Both parties shall have the same freedom of action upon the expiration of the period agreed upon under paragraph I.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR, HERR FRIEDRICH W. VON PRITZWITZ
UND GAFFRON.

Sino-Japanese Situation.

The German Ambassador called and asked me what the news was from the Far East. I told him that the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai had announced to our Consul General that the Japanese army had stopped hostilities at Shanghai; that, however, no mention was made as to hostilities elsewhere and no explanation was given as to why, after having accepted the proposal of the four powers for immediate cessation of hostilities, the Japanese had made their attack of the day before yesterday; and that I could make no prophesies for the future. The Ambassador responded that certainly the Japanese actions had been very baffling. He asked my explanation of the sudden activity and the firmness of tone of the recent communications to Japan from Russia. I smiled and said that I did not know; that it might have been a combination of the 19th Route Army and the letter to Borah. He replied and said yes, he thought the Japanese military prestige had been dimmed.

76/94

I then asked the Ambassador what he thought was going to happen at Geneva. He said he really knew very little;

F/LS

793.94/4581

FILED

MAR 9 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

little; that the larger powers seemed to be holding back on any action on Article XVI of the Covenant. I asked him whether he thought there was any likelihood of any action being taken as to nonrecognition of steps taken in violation of treaties. He said he had heard a good deal about that but did not know any details. I asked him the specific question of whether he thought Germany would be in favor of such a step. He replied that he thought Germany and her people would be in favor, but he hastily added that he had no definite knowledge or instructions from his Government. I said that we certainly could not be accused of failure to cooperate with the League, and he said certainly not, that our position was perfectly clear. I said that we, in the language of the street, were "sitting pretty" and were not worrying about what the Assembly did.

HLS.


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH ITALIAN
 AMBASSADOR, MARCH 1, 1932.



793.94
 The Italian Ambassador called to talk about the Sino-Japanese situation and to give me the gist of a number of telegrams running over the past ten days received by him from various Italian missions.

Most were innocuous and conformed to our information. One seemed to contain a statement that the Embassies of the four powers at Tokyo had stated to the government that an autonomous Manchuria was more satisfactory to us than an independent Manchuria. Neither of us seemed to understand the meaning but I told the Ambassador that Forbes had no such instructions, that I knew of no attitude or policy of the government in favor of any such expression, and that we were insisting that the Manchurian problem should be met without implication or commitment on the principle of our announced policies in the January seventh note and the Secretary's Borah letter.

611.9412
 The Ambassador read another telegram to the effect that it was rumored in Geneva that our Government was in favor of an economic boycott. I told him that was not true, that the contrary was the case, and the only thing to give color to it was the manifest growth of the private

F/L/S
 793.94/4582

FILED
 MAR 4 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

boycott in this country which I personally looked on with considerable concern. I told him the general story of the negotiations for the last Council action in regard to good offices and explained our insistence that the offer should not take sides, our fear over arousing a general anti-foreign movement in China, and our insistence that the Manchurian problem should not be wedged into international acceptance.

The Ambassador asked whether we understood the Assembly was likely to levy a boycott and I told him that we had no special information but the trend seemed to be toward less extreme measures if anything was done at this time. He said it was rumored in London that we had offered Great Britain concessions on debts if she would help us with Japan. I said this was entirely untrue, that the topic had never been discussed so far as I knew, and while cooperation with us in the Manchurian situation might affect sentiment in this country which in turn might affect debt settlements indirectly, there was no trade, bargain or any approach to the subject. He said that all the European countries appreciated that sentiment on the topic might be affected by the Japanese negotiations and that he thought this motive was influencing England somewhat in shifting her original position.

500.2111
 800.511189
 Great Britain

JGR

A-R JGR:HWC

1730

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 5, 1932

Rec'd 9:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

March 5, 8 p. m.

Italian Charge d'Affaires has received a telegram

from the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo to the effect that
he understands whatever the Chinese reply may be with
regard to proposed Shanghai conference the Japanese
Government will continue to consult with the interested
powers and will not resume hostilities so long as Chinese
forces do not come within 20 kilometer zone.

JOHNSON




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MAR 11 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
(Prepared in accordance with the Legation's Circular telegram of November 25, 1931.)



Required Report

MAR 4 32


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Department of State

MAR 11 1932

793.94/4584



THE ANTI-JAPANESE BOYCOTT AND ITS
EFFECTS ON FOREIGN TRADE IN CHINA

(Continuation)

From:

J. Ernest Black
J. Ernest Black,
American Vice Consul.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China.

Date of Completion: JANUARY 23, 1932.

Date of Mailing: FEB 9 1932

APPROVED:

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham
American Consul General.

174
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

I N D E X

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General	1
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Small Factories	6
Japan's Export Trade	6
Anti-Japanese Societies	7
Confidential Section	8

- 1 -

GENERAL

Since the completion of this Consulate General's report of December 2, 1931 entitled "The Anti-Japanese Boycott and Its Effects on Foreign Trade in China," an appreciable tightening of the boycott has manifested itself in the Shanghai district. This is probably due principally to the fact that the various anti-Japanese societies operating throughout the district have found it extremely profitable to seize and hold goods which are of Japanese origin or resemble them, releasing them only on the payment of a considerable fine. In many instances goods of American origin, principally salted fish, and goods of Japanese origin belonging to American firms have been seized by the boycott associations and only released after considerable negotiations between the Consulate General and the local authorities. In cases where the products are of non-Japanese origin and belong to an American firm, certificates to this effect are issued by this office and are attached to the various cases of such goods while in transit. Notwithstanding the fact that these shipments are covered by consular certificates, several shipments of salted fish have been confiscated by the boycott societies and only released after strong representations to the local authorities. In all justice to the local officials it must be stated that they have done their utmost to prevent the occurrence of seizures of goods accompanied by consular certificates and seizures at the present time are much fewer than they were about a month ago. It is quite evident, however, that the boycott societies will seize cargo on the slightest pretext provided they

- 2 -

they think they can make anything out of it. The present activities and methods of the boycott associations closely resemble those of the so-called "racketeers" in the United States. Acting under the semblance of patriotism the leaders of the associations are wont to order certain shipments of goods confiscated which are later released upon the payment of a considerable fine on the part of the owners or sold surreptitiously if the fine is not forthcoming. By this method a few leading members of the boycott associations are at present making large profits at the expense of the Japanese as well as of the Chinese dealers and shop-owners.

JAPANESE SHIPPING

Notwithstanding the numerous seizures of Japanese goods by the anti-Japanese societies, the effect of the boycott on Japanese shipping has unquestionably been the most effective means of injuring Japan's trade with China. The total loss sustained by various Japanese shipping companies in China as a result of the suspension of their shipping services along the China coast and in the Yangtse Valley since the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria is estimated to have amounted to more than Yen 50,000,000 (approximately US\$25,000,000). This financial loss has been borne principally by three shipping companies, namely, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha and the Nissen Kisen Kaisha.

According to recently released statistics, the N. Y. K., the principal Japanese steamship company, experienced its worst year in 1931 for the last five year period as far as freight transportation between China and Japan is concerned.

During 1931 N. Y. K. vessels carried goods from Japan
to

- 3 -

to China amounting to only 348,141 tons, which was 107,100 tons less than in 1929. As the average tonnage for several preceding years has amounted to approximately 500,000 tons, it can readily be seen that the boycott has had a very marked effect on Japanese shipping. Other Japanese shipping companies similarly experienced sharp declines in the volume of goods and passengers carried by their respective vessels as a result of the boycott.

Up to September 1931, N. Y. K. vessels carried goods amounting to approximately 30,000 tons monthly from Japan to Shanghai. During September, however, this figure dropped to 20,000 while in October and November, it dropped to the 10,000 ton level.

In consequence of the loss of passengers and freight by the Japanese shipping companies, American, British and Norwegian shipping concerns have materially increased their earnings and have entered into new long term contract with Chinese merchants which will undoubtedly fill their vessels to capacity for some time even if the boycott suddenly terminates. The Japanese companies are endeavoring to the utmost degree to procure Chinese cargo by means of radical rate reduction but up to the present have not been successful as they are unable to guarantee the services of Chinese coolies in the Yangtse ports for unloading purposes with the result that Shanghai merchants will not take the risk of shipping by Japanese vessels despite the very much lower rates. According to the latest reports available more than 415,000 tons of Japanese ships are at present tied up in various ports as detailed below:

Company

- 4 -

<u>Company</u>	<u>No. Of Ships</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
N. Y. K.	19	134,286
*Crab Canning	27	81,384
Kwantung Administration	6	22,036
Others	57	176,411
Total	109	414,120

JAPANESE OWNED MILLS

The anti-Japanese boycott movement has also had its marked effect on the locally owned Japanese cotton mills which have been forced to curtail their production materially. In order that losses might be minimized as much as possible the mills have endeavored to ship cotton goods which have accumulated in local warehouses to Manchuria as well as to the Dutch Indies and British India.

Recent reports from Manchuria indicate that the quantities of cotton goods arriving in Dairen for consumption in Manchuria from Shanghai have steadily increased, which has resulted in a 15 percent reduction in the price of cotton yarn and cloth produced in Manchuria.

Cotton yarn and cloth shipped from Shanghai to Dairen during September, October and November of 1931, as compared with the figures for the corresponding months of 1930, are as follows:

	<u>COTTON YARN</u>	
	<u>1930</u>	<u>1931</u>
September	220 bales	419 bales
October	132 "	1,146 "
November	42 "	2,750 "

COTTON

*Japanese fishing vessels principally employed in catching crustacea.

- 5 -

COTTON CLOTH

	<u>1930</u>	<u>1931</u>
September	782 bales	813 bales
October	547 "	418 "
November	230 "	1,910 "

A tense situation has existed for sometime concerning the relations of employers and employees in the mills in the Western district of Shanghai. Recently, the Dong Shing Mill posted a notice by which the usual bonus was rescinded. This was done subsequently to a meeting of the Japanese mill owners. Others followed suit within several days, and as a result as many as 8,500 employees are either on strike or have been locked out.

According to authentic statistics which are considered to be reliable, Japanese industrial plants in Shanghai employ about 55,000 Chinese. These mills are situated in the International Settlement and in the Chapel district. The management of the Nagai Wata Kaisha, with their nine establishments have not announced their decision regarding the payment of bonuses, but it is expected that they will shortly notify their employees of the abolition of the grant. This company employs about 14,000 persons, the majority of whom are females.

Representatives of local Japanese cotton mills recently held a meeting to discuss policies to be adopted in dealing with a strike of more than 6,600 workers. These strikes include 3,900 employed by the Japanese China Cotton Spinning & Weaving Company, 1,200 of the Shanghai Silk Spinning Com-

pany

- 6 -

pany and 1,500 of the Dong Hsing Spinning & Weaving Company.

As a result of this meeting it was decided that unless the strikers resumed working unconditionally, the mills affected by the strike would continue to remain closed. In consequence of this decision by the Japanese mill owners, dissatisfied Chinese strikers stormed one of the mills causing considerable damage.

Up to the present time the workers have not returned to their work and it is believed that further strikes will occur in this industry.

SMALL FACTORIES

According to the local Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the small factories and plants in Shanghai owned and operated by Japanese are suffering extremely as a result of the boycott. Of the 55 small factories under Japanese management in Shanghai, the majority are now closed, as shown in the following table:

Totally closed	35
50 percent closed	7
30 to 40 percent closed	4
80 percent closed	3
90 percent closed	3
In full operation	1
Unknown	<u>2</u>
	<u>55</u>

JAPAN'S EXPORT TRADE

According to the Japanese Commercial Counsellor, Japan's foreign trade values, imports and exports, for the eleven months of 1931 totalled Yen 2,188,000,000 (approximately

- 7 -

mately US\$1,094,000,000) with Yen 1,064,000,000 (approximately US\$532,000,000) for exports, recording Yen 60,000,000 (approximately US\$30,000,000) as an import excess. Compared with the previous corresponding period, the trade figures for exports, imports and an excess of imports over exports showed a decrease of 21 percent, 12 percent and 35 percent respectively.

Exports to China have been greatly handicapped owing to the Manchurian situation, the total export values amounting to Yen 246,000,000 (approximately US\$123,000,000) up to the end of November which showed a decrease by 34 percent, compared with the previous corresponding period. Although the import trade with China was not so seriously affected as the export trade the total figures showed a decrease by 18 percent while the favorable trade balance with China amounted to Yen 30,000,000 (approximately US\$15,000,000), showing a considerable decrease of Yen 79,000,000 (approximately US\$39,500,000) compared with the previous corresponding period.

ANTI-JAPANESE SOCIETIES

As mentioned above, the pickets of the various anti-Japanese societies have recently been very active in seizing Japanese goods. There are several hundred anti-Japanese societies operating in various parts of this consular district, the largest and most influential of which is the National Salvation Committee to Resist Japan. An increase in the number of societies has also been noted since the beginning of the year. The various societies in this consular district operate independently of each other and goods

- 8 -

goods which have been released by one society may be seized by another. As a general rule each organization has a certain district within which it must confine its operations and trouble between two societies generally arises in the event of one association effecting seizures in another's territory. The activities of the anti-Japanese societies may be closely compared with those of "bootleggers" in the United States. It is believed that the activities of these associations will continue for some time to come owing to the fact that the leaders of the organizations derive large profits from their activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

It has been authoritatively ascertained by this office that firms desiring to market products which resemble those of Japanese origin in appearance have paid bribes to certain boycott associations for the privilege of having their goods immune from seizure. One local firm which is incorporated under the China Trade Act has paid more than Mex.\$1,200 (US\$280) to the boycott association of Ningpo in order to prevent their salt herring from being confiscated notwithstanding the fact that all the cases sent to that city have been accompanied by American Consular certificates. The same firm is at present negotiating with the boycott association leaders in Hangchow in order to arrive at a figure which will be acceptable to both parties concerned. The manager of the local firm has stated emphatically that this is the only method which will insure the goods against seizure by the boycott associations.

SOURCE

175
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Article published in the Shanghai press, report of the Japanese Commercial Counsellor, personal interviews with local businessmen, and information obtained from various periodicals constitute the sources of information contained in this report.

800/610.21
JEB:JGH/wst

In quintuplicate to the Department of State;
One copy to the American Legation, Peiping, China;
One copy to the American Commercial Attache, Shanghai, China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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

FROM

GRAY AND PLAIN

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 5, 1932

Rec'd 8:50 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

155, March 5, noon.

Press Union Bulletin March 4th carries the statement that the Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Shanghai has issued a proclamation in the Chinese language which was distributed among the Chinese in Chapei and its environs on that afternoon. Briefly the proclamation emphasizes the following points: (END GRAY)

"One. Japan has always endeavored to cultivate fairly relations with the Chinese people.

Two. Japan has no ill feeling against the innocent and non-combatants of the Chinese, who should, therefore seek to continue in their peaceful pursuits of life resting assured that their lives will be fully safeguarded.

Three. Chinese militarists and their followers have placed Japanese lives and property (*) which has necessitated the despatch of Japanese forces to Shanghai and which have led to the recent clash.

Four. Japanese have no territorial or other ambitions

in

F/LS 793.94/4585

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MAR 11 1932

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REP

2-#155, from Shanghai, Mar. 5, noon.

in Shanghai or its vicinity.

Five. Now that the Chinese military have been driven away, the Chinese people should cooperate with the Japanese in changing the friendly relations between the two people."

Repeated to the Legation and to the Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

(*) Apparent omission

RPF

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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GREEN


FROM Geneva

Dated March 5, 1932

Rec'd 10:09 a.m.



NET



Secretary of State,

Washington

VERY URGENT.

54, March 5, 2 p.m.

On reading over the record of our telephone conversation last night it has occurred to me to state to you a thought which I neglected to mention at that time. The plan comprised in the Council's resolution of February 29 and the Assembly's resolution of yesterday, both comprise the presence of Americans in every discussion. You may consider that this fact in itself is a safeguard for the prevention of unfair advantage being taken of the Chinese and I gather that Yen so considers it.

An idea has been discussed this morning as to the method of limiting the scope of the Conference called "round table" for want of a better name. It is suggested that the ~~Ministers~~ of the four principally interested powers in Shanghai should be requested to submit a proposed agenda for the conference after consultation with their Japanese colleague and the

local

F/LS 793.94/4586

FILED

MAR 10 1932

MET

2-#54 from Geneva, March 5, 2 pm.

local Chinese authorities.

This would carry the advantage of an agenda prepared by those having intimate knowledge of local necessities and would be more carefully thought out and efficacious than would the result of a debate among the states of the Assembly.

Since discussion on this point may come up this afternoon I should appreciate being advised very urgently whether you consider such a plan useful and our cooperation therein feasible.

WILSON

WSB

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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Charge Department ☒

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

March 5, 1932.

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (Switzerland)

Your 54/4586 March 5, 2 p.m.

I see dangerous possibilities in your suggestion. It appears to dispossess Nanking from the formulation of agenda. The local Chinese authorities do not seem to me an adequate representation of China, and arrangements made with them might not be ratified by Nanking. Such an arrangement may too easily be misrepresented as a working alliance between Tokyo and the four powers against China, endeavoring to slide through some long sought foreign advantages in the Settlement at the expense of Chinese National interests. In Yen's letter to Boncour of March 2 he made the following condition QUOTE It is of course understood that participation in this conference is subject to agreement between participating governments as to its agenda UNQUOTE. I should be surprised if he did not mean Nanking and not the local authorities. In my opinion every effort should be made to get the highest possible Chinese authority into this conference.

S:HLB:CLS

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

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Stinson
(HSC)

175
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

3/7/32

Please attach
this rough draft
to order.
DGS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

DCR - Mr. Lohman.

This is the Secretary's
holograph draft of our 28, March
5, 9 P.M. to Wilson and General.

Will you please see that it is
placed in the files in the proper
place?

WGC.

Werner
Reserve
Governor

file
112

Yours 54 Mch 5 2 P.M.


I see dangerous possibilities in your suggestion - It appears to dispossess Nanking from ^{the} formulation of agenda and to leave ~~it to an alliance~~ The local Chinese authorities do not seem to me an adequate representation of China, ~~for them~~ and arrangements made with them ^{might} ~~may~~ not be satisfied by Nanking. Such an arrangement may too easily slide ^{be misrepresented as a} ~~into~~ a working alliance between Tokyo and the four powers against China, endeavoring to slide through some long sought - foreign advantages in the Settlement at the expense of Chinese national interests - In Yen's letter to Boncompagni

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Condition Quote It is of course
understood that participation in
this conference is subject to
agreement between participating
governments as to its agenda
Unquote = I should be surprised
if he did not mean Nanking
and not the local authorities.

In my opinion every effort should
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Chinese authority into this conference

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, NOBILE GIACOMO DE MARTINO.

Sino-Japanese Situation.

The Italian Ambassador came in to read me the message from his Government which recited the concurrence of Italy in the recent proposals of the four powers at Shanghai. I asked him how Italy felt about the action of Japan in making a general attack the day after she had agreed to a cessation of hostilities. He said he could not understand it.

He brought up the question of Geneva and said that in the Assembly there was evidently reluctance to adopt a boycott. I asked him what the attitude of Italy would be towards a resolution in the Assembly declaring against a nonrecognition of steps taken in violation of treaties, as suggested in the Borah letter. He replied by saying that the Borah letter had won great repercussions throughout the world, and he supposed Italy would be in favor of it, but he didn't know.

HLS.

S HLS:BMS

F/LS
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1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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 5 1932
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.
 Dated March 5, 1932
 Rec'd 9:10 a.m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAR 5 1932
 Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4588

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

159, March 5, 4 p. m.

Continuing my daily report 154, March 4, 5 p. m. (*)

Two. The majority of sand bag" placements and barbed wire entanglements erected by Chinese soldiers in various sections of western Chapei were removed by Japanese soldiers late yesterday afternoon.

Three. The American Marine headquarters report that reports of fighting at Nanziang and Liuho are considered unreliable. The Japanese also deny that there has been any fighting at those points.

Four. Last night Shanghai had a remarkable demonstration of Chinese mob psychology. As a result of the issue of circular by unknown parties containing a fictitious report of the death of General Shirakawa commanding Japanese forces and the overwhelming defeat of the various Japanese armies by the 19th Route Army the Chinese ^{population suddenly} broke loose in a mad frenzy of excitement which was ushered in by the wholesale firing of cracker and waving of flags all over

MAR 11 1932

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REP

2-#159, from Shanghai, Mar. 5, 4p.m.

all over the city. Excitable mobs poured down all the main avenues and streets and were with difficulty controlled. Several baton charges were made and it was necessary to call out reserves, the police even threatening to fire if the mob did not disperse. In some places the police and reserves were taken. The mobs were finally dispersed by ten o'clock.

Five. An investigation reveals the fact that within a year no less than 162,000 workers in various trades who have been thrown out of work as a result of the Sino-Japanese hostilities. Some 65,000 of these are living within the limits of the Settlement.

Repeated to Legation, Nanking, copy to the Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

HPD


(*) Apparent omission.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FROM

GRAY


Shanghai via NR

Dated March 5, 1932

Recd 9:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.



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FW 793.94/4588

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- # 159 from Shanghai

population suddenly broke loose in a mad frenzy of excitement which was ushered in by the wholesale firing of cracker and waving of flags all over the city. Excitable mobs poured down all the main avenues and streets and were with difficulty controlled. Several baton charges were made and it was necessary to call out reserves, the police even threatening to fire if the mob did not disperse. In some places the police and reserves were taken. The mobs were finally dispersed by ten o'clock.

Five. An investigation reveals the fact that within a year no less than 162,000 workers in various trades who have been out of work as a result of the Sino-Japanese hostilities. Some 65,000 of these are living within the limits of the Settlement.

Repeated to Legation, Nanking, copy to the Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB
HPD

176

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

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793.94119

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MAR 4 1932
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY
MAR 5 1932

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAR 5 1932

Department of State

March 2, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, SIR RONALD LINDSAY.

Shanghai.

During the call of the British Ambassador he brought up the situation at Shanghai. He said he could not understand how the Japanese could ask for a truce and stage a major attack; that the main thing was to keep our own two Governments working exactly together. I told him I agreed and that I had been having very satisfactory communications with Sir John Simon at Geneva over this proposed truce; that I also had been having very great help from the French Government through Claudel; that that was very encouraging in view of the rumors that there had been in the first place of sympathy or understanding between France and Japan. The Ambassador said that he was very interested to hear that; that he had not been able himself to believe that there was any understanding between them; that they did not have enough in common to produce such a situation.

HLS.

S HLS:EMS

F/LS
793.94/4589

1765

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

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Charge to
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Washington,

Naval Radio

March 1, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China)

For the Minister.

Department's 60, February 29, 4 p.m.

Geneva reports adoption of a proposed plan by all
 the members of the council present other than China and
 Japan and personally endorsed by the representatives of those
 two countries and referred by them to their Governments, with
 text as follows:

QUOTE One. A conference to be immediately set up in
 Shanghai composed of representatives of the Governments of
 China and Japan together with representatives of the other
 powers above referred to for the purpose of bringing about a
 final conclusion of fighting and the restoration of peaceful
 conditions in the Shanghai area.

Two. The conference would be undertaken on the basis

(a) That Japan has no political or territorial de-
 signs and no intention of establishing a Japanese Settlement
 in Shanghai or of otherwise advancing the exclusive interests
 of the Japanese, and

(b) That China enters the conference on

the basis that the safety and integrity of the Inter-

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.-No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/4589A

1766

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- 2 -

national and French Settlements must be preserved under arrangements which will secure these areas and their residents from danger.

Three. The meeting of this conference is of course subject to the making of local arrangements for a cessation of hostilities. The Council trusts that this will very speedily be brought about. It is proposed that the military, naval and civilian authorities of the other principal powers represented in Shanghai will render all possible assistance in consolidating the arrangements.

Four. To this proposal, which is aimed at the immediate reestablishment of peace in the Shanghai area, without prejudice to or qualification of any position previously taken by the League of Nations or any power in relation to Sino-Japanese affairs, the President desires, in the name of himself and of his colleagues, to invite the adherence and cooperation both of China and Japan and of the other powers referred to, whose local position enables them to make

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138

1767

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

- 3 -

a special contribution to the common purpose of stopping
armed conflict and restoring peace UNQUOTE

Stinson

SKA

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FEJ:CLS

FE
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Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

1768

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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OR
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Department of State

Washington,

March 3, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (China).

71 CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE MINISTER.

Reference my numbers 60/4476 of February 29, 4 p.m.,
 65/4526 of March 1, 11 p.m., and 66/44A of March 1, 12 p.m.

Until you receive further instructions, I do not wish to have either you or any civil or military representative of this Government participate in the round table conferences which are now in prospect under the recent suggestion of the League of Nations. I consider that the situation has been obscured by the fact that the Japanese, after having initiated this movement and having accepted the proposals of the ^{Council of the League} ~~four powers~~, have carried through a major offensive, and I do not wish to participate in the conference until I am more clear as to what will be proposed there. As intimated in my previous instructions above referred to I do not wish to get drawn into proposals which will appear as an endorsement of Japan's position or as unfair to China.

S HES/RSM:AT

A. T. K.

OR

Enciphered by _____ 1932. P.W.

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

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This document contains confidential information. It should be handled accordingly. Being communicated to anyone.

WADO 22

5/11

Gustafson

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

March 4, 1932.

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AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China)

PRIORITY.

For the Minister.

One. Wilson telegraphs from Geneva that disagreement

arose in League Assembly meeting on the question of fact concerning cessation of hostilities at Shanghai and that proposal was made that QUOTE the qualified military authorities of the principal interested powers should be instructed to report immediately as to the facts UNQUOTE. Also that the British, French and Italian representatives at Geneva agreed to issue such instructions.

Two. Please inform Admiral Taylor of my desire that the American military authorities cooperate with the military authorities of other interested powers in making the report in question. Also that I feel that American military authorities should be guided by the procedure set forth in Department's telegram of February 5, 6 p.m. to the American Consul at Shanghai, paragraph two.

Three.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/4589C

793.94/A
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893.102-S
793.94/119
500.5111
76

This cable was sent in confidence and it should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

Three. This instruction relates only to the report
on the question of fact referred to in paragraph one.

Four. Telegraph Department action taken *and inform*
Department of findings of fact.

Stinson

Stet

Stet

FE:MMH:CLS

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FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PLAIN

Washington,

March 5, 1932.

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China)

CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE MINISTER.

My 71/4589d, March 3, 5 p.m.

One. I am informed from Geneva that a meeting of the Plenary Assembly has passed unanimously (including both parties to the dispute) the following resolution:
QUOTE The Assembly recalling the suggestions made by the Council on the 29th February and without prejudice to the other measures therein envisaged;

One. Calls upon the Governments of China and Japan to take immediately the necessary measures to ensure that the orders which, as it has been informed, have been issued by the military commanders on both sides for the cessation of hostilities, shall be made effective;

Two. Requests the other powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to inform the Assembly of the manner in which the invitation set out in the previous paragraph has been executed;

Three. Recommends that negotiations be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives with

the

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

- 2 -

the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the powers mentioned above for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The Assembly will be glad to be kept informed by the powers mentioned above of the development of these negotiations UNQUOTE.

Wilson further informs me that it is morally certain that the Assembly will take action along the line already taken by this Government in its note of January 7th.

Two. I understand that the proposed conference is to be based on the following principles: (a) China freely consents to such a conference; (b) the discussions of the conference are to be limited to the question of terminating hostilities, evacuating military forces and immediate reestablishment of peace in the Shanghai area. My understanding is that Japan has agreed to the provisions reported in the Department's No. 66^{4589a} of March 1, 12 p.m. to Shanghai, including the restriction that QUOTE Japan has no political or territorial designs and no intention of establishing a Japanese settlement in Shanghai or of otherwise advancing the exclusive interests of the Japanese

UNQUOTE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

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- 3 -

UNQUOTE; and that the whole proposal is aimed at the immediate reestablishment of peace in the Shanghai area without prejudice to or qualification of any position previously taken by the League or any Power in relation to Sino-Japanese affairs and that the cooperation of the Powers is invoked and is forthcoming for the common purpose of stopping armed conflict and restoring peace. In my view this means that no proposals are to be given consideration there which may go outside of the limits of those provisions. This applies, in my view, also to any effort to bring about permanent changes in the boundaries of the International Settlement or to effect any other changes at China's expense in the advancing of which other Powers may be individually or collectively motivated by self-interest.

Three. To recapitulate, in giving approval to this plan, the American Government took the position and has reaffirmed it in conferences between Wilson and leaders of the Assembly at Geneva that at the proposed conference no question should be taken up which relates to permanent changes and discussion should be restricted to questions relating

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Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

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PLAIN

- 4 -

relating to the liquidation of the military situation at Shanghai. Specifically, without China's consent there should not be brought up at any conference in which we participate any question relating to the subject of a pacific boycott, it being my view that if the Japanese wish to take up any subjects of that sort they must take them up at a subsequent conference which will deal with the whole controversy between China and Japan, including the problem of Manchuria, at a time when such controversies can be settled without the pressure of the occupation of the Japanese military forces.

Four. Subject to its being clear that the conference is to be conducted in accordance with the principles and provisions outlined above, I authorize participation by you and military and naval authorities of the United States.

Stimson
(HSC)

FE:SKH:CLS

FE

Enciphered by


Sent by operator M., 19.....

1774

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM



FROM

GRAY AND GREEN

Geneva

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 8:15 p. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 10 1932 PM
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

102, March 4, 10 p. m. (SECTION ONE).

Consulate's 101, March 4, 9 p. m.

One. General Committee of the Assembly consisting of representations of all the delegates to the Assembly met today at 4 p. m. under the chairmanship of Hymans, President of the Assembly. Hymans opened the discussion by reading a letter from the Chinese delegation stating that the Chinese Commander had proclaimed a cessation of hostilities at midnight but adding that in spite of Japanese assurances the Japanese were still attacking and severe fighting was in progress. He then read a letter from the Japanese delegation stating that the Japanese army and navy had ceased hostilities and that although the Chinese soldiers occasionally fired on the Japanese lines and chance skirmishes took place this

did not

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FILED
MAR 10 1932

#102, March 4, 10 p. m., from Gilbert, Geneva

-2-

did not alter in any way the attitude of the Japanese High Command in regard to the cessation of hostilities unless the Chinese army should make a real offensive.

Two. This contradictory information placed the Assembly in a position of great uncertainty. Yen then spoke expressing doubt in regard to the cessation of hostilities on the part of the Japanese and suggested that the Assembly request the four neutral Admirals in Shanghai, the British America, French and Italian, to ascertain whether hostilities had really ceased and to authorize them to see to it that these hostilities should cease and thus remain for a period of time sufficient for arranging the terms of an armistice.

Three. The Secretary General then announced that he had telegraphed yesterday to the Commission at Shanghai requesting them to furnish a report as soon as possible concerning developments and particularly in regard to the actual situation respecting the cessation of hostilities. He added, however, that it might be difficult for the Commission to obtain information from points at a distance from Shanghai and suggested that the powers

having

#102, March 4, 10 p. m., from Gilbert, Geneva

-3-

having military, naval and civil authorities on the spot instruct them to convey information to the Commission.

Simon, Boncour and Piloti gave assurances that their governments would endeavor to obtain accurate information through their representatives on the spot.

Four. Sato expressed approval of the procedure but maintained that on the Japanese side hostilities had ceased. A debate on this point then ensued between Sato and Yen which was effectually closed by Yen reading telegrams which he had just at that moment received indicating that the Japanese forces are advancing in great numbers, that Japanese transports had entered the Yangtze River this afternoon and that hostilities were imminent at a point forty miles west of Shanghai, twice the distance which the Japanese had demanded that the Chinese troops should retreat. The telegram ended by stating:

"The Japanese military officers make no secret that they intend to take the entire region between Shanghai and Nanking."

In view of this situation Yen insisted with vehemence

that

#102, March 4, 10 p. m., from Gilbert, Geneva

-4-

that the Assembly take suitable action to insure that the cessation of hostilities be real.

Five. The President then called attention to the great uncertainty which existed due to the disquieting news received from Yen and stated that the first task of the Assembly was to bring about a cessation of hostilities. He suggested a meeting of the Bureau consisting of the President and eight Vice Presidents to draw up the terms of a resolution. This procedure was approved and the meeting was suspended for half an hour.

GILBERT

FW

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 9:50 a.m. 5th



Secretary of State,

Washington

102, March 4, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

One. After recess Hymans submitted in the name of Bureau resolution transmitted in Consulate's 101, March 4, 9 p.m.

Two. Sato immediately announced that he would accept paragraphs one and two. With regard to paragraph three he proposed that the final half of that paragraph should read "for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render final the cessation of hostilities and regulate the conditions and the details concerning the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and the future situation of the Chinese forces".

He emphasized that arrangements should be made to settle not only the details of Japanese withdrawal but also the conditions of that withdrawal. He considered that the reference to the future situation of the Chinese forces

was

MET

2-#102 from Geneva, March 4, 10 pm
(SECTION TWO)

was in keeping with the announced Japanese policy to withdraw as soon as security is restored in Shanghai.

Three. To this Hymans replied "There is a very considerable difference between the amended treaty and the text as it is before you because "conditions" implies an event by which withdrawal is conditioned. That, I gather, is the meaning of M. Sato's amendment, but that was not the intention of those who drafted this text. We referred to the technical details of withdrawal whereas "conditions" might imply political conditions and therefore it altogether changes the meaning of the text".

Four. Sato responded that while Japan did not wish to hamper the present efforts it is only by taking into account all the prevailing circumstances on the spot that it will be possible to decide upon the details of withdrawal. He explained that "conditions" meant the maintenance of security and protection for the lives and property of Japanese nationals.

Five. Hymans expressed the view that there was only a slight difference between the text proposed by the Bureau
and

MET

3-#102 from Geneva, March 4,
10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

and the text as amended by the Japanese in view of Sato's explanation. He considered that conditions concerning security would naturally be provided for and included in the arrangements which are referred to in the Bureau's draft to "render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces".

Six. Sato continued to insist that the word "arrangements" in the draft text should be clarified in the sense of his amendment.

Seven. Thus far this lengthy debate on the draft resolution had been confined almost entirely to Hymans and Sato. In the face of this last exhibition of Japanese intransigence Hymans declared that he had endeavored in his capacity as President to explain the resolution but that a point had been reached when "it is for the members of the fifty states who are met here to express their views and to say in public what their opinions are on this matter". A lengthy silence ensued which was broken when Motta rose to his feet amidst applause.

Eighth.

MEF

3-#102 from Geneva, March 4, 10pm
(SECTION TWO)

Eighth. Motta commenced by appealing to Sato to accept the resolution as presented but continued with some very plain speaking. He asserted that while he was anxious that this resolution obtain the unanimous consent of the whole Assembly, including China and Japan, what the resolution proposed was a preliminary application of Article 15 of the Covenant and that Article provided that valid resolutions could be passed by the agreement of all members of the Council and a majority of the other states in the Assembly excluding the parties to a dispute. It would therefore be possible to pass a valid resolution without the consent of one or the other of the parties. He understood the resolution to mean that, "the withdrawal of the Japanese troops can no longer be called in question. Japan has expressed her readiness to withdraw those troops and China is asking for the withdrawal as its natural right". If the Japanese proposal be accepted and the word "conditions" be substituted then the principle of the withdrawal is questioned. He considered that impossible and asked that the resolution be passed as presented.

Nine.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huntzger NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-#102 from Geneva, March 4,
10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Nine. Bones then expressed entire agreement with what Motta had just said. Furthermore he considered that it is essential that public opinion throughout the world should know exactly the meaning of this resolution. He expressed entire agreement with Motta's opposition to the addition of anything that might call in question the principle of the withdrawal.

Ten. Sato, after recalling that the Japanese attended this Assembly with certain reservations regarding the application of Article 15 announced that following the interpretation which the President had given of the resolution the Japanese delegation "can accept the text, that is to say, we raise no obstacle to its acceptance by the Assembly".

Eleven. The President then adjourned the Committee and announced that the Assembly would meet in the same room within 10 minutes. This was merely a matter of form as the General Committee included all the chief delegates to the Assembly.

Twelve. The draft resolution was then submitted to the Assembly for adoption. Yen expressed his interpretation
of the

MET

5-#102 from Geneva, March 4, 10 p.m.
(SECTION TWO)

of the resolution to the effect that the negotiations mentioned in paragraph three refer to armistice negotiations rather than to the so-called "Shanghai conferences", which is to follow the armistice negotiations. He announced that China accepted the resolution on the understanding that "no condition should be imposed upon the withdrawal of troops occupying the territory of an invaded country."

Thirteen. The resolution was then adopted unanimously by roll call. (END MESSAGE)

GILBERT

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

FROM

GENEVA

Dated March 5, 1932

Rec'd 10:40

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 PM MAR 10 1932
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAR 5 1932
 Department of State

55, March 5, 3 p. m.

Yen sent me a note during the session this morning
 to the effect that it would be helpful if the
 American Government would urge, at the various capitals,
 that the delegates of the separate nations be instructed
 to adopt a firm attitude in the Assembly on matters of
 principle.

Unless you feel that I should adopt a contrary course
 I propose to tell Yen that I am making your views very
 clear to such delegates as I consider useful here in Geneva,
 that the fact that I am doing this unofficially renders it
 no less effective and that such action as he proposed
 might cross wires and would surely be misinterpreted
 in view of our non-membership in the League.

WILSON

RPF
 HPD

F/LS 793.94/4591

MAR 11 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

March 5, 1932.

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WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (Switzerland)

34

Your number 55 / 4591, March 5, 3 p.m.

I approve the course proposed in second paragraph.

793.94/4591

Stinson

FE: SKH: CLS

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.


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


GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 5th, 10:36 a.m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

See 893-102 S/929

156, March 4, 1 p.m.

One. The retreat of the 19th Route Army places Shanghai in a comparatively undisturbed state. It is not anticipated that the peace of the Settlement will again be seriously threatened at this time. This condition makes it necessary to consider the future so far as the International Settlement is concerned. Two things are very important for the consideration of local and home authorities concerned.

Two. First, Hongkew and Yangtzepoo must be as completely restored to the Shanghai Municipal Administration as the state of emergency will permit and that at the earliest possible moment. Under the protestation that their military activity was entirely for the defense of the International Settlement, Hongkew and Yangtzepoo have been under the exclusive control of the Japanese forces since January 28th. The public functions of the Shanghai Municipal Government have been thwarted and a reign of terror

FW 793.94/4592

FILED

MAR 16 1932

REP

2-#156, from Shanghai, Mar. 4, 1p.m.

terror substituted therefor by the arbitrary action of Japanese military. The state of emergency was assumed by the Japanese to license them to take over complete municipal

control of this district and to commit outrages that render life and property insecure for all but Japanese. This condition must cease and the district restored to the Shanghai Municipal Council for administration with Japanese military, merely to supplement the municipal police as defense agents on the perimeter of their sector so long as such state of emergency exists. The administration by the Shanghai Municipal Council must be exercised by those recognizing only the Shanghai Municipal Council. There are 1924 authenticated cases in which the Japanese interfered with the functioning of police authorities between January 28th and March 1st. There are innumerable cases which are based upon firm conviction of their existence but which have not at the present time been definitely authenticated.

Three. Second, it is hoped that the powers concerned will give careful consideration to the future of the International Settlement and the safeguarding of the Settlement and all lives and property located therein or adjacent thereto. If it was not known before, recent events have convinced all careful observers that the land regulations have served their purpose and have become obsolete; the first special district

REP

3-#156, from Shanghai, Mar. 4, 1p.m.

district court is received by Chinese officials as being an instrument to carry out party orders within the Settlement and therefore is not an independent Court. The extra Settlement and concomitant road questions are well known to the Department. The Court and the Municipality of Shanghai are constantly antagonistic, rendering the Settlement impotent in regard to forcible collection of taxes and the preservance of law and order. The want of cooperation of the Court and of Shanghai Municipal Council places us in a monstrous position. Had there been cooperation and had the boycott agitators, who destroyed or stole property, been regarded by the first District Court as possible criminals rather than Shanghai patriots, it is by no means unlikely that the severity of the present situation might have been minimized if not averted.

Four. While the Sino-Japanese conflict continued I ventured to transmit to the Department by the pouch of ^{893.102-S/929} February 23 a plan as a basis, (repeat as a basis,) for discussion with the hope that its proposal by the United States Government might save Shanghai for all time as a place for valuable residence. This scheme has been reviewed critically by well known Chinese business men and unless some unanticipated reason presents itself it is believed that it would receive the tacit support of
the most

REP

4-#156, from Shanghai, Mar. 4, 1p.m.

the most important Chinese business men in Shanghai. It would not receive support from the politicians. The scheme proposes that a special area, including the International Settlement, French Concession and Greater Shanghai be created by a charter from China granting the residents 35 years administration under a governor appointed by The Hague. It is realized that a charter would not be favorably considered by China ordinarily but such proposal might be acceptable to all parties at some stage of the imminent negotiations. I trust the Department will consider my despatch in the sense that it has been presented and if it finds merit possibly it may be used at some stage. I really believe that it is the best scheme that I have seen and it is not in contravention of the Feetham report which at the time of its issuance did not seem to have any great practical value but under new developments it is possible that such report would be of great assistance.

Repeated to the Legation.

Copy to the Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET


GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 4, 1932

Rec'd 5th, 10:36 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington

156, March 4, 1 p.m.



One. The retreat of the 18th Route Army places Shanghai in a comparatively undisturbed state. It is not anticipated that the peace of the Settlement will again be seriously threatened at this time. This condition makes it necessary to consider the future so far as the International Settlement is concerned. Two things are very important for the consideration of local and home authorities concerned.

Two. First, Hongkew and Yangtzepoo must be as completely restored to the Shanghai Municipal Administration as the state of emergency will permit and that at the earliest possible moment. Under the protestation that their military activity was entirely for the defense of the International Settlement, Hongkew and Yangtzepoo have been under the exclusive control of the Japanese forces since January

28th.

F/G 793.94/4592

FE

MET

2-#156 from Shanghai via N.R.,
March 4, 1 p.m.

28th. The public functions of the Shanghai Municipal Government have been thwarted and a reign of terror substituted therefor by the arbitrary action of Japanese ^{military} ~~/~~ $\frac{1}{2}$. The state of emergency was assumed by the Japanese to license them to take over complete municipal control of this district and to commit outrages that render life and property insecure for all but Japanese. This condition must cease and the district restored to the Shanghai Municipal Council for administration with Japanese military, merely to supplement the municipal police as defense agents on the perimeter of their sector so long as such state of emergency exists. The administration by the Shanghai Municipal Council must be exercised by those recognizing only the Shanghai Municipal Council. There are 124 authenticated cases in which the Japanese interfered with the functioning of police authorities between January 28th and March 1st. There are innumerable cases which are based upon firm conviction of their existence but which have not at the present time been definitely authenticated.

Three.

MET

3-#156 from Shanghai, via N.R.,
March 4, 1 p.m.

Three. Second, it is hoped that the powers concerned will give careful consideration to the future of the International Settlement, and the safeguarding of the Settlement and all lives and property located therein or adjacent thereto. If it was not known before, recent events have ^{convinced} all careful observers that the land regulations have served their purpose and have become obsolete; the first special district court is received by Chinese officials as being an instrument to carry out party orders within the Settlement and therefore is not an independent Court. The extra settlement and concomitant road questions are well known to the Department. The Court and the Municipality of Shanghai are constantly antagonistic, rendering the Settlement impotent in regard to forcible collection of taxes and the preservice of law and order. The want of cooperation of the Court and of Shanghai Municipal Council places us in a monstrous position. Had there been cooperation and had the boycott agitators, who destroyed or stole property, been regarded by the first District Court as possible criminals rather than Shanghai patriots, it is by no means unlikely that the severity of the present situation might have been minimized if not averted.

Four.

MET

4-#156 from Shanghai via N.R.,
March 4, 1 p.m.

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ventured to transmit to the Department ^{by the pouch} of February 23
a plan as a basis. ^(repeat as a basis) for discussion with
proposal
the hope that its / by the United States government might
save Shanghai for all times as a place for valu-
able residence. This scheme has been reviewed critically
by well known Chinese business men and unless some unantici-
pated reason presents itself it is believed that it would
received the tacit support of the most important Chinese
business men in Shanghai. It would not receive support
from the politicians. The scheme proposes that a special
area, including the International Settlement, French Con-
cession and Greater Shanghai be created by a charter from
China granting the residents 35 years administration under
a governor appointed by The Hague. It is realized that a
charter would not be favorably considered by China ordinar-
ily but such proposal might be acceptable to all ^{parties} at
some stage of the imminent negotiations. I trust the
Department will consider my despatch in the sense that it
has

MET

5-#156 from Shanghai via N.R.,
March 4, 1 p.m.

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that I have seen and it is not in contravention of the Feetham
report which at the time of its issuance did not seem
to have any great practical value but under new develop-
ments it is possible that such report would be of great
assistance.

Repeated to the Legation.

Copy to the Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

HPD

~~Note: This message is badly
garbled and a repetition of
these groups has been requested.~~
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS.

179

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 5 1932
DIVISION OF
CONSULTATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated March 6, 1932

Rec'd. 7.25 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

VERY URGENT

56, March 6, 11 am

Your 28, March 5, 9 pm

When I dictated my 54, March 5, 2 pm, I made a slip

of the tongue in dictating the word "local". I had no
intention of differentiating between the Shanghai and
Nanking authorities. Please state urgently whether the
idea thus amended by providing consultation with Nanking
meets with your approval. I should like to be in
possession of the information if possible Monday morning.

WILSON

JS

CIB

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 7 1932
Department of State

F/DEW 793.94/4593

MAR 11 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

March 6, 1932.

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

30 Your 56, March 6, 11 a.m.

One. If the Chinese authorities with whom our

Minister at Shanghai is to consult in regard to agenda

are the highest national Chinese authorities, I feel that

my No. 28, March 5, 9 p.m. to you and my instruction to

Minister Johnson of March 5, 9 p.m., the text of which was

communicated to you in my No. 29, March 5, 10 p.m.,

sufficiently indicate my views in regard to the points

raised in your telegrams 54 and 56.

Two. It would seem important to get the representatives

of the various powers most concerned into conference at Shanghai

at the earliest possible moment.

Stimson

SKM

FE: JED:MHC:SS

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/4593

793.94/4593
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.B.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RE

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated FROM
to anyone.

SHANGHAI

Dated March 6, 1932


Rec'd. 5.26 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

PRIORITY

March 6, 10 am



Gist of Chinese Government's views on Japanese terms

of March 2nd were communicated confidentially to British
Minister by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs March
4th as follows:

(GRAY) Chinese consider proposals tantamount to
dictation of terms. Unilateral withdrawal by Chinese
merely in return for cessation of hostilities is unaccept-
able in principle though now one of academic interest.
China might consider idea of a conference contemplated in
the second paragraph of the Japanese proposals but only
if its scope limited to methods of mutual withdrawal and
no other questions raised. Third paragraph is considered
worse than the ultimatum and the fourth paragraph could at
any time serve as a pretext for Japan to resume hostilities.

JOHNSON

JS * OLB

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F/DEW 793.94/4594

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Telegram dated March 6, 1932, from Shanghai reads substantially as follows:

The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs told the British Minister confidentially on March 4 the gist of Chinese Government's views on Japanese terms of March 2 were as follows:

Chinese consider proposals tantamount to dictation of terms. Unilateral withdrawal by Chinese merely in return for cessation of hostilities is unacceptable in principle though now one of academic interest. China might consider idea of a conference contemplated in the second paragraph of the Japanese proposals but only if its scope limited to methods of mutual withdrawal and no other questions raised. Third paragraph is considered worse than the ultimatum and the fourth paragraph could at any time serve as a pretext for Japan to resume hostilities.

(S) JOHNSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

man



FROM

GRAY & GREEN
GENEVA

Dated March 5, 1932

Rec'd 4:45 p.m.


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 10 1932

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State

Washington



103, March 5, 3 p.m.

One. When the General Committee of the Assembly resumed discussion of the Sino-Japanese dispute this morning Drummond immediately read letter from Wilmersdorf referring to the resolution adopted yesterday and announcing that the American military authorities at Shanghai will cooperate. The Assembly took note of this communication.

Two. An acrimonious discussion then ensued between Sato and Yen respecting the present location and number of Japanese troops in the Shanghai region. This soon developed into mutual recriminations regarding the dissemination of propaganda and false news.

Three. When this debate threatened to continue indefinitely Boncour rose and reminded the committee that if these exchanges continued the General Committee would find itself engaged in a discussion based upon conflicting

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FILED

MAR 11 1932

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2- #103, from Geneva, March 5, 1932

conflicting information. He considered it inevitable that clashes should occur after such extensive hostilities and that until a neutral zone was established between the opposing forces the same contradictory reports will continue. He then explained that immediately after yesterday's meeting he had telegraphed to the French representative in Shanghai requesting any information that would be helpful. The reply had been received and stated quite clearly that hostilities had ceased yesterday at two p.m.

Four. Simon then announced that he had also telegraphed to Shanghai and wished to communicate the contents of two telegrams that had just been received and which he described as being of a preliminary and provisional character. These telegrams were to the effect that "all main operations have ceased" but there has been occasional firing in the region of Nanziang to ^{place} which the British Military Attache is proceeding today. A staff officer is also going to Kiang-Kwang and these reports will be communicated in due course. The Eleventh Japanese Division has been completed by the disembarkation of one more regiment and the Fourteenth Japanese Division is now on the way.

After

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

nam

3- #103, from Geneva, March 5, 1932

After comment by Hymans that the French and British telegrams give rise to some relief and noting that yesterday's resolution provides for an impartial verification of the facts the debate was concluded upon the most recent events at Shanghai.

Five. There follows statements by various representatives upon the whole.

Six. Bradland, Norway, while recognizing the difficulties of the problem stated clearly that the present conflict has raised questions of principle on which the League should express an opinion without delay. Violations of the principles in question would have "incalculable consequences for the future of the League". The conciliatory action of the Council has not yielded the results desired and it is of the greatest importance that "the main lines of action taken by the Council should receive the approval of the Assembly". The Assembly should adopt measures for the purpose of ending hostilities and preparing for a settlement of the whole conflict by drawing up recommendations in accordance with Article No. 15 paragraph four. League action however should not be confined to making recommendations and if either party did not

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4- #103, from Geneva, March 5, 1932

not accept or respect these recommendations the League should take appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant.

Seven. Restrepo, Colombia, spoke to the following effect: while the time may not have come to designate the aggressor and to state whether the territory of a member state has been violated in infringement of the Covenant, the Assembly must be prepared to do so at any time and should not give evidence of any hesitation if that moment arrives. It would be well to await the results of the efforts to stop hostilities and subsequently to act in consequence. Referring to Article 10 and the appeal of the twelve Council members to Japan on February 16 particularly that part regarding the infringement of territorial integrity, the important principles to be considered and safeguarded are as follows:

"(a). No state has the right to effect the military occupation of the territory of another in order to ensure the execution of certain treaties.

(b). No state is entitled to oblige another - having invaded its territory - to enter upon direct negotiations on the

nam

5- #103, from Geneva, March 5, 1932

on the bearing and legal value of treaties previously existing between the two states.

(c). The exercise of the right possessed by each state to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its nationals must be limited by respect for the sovereignty of the other; no state being entitled, in order to provide such protection, to authorize its military forces to penetrate into the territory of the other for the purpose of carrying out police operations.

(d). The fact that a state has certain rights, claims, economic concessions et cetera, in regard to another state does not entitle the former to effect the military occupation of the territory or to seize the property of the debtor state. Any recovery of debts by compulsion is illicit, in accordance with the principles accepted by the Second Peace Conference at The Hague 1907.

Eight. ^a Ortega, Mexico, while not so explicit, spoke in the same tenor as that given in paragraph seven above.

Nine. Lofgren, Sweden, held that war had been in progress in everything but name and that military measures had been utilized that are in no way conformable to existing

man

6- #103, from Geneva, March 5, 1932

existing treaties. Without pronouncing judgment on the respective claims of China and Japan the Swedish Government considers that "the disembarking of troops and the use of these troops for military operations on the territory of another power is contrary to the provisions of the League Covenant and the Pact of Paris. If it was intended to expand the conception of legitimate defense to such an extent as has been done in the present case, the maintenance of any legal international order would be rendered impossible." He then emphasized the necessity of a final cessation of hostilities and held that this cessation should be so effected that the position of the parties to the dispute "so far as the settlement of that dispute is concerned, should not be influenced by military pressure and that an end should be put to the invasion of Chinese territory."

Ten. Erich, Finland, stated that the present situation raised serious problems concerning the very basis of the League i.e. whether it was to be a real guarantee for security or merely an institution for debate and platonic resolutions. The smaller states must insist

man

7- #103, from Geneva, March 5, 1932

insist upon "a just interpretation and reasonable application" of the principles of the Covenant. It is better to recognize frankly the limited powers of the League than to evade the provisions of the Covenant by more skillful than sincere (*). Finland has always insisted that the League "does not recognize aggression as justified or as a direct means for the settlement of a difference." In the present case it should be recalled that as early as 1934 Finland had insisted that "aggression condemned by Article 10 of the Covenant may take place without any declaration of war through acts of hostility which infringe the territorial integrity and political independence of a country". However complicated the present situation may be the Assembly must use all means at its disposal for the settlement of this difference.

Eleven. Beclacrts, Netherlands, noting the efforts of the League in collaboration with the United States for a peaceful settlement found the most disturbing feature to be the failure of the moral influence of the Council. The country which considered itself entitled "to take military action continued to take military
action

mam

8- #103, from Geneva, March 5, 1932

action in spite of the unanimous opinion of the countries
on the Council". Without attempting to allocate any
blame the Assembly must deal with the matter "not only
with the realization that is necessary to bring about
as quickly as possible the end of bloodshed but also
the realization of the fact that any failure on its
part would reopen the whole problem of the organization
of the international community".

The general debate was then adjourned until 3:30
this afternoon.

OX

GILBERT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FROM

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

104, March 5, 10 pm

Consulate's 103, March 5, 3 pm

General Commission of the Assembly met again at 3:30

and continued the general discussion. The following
delegates spoke: Munch, Denmark; Motta, Switzerland;
Zulueta, Spain; Tonissons, Esthonia; Benes, Czechoslovakia;
Politis, Greece; Sepahbodi, Persia; Buero, Uruguay and
Branco, Portugal.

While not entering into the substance of the dispute
the speakers set forth the general principles on which
they considered the Assembly should act. With the excep-
tion of two or three, the speakers gave an impression
of firmness and there was no evidence of an attempt to
avoid the issue. They emphasized the fact in almost all
cases that not only did their countries maintain the
friendliest relations with the two parties to the dispute
but also afforded, with the exception of Portugal, the
additional

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
GREEN
MAR 10 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Rec'd. 10.30 PM

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 7 1932
Department of State

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MAR 11 1932

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rh #2 of No. 104, March 5, 10 pm from Geneva

additional factor of impartiality resulting from their having no special material interests in the Far East.

As the representatives of small countries they were unanimous in expressing their solicitude in regard to the importance of maintaining the principles of the Covenant and in their emphasis on considerations of security.

The following is a brief summary of the principal points brought out in the discussion:

One. Application of the principles of the Covenant.

While expressing themselves in friendly terms the delegates were almost unanimous in insisting upon the maintenance of these principles and the exhaustion of all the resources of the Covenant for the settlement of the conflict. While laying stress on the desirability of using every effort to bring about a settlement through measures of conciliation nevertheless several delegates particularly Munch, Motta, Benes and Politis insisted that in this instance paragraphs three and four of Article 15 providing for a recommendation by the Assembly should be applied, whatever the consequences might be.

In this

rh #3 of No. 104, March 5, 10 pm from Geneva

In this connection Munch suggested that if a cessation of hostilities could not be brought about by ordinary methods of persuasion the Assembly should consider the application of a series of measures based on the principles contained in the convention for developing means of preventing war adopted by the 1931 Assembly. Although this convention has not yet been ratified Munch asserted that its principles had been definitely approved. There was practical unanimity in insisting on the maintenance of the judicial and moral authority to the League.

Two. The maintenance of the principles relating to the respect for territorial integrity and the use of pacific means in the settlement of disputes. This point was emphasized in particular by Munch, Zulueta, Benes and Politis and concurred in by others. While employing a friendly tone with respect to Japan several delegates expressed the opinion directly or implied indirectly that Japan had violated these principles.

Three. The refusal to recognize the validity of treaties obtained by force. Although this principle did not form a general subject of discussion it was however

stressed

rh #4 of No. 104, March 5, 10 pm from Geneva

stressed by three delegates. Manch made the following statement:

"In the second place the principles must be clearly asserted that after the creation of the great international organization based on law namely the League of Nations and after the adoption of the Pact of Paris no new right can be created by force. No agreement obtained by force can be registered by the Secretariat as is required in Article 18 of the Covenant as an indispensable condition for the validity of any agreement concluded by the states members of the League of Nations. For many states members the guarantee contained in the Covenant against the creation by force of new rights is certainly one of the greatest marks of progress achieved through the existence of the League of Nations.

Motta also evidently had this principle in mind when he suggested that again implies the idea that it is not permissible to take the law into one's own hands by force. The results of force cannot be recognized by the League of Nations since the League is based above all on the idea of law and especially of justice."

Zulueta

rh #5 of No. 104, March 5, 10 pm from Geneva

Zulueta made the following statement:

"We consider that Article 10 constitutes the supreme charter of the League of Nations and consequently Spain confirms before the Assembly the principle which 12 members of the Council including herself unanimously adopted in an appeal recently addressed to the Government of Japan according to which the members of the League could not recognize political or administrative changes brought about by force or contrary to the principles of the Geneva covenant or the Pact of Paris. Spain considers that the Assembly would do well if all members felt themselves called upon to give an explicit opinion upon this point."

Four. Legitimate defense. In reply to the Japanese thesis that Japan had acted in self defense the Swiss, Spanish, Estonian and Czechoslovakian representatives stated emphatically but tactfully that although they gave proper consideration to the principle of legitimate self defense they could not admit that Japan could justify a plea of this nature. Motta spoke on this point as follows:

"I do not propose at this point to expatiate on certain natural ideas concerning legitimate defense; legitimate defense

rh #6 of No. 104, March 5, 10 pm from Geneva

defense has been used as a cloak but I do not think one can take cover behind that argument until all the pacific and protective procedures provided for in the Covenant have been exhausted."

Five. The principle of non-intervention. Buero supported the statements made by the Colombian and Mexican delegates on this point in the morning session and stated that it was the traditional policy of Uruguay and of the other Latin American states to uphold the principle of absolute non-intervention and he maintained that no state could take upon itself the right to judge concerning the internal development or organization of another country. He mentioned in this connection the attitude of the Latin American states at the Pan American Congress of 1928.

Zulueta by implication supported the same principle and stated that the lack of organization in a country could not be accepted as a pretext for aggression. Both delegates maintained that one of the chief aims of the Covenant was to protect states which were insufficiently organized for their own protection.

GILBERT



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM REGD

Voluntary Report.

MAR 5 32



R E P O R T

Number 124.

793.94

"THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS."

From: Jesse B. Jackson, Consul.
(JESSE B. JACKSON)

Fort William and
Port Arthur, Ontario,
Canada.

Date of Completion: Feb. 26, 1932.

Date of Mailing: March 1, 1932

MAR 28 1932

FILED

- 2 -

As of interest to the Department, there is quoted hereafter an address delivered by The Honorable Vincent Massey, formerly Canadian Minister to the United States, at Fort William before the Canadian Club on February 26, 1931, at which the author hereof was present.

It appears well to state that Mr. Massey had been on a tour of cities in western Canada, and gave the same address at various places where he stopped while en route, and proceeded eastward with the same object in view.

Also, that practically without exception, the general public in this vicinity agrees with the points of view stated therein. The subject and address were as follows:

"THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS."

"Canada needs no argument to show that the situation in Manchuria is one to command her active interests. No disturbance as grave as this and which affects in its immediate proximity one-third of the population of the world can very well be isolated. As a matter of fact we have not forgotten the lesson which we learned in 1914 of what an obscure crime in a balkan state can mean. We are therefore not unmindful of what events may flow from the destruction of a few metres of railway line four months ago at an unknown place in Manchuria - the Balkans of Asia."

"We may well be conscious of an added reason for concerning ourselves with this latter question. We belong to an international body whose duty it is to consider just such things and, the Council of the League of Nations represents the board of directors of a corporation of which we are shareholders and for whose actions we have a full share of responsibility. Again, it is for us, with the full obligation of nationhood, to arrive at an independent opinion as to whether the terms of the Treaty of Washington of 1922, which enjoins its signatories, amongst other things, "to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China", have been infringed. We must decide for ourselves, too, whether either party to this present dispute has violated the terms of the Pact of Paris, which rules that the "settlement or solution of all disputes....shall never be except by pacific means". It is hard to reconcile some recent occurrences with this provision."

"Again

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"Again, our trade with the Orient is now of sufficient volume to make us watch Manchuria with an increasingly anxious eye. I have heard it maintained recently that the Far Eastern Crisis is actually assisting us through the goods which China is now ordering from Canada instead of from Japan, with which country she has, for the time being, refused to trade. It is no doubt true that we are enjoying a temporary advantage for this reason, but I think you will agree that for the few thousand dollars' worth of trade which this may temporarily bring us, we are likely to lose tens and scores of thousands in the loss of purchasing power suffered by that very promising customer of ours, Japan, as a result of this same boycott."

"The incident of September 18th last, when the Japanese General Staff took it on itself to administer the 'sharp lesson', which for some time they had been itching to apply to the Chinese, is, as we know, only one new page in a melancholy chapter of trouble of which Manchuria has been the cause for half a century. This area has come to be one of the world's great friction points - I was going to say one of the world's two great friction points, because there seem to be two regions, one in Europe and one in Asia, which offer a perpetual menace to international peace - the former lying near the eastern frontier of Germany, where the Polish corridor was made to sever German territory. There is an analogy between the two. Leaving the rights and wrongs of the matter to one side, they each of them represent a situation created and maintained by force, where the only answer to force on the part of the weaker party is a bitter and smouldering resentment and a constantly threatening restlessness."

"It may be useful to turn from the recent events for a moment and direct our attention to the real Manchurian problem which lies behind them. What arguments does each disputant bring to the issue? Japan's case is impressive. First of all comes the argument of economic necessity. You are familiar with the facts. Japan is faced with the twin problem of growing population and inadequate food supply. The solution can only come from a steady process of industrialization. Manchuria provides what she urgently needs for this purpose .. raw materials and markets. Japan, for instance, produces only one-twentieth of the iron ore which she uses. This and the coal on which her industrial life depends and the fertilizer which is needed for her ancient fields and fuel oil and even food stuffs must be imported in increasing quantities - and Manchuria supplies them, just as it supplies markets for the great factories of Osaka and Nagoya. It is no wonder that the trade of Japan with Manchuria should have increased in the last twenty years twelve-fold until now, to judge from the trade figures, the Manchurian provinces are economically more important to Japan than they were even to China proper. More than half their external trade is with the Japanese Empire."

"Then

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"Then there is the argument of 'blood and treasure'. You have only to hear a Japanese speak of the siege of Port Arthur, although it is now nearly a generation away, to realize what this means to national pride. What Vimy Ridge meant to the Canadian Corps, Port Arthur meant to Japan. Japan's achievements in Manchuria began with a great adventure which marked her accession to full national stature. Her pride in this is a powerful element in the present crisis. She has paid a vast price in money as well as in men. There is no doubt whatever of the treasure which has been poured into Manchuria. In twenty-five years it is estimated that Japan and the Japanese have invested one thousand million dollars gold in the development of Manchurian industry and agriculture."

"The Japanese make much of their legal claims in Manchuria. Elaborate and convincing statements are made as to the documentary grounds on which they base their present policy. The control of the South Manchurian Railway and its subsidiaries and the extension of its lease and that of Dairen and Port Arthur, the maintenance of Japanese troops and police in Manchuria, Japan's protests against the construction of competing Chinese railways, her exercise of mining rights - all these contentions have a technical legal basis in various conventions and agreements."

"Practical people, such as we Canadians are, cannot help being impressed by the argument of efficiency which appeals to us perhaps more strongly than the briefs of international lawyers. Japan's twenty-five years in Manchuria is an engrossing story of business achievement. The railway of which we hear so much may sound like a transportation system and nothing more. (It operates, as a matter of fact, only some 700 miles of line, although with admirable efficiency). But when we remember its coal and iron mines, shale oil works, gas and electric plants, blast furnaces, research laboratories, geological institutions, hospitals, schools, hotels and even model farms and agricultural experimental stations - all operated by the railway - we can accept it as one of the most striking business enterprises in the world. We can understand why the earnings of the South Manchurian Railway should be greater than all the Chinese lines put together, or how Dairen has now become the second port in China - the greatest next to Shanghai. Japan's aim in all this effort is naturally to benefit Japan, but the Japanese can claim quite rightly that the Chinese share in the resultant blessings. The versatile soya bean, for instance, which Manchuria produces may now feed millions of the Japanese population, but their cultivation means work for other millions of Chinese farmers and a market for their product. Again, Japan can say with justice that the Chinese population of these Manchurian provinces have gained immeasurably by the law and order which she has instituted and the effort she has put forward in the name of efficient administration."

"Perhaps

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"Perhaps this may seem like the answer to the Manchurian riddle. We may be tempted to say, if a power is willing to bestow economic prosperity on this troubled region why should we inquire too closely into the grounds for its presence or the methods by which its tenure is secured. A dangerous precedent this would be, however, for economics do not tell the whole story. In the last analysis there are other elements in international affairs, sometimes even more powerful. Racial pride is one. I remember a conversation, a few weeks ago in China when a Japanese friend was stating the case for Japan in Manchuria and touched on the victory over Russia in 1905-6. A Chinese said to the Japanese, "your sentimental plea dates back for twenty-five years, ours goes back for three centuries". This was characteristic of the Chinese who think of centuries as we think of weeks. The Manchu emperors may have been dethroned in China for twenty years but the Chinese look on Manchuria - the cradle of the dynasty - as essentially theirs."

"Whatever we may think about China's sentiment for Manchuria at the present time, we must realize that we are faced, not with a theory, but with a fact. Any one who has been in China in the last few months will agree that the racial feeling evoked by the Manchurian crisis is strong enough to move Chinese all over that disunited country to face the situation as one man. They are bitter, resentful and determined that they will not submit to the violation of what they regard as their sovereignty."

"Apart from the presence in these three Eastern provinces of China - as the Chinese prefer to call Manchuria - of thousands of Japanese troops, it is difficult for her to be persuaded that Japan has not in mind a fate for this region similar to that which befell Korea which, as you know, is a Japanese dependency. The South Manchurian railway, they refuse to regard as a bona fide commercial enterprise. They look on it rather as the entering wedge for the political domination of their Eastern provinces. In this connection the Chinese cannot understand why Japan will not permit the growing population of Korean immigrants in Manchuria to become Chinese citizens, although she permits her subjects to assume alien citizenship in every other country. The Japanese argue that these Koreans in Manchuria too often act as agents for anti-Japanese plots in Korea itself - as they do. But this leaves the Chinese unmoved."

"China steadfastly maintains that Manchuria is Chinese. Of its population of some thirty millions, all but two or three millions have come from China, less than a million from Korea and only some 200,000, from Japan itself. The

gross

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gross immigration from neighbouring Chinese provinces to Manchuria in the last few years has been over one million per annum. This represents, as a matter of fact, the greatest migratory movement in modern history, and there is still room for plenty of settlers for it is estimated that Manchuria can support over twice her present population."

"Japan claims that just as twenty-five years ago she checked the expansion of imperialistic Russia, she now provides the eastern barrier to the ambitions of the Soviets. But the Chinese say in answer to this claim that the most imminent danger from Russia is not Russian bayonets but bolshevistic ideas. The present aim of Russia is not the acquisition of Chinese territory, through any overt act, but rather the conquest of Chinese minds through propaganda. Chinese have told me that during these weeks of disillusionment through which the nationally-conscious Chinese are passing, the temptation to turn to Bolshevism, despite the efforts of the Government on the other side, is becoming almost irresistible. Bolshevism, it must be remembered, is a disease which feeds on misery and despair. The danger of Moscow being involved in the present crisis in a military sense, is, I would suggest, extremely remote, and it is unlikely that the individualistic Chinese would ever accept communistic principles, but Bolshevism in its destructive sense may still find strong outposts in China to serve as a new threat to the world outside. There is every reason to believe that Moscow is entirely satisfied with the course of events in Manchuria."

"The Chinese answer to the legal claims of the Japanese has been made plain enough. China, as I have said, denies their validity. Japan may base the extension of her leases on a treaty signed by China, they may offer the same grounds for many privileges such as the right of their nationals to lease land and engage in agriculture, the right of maintaining consular police and exercising consular jurisdiction over Japanese subjects in the interior, but the agreements in question, the Chinese point out, were presented, as the world of course knows they were, in the form of an ultimatum in 1915 and signed under pressure. For this reason, China repudiates them as having no moral sanction and celebrates the anniversary of their signature as a day of national humiliation."

"So much for the major arguments on both sides. In every dispute, of course, there are factors often overlooked, which have their own significance. One element in the Manchurian problem has recently been discussed by a distinguished Japanese, who criticizes the policy of the South Manchurian Railway, with great frankness. He disapproves, for instance, of its unwillingness to employ Chinese, apart from rare instances, except in manual labour. He criticizes

such

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such petty and irritating practices as that of changing Chinese street names in Manchurian towns to Japanese, and deplores the actual discrimination of the railway authorities under certain conditions against Chinese passengers, and their refusal to carry Chinese troops in the movement against Russia two years ago. These things may sound trivial, but they have their own bearing on the problem. Human nature being as it is, such discrimination against the Chinese on what they regard as their own soil, probably chafes more harshly on the individuals even than the presence of foreign police or consular courts - irritating although these are."

"It cannot, of course, be said that China's answer to this has taken the most helpful form. The Chinese side of the case has too often been in the hands of irresponsible and lawless people and, as we know, Japan has been subject to an exasperating policy of pin-pricks from which both personal safety and the rights of property have seriously suffered. Banditry and sabotage in Manchuria have long been a curse. When one considers, however, that the Nationalist Government established itself at Nanking and commenced its task of governing 400 million people (a population as big as that of Europe), only three years ago, it is not to be wondered at that outlying provinces should still suffer from disorders."

"The Manchurian problem, of course, bristles with difficulties. The very railway map of Manchuria seems to give a depressing enough picture of conflicting national aims, with Chinese railways, Japanese railways, Sino-Japanese railways and Sino-Russian railways, all in desperate competition. The map itself, however, suggests two facts to brighten the scene. First, none of the national units represented desires war - that is of the first magnitude. The finances of none could stand the strain. As for Russia, she is far too occupied with her great plan of industrialization to risk it on such an adventure, and the best judgment of both Japan and China, I am convinced, is against such a measure. Secondly, these politically-minded railways are all needed for an economic job. Manchuria is rich enough and big enough to carry them all in a co-ordinated plan which should be possible to achieve when the emotional clouds have lifted."

"But these clouds have not yet lifted. Chinese official policy has been largely negative - to offer no assistance and to appeal to the League quite properly under an article which exists for just such a purpose. But the national boycott against Japan (for which the government has no responsibility) represents, so I was informed, the most widespread and vindictive use of this

familiar

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familiar Chinese weapon within the memory of living residents. The boycott committees are well organized, intimidation against those who break the rules is freely practised and while I was in Shanghai several merchants who had offended the boycott committee were kidnapped and placed in the precincts of a temple. In this building, inappropriately known as the "Temple of the Goddess of Heaven", they languished for many days."

"The depth of feeling is patent to any visitor. The face of China seems covered with posters, either printed or improvised locally, depicting the sins of the Japanese in Manchuria in the most snaguinary form. It seemed to me as if few spaces on the walls of buildings or on railway trains were left untouched by some such evidence of national ardour. Bands of students would invade railway carriages to enlist the aid of Chinese and the sympathy of the foreigner alike in the national cause. On the steps of Sun Yat Sen's tomb in Nanking we saw written in blood the pledges of students to avenge the wrongs of China. Educationists told us that the student body, always an intemperate element in the Chinese population, had **never** been so moved as now. We saw them parading in their thousands for the purpose of demanding war. One Chinese college head, with infinite wisdom, said that when the strong wine of nationalism had so mounted to the heads of his students that they wished to move straight off to fight Japan, he suggested three or four hours of hard drill a day by way of preparation. This he found had a sobering effect. But unfortunately there seems to be little to check the rising fury of the student world of China and the increasingly large urban population which shares their excitement. There is every reason to believe that the Chinese Government is doing all in its power to urge moderation and restraint. When some of us visited the President, General Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking there were several Japanese members in our party. These, in addition to the heavy military protection which their presence made necessary, were treated with every consideration. Offending posters were removed before their arrival and the President himself went out of his way to treat them with especial courtesy. The President too has made several courageous efforts to moderate the popular feeling."

"What am I to say of the status quo of Manchuria at present? For the moment there appears to be quiet in the Manchurian theatre - a quiet which has followed the march of Japanese troops. Japan is now in complete control of all three Manchurian provinces. This she has accomplished by the application of the ancient method of force. And whatever the provocation may have been, and we can agree that it was considerable, she cannot escape the charge of having violated solemn international engagements in doing what she has done."

"Questions of first importance are suggested by the
 relations

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relations between the League of Nations and the Government of Japan in the Manchurian issue. It may clarify our thinking if we consider for the moment the various approaches which the League has in its power to make to an international situation. These are, roughly, three in number. First, the League itself can apply force. Under the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant, as everyone knows, a recalcitrant power can be placed under economic pressure from its fellow members. The League is not a super-state; it does not exist to function as a piece of coercive machinery. It can exist only as a voluntary association of sovereign states. If its authority even to investigate an international question submitted to its Council is challenged as Japan has challenged it recently it does not require much political imagination to realize the threat to its solidarity which would follow the exercise of economic sanctions. There is little use in attempting a course of action against a member state which might well lead to its withdrawal from this voluntary association. There is, therefore, a practical reason against such a course of action, quite apart from the belief of most of us that force in international affairs has rarely solved anything. It has usually only created a new set of difficulties."

"In the machinery of the League are implicit two other methods of dealing with such a situation as we have in Manchuria. One of these, arbitration, we could dismiss at present as impossible. There are too many elements on both sides which the disputants would regard as political - matters not justiciable and not to be submitted to a court. The preparation of the terms of reference would be difficult as the settlement of the dispute itself."

"There is a third approach open to the League which, in the present issue, the Council has endeavoured to pursue - the process of conciliation. It has, of course, become fashionable to regard the League in this episode as a rather futile and well-intentioned body which has spent laborious months in the painful and widely advertised accomplishment of nothing at all. This view, I would suggest, is not fair. I think it is clear that in the first six weeks of the issue, at least, the League operated as a check on both sides in the Manchurian theatre. On the other hand, an attitude of extreme eulogy with reference to the League is, in any circumstances, just as unwise as that of unthinking criticism. One cannot, of course, ever accept the League's actions as infallible simply because it stands for a noble ideal. Idealism and mistaken judgment are, unfortunately, now and then seen in company."

"The League made, I would suggest, one serious error in the present crisis, in demanding last October the withdrawal of Japanese troops by a given date. This order undoubtedly consolidated Japanese opinion behind the war party, and is probably partly responsible for the replacement, a few weeks ago, of the late government by one of less moderate policy. When an order such as the one delivered to Japan can be supported with force, there is less

need

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need to be careful not to cause offence to the nation involved. Its assent, in such a case, is not required. Even the process of arbitration carries legal sanctions, but conciliation and arbitration are two different things. Conciliation involves no sanctions of any kind and is successful only if the goodwill and co-operation of both parties is secured. In the case in point between the League and Japan, this principle does not seem to have been observed. It would seem to be a matter of common sense that when you are attempting to arrive at a settlement with any person or any group of persons that you should endeavour to cause as little embarrassment to the other party as possible and that you should do what you can to save him from the humiliating position of 'losing face'. This involves an intelligent endeavour to appreciate and understand his point of view and also an intimate contact with the 'atmosphere' of the situation involved and also the avoidance of publicity during the conversations. (The process of conciliation is not greatly helped by conversation through a megaphone.) These factors in the case in point seem to have been disregarded."

"Much of the difficulty was due to the distance involved. I have already ventured the suggestion that had the Council of the League, or a committee of its members of cabinet rank, paid the eastern powers the compliment of holding their meetings on this all-important issue in Tokyo and Nanking and Mukden, there might have been a better chance of arriving at a sound judgment and of carrying the confidence of the governments involved. Geneva and Paris are, after all, some eight thousand miles away from these Oriental communities and when an exchange of views on highly delicate subjects is effected through cables which must be put into cypher and then decoded and translated and passed through half a dozen hands, one is apt to have left nothing but the bare, uncompromising facts. Personal touch and a knowledge of the atmosphere which cannot be transmitted by mechanical means, are, in such cases, essential to success."

"There are plenty of liberal-minded Japanese - I had the pleasure of meeting a good many of them both in Shanghai and Tokyo - whose attitude to the League is enlightened and co-operative, but, unfortunately, as the weeks passed and the Council of the League seemed to the Japanese people both remote and unsympathetic, Japan seemed to fall more and more under the influence of the military party, who are pleased to regard the League of Nations as an unlicensed intruder. And, under its new government, Japan, has revealed definite resentment of outside interference in the Manchurian issue as being a private quarrel. But no international dispute can any longer be a private quarrel and there surely should be no question of

the

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the propriety of the League's investigation of any international situation of sufficient gravity to be referred to it under one of the articles of the Covenant. The fact that on this occasion one of the disputants apparently resents its good offices as an intrusion only serves to show that the ideals of the League are still in advance of the claims of nationalism. In Manchuria today we have something more significant than a conflict between the Chinese people and the Japanese Government. We have a collision between twentieth century international machinery and a nineteenth century point of view. The world has accepted in theory at least, certain principles for the settlement of international disputes and we no longer live in a pre-war era in which there was nothing to check national action but the opposing self-interest of rivals. It is no doubt a source of irritation to the Japanese general staff to have it said that their action in Manchuria is not a domestic matter but one of concern to the society of nations as a whole. It is, nevertheless of vital importance that in the settlement of the present issue, that principle should be stoutly upheld."

"May I suggest that however ineffective it may have been in this controversy, we must not lose faith in the League. Our course should be rather to give it to the utmost our intelligent support. For the Council, as a committee of governments can be no stronger than public opinion among the peoples which these governments represent. It is too early yet to judge the League. Statesmanship at Geneva can still assert itself. The status quo in Manchuria at the moment has been won by the sword. If the principles for which the League stands are to be vindicated, this status quo must either be justified or modified in accordance with reason and justice."

"The world requires a complete liquidation of the Manchurian question and a basic reconstruction of relationships with the essentials safe-guarded on both sides. It should not be an insoluble problem ~~to~~ ascertain what those essentials are. Both sides must, of course, make concessions. Wise opinion in Japan has no thought of Manchuria except in terms of economics; Japanese investments must be adequately protected. Wise opinion in China has no wish that these should be jeopardized and desires only that Chinese sovereign rights shall not be infringed. The two pillars of any permanent settlement must therefore be the protection of Japanese commercial enterprise, on the one hand, and the safe-guarding of China's sovereignty on the other."

"No problems are insoluble, but problems can easily be given a wrong solution. Whatever is done in Manchuria can only have a lasting effect if it is done with the free and uncoerced assent of both parties. This need not be urged on idealistic grounds alone. There is a moral side to such a question, of course, but I submit that it is also

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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very practical common sense. A peace which is readily accepted is more likely to be kept. Let us hope that whoever the men may be who must ultimately deal with the Manchurian question, they will make a job of it. The world and Canada as part of it, will stand to profit greatly from such an achievement."

Forwarded in Quintuplicate.
(Copy to Legation, Ottawa; to Consulate General,
Toronto).

File No. 800.

JBj/HTD.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Report No. 124, entitled "THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS," from
the American Consulate, Fort William-Port Arthur,
Ontario, File No. 800).

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SOURCES OF INFORMATION:

Kindness of the Editor of the Times-Journal,
Fort William, Ontario, Canada.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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AE



FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 6, 1932

Rec'd 3 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

March 6, 1 a. m.

Your 76, ^{4589C} March 4, 11 p. m.



Captain Mayer after conferring with British military
attache feels that while major hostilities between main
Chinese and Japanese forces ceased on March third, minor
engagements between contact groups have occurred on
March fourth and fifth particularly near Wangtu (Huangtu)
4 miles west of Nanziang station and also near Liuho.
These engagements apparently are brought on by the efforts
of the Chinese to establish a favorable line/outposts.
Japanese aeroplanes have been scouting over Chinese lines
and rear areas.

JOHNSON

JS-CIB

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note
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MAR 12 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FE

793.94
893.102
793.94119

cib

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

RECEIVED
MAR 6 1932
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State
Washington.

FROM

Shanghai via NR

Dated March 6, 1932

Recd 3 a.m.

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
MAR 7 1932
MAR 7 1932

F/DEW

793.94/4598

PRIORITY.

March 6, 1 a.m.

Your 76, ^{not recorded} March 4, 11 p.m.

Captain Mayer after conferring with British
military attache feels that while major hostilities
between main Chinese and Japanese forces ceased on
March third, minor engagements between contact groups
have occurred on March fourth and fifth particularly
near Wangtu (Huangtu) 4 miles west of Nanziang station
and also near Liuho. These engagements apparently are
brought on by the efforts of the Chinese lines and rear
areas..

MAR 14 1932

FILED

JOHNSON.

JS-CIB

m.m.d.

to establish a
favorable line of outposts.
Japanese aeroplanes have
been scouting over Chinese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,
March 7, 1932.

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (Switzerland).

31 Department's 27, March 4, 11 p. m.

Under date March 6, 1 a. m., Minister Johnson

telegraphs from Shanghai as follows QUOTE Captain Mayer
(from office of Military Attaché, Peiping, now in Shanghai)
after conferring with British military attache feels that
while major hostilities between main Chinese and Japanese
forces ceased on March third, minor engagements between
contact groups have occurred on March fourth and fifth
particularly near Wangtu (Huangtu) 4 miles west of
Nanziang station and also near Liuho. These engagements
apparently are brought on by the efforts of the Chinese
to establish a favorable line of outposts. Japanese
aeroplanes have been scouting over Chinese lines and rear
areas UNQUOTE.

Inform Drummond.

FE:MMH:REK

Enciphered by mmh

Sent by operator M., 19

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793.94/4598

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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Collect
Charge Department
OR

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\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

March 7, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (China).

80 For the Minister.
Your March 6, 1 a.m.

See Department's 76, March 4, 11 p.m., paragraphs
one and four.

What common action taken? What report, if any,
made by the military representatives of the League
powers to the League and/or to their respective
governments?

Stinson

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

793.94/4598

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

FROM

DIVISION OF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 11 1932

DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Dated March 6, 1932

Recd 6:35 p.m.

193.94
 note
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 793.94119
 500. C-111

Secretary of State

Washington.

57, March 6, 9 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

FAR EASTERN
 MAR 7 1932
 Department of State

F/LS

793.94/4599

The ideas which you expressed to me in our
 telephone conversation of March 4th and which are embodied
 in your 29, March 5, 10 p.m., I have made clear to Drum-
 mond and the British, French and Italian delegations. I
 am taking no further steps today awaiting instructions
 from you as to the idea suggested in my 54 as explained
 in my 56, March 6, 11 a.m. On reliable information,
 reflection and conversations including Yen and Olds with
 whom I have been in constant contact emphasize the
 thought (also brought out in Johnson's view as expressed
 in your 25, March 1, midnight) of the danger of having
 negotiations treat of anything except the withdrawal
 Japanese troops and the reestablishment of peaceful
 conditions in the Shanghai area. The instructions which
 you have given to Johnson as conveyed in your 29, March
 5, 10 p.m., make the situation eminently clear and raise
 the question

-2- # 57, from Geneva.

the question again of whether in dealing with a small body there, that is his British, French, Italian and Japanese colleagues and the Nanking authorities, Johnson cannot keep this matter restricted better than we can in Geneva with the disadvantage of dealing with the representatives of fifty odd nations. If certain details arose outside the scope of their instructions which they might consider it necessary to discuss, they could request further instructions from their respective governments. It was the foregoing which I had in mind when I conveyed to you the suggestion of allowing the agenda to be drawn up in Shanghai.

WILSON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated March 7,

Rec'd 9 a. m.



Secretary of State,
 Washington.

58, March 7, 2 p. m.

Have had conversations this morning with both Yen and
 Olds. Their ideas run along the same line as yours as to
 the conversations which can be immediately undertaken.

As our thoughts run along similar general lines we
 will be asked in conversations with representatives of
 other states to push for same objective.

WILSON

WSB

KLP

F/LS 793.94/4600

FILED

MAR 11 1932

793.94
 813.102
 793.9411
 500.C111
 REP

1835

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

DM RECD
 TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to

Washington,

This cable was sent in ~~confidential~~ Code.
 It should be carefully guarded and before
 being transmitted to anyone.

March 8
 March 7, 1932.

MR 232

Here

793.94/4600

WILSON

BERGUES

35 GENEVA (Switzerland)
 Confidential to Wilson
 Your 58 March 7, 12 p.m.

I feel that ~~there~~ in such conversations with representa-
 tives of other states you should proceed guardedly as
 regards initiative. In particular you should guard against
 giving any impression that the American Government is taking
 sides as between China and Japan. Our position is based on
 our view of treaty rights and obligations, and we must not
 repeat not become protagonists of the views, interests or
 activities, as such, of either of the disputants.

Stimson

FE:SKH:CLS

RAM
 FE
 SKH

MR 232

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

DM RECD

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/4600

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Washington,

March 7, 1932.

7pm

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

33 *Confidential for Wilson from Secretary*
Your 54, ⁴⁵⁸⁶March 5, 2 p.m., to 58, ⁴⁶⁰⁰March 7, 2 p.m.,

inclusive, and my 28, ⁴⁵⁸⁶29 and 30; also, most recent
telephone conversations.

I feel as a practical matter that the actual agenda
for the proposed conference will have to be worked out at
Shanghai. I think it is highly important, however, that
the representatives of the neutral powers who are to
participate in the conference and in the preparation of
the agenda should be clearly instructed as to the strict
interpretation of the scope of the conference intended by
the Assembly's resolution as Johnson has been instructed
as reported to you in my 29, ⁴⁵⁷⁶March 5, 10 p.m. Johnson
has already been authorized to participate in a conference
on this basis in relation both to procedure and agenda.

In the meantime, I think our activities at Geneva
should be confined to discreetly encouraging
clarification and emphasis by the League and by

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/4600

793.94/4600
note
510.0112
793.94119
892.102-S

1 8 3 7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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1-138

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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

- 2 -

member governments of views and positions coinciding with
ours and to discouraging retreat from such views.

My general views stated in 23, ⁴³⁸⁷February 26, 7:00 p.m.,
are unchanged.

I have been encouraged by the spirit shown by the
Assembly and believe that prompt action along the lines of
the Borah letter would have beneficial effect upon Shanghai
Conference and may prevent any attempt, either by Japanese
or other powers, to obtain at Shanghai permanent concessions
at expense of Chinese.

A strong influence will inevitably develop among all
foreigners in Shanghai, including Americans, to avail
themselves of this opportunity to clear up long-standing
petty grievances against the Chinese. We cannot afford
to allow this to obscure the broad issues of treaty
violation on which the Assembly's course is running parallel
to ours. For us or any other neutral to take advantage of
the Japanese military occupation to seize such benefits
would destroy the moral position now taken by the neutral
world towards Japan. Prompt action seems to me the surest
method by which such a deteriorating tendency can be prevented.

S HLS:OBS

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.



U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

Stimson
2-7-44.

1838

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM GREEN
Geneva

Dated March 7, 1932

Rec'd 11:10 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

59, March 7, 4 p. m.

The Japanese Delegation have given me quotation from a report of the Consul General and Admiral Taylor which they state has been published at Washington, concerning the present situation at Shanghai. I should be grateful to have confirmation of such a report and any extracts / which I may communicate to Drummond.

WILSON

RR

WSB

F/LS 793.94/4601

FILED

MAR 12 1932

793.94
893.1025
793-94119
3-000 C.M.

REP

1835

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Mit. O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

March 7, 1932.

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

32 Your 59, March 7, 4 p. m.

One. Department does not repeat not appear to have any record of having given out any joint report QUOTE of the Consul General and Admiral Taylor concerning the present situation at Shanghai UNQUOTE. The Department has given out information on the Shanghai situation based on telegraphic reports from the Consul General, and the Department understands that the Navy Department has followed the same procedure with regard to reports received by it from Admiral Taylor. If you can furnish Department a more detailed description of the alleged report to which you refer, the Department will attempt to identify the materials and source.

Two. The NEW YORK TIMES ~~has~~ of March 7 carries an article by Clarence Streit under Geneva date line March 6 stating inter alia that the League is not getting QUOTE swift and reliable neutral official information on the

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/4601

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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OR
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\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

- 2 -

present military situation at Shanghai UNQUOTE; that
QUOTE there is a widespread suspicion that they (Great
Britain, France and Italy) are not keeping the League
fully informed UNQUOTE; that QUOTE as for the United
States, which promised the League to cooperate in this
task, it has supplied no information UNQUOTE. The
Department would be interested in receiving your views
as to the basis for Streit's statements and ^{indicating} ~~as to~~ what
information the United States is in position to furnish
the League that the League cannot obtain from League
members or from League agencies with which American
representatives are cooperating. The Department is receiving
daily telegraphic reports from the Consul General at Shanghai
summarizing the developments of the day. Copies of these
reports and of other pertinent information on the Shanghai
situation are being ^{currently} sent you by mail. At the same time, I
am sending you by telegraph ^{such} information ^{as} which I feel ^{may} ~~would~~
be useful ~~to you~~ in connection with developments of importance.

Stinson
Sick

FE:MTH:REK

FE

Enciphered by mmh

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1922 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 10 1882.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/4602

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 5 enclosing a photostat copy of a telegram addressed to you at Stanford University under date New York, March 1, 1932, and signed Mitsui and Company L.

By way of comment on the contents of the telegram, I may state that I regret to note that, in a communication purporting to originate from the sources in Japan indicated and addressed to the organizations in the United States indicated, the facts in the case are distorted or by the manner of statement rendered misleading, as illustrated by the statement:

"First, the Kellogg Pact, the Nine Power Treaty and the League Covenant are all subject to the urgent necessities of self defense as is admitted on all hands and as a matter of fact America, England and other powers employed armed forces on Chinese soil in self defense when five years ago American men of war bombarded Nanking."

The

The Honorable

Ray Lyman Wilbur,

Secretary of the Interior.

793.94/4602

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The real facts in relation to such matters are, I believe, too well known to you to require any exposition on my part.


Sincerely yours,

E. L. STIMSON


FE:SKH/AMF

2/8/38

RAM
FE
GR 17
MAR 8 1952 P.M.
MA



4
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



793.94

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You may be interested in the communication sent out on March first by Mitsui and Company, which was telegraphed to me at Stanford University.

Sincerely yours,

Robert H. H. H.

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State.

Inclosure. ✓

MAR 10 1932

FILED

F/LS

793.94/4602

FE

0844

Milton C. Gustafson

12-18-75

Postal Telegraph

PALO ALTO, CALIF.
343 UNIVERSITY AVE.
TELEPHONE 4127



This is a list of Telegrams or Cablegrams which should be indicated by signal in the check or in the address.

DL	DAY LETTER
NL	NIGHT LETTER
HM	NIGHT MESSAGE
LCO	DEFERRED CABLE
NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER
WLT	WEEK END CABLE LETTER

Page 32 1932 MAR 2 AM 8 35

F2 733 NL=RS NEWYORK NY MAR 1 1932

RAY LYMAN WILBUR ESQ PRESIDENT=
LELAND STANFORD JR ANNEX STANFORD UNIVERSITY CALIF=

WE TRANSMIT HERewith FOR YOUR PERUSAL A COPY OF A TELEGRAM DATED
TOKIO MARCH FIRST READING; ON BEHALF OF THE ELECTRICAL
ASSOCIATION, THE JAPAN POWER ASSOCIATION, THE INSTITUTE OF
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERS, THE ILLUMINATING ENGINEERING SOCIETY, THE
INSTITUTE OF TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE ENGINEERS AND THE ELECTRICAL
DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY, HAVING MEMBERS TOTALLING TWENTY ONE THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED AND EIGHTY FIVE COUNT KEIGO KIYOURA FORMER PRIME
MINISTER, APPEALS TO THE NATIONAL ELECTRIC LIGHT ASSOCIATION, THE
AMER INST OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERS, AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL

12-18-75

DL	DAY LETTER
NL	NIGHT LETTER
NM	NIGHT MESSAGE
LOC	DEFERRED CABLE
NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER
WLT	WEEK END CABLE LETTER

Page 16

1932 MAR 2 AM 8 35

COMMITTEE OF THE WORLD POWER CONFERENCE AND OTHER ASSOCIATIONS
AND PEOPLE CONNECTED WITH THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES IN THE
UNITED STATES IN RELATION TO THE SHANGHAI INCIDENT WE HAVE
NOTICED WITH PAIN AND SURPRISE THAT A CONSIDERABLE SECTION OF
OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY COME TO THE SETTLED
CONCLUSION THAT THE RECENT ACTIONS OF JAPAN IN SHANGHAI ARE
INDISPUTABLY BLAMEWORTHY AND DESERVING OF REPROBATION IT IS
THEREFORE OUR DESIRE TO ADDRESS OUR VALUED FRIENDS IN OUR OWN
PROFESSION WHO HAVE THE SAME INTERESTS AND SAME LOVE OF PEACE
TRANSCENDING NATIONAL BOUNDRIES AND TO APPEAL TO THEM TO GIVE US
A FAIR HEARING AND TO DO THEIR UTMOST TO CALM PUBLIC OPINION
BEFORE IT BECOMES ADAMANT AGAINST US WE WISH TO MAKE THE

0846

Milton C. Gustafson

12-18-75

PAID BY
PALO ALTO, CALIF.
343 UNIVERSITY AVE.
TELEPHONE 4127

Postal Telegraph



With 5¢ a full rate Telegram or Cablegram unless otherwise indicated by symbol in the check or in the address.

DL	DAY LETTER
NL	NIGHT LETTER
MS	Money Message 25¢
LCO	Deferred Cable
NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER
WLT	Week End Cable Letter

Page 11

932 MAR 2 AM 8 35

FOLLOWING POINTS CLEAR: FIRST THE KELLOGG PACT THE NINE POWER
TREATY AND THE LEAGUE COVENANT ARE ALL SUBJECT TO THE URGENT
NECESSITIES OF SELF DEFENSE AS IS ADMITTED ON ALL HANDS AND AS A
MATTER OF FACT AMERICA ENGLAND AND OTHER POWERS EMPLOYED ARMED
FORCE ON CHINESE SOIL IN SELF DEFENSE WHEN FIVE YEARS AGO
AMERICAN MEN OF WAR BOMBARDED NANKING SECOND IN THE PRESENT CASE
IT WAS THE CHINESE WHO CREATED SUCH A SITUATION IN SHANGHAI THAT
THE AUTHORITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT DEEMED IT
NECESSARY TO DECLARE A STATE OF SIEGE AND TO CARRY OUT A PLAN OF
COMMON DEFENSE THROUGH THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF ALL THE FOREIGN
GARRISONS INCLUDING THE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE IT WAS THE CHINESE
WHO STARTED TO FIRE UPON THE JAPANESE SECTOR AND COMPELLED OUR

0847

Milton C. Gustafson

12-18-75

Postal Telegraph

PALO ALTO, CALIF.
343 UNIVERSITY AVE.
TELEPHONE 4127



This is a list of Telegrams to California and Alaska transmitted by cable to the coast and to the interior	
DL	Day Letter
EC	Evening Letter
HM	Hour Message
LOC	Deferred Cable
RLT	Reply Cable Letter
RLY	Reply Cable Letter

1932 MAR 2 AM 8 35

BLUEJACKETS TO RETURN THE FIRE IF THE CHINESE ATTACK HAD BEEN
DIRECTED AGAINST THE AMERICAN MARINES WHAT WOULD THE AMERICANS
HAVE DONE MOREOVER IN VIEW OF THE OVERWHELMING FORCE OF THE
CHINESE ATTACKING PARTIES THE DEFENSE IF UNDERTAKEN AT ALL HAD TO
BE PROMPT AND DECISIVE WHILE WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE MEANT EXPOSURE
OF TENS OF THOUSAND OF FELLOW COUNTRYMEN TO SURE PERIL THIRD
JAPAN HAS NOT THE LEAST DESIRE FOR SNATCHING A PIECE OF TERRITORY
FROM CHINA OR FOR DEPARTING IN ANY DEGREE WHATEVER FROM THE OPEN
DOOR PRINCIPLE OUR SELF DEFENSE MEASURES OUGHT NOT TO BE VIEWED
WITH CONCERN BY AMERICA THEY ARE TEMPORARY AND ISOLATED ANOMALIES
AND DO NOT INFRINGE FOR ONE MOMENT EITHER THE TREATIES OR THE
OPEN DOOR FOURTH IN THE CHAOTIC STATE OF CHINA THE NECESSARY ACTS

0848

Milton C. Gustafson

12-18-75

Postal Telegraph

PALO ALTO, CALIF.
345 UNIVERSITY AVE.
TELEPHONE #127
STANDARD TIME
INDICATED ON THIS MESSAGE

U.S. AND FOREIGN
CABLESCOMMERCIAL
CABLES

Pay to Cash your Telegrams for California rates (subject to change)	
RM	Day Letter
RM	Night Letter
RM	Day Telegram
LCM	Day Telegram
LCM	Day Telegram
LCM	Day Telegram
LCM	Day Telegram
LCM	Day Telegram

1952 MAR 2 AM 8 35

OF SELF DEFENSE ARE UNFORTUNATELY OF FAR WIDER SCOPE THAN WOULD
BE THE CASE IF CHINA WERE UNDER A STABLE CENTRAL CONTROL. IT IS A
GROSS MISAPPREHENSION TO ENVISAGE CHINA AS A COHERENT NATION
CAMOUFLAGED UNDER REPUBLICANS. FORMS CHINA IS AT PRESENT ONLY A
CLOAK FOR THE RIVAL GREEDS OF OPPRESSIVE MILITARY BARONS.
THEREFORE A NATION WHOSE TROOPS ARE LAWFULLY IN CHINA AND ARE
ATTACKED MUST TAKE CHARGE OF THE SITUATION IN A MANNER WHICH
WOULD POSSIBLY BE QUITE OUT OF PLACE IN A NORMAL STATE. FINALLY WE
FEEL SURE THAT TRAINED INTELLIGENCE LIKE YOURS WILL DISCOUNT
STORIES OF ATROCITIES WHICH ARE BEGINNING TO GAIN CURRENCY. IT IS
WELL KNOWN HOW SUCH TALES WERE MANUFACTURED IN THE WORLD WAR. THEY
ARE EVEN MORE READILY MANUFACTURED IN SHANGHAI. WE ASSURE YOU THAT

0849

Milton C. Gustafson

12-18-75

PALO ALTO, CALIF.
343 UNIVERSITY AVE.
TELEPHONE 2127

The Telegraph



The United States Department of Defense	
Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

832 MAR 12 AM 8 33

THE GHASTLY HORRORS OF THE CONFLICTS WHICH CHINESE ATTACKS HAVE FORCED UPON US ARE AS GRIEVOUSLY LAMENTED HERE AS THEY ARE ELSEWHERE THE STRUGGLE WAS NONE OF OUR SEEKING AND HAS ALREADY COST US MUCH IN BLOOD AND TREASURE JAPAN IS SIMPLY TOO ANXIOUS TO SECURE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BUT SHE CANNOT ABANDON HER PEOPLE TO MILITARISTS WRATH NOR CAN SHE ADMIT THAT SELF DEFENSE IS CRIMINAL WE SINCERELY TRUST THAT YOU WILL GIVE THESE FACTORS DUE CONSIDERATION AND THAT YOU WILL ENDEAVOR TO PLACE YOURSELVES IN OUR POSITION AND ASK YOURSELVES WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN A SIMILAR SITUATION REMEMBERING THE FACT THAT TENS OF THOUSANDS OF THE JAPANESE RESIDE IN SHANGHAI AND THAT MANY HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WORTH OF JAPANESE PROPERTY IS LOCATED THERE

0850


Milton C. Gustafson

12-18-75

PALO ALTO, CALIF.
345 UNIVERSITY AVE.
TELEPHONE 4127



SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
DEC 18 1975	
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 761.94/469 FOR despatch #32

FROM Latvia (Skinner) DATED February 4, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1187 ...

REGARDING:

Russia's attitude towards Japan's advance northward in
Manchuria, as portrayed in an article in the Moscow
PRAVDA of January 27, 1932, entitled "Things are Getting
too Hot for the Japanese Imperialists"

do

793.94/4603

4603

185
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894,032/99 FOR Despatch # 474.

FROM Japan (Forbes) DATED Feb. 8, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Speech of Foreign Minister Yoshizawa which concerns
itself with the aspects of the anti-Japanese
movement in China for which the Chinese autho-
rities are blamed and which has been the cause
for the present difficulties between China and
Japan.

hs

793.94/4604

4604

185

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE Manchuria/21
893.01-10000/21 FOR Note #

FROM Chinese Legation () DATED Feb. 23, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

China refuses to recognize independence of new Government
of Manchuria;- Encloses copy of cablegram from Ministry of
Foreign Affairs at Nanking stating --.

jr

793.94/4605

4605

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.24/45 FOR Tel. #48-5pm

FROM Germany (Sackett) DATED Mar. 3, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING:

War supplies for Japan.
Germania - Risenickendorf, AEG cable plant at Oberspree,
Pintsch works and I.G. Farben engaged in manufacture
of war supplies for Japan.

Jr

793.94/4606

4606

REP

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

BERLIN

Dated March 3, 1932

Rec'd 2:08 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

48, March 3, 5 p. m.

The Communist ROTEFAHNE reports today that a Japanese commission negotiated recently with the firm of Germania-Reinickendorf and that this plant is now manufacturing machine gun lock springs in large quantities. The ROTEFAHNE further reports that the AEG cable plant at Oberspree, which can be converted instantly for the manufacture of munitions, already supplies field telephones for delivery to Shanghai and that the Fintsch works at Fuerstenwalde manufactures mine throwers "regulators and gun cocks". All these plants are located near Berlin.

In view of this information the ROTEFAHNE urges all workers to refuse work in connection with the manufacture, transportation and shipment of war supplies intended for imperialists. (END GRAY)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Wiley learned yesterday from acquaintances who are interested in a handicraft school for workers

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#48, from Berlin, Mar. 3, 5 p.m.

workers children in Halle that the Communists who are in the majority at the nearby Leuna Works of the I. G. Farben recently considered the question of suspending work on a large order for poison gas ostensibly destined for Japan but finally decided not to quit in view of the increasing unemployment.

SACKETT

WSB


WWC

1857

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



SHERWOOD EDDY
 347 MADISON AVENUE
 NEW YORK CITY



On the Pacific, Feb. 8, 1932.

Dear Sir:

I have just completed a tour of twenty-one cities in eleven provinces of China, meeting the officials, students and leaders of the nation. I came to the Far East at the invitation of the Chinese themselves because I believed that they were entering upon a life and death struggle against the rising tide of Communism.

The ruthless military offensive of Japan in Manchuria and down the east coast have pierced China's heart, awakening her people to the realization of their desperate need. An average of two thousand students a day in twenty-one cities poured out to our meetings. In a total attendance of some 200,000 there were nearly 80,000 students, who purchased over 100,000 of our books translated into Chinese - an average of more than one book per person.

In four of the last cities visited the students were all out on strike and the colleges were closed, yet these young people crowded our meetings, listening attentively through the entire series in each place. In Nanking I met Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal Feng, the Christian General, and Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, leader of the short-lived united government of China which, with a shortage of sixteen millions silver a month, faced bankruptcy from its birth.

In Nanchang I visited the province which is forming the center of a Communist U.S.S.R. and expecting soon to unite five solid central provinces, with a population of nearly a hundred million people, into a widening Soviet Republic. Post-offices and district magistrates here are already using the U.S.S.R. seal. At Hankow we found only two or three of the seventy counties of the province free from Communism. While we were there a missionary friend thirty miles out of the city was driven in with his theological seminary because the unpaid troops had gone over to the Communists who had promptly paid them double wages.

Just before we sailed for home we witnessed the beginning of the troubles which led to the bombing of Shanghai and to the battles which are now in progress. At the invitation of the Japanese, we visited Japan for three days, had a series of interviews and met groups of representative people for discussion. We found here such a tense war-time psychology and tight censorship of press and platform that no single man in all Japan dare speak out boldly in criticism of the military adventure of army and government. Instant assassination or imprisonment would follow any such spoken word under the present fascist control of militarism. Indeed, the people are not permitted to hear or know any facts that are unfavorable to Japan. In their propaganda Japan is proclaimed "The Redeemer of China."

During my brief stay in Japan, I had frank and friendly conferences with several of the Japanese leaders. I testified to their own continued military offensive as I had watched it develop for four months after the capture of Mukden, unprovoked by any Chinese attack on the railway, and during the setting up of bogus, puppet "independence governments in Manchuria under Japanese military "advisors." Much as they carried out their previous plan for Korea, the Japanese in Manchuria have repeatedly and solemnly protested that they have "no territorial designs whatever." I testified to the Japanese that their military rule in both Manchuria and

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Korea is bitterly against the will of more than nine-tenths of the educated people. One week before the events took place, a Japanese general told me personally that Japan must first whip China by taking Shanghai and Nanking before they can negotiate on the Manchurian question. This, of course, means ruthless and unabashed war, while at the same hour Japan has advanced boldly into Russian controlled Harbin.

Japan has staked everything upon this desperate military adventure, doggedly refusing from first to last all judicial or peaceful means of settlement. As an original member of the League of Nations she signed the Covenant, solemnly agreeing "that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to judicial settlement, or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award of the arbitrators....." In the Nine Power Treaty at Washington in 1921, she pledged her word "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China,..... to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights of privileges." In the Pact of Paris Japan agreed "to condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies." The contracting parties agreed that "all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature, shall never be except by pacific means."

The crux of the case between Japan and China centres in the Treaties of 1915, based on Japan's Twenty-one Demands. The Chinese maintain that these treaties were extorted from China under threats, and with compulsion to require secrecy. They were never ratified by the Chinese Parliament, which according to the Constitution must approve all treaties. They have been indignantly repudiated by the Chinese people from that day to this. Japan has been unwilling to submit her case to arbitration, while China has been consistently eager to do so. Japan thus breaks her Covenant obligations in taking the administration of justice into her own hands before the dispute has been submitted to arbitration or inquiry by the Council. By her action she has thus assailed the very foundation of the League of Nations and of all world organization for peace.

At the time I visited Japan I warned my Japanese friends that their persistent military offensive was a menace to China, to Japan itself, and to the World, as follows:

To China, barring a miracle, this policy of war and military occupation if relentlessly continued can only mean the fall of the Central Government at Nanking and beyond, chaos, Communism and probably the "Break-up of China", though in a manner quite different from that prophesied by Sir Charles Beresford just prior to the Boxer Uprising in 1900. 1. Japan would take directly or under a thinly veiled "protectorate" such areas as she may choose, as occasion or excuse afford, in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Shantung and down the eastern coast of China. 2. Five or six contiguous central and southern provinces probably will soon form a solid Communist U.S.S.R. backed by Moscow. 3. Shanghai and part of the Yangtze River Valley may be kept open under a bankrupt and dwindling Central Government. 4. Isolated and semi-feudal areas in the South, West and North will struggle to maintain themselves under some working agreement with the hegemony of the Japanese on the one side and the Communist Provinces on the other. The break-up of this most populous nation would be accompanied by an appalling loss of life and suffering for this despairing people. One simply cannot visualize what this would mean in the light of Communist terror and bloodshed, which is far more ruthless and cruel in China than it ever was in its worst days in Russia.

For Japan, I testified to my friends that their present course if carried to its logical conclusion eventually would mean probably three things - economic bankruptcy, an inevitable war with Russia, followed by internal revolution. In such a war Japan must face the possible united opposition of the 165,000,000 of Russia, the 400,000,000 of China, and the 20,000,000 of Korea, a total of 585,000,000.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

people, with soldiers armed by Russia and backed by the vast resources of the U.S.S.R. after the completion of its proposed second Five-Year Plan, six years hence. The Japanese General to whom I talked did not seem to be in the least sobered by this prospect, but told me confidently they would "divide and conquer", taking them one by one and annexing Eastern Siberia "up to Lake Baikal."

If the Japanese military offensive continues and neither the League nor America can progress beyond the stage of "firm" notes, the military maneuvers of Japan coupled with the present policy of France may insure for the world the failure of the Disarmament Conference. This in turn will mean the menace of Germany in revolution, with the awful prospect of another world war followed by its crop of resulting revolutions.

I admit that the outlook for the immediate present is dark indeed, but it is not hopeless. For one thing, we must do everything in our power to help save China from the abyss of Communism, with all the suffering and loss of life that accompanies it in this unhappy country. The investment of life and money in a century of missionary work is imperilled. Whatever the hard times may be, this work must not fail. Never was there an hour when mission work of the right sort was more needed or more fruitful. Mission Boards must not be left unsupported to sound the call for retreat at this critical moment.

Again, we must do our best, even at the eleventh hour, to make peace and stop war. With or without another world conflict, with its unimaginable consequences, the world must still be saved from war as it was once saved from the curse of slavery. Blessed are the makers of peace, who shall cast out the spirit of war from their own hearts and, undiscouraged, shall yet build an organized world of brotherhood. The future is still ours.

Finally, during this period of transition and depression, we must strive in each land and in each life, to put our own house in order, to build nothing less than a social order for both justice and liberty, tackling our specific problems, personal and social, one by one. East or West, in Asia or in Europe, in China or in America.

Ever yours,

Sherwood Eddy

Mr. Stanley Hornbeck,
 Department of State,
 Washington, D. C.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

PTC
 9/1 Walter Murray
 has no objection send
 a copy to Paris (human
 affairs) and not who it was.
 LVA.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

RAB

C. Has no in-
 formation from which
 I can identify the
 correspondent of L. Martin
 mentioned in John
 letter.

PT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

FEB 1932
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

HC
HFE
EE
To Mr. [unclear]
WSM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

HC
Thank you.
To Mr. [unclear]
NE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NE:WSM.

U-5

May thanks.
I would be glad
if you would send
this also to U,
WE + EE.

SKH

SKH

MAH

To Mr. [unclear]

1 initial


Probably Mr.
d'Auxion de Ruffe

if

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ARTHUR UPHAM POPE

Cable Address: ACKERPOPE
London - Paris - New York



100 West 58th St.,
New York City.
February 2, 1932.

Mr. Wallace ~~Smith~~ Murray,
State Department,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Wallace:

One matter I forgot to speak to you about that might possibly be of some use to someone in the Far Eastern division.

79394

I crossed Russia in July with a French lawyer from Shanghai and as luck would have it he was on the same train with me on his way back to China when I was going to Russia last October. For the moment I have forgotten his name, but it is not so important, as the F.E.D. can no doubt promptly identify him if it is worth while. He is the correspondent for "Le Matin", and he has published a good many articles, and I believe some books, on Chinese subjects. He has been out in China a good many years, and feels very strongly that there is no future for the Chinese. He said that they are in every way bankrupt, and will soon be in the hands of the receivers. By the same token he has become extremely partial to the Japanese, and impressed me as much too eager to expound and inculcate his views. He said (these are almost his exact words):

"Everybody who really knows about China, knows that it is a nation that can never govern itself, and which must be set in order by some other nation. A plan has already been prepared for ending the Chinese chaos and putting the country under foreign control, and this time it is going to work. I know all about it. I have been consulted and have studied the plan, and it has got the backing it needs to succeed. China is going to be divided up and the whole mess liquidated. The plan will be put into effect in the winter or summer of 1932."

From his conversation I judge he has rather close connections with Quai D'Orsay.

I would like to get a look-in at the conference that is going to be held at Brown University on Near Eastern affairs.

F/DEW 793.94/4608

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONTINUATION]

2-- Mr. Wallace Smith Murray

February 2, 1932.

Are you going to be there the whole time to see that nothing foolish is said about Persia. If you are not, I might spell you as watch dog for a bit. I graduated from Brown University and taught there four years, but they only know me as a philosopher and not as a specialist in Persia. Where could I find out about the plans?

Best regards,

Arthur Upham Pope

AUP:M

1864

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 26 1932.

Dear Norman:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of an interesting letter which Wallace Murray has received from Arthur Upham Pope. We have been unable here to determine the name of the correspondent for "Le Matin" mentioned in this letter. Do you suppose you or Bob Pell could perhaps dope out who the man is?

Sincerely yours,


Pierre deL. Boal, Chief,
Division of Western European Affairs.

Enclosure:
Copy of letter.

Norman Armour, Esquire,
C/O American Embassy,
Paris.

WE:PTC:VAS
2/24/32

Feb. 25 1932 PM




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH



FROM

GRAY

SHANGHAI via R.R.

Dated March 7, 1932

Rec'd. 11:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



164, March 7, 6 p.m.

FOLLOWING FROM CAPTAIN MAYER FOR WAR DEPARTMENT.

"24. Japanese headquarters state that 3000 Chinese troops possibly from 47th Division are attacking their out-post line at Chiuching and Huaiachiachen just west of Liuho this morning and that orders had been issued at 11 a.m. March 7 to hold line but not attack. They also state their outpost line is Chiuching-Waikang-Huangtu with main line ^ULiuho-Chiating-Nanzhang, Soo Creek is south boundary. They deny landing troops at Deer Creek or Prowtung".

Repeated to Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WFO

WSB

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/LS 793.94/4609

MAR 14 1932

FILED




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Berlin, February 24, 1932.

No. 113

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict and the League.

793.94

MAR 7 1932



F/LS 793.94/4610

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that while much space has been devoted in the German press to the Sino-Japanese conflict and to the League's efforts in behalf of peace, editorial comment has been comparatively sparse. German sympathy, as revealed by the press, was apparently all on the side of the Chinese. The impotence of the League, as evidenced by recent developments, was stressed in all quarters.

According to the independent Nationalist BERLINER BOERSEN ZEITUNG (February 20), Japan had treated the League brusquely.

The

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The DEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Right wing of People's Party - February 20) found that the League Council was completely helpless in the Sino-Japanese conflict. It was not the first time that the League had been powerless in face of a war but it was the first time that it had had to negotiate under the pressure of an ultimatum delivered by one member of the Council to another. With evident approval this journal reported, under a Geneva date-line, that many believed that the League would never recover from its defeat, while others sarcastically suggested that the plenary session of the League scheduled for March 3, if it could not settle the conflict, might at least be used to admit Manchuria to membership in the League.

The democratic VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG (February 20) remarked: "In this almost desperate situation, after days of debating behind closed doors, the Council of the League has called for March 3 the plenary session of the League demanded by China in view of the imminent battle of Shanghai, thus showing that, vis-à-vis a war which has actually broken out, it must admit its helplessness."

The democratic FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG said that "the Sino-Japanese conflict is the first big example by which the League demonstrates the flaws of its inner construction. It is easy to ironize the inactivity and inability of the Council. As a matter of fact, however, it is only suffering from its native faults. As yet, the League has not acquired that universality without which it can hardly be conceived. Two huge bodies: the United States
 and

-3-

and Russia are not members How can the Geneva Council, composed mainly of Europeans, achieve action when it receives, from so powerful an interested country as the United States, no firm support but merely diplomacy." The future of the League depended on its exhibiting foresight and mediating in conflicts while they were still incipient. In the Nine-Power Agreement, which included Japan, the signatories had agreed to respect China's independence. This pact, furnished an opportunity, shared by America, for interference.

That matters had come to the present pass, the Social Democratic VORWAERTS attributed to the cowardice of the Powers, who were now in a panic. The Japanese action, which commenced almost half a year ago, should have been nipped in the bud. Japan had lost all respect for the League. No great hopes could be placed in a plenary session. "It is evident that the attitude of German diplomacy in this question is no less miserable than that of the other powers. The Wilhelmstrasse has not yet realized Germany's interest in effective protection for the militarily weak vis-à-vis the overwhelming forces of armed imperialism. Only Japan's possible support of the German point of view in the reparation question is taken into account."

1/

The attached cartoon from the political-satirical weekly SIMPLICISSIMUS (February 21) shows a session of the Council and bears the legend: "Gentlemen, there is no use continuing to negotiate concerning the Sino-

Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Japanese conflict. Until we know who is going to lose
the war, it cannot be said who is to blame for the war."

Respectfully yours,

Frederic M. Sackett

Frederic M. Sackett.

✓ Enclosure:
1. Simplicissimus.

Copy to:
EIC Paris.

710.
AWK HCF ER

Der Völkerbund

(F. Schöllma)



„Meine Herren, es hat keinen Zweck, über den chinesisch-japanischen Konflikt weiter zu verhandeln. Ehe wir nicht wissen, wer den Krieg verliert, läßt sich doch nicht sagen, wer schuld daran ist.“

1871

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


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WE

No. 2306.


Paris, February 25, 1932.

Subject: The Sino-Japanese Conflict.

PM REC'D



MAR 7 1932



F/LS 793.94/4611

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's
instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I
have the honor to transmit herewith clip-
pings from the French press, on the subject
of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the
period from February 17 to February 25, 1932,
inclusive.

MAR 10 1932
FILED

Respectfully yours,

Walter E. Edge
Walter E. Edge.

Enclosures.....

- 2 -

Enclosures (single copy):

Clippings from the following newspapers:

February 17, 1932.

- No. 1 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 2 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
- 3 - LE TEMPS

February 18, 1932.

- No. 4 - LE POPULAIRE

February 19, 1932.

- No. 5 - LE QUOTIDIEN

February 20, 1932.

- No. 6 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 7 - LE JOURNAL
- 8 - L'OEUVRE
- 9 - LE POPULAIRE
- 10 - LE QUOTIDIEN
- 11 - LA REPUBLIQUE
- 12 - LE TEMPS

February 21, 1932.

- No. 13 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 14 - LA REPUBLIQUE

February 22, 1932.

- No. 15 - L'ACTION FRANCAISE
- 16 - LE POPULAIRE
- 17 - LA REPUBLIQUE

February 23, 1932.

- No. 18 - L'AVENIR
- 19 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS
- 20 - LE MATIN
- 21 - L'OEUVRE
- 22 - PARIS MIDI
- 23 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 24 - LA REPUBLIQUE
- 25 - LE TEMPS

February 24, 1932.

- No. 26 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
- 27 - L'OEUVRE
- 28 - PARIS MIDI
- 29 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 30 - LE POPULAIRE
- 31 - LE QUOTIDIEN
- 32 - LA REPUBLIQUE

February 25, 1932.

- No. 33 - L'ACTION FRANCAISE
- 34 - LE JOURNAL
- 35 - LE POPULAIRE

In quintuplicate
710
RS/jdk

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris,

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, February 17, 1932.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Une grave initiative du Conseil de la Société des Nations

Genève, 16 février.

En ce qui concerne le conflit sino-japonais, la présente journée a été marquée par un fait très important, fort capable d'aggraver et de précipiter la crise à Shanghai et ailleurs, peut-être même, hypothèse extrême, mais nullement gratuite, de rejeter le Japon hors de la Société des Nations.

Vendredi, les douze membres du conseil de la Société des Nations paraissaient disposés à ne plus se mêler du litige sino-japonais, sinon pour le transmettre à l'assemblée de la Société des Nations, dont la Chine, usant du droit que l'article 15 du Covenant confère aux parties, avait formellement demandé la convocation. Dans la journée de lundi, tout a changé. Les fanatiques de la Société des Nations, les Madariaga, les Colban, les Switzer (un fonctionnaire du secrétariat, de nationalité américaine, qui, à l'occasion, sert d'agent de liaison entre Washington et Genève) s'étaient dit que le Conseil ne pouvait ainsi disparaître de la scène, impuissant et bafoué, alors que l'armée japonaise s'appropriait à frapper un coup décisif. Ils persuadèrent sir Eric Drummond qu'une dernière démarche beaucoup plus énergique que les précédentes devait être tentée pour arrêter le gouvernement nippon.

Sir Eric Drummond prépara donc le texte d'un appel à Tokio. Tout d'abord, il y mit des formes et s'attacha à ménager les sentiments japonais. C'est ainsi que dans ce premier brouillon, il établissait une distinction entre le problème mandchourien réglé par le Conseil le 10 décembre, à la satisfaction du Japon et le problème de Shanghai. L'avertissement qu'il faisait entendre ne portait que sur ce dernier point. En outre, sir Eric s'était abouché avec la délégation japonaise qui essaya de l'orienter vers une action de caractère bilatéral. Les Madariaga, les Colban et les Switzer ne se déclarèrent pas satisfaits de ce document et le secrétaire général accepta de le renforcer. On pouvait y lire, par exemple, que la Société des Nations ne reconnaîtrait jamais la moindre atteinte portée aux droits souverains de la Chine et à son intégrité territoriale.

Tel est le projet qui fut communiqué ce matin aux douze membres du Conseil, réunis hors la présence des délégués japonais et chinois. Les « douze » chargèrent un comité de rédaction de le mettre au point, un comité de rédaction où siégèrent,

auprès des représentants de la France, le marquis de Londonderry, M. Fotich (Yougoslavie) et l'inévitable Madariaga. Le soir même, dans une nouvelle réunion officielle, il fut adopté.

Il couvre trois grandes pages dactylographiées. En voici le sens général : Les douze membres du conseil, réunis en dehors des parties, sont tombés d'accord pour rappeler au gouvernement japonais ses responsabilités en tant que grande puissance et en tant que membre fidèle de la Société des Nations, notamment en ce qui touche à l'article 10 du Covenant (respect de l'intégrité territoriale des Etats), au traité des neuf puissances de 1922 et au pacte Kellogg. Les Douze exhortent ensuite le Japon à faire preuve de modération, et ils emploient la phrase que nous avons déjà citée sur les droits souverains de la Chine.

Quel effet aura cette admonestation sur les événements d'Extrême-Orient ? Voilà qu'il n'est pas aisé de prévoir. Une certaine inquiétude se manifeste. La plupart sentent confusément que, dans le conseil, nous n'avons pas affaire à une politique réfléchie, mais à une idéologie.

PERTINAX.

Enc 17

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, February 17, 1932.

De Chapei à Wou-Soung

par Albert MILHAUD

De Wou-Soung à Chapei une ligne de chemin de fer s'allonge toute droite, qui est à la courbe du petit fleuve Wangpo ce que la corde est à l'arc. Ce n'est pas par hasard que les noms de Chapei et de Wou-Soung reviennent perpétuellement dans les *communiqués*, — non ! excusez-moi, ce n'est pas la guerre, — du moins dans les informations de la presse. Le jour où ils tiendraient la ligne de Chapei à Wou-Soung, les Japonais seraient maîtres de la voie ferrée ou bien près de le devenir ; ils domineraient donc Changhaï et, si je suis bien informé, ils transformeraient l'agglomération misérable de Chapei en un splendide quartier japonais ; ce serait ainsi la troisième concession changhaïenne. Est-ce tout ? Non pas. Les Japonais seraient pratiquement les maîtres des embouchures du fleuve Yang-tsé, l'un des plus grands fleuves du monde, et ils tiendraient presque à merci Nankin, la capitale chinoise historique. Enfin, le problème actuellement posé serait réglé, c'est-à-dire que les Chinois seraient contraints de reconnaître en fait ou en droit, en fait et en droit, la mainmise définitive, plus ou moins camouflée, du Japon sur la Mandchourie.

Les Japonais réussiraient-ils aisément leur opération sur la ligne Chapei-Wou-Soung ? Jusqu'à présent, on a vu échouer la tentative de vive force faite par les fusiliers marins. Le commandement japonais a dû amener d'urgence le renfort d'une division. Les correspondants de la presse occidentale nous font savoir qu'il y a là-bas, désormais, 18,000 hommes de troupe japonais. On ne doit pas forcer le chiffre.

Les Chinois, qui ne bénéficient pas, auprès de l'opinion, du même prestige militaire, ne seraient pas moins de 30 à 35,000 hommes. On n'a peut-être pas oublié que ces forces constituent la 19^e armée, et que cette 19^e armée comprend la 78^e division cantonaise, la 61^e division cantonaise, la 90^e division cantonaise. Ce recrutement de troupes méridionales s'explique. L'armée qui est venue relever le gant, lors des premières attaques japonaises, avait pour but de protéger le prestige et l'honneur des hommes de gouvernement d'origine cantonaise aujourd'hui mis à l'écart. Mais les troupes ont bien résisté ; elles sont devenues glorieuses depuis qu'elles ont tenu contre le choc japonais. Populaires, elles s'exaltent tout naturellement. D'ailleurs, il convient de dire qu'elles ont l'appui de conseillers techniques européens : aviateurs américains, stratèges allemands.

Ces troupes chinoises se sont aussitôt protégées par une ligne de tranchées, et le général Tsai-ting-kai a décidé de ne pas prendre l'offensive, mais de tenir jusqu'au bout. Il veut faire la preuve, aux yeux de Genève, que l'agresseur c'est le Japonais et, d'autre part, il donne du temps à son pays pour rassembler des forces.

ficiers de l'école de Ludendorff, et qui n'est pas éloignée du champ de bataille actuel.

Même si l'on imagine impossible le transport par voie ferrée des cohues de la soldatesque répandue sur toute la terre chinoise, il n'est pas inimaginable de penser que la division modèle de Chang-Kai-Chek, ou les trois divisions de Feng, peuvent entrer en ligne, surtout si elles sont supplées ailleurs dans le maintien de l'ordre par les troupes des vieux généraux qu'on voit sortir de l'ombre.

La lutte qui s'engage sur les bords du Wang-po, face à la voie ferrée de Chapei-Wou-Soung, peut donc durer longtemps. Des tranchées, comme jadis sur nos départements meurtris, des lignes organisées à l'allemande, comme jadis celles des Jeunes-Turcs à Tchataldja ; voilà ce que rappelle cette bataille, qui depuis la fin janvier a commencé.

Quand finira-t-elle ?

On n'est en droit de se livrer à aucune conjecture à cet égard. C'est un cliché de dire qu'en matière d'affaires chinoises nulle prévision n'est imaginable, et que l'évanouissement des principaux personnages du drame est un fait constant au moment psychologique.

Sommes-nous abusés lorsqu'on nous dit que, cette fois, il n'en sera pas ainsi et que le mouvement de résistance nationale prend une ampleur considérable ? Les Chinois seront-ils ravitaillés du dehors en armes, en munitions, en personnel technique et militaire ? Ce sont des questions qui se posent. Et, pourtant, officiellement, le pacte Kellogg est toujours debout. Mais est-il toujours debout depuis septembre dernier ?

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, February 17, 1932.

De Chapei à Wou-Soung

par Albert MILHAUD

De Wou-Soung à Chapei une ligne de chemin de fer s'allonge toute droite, qui est à la courbe du petit fleuve Wangpo ce que la corde est à l'arc. Ce n'est pas par hasard que les noms de Chapei et de Wou-Soung reviennent perpétuellement dans les communiqués, — non! excusez-moi, ce n'est pas la guerre, — du moins dans les informations de la presse. Le jour où ils tiendraient la ligne de Chapei à Wou-Soung, les Japonais seraient maîtres de la voie ferrée ou bien près de le devenir; ils domineraient donc Changhaï et, si je suis bien informé, ils transformeraient l'agglomération misérable de Chapei en un splendide quartier japonais; ce serait ainsi la troisième concession changhaïenne. Est-ce tout? Non pas. Les Japonais seraient pratiquement les maîtres des embouchures du fleuve Yang-tsé, l'un des plus grands fleuves du monde, et ils tiendraient presque à merci Nankin, la capitale chinoise historique. Enfin, le problème actuellement posé serait réglé, c'est-à-dire que les Chinois seraient contraints de reconnaître en fait ou en droit, en fait et en droit, la mainmise définitive, plus ou moins camouflée, du Japon sur la Mandchourie.

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Ce plan semble bien avoir réussi jusqu'à présent, puisqu'une sorte de gouvernement chinois d'union sacrée s'est constitué, et que, soutenu par le sentiment national il semble en voie de reconstitution de l'unité chinoise. Evidemment, dans ce pays peuplé comme l'Europe entière, rien ne se fait d'un coup de baguette magique, mais il paraît clair qu'une sorte d'entente est en train d'aboutir entre les principaux chefs militaires: on voit réapparaître, après cinq ans d'effacement, le fameux Ou-pei-fou, l'ancien rival de Chang-tso-lin. On voit le général Feng — le général chrétien comme on l'appelle — promettre son concours contre les Japonais. Lui aussi, comme Ou-pei-fou, semblait « retiré dans ses terres », uniquement préoccupé de soins personnels et égoïstes. On voit enfin en scène le fameux Chang-Kai-Chek, qui dispose non seulement d'une très grande armée, mais tout particulièrement d'une division modèle, organisée par des of-

ficiers de l'école de Ludendorff, et qui n'est pas éloignée du champ de bataille actuel.

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TEMPS 17

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, February 17, 1932.

BOURRASQUE SUR LE PACIFIQUE

Ne dramatisons point. Toutefois gardons-nous de considérer ce qui se passe en Chine uniquement sous l'angle de ce que l'on appelle couramment l'actualité, c'est-à-dire le fait présent qui alimente les journaux, que rien, souvent, ne précède et ne suit, et qui, même dans le cas contraire, n'a pour le lecteur que l'intérêt d'être, au moment où il le lit. L'affaire de Mandchourie et celle de Shanghai doivent éveiller un autre intérêt. Nous le disons avec d'autant plus de conviction et nous craignons d'autant moins d'être suggestionné par l'habitude professionnelle, que nous avons remarqué au cours de ces derniers jours, chez des confrères nullement spécialisés dans la politique extrême-orientale, un souci ou du moins une idée analogue à la nôtre.

Que pour apprécier ces deux affaires on les sépare à tous égards comme le veulent les Japonais ou qu'on les réunisse au contraire comme y tiennent les Chinois, elles sortent du cadre extrême-oriental. La première y serait restée cette fois encore sans l'intervention de la Société des nations. C'est donc par accident qu'elle en est sortie. La seconde s'en échappait d'emblée d'elle-même à cause du caractère essentiellement international de la ville où elle avait surgi.

Quoi qu'il en soit, les deux affaires se présentent maintenant sous un jour tel que leur côté international est manifeste; et c'est précisément ce qu'il ne faut pas considérer avec indifférence. Or, nous avons trouvé cette opinion sous plusieurs plumes, et c'est peut-être la première fois que, depuis que nous nous occupons du problème du Pacifique, nous sentons de la spontanéité, le réflexe pour ainsi dire des événements, chez ceux qui en écrivent, au lieu d'un raisonnement plus ou moins académique et sans véritable conviction.

Le fameux problème du Pacifique, et tout ce qu'il comporte, d'aucuns s'en sont moqués, certains s'en moqueront encore; d'autres en ont parlé sans en saisir la gravité, et par une sorte de « snobisme diplomatique qui sévit à ce sujet », comme l'écrit en judicieux observateur l'amiral Castex. Tout de même, ce qui se déroule à présent en Extrême-Orient fera sans doute réfléchir les uns et les autres. Pour notre part, cela nous fait l'effet de ces bourrasques qui généralement précèdent une tempête; bien que cette dernière quelquefois se détourne, elles y ont fait penser.

Oh ! l'orage n'éclatera pas nécessairement. Nous croyons même sincèrement qu'il se détournera. Le conflit du Pacifique, que nous ne sommes pas seul à pressentir, et dont nous n'avons cessé, depuis des années, d'étudier les préliminaires en étudiant le problème du Pacifique, n'est pas encore pour demain (1). Mais nous ne saurions isoler dans le temps les événements d'aujourd'hui. Nous ne pouvons nous empêcher de les rattacher à l'avenir. Ils sonnent comme un avertissement pour éveiller notre attention ou pour donner un sens positif à ce qui, jusqu'ici, ne se présentait à l'esprit de beaucoup d'entre nous que sous la forme d'une théorie.

« Le problème du Pacifique, écrit l'amiral Castex dans le tome III de ses *Théories stratégiques*, ne vaut pas les os d'un soldat ni d'un marin français. Laissons à son sujet s'entre-dévorer Anglais, Américains, Japonais et Russes et, pour une fois, comptons les coups. Le problème en question nous intéresse médiocrement. Nous avons d'autres préoccupations en Méditerranée occidentale et sur le Rhin, et une lutte autrement vitale à y soutenir. »

C'est un point de vue que le *Temps* a examiné il n'y a pas longtemps, et notre intention n'est pas d'y revenir; mais ce que nous nous plaçons à constater chez notre auteur, c'est l'évidence qu'a pour lui le problème, le naturel avec lequel il en voit l'aboutissement, celui, hélas ! que nous entrevoyons nous-même.

N'étant pas stratège, nous ne saurions dire par où s'accrocheront les adversaires. Nous avons entendu sur ce point bien des choses dont la vraisemblance ne nous a pas paru satisfaisante; ces jours derniers encore nous entendions parler de points d'appui en Asie même pour des flottes conjuguées d'Amérique et de Grande-Bretagne... Faudrait-il encore que l'entente politique des deux pays existât au préalable, et d'autres ententes aussi; nous craignons, en effet, que ceux qui espèrent pouvoir « compter les coups » ne se trompent. Mais laissons de côté les hypothèses et constatons que dès le début des affaires actuelles, Londres ne s'est pas laissé entraîner par Washington contre Tokio. Visiblement, les Américains entendent mener du point de vue international, mais ils le font avec une modération non moins évidente.

Et cependant, l'envoi de leurs navires dans les eaux chinoises a immédiatement pris devant l'opinion mondiale un caractère différent de celui qu'a eu l'envoi d'autres forces navales étrangères. Immédiatement, les deux concurrents d'aujourd'hui en Chine se sont détachés en adversaires de demain sur l'horizon du Pacifique. Américains et Japonais, malgré la forme modérée des notes qu'ils ont échangées, ont fait songer à autre chose qu'à Chapei, et ce qui ne passait pour certains que pour de simples vues de l'esprit, soudain prit l'aspect de possibilités, sinon de réalités en puissance. On peut dire que pendant ces dernières semaines, l'opinion publique a fait partout, à cet égard, un progrès considérable. Est-ce à dire qu'elle doive s'alarmer ? Non.

Le conflit du Pacifique nécessitera des décisions et des mesures préalables dont la succession ne pourrait pas échapper totalement à l'observateur. Mais nous tenons pour un avertissement ce qui se passe à Shanghai. Le destin a voulu qu'à la suite de la malheureuse affaire créée inconsidérément en Mandchourie, le boycottage, l'arme que les Chinois manient avec le plus de succès, frappât si cruellement les Japonais dans leur commerce, que ceux-ci furent dans l'obligation de riposter.

Ne pouvant atteindre individuellement leurs clients d'hier et les convaincre de leur passer des commandes, ils s'en prirent aux organisations antijaponaises installées à Shanghai et dont les ramifications s'étendent jusqu'au fond de la Chine, puis au gouvernement de Nankin qui, pour le moins, laissait faire. (Remarquons en passant à quel point l'unité chinoise existe, non pas, certes, l'unité politique telle que nous l'entendons, nous autres citoyens d'une Europe morcelée, mais une autre, profondément ancrée dans les cerveaux et dans les cœurs. On lit dans le rapport de la commission consulaire de Shanghai, publié en grande partie dans le *Temps* du 10 février : « Ce boycottage, qui a été encouragé par les sociétés de boycottage antijaponais, constituées par diverses organisations chinoises agissant de concert, comportait la surveillance des magasins, la saisie des marchandises fabriquées au Japon, des amendes et des peines de prison aux Chinois qui faisaient usage ou commerce de ces marchandises, ainsi que d'autres actes illicites pour lesquels aucun recours auprès des tribunaux n'était possible. » Et cela sur tout le territoire de l'immense Chine. Il en est ainsi à chaque boycottage des produits d'une puissance quelconque : Amérique, Angleterre, Allemagne. Qu'on aille nier après cela l'unité chinoise !)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Bref, l'action de force des Japonais à Shanghai, où sont 25,000 blancs, inquiète naturellement ces derniers et met leurs gouvernements dans la nécessité d'intervenir. Le rappel par les signataires de la conférence de Washington du fameux principe de la « porte ouverte » a paru suffire à ceux-ci en Mandchourie. A Shanghai il ne leur a pas suffi. Leurs vaisseaux sont venus mouiller devant la grande cité. Les notes diplomatiques ont pris un tour plus pressant, ont eu plus de précision. Tout ce qui pouvait être dit sur un certain ton a été dit. Le haussera-t-on ? Pas cette fois. Le conflit n'est pas mûr, autrement dit les esprits ne sont pas suffisamment entraînés à l'idée de recourir à l'unique moyen de modifier une situation de fait créée par la force : une plus

(1) Voir nos études: *le Problème du Pacifique* (Dela-grave); *le Pacifique et la rencontre des races* (Fayard et Cie).

grande force opposée. Car le conflit — comme la paix — doit être dans les esprits avant d'exister dans les faits.

Mais un premier pas a été fait qui n'est plus à faire. Le contact a été pris, à l'occasion de la Chine, entre Américains et Japonais. Mais, au moins, cette fois, est-ce bien pour maintenir la paix en Extrême-Orient, ou pour permettre aux Chinois de continuer à boycotter les produits du Japon au profit des produits américains et autres ? Pour le coup, il faudrait le savoir, avant d'exposer « les os d'un soldat ou d'un marin français »...

ANDRÉ DUBOSQ.

Pop. 18

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, February 18, 1932.

LA GUERRE EN EXTREME-ORIENT

Une grande bataille est imminente à Changhaï

A la Chambre des Communes, on s'inquiète. Les Etats-Unis se préparent à présenter au Japon une nouvelle protestation. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations adresse un nouvel appel « amical » au Japon.

Mais celui-ci ne perd pas son temps. Tandis que son délégué à Genève soulève des questions de procédure contre la convocation de l'assemblée extraordinaire de la S. D. N. ses troupes accourent à Changhaï et se préparent à déclencher une grande offensive contre l'armée chinoise. On annonce que le commandant du corps expéditionnaire nippon signifiera incessamment aux Chinois un ultimatum exigeant leur retraite à une distance de vingt kilomètres de Changhaï. Et le général Araki, ministre de la Guerre, déclare au correspondant du *Daily Express* que « la patience du Japon est à bout et notre armée attend ».

A entendre le ministre de Tokio, on pourrait penser que Changhaï se trouve en territoire japonais et que ce sont les Chinois qui menacent la sécurité et l'intégrité du territoire du Japon !

D'ailleurs, pourquoi le gouvernement de Tokio se gênerait-il ?

Voilà cinq mois déjà que ses troupes foulent le sol chinois. Elles ont occupé les capitales des trois provinces de la Mandchourie, elles contrôlent le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois, elles bombardent Changhaï depuis plusieurs semaines. Tous les jours de nouveaux détachements débarquent dans cette ville avec tout le matériel nécessaire pour faire une véritable guerre aux Chinois.

Mais l'institution internationale chargée de sauvegarder la paix, et les grandes puissances, signataires du Covenant, du traité des Neuf et du pacte Kellogg, ne se décident toujours pas à dire au Japon, d'une manière énergique, qu'ils ne toléreront pas la mainmise du Japon sur la Chine, qu'ils ne permettront pas à l'Empire du Soleil Levant de faire la guerre à la Chine. Il y a plus. Dans plusieurs pays on exécute des commandes de matériel de guerre pour le Japon. Paul Faure a signalé à la Chambre les envois du Creusot. Aux Communes, M. Colville, secrétaire d'Etat au Commerce d'Outre-mer, a reconnu également que des permis avaient été délivrés, durant ces derniers mois, à des manufactures d'armes, pour l'exportation de matériel de guerre au Japon.

Même dans son dernier appel, adressé au gouvernement japonais, le Conseil de la S. D. N. n'a pas osé appeler les choses par leur nom. Il a peur de dénoncer l'agresseur devant l'opinion publique. Il semble même se préoccuper davantage de la sécurité de la Concession internationale de Changhaï, que du maintien de la paix et de la sauvegarde des droits de la Chine.

Or il est hors de doute que la protection des étrangers à Changhaï et des intérêts des puissances coloniales en Chine est impossible si l'on n'arrête pas immédiatement les hostilités et si l'on n'oblige pas le Japon à retirer ses troupes de Changhaï et de Mandchourie. D'ailleurs, les Japonais s'arrangeront de façon à ce que, au cours de la bataille imminente à Changhaï, les troupes chinoises soient entraînées vers la Concession internationale, afin qu'elle soit envahie par ces dernières. Le Japon espère par ce moyen, placer les puissances coloniales dans une situation difficile et les obliger à demander aux troupes japonaises aide et protection.

Il ne faut pas que l'opinion publique soit dupe de cette manœuvre.

Même si les gouvernements capitalistes se laissent prendre au piège, ou acceptent ce marché honteux.

O. ROSENFELD.

Quot. 19

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, February 19, 1932.

Le désarroi de la Société des Nations

Le texte de l'appel adressé de Genève par les représentants des Etats membres du Conseil de la Société des Nations à l'exception, bien entendu, de ceux de la Chine et du Japon, retentit tristement à travers le monde, tandis que la guerre — car il faut appeler les choses par leur nom — se poursuit âprement sur le sol envahi de la Chine.

Voici comment il se termine :

« Les douze membres du Conseil désirent rappeler qu'aux termes de l'article 10 du pacte de la Société des Nations, tout membre de la Société s'est engagé à respecter et à maintenir l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique présentes de tous les membres de la Société. Ils ont le droit, à titre amical, d'appeler l'attention sur cette disposition d'où il résulte notamment, à leur avis, qu'aucun empiètement sur l'intégrité territoriale et aucune atteinte à l'indépendance politique d'un membre de la Société des Nations, commis au mépris de l'article 10, ne sauraient être reconnus valables et effectifs par les membres de la Société. »

Comme tous ces mots sonnent mal ! Quoi ! alors que le territoire chinois est violé, l'ultime protestation consiste à dire que les effets de ces violations ne sont pas reconnus valables ?

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations commet une lourde faute en tenant un langage aussi peu énergique. On peut le résumer ainsi : « Nous n'osons déclarer criminel l'agresseur ; nous nous bornons à faire connaître aux deux parties que les combats seront sans effet durable. »

Avant la création de la Société des Nations, la Chine eût été mieux protégée contre une telle agression, et les « Puissances » se seraient sans doute opposées, par l'envoi sur les lieux de quelques cuirassés, à la continuation des hostilités.

LE QUOTIDIEN.

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, February 20, 1932.

Avant la bataille de Shanghai

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations essaie une fois de plus d'arrêter le gouvernement de Tokio par de vaines supplications et il se désiste au profit de l'Assemblée

Genève, 19 février.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a tenu ce soir, entre 5 heures et demie et 9 heures une séance vraiment dramatique. L'ultimatum adressé par le Japon aux généraux chinois qui commandent autour de Shanghai doit expirer à minuit (heure de l'Europe centrale). Et cet ultimatum succède à un appel lancé au gouvernement de Tokio, de Genève, samedi dernier, pour le supplier, au nom du Covenant, au nom du traité des neuf puissances relatif à l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, au nom du pacte Kellogg, de suspendre ses coups. Comment imaginer défi plus direct, démenti plus éclatant ? « Où va la paix de l'Europe ? Où va le pacte de la Société des Nations ? » s'est exclamé, en plein Conseil, M. de Madariaga, l'idéologue qui, depuis deux mois, représente à Paris l'Espagne républicaine. Ce disant, il traduisait bien le sentiment des spectateurs, qui, pour une fois, ne perdaient pas un mot des propos échangés.

Tel qu'il avait été fixé, le programme de la séance était assez modeste. Il s'agissait simplement de faire droit à la requête de la Chine et de substituer l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations au Conseil pour le règlement du conflit sino-japonais selon la procédure de l'article 15. Mais, vers la fin de la matinée, apprenant que les derniers pourparlers de Shanghai avaient mal tourné et que l'attaque japonaise était imminente, le représentant du gouvernement de Nankin, M. Yen, avait fait savoir qu'il priait le Conseil de prendre des « mesures conservatoires ». Attitude assez contradictoire. M. Yen demanda, il y a huit jours, que l'Assemblée fût saisie aux lieu et place du Conseil parce que ayant pu constater pendant des mois l'impuissance du Conseil. Or, au dernier moment, le voici qui se ravise et pousse le Conseil à tenter une ultime intervention. Le Conseil, du reste, ne saurait relever brutalement ce que la conduite de M. Yen peut avoir d'illogique, car il se rend compte très bien qu'après tant de vacillations son autorité à lui est entamée. De même que mardi dernier, il en appelait à Tokio contre toute espérance, il voudrait une fois de plus s'employer à prévenir la bataille. Il ne se résigne donc pas à garder le silence et, devant les parties en dispute et controverse, il se répand en supplications et gémissements. Ceux qui ont assisté à la scène ne l'oublieront pas de sitôt.

La politique japonaise défendue par M. Sato

A M. Sato, ambassadeur du Japon à Bruxelles, revenait la mission difficile de défendre la décision prise par son gouvernement d'opposer un *non possumus* courtois mais intangible aux dernières instances des uns et des autres. M. Sato est tout sagesse et mesure. Il s'exprime lentement, en phrases qui semblent décousues mais qui, lues dans le texte, s'enchaînent en raisonnements assez puissants. Aujourd'hui, il a grandement élargi son plaidoyer habituel. Après avoir réfuté les accusations portées par le délégué chinois contre les troupes japonaises (emploi de gaz, de balles dum-dum, etc.), il affirme que le Japon n'agit point à Shanghai dans un esprit de provocation, mais qu'il s'est lancé en avant par simple nécessité. Tout le

d'importance, après ceux de l'Angleterre et, dans les échanges commerciaux le Japon est au troisième rang. Quand la vie des Japonais de Shanghai ne sera plus menacée, quand les troupes chinoises auront reculé, le Japon s'en remettra aux puissances du soin de surveiller une zone neutre. Conclusion pratique : M. Sato refuse de transmettre à son gouvernement la demande d'un ajournement de l'ultimatum, formulée par M. Paul-Boncour.

Inutile de souligner l'importance du passage relatif aux grands peuples renfermés dans des limites étroites et qui souffrent chez eux. Il pose la dangereuse question de l'intangibilité des traités à laquelle la Société des Nations ne peut pas s'attaquer franchement sans disparaître, car les ajustements, les modifications du droit existant, qui les définiront et les imposera jamais, sinon la force des armes ? En Europe, les arguments de M. Sato ne trouveront-ils pas des amateurs ?

La tristesse de M. Paul-Boncour

M. Yen, le délégué chinois, élevé dans une Université de Virginie, est un bon orateur. Il le prouve en protestant contre le passage du discours japonais où la Chine est dénoncée comme dénuée de tout gouvernement et, par conséquent, indigne d'appartenir à la Société des Nations, en essayant de démontrer que le Japon est à l'origine de toutes les tribulations chinoises. Mais le problème n'est pas là. Le problème : ce sont les canons qui, bientôt, vont retentir. Etat de choses inexorable. M. Paul-Boncour est bien forcé de le constater. Il parle d'une voix basse, empreinte de tristesse : « L'honneur et la douleur de la Société des Nations, c'est d'être vouée à l'universalité ». « Vous êtes cruel, monsieur le délégué de la Chine, d'exiger de nous des mesures conservatoires. Vous savez bien que, d'après le pacte, les mesures conservatoires ne peuvent être prises que de l'accord des parties. » Et, ici, intervient cette demande d'un ajournement de l'ultimatum à laquelle nous avons déjà fait allusion. « Ah ! si nous pouvions obtenir gain de cause, comme nous nous endormirions ce soir avec une meilleure conscience ! »

Les membres du conseil prennent la parole un à un pour se joindre aux regrets et aux exhortations futiles de leur président. Chacun sait que son gouvernement ne fera pas avancer un soldat ou un navire, comme pas un ambassadeur ne sera rappelé. Le mieux est donc de ne pas insister. « Nous avons affaire à un cas limité : donc point de découragement ! » Cette réflexion est d'un membre du conseil. Elle n'est pas très encourageante, car est-on si certain qu'un cas européen, un cas frontière, mettrait le conseil de la Société des Nations en posture beaucoup plus favorable ? Les plus fermes dans leur foi se sentent ébranlés.

Les discours durent depuis plus de trois heures. Le conseil convoque l'Assemblée extraordinaire de la Société des Nations pour le 3 mars, sans illusion sur ce qu'elle pourra accomplir. Quant à lui, n'ayant plus à poursuivre le règlement du conflit (article 15), il s'emploiera encore à sauvegarder la paix par la conciliation (article 11). Mais il n'a pas plus d'illusions sur son propre compte

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, February 20, 1932.

Avant la bataille de Shanghai

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations essaie une fois de plus d'arrêter le gouvernement de Tokio par de vaines supplications et il se désiste au profit de l'Assemblée

Genève, 19 février.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a tenu ce soir, entre 5 heures et demie et 9 heures une séance vraiment dramatique. L'ultimatum adressé par le Japon aux généraux chinois qui commandent autour de Shanghai doit expirer à minuit (heure de l'Europe centrale). Et cet ultimatum succède à un appel lancé au gouvernement de Tokio, de Genève, samedi dernier, pour le supplier, au nom du Covenant, au nom du traité des neuf puissances relatif à l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, au nom du pacte Kellogg, de suspendre ses coups. Comment imaginer défi plus direct, démenti plus éclatant ? « Ou va la paix de l'Europe ? Ou va le pacte de la Société des Nations ? » s'est exclamé, en plein Conseil, M. de Madariaga, l'idéologue qui, depuis deux mois, représente à Paris l'Espagne républicaine. Ce disant, il traduisait bien le sentiment des spectateurs, qui, pour une fois, ne perdaient pas un mot des propos échangés.

Tel qu'il avait été fixé, le programme de la séance était assez modeste. Il s'agissait simplement de faire droit à la requête de la Chine et de substituer l'assemblée de la Société des Nations au Conseil pour le règlement du conflit sino-japonais selon la procédure de l'article 15. Mais, vers la fin de la matinée, apprenant que les derniers pourparlers de Shanghai avaient mal tourné et que l'attaque japonaise était imminente, le représentant du gouvernement de Nankin, M. Yen, avait fait savoir qu'il prierait le Conseil de prendre des « mesures conservatoires ». Attitude assez contradictoire. M. Yen demanda, il y a huit jours, que l'assemblée fût saisie au lieu et place du Conseil parce que ayant pu constater pendant des mois l'impuissance du Conseil, Or, au dernier moment, le voici qui se « défendait » par des « mesures » chinoises contre les troupes japonaises (emploi de gaz, de balles dum-dum, etc.), il affirme que le Japon n'agit point à Shanghai dans un esprit de provocation, mais qu'il s'est lancé en avant par simple nécessité. Tout le commerce nippon est frappé et les sujets japonais sont en péril. L'on comprend que dans les batailles de rues livrées au nord des concessions contre 30.000 Chinois, les 2.700 fusiliers-marins, démunis d'artillerie, ont subi un revers. Le Japon perdrait la face dans toute la Chine et les positions qu'il y occupe deviendraient intenable s'il ne réussissait pas à faire respecter ses armes.

D'où l'attaque du général Oyeda. Tout cela M. Salo ne le dit pas mais, d'après les phrases qu'il prononce, cette préoccupation apparaît. Pour le reste, ce que déclare le diplomate japonais porte fort et net. Le pacte de la Société des Nations n'est pas fait pour l'Extrême-Orient. Il ne trouve pas d'application dans un monde anarchique comme le monde chinois. Il y a dix ans, quand elle entra dans la Société des Nations, la Chine possédait encore un gouvernement ; par la suite, elle est devenue un chaos.

Pour sauvegarder leurs intérêts, les puissances ont fait, dans le passé, ce que le Japon fait aujourd'hui. Pourquoi deux poids et deux mesures ?

À la vérité, la Société des Nations n'a pas été à même de servir utilement la cause de la paix. « Nous sommes obligés de nous défendre par nos propres moyens. » Par suite, le point de vue s'élargit encore. Nous avons un petit territoire, une population surabondante et les peuples vivant en petit nombre sur de vastes étendues nous ferment la porte : Amérique du Sud sauf deux ou trois États, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande, Afrique du Sud. « Nous ne pouvons pas nous laisser exposer de Chine. » Pour la Mandchourie, AMONG les nations, la Société n'acceptera de l'occuper. « La Société est une chose parfaite de laquelle les grands se contentent, en fait.

d'importance, après ceux de l'Angleterre et, dans les échanges commerciaux le Japon est au troisième rang. Quand la vie des Japonais de Shanghai ne sera plus menacée, quand les troupes chinoises auront reculé, le Japon s'en remettra aux puissances du soin de surveiller une zone neutre. Conclusion pratique : M. Sato refuse de transmettre à son gouvernement la demande d'un ajournement de l'ultimatum, formulée par M. Paul-Boncour.

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[illegible]

Jan 20

Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, February 20, 1932.

LE JAPON VOTE aujourd'hui

On croit que la majorité
sera acquise au gouvernement
dont la politique extérieure
serait ainsi plébiscitée

Le Japon vote aujourd'hui. C'est un fait d'importance au moment même où le conflit sino-japonais entre dans sa phase la plus aiguë.

L'empire du Soleil-Levant, à qui un empereur libéral octroya le régime parlementaire, en 1889, n'est pas venu d'un seul coup au suffrage universel. Pendant 36 ans, jusqu'en 1925, le suffrage censitaire a préparé les voies à la réforme qui a couronné l'ascension des masses au pouvoir législatif. Réforme d'importance, puisque, par la suppression du cens et l'abaissement de l'âge électoral de 30 à 24 ans, le nombre des électeurs est passé de 3 à 15 millions. Deux expériences ont eu lieu depuis. Celle-ci est la troisième, 674 candidats se disputent les 446 sièges à pourvoir.

Il y a au Japon deux grands partis politiques, le parti Seiyukai, conservateur, et le parti Minseito, libéral, qui se partagent alternativement le pouvoir. Les ministres ne sont pas responsables devant la Chambre, mais devant l'empereur. Il s'ensuit que quand un gouvernement se trouve en face d'une Chambre hostile, il la dissout. C'est ce qu'a fait le chef du gouvernement conservateur actuel, M. Inukai, le 21 janvier dernier.

La première question qui se pose est donc celle de savoir si M. Inukai obtiendra des électeurs l'appui qu'il sollicite ? Déjà, 24 membres du parti Seiyukai ont été élus sans concurrents, contre 12 seulement du parti Minseito. D'une façon générale, on croit que le gouvernement obtiendra une majorité assez considérable.

Les résultats pourront-ils influencer d'une façon décisive sur l'orientation de la politique du Japon à l'égard de la Chine ? C'est très peu probable.

La question ne se posera évidemment pas, si, comme nous le croyons, le gouvernement l'emporte. M. Inukai et M. Yoshizawa ne pourront, en effet, que puiser dans le verdict populaire un surcroît de confiance et d'autorité. Pour le cas, très improbable, où le parti libéral l'emporterait, on peut être certain qu'il poursuivra d'une main ferme la politique actuelle. C'est, d'ailleurs, lui qui a pris l'initiative des opérations de police en Mandchourie.

Les Japonais peuvent, en effet, se diviser parfois sur des questions de politique intérieure, mais ils savent toujours rester étroitement unis quand les intérêts essentiels du pays sont en jeu et que l'honneur du drapeau est engagé.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Luitel NARS, Date 12-18-75

Desire 20

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, February 25, 1932.

Genève se voit, aujourd'hui, devant un péril.

C'est une des plus pathétiques péripéties du martyrologe de la Paix, depuis la Grande Guerre.

La Conférence du Désarmement, à qui le projet français propose de conférer le soin d'armer la Société des Nations, ne peut encore rien.

Il est possible que, demain, il soit prouvé que, telle qu'elle est, la Société des Nations ne peut plus rien.

Un effort acharné a été commencé hier à Genève et s'y poursuivra.

Peut-on y assister sans émotion ?

Juste au moment où apparaît quelque espoir que la paix, jusqu'ici passive, soit pourvue des garanties d'une législation positive, est-ce que les circonstances ne vont pas, sinon en arrêter la recherche, du moins en retarder la confiance ?

Et quelles circonstances !

Dieu sait si l'histoire de ces vieux nids de discordes et de secrets que sont les grands ports d'Extrême-Orient à concessions internationales, où la paix n'a jamais été maintenue que par la force, fut féconde en surprises, en complots, en intrigues, en corruptions !

Aujourd'hui, c'est sur Changhaï qu'a glissé et s'est buté le conflit sino-japonais. Pourquoi ? Parce que Changhaï est le foyer du boycott japonais. Premier risque de guerre.

Changhaï est en même temps le rendez-vous, séculaire bientôt, de tous les intérêts étrangers en Chine. Américains, Anglais, Français, Japonais, Chinois s'y coudoient dans la concession, dont le long glacis rectangulaire, prolongé par les antennes des routes internationales allant sur Hankéou et sur Nankin, dominait autrefois une Chine résignée. Mais la Chine n'est plus résignée. Deuxième risque de guerre.

Enfin, entre les puissances réunies sous cette menace à Changhaï, qui y ont fait venir des troupes et des navires de renfort (il y en a plus de 50, sans compter la flotte japonaise, ancrés dans le Whang-Poo), si, diplomatiquement, il s'est établi un accord affiché, de sérieuses divergences subsistent. Les Etats-Unis ont leur tactique à eux.

Que feront les uns et les autres, mis au pied du mur ?

Donneront-ils spontanément d'avance à la Société des Nations leurs armes ? Déjà l'Angleterre appréhende cette charge et recommande à la Société des Nations la modération.

La modération ? Autant dire l'abstention, autant dire le renoncement ? Troisième risque de guerre, la pire : celle d'une guerre isolée d'une puissance, soit avec le Japon, soit avec la Chine.

Epreuve redoutable, vous voyez.

Si Genève arrive à traverser ces jours, nous pourrions mieux regarder devant nous, avec plus de calme, car, en douze ans, elle n'en a pas rencontré encore d'aussi dangereux.

HENRI HERTZ.

P&F 20

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, February 20, 1932.

A l'heure où j'écris ces lignes — à Changhaï il fait déjà jour — la grande bataille attendue depuis quelques jours a certainement commencé. D'un côté, environ 100.000 Chinois, de l'autre, de 30.000 à 50.000 Japonais (les informations sur les effectifs nippons à Changhaï sont contradictoires).

C'est la guerre dans le sens le plus strict du mot. Il n'est plus question ni « d'opérations de police », ni de lutte contre le « banditisme ». Le corps expéditionnaire nippon est en face de la 19^e armée chinoise augmentée de renforts fournis par le gouvernement de Nankin, par les autorités de Canton et par les généraux indépendants.

Avant-hier soir, le commandant des troupes nippones avait adressé aux Chinois un ultimatum. Aux termes de celui-ci, l'armée chinoise devait abandonner Changhaï avec tous ses faubourgs et se replier à une distance de 20 kilomètres de la ville. Hier soir, les autorités militaires chinoises faisaient savoir qu'elles acceptaient de se retirer de Changhaï si les Japonais, de leur côté, évacuaient la ville et s'en éloignaient à une distance égale. Naturellement, le Japon a repoussé cette proposition. Rien qu'il ait envahi un territoire qui ne lui appartient pas, il se croit en droit d'y faire la loi. Et il va si loin dans son arrogance cynique, qu'il accuse de « provocation » les Chinois qui ne font que défendre leur sol national!

Le Japon ne cache d'ailleurs plus son jeu: M. Sato, qui le représente au Conseil de la S.D.N., a fait hier des déclarations que l'Agence Havas nous transmet dans les termes suivants:

A son avis, tous les maux présents viennent de ce que le pacte de la S.D.N. ne s'applique qu'à des pays organisés. Or, la Chine n'est pas un pays organisé; elle est en guerre civile depuis plus de dix ans: le désordre et l'anarchie y règnent en maître.

Avec d'autres pays le Japon eût agi tout autrement. Lorsque la Chine a été admise dans la S.D.N., elle avait une apparence d'organisation; mais la situation s'est modifiée. Les généraux se battent entre eux, provoquant l'anarchie et rendent la Chine incapable de protéger les étrangers.

Fort de cette « doctrine » le représentant du Japon dénie au Conseil le droit d'intervenir dans les « affaires » de l'Empire du Soleil Levant. Il va plus loin. Il évoque, non sans raison, des précédents, c'est-à-dire des crimes analogues commis en Chine par les grandes puissances capitalistes.

M. Sato dit — toujours selon l'Agence Havas:

Avant le Japon d'autres grands gouvernements ont été obligés de recourir à des mesures exceptionnelles de protection. Le Japon ne manque pas de précédents. Si le Conseil condamne aujourd'hui les mesures prises par le Japon, il doit dire ce qu'il pense des précédents. Sans doute estime-t-il que le pacte ne pouvait s'appliquer à la Chine comme à tous autres pays.

Renoncer à Changhaï ce serait pour le Japon abandonner la défense de ses intérêts. Aucun pays ne saurait y consentir.

Le Japon occupe à Changhaï le deuxième rang pour les capitaux investis et le troisième pour le commerce extérieur.

Le Japon est menacé d'être chassé de toute la Chine; il ne pouvait trouver en la S.D.N. un appui pour sauvegarder ses droits. C'est pourquoi il a pris lui-même sa défense.

M. Sato a ainsi posé la question avec franchise. Il oblige les puissances à déclarer ouvertement si elles reconnaissent à la Chine les droits dont jouissent les autres Etats, ou bien si elles la considèrent comme une colonie.

On comprend que le langage un peu brutal de M. Sato a fortement embarrassé les membres du Conseil. Condamner le Japon, c'est se déjuger, c'est condamner le colonialisme, les privilèges impérialistes en Chine, l'exterritorialité, les traités inégaux. Accepter la thèse du Japon, c'est lui laisser toute liberté d'action à Chan-

ghaï, c'est trahir les engagements solennels du Covenant et du pacte Kellogg, c'est renoncer à sa mission de sauvegarder la paix.

Dans sa réponse au délégué du Japon, le président Paul-Boncour a trahi l'embarras des Etats capitalistes représentés à Genève. Il a prononcé un discours émouvant. Il a supplié M. Sato de demander à son gouvernement l'ajournement de l'offensive d'aujourd'hui. Il a rappelé l'assurance donnée par le Japon de respecter l'article 10 du Covenant. Mais il n'a pas osé jeter publiquement, à la face du représentant du militarisme japonais, l'accusation que le monde entier formule, à savoir que le gouvernement japonais est un parjure et un agresseur, et que la conscience universelle exige l'évacuation immédiate des troupes nippones.

Les débats d'hier, à Genève, ont fait ressortir avec clarté le divorce entre la conscience universelle — qui est celle du monde du travail — et la conscience capitaliste qui ne peut pas renoncer aux « principes » du colonialisme, même si un nouveau carnage mondial en résulterait.

Or, chaque heure qui s'écoule nous rapproche du choc entre les intérêts rivaux des puissances impérialistes. Les Etats-Unis s'orientent vers une guerre avec le Japon. Une note publiée, hier, à Washington déclare « que les Etats-Unis se consacrent actuellement à la protection de la concession internationale et ne songent plus à recourir à des démarches diplomatiques, puisque celles-ci ne servent à rien ». Ce n'est, certes, pas encore la rupture des relations diplomatiques avec le Japon. Mais c'est déjà un pas dans cette direction.

Et il ne faut pas perdre de vue que, si les Etats-Unis envisagent une guerre avec le Japon, ils feront tout pour pousser l'U.R.S.S. à un conflit avec le Japon, car, sans alliance avec la Russie, il est difficile à l'Amérique de faire la guerre au Japon.

De son côté, en prévision de la guerre du Pacifique, le Japon cherchera à s'assurer le contrôle de la côte russe du Pacifique. L'occupation de Vladivostok, de toute la région maritime et de la presqu'île du Kamchatka est le prochain objectif de l'armée et de la flotte du Japon.

Provoquée par le Japon qui menace son territoire, sollicitée par les Etats-Unis qui cherchent une alliance militaire, l'U.R.S.S. et son maître Staline pourront-ils résister, et se tenir encore longtemps à l'écart des événements de l'Extrême-Orient?

« Le temps travaille pour la paix » ont télégraphié de Genève les envoyés spéciaux de notre grande presse en approuvant, en septembre, l'inaction et la faiblesse du Conseil de la S.D.N.

On peut se rendre compte aujourd'hui de la clairvoyance de la presse capitaliste. Elle porte une grande, très grande responsabilité dans les événements tragiques qui se déroulent en Chine et dans ceux, encore plus catastrophiques, qui se préparent pour le printemps.

O. ROSENFELD.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Quot 20

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, February 20, 1932.

Les chinoiseries de Genève

Qu'elle soit déclarée ou non, la guerre sévit à l'heure actuelle entre le Japon et la Chine.

Or, il existe à Genève un organisme international dont le rôle essentiel, nous pourrions dire la raison d'être, est précisément d'empêcher la guerre.

Que fait-il ? Comment remplit-il sa haute mission ?

Tandis que les nouvelles les plus pessimistes nous parviennent de Shanghai, tandis que le monde entier a les yeux fixés sur cette partie de l'Asie ensanglantée, le Conseil de la S. D. N. délibère.

Sans doute il faut bien délibérer avant d'agir, mais de quoi s'occupent donc, dans l'urgence extrême, les diplomates de Genève ?

On ne peut le dire sans étonnement et sans regret, ils se demandent gravement « si la compétence du Conseil, sur la base de l'article 15 du pacte, cesse du moment où l'Assemblée est convoquée, ou si cette compétence demeure, jusqu'au jour précis où l'Assemblée extraordinaire entre en séance ».

Genève est-il donc devenu Byzance, où l'on discutait du sexe des anges, tandis que l'ennemi menait l'attaque contre la ville ?

Que dire de ces garants de la paix, qui s'embarrassent d'une question de procédure, tandis que le monde attend avec inquiétude le terme de l'ultimatum lancé par les Japonais, c'est-à-dire « le 20 février, au coucher du soleil » !

L'article 15 stipule que le Conseil de la S. D. N. « peut » soumettre le litige dont il est saisi à l'Assemblée.

Le docteur Yen, au nom de la Chine, s'est conformé à cet article du règlement.

La Société des Nations, à laquelle s'attachent tant d'espérances, semble, en ces temps d'épreuve, préparer systématiquement des déceptions à ses innombrables amis, à ces millions de pétitionnaires qui lui criaient, il y a quelques jours : « Nous croyons en vous, mais sachez faire la paix ! »

Le moment est décisif.

L'Assemblée de Genève joue son prestige, et peut-être même son avenir. Si elle se réfugie dans de pures formalités, si elle se dérobe à ses obligations les plus strictes, elle offre alors aux peuples la plus affligeante carence.

Que les hommes d'Etat qui siègent actuellement à l'Assemblée se rendent compte des énormes responsabilités qui leur incombent.

Que le sentiment de ces mêmes responsabilités leur donne enfin de l'énergie et les fasse agir.

LE QUOTIDIEN.

1886

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, February 20, 1932.

MAUVAISES NOUVELLES DE CHINE

On se bat à Shanghai

Les nouvelles de Chine sont décidément mauvaises. Les négociations entre généraux chinois et généraux japonais ont été rompues. Un ultimatum japonais a été remis d'après lequel le Japon exigeait le retrait de l'armée chinoise à 20 kilomètres en arrière; le démantèlement des forts et la cessation du boycottage. Pratiquement, il entendait prendre ainsi possession de Shanghai et de sa banlieue.

Or, Shanghai est la porte de la Chine; tenir Shanghai, c'est tenir la Chine, et jamais l'Angleterre ni l'Amérique ne permettront que ce marche de 500 millions de consommateurs leur échappe. L'Amérique surtout élèvera sûrement la voix; elle l'élève déjà à propos de la proclamation de l'indépendance mandchoue. Comment pourrait-elle admettre que le Japon annexe à son empire la Mandchourie, soit 30 millions d'hommes et 800.000 kilomètres carrés, avec une abondance de richesses minières dont nous n'avons aucune idée? Et voilà que le Japon fait plus, qu'il occupe la porte de la Chine... Les cuirassés américains sont déjà sur place; les Etats-Unis refusent de reconnaître le nouveau régime mandchou, et les voilà qui protestent, au moins officieusement contre l'occupation de Shanghai.

Et la S. D. N.? direz-vous.

Bah! les douze membres du Conseil ont bien fait tenir un appel au Japon, mais celui-ci, vingt-quatre heures après l'avoir reçu, a justement saisi définitivement — on peut dire annexé, car l'indépendance de la Mandchourie n'existera plus, n'existe plus — celui-ci donc a justement saisi définitivement les 800.000 kilomètres carrés qu'il avait juré ne pas vouloir annexer. Ainsi, le Japon joue son jeu sans se soucier des règles et roule la S. D. N. avec le sourire.

Il peut se le permettre. Voici la fin de l'appel des Douze. On ne peut rien imaginer de plus plat:

Les douze membres du Conseil désireront rappeler qu'aux termes de l'article 10 du pacte de la Société des Nations, tout membre de la Société s'est engagé à respecter et à maintenir l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique présentes de tous les membres de la Société. Ils ont le droit, à titre amical, d'appeler l'attention sur cette disposition d'où il résulte notamment, à leur avis, qu'aucun empiètement sur l'intégrité territoriale et aucune atteinte à l'indépendance politique d'un membre de la Société des Nations, commis au mépris de l'article 10, ne sauraient être reconnus valables et effectifs par les membres de la Société.

Alors?

Alors, en présence de cette carence de la S. D. N., les Chinois massent quelques armées; les Japonais débarquent des troupes. Tout cela finira dans un bain de sang sino-japonais, en attendant qu'au sang jaune vienne se joindre le sang américain.

Civilisation...! — D. S.

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TEMPS 20

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 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, February 20, 1932.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Le conflit sino-japonais continue à se développer dans des conditions qui créent de sérieuses préoccupations pour le conseil de la Société des nations et pour les gouvernements intéressés à la situation politique en Extrême-Orient. Les pourparlers engagés à Shanghai entre les autorités militaires japonaises et chinoises n'ont pas abouti et les Nippons ont envoyé au commandant en chef de la 19^e armée cantonaise un ultimatum lui accordant un délai de vingt-quatre heures pour se replier à au moins vingt kilomètres au nord de Shanghai; le gouvernement de Tokio n'a pas encore répondu à l'appel du comité des Douze, mais toutes les informations de presse indiquent que l'opinion japonaise réagit vivement contre l'attitude du conseil de la Société des nations; enfin, la constitution de la Mandchourie en Etat indépendant est annoncée comme un fait acquis, la déclaration d'indépendance ayant dû avoir lieu hier à Moukden et ayant bien le caractère d'une rupture définitive avec la Chine. Il y a là, on le voit, un ensemble de complications qui a pour effet de poser le problème sous un aspect de nature à faire naître de nouvelles inquiétudes. L'espoir d'un règlement amical qui prévalait ces jours derniers paraît s'éloigner une fois de plus.

L'ultimatum envoyé par les Japonais au commandant de la 19^e armée chinoise expire le 20 février au coucher du soleil. Si les Chinois ne s'inclinent pas, il faudra donc s'attendre à une offensive de grand style des Nippons, qui ont amené leurs forces à pied d'œuvre et pris toutes les mesures nécessaires pour frapper un coup décisif. Les Chinois, très supérieurs en nombre, ont pu résister jusqu'ici avec succès aux Japonais manœuvrant avec des forces très réduites et n'ayant pas prévu d'opérations de grande envergure. Mais on ne peut guère se faire d'illusions sur leur résistance à une véritable attaque, conduite avec tous les moyens dont dispose actuellement le commandement nippon à Shanghai. Le plus sage serait évidemment d'éviter la bataille, mais les dirigeants chinois, quel que puisse être leur désir de se dégager, enfin, de cette tragique aventure, peuvent difficilement céder à la mise en demeure des Japonais, car l'essentiel pour toute politique chinoise est de sauver la face. Il ne fait aucun doute, d'autre part, que le Japon doit à son prestige de grande puissance d'obtenir un avantage sur le terrain avant de se prêter à un arrangement. Il ne peut traiter en restant sur un échec, car les milieux militaires, dont l'influence est prépondérante à Tokio, ne pardonneraient pas au cabinet Inukai une telle abdication. C'est par là surtout que la situation a un caractère tragique. Officiellement, il n'y a pas de guerre sino-japonaise, les relations entre les deux pays ne sont pas rompues, les principales puissances s'efforcent toujours de négocier un accord, mais, en réalité, c'est d'un acte de guerre, d'une opération militaire décisive que l'on attend maintenant la solution du conflit. Malgré tout, les informations qui nous parviennent font espérer que le pire pourra être évité et que Nankin s'arrêtera à une formule lui permettant de retirer ses troupes avant l'expiration du délai prévu par l'ultimatum japonais.

La situation est si singulière, si paradoxale, à Shanghai, qu'on ne peut raisonnablement l'apprécier à la lumière des règles ordinaires du droit international et des principes qui commandent l'activité générale de la Société des nations. Le conseil de Genève se trouve dans le plus cruel embarras. Ce fut une erreur, nous n'avons cessé de le répéter, de le saisir en vertu de l'article 11 du pacte d'abord, en vertu de l'article 15 ensuite; mais une fois engagée la procédure prévue par le pacte, le conseil ne pouvait prendre une autre attitude que celle qu'il a adoptée. Il était lié par les termes mêmes du pacte.

Dans la communication qu'il vient d'adresser au Japon, où il évoque la collaboration que l'Empire du Soleil-Levant a toujours apportée à la Société des nations et les obligations internationales contractées par cette puissance comme membre de l'institution internationale de Genève et comme signataire du traité des neuf puissances et du pacte Briand-Kellogg, le comité des Douze fait, en somme, appel à la conscience du gouvernement et du peuple japonais. Il est possible que l'on éprouve quelque amertume à Tokio à devoir constater que cet appel est adressé seulement au Japon et non pas aux deux parties, ce qui peut être interprété comme une indication que, dans l'esprit du comité de Genève, c'est le Japon qui assume ici les plus graves responsabilités; mais le comité des Douze a fait la seule démarche dans l'esprit de la Société des nations qu'il lui était encore possible de faire avant de se laisser dessaisir de la cause. En effet, une fois décidée la convocation de l'assemblée — et il n'est guère possible de refuser cette convocation, la demande de la Chine étant absolument conforme à ce que prescrit le paragraphe 9 de l'article 15 — le conseil n'a plus à poursuivre son action. L'assemblée seule aura à connaître du conflit et à prendre des résolutions.

Les choses n'en seront d'ailleurs pas simplifiées, car le même problème se posera, autant pour l'exécution des décisions de l'assemblée que pour l'exécution des décisions du conseil. La plus grande prudence s'imposera et déjà on peut se rendre compte, par certains commentaires de la presse britannique, que la

réunion de l'assemblée de Genève est envisagée avec quelque méfiance. Il est à noter, par exemple, que le *Daily Telegraph* fait observer que la Grande-Bretagne devrait se charger d'une grande partie des dépenses nécessitées par une action éventuelle contre son ancien allié, et cela dans les conditions les moins favorables. « Pour éviter à la Société des nations de lancer ses membres dans une direction pouvant facilement conduire à la guerre, dit ce journal, il faut que des conseils de sagesse viennent de Londres. » On voit quelles préoccupations, absolument légitimes, se font jour dans les milieux politiques britanniques avant même que la réunion de l'assemblée de la Société des nations soit décidée.

Quant à la proclamation de l'indépendance de la Mandchourie, c'est un événement qui ne surprendra personne. Il ne fait aucun doute que cela s'accomplit sous la pression des Japonais. En fait, la Mandchourie est définitivement perdue pour la Chine et il apparaît bien que les dirigeants des différentes provinces mandchoues sont d'accord pour constituer le pays en Etat indépendant. L'idée de l'Etat-tampon existe d'ailleurs depuis 1920, comme le *Temps* l'a rappelé hier, et il est certain que le Japon et la Russie soviétique sont tacitement d'accord pour favoriser une création qui leur donnera toute liberté de tirer le plus large parti possible des droits qu'ils ont acquis dans les zones où s'exerce leur influence respective. Quelle sera, après cela, la situation de la commission d'enquête envoyée en Mandchourie pour informer exactement le conseil de la Société des nations des circonstances du conflit sino-japonais? Elle ne pourra que constater un état de choses absolument nouveau, créé de toutes pièces par les Mandchous eux-mêmes et dont leur gouvernement indépendant, installé à Moukden, assume officiellement toute la responsabilité. La conclusion s'imposera d'elle-même : on se trouvera devant un fait accompli qu'on sera bien obligé d'admettre tel quel.

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Enclos 21

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Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, February 21, 1932.

L'ultimatum de Shanghai et le Conseil de la Société des Nations

LES LEÇONS DU CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Genève, 20 février.

Il faut revenir sur cette extraordinaire séance de vendredi où l'on vit le conseil supplier et gémir sous la menace de l'ultimatum japonais.

Pour la première fois le Conseil s'était lancé dans l'application de l'article capital du Covenant de la Société des Nations relatif au règlement pacifique des conflits. Et, au bout de trois semaines l'une des parties lui déclare en substance : Je romps avec la procédure. Je passe à l'action militaire parce que nécessité fait loi. Vous êtes incapable de défendre le droit et je ne puis me confier qu'à moi-même. D'après l'article 12 du Covenant le rapport du Conseil doit être établi dans les six mois à dater de la notification du différend par l'une des parties et ni l'une ni l'autre des parties n'ont le droit de recourir à la guerre avant l'expiration d'un délai de trois mois.

Très courageusement M. Sato, au nom de la délégation japonaise, n'a pas caché hier que le Japon s'était écarté des règles du jeu. Et, cependant, nul n'a osé réclamer le recours à l'article 16 : « Si un membre de la Société recourt à la guerre, contrairement aux engagements pris aux articles 12, 13, 15 ou il est *ipso facto* considéré comme ayant commis un acte de guerre contre tous les membres de la Société ». Suit l'énoncé des sanctions économiques et militaires. Les sanctions économiques et militaires ? Nul ne veut risquer la moindre cargaison, le moindre navire, le moindre soldat. Ce matin le Conseil s'est réuni pour discuter l'affaire de Memel où l'on a pu voir les Allemands aux prises — sur un plan secondaire et même négligeable — avec un ancien officier prussien maintenant délégué de la Lithuanie, M. Zaunius. Eh bien, M. Sato était à sa place dans le Conseil. Nul ne s'est avisé de demander que le Japon fût déclaré en rupture de pacte.

Une mesure a bien été prise ce matin, mais si médiocre qu'elle a pour unique effet de souligner l'impuissance du Conseil. Normalement il incombait à M. Paul-Boncour de déclarer, l'affaire de Memel une fois expédiée, que la session était close. Or, contrairement à ce qui avait été décidé, il s'est contenté de lever la séance. Ainsi la session du conseil continue, théoriquement tout au moins. La Conférence du Désarmement qui retient à Genève les chefs des délégations membres du Conseil, a permis l'emploi de ce procédé.

Jusqu'à la réunion de l'Assemblée, jusqu'au 3 mars, le Japon demeurera exposé aux prières et aux supplications du Conseil. Il ne s'en portera pas plus mal si ses troupes avancent rapidement en besogne. Le 3 mars l'Assemblée se réunira et sans doute, sauf conjonctures imprévisibles, ne sera-t-elle pas plus heureuse dans ses efforts d'apaisement que le Conseil, les puissances moyennes ou petites représentées à l'Assemblée ne devant pas être plus disposées que les grands Etats membres du Conseil à payer de leur personne. Mais le Conseil étant toujours en session, il sera loisible à l'Assemblée de lui renvoyer la balle.

L'espérance du secrétariat, qui lança la Société des Nations, Conseil et Assemblée, dans cette belle aventure, est que le Japon succombera inévitablement devant l'immensité de la Chine, que, s'évertuant à vider la rivière à l'aide d'une pelle de fer, mais d'une petite pelle, il finira par demander grâce. « Le Japon à Shanghai, c'est Napoléon à Moscou ! », disait l'un des plus hauts fonctionnaires, et il émettait l'espoir que le Japon révolutionnaire surgissant des déboires éprouvés sur le continent chinois, mit rapidement le gouvernement de Tokio à la raison.

Nous n'essaierons pas d'examiner cette hypothèse. Nous nous contenterons de faire observer que la Société des Nations n'a soutenu son intervention dans le conflit sino-japonais qu'en aggravant continuellement le cours des événements.

Le 18 septembre, quand éclatèrent les premiers troubles de Mandchourie, le mieux était de laisser les deux adversaires l'un en face de l'autre. Le Japon disposait d'une écrasante prépondérance militaire et la Chine d'une arme redoutable, le boycottage commercial. Si le monde extérieur ne s'était pas mêlé de leur querelle, les deux pays eussent trouvé l'un de ces accommodements sur lesquels ils ont vécu si longtemps. Quiconque a suivi les affaires d'Extrême-Orient sait très bien que depuis dix ans le Japon a toujours mesuré ses gestes pour éviter, dans l'ordre économique, les représailles de la multitude chinoise.

Mais la Société des Nations conçut, en septembre et octobre, le projet insensé d'arracher la Mandchourie au Japon et de défaire ce que le traité de Portsmouth avait fait. Aussitôt, le nationalisme chinois prit feu et, comptant sur l'aide des puissances, ne voulut pas mesurer la force mi-

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litaire à laquelle il s'attaquait. Quant au Japon, menacé dans ses intérêts essentiels, il dut aller de l'avant sans s'arrêter à des considérations d'ordre commercial. Aujourd'hui, effrayé du dommage que subissent ses marchands et plus généralement ses nationaux, il essaie de briser par la violence ce qui lui résiste, de re-

hausser son prestige et son autorité jusqu'au point où tout s'inclinera.

Il est donc permis d'écrire que la Société des Nations a semé la tempête dans tout l'Extrême-Orient et que les reliquats de la colonisation européenne peuvent souffrir de son imprudence. Mais ce n'est que l'une des faces de l'histoire. Contraint de tolérer la violation de son Covenant, mis en présence de l'un des problèmes d'émigration que le Covenant a voulu exclure des discussions internationales (article 15, paragraphe 8), le Conseil est bafoué, humilié, dénoncé à la risée publique. Il n'est pas sûr qu'en se débattant contre l'inévitable, adressant à Tokio l'appel de douze de ses membres, il n'ait lui-même contrevenu à sa procédure. Devant ce spectacle, que l'on juge de l'infirmité qu'il étalera demain lorsque se poseront les problèmes européens les plus graves. « Nous ne pouvons compter que sur nous-mêmes », disait hier M. Sato. Paroles d'application universelle et qui sonnent le glas de Genève.

PERTINAX.

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Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, February 21, 1932.

LA S.D.N. DONNERA-T-ELLE LA CHINE A L'U.R.S.S.?

par **PIERRE COT**

L'attitude de la Société des Nations, dans le conflit sino-japonais devient inquiétante. En dépit des efforts méritoires de M. Paul-Boncour, le Conseil continue à ne rien faire. Et pourtant, il n'y a plus une minute à perdre, si l'on veut éviter, à la S.D.N., de se décerner à elle-même un brevet d'incapacité.

La guerre existe entre la Chine et le Japon. Chaque jour, des hommes sont tués. Les hostilités se poursuivent. Les renforts sont amenés à pied d'œuvre. Le Japon occupe, par la force de ses armes, un immense territoire, qui, en droit, appartient à la Chine. Les pactes sont violés et les traités foulés aux pieds. Des combats sanglants se livrent entre deux membres de la S.D.N. Et la Société des Nations n'a pas le courage de se dresser entre les belligérants et de crier « Assez ! » On se contente de dire : « La guerre n'a pas été déclarée ; ce n'est donc pas la guerre. C'est une méthode un peu singulière, un peu violente, de résoudre un conflit. Mais personne ne songe à déclarer la guerre. »

La guerre est une chose assez tragique pour qu'à son horreur on n'ajoute pas le cynisme et l'hypocrisie.

Quelle doit être — ou quelle devrait être — l'attitude de la France ?

D'abord, et avant tout, défendre le prestige de la Société des Nations. Et, pour cela, exiger que la Société des Nations prenne nettement parti et désigne l'agresseur.

Car la Société des Nations est en cause. La Chine a fait appel à sa justice et à sa protection. Si la guerre ne s'arrête pas, si le Japon n'évacue pas les territoires qu'il occupe indûment, c'est que le mécanisme de la S.D.N. n'aura pas joué.

On s'abrite derrière la faiblesse de ce mécanisme. On dit : « La Société des Nations ne dispose pas des pouvoirs nécessaires pour imposer sa volonté. Il lui manque ce « bras séculier » dont parlait Briand. Ah ! tout changerait si la Société des Nations avait une force internationale ! »

Un tel langage est un pur sophisme. Que la S.D.N. prenne une décision. On verra ensuite si les moyens de faire respecter cette décision lui font défaut. Tant qu'elle n'a pas fait son devoir, tant qu'elle n'a pas fait tout ce qu'elle peut faire, tant qu'elle n'a pas utilisé tous les pouvoirs qu'elle possède, on n'a pas le droit de dire qu'elle est impuissante.

En effet, la S.D.N. a des pouvoirs. Lesquels ? D'abord la force morale, qui s'attacherait à une décision, désignant l'agresseur et le mettant au ban de la conscience publique. Ensuite les sanctions prévues par l'article 16, sanctions diplomatiques et sanctions économiques, dont le déclenchement générerait singulièrement l'agresseur. Je suis de ceux qui pensent

Quelle devrait être l'attitude de la France ?

Se dresser à la Société des Nations et déclarer : « Assez d'hypocrisie ! La guerre est là. Désignons l'agresseur — que les faits, au surplus, désignent eux-mêmes. Dénouons-le au monde entier. Demain, la France est prête à collaborer, dans la plus large mesure, à la mise en œuvre des sanctions qui s'imposent. Voici notre or et notre épée ; jetez-les dans le plateau de la balance où vous aurez mis la Justice. »

Mais j'entends le conseil de sagesse que nous donnent les défenseurs du Japon. Car, remarquez-le, ce sont les défenseurs du Japon qui veulent empêcher la S.D.N. d'agir ; quel aveu de culpabilité ! Les Japonais, nous dit-on, sont nos amis. On chuchote qu'un traité secret nous lierait à eux...

Un traité secret ? Inutile même de le déchirer ou de le dénoncer. Un traité secret n'a pas de valeur. C'est le fait de l'avoir signé qui est une faute. Un traité secret ou rien, c'est la même chose.

L'amitié japonaise ? Elle vaut tant que le Japon n'est pas l'agresseur. Je me refuse à traiter en ami qui viole la loi internationale et ne s'incline pas devant l'autorité de la Société des Nations.

La Chine envahie et violée nous lance un cri de détresse. Elle demande l'intervention de la S.D.N. Notre devoir est clair. Mais voyons où est notre intérêt. Que se passera-t-il si, en manière de réponse aux S.O.S. chinois, la Société des Nations se borne à enregistrer les discours et les regrets des membres du Conseil ?

De deux choses, l'une : Ou le Japon l'emporte, ou la Chine arrive à maintenir son indépendance. Cette dernière hypothèse n'est pas impossible. Un diplomate belge, très au courant des questions chinoises, me disait, hier, à Genève : « Voilà les Japonais arrêtés sur la Marne. Ils ont perdu la guerre. Cela peut durer quatre ou cinq ans encore. Mais désormais, ils sont vaincus. » Envisageons les deux hypothèses.

Le Japon est vainqueur. Il a refusé de s'incliner devant la S.D.N. Il conserve les territoires occupés par ses troupes. Savez-vous ce que cela signifie, pour tout le monde asiatique ? C'est la victoire de l'homme jaune sur l'homme blanc. C'est Tokio ayant raison de Genève. C'est le plus rude coup qui puisse atteindre le prestige de notre race, en Extrême-Orient.

Supposons, maintenant, que la Chine résiste. Elle ne peut le faire qu'en se jetant dans les bras de la Russie. Genève ou Moscou, disait Drieu la Rochelle. Voilà le choix que devra faire la Chine. Déçue par la Société des Nations, elle cherchera, dans les cadres de l'U.R.S.S., la garantie de son indépendance. Les Soviets ont le

cision, désignant l'agresseur et le mettant au ban de la conscience publique. Ensuite les sanctions prévues par l'article 16, sanctions diplomatiques et sanctions économiques, dont le déclenchement gênerait singulièrement l'agresseur, le suis de ceux qui pensent que ces pouvoirs sont suffisants. Mais pour faire le plan de la conférence, il faut commencer par les mettre en œuvre. « Ce n'est qu'en plein océan que tu sais comment la barque est à la vogue. » Au lieu de déclarer que la O.N.U. est insuffisante, qu'on la mette au ban d'essai.

— Pourquoi ne le fait-on pas ?
— Parce que les opinions publi-
ques — ou plutôt les gouverne-
ments — refusent de prendre par-
ti. L'égoïsme, national l'emporte
sur le devoir international. On ne
veut pas cesser de faire du com-
merce avec l'agresseur. Bien plus,
on sollicite ses commandes.

Je rapporte de Genève un renseignement qui ne craint aucun démenti. Le voici :

La maison Schneider a reçu des commandes d'artillerie lourde pour le Japon. Le Japon n'a nul besoin des matériels commandés. Mais il a besoin de l'influence de la maison Schneider.

N'avais-je pas raison de rappeler au congrès du parti radical-socialiste que « certains articles de presse sont écrits avec des plumes qui sont du même métal que les gros canons. »

chine existe. Elle ne peut le faire qu'en se joignant avec les pays de la Russie, l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques, l'Union de la République de Chine, la République de Chine, par la Société des Nations. Elle cherche, dans les cadres de l'U.R.S.S., la garantie de son indépendance. Les Soviets ont la grande habileté de lier aux principes qui adhèrent à l'U.R.S.S. un maximum d'indépendance. La Chine aux Chinois ! Si notre Société des Nations ne peut — ou ne veut — assurer la réalisation de ce programme, c'est l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques qui pourrait fort bien accomplir la tâche — et recueillir l'héritage.

Genève ou Moscou ! S.D.N. ou U.R.S.S. ! Dans bien des domaines et sur bien des plans se pose le dilemme.

Et comme la vie ne choisit jamais complètement, comme elle est complexe, savez-vous ce qui se passera demain ?

Le Japon gardera la Mandchourie. Il défiera Genève. L'homme blanc se moquera de la S.D.N. Et la Chine, craignant ce voisin, se ralliera à la formule communiste.

Un Japon plus puissant, menaçant tout le Pacifique, une Chine bolchevisée, menaçant l'Inde et l'Indochine, voilà ce qui peut sortir de la peur des grandes puissances et de l'apathie du Conseil.

Avec, en plus, du sang humain en perspective, évidemment.

A.F. 22

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ACTION FRANCAISE, February 22, 1932.

M. Henry P'u les Japonais et la Mandchourie

Les nouvelles d'agences annoncent brièvement que la commission administrative de la nouvelle République de Mandchourie a choisi à l'unanimité M. Henry P'u comme chef du gouvernement.

M. Henry P'u (nous respectons l'orthographe donnée par les journaux anglais, mais nous ne risquons aucun conseil quant à la prononciation de ce nom stérnuta-tore) est un jeune homme de vingt-six ans, dont l'existence a déjà été passablement remplie. En 1908 — il avait alors deux ans — il a été proclamé empereur de Chine, à la mort de son oncle Kwang-Su, sous le nom de Hsuan-Tung. Quatre ans plus tard, en 1912, les Chinois ayant décidé de goûter les charmes du régime républicain, qui, comme on le constate tous les jours, leur réussit si bien, l'enfant Hsuan-Tung dut abdiquer. Il a grandi, prisonnier d'Etat, dans son palais de Pékin : adolescence agrémentée de quelques à-coups : une restauration en 1917, qui dura huit jours, un mariage en 1922 et, la même année, le sacrifice de la natte traditionnelle, sous la pression des jeunes Chinois offusqués par cette coiffure qui leur rappelait les temps barbares heureusement révolus. En 1924, l'ex-empereur, lassé de sa captivité, réussit à s'évader, abandonnant de bon cœur ses biens et ses richesses à la République pour respirer l'air de la liberté. Depuis cette date, il a vécu à Tien-Tsin des libéralités du gouvernement de Tokio, qui lui sert une rente mensuelle et qui l'a même autorisé, pendant les troubles de Tien-Tsin, à séjourner quelque temps au Japon. Malheureusement, la vie a terriblement renchéri, aussi bien en Extrême-Orient que chez nous, et les subsides japonais se sont révélés insuffisants. Le bruit a couru l'année dernière, en Amérique, que Hsuan-Tung, devenu entre temps M. Henry P'u, qui est, paraît-il, doué d'une belle voix de ténor léger, aurait reçu d'intéressantes propositions de la part d'impresarios entreprenants, désireux de lui confier des rôles de ténor léger. Aujourd'hui la roue a encore tourné et l'« Etat indépendant de Mandchourie » offre à son compatriote dans la gêne (on sait que, depuis le milieu du XVII^e siècle, c'est une dynastie mandchoue qui régnait en Chine) la place de chef d'Etat.

On ne connaît pas encore la réponse de M. P'u.

La Mandchourie indépendante? Agréable fiction, diront les sceptiques ou les gens qui ont simplement de la mémoire. Et ils rappellent le président de la Corée qui, elle aussi détachée de la Chine, a été reconnue indépendante en 1895, pour être soumise au protectorat japonais en 1907 et enfin annexée en 1910.

Il est bien probable, en effet, que c'est sur la Mandchourie, et non sur Chonghaï, que porte l'effort principal de la politique japonaise. Cette immense région, deux fois grande comme le plus grand pays d'Europe occidentale, au sol et au sous-sol également riches, est depuis longtemps convoitée par le Japon, qui étouffe dans ses îles et qui a un impérieux besoin de

débouchés pour sa population sans cesse croissante. En 1915, le gouvernement de Tokio réclama sans douceur et obtint de la Chine la reconnaissance de ses « droits spéciaux » sur la Mandchourie. Mais, en 1922, le traité des Neuf-Puissances, conséquence des négociations de Washington, contraignit le Japon à reculer, à accepter le principe de la porte ouverte et à promettre de s'entendre « en toute franchise » avec les autres intéressés en cas d'incidents nécessitant l'application dudit traité.

En dépit de tous les obstacles, la froide ténacité japonaise poursuit son dessein. Kharbine a été occupé sans combat par les troupes du Mikado. Des négociations, dont on ne sait plus grand-chose, sont poursuivies avec le voisin russe qui laisse faire. Une commission d'enquête, dont l'assemblée de Genève a décidé la création, a bien été envoyée en Mandchourie pour y étudier la situation. Mais quand elle arrivera — si elle arrive — elle se trouvera en présence du fait accompli, c'est-à-dire de la séparation d'avec la Chine. D'ailleurs, l'attention de l'Europe et de l'Amérique s'est détournée sur les événements de Chonghaï. Le Japon a les mains à peu près libres en Mandchourie. Le fruit n'est pas loin d'être mûr.

Et voilà pourquoi, en attendant qu'il le soit tout à fait, Tokio a suggéré à P. « Etat indépendant » d'aller chercher M. Henry P'u. Un ex-empereur de Chine, Mandchou de race, a paru le meilleur des paravents. Derrière lui, ou derrière un autre, s'il s'efface, les Japonais continueront à s'installer jusqu'au jour où les circonstances leur permettront de laisser tomber le masque.

J. DELEBECQUE.

Pop. 22

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, February 22, 1932.

Un télégramme de Tokio nous apprend que la « réponse » du Japon à l'appel que lui ont adressé le 18 février, les « douze membres du Conseil de la Société des Nations » a été retardée et ne sera probablement pas publiée avant aujourd'hui.

Je ne sais pas si les Douze ont la naïveté d'attendre cette réponse ou s'ils se sont contentés de celle que le Japon a donnée samedi matin. Mais il est certain que l'opinion publique n'attend plus rien du gouvernement de Tokio. Rien de bon, s'entend.

Dans un suprême appel, les Douze avaient supplié le cabinet japonais de ne pas donner suite à la menace de l'ultimatum et de ne pas déclencher l'offensive contre l'armée chinoise de Changhaï. Or, à l'heure fixée, les troupes nippones, après un intense bombardement, soutenues par les avions et les tanks protégées par des nuages artificiels, ont attaqué les positions chinoises.

Si ce n'est pas une réponse du Japon à la note de la S.D.N., je ne sais plus ce qu'il faut aux hommes d'Etat réunis à Genève : aucune réponse écrite ne peut être plus éloquent que cet acte. Le Japon agit sans se soucier de l'opinion de ses collègues du Conseil. Il se moque de leurs avis, de leurs recommandations, de leurs supplications.

Le Japon fait la guerre, mais le Conseil de la S.D.N. n'ose même pas reconnaître la violation du pacte Kellogg. Le Japon sème la mort et la dévastation, mais le Conseil n'a pas le courage de le dénoncer comme agresseur. Le Japon agit, mais le Conseil se perd dans le maquis de la procédure.

En attendant, l'anxiété gagne les Etats-Unis, l'Angleterre, la Russie. Les gouvernements et les peuples n'examinent plus les moyens d'arrêter les hostilités et de mettre fin à la guerre entre le Japon et la Chine. Ils discutent s'ils doivent rester à l'écart de cette guerre et comment ils doivent faire pour ne pas être entraînés dans le grand conflit de l'Extrême-Orient.

Cependant, il aurait suffi que les gouvernements de Londres et de Washington, de Paris et de Moscou s'entendissent pour exercer sur le Japon une pression économique et financière. L'Empire du Soleil Levant ne pourrait pas résister au blocus économique et financier. Ainsi que le note très judicieusement le *Reynolds* de Londres : « Les armées et la flotte japonaises pourraient temporairement continuer la lutte en dépit des puissances, mais les finances et le commerce japonais, qui ont déjà subi les répercussions du boycottage chinois, s'effondreraient rapidement sous l'effet d'une pression économique et financière. »

Or, la presse capitaliste de la Grande-Bretagne est hostile à une action pareille. Le *Daily Mail*, dont on lira plus loin un extrait suggestif, jette l'anathème contre ceux qui préconisent une action économique concertée contre le Japon.

Aux Etats-Unis, le président Hoover ne veut pas en entendre parler et le sénateur Borah déclare « qu'une telle action pourrait facilement entraîner l'Amérique à déclarer la guerre ».

En France, la grande presse continue à soutenir ouvertement le Japon et le gouvernement s'est refusé à toute déclaration lors de la discussion sur la fixation de la date de l'interpellation de notre ami Moutet.

Comment expliquer cette étrange conduite des gouvernements ? On ne peut pas croire que tous les hommes d'Etat de New-York, de Londres ou de Paris soient des imbéciles. On ne peut pas supposer non plus qu'ils soient tous frappés subitement d'un « rétinisme » qui ne leur permet plus de comprendre la gravité des événements et leurs conséquences.

Mais voilà, les intérêts capitalistes, que les gouvernements sont appelés à défendre, sont contradictoires. Le capitalisme européen et américain ne veut pas de guerre. Il en a même peur. Cependant les fournitures de guerre — matériel et ravitaillement — sont d'un rapport intéressant.

Les armées japonaises et chinoises ayant besoin de canons et d'obus, d'avions et de moteurs, de camions et de pneus, de produits alimentaires et de vêtements, d'importantes commandes pourraient venir ranimer un peu l'industrie handicapée par la crise. Déjà les premières semaines de la guerre ont fait monter les valeurs en Bourse. De belles perspectives s'ouvrent donc devant les spéculateurs et autres requins.

Là est la cause de l'hostilité rencontrée par l'idée d'une intervention concertée des grandes puissances. Et si la mainmise du Japon sur la Chine ne ménageait pas les intérêts des autres puissances capitalistes, les « milieux compétents » des Etats-Unis, de la France et de l'Angleterre pousseraient volontiers les deux belligérants à une longue guerre.

Mais, il y a les concessions internationales à Changhaï, à Canton, à Hankéou. Il y a le commerce étranger en Chine. La guerre sino-japonaise peut compromettre la situation des premières et paralyser le second. De là le désir d'arrêter les hostilités.

Enfin il existe un autre danger pour les impérialistes. Si le Japon sort victorieux, il deviendra si fort qu'il pourrait menacer certaines colonies des Etats-Unis et de Grande-Bretagne. Mais si la Chine réussissait à infliger un échec cuisant au Japon, le sentiment national chinois prendrait une telle force qu'il ne supporterait plus les traités inégaux que les puissances étrangères ont imposés à l'Empire céleste.

De là, la peur de ces puissances de laisser le Japon conquérir la Chine, mais aussi la crainte d'aider la Chine à battre le Japon.

Toutes ces contradictions paralysent l'action et même la volonté des gouvernements capitalistes. Ils ne sont plus maîtres de leur attitude. Ils sont à la merci du moindre incident qui peut se produire.

Abandonnés à eux-mêmes, les gouvernements ne sont capables que de laisser la guerre en Extrême-Orient s'envenimer et devenir une conflagration mondiale. Abandonnés à eux-mêmes et à l'influence néfaste des milieux capitalistes, les Tardieu, les MacDonald-Baldwin et les Hoover ne sont pas capables de mettre fin au conflit sino-japonais.

Si les peuples ne veulent pas de guerre, ils n'ont pas de temps à perdre. Ils doivent organiser immédiatement une pression sur leurs gouvernements respectifs en vue d'une action économique efficace contre l'agresseur.

O. ROSENFELD.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Ref 22

Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, February 22, 1932.

LA GUERRE EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT

Les Etats-Unis contre le Japon?

Comme il était facile de le prévoir, le conflit s'élargit. Il y a beau temps que nous avons, ici-même, souligné que le jour où il tirait le premier coup de canon en Mandchourie, le Japon posait le problème du Pacifique.

Et dès le moment où le problème du Pacifique est évoqué, le Japon n'est plus seul à seul avec la Chine. Les Etats-Unis entrent en scène. Dès l'occupation de la Mandchourie, ils ont protesté. Mais le Japon a déclaré qu'il ne songeait nullement à une annexion. Les Japonais ayant débarqué à Changhaï, nouvelle protestation américaine appuyée de l'envoi d'une force navale. Des marins américains ont même débarqué à Changhaï, ont fait des perquisitions dans des filatures japonaises. C'est merveille qu'il n'y ait pas encore eu de coups de fusil échangés entre Américains et Japonais.

Le monde politique des Etats-Unis ne bouge pas encore. C'est que le Japon est solide et qu'une guerre avec lui présenterait de terribles aléas. Mais l'opinion américaine se cabre. D'une part, les pacifistes, nombreux en Amérique, s'élèvent contre l'impérialisme japonais. La mystique de la paix leur paraît en danger : ils travaillent les masses électorales américaines, sur le thème : Assez de guerres, plus de sang versé !

D'autre part, les hommes d'affaires veulent à tout prix que le régime de la porte ouverte subsiste en Chine. L'occupation de Changhaï leur paraît une menace directe au commerce américain. Le Japon a eu beau dire que le régime de la porte ouverte subsisterait non seulement en Chine, mais dans cette Mandchourie qui passe sous son protectorat, les hommes d'affaires américains rejoignent les pacifistes dans une action anti-japonaise.

Enfin, les politiques commencent à avoir peur pour les Philippines. Ils n'oublient pas que le Japon, dont les émigrants sont refoulés de partout, ne peut espérer coloniser très vite la Mandchourie, tant à cause du climat qu'à cause de l'afflux de la main-d'œuvre chinoise

qui est à meilleur marché que la japonaise, et que les politiques japonais jettent des regards d'envie sur les Philippines et même sur l'Australie, terres d'élection pour le colon japonais.

Bref, on demande aux Etats-Unis le boycottage des marchandises nippones.

Or, pour qui sait que le boycottage des marchandises nippones en Chine a amené le Japon à Changhaï, on peut se demander où nous allons.

La sagesse des gouvernements aura, ces jours-ci, fort à faire à Tokio, à Nankin, à Washington. Espérons, nous en avons le devoir.

Pierre DOMINIQUE.

Subst. 23

Enclosure No. 19 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, February 23, 1932.

L'embarras de la S. D. N.

Les Japonais ont été évidemment surpris par la forte résistance que les Chinois ont opposée à leurs opérations de Changhaï. Ils pensaient atteindre rapidement les objectifs fixés. Or, malgré les gros renforts qu'ont reçus leurs troupes, ils n'ont progressé qu'avec beaucoup de peine. Sans aucun doute, en y mettant le prix et le temps nécessaires, ils arriveront à leurs fins, grâce aux moyens qu'ils possèdent. Mais l'expérience qu'ils font est instructive et montre le danger auquel ils s'exposeraient s'ils s'engageaient trop loin dans cette Chine où des résultats décisifs sont difficiles à obtenir. En attendant, ils s'efforcent de créer à leur avantage un état de fait en Mandchourie, où la commission de la S. D. N. trouvera en arrivant un gouvernement autonome. La difficulté n'est plus pour eux en Mandchourie, où ils ont à peu près réalisé leurs ambitions, mais à Changhaï. Comme il arrive souvent, le Japon, ayant sous-estimé la valeur de ses adversaires, est entraîné plus loin qu'il ne le désirait. C'est toujours le péril de ces sortes d'aventures.

De son côté, la Ligue est plus embarrassée que jamais. Le 18 février, son Conseil a envoyé au gouvernement de Tokio un appel l'invitant à s'en remettre sans réserves aux méthodes de règlement pacifique indiquées dans le pacte de la S. D. N. et, d'autre part, lui signalant l'existence du pacte Kellogg et du traité dit des neuf puissances. La réponse japonaise est envoyée aujourd'hui. D'après les télégrammes de Tokio, ce serait une fin de non-recevoir polie dans les termes, mais un peu désinvolte. Les Japonais exprimeraient leur étonnement qu'on ne se soit adressé qu'à eux seuls, prétendraient qu'on ne peut pas invoquer l'article 10 du Covenant (relatif à l'indépendance nationale et à l'intégrité territoriale), parce que Changhaï, ville occupée également par les troupes d'autres puissances, a une situation spéciale et parce que le Japon n'a pas l'intention d'occuper durablement le territoire chinois et contesterait au Conseil le droit de faire allusion au pacte Kellogg ou au traité des neuf puissances, étant donné qu'ils ne sont pas mentionnés dans le pacte de la S. D. N. Sur ce dernier point, il est impossible de ne pas le faire remarquer tout de suite, l'argumentation japonaise ne peut pas être considérée comme sérieuse. Ces textes qui, quelque opinion qu'on ait au sujet de leur valeur pratique, lient moralement et juridiquement leurs signataires, ne sont pas visés par le pacte de la S. D. N. pour la bonne et suffisante raison qu'ils ont été établis plusieurs années après sa rédaction. Le Conseil a certainement le droit — il a même le devoir — de rappeler aux pays mis en cause les engagements qu'ils ont contractés. On comprend d'autant moins cette extraordinaire façon de raisonner que, dans les déclarations qu'il a faites hier au correspondant de l'agence Reuter,

M. Yoshizawa, ministre des affaires étrangères, a dit que le Japon, qui ne songe pas à se retirer de la Ligue, n'a pas non plus l'intention de répudier le pacte Kellogg ou le traité des neuf puissances.

Que fera le Conseil de la S. D. N. ? Nous ne nous chargeons pas de le dire. Peut-être aurait-il pu, au début, par une action mieux conçue, empêcher les événements de se développer comme ils l'ont fait; aujourd'hui son intervention est devenue beaucoup plus difficile. La prochaine réunion de l'assemblée de la Ligue, qui est convoquée pour le 3 mars, ne simplifiera probablement pas sa tâche. Les représentants de petits Etats qui n'auraient aucune charge à assumer et qui ne courraient aucun risque dans le cas où des sanctions militaires ou économiques seraient prises en Extrême-Orient jetteront feu et flamme; ce sont souvent les hommes qui tiennent le plus à la neutralité de leur propre pays qui se montrent le plus fougueux quand il s'agit d'envoyer les autres guerroyer au loin. Il n'est pas étonnant que le Conseil soit moins prompt, car il est composé en grande partie par les délégués des nations qui auraient à s'exposer. L'attitude des Etats-Unis est d'ailleurs pour beaucoup dans ses hésitations. L'opinion américaine paraît très hostile même aux mesures économiques à l'égard du Japon. La prudence du Conseil est assez compréhensible dans ces conditions. Il est aussi bien obligé de se rendre compte qu'en dépit de tous les reproches justifiés qu'on est en droit de faire au Japon, qui agit sans guère se préoccuper des droits d'autrui et des graves complications que cause sa politique, l'état anarchique de la Chine donne à ce conflit un caractère assez particulier.

On s'aperçoit en somme que la fameuse universalité de la S. D. N. et l'idée que tous les Etats, quel que soit leur degré de civilisation, doivent être placés sur le même plan ne sont pas sans inconvénients. Le monde est plus complexe que ne veulent l'admettre les théoriciens. La machinerie de Genève n'est pas au point, et c'est une dangereuse erreur de croire qu'elle est actuellement en mesure de garantir la sécurité. On s'en apercevrait, dans des conditions beaucoup plus tragiques, dans le cas d'une crise européenne bien plus simple, où seraient aux prises de puissants Etats. C'est évidemment regrettable, mais nous croyons que la faute la plus grande qu'on puisse commettre est de ne pas voir les choses telles qu'elles sont. Si l'on veut travailler utilement pour la paix, il est indispensable de commencer par regarder la réalité en face.

En ce qui concerne le conflit sino-japonais, il est possible que la solution ne puisse désormais être trouvée que par des négociations directes. C'est celles-ci qu'il faudrait peut-être essayer de faciliter. Cette méthode n'aurait rien d'héroïque, mais, au point où l'on en est, il n'y en a

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probablement pas de plus efficace. D'une déclaration du président du Yuan exécutif, il résulte que le gouvernement de Nankin « serait prêt à prendre en considération des propositions raisonnables qui lui seraient faites pour le règlement du différend ». La difficulté est qu'il serait sans doute nécessaire d'obtenir au préalable une suspension des hostilités. Elle est grande. Nous ne nous faisons à ce sujet aucune illusion. Dans tous les cas, l'essentiel est de conserver son sang-froid dans l'examen de ce tumulte extrême-oriental.

PIERRE BERNUS.

Matin 23

Enclosure No. 20 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, February 23, 1932.

LA FAILLITE DE LA S. D. N.

En somme, le gronjement des canons de Changhaï aura démontré un certain nombre de vérités que seuls les aveugles et les niais s'obstineront à ne pas reconnaître...

Première vérité : la Société des nations s'est montrée hors d'état d'empêcher qu'on se batte et qu'on se tue entre peuples. Donc, elle a fait faillite à son rôle primordial. Car on ne l'a pas créée pour faire de la coopération intellectuelle ou de l'hygiène internationale : on l'a créée pour maintenir la paix. Du jour où elle ne maintient pas la paix, elle n'est plus qu'une inutilité encombrante.

Deuxième vérité : la Société des nations, qui s'est montrée incapable, s'est montrée ridicule. Ses grands prêtres n'ont cessé, en effet, depuis dix ans, de prononcer des oracles sonores, lesquels s'avèrent être de formidables contre-vérités : « Nous sommes la conscience du monde... Nous dirons désormais le droit... Arrière les fusils ! Arrière les mitrailleuses !... Tant que nous serons là, il n'y aura plus de guerre. » Toutes paroles qui, aujourd'hui, à la lueur des incendies sanglants se propageant dans tout l'Extrême-Orient, constituent autant de lamentables tromperies et de fausses promesses.

Troisième vérité : la Société des nations, qui s'est montrée incapable et ridicule, se montre, aussi, dangereuse. On a beau, en effet, tourner et retourner le problème, on en revient toujours à ceci : que les deux forces qui s'affrontent à cette heure en Asie représentent, l'une, l'ordre et le progrès, l'autre, le désordre et l'anarchie. Le premier devoir de la Société était donc de peser sur les forces de désordre et d'anarchie pour qu'elles cèdent. Car ces forces-là déclenchent aussi sûrement la guerre que l'ambition et la violence. Or, c'est le contraire que la Société a fait. Dans le début, elle a adressé des sommations aux gendarmes au lieu de les adresser aux brigands ; elle a donc, par ce fait, encouragé les brigands et irrité les gendarmes. Puis, elle a prétendu mettre sur le même pied le Japon et la Chine, la civilisation et le chaos : elle a donc, par ce fait, permis tous les espoirs au chaos et toutes les révoltes à la civilisation. En un mot, elle a nourri le conflit, elle l'a attisé, elle l'a enflammé. Il est possible qu'elle ne l'ait pas fait exprès ; mais elle l'a fait tout de même. Quand une maison brûle, peu importe pour ceux qui y grillent que l'incendie soit dû à la malveillance ou à la maladresse !

Remarquez, au surplus, que la S. D. N. — ou, en tout cas, son secrétariat — pouvait d'autant moins ignorer l'impuissance de la Chine à tenir ses engagements que, depuis dix ans, la Chine est financièrement défailante vis-à-vis de la Société et a successivement manqué à toutes ses promesses écrites ou verbales. Là où il n'y a pas un gouvernement pour payer les maigres cotisations dues à la S. D. N., comment peut-on espérer qu'il y en aura un pour faire respecter les traités conclus avec le Japon ?... Cependant, non seulement le secrétariat genevois s'est appliqué à cacher ce manque de parole, mais, en septembre dernier, il a travaillé de toutes ses forces à faire élire la Chine au conseil de la S. D. N. Et il y a pleinement réussi... Ainsi, dans les clubs ordinaires, on affiche les noms des membres qui ne sont pas en règle avec la caisse : au club des nations, on les met, au contraire, sur la liste du comité de direction. Bel encouragement, en vérité, à faire observer les statuts et à inspirer confiance dans les dirigeants !...

Point n'est besoin, croyons-nous, d'insister. Les faits parlent plus haut que tous les discours.

La S. D. N. a prouvé, irréfutablement prouvé, qu'elle était dans l'impossibilité de prévoir un conflit, de l'empêcher, de l'arrêter. Il s'en faut de peu qu'elle ne prouve qu'elle est dans l'impossibilité de le circonscrire. Il ne lui reste guère plus, sur le chantier de décombres du parc de l'Ariana où cinq de ses architectes n'ont pu s'entendre pour construire son palais projeté, qu'à mettre un écriteau ainsi conçu : « TRAVAUX ARRÊTÉS POUR CAUSE DE FAILLITE. » On pourra, si on veut, en ajouter un second : « PROCHAIN AMÉNAGEMENT DE LA CONSTRUCTION EN SANATORIUM POUR VISIONNAIRES AGÉS. »

Stéphane Lauzanne.

Casura 23

Enclosure No. 21 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, February 23, 1932.

Hé! hé! ces Chinois!...

Eh bien ! oui, les Chinois, autour de Changhaï, résistent aux assauts des Japonais, même appuyés de tanks.

Du coup, les Japonais atténuent leurs exigences. Ils demandaient, l'autre jour, aux troupes chinoises, par ultimatum, un recul de vingt kilomètres. Cinq kilomètres leur suffiraient aujourd'hui.

Pourquoi ?

Parce que les Japonais se sont trouvés subitement, non pas devant des bandits, mais devant des soldats réguliers.

— Quelle est la différence ?

— C'est que le soldat battu est un bandit, tandis que le bandit qui résiste et qui « tient le coup » devient un soldat.

Sur ce, permettez-moi de noter ceci :

J'ai des amis pour qui, jusqu'à ces jours derniers, les Chinois ne représentaient que l'anarchie et le désordre, tandis que les Japonais, avec leurs cuirassés, leurs canons et leurs mitrailleuses, représentaient l'ordre et la civilisation. Mais voici qu'aux canons, mitrailleuses et fusils japonais, les Chinois s'avèrent en mesure de répondre. Il n'en faut pas plus pour que mes sceptiques amis manifestent, à l'égard des Chinois, une certaine révérence.

Or, ces Chinois, qui prouvent ainsi leur capacité de résistance, ont demandé, naguère, l'intervention de la Société des Nations.

On a ricané en disant :

— Parbleu ! Quand on n'est pas « fichu » de se défendre soi-même, on fait appel aux autres !...

Eh bien ! l'événement prouve que si les Chinois faisaient appel à la Société des Nations, ce n'était pas qu'ils fussent incapables de se défendre. C'était simplement qu'ils croyaient à la sagesse humaine.

Et c'est une bien jolie leçon de civilisation — de vraie civilisation — qu'ils nous ont donnée là.

P.m. 23

Enclosure No. 22 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from PARIS MIDI, February 23, 1932.

Les Etats-Unis isolés devant le Japon

Pendant que Genève « étudie » les moyens d'éviter la guerre, Japonais et Chinois la font en Extrême-Orient.

Cette guerre a surpris et déconcerté l'Europe ; nous avons de la peine à nous l'expliquer. Pourtant les causes n'en sont que trop naturelles et trop simples.

Depuis longtemps, la Chine, avec ses centaines de millions d'habitants, est considérée comme un merveilleux champ de vente et de profits. La Russie, le Japon, l'Amérique, l'Angleterre enfin savent que pour écouler leurs machines, leurs matières premières, leurs lampes, leurs casseroles, leurs autos et tout l'encombrant attirail de leur production, la Chine est le débouché rêvé.

L'Amérique travaillait, là-bas, par une sympathie, qui s'exprimait sous toutes les formes de civilisation : tourisme, collaboration universitaire, services médicaux et mille autres. La Russie offrait son idéal social ; l'Angleterre, son prestige. Et le Japon, rien ! Le Japon semblait se laisser manœuvrer : il était boycotté, écarté, détesté...

Il attendait son heure.

Cette heure est venue.

L'Angleterre s'est mise hors de cause ; peut-être même entrevoit-elle un facile arrangement avec ses anciens alliés de la grande guerre. La Russie, occupée à passer de l'état communiste à l'état industriel, est aussi fragile qu'une chrysalide en train de muer ; elle ne demande momentanément que la paix. D'ailleurs, elle n'a plus aucune prétention sur la Chine du Pacifique ; elle n'étend son influence que sur les hauts plateaux de la Mongolie et du Tibet, vers la Perse et l'Inde.

Restent les Etats-Unis.

Eux sont directement intéressés, puisque la géographie même et la nature des choses leur rendent nécessaires les territoires sur lesquels le Japon essaye aujourd'hui d'étendre par les armes son influence.

Mais qu'y faire ? Ils sont lancés dans une politique de désarmement et d'abandon. Lorsque le Nicaragua a été ravagé par des révolutionnaires qu'on traitait, à Chicago et à New-York, de simples bandits, le

gouvernement de Washington, qui s'était jadis engagé à protéger ses citoyens installés là-bas, les a prévenus qu'ils n'auraient à compter sur aucune protection, et qu'ils feraient bien de se résigner à tout perdre.

Lorsque M. Mussolini a élevé la voix pour se plaindre d'une parole imprudente d'un vice-amiral américain, le vice-amiral a été emprisonné, avant toute enquête, et le gouvernement américain a précipité ses excuses. Une série d'économies et de réductions ont été prévues pour la flotte et l'armée. Bref, le gouvernement de Washington a détendu chez lui tous les ressorts de la défense et de l'attaque.

Il ne pourrait donc imposer sa volonté au Japon que s'il était soutenu par un puissant allié.

Or, il n'a point, il ne peut pas avoir d'alliés, dans les circonstances actuelles, et pour l'Extrême-Orient.

En attendant, les Japonais délimitent à coups de canon, et selon leurs vues, leur zone d'influence politique et commerciale. Ils ne rendent de comptes à personne. Personne n'a la force de leur demander des comptes.

C'est une expérience dure pour les Etats-Unis.

Elle ne doit pas les décourager d'être pacifiques et ennemis de la guerre.

Mais elle doit leur prouver que, pour vivre en état pacifique, il faut être muni de garanties.

Un traité, un accord sont des garanties, fragiles, je le veux bien ; mais cela existe, cela est de l'honneur. Celui qui diminue la force morale des paroles données, diminue les chances de paix.

Les alliances sont aussi des garanties, les simples amitiés sont des garanties.

L'Amérique n'a jamais été si grande que quand, par des garanties mutuelles, elle a lié sa cause à celle de l'Europe. Elle n'est jamais plus menacée que quand elle écoute ceux qui lui conseillent de s'enfermer dans l'égotisme de sa grandeur ou de sa richesse.

Amica America, disait M. Jean Giraudoux. Voilà la vérité pour nous et pour elle.

Fortunat Strowski.
Membre de l'Institut.

P.P. 23

Enclosure No. 23 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, February 23, 1932.

LE CONFLIT DEVANT LA S. D. N.

Genève, 22 février.

D'UN DE NOS ENVOYÉS SPÉCIAUX

Il faut avoir le courage de le dire. Nous assistons actuellement à un spectacle lamentable : la destruction lente et méthodique de l'autorité de la S. D. N. Pendant douze ans, des hommes éminents, au premier rang desquels se sont toujours trouvés les représentants de la France — les Bourgeois, les Viviani, les de Jouvenel, les Herriot, les Briand, les Paul-Boncour — ont déployé les efforts les plus méritoires pour faire de l'organisation de Genève le principal rempart de la paix.

Il n'est pas d'occasion qu'ils n'aient saisi pour accroître sa puissance morale et ce n'est pas leur faute s'ils ne l'ont pas dotée de ce « bras séculier » dont parlait jadis M. Briand, de cette force de police internationale dont M. Tardieu vient encore, au nom de la France, de proposer la création.

Grâce à l'autorité qu'ils ont su lui donner, grâce à l'appui que lui a prêté la presse de tous les pays, la S. D. N. a pu, à maintes reprises, en obligeant les gouvernements tantôt à s'expliquer entre eux, tantôt à comparaître à la table du conseil, éviter que des différends ne s'aggravent et ne dégénèrent en conflits armés. Deux fois même, elle a mis fin à des opérations militaires déjà engagées et on avait toutes raisons de croire que son intervention suffirait désormais à arrêter au bord de l'abîme un peuple prêt à recourir aux armes, à le faire hésiter, réfléchir et, ainsi peut-être, à empêcher la guerre... Voilà ce qu'on était en droit d'espérer... Toutefois, pour que cet espoir pût se réaliser, il fallait veiller jalousement à ce que rien ne vint, pendant quelque temps encore, diminuer l'influence si péniblement acquise.

A Genève, on ne l'a pas compris. Grisé par les petits succès passés, oublieux de l'expérience pourtant cuisante, mais déjà lointaine, de l'affaire de Corfou, on a cru voir dans le conflit sino-japonais l'occasion rêvée non seulement d'affirmer l'autorité de la Société, mais de réaliser enfin l'universalité de cette dernière en lui assurant la participation des Etats-Unis. C'était à la fois bien mal connaître la situation en Extrême-Orient et les dispositions américaines.

Jamais les Etats-Unis n'ont été plus opposés à entrer dans la Ligue, jamais les Japonais, exaspérés par les manquements de la Chine à ses obligations, n'ont été plus déterminés à en finir. Jamais les Chinois eux-mêmes n'ont été en proie à une anarchie plus complète.

Au lieu de canaliser l'affaire, d'insister auprès des deux parties pour qu'elles ajustent directement leurs divergences, de les y aider même en recourant à la médiation du conseil, on a laissé — nous devrions dire on a fait — porter l'affaire devant ce dernier comme s'il s'agissait d'un différend entre deux nations également organisées, alors que la Chine est grevée, par traités, d'hypothèques territoriales, économiques et militaires, comme n'en connaît aucun autre pays du monde. On n'a pas vu qu'on ris-

quait ainsi soit de légitimer plus tard une analogie absolument inexistante en fait, mais terriblement dangereuse, soit de faire éclater l'impuissance de la Société des nations.

En octobre, à Genève, en novembre et en décembre à Paris, en janvier et en février ici, M. Briand puis M. Paul-Boncour, énergiquement appuyés notamment par les représentants de la Yougoslavie et de la Pologne, se sont employés — tout retour en arrière étant impossible — à sauvegarder la procédure et à éviter qu'on puisse, à cet égard, invoquer plus tard le moindre précédent.

Quelque difficile qu'eût été la tâche, il y ont réussi et on doit une reconnaissance toute spéciale à M. Paul-Boncour d'y être parvenu, ces jours derniers encore, dans des circonstances particulièrement délicates. Malheureusement, ces circonstances délicates — nous voulons parler de la situation à Changhaï, du maintien de l'ultimatum japonais et de la reprise des hostilités en cours — ont prouvé de la façon la plus éclatante l'impuissance du conseil.

Sans parler ni du territoire perdu ou dévasté, ni des morts et des blessés qu'on compte par milliers, voilà où les encouragements qu'on a été jusqu'à lui donner en pleine séance du conseil ont mené la Chine et, avec elle, la Société des nations. Dans quelques jours, c'est l'assemblée plénière elle-même, c'est-à-dire la plus haute instance internationale qui va être appelée à connaître de cette déplorable affaire dans laquelle, il serait vain de le nier, le Japon a, lui aussi, depuis les événements de Changhaï, une formidable responsabilité.

M. Paul-Boncour, en tant que président du conseil, va avoir à expliquer en détail les événements qui se sont déroulés depuis le 29 septembre dernier, date à laquelle M. Lerroux a fait, en la même qualité, un exposé analogue.

On peut être assuré que le représentant de la France le fera avec son éloquence, sa mesure, son objectivité habituelles et sans perdre de vue ce qui a été jusqu'à présent sa constante préoccupation : la sauvegarde de la procédure fixée par le pacte.

Mais qui présidera, qui dirigera les débats de l'assemblée ? Qui aura le prestige et l'autorité nécessaires pour la guider, pour l'empêcher de s'égarer dans des voies dangereuses ? Deux hommes paraissent particulièrement désignés pour cette haute mission, car tous les deux représentent depuis le premier jour leur pays à la S. D. N. : MM. Paul Hymans et Edouard Benès. Il est très vraisemblable que c'est à eux qu'on pensera. Il y a toutes raisons de croire cependant, s'il en est ainsi, que le ministre des Affaires étrangères tchécoslovaque, dont on connaît la modestie, s'effacera spontanément devant son collègue de Belgique qui présida jadis — on se rappelle avec quel talent — la première assemblée qu'ait jamais tenue la S. D. N. Dans les circonstances présentes, qui réclament autant de prudence que de fermeté, aucun choix ne saurait être en effet plus judicieux.

Albert JULLIEN

Ref. 23

Enclosure No. 24 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, February 23, 1932.

LA GUERRE EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT

Les élections japonaises

Les conservateurs japonais étant arrivés au pouvoir, la droite fut dissoute. Elle comptait 273 libéraux et 174 conservateurs plus quelques indépendants ou prolétaires. Ceci se passait en décembre dernier. Et c'est alors que l'affaire de Mandchourie prit toute son ampleur et que le débarquement à Changhaï fut décidé.

Le gouvernement conservateur prenait ainsi des mesures impérialistes et demandait au peuple son avis. Le peuple japonais a répondu. Les conservateurs sont victorieux, les libéraux sont vaincus. Nous n'avons pas encore les chiffres définitifs, mais on sait déjà que la majorité du peuple japonais, malgré le premier échec de Changhaï, s'est décidée pour l'intervention.

Sans doute, il nous faut faire intervenir pour comprendre ce résultat la puissance des clans, celle aussi d'une presse asservie aux partis et à certains intérêts économiques et financiers, sinon ce serait la condamnation du suffrage populaire, et la preuve que les masses sont parfois plus militaristes que les politiciens eux-mêmes.

Quoi qu'il en soit, nous aurons demain à Tokio, soutenant l'élément militaire dont on sait l'action toute puissante, un ministère conservateur et une majorité conservatrice. Dans ces conditions, il est invraisemblable de penser que le Japon reculera soit en Mandchourie, soit à Changhaï, soit à Genève. Et d'ailleurs comment reculerait-il ? Il a partout coupé les ponts.

En Mandchourie, il a créé un Etat soi-disant indépendant et qui pratiquement est sous son contrôle. Quelque chose qui ressemblera à cette Albanie qui vit sous la tutelle de l'Italie, bien qu'elle soit représentée à la S. D. N.

A Genève, le Japon a répondu par une note plutôt ironique, où il rappelle l'intervention de l'Angleterre en Chine

en 1927, et aussi le fait que la Chine est en pleine anarchie.

« Je fais ce que fit l'Angleterre, dit le Japon. Vous ne l'avez pas blâmée, pourquoi me blâmez-vous ? Pour le reste, avec qui dois-je traiter ? Le gouvernement de Nankin, réfugié d'ailleurs un peu plus en amont, sur le fleuve Bleu, gouverne-t-il la Chine ? Où est la Chine ? »

Avec des raisonnements semblables, on peut aller loin, surtout lorsqu'on se trouve en présence d'une S. D. N. qui n'ose pas prendre de décisions parce qu'elle n'est pas assurée de pouvoir les faire respecter.

Enfin, à Changhaï, le Japon a été amené par les circonstances à engager une véritable action militaire contre les Chinois. Il pensait pouvoir s'en tirer avec 1.600 fusiliers marins ; les fusiliers ont été repoussés ; le Japon a débarqué une division ; la division a été repoussée ; il en est à 25 ou 30.000 hommes et le général qu'il a là-bas demande de nouveaux renforts. Il a mis le doigt dans l'engrenage, la main y est déjà passée ; attention au bras !...

Mené par les conservateurs impérialistes, le Japon sans doute ne cédera pas et comme il a la maîtrise de la mer, il tiendra le coup. Mais c'est ici qu'interviennent les Etats-Unis. L'opinion américaine, disions-nous il y a deux jours, est très montée contre les Japonais ; on parle de l'autre côté de l'eau d'un boycottage des produits japonais. Mais bien plus, voici qu'on nous annonce que quarante navires de guerre américains ont franchi le canal de Panama, passant de l'Atlantique dans le Pacifique.

Manceuvres navales, dit-on à Washington. Peut-être. Mais ces manœuvres se font à un bien fâcheux moment.

Pierre DOMINIQUE.

TEMPS 23

Enclosure No. 25 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, February 23, 1932.

LES JAPONAIS A SHANGHAI

Tandis que le peuple japonais était appelé aux urnes pour le renouvellement de la Diète, la bataille se développait au nord de Shanghai dans des conditions qui ne laissent pas de déconcerter quelque peu les esprits attentifs aux événements d'Extrême-Orient. On pensait généralement qu'une fois amenés à pied d'œuvre les renforts envoyés du Japon après l'échec de la petite troupe de fusiliers marins lancée contre Chapei, le commandement nippon, appuyé par l'artillerie de l'escadre, aurait vite fait de déblayer le terrain et de refouler la 19^e armée chinoise à vingt ou trente kilomètres de Shanghai. On fut même quelque peu surpris que les Chinois, au lieu de céder à la mise en demeure des Japonais, voulussent courir leurs chances dans une bataille que d'avance on considérait comme perdue pour eux. L'affaire est plus dure qu'on ne le supposait tout d'abord et elle menace de prendre l'importance d'une opération de longue haleine.

Les forces nippones ont porté tout leur effort sur la ligne qui relie Shanghai à Wou-Sung et elles ont réussi, après une lutte acharnée, à s'établir près de Kiang-Ouan, leur objectif étant évidemment de rompre le front chinois, de manière à pouvoir se rabattre ensuite sur Chapei au sud et sur Wou-Sung au nord. Il ne faut accueillir qu'avec la plus grande réserve les nouvelles de source chinoise suivant lesquelles des pertes considérables auraient été infligées aux Nippons, auxquels, de plus, les troupes cantonaises auraient pris un important matériel. Ce sont là des rumeurs par lesquelles on entretient l'enthousiasme des masses chinoises toujours disposées à s'abandonner à de faciles illusions. Ce qui paraît résulter de la situation telle qu'elle est actuellement connue, c'est que la lutte s'annonce très dure, que les Japonais doivent opérer sur un terrain particulièrement difficile et que les troupes chinoises, instruites par des officiers étrangers, notamment par des Allemands, font preuve d'une résistance dont on les croyait incapables. Leur grande supériorité numérique — on les évalue à une cinquantaine de mille hommes sans compter 20,000 à 30,000 hommes de renfort envoyés par Nankin contre environ 24,000 Japonais — oblige les Nippons à étendre leur front. Toujours est-il qu'après deux jours d'offensive, les troupes du mikado n'ont pu avancer que de quelques kilomètres. De nouveaux renforts seront nécessaires et une trentaine de mille hommes de troupes fraîches seraient envoyés du Japon, ce qui prendra un certain temps, étant donné l'éloignement des bases de l'armée du mikado.

A moins d'un effondrement soudain du front chinois sous les coups de l'artillerie nipponne, on ne doit donc plus s'attendre à une décision rapide. C'est bien maintenant à Shanghai la guerre, sans déclaration préalable, sans rupture des relations diplomatiques, et lorsque se réunira, le 3 mars, à Genève, l'assemblée extraordinaire de la Société des nations qui aura à connaître du conflit, le conseil étant dessaisi en fait, elle se trouvera devant une situation extrêmement délicate. Suivant certaines informations, non encore officiellement confirmées, le gouvernement de Tokio répondra à l'appel du comité des Douze en marquant sa surprise que cet appel n'ait été adressé qu'à lui seul et non pas aux deux puissances en conflit. La thèse est que le Japon ne fait pas autre chose que défendre les droits et les intérêts de ses nationaux en Chine par les mêmes moyens dont ont usé d'autres puissances dans des circonstances analogues — rappel de l'action britannique de 1927 — et qu'au surplus les règles du pacte de la Société des nations ne peuvent être appliquées qu'à des Etats organisés, ce qui n'est pas le cas de la Chine.

Quel accueil l'assemblée de Genève fera-t-elle à cette thèse qui, si elle peut se défendre du point de vue des réalités de l'heure présente en Extrême-Orient, n'en est pas moins difficile à concilier avec les principes normaux du droit international, étant donné que la Chine a été admise comme Etat souverain et indépendant au sein de la Société des nations ? Un grand débat sur une question aussi délicate ne sera pas sans présenter de sérieux inconvénients. Certes, l'assemblée pourra marquer son sentiment et voter des résolutions, mais elle fera bien de ne s'avancer qu'avec une extrême prudence sur un terrain aussi peu sûr que celui où elle est appelée à agir. Il ne faudrait pas, pour le prestige de la Société des nations, qu'on en vienne à envisager des mesures dont il serait impossible d'assurer l'exécution. Aucune des grandes puissances qui auraient la responsabilité d'une intervention éventuelle, fût-ce sous la forme de simples mesures économiques, n'est disposée à s'engager dans une action contre le Japon, action qui aurait pour conséquence de généraliser un conflit actuellement encore localisé et qui risquerait de poser dans toute son ampleur le problème du statut international de la Chine et même le problème, beaucoup plus grave encore, de l'équilibre politique dans le Pacifique. Ni la Grande-Bretagne, ni les Etats-Unis, quel que soit le sentiment que l'on puisse éprouver à Londres et à Washington au sujet de l'attitude du Japon, ne sont disposés à s'engager dans une telle aventure.

Quant au Japon, au point où en sont les choses, il ne peut plus guère modifier sa politique. La résistance imprévue des Chinois à Shanghai l'entraîne bien au delà de ce qu'il se proposait d'entreprendre quand il a fait débarquer dans cette ville un premier contingent de fusiliers marins pour exercer une pression en vue d'obtenir la fin de la campagne de boycottage. Son prestige de grande puissance et la sauvegarde des immenses intérêts qu'il possède en Chine lui interdisent de rester sur un échec. Il n'y a plus d'autre issue pour lui que de faire l'effort nécessaire pour régler le plus rapidement possible la question sur le terrain. Le gouvernement de Tokio est poussé à l'action par son opinion publique, qui vient de s'affirmer dans les élections pour la Diète dans un sens sur lequel il n'y a pas à se méprendre. La Diète dissoute au mois de décembre dernier, après l'arrivée au pouvoir du cabinet conservateur présidé par M. Inukai, était composée de 273 députés libéraux se réclamant du parti Minseitō, de 174 députés conservateurs appartenant au parti Seiyūkai, de 5 prolétaires et de 14 députés indépendants ou se réclamant de groupements secondaires. Or, les résultats connus à cette heure marquent une avance considérable des conservateurs et un recul non moins considérable des libéraux. Il ne fait aucun doute que le cabinet Inukai aura dans la nouvelle Diète l'appui d'une solide majorité, ce qui lui assurera une entière liberté d'action pour le développement de sa politique à l'égard de la Chine. Ce résultat des élections confirme l'action toute-puissante de l'élément militaire et marque la persistance de l'ancienne influence des clans. Dans ces conditions, il n'est pas à prévoir que le gouvernement de Tokio veuille modifier son attitude et se prêter à un règlement avec la Chine avant d'avoir rétabli entièrement en sa faveur la situation à Shanghai.

Enclosure No. 26 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, February 24, 1932.

Leçons de l'Histoire

par Albert MILHAUD

La résistance des Chinois, contenant la poussée japonaise, crée beaucoup d'embarras dans certains milieux européens. Il était convenu que les Célestes « n'existeraient pas » un instant devant l'offensive du général Uyeda. Le Japon, c'était le parti de l'ordre en Extrême-Orient. Comment ne pas affirmer sa confiance dans la supériorité du gardien de l'ordre ? Vous avez compris que si l'on s'attarde à regretter les pénibles émois que le Japon a fait subir à la S. D. N., on est un peu complice du désordre en Extrême-Orient et l'on commence, déjà, à paraître suspect. Pour que tout se passât pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes possibles, la Chine devait être battue et soumise. Ne parlons pas du pacte Kellogg. Parlons peu, sinon ironiquement, de la S. D. N. elle-même. Tel était le mot d'ordre.

On nous a raconté, pendant plusieurs jours, que les Cantonais étaient des guerriers trop avantageux et sans doute un peu vantards : souvenir classique du *Miles gloriosus* plaqué sur plateau de laque. Cependant le Cantonais a tenu bon. On nous a dit : « Cela ne durera pas longtemps ! » On nous assurait que ces soldats de Canton étaient désavoués par le gouvernement chinois : ils se battaient pour l'amour de Sun Yat Sen et périssaient par simple désir de fournir un sujet de conversation aux consommateurs « du plus grand bar du monde » qui, on nous l'a appris récemment, voit aligner ses hauts tabourets dans un hôtel de Changhaï. Des héros, ces guerriers qui s'opposent à l'attaque japonaise de Chapei à Woosung ? Allons donc ! Des ombres chinoises. On nous racontait que Chang Kaï Sek observait avec un regard dédaigneux ces fantoches qui enrayaient l'offensive nipponne et les considérait comme des rebelles qui témoignaient de leur mauvais esprits en défendant pied à pied le sol de la patrie. Et puis, patatras ! tout ce beau système est à terre, voici les soldats de Chang Kaï Sek qui se mêlent à leurs camarades cantonnais pour soutenir leurs efforts. Vous croyez, peut-être, que ce phénomène de solidarité nationale peut sembler honorable ou légitime ? Non pas. Les soldats de Nankin ne seraient pas venus au secours des soldats de Canton sans des encouragements malsains venus de l'étranger.

Ce sont ces propos surprenants et parfois inouïs que nous retrouvons de ci, de là. Ne mettons personne en cause. Le bourrage de crâne continue.

Nos défenseurs de l'ordre — Genève, c'est le désordre — voilent prudemment tout ce que nous savons de la résolution des Chinois. Je me garderai de dire qu'il n'y a pas des parties troubles dans l'attitude des Chinois vis-à-vis du Japon et de toutes les puissances, et dans leur politique à l'égard des traités et des contrats, et je me garderai bien plus encore de leur donner raison, sans examen du dossier, sur toutes leurs prétentions et leurs agissements dans la période qui a précédé le 18 septembre 1931, c'est-à-dire avant le coup de Moukden. Je me garderai également de donner tort aux Japonais, qui peuvent avoir de légitimes griefs. Actuelle-

1808 et 1812 constituent des leçons de portée universelle. Veuillez le croire : l'histoire est beaucoup plus utile qu'on ne le pense. La guerre d'Espagne de Napoléon, sa retraite de Russie en disent long au philosophe qui médite sur les erreurs de jugement chez les gouvernants. On ne souhaite pas de semblables épreuves à ce brave peuple japonais qui, peut-être, ne pâtit aujourd'hui que d'un excès de bravoure gaspillée. Evidemment, l'opinion publique au Japon soutient l'entreprise : les dernières élections conservatrices le prouvent. Est-ce témoigner une vive sympathie à ce peuple, déjà inscrit dans les fastes de la grandeur militaire, en lui faisant : Kss ! Kss ! Allons donc !

S'il y avait une puissance morale dans le monde assez haute pour arrêter la lutte qui débute là-bas, pour tenter d'arrêter les effusions sanglantes, quel triple service elle rendrait au Japon, d'abord, à la Chine, ensuite, à la fourmilière humaine en danger, enfin. Ce n'est peut-être pas l'heure de tourner en dérision les puissances morales.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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L'empire du Mikado peut-il se dégager de cette aventure ? Il faudrait l'espérer. Nous avons eu notre guerre d'Espagne et notre guerre de Russie.

Oeuvre 24

Enclosure No. 27 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, February 24, 1932.

Le Japon a perdu, hier, la partie commencée par lui, il y a juste un mois.

Double partie : militaire, diplomatique.

Partie militaire : le 23 janvier, l'escadre japonaise débarqua des fusiliers marins avec mission de s'emparer de Chapei, faubourg nord de Changhaï, touchant la concession internationale. Chapei ne fut pas pris.

Le commandement japonais décida une opération d'envergure qui, précédée du démantèlement des forts de Wou-Sung, à l'embouchure du Whang-Poo, permettrait de rejeter l'armée chinoise loin de Changhaï, sans qu'elle eût plus rien pour la couvrir.

Après un ultimatum sans effet, cette offensive commença le 19 février au matin. Avance japonaise jusqu'à la lisière du village de Kiang-Wan incendié, puis tentative d'attaque débordante avec Kiang-Wan comme pivot.

Or, hier, malgré un tir de préparation à obus à gaz, les Japonais, après avoir progressé de 4 milles, ont été refoulés à la baïonnette sur leur ligne de départ. De sorte que le commandement, dans la soirée, dut envisager : 1° de mettre ses troupes au repos ; 2° d'attendre d'avoir doublé ses effectifs.

Partie diplomatique : Avant et après le 23 janvier, que d'assurances japonaises, que d'entretiens à Changhaï, à Tokio, avec les consuls, avec les ambassadeurs, à Genève avec le Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Quand les canons parlent, les diplomates se taisent. Dicton ! Jamais les diplomates n'auront autant parlé. Les généraux, les amiraux se sont faits diplomates pour pouvoir parler autant que leurs canons !

Question de vie ou de mort pour le prestige du Japon !

Les puissances s'impatientaient. A tout prix, qu'elles patientent.

Mener les deux parties de pair.

Et gagner de justesse : Répondre : oui aux chancelleries et à la Société des Nations, juste à la minute où les Chinois répondront : oui, aux canons.

Superbe tour d'adresse. Il aurait dû être foudroyant. Il se prolongea un mois.

Et qui gagne ? La Chine. Car la Chine de 1932, quoique encore en désordre, n'est plus la Chine de 1895 et les troupes républicaines de Nankin et de Canton et les 15.000 magnifiques soldats du Kouan-Si, qui arrivent à marche forcée, ne sont pas les soldats débâchés du Nord que les Japonais appellent diplomatiquement « bandits ».

Oh ! certes, la semaine prochaine, avec 75.000 hommes au lieu de 37.000, le Japon jouera une deuxième partie militaire. Et à l'assemblée de la Société des Nations du 3 mars, une deuxième partie diplomatique.

Même s'il gagne, retrouvera-t-il l'autorité et la gloire d'autrefois ? Gardera-t-il, seulement, intact son gain de Mandchourie ?

HENRI HERTZ.

P.M. 24

Enclosure No. 28 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from PARIS MIDI, February 24, 1932.

« Entre deux maux... il ne faut pas toujours choisir le moindre »

Ce qui se passe est inouï.
Depuis plusieurs mois on se bat en Extrême-Orient.

Depuis plusieurs jours on s'y tue

furieusement à coups de bombes d'avions, à coups de balles dumdum, à flots de gaz asphyxiants, tandis qu'à Genève on réclame la suppression des armes agressives.

Et tout le monde laisse faire.

Le Conseil de la S.D.N. a montré une étrange faiblesse et donné le spectacle de séances à pleurer. Les puissances ne soufflent mot. L'Amérique « fait le mort ». Morte la Russie. Evanouie l'Angleterre. Disparue la France.

Où si elles manifestent quelque signe de vie, c'est, semble-t-il, pour montrer une sigilière indulgence à l'égard du Japon.

Faut-il en conclure à l'impuissance originelle de l'organisme de Genève, à sa décadence ? Non ! Puisque la S.D.N. n'a même pas employé les moyens en son pouvoir.

La vérité, c'est qu'à Genève les représentants des nations n'ont pas encore réussi à dépouiller le vieil homme. Ce ne sont pas des juges impartiaux qui sont attablés qual Wilson. Ce sont à la fois des juges et des parties.

Or ces parties ont toutes des arrière-pensées. Et comme, on le sait, il n'est pas possible de faire des traités avec des arrière-pensées, de la même façon il est impossible d'en faire jaillir la justice.

Ces arrière-pensées, pour une fois, semblent communes. On laisse faire le Japon parce qu'on croit que le Japon est le représentant en Extrême-Orient de la civilisation, contre la barbarie chinoise ou soviétique. Car ce que les puissances redoutent avant tout c'est, à la faveur de l'anarchie du Céleste Empire, une soviétisation totale du pays. Le Japon est en somme le défenseur des nations occidentales contre le bolchevisme.

Mon Dieu, la préoccupation est légitime, mais est-elle fondée ?

Non, à mon sens. Car tous les efforts déployés par Moscou n'ont guère abouti qu'à un renforcement de l'anarchie en Chine. Et avant qu'un pays de 400 millions d'habitants soit bolchevisé, il s'écoulera sans doute un certain temps.

Les puissances font donc fausse route. Il est, en effet, un danger beaucoup plus pressant que la peur malade de Moscou semble avoir fait totalement disparaître: c'est la *mainmise du Japon sur la Chine*. Il reste là-bas un des rares débouchés pour l'Europe en proie à la surproduction. L'Europe ne va-t-elle pas le perdre. « Porte ouverte », dit bien le

Japon ! Mais, quand on est le portier, et qu'on est soi-même en crise, on ne résiste pas à la tentation de fermer la porte. Un de ces jours c'est sur un mur que les nations se casseront le nez.

Entre les deux périls, le bolchevique et le Jaune, on comprend une certaine hésitation. On ne s'explique pas la partialité.

Pour une fois l'adage qui veut qu'entre deux maux il faut choisir le moindre se trouve en défaut. Pas celui-ci plutôt que celui-là ! Ni l'un ni l'autre.

Il est encore une autre explication de l'attitude des nations. Mais faut-il en parler ? Si l'on en croit une dépêche Havas, les banquiers d'Amérique, de l'Amérique elle-même, vendent des munitions et du nitrate au Japon, les banquiers de cette Amérique qui est la plus directement menacée par l'action japonaise. Une dépêche du correspondant du *Baltimore Sun* annonce même que « les gouvernements français, anglais et américain auraient décidé de décourager toutes les discussions parlementaires au sujet de la vente d'armes à la Chine et au Japon. »

Abstenons-nous de tout commentaire.

Mais ne nous étonnons plus que le Conseil de la S.D.N. soit impuissant, et que les gouvernements restent passifs.

Où, plutôt, étonnons-nous de cette manie de suicide qui paraît, depuis quelque temps, avoir atteint le monde entier sous le fallacieux prétexte de défendre une civilisation qui n'est pas menacée ou d'enrayer le chômage.

Gabriel Perreux.

P.P. 24

Enclosure No. 29 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, February 24, 1932.

Le conflit sino-japonais devant la Société des nations

Genève, 23 février

D'UN DE NOS ENVOYÉS SPÉCIAUX

Ceux qui, au secrétariat de la S. D. N., ont non seulement encouragé le délégué chinois à réclamer la convocation de l'assemblée pour la saisir du conflit sino-japonais, mais poussé l'obligeance jusqu'à rédiger sa requête n'avaient évidemment pas prévu les multiples complications auxquelles cette demande allait donner lieu. Depuis vingt-quatre heures nous sommes ici, grâce à cette démarche, en pleine agitation. Certains ne se sont-ils pas mis en tête, en effet, de faire participer les Etats-Unis à la réunion plénière de cette « Ligue » dont ils refusent obstinément depuis douze ans de devenir membres ?

Or comment leur procurer cette faveur — ardemment souhaitée d'ailleurs par les Américains eux-mêmes — sans que surgisse aussitôt une demande analogue de la part de la délégation soviétique ? On voit le problème et les difficultés que présente sa solution... Les partisans de cette participation américaine se sont avisés d'invoquer le fameux traité de Washington de 1922 — dit traité des neuf puissances — qui vise le maintien du *statu quo* dans le Pacifique et dont les Etats-Unis sont naturellement signataires. Mais cet argument n'a pas plus de valeur que celui que pourrait invoquer M. Litvinov en faveur de la participation des Soviets dont le territoire est limitrophe de la Chine et dont les intérêts dans ce pays sont discutables.

L'idée leur est alors venue de demander que soient invités à ladite assemblée extraordinaire les délégués des neuf Etats représentés à la conférence du désarmement et qui n'appartiennent pas à la S.D.N. De cette façon, les Américains ne bénéficieraient plus d'un régime d'exception et pourraient s'associer à la condamnation escomptée de l'attitude du Japon. Le but serait donc atteint. Les choses, toutefois, ne sont pas aussi simples. D'abord rien n'empêcherait la Russie soviétique d'intervenir, elle aussi, dans le débat, et il est, d'autre part, assez ridicule d'étendre l'invitation, non seulement à la Turquie, mais à Costa-Rica, à l'Equateur, à l'Afghanistan, au Hedjaz, à l'Egypte et au Brésil.

Au point de vue juridique, d'ailleurs, cela n'est pas possible, et c'est la conclusion à laquelle a abouti ce matin une petite conférence tenue par quelques hauts fonctionnaires de la S. D. N.

Il est, en effet, insoutenable que les Etats non membres de la Société, c'est-à-dire non liés par les obligations du pacte, puissent être admis à participer à un débat ouvert conformément à l'article 15 contre un Etat membre et susceptible d'entraîner contre cet Etat les sanctions prévues à l'article 16.

Le Japon, dont la réponse à l'appel du conseil prouve qu'il n'accepte pas la situation d'accusé dans laquelle on prétend le mettre, serait en droit, non seulement de protester contre la présence des représentants de ces Etats, mais d'en référer sur ce point, comme sur la validité de la résolution adoptée à la Cour de justice de la Haye. L'avis de cette dernière paraît si peu douteux qu'on a déjà envisagé une position de repli, toujours dans le but de rendre possible la seule collaboration américaine. Nous avons dit hier que l'assemblée constituerait une commission chargée d'étudier dans tous ses détails l'affaire sino-japonaise, de préparer un rapport et d'élaborer, suivant la procédure habituelle, un projet de résolution. On a donc songé dans les mêmes milieux à invoquer le précédent créé en septembre dernier à la troisième commission, aux travaux de laquelle les Etats-Unis furent exceptionnellement autorisés à participer, pour réclamer une participation identique à la commission spéciale de l'assemblée.

On voit quelles intrigues se donnent actuellement libre cours dans la coulisse pour associer l'Amérique à une procédure qui ne se traduira sans doute que par un vote de blâme à l'adresse du Japon, mais qui, si l'arti-

cle 16 était strictement appliqué, pourrait conduire à des sanctions politiques, économiques, financières et même militaires auxquelles les Etats-Unis — que ne lie pas le pacte — auraient toute latitude de se soustraire.

Il y a là, de la part de certains agents, un maquignonnage qui est loin de grandir la Société et qui risque de compromettre les mesures de rigueur qu'elle peut, dans un cas comme celui-ci, être régulièrement amenée à prendre. L'assemblée de la Société des nations est une chose. La conférence de réduction des armements en est une autre. Chacune d'elles a sa mission. On ne saurait, sous le prétexte que les membres de la première sont représentés à la seconde par les mêmes délégués, établir entre elles une confusion dangereuse.

Albert JULLIEN

Pop. 24

Enclosure No. 30 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, February 24, 1932.

La journée d'hier a été mauvaise pour le militarisme japonais. Il a essuyé un cuisant échec. Non seulement les troupes nippones n'ont pu déloger de ses positions la 19^e armée chinoise, mais elles ont même dû battre en retraite.

C'est le deuxième échec qu'enregistre le Japon dans l'espace de quatre semaines. Sa première tentative de s'emparer de Chapei par surprise avait échoué. Le commandement japonais s'était d'ailleurs lancé dans l'aventure avec seulement 1.600 fusiliers marins.

Or, depuis samedi dernier, il attaque les Chinois avec au moins 30.000 hommes, muni du matériel de guerre le plus perfectionné. Et, encore une fois, les Japonais n'ont pas réussi. Ils se voient donc obligés d'envoyer à Changhaï un deuxième corps expéditionnaire, comprenant de 25.000 à 30.000 hommes.

Ainsi, le Japon qui croyait pouvoir se borner à une promenade militaire en Chine, doit à présent se préparer à une dure campagne. Quant à la Chine, qui avait été très découragée par l'occupation de la Mandchourie, elle reprend courage et confiance. Son unité est en marche. Et, d'ici peu de temps, elle pourra opposer à l'envahisseur une grande armée.

Nous voilà au seuil d'une guerre, d'une vraie guerre, d'une guerre dont on peut dire seulement qu'on sait où et quand elle commence, mais dont on ne peut prévoir la fin, ni dans le temps, ni dans l'espace.

Le monde restera-t-il impassible ? Laissera-t-il revenir la guerre qu'on croyait cependant bannie pour toujours le 11 novembre 1918 ?

Chaque heure qui passe rend plus difficile une intervention pacifique susceptible d'arrêter les hostilités. Il y a quatre mois, une simple protestation de la S.D.N., des Etats-Unis et de l'U.R.S.S., agissant d'un commun accord, aurait pu rappeler le Japon à l'ordre et au respect de ses engagements.

Aujourd'hui, il faudrait recourir aux mesures de pressions économiques et financières, peut-être à la rupture des relations.

Le Conseil général du Congrès des Trade-Unions, l'Exécutif du *Labour Party* et le groupe travailliste à la Chambre des Communes, ont publié hier une déclaration dans laquelle ils insistent auprès du gouvernement anglais pour qu'il suggère au Conseil de la S.D.N. d'examiner immédiatement l'opportunité du rappel des ambassadeurs et des ministres à Tokio.

Boycottage économique, représailles financières, rupture des relations diplomatiques, ce sont là les dernières mesures pacifiques que les grandes et petites puissances peuvent encore employer pour empêcher le Japon de mettre le feu à l'Asie.

Mais que l'opinion publique ne se fasse pas d'illusions : les gouvernements liés aux milieux capitalistes ne recourront pas à cette méthode, s'ils n'y sont pas forcés par la pression énergique des peuples.

Pourtant, si l'on n'agit pas et si l'on n'agit pas immédiatement, rien ne pourra plus empêcher la guerre d'Asie de dégénérer en une guerre universelle. Et les gouvernements qui se retranchent aujourd'hui derrière le « pacifisme » pour ne pas appliquer contre l'agresseur les mesures de pression économique, seront les premiers à jeter les peuples dans la tuerie au nom du « droit » et de la « justice ».

O. ROSENFELD.

Enclosure No. 31 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, February 24, 1932.

Echec au Japon

Le Japon, l'Empire du Levant, est classé par la Convention de Washington, comme la troisième puissance maritime du monde.

Le Japon a donné contre les Russes et contre les Chinois, eux-mêmes, des preuves éclatantes de sa puissance militaire.

Comment supposer que dans cette affaire de Shanghai la grande force armée de l'Extrême-Orient ne réduise pas à merci, en quelques jours, les hordes mal organisées, mal instruites, mal équipées, au service de la Céleste République ?

Au dire des reporters chargés de suivre les opérations offensives, autour de Chapeï, il est pourtant vrai que les grands stratèges du Japon sont tenus en échec, par une résistance qu'ils n'avaient ni mesurée ni même soupçonnée.

Le temps n'est donc plus où les Chinois, pour chasser l'ennemi, se contentaient de prier leurs dieux et d'agiter quelques dragons propices, brodés sur des bannières de soie.

Ces jours-ci, ce ne sont pas des boulets de porcelaine qui sortent des canons, mais de vrais obus, chargés à mitraille et capables de semer la mort parmi les bataillons assaillants.

Cependant, le « conflit », qui est maintenant la bataille sino-japonaise, demeure pendant à la S.D.N., qui en délibérera le 3 mars prochain.

Entre temps, l'Amérique menace de boycotter les produits japonais, et voici, dit-on, à Tokio, un nouveau *casus belli*.

Les représentants de la Chine ont remis leur cause à la Société des Nations dont ils invoquent les statuts, mais ils n'oublient pas de paraphraser un vieil adage, en disant : « Aide-toi, la S. D. N. t'aidera ! »

La jactance nipponne baisse pavillon. De grands techniciens militaires déclarent qu'il doit se préparer à une guerre de douze mois au moins !

Une année ! Une année de meurtre, de deuils, de misères et de troubles, pour tout l'Extrême-Orient. Voilà peut-être de quoi incliner au respect des traités ceux qui sembleraient résolus, sans les risques, à les violer effrontément.

L'heure de l'arbitrage, de la paix, ne va-t-elle bientôt sonner à Genève ? L'effort des peuples pacifistes peut maintenant encore s'exercer avec fruit, mais demain ?...

LE QUOTIDIEN.

Ref. 24

Enclosure No. 32 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, February 24, 1932.

A PROPOS DE LA GUERRE DE CHINE

Réactions nationales

Je voudrais souligner ici deux points : le premier, c'est la vigueur de la réaction nationale ou nationaliste au Japon ; le second, c'est la vigueur de la même réaction en Chine.

Les libéraux gouvernaient le Japon. On envahit la Mandchourie, on débarque à Changhaï ; les dépêches d'origine anglo-saxonne veulent nous faire croire que le Japon est secoué d'un mouvement libéral, radical, socialiste, en tout cas, antiguerrier. Allons donc. Nous avons aujourd'hui le résultat des élections : parti de la guerre : 301 ; parti de la paix : 149. Les chiffres étaient, il y a deux mois, exactement inverses. Appelé à se prononcer, le peuple japonais vote pour la guerre, voilà la vérité.

Ce n'est pas tout. L'opinion américaine ayant manifesté l'intention, pour aider la Chine ou mieux pour maintenir ouvert le marché chinois, de boycotter les marchandises japonaises, l'opinion publique japonaise a riposté en déclarant que le Japon verrait là un *casus belli*. Une dépêche de Tokio déclare :

Si l'Amérique ou la Société des Nations tentaient de lui imposer un boycottage économique, le Japon n'aurait d'autre alternative que de se soumettre, ce qui est inconcevable, ou de jouer le tout pour le tout, et dans ce cas, même s'il perdait la partie, cela coûterait cher au monde en existences humaines et en argent.

La dépêche continue :

La presse, dans ses récents articles, se fait l'écho de la résistance acharnée que rencontrerait un boycottage et elle conseille que, dans ce cas, le Japon, relevant le défi, saisisse les points stratégiques sur le continent asiatique pour assurer ses sources de ravitaillement, tandis que sa flotte assurerait la sécurité de ses communications maritimes dans les eaux d'Extrême-Orient. Elle admet qu'un boycottage nécessiterait la transformation radicale de l'organisation économique du pays, mais les difficultés ne sont pas regardées comme insurmontables, surtout si les Soviets qui ne sont pas membres de la S. D. N. refusaient d'entrer dans la ligue antijaponaise.

Inutile de commenter, surtout si l'on veut bien se souvenir de l'importance que prend au Japon le point d'honneur.

Et en Chine ? Eh bien ! on sait qu'il y a au moins deux Chines. La Chine de Nankin. La Chine de Canton. A Nankin siège un gouvernement régulier re-

présenté à la S. D. N. A Canton siège un gouvernement révolutionnaire en relations assez étroites avec les Soviets. A l'annonce du débarquement japonais, le gouvernement de Nankin a demandé l'intervention de la S. D. N. Le gouvernement de Canton a envoyé contre les Japonais la 19^e armée. La S. D. N. n'a rien fait. Mais la 19^e armée s'est permis d'arrêter les Japonais. A la suite de cela, le gouvernement de Nankin s'est mis à parler haut, et voici qu'on parle d'une véritable cristallisation du sentiment patriotique chinois sur le thème national-socialiste — si l'on peut dire, car le mot a maintenant une fortune universelle — défendu par Canton.

Laissée à elle-même, la Chine depuis 1911 était en pleine anarchie. L'intervention japonaise de 1915, anglaise de 1927 n'avaient pas réussi à l'en tirer. En 1932, la voilà qui se réveille, qui prend conscience d'elle-même, qui s'organise. Et — grave symptôme — les ouvriers de cette unification au moins morale sont des militaires.

Les bons observateurs pouvaient prévoir cela depuis longtemps. Il y a vingt et un ans que la Chine est en révolution, que des bandes armées parcourent son territoire. On s'est beaucoup moqué de ces soldats chinois, qu'on traitait volontiers de brigands, et qu'on se figurait semblables aux Boxers ou aux Pavillons Noirs. Et puis voilà qu'il faut déchanter. Vingt et un ans de guerre civile, rien de tel pour former des soldats, des officiers, des généraux. Il ne manque plus dans l'affaire qu'un Bonaparte jaune. Le jour où il surgira, appuyé par 500 millions de Chinois, je ne sais pas ce que pensera le Japon, ni ce que pensera l'Amérique, mais l'Europe n'aura qu'à bien se tenir.

Pierre DOMINIQUE.

a.f.25

Enclosure No. 33 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ACTION FRANCAISE, February 25, 1932.

Une « occasion » perdue

L'abstention finale de la Ligue de Genève, qui laisse le canon tonner à Changhaï ne pouvant le faire taire, a été douloureuse pour les croyants. Quelques-uns se sont emportés contre leur église avec l'indiscrétion des laïcs pieux. M. William Martin a fait penser à Joseph de Maistre admonestant le pape. Mais, comme dit Georges Duhamel à la fin de ses *Querelles de famille* (et c'en est ici bien une), il n'y a que les pessimistes incurables pour être contents de tout.

Ceux qui cherchent querelle à la Société des Nations, comme Duhamel au monde, lui font encore confiance, du moins jusqu'à nouvel ordre. Mais quels conseils elle a reçus! Dans un organe anglais d'un pacifisme d'avant-garde, M. Brailsford s'étonne qu'on n'ait pas châtié le Japon. L'occasion pouvait-elle être meilleure d'associer les Etats-Unis à une action de la Ligue? Et que risquait-on? Les Japonais n'ont pas un allié. « Il me semble, dit M. Brailsford, que les circonstances étaient particulièrement favorables. »

Tombons tous sur ce Japon solitaire... Les ligueurs n'ont pas été tentés par cette exhortation. M. Brailsford ne s'aperçoit pas, de son côté, qu'il adresse un naïf appel à la force. Pourtant ne serait-ce pas encore par elle que tout se terminerait?

Le *New Leader*, qui veut conduire le monde dans de nouvelles voies, regrette qu'une heure aussi propice ait été perdue. Il n'y avait qu'à bloquer le Japon, à priver sa vaste population, qui grouille dans ses îles, des aliments qu'elle ne produit pas. La reddition était certaine, après une crise économique et financière, et même politique. Il y aurait eu famine, révolution, enfin toutes les horreurs de la guerre, sans compter qu'au blocus maritime le Japon eût peut-être d'abord riposté. Batailles navales. Navires coulés avec leurs équipages... Images de douceur et de charité.

Mais ces choses extrêmes, ne les éviterait-on pas en commençant par le désarmement? Alors, comment désarmer? M. Brailsford se le demande et ce n'est pas dans les principes d'égalité ou de parité qu'il trouve la solution. Egaux, il faudrait que les peuples le fussent en tout et non seulement en nombre et en ressources, car les idéalistes de la paix, en ceci fort matérialistes, oublient le « potentiel » moral, le courage et même les raisons, fussent-elles mauvaises, qu'un peuple peut avoir de faire la guerre. Elles donnent l'élan qui ne s'égale pas facilement non plus. M. Brailsford néglige cela. Et il néglige l'intelligence qui compte encore. Qui obtiendra l'égalisation du génie militaire? On interdit (sans confiance) des engins de destruction. Oui, mais interdire Annibal, Napoléon, Nelson?

M. Brailsford conclut avec mélancolie : « Dans l'égalité, il n'y a pas de sécurité; on ne peut la trouver que dans le troisième des principes révolutionnaires. » Evidemment ce n'est pas dans le premier. Ce n'est pas dans la liberté, qui signifie concurrence, course aux armements. Il ne reste plus qu'à organiser la fraternité. Comment? Par l'assistance mutuelle qui suppose la répression, l'usage de la force, la guerre, bref la fraternité ou la mort.

C'est pourquoi on a mieux aimé perdre des circonstances, qui étaient si remarquablement « favorables », et ne pas condamner le peuple japonais à la famine tandis que les innocents matelots de la flotte internationale fussent allés, par le fond des mers jaunes, donner à manger aux requins. — J. B.

Jan 25

Enclosure No. 34 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, February 25, 1932.

LES LEÇONS ET LES CAUSES de la résistance chinoise

L'éveil subit du patriotisme chinois
a su dégager les forces
matérielles et morales
que toute nation recèle

On aurait tort de croire que la résistance acharnée des Chinois à Changhaï s'explique seulement par la supériorité du nombre. En quelques semaines, des bandes désarmées sont devenues une armée assez bien organisée, encadrée et commandée par des officiers étrangers expérimentés, opérant avec discipline, dotée d'un matériel qui devient chaque jour plus nombreux et plus perfectionné, et, par-dessus tout, animée du patriotisme le plus intransigeant.

La surprise des Japonais se traduit par un insuccès qui, pour l'instant, frappe de stérilité tous les efforts de conciliation et rend les négociations à peu près impossibles. Il est bien évident, en effet, que les soldats du mikado ne consentiront pas à arrêter leur action sans avoir au moins sauvé la face.

On peut bien dire que l'étonnement des Européens n'a pas été moins grand. Qui aurait pu supposer, en effet, que les Chinois nous apprendraient un jour l'art de faire la guerre ? N'est-ce pas là, en effet, la leçon la plus immédiate qui se dégage des événements de Changhaï ? La preuve est faite désormais qu'un peuple, fût-il le moins préparé à se battre, peut se procurer presque instantanément tout ce qui est nécessaire à la conduite de la guerre moderne. C'est une constatation utile à faire au moment où la conférence du désarmement entre dans le vif de ses travaux. Si loin qu'elle pousse ses investigations, quelque sévères que soient les limitations qu'elle veuille imposer, elle fera sagement de ne jamais perdre de vue la multitude de ces impondérables dont la réalité, qui se joue parfois des thèses les plus solidement construites, est pleine.

Ce n'est pas tout. Le nationalisme chinois disparaîtra-t-il en même temps que la menace japonaise ou survivra-t-il aux événements actuels ?

Dans le premier cas, ce serait le retour pur et simple à l'anarchie avec tout ce que cet état de fait comporte de périls : le conflit actuel en est une démonstration saisissante. Dans le second cas, ce pourrait être l'annonce de la constitution plus ou moins lointaine, à l'est de l'Asie, d'un nouvel État dont l'avènement romprait l'équilibre déjà très instable des forces du Pacifique et poserait les plus graves problèmes.

On voit que, sous quelque face qu'on l'examine, la question d'Extrême-Orient n'a pas fini de solliciter l'étude des diplomates et l'attention des grandes puissances.

Pop. 25

Enclosure No. 35 to Despatch No. 2306 of February 25, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, February 25, 1932.

L'impérialisme japonais et ses complices

La réponse du gouvernement japonais au dernier appel des Douze est parvenue à Genève. C'est un long document qui remplirait au moins trois colonnes de notre journal.

Tokio proteste tout d'abord contre la « partialité » du Conseil de la S. D. N. L'appel, déclare-t-il en substance, aurait dû être adressé à la Chine et non au Japon; parce que c'est la Chine qui est l'agresseur. Quant aux Japonais ils ne font que se défendre contre les attaques chinoises.

Le gouvernement nippon proteste ensuite de ses sentiments pacifiques et de son état d'esprit conciliant. Il déclare qu'il ne nourrit aucune ambition territoriale en Chine.

En passant la note japonaise fait observer que la S. D. N. n'a pas à s'occuper du traité des Neuf, seules les puissances signataires de ce traité pourraient l'invoquer.

Ce document incroyable se termine ainsi :

Le gouvernement japonais croit sincèrement qu'à la réflexion, ces puissances finiront par partager les vues exposées ici, et il espère ardemment qu'elles continueront à faire les plus grands efforts pour engager les Chinois à s'abstenir d'actes d'agression tels que ceux qui ont déclenché les conflits armés des cinq derniers mois.

Le Japon se refuse énergiquement à accepter la flétrissure que certains tentent de lui infliger en l'accusant d'encourager et de désirer la guerre.

Autant que tout autre, le peuple japonais exécute la guerre et ses inévitables horreurs. Si les efforts des douze puissances peuvent réussir à amener la Chine à adopter une attitude pacifique, il n'y aura nulle part de joie plus sincère qu'au Japon.

Ne commentons pas. Les auteurs se moquent simplement du monde et plus spécialement du Conseil de la Société des Nations. Mais les Douze n'ont-ils pas, par leur faiblesse et leur complaisance vis-à-vis du militarisme japonais, mérité ce soufflet ?

L'attitude du gouvernement anglais

Le Japon croit pouvoir se permettre tout. Mais a-t-il tort de se gêner ? Les gouvernements de la Grande-Bretagne, des Etats-Unis et de la France ne l'encouragent-ils pas ?

A la séance d'hier, à la Chambre des Communes, M. Eden, sous-secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères, a fait aux interpellateurs qui le questionnaient au sujet de l'attitude du gouvernement britannique, la réponse suivante :

L'envoi d'une nouvelle note aux deux belligérants pour leur rappeler leurs obligations, en vertu du covenant de la Société des Nations, ne serait d'aucune utilité, le gouvernement anglais ayant déjà clairement défini son attitude sur la question, et le Japon ayant donné l'assurance qu'il ne nourrit aucune ambition territoriale, et ayant promis de respecter le principe de la « porte ouverte ».

Puisque le Japon a promis de laisser en Chine les « portes ouvertes », c'est-à-dire de ne pas gêner le commerce des autres puissances, l'Angleterre n'a pas à s'inquiéter. Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n'a donc rien à reprocher au Japon. Quant aux fabricants de canons et de munitions, ils font des affaires d'or et ne désirent qu'une chose : que le Japon continue à leur acheter le matériel de guerre. Cela fait marcher le commerce.

Le point de vue des autorités américaines

Le gouvernement des Etats-Unis n'envisage pas la situation avec le même calme. Il est, certes, également partisan de la politique de la « porte ouverte ». Mais, possédant en Chine des intérêts beaucoup plus importants que ceux de l'Angleterre, le capitalisme américain se rend bien compte du danger qui les menace. L'extension de l'influence japonaise en Chine ne peut s'opérer qu'au détriment de l'influence américaine. C'est pourquoi Washington est plus sensible à la violation du traité des neuf et se préoccupe même de l'indépendance de la Chine et de l'intégrité de son territoire.

D'ailleurs les Etats-Unis ne sont pas bien rassurés en ce qui concerne les Philippines, que le Japon convoite depuis longtemps. Aussi M. Stimson déclare-t-il :

Qu'aucun des traités ne saurait être méconnu sans porter atteinte à l'équité intervenue entre les nations. Il ajoute que l'Amérique a promis de re-

noncer à la supériorité dans la construction des navires de guerre et de ne pas fortifier ses positions aux Philippines à condition toutefois qu'aucune autre puissance ne s'accroisse par voie de conquête aux dépens de la Chine.

Les complices du Japon

Mais telle n'est pas l'opinion — ou plutôt l'action des milieux intéressés ».

Un télégramme de Washington à l'Agence Reuter nous apporte les informations suivantes :

Parlant devant le comité des affaires étrangères de la Chambre des représentants, M. Paul Linebarger, qui doit être conseiller juridique auprès du gouvernement national chinois, a accusé les banquiers et les fabricants de munitions américains d'aider le Japon dans son différend avec la Chine.

M. Linebarger a déclaré que des munitions évaluées à 181 millions de dollars avaient été récemment vendues au Japon avec l'aide des banquiers américains, alors qu'il était impossible à la Chine d'obtenir pareil appui.

D'autre part, suivant le correspondant du *Baltimore Sun*, le département d'Etat, les gouvernements français et anglais, auraient décidé de décourager toutes les discussions parlementaires au sujet de la vente d'armes à la Chine et au Japon. Le journal ajoute qu'à la demande du Département d'Etat, la Commission des Affaires étrangères de la Chambre avait décidé d'abandonner la semaine dernière la discussion publique de la résolution présentée par M. Fish tendant à autoriser le président Hoover à mettre embargo sur les chargements des munitions destinées aux belligérants.

Le département d'Etat semble également avoir ordonné le secret le plus complet concernant les expéditions faites actuellement.

On mande par ailleurs de Hopell (Virginie) que l'on charge actuellement des nitrates dans les docks d'une des plus importantes compagnies de produits chimiques des Etats-Unis sur cinq navires à destination du Japon.

Ce télégramme mérite la plus grande attention. Il confirme les informations qu'on avait dernièrement sur les expéditions de munitions et d'armes au Japon aussi bien d'Angleterre que de France et de Tchécoslovaquie.

Et hier, le bruit avait de nouveau couru à New-York que le gouvernement français était lié au Japon par un traité secret. L'ambassadeur de France à Washington a démenti la nouvelle. Mais l'étrange mutisme de MM. Laval et Tardieu ne permet pas d'accueillir sans réserves les affirmations du ministre français.

La marche sur Vladivostok

Or, tandis que le Conseil de la S. D. N. reçoit des leçons de la part de son ancien collègue M. Yoshizawa, l'actuel ministre des Affaires Etrangères japonais, que les marchands de la mort en France, en Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis s'enrichissent, que les gouvernements capitalistes restent dans l'inaction, — pendant ce temps les Japonais poursuivent l'exécution de leur plan militaire.

De Kharbine leurs troupes se dirigent vers Imyanpo qui se trouve sur le Chemin de Fer de l'Est Chinois à 160 kilomètres de Kharbine, dans la direction de Vladivostok. Ce chemin de fer qui appartient à l'U. R. S. S. est déjà en fait sous le contrôle du Japon qui occupe les gares de Tsitsikar et de Kharbine. Mais cela ne lui suffit pas. Les troupes marchant à présent le long du chemin de fer ayant pour objectif la gare terminus qui est le port russe du Pacifique, Vladivostok.

Ainsi que j'ai déjà eu l'occasion de l'indiquer ici l'occupation de Vladivostok et de toute la région maritime présente pour le Japon non seulement un intérêt économique et militaire, mais est une nécessité stratégique en cas d'une guerre avec les Etats-Unis. Il semble donc que le Japon envisage froidement cette éventualité.

Par les soins des Japonais, la Mandchourie est détachée de la Chine. Elle devient un Etat « indépendant », c'est-à-dire une colonie japonaise. Le même sort attend la région maritime et Vladivostok, que le Japon veut détacher de la Russie pour créer un Etat tampon, c'est-à-dire une place d'armes.

Ainsi, petit à petit, l'impérialisme japonais crée en Extrême-Orient une situation qui rend une grande guerre inévitable.

Et le monde laisse faire !

O. ROSENFELD.

1914

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/24 Ames/24 FOR Tel. # 309, noon.

FROM China (Perkins) DATED March 6, 1932.

TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Japanese troops which have detrained at
Hailin on eastern line of railway.

hs

793.94/4612

191 -

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated March 6, 1932

Rec'd. 3.40 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

309, March 6, noon

Following from Consul General Harbin:

"March 5, noon. One. Japanese troops have detrained at Hailin on eastern line of railway.

Two. Lishaoken has been appointed president of Chinese Eastern Railway by new government of Manchuria in place of Motehui.

Three. Japanese controlled press claims that this indicates that the Soviet Government, which evidently approved of this appointment, intends immediately to recognize the new government, but Soviet Consul General states he has received no instructions regarding this question. This press further states independent maritime customs will be established by new state.

Four. Mayor Pao has decided to spend local dollars one hundred thousand of municipal funds to celebrate on

March

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #2 of No. 309 from Peiping

March 9th, 10th, and 11th inauguration of new state."

For the Minister

PERKINS

JS

OIB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01/484 FOR Tel. # 310, noon.

FROM China (Perkins) DATED March 7, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Plenary session of Central Executive Committee
decided to alter regulations concerning the
functions of the military council.

hs

793.94/4613

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 7, 1932

Rec'd 2:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

310, March 7, noon.

Following from Reuter, Loyang, March sixth:

"The plenary session of the Central Executive Committee made yet another capital of China as a result of today's deliberations. It decided to retain Loyang as the 'temporary capital', while Nanking, Sianfu, Shensi, 'the cocapital' with the title of Hsi Ching (western capital).

The session also decided to alter the regulations concerning the functions of the military council, making the council's chairman concurrently commander-in-chief of China's army, navy and aviation forces.

FOR THE MINISTER
PERKINS

CIB

WSL

192

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

mam

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

SHANGHAI VIA NR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 7 1932
DIVISION OF

FROM

Dated March 7, 1932

Rec'd 3:50 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

MAR 8 1932
Department of State

163, March 7, 5 p.m.

Continuing my daily report 159, March 5, 4 p.m.

One. Except for minor skirmishes west of Nanziang
no fighting has taken place on the various fronts during
the past three days. Japanese sources state that
their front is at ^{Wangda} ~~(?)~~ about four miles west of Nan-
ziang.

Two. A detachment of the 14th Division of about
1500 men arrived at Shanghai on March 6th on four
transports and landed at Nippon Yusen Kaisha wayside
wharf and Hongkew wharf, the main body landing at
Liuho. Some 500 troops landed at Nippon Yusen Kaisha
wharf are to act as reserves for the Ninth Division.
General Shirakawa has issued a proclamation in Chinese
to the effect that Japan has ^{always} endeavored to cultivate
friendly relations with the Chinese people. About two
hundred thousand copies of this manifesto were distributed among

793.94
note
893.102-S
894.23
793.94119

F/LS 793.94/4614

MAR 21 1932

FILED

1921

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

man

2- #163, from Shanghai, March 7,
1932

distributed among Chinese in Chapei. All peace negotia-
tions seem to be at a deadlock.

Three. Persons wishing access to Chapei must
apply for facilities at the Japanese naval headquarters
in the North Station. Every facility is to be granted
to foreigners having property or business in that area
but entrance is prohibited to sightseers. Chinese are
given access by the possession of Shanghai Municipal
Council green passes while Chinese accompanied by
foreigners have free access.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking; copy to
Minister.

HPD

CUNNINGHAM

note
793,94119

152

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

name

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENERAL

Dated March 7, 1932

Rec'd 6:39 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

61, March 7, 9 p.m.

At this afternoon's meeting of the Assembly,

Titulesco made a strong appeal for employing all the measures in the Covenant stating that while the League could afford to fail in bringing about a solution after exhausting the means at its disposal, if it failed to act to the limit of its authority it would sacrifice the confidence of all small nations.

Zaleski, Poland, offered nothing beyond a reminder that the League is really based on the provisions in the preamble of the Covenant regarding respect of treaty obligations, et cetera. (END GRAY)

Simon then spoke (see Gilbert's telegram 106). His statement seemed so entirely vague that most of us did not even gather the impression that he was advocating definite measures. On being asked afterward, however, what he had in mind as to the character of the resolution to be

793.94
note
500.2111
593.102-S
793.94/119
500.2111
711.0012 Anti-War

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 14 1932
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

RECEIVED
MAR 8 1932
DIVISION OF
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4615

MAR 16 1932

FILED

192

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

man

2- #61, from Geneva, March 7, 1932

to be adopted he showed us a text which merely gives his general idea and which concludes with a very definite statement approximately as follows:

(GRAY) "The Assembly resolves that it is incumbent upon all States members of the League to refuse to recognize any solutions of international differences brought about by force in violation of the Covenant of the League and the Kellogg Pact". (END GRAY)

Simon was followed by Rosso, Italy, Weizsacker, Germany, Paul Boncour, France, who associated themselves in very general terms with Simon's suggestions. The state of impression was one of the great powers putting brakes on the impulsive proposals of the small nations.


WILSON

FW OX

1924

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED




FROM

Geneva

Dated March 7,

Rec'd 8:23 p. m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

106, March 7, 7 p. m.

Wilson's 51, March 4, 2 p. m.

Sir John Simon spoke in the General Commission of the Assembly this afternoon. Before beginning his speech he made the following statement to Ambassador Gibson:

"I am going to put us squarely in line with America and I hope you will telegraph it."


The pertinent portion of Simon's speech follows:

"Should we not take this opportunity solemnly to reaffirm the fundamental principles on which the League is based and by which every signatory is bound? Should we not declare afresh that the Covenant of the League of Nations does not authorize a state, however well founded its grievances against another state, to seek redress by methods other than the pacific methods set forth in Article 12 of the Covenant? The Pact of Paris which

F/LS 793.94/4616

MAR 16 1932

FILED



1925

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 106 from Geneva

which together with the Covenant is one of the pillars of the peace organization of the world, provides, as my distinguished friend Mr. Titulescu has pointed out under Article 2 that 'the high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may rise amongst them should never be sought save by pacific means' should we not make reference afresh to Article 10 of the Covenant by which all members of the League have undertaken to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League? These propositions therefore are propositions which every member of the League is bound to accept without regard to the merits of the controversy and all these complicated matters. Changes brought about not as the result of conciliation and peaceful adjustment, but by means contrary to the Covenant of the League or the Pact of Paris manifestly could not receive the approval of members of a assembly of nations which exists for the very purpose of observing these obligations and upholding these principles.

Such are the general lines of the declaration

which

1921

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 - No. 106 from Geneva

which I would invite my colleagues here to join in
formulating. It would not be the complete discharge of
our duty, not at all, but it would be a step we can take
and ought to take at the end of our general discussion".

GILBERT

FW-OX

192

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.

SHANGHAI

Dated March 7, 1932

FROM

Rec'd 4:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

March 7, 8 p.m.

Your 77, March 5, 9 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

(GRAM) One. I saw my British, French and Italian colleagues at noon today and I gave them in confidence the substance of Department's instruction to me. My French, Italian colleagues have been authorized to participate in a conference but have no detailed instructions. My British colleague has had no instructions whatever. We are waiting upon events as it is not clear to us as to how negotiations between the two parties may be brought about. In the meantime Japanese continue to land troops, a large part of the 14th Division having landed within last twelve hours. Their position is described in telegram No. 164, March 7, 6 p.m., from American Consulate prepared by

793.94
notes
893-1025
793.94117

F/E

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 8 1932
Department of State

F/LS
793.94/4617

FILED

MAR 14 1932

1928

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- from Shanghai, March 7, 1932

by Captain Mayer.

Two. Matsuoka came to see me this morning. He expressed the hope that interested neutral powers might mediate. He is, I believe, seeing my French colleague this evening and will see my British colleague tomorrow morning. (END GRAY)

He made it clear that neither he nor Shigemitsu had any influence with military leaders here and stated that military would not leave present occupied area until satisfied that objects of expedition have been accomplished to wit: Chinese troops must not enter evacuated area, and some satisfactory arrangement must be arrived at which will promise security to Japanese nationals living within area now occupied by Japanese troops. Matsuoka intimated that arrangements for area to be policed by Chinese after Japanese evacuation would not be satisfactory to Japanese military. He thought that a satisfactory arrangement would be to have area policed or at least supervised by the police (if the International Settlement or by the international military forces here. He stated that this would of course be temporary as more permanent arrangements would

192

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

3- from Shanghai, March 7, 1932

would be settled at a round table conference. I informed Matsuoka that I did not think the United States Government would take kindly to any proposal which might run counter to our known policy in regard to the future status of the International Settlement. Matsuoka insisted that his suggestions were for temporary arrangements to take care of area evacuated by Japanese troops and should be distinguished from permanent arrangements which should be left for a round table conference if and when held.

Three. The Japanese are going to make a distinct bid for foreign support through the prospect of extension of Settlement. My British colleague is personally not in sympathy with any plan for Settlement extension. French Minister informs me that he does not care to have anything to do with the policing of Nantao or areas adjacent to French concession if this is suggested by Japanese. There is a considerable body of opinion however among local British and American business residents in favor of taking advantage of present situation for the purpose of obtaining extension

153
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

4- from Shanghai, March 7, 1932

extension of Settlement area. British Minister is already experiencing such pressure and I also expect it. See Shanghai's 156, March 4, 1 p.m.

Four. Chinese will be opposed to any proposal contemplating extension of Settlement.

Five. Japanese are in military occupation now and I am convinced that they will not give up this occupation until they have obtained favorable terms from the Chinese Government which I believe will include some measure of foreign supervision of administration in evacuated areas adjacent to Settlement. Powers interested in International Settlement of Shanghai and in the trade of Yangtze Valley will be faced with difficult questions, for a prolonged Japanese occupation must naturally give to Japanese dominant position both as regards the Settlement and the commerce in the valley. Attitude of Japanese military seems to be that as the Chinese withdrew under pressure the Japanese are under no obligations to withdraw from 20 kilometer zone.

JOHNSON

HPD

1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State
This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

Washington,

March 10, 1932.

Charge to
\$ 4617

793.94/4617
500. C.I.I.
893.1025
793.9419

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (China).

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER.

March 7, 8 pm / 4617 from Shanghai.
Your 77 March 5, 9 pm

Wilson informs me under date March 9 that in conversation with Sir John Simon he mentioned the fact reported by you, as reported by Department to him, that British Minister at Shanghai had received no instructions concerning negotiations. Simon stated that he had sent to Lampson a copy of the Assembly's resolution of March 4 and that as this had been concurred in by Great Britain's Minister for Foreign Affairs he had assumed that that fact was sufficient authorization. He said that he would furnish Lampson at once with more specific instructions, and he inquired regarding instructions which we had sent you in order that his instructions might be drafted on similar lines. Wilson informed him of the substance of your instructions and Simon informed Wilson that he would send instructions to ^{Lampson} Shanghai yesterday evening.

Enciphered by FE:SKH:AT

FE

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/4617

Stinson

SKH

1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

PM REC
TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully guarded and not
be so easily repeated to a third party.

March 8, 1932.

WILSON

BERGUES

36 GENEVA (Switzerland)

Confidential for Wilson.

793.94/4617
Department has received from American Minister,
Shanghai, under date March 7/4617 a telegram stating, in
parts, as follows:

A. QUOTE I saw my British, French and Italian
colleagues at noon today and I gave them in confidence
the substance of Department's instruction to me. My
French, Italian colleagues have been authorized to
participate in a conference but have no detailed in-
structions. My British colleague has had no instruc-
tions whatever. We are waiting upon events as it is
not clear to us as to how negotiations between the
two parties may be brought about. In the meantime
Japanese continue to land troops, a large part of
the 14th Division having landed within last twelve
hours. ~~There is no indication of any further action~~ UNQUOTE

B. QUOTE Matsuoka made it clear that

neither

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/4617

1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

neither he nor Shigemitsu had any influence with military leaders here and stated that military would not leave present occupied area until satisfied that objects of expedition have been accomplished UNQUOTE.

C. QUOTE The Japanese are going to make a distinct bid for foreign support through the prospect of extension of Settlement. My British colleague is personally not in sympathy with any plan for Settlement extension. French Minister informs me that he does not care to have anything to do with the policing of Nantao or areas adjacent to French concession if this is suggested by Japanese. There is a considerable body of opinion however among local British and American business residents in favor of taking advantage of present situation for the purpose of obtaining extension of Settlement area. British Minister is already experiencing such pressure and I also expect it. UNQUOTE

D. QUOTE Chinese will be opposed to any proposal contemplating extension of Settlement. UNQUOTE

E. QUOTE Attitude of Japanese military seems to be that

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.-No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1939 1-138

1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 3 -

that as the Chinese withdrew under pressure the
Japanese are under no obligations to withdraw from
20 kilometer zone. UNQUOTE

Winston

FE:SKH:CLS

SKH
FE

SKH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

1935

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

PLAIN

RECEIVED

FROM

Peiping via NR

MAR 7 1932

Dated March 8, 1932

DIVISION OF

Recd 5:25 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State

Washington.

314, March 8, 5 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Canton, March seventh:

"At the weekly memorial service today, Doctor
C C Wu said that General Tsai Ting Kai's retreat from
Shanghai was owing to the lack of reinforcements.
General Tsai, he said, had only forty thousand troops
against one hundred thousand Japanese. China, he went
on, has two million soldiers. Why were there only
forty thousand to defend Shanghai. This matter, he
declared, demanded an investigation."

For the Minister

PERKINS

JS OIB

F/LS 793.94/4618

FILED

MAR 14 1932

793.94
note
893.102
893.00

1932


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
note
893.102
5-00 C/11
793.94119

REP



FROM GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 8, 1932

Rec'd 10:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

March 8, 3 p. m.


Your 80, March 7, noon.

With my British, French and Italian colleagues and our respective commanders-in-chief we agreed yesterday to pool our information regarding status of military operations and have same forwarded to Geneva through British Minister as Senior Minister. This information will be sent daily to Geneva from now on and serially numbered. Situation report No. 1 was due today. Does the Department desire that I repeat these reports to it?

JOHNSON

RR

WSB



F/LS 793.94/4619

FILED
MAR 14 1932

1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

PM RECD
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

March 8, 1932.

MAR 8 32

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (China)

81 For the Minister. /4619
Your March 8, 3 p.m.

Please repeat to Department situation reports

referred to.

793.94/4619

Stimson

SKP

FE:MMH:AT

RAM
FE

MAR 8 1932

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/4619

1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

March 8, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL,
SHANGHAI (China).

85 For the Minister.

Your March 8, 3 p. m.

~~Department assumes the~~ In cooperation rendered by
American representatives in connection with situation
reports, American representatives ~~are~~ being guided by the
procedure referred to in the Department's No. 76, March 4,
11 p. m., to the Consul at Shanghai for the Minister,
paragraph two?

793.94/4679

FE:MMH:REK

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1932 1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
March 11, 1932.

~~824H:~~

As Mukden's 315, March 8,
10:00 a. m. is in accord with the
Department's instructions to that
office in regard to the Mukden
radio station, we see no reason
whatsoever to say anything to
Mukden now on the subject.

[Handwritten signature]

M. M. H.

copy

RAM

672
5124

134
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 9, 1932.

No action appears necessary at present
in regard to the Legation's telegram No. 315
of March 8, 10 a. m., attached herewith.

In this connection, however, the Depart-
ment in its telegram of October 7, 1931,
5 p.m. stated in part as follows:

"Two. Instruct Mukden that any
approach whatever, oral or written,
to the Consulate by Japanese authori-
ties or Chinese or Americans interested
in this question should be reported to
Department at once and no commitments
of any sort be made in connection
therewith without instruction."

*I agree. We should leave it up to the
Radio people and keep out of the picture
as much as possible. JF*

RCME:emu


194

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY



FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 8, 1932

Rec'd 10:50 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington

315, March 8, 10 a.m.

Following from American Consul at Mukden:

"March 8, 8 a.m.

Japanese Consulate officially informed me yesterday that the competent authorities of the Northeastern Provinces had completed preparations for reopening the Mukden radio station and that they were desirous of arranging with the Radio Corporation for an early resumption of radio communications.

Japanese Consulate informed me orally that the Chinese authorities hoped to arrange with the Radio Corporation for the continuation of the contract with the former Manchurian authorities. It appears that the present authorities obtained possession of a copy of this contract.

The Shanghai representative of the Radio Corporation is being informed."

WSB-HPD

For the Minister,

PERKINS.

F/LS 793.94/4620

NOV 2 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 241 Political PM REGD

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
Geneva, Switzerland, February 25, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 9 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

MAR 7 32

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my to
sup. c. 112

SUBJECT: Transmitting the Reply of the Japanese Government to the Appeal of Twelve Members of the Council of the League of Nations

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

Division of
FAP EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 9 1932
Department of State

793.94/4382

1/

With reference to the Consulate's telegram No. 89 of February 24, 4 p.m. and the Department's No. 42, February 24, 6 p.m., I have the honor to transmit herewith one copy of League of Nations document C.266.M.154.1932.VII which contains the communication from the Japanese Government dated February 23, 1932 to Mr. Paul-Boncour, President of the Council, together with the Annex, a statement in reply to the appeal of the twelve members of the Council, other than the parties to the dispute, addressed to the Japanese Government on February 16, 1932. Three additional copies of this document are being forwarded to the Department under the regular subscription to League of Nations documents.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

No. 1 - League of Nations
Document C.266.M.154.1932.VII

Original and five copies to Department of State
One copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland

F/LS 793.94/4621

MAR 9 1932

FILED

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
with No. 241 of
Feb. 25, 1932.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.266M.154.1932.VII

GENEVA, February 23rd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated February 23rd, 1932, which he has received from the Japanese Delegation.

February 23rd, 1932.

Sir,

With reference to my letter of February 16th, I have the honour to send you herewith a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to Your Excellency with an Annex.

These documents will be published in the morning editions of the Japanese press on February 24th.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) N. SATO.

Japanese Representative on the
Council of the League of Nations.

H.E. M. Paul-Boncour,
President of the Council,
League of Nations,
GENEVA.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Tokio, February 23rd, 1932.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge your note of the 16th February, 1932, addressed to the Ambassador of Japan at Brussels, the representative of Japan on the Council of the League of Nations, covering a communication from the twelve members of the Council of the League.

I must in the first place express my thanks to you for your courtesy in becoming intermediary of this communication which has had, as I need not say, my most earnest and immediate attention. I would ask you to express to your colleagues who collaborated in its composition my very real and sincere appreciation of the extremely courteous and sympathetic terms in which it is couched; terms which are flattering to the legitimate pride taken by the Japanese people in the record of their country as a devoted friend of peace.

No one can read their statement without being profoundly impressed by their keen realization of the perils and difficulties of the situation and by the generous anxiety which is apparent on their part to leave no avenue unexplored, by which the unhappy state of affairs now unfortunately prevailing in the neighbourhood of Shanghai might be remedied.

I cannot but feel, however, that they have addressed their moving appeal to a quarter, where it is not necessary. They are "forcing open door." It lies in the hands of the Chinese leaders to bring about the discontinuance of the armed conflicts which Japan would never have begun, and which she intensely deplores and dislikes.

His Excellency
Monsieur Paul-Boncour,
President of the Council of
the League of Nations,
Geneva.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Your Excellency will find enclosed a statement by my Government in which their views are set forward in detail, and which I shall be obliged if you will be good enough to lay before those members of the Council who participated in the statement transmitted by you as above. I trust, however, that I may be allowed without being misunderstood to deprecate the growth of the practice of substituting for discussions by the Council of the League, discussions by a select Committee of whatever composition.

This appears to be in accordance neither with the spirit nor the letter of the Covenant, which implies that the discussions arising out of every case submitted to the Council will be conducted in the presence of all the members - whatever weight may be attached to their respective votes in the result. Whilst conscious of the fact that the Powers are actuated by the best motives, and that they are hampered by very considerable difficulties, my Government cannot but decline to recognise that these regular and repeated ex parte discussions are really compatible with the procedure of the League. The public naturally confuse them with the proceedings of the Council, with most unfortunate results.

As a matter of courtesy, however, I have willingly responded to the individual desires of your colleagues, by drawing up the statement above referred to for submission through your good offices to each of these Powers, whose strenuous efforts in the cause of humanity and peace I desire gratefully to acknowledge. Japan is only too anxious to put a stop to the conflict.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration,

Your most obedient and humble servant,

(Signed) YOSHIZAWA.

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STATEMENT.

The Japanese Government cannot understand why an appeal of the twelve Powers should be addressed to Japan, as though she were able, by exercise of some unspecified act of forbearance, immediately to bring about the cessation of the alarming situation at Shanghai.

It is to the Chinese, as the attacking party, to whom the appeal might be effectively made. At the very least, it is impossible to see why it should be made to Japan alone. It does not appear to be suggested that Japan was wrong in resisting the attack made on her marines, and unless that is assumed, why is she called upon to discontinue that resistance?

2. If the note had any positive suggestion to offer, such as the establishment of a "safety zone" adjoining Shanghai, with a view to effective separation of the Chinese from the Japanese forces, or indeed any other guarantee for cessation of conflict, the appeal would be intelligible. But no such suggestion is made. The Japanese forces are expected to lay down their arms, or to withdraw to Japan to allow the Chinese troops to occupy the international settlement - for that would be the inevitable result. If it is said that the Chinese would be afraid to put themselves thus definitely in the wrong, the answer is that they already have done so twice; moreover the storming of Shanghai could always be attributed to irresponsible soldiery.

3. A strong exception must be taken to the assumption that China is willing to resort only to peaceful measures for the solution of the dispute, while Japan is not so disposed. China may undoubtedly and formally declare her willingness to take none but peaceful measures, but deeds speak louder than words. There is no possible reason why aggressive measures of China should be condoned, because of her pacific declarations, while defensive measures of Japan are branded as hostile. While Japan is daily sustaining losses of life and treasure through Chinese military attacks, it is distinctly surprising to be told that China is willing to settle all disputes by peaceful means!

The Japanese Government do not understand the observation that "Japan has not found it possible to have recourse unreservedly to methods of pacific settlement provided for in the Covenant of the League of Nations." Japan has participated unreservedly in the process of settlement provided for in the Covenant; it surely cannot be supposed that these methods exclude interim measures of self-defence which are interdicted by no resolution of the League, or that these methods compel her to accept a departure from their own express provisions, in the shape of a majority decision.

It is a universally accepted axiom that all treaties of pacific settlement leave unimpaired the right of legitimate self-defence! The gravamen of the regret appears rather to be

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that Japan has not unreservedly put herself in the hands of her colleagues: and this with great respect she was legally and morally entitled to decline to do. Legally because she was under no promise to do otherwise. Morally because although reposing greatest confidence in their judgment and goodwill, she believes that she is naturally and necessarily in a far better position to appreciate the facts than any distant Power can possibly be.

4. The appeal invokes Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The measures of Japan, strictly defensive, do not infringe the provisions of that Article. That they do not do so is illustrated by the fact that neither when strong reinforcements were despatched by other Powers five years ago to defend Shanghai, nor when American and British forces bombarded Nanking, nor on various other occasions which will readily be recalled, was any question raised by any Power concerning this provision of the Covenant. It is a very proper provision; but it does not exclude self-defence, nor does it make China a "chartered libertine", free to attack other countries without their having any right to repel the attack.

5. As Japan does not, any more than it was contemplated on those occasions, contemplate any attack on territorial integrity or independence of a member of the League of Nations, it is superfluous to say that the bearing of the observation that attacks of such a character made in defiance of Article 10 of the Covenant cannot be recognised as valid and effective, is notably obscure to the Japanese Government. They take this occasion of once more firmly and emphatically declaring that Japan entertains no territorial or political ambitions whatsoever in China.

6. The Japanese Government are also unable to suppose that the duty of justice and moderation towards China is one which flows from the "Nine Power" Treaty of Washington. The duty of justice and moderation towards all Powers is entirely independent of the treaty, and it is most willingly and gladly accepted by Japan who is equally appreciative of the justice and moderation shown to herself by others. Japan is fully prepared to stand by all her obligations under the "Nine Power" Treaty, but it is conceived that it would be inconvenient and improper to enter upon a discussion of its terms with Powers other than those who are Parties to that engagement and in the absence of some who are Parties.

7. Finally it must be emphasized that the Japanese Government do not and cannot consider that China is an "organized people" within the meaning of the Covenant of the League of Nations. China has, it is true, been treated in the past by common consent as if the expression connoted an organized people. But fictions cannot last for ever nor can they be tolerated when they become grave sources of practical danger. Time has inevitably come when realities, rather than fictions,

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must be reckoned with. The general desire to see China happy, prosperous and united, has led the world to treat her as united in a way in which in sober fact she was not. Its population is not organized except in patches. If Japan had no interests there, it might be possible to go on indefinitely respecting the fiction that the region is occupied by an "organized people".

Japan, however, has enormous interests there. It is impossible any longer to treat the chaos in China as if it were the order. The authorities which subsist in various parts of China derive theirs simply from the fact that they do exercise control within limited areas. But they can have no title nor extend their control beyond them. This anomalous state of things cannot but profoundly modify the application to Chinese affairs of the Covenant of the League. Instead of a single organized people we have there various rudimentary nuclei of organizations. The Japanese Government do not pretend that it is easy to work out implications and consequences of this situation. It is not easy, but it is necessary. We must face the facts: and the fundamental fact is that there is no unified control in China and no authority which is entitled to claim entire control in China.

8. The considerations have now been stated in short compass which this Government desire to adduce in answer to the appeal to them, an appeal of which they keenly feel the generosity and lofty humanity. It has been shown that the Powers, in appealing to Japan, are forcing an open door, and that it is the aggressive Chinese forces to whom the appeal should be addressed. It has been suggested that to be really useful and practical, the appeal should comprise some specific plan, such as creation of a "safety zone". The charge has been rebutted that Japan is less disposed than China to settle matters by peaceful means. Lastly it has been shown that China cannot be dealt with on any other footing than that of fact and reality, and that the fact is that China does not constitute an "organized people". It remains for the Japanese Government to repeat their deep sense of the high purpose and philanthropic energy which have actuated the Powers in taking this unusual step.

It is their sincere belief that on reflection those Powers will come to coincide with the views now advanced and it is earnestly hoped that they will not relax their utmost efforts to induce the Chinese to refrain from aggressive acts such as those which have precipitated armed conflicts of the past five months.

Japan altogether repudiated the stigma which is attempted in some quarters to be attached to her, of favouring and desiring war. Her people yield to none in their detestation of war and its inevitable horrors. If the efforts of the twelve Powers should succeed in bringing about a pacific attitude on the part of China, nowhere will more sincere delight be felt than in Japan.

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