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**NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS**

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS  
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 15

1930-39

793.94/4622-4830  
Feb.-Mar. 1932



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES-MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

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Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

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In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Rome, February 25, 1932.

*FE*  
*WE*

793.94

No. 1293.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 9 1932  
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

AM RECD  
DEPT. OF STATE  
REC'D  
MAR 7 1932

MAR 7 32

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 9 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4622

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 1285<sup>14545</sup> of  
February 18, 1932, regarding the Sino-Japanese con-  
flict, I have the honor to inform the Department  
that while the Italian press maintains its neutral  
attitude, it comments freely and sarcastically on  
the inconsistency of major military operations be-  
ing labeled "police" measures and passing as acts  
not involving war.

There is, however, a singular lack of editori-  
al interest as to the causes and ultimate results of

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the conflict, in spite of the fact that one quarter to one half of the front page of each newspaper is devoted to news from Shanghai. It is perhaps significant of the detached attitude of Italy that at least one dispassionate technical critique on the military lessons of the Shanghai operation has already appeared.

The Department's attention is, however, invited to a series of articles which are appearing in the Turin STAI PA. In the first article Signor Ruggiero, the American correspondent of that newspaper, states that the supreme anxiety of the United States with regard to the Sino-Japanese situation is the danger to the open door policy in China, feeling certain that if Chinese territorial integrity were to be violated, an economic and commercial monopoly for Japan would result. He also states that the impression prevails in America that this country has been abandoned in the present crisis by all the other western nations. It is particularly felt, he declares, that Great Britain has stood safely in the shadow of the United States, allowing the latter to do all the disagreeable work; in fact the Japanese themselves regard the United States, since the publication of the American notes, as the sole formidable obstacle to their expansion and one which some day will have to be grappled with once and for all. The Americans now appear convinced that

Great

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Great Britain will not assist them in exerting powerful moral pressure upon Japan, unless Australia and Canada, where "hatred and fear of the Japanese reach the point of paroxysm," force the mother country to a different attitude; they moreover fear that the French tendency is to support Japan, hoping to gain from the upheaval in China greater spheres of influence in the Far East. A further opinion, continues Signor Ruggiero, prevails in the United States that more than a few European nations would not be displeased, in view of the American position as a European creditor and of the trade possibilities involved, should war break out between the United States and Japan.

Signor Ruggiero is firmly convinced that the Sino-Japanese conflict can never be judged upon its merits in the United States, because of deep-rooted aversion to the Japanese race in general. Such anti-Japanese sentiment is apparently to be attributed to the question of supremacy in the Pacific but is in reality, he states in his second article, a matter of biological and racial prejudice. The experience of America with Japanese immigrants not only frightened her for economic reasons to the point of excluding Japanese immigration entirely "with a brutality unjustified by any political necessity or any consideration of national prestige," but produced a profound sense of disgust for a people

which

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which dwelt in such close quarters, which subsisted so frugally, and which multiplied so rapidly. "In a country like America, uncontrolled and improvident propagation unhampered by any economic considerations, which in the United States assume all the appearances of ethical principles directed toward the prevention of pauperism, arouses like any other thing suggestive of primitive animalism a sense of repulsion." The Americas, in Signor Ruggiero's version, proclaim that no people has the right to carry abroad and spread poverty, infant mortality, and the "unrestricted multiplication of starving masses." They moreover make themselves "birth control missionaries" to all countries, particularly the more unenlightened, of the world and claim that "countries having low birth rate and a high standard of living have the right to exclude fertile races who would spread pauperism and would lower the standard of living."

Signor Ruggiero announced that a further article on the subject will appear shortly setting forth the American estimation of Japanese civilization.

Respectfully yours,



John W. Garrett.

✓  
Enclosures: Clippings.

SC/eh

716.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

LA STAMPA, Turin.  
February 20, 1962.

page 1

Despatch No. 1293

## Conflitto insanabile

NEW YORK, febbraio.

Le ragioni della diffidenza, dell'antipatia, della ripulsione intima che gli Stati Uniti sentono verso il Giappone apparentemente risalgono alla rivalità per il dominio del Pacifico. Ma sono di origine assai più profonda e propriamente biologica ed etnica. La popolazione del Giappone è raddoppiata in meno di due generazioni: essa attualmente supera i 65 milioni. Con la prossima generazione alcuni prevedono possa aumentare di altri venti milioni e toccare complessivamente gli 84 milioni. Questa espansione strabocchevole in un'area inferiore allo Stato di California rappresenta per gli americani un fenomeno disgustoso e poco meno che immorale. Si aggiunga che solo un sesto della superficie totale del Giappone propriamente detto è coltivabile. Il rapido accrescimento della popolazione giapponese è di data relativamente recente. Durante il governo degli *Shogun*, iniziatosi ai principi del secolo decimosettimo e durato fino alla restaurazione Meiji nel 1868, il paese era governato con sistema feudale e i grandi proprietari terrieri non incoraggiavano il rapido aumento della popolazione. Fino al 1872 con i suoi 33 milioni, essa raggiungeva la densità di 550 abitanti per ogni chilometro quadrato coltivabile. Con l'assimilazione della cultura occidentale e la conseguente adozione dei sistemi scientifici ed industriali europei e americani cominciò l'aumento incontenibile della popolazione giapponese. Cresce attualmente di 700.000 persone all'anno. Considerando che l'enorme blocco etnico si ammassa su di uno spazio di circa 382 mila chilometri quadrati, di cui solo 60 mila sono coltivabili, ciò porta la densità media all'incredibile cifra di 1000 abitanti per chilometro quadrato coltivabile. Con tutto il grandioso sviluppo delle sue industrie il Giappone, a causa della mancanza di essenzialissime materie prime come il carbone, il petrolio e vari minerali non è riuscito ancora ad ottenere una bilancia favorevole per le sue esportazioni. Dovendo dipendere quasi esclusivamente dai prodotti del proprio suolo, per quanto questo sia sottoposto alla cultura più intensiva, il popolo giapponese è in uno stato cronico di grave denutrizione. Di qui la necessità di trovare altri sbocchi alla natalità incalzante e nuovi territori più ricchi e promettenti da sfruttare. Ma i giapponesi non abbandonano volentieri la loro terra. Si rendeva indispensabile creare in quel popolo uno spirito espansionista e colonizzatore. I governanti e la casta militare, da alcuni decenni si sono assunti questo compito. Fin dalla guerra vittoriosa del 1894 contro la Cina e quella fortunata del 1904 contro la Russia, il Giappone essendosi innalzato al rango di Potenza mondiale vide allargarsi i propri orizzonti, sentì moltiplicate le sue possibilità e venne nella determinazione di seguire le Potenze occidentali in fatto di politica coloniale. L'ultima guerra, da cui il Giappone raccolse frutti non disprezzabili pur rimanendone appena sfiorato, rafforzò nelle classi dominanti il proposito della conquista territoriale ad ogni costo. Di questo atteggiamento risoluto, gli Stati Uniti furono involontariamente il fattore principale.

I giapponesi, per quanto assai restii ad emigrare ne furono costretti da necessità ferree che non lasciavano aperte altre alternative. Ma con loro intenso risentimento si videro chiudere le porte dei continenti dove speravano di potersi fissare con buone probabilità di successo. Ne dettero l'esempio gli Stati Uniti e l'Australia, seguiti da paesi minori sui quali dette Nazioni potevano direttamente o indirettamente influire. I primi lo fecero con una brutalità non giustificata da alcuna necessità politica o da motivi di prestigio nazionale. Esisteva il cosiddetto « gentlemen's agreement » per cui negli Stati Uniti non potevano entrare annualmente se non poche centinaia di giapponesi. Il Governo imperiale s'era attenuto scrupolosamente all'accordo. Fu il senato americano, in un accesso incontrollabile e curioso di gingoismo, che volle deliberatamente insultare il Giappone, pretendendo l'esclusione totale dei suoi sudditi a

dell'espansione territoriale, hanno dato come spiegazione quasi esclusiva di tutti i loro atti la situazione di necessità che loro crea la fortissima natalità e la scarsità di territorio. Non avrebbero potuto scegliere un motivo meno abile e meno persuasivo per attirarsi la benevolenza e la condiscendenza degli americani. In un Paese come l'America la natalità sregolata, imprevedibile, caotica, non contenuta da considerazioni economiche, che assumono qui tutto l'aspetto di principi etici intesi ad impedire la formazione del pauperismo, suscita un senso di ripulsione come ogni cosa che ricordi l'animalità primitiva. La pressione netta del numero non poteva far presa sulla coscienza di questo popolo. Gli americani, insomma, sentono e lo fanno intendere a chiare note che nessun popolo ha il diritto di portare in giro e diffondere la miseria, la mortalità infantile, la moltiplicazione incontrollata di masse fameliche. La politica americana potrà esser dettata da un sentimento egoistico, da un timore indistinto di divenir preda nel futuro di popoli ad alta natalità, ma non c'è possibilità d'illusioni o di equivoci su questo punto. Gli americani pongono nettamente il problema: essi non rico-

nosceranno mai la ragione netta del numero. Un Paese che moltiplica le sue cliniche di « birth control » e manda all'estero, specialmente nelle plaghe sovrappopolate dell'Estremo Oriente, i suoi propagandisti per la limitazione delle nascite, non potrà mai accettare come valevole l'argomento dell'esuberanza di popolazione. I Paesi a bassa natalità e ad alto tenore di vita hanno il diritto di escludere popoli di grande fecondità che diffonderebbero il pauperismo ed abbasserebbero lo *standard* dell'esistenza. Se questo principio fosse stato annunziato chiaramente anni fa, l'esclusione degli immigranti orientali sarebbe apparsa ragionevole, invece di offenderli con una motivazione dettata da pregiudizio di razza. Questo si pensa, si scrive e si enuncia qui apertamente da vari anni, specialmente quando una crisi come la presente minaccia di mettere in fiamme l'Oriente. Orecchio più favorevole potrebbero tendere gli americani alle ragioni di una civiltà superiore che richieda di espandersi, ma sulla valutazione che essi fanno della civiltà giapponese parleremo prossimamente.

AMERIGO RUGGIERO.

LA STAMPA, Turin.  
February 20, 1962.

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Despatch No. 1293

## Conflitto insanabile

NEW YORK, febbraio.

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mente industriale, prima si recero con una brutalità non giustificata da alcuna necessità politica o da motivi di prestigio nazionale. Esisteva il cosiddetto « gentlemen's agreement » per cui negli Stati Uniti non potevano entrare annualmente se non poche centinaia di giapponesi. Il Governo imperiale s'era attenuto scrupolosamente all'accordo. Fu il senato americano, in un accesso incontrollabile e curioso di gingoismo, che volle deliberatamente insultare il Giappone, pretendendo l'esclusione totale dei suoi sudditi a causa della loro razza. Nella conferenza di Parigi del 1919 il Giappone richiese fosse accettato il principio dell'uguaglianza delle razze che fu invece respinto. In compenso gli si accordò il diritto di metter piede in Manciuria, ricca di minerali che ad esso mancano, e dove l'Impero giallo vi ha fondato industrie e sviluppato ferrovie. Solo un milione di giapponesi è emigrato finora in Manciuria, giacché non sembra che essi siano capaci di resistere al clima rigido di quella terra. Ma in Manciuria vivono circa sei milioni di Manchu, due milioni di russi e venticinque milioni di cinesi settentrionali i quali ultimi, nei recenti anni, con un movimento vertiginoso di cui pochi esempi si riscontrano nella storia, un movimento che somiglia agli spostamenti in massa delle epoche preistoriche, hanno abbandonato la Cina propriamente detta per sfuggire alla miseria macerante e senza speranza di un Paese sovrappopolato e in preda al disordine. Era inevitabile che un cozzo avvenisse. Il Governo giapponese non poteva lasciare in balia di bande di ladroni ferrovie e stabilimenti industriali impiantati con grandi sacrifici finanziari e, d'altra parte, il debole Governo cinese non aveva la forza di infrenare gli eccessi delle orde caotiche sospinte dalla fame.

I fatti esposti, però, non hanno avuto e non avranno mai il potere di acquistare al Giappone simpatie negli Stati Uniti. E questo per una ragione principalissima. I giapponesi, da quando si sono messi sulla via

dell'espansione territoriale, hanno dato come spiegazione quasi esclusiva di tutti i loro atti la situazione di necessità che loro crea la fortissima natalità e la scarsità di territorio. Non avrebbero potuto scegliere un motivo meno abile e meno persuasivo per attirarsi la benevolenza e la condiscendenza degli americani. In un Paese come l'America la natalità sregolata, imprevedibile, caotica, non contenuta da considerazioni economiche, che assumono qui tutto l'aspetto di principi etici intesi ad impedire la formazione del pauperismo, suscita un senso di ripulsione come ogni cosa che ricordi l'animalità primitiva. La pressione netta del numero non poteva far presa sulla coscienza di questo popolo. Gli americani, insomma, sentono e lo fanno intendere a chiare note che nessun popolo ha il diritto di portare in giro e diffondere la miseria, la mortalità infantile, la moltiplicazione incontrollata di masse fameliche. La politica americana potrà esser dettata da un sentimento egoistico, da un timore indistinto di divenir preda nel futuro di popoli ad alta natalità, ma non c'è possibilità d'illusioni o di equivoci su questo punto. Gli americani pongono nettamente il problema: essi non rico-

nosceranno mai la ragione netta del numero. Un Paese che moltiplica le sue cliniche di « birth control » e manda all'estero, specialmente nelle plaghe sovrappopolate dell'Estremo Oriente, i suoi propagandisti per la limitazione delle nascite, non potrà mai accettare come valevole l'argomento dell'esuberanza di popolazione. I Paesi a bassa natalità e ad alto tenore di vita hanno il diritto di escludere popoli di grande fecondità che diffonderebbero il pauperismo ed abbasserebbero lo *standard* dell'esistenza. Se questo principio fosse stato annunciato chiaramente anni fa, l'esclusione degli immigranti orientali sarebbe apparsa ragionevole, invece di offenderli con una motivazione dettata da pregiudizio di razza. Questo si pensa, si scrive e si enuncia qui apertamente da vari anni, specialmente quando una crisi come la presente minaccia di mettere in fiamme l'Oriente. Orecchio più favorevole potrebbero tendere gli americani alle ragioni di una civiltà superiore che richieda di espandersi, ma sulla valutazione che essi fanno della civiltà giapponese parleremo prossimamente.

AMERIGO RUGGIERO.

## Gli Stati Uniti

### e il conflitto in Estremo Oriente

NEW YORK, febbraio.

L'azione giapponese contro Shanghai ha dato qui la sensazione precisa che nella prossima settimana si deciderà non solo il destino della Cina, ma sarà messa alla prova suprema l'organizzazione della pace nel mondo. Si ritiene che se gli Stati Uniti e l'Europa non riusciranno a tenere a freno il Giappone nella presente crisi, il mondo civile sarà rigettato indietro alla situazione del 1914, quando le varie Nazioni mettevano le mani su tutto quello che potevano e se ne assicuravano il possesso definitivo se ne avevano la forza necessaria. La pubblicazione delle Note scambiate fra il Segretario degli Esteri, Stimson, e il Governo giapponese, negli ultimi sei mesi, sulla situazione manciuriana, serve a mettere in luce la politica che gli Stati Uniti seguono nel precipitare degli eventi nell'Estremo Oriente.

« Una minaccia di guerra — scrive Stimson nell'ottobre scorso — dovunque possa sorgere interessa profondamente tutto il mondo ed è per questo che il Governo americano è costretto a richiamare l'attenzione di ambedue i contendenti sui seri pericoli che la presente situazione involve ».

E, più esplicitamente, in una Nota recente che in altri tempi sarebbe stata chiamata minacciosa, il Segretario Stimson fece conoscere al Giappone che gli Stati Uniti « non possono ammettere la legalità di alcun trattato o accordo che danneggi i diritti degli Stati Uniti e dei suoi cittadini in Cina ». Si allude, con ciò, specialmente ai diritti di libero commercio e di residenza che si comprendono nel principio riconosciuto della porta aperta. Perché è soprattutto questo che importa agli Stati Uniti: il libero accesso all'immenso mercato cinese, non tanto per quello che la Cina rappresenta oggi, ma per quello che può rappresentare in un futuro sia pure non immediato. L'America è convinta che ogni attentato alla integrità territoriale della Cina si concretterà in una posizione di monopolio economico e commerciale per il Giappone che danneggerà enormemente tutte le Nazioni occidentali.

Intanto l'America sente che in questa lotta formidabile perché non sia chiusa all'Occidente gran parte dell'Asia, è stata lasciata sola. Ha l'impressione di essere stata abbandonata dall'Inghilterra, dalla Francia, dalla Lega delle Nazioni nel compito di affrontare e contenere la aggressività del Giappone. Tanto la Gran Bretagna che la Francia sembra che negli ultimi tempi siano state propense ad accordare all'Impero del Sol Levante mano libera in Cina, purché i suoi atti non incrocino con le loro speciali sfere d'interessi. Si fa notare la differente condotta usata dall'Inghilterra e dagli Stati Uniti nei riguardi del Giappone negli attuali avvenimenti dell'Estremo Oriente. Mentre le Note degli Stati Uniti sono state esplicite nella determinazione della loro politica, quelle dell'Inghilterra sono apparse deboli.

Il « Foreign Office » inglese aprì la questione con una dichiarazione formale in cui si asseriva, in termini generali, ch'esso era d'accordo con la posizione degli Stati Uniti in riguardo al trattato delle nove Potenze ed anche alla porta aperta per il commercio internazionale in Maniuria. Ma aggiungeva che su questi argomenti il Governo giapponese aveva dato spiegazioni chiare e soddisfacenti. E concludeva: « In vista di queste dichiarazioni il Governo di Sua Maestà non ha creduto necessario inviare una nota formale al Governo Giapponese, ma ha richiesto all'Ambasciatore giapponese a Londra di ottenere la conferma di queste assicurazioni dal suo Governo ». Tale agire del Ministero degli Esteri inglese ha dato l'impressione, qui, che l'Inghilterra voglia mettersi al riparo dietro le poderose spalle di Uncle Sam. E' a costui che si vuol lasciar compiere la parte forte ch'è nello stesso tempo la parte odiosa. Infatti, nel Giappone, la pubblicazione delle Note americane ha prodotto una irritazione fortissima. I giapponesi vedono negli Stati Uniti l'unico ostacolo formidabile alla loro espansione territoriale, il nemico che il de-

atti che possano condurre ad una guerra. Ma, appoggiati dall'Inghilterra e dai « Dominions » potrebbero esercitare sul Giappone una fortissima pressione economica. L'efficacia della quale, però, dipenderebbe dall'atteggiamento della Francia. La Francia è in condizione, e finora anche nella disposizione, di annullare l'effetto di ogni misura economica, blanda o energica che sia. L'Indocina francese è stata ottenuta con metodi non dissimili da quelli usati ora dal Giappone. Inoltre, nel caso di un'alterazione dell'equilibrio territoriale in Oriente, la Francia avrebbe l'opportunità di allargare i suoi domini coloniali in quella piazza del mondo.

Ed è così che gli Stati Uniti si trovano a dover far fronte da soli alla grave crisi che impende nell'Estremo Oriente. Crisi che gli americani addebitano alla triste situazione economica dominante in Europa. Il Giappone non avrebbe mai pensato ad iniziare azioni guerresche di cui non si può prevedere la portata, se non fosse stato sicuro che le Nazioni occidentali non avrebbero potuto prendere alcuna decisione a causa della loro prostrazione economica. Ed è questo che esaspera maggiormente gli americani. I quali, a torto o a ragione, sono pure convinti che nessuna Nazione europea è inte-

ressata a mantenere la pace in Cina. Al contrario, alcune che si propongono di trarre maggior profitto da questa dovesse una guerra tra Giappone, ritengono gradita in certo modo il primo degli impegni all'estero, circa Sarebbe una guerra assai costosa. Le Nazioni avrebbero colossali denari. E ciò a vantaggio di vari Paesi, se l'Europa si mettesse fuori della guerra non sarebbe. Il Giappone delle maggiori commerciali, e come rivali del mondo. Quest'ultimo, si può prevedere la portata, se non fosse stato sicuro che le Nazioni occidentali non avrebbero potuto prendere alcuna decisione a causa della loro prostrazione economica. Ed è questo che esaspera maggiormente gli americani. I quali, a torto o a ragione, sono pure convinti che nessuna Nazione europea è inte-

LA STAMPA, Turin.  
February 18, 1962.

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Despatch No. 1293

## Gli Stati Uniti e il conflitto in Estremo Oriente

NEW YORK, febbraio.

L'azione giapponese contro Shanghai ha dato qui la sensazione precisa che nella prossima settimana si deciderà non solo il destino della Cina, ma sarà messa alla prova suprema l'organizzazione della pace nel mondo. Si ritiene che se gli Stati Uniti e l'Europa non riusciranno a tenere a freno il Giappone nella presente crisi, il mondo civile sarà rigettato indietro alla situazione del 1914, quando le varie Nazioni mettevano le mani su tutto quello che potevano e se ne assicuravano il possesso definitivo se ne avevano la forza necessaria. La pubblicazione delle Note scambiate fra il Segretario degli Esteri, Stimson, e il Governo giapponese, negli ultimi sei mesi, sulla situazione manciuriana, serve a mettere in luce la politica che gli Stati Uniti seguono nel precipitare degli eventi nell'Estremo Oriente.

« Una minaccia di guerra — scrisse Stimson nell'ottobre scorso — dovunque possa sorgere interessa profondamente tutto il mondo ed è per questo che il Governo americano è costretto a richiamare l'attenzione di ambedue i contendenti sui seri pericoli che la presente situazione involve ».

E, più esplicitamente, in una Nota recente che in altri tempi sarebbe stata chiamata minacciosa, il Segretario Stimson fece conoscere al Giappone che gli Stati Uniti « non possono ammettere la legalità di alcun trattato o accordo che danneggi i diritti degli Stati Uniti e dei suoi

na credito necessario inviare una nota formale al Governo giapponese, ma ha richiesto all'Ambasciatore giapponese a Londra di ottenere la conferma di queste assicurazioni dal suo Governo ». Tale agire del Ministero degli Esteri inglese ha dato l'impressione, qui, che l'Inghilterra voglia mettersi al riparo dietro le poderose spalle di Uncle Sam. E' a costui che si vuol lasciar compiere la parte forte ch'è nello stesso tempo la parte odiosa. Infatti, nel Giappone, la pubblicazione delle Note americane ha prodotto una irritazione fortissima. I giapponesi vedono negli Stati Uniti l'unico ostacolo formidabile alla loro espansione territoriale, il nemico che il destino ha posto sulla loro via e col quale un giorno o l'altro bisognerà abbrancarsi in una stretta mortale. L'America s'è persuasa che finora non può contare su di un aiuto aperto e sicuro da parte dell'Inghilterra. Questa ha grandi interessi economici in Oriente e per ora le sue industrie tessili profitano largamente del boicottaggio cinese contro le merci giapponesi. La situazione economica e politica interna non le permettono di lanciarsi in avventure pericolose in Oriente proprio nel momento in cui l'India è agitata da un fermento torbido che fa presagire avvenimenti gravi.

L'Inghilterra non farà passi decisivi e lascerà gli Stati Uniti a sbrigarcela come possono. Ammenocchè i « Dominions » dell'Australia e del Canada non s'impongano sulla madre patria e la costringano ad agire energicamente. In queste Nazioni che rappresentano due delle più potenti unità dell'Impero Britannico, l'odio e il timore dei giapponesi giungono al parossismo. Specialmente in Australia scarsamente abitata e in vista di popolazioni asiatiche di densità fortissima, nell'Australia tutta occupata e preoccupata di tener lontani intrusi di altre razze perchè prevalga il principio di una « Australia bianca », l'allarme suscitato periodicamente dal pericolo di un Pacifico controllato dai giapponesi prende forme di frenesia. Solo se i due « Dominions » si faranno sentire l'Inghilterra potrà associarsi senza riserve all'azione degli Stati Uniti. Non che questi pensino menomamente, specie nel caso rimangano soli, ad arrischiare

atti che possano condurre ad una guerra. Ma, appoggiati dall'Inghilterra e dai « Dominions » potrebbero esercitare sul Giappone una fortissima pressione economica. L'efficacia della quale, però, dipenderebbe dall'atteggiamento della Francia. La Francia è in condizione, e finora anche nella disposizione, di annullare l'effetto di ogni misura economica, blanda o energica che sia. L'Indocina francese è stata ottenuta con metodi non dissimili da quelli usati ora dal Giappone. Inoltre, nel caso di un'alterazione dell'equilibrio territoriale in Oriente, la Francia avrebbe l'opportunità di allargare i suoi domini coloniali in quella parte del mondo.

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## Giappone e Cina

### La Manciuria

La proclamazione dell'indipendenza della Manciuria ha una importanza che merita di essere sottolineata.

Dopo la costituzione della repubblica in Cina, la Manciuria si era resa autonoma di fatto. Ma permaneva ad essere cinese di spirito e di azione.

Nello scorso anno vi era stata una maggiore risaldatura politico-amministrativa col resto della Cina, quantunque il concetto di una Cina quale salda unità nazionale non esistesse, le discordie e le lotte civili imperversando da diversi anni su quel più popoloso Paese del mondo.

Autonoma o meno, la Manciuria aveva proseguito sinora una politica cinese strettamente, si può dire, nazionale.

La Manciuria, culla dell'ultima dinastia imperiale cinese, era poco popolata malgrado i suoi 942.000 chilometri quadrati di superficie e malgrado le immense possibilità di tale vastissimo territorio.

### Le ferrovie mancesi

L'apertura della ferrovia russa, della transiberiana e delle reti mancesi di attraversamento e di collegamento originò la trasformazione economica dell'ampia regione.

La transiberiana per giungere a Vladivostok suo punto terminale sul mare del Giappone doveva compiere un grande e lungo arco verso nord seguendo la valle dell'Amur, fino a Ciabarobsk e da qui, scendendo colla cosiddetta ferrovia dell'Ussuri, per ben 770 chilometri a Vladivostok.

Si pensò allora di creare una direttissima attraverso territorio cinese e cioè attraverso la Manciuria da Gugartui-Manciurga per Charbin a Pogranitchnaja per una lunghezza di 1480 chilometri, con che però se ne risparmiavano 1420 di percorso in confronto alla linea tutta in territorio russo dell'Amur e dell'Ussuri.

In seguito al trattato di Scimonosechi del 17 aprile 1895, che chiudeva la guerra cino-giapponese del 1894-95, la Russia non solo ottenne dalla Cina il passaggio suddetto attraverso la Manciuria, ma altresì il diritto di costruire e di far esercitare da apposita « Società » la magistrale Charbin-Porto Arturo (porto allora « concesso » dalla Cina alla Russia) sul Mar Giallo.

La pace di Portsmouth del 25 agosto 1905 fra Giappone e Russia risultò nella cessione della parte di tale linea fra Kuangengtse (a metà strada fra Mukden e Charbin) e Port-Artur dalla Russia al Giappone.

Il trattato 22 dicembre 1905 fra Cina e Giappone confermava la cessione della « concessione » della linea suddetta al Giappone del porto di Porto Arturo e di tutta la penisola di Liaotung (già oggetto del trattato di Scimonosechi) nella quale si trova il porto di Dairen il quale ha sostituito commercialmente quello di Kiojun (Porto-Arturo).

Lo stesso trattato dava il diritto ai Giapponesi di effettuare congiunzioni ferroviarie ad oriente del tronco sud-manciuriano loro trapassato colla Corea e la concessione di miniere di carbone nel detto territorio fra la Corea e la ferrovia.

### La zona di influenza giapponese

In tal modo il Giappone veniva ad assumere una specie di diritto pratico di sfruttamento, di « zona esclusiva di influenza » nel territorio ad est della ferrovia sud-manciuriana.

Il Giappone ha investito ingenti capitali, forniti in parte dall'America nella linea sud-manciuriana e connessioni con la Corea.

Da sua parte la Cina provvedeva al raccordamento della Cina propriamente detta con Mukden e cioè con la magistrale nord-sud della Manciuria.

Sotto il lievito potente della penetrazione ferroviaria (cui si accompagnò quella stradale per gli accessi alle ferrovie), la Manciuria prese uno sviluppo eccezionale.

Divenne la metà di una costante e forte immigrazione cinese. La popolazione stimata nel 1900 a circa 5 milioni e mezzo di abitanti, era calcolata nel 1914 a circa 15 milioni ed ora la si ritiene di 30 milioni circa. In trent'anni la immigrazione cinese l'avrebbe, adunque, quasi sestuplicata. Se le cifre sono attendibili, si sarebbe di fronte al massimo tra i « records » della storia delle popolazioni.

Tale popolazione prevalentissimamente agricola creò della Manciuria il centro mondiale di produzione del soya, il noto fagiolo oleoso che, coll'olio, fornisce gli ancora più noti e ricercati pannelli che tanto il mondo consuma per la alimentazione del bestiame bovino.

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giapponesi e lo sbarco dei giapponesi a Sciangai per debellare il boicottaggio.

### Le necessità giapponesi

Il Giappone, divenuto Stato spiccatamente capitalistico, essenzialmente industriale, ha prepotente necessità di sbocchi alla sua cotanto accresciuta produzione industriale, e altrettanta necessità di procurarsi al miglior mercato possibile le materie prime.

### I giapponesi non emigrano

Non ha bisogno il Giappone di territori da popolare. Benchè la sua popolazione sia la più densa fra i grandi Stati del mondo — ha 170 abitanti per chilometro quadrato — il Giappone non ha una emigrazione degna di tal nome. Il giapponese non emigra, non intende in alcun modo emigrare. Si addensa in modo incredibile sul suo suolo, si costringe a faticoso guadagno di vita, ma non esce dal suo Paese. Questo vuol essere ben notato da chi intende studiare ed osservare quel mirabile Paese. I giapponesi che escono sono commercianti, viaggiatori di commercio, dettaglianti, industriali, tecnici o capitalisti — mai e poi mai agricoltori, od operai, ossia lavoratori del braccio.

I giapponesi si sono presi nella guerra con la Cina, la Corea, la vasta isola di Formosa la quale potrebbe da sola assorbire milioni di giapponesi e nella guerra colla Russia metà dell'Isola, anch'essa amplissima, di Sacalin! Ma fuori che qualche centinaio di migliaia di giapponesi — tutti delle classi per così dire non manuali — di giapponesi nei loro nuovi possedimenti non ne sono andati. Nella loro « sfera di influenza » in Manciuria sono, pare, solo 40 a 50 mila ed hanno dovuto, se hanno voluto un pochino contrastare alla inondazione cinese, favorirvi l'emigrazione dei coreani, sudditi giapponesi sì ma non poi troppo fidi.

Quindi, il Giappone, checchè taluno dei suoi delegati parli, per chi non lo sa, della pressione demografica del proprio Paese e della conseguente, pretesa, ma irrealistica, necessità di elaterio di terre per essa, non ha bisogno di territori di possesso diretto e difficile, ma invece gli occorre molta popolazione altrui che comperi quella che la densa popolazione propria produce e che permetta quindi a detta popolazione propria di guadagnare la vita pur standosene addensata a casa, da dove non vuol dipartirsi.

### Anche altri non vogliono emigrare

E' in maggior misura la stessa situazione dell'altra grande Nazione insulare del mondo — l'Inghilterra — i cui abitanti, una volta emigranti audaci, non vogliono più emigrare. (I tentativi canadesi ed australiani, fatti dopo le guerre, per attirare a sé emigranti inglesi che conservassero la purezza orgogliosa dell'orgoglioso sangue anglo-sassone, sono stati una serie di completi insuccessi). Vogliono vivere a casa, nella vecchia patria, sempre più, anch'essi, addensati e quindi in attiva lotta con la sorte, ma non vogliono più emigrare. E questo è uno e tutt'altro dei minori problemi che assilla l'Inghilterra e, coll'Inghilterra, ma in minore grado di essa, altri Paesi continentali (ad es.: Austria, Germania, Svizzera), e più li assillera col procedere degli anni.

Il problema, se per i giapponesi è di pensiero e di carattere della razza, per l'Inghilterra e per i Paesi continentali è problema di tenore di vita, di comodi, di remunerazioni.

I più elevati introiti interni e le maggiori agevolzze metropolitane di vita recidono lo spirito emigratorio.

### L'azione capitalistica giapponese in Cina

Con una Manciuria indipendente dalla Cina e sotto l'influenza capitalistica giapponese, il Giappone spera di dare lavoro e pane alla propria popolazione industriale.

Ma proprio il capitale giapponese è stato ed è uno dei maggiori elementi per la rapida industrializzazione della Cina. Sui 4.200.000 fusi che corrono in Cina nella industria cotoniera, 1.600.000 sono di proprietà di ditte giapponesi e sui 33.600 telai che vi battono, 14.100 sono di proprietà giapponese.

I filati cinesi hanno, ormai, battuto in India i giapponesi e gli europei, e sono filati che escono per virtù di capitali giapponesi a concorrenziare i giapponesi metropolitani.

Comunque sia, il Giappone sente non semplicemente l'interesse, ma l'aculeo di avere sbocchi crescenti alla sua industria, sempre più varia e sempre più estesa in Cina. La sua azione è volta a prendere tanta influenza in Cina da far lievitare viemmeglio quell'enorme massa di compratori potenziali, che sono i 400 a 500 milioni di cinesi. All'uopo le armi precedono i capitali proprio come nelle imprese coloniali. Perché, già, la Cina è considerata dall'evoluto Giappone più come una colonia, colonia di sfruttamento e non, ripetesi, di popolamento, che come uno Stato organizzato.

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Lo sviluppo assai rapido della produzione mancese, il forte movimento migratorio e la completa penetrazione demografica cinese diedero lievitò al pensiero di sottrarsi alla influenza giapponese che, col mezzo dell' unica ferrovia nord-sud, si faceva fortemente sentire.

### La concorrenza ferroviaria cinese

Mossi da tal pensiero ed insieme dall'altro, economicamente sanissimo, di vieppiù sviluppare il vasto, fertile e promettente territorio, i cinesi si misero a laceramente a costruire tronchi ferroviari, i quali, nel loro insieme e per virtù degli opportuni raccordi, erano venuti per costituire una seconda grande longitudinale parallela, seppure a molta e molta distanza verso occidente, alla Charbin-Kuangengtsé che è prevalentemente cinese ed alla Kuangengtsé-Mukden-Dairen che è la Sud-manciuriana giapponese.

Veniva così a crearsi una concorrenza pariente dalla transiberiana e correlativa ferrovia orientale russo-cinese e giungente al mare libero (da ghiacci) al mar Giallo, cioè, concorrenza contro la ferrovia e l'influenza giapponese.

Da qui i primi e già maturi attriti da cui derivò l'atteggiamento del Giappone, il suo intervento militare in Manciuria con relativi « briganti » che richiamano, per la singolare energia, quei Crumiri che i francesi « dovettero » combattere in Tunisia provocandone l'annessione di fatto alla Francia.

Per successivi sviluppi, da qui infine il boicottaggio cinese contro le merci

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Non ha bisogno il Giappone di territori da popolare. Benchè la sua popolazione sia la più densa fra i grandi Stati del mondo — ha 170 abitanti per chilometro quadrato — il Giappone non ha una emigrazione degna di tal nome. Il giapponese non emigra, non intende in alcun modo emigrare. Si addensa in modo incredibile sul suo suolo, si costringe a minor guadagno di vita, ma non esce dal suo Paese. Questo vuol essere ben notato da chi intende studiare ed osservare quel mirabile Paese. I giapponesi che escono sono commercianti, viaggiatori di commercio, dettaglianti, industriali, tecnici o capitalisti — mai e poi mai agricoltori, ed operai, ossia lavoratori del braccio.

I giapponesi si sono presi nella guerra con la Cina, la Corea, la vasta isola di Formosa la quale potrebbe da sola assorbire milioni di giapponesi e nella guerra colla Russia metà dell'Isola, anch'essa amplissima, di Sacalin! Ma fuori che qualche centinaio di migliaia di giapponesi — tutti delle classi per così dire non manuali — di giapponesi nei loro nuovi possedimenti non ne sono andati. Nella loro « sfera di influenza » in Manciuria sono, pare, solo 40 a 50 mila ed hanno dovuto, se hanno voluto un pochino contrastare alla inondazione cinese, favorirvi l'emigrazione dei coreani, sudditi giapponesi si ma non poi troppo fidati.

Quindi, il Giappone, checchè taluno dei suoi delegati parli, per chi non lo sa, della pressione demografica del proprio Paese e della conseguente, pretesa, ma irrealistica, necessità di elaterio di terre per essa, non ha bisogno di territori di possesso diretto e difficile, ma invece gli occorre molta popolazione altrui che comperi quella che la densa popolazione propria produce e che permetta quindi a detta popolazione propria di guadagnare la vita pur standosene addensata a casa, da dove non vuol dipartirsi.

### Anche altri non vogliono emigrare

E' in maggior misura la stessa situazione dell'altra grande Nazione insulare del mondo — l'Inghilterra — i cui abitanti, una volta emigranti audaci, non vogliono più emigrare. (I tentativi canadesi ed australiani, fatti dopo le guerre, per attirare a sé emigranti inglesi che conservassero la purezza orgogliosa dell'orgoglioso sangue anglo-sassone, sono stati una serie di completi insuccessi). Vogliono vivere a casa, nella vecchia patria, sempre più, anch'essi, addensati e quindi in attiva lotta con la

armi precedono i capitali proprio come nelle imprese coloniali. Perché, già, la Cina è considerata dall'evoluto Giappone più come una colonia, colonia di sfruttamento e non, ripetersi, di popolamento, che come uno Stato organizzato.

### La emancipazione economica dell'Asia

I giapponesi, capitalisti di netta tendenza, anche se si sono dovuti accontentare a dimezzare le loro disponibilità di oro e se continuano ad esportare l'oro — adesso non più della Banca, ma del Governo — hanno relativamente copiose liquidità interne. Essi hanno ancora e fortemente reciso i salari interni con riduzioni dirette oltre che con la svalutazione di un terzo del loro yen. Così hanno la più estesa capacità potenziale di espansione e di concorrenza. Insieme al resto dell'Asia tendono energicamente all'emancipazione asiatica dall'industria e dall'economia europea, come ho già rilevato nell'articolo sul « Sole » del 12 agosto 1931: « il risveglio dell'Asia » e tendono ad emanciparsi anche finanziariamente e capitalisticamente. E la vecchia Europa non fa che bisticciarsi fra di essa, mentre il sol levante sale!

MARIO MAZZUCHELLI

## Gli insegnamenti di un conflitto

Chiudevamo queste note, la settimana scorsa, rilevando la stretta coordinazione, nell'impiego delle armi del cielo e della terra, da parte dei giapponesi, e notavamo come in questa coordinazione, sempre più intima, debbasi vedere una delle caratteristiche fondamentali della guerra moderna.

Volevamo dire che, come sarebbe assurdo pensare che, sulla terra, possano svolgersi azioni di sole fanterie senza l'ausilio delle artiglierie per prepararne e appoggiarne l'avanzata e proteggerne le conquiste, così non sembra più possibile immaginare oggi la guerra nel suo insieme, sulla terra e sul mare, senza la necessaria indispensabile integrazione dell'arma aerea. Rimandiamo, per ora, ad occasione più favorevole, ogni considerazione circa il modo e l'entità di una tale integrazione ed anche se l'arma aerea debba essere la integratrice o l'integrata, nella prospettata coordinazione: ma, poiché, quali che siano i progressi tecnici nel perfezionamento delle armi e dei mezzi meccanici a disposizione degli Stati, l'unità fondamentale di tutte le forze armate rimarrà pur sempre l'uomo, noi dobbiamo fin d'ora affermare la nostra convinzione che la definitiva risoluzione della guerra rimarrà prerogativa dell'esercito almeno fino a quando, per giungervi, sarà necessario non soltanto debellare il nemico — forze armate e nazione — ma effettuare una reale conquista ed occupazione di territorio. Il che tuttavia non ci impedisce di pensare che l'arma del cielo, per se stessa ancora incapace di effettuare questi due atti definitivi, possa cooperare in misura grandissima con l'esercito ed, anzi, cooperare in misura sempre più grande di quanto anche, in talune favorevoli circostanze, in misura preminente, così da rendere il compito delle forze terrestri ad un semplice presa di possesso, senza grande contrasto con le forze similari avversarie.

Tutto questo però è materia di discussione in cui non vogliamo addentrarci.

Vogliamo piuttosto continuare ad osservare ciò che si svolge in Estremo Oriente per notare talune circostanze e taluni fatti che ci sembrano particolarmente interessanti.

Il conflitto in atto non è, per se stesso, dal punto di vista strettamente militare, vastissimo e soltanto appare realmente importante dinanzi a Sciangai, sia perché i giapponesi non hanno più, di contro, avversari ambigualmente troppo facili a ripiegare senza affrontare, con serietà di propositi, l'alea e l'onore del combattimento, sia ancora perché l'addestramento e l'armamento delle unità cinesi non sembrano qui tanto trascurabili quanto potevano essere quelli delle forze solitamente dileguantisi in Mandchuria, le quali erano in parte irregolari e costituite di cosiddetti « banditi ».

A Sciangai fronteggiano i giapponesi truppe del Governo di Nanchino — fra le quali una famosa divisione modello — ed alcune unità dell'esercito dipendente dal Governo dissidente di Canton, esercito che sembra essere il meglio organizzato fra quanti ne esistono ora in Cina.

Quante siano in tutto le forze cinesi non si sa con precisione: si parla di unità della 19ª armata cantonese, oltre, naturalmente, alla divisione modello e ad altri reparti di Nanchino. Certo esse sono sempre state, fin dai primi giorni, di gran lunga più numerose delle forze giapponesi, le quali, fino ad otto giorni fa, non superavano i 10.000 uomini, ed erano costituite quasi integralmente da reparti di marina, che non sono, come è noto, allenati ed equipaggiati in modo da poter essere impiegati in azioni terrestri di vasta portata.

Questa originaria e persistente sproporzione delle forze può in parte spiegare e giustificare la grande prudenza del comando giapponese, che non ha, evidentemente, voluto tentare prematuramente, azioni avventate per sfaccare la resistenza cinese; ma non mette in luce molto brillante la condotta del comando o dei comandi cinesi, i quali, pur possedendo la superiorità numerica assoluta ed un armamento complessivamente buono — e lasciamo da parte la saldezza di cuore dei cantonesi che taluno ha voluto mettere in conto di giustificazione dei non conseguiti vantaggi giapponesi — non hanno mai osato attaccare a fondo.

Dal 14 febbraio in poi le forze giapponesi sono andate di mano in mano aumentando ed ora si ritiene che ammonino, nella zona di Sciangai, a 30.000 uomini dell'esercito oltre a circa 10.000 marinai, dei reparti di sbarco, e riservisti locali armati ed inquadrati sul posto, per meglio presidiare le trincee al margine della concessione internazionale.

Di fronte a questi 40.000 si calcola che stiano non meno di 100.000 cinesi.

La stessa sproporzione numerica esisteva però già, certamente, prima del 14 febbraio: ma la lotta, fra i due avversari, — in taluni momenti veramente accanita — non aveva però portato a

nuova, aggiungendo nuovi terrificanti aspetti al già terribile spettacolo del combattimento.

Quanti aerei possano allineare in cielo i cinesi, contro i giapponesi, non sappiamo. Ma è probabile che non manchino, anche da parte loro piccole aliquote di apparecchi da caccia e da ricognizione, i quali, del resto, hanno già fatto qualche apparizione.

Vedremo dunque come e con quali risultati l'aviazione sarà impiegata: ma, intanto crediamo di poter fermare un poco la nostra attenzione sul fatto, già accennato, che, dal 3 al 14 febbraio — dal 14 in poi l'andamento della lotta fu molto influenzato da interventi diplomatici e da interferenze politiche — i giapponesi si preoccuparono di fare semplice azione difensiva, a Sciangai, sia perché ciò rientrava nei loro disegni operativi, sia ancora, e forse principalmente, perché non si sentivano abbastanza forti per rompere la crescente pressione dei cinesi, preponderanti per numero. Ora è appunto probabile che, per alleggerire tale pressione e logliere agli avversari ogni velleità di attaccare, il comando giapponese abbia fatto quell'uso larghissimo dei bombardamenti aerei che le notizie giornalistiche hanno segnalato. Questi bombardamenti non sono stati sufficienti (né potevano essere) a far progredire le esigue truppe di sbarco, dura-

mente impegnate nelle concessioni, ma, spargendo, nel corso di questa azione di eventi,

Questo fatto ci re che l'arma aerea, la sua essenza, può dare utilità che allo sviluppo neamente difensiva.

Fare affermazioni, su tale rigualmente, sopra il caso particolare, ampiezza di essi, più del tutto fu un bombardamento intenso, scatenò grande di frontiera, e qualche di una contropropria, possa contribuire a scompaginare e, niente attacco lo fallire una offensiva. Naturalmente numero degli, giata preliminare, e dalla sua conto della posizioni, e dalla sua

## Gli insegnamenti di un conflitto

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Tutto questo però è materia di discussione in cui non vogliamo addentrarci. Vogliamo piuttosto continuare ad osservare ciò che si svolge in Estremo Oriente per notare talune circostanze e taluni fatti che ci sembrano particolarmente interessanti.

Il conflitto in atto non è, per se stesso, dal punto di vista strettamente militare, al cuore dei cantonesi che taluno ha voluto mettere in conto di giustificazione dei non conseguiti vantaggi giapponesi — non hanno mai osato attaccare a fondo.

Dal 14 febbraio in poi le forze giapponesi sono andate di mano in mano aumentando ed ora si ritiene che ammonitino, nella zona di Sciangai, a 30.000 uomini dell'esercito oltre a circa 10.000 marinai, dei reparti di sbarco, e riservisti locali armati ed inquadrati sul posto, per meglio presidiare le trincee al margine della concessione internazionale.

Di fronte a questi 40.000 si calcola che stiano non meno di 100.000 cinesi.

La stessa sproporzione numerica esisteva però già, certamente, prima del 14 febbraio: ma la lotta, fra i due avversari, — in taluni momenti veramente accanita — non aveva però portato a sensibili vantaggi per nessuno. Non per i giapponesi, che avevano allora soltanto lo scopo di non cedere terreno in attesa dei rinforzi; non per i cinesi, quantunque ogni piccolo cedimento nemico dovesse essere, da loro, considerato come successo di grandissimo valore materiale e morale.

Ora che le forze sono cresciute nella misura che abbiamo detto, anche i propositi bellicosi, nonostante i vari tentativi di conciliazione, le tregue e gli ultimatum, si sono fatti più aspri. Le notizie di oggi ci diranno anzi, probabilmente, che l'offensiva giapponese si è scatenata con il violento impiego di tutti i più moderni mezzi di guerra — esclusi ancora i gas — e con grande partecipazione dell'aviazione.

Questa, rappresentata, nel campo giapponese da più che cento apparecchi da battaglia — quantità assai forte, non inferiore come proporzione numerica alle aliquote che durante le più aspre battaglie del 1918 combatterono già sulle fronti europee, ma certo notevolmente superiore a quelle come efficienza complessiva, per i perfezionamenti realizzati, da allora ad oggi, nei materiali, nell'addestramento e nella tecnica nell'impiego — darà al corso degli eventi la fisionomia

nuova, aggiungendo nuovi terrificanti aspetti al già terribile spettacolo del combattimento.

Quanti aerei possano allineare in cielo i cinesi, contro i giapponesi, non sappiamo. Ma è probabile che non manchino, anche da parte loro piccole aliquote di apparecchi da caccia e da ricognizione, i quali, del resto, hanno già fatto qualche apparizione.

Vedremo dunque come e con quali risultati l'aviazione sarà impiegata: ma, intanto crediamo di poter fermare un poco la nostra attenzione sul fatto, già accennato, che, dal 3 al 14 febbraio — dal 14 in poi l'andamento della lotta fu molto influenzato da interventi diplomatici e da interferenze politiche — i giapponesi si preoccuparono di fare semplice azione difensiva, a Sciangai, sia perché ciò rientrava nei loro disegni operativi, sia ancora, e forse principalmente, perché non si sentivano abbastanza forti per rompere la crescente pressione dei cinesi, preponderanti per numero. Ora è appunto probabile che, per alleggerire tale pressione e togliere agli avversari ogni velleità di attaccare, il comando giapponese abbia fatto quell'uso larghissimo dei bombardamenti aerei che le notizie giornalistiche hanno segnalato. Questi bombardamenti non sono stati sufficienti (né potevano essere) a far progredire le esigue truppe di sbarco, dura-

mente impegnate nelle concessioni, ma, spargendo, nel corso di questa operazione di eventuale

Questo fatto ci dice che l'arma aerea, la sua essenza, può dare utilissimi che allo sviluppo

neamente difensiva. Pare affermarsi, su tale riguardo, naturalmente, sopra il caso particolare, l'ampiezza di essa più del tutto fu un bombardamento intenso, scatenato grande di fronte, milanza e quindi una contropropria contribuisce a scompaginare e niente attacco lo fallire una offerta. Naturalmente numero degli aerei, giata preliminare, e dalla sua conto della posizione, e dalla sua

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NO - Num. 45

### zioni a pagamento

millimetro di altezza, larghezza di una co-  
unzi mortuari, L. 8,50. Finanziari, L. 7 a  
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sindacabile ritenesse di non poter accettare.

L'UNIONE PUBBLICITA' ITALIANA, S. A.  
a Teresa, n. 7, Piazzetta della Chiesa  
L'Unione Pubblicità Italiana: 42-039 - 53-901

## Le forze giapponesi

L'organizzazione militare giappo-  
nese, intesa secondo i criteri scien-  
tifici in atto nelle Nazioni civili, è  
giovannissima: ha poco più di 60  
anni di vita. Ancora nel 1868 il  
Giappone non possedeva esercito,  
ma soltanto delle milizie a fisiono-  
mia medioevale, composte da genti-  
luomini (samurai), ai quali esclusi-  
vamente spettava il diritto e l'ono-  
re di indossare le armi; queste mi-  
lizie dipendevano dai grandi feuda-  
tari dell'Impero.

Le pittoresche ed anacronistiche  
compagnie di samurai erano rette  
da inflessibili e purissime regole  
d'onore militare, che rappresentano  
la sola eredità tramandata intatta  
alle moderne istituzioni militari  
giapponesi, sorte per servire uno  
stato unitario, ricco di ambizioni e  
di volontà di dominio.

Il primo esercito, composto an-  
cora di samurai, venne organizzato  
alla francese e si valse dell'opera di  
istruttori francesi e italiani; ma,  
dopo la campagna franco-prussiana  
del 1870-71, il Giappone, alla pari  
di molti Stati europei, sentì il biso-  
gno di imitare le istituzioni mili-  
tari tedesche e di avere istruttori  
tratti dall'esercito vincitore della  
Francia; con una serie di leggi mi-  
litari, susseguitesi negli anni 1875,  
1879, 1883 e 1889, il Giappone adot-  
tò ordinamenti sensibilmente ana-  
loghi a quelli prussiani e, a datare  
dal 1884, con l'insediamento a  
Tokio della missione tedesca gui-  
data dal generale Von Mohl, tutti  
gli istruttori europei delle forze ar-  
mate del Sol Levante furono te-  
deschi.

Nel 1894 il nuovo esercito giap-  
ponese fece la sua prima prova pub-  
blica con la campagna contro la  
Cina: spedizione oltre mare — mo-  
bilitazione di tre armate di circa  
100.000 uomini, con mezzo migliaio  
di pezzi di artiglieria — difficoltà  
politico-militari numerose da af-  
frontare e superare. La guerra fu  
vittoriosa e la prova soddisfacente.

Venne quindi la prova decisiva  
della guerra contro la Russia, nella  
quale il Giappone collaudò definiti-  
vamente il suo alto comando, i suoi  
stati maggiori, le sue armi, le sue  
navi, le sue truppe di terra e di  
mare e, soprattutto, le sue possibi-  
lità e le sue forze nel grande cam-  
po della politica mondiale.

Alla fine della guerra il Giappone  
aveva in Manciuria circa mezzo mi-  
lione di combattenti e la cifra di  
uomini trasportati oltre mare, du-  
rante tutta la guerra, superava il  
milione e mezzo di uomini. La pro-  
va era, dunque, stata eccellente.

Alla guerra mondiale, com'è noto,  
l'esercito giapponese non prese  
parte attiva, ma ne seguì e studiò  
attentamente tutte le fasi, sfruttan-  
do ed applicando senza esitazione i  
dati d'esperienza forniti dalla guer-  
ra stessa. In conseguenza, nel 1915,  
fu creato il primo reparto d'avia-  
zione su 4 battaglioni, con 150 ap-  
parecchi acquistati in Europa ed  
alla fine della guerra mondiale l'e-  
sercito giapponese comprendeva:

Fanteria: 86 reggimenti;  
Cavalleria: 29 reggimenti;  
Artiglieria: 19 reggimenti da  
campagna più un battaglione a ca-  
vallo; 4 reggimenti da montagna;  
6 reggimenti pesanti campali;  
Genio: zappatori minatori: 21  
battaglioni; ferrovieri: 2 reggimen-  
ti; telegrafisti: 2 reggimenti; aéro-  
stieri: 6 compagnie.

Aviazione: 6 battaglioni.

Nel 1922 il Parlamento giappo-  
nese votò la riduzione della ferma a

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mare e, soprattutto, le sue possibilità e le sue forze nel grande campo della politica mondiale.

Alla fine della guerra il Giappone aveva in Manciuria circa mezzo milione di combattenti e la cifra di uomini trasportati oltre mare, durante tutta la guerra, superava il milione e mezzo di uomini. La prova era, dunque, stata eccellente.

Alla guerra mondiale, com'è noto, l'esercito giapponese non prese parte attiva, ma ne seguì e studiò attentamente tutte le fasi, sfruttando ed applicando senza esitazione i dati d'esperienza forniti dalla guerra stessa. In conseguenza, nel 1915, fu creato il primo reparto d'aviazione su 4 battaglioni, con 150 apparecchi acquistati in Europa ed alla fine della guerra mondiale l'esercito giapponese comprendeva:

Fanteria: 86 reggimenti;  
Cavalleria: 29 reggimenti;  
Artiglieria: 19 reggimenti da campagna più un battaglione a cavallo; 4 reggimenti da montagna; 6 reggimenti pesanti campali;  
Genio: zappatori minatori: 21 battaglioni; ferrovieri: 2 reggimenti; telegrafisti: 2 reggimenti; aerostieri: 6 compagnie.

Aviazione: 6 battaglioni.  
Nel 1922 il Parlamento giapponese votò la riduzione della ferma a 16 mesi ed una conseguente diminuzione di armamenti; tale progetto, ancora in via di attuazione, ha portato oggi, più che altro, ad un differente raggruppamento delle truppe e dei comandi.

La forza bilanciata dell'esercito giapponese, alla data del 1931, sommarava a circa 17.000 ufficiali e 200.000 uomini di truppa suddivisi in 17 divisioni di fanteria, con la dislocazione seguente: 11 divisioni nell'isola di Hevo; 2 nell'isola di Kiusiu, 1 nell'isola di Hokkaidu, 1 nell'isola Scikoku, 2 in Corea.

La divisione Giapponese costituisce la più complessa unità organica del tempo di pace ed ha formazione quaternaria; comprende, cioè, quattro reggimenti di fanteria, raggruppati in due brigate; completano la divisione 1 reggimento di cavalleria, 1 reggimento di artiglieria da campagna, 1 battaglione del genio ed 1 battaglione per i servizi.

Il reclutamento è obbligatorio; tutti i cittadini fisicamente idonei possono essere chiamati alle armi, dai 17 ai 40 anni di età; il servizio incomincia normalmente a venti anni ed è rinartito come segue:

— Esercito attivo (Gueneki), comprendente gli incorporati di leva sotto le armi (circa 200 mila uomini) e la 1.a riserva (Jobi) fornita dagli incorporati in congedo delle 6 classi più giovani.

— Seconda riserva (Kobi) costituita dalle prime dieci classi di incorporati in congedo dopo le 6 classi della 1.a riserva.

— Esercito territoriale (Kukumin) comprendente le rimanenti classi di incorporati in congedo e la grande massa dei non incorporati annualmente, forniti dalla sola istruzione premilitare, di cui si è detto nel precedente articolo.

Il servizio obbligatorio dura 16 mesi.

E qui conviene accennare all'interessantissima e sintomatica questione delle riserve giapponesi. Il gettito annuo delle classi di leva imperiali è di poco meno di 600.000 uomini, dei quali, dopo rigorosissima visita sanitaria, oltre 500.000 forniscono il quantitativo dei fisicamente idonei; di questi soltanto 100.000, previa estrazione a sorte, vengono incorporati. Ciò porta come conseguenza che il Giappone, mentre possiede delle colossali masse umane di riserve non istruite, o, quanto meno, fornite soltanto del-

## Il mistero di Sciangai

La battaglia di Sciangai — la quale, ad onor del vero, si svolge con una commendevole parsimonia di perdite dalle due parti — dovrà durare, a quel che s'annuncia, almeno otto giorni; dopo di che, o i giapponesi avranno vinto e detteranno le loro condizioni, o i cinesi avranno fiaccato la burbanza dell'avversario costringendolo a rimbarcarsi, o si inizierà una nuova battaglia, come un ballottaggio. In ogni caso non saranno per niente affatto chiari i propositi e gli scopi della casta militarista giapponese.

Che vuole il Giappone a Sciangai? E' un diversivo, destinato, come abbiamo detto, a far passare in seconda linea gli avvenimenti manciuriani? Poteva bastare, evidentemente, uno sbarco, le prime scaramucce, il primo bombardamento aereo di Cia-pei, una dimostrazione navale nelle acque del Fiume Azzurro. Questa battaglia di Sciangai, preceduta da un ultimatum inaccettabile, appare assolutamente superflua; vi è stato trascinato, irresistibilmente, il Comando giapponese, o è la prima mossa di un piano del quale si sconosce finora la portata? La lentezza con la quale si svolgono queste operazioni non deve meravigliare; anche le operazioni in Manciuria furono lentissime e apparivano sempre limitate ad obiettivi particolari, mentre erano concatenate le une alle altre in un organico sistema. Altrettanto può essere di queste operazioni intorno a Sciangai; ma fino a questo momento prevale l'impressione che si tratti d'uno slittamento involontario, dovuto a ragioni di prestigio militare. Se così veramente fosse, il Giappone verrebbe presto a trovarsi in un vicolo cieco, dal quale nessuna mano amica lo aiuterebbe di certo ad uscire. Si può dire anzi che la sorprendente attitudine americana in questo conflitto trova una spiegazione — non sappiamo quanto vera, ma verosimile — nell'ingarbugliarsi dell'avventura giapponese, in Manciuria e fino alla Grande Muraglia abbastanza chiara, a Sciangai diventata alquanto equivoca.

Più che la prossima assemblea plenaria della S. d. N. potrà dirci dunque qualche cosa di serio sullo sviluppo degli avvenimenti in Estremo Oriente la condotta della battaglia di Sciangai, destinata già dagli interessati a durare non meno di otto giornate.

IL POPOLO DI ROMA, Rome.  
February 21, 1932. page 1 .

Despatch No. 1293



## La nazione nord-americana minacciata dal suicidio di razza

Più volte abbiamo richiamata l'attenzione del pubblico sul suicidio di razza che minaccia la nazione nord-americana. Di questa minaccia, assai grave, incomincia a rendersi conto lo stesso popolo americano; e più ancora, naturalmente, le classi dirigenti americane. Non mancano perciò le pubblicazioni — libri, articoli di giornali, opuscoli — che gettano l'allarme, e prospettano il pericolo, e suggeriscono rimedi.

Arriveranno in tempo i rimedi, e saranno realmente efficaci? Ciò è molto dubbio perché la folle teoria della limitazione delle nascite come condizione essenziale di benessere sociale, da troppo tempo predicata ed attuata, ha fatto ormai troppa breccia nella convinzione del popolo americano.

L'argomento è stato in questi giorni lucidamente esaminato, anche in rapporto al sistema industriale nord-americano e alla ferrea limitazione delle immigrazioni, in una lettera da New York di Amerigo Ruggiero a « La Stampa » di Torino.

Scrive fra l'altro il Ruggiero:

Gli americani, in genere, non sono stati mai favorevoli alla prolificità abbondante e senza freno. La considerano come uno stigma di popolo inferiore e di civiltà arretrata. Le famiglie numerose vanno sempre accoppiate nella loro mente con l'idea di povertà, d'ignoranza e di sudiciume e richiamano il quadro dei quartieri negri, degli « slums » dove si ammassano gli stranieri, di capanne di strani popoli esotici. L'americano, specie quello delle classi agiate, in fatto di figliolanza resta sempre attaccato al motto: « uno ma leone ». Non ultima fra le cause che portarono alla chiusura dell'immigrazione fu lo spavento e la ripugnanza che destavano le grosse famiglie degli immigrati.

Tutta una letteratura, falsa, a base di affermazioni speciose, d'informazioni non controllate, di ragionamenti unilaterali, di conclusioni cervelotiche, contribuì a radicare nell'animo del popolo americano quel senso di spavento di cui parla il Ruggiero. L'effetto voluto da quella letteratura fu raggiunto:

L'emigrazione fu chiusa con l'approvazione di gran parte del popolo americano che, sobillato dai soliti vociferatori, credette di aver salvaguardata per sempre la purezza della razza e mantenuto fermo il principio dell'alto tenore di vita.

Negli anni che seguirono la guerra, la propaganda per il controllo delle nascite ha ripreso un nuovo e inaspettato rigore. Il « birth control », a dire il vero, gli americani, con la nota ipocrisia degli anglo-sassoni, amavano praticarlo, ma non parlarne troppo. Solo i più audaci, generalmente scienziati e sociologi che non si attenevano ai formalismi delle buone usanze, osavano inoltrarsi in un terreno difficile e irto di ostacoli. Soprattutto, parlare apertamente di argomenti che richiamavano troppo al vivo l'animalità, non era considerato un procedere corretto da « gentlemen ». Era volgare e « shocking ».

Dopo la guerra, fu un'altra cosa. S'incominciarono a chiamar le cose con i loro nomi. La propaganda per il controllo delle nascite riprese, e con maggior vigore. Dice il Ruggiero:

Non che la recentissima propaganda per il controllo delle nascite non abbia trovato ostacoli. Vi si sono opposti quei gruppi dell'alta società ancora ligi alle buone usanze del tempo andato, le varie associazioni contro l'immoralità, e varie denominazioni religiose. Ma, a parte i cattolici, che seguono in questo una dottrina morale e religiosa definitivamente stabilita ed immutabile, tutti gli altri gruppi hanno sollevato opposizioni non per l'essenza delle idee da difendersi, ma perché la loro diffusione veniva fatta per mezzo di opuscoli, le cui conoscenze, troppo specificate e tecniche per i profani, si prestavano ad esser colpite dalle leggi che condannano l'immoralità. Ma riguardo al contenuto, al può dire tutti fossero d'accordo.

Si aggiunga che l'azione della magistratura e della polizia contro la insana propaganda per il controllo delle nascite è stata sempre molto incerta. E se per qualche tempo i libri e gli opuscoli che la facevano, furono proibiti e sequestrati, una recente sentenza di una Corte superiore li ha rimesso in circolazione.

La propaganda per la limitazione

Si è qui terrorizzati dalla macchina. La macchina è diventata una specie di Frankenstein, il mostro che distrusse il suo stesso fattore. Lo strumento dia-bolico ha tolto lavoro e pane a milioni di persone: il suo progresso non si arresterà qui. Altri milioni di esseri umani diverranno sue vittime nel futuro: per impedirne la strage bisogna far sì che non nascano.

E quando la saturazione del macchinismo sarà avvenuta (e alcuni non la ritengono lontana) ogni avventura capitalistica e industriale avrà termine. E con essa l'espansione dell'umanità, perché le macchine in esistenza basteranno a metter freno ad ogni accrescimento illimitato e pericoloso della popolazione. Non ci sarà compenso alla inutilizzazione delle braccia umane da parte della macchina nella ricerca di nuovi campi economici da sfruttare. Questo, in breve, ciò che pensano e sentono i fautori della limitazione delle nascite. La quale comincia a produrre effetti curiosi che i suoi partigiani erano lontani dall'aspettarsi.

L'America si prepara un bell'avvenire, dicevamo anche pochi giorni addietro parlando del fantastico moltiplicarsi dei divorzi nella nazione nord-americana.

LA TRIBUNA, Rome.  
February 19, 1962. page 2.

Despatch No. 1293

LA  
giero:

Non che la recentissima propaganda per il controllo delle nascite non abbia trovato ostacoli. Vi si sono opposti quei gruppi dell'alta società ancora ligi alle buone usanze del tempo andato, le varie associazioni contro l'immoralità, e varie denominazioni religiose. Ma, a parte i cattolici, che seguono in questo una dottrina morale e religiosa definitivamente stabilita ed immutabile, tutti gli altri gruppi hanno sollevato opposizioni non per l'essenza delle idee da diffondersi, ma perché la loro diffusione veniva fatta per mezzo di opuscoli, le cui conoscenze, troppo specificate e tecniche per i profani, si prestavano ad esser colpite dalle leggi che condannano l'immoralità. Ma riguardo al contenuto, si può dire tutti fossero d'accordo.

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La propaganda per la limitazione delle nascite ha fatto specialmente breccia sulle donne americane. Tutto ciò è particolarmente triste e pericoloso. Ma...

La cosa è spiegabile per il fatto che esiste, qui, tutta una categoria professionale di cosiddette « social workers », una vera e propria carriera che non ha corrispondenza in Europa, che richiede i suoi studi, i suoi corsi di discipline teoriche e di dimostrazioni pratiche. Sono queste « lavoratrici sociali » che vengono a contatto con le più atroci miserie degli « slums » cittadini, dei quartieri lebbrosi dove si accatasta la poveraglia straniera; che constatano casi orribili di denutrizione cronica, di abbruttimento, di maltrattamenti, di sevizie, di tormenti di ogni genere a cui l'infanzia delle classi povere deve sottostare. Hanno visitato i distretti minerari nelle epoche di scioperi e di crisi del carbone e quelli cotonieri degli Stati del Sud nelle cui tessitorie il lavoro dei fanciulli prevale con tutti gli orrori dell'epoca schiavistica. Con studi di scienze sociali incompleti, superficiali ed affrettati, esse corrono subito alle conclusioni ed attribuiscono tutte le brutture che hanno constatato ad un eccesso di natalità. Sincere nel loro zelo e nella loro pietà umana, vorrebbero metter termine ad ogni sofferenza dei figli delle classi povere con un gigantesco sciopero delle culle. Non s'avvedono che tutto dipende da un guasto essenziale nel sistema capitalista-industriale che causa delle crisi di sovrapproduzione, dei cicli di depressione, di un'anarchia economica per cui s'impone il suo rinnovamento se non vuol andare alla perdizione. Le nascite non hanno nulla a che fare. E' questione di difettosa distribuzione della ricchezza, di assurda organizzazione del lavoro o della produzione. Se l'America fosse abitata nella stessa densità dell'Europa potrebbe contenere una popolazione quattro volte quella attuale.

La depressione economica in cui, con il mondo tutto, si dibatte l'America ha fatto il resto. La propaganda del « birth control » ha avuto così in questi ultimi tempi un nuovo impeto. E il Ruggiero così conclude:

## americana di razza

...i terrorizzati dalla macchina. La macchina è diventata una specie di mostro, il mostro che distrusse il lavoro. Lo strumento di lavoro ha tolto lavoro e pane a milioni di persone: il suo progresso non si fermerà qui. Altri milioni di esseri umani diverranno sue vittime nel futuro per impedire la strage bisogna che non nascano. Quando la saturazione del macchinismo sarà avvenuta (e alcuni non la tengono lontana) ogni avventura capitalista e industriale avrà termine. con essa l'espansione dell'umanità, anche le macchine in esistenza bastano a metter freno ad ogni accrescimento illimitato e pericoloso della popolazione. Non ci sarà compenso alla utilizzazione delle braccia umane da parte della macchina nella ricerca di nuovi campi economici da sfruttare. Questo, in breve, ciò che pensano e temono i fautori della limitazione delle nascite. La quale comincia a produrre effetti curiosi che i suoi partigiani sono lontani dall'aspettarsi.

L'America si prepara un bell'avvenire, dicevamo anche pochi giorni dietro parlando del fantastico moltiplicarsi dei divorzi nella nazione nord-americana.




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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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893.102  
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5-0-C-111  
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MEMORANDUM.

The Italian Ambassador, later followed by Count Marchetti, called me on the telephone to say that in view of my statement some time ago (see previous memorandum) that we had not authorized Forbes at Tokyo to carry on any discussions about the future government of Manchuria, Grandi in turn was telling his Ambassador to keep out of such topics as the discussion was premature.

They both asked what attitude we were taking about proceedings at Geneva and cooperation with any League plans.

I said we were ready to cooperate on plans when it appeared, first, that the Chinese were willing to enter conference; second, that no advantages were being sought from a military predominance. This referred to conferences at Shanghai on the local situation. A general settlement was a matter for procedure later with an understanding by the powers.

Marchetti asked me if later we would ask for a conference of the powers under the Nine Power treaty. I said the Secretary had no plans and I thought was formulating none until conditions were stabilized.

*JGR*  
JGR

A-R JGR:HWC

F/LS 793.94/4623

NOT RECORDED



AM RECD



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Riga, Latvia,

February 24, 1932.

SUBJECT: ~~Attitude~~ Attitude of the Russian population regarding  
the Chinese-Japanese conflict, as reported  
by Messrs. R. Baylor and William Schipper.

793.94  
762 note  
762 94

*Handwritten initials and scribbles*

DIVISION OF  
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
APR 4 - 1932  
COPY IN EE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
MAR 31 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
APR 1 1932  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 8 - 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4624

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1 copy to M.I.D. (EE)			

No. 87

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

APR 7 1932

APR 8 - 1932

Sir:

I have the honor to submit below certain observations on the attitude of the Russian population towards the Chino-Japanese conflict in the Far East, which were made to a member of the staff of the Legation by Messrs. Robert Baylor\* and

William

\* Robert P. Baylor, bearer of Departmental passport No. 277501, issued on June 18, 1930. Entered

-2-

William Schipper,\* American specialists in the employ of Soviet State organizations.

Both Mr. Baylor and Mr. Schipper agree that the Far Eastern situation is the topic of outstanding interest in the public mind of Soviet Russia. The press, both the metropolitan and provincial, is devoting a great deal of attention to it. It is being widely discussed by the general public. These discussions follow quite closely the attitude taken by the press, but the general public apparently feels that the vital interests of Soviet Russia are more involved than the press reports indicate. While the Russian population generally feel that Soviet interests have been definitely challenged by the Japanese action in Manchuria, there is little talk to the effect that the Soviet Union will resort to war to protect those interests. On the contrary, it is generally felt that every effort will be made to avoid war at the present time. This feeling is based on the realization that the Soviet Union is not prepared for a war in the Far East at the present time, and that the full strength of the country must be devoted to the completion of the Five-Year Plan and the reconstruction of agriculture.

There is apparent, however, a strong hope that  
the

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tered Russia as a concrete construction engineer in the employ of McDonald Brothers. Later accepted an individual contract for the same specialty with the Non-ferrous Metals Trust.

\*William Schipper, a German citizen of 25 years' residence in the United States. Electrical designer and draftsman in Moscow under technical aid contract of the Soviet Electrical Trust with the International General Electric Company. Reported on more fully in this Legation's despatch No. 58, Feb. 18, 1932.

-3-

the United States will become seriously embroiled with Japan over the events in Manchuria and China proper. Popular opinion accepts as the ideal solution from the Soviet point of view a definite clash between the United States and Japan in which the former "would pull Russia's chestnuts out of the fire." There is little hope for or expectation of any effective interference by the League of Nations or by the western European Powers.

Mr. Baylor stated that he was located at Sverdlovsk (in the Urals on direct rail connections with the Trans-Siberian Railroad) in October and November of 1931. During these months, he observed heavy troop movements towards the East. It was generally recognized in Sverdlovsk at that time that these troops were reinforcing the Far Eastern garrisons in anticipation of possible disturbances on the frontiers. He felt that the Manchurian trouble which developed later was actually anticipated by the Russian authorities.

Mr. Baylor spent part of the month of January at Semipalatinsk; he made several trips along the southern end of the Turk-Sib Railway. Here again he witnessed heavy troop movements. The Turk-Sib was carrying troops north from Alma Ata. American engineers permanently located at Semipalatinsk stated that this was the first time that such movements had taken place. Local opinion was to the effect that the troops were bound for Novosibirsk, and then to the Far East via the Trans-Siberian Railway.\*

Respectfully

---

\* A London despatch to the Paris edition of the Chicago Tribune of February 10, 1932, in reporting upon mobilization of Turkish and Persian forces in connection

-4-

Respectfully yours,

Robert P. Skinner.

(In quintuplicate)

800R

710R (Japan-China)

LMH/lr

4 Carbon Copies  
Received

*L. J. H.*

\*

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tion with threatened tribal troubles in Afghanistan and India state that "A few hours after the Turkish mobilization, the Commissar of War at Tashkent, who acts independent of Moscow in Islamic matters, ordered the mobilization of Turkish armies in Turkestan and along the Indian frontier." There has been no mention of such an act in the Soviet press; the report might have been based upon troop movements of the ~~the~~ character described by Mr. Baylor. It is interesting to note that the Moscow ECONOMIC LIFE of February 10, 1932, reports that Tefvik-Bey, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs while at Moscow en route to Geneva for the Disarmament Conference, "was received on February 8 by Comrade K.E. Vorishilov, People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Soviet."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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8 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND  
COMMUNICATIONS

FROM STATE  
MAR 9 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Geneva  
Dated March 8, 1932  
Rec'd 11:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

62, March 8, 11 p.m.

Your 32 / *no record* March 7, 6 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 8 1932  
MAR 8 1932

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note  
893.102-S  
500.0111

F/DEW

793.94/4625

The summary of a telegram which the Japanese delegation received from Debuchi dated March 5 was to the effect that the Departments of State and Navy have published reports from the Consul General of the United States and Admiral Taylor on the present situation at Shanghai in which it is stated that Japanese soldiers are patrolling Chapei where tranquillity has not yet been reestablished. Shanghai remains calm. The inhabitants of the districts of the zone of Dixwell Road to the north of Gardew bridge have been able to return to their homes in relative security. The agents of the Municipal Council have taken up their service in the Dixwell Road post. Certain of the schools in this region will be reopened very soon, the barbed wire bordering the North Szechuan Road is being taken down.

MAR 10 1932

FILED

Reference to your paragraph two, as you know Streit is the center of the anti-American and extravagantly pro-League

REP

2-#62, from Geneva, Mar. 8, 1p.m.

League gossip in Geneva. All of the delegations have been communicating as promptly as received any information from Shanghai which has been read out in the Assembly meetings and I do not think the United States has been behindhand in this matter. No information sent by mail reaches here for at least two or three weeks so that the reports from the Consul General Shanghai to which you refer would be out of date by the time they arrived here. Naturally it is of the greatest possible help to have the telegraphic information which you send us and which is being sent on to Sir Eric Drummond as rapidly as it comes in.

WILSON

WSB

RR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY



Shanghai via N. R.


Dated March 8, 1932

Rec'd 12:43 p. m.

F/LS

793.94/4626

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



168, March 8, 5 p. m.

793.94  
note  
893.102-8

Continuing my daily report March 7, 5 p. m., all  
quiet along the Whangpoo. Japanese troops still moving  
in to support their lines. Daily reports will be  
discontinued. Special reports will be despatched as  
necessary.

4614

Repeated to Legation and Nanking. Copy to Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

RPF

HPD

MAR 14 1932

F/LS

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.~~



FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 8, 1932

Rec'd 1:03 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



170, March 8, 7 p. m.

FOLLOWING FROM CAPTAIN MAYER FOR WAR DEPARTMENT.

"26. At Liuhoo today 11th Division headquarters stated that report of fighting March 7th erroneous. Air scout saw Chinese marching in direction of Japanese lines near Liuhoo but there was no contact between troops. They stated there had been no action on division front since March 3rd. All units of 11th Division now in Division area and deny that any 14th Division troops landed at Liuhoo."

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

RR  
WSB

*793.94  
note  
893.102-S*

F/LS 793.94/4627

MAR 14 1932  
FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*[Handwritten signature]*

February 24, 1932.

Mr. Murphy,  
Commercial Office,  
Dept. of State.

In accordance with  
our telephone conversation  
I am sending to you here-  
with a copy of a radiogram  
just received from our  
representative in Shanghai,  
Agricultural Commissioner  
Owen L. Dawson.

*[Handwritten signature]*

L. A. Wheeler,  
Acting in Charge,  
Foreign Agr. Service Division.

ARMY MESSAGE CENTER

7 DIRB 267 AGL 126PM

SHANGHAI 11 PM FEBRUARY 24 1932

AGRECON WASHINGTON

RECEIVED  
MAR 7 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS RECORDS

FL  
J  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
GENERAL AFFAIRS  
FEB 29 1932  
Department of State

RESUME COTTON SITUATION SHANGHAI'S NEIGHT CHINESE MILLS ARE

OPERATING PART TIME ONE BRITISH NO JAPANESE MILLS OPERATING. YARN PRODUCTION ABOUT TEN PERCENT OF CAPACITY. TOTAL COTTON CONSUMPTION IN FEBRUARY IN SHANGHAI HAS BEEN EXTREMELY SMALL. MILLS ARE HAMPERED IN THEIR OPERATIONS DUE TO GENERAL DISTURBED SITUATION BUT WORST OBSTACLE IS CONTINUED TIGHTNESS CURRENCY SITUATION NATIVE BANKS DUE UNWILLINGNESS BANKS TO TRANSFER FUNDS FOREIGN BANKS WHICH RESULT SUSPENSION DELIVERY TO MILLS.

COTTON STOCKS AT WAREHOUSES, PUBLIC STORAGE PLACES, WHARVES AND MILLS ESTIMATED NEAR TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND BALES. LACK OF STORAGE SPACE HAS FORCED MANY STEAMERS TO DISCHARGE COTTON AT KOBE SOME ALSO AT HONGKONG.

EXPORTING OF YARN TO SOUTH CHINA FROM EXISTING STOCK IS FAIRLY ACTIVE AND MILLS IN TERRITORY ADJACENT TO SHANGHAI ARE SKILLING OUTPUT AT PROFITABLE PRICES. BUSINESS BEING DONE IN YARN AT ABOUT ONE HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT TO ONE HUNDRED SIXTY TAIELS. ONE TAIEL EQUALS THIRTY THREE CENTS. SINCE OUTBREAK OF DISTURBANCE INSURANCE PREMIUMS HAVE GONE AS HIGH AS FIVE PERCENT PER MONTH. AT PRESENT THEY ARE BETWEEN ONE AND TWO PERCENT ON AMOUNTS OVER TWENTY THOUSAND POUNDS STERLING. THIS ONLY APPLIES TO STOCKS STORED ALONG THE RIVER AS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN COVERAGE ON COTTON LYING IN THE NORTHERN PART OF SHANGHAI OR ON ANY JAPANESE WHARF.

ARRIVALS OF COTTON SHANGHAI HAVE ALMOSE CEASED DUE LACK OF WAREHOUSE SPACE AND INABILITY OF EFFECTING DELIVERY TO MILLS IMPORTERS ARE ASKING THEIR HOME OFFICES FOR POSTPONENT AND SOME POSSIBLY CANCELLATION OF OPEN CONTRACTS.

DANSON

F/L/S  
793.94/4628

JUL 18 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 244.

793.94  
894  
893.7/0223

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,  
Callao-Lima, Peru. February 23rd, 1932.

MAR 7 1932  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

DIVISION OF  
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SUBJECT: Chinese and Japanese Propaganda in Peru.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
PUBLICATIONS SECTION  
MAR 9 1932  
THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON.

F/L/S 793.94/4629

SIR:

I have the honor to bring to the Department's attention the existence of Chinese and Japanese propaganda in Peru, and to enclose herewith pamphlets published by the respective cultural societies of each nationality.

These pamphlets are issued for the purpose of influencing public opinion in Peru.

Respectfully yours,

*William C. Burdett*  
William C. Burdett  
American Consul General.

MAR 22 1932  
FILED

✓ Enclosures:  
Pamphlet issued by Japanese.  
Pamphlet issued by Chinese.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*El Presidente de la Sociedad Central Japonesa del Perú  
saluda a Ud. atentamente y se complace en adjuntarle un ejemplar del  
folleto titulado "La Verdad sobre la Cuestión de Manchuria",  
que esta Sociedad ha hecho publicar como un pequeño aporte suyo en el  
esclarecimiento de los hechos que motivan el conflicto manchuriano.*

*Motoyó Nonomiya aprovecha la oportunidad para expresar  
a Ud. los sentimientos de su especial consideración.*

*Lima, Enero de 1932.*

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Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972  
By M. J. O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 244 of Wm.C. Burdett, American  
Consul General at Callao-Lima, Peru, dated Feb. 23, 1932,  
on the subject "Chinese and Japanese Propaganda in Peru."  
793.94/4629

Texto íntegro del famoso plan secreto  
de Tanaka para la conquista de  
Manchuria y Mongolia.



THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE  
DIVISION OF COLLECTIONS AND RECORDS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
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**Texto íntegro del famoso plan secreto  
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## PROLOGO

### El famoso plan secreto del premier Tanaka.

La actual invasión de Manchuria, no es sino la demostración práctica del famoso plan imperialista japonés elaborado hace mas de treinta años, y propuesto sobre bases científicas por el premier Tanaka, hombre hábil e inteligente que puso su talento, al exclusivo fin de empujar al Gobierno japonés hacia la conquista de Manchuria y Mongolia, primero, y después a la China.

El Centro Cultural Chino, en posesión documentada del famoso documento secreto que Tanaka presentara en sesión secreta ante su Gobierno japonés, cree de interés mundial el publicarlo, tras haber efectuado una laboriosa traducción, y ya sobre la seguridad de que dicho plan, no es el fruto de la fantasía como al principio también lo creyéramos nosotros, sino la amarga realidad de un imperialismo que se cierne sobre el mundo con todos los hilos de un espionaje formidable, y con datos precisos que indican que el plan se hizo sobre el terreno en discusión.

Omitimos todo comentario. El lector, al leer estas páginas, quedará sorprendido de dos cosas; del talento de Tanaka, y de la audacia imperialista japonesa, ahora en pleno ejercicio en Manchuria donde está ejecutando precisamente muchos de los puntos propuestos en este plan.

El Centro Cultural Chino, cumple pues con un deber de salvaguardador de los derechos universales, al presentar al mundo este documento, digno producto de un expansionismo que no solo hará peligrar a la China, sino a todo el orbe; el plan mismo lo dice así, y he aquí la prueba, que nos libra de emitir nuestro juicio.

**El Centro Cultural Chino.**

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**TEXTO INTEGRO DEL FAMOSO PLAN SECRETO DE  
TANAKA PARA LA CONQUISTA DE  
MANCHURIA Y MONGOLIA**

**El Japón y su política expansionista en Manchuria y Mongolia.**

Después de la guerra europea, nuestra situación política y económica se encuentra profundamente afectada e incierta. Sus causas son fáciles de averiguarlas, y se deben precisamente al poco desarrollo y falta de cumplimiento de nuestra influencia en Mongolia y Manchuria, donde tenemos grandes probabilidades de incrementar nuestros privilegios. Quién sabe si este problema preocupa ahora a su Majestad, pero la culpa es mía, porque, desde que asumí las responsabilidades del cargo de premier que ocupo por designación de S. R. A. la política del Japón frente a la China, debería ser más enérgica. Debemos procurar hallar la oportunidad de arraigar más nuestros intereses en aquellas zonas, porque, antes de asumir el cargo que desempeño, mi política con relación a Manchuria y Mongolia, fué siempre encaminada a sojuzgarlas, y, ahora ésta política, debe llegar a su término cuanto antes a fin de que nuestra expansión territorial fomenta en dichas zonas, como primera medida, la fundación de una colonia japonesa.

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La definición geográfica de Manchuria y Mongolia, la componen: Mukden, Kirim, Hac Lun Kong, Mongolia Exterior e Interior, con una extensión territorial de 74,000 millas cuadradas y una población de 28,000,000 de habitantes. Con relación a la extensión territorial del Japón, éstas 74,000 millas cuadradas, representan la tercera parte, o sea, demasiado territorio para tan pocos pobladores. Estas tierras, son además ricas en minas, fértiles y productivas, su

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producción de maderas insuperables, sin contar sus selvas, todo lo cual no poseen todas las regiones del mundo. Nosotros aprovechando sus riquezas y colonizándolas, solucionaremos nuestra vida económica, por eso, hemos ejecutado ya el ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, tomando por pretexto los beneficios que éste representa para ambos pueblos. Se han invertido ingentes capitales; se han creado líneas navieras y se han levantado ramales ferroviarios a los centros mineros, agrícolas y aún a las zonas selváticas. Para todo esto el presupuesto que debe invertir el gobierno, es de 140 millones de yens. Con esta inversión, se organizará nuestra industria en Mongolia y Manchuria. Apparently, estos capitales serán colocados por el gobierno y por el pueblo, pero en realidad, sólo pertenecerán exclusivamente al Gobierno Japonés. La empresa del ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, debe ser un Estado dentro de otro Estado, con una prerrogativa mas, de que la supervigilancia policial, estará en nuestras manos, como si se tratara de una concesión sin serlo, mas bien considerando esas zonas, como una segunda Corea.

Este plan no es nuevo. Es una tesis tradicional, propuesta hace muchos años por los que nos precedieron, como también meditada y aceptada por todos los anteriores emperadores. Pero, la guerra europea, ha cambiado muchas cosas. La situación que tenemos es distinta. Las autoridades de Manchuria han cambiado. Su cambio se manifiesta en que muchas de ellas son verdaderos obstáculos a nuestros planes expansionistas, por cuyo motivo, nuestra diplomacia ha ido de fracaso en fracaso. Además, no debemos olvidar que el Tratado de las nueve potencias, celebrado en Washington, ha limitado nuestras prerrogativas de expansión territorial en Manchuria, y no debemos pasar por alto este asunto, porque la zona mas rica de Manchuria se halla al norte, zona que pasara a nuestro poder a raíz de la guerra con Rusia, pero que, ahora, hemos perdido, debido al Tratado de Washington. Es de notar que, en estos últimos años, el exceso de pobladores chinos en Manchuria sobrepasa el millón anual, gentes que van a buscar fortuna, cuando nosotros, en el Japón tenemos 800,000 hombres de exceso por año, que carecen de lo indispensable y que bien podrían ser enviados a la Manchuria. Si no ponemos atajo a esta invasión china, dentro de cinco años, tendremos allí más de 600 millones de chinos demás.

Cuando se suscribió el Tratado de Washington, la prensa japonesa dió la voz de alarma, resultando de esto que el Emperador reuniera un consejo secreto que resolvió enviarme en misión secreta a los Estados Unidos para compulsar las opiniones de los más destacados internacionalistas, los que, me declararon que este Tratado había sido sugerido por los Estados Unidos, pero que ellos, de su parte, no se oponían a nuestra política expansionista en Manchu-

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ria. Al regresar de esta alta misión, en Shangay, los chinos intentaron victimarme arrojándome una bomba de la cual salvé milagrosamente. En respuesta a ese atentado, no me queda sino intensificar mi política con mano de hierro para lograr nuestro objeto sobre Manchuria y luchar así por el progreso del Japón.

La guerra que sostuvimos con Rusia, no fué sino un juego diplomático, porque en realidad, ella se hizo a la China, pero ahora, antes de declararle la guerra a los chinos, se hace necesario aplastar a los Estados Unidos en la misma forma como lo hiciéramos con los rusos. Antes de conquistar la China, debemos conquistar Manchuria y Mongolia, y, para conquistar al Mundo, debemos comenzar por la China; logrado este objetivo, iremos sobre Asia Menor, India, Singapore, Indo-China, Java, Filipinas, etc., etc. pueblos que reconocerán humillados nuestro poderio; solo entonces, el mundo reconocerá que Asia es para los japoneses, y seremos siempre temidos. Esta fué también la idea del emperador Menshihito quien nos legó estos deseos para que nosotros lo prosiguiéramos como una herencia sagrada. Pero ahora hallamos dificultades, porque aunque el Tratado de Washington es un tratado meramente comercial, los capitalistas anglo-americanos, intentan con su dinero contrarrestar nuestra influencia en la China, y en esto se asemeja a la Conferencia de Desarme, con la que se intenta restringir nuestra capacidad bélica. Esta limitación no tiene otro fin que poner atajo a nuestros planes sobre la China para que sus riquezas pasen al poder de ellos. Todo esto, es llanamente política angio-americana para derrumbar al Japón.

Más, considerando el problema bajo el punto de vista comercial, tenemos que los ingleses se abastecen de materia prima en Australia y la India; los Estados Unidos, en América del Sur y el Canadá, y de esta manera, sostienen sus industrias y se hallan capacitados para comerciar con los chinos. En cambio, nosotros, tenemos exceso de habitantes, escasez de provisiones y materia prima. En esta situación no podemos competir con ellos, y la amenaza mas grande para el Japón es el resurgimiento de la China; pesen a sus guerras civiles, pues ya posee industrias que pueden competir con las nuestras. Nuestra producción, está exclusivamente a expensas del comercio chino, y cuando la unificación de la China sea una realidad, su industria progresará. La mercadería americana y europea, será vendida a bajos precios, llegando el caso de que nuestro comercio sea un fracaso. Por otra parte, el partido japonés de oposición Mansahito, nos llevará a la ruina si pone en ejecución el Tratado de Washington, como parece quiere intentarlo.

El futuro del Japón tanto como su situación actual dependen solo de la conquista de la Manchuria y la Mongolia, única forma de

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ahogar el progreso de la industria china, procurando contrarrestar la influencia anglo-americana. Estas medidas son salvadoras.

Una vez conquistadas la Mongolia y la Manchuria, estableceremos allí nuestro centro de operaciones, y con pretextos comerciales, podremos dominar a la China. Con el gobierno de ambos territorios, tendremos el control de los intereses chinos y con este sistema, y con estos mismos intereses, proseguiremos extendiendo nuestro plan de expansión a la India, Asia Menor, Asia Central, Filipinas y Europa.

Manchuria y Mongolia, son la llave de nuestras aspiraciones; son puntos estratégicos para nuestras operaciones, y el final será nuestro derecho a la vida.

Con el progreso de nuestras industrias necesitaremos materia prima, y para ser una potencia, necesitamos expansión territorial. Con el desenvolvimiento de nuestra política en Manchuria y Mongolia, resolveremos todos nuestros problemas, y llegaremos a convertirnos en una gran potencia. Así solucionaremos nuestro exceso de pobladores y nos será fácil enviar a esos territorios 700,000 inmigrantes por año.

No olvidemos pues que, para el poderío del Japón no hay otra solución que ésta: la conquista de Manchuria y Mongolia.

### **Manchuria no es territorio chino.**

Según la historia, llegamos a esta conclusión: Manchuria y Mongolia, no son territorios chinos ni mucho menos, una anexión especial. Nuestros eruditos, investigando este asunto, han llegado a demostrar que los territorios mencionados no pertenecen a la China, y esta tesis, ha sido ya sustentada ante el mundo por la Universidad del Imperio.

Desgraciadamente para nosotros, cuando la guerra con los rusos, tuvimos la debilidad de reconocer Mongolia y Manchuria como territorios chinos, como también lo hicieramos en la Conferencia de Washington. Esta es la causa por la que, la diplomacia internacional reconoce esos territorios como chinos, y por todo esto, el Japón encuentra en Manchuria y Mongolia inmensos obstáculos para el desarrollo de sus intereses.

Después de la restauración de la República en la China, han sido anexadas a la República, como territorios especiales; Si-Chon, Sum Kion, Mongolia y Manchuria, pero debemos aguardar el momento oportuno, para declarar que esos territorios no le pertenecen. Nuestro plan sistemático debe ser ganar terreno pulgada a pulgada tanto en Mongolia Interior como en la Exterior, para ampliar nuestra expansión, y llegar a la captura de los intereses del Sur de la

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Manchuria. Para esto, debemos tomar como base las 21 demandas, proponiendo de nuestra parte las siguientes condiciones que nos servirán de punto de partida para propulsar nuestros intereses por muchos años:

1°—Concesión de Manchuria por un término no menor de 30 años con un plazo prorrogable al finalizar este arreglo.

2°—Los ciudadanos japoneses residentes en Mongolia Exterior, como Interior, tendrán amplias garantías y libertad para el ejercicio de su comercio, agricultura e industrias. Estas garantías deben ser extensivas a los braceros y obreros. Los japoneses residentes en el Norte y Sur de la Manchuria, gozarán del derecho de inmunidad.

3°—Deben pasar a nuestro poder los 19 yacimientos de minas de hierro y carbón de Mukden y Kirin, conjuntamente que sus zonas selváticas.

4°—La construcción del ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, como el de la Mongolia Oriental, es indispensable, procurando privilegios especiales. Cualquier empréstito externo que desea hacer la China, debe antes consultarlo al Japón.

5°—La China si necesitare expertos en economía política, finanzas, milicia, etc., cualquiera que sea el ramo, debe solicitarlos del Japón.

6°—El Japón en la Manchuria, podrá establecer su policía propia, y los residentes coreanos, deben permanecer bajo nuestro control.

7°—La concesión de la Administración del ferrocarril Kirin-Chan-Chung, debe ser prorrogado por 99 años más.

8°—Toda la producción de Manchuria debe ser vendida exclusivamente al Japón antes que a los Estados Unidos o a Europa.

9°—Las pertenencias mineras de la provincia de Hai-Lun-Kong, deben pasar ampliamente a nuestro poder.

10°—Debemos estar sólidamente facultados para la construcción del ferrocarril de Kirin a Huinen, y el otro de Chan Chun a Dairen.

11°—Recuperaremos los derechos que tiene ahora Rusia en el Ferrocarril Oriental por concepto de empréstitos hechos a esta empresa.

12°—Procuraremos gozar de amplios poderes en los puertos de An-Tung y Yi-Kow.

13°—El Banco Central de Manchuria debe ser capitalizado por banqueros chinos y japoneses.

14°—Debemos exigir la exclusiva del comercio ganadero en Manchuria.

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### **Los avances de nuestra política en la Mongolia.**

Nuestra táctica política en Mongolia, debe consistir en alentar a los monarquistas, apoyarlos para que, en reconocimiento sean nuestros aliados.

Considerando este asunto, en misión secreta, hemos enviado 19 oficiales de reserva disfrazados de chinos a fin de evitar recelos de las autoridades locales. Esta misión lleva por objeto, vigilar y controlar el régimen monárquico en Mongolia.

Cuando nuestra inmigración vaya a Mongolia, adquiriremos tierras baratas: en las fértiles y cultivables, sembraremos arroz, y las otras las dedicaremos a la ganadería. De esta manera, tendremos elementos de vida, buen ganado para nuestro ejército. El beneficio de las carnes, en esta zona, incrementará la industria de las conservas para su exportación a Europa y América, y los cueros por otra parte, fomentarán la industria nacional.

Se hace necesario que impulsemos secretamente nuestra influencia, antes de que la China y Rusia se den cuenta de nuestras intenciones expansionistas. Adquiriendo una vasta extensión territorial mongola, a bajo precio, después, habremos logrado posesionarnos de tal extensión, que ya nadie podrá precisar, donde concluyen las posesiones japonesas y dónde las mongolas.

Para que rinda buenos efectos el plan que propongo, debe comenzarse desde este año (1926) procurando que el Ministerio de la Guerra, invierta secretamente un millón de yens, para enviar 400 oficiales disfrazados de chinos o de misioneros a la Mongolia. Entre otras cosas, procuremos estrechar nuestras relaciones con la familia real mongola, a fin de obtener, toda clase de facilidades para la adquisición de territorios.

Todo esto, redundará para el Japón en éxito de mas de cien años.

### **Protección de la inmigración coreana en la Manchuria.**

Desde que tomamos posesión de la Corea, todo parecía halagador, pero, después de la guerra europea, cuando el Presidente de los Estados Unidos, propuso sus famosos catorce puntos, todas las naciones pequeñas intentaron su emancipación. Hasta la Corea quiso independizarse. Convirtieron la Manchuria en el centro de sus operaciones contra nosotros, por eso, la inmigración de coreanos a Manchuria aumentó en varios millones. Pero aún frente a esta situación podemos sacar ventajas, dominando a los coreanos, se convertirán en efectivos aliados nuestros, y procurando la estrechez

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de relaciones entre chinos y coreanos podremos lograr la explotación de las tierras vírgenes de Manchuria y Mongolia.

Debemos procurar que los coreanos nacionalizados chinos adquieran propiedades agrícolas en Manchuria y Mongolia. Se formará el Banco Japonés, y éste como la Empresa del Ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, facilitarán empréstitos a los coreanos nacionalizados chinos a fin de que puedan impulsar sus industrias, y así se nos presenta una brillante ocasión para fomentar y acrecentar nuestra inmigración.

No importa que los coreanos se nacionalicen chinos, al fin y al cabo, ellos serán siempre súbditos japoneses, como sucede con los japoneses radicados en Sud-América, quienes, aunque se nacionalizan en esos países, siguen siendo siempre japoneses. Cuando el número de coreanos nacionalizados chinos llegue más o menos a los dos millones y medio, y se produzca un conflicto con la China, ésta es gente que puede salir en defensa de nuestros intereses. Aún en tiempo de paz podemos utilizarlos para soliviantar las masas populares chinas en contra de la República. Pero, con todo debemos estar precavidos, porque bien puede el gobierno chino, incitar a estos mismos coreanos contra nosotros, llegado este caso, le declararíamos la guerra a la China aunque tenemos la amenaza de una intervención de parte del Sovjet.

En el supuesto de que Rusia y China soliviantaran a los coreanos contra nosotros, sufriríamos un rotundo fracaso en nuestro plan expansionista, y quien sabe, si en la opinión de nuestros conciudadanos se opere tal cambio que sería una desgracia para nuestra política.

A todo lo expuesto aun no le hallo la solución mas eficiente para evitar el peligro que nos amenaza. Nuestras miras son, la conquista de Mongolia y Manchuria, y con respecto a los coreanos, no debemos perderlos de vista ejerciendo sobre ellos estricta vigilancia.

Si se llevaran a cabo las condiciones que más adelante formuló, entonces, nuestra organización policial la haremos lo mas eficientemente posible.

A los coreanos debemos halagarlos con política de contemplación prestándoles ayuda financiera mediante el ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano; brindándoles protección y proporcionándoles toda clase de facilidades para el progreso de sus industrias.

La inmigración coreana a esas zonas, es importante desde el punto de vista de la defensa de nuestras fronteras como también del económico. Si hacemos un censo de coreanos emigrados contaremos un millón en Manchuria y Mongolia, y todos ellos han invertido fuertes capitales que aumentan día a día.

Mediante esta inmigración habremos logrado la única forma de

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reasumir nuestros privilegios en Manchuria y Mongolia, y, jurídicamente, nadie podrá objetarnos.

### **La construcción del ferrocarril de Mongolia y Manchuria.**

Las vías de comunicación son la base fundamental de la defensa de una Nación, y ello equivale a una guerra ya ganada, como en nuestro caso es la defensa de nuestras finanzas. China, solo cuenta con 7,300 millas férreas, y Manchuria y Mongolia con 3,000 millas lo que representa el 40% de las construcciones ferroviarias chinas. Aún en el caso de que tuvieran de 5 a 6 mil millas, no representaría nada en relación a su extensión territorial y su capacidad productiva. Los ferrocarriles que hemos construido, se encuentran en su mayor parte al Sur de Manchuria, en el norte, no tenemos hecho nada en este sentido. En el sur hay muchos chinos y su defensa nacional como su política nos perjudican.

Para la explotación de las riquezas del suelo manchú, necesitamos cimentar nuestra defensa nacional, y hacer cualquier sacrificio para construir el ferrocarril Nor-Manchuriano. Mediante esta obra podremos enviar inmigración japonesa en gran escala: así facilitaremos nuestra defensa, y tendremos en nuestro poder la política y la economía manchúes.

Nuestras miras sobre el ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, han sido con fines comerciales, pero hasta ahora no habíamos pensado en una acción militar, es por esto que en lo sucesivo, debemos pensar en la construcción de ferrocarriles tanto en Manchuria como en la Mongolia, los que, atravesando todo el territorio lo circunden como un anillo de hierro, rodeado de esta manera, tendremos el control comercial, político y aún podremos observar sus movimientos militares en el centro de esa zona, logrando entorpecer su desarrollo y procurando eliminar la influencia rusa. Este ferrocarril, será la llave principal de nuestra expansión. Actualmente existen dos puntos principales: el primero es el ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, y el segundo, el Oriental Chino. Con las riquezas de la provincia de Kirin, dentro de poco, se podrá construir un gran ferrocarril, obra que emprenderá el gobierno chino. Estos capitales chinos unidos a los de Mukden y Hai-Lun Kuen llevarán a efecto esta empresa lo que implicará para nosotros en el ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano un grave obstáculo.

Felizmente la situación financiera de Mukden sufre ahora de aguda crisis y nosotros, les negaremos recursos; no podrán hacer nada, y aprovechando esta oportunidad lograremos ir siempre adelante hasta llegar al éxito. Más, si procuramos tomar las medidas tendientes a ocasionar la baja de la moneda en Manchuria, se pre-

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sentará la situación mas apremiante en su actual crisis, y entonces Mukden, tendrá un tipo de moneda igual a la del Soviet, y no podrá reorganizarse ni progresar. Lo que nos es imposible es destruir la influencia del ferrocarril Oriental chino, pero felizmente, este ferrocarril está hecho de tal manera que solo servirá para fines comerciales, mas no así para el estratégico-militar, además, la influencia rusa, cada día se desprestigia más, y ya no tiene fuerza suficiente para avanzar sobre Manchuria y Mongolia. En adelante cuando los chinos tengan intenciones de construir el ferrocarril, ya estarán bajo nuestro control. El gobierno de Mukden, sin saberlo, parece tener vastos conocimientos militares, por cuyo motivo ha construido el ferrocarril de Tafu-San a Tun-Lui y de Kirin a Hay Lun.

Se asegura que el gobierno chino intenta la prolongación del ferrocarril de Ta-Fu-San: de Kirin a Hay Lun. Construídos éstos ferrocarriles, cualquier expedición militar de Pekín para Manchuria, no necesita del ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano. Pero la amenaza mas grande para nosotros, sería la construcción del ferrocarril de Mukden a Hay Lun y de Hay Lun a Kirin pasando por Usan hasta Harbin, con estas líneas situadas a derecha e izquierda, el ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano quedaría rodeado convirtiéndose en un pequeño distrito. Por esto nuestro comercio y nuestra política quedarían restringidos en Manchuria y Mongolia, como hemos quedado restringidos por el Tratado de Washington.

Con la construcción de los ferrocarriles mencionados el nuestro de Sud-Manchuria quedaría bloqueado como voy a demostrarlo:

1°—La China proyecta la construcción de los ferrocarriles de Soc-Lun a Tu-Nan y otro de Kirin a Harbin.

2°—Rusia tiene intenciones de hacer los ferrocarriles de Hantan a Patunan, otro de Kirin a Hay-Lun y un tercero de Hen-Hay-Wu a Mukden.

El proyecto de construcción de ferrocarriles por parte de Rusia, le sirve de protección sobre el ferrocarril oriental chino, y como medio de ampliar su imperialismo. No obstante de ser Rusia un país débil, no deja de preocuparnos. Su plan es obstaculizar nuestro ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, y por eso, debemos estar prevenidos contra cualquier avance o acción de parte de los rusos, gestionando ante el gobierno chino que éstos avancen hacia el Sur, tomando como pretexto para contrarrestar a Rusia, su propaganda comunista, y de este modo lograremos avanzar hasta el norte de Manchuria. Conseguido este objeto, nos apoderaremos de sus riquezas.

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Con este plan, en el Sur contendremos a los chinos en su avance al norte, y en el norte, impediremos que los rusos avancen al sur. Para enfrentarnos a Rusia, sea política y económicamente, debemos presentar a la vanguardia a los chinos quedando nosotros a la retaguardia. Solo así impediremos su avance, aunque debemos también adoptar medidas secretas para entendernos con los rusos para que presione a la China y evitemos nosotros los daños que podamos tener en Manchuria y Mongolia. En el periodo del premier Kato reanudamos nuestras relaciones con Rusia, y tuvimos como embajador a Yuffe con quien en un acuerdo privado, gestionamos adoptar medidas de presión contra la China.

En una de estas conferencias secretas, Rusia expuso al Japón lo siguiente: *"Desgraciadamente la frontera Ruso-China está en arco. Rusia no tiene intenciones de conquistar territorio ajeno, y además, las fronteras del norte son estériles y frías; carece de importancia para la construcción de un ferrocarril, y por estas razones, nos hemos apoderado del ferrocarril Oriental Chino tomando participación en sus intereses y Rusia no abandonará jamás éstos intereses porque ellos le representa la única salida al Pacífico por el puerto de Gladivostok"*. Si estas declaraciones de Rusia causan intranquilidad, nosotros, debemos estarlo aún más.

La posesión del ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, no es empresa que nos tenga muy satisfechos. Nuestros planes posteriores deben extenderse al Sur como al Norte, porque al Norte de Manchuria como al Este, existen riquísimas zonas territoriales donde puede desarrollarse nuestra industria. Si la población china aumenta en Mongolia y Manchuria, política y económicamente nos perjudicaría, por eso, cuanto antes, debemos lanzarnos a la conquista del Norte para el éxito duradero de nuestros planes.

En caso de que el ferrocarril oriental chino se extendiera hasta el Norte, sería un peligro para nuestra expansión territorial. Nos traería como resultado una conflagración Ruso-Japonesa, pero llegado este caso, adoptaremos las mismas medidas que en nuestra primera guerra con Rusia; nos apoderamos del ferrocarril Oriental Chino para reemplazarlo con el Sud-Manchuriano tomando posesión de la provincia de Kirin para sustituir la base naval de Dairen. Por las riquezas del Norte de Manchuria tenemos que enfrentarnos a Rusia, conflicto inevitable para el progreso y éxito del Japón. Si no resolvemos este dilema, tendremos graves obstáculos en nuestros planes. Actualmente, pedimos de la China concesiones en sus importantes ferrocarriles con propósitos militares, pero cuando sean prolongados al norte, vendrá la intervención rusa oponiéndose y originando una guerra con nosotros.

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## EJECUCION DE NUESTROS PLANES FERROVIARIOS EN MANCHURIA Y MONGOLIA

### Ferrocarril Tun Lui-Jehol.

Este ferrocarril puede tener una extensión de 447 millas: su construcción puede costar 50 millones de yens, pero una vez concluido será para el Japón de grandes expectativas. Entre todos los ferrocarriles de Mongolia y Manchuria, éste es el más importante, tanto comercialmente cuanto militar y políticamente.

Nuestro Ministerio de Guerra en compañía de la Empresa del Ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, ha realizado minuciosas investigaciones por mas de diez veces sobre terrenos de la Mongolia Interior, dando como resultado el descubrimiento de tierras fértiles, donde podemos enviar con poco esfuerzo, 20 millones de inmigrantes. Actualmente esta zona, produce 2 millones de reses. Con el tráfico de este ferrocarril tendremos toda clase de facilidades, provisiones, y se impulsaría la producción para su exportación a Europa y América. Además la especialidad de Mongolia está en sus lanas; cada cabeza de ganado lanar da seis libras de lana al año, mientras en el Japón solo se logran 2 libras anuales por cabeza. Este cálculo está basado en la experiencia, agregando de que la lana mongola es superior en calidad a la de Australia. Por su bajo precio, su calidad, y su abundancia, esta producción es una riqueza oculta a los ojos del mundo. Hecho este ferrocarril, el Japón incrementará su producción aumentándola en un décuplo, pero, estas grandes riquezas deben permanecer secretas. Tenemos que cuidarnos de los anglo-americanos porque su producción lanar es escasa y ellos si se dan cuenta vendrán a disputarnos la posesión de estos territorios. Debemos darnos prisa en la construcción de este ferrocarril, que, llegado el momento aunque otros países noten su importancia, ya será tarde y nada podrán hacer.

### El ferrocarril de Tao-Nan a Soo-Luen (1).

De ser construido este ferrocarril, tendría una extensión de 136 millas con un costo de 10 millones de yens. Indudablemente nosotros tendremos una guerra con Rusia por el Norte de Manchuria, y es entonces que podemos utilizar este ferrocarril, para el traslado de nuestras tropas del Sur al Norte de Manchuria, como también para impedir el avance de los rusos hacia el Norte. Comercialmente este ferrocarril puede rendirnos ingentes riquezas a lo largo del río Tao-Ye con cuyos resultados estamos en condiciones de sostener el

(1) Este ferrocarril se encuentra construido en la actualidad.

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ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano. Además la Mongolia Interior, podemos aprovecharla en beneficio de nuestra política de expansión mediante nuestra influencia para colonizarla. Llegada la ocasión, en Mongolia Interior como en la Exterior, adquiriremos yacimientos mineros, tierras cultivables y selváticas. Simultáneamente usaremos el ferrocarril de Tun-Shin a Jehol para penetrar al Sur de Mongolia, y así mantendremos el contacto del Sur con el Norte. Cuando tengamos exceso de producción, emplearemos ambos ferrocarriles prolongándolos hasta la Mongolia Exterior.

Incrementada la riqueza de estas regiones, ella formará la base de nuestra economía interna, pero, una vez hecho el ferrocarril de Tao-Nan a Soo-Luen, tenemos el peligro del aumento de la población china con gran riesgo de ver trancos nuestros planes sobre Mongolia, convirtiéndose más bien en provecho de ellos. Felizmente la zona del ferrocarril, pertenece a la ex-monarquía mongola. Con previsión adquiriremos toda esa extensión territorial, y de este modo repeleremos a los chinos, por otra parte debemos ejercer presión sobre los mongoles, para que ellos impidan el ingreso de chinos en sus territorios, y con esta política los chinos se ahuyentarán de Mongolia.

### **El ferrocarril de Chan-Chun a Tao-Nan (2).**

Este ferrocarril, tendría 131 millas y su costo sería de once millones de yens, siendo importante su situación financiera, por recorrer la zona más rica del Norte de Manchuria. Su construcción facilitaría las comunicaciones entre el Norte y Sur de Manchuria. Esta obra arruinaría al ferrocarril Oriental Chino, sosteniendo el ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano. No debemos olvidar que la parte alta del río Sangari, nos pertenece con todas sus ingentes producciones. Cerca de Tay Say, podemos instalar una Central Eléctrica. Además, este ferrocarril puede desarrollar una población industrial y agrícola numerosa. Cuando esté construido, lo podemos anexar en esta forma: Tay-Loy a Tao-Nan; Tay Loy a Ta; Tay Loy a Tsi-tsi. Har, es decir formando un triángulo. Las ramificaciones de este ferrocarril, nos servirán para aislar al transiberiano, entonces, podremos apoderarnos de todas las riquezas de Manchuria. Militarmente, ya podemos dar el primer paso avanzando hacia Hay-Lun Kuong. Ahora el ferrocarril de Chan-Chun atraviesa Fu-yi Tay Soy hasta Tao Nan formando un pequeño círculo pero que, militarmente es una línea importante y estratégica.

Para la conquista inmediata de Mongolia, se hace indispensable la construcción de este círculo ferroviario. La zona que com-

(2) Esta construcción ferroviaria no se ha llegado a realizar, no obstante el interés del Japón por llevarla a efecto.

prende esta obra es amplia y tiene pocos pobladores, y sus tierras son tan fértiles que no necesitan abono por lo menos en cincuenta años. Si este ferrocarril cae en nuestro poder, las riquezas de Manchuria y Mongolia serán totalmente nuestras, y a esas regiones podemos enviar de 20 a 30 millones de inmigrantes japoneses.

Construiremos también el ferrocarril de Kirin a Tun Fa en conexión con nuestro ferrocarril de Corea a Ouinen, y así podremos comunicarnos directamente hasta Tokio y Dairen. En un caso de guerra nuestra expedición militar, saldría directamente de Tokio hacia el norte de la Manchuria y Mongolia, y en cambio las tropas chinas serán impotentes para llegar hasta el mismo punto.

El libre tráfico de los submarinos rusos en el mar del Japón será imposible; porque no podrán penetrar en el estrecho de Corea. La única esperanza nuestra está en la construcción del ferrocarril de Kirin a Huinen y de Chon Chon a Dairen. (Ultimamente a raíz del conflicto de Manchuria, el Japón aprovechó la oportunidad para construir este ferrocarril como lo ha comunicado el cable).

En esta zona tendremos materia prima y subsistencia suficientes que ya no tendremos necesidad de buscarlas en otra parte y podemos mantener una guerra con cualquier potencia. Llegado el momento las reclamaciones de la China sobre Manchuria y Mongolia no tendrían importancia, porque estaremos preparados y les infundiremos respeto y temor.

Para concluir con la tercera parte de este plan sobre la conquista de la Manchuria y Mongolia que forma el proyecto del príncipe Menshihito debo decir que su éxito depende de la construcción de estos ferrocarriles.

Para darse cuenta exacta de los puntos de que consta este plan mencionado, la primera parte, consta de la conquista de las Islas Formosas; la segunda comprende la sojuzgación de Corea, la tercera, el punto que acabo de exponer.

#### **El ferrocarril de Kirin a Huinen.**

El ferrocarril de Kirin a Ton Fa, ya está concluido; pero el de Ton Fa a Huinen aún no se ha comenzado. El camino de Huinen a Lu-Tau-Kau es de vía angosta, pues solo mide dos yardas y media de ancho, pero, podemos construir un ferrocarril. El costo de la línea férrea de Ton Fa a Huinen, sería de 8 millones de yens, y el de Ton Fa a Lo-Tau-Kau puede tener un costo de 10 millones de yens, lo que suma más o menos veinte millones de yens. De esta obra depende el éxito de nuestro plan de colonizaciones en dicha zona.

Antes, para trasladarnos a Europa, teníamos paso obligado por Dairen y Pu-Yen, ahora de Chen-Kong pasando por Huinen y Si-

bería podemos llegar a Europa llevando por tan importante vía nuestras aspiraciones. En lo futuro, tanto los pasajeros como la mercadería se servirán de este ferrocarril con paso obligatorio por nuestros territorios. Cuando llegue el momento, impulsaremos sus actividades intensificándolas en dichos territorios, y sin temor, insensiblemente habremos conquistado la Mongolia y la Manchuria.

De esta manera, habríamos ejecutado la tercera parte del plan de conquista de Menshihito y solo así, habrá llegado el momento de dominar el mundo.

#### **El ferrocarril de Kirin-Huinen y el mar del Japón.**

Para la construcción de este importante ferrocarril, procuremos que de Huinen se bifurquen dos ramales, sea a Chen-Chun, o sea a Lo-Chon según convenga a nuestros intereses. Pero, considerando el asunto militarmente, nos conviene el ramal a Lo-Chon, por tratarse de uno de los mejores puertos para estación comercial. Puesto en actividad este puerto, fácilmente arruinaremos el puerto ruso de Pun-Yan, siéndonos sencillo el acaparamiento de todos los productos nor-manchurianos. Aunque Dairen no nos pertenece, mientras no tengamos Manchuria y Mongolia en nuestras manos, tendremos inmensas dificultades, pero conseguido este fin, Dairen no debe preocuparnos. En tiempo de guerra, como necesitamos transportar mercaderías de Manchuria a Mongolia, saldrán por Dairen. Fracasará nuestro plan en el caso de que la escuadra enemiga bloquee los estrechos de Thusima y Kurila porque entonces no podremos extraer las riquezas de esas zonas, y tendremos la guerra perdida. Muy a pesar nuestro, y posiblemente después de la guerra europea, los anglo-americanos, se han aliado secretamente para restringir nuestros planes expansionistas en la China, por nuestro futuro, urge declarar la guerra a los Estados Unidos para castigar a la China y al Mundo entero. Los Estados Unidos, tiene una escuadra establecida en Filipinas, muy próxima a los estrechos de Thusima y Kurila, en la suposición de que los submarinos bloquearan ambos estrechos, entonces entorpecerían nuestro aprovisionamiento de comestibles y materia prima de Mongolia y Manchuria. Pero, terminado el ferrocarril Kirin-Huinen, Manchuria y Corea formarán una gran red de comunicaciones, mientras por otra parte, los ferrocarriles de Chan-Chun a Tao-Nan Tay-Loy hasta Tao-Nan formarán un pequeño círculo ferroviario y nuestro sistema de comunicaciones será perfecto, obteniendo facilidades inmensas para el traslado de tropas como de mercaderías.

Llegado el caso de guerra podremos por este sistema abastecernos de lo necesario, aunque los Estados Unidos mantenga su po-

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derosa escuadra y China y Rusia formen dos fuerzas militares; pero, aún así, no podrán contra nosotros. La Corea estará controlada por nosotros, y nada podrá, si en tiempo de guerra intenta revelarse contra nuestra autoridad.

Para el éxito de nuestra política, es indispensable la pronta ejecución del ferrocarril Kirin-Huinen porque la lucha con Rusia por Mongolia y Manchuria, es inevitable. Poniendo en práctica la tercera parte del plan Menshihito nuestra primera expedición partirá de Fukuoka o Hiroshina hacia Corea y de acá, avanzará al sur de Manchuria poniendo atajo al avance de los chinos que marcharían al norte.

La segunda expedición militar, saldrá de Nagoya y Kuansay a Touruga hasta el puerto de Chin-Chon pasando por el ferrocarril Kirin-Huinen progresando en su avance hacia el norte de Manchuria.

La tercera expedición militar, saldrá de Kuantu al puerto de Nigata y de acá avanzará directamente a Chin-Chon o Lo-Chon pasando en su rápido avance al norte por el ferrocarril Kirin-Huinen. La expedición de Pac-Mon-Thu y Sin-Toy saldrá de Aomari y Hakodate para avanzar rápidamente sobre el puerto ruso de Pu-Yen a fin de apoderarse del ferrocarril transiberiano, y avanzar sobre Harbin, tomando Mukden y Mongolia impidiendo así el avance chino al sur. Concentrada toda la expedición en Mongolia y Manchuria, se dividirá en otras dos; la primera marchará al Sur estableciendo su cuartel general en San Hay Kuan para detener a los chinos que avancen al norte. La segunda expedición se dirigirá al norte estableciendo su cuartel en Shi-Shi-Har para detener a los rusos en su avance al sur. Mongolia y Manchuria estarán en nuestro poder y con sus riquezas naturales, materia prima y víveres podremos sostener una guerra por el espacio de diez años.

Ahora haré una exposición del ferrocarril de Kirin a Huinen. El kilometraje desde Chin-Chon hasta Pu-Yen es de 130 millas; de Chin-Chon a Ton Ho, 475 millas; de Chin-Chon a Moche, 500 millas; de Chin-Chon a Nagasaki 650 millas y de Chin-Chon a Fusan 500 millas.

Si surgiera un conflicto con Estados Unidos o Rusia, destruiremos Mongolia y Manchuria, y por defender nuestro plan expansionista, no podremos ni respetar la neutralidad de estas zonas, porque los convertiremos en campos de batalla, es por todo esto que urge la construcción del ferrocarril Kirin-Huinen y de Chan-Chan a Dairen como construcciones militares y como complemento de nuestra defensa nacional. Además posesionados nosotros de la administración del ferrocarril Kirin-Huinen, en poco tiempo, podremos enviar diez millones de japoneses que colonicen y cultiven a

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quellas zonas. Estas colonizaciones tendrán de todo y de esta manera evitaremos la afluencia de chinos en esas regiones. La construcción de esta obra representa para el Japón una obra comercial y militarmente importante.

### **El ferrocarril de Kirin-Huinen y sus fabulosas riquezas. (3)**

Para comenzar esta construcción, se hace necesario que las aguas del río bajen, porque así su costo sería menor. A los costados de este ferrocarril se encuentran ricas canteras cuya explotación requiere maquinarias modernas, y de estas canteras se podría extraer material de construcción para los túneles en un dos y medio de aprovechables. Toda esta zona es rica en maderas y tiene en abundancia materiales de obras. A lo largo del río Kau-Ho, hay ricos yacimientos carboníferos; tierra sólida que puede emplearse en la obra del ferrocarril. Allí no falta nada, lo único que llevaríamos sería cemento, enrielladuras y locomotoras. La naturaleza ha dotado a esta región de ingentes riquezas que servirán de base para la explotación y construcción de este ferrocarril. Sobre el presupuesto mas arriba calculado, este ferrocarril puede construirse con un 70 por ciento de su costo, y el tiempo de su construcción al 40 por ciento sobre el tiempo más arriba calculado.

Quiero indicar ahora sus riquezas naturales; en Thon Fa hay ricas maderas. Por estudios efectuados por nuestro Estado Mayor y la Administración del ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, esta región, se ha observado que produce 20 millones de toneladas de madera al año. Tiene producción para una demanda de 200 años, y el Japón exportará anualmente un millón de toneladas. Tendríamos suficiente madera y ya no necesitaríamos de la importación que hacemos a los Estados Unidos. Nuestra estadística de importación a los Estados Unidos marcan nuestra demanda de 8 a 12 millones anuales. Las selvas de Kirin las hemos estudiado, y trataremos de ocultar sus riquezas al mundo. Si China y Rusia descubrieran todo esto, sin duda inducirían a los Estados Unidos a una intervención para evitar la construcción del ferrocarril. Pero existe otro temor y es que las empresas americanas madereras, se den cuenta e invirtiendo su oro, gestionen ante el gobierno provincial de Mukden la compra de estas riquezas, para defender el comercio de maderas en Oriente, y entonces matarían nuestra industria papelera.

La provincia de Kirin es tan vasta como el Océano. Hace muchos siglos que se halla inexplorada, y solo por este tiempo, ya podemos darnos cuenta de su importancia. La distancia entre Chan-

(3) Este ferrocarril como más adelante se dice, ha sido construido a raíz del último conflicto de Manchuria en un plazo de dos meses solamente).

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Chun, Dairen y Osaka es de 1385 millas y por metro cuadrado de madera se paga 34 centavos, siendo la producción escasa y los fletes caros no podemos competir con los Estados Unidos, pero si tuviéramos el ferrocarril de Kirin a Huinen la distancia de Kirin a Osaka, sería de 700 millas, y el gasto de fletes sería de 13 centavos por metro cuadrado, e indudablemente mataríamos la industria maderera americana. Además la producción de las selvas de Kirin se calcula en 20 millones de toneladas. Se puede obtener una utilidad de cinco yens por tonelada, lográndose hasta 200 millones de yens. En posesión de estas zonas tendremos la fabricación de mueblería, papeles, útiles de escritorio, productos químicos aumentando nuestros ingresos anualmente en unos 20 millones de yens. En San Yao tenemos una rica mina de carbón con una producción de 140 millones de toneladas. Estos yacimientos comparados a los de Fusan son superiores, tiene grandes facilidades para su explotación y puede abastecer a todo el mercado chino.

Si logramos la construcción de este ferrocarril, tranquilamente, habremos logrado la mar de ventajas.

En posesión de estos yacimientos carboníferos, no será difícil para nosotros dar el golpe de muerte a la industria china. Sólo con los minerales de San Yao habremos logrado cinco yens de utilidad por tonelada, que, invertidos en la elaboración de productos químicos, nos darán 16 yens de utilidad lo que importa un ingreso de 200 millones de yens. Ya se ve la importancia de esta obra, y además en To-Fa existe la agricultura ampliamente desarrollada que produce trigo, de diversas especies, maíz, arroz cuya producción asciende anualmente a más de dos millones de can (medida que equivale a más de dos onzas). Funcionan como 20 fábricas de licores chinos que tendrían que abastecerse por fuerza de nuestra industria arrocera. En Tu Fa, existen como 30 fábricas de aceites con una producción de 900,000 cans. Se elabora pasta de soya con la producción de 600,000 paquetes. Con todos estos productos se obtendría el oro indispensable para la construcción del ferrocarril dejando, además una utilidad de más de 29,000 yens por año.

Si tomamos en consideración las minas de carbón, la producción maderera de las selvas y otras industrias más, obtendríamos un rendimiento de 8 millones de yens anuales. Las minas serán nuestras, sus selvas, su comercio, la inmigración, a parte de las ventajas económicas anotadas.

#### **El ferrocarril de Wan-Chang a Hay-San. (4)**

Este ferrocarril tendría una extensión de 173 millas y su costo

(4) Este ferrocarril no ha sido construido.

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sería de 14 millones de yens. La zona que cruzaría es de grandes selvas. Si deseamos mantener nuestro poderío en el ferrocarril Kirin a Huinen, tanto como explotar la zona del norte de Manchuria, sus minerales, como su agricultura, es importante que construyamos el ferrocarril Wan Chang a Hay San. Tiene otra importancia esta obra, y ella es de que el progreso de Huinen depende de su construcción.

Tiene este ferrocarril importancia para el lago Kien Po situado al Sur de Hay-San y al norte de Tu Fa. En este lago se puede efectuar una instalación eléctrica que desarrolle 800,000 caballos de fuerza que pueden reemplazar en Manchuria y Mongolia, la mano de obra con maquinaria eléctrica. Hay otro lago llamado Hen Hay, pero se halla en poder de China y Rusia, y allí también se puede establecer una central eléctrica, y hay el temor de que China y Rusia se alíen para instalarla. Mas, aprovechando de que este año se reúne en Tokio la *Conferencia Internacional de Industrias Eléctricas*, sin que China y Rusia se den cuenta, propondremos ante dicho Congreso, la incompatibilidad de establecer dos centrales eléctricas en un mismo punto. No debemos olvidar que allí tenemos la empresa papelera Gq-Go que funciona en Nen-Ku y cerca a la estación de Hay-San. Puesto que tenemos una fábrica de papel en esa región y que se abastece de materia prima en el mismo lugar, para completar nuestro éxito, debemos establecer la factoría mencionada.

Para nosotros tenemos bastante papel, pero debemos incrementar su producción con la electrificación, a fin de matar la industria china de papeles. El Gobierno provincial de Mukden, proyecta construir el ferrocarril de Kirin a Usan, y este proyecto no tiene otra intención que recuperar las riquezas normanchurianas para exportarlas por el puerto de Uluto y Thien Shin. Para contrarrestar este proyecto, felizmente, tendremos los ferrocarriles de Wan-Ca Chan a Hay-San y de Kirin a Huinen, con lo que traeremos al fracaso los proyectos del gobierno de Mukden. Estos ferrocarriles hacen un transporte de productos a precios cómodos en el Norte de Manchuria, fletes bajos comparando los cobrados por el ferrocarril chino, además pueden ser un 60 por ciento más bajos en comparación a los cobrados por el ferrocarril transiberiano podemos cobrar un 40 por ciento menos.

China y Rusia serán impotentes para competir con nosotros, si logramos construir estos dos ferrocarriles, y nuestro éxito será definitivo.

### **Nuestra táctica comercial en Manchuria.**

Las actividades comerciales de Manchuria cuyo control tenemos,

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se pueden calcular de 70 a 80 millones de yens. La producción mongol-manchuriana de lanas, algodón, soya, pasta de soya, hierro, etc., etc., ocupa en el mundo financiero, el vigésimo puesto; indudablemente en el porvenir, estas riquezas progresarán mucho más aún. Por datos oficiales sabemos que en Yin-Kan hay 38 fábricas chinas de aceite, y nosotros no poseemos ninguna; en Tun Fa, hay 20 fábricas chinas, mientras nosotros no tenemos nada; en Dairen hay 38, y nosotros 7. Esta situación es difícil para nuestra política, y para recuperar estos intereses, se hace necesario poseer todas las vías de comunicaciones a fin de restringir el transporte de importación y exportación. Tendremos también la ayuda financiera de la Bolsa Comercial japonesa que apoyará a nuestros fabricantes de aceite. Mediante estas medidas, fácilmente podremos aplastar a los productores chinos de este producto.

Los residentes chinos en Osaka, compran mercadería japonesa que revenden en Manchuria y Mongolia haciendo fuerte competencia a nuestros comerciantes. La vida para un japonés en Manchuria como en Mongolia, es más costosa que para un comerciante chino, y éste es motivo, porque los nuestros, se ven obligados a vender su mercadería más cara, situación que nos llevará al fracaso. El comerciante chino, además, adquiere esa mercadería en Osaka a precios subidos siendo de pésima calidad, y, en comparación de los mismos artículos que exportamos del mismo lugar, tenemos un costo del diez por ciento menos. El comerciante chino tiene en su contra el pago de fletes, pues abona 2.70 más por tonelada que el comerciante japonés. Y con todas estas desventajas en contra suya, el comerciante chino, compete con los nuestros, llevándolos a la ruina. Tenemos que llegar pues a esta conclusión de considerar nuestros comerciantes incapacitados, pese a la ayuda financiera que les presta el gobierno, facilitándoles empréstitos a largos plazos y con un interés de tipo bajo.

Es doloroso decirlo, pero el comerciante japonés aún con este apoyo, no puede detener su fracaso.

En lo sucesivo debemos preocuparnos de nuestras actividades comerciales en Manchuria y Mongolia aún con más empeño, adoptando medidas radicales para contrarrestar la competencia china, a fin de recuperar nuestra fuerza comercial en esos territorios. Procuraremos llevar a cabo la exportación de los productos especiales de Manchuria y Mongolia al mundo. Con relación a estos productos, procuraremos la exclusiva, manteniendo allí nuestro control económico. Con esta política, llevaremos adelante nuestro plan expansionista, y pondremos atajo al avance del capitalismo americano en esas zonas, y con la exclusiva, detendremos el progreso del comercio chino.

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**Con una red de comunicaciones ferroviarias y marítimas,  
tendremos el dominio del Océano Pacífico.**

Toda la producción especial de Manchuria y Mongolia, se exporta por el puerto de Dairen, An-Tun y Yin Kau, pero la principal, se hace solo por Dairen. El tráfico anual de barcos en este puerto asciende a 7,200 barcos con un tonelaje de 11.650,000. El movimiento comercial de Manchuria y Mongolia llega a 70 por ciento de las negociaciones. Los barcos que hacen escala en Dairén llevan itinerario fijo con quince rutas distintas. Teniendo en nuestro poder el control marítimo y terrestre mongol-manchuriano, restaremos importancia a los puertos de An-Tun y Yin Kau. Restada la importancia a estos puertos, obtendremos la exclusiva de soya para abastecer de ella a la China. Bien sabemos que es costumbre tradicional en la China el consumo de aceite de maní y de soya, pues en caso de guerra, prohibimos la exportación de estos productos, y entonces en la China, se originará la crisis de las provisiones. Con la pasta de soya también se abonon las tierras de los arrozales, y ésta es la materia prima para la agricultura tanto en China como en el Japón. Si obtenemos la exclusiva de este producto, como también la de los transportes, tendremos dicha pasta a bajo precio y nos servirá de excelente abono para nuestra agricultura. Con la adquisición de los yacimientos carboníferos de Fusan y San Yao y la materia prima de abono para la agricultura, de hecho mataremos la industria agrícola china. Para el sostenimiento de nuestra expansión territorial se hacen indispensables estas medidas.

Además tanto en Europa como en América, existe un consumo fuerte de soya y obtenidas las exclusivas mencionadas, con el control de todas las comunicaciones, cuando el mundo tenga necesidad de estos productos, estará a nuestras expensas. Para unificar el comercio japonés en Mongolia y Manchuria, debemos realizar este plan. Debemos terminar nuestro programa ferroviario como la fórmula más efectiva para presionar al comercio chino.

Los comerciantes chinos aun emplean buques de vela para sus negociaciones, y aun así, nuestros comerciantes no pueden competir

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con ellos para llevarlos a la ruina, situación que no nos tiene satisfechos. En adelante debemos invertir fuertes capitales para arruinar al comercio chino con sus buques veleros, y premiaremos a nuestros comerciantes que más se asemejen a los comerciantes chinos en instalación de fábricas de aceite y el modo de hacer el transporte en buques veleros. Se hace necesario impulsar nuestra compañía de vapores en Dairén, El Gobierno y la empresa de nuestro ferrocarril sudmanchuriano, deben procurarles empréstitos a bajo interés. Al próximo año construiremos barcos en Dairén con un total de 50,000 toneladas.

Esta es la única manera de conquistar en el Asia Oriental el poder de todas las comunicaciones.

Ahora tenemos el ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano; el poder político en Mongolia y en Manchuria, sin contar los productos que podemos exportar. Hablando comercialmente, nuestro progreso en Dairén será un éxito.

### **Debemos implantar en Mongolia y Manchuria el patrón de oro**

Aunque en Mongolia y Manchuria, es sólida nuestra influencia político-económica, la circulación actual de su moneda, con respaldo físico en plata, en relación a nuestra garantía en oro, nos causa todo género de entorpecimientos. Nuestro comercio no puede desenvolver sus actividades a causa de esta diferencia como paso a indicarlo:

1°—Nuestros capitales invertidos en Manchuria y Mongolia tienen un respaldo en oro, y allí, sufren depreciación enorme a causa del cambio tanto para la compra de provisiones, materia prima, pago de jornales, etc., etc. Cuando llevamos oro y el cambio de la plata se halla bajo, nuestras pérdidas son incalculables. En muchos casos nuestra moneda equivalente a una libra oro, invertida en Manchuria o en Mongolia, solo se cotiza en ocho soles. Hay industriales japoneses que solicitan préstamos a los Bancos japoneses por 100,000, 200,000 yens, y éstos quedan desgraciadamente reducidos a 160,000 y a 100,000 yens, razón mas que suficiente para que los Bancos no inviertan su dinero en estos préstamos por temor a las alternativas del cambio que puede perjudicarlos.

2°—El comercio chino suba o baje el cambio, no sufre nada, y queda en el mismo estado. Esto favorece al progreso de los buques veleros chinos. Además el comerciante chino está dotado de mucha experiencia, y la naturaleza le ha dado gran visión comercial contra la cual somos impotentes. El cambio nos daña, y no podemos poner atajo a nuestra ruina comercial, pese a nuestras comu-

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nicaciones, a la protección económica que la Bolsa proporciona a nuestros comerciantes: el transporte de soya lo continúan haciendo los veleros chinos.

3º—Si lográramos implantar el patrón de oro en Manchuria y Mongolia, nuestra moneda tendría garantía, seguridad y realce. De este modo estaría en condiciones de adquirir todos los productos especiales, y la moneda china, paulatinamente sufriría depreciación.

4º—Aniquilando a los chinos comercialmente, nos sentiremos dueños de la situación económica y política.

5º—Las tres provincias de Oriente tienen los siguientes Bancos chinos: Banco de Colonización; Banco de Comunicaciones; y el Banco Kuong Shan y otros Bancos de intercambio que han puesto en circulación 100.000 yens, hasta ahora. Estos billetes perjudican a nuestro comercio, por eso, es importante para nosotros abolir el patrón de plata e implantar el de oro, así el comerciante chino no podrá adquirir los productos especiales de Manchuria y Mongolia. Aprovechando esta circunstancia nuestro monopolio comercial y económico será definitivo, obligaremos a las autoridades de Oriente a tener consejeros japoneses, y la Bolsa Comercial como todo el movimiento financiero estarán bajo nuestro único control.

### **El capitalismo extranjero en Mongolia y Manchuria.**

Hasta ahora nuestros antecesores se opusieron a la inversión del capital extranjero en Mongolia y Manchuria, pero la Conferencia de Washington, ha declarado libres el ejercicio de la industria y el comercio. Pero, cuando en un Congreso de economistas internacionales, se tocó este punto de Mongolia y Manchuria, todos contemplaron con recelo esta política económica.

Aprovechando de las declaraciones del Tratado de las Nueve Potencias, que ha declarado libre la industria, demos ocasión a los capitales extranjeros para que sean invertidos en Mongolia y Manchuria, con esta medida, evitaremos sus recelos, y conseguiremos de esta manera el reconocimiento internacional de nuestros privilegios en esa zona.

En lo sucesivo cualquier país que desee invertir sus capitales en Manchuria y Mongolia, tendrá toda clase de facilidades, pero debemos evitar, que el gobierno chino, coloque empréstitos en el extranjero para el desarrollo de su comercio en esos territorios.

Reconocidos nuestros privilegios en Mongolia y Manchuria, tendremos intervención en todos los asuntos de la China. Este proceder es de gran táctica para los intereses del Japón.

### Reorganización del ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano.

El mismo plan que empleamos para sojuzgar a Corea, debemos implantarlo en el ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano japonés. Para beneficio de nuestros planes expansionistas, la reorganización de este ferrocarril, se hace necesaria, a fin de salvar las actuales dificultades.

Las obligaciones que tenemos frente a esta Empresa, están comprendidas en nuestra política interna, porque siempre ha sido la causa de nuestras crisis ministeriales. Siempre que fracasó un gabinete fué debido a nuestra política en Manchuria y Mongolia, siendo en apariencia esta Empresa formada por capitales del pueblo y del Gobierno, ella es propiedad del Estado. Cuando intentamos desenvolver nuestros intereses en este ferrocarril, los demás países, no lo consideran como una empresa particular, sino como un centro de operaciones políticas, por eso, la Conferencia de Washington, restringió su desarrollo progresivo obstaculizando el avance de nuestros planes.

Con relación al ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, tenemos nuestro Estado Mayor en Kuantó; en Dairén hay autoridades japonesas y Cónsul General. Por tener demasiadas autoridades en Dairén, todos los asuntos se consultan entre ellas para llegar a un acuerdo secreto, pero este sistema dá motivo a los chinos para descubrirnos, y tenerlos alertas de los progresos del Ferrocarril Sud-Manchuria. Los asuntos más graves deben resolverse en Tokio por el Gabinete, pero resultan tales divergencias de opiniones, que siempre interrumpen el progreso de nuestros planes.

Por esto, urge la reorganización del ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, incrementando sus progresos; ampliándolo industrialmente y con presteza hacia el corazón de Manchuria y Mongolia y procurando que los chinos, europeos y americanos, inviertan en él sus capitales, reteniendo nosotros el mayor número de acciones, para no perder nuestra fuerza y continuar desarrollando nuestros planes.

En resumen, permitiendo la inversión de capitales extranjeros en este ferrocarril, evitaremos celos, y libremente, podremos llevar adelante la conquista de Manchuria y Mongolia, hallándonos en condiciones de contrarrestar los efectos del Tratado de Washington. Con esta ayuda financiera de ellos podremos impulsar nuestras industrias.

La importancia de este ferrocarril la reseñaré en el próximo capítulo.

### **La explotación del hierro y acero.**

La explotación de hierro y acero en Manchuria afecta directamente a la nación por las alternativas del cambio. En el mundo de las finanzas, se considera este asunto de capital importancia, y nosotros en este ramo no hemos progresado gran cosa, porque no poseemos minas de estos minerales, y tenemos que importarlos de Yantsekiang. Según estudios practicados por nuestro Estado Mayor sabemos que existen en Mongolia y Manchuria, ricos yacimientos de hierro y de acero con una producción calculada en 1,200 millones de toneladas.

La Empresa ferroviaria sud-manchuriana, posee la explotación de estos minerales en Osán. Al principio, la explotación era desconocida en Osán y por esta razón sufrimos pérdidas por el valor de 300,000 yens anuales. Pero, después utilizamos los servicios de un ingeniero alemán quien, tras un informe, indicó la necesidad de la instalación de una nueva maquinaria con la que podríamos obtener una utilidad de cuatro millones de yens anuales. Si los minerales del lago Pun-Kay, nos rinden buenos resultados, los anexaremos a nuestra negociación de Osán, y de este modo tendremos suficiente hierro y acero, sin necesitar ya la importación de ellos de otros países. No olvidemos pues que en Mongolia y Manchuria, existe una producción de 120 millones de toneladas de hierro y acero. Además allí tenemos también carbón cuya producción es de 2,500 millones de toneladas, materia indispensable para alimentar nuestras fundiciones de hierro y acero y así tendremos mineral bastante para sesenta años.

Formulando una síntesis de nuestros intereses tenemos: por tonelada de acero, una utilidad de 100 yens y sobre la producción de 350 millones de toneladas, 3,050 millones de yens. Acá tenemos uno de los más importantes intereses del Japón. La importación que tenemos de 1,120 toneladas, ya no la haríamos mas, porque estos minerales los tendríamos en abundancia en Mongolia y Manchuria y, entonces, seríamos la primera potencia mundial.

### **El problema de la combustión.**

Otro de los problemas que debemos encarar es el de los combustibles como el petróleo, pero felizmente tenemos las minas de carbón de Fusan que producen antracita y aceites combustibles en cantidad que llega a 5,200 toneladas y que se pueden cotizar anualmente en

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250 millones de yens y en 2,000 millones la utilidad que podemos obtener de los derivados químicos que resultarían de la concentración de los humos.

Esta producción que puede revolucionar la industria, será la base del incremento de nuestra defensa nacional. En el supuesto que el carbón, el hierro y la antracita, estuvieran en nuestro poder, nuestro poderío militar y naval será invencible. Hay quienes afirman de que Mongolia y Manchuria son el alma de nuestra nacionalidad, y quienes tal cosas dicen no hacen sino confirmar la verdad.

#### La producción de soda y soda cáustica.

Otra de las industrias que en Mongolia y Manchuria es indispensable implantar es la de la soda y soda cáustica que pueden producir 15 millones anuales de utilidad porque tenemos la materia prima allí mismo. Esta explotación industrial, la haremos completamente independiente del ferrocarril Sud-manchuriano.

(Sigue a esta declaración la exposición de otros puntos, sobre explotación de productos químicos, pero como se hallan en clave, y escapan a las fórmulas químicas universalmente conocidas, su traducción en signos convencionales, se hace imposible, pero el Premier Tanaka, se refiere a la industrialización de otros productos químicos fuera de los mencionados).

Concretando el asunto, si el Japón pudiera tener el control y lograra independizar todas estas industrias, lograría utilidades por el valor de 6,000 millones de yens. Todas las industrias del Sur de Manchuria, nos servirán de base para afianzar nuestra defensa nacional y poder así asegurar nuestra situación comercial.

Se hace indispensable la fundación de hospitales, beneficencias y centros culturales. La inversión de capitales extranjeros, solo será permitida sobre las líneas férreas ya construidas. Para evitar recelos de las otras potencias que pueden maliciar de nuestros planes, podemos deducir como pretexto que el ferrocarril no solo es propiedad nuestra sino de intereses internacionales.

Con esta diplomacia, despistaremos las susceptibilidades que pueda surgir en nuestras relaciones con otros países.

En casos apremiantes en los que necesitemos empréstitos, del extranjero, para adelantar en nuestras expansiones y colonizaciones, permitidas las inversiones de capitales extranjeros, éstos, gustosos, nos facilitarán cualquier otro empréstito, y el gobierno chino, no tendrá la fuerza suficiente para obstaculizarlo.

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Considerando las ingentes riquezas de Mongolia y Manchuria, no olvidemos que éstas se encuentran al norte. Nuestras posesiones de estas riquezas, sólo son a lo largo del ferrocarril de Kirin a Hui-nen, y en el de Chan-Chun a Dairén como las zonas minerales y selváticas. Todos estos intereses deben administrarse por una empresa independiente que no tenga vinculaciones con el ferrocarril sud-manchuriano, porque los intereses del norte, son bastantes para el sostenimiento del ferrocarril citado. Con la inversión de capitales extranjeros en este ferrocarril, ellos no podrán ya intervenir en nuestros asuntos sobre Manchuria y Mongolia, pero debemos saber que en estos últimos meses, la afluencia de chinos del interior a Sud-Manchuria, es alarmante, y sus finanzas como su defensa nacional, se cimentan cada vez más. Nuestra situación en Manchuria es insegura. Nuestros inmigrantes, no se encuentran garantizados por esta inestabilidad de nuestras concesiones. Si tuvieran un apoyo diplomático de parte de nuestro gobierno, quizás, tendrían seguridades, pero por otra parte la situación económica, de nuestros emigrantes no puede competir con la de los santineses, por eso en lo sucesivo, en Manchuria se hace indispensable el sostenimiento de grandes capitales que vayan a la vanguardia para aplastar a los chinos y continuar con nuestra colonización para llegar al éxito. Debemos subvencionar a nuestros emigrantes, construir rápidamente todas las comunicaciones y nuestro plan será la posesión de las riquezas de Manchuria y Mongolia.

Tomemos en consideración que la China y Rusia progresan militarmente cada día más, y, por otra parte, geográficamente; somos vecinos, y por cierto, esto entorpece para cumplir con lo dispuesto en nuestros planes. Para llevar acabo los planes del emperador Men-shihito el progreso de nuestra inmigración en el norte de Manchuria se impone como único medio de aislar las relaciones amistosas entre China y Rusia. De este modo los distanciaremos.

Si surgiera una guerra, nuestros inmigrantes fácilmente, podrán poner atajo a cualquier expedición militar del Sur. Nuestras tropas establecidas en esta zona y unidos a los indígenas podrán prestarles ayuda en un caso dado aún en caso de invasión a la Manchuria y Mongolia. Si llegara el caso de garantizar estos intereses, nuestros emigrantes del norte aprovecharán sus riquezas para sostener las tropas japonesas, y pueden abastecer al país de subsistencias necesarias.

La fusión del Norte de la Manchuria con el Japón es de suma importancia, por eso en adelante, a toda costa debemos afianzarnos avanzando mas al norte.

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### Fundación de un Centro de Colonización.

En el sur de Manchuria se hace necesaria una reorganización completa porque nuestras autoridades, están siempre en desacuerdo, y esto es de importancia para nuestros intereses porque ello impide nuestro rápido progreso en esos territorios. Debido a estos desacuerdos nuestros planes se descubren llegando a conocimiento de las autoridades de Mukden quienes se valen de esto para iniciar campañas internacionales de desprestigio para nuestra política. La solución de cualquier asunto en Manchuria y Mongolia, se consulta varias veces, se investiga entre las cuatro autoridades que existen, y para su aprobación se somete a la consulta del Gabinete. Por estos trámites, estas soluciones sufren demora de meses y años. El oro de las autoridades de Mukden, compra en Dairén a los traidores de nuestra causa y son utilizados como espías para descubrir nuestros planes sobre Manchuria y Mongolia. Por esto, cuando llevamos a la ejecución un plan, ya ellos lo conocen, e inmediatamente le divulgan al mundo y la prensa extranjera nos ataca.

En muchas ocasiones hemos sufrido esta clase de sorpresas, y también tenemos al frente de nuestros deseos el partido de oposición que nos descubre tomando como base de sus campañas este asunto para hacernos política, y de esta manera, nos causa mucho daño. En lo sucesivo nuestras actividades con relación a Manchuria deben centralizarse en Tokio:

- 1°—Debe conservarse el secreto de nuestros planes.
- 2°—Debemos procurar que la China no nos descubra.
- 3°—Evitemos despertar recelos en los países extranjeros.
- 4°—Es necesario unificar nuestra actual política en Manchuria.

5°—Se hace necesaria una comunicación directa entre las autoridades de Mongolia y Manchuria con nuestro premier a fin de mantener la cohesión contra la China.

Es a nosotros a quienes toca llevar a la realidad los planos de Hito y de Kuay Taylon que conquistaron Corea: debemos hacer cosa igual en Mongolia y Manchuria para establecer nuestro Centro Colonizador. Pongamos en práctica los mismos métodos, así como sojuzgamos Formosa, Corea, Hua-Tay-Tu que ahora nos pertenecen. En fórmula solo dirigiremos los negocios mongol-manchurianos, pero en realidad los iremos conquistando hasta verlos convertidos en colonias nuestras. Así engañaremos al mundo, logrando desvirtuar los comentarios desfavorables sobre los desacuerdos de nuestra política.

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Cuando empezamos la conquista de Corea, todos los países del mundo se opusieron y lanzaron sus protestas, pero después Hito, para contrarrestar esa campaña, envió propagandistas a Europa, América y Corea, para que manifestaran que el Japón no intentaba conquista alguna, ni mucho menos desaba apoderarse de territorios ajenos, puesto que únicamente protegía la independencia de esos territorios. Esta propaganda convenció al mundo, y después establecimos colonias bajo el pretexto de proteger también las islas Formosas, esperando sigilosamente el momento de conquistarla.

En la actualidad, tocante a este punto de colonización e inmigración, debemos fundar un Departamento de Colonización para que se encargue y maneje todas estas cuestiones.

Nuestras autoridades solo están facultadas para recibir órdenes superiores, sin tener participación en los acuerdos de nuestra política expansionista, para mantener el secreto de nuestros planes, y así, evitaremos el comentario internacional desfavorable.

La Empresa Industrial, la Agencia de Empleos, el Banco Hipotecario, el Departamento de Colonización, la Bolsa Comercial, no deben tener conexión con el ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, y si más bien estar bajo el control del Departamento de Colonización, para que formando fuerza, ayuden al Gobierno en sus planes, para el logro efectivo de nuestra expansión.

### **El río Tai-Lin y el ferrocarril Peig-Pín-Mukden.**

La zona comprendida a lo largo del río Tay-Lin está compuesta por extensas pampas donde existen guaridas de salteadores, pero ahí tenemos coreanos dedicados al comercio y a la agricultura. Con el tiempo el progreso de estas zonas será halagador. Para la conquista de Jehol, las riberas del río Tay-Lin deben pasar a nuestro poder, y la inmigración de coreanos allí necesita de apoyo eficaz. Esperamos la oportunidad para exigir al gobierno chino concesiones para colonizarlas. Entonces aumentaremos la inmigración dando así los primeros pasos para la conquista de Jehol y Mongolia. En caso de guerra la concentración de nuestras fuerzas se haría en Tay-Lin evitando el avance de las tropas chinas al norte. A los coreanos que tengan establecidos negocios allí o que deseen dedicarse al comercio, les daremos facilidades por medio de nuestro Banco Hipotecario y la Bolsa Comercial. Estos mismos coreanos serán utilizados como braceros al servicio del Banco Hipotecario, y de la Bolsa Comercial. Se dedicarán al cultivo de tierras, cultivadas y seleccionadas, serán requisadas para ser cedidas a los agricultores japoneses, dando en cambio a los coreanos aquellas otras tierras incultivadas. Este plan preparará el camino de nuestra inmigración

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la que dedicará su tiempo a sembrar papas, arroz, y soya. La Empresa Industrial Japonesa, administrará la explotación agro-pecuaria, y así avanzaremos pulgada a pulgada y metro a metro, proporcionando al Estado ganado y comestibles. Esta misma empresa administrará la cría de ganado caballar para nuestro ejército, o en su defecto por otra sociedad para que su desarrollo sea efectivo en Mongolia y Manchuria, y nuestro ejército cuente con centros abastecedores seguros.

#### **El peligro chino en Mongolia y Manchuria.**

La afluencia de chinos en Mongolia y Manchuria actualmente crece, constituyendo un serio peligro para nuestros inmigrantes, por lo que el Gobierno Japonés debe empezar a tomar sus precauciones. Si ahora no se toman medidas para expulsarlos, en el plazo de diez años, nuestra inmigración allí será un completo desengaño.

Nuestra policía en Mongolia y Manchuria, debe presionarlos en toda forma para que se ahuyenten y no vuelvan mas. Por otra parte nuestros capitalistas que los hostilicen rebajándoles jornales, reemplazando la mano de obra con fuerza motriz, y se originará la desocupación y, como consecuencia el retiro de los chinos.

#### **Fundación de hospitales y centros escolares.**

La Fundación de hospitales, centros escolares, etc., debe ser independiente del ferrocarril Sud-Manchuriano, porque los habitantes de los pueblos orientales, recelan de esta Empresa, señalándola como centro principal de nuestra opresión imperialista, y por eso, toda institución que depende de ella despierta desconfianza e indignación.

La fundación de estas obras de beneficencia y cultura, en forma independiente nos traerá el reconocimiento de la China y agradecerá nuestros servicios. Se impone ante todo la fundación de una escuela normal de hombres y mujeres, para que de allí egresen los futuros maestros que enseñen a los chinos a fin de estrechar por este medio nuestras relaciones con ellos para siempre.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SOCIEDAD CENTRAL JAPONESA DEL PERU

**La Verdad**  
sobre la  
**Cuestión de Manchuria**



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— DICIEMBRE, 1931 —

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 244 of Wm. C. Burdett, American Consul  
General at Callao-Lima, Peru, dated Feb. 25, 1932, on the subject  
"Chinese and Japanese Propaganda in Peru."  
793.94/4629

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SOCIEDAD GENERAL JAPONESA DEL PERU

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# La Verdad

sobre la

# Cuestión de Manchuria



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## EL PORQUE DE ESTE FOLLETO

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*La necesidad de que el criterio público se forme a base de la verdad absoluta, explica esta publicación. Sensibles, en verdad, son los recientes incidentes de la Manchuria que hoy ocupan la atención del mundo. El Japón, como guardián de orden y adalid de la civilización en el Extremo Oriente, e inspirado en el espíritu de fraternidad que debe prevalecer entre pueblos vecinos, ha venido esforzándose, con verdadera paciencia, para dar solución por la vía pacífica a los múltiples problemas pendientes entre él y la China. No obstante la actitud tolerante y conciliadora del Japón, la China ha venido ejerciendo una política de odios, insidias y violencias contra el Japón. Violaciones de tratados internacionales; inculcación de sentimiento anti-japonés en las escuelas públicas; boycot económico contra mercaderías japonesas; asesinatos de japoneses y coreanos; todos estos actos punibles cometidos sistemáticamente, ya sea directamente por las autoridades chinas, o a su instigación, han venido acumulándose en los últimos tiempos, sin que haya habido la menor intención para solucionarlos debidamente, y han traydo finalmente, por consecuencia, la adopción de medidas de defensa propia como el último recurso por parte del Japón.*

*"El Japón no ambiciona,—acaba de manifestar el Premier Señor Tsuyoshi Inukai—ni una sola pulgada de territorio manchuriano. Todo lo que insiste es que la China respete los derechos concedidos por los tratados internacionales, en virtud de los cuales el Japón ha adquirido vastos intereses*

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*que se aproximan a 2,000 millones de yens, y que garantice la seguridad de las vidas y propiedades de más de un millón de japoneses y coreanos residentes en Manchuria”.*

*Con estas breves palabras el lector podrá darse cuenta someramente del origen y finalidad del conflicto manchuriano.*

*Lima, Diciembre de 1931.*

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## CONTENIDO

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*que se aproximan a 2,000 millones de yens, y que garantice la seguridad de las vidas y propiedades de más de un millón de japoneses y coreanos residentes en Manchuria”.*

*Con estas breves palabras el lector podrá darse cuenta someramente del origen y finalidad del conflicto manchuriano.*

*Lima, Diciembre de 1931.*

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## LA CUESTION DE MANCHURIA

POR

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Doctor en derecho.  
Representante del Ferrocarril Sur-Manchuriano.

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- (1).—Los recientes incidentes de Manchuria.
  - (2).—El estatuto legal de la Manchuria: las bases de la actividad japonesa en ese país.
  - (3).—La obra del Japón en la Manchuria.
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  - (5).—Conclusión: La actitud del Japón hacia la China y ante la Sociedad de las Naciones.

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### I

#### LOS RECIENTES INCIDENTES DE MANCHURIA

LA SITUACIÓN DE LA CHINA: LOS DESÓRDENES Y LA NECESIDAD DE DAR PROTECCIÓN A LOS EXTRANJEROS.—Para juzgar con sano criterio los acontecimientos actuales, es necesario tener siempre presente la situación real. Los principios de conducta política que se aplican normalmente a los "pueblos organizados",—para servirse de una expresión usada en el Preámbulo del Pacto de la Sociedad de las Naciones,—dejan de ser aplicables cuando se trata de un te-

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ritorio en el cual la autoridad constituida es impotente para hacer respetar su voluntad. Tal es el caso de la China en donde los desórdenes son endémicos y la vida, así como los bienes de los extranjeros y de los mismos chinos, están constantemente amenazados. Que las amenazas vengan de bandidos o de antiguos soldados que se han hecho bandidos, o que haya impotencia o complicidad de las autoridades, es un hecho que de todos modos los residentes extranjeros quedan expuestos a los más graves peligros, sobre todo en un país en que la xenofobia está siempre latente.

Hoy los japoneses están amenazados; ayer eran los ingleses o los americanos, mañana puede ser cualquiera otra categoría de residentes, y frecuentemente todos los extranjeros están en peligro como fué el caso en el año 1927.

Es a consecuencia de esta situación especial que las Potencias han adoptado una práctica que puede ser considerada como una verdadera costumbre jurídica, fundada en las necesidades de una situación particular y consagrada por una adhesión unánime. LA PRACTICA SEGUIDA POR LAS DIVERSAS POTENCIAS, ES QUE EN CASO DE PERTURBACIONES GRAVES, ÉLLAS MISMAS PROTEGEN, MEDIANTE MEDIDAS MILITARES, LA VIDA Y LOS BIENES DE SUS SUBDITOS. La imposibilidad en que se encuentran las Potencias de poner su confianza en las autoridades territoriales de la China, se manifiesta en primer lugar por los regímenes especiales que han sido admitidos en todos los puntos donde los intereses de los extranjeros son considerables; especialmente el derecho reconocido por los tratados para tener tropas extranjeras a fin de asegurar la guardia de las Legaciones y las comunicaciones con el mar (1); en seguida, la misma existencia de concesiones, en cuyos territorios la policía queda asegurada por organismos municipales en los cuales predomina el elemento extranjero. Pero, hay algo más: Cuando los desórdenes internos se agravan, cuando importantes intereses extranjeros peligran, las Potencias se encuentran en la obligación de estar militarmente para proteger a sus súbditos, aún fuera de toda estipulación pactada. Es así, que en

(1). Los efectivos extranjeros estacionados en Pei Ping, así como en varias localidades entre Pei Ping y el mar, en virtud del Protocolo de 1900, están compuestos como sigue (a fines de 1930): Ingleses, 1,020; Americanos, 1,615; Franceses, 2,271; Italianos, 410; Japoneses, 892.

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varias ocasiones y en una muy reciente época, las potencias han enviado buques de guerra a los puertos chinos (1). Es así, igualmente, que en los alrededores de ciertas concesiones, tales como la concesión internacional y la concesión francesa de Shanghai, se han constituido zonas de "extensión", en donde las Potencias se consideran como teniendo el derecho y el deber de proteger por sus propias fuerzas militares, del mismo modo que en las concesiones propiamente dichas, sin que los tratados lo hayan especificado. (2)

LA ACTITUD DEL JAPÓN EN MANCHURIA Y EN EL RESTO DE LA CHINA, ESTÁ DE ACUERDO CON LAS PRÁCTICAS INTERNACIONALES EXISTENTES.—El Japón se ha visto forzado a realizar durante los últimos meses, lo que las diversas Potencias han hecho tan frecuentemente, aún en el curso de los años más recientes. Sus derechos e intereses en Manchuria son considerables, (según detalle que se hace mas adelante), y están relacionados con sus intereses vitales de una manera mucho más íntima, que los intereses de cualquiera otra potencia en la China. Por consiguiente, le es particularmente imposible admitir que una grave agitación,—alentada por las autoridades—, venga a poner en peligro esos vitales derechos e intereses.

Lo que el Japón tiene la intención de hacer actualmente, es exacta y exclusivamente un ACTO DE POLICIA, consistente en medidas de auto-protección, admitidas en el —estado actual del derecho internacional. Ha declarado, oficialmente, en varias ocasiones y en particular, ante el Consejo de la Sociedad de las Naciones, que no tiene ninguna mira territorial en Manchuria; sus tropas no proceden,—siquiera temporalmente,—a una ocupación militar; En todas partes se hace todos los esfuerzos posibles para dejar la Administración en manos de los funcionarios chinos. Sin em-

(1). Número de buques de guerra extranjeros que se encuentran en las aguas de la China, (Octubre de 1931): Ingleses, 30. Japoneses, 29; Americanos, 25, etc.....

(2). En el año 1927, cuando tuvieron lugar las perturbaciones debidas a la agitación violenta contra los extranjeros, las Potencias desembarcaron fuertes contingentes de tropas en Shanghai: Ingleses, 15,400; Americanos, 5,664; Franceses, 2,000; Japoneses, 1,664; Italianos, 300; Portugueses, 90; Españoles, 100. Inglaterra retiró sus tropas en tres etapas: Febrero y Octubre de 1928, y Marzo de 1929; quedan todavía 2,300 hombres, cerca de la mitad de los cuales está estacionada fuera de la concesión. Los efectivos de los otras Potencias están repartidas como sigue: (1.º de Setiembre de 1931): Americanos, 1,253; Franceses, 1,050; Japoneses, 688, (una parte fuera de la concesión).

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bargo, es necesario proteger en caso de peligro, la vida y bienes de los súbditos japoneses y especialmente la integridad de las vías de comunicación.

Una simple ojeada al mapa adjunto al presente folleto, mostrará la extensión de la amenaza a la cual están expuestos los japoneses: la importancia del bandolerismo; su esparcimiento en el país; las dificultades con las cuales el alto comando japonés tiene que luchar; aún la desproporción de las fuerzas en contacto; explican la necesidad de ciertas formas de acción que han sido criticadas: ocupación de puntos estratégicos, vuelos de aviones, etc.....

La gente se ha extrañado que las tropas japonesas que tienen mediante los tratados el derecho de guardar la zona del Ferrocarril, hayan salido de esta zona. Pero esas tropas no han hecho otra cosa sino seguir la práctica constante de las demás Potencias en la China: LOS BUQUES DE GUERRA EXTRANJEROS QUE SURCAN LOS RIOS CHINOS, LOS MARINEROS Y SOLDADOS EXTRANJEROS QUE DESEMBARCAN EN TERRITORIO CHINO, ACTUAN, NO EN VIRTUD DE TRATADOS FORMALES, SINO EN VIRTUD DE LA PRACTICA IMPUESTA POR EL CAOS QUE REINA EN LA CHINA. Actualmente, los japoneses obedecen a la misma necesidad. Las tropas de guardia no salen de la zona del Ferrocarril sino cuando son obligadas a hacerlo, sea para perseguir hordas de bandidos que se han entregado a cometer depredaciones en la vía, o sea para restablecer el orden en los puntos en que los intereses japoneses han sido atacados al margen de las leyes. Tan pronto como la acción policial ha obtenido los resultados buscados, se ordena el regreso de las tropas a la zona que ocupan permanentemente. Es esta misma política la que ha sido dada a conocer oficialmente en Ginebra por el Representante del Japón.

Actualmente, los lugares en que hay tropas japonesas estacionadas, fuera de la zona del Ferrocarril, son en número de cuatro solamente: en Mukden, que colinda con la misma zona del ferrocarril y donde los atentados cometidos en el mes de Setiembre han dado lugar a medidas especiales de prudencia; en Kirin, estación principal de una línea ferroviaria china, construida con la ayuda de capitales japoneses y cuya explotación ha sido confiada a la Compañía del Fe-

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rocarril del Sur de la Manchuria; en Kuliho (cerca de Shinminfu), y en Chenshiatun. Estos efectivos han sido reducidos ya, a medida que el orden ha ido restableciéndose. A principios de Noviembre, los destacamentos de Kirin y Shinminfu fueron nuevamente reducidos a la mitad.

Las medidas de protección que están tomándose actualmente, son motivadas por los desórdenes que habían precedido a la operación del 18 de Setiembre y que la siguieron. Hay que agregar que la protección de las vías de comunicación es particularmente necesaria en esta época del año, en que se efectúa el transporte principal de las cosechas. El papel policial asegurado por las guardias japonesas del Ferrocarril, no se limita a la protección de los intereses japoneses, sino que beneficia a todos los pobladores. Esta amplia protección, debe ser agregada a toda la argumentación jurídica; pues, es un hecho general que los chinos y los extranjeros se benefician con el mantenimiento del orden en Manchuria. Pasa exactamente allí lo que pasa en Shanghai, por ejemplo, en donde el mantenimiento del orden se hace no sólo en provecho de las Potencias, sino para el bienestar de todos los extranjeros, al mismo tiempo que de la misma población china.

## II

### EL ESTATUTO LEGAL DE LA MANCHURIA: LAS BASES DE LA ACTIVIDAD JAPONESA EN ESE PAÍS

Los incidentes de estas últimas semanas, no deben juzgarse sólo con relación a la situación general en la China y a las prácticas que se llevan a cabo allí. Esos incidentes se han producido en la Manchuria, en una región donde el Japón tiene derechos especiales e intereses considerables. La situación a la cual el Japón ha tenido que resistir, tiende, nada menos, que a privarlo de todos sus derechos e intereses, con desprecio de los tratados y a pesar de su obra bienhechora en el país. Es, pues, indispensable examinar: 1.º La base legal de la actividad japonesa en la Manchuria, que será tratada en el presente capítulo; 2.º la acción civilizadora del

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Japón en la Manchuria; y 3.º las maniobras y atentados dirigidos contra esa acción; lo que será objeto de los capítulos siguientes.

ANTIGUO ESTATUTO DE LA MANCHURIA.—En el curso de la historia china, la Manchuria ha tenido una situación distinta a la de la China propiamente dicha: Era un territorio tributario, habitado por una población especial; cuna de la última dinastía imperial (1644-1912), la Manchuria tenía su estatuto particular bajo la autoridad de los Gobernadores de origen manchú; y aún, la inmigración de los chinos estaba allí prohibida. No es, pues, extraño que, aún después de la revolución, la Manchuria haya frecuentemente vivido de una manera autónoma.

LOS TRATADOS.—*El Tratado de Shimonoseki* que puso fin a la guerra chino-japonesa, (17 de Abril de 1895), cedió al Japón el Sur de la provincia de Feng-tien (Mukden) y la península de Liaotung. Sin embargo, debido a la intervención de Rusia, apoyada por Alemania y Francia, el Japón tuvo que renunciar a esta cesión.

En el año 1896, la China firmó un tratado secreto de alianza con Rusia y, algunos meses más tarde, concedía a esta Potencia el derecho de construir en Manchuria un ferrocarril que iba a ser el "Este Chino".

En el año 1898, la China arrendó a Rusia mediante un contrato y por un periodo de 25 años, la extremidad de la Península de Liaotung, (región de Dalny-Dairen y Puerto Arturo).

La influencia creciente de Rusia en Manchuria y en Corea, y sus ambiciones en esas regiones, dieron lugar a la guerra Japonesa-Rusa: *el tratado de Portsmouth*, que puso fin a esa guerra, (5 de Setiembre de 1905), cedió al Japón, bajo la reserva del consentimiento de la China, el arrendamiento de la península de Liaotung, (art. V.), y el ferrocarril de Changchun a Puerto Arturo, (que se llamó más tarde el "Sur-Manchuriano"), con todos los derechos conexos. (Art. VI.). *El 22 de diciembre de 1905, un tratado chino-japonés* contenía el consentimiento de la China a esas concesiones.

El protocolo adjunto al tratado de 1905, reglamenta toda una serie de cuestiones relativas al ferrocarril. En particular, por el artículo 3.º, "El Gobierno chino se compro-

mete, con el fin de proteger los intereses del ferrocarril del Sur de Manchuria, a no construir, antes de haber recobrado dicho ferrocarril, vía vecina o paralela alguna, ni ramal alguno que pueda perjudicar los intereses del ferrocarril arriba mencionado”.

Por el acuerdo concerniente a la región de Chientao, (4 de Setiembre de 1909), la China se compromete a abrir para la residencia y el comercio de los extranjeros, ciertas localidades situadas en la región contigua a la frontera de la Corea y reconoce a los súbditos japoneses oriundos de Corea, el derecho de residir allí con fines agrícolas, y se compromete a proteger las tierras y las casas de los residentes Coreanos.

LAS VEINTIUNA DEMANDAS.—Así quedaba la situación de derecho, cuando el Japón dirigió a la China, en el año 1915, esas “veintiuna demandas” de las cuales se ha hablado tanto. Un tratado fue firmado y ratificado conforme los usos internacionales. En el curso de las negociaciones el Japón había renunciado ya a varias de esas “demandas”. Además, negociaciones ulteriores, y en particular las deliberaciones de la Conferencia de Washington dieron por resultado la abrogación de la mayor parte de las concesiones pedidas a la China en el año 1915, y no subsiste hoy sino un pequeño número de las disposiciones de ese Tratado, que se refieren, precisamente, a la Manchuria:

1.º El periodo de arrendamiento de la península de Liaotung queda fijado a 99 años;

2.º El periodo de la concesión del Ferrocarril Sur-Manchuriano y del Ferrocarril de Mukden a Auntang se prorrogará también a 99 años;

3.º Los súbditos japoneses tendrán en la Manchuria del Sur:

a) —El derecho de residir y viajar, de entregarse a toda clase de ocupaciones e industrias;

b) el derecho de tomar en arrendamiento terrenos con un fin comercial, industrial o agrícola;

c). el derecho de explotar ciertas minas.

4.º —Los súbditos japoneses tendrán los mismos derechos que los ciudadanos chinos en materia agrícola, industrial y comercial, en la Mongolia interior oriental.

La China, ha tratado, a menudo, de sostener que tales disposiciones del tratado de 1915 no tienen fuerza obligatoria en lo que a ella concierne, porque le han sido "impuestas". Es, evidentemente, imposible tomar en consideración una doctrina semejante; la teoría de los "vicios del consentimiento", no tiene aplicación en el derecho internacional, y si se tratase de introducirla, se privaría de su validez a la casi totalidad de los tratados; lo mismo pasaría en particular con todos los tratados de paz, que no son otra cosa sino la consagración de los resultados de la guerra, cuyo objeto es, precisamente, doblegar la voluntad del adversario. El mismo pacto de la Sociedad de las Naciones, sería puesto en tela de juicio.

Sólo por vía de negociaciones y por el consentimiento de las partes interesadas, los tratados pueden modificarse. Es así que el tratado chino-japonés del año 1915 fué alterado en la mayor parte de sus disposiciones. En cuanto a las disposiciones que subsisten aún, no sólo no existe ninguna razón para negar su fuerza obligatoria, sino que su validez fué reconocida en la Conferencia de Washington, en el año 1922. De aquí que Mr. Hugues, Delegado de los Estados Unidos, declaró el 3 de febrero de 1922, que su Gobierno considerará los derechos otorgados a los súbditos japoneses en la Manchuria del Sur y la Mongolia interior oriental, como no exclusivos, y como reivindicables en favor de los ciudadanos americanos, en virtud de la cláusula de la nación más favorecida existente en el tratado americano-japonés en vigencia.

Es natural agregarse que los derechos en cuestión se justifican por la equidad, tan valiosa como el estricto derecho. Los gastos considerables efectuados por el Japón para el arreglo de las vías férreas no pueden ser amortizados sino en un largo período de tiempo. Los derechos concedidos a los súbditos japoneses son esencialmente los que pertenecen, en todos los países civilizados, a todos los residentes extranjeros. Y la intervención precitada del señor Hugues, muestra claramente que la causa defendida por el Japón es la misma causa de los extranjeros y de la civilización.

### III

#### LA OBRA DEL JAPÓN EN LA MANCHURIA

No es exagerado afirmar que la Manchuria, cuya superficie es de 941,700 kilómetros cuadrados, (es decir aproximadamente la de Francia e Italia juntas), es casi completamente una creación de la actividad japonesa. Al día siguiente de la guerra Ruso-Japonesa, el país era muy pobre, la población esparcida, los medios de comunicación absolutamente primitivos y la industria no existía. Durante 25 años, el Japón ha aportado capitales, elementos competentes, energías y el sentido del orden y del progreso. Por su acción pacífica y civilizadora, ha logrado dar al país un desarrollo tal, que sólo las cifras pueden dar una idea de su magnitud.

POBLACIÓN.—Es difícil avaluar exactamente la población del país hacia el año 1905, pero puede estimarse que se ha doblado en los últimos 25 años. Llega, actualmente, a 29,200,000 habitantes, de los cuales hay 1,328,000 en la zona japonesa. La densidad de la población es de 76 habitantes, aproximadamente, por milla cuadrada fuera de esta zona, y alcanza 875 habitantes por milla cuadrada en la zona japonesa. El número de residentes japoneses llega a más de un millón, (entre los cuales hay cerca de 800,000 nativos de Corea).

CAPITALES.—Los capitales japoneses colocados en Manchuria desde hace 25 años, son los siguientes:

	YENS
Compañía del ferrocarril Sur-Manchuriano . . . . .	716,201.000
Empresas afiliadas a la Compañía . . . . .	318,392.000
Empréstitos del Gobierno Japonés al Gobierno Chino . . . . .	98,731.000
Sociedades y particulares . . . . .	554,277.000
	<hr/>
	1.687,601.000

o sea cerca de 21 millones de francos; o al tipo actual de

cambio (S/. 1.58 por Yen) más de 2,666 millones de soles oro peruanos.

**LAS OBRAS PÚBLICAS.**—El desarrollo de las vías férreas ha sido notable. En la misma China no se ha construido desde el año 1877 sino 8,320 kilómetros, mientras que sólo en la Manchuria se ha construido más de 5,920 desde el año 1897, de los cuales 1,750 son chino-rusos; 1,104 japoneses; 140 chino-japoneses; 2,880 chinos. De los 2,880 kilómetros chinos, 650 han sido construidos con capitales ingleses y 990 con capitales japoneses.

El puerto de Dairen, que ha costado 68 millones de Yens (816 millones de francos, o sea más de 107 millones de soles oro peruanos), se ha convertido en el segundo puerto de la China por orden de importancia. El movimiento ha alcanzado allí en el año 1929, el número de 8,211 buques haciendo un total de 14 millones de toneladas con un comercio de 508 millones de yens (6 mil millones de francos o sea más de 802 millones de soles oro peruanos).

Las riquezas minerales han sido sistemáticamente explotadas. Las minas de carbón de Fushun y Yentai producen cerca de 30,000 toneladas diariamente; las minas de hierro de Penhsihu y Anshan permiten producir anualmente 250,000 toneladas de hierro fundido.

El país es muy rico bajo el punto de vista agrícola. La producción ha sido doblada en el curso de los últimos quince años.

**COMERCIO EXTERIOR.**—El desarrollo del comercio exterior revela de un modo sorprendente el desarrollo general de la prosperidad. (valor promedio del Tael Haikwan en 1929: 16 francos 43):

	Importación	Exportación	Total	Balance
1907 (Tael HWK) .	30,685.000	22,042.000	52,727.000	— 8,643.000
1929 (Tael HWK) .	329,604.000	425,661.000	755,225.000	+ 96,057.000

**EL DESARROLLO DE LA PROSPERIDAD EN LA MANCHURIA NO HA SIDO BENÉFICO SÓLO PARA LOS JAPONESES, SINO, AL MISMO TIEMPO, PARA LA POBLACIÓN CHINA Y LOS EXTRANJEROS.**—La población china, ha sido la primera en sacar pro-

vecho de la prosperidad general y del orden que la presencia de los japoneses ha hecho reinar en el país. Pero, además, sumas muy importantes han sido gastadas en los servicios de utilidad pública, sea por el Gobierno Japonés, sea por la Compañía del ferrocarril Sur-Manchuriano. Las condiciones de la higiene han sido mejoradas; una lucha sistemática se ha llevado a cabo contra las epidemias, que asolaban el país; servicios de canalización y de agua potable se han establecido en las ciudades. Sólo la Compañía del ferrocarril ha creado 21 hospitales; su último presupuesto anual pasa de 4 millones de Yens (48 millones de francos o sea 6,320,000 soles oro peruanos), y el número de días de estadas de enfermos pasa de 2 millones. Se han creado escuelas de todos grados, haciendas-modelo, etc.

La atracción que el país manchuriano, actualmente, ejerce sobre las poblaciones chinas prueba más que cualquier afirmación que grandes ventajas quedan aseguradas a los chinos bajo el régimen actual de la Manchuria. Mientras las guerras civiles asolaban y arruinaban las provincias de la propia China, el orden y la paz mantenidos en la Manchuria, atrajeron allí cantidades enormes de inmigrantes. He aquí las cifras relativas a los últimos años:

	Total de inmigrantes	Inmigrantes que han quedado en el país
1927 . . . . .	1.178,000	936,000
1928 . . . . .	938,000	544,000
1929 . . . . .	1.046,000	424,000

Por otra parte, el desarrollo de la Manchuria ha sido muy provechoso para *los extranjeros*. El tratado de Portsmouth asentaba ya (art. III) el principio de la "oportunidad igual". Este principio ha sido afirmado de nuevo en Washington en el año 1922 (Tratado llamado de las Nueve Potencias, de 6 de Febrero de 1922, especialmente el artículo III). Es, por consiguiente, para el interés común que el Japón defiende la causa del orden y de la prosperidad. Las cifras siguientes muestran las ventajas que los diversos países han obtenido por el desarrollo de la Manchuria.

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Comercio exterior (en millones de Taels Haikwan)

	AÑO 1928			AÑO 1929		
	Imp.	Exp.	Total	Imp.	Exp.	Total
Juntos . . . . .	53	47	100	329	426	755
Japón . . . . .	14	17	31	138	169	307
La propia China . . . . .	21	18	39	99	93	192
Rusia . . . . .	7	10	17	16	40	56
Imperio Británico . . . . .	2	1	3	26	29	55
Países Bajos e Indias holandesas . . . . .	(menos de un millón)			2	37	39
Estados Unidos y Fili- pinas . . . . .	6	6	12	26	12	38

Las principales importaciones son las compras de maquinarias y herramientas por la Compañía del Ferrocarril Sur-Manchuriano. En el curso de los últimos veintidos años, esas compras han pasado de 500 millones de Yens (6 mil millones de francos o sea 790 millones de soles oro peruanos), y si el Japón, en Yens, ha suministrado por valor de 143 millones (1,716 millones de francos o sea 225,940,000 soles oro peruanos) en mercaderías: 129 millones (1,548 millones de francos) han venido de los Estados Unidos; 28 millones, (336 millones de francos) de la Gran Bretaña; 13 millones (156 millones de francos) de Alemania; y 43 millones de Yens (516 millones de francos), de otros países.

IV

LAS MANIOBRAS ANTI-JAPONESAS

A.—EL BANDOLERISMO.

Si fué necesario reconocer por los tratados el derecho de Rusia primero, y después el del Japón, para mantener guardias protectoras del ferrocarril, es porque Manchuria es presa del bandolerismo desde hace siglos, lo mismo que la mayor parte de la China. Fuera de la zona protegida, los ataques de los bandidos contra los campesinos son cotidianos. En la misma zona del Ferrocarril, los ataques son fre-

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cuentas (contra centinelas, depósitos de materiales, etc.). En el año 1929, hubo hasta 368 asaltos.

Estos actos de violencia, se han hecho más frecuentes y más graves por dos razones, que hay que tener siempre en cuenta respecto al conjunto de la China así como para la Manchuria: En primer lugar, existe en esas regiones un sentimiento general de hostilidad contra los extranjeros; los ingleses un día, otro día los franceses, y actualmente los japoneses, son víctimas de esa hostilidad. La historia reciente de la China, muestra muchos ejemplos de esas explosiones de xenofobia. Por otra parte, las autoridades chinas no sólo no hacen lo que deberían hacer para reprimir esas tendencias, sino, muy frecuentemente, las alientan y hacen todo lo posible para que se desarrollen. Es así, que en las escuelas chinas se pone en manos de los niños libros que contienen imputaciones abominables contra los extranjeros y sobre todo contra los japoneses; la historia es completamente desfigurada, y en élla se fomenta cuidadosamente los sentimientos de odio contra todo lo que es extranjero.

B.—EL PROBLEMA DE LOS FERROCARRILES (véase el mapa anexo).

1.º.—Se ha mencionado, en un capítulo anterior, que la China se ha comprometido, con el fin de no competir con el ferrocarril Sur-Manchuriano, a no construir vía férrea alguna paralela a ese ferrocarril, ni ramal alguno que pueda hacer desviar el tráfico que le corresponde. Pues bien, la China no ha cumplido con su compromiso:

a).—En el año 1925, élla ha emprendido la construcción de una línea que parte de Tahushan (a lo largo de la línea Pekin-Mukden) en dirección a Taonan. Esta línea es paralela al ferrocarril Sur-Manchuriano y tiende a hacer desviar el tráfico que pasaba por las líneas de Angangki a Taonan, y de Taonan a Szuping kai, ocasionando perjuicios al ferrocarril Sur-Manchuriano.

b).—Entre los años 1927 y 1929, la China ha construído la línea Kirin-Hailung, que es una prolongación de la línea Mukden-Hailung y que tiende a hacer desviar el tráfico que pasaba por Kirin y Changchun, en perjuicio del Sur-Manchuriano.

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c).—En el año 1930, la China ha principiado a arreglar el puerto de Houlou-tao, destinado a acaparar el tráfico de Dairen y el del Sur-Manchuriano.

2.º—Mediante un intercambio de notas (5 de octubre de 1913 y 24 de Setiembre de 1918), y contratos de empréstitos, la China se ha comprometido a construir con el concurso de capitales japoneses, toda una serie de líneas. Los derechos así conferidos al Japón, han sido reconocidos por los grupos bancarios de América, Inglaterra, Francia, y sus respectivos Gobiernos cuando se formaron los consorcios en 1920. La China ha puesto toda clase de dificultades para cumplir sus compromisos, especialmente para la construcción del trozo Tunhua-Tumenchiang que debe unirse a una línea que existe en la frontera de la Corea, y para construir la línea Changchun-Tailai-Taonan.

Así pues, en lugar de prestar su cooperación prevista en los tratados, la China viola éstos doblemente: Construyendo líneas que ella misma había convenido en no establecer, y poniendo trabas a la construcción de las líneas que ella misma se ha comprometido a crear en colaboración con el Japón. La mala voluntad que China pone de relieve a este respecto, es tanto más evidente cuanto que en las otras partes de la China las autoridades dan pruebas de una negligencia extraordinaria en materia ferroviaria. Sólo en la Manchuria tiene una política persistente, inspirada por una voluntad hostil al Japón. Hay que agregar que al poner en vigencia en las líneas chinas tarifas tan bajas que no pueden ser remuneradoras, la China pone en práctica un verdadero "dumping", y hace todos los esfuerzos posibles por arruinar la Compañía del Ferrocarril Sur-Manchuriano que ha hecho, en realidad, la prosperidad del país mediante sus iniciativas y actividades.

#### C.—LA CUESTIÓN DE ARRENDAMIENTOS DE TERRENOS.

El tratado de 1915, en uno de los artículos, que continúa vigente, reconoce a los súbditos japoneses el derecho de tomar en arrendamiento lotes de terreno para empresas comerciales, industriales o agrícolas. Las autoridades chinas hacen todo lo posible para invalidar este compromiso. Con tal fin, presionan a los mismos chinos, prohibiéndoles arren-

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dar terrenos a súbditos japoneses, rehusan registrar los contratos de arrendamiento cuando están ya listos para tal registro; dificultan el certificado correspondiente, o deciden, cuando un título ha sido cedido a un extranjero, anularlo. Por otra parte, no vacilan poner tropiezos a los súbditos japoneses hasta de manera indirecta. En efecto, la mayoría de los arrendatarios son inmigrantes oriundos de la Corea, y los chinos se esfuerzan en inducirlos a naturalizarse chinos, rehusando, en caso contrario, reconocer sus derechos de arrendamiento, por ejemplo, aunque los hayan adquirido en virtud de los tratados. Los campesinos oriundos de la Corea radicados en la Manchuria, son frecuentemente víctimas de graves violencias. Los actos de los bandidos contra ellos son tolerados o alentados por las autoridades. (Ejemplo reciente, es el de Wanpaoushan, de donde se ha intentado expulsar a los coreanos por vías de hecho).

#### D.—FISCALIZACIÓN, BOICOTE Y OTRAS FORMAS DE SABOTAJE ANTI-JAPONÉS.

De varias maneras, las autoridades chinas hacen todos los esfuerzos posibles para poner trabas a la actividad legal y benéfica de los japoneses. Usan los medios fiscales con tal fin; y así, aunque los materiales importados para el Ferrocarril Sur-Manchuriano están exentos de derechos de aduana, sin embargo se les hace pagar tasa. Cuando las mercaderías han entrado en un puerto chino, gozan del beneficio de exención de derechos en caso de ser re-expedidas a otro puerto chino, pero los chinos rehusan aplicar este principio al puerto de Dairen.

A veces, las autoridades chinas pretenden que el boicoteo de las mercaderías japonesas se debe a un movimiento espontáneo contra el cual nada pueden hacer. Cada uno, dicen, está libre de comprar a quién le plazca. Sin embargo, es un hecho que no se trata en manera alguna del libre ejercicio de la actividad del comprador. El boicoteo está organizado por grupos, por sociedades de estudiantes, por ejemplo, que ejercen sobre sus compatriotas una terrible compulsión, que puede ir hasta el asesinato, calificado como "pena capital". Los Chinos que compran o venden mercaderías japonesas, se exponen a los más crueles tratamientos. No sólo acontece

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que se les saqué sus almacenes y tiendas, que se les destruya sus establecimientos, sino también se apoderan de sus personas y los enjaulan, haciéndoles pasear en sus jaulas ante el público. Semejantes actos no pueden producirse ni repetirse sin la complicidad de las autoridades chinas.

Actos de esta índole, tienen un carácter verdaderamente inhumano. Se rehusa vender leche y carbón a los japoneses. Se impide a los chinos que trabajen para las empresas japonesas. Se permite fijar carteles, repartir volantes que incitan a la matanza de los japoneses. Un comunicado del Gobierno Japonés al Consejo de la Sociedad de las Naciones, del 18 de Octubre, dá todos los detalles relativos a esos procedimientos, enteramente contrarios a la práctica de los países civilizados. En la China Central: en Shanghai, Hankeou, Chungking y Hongkong, han habido 215 caso de ultrajes, insultos y opresión contra los súbditos japoneses; 498 casos de ultraje o expulsión contra escolares japoneses. En Hongkong hubo 5 japoneses muertos y 9 heridos.

Uno de los resultados inmediatos de esas campañas antijaponesas, ha sido el obligar a una gran cantidad de residentes japoneses a irse de las ciudades en donde tenían sus establecimientos y negocios, de acuerdo con el tratado en vigencia. Es así que los Consulados y las colonias enteras de Chenchow, Yunnafu, Chentow, Chihfeng, han tenido que ser evacuados. La mayoría de los residentes, y en particular las mujeres y los niños han debido refugiarse en Nankin (sede del Gobierno Chino), Hanchow, Suchow, Wuhu, Wenchow, Kiukian, Shasi, Ichang, Chungking y Chansha.

En la Manchuria, un gran número de súbditos japoneses han sido asesinados: 170 hasta el 9 de Noviembre de 1930; 150 han desaparecido, y 32 han sido llevados como rehenes; 29 casas han sido reducidas a cenizas; 57 han sido saqueadas.

Hasta los chinos, son víctimas de esos movimientos de odio al mismo tiempo que los japoneses. En la Manchuria, hubo 96 chinos asesinados; 216 fueron llevados como rehenes (antes del 27 de Octubre).

Si la agitación está dirigida actualmente contra los japoneses, no hay que perder de vista que hace algunos años estuvo dirigida contra los Ingleses y Americanos. No hay casi nación extranjera alguna que no haya sido, un día

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u otro, víctima de esa agitación. El asesinato reciente del inglés Thorburn y la incuria de las autoridades chinas a este respecto, pueden compararse con el asesinato del capitán Nakamura que provocó una reacción tan viva en todo el Japón.

Todos estos hechos muestran que la actitud de la China no es, en manera alguna, la de un país civilizado, deseoso de cumplir lealmente con sus obligaciones internacionales.

V

CONCLUSIÓN

LA ACTITUD DEL JAPÓN HACIA LA CHINA ANTE  
LA SOCIEDAD DE LAS NACIONES

LA CAMPAÑA CHINA CONTRA LOS TRATADOS.—Lo más grave en los actos arriba descritos, es que tienen un carácter sistemático. No se trata de hechos individuales, independientes unos de otros, sino que están en relación con un espíritu y una mala voluntad persistentes y comunes a todas las autoridades chinas. Y esta misma mala voluntad, se relaciona con una doctrina que no está dirigida únicamente contra el Japón, sino también contra las otras Potencias. Es muy conocida la campaña que la China lleva a cabo contra lo que ella llama los "tratados desiguales", que, según, ella, le han sido "impuestos" y son contrarios a su "dignidad".

Que China trate de obtener su abrogación, es muy comprensible, y las Potencias han demostrado ya que están dispuestas a aceptar la modificación de los tratados en la medida de lo posible. Pero en su impaciencia, la China pretende abrogar por su única voluntad los tratados regularmente concluidos. No sólo esta pretensión es insostenible en derecho, sino que traería, prácticamente, las peores consecuencias, si se llevase a cabo; pues que la China no ha realizado aún progresos suficientes para permitir a los extranjeros vivir, con tranquilidad y seguridad en su territorio, si no fuesen protegidos, en la forma actual.

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Los acontecimientos recientes son la mejor prueba de esta impotencia de la China para mantener el orden en su territorio y reprimir la xenofobia.

Es por tal causa, que el Japón insiste, ante todo, en que la China reconozca expresamente la validez de los tratados concluidos por ella. Mientras continúe oponiéndose a la validez de esos tratados, no sólo no habrá seguridad en las relaciones que las otras naciones tengan con ella, sino que será imposible someter a un organismo internacional las divergencias que se presenten entre la China y otras Potencias; siendo la primera condición para que semejante procedimiento sea posible, que las partes interesadas reconozcan igualmente la validez de los tratados, base de toda vida internacional.

LA POLÍTICA JAPONESA EN LA MANCHURIA ES IDÉNTICA A LA DE OTRAS POTENCIAS EN LAS REGIONES DONDE ELAS TIENEN INTERESES ESPECIALES.—La actitud del Japón en el Japón en el conflicto actual queda plenamente justificada desde el punto de vista jurídico, pues lo que el Japón reclama esencialmente, es el respeto a los tratados. Además, tiene vital interés en exigir este respeto en la Manchuria, región donde sus intereses particulares han sido reconocidos.

Debe expresarse que las grandes Potencias consideran que tienen el deber y el derecho de vigilar el mantenimiento del orden en las regiones donde tienen intereses vitales. La política de los Estados Unidos en la América Central es conocida, y no hay que olvidar que, antes de firmarse el pacto de renunciamiento a la guerra, Inglaterra se reservó el expreso derecho de vigilar la paz en las regiones en las cuales el Imperio tiene intereses especiales, aunque no estén bajo la soberanía británica. Esta política constante debe ser considerada hoy como una práctica reconocida por el derecho internacional.

LA VOLUNTAD DE COOPERACIÓN DEL JAPÓN.—Hemos tenido varias veces la ocasión de mostrar que al defender sus derechos e intereses, el Japón defiende, al mismo tiempo, los intereses de la población china y de los extranjeros, así como la prosperidad general. Lo que él desea ante todo, es ver realizarse las condiciones de una cooperación útil para todos. Sin embargo, es necesario que los Chinos, por su lado, tengan la sincera voluntad de cooperar amistosamente; es im-

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prescindible que haya un verdadero relajamiento de la tensión que existe contra los japoneses y los extranjeros en general.

Las excitaciones violentas, que se han manifestado últimamente, muestran desgraciadamente que falta mucho para que las condiciones de una buena cooperación se realicen. Si se retirasen las tropas japonesas actualmente, habría que temer lo todo, teniéndose en cuenta la sobreexcitación de los espíritus y las actividades de los bandidos y soldados desbandados que merodean a lo largo del Ferrocarril Sur-Manchuriano. En el mismo interés de la futura cooperación, es importante que se tomen todas las precauciones necesarias para evitar violencias y asesinatos en masa.

EL JAPÓN Y LA SOCIEDAD DE LAS NACIONES.—En ciertos círculos, parece haberse reprochado al Japón, su falta de confianza en la Sociedad de las Naciones. Nos permitimos recordar que desde la creación de la Sociedad, el Japón ha sido uno de sus miembros más fieles habiendo cumplido escrupulosamente con sus obligaciones, pagando, por ejemplo, sus cuotas con toda puntualidad, (lo que no podría decirse respecto de la China). Desde el principio del conflicto actual, el Gobierno Japonés se ha empeñado en informar al Consejo de lo que pasaba en la Manchuria. En la reunión del mes de Octubre, precisamente cuando la decisión tomada por el Consejo, en lo que concierne a la participación de un Estado que no era miembro de la Liga, daba lugar a objeciones jurídicas de las más graves, el Japón tuvo a bien continuar tomando parte en las sesiones. Nada puede probar mejor el espíritu de buena voluntad con el cual mira la situación, que esa actitud suya. Sin embargo, hay que manifestar, por otro lado, que una gran parte de la opinión pública japonesa ha tenido la impresión, de que la causa del Japón no ha sido tratada siempre en Ginebra como hubiera debido serlo y que las balanzas no estaban siempre colocadas en manos imparciales. Detrás de las fórmulas que tratan, en apariencia, con miramientos la dignidad de las dos partes, parecía, a veces, que se exigía solamente del Japón compromisos precisos y sacrificios positivos, mientras que no se exigía a la China sino promesas verbales y de poca consistencia.

Pues bien, lo que el Japón quiere evitar a todo trance, es, precisamente, el ser inducido a contentarse con promesas verbales.

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¡No exige sino el respeto leal de los tratados!. Es su interés primordial el tener por vecina a una China pacífica, ordenada y próspera, que sería para él una buena cliente y colaboradora. Pero, hay que constatar que este ideal está lejos aún de su realización.

La opinión japonesa está unánimemente persuadida, de que si la justicia de su causa no ha sido reconocida en todas partes, es porque se ha ignorado, o bien la situación de hecho que impera en la Manchuria y en la China; o bien los tratados y usos reconocidos y que sirven de base a su derecho y que justifican la actitud tomada por el Japón en los últimos acontecimientos. Cuando la situación de hecho y de derecho sea conocida exactamente, no hay duda que la tesis japonesa será aprobada, como la más conforme tanto a la equidad como a los intereses generales y permanentes de los extranjeros y de los mismos chinos.

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sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
August 10, 1972  
NARS, Date 12-18-75

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## EL ORIGEN DEL PROBLEMA MANCHURIANO

De la importante Revista "Far Eastern Review", de agosto del presente año, que se edita en Shanghai, traducimos párrafos de un artículo en el que se estudia este palpitante problema de actualidad.

### LA AMENAZA DEL COMUNISMO EN EL ORIENTE

La Manchuria comprende un vasto territorio que hace sólo 30 años estaba infestado de bandidos. Para vengar su derrota por los japoneses en 1895, Li-Hung-Chang, celebró un tratado secreto de alianza con Rusia, entregando esa zona al dominio del Zar. Los ejércitos rusos invadieron las nuevas tierras de promisión, construyeron ferrocarriles estratégicos, fundaron ciudades y crearon puertos, enriqueciendo a los empobrecidos mandarines y campesinos de esas desoladas regiones. No obstante esto, los rusos no supieron crear verdadero progreso, no explotaron las minas ni establecieron industrias, no desarrollaron en suma las grandes riquezas naturales del territorio. La gran corriente de oro ruso se aprovechó únicamente con fines militares y estratégicos.

Atraídos por esta nueva fuente de riquezas, los chinos del Sur, comenzaron a invadir el nuevo territorio.

La guerra ruso-japonesa distribuyó una nueva avalancha de oro extranjero en la Manchuria. A la terminación del conflicto, el progreso de la región sobrepasó todos los cálculos y expectativas de los mas optimistas. Se construyeron ferrocarriles, se establecieron nuevas industrias, se trabajaron ricas minas del sub-suelo, surgieron nuevas po-

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blaciones cada día más prósperas y florecientes. Se removieron todos los obstáculos que se oponían a la inmigración china, y éstos invadieron el territorio, porque sabían que en él hallarían libertad, paz y trabajo.

La Revolución de 1911, incorporó definitivamente la Manchuria a la nueva República China.

Poco antes de esa fecha, en el año de 1908, una importante firma japonesa, Mitsui y Cia, despachó a Liverpool un cargamento de prueba de frijoles soya, que es el principal producto de la Manchuria. Este envío abrió el mercado mundial para ese producto. Desde entonces comenzó el progreso de la Manchuria. Muchas casas comerciales extranjeras establecieron oficinas y agencias en el vasto territorio para participar de las pingües utilidades que ofreció el nuevo producto. Los agricultores manchurianos vendían el codiciado producto libremente. La riqueza fué creada y el desarrollo producido por esta nueva industria es admirable.

La producción de frijoles "soya" en el año de 1915 era de 34.429,000 bushels. En 1929, ésta había llegado a 221.824.549 bushels o sea 5.351,130 toneladas que representan el 63 % de la producción mundial de este codiciado producto. De esta producción, más o menos 2.000,000 de toneladas se consumen localmente, mientras que los 3.000,000 de toneladas restantes se exportan a las grandes fábricas productoras de aceites y sustancias alimenticias de Europa.

El "soya" manchuriano ha revolucionado la industria ganadera y productora de Dinamarca y Holanda, permitiendo a estos pequeños países desarrollar una enorme industria productora de mantequilla, queso, jamón, tocino, etc.

El precio medio de la tonelada de "Soya" en Europa es 100 yens oro, a la que hay que agregar gastos de transporte, etc. El agricultor manchuriano que trabaja en una forma de yanaconazgo, a base del 50 % con el dueño de las tierras, obtiene una utilidad de más o menos 55 yens por tonelada. La riqueza manchuriana aumentaba, pues, anualmente a razón de 180.000,000 de yens oro. Los ferrocarriles percibían, por otro lado, más de 78.000,000 de yens por concepto de fletes y transportes. Debido a estas excepcionales condiciones y a esta constante inyección de nuevas riquezas, el progreso de la región era cada vez mayor. Los capitalistas japoneses, por otro lado, han intervenido más de

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1,000.000,000 de yens oro en las industrias de esta región. Los terratenientes chinos, por su parte, se encontraron así intempestivamente dueños de incalculables riquezas; sus cajas de caudales recibían constantemente nuevas corrientes de oro. La Manchuria se había convertido para todos estos mandarines, en la gallina de los huevos de oro. Pero, la revolución de 1911, había creado una nueva e insaciable necesidad: la del sostenimiento de los grandes ejércitos que tenían que reafirmar su poder. La única fuente de riquezas a su alcance era la de crear nuevos y nuevos impuestos sobre los productos agrícolas de la Manchuria para fines militaristas. Estos nuevos impuestos fueron, no obstante, soportados por los agricultores manchurianos, ya que las utilidades que alcanzaban con la explotación del "soya" eran extraordinarias. Pero, la crisis mundial redujo el precio de los productos en los mercados europeos y la crisis hizo sentir sus efectos. Los contribuyentes se resistían a pagar impuestos que los dejaban en la miseria. El militarismo chino necesitó, entonces, imponer su voluntad y con ese fin dispuso que la producción íntegra debería ser vendida a las autoridades, quienes la abonaban con papel moneda emitido en el mismo territorio sin control ni garantía de ninguna clase; recibiendo en cambio las autoridades por la venta del producto, yens oro; que utilizaban íntegramente en el sostenimiento de su formidable máquina guerrera. Existen actualmente en la Manchuria billetes con mil distintas denominaciones y con valores de cambio imposible de fijarse. La enorme fortuna acumulada en muchos años de trabajo está representada hoy por papel moneda sin valor efectivo de ninguna clase. Como es natural, este estado de cosas ha despertado las protestas, el hambre y la cólera sorda de los manchurianos quienes por lo demás escuchan la propaganda del Soviet ruso; frente a la esclavitud establecida de hecho por las autoridades chinas, existen las fascinadoras expectativas del comunismo ruso. Los manchurianos no han vacilado en escoger el camino y hoy día las perspectivas de conquista social rusa no pueden ser más halagadoras.

El problema de la China tiene una trascendencia y significado que debemos explicar. *En realidad no existe como tal la nación China, no es sino un continente habitado por distintos grupos que no tienen de común sino la raza;*

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*un mongol difiere de un manchuriano en lenguaje, costumbres, tradiciones y aún en manera de vivir.* La verdadera lucha estriba en que cada grupo quiere predominar sobre el otro. La China de hoy puede ser comparada con la Europa Medioeval. Cada una de las provincias chinas quiere gobernar a las otras e imponerles sus leyes y sus costumbres. Frente a este estado de cosas, los ejércitos victoriosos de determinado grupo necesitan millones y millones para sostener su predominio sobre los otros.

En 1924 el mariscal Chan Tso-Lin declaró la independencia de la Manchuria y se negó a reconocer la autoridad de Pekin y en octubre del mismo año celebró un convenio con el Gobierno del Soviet en lo que respecta al ferrocarril del Este: contrato que es válido hoy día.

La Manchuria es considerada, pues, hoy como un estado independiente unido a Nankin de acuerdo con los términos de un convenio que le reconoce soberanía en el Norte de la China. Pero el Mariscal Chan Hueh Liang no es un jefe derrotado, él participa del gobierno de su territorio con los mismos poderes y prerrogativas que su aliado de Nanking y no permitirá que las autoridades del Kuomintang intervengan en sus negocios.

Sea que el resto del mundo lo quiera o no, la separación de la Manchuria del territorio, tarde o temprano, tendrá que ser reconocida. No se puede hablar de ningún tratado de paz ni amistad entre ambos países sin que la China reconozca los derechos del Japón en la Manchuria: esto constituye el verdadero problema de hoy entre la China y el Japón.

Parece que el Japón estaría dispuesto a renunciar todos sus derechos en la China, siempre que ésta le permita, junto con el derecho de residir en el interior, el derecho de poseer y enajenar propiedades y ejercitar libremente las industrias dentro de su territorio; a esto se ha negado la China.

La China se niega también a reconocer la validez del Tratado de 1915, mientras que el Japón sostiene que los derechos adquiridos mediante ese tratado son incommovibles. Ningún estadista japonés puede siquiera discutir la validez de ese tratado. La Nación entera se levantara como un sólo hombre y lucharía, si fuera necesario, con el mundo entero antes de abandonar los derechos que consideran el

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fruto de una era de sacrificios. *Pedir al Japón que abandone la Manchuria es pedirle que se suicide; el Japón nunca abandonará las posiciones económicas adquiridas.*

Ni el pacto Kellogg, ni la Liga de las Naciones, ni ningún otro instrumento para la supresión de la guerra, tienen el suficiente peso para que el Japón decida abandonar un problema tan intimamente ligado con su existencia. Sólo la seguridad de que la China pudiera derrotar al Japón en los campos de batalla, haría que éste desistiera de su propósito; esa posibilidad no existe hoy día. Y la derrota traería la miseria en la Manchuria. La única manera de evitar, pues, esa guerra es que los demás poderes de la tierra reconozcan la verdadera situación y acepten la decisión de los manchurianos. Sólo así, la Manchuria se salvará del Soviet y se abrirá al capital extranjero, constituyéndose un estado independiente entre el Japón y el Soviet; y entre el Soviet y la China.

La actitud de la Liga de las Naciones al no estudiar el problema en toda su amplitud y trascendencia, no hace sino cooperar con la política del Soviet que es la que mueve hoy los resortes de este grave problema.

OPINION DEL CORRESPONSAL DEL  
"SHANGHAI EVENING POST",  
H. G. W. WOODHEAD

DICE QUE EL JAPON COMETIO UN ERROR AL DESCUIDAR  
LA EXPOSICION DE SU CASO.

Este corresponsal dice que la Liga procedería erróneamente si insistiese únicamente en el retiro de las tropas japonesas, sin tener en cuenta todo el problema.

Shanghai Evening Post, 20 de Octubre de 1931.

Una ligera ojeada a las columnas editoriales de la prensa extranjera en China, seguramente conduciría al lector a suponer que la simpatía extranjera está decididamente de parte de la China en su actual disputa con el Japón; pero, me aventuro a dudar de que cualquiera de estas deducciones sea justificada. Puede haber causado mala impresión y hasta es posible que se dude sobre si hay un motivo o una justificación suficiente para ciertos incidentes ocurridos a raíz de la intervención del Japón en la Manchuria, especialmente en lo concerniente a los recientes "raids" aéreos. Pero, el Japón al recurrir a la fuerza con el fin de arreglar sus disputas pendientes con la China, sólo está haciendo lo que casi todos los americanos e ingleses residentes en este país hubieran esperado que su gobierno realizase en diferentes oportunidades, a partir de 1924, para defender los derechos de sus connacionales en China y llegar a un arreglo de viejas disputas; las que no hacían sino entorpecer las negociaciones y que una política sana y conciliadora no había logrado solucionar.

No puede dudarse que la política paciente y conciliatoria seguida por las potencias que tienen los más importantes intereses en China—exceptuando a Rusia—ha alentado a los políticos chinos a creer que podían hacer caso omiso de los gobiernos extranjeros y sobrepasar los privilegios que acuerdan los tratados, violando éstos hasta donde quisieran, sin temor a una resistencia efectiva de parte de aquellos.

*El Pacto Kellog ha sido, de hecho, explotado por el gobierno chino para violar una vez y otra los tratados. Últimamente no ha pasado un mes sin que no se hayan testificado nuevos atropellos a los derechos de los extranjeros en este país y además se les ha hecho creer a los chinos que el efecto acumulativo de estos atropellos era destruir los tratados y anular las concesiones y arreglos con los extranjeros, derivados de aquellos. ¿No han sido dos de las principales potencias—Estados Unidos y la Gran Bretaña—las que han llevado su complacencia al extremo de negociar el abandono de las concesiones de los tratados, después que el gobierno de Nan-King había formalmente decretado la abolición de éstos?*

EL GOLPE RUSO

Únicamente una potencia, en estos últimos años, ha empleado la fuerza para los derechos que se desprenden de un tratado: la Rusia Soviética. Rusia era, como el Japón, una signataria del Pacto Kellog. Pero, cuando las autoridades chinas en Manchuria se propusieron confiscar el Ferrocarril Chino del Este, Rusia, dejando de lado todas las protestas que se basaban en ese documento, invadió el norte de la Manchuria y señaló sus propias condiciones por medio de negociaciones directas con las autoridades manchurianas. A pesar del Pacto Kellog y las obligaciones que éste estipulaba, la opinión extranjera no fué en su totalidad desfavorable a Rusia.

"El procedimiento arbitrario que se relaciona con la China Oriental, refleja que, en su deseo de arrojar a los extranjeros, los chinos están poco dispuestos a cumplir con las obligaciones formales pactadas de buena fe y conscientemente por los anteriores gobiernos de la China"—dijo el "Times" de Nueva York.

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“Los chinos por su acción arbitraria en el Ferrocarril Oriental han dado a entender a todas las demás potencias, que los gobernantes actuales de China no reconocerán ningún tratado, a no ser que se halle respaldado por la fuerza”—dijo el “Manchester Guardian”.

Los chinos han dado lugar a un excelente argumento, aún a la potencia extranjera más amiga de ellas, para que difate la época de verificar cambio alguno sobre el actual sistema de la extraterritorialidad.

#### UNA SORPRESA PARA EL JAPÓN

Debe ser sorprendente para los estadistas japoneses saber que cuando su gobierno recurre a la fuerza como resultado de una provocación insistente y, sobre todo, con el fin de proteger sus ferrocarriles y sus derechos económicos en Manchuria, que son aún de más vital importancia para el Japón que lo era el Ferrocarril Oriental para el Soviet, no sólo se invoca el Pacto Kellog y no sólo se invita a una Nación que no pertenece a la Liga a que participe en las deliberaciones del Consejo, sino que la prensa europea aun discute la posibilidad de aplicar el artículo XVI del Pacto de la Liga; es decir, un artículo que estipula que si alguna Nación, miembro de la Liga, recurre a la guerra sin respetar sus compromisos “será ipso-facto” juzgada de haber cometido un acto de guerra contra las demás naciones de la Liga”.....

Nadie por un momento puede imaginar que América o las grandes potencias europeas sueñen aplicar este artículo en la disputa presente. Todas ellas han tenido amplia experiencia de la agresividad e incumplimiento del gobierno chino, para creer que una intervención naval o militar en apoyo de China contra el Japón, valiese los huesos de un simple soldado americano o europeo. Mientras ellas continúan haciendo toda presión amigablemente posible para llegar a un acuerdo pacífico en la disputa chino-japonesa, el Consejo de la Liga, ciertamente, no será culpable del desatino de instruir a todos sus miembros de “someter (al Japón) a la suspensión de todas las relaciones comerciales y financieras y la prohibición de todo intercambio entre sus nacionales y los nacionales del Estado que rompe el Pacto”, o “pedir a los diversos gobiernos signatarios de los convenios de la Li-

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ga, el efectivo militar, naval o aéreo, con que deben contribuir por separado a las fuerzas armadas que se usen para proteger los convenios de la Liga”.

#### CUANDO LOS PACTOS FRACASAN

La absoluta verdad en este asunto es que ambos, el Pacto de la Liga y el Pacto Kellog, deben desecharse a menos que, tanto el espíritu como la letra de estos documentos sean escrupulosamente observados por las partes. *Ningún documento fué jamás hecho con la intención de permitir a un país como China, mofarse de las obligaciones de tratados firmados por ella con otros países y provocar a las potencias que tienen intereses sustanciales en China.*

Si la Liga de las Naciones cumple sus funciones como organización, para evitar la guerra o que se recurra a la fuerza; debe también exigir a sus miembros un reconocimiento de la intangibilidad de las obligaciones provenientes de tratados anteriores al presente estado de cosas y que no dejan lugar solución alternativa alguna.

Los japoneses, hasta el presente, han mostrado singular ineptitud en la exposición de su causa, es decir, para hacer ver el motivo de su intervención en Manchuria. Pero cada experto en asuntos del Lejano Oriente sabe que el Japón, más que ningún otro país, ha sufrido las violaciones de los Tratados y otras formas de provocación por parte de los chinos.

Había indicios, semanas antes de que el Japón acudiera a la fuerza, de que su paciencia se estaba agotando. Y ahora que él, en forma definida, ha emprendido la defensa de sus derechos por la fuerza—lo cual, asevera, no es equivalente a una guerra—sólo puede encontrarse una solución insistiendo en que China, tanto como el Japón, cumplan las obligaciones existentes en los Tratados. Los japoneses no retirarán sus tropas hasta no estar completamente satisfechos de que sus connacionales están adecuadamente protegidos. China no puede, por el momento, dar ninguna garantía que importe el valor del papel en que ésta se haya escrito. Los japoneses están decididos a hacer respetar los derechos emergentes de los Tratados y no hay indicios de que China cumplirá estos requerimientos.

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#### UN PERJUICIO A LOS EXTRANJEROS

La Liga haría un perjuicio singular—a los intereses extranjeros en China, si—presumiendo que tiene medios para hacerlo—insistiese solamente sobre el retiro de las fuerzas japonesas y creara la impresión en China que los derechos creados por sus Tratados con el Japón eran un asunto indiferente para la Liga. Una derrota diplomática del Japón, tal como ésta, sería equivalente a mirar con indiferencia las violaciones de los Tratados y alentaría a los chinos en la idea de que ningún asunto, por grandes que sean los intereses atacados, daría derecho para defenderse a ninguna potencia. Tal estado de cosas para los intereses extranjeros en aquel país, sería intolerable en adelante.

#### LAS SOSPECHAS JAPONESAS

No debe sorprender que el Japón mire las mediaciones extranjeras con profunda sospecha. ¿No fué él (el Japón) arrojado de la posesión de la Península de Liao-Tung en 1895 por la intervención de Rusia, Francia y Alemania, habiendo el primero de estos países tomado posesión de dicha Península tres años después?

En Versalles, y otra vez en Wáshington, la posición del Japón en Manchuria fué vigorosamente atacada y el Barón Shidehara se vió en la necesidad de exponer que: "si alguna vez se reconociese que los derechos solemnemente concedidos por los tratados pudiesen revocarse en cualquier momento, alegando que fueron concedidos contra la voluntad espontánea del que los concedió, se establecería un precedente excesivamente peligroso y de consecuencias de suma trascendencia sobre la estabilidad de las relaciones internacionales existentes en Asia, Europa y en cualquiera otra parte del mundo".

Bajo la presión extranjera, el Japón retiró la más objetable de las Veintiuna Demandas y devolvió el Ferrocarril de Shang-Tung y el territorio alquilado a China. Pero, en lo que a Manchuria concierne, el Japón ha sostenido uniformemente que él no se someterá a ninguna mediación en sus intereses.

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El error del Japón ha sido no notificar a la Liga sobre las causas y motivos precisos de su reciente acción de armas; y es a esta omisión, a la que la Liga debe recurrir ahora, si realmente busca cómo terminar su presente *impasse*.

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### EL ACTUAL CAOS SOCIAL Y ECONOMICO DE CHINA

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La revolución china, que se inició el año de 1911, ha determinado un estado extraordinario de cosas en ese país. La mitad de la gente en China carece de trabajo. Millones de personas se encuentran sin hogar, padeciendo de hambre y sufriendo de todo género de privaciones, sin que las leyes humanas puedan operar ningún beneficio en este país convulsionado. El dinero que se puede obtener, mediante impuestos, sólo sirve para mantener el ejército que absorbe toda la preocupación de la China y el dinero que pudiera emplearse en el socorro de tantos millones de seres desesperados, no puede menos de invertirse en la adquisición de elementos bélicos.

Más de cinco millones de gente armada están viviendo en la China del pueblo empobrecido. Tres millones de hombres están incorporados a las 288 divisiones que forman los distintos ejércitos de Chiang Kay Sheik, columna fundamental del gobierno nacionalista. Los ejércitos de Manchuria, tienen cuando menos, quinientos mil hombres; Sze Huen tiene más de trescientos mil; Kuang Si Kuan Tun, doscientos mil. Las bandas inorganizadas, la multitud errabunda que vive del pillaje asciende a dos millones. Todos estos hombres están equipados a la europea, con armamento de inmejorable calidad. Artillería, tanques de guerra, aeroplanos, camiones, autos, todos los vehículos de muerte o de auxilio, adquiridos por las fuerzas en beligerancia, son usados, demandando su utilización una cantidad de dinero que escapa a todo cálculo.

En el presupuesto publicado por el Ministro Sung, tenemos una visión de los orígenes del dinero invertido en gue-

rrrear unos contra otros y los medios para mantener a Nanking en el poder. Según el presupuesto de 1930, los ejércitos nacionalistas cuestan S. 245.000.000.00, con un déficit de S. 100.000.000.00 que se cubre mediante empréstitos. Este año, el déficit llega a doscientos ochenta millones de dólares.

El presupuesto de 1931, revela que los gastos militares representan 87.5 % de las entradas. Vemos, entonces, que en un momento dramático como el sufrido con las inundaciones del Yang Tze, el erario chino no puede distraer ni un centavo para el auxilio de millones de hombres, pues todo su dinero está destinado a una revolución que, hasta ahora es absolutamente infecunda y de la que nadie sabe los objetivos.

El hombre que no ha caído en el engranaje militar no tiene, entonces, más remedio que salir a buscar alimentos de cualquier manera. El habitante pacífico, desesperado por la necesidad que le impone una conducta fuera de la ley, se convierte en bandido. Las fuerzas militares no tienen, en ese momento, más remedio que aniquilar al bandido. Y es así como, por culpa de los ejércitos, se crean las hordas de bandoleros que, luego, caen exterminados por aquellos que les dieron origen. El obrero, el campesino chino no tiene manera de hacerse oír. Y día a día, la ambición de unos y la ineptitud de otros van consumando, unidas, el crimen lento y seguro de aniquilamiento de ese país.

Y no nos equivoquemos en cuanto a las miras y los objetivos de las varias facciones que pretenden regir al país. La ambición de cada grupo, de cada político, es conquistar y gobernar los grupos restantes, llamados, a falta de mejor nombre, la nación china. Y no hay nación como nación. Hay un territorio en el que habitan millones de hombres. Esto es todo. La diferencia entre Manchuria y Cantón, por ejemplo, es flagrante. Costumbres, idiomas, religión, todo difiere en forma palpable y de fácil constatación.

Con 96 % de analfabetos es inútil hablar de unificación de la China. Esta no es sino una palabra de fácil explotación. ¿Hay algún remedio? ¿Hay algún modo de libertar a China de su actual esclavitud? ¿Cuánta es la responsabilidad del mundo ante el sistema militar actual de ese país? ¿Estamos en lo justo reconociendo que el pueblo chino, con un 96 % de analfabetos, constituye una nación cuyo

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territorio integral es sagrado?. ¿Debemos perpetuar el absurdo diplomático y jurídico de que un país tan grande como un continente debe ser regido por un grupo privilegiado y unido bajo un gobierno, no importa a qué costo de la humanidad?. Siguiendo este criterio, la conservación de la integridad territorial china y su no disminuida soberanía sobre estas regiones, ha llegado a ser un principio fundamental de la diplomacia europea. Sin embargo, al tiempo que se enunciaba este principio, China entregaba secretamente la Manchuria a Rusia, bajo los términos de una alianza militar, con el objeto de humillar primero y aplastar después al Japón. Japón estaba atado de pies y manos por respetar la integridad de China, mientras este país y Rusia se disponían secretamente a aplastar su existencia.

*MERCED A LOS DIPLOMATICOS ROJOS DE MOSCU, RUSIA ESTA GANANDO EN CHINA UNA PARTIDA QUE ES UN PELIGRO PARA EL RESTO DEL MUNDO. MONGOLIA HA SIDO AMPUTADA SIN DOLOR A LA CHINA Y ANEXADA AL SOVIET. SIN KIANG VA POR EL MISMO CAMINO. LA REGION DE BARGA SE ESTA DESLIGANDO Y LA PRESION DE LOS ESLAVOS ESTA CONQUISTANDO LAS LEJANAS PROVINCIAS DE LA CHINA PARA LA REPUBLICA DE LOS SOVIETS.*

Los mongoles han declarado su derecho para gobernarse y el respeto del mundo ha reconocido el hecho consumado. Cuando Sin Kiang declare su independencia, Moscú reconocerá este nuevo estado de cosas y el resto del mundo aceptará lo inevitable. Moscú no reconoce, en cambio, el principio de la integridad territorial china y lenta, pero seguramente, los comunistas están destrozando la China mientras otros poderes se adhieren a una doctrina ya gastada que ningún estadista tendría hoy el valor de afirmar.

A. H. S.

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### LA VERDAD HISTORICA SOBRE EL CONFLICTO CHINO - JAPONES

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En la región de Manchuria los japoneses tienen doble misión que llenar: labor benéfica en pro del desarrollo chino, y papel de adalid de la civilización, evitando que el caos resulte, por la propaganda de ideas comunistas que llegarían a invadir el mundo entero, destruyendo todos los beneficios adquiridos por la humanidad en tantos siglos. Desgraciadamente, la corrupción debida a las castas militares chinas, sembrando terror entre los pacíficos habitantes; y la serie de luchas fratricidas que vienen desarrollándose en la China desde hace un cuarto de siglo, representan un campo propicio para convertir a la China en un foco de propaganda disociadora mundial. La Manchuria es la región menos azotada por la plaga de las revoluciones intestinas; es la región que disfruta de paz y prosperidad, debido únicamente a los esfuerzos desplegados por el Japón. El Japón tiene además de una colonia de más de un millón de japoneses y coreanos, inversiones de capital en esta parte, ascendente a más de mil millones de dólares, para explotar los intereses de la zona de ferrocarriles sur-manchurianos y del puerto de Dairen, que le ha sido cedido por Rusia, como resultado de la guerra ruso-japonesa. El Japón mantiene una guarnición permanente desde hace más de veinticinco años para cuidar la paz y salvaguardar no sólo sus intereses en la zona de su influencia sino los intereses y la vida de miles de extranjeros y de los mismos chinos. Ahora, para explicar la situación especial del Japón en Manchuria, se necesita hacer, ante todo, una breve exposición de los acontecimientos desarrollados en los últimos años,

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principalmente en los posteriores a la guerra chino-japonesa de 1895.

En virtud del Tratado de Paz que puso fin a dicha guerra, la Península de Liaotung, que prácticamente ocupa la mitad del territorio que nosotros llamamos Manchuria del Sur, fué cedida al Japón por la China. Li Hung Chang, el plenipotenciario chino y el más astuto diplomático y político que jamás tuvo China, firmaba con una mano el Tratado de Paz en Shimonoseki, mientras que con la otra urdía su plan maquiavélico para invitar a las grandes potencias europeas a que intervinieran en su favor y le quitaran al Japón el mismo territorio que él, Li Hung Chang, con su mano derecha le estaba cediendo. Inglaterra no aceptó tal invitación; sin embargo, Rusia, Alemania y Francia, respondieron afirmativamente, formulando, en consecuencia, idénticas representaciones diplomáticas al Japón, el cual hubo de ceder a la acción de estas tres potencias. Los diez años siguientes fueron de humillación para el pueblo japonés. Y entonces ¿qué hizo Rusia que había dicho al Japón que la posesión de la Península Liaotung en manos del Japón constituía un peligro para la paz del Lejano Oriente? En 1896, el mismo año siguiente, se firmaba el acuerdo Li-Lobanoff. Pacto de Alianza Secreto, entre Rusia y China; y Rusia extendía su garra invasora hacia la Manchuria de acuerdo con la China. Esto originó la guerra Ruso-japonesa.

Este pacto de Alianza había sido cuidadosamente guardado en secreto por los países interesados, habiéndose descubierto muchos años más tarde en la Conferencia de Washington de 1921. El Japón no conocía la existencia de este pacto secreto durante la guerra ruso-japonesa; y expresó sincero sentimiento por tener que pelear con Rusia en territorios pertenecientes a China, neutral en apariencia. Durante todo el tiempo de la guerra, el Japón abrigó un sentimiento de compasión hacia China, por su neutralidad fingida, pero desconocida para el Japón. Si el Japón hubiera sabido la colusión de China y Rusia en esta guerra, las condiciones de paz hubieran afectado también seriamente a la China.

Vamos a dejar a un lado el famoso pacto secreto. Co-

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mo dijimos, los diez años siguientes a la guerra con China fueron de humillación para el Japón. Únicamente, cuando la seguridad nacional del Japón fué amenazada vitalmente por la ambiciosa expansión de Rusia sobre Manchuria y Corea, el Japón acudió a las armas, enfrentándose con la formidable Rusia jugando el todo por el todo y venciénola en los campos de Manchuria, a costa de la vida de cien mil de sus hijos y de los mil millones de yens de gastos bélicos o sea tres mil seiscientos millones de soles oro peruano, y eso, que la vida de los japoneses muertos en los campos de batalla no pueden estimarse en dinero.

El pueblo japonés, aún ahora, se encuentra agobiado por la enorme deuda contraída por causa de esta guerra. Y, ¿por qué el Japón hizo este enorme sacrificio? Fué, únicamente, con el fin de rescatar de Rusia la Manchuria y Mongolia que Li Hung Chang había dado prácticamente a Rusia y para restituir así, esos territorios a la soberanía China. ¿China ha pagado por esto siquiera un centavo? y ¿está lista a indemnizar al Japón por este sacrificio?. China viene haciendo campaña, constantemente, para lograr la abrogación de los derechos japoneses. Pero, la cuestión fundamental consiste en que la zona de los ferrocarriles manchurianos y otros derechos que quedaron en poder del Japón al terminar la guerra ruso-japonesa, fueron cedidos por Rusia al Japón, y no por China, por el Tratado de Paz firmado en 1905 en Portsmouth, entre los plenipotenciarios del Japón y Rusia, por intermediación del presidente de los Estados Unidos, Mr. Roosevelt. Aún estos derechos adquiridos por el Japón no tendrían la importancia que tienen hoy día, si no fuese por las cuantiosas inversiones que el Japón hizo después de la guerra. Las inversiones de capital que el Japón ha hecho, representan, como dijimos al principio, la suma de dos mil millones de yens; y estas inversiones y el resguardo de las propiedades y vidas de extranjeros, obligan naturalmente al Japón a tomar medidas de emergencia encaminadas al mantenimiento del orden público y la paz en Manchuria. Si el Japón se retira de la zona que ocupa en la Manchuria, al instante, Rusia se apropiaría de ella y no sólo la China sino el mismo Japón tendrían en gravísimo peligro su soberanía y existencia.

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Hemos bosquejado el aspecto histórico de la cuestión manchuriana. Ahora, estudiaremos el otro aspecto de la cuestión, o sea el referente al futuro de Manchuria, que reviste para el Japón capital importancia. Hemos visto como Li Hung Chang trató de desalojar al Japón con la ayuda de Rusia. ¿Nuestros amigos chinos podrán garantizar al Japón que la China no producirá jamás en el futuro un político tan peligroso como Li Hung Chang?—La historia universal representa la rotación de acontecimientos originados por fuerzas ciegas, entre naciones y razas recíprocamente. Las fuerzas conscientes juegan muy poco en la historia humana desgraciadamente. ¿Quién puede asegurar que la raza eslava, organizada en su nuevo aspecto de comunismo, no intente lanzarse nuevamente y con más fuerza esta vez, sobre Manchuria, amenazando la paz del Extremo Oriente? Como se sabe, ha sido política constante de Rusia, bajo todos sus regímenes, el buscar el acceso al mar, en un lugar libre de congelación en invierno. No creemos lejano el día que Rusia, en mejores condiciones que hoy, reconstruida y organizada militarmente y con sus ideas comunistas, más temibles que sus armas; intente realizar tal empresa. Y para esta emergencia, ¿está acaso preparada la China para contrarrestar la fuerza aplastante moscovita, conteniendo su avance al Sur? ¿Puede ofrecernos la China, completa seguridad de que sus fronteras del norte serán defendidas debidamente y que no comprometerá los vitales intereses del Japón y de los pueblos amigos de este país, y aún la seguridad nacional del Japón?—La historia se repite y nosotros no podemos menos que abrigar una grande aprehensión sobre este punto. A menos que la China esté preparada para darnos seguridad satisfactoria sobre esta cuestión de capital importancia, el Japón no podrá cambiar tan fácilmente en la actitud que observa hasta el presente.

En resumen, el día que la China, alejada completamente de sus guerras civiles, que tan caro cuestan a su pueblo, ofrezca al Japón seguridad completa sobre los puntos tratados arriba, la llamada cuestión manchuriana quedará resuelta satisfactoriamente.

S. TANAKA.

## LA VALIDEZ DE UN TRATADO

por Geo. Bronson Rea.

### EL FONDO Y LAS REALIDADES DEL PROBLEMA DE LA MANCHURIA

Publicamos, a propósito del problema manchuriano, el siguiente artículo sobre extraterritorialidad y los principios básicos de la disputa entre China y el Japón, que fue escrito y publicado por primera vez, el 19 de setiembre próximo pasado; es decir, antes de que las autoridades militares japonesas de la Manchuria, se vieran obligadas a actuar en la crisis que ha dado por resultado la ocupación de Mukden y otros puntos estratégicos de la Manchuria. En este artículo se ve que el verdadero desacuerdo entre China y el Japón tiene su origen en el Tratado de 1915, que China, ahora, se niega a reconocer, fundándose en que fue obtenido bajo dura presión.—Geo. Bronson Rea, notable publicista norteamericano, trata, en este artículo, de presentar los puntos más salientes de la controversia que ha acentuado el malestar existente entre ambos países y ha profundizado el antagonismo entre esos dos grandes pueblos orientales.

En 1894, el Japón fue a la guerra con China a causa de Corea. El tratado de paz se firmó en Shimonoseki el 17 de abril de 1895, por el cual China reconocía, en forma definitiva, la completa independencia de Corea y cedía al Japón, a perpetuidad y entera soberanía, toda la parte sur de la provincia de Fengtien con todas las islas pertenecientes a dicha provincia.

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Considerando que la posesión permanente por parte del Japón, del territorio cedido, redundaría en forma perjudicial para una paz duradera en el Oriente, Rusia, Alemania y Francia se unieron y en conjunta recomendación pidieron al Japón que se abstuviera de mantener su posesión en esos distritos en forma permanente. LAS ENTONCES TRES MAS PODEROSAS POTENCIAS MILITARES DE EUROPA, OBLIGARON AL JAPON A CEDER LOS LEGITIMOS FRUTOS DE SU VICTORIA Y A ACEPTAR, EN CAMBIO DE ESE IMPORTANTE TERRITORIO, LA INSIGNIFICANTE INDEMNIZACION DE 30.000.000 DE TAEELS. INCAPACITADO PARA IR CONTRA PODERIO TAN ABRUMADOR, EL JAPON SE DOBLEGO, ANTE ESA FUERZA SUPERIOR, Y EN LA PROCLAMA IMPERIAL FICHADA EN MAYO 10 DE 1895, EL EMPERADOR ACEPTO LA RECOMENDACION DE LAS TRES POTENCIAS Y EN UNA FORMAL CONVENCION, FIRMADA EN NOVIEMBRE 8 DE 1895, CEDIO A CHINA EL TERRITORIO QUE ESTA LE HABIA CEDIDO ANTES.—EL JAPON FUE OBLIGADO, BAJO PRESION, A ENTREGAR FENGTIEN A LA CHINA.

En mayo de 1896, la China, aún herida por la humillación de su derrota del año anterior, y agradecida a Rusia por su intervención, celebró mediante Li Hung Chang, una alianza secreta militar, ofensiva y defensiva con Rusia, dirigida contra el Japón. Para llevar a cabo el objeto de esta alianza y facilitar el acceso de tropas rusas a los sitios que los flamantes aliados consideraban amenazados (la frontera de Corea), y asegurar los medios de subsistencias de estas tropas, China otorgó a Rusia el derecho de construir un ferrocarril que cruzara las provincias de Heilungkiang y Kirin, en dirección a Vladivostok. ESTE IMPORTANTE TRATADO FUE MANTENIDO EN PROFUNDO SECRETO. Efectivamente, su texto oficial no fue revelado hasta 1921, es decir, 25 años después.

En Setiembre 8 de 1896, el anterior tratado secreto fue completado con la firma de un tratado comercial para la construcción y explotación del Ferrocarril Oriental Chino (Chinese Eastern Railway). En marzo 27 de 1898, China

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entregó a Rusia, por el término de 25 años, la península de Liaotung, concediéndole además el derecho de extender el mencionado Ferrocarril Oriental Chino, de Harbin a Puerto Arturo.

Los términos de la alianza secreta referida, una vez confirmada por China, dieron pretexto a Rusia para ocupar e inundar de tropas toda la Manchuria, cerrando esa provincia al comercio y a los viajeros extranjeros y convirtiéndola en virreinato gobernado desde San Petersburgo. *La Manchuria se convirtió, así, en una provincia rusa.*

La guerra ruso-japonesa vino a continuación. El Japón salió, nuevamente, victorioso del conflicto. En la Conferencia de Paz de Portsmouth, Rusia rehusó pagar una indemnización en dinero; pero, con el consentimiento de China, transfirió al Japón la concesión de Liaotung y sus derechos sobre el ferrocarril manchuriano del sur (South Manchuria Railway). Como la vía ferroviaria había sido destruida en la retirada del ejército ruso y las tropas japonesas en su avance fueron reconstruyéndola con una línea militar de trocha angosta, para el transporte de sus tropas y materiales de guerra el Japón se sintió, legalmente, acreedor al derecho de uso de tal línea, así como a que se reconociese su obra reconstructora.

El Japón, pidió dinero prestado a Inglaterra para reconstruir la línea del sur de la Manchuria y desembolsó sus propios capitales, en esa provincia, para favorecer su desarrollo. En 1910, la circunstancia de que el término de la concesión de Liaotung imposibilitaba seguir obteniéndose dinero prestado para el desenvolvimiento de la Manchuria; exigía que pudiera asegurarse la prórroga de tal concesión. De otro modo, el Japón se vería obligado a perder las compensaciones por su victoria sobre Rusia y, además, sus propios capitales ingentemente invertidos en el desarrollo de la Manchuria. Lógicamente, pues, el Japón debía gestionar la consolidación de su posición en Manchuria; posición transferida a él por Rusia. Efectivamente, en febrero de 1915, el Japón presentó sus "21 Demandas a China", y en las subsecuentes negociaciones, China convino en aceptar lo concerniente a Manchuria y Shantung y firmó el Tratado de 25 de mayo de 1915, extendiendo la concesión Liaotung y los términos del FF. CC. Sur Manchuriano y del FF. CC. An-

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tung a 99 años. El tratado, igualmente, accedió a la petición japonesa sobre el derecho de negociar el territorio concedido para construir casa-habitaciones y todo género de residencias, para comerciar y manufacturar y para emprender y realizar labores agrícolas.

Este tratado, constituye actualmente, el eje central del problema manchuriano. Los Chinos, afirman que fue arrancado por violencia y que, por tanto, dicho tratado no es válido. Muchos libros se han escrito acerca del problema manchuriano, desde los respectivos puntos de vista de chinos y japoneses. Pero, hay un aspecto de la disputa que parece que ha sido ignorado. *Dos errores no pueden crear un derecho; sin embargo, esta regla ha sido utilizada por ambos contendientes: Si el Japón fué obligado, por fuerza mayor, (presión de Inglaterra, Francia y Rusia) a devolver a China la parte sur de la provincia de Fengtien, después de que China se la había cedido a perpetuidad por el tratado de paz de abril de 1895; resulta, que aduciéndose la nulidad del pacto jurídico por fuerza, debería también aducirse la nulidad de tal retrocesión, verificada en 8 de noviembre de 1895. En resumen, si cuando China aduce que por la fuerza firmó su pacto con Japón; debe también tenerse presente que Japón, por fuerza, fué obligado a perder casi todas sus legítimas indemnizaciones. Y si aduce de nulidad de pactos, por la China; debe también anularse los obligados a suscribirlos por el Japón en contra de sí mismo. Por lo menos, el principio que envuelven ambos pactos es idéntico. Por consiguiente, si se sitúa el problema manchuriano desde tal aspecto, aparecería como que el Japón, simplemente, esperaba una favorable oportunidad para—como se dice—pagar a China con la misma moneda, empleando los mismos métodos para recobrar un bien que le había sido restado por aplastante fuerza superior.*

Cualesquiera que sea el aspecto legal o moral de dicho caso, no es difícil de analizar y comprender sus repercusiones psicológicas en una nación—como el Japón— de hombres orgullosos de su valentía, que han sido privados de los legítimos frutos de su victoria, mediante una combinación de potencias militares ajenas a la cuestión. *A esta humillación, se añadió una afrenta aún más grave, la de ver a China obsequiar a Rusia el mismo territorio que Japón le aca-*

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*baba de restituir, regalo hecho bajo la forma de una alianza secreta enteramente ofensiva al Japón.* Después de una segunda guerra, posiblemente motivada por esta alianza, nuevamente surgió Japón victorioso y una vez más vino en posesión de una parte del territorio que devolvió en 1895; con la sola diferencia de que, en vez de una cesión fuera de derecho y a perpetuidad, su adquisición fue restringida—esta vez—por el plazo no expirado aún de 25 años *mínimum*. Pronto volvió China a creer que el Japón podría ir demasiado lejos, con el desenvolvimiento de Manchuria bajo estas condiciones; y rehusó compromiso alguno. A su vez, Japón para asegurar su situación y garantir en alguna forma el reintegro de sus cuantiosas inversiones, convino con China en prorrogar la Concesión Liaotung antes de que ella expirara.

Al fin, logró Japón, que China reconociese sus pedidos de garantías y obtuvo el tratado que consolidó su posición. Es inútil aventurar una opinión al respecto así como sobre el fondo de la cuestión.

En la Conferencia de Versalles, China trató de poner en discusión los Tratados de 1915, como parte de las negociaciones para la Paz Mundial; y si no hubiera sido porque Francia, Inglaterra e Italia habían prometido su apoyo al Japón, China habría triunfado en sus pretensiones. En la Conferencia de Washington, para la limitación de armamentos navales, China volvió a insistir sobre la invalidez del Tratado de 1915, y nuevamente sufrió una desilusión; mientras el Japón asistió a la Conferencia solamente a condición de que no se intentara discutir sus derechos en Manchuria. China hizo una patética presentación de su caso, explicando sus razones para negarse a reconocer la validez del Tratado. Cuando fallaron sus esfuerzos para lograr que la Conferencia se pronunciara sobre el conflicto manchuriano, China se reservó el derecho de buscar una solución en todas las futuras oportunidades apropiadas.

*La posición del Japón, como se demostró en Washington, se basa en la más completa legalidad. Poniendo punto final al caso del Japón, el Barón Shidehara dijo: "si alguna vez se reconociese que los derechos, solemnemente concedidos por el Tratado, podrían ser revocados en cualquier momento, basándose en que fueron concedidos contra es-*

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*pontánea voluntad de su poseedor, se establecería un precedente excesivamente peligroso, con no lejanas consecuencias para la estabilidad de las relaciones internacionales existentes en Asia, en Europa y en todas partes”.*

En respuesta a la invitación del Secretario Hughes, llamando a los delegados a exhibir y registrar en la Conferencia copias de todos los Tratados secretos y de otra clase que tuvieran celebrados con China, los chinos suministraron un sumario telegráfico de su tratado secreto de alianza con Rusia firmado en 1896; se tuvo por esa exhibición, la primera confirmación oficial de dicho Tratado, vigente en la actualidad.

La Delegación Japonesa al tiempo que se realizó la tremenda aparición de dicho documento, revelador de su exacta posición en Manchuria, se abstuvo prudentemente de hacer abiertos comentarios que pudieran provocar discusiones en la Conferencia. En aras de la armonía y para evitar extrañas interferencias en esta disputa que peculiarmente, sólo concernían a las dos partes interesadas, la Delegación Japonesa prefirió afirmarse sobre la legalidad del Tratado de 1915, principiando por aclarar que cualquiera revisión, nuevo examen o discusión de viejos agravios en la Conferencia, no serviría para nada útil. Los Delegados Japoneses sostuvieron que si se traía a discusión, en la Conferencia, el Tratado de 1915 y éste era, por alguna circunstancia, declarado inválido, entonces sus derechos en Manchuria serían definidos por el Tratado de Portsmouth y en vista de la evidencia presentada por China de provocar una guerra, ella estaría expuesta a una indemnización que el Japón pudiera demandarle. En vista de la declaración hecha por China, de buscarle al Tratado de 1915, en todas las futuras ocasiones apropiadas, una solución que condujera a negociaciones amistosas con el Japón sin la intervención de tercera potencia, se abstuvo diplomáticamente la Delegación Japonesa, de provocar una discusión en Washington que, probablemente, hubiera reabierto por completo el caso ante una corte internacional. *Si China insiste ante el Japón de que el Tratado de 1915 no es válido, el Japón podrá, entonces, remontarse a Portsmouth y fijar la indemnización, ampliamente justificada, por razón de la alianza secreta de China con Rusia.*

La Delegación Japonesa en Washington, absteniéndose

de verificar cualquier comentario abierto o discusión y manteniendo su propia tesis, cuando el Secretario Hughes leyó en sesión pública el texto compendiado del Tratado de alianza secreto Li-Lobonoff de 1896, tuvo una actitud que constituyó uno de los mas notables ejemplares de control frente a una severa provocación, característica del Código del Samurai. Código de la moral y honor japonés. Pues, de otro modo, si lo hubieran deseado los japoneses, hubiesen entonces hecho fracasar la Conferencia; demandando la reapertura de todo el caso de Manchuria, basándose en la confesión de China y ofreciendo la alianza secreta Chino-Rusa como la prueba de justificación de la alianza anglo-japonesa, subsecuente contra la que, en ese preciso momento, arremetían todos en la Conferencia, calificándola del más inicuo, más agresivo e intolerable pacto de la historia moderna: la causa de todas las desdichas de la China e inhabilidad para poner su casa en orden. El dominio sobre sí del Japón, salvo la Conferencia y la Paz del Pacífico, y como la China se reservó el derecho de buscar una solución al conflicto de la Manchuria, en cualquiera ocasión apropiada en lo futuro, el Japón, similarmente, se reservó el derecho de hacer responsable a la China por las consecuencias de esos actos.

La Concesión original de 25 años, sobre la península de Liaotung expiró en 1923. De acuerdo con su declaración de considerar el Tratado de 1915 como ilegal, China notificó formalmente al Japón que había terminado la concesión y pidió el restablecimiento de su soberanía sobre dicho territorio. El Japón categóricamente declinó discutir el asunto.

Si lo sostenido por China se mantuviese, entonces el Japón estaría en la Manchuria como un agresor, ocupando por la fuerza territorio perteneciente a China. Desde el punto de vista chino no hay circunstancias atenuantes. Rechaza la sugestión, de que bajo cualquier aspecto pueda ser élla responsable ante el Japón, por haber colocado a Rusia en la Manchuria, o de que, en cualquiera forma, hubiese sido China responsable de la guerra misma. China declara que la concesión expiró en 1923, que los derechos ferrocarrileros terminarán en 1934 y quieren que el Japón se vaya,

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retire sus tropas y coloque sus industrias y actividades bajo la jurisdicción China.

El Tratado general de comercio entre China y Japón, que entre otras cosas, extiende los privilegios extraterritoriales a los súbditos japoneses, ha expirado. Durante varios meses progresaron las negociaciones para un nuevo tratado.

Naturalmente, el Japón está listo a renunciar a todo privilegio especial, derechos extraterritoriales y concesiones en la China propiamente dicha, en cambio de recíprocos derechos concedidos a los japoneses, como residir en el interior, ser propietarios, arrendar tierras, levantar edificios y ocuparse en industrias y negocios para sus súbditos.

Manteniéndose, categóricamente, en su política de no reconocer el Tratado de 1915, China dice que el Japón no puede gozar de tales derechos hasta que renuncie a la Concesión de Liaotung y retire sus tropas de Manchuria. Pero, toda la posición del Japón en la Manchuria, sus inversiones de un billón y medio de yens, sus necesidades económicas, seguridad estratégica, honor y dignidad nacionales, todo descansa sobre la legalidad del Tratado de 1915. Renunciar a este Tratado equivale a cometer un suicidio nacional. He aquí el verdadero problema que espera atinada solución. Mientras el "impasse" no se resuelva, es claro que ningún tratado de comercio y amistad puede negociarse entre Japón y China.

El caso del Capitán Nakamura, el affaire de Wanpaoshan, las masacres en Corea y otros mil incidentes, que complican y amargan las relaciones entre los dos países, todos proceden de la negativa china a reconocer el Tratado de 1915 como obligatorio.

Ambas partes, puede decirse, han estado frente a un muro de granito, en cuanto a sus puntos de vista. Confiando que la Liga, el Pacto de Paz Kellogg y la simpatía del mundo, constreñirían al Japón y le impedirían emplear la fuerza armada en apoyo de su diplomacia, la China se ha propuesto un asedio determinado para minar la posición del Japón, mediante presión económica. La China ha ignorado las solemnes declaraciones del Japón de que no toleraría ninguna intervención extraña en la Manchuria, de que lucharía con todo el mundo, si fuera necesario, para defender sus derechos ganados, duramente, en aquella región. La China, también, ha

pasado por alto el hecho esencial de que aún en el pacto de Paz Kellogg-Briand, varios signatarios se reservaron el derecho de la propia defensa y la de las regiones donde tuvieran vitales intereses. En estas condiciones una crisis era inevitable; cualquier incidente tendría que romper el "impasse" que lenta, pero seguramente, ajustaba el nudo alrededor del cuello del Japón. El Japón tenía que moverse en la Manchuria como Gran Bretaña se ha movido en la India y en Egipto; como los Estados Unidos han actuado en el Caribe y como Francia lo hizo en Marruecos. No es una cuestión de principios, de policía de partidos o de interés personal. Es una cuestión del destino de una nación, el instinto de la vida y de conservación personal que, tarde o temprano, barre del camino obstáculos, para así salvaguardar el derecho de existencia.

A la larga, poco importa la diferencia en cuanto al incidente preciso que rompa el "impasse". Puede que sea o no justificado. Puede que haya sido premeditado o incidental. Los oficiales del ejército japonés en Manchuria inflamados por el asesinato del Capitán Nakamura, pueden muy bien haber perpetrado deliberadamente un pretexto para iniciar las hostilidades. Es demasiado temprano para determinar la responsabilidad por el incidente de Mukden. Alguien dejó caer el fósforo en la Santa Bárbara. Algo empujó al ejército japonés para que se moviera y nos encontramos ya frente a hechos concretos, frente a hechos realizados.

El mundo oirá mucho acerca de los designios imperia- listas del Japón sobre la China. Se nos dirá cómo el partido militar en el Japón ha forzado la escena. Se intentará comparar la máquina militar japonesa con el despotismo militar prusiano que gobernó a Alemania. Pero, antes de llegar a conclusiones ligeras, sería bueno recordar el fondo histórico del problema manchuriano y la reacción de cualquier grupo de hombres luchadores ante los varios momentos en que han sido obligados a dejar ir el legítimo fruto de la victoria, mediante coacción del exterior e intervención internacional. A la historia del pasado se agrega la situación presente en la Manchuria, donde los japoneses triunfadores en dos guerras se ven, otra vez, privados de las indemnizaciones ganadas, mediante el funcionamiento de pactos de paz y otros instrumentos para renunciar a la guerra. La soberanía de la China sobre la Manchuria no es discutida ni aún por el Japón; pero,

podría preguntarse si la China ha ejercitado sus derechos de soberanía sabia y lealmente; si ha cumplido sus obligaciones internacionales en una región estratégica, que se levanta como una cuña entre dos grandes y poderosos estados, con sistemas sociales en conflicto, ideales políticos y ambiciones territoriales encontradas. *¿Se ha movido la China, en cualquier forma, para recobrar su perdida soberanía sobre la Mongolia y detener las actividades y movimientos del Soviet en las tierras fronterizas a la Manchuria? ¿Se ha esforzado por hacer que progrese el bienestar de los pueblos de Manchuria, contribuyendo al mantenimiento de la ley, el orden y la estabilidad; o ha hecho cualquier esfuerzo para proteger las enormes inversiones de capital extranjero, que iniciaron las bases de la prosperidad manchuriana? . . . . .*

El cuadro que ofrece la Manchuria, constituye, tal vez, el más gráfico ejemplo del abuso, por parte de China, en la historia contemporánea. Al principio, el capital japonés, que llega a la enorme suma de un billón y medio de yens; unido al carácter emprendedor de los japoneses, ha llevado el desarrollo de los recursos e industrias, hasta un alto grado de eficiencia; creando insospechadas fuentes de nueva riqueza y dejando a los chinos, ingentes sumas, en calidad de rentas fiscales.

Para poder desviar esas sumas hacia los bolsillos de sus Señores, el pueblo chino de las tres provincias orientales había sido sistemáticamente desposeído de los frutos de su trabajo durante muchos años, hasta comenzar a sumir en la ruina a la que era próspera y feliz región manchuriana. Cerca de siete billones de dólares de inconvertible papel moneda que ahora no vale nada, han sido colocados forzosamente en los bolsillos de los agricultores, en cambio de sus efectivas cosechas que fueron después vendidas en oro, que ha servido para sostener enormes ejércitos, para las guerras civiles chinas; y a la vez se han enriquecido funcionarios superiores chinos.

Como corolario del empobrecimiento de la región, las inversiones del Japón han disminuído en valor hasta el punto de que ya no rinden utilidades. Tan sólo es cuestión de tiempo el que su valor desaparezca en lo absoluto. Vendrá la desvalorización total de los capitales japoneses y de otros países, invertidos en Manchuria. Derrotado el Japón económicamente,

mediante el funcionamiento de un sistema y manejos planeados para echarlo de la Manchuria, sus derechos jurídicos y su posición estratégica también se desvalorizan progresivamente.

Japón ve las palabras bíblicas escritas en la pared y sus jefes militares han apelado al derecho de defensa propia. El mundo ahora se encuentra frente a hechos consumados. La China debe ahora enfrentarse sólo al Japón, para el arreglo de un asunto que durante los últimos 16 años ha mantenido sin solución la paz del Lejano Oriente, desviado el desarrollo natural de la Manchuria, hecho posible la independencia de Mongolia y el avance de la influencia soviética a través de las tierras fronterizas de Manchuria y de la China del Norte.

Nanking ha apelado oficialmente a la Liga y extraoficialmente al Gobierno y pueblo de EE. UU., que auspiciaron el Pacto Kellogg, para que ejerciten su influencia por la causa de la paz internacional. Sus llamados a la Liga se encuentran frente a las declaraciones del Japón de que no permitirá ninguna intervención extraña en su disputa sobre la Manchuria; y la Liga no puede hacer otra cosa que enviar una comisión a inquirir sobre los sucesos de la noche del 19 de setiembre. Si el Japón fuera obligado a someter su caso al arbitraje de la Liga, invitando así una vez más, a que la presión internacional le prive de sus derechos adquiridos, el triunfo diplomático de la China sería completo.

Pero, con EE. UU. fuera de la Liga, es difícil creer que Gran Bretaña, Francia o Italia voten en el sentido de obligar al Japón, bajo coacción, a renunciar a los derechos de un tratado que, secretamente, acordaron apoyar en Versalles, como parte de la compensación al Japón por su participación en la guerra mundial. Tal infidelidad mataría a la Liga y dejaría expedito el camino para la muerte del Pacto de Paz.

La llamada de China a EE. UU. pierde mucho de su sinceridad y fuerza cuando declara que "si una agresión tal como la invasión no provocada del territorio de una nación amiga por el Japón pueda pasar inadvertida por la opinión del mundo, entonces la raza humana se encuentra frente a perspectivas de aniquilamiento por medio de guerras de conquista, precipitadas por la codicia de gobiernos imperialistas".

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Algo de esa misma consideración para su propio pueblo, que ha sido aniquilado por las guerras civiles de conquista del poder sostenidas durante 15 años por la codicia de sus propios voraces militares, sería, al fin, más efectivo que la solicitud de toda la raza humana.

China es sólo una fortaleza moral, pero Japón también es un caso basado en las realidades que son difíciles de olvidar por ser de orden sentimental. El Japón, generalmente, ha procedido explicando las causas inmediatas que dieron origen a su actuación armada en la Manchuria. Los chinos sostienen que la acción japonesa en la Manchuria ha sido estudiada deliberadamente, violando el espíritu y la letra del Pacto Kellog; pero, si el Japón contesta que él actuó en defensa propia y en resguardo de la región donde tiene vitales intereses, el Pacto Kellog no puede ser invocado para resolver esa disputa. La ley internacional es resultado de costumbres internacionales y la fuerza tendrá que continuar tomando parte en la resolución de problemas no susceptibles del arreglo por medio de sugerencias amistosas. La nación en peligro hará respetar sus propias leyes para defenderse contra cualquier amenaza, real o posible, que amenace su existencia.

Una nación que no puede resolver sus propios problemas internacionales por compromiso o arbitraje, recurre a la razón o al patriotismo, y la que, como China, por dos décadas ha recurrido a la espada para resolver sus propias disputas políticas, mientras recibía desde fuera ofertas amistosas para arreglar sus cuestiones internas, está colocada en la más desagradable posición, cuando denuncia a otra nación por emplear los mismos métodos para conseguir el arreglo de una larga disputa, cuya liquidación ahora empieza a ser imperativa para su seguridad y existencia.

China se ha opuesto a cualquier intervención extranjera o mediación que traiga consigo conclusiones pacíficas a la serie de guerras intestinas, injustificadas y devastadoras, sin utilidad alguna y las cuales han llevado a la miseria a millones de sus infortunados pobladores, al hambre, la esclavitud, la bancarrota y la muerte; agotando sus recursos, deteniendo su desarrollo, destruyendo su comercio y, en general, originando la ruina que domina a ellos mismos y a sus vecinos.

China se ha reservado el derecho de sostener guerras, a su propio modo para afrontar su diplomacia contra alguna o cualquiera de las naciones que incurran en su desagrado. Renunciando al uso de la fuerza, ha apelado al arma del boicot, presión económica, agitaciones laboristas, huelgas generales, intervención en lo embarques, confiscación de fletes, penas, prisiones, castigos y aún sumaria ejecución de aquellos "traidores" que mantienen relaciones comerciales con el "enemigo". No ha habido manera efectiva alguna de combatir esa concepción de guerrear y el Japón, en particular, ha sido forzado a permanecer aquiescente a repetidas provocaciones y campañas, que en forma confesa, han sido lanzadas para lograr su ruina económica.

*Irguiéndose sobre sus derechos como estado soberano, miembro de la Liga y de la Corte de La Haya y signatario del Pacto Kellogg, la China califica cualquier ofrecimiento de mediación, para poner término a sus propias guerras catastróficas, como una infracción a su soberanía; pero, demanda inmediata intervención y auxilio en cualquiera disputa con una potencia exterior, que, preocupada con su dejadez malévola, recurre a la fuerza para obtener un arreglo.*

La espada del Japón ha cortado el nudo gordiano de cómo, cuándo y de qué manera una nación puede defenderse contra un sistema de guerra no reconocido por la costumbre o leyes internacionales. Si su actitud en Manchuria no hace otra cosa, se destacará esta pregunta forzosamente ante el mundo, y se obligará a una modificación de las teorías aceptadas de las leyes internacionales que consideran el empleo del boicot como un instrumento de guerra. En este aspecto, una vez más, China o las otras potencias del Pacífico no pueden decir que no fueron prevenidas a tiempo. Uno de los portavoces más destacados del Japón puso este asunto sobre el tapete en la Conferencia de Kioto, como uno de los temas más importantes que debían considerarse; pero no hubo tiempo para su discusión. El señor Odagiri explicó claramente la posición del Japón cuando dijo que: "la aplicación continuada del boicot, como instrumento para resolver las disputas internacionales, es altamente provocativa e injusta. . . . Si la guerra ha de ser condenada como instrumento de política internacional, el boicot debe ser declarado fuera de la ley". Por encima de esta clara y precisa declara-

— 58 —

ración de la posición del Japón sobre el empleo del arma económica, China otra vez ha vuelto a declarar una guerra económica contra el Japón con motivo de las masacres de Corea por los chinos. Sin tener en cuenta la leyes internacionales, el Japón se ha defendido por la fuerza y ha planteado, francamente, la cuestión ante el mundo.

Si la obligada ocupación de la Manchuria por el Japón lleva a la China hacia la desaparición de su inercia y logra una tardía unificación de todos los partidos y facciones, bajo alguna forma de gobierno federalizado o centralizado, habrá traído una bendición sobre las grandes masas de pacíficos pueblos chinos que han pagado el precio con incontables sufrimientos por un pequeño florecimiento de paz y estabilidad.

Es un comentario triste el que surge sobre el patriotismo de un pueblo, cuando se contempla que la más calamitosa inundación en la historia, que ha causado la muerte de millones de hombres ya ahogados, o por hambre o enfermedad, no ha logrado reunir a las facciones en lucha para aliviar los sufrimientos de su propio suelo. Con cosechas de cereales en Manchuria suficientes para alimentar el exceso de los pueblos hambrientos en el Yangtze; con un sistema ferrocarrilero de propiedad del gobierno que podía trasportar estos alimentos hasta Hankow en tres días. Nanking se ha visto obligado a buscar auxilio y trigo en los EE. UU., pagando los precios corrientes del mercado con dinero prestado, así como para convertirlo en harina y trasportarlo en barcos extranjeros a través del Pacífico, llevándolo río arriba hasta los distritos inundados. Los funcionarios chinos que controlan las cosechas de granos en Manchuria, que compraron al agricultor con billetes papel, sin valor alguno, han demostrado no tener disposición ninguna para atender a los llamados de la humanidad, del nacionalismo, del patriotismo, o de la caridad para salvar las vidas de sus compatriotas en el Sur.

Lo que no pudo lograrse en ninguna otra forma, ha sido obligado a verse por la actitud del Japón. Cantón, Nanking, Pekin, Mukden, Chengtu, enterrarán ahora sus diferencias, cerrarán sus filas, para salvar a la nación. Chiang-Kai-Sheck, una vez más, se convierte en el hombre de la hora, el jefe de un país unido, al declarar que dirigirá los ejércitos de la China en persona y luchará por la preservación

— 59 —

de la raza y, si fuera necesario, caerá en el combate con sus soldados. La amenaza del Japón ha logrado, en tres días, lo que la guerra, el hambre, la peste, la inundación, la devastación y la pobreza, desde adentro, y la presión continua de afuera, no había logrado durante veinte años. No ha sido sino cuando su país se ha visto amenazado con la división, que los jefes militares chinos han mostrado la más ligera disposición a sepultar el hacha de guerra y a unirse en la defensa de sus propios intereses nacionales. Es lástima, una humillación, aún para un observador extranjero, tener que reseñar estos hechos; pero si esta es la única manera como China puede salvar de su situación, entonces, sus verdaderos amigos que le desean bien se reservarán su juicio y mantendrán su neutralidad con la esperanza de mejores días. Si una China unida, es el resultado final de la disputa manchuriana, si el país se salva de caer en el comunismo, el precio de este resultado jamás podrá ser considerado excesivo.

La China paga el precio de haberse demorado y no haber sabido poner, a tiempo, su casa en orden, y no haber sabido hacerse cargo de sus obligaciones como Estado soberano. Mucho se ha desperdiciado desde 1919; tanto, que ha podido transformar a China en una de las naciones más poderosas y respetadas del mundo. Con cinco millones de hombres sobre las armas, no puede erguirse sobre si misma, y repeler una agresión extranjera. Con diez veces tantos combatientes como el Japón, China apela al mundo pidiendo ayuda frente a los derechos del Japón. La nota de China a la Liga de las Naciones invocando su ayuda, se dice que está concebida en los términos más graves; pero ninguna amenaza puede alterar la situación o deshacer los hechos ya consumados. El mundo no irá a la guerra para obligar al Japón a evacuar la Manchuria, antes de que ambos lados de la disputa sean cuidadosamente examinados y considerados. Japón tiene un caso justo y China sería muy sabia al escucharlo y hacer un supremo esfuerzo para buscar una solución razonable, compatible con su dignidad y orgullo.



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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 8 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
Dated March 7, 1932  
REC'D 8:30 P.M. OF  
FAR EASTERN DEPT  
MAR 8 1932  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
8 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY

man

FROM

Secretary of State  
Washington

107, March 7, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

General Commission of the Assembly resumed discussion of the Sino-Japanese dispute this afternoon. Yen read a communication addressed to the President the pertinent portions of which are as follows:

"I have now the honor to inform you that I am in receipt of the following telegram from the Honorable T V Soong, Vice President of the Council of Ministers, to the following effect

"Having accepted the resolution of the Assembly, we are requested to enter such negotiations for the armistice on the basis of the two understandings, namely:

First. Limited to matters pertaining only to cessation of hostilities and complete withdrawal of Japanese forces and

Secondly. No conditions to be attached to such withdrawal"

F/LS 793.94/4630

MAR 19 1932  
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man 2- #107, from Geneva, section one,  
March 7, 1932

withdrawal".

The telegram adds "that the negotiations for the armistice had not begun because the powers who have been requested to give their assistance in the matter had not yet moved".

Yen added "I take it that perhaps the telegram means that it is because naval and civilian authorities of the powers have not yet completely received their instructions. That maybe the explanation for the (\*) who have been requested to give their assistance not having made any movement yet".

Hymans then remarked that he presumed that the fact that no further information had been received from the powers was because they had none as yet to transmit. No information being volunteered on this point by the representatives of the interested powers present in the Commission, the general discussion was begun. Further details of the meeting will follow.

(END SECTION ONE)

FT OX

GILBERT

(\*) apparent omission

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY & GREEN

Geneva

Dated March 7, 1932

Rec'd 12:45 p.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington

107, March 7, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The following representatives spoke during the general discussion in the General Commission: Titulesco, Zaleski, Simon, Rosso, Weizacker, Boncour, Garay (Panama).

857.44 Briand

With the exception of the proposal by Simon that the Assembly adopt as a first step a declaration of principles (reported in Consulate's 108, March 7, 7 p.m.) and a draft resolution submitted by Restrapo (Columbia) no new elements were introduced during the course of the discussion. On the announcement of the death of Briand, Hymans and Boncour addressed the Assembly in his honor and the meeting was suspended for fifteen minutes as a sign of mourning.

Simon's proposal referred to above was approved in principle by the Italian and German representatives and a similar trend though less clearly defined, emerged from the speeches of the

MET

2-#107 from Geneva, March 7, 8 pm,  
(SECTION TWO)

of the Rumanian, French and other delegates.

In general there has been a marked concordance in both tone and substance of nearly all the speeches thus far delivered, which on the whole have been imbued with a spirit of moderation and an evident solicitude for maintaining an attitude of impartiality. While reserving final judgment on the substance of the controversy they have nevertheless firmly advocated the necessity of maintaining the principles of the Covenant and the respect for treaty engagements. It should be added, however, that today the representatives of the great powers were less firm and direct in their approach to the problem than those of the smaller states and gave the impression of wishing to slow down the impetus which the Assembly was gaining toward adoption of a firm stand. This attitude may be due to the fear that the small powers may precipitate matters.

Garay devoted his speech to a reaffirmation of his statement before the League Council in its meeting of December 10 - see minutes. He supported the principles already advanced by the previous Latin American speakers before the Assembly. He summarized his views as follows:

"For my

MET

3-#107 from Geneva, March 7, 8 pm.  
(SECTION TWO)

"For my part I desire to safeguard the following three principles. First, the principle of non-intervention of course without prejudice to the intervention of the League as between signatories of the Covenant, or interventions provided for in treaties between parties.

Secondly, the principles of territorial sovereignty of the state as the limit or barrier which is imposed on the exercise of the right of protection of foreigners by the nation to which they belong.

Thirdly, the pacific settlement of international disputes, which the League makes compulsory for members of the League of Nations under Article 12".

The resolution referred to above introduced by Restrepo has been circulated but has not been discussed in the Assembly Commission. For future reference the text is herewith submitted.

"THE ASSEMBLY

Adopting the principles followed by the Council with regard to the conflict between China and Japan.

Declaring that the cessation of hostilities and of any military pressure by either of the parties on the other is an essential preliminary condition for any subsequent action by the League to obtain a peaceful settlement of the conflict between China and Japan.

Having in view the resolution adopted by the Council on September 30th and December 10th and the draft resolution

accepted

MET

4-#107 from Geneva, March 7, 8 pm.  
(SECTION TWO)

accepted by thirteen of its members on October 24th.

Recalling that the two parties have recently in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the 4th instant agreed to take all necessary measures to prevent the continuation of hostilities.

One. Invites the Chinese Government to give all guarantees for the protection of the life and property of Japanese nation/<sup>als</sup> both at Shanghai and in Manchuria with the cooperation of impartial observers appointed by the League.

Two. Invites the Japanese Government to withdraw its troops from Shanghai and to commence the evacuation of Manchuria in accordance with the terms of the Council's resolution of September 30th.

Three. The Assembly recommends that the evacuation of Chinese territory should be terminated within a period to be fixed in accordance with technical requirements by a commission appointed by the Assembly".

(END OF MESSAGE)

HPD-WWC

GILBERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 14 1932  
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
8 1932  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM Dated March 8  
Rec'd 1:11 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Telegram to  
Geneva.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 8 1932  
Department of State

F/LS  
793.94/4631

63, March 8, 5 p. m.

Before the meeting of the General Commission of the Assembly this afternoon Sir John Simon informed us that he was in receipt of a message from the British Minister in China that the foreign representatives there have arranged in consultation with the four commanders-in-chief to coordinate their inquiries and to utilize the reports of the Legations, Military Attachés and all other information available in order to send to Geneva daily a joint report which will be transmitted by the British Minister as senior representative concerned to the head of his delegation for textual communication to the heads of the French and Italian delegations and to me.

MAR 8 4 1932

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Sir John Simon had received the situation report number one which he is transmitting to the Assembly this afternoon. Sir John informed me that the telegram above referred to was drafted in concert with American, British, French and Italian chiefs of mission.

While

REP

2-#63, from Geneva, Mar. 8, 5p.m.

While it is assumed that there will be no objection on our part to distribution to the Assembly of further daily situation reports as received, Drummond has asked our acquiescence. He will write me on the subject and I shall answer affirmatively unless you direct otherwise. Is Department receiving these reports direct or do you desire them repeated from here? March 8, 5 p.m.

WILSON

WWC

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

March 8, 1932.

*Gray*  
*span*

MAR 8 32

WILSON,  
BERGUES,  
GENEVA (Switzerland).

793,94/4631  
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37

Your 63, March 8, 5 p.m.

Department has no objection to distribution to  
the Assembly of such reports.

Department has instructed Shanghai to send direct  
to us copies of the reports. Do you think it would be  
preferable for us to receive them via Geneva?

793.94/4631

*Simon*  
*SKH*

8. 1932. PM

FE:SKH/ZMF FE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD  
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PREPARING OFFICE  
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Department of State

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Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

Washington,

March 8, 1932.

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

Your 62, March 8, 1 p. m.

One. Under date March 4 this Department released to the press a statement based on report by American Consul General and Navy Department released statement based on report by Admiral Taylor. The substance of these reports was equivalent practically to what is reported in your telegram under reference.

Two. As the League is receiving reports from the Shanghai Commission, with which the American Consul General is cooperating, and as the League is to receive daily situation reports with regard to the status of military operations at Shanghai (see your 63, March 8, 5 p. m.), the Department is of the opinion that there is no repeat no need for it to alter the procedure now prevailing with regard to telegraphing information to you.

FE:MMH:CLS

FE

*mmh*

*mmh*  
MAR 8 1932

*Stinson*

*SCH*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator M., 1932

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

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793.94/4631  
note  
893.102-S  
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793.94/4631

*Gray*  
*6pm*

*Telephoned to MID  
Mar. 8, 1932  
3:15 pm*

**COPIES SENT TO  
AND M.I.D.** *FE*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**  
GRAY

*793.94  
893.1025*

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 8 1932  
DIVISION OF

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 8, 1932

Rec'd 1 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

*W D*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 8 1932  
Department of State

166, March 8, noon.

Following from Captain Mayer for War Department:

"25. Japanese state headquarters as follows:

9th Nanziang, 11th Liuho, 14th Woosung, Army Yangtzepoo.

Zones: 11th Chiating inclusive to Yangtze River, 9th

plus 24th brigade Soochow Creek to Chiating exclusive.

However, believe some units of 14th Division debarked at

Liuho and saw mountain artillery and one battery tractor

drawing 105 millimeter guns moving apparently from

Whangpoo River towards front. Chinese report 19th Route

Army under Chiang Ting Wen massing in vicinity of Hang-

chow, part of 36th independent brigade 88th Division has

arrived at Hsingchuang on Hangchow Railway where defenses

are prepared. Kiangnan arsenal machinery dismantled and

removal of stores completed. Hangchow Railway staff and

rolling

F/L/S 793.94/4632

MAR 10 1932  
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#166 from Shanghai via N.R.,  
March 8, noon.

rolling stock have been withdrawn southwest of Hsingohuang  
and line reported interrupted from every point March 7th".

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

Secretary of State  
Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
GRAY *MMK*  
MAR 14 1932  
GENEVA  
WESTERN DIVISION OF  
Date *March 8, 1932*  
RECORDED  
INDEXED  
MAR 9 1932  
FAR EASTERN DIVISION  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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MAR - 9 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

F/LS 793.94/4633

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893.102-5*

64, March 8, 9 p.m.

This afternoon's session of the Assembly concluded the general discussion. There was a series of speeches of no particular value save that of T. Water, South Africa delegate, who concluded by a blunt statement as to the need for leadership and an inquiry as to whether the representatives of the great powers felt they have given such leadership. At the conclusion of the general discussion Yen renewed the appeal he had made to the Assembly on its convening and Sato replied in the most conciliatory language he has yet used welcoming on behalf of Japan the efforts of the League and of the United States to bring about a solution of the present problem and reaffirming the faith of Japan in the Covenant and the Pact.

MAR 16 1932

FILED

Benes then proposed that a drafting committee be set up composed of the Bureau of the Assembly, together with the authors

mam 2- #64, from Geneva, March 8, 1932

the authors of any proposed resolutions, to meet tomorrow afternoon. This means that Sir John Simon's proposal referred to in my 61/<sup>4615</sup> March 7, 9 p.m., will come before the drafting committee before being brought out in the Assembly. It will, however, be his effort to keep it entirely free from any other proposals.

It seems obvious that there is considerable apprehension among the smaller nations because of their fear lest the great powers in their desire to avoid definite action insist on setting up a small committee for the ostensible purpose of carrying on the work but for the real purpose of dismissing the Assembly without taking any definite action. There are various plans under consideration for the setting up of some committee of this sort but any such proposal is bound to encounter serious opposition from the smaller nations.

WILSON

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from

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 7 1932  
DIVISION OF RECORDS

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 14 1932  
WESTERN UNION  
RECD

Secretary of State

Washington

108, March 8, 9 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 9 - 1932  
Department of State

793.94  
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793.94-Comm.

One. The resumption today of consideration by the General Assembly committee of the Sino-Japanese question was opened with a statement by Simon followed by a pertinent discussion, which have been reported by Wilson.

Two. The subsequent general discussion was terminated by statements of Yen and Sato, the substance of which follows:

(a) Expressing gratification at the trend of the general discussion, Yen drew the conclusion from the debate that all speakers had supported the proposition that the "League must stand by its Covenant in all events" and quoted Simon in this regard.

With respect to procedure, he noted that Article fifteen provided in the first instance for mediation, but held that the Council had employed this for five months without success; if the Assembly attempted mediation again and also

F/LS 793.94/4634

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MAR 16 1932

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2- 4108, from Geneva, March 8, 1932

and also failed, China expects the Assembly to exhaust other possibilities under the Covenant.

Yen then noted that it had been proposed that after eventual adoption of a declaration which would be similar to that of the American note of January 7 nothing more should be done at present on the grounds that further action would be prejudicing the case. To this procedure Yen made strong objection declaring that China did not ask or expect the Assembly to take action tantamount to prejudice the case. What China asked the Assembly was to recognize "that the Covenant has been broken" on the ground of extensive military occupation of Chinese territory in violation of Article ten and that "contrary to the provisions of Article twelve Japan~~ese~~ has publicly and formally stated that she would not submit the dispute to arbitration". Yen declared that for these facts no special verification by a commission was necessary especially as Japanese admitted them and plead provocation. He considered that the attitude of the League should in effect be that regardless of provocation and excuse Japan~~ese~~ has undertaken the settlement of the dispute in a wrong way and has broken her contract with other countries for peaceful

man

3- #108, from Geneva, March 8, 1932

peaceful methods of settlement to which she had agreed. The League should tell Japan~~ese~~ to recall her troops and then the League will help to settle the dispute by methods to which all are committed. Yen asserted that a declaration that the Covenant had been violated would in no way prejudice the merits of the case.

With regard to Manchuria Yen pointed out that the resolution which created the Manchurian Commission made a distinction between the immediate matter of "stopping hostilities and liquidating the military occupation of Manchuria and on the other hand the task of adjusting the dispute itself". He recalled that the resolution expressly stipulated that the appointment and work of the Commission should not prejudice in any way the promise given by Japan on September 30 as regards the withdrawal of Japanese troops. Recalling that Japan had approved of and supported the establishment of a "puppet state" in Manchuria, Yen declared that the Manchurian Commission was intended to contribute to a final solution and was not designated "to perpetuate the foreign occupation of Chinese territory". He asked in the name of his Government that the decision of the Council regarding the withdrawal

*Note  
793.94-Commission*

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4- #108, from Geneva, March 8, 1932

withdrawal of Japanese troops "be put into execution by and through the supreme authority of the Assembly". In concluding he appealed to the Assembly to take the necessary action.

(b) Sato then spoke and referred the committee to Matsudaira's opening speech in the Assembly and the declarations made by Japanese representatives on the Council for a full presentation of Japan's case. He reiterated that Japan had no designs on the "political independence or administrative integrity of China" and asserted that the Japanese had only taken military measures because conditions in China left them no possibility of acting otherwise. He recalled that other countries had taken similar action in the past and asserted that there is an analogy between the situation in China and that existing in Europe or on the American continent. He emphasized that Japan had no intention of using military pressure to obtain privileges and pointed out that Japan had gladly accepted the resolution of March 4th providing for negotiations to ameliorate the situation in Shanghai. Recalling that Japan has always accorded whole-hearted cooperation to the League, he stated that "we accepted the Covenant in its

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5- #108, from Geneva, March 8, 1932

in its entirety, and we wish to see it applied without derogation or without exception but with due respect to facts as they are, as this was intended by those who drew up the Covenant and as it is embodied in the texts themselves". In conclusion he expressed his appreciation of the efforts of the League and of those of the United States.

Three. Benes then proposed the appointment of a drafting committee to be composed of the members of the Bureau submitting motions, for the purpose of examining all motions and presenting final proposals as to the conclusions to be drawn from the general discussion. After a brief debate this proposal was adopted and it was announced that the drafting committee would meet tomorrow at four p.m.

Four. Details of today's general discussion will follow in subsequent telegram.

FW OX

GILBERT

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WE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94  
note  
893.10259  
793.94119  
5-00.C111  
REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 9 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

GRAY

Geneva

Date

Rec'd 8:15

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 14 1932  
WESTERN UNION  
UNION OF  
RECORDS

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 9 - 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4656

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

109, March 9, 9 a. m.

The Netherlands delegation has communicated to the President of the Assembly the following information received on March 5th and 8th from the Consul General of the Netherlands at Shanghai:

"One. According to the communication of March 5th the Japanese Commander-in-Chief had stated that he did not intend to go beyond the Liuho-Kashing-Nanziang-Chenju line. However, Japanese patrols had been observed south of the Nanziang-Chenju line. The Chinese had withdrawn along the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway line to a distance of 16 kilometers from Shanghai and along the Shanghai-Nanking Railway to 22 kilometers from Shanghai where the opposing forces were fairly close to each other. Further north isolated groups of Chinese were withdrawing from the Woosung forts to rejoin

MAR 16 1932

FILED

REF

2-#109, from Geneva, Mar. 9, 9a.m.

rejoin the Chinese lines at Taitang and local skirmishes had occurred which had terminated at the time the communication was despatched. The headquarters of the Japanese 9th Division were at Nanziang, the Chinese headquarters were probably at Lohkapang.

Two. According to the communication of March 6th the situation had remained unchanged since the previous day and no further fighting had been reported.

GILBERT

WSB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
February 16, 1932.

*FEE*  
*DCR*  
*file*  
*gmc*



Subject: The 1927 Neutralization Plan for Shanghai.

Reference: Mr. Sokolsky's Letter of February 11, 1932, to Mr. Hornbeck.

F/DEW  
793.94/4636

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*896.102-S*

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The article to which Mr. Sokolsky refers in the footnote of his letter is published in THE NORTH CHINA HERALD issue of February 12, 1927, page 224, under the title of "A Chinese Plan". (This issue may be found in the Department Library, under Library reference AN-3-.06-V.162.) In this article Mr. Sokolsky alleges that the so-called American plan for the neutralization of Shanghai <sup>by the American Government</sup> (sent to various Chinese factions on February 4, 1927) was not an American plan. He leads one to infer that it ~~is~~ <sup>was</sup> a Chinese plan but he does not state from what Chinese source it originated.

In the first paragraph of his letter Mr. Sokolsky states that the plan was originated by Dr. C. T. Wang and he refers to an account in the CHINA YEAR BOOK. An article on this subject entitled "The Neutralization of Shanghai Plan" is to be found on pages 1355-56 of the CHINA YEAR BOOK for 1928. Mr. Sokolsky assisted in the preparation of the CHINA YEAR BOOKS about the time this volume was prepared and presumably he prepared this account.

In

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In this account it is alleged that Dr. C. T. Wang made the original suggestion but it is not stated to whom he made it. As of possible interest, the first paragraph of this account as found in the CHINA YEAR BOOK for 1928 is quoted on a separate sheet attached hereto.

~~SECRET~~  
023/WDM

(Excerpt from the CHINA YEAR BOOK for 1928, page 1355,  
entitled "The Neutralization of Shanghai Plan" first  
paragraph.)

#### THE NEUTRALIZATION OF SHANGHAI PLAN

"By the time the Kuomintang were ready to capture Shanghai, the Nationalist army and their Communist allies were in such bad odour, that proposals were made by Chinese and foreigners to prevent Shanghai from meeting the fate of Hankow. On February 5, 1927, Mr. Kellogg, the American Secretary of State, made a proposal that the International Settlement at Shanghai be excluded from warlike activities. This proposal was unnecessary and impractical and evidenced a deplorable ignorance of the status of the International Settlement, which is ipso facto excluded from warlike activities. The Chinese, led by C. T. Wang, who made the original suggestion, had something quite different in mind. They sought to have a huge slice of Kiangsu province, with Shanghai as a centre, turned over to them as a neutral zone. With this in their possession, they planned to bargain with either Marshal Sun Chuan-fang or the Nationalists for position. The only question on which the Nanchang and Hankow factions united was opposition to this plan. The Hankow faction denounced Dr. C. T. Wang and his plan because they suspected that he had joined with General Chiang Kai-shek to form a separate state in the vicinity of Shanghai; General Chiang Kai-shek denounced Dr. C. T. Wang's plan because he felt that an effort was made to interfere with the progress of his armies. What both feared was that Dr. C. T. Wang would duplicate Eugene Chen's diplomatic victory at Hankow and Kiukiang and in that way inject a new element in the already divided Kuomintang. Although Dr. Wang had been a member of the Kuomintang, he was regarded by all factions of the party as being outside of it and therefore his "neutralization of Shanghai" plan must be taken as something outside the party, which might have stemmed the Kuomintang advance in the interest of an outside group."

" \* \* \*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 15 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 10 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 14 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FROM GRAY  
Geneva  
Dated March 9, 1932

RECEIVED Rec'd 6:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

MAR 10 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

MAR 9 - 1932  
Department of State

110, March 9, 10 a. m.

In a communication dated March 8 the Secretary General  
circulated the following telegram received by the Chinese  
Legation in Washington:

"The two understandings contained in your statement in  
the Assembly before the adoption of the resolution calling on  
the Chinese and Japanese Governments to enter into negotia-  
tions for a definite armistice in Shanghai, were brought to  
the attention of Mr. Stimson, American Secretary of State.  
Mr. Stimson stated that they were agreeable to the American  
position. In fact he had telegraphed to Minister Johnson on  
Saturday authorizing the latter to participate in discussing  
the liquidation of the military phase of the situation,  
leaving the rest if necessary to a later conference at  
Shanghai or elsewhere. He presumed that China would place  
police in evacuated area to keep order."

GILBERT

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F/L/S  
793.94/4637

MAR 10 1932  
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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893-1026  
793-94119

REP



FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 9, 1932

Rec'd 8:30 a. m.



F/LS 793.94/4638

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

172, March 9, 2 p. m.

FOLLOWING FROM CAPTAIN MAYER FOR WAR DEPARTMENT.

"27. Shirakawa announced a zone in front of Japanese  
outpost line in which Japanese patrols will operate and in  
which if Chinese troops are found a clash might result.  
Western limits of patrol zone are Fuchiao-Yuehwangshih-Waikang-  
Anting-Paihuchiang. South of Soochow Creek Japanese have  
detachments at Toyoda mill and Siccawei just west and  
southwest of the Settlement. Half of 14th Division has  
landed balance en route, it is reported they will relieve  
9th Division which will remain in reserve. Hanchow  
Railway resumed operation March 7."

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

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HPD

MAR 14 1932


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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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GRAY



FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 9, 1932

Rec'd 8:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

March 9, 10 a.m.

See my March 7, 8 p.m., paragraph four.

Following from the Consul General at Nanking:

"March 8, 6 p.m.

One. Vice Minister Hsu Mo asked me to call upon him March 7, 4 p.m. and then asked that I telegraph you for the information of the Department of State in substance as follows:

'Two. In connection with the present military situation in Shanghai the Chinese Government still consents to the negotiations provided for in the third article of the resolution passed by the Assembly of the League of Nations on March 4 but only on the basis of reservations offered by the Chinese delegate, namely, that the negotiations shall relate only to armistice and the withdrawal

of

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 9 1932

F/L/S 793.94/4639

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MAR 14 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2--from Shanghai via N.R.,  
March 9, 10 a. m.

of Japanese forces and that such withdrawal shall be without any preliminary conditions whatsoever. The Chinese Government has reason to anticipate that Japan will attempt to exploit the recent military operations at Shanghai and that Japan is attempting to enlist the support of other nations to this end. The Chinese Government desires to make it clear that it will discuss no subject with Japan at Shanghai other than withdrawal of the Japanese forces so long as Japanese forces remain in the invaded territory and if in spite of the position taken by the Chinese Government other subjects are raised then the Chinese Government will insist that Japanese military activities in Manchuria be discussed as well. The Chinese Government earnestly hopes therefore that the American Government will assist the Chinese Government to resist any attempt by Japan to enlarge the scope of the negotiations provided for in Article 3 of the reservations passed by the Assembly or to approximate the recent incidents in Shanghai, as for example, by imposing conditions to the withdrawal of the Japanese forces".

JOHNSON


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Justison NARS, Date 12-18-75


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*793.94  
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893.101 Shanghai*



FROM PLAIN & GRAY  
Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated March 9, 1932  
Rec'd 10:10 a. m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

173, March 9, 3 p. m.

The following letter was despatched by the Mayor of Greater Shanghai to the Japanese Consul General yesterday:  
(END GRAY)

"I have the honor to state that as our troops have now left the regions of Woosung, Kiangwan, Chapei and other places, it has become urgently necessary for the various municipal services, such as public safety, sanitation, public utilities, et cetera, to be resumed in the interest of the public. Mindful of its duties and applications, the city government of Greater Shanghai has decided to issue orders to the organs concerned to this effect.

In view of the fact that Japanese troops are still stationed in the several districts concerned, and in order to prevent misunderstanding, I have the honor to notify you and to request that your military authorities be duly informed in this connection. Your reply is awaited."

(GRAY) Two. I understand that the Japanese Consul General

F/L S 793.94/4640

*FILED  
MAR 11 1932*

REP

2-#173, from Shanghai, Mar. 9, 3p.m.

General is referring the letter to his Minister and to the Foreign Office for instructions. He is unable to reply within his instructions and the opinion is freely expressed that no Chinese administrative functions will be allowed in Chapei until the various questions are discussed at the round table conference which is supposed to be imminent.

Three. The Mayor of Greater Shanghai has addressed the following letter to the American Consul General on the same subject;

"With the evacuation of Woosung, Kiangwan and Chapei by the Chinese forces, it is urgently necessary to continue the maintenance of such activities as related to public safety, public health and public utilities in each of these areas. Since it is incumbent upon this municipality to attend to the matter, we have decided to order the controlling officers to exercise their respective functions. In view of the fact that some of the Japanese troops are still quartered in the above mentioned districts, this municipality has addressed a letter to the Japanese Consul General with the request that he pass the information to the Japanese military authorities so that they may take note accordingly and send a reply in order to obviate the possibility of a misunderstanding. Meanwhile, I have the honor

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-#173, From Shanghai, Mar. 9, 3p.m.

honor to transmit this for your information."

This letter requires no action on my part and only  
a formal acknowledgment is being sent as a reply.

Repeated to the Legation, Copy to the Minister.

CUNNINGHAM


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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

Geneva

Dated March 9, 1932

Rec'd 10:26 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

66, March 9, 4 p.m. /4600

Your 35, March 8, noon.



793.94

793.94/4641

All members of the Delegation have made and will continue to make the idea you lay down our guiding principle.

WILSON

Re initiative.

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
FROM

GRAY & TRAIN

Shanghai via

Dated March 9, 1932

Rec'd 10:25 a.m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

March 9, 3 p. m. *no record*  
Department's 81, March 8, 5 p. m.

Following is joint situation report No. 1 transmitted yesterday to Geneva en clair by my British colleague as senior representative on behalf of the French Minister, Italian Charge d' Affaires and myself: (END GRAY)

"American, British, French and Italian representatives and commanders-in-chief met on March 7th and decided to send following joint message to their respective representatives in Geneva with reference to recent requests from Geneva for information regarding cessation or otherwise of hostilities between Chinese and Japanese forces in neighborhood of Shanghai. It is difficult owing to comparative remoteness from Shanghai Settlement of the present front, to secure such information from naval sources alone. Foreign representatives have, therefore, arranged in consultation with their four commanders-in-chief to coordinate their inquiries and utilizing the reports of Legation, Military

Attaches

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MAR 16 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- From Shanghai, Mar. 9, 3p.m.

Attaches and such other information as may be available to foreign commanders-in-chief from naval, military or other sources, to send to Geneva a daily joint telegram which will be transmitted by British Minister as senior representative concerned to head of his delegation for textual communications to heads of French and Italian delegates and American Minister in Berne for such action vis a vis the League as they may think fit.

Two. These daily telegraphic reports will be numbered serially beginning today with 'SITUATION REPORT NUMBER ONE'.

Three. It is hoped that these arrangements will meet with approval.

Four. This telegram has been drafted in concert by American, British, French and Italian heads of mission."

JOHNSON

WWC

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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*WE*

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MEMO

CORRECTED COPY

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
*MAF*  
GREEN MAR 15 1932  
GENEVA DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
Dated March 9, 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 10 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 10 1932

*No reply.*  
MAR 10 1932  
Department of State

793.94/4643

65, March 9, 3 p.m.

Your 37, March 8, 5 p.m., second paragraph.

It would seem more expeditious for you to receive these reports direct from Johnson and I shall therefore not repeat them to you from here.

You may in this connection consider the advisability of instructing Johnson to send me copies of such portions of his telegrams to you as he may deem essential to keeping me fully posted on conditions. Such procedure would save a considerable amount of time over the present method of repetition from Washington.

WILSON

RR EPD

MAR 10 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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WE*

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

KLP

Geneva

FROM

Dated March 9, 1932.

Rec'd. 11:40 a.m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

65, March 9, 3 p.m.

Your 37, March 8, 5 p.m. second paragraph

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WILSON

RR

HPD

*see corrected copy*

MAR 10 1932

F/DEM

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MAR 11 1932

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CO-RECTED COPY

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated March 9, 1932

Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

65, March 9, 3 p.m.

Your 37, March 8, 5 p.m., second paragraph.

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You may in this connection consider the advisability of instructing Johnson to send me copies of such portions of his telegrams to you as he may deem essential to keeping me fully posted on conditions. Such procedure would save a considerable amount of time over the present method of repetition from Washington.

WILSON

RR HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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7 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

GRAY & GREEN

FROM Geneva

Dated March 9, 1932

Secretary of State,

Washington

111, March

Consulate's 108, March 8, 9 p.m.

The following representatives took  
discussion yesterday:

Lester (Ireland), Parades (Salvador), Apponyi (Hungary),  
Maynard (Haiti), Perley (Canada), Batalof (Bulgaria),  
Mazuranic (Yugoslavia), Tewater (South Africa), Agakhan  
(India), Feldmans (Latvia), Costi Durels (Bolivia).

In general the speeches follow the same trends as those  
reported in previous telegrams and no definitely new ele-  
ments were introduced. The general principles already  
advanced were reaffirmed.

The proposed Simon's resolution was not debated but  
was mentioned by some of the speakers. Apponyi in referring  
to the proposal stated, "I await the text of the resolution  
in order to give it my fullest support". Mazuranic and

Agakhan

Rec'd 10:08 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 9 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 14 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

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MAR 16 1932

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MET

2-#111 from Geneva, March 9,  
11 a. m.

(they?)  
Agakhan stated that this would support Simon's proposal.  
Other speakers without referring directly to the proposal  
appeared to support it by inference.

Paredes, Maynard and Costa Durels supported and  
reaffirmed the principles of sovereignty and non-interven-  
tion already emphasized by the preceding Latin-American  
speakers.

The Canadian and South African delegates particularly  
the latter made the strongest and most direct statements.  
The Canadian stated briefly that the work of the Assembly  
must be based primarily upon the following considerations:

One. We should stop further bloodshed and bring about  
a real and effective armistice.

Two. We should distinguish between the rights of a  
cause and the manner in which those rights are realized  
and enforced.

Three. We should affirm as solemnly as possible the  
fundamental truth that no infringement of the territorial  
integrity and no change in the political independence of any  
member of the League which is brought about by force in dis-  
regard of the undertakings of Article ten of the Covenant

can be

MET

3-#111 from Geneva, March 9, 11 am.

can be recognized as valid and effective by the other members of the League".

The South African delegate summarized his conclusions as follows:

"But, Mr. President, let me say this at once, that it is not possible for my delegation to form a just judgment on the facts at the present moment in the sense that it is at this juncture not able to allocate the blame to one party or the other to this dispute, for all the facts of the dispute between China and Japan are not yet known; although this I am able to say bluntly, that we have no other name for the state of affairs in China today than that of war and the following facts at any rate appear to be clear to us.

Powerful Japanese forces equipped with all the modern weapons of war have been transported into Chinese territory. These armies have been actively and destructively used against Chinese forces and have taken possession of a considerable portion of Chinese territory. It appears to us equally clear that Japan has not sought to use the pacific means at its disposal under the Covenant of the League to which it is signatory. Nor in the absence of any further explanation

MET

4-#111 from Geneva, March 9,  
11a.m.

explanation by Japan does it appear to us that in this dispute she has remembered her declarations under the Pact of Paris. Equally it seems to my delegation an undisputed fact that China has placed its case in the hands of the League and has been prepared at every stage of the inquiry by the Council of the League to act on its advice and instructions. Said emphatically, has Japan refused to show the same confidence in the fairmindedness of a body of which it has been for many years so active and important a member.

As far as these facts are concerned it is a case to be stated unhesitatingly in our opinion that a prima facie case has been made out that Japan has acted in contradiction of what we believe to be the obligations to which equally with all of us she has been bound.

Yet so far and no further it is possible for me to form a clear opinion.

I for one would urge the distinguished representatives of Japan to state to this Commission of the Assembly in the clearest terms its full case on these points to which I have drawn attention. Japan may have the most profound reasons why she has not been able to use the machinery of the League

or why

MET

5-#111 from Geneva, March 9,  
11 a.m.

or why she has not been able to follow its advice. I can only urge again that we be given these reasons for it seems to me to be the simple duty of this Assembly to find on the validity of those reasons". He then advanced the principle that the great powers should not take advantage of China's weakness to advance their special interests. He concluded with an appeal to Japan to reconsider and not continue in her present course which would have the effect of casting on one side the friendship and admiration of so many nations and the good opinion of the world.

GILBERT

WSB

HPD

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



GRAY


FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 9, 1932

Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

F/DEW

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



*793.94  
note  
893.102-5  
811.23  
893.0146*

175, March 9, 5 p. m.

Referring to Department's telegram of January 31, 11 p.m.

*38/2a*

793.94/4645

One. I received a visit today from Colonel Gasser, in command of the 31st Regiment, and Colonel Thompson, representative of General Hines, who informed me that the Regiment was very badly needed in Manila and inquired whether I had any reason for urging its retention here.

I stated that after the arrival of the military authorities the number to be retained or maintained was primarily a question for them to determine taking into account whatever advice I may be able to give them regarding existing political conditions. Colonel Gasser then stated that both the Minister and the Commander-in-Chief were of the opinion that the 31st could very safely be withdrawn at the present time as the emergency had passed for which it came.

MAR 14 1932

FILED  
Confidential File

Two. I consulted the Secretary General of the Shanghai Municipal Council and he stated that there was no longer reason for retaining it. I do not anticipate any serious trouble

REP

2-#175, from Shanghai, Mar. 9, 5p.m.

trouble from without the Settlement as the Chinese cannot be victorious in any combat with the Japanese. I do not believe that there is likely to be any internal disturbances which will assume proportions that cannot be dealt with by the present forces of foreign troops and the municipal authorities although I am of the firm conviction that the withdrawal of the 31st Regiment reduces the American forces to its minimum and it should be maintained at that strength for a very long period, certainly until all differences between the Japanese and Chinese have been adjusted. I have great concern regarding the effect of the withdrawal on the Japanese both civil and military who are increasingly brutally arrogant and overbearing and it is by no means certain that this state will not become exaggerated by the withdrawal. I have some concern regarding the effect of the withdrawal of the 31st Regiment on the Chinese mind as it is by no means certain that the Chinese mind will accept this withdrawal without some evidence of unfriendly character towards the United States as it may be regarded as a cessation of interest by the United States in the Sino-Japanese conflict. The withdrawal will be a reassurance to the people in the United States as well as to the local foreign public that conditions are improving. Taking into account the heavy

initial

REP

3-#175, from Shanghai, Mar. 9, 5p.m.

initial expenditures necessary for extended billeting and the reasons pro and con stated herein, I informed them that I was inclined to take a chance by concurring with the Minister and the Commander-in-Chief.

Three. I desire to express appreciation on behalf of the entire community for the despatch of the 31st Infantry at a time when conditions seemed so serious and also appreciation for the spirit of cooperation shown by Colonel Gasser (\*) his staff desires regarding duration of its stay. The buildings available for billeting were by no means modern so their stay has not been a fair weather service.

Repeated to the Legation, copy to the Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

HPD

(\*) Apparent Omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington, D.C.  
MAR 11 1932  
This message is sent in Confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

March 11, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
SHANGHAI (China).

Confidential  
For the Minister.

Reference Shanghai's 175/4645 cf  
Department's 86/4645 cf  
March 9, 5 p.m. and  
March 9, 5 p.m.

Department is informed now by Navy Department that  
Admiral Taylor recommends that March eighteenth be set for  
departure thirty-first infantry and states that you agree.

I have conferred with the Navy Department and the War  
Department. This Government sent Admiral Taylor with naval  
reinforcements and the thirty-first infantry to Shanghai on  
the basis of its views of the situation. In our action in  
relation to that situation, we have been endeavoring to  
cooperate with other powers, both in connection with the  
common problem of defense and certain common diplomatic  
objectives. In reference to both, it is our belief that  
the moment for withdrawal or reduction of our forces has  
not yet arrived and that no repeat no action of that sort  
should be taken without our first having consulted with the  
other most interested powers. It is therefore desired that

793.94/4645  
note  
893.102-5  
873.0146  
811.23  
811.30-Asiatic Dept

793.94/4645

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
Charge to  
\$

*(Handwritten initials)*

Department of State

- 2 - Washington,

(a) any recommendations which any American authorities in China may desire to make in relation to this subject be communicated confidentially through the American Minister for the consideration here of the three Departments concerned and that (b) there shall not repeat not be initiated by American authorities at Shanghai any discussion of the subject with authorities of other countries unless and until this Government so instructs.

Please inform Cunningham and the Commander in Chief, ~~and the Commanding Officer of the Thirty-first Regiment.~~

*SKH*

*Stinson*

*Read to Admiral Pratt and  
General McArthur,  
both of whom officers. RAM*

Enciphered by FE:SKH/ZMF *SKH* *SKH*  
Sent by operator M., 19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128 TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NON-CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
or

Department of State

Washington,

Charge to  
\$

March 9, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (China) <sup>AP 9 32</sup>

*86*  
*Priority*  
CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 175/4645 March 9, 5 p.m.

One. Department assumes that this matter will be brought to its attention by the War Department.

In the meantime, the Department, for diplomatic reasons, desires that the views of the various American authorities at Shanghai, as reported in your telegram under reference, be kept confidential, and that no intimation be given outside of American official circles that this question is under discussion in those circles.

Inform other American authorities concerned.

Two. Have you any knowledge that authorities of other nationalities are considering possible withdrawal of contingents of their forces? Reply without making any inquiries.

*Stinson*

*Skat*

*Attended by*  
*Secretary State*  
FE:SKH/ZMF *WME*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

793.94/4645

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

*793.94/4645*

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.


FEE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



FROM GRAY  
Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated March 9, 1932  
Rec'd 11:30 a. m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

174, March 9, 4 p. m.

Referring to my telegram No. 173, March 9, 3 p. m.

One. The Senior Consul has received from the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council a copy of a letter dated March 8 addressed by him to the Mayor of Greater Shanghai. This letter in full is as follows:

"I have the honor to invite your attention to the grave danger arising from the disorganized and insanitary state of those portions of Chapei which, as the result of the recent conflict, have been left without any sanitary or other essentials of public service. In particular I would emphasize that in those portions of Chapei abutting on the Settlement, and in the area adjoining North Szechuan and Dixwell Roads, any further delay in restoring sanitary conditions constitutes the grave menace to the health of the Settlement and of the whole of Shanghai. The Settlement has recently been threatened with a very severe smallpox epidemic which was largely due to imported cases, and it is feared

793.94  
note  
893.102-S  
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793.94/4646

MAR 16 1932

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REP

2-#174, from Shanghai, Mar. 9, 4p.m.

feared that with the complete paralyzing of the normal conservancy and sanitary arrangements in the Chapei area, the health of the whole community will be endangered.

In so far as its assistance has been requested in sending the municipal fire brigade and obtaining a water supply to check the spreading fire, the Council carried out what was obviously a public duty. As it has already indicated to officials of your municipality, the Council would further welcome the immediate initiation by you of sanitary work in the areas concerned, and would gladly cooperate in whatever way it could be of assistance.

Whilst the Council assures you that it has no desire to function even temporarily outside the limits of its own administration, it feels, however, that if nothing is done immediately to remove the menace to health in the contiguous areas it will be compelled of necessity to make a survey of the problem and take steps to render such sanitary supervision and service as may be required under the circumstances.

As you are already aware of the position I hardly need assure you further that the Council is solely actuated by the desire to assist and cooperate with you in a matter of public duty which, in the interest of humanity, must be undertaken by some organized body."

Two.

REP

3-#174, from Shanghai, Mar. 9, 4p.m.

Two. The Chairman transmits the letter to the Senior Consul apparently as information only as he requests no action. There is no doubt but that the existing conditions in Chapei are a grave menace to the health of the Settlement due to the insanitary conditions and the absence of water supply. There is not the slightest doubt but that a large number of the foreign ratepayers would welcome the extension even temporarily of municipal functions to include Chapei. Some members of the Council do hope that out of the present undeclared war the Settlement extension will result. It would appear that the menace to the health of the Settlement should be removed but if the Chinese are not permitted to function as a municipality by the Japanese then the latter should be held responsible for the performance of municipal functions so that the menace to the Settlement would be removed.

Three. On March 3rd Fessenden called and stated that he had been instructed to begin to discuss with me the possibilities of extending municipal functions to Chapei in order that disease might be prevented from entering the Settlement therefrom. He emphasized at that time the necessity of introducing sanitation there although he referred to other municipal functioning. At that time I informed him that I would be very glad to convene the

Consular

REP

4-#174, from Shanghai, Mar. 9, 4p.m.

Consular Body, if he desired it, when he would present the matter fully to them. This he did not desire at the moment. I emphasized at the time the importance from a municipal standpoint of securing immediate control from the Japanese Marines and military authorities of Hongkew and Yangtze and Extra Settlement Roads now being occupied by Japanese. I emphasized the importance of the strengthening of municipal functioning on Extra Settlement Roads in the western district since the Chinese police were perhaps functioning less effectively on adjacent territory than they had been.

Repeated to the Legation. Copy to the Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I. *FE*

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
9 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Shanghai via N. R.

FROM Dated March 9, 1932

Rec'd 12:20 p. m.

F/DEW  
793.94/4647

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 9 - 1932  
Department of State

March 9, 8 p. m.

Today's joint situation report number two:

793.94  
note  
893.102-S

"Japan's command issued statement dated March eighth defining limits of sphere of their military operations. Statement declares that should Chinese detachments enter line connecting the points mentioned Japanese authorities cannot warrant impossibility of clash with Japanese patrols on duty there and that should trouble arise therefrom responsibility must rest with Chinese forces. Western limits of this ~~patrolled~~ area as described in above statement are outside twenty kilometer zone and run from the north as follows:

MAR 14 1932

Fuchiao, Yue Hwangshih, Waikang, Anting, Paihukhiang. These places are marked in Chinese postal map of Shanghai district one to one hundred and fifty thousand. This constitutes a belt averaging two to three miles wide west of and in front of present Japanese outposts line. Soochow Creek to International Settlement forms southern boundary of area.

Reports

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#-- from Shanghai via N.R.,  
March 9, 8 p. m.

Reports that clashes occurred on March seventh between two sides on Japanese right wing are unfounded. Our information is that Japanese planes carry out daily reconnaissances along Chinese front and over back areas. There are no indications of any intention on part of Japanese forces to attack. Chinese are reported to have received reinforcements some of which are said to have reached Taitsang".

JOHNSON

HED-WVC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
March 12, 1932.

~~SECRET~~  
ESM:

Some views of Minister Johnson in regard to the conditions at Shanghai as expressed in a conversation which he had with the Netherlands Minister on January 28, 1932. The gist of these views were telegraphed to the Department at the time.

*R*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, February 2, 1932.



No. 1390

MAR. 9 32

*FE*

*Copy in file*  
MAR 14 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4648

*793.94  
note  
893.102-S*

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 139/<sup>3674</sup> of  
January 28, 6 p.m., concerning a conversation I had  
on that date with the Netherlands Minister regarding  
conditions at Shanghai, I have the honor to transmit  
herewith, as of possible interest to the Department,  
a copy of a memorandum of this conversation, a sum-  
mary of which was contained in the telegram referred to  
above.

1/

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

*Mahlon F. Perkins*  
MAHLON F. PERKINS.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of  
conversation.

800

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FILED  
MAR 16 1932

1  
Enclosure No. 1390

Conversation.

Peiping, January 28, 1932.

Mr. Thorbecke, the Netherlands Minister.

Subject: Conditions at Shanghai.

Mr. Thorbecke called and stated that he wanted to ask my opinion about Shanghai. He said that he had received just now a telegram from his Consul in Shanghai advising that a state of emergency had been declared, that the French had mobilized, that the volunteers and police of the International Settlement had also mobilized, and that the Japanese had announced that they would take action within twenty-four hours. He referred to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and to the precedent then established, when the Japanese had undertaken to respect the neutrality of the International Settlement at Shanghai. He asked whether I did not think it would be wise for us to consider whether we should apply to the Japanese and the Chinese authorities at Shanghai for the purpose of obtaining respect for the neutrality of the International Settlement.

I told the Minister that I was endeavoring to keep Washington informed of the situation at Shanghai; that it occurred to me we were on a somewhat different plane from that which existed at the time of the

Sino-

- 2 -

Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Apparently in this case there was no war; a state of belligerency did not exist. The Japanese will and probably do state that they are landing troops merely for the purpose of protecting Japanese interests. I hesitated to take action that might seem at least to interpret present situation at Shanghai as a state of war. Furthermore, I would hesitate approving action that might result in inspiring the Chinese with a false hope of their security through a misunderstanding of the purposes behind it, and in any case I desired to await reactions from Washington to messages that I had already sent describing the situation in Shanghai.

The Netherlands Minister agreed with me that we did not wish to become involved in this quarrel between the Japanese and the Chinese. I told him that my information from Shanghai was somewhat reassuring and that I was assuming that the Japanese would respect the neutrality of the International Settlement.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, January 25, 1932.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.B.

No. 1385

MAR 9 32

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 10 1932  
Department of State

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to the Legation's telegrams, No. 107/<sup>3605</sup> January 22, 3 p.m., and No. 109/<sup>3600</sup> January 22, 5 p.m., I now have the honor to transmit herewith a more detailed report from Lieutenant C. C. Brown, of the Naval Attache's office of this Legation, dated, Mukden, January 8th, in which he describes some of his experiences in Manchuria, together with observations on the movements and equipment of the Japanese forces.

Respectfully yours,  
*Nelson Trusler Johnson*  
NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosure:  
1/ As noted.

800.

CVHE:MM

793.94  
note  
894.23

FE

F/LS 793.94/4649

MAR 25 1932

FILED

COPY

Mukden, January 8, 1932.

The 20th Division (recently from Korea) completed the actual occupation of the Peiping-Mukden Railway from Koupangtze to Shanhaikwan, with division headquarters established at Chinchow, once that city was reached on 3 January at 1020. The operation started via Yingkow and Tawa (大窪), on that branch line was reached on 28 December, Panshan (盤山) on the 29th and Koupangtze on 31 December. This junction (Koupangtze) was occupied at noon on the 31st by a cavalry detachment from the direction of Yingkow, they mounting machine guns on the overhead platforms at the station simultaneously with the arrival of an armored train from the North. General Tamon, commanding the 2nd Division, which had entrained via Mukden, arrived in Koupangtze that same evening, and took over the area from Koupangtze north releasing the 20th Division to proceed South. On New Year's day, Tamon held a reception for his ranking officers at his headquarters in Chinchow.

Lienshan (連山), the Hulutao junction, was entered by 20th Division units on the 4th, and it was expected that Shanhaikwan would be reached on the evening of the 5th, or morning of the 6th. Many of the smaller bridges below Suichung (綏中) had been destroyed by the Chinese and considerable repair work was necessary before trains could proceed through to Shanhaikwan, although hundreds of South Manchuria Railway workmen were engaged at various points in reconstruction work. Cavalry and tanks, as well as infantry, was paralleling the line ahead of, and coincident with the advance of the armored trains and armored automobiles, which had been fitted with specially flanged wheels for use on the railways. On the 5th troops were sent out from Chinchow up the Peipiao (北票) branch line and on the same day arrived at Ihsien (義縣), about 31 miles from Chinchow. Little movement via train had been made along the Tahushan-Tungliao line, although cavalry units were patrolling either flank.

The opinion generally expressed by headquarters and individual officers was that no move would be made below the Wall or into Jehol proper. However, it was admitted that a Chinese concentration at Lanchow (瀋州) was viewed with serious concern and that for strategic reasons, Chinwangtao should be considered synonymous with Shanhaikwan. It was stated that a "garrison" policy would be adopted along the railway and that as soon as possible the 2nd Division would be returned to Liaoyang, its original station. To confirm this it was pointed out that the heavy artillery of this division was at the time being entrained for Mukden. However, it was noted that it was being replaced by lighter guns.

This is borne out, since my return to Mukden, by

hearing

- 2 -

hearing from reliable sources, that General Mira, commanding the 20th Division, will remain with his headquarters at Chinchow. The Kamura Brigade (original Korean Mixed Brigade) will have its headquarters at Koupangtze. The other Brigade of the Division under General Ida, or as sometimes spelled Yorida, will establish headquarters at Suichung (绥中). This contemplates that everything west of the Liao River shall be 20th Division area and that General Tamon with his Division shall be responsible for the region east of the Liao. This leaves the 8th Brigade under Susuki unplaced unless he is to go back to Yinkow or return to the North. I saw units of the Minami 4th Brigade along the line also and am positive that more troops are being employed than officially indicated. General Mori is the Chief of Staff of the 20th Division.

There was little trouble at the Kuantung Army headquarters here in arranging to visit Chinchow and that region and I was provided with a letter to all commanding officers, etc. They intimated, as mentioned in my telegram of the 3rd, that they expected to push on to Shanhaikwan. A new line in the Fourth or Intelligence Department, was in evidence. My friend Major Hirata, has been ordered back to Japan and was replaced by a Lt. Col. Matsui, a very nice gentleman who has had considerable Russian experience which included among other things three months in a Russian prison. Major Nakagawa, formerly in Tientsin, is in Watari's place, and he was also very pleasant. Kanai, South Manchuria official, now in Shanghai and formerly in Peiping and whom I knew, is also in this section. The South Manchuria Railway is so closely interwoven with the present movement that even the military seems unable to draw the line of distinction. Kanai, I heard referred to as a "Brigadier General", Mr. Odoni, graduate of the University of Washington, is head of the sub-section which is concerned with the translation of English into Japanese. A Mr. Ikagami, for ten years or so a Seattle merchant, is on the reverse angle, that is, Japanese news into English. In ordinary times he is the medical translator for the medical college here, as well as entertainer for visitors. There is also a Major Karasaki, who is also a Russian expert. Mr. Kawasaki and his American wife, are registered here at the Yamato, and have been for some time. She tells me that he is waiting for the arrival of the Commission. In ordinary times their role seems to be touring throughout the U.S. where she plays the piano while he recites (in perfect English) poems about the East and West becoming more friendly. He is now engaged in absorbing a background for the arrival of the Commission. That about completes the more interesting figures of the intelligence section as I have seen them in the past 24 hours.

The military train left a military loading platform

- 3 -

form in the railway yards of the South Manchuria Railway at 0700 on Monday, 4th January, 1932. There were three 3rd class SMR coaches filled with officers and men and I managed to secure a seat in the first car. No overtures were made to me by any of the officers nor was I prevented from alighting at each station to look over the entrenchments or barricades erected. At Hsin-min it was reported that "Hunghutze" bandits were in the vicinity and the train proceeded more slowly (about 8 miles per hour) from here on, with the soldiers on the train ready to deploy. At each station it was necessary to receive reports before advancing to the next station and supplies were usually unloaded. Every station siding contained SMR rolling stock although practically no PMR equipment was in evidence the entire journey. Koupangtze was reached about 1400. It was not known whether any trains would proceed south or not the same day. Several Japanese reporters had arrived from Chinchow and were waiting for a military train to take them to Yingkow. That branch was running military trains very intermittently as the majority of rolling stock had accompanied the southward advance of the army. The station at Koupangtze had been burnt the evening the Chinese evacuated and the railway sidings showed considerable evidence of the visit of the Japanese bombing planes a few days previous.

A staff officer, with a detail of men and many bundles of posters and slogans in Chinese, had accompanied the train from Mukden. At every station he turned over numbers of these to an officer and issued instructions for their use. A number of these are attached to this report, although several which extend a welcome to the Japanese troops are missing. Upon my return northward a few days later these posters were much in evidence from the railway.

Another train was made up at Koupangtze later in the afternoon and Chinchow reached about 2015. As this was Division headquarters and had been entered only the day before, considerable military activity was apparent. All Chinese inns were closed or taken over by the military and there was no space available in the station for me to spend the night.

The 5th was spent in Chinchow watching the extensive preparations for what appeared to be an anti-bandit campaign, either paralleling the PMR, or into Jehol proper, since troops were being sent up the Peipiao branch line that day. Railway cars, fitted with flat aerials on the car roof, and with self-contained generator sets are used with each regimental headquarters, as nearly as could be determined. These were not improvised but specially constructed for this purpose in semi-baggage and passenger car fashion. The forward end contained the power plant with the center of the car divided into small operating rooms and the rear of the car containing compartments

for

- 4 -

for the personnel. The power plant would indicate a radio station of considerable capacity.

There were no facilities for messing as understood in our service and with the exception of a few soldiers huddled around a small fire from time to time making tea there did not seem to be any warm food. On the trains both officers and men ate cold rice and bread occasionally, with "sake" in the majority of canteens. One of the officers explained this was part of the army training for hardening the soldiers on campaign and enlarged upon the advantages Japanese troops would have over our own on a similar campaign. However, one of the Japanese newspaper men was a bit more frank, and, according to my impressions, far more truthful. He said that owing to the single track line supplies were not arriving properly and could not keep up with headquarters, even less the advance. He had just returned from what was that day the "front" and said that the troops there were completely out of rations. In his opinion it was due to the failure of the military to have a competent military director of transport and reluctance to turn over the running of the railway to the SMR civilians who were in reality wholly responsible for such traffic as was being maintained. This fellow, who did not seem in any sense bitter against the military but was merely approachable, further said that the appropriations for this campaign were being held down to very rock bottom by the government as the cost had already been far above what was budgeted. He said that this was the main reason for meager equipment. I do not wholly share that view about the equipment - rather I should say it was available at various points along the line but "frozen" by lack of transport or inability to use it when they had it. The real backbone of the transport is the two-wheeled three-horse cart which had been impressed by the hundreds along with the drivers. Almost without exception the drivers stated that while they were given no option as to service they were given a quartermaster requisition which they were to present at Brigade headquarters where they would be paid. A great saving will insue here for I cannot picture many of those yokels presenting themselves at a Japanese Brigade headquarters - that is one of the places where the spirit of Rotary has as yet failed to penetrate.

The equipment carried by the individual soldier was amazing. I never saw an infantryman with less than 120 rounds, besides his heavy pack, spade or other entrenching tools, a helmet on the pack, and in many cases Mausers which had patently been taken from the Chinese. However, the Japanese learned their lesson around Tsitsihar for every man is provided with heavy felt boots, an excellent fur hat and a sleeveless sheep skin greatcoat. Even with that there were many

cases

- 5 -

cases of frostbite, frozen feet and hands. No wounded were in evidence and I noted only two field hospitals, one at Chinchow and one at Koupangtze, and while there may have been others I am inclined to believe that these division hospitals were the only ones.

Special material was available for small stream crossing in the way of collapsible bridges, cleated boards, and runways to spread the weight of artillery. Considerable straw was placed on the ice for horse drawn transport and the artillery was in some cases disassembled. This last however, according to the artilleryman, was merely a whim of the engineers, something to justify their existence. One of the few really human notes of the entire trip!

The flag of the 73rd regiment, according to the Japanese reporters, was consecrated by the blood of the regimental officers, who with their own blood painted over the crimson sun on the standard. These regimental flags are not regarded lightly - for I was nicely settled in one end of a car and they brought the colors aboard, cased, and put them in a baggage rack, with due ceremony of course and then asked me to get out of the car. Naturally I did.

The attitude towards the U.S. and Britain is not friendly by any means and it isn't necessary to speak Japanese to realise it. In no case was there any physical rudeness, but on the other hand there was the most studied aloofness. I climbed on a crowded car with every seat filled and of course expected to stand although I had met two or three of the officers and they undoubtedly knew who I was as I had to give a letter to the Military Police and he inquired from others about me. A Mr. Sato, one of the big numbers in the Osaka Mainichi, wanted to get me a seat but I told him I preferred not to cause any inconvenience to any one and that I could sit on my bag in the aisle. However, he went directly to the major, in charge of the train, and according to his story told them it was a hell of a way to treat foreign officers. Whatever took place they gave me a seat and I was duly thankful as the return trip took 22 hours. Mr. Sato during the argument was the recipient of several uncomplimentary remarks from a captain whom he tells me he has since reported to Honjo. It must have been a nasty crack for he was certainly upset and both Colonel Matsui and Major Nakagami have mentioned it, as well as half-heartedly regretting that I did not receive better treatment. Sato said "The Military Party in Japan does not yet realise that there are other things and thoughts in our country beside the Manchurian campaign - nor do they appreciate the power of the press in Japan - although the ranking officers are beginning to do so and that is evidenced by the facilities they are giving the 150 correspondents accompanying the forces on this drive."

Copied: JS.



PM RECD  
LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, February 3, 1932.  
MAR 6 1932  
COM. S. 100

No. 1399

MAR. 9 32

F/LS 793.94/4650

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 10 1932  
Department of State

793.94

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

In continuation of the Legation's despatch  
No. 1375/<sup>4174</sup> of January 20, 1932, I have the honor to  
1/2 transmit herewith two additional editorials bearing  
upon the Sino-Japanese situation, which have appeared  
in THE LEADER of Peiping during the past two weeks.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister,

*Mahlon F. Perkins*

Mahlon F. Perkins  
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosures:

Two editorials, "The Menace in  
Shanghai" and "Another  
League Session", from the  
Peiping LEADER of January  
24 and 27, 1932.

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RLB:epg.

FILED

MAR 12 1932

THE LEADER. Sunday, January 24, 1932

### THE MENACE IN SHANGHAI

We have no reliable figures of the number of Chinese soldiers and civilians, killed by Japanese in China's Three Eastern Provinces during the last four months. The number certainly runs into the thousands. As for the number wounded, beaten, imprisoned, robbed of all their earthly possessions, this it is impossible to calculate with any hope of certainty, though it is surely in the tens of thousands—to name a conservative figure.

Figures are more definite on the number of Chinese civilians murdered and assaulted in Japanese territory during the past half-year. The number killed by Japanese subjects in Korea is between a hundred and thirty and a hundred and fifty (a number of persons having disappeared and their fate being unknown), and those beaten and wounded number some hundreds, with thousands plundered and left destitute. The murdered here, as in China's north-eastern provinces, included merchants and scholars, laborers and priests, men and women and children.

Early last week there was a regrettable affair in Shanghai, in which five Japanese priests or monks were beaten by some workers in the Chinese city there. We say, frankly, that it was regrettable. It was not nearly as regrettable as the thousands of murders of Chinese by Japanese subjects, both in Chinese and Japanese territory, but even so it was regrettable. It was not nearly as regrettable as the fact that the Japanese Buddhist Churches have raised no voice of protest against these outrages by the Japanese Government and its agents, but still it was regrettable. Violence and outrage are always regrettable.

We do not know if these monks were really spies, or if they were sent out into Chinese territory especially to start something, or whether they were just the typical Japanese civilians, wandering about in what they felt to be perfect safety in a country which was being plundered and ravished by their fellow-countrymen, while their diplomats abroad and propaganda chiefs at home sent out wild reports about the danger and insecurity of Japanese subjects in China. However it may be, there was an association of young Japanese ruffians in Shanghai which apparently was awaiting such an attack as a pretext for a criminal outbreak, and a gang of thirty or forty of these young men, a couple of hours after midnight on the following night, went out into the Chinese town and set fire to a Chinese factory, workmen from which are supposed to have attacked the afore-said "priests." A Japanese report says that "two plants were completely destroyed before the flames were got under control at 3.40 o'clock."

Fleeing back into the Settlement, the young firebugs split up into groups, and upon being challenged by Settlement police on duty attacked them with swords. In one group one of the men ran a policeman right through the body, he dying later in hospital, while his comrades sliced at others. One policeman drew his revolver and began shooting at the attackers, bringing down three of them, of whom one also died in hospital.

Protests, of course, were promptly made to the Japanese Consul-General. But in the afternoon a meeting of Japanese residents was held—said to number 12,000,—and not only did not condemn the murderous outrage of the young firebugs of the *Doshikai*, but indulged in speeches of “patriotic indignation,” apparently offended that the Settlement police had not let themselves be sliced up in the non-resistant way manifested by the Chinese police and soldiers in Manchuria. This meeting passed a resolution demanding that the Tokyō Government “dispatch the army and navy. . . and extirpate the anti-Japanese movements.” To show the noble patriotic spirit of Shanghai’s Japanese residents, these gentry proceeded after the meeting to smash Chinese shop windows and assault Chinese civilians and police in the Settlement.

The following morning, of course, the Japanese Consul-General apologized to the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council for the killing of their constable, also apologized to the Chinese mayor of Greater Shanghai for the burning of the factory. He stated that the Japanese offender would be punished and compensation paid for the injuries done by them. But the same afternoon another meeting of Japanese residents condemned the “peaceful measures” of the Consul-General, and again demanded the dispatch of Japanese troops.

The Japanese Foreign Office, with their usual diplomatic propriety, announced that the affair was to be settled between their Consul-General and the Shanghai Mayor, as a local question, that the Japanese offenders should be punished in accordance with the Japanese law, and that this should be made an opportunity for extirpating the Anti-Japanese Association and similar bodies.

But this is not the way the Japanese warlords do things, and on January 22 Admiral Shiosawa, commanding the Japanese fleet in Chinese waters, delivered demands to the mayor of Shanghai (described by *Reuter's* as an ultimatum) calling for “an immediate and satisfactory reply” to the Japanese protest over the “prolonged anti-Japanese agitation and the attack on five Japanese priests.” Six warships were promptly dispatched to Shanghai from Japan, and a dozen others ordered to hold themselves in readiness to proceed.

We do not know what the International Settlement authorities are doing. It is difficult to imagine that they are permitting the Settlement to be used as a base for Japanese military and naval operations against China. If it is so used it must be with the collaboration and assistance of the American, British, and other authorities there. But whatever they do, there is no doubt of the proper course for the Shanghai mayor and the Nanking Government, and the proper reply to the Japanese insolence.

These are almost the first attacks upon Japanese in China, and such attacks will cease altogether as soon as the Japanese criminals, in and out of uniform, cease attacking Chinese in Fengtien, in Heilungkiang, in Kirin, in Jehol, in Tsingtao, in Tientsin, in Seoul, and elsewhere. The anti-Japanese Association is the product of these outrages, and it will cease its activities as soon as Japanese troops are withdrawn from Chinese territory and due compensation made for all damage done by the alien marauders.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

There can be no other reply, and no equivocation. The Japanese invader is now striking at the very heart of China—at Shanghai. The fight must go on, more sternly and more uncompromisingly than before. No dealings with the enemy, no purchases of Japanese goods, until Japanese forces are withdrawn from China. Chinese Government officials must remember, whatever the peril to themselves, that the bitter resistance of the people against the invaders must go on. A Government which attempts to extirpate the boycott movement should itself be extirpated.

If China gives an inch, the enemy will take a yard. It was a local incident which the Japanese (who undoubtedly created it) used as a pretext for the occupation not only of Mukden, but of all Manchuria, an occupation still going on. If the enemy is permitted to gain a foothold in Chinese Shanghai, it will be the beginning of the occupation of the Yangtze district. This is no time for shutting one's eyes to the facts.

THE LEADER, Wednesday, January 27, 1932

ANOTHER LEAGUE SESSION

Another session of the Council of the League of Nations has gathered. This time Japan is in control of the whole of Fengtien province, her troops are making desperate attempts to overcome the bitter resistance of patriots and invade Jehol, Chinese renegades in her employ have control of most of Kirin, Harbin is in the hands of other Chinese friends of Japan, Japanese marines are landed at Shanghai and threatening a further invasion there, and the Japanese Legation in Peiping is attempting to treat this city as Japanese territory and enforce unique Japanese laws against Chinese citizens here.

Each session of the League Council shows further progress on the part of the Japanese military. But at the League, at least, China can win out. At Geneva it is not merely a question of military force, but a question of brains, and in the discussions which take place in this splendid debating society the Chinese invariably have the best of it. Dr. Yen won a most brilliant victory over Mr. Sato in the opening day's debate, and deserves the highest praise for his splendid effort.

Not that this will change the situation in China, of course. Japanese planes will continue to bomb defenseless Chinese towns, Japanese soldiers will continue to plunder Chinese property, Japanese money will continue to subsidize Chinese bandits and seduce Chinese renegades into warring upon their own people, Japanese professional patriots will continue to burn Chinese buildings and murder Chinese policemen, Japanese diplomats will continue to demand the enforcement of Japanese law against Chinese citizens in China. And all the insulting and abusive and scurrilous campaign waged by Japanese official spokesmen and Japanese propaganda agencies against China's officials will continue as heretofore. And so far as they are not stopped by the bitter resistance of the Chinese people, Japanese forces will go ahead with the occupation of China.

There was hope a few days ago that the Chinese Government would, as a loyal member of the League of Nations, call for action against the international lawbreaker which has violated the Covenant of the League, has broken every promise made, has cynically spat upon the League resolution before the ink was dry on the newspapers reporting it. Perhaps the Chinese Government will still demand its rights as a true member of the League against a treacherous fellow-member. But in the opening session, apparently, Dr. Yen has not demand it.

The one new and original thing which has developed in the situation is the amazing about-face of the Japanese in stating that now that the Chinese regular troops have been withdrawn from Manchuria, and there are only "bandits and irregulars" there, "the Emperor's sanction has been obtained to recall the Japanese field and heavy artillery belonging to the 12th Division," as well as some other forces. That the Emperor is sanctioning this, for the reason given, means that his forces are not interested in fighting bandits. They were interested really in fighting regular troops, and now that the regular troops have been withdrawn they can reduce their forces. They apparently consider that they can get along much better with the bandits and irregulars.

But the point here is that the Japanese have been insisting for month after month that they were only taking action against bandits in Manchuria. They have declared it not only through their publicity agents in Tokyo and elsewhere, but through their representatives at the League. The last resolution of the League they accepted, but making their addition that they would not be hampered in their work of bandit suppression.

It seems impossible that the Japanese warlords should actually be laughing in the face of the League in the face of the world. And yet that is what this late spokesman for the League has done.

"What fools you are! We kept up this talk of bandits until we had occupied all Manchuria and chased the Chinese troops out. Now we have the regulars out we can make peace with our comrades the bandits, and take our troops out. And we tell you in peace now. You have not acted before. You have not acted now. We have taken Manchuria and slammed the door in your faces. What are you going to do about it?"

But we must not forget that Mr. Yvann a splendid victory in the debate on Monday. Let us hope that China has an equally capable orator at future meetings of the League, when the further advance of the Japanese marauders into Chinese territory will be discussed.

Respectfully,  
F. G.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 24, 1932.

~~MMT:~~  
~~SKH:~~  
~~RSM:~~

The Minister transmits herewith a copy of a memorandum of a very interesting conversation which Mr. Peck at Nanking and Mr. Ingram of the British Legation had with Eugene Chen in regard to the understanding which Chen and other Cantonese leaders had with the Japanese authorities. On page 2 of this memorandum there is outlined an understanding which Chen had with Baron Shidehara in regard to a solution of the Manchurian situation, which is strikingly similar to a plan I prepared last November.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, January 28, 1932.

No. 1388



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*Copy in file*  
Division  
FAR EASTERN  
MAR 10 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4651

793.94

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter dated January 19, 1932, from the Consul General at Nanking, transmitting a memorandum of a conversation he had with Mr. Eugene Chen, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at Nanking on January 10, 1932.

As the Department will observe Mr. Chen, during this conversation, appeared to be desirous of explaining the purpose of his visit to Japan in 1931, and, by outlining his negotiations with Japanese military and civil officials, to refute allegations contained

in

APR 11 1932

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- 2 -

in native language newspapers that he had entered  
into compromising agreements with the enemy.

Respectfully yours,

*Nelson Trusler Johnson*  
NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum of conversation  
enclosure to Consul General  
Peck's letter January 19,  
1932.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1  
Dispatch No. 1388

Banking Office.

January 19, 1932

Dear Nelson:

On January 10, 1932, Eugene Chen, Ingram and I had lunch together here at the Consulate, and in the course of conversation afterwards Chen gave us an account of his trip to Japan in the summer of 1931 and of the relations subsequently existing between the Japanese and the Canton regime. It was agreed between Ingram and me that the former should jot down the salient portions of this disclosure and I enclose a copy of what Ingram put down.

I am sending this letter in duplicate, in case you desire to send a copy to Stanley Hornbeck.

Yours sincerely,

Willys R. Peck.

Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson

American Minister,

Peiping.

Mr. Eugene Chen's account of the history of his relations with the Japanese during the last half of 1931.

In the Summer of 1931 Mr. Eugene Chen, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs with the Canton Government, went to Tokyo with the object of sounding Baron Shidehara regarding the possibility of China and Japan bringing their mutual relations on to a more workable basis, especially where Manchuria was concerned. In proceeding to Tokyo Mr. Chen had the full support of his colleagues in the Canton Government, who, realising that the moment might shortly come when they would succeed to the helm of the Central Government of China, were anxious to obtain some kind of fore-knowledge which would enable them to formulate a successful Japanese policy.

Baron Shidehara was at first very cautious in his conversations with Mr. Chen, who sought to impress on him however that he had no authority to speak on behalf of anyone but himself. Mr. Chen also got into touch with the military clique in Tokyo and through them was introduced to the present Premier, Mr. Inukai, who was indicated to him by that clique as being the probable leader in the event of the Minseito Party being turned out of office. The impressions with which Mr. Chen came away were that the Manchurian problem was not

insoluble


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insoluble in as much as Baron Shidehara seemed able to stand up to the military clique. Moreover, if the military clique were to follow the leadership of Inukai the latter seemed reasonable and did not exclude the possibility of a settlement. Both, however, made it quite clear that any settlement would have to be reached a deux and that the intervention of any third party would not be tolerated.

Then came September 18th with the Japanese coup at Mukden. Ever since Mr. Chen had remained in touch with the Japanese Government through the Japanese Consul-General in Canton, Mr. Suma. The intercourse thus carried on resulted in what Mr. Chen described as a virtual agreement with Baron Shidehara on the following lines. (a) Institution of a high commission for Manchuria under Tong Shao-yi; (b) establishment by the Commission of efficient police and local administration; (c) abolition of all warlords; (d) setting up of a Joint Commission of experts who would examine the treaty questions and submit their findings to their respective governments who would then negotiate on those points where the Commission failed to reach agreement.

Baron Shidehara eventually fell but touch was kept with his successor through one Kiyano, a mutual friend of Inukai's and of certain Cantonese elder statesmen. The Japanese kept up the fiction of negotiation with the Cantonese partly by messages to Hu Han-min through Mr. Suma, partly by conversations

between



between Cantonese and the Japanese delegation to the Disarmament Conference on its way through Hongkong, and partly direct through Kiyano who had actually come to Nanking to keep in touch with the Cantonese here. Indeed the whole Sun Fo regime had up to the eleventh hour pinned their faith on these subterranean conversations. Mr. Chen had up till the evening of January 8th been hoping to receive assurances that the Japanese Prime Minister could control the military clique, if third party intervention were eliminated. These hopes had, however, been dashed by the last communications he had received. He had, therefore, to start afresh and think out some other line of policy.

NANKING,

10th January, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Mr. ~~Sumner~~

11-28  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 1 1932

I think  
authorities -  
China will  
adequately take  
care of this.

Sumner

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 1 1932

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 8 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

RECEIVED  
FEB 29 1932  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

February 28, 1932 12:30 P. M.

*File*

F/L/S  
795.94/4652

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note  
8/10/152  
8/13/113

The Navy Department read over the telephone a confidential message just received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet at Shanghai to the effect that a cargo of ammunition had been discovered under a cargo of food relief flour consigned to Hankow under the U. S. flag. The Commander-in-Chief has given notice that after noon of the 29th all American flags would be seized unless satisfactory warrant for their use could be shown (in the case above cited, the flag was not legitimately used).

The Commander-in-Chief further reported that he was reliably informed that the Chief of Staff of the Commander of the Chinese forces at Shanghai had stated that the Chinese forces were willing to withdraw 20 kilometers provided the Japanese forces would withdraw into the Settlement. The Japanese Vice Admiral is reported to have replied that he would communicate directly with Tokyo on the subject.

JUN 6 1932

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A copy of this message is on its way from the Navy Dept.

RSM/RPB.



REP

2-from Shanghai, Mar. 9, 7p.m.

a definite agreement for the complete cessation of hostilities.

Japanese authorities have all the way presumed that the Japanese attitude on the matter has been understood by the Chinese authorities. However, failing to hear anything from the Chinese Government since the aforesaid resolution was passed by the Assembly of League of Nations they wish to make clear beyond a doubt their readiness to negotiate along the lines laid down in the resolution."

Three. Lampson read document over and pointed out to Shigemitsu that it contained no reference to withdrawal of Japanese troops. He kept document for study, however, and noticing that opening paragraph resembled textually paragraph No. three of the League resolution of March 4th, he made a marginal note for insertion after word "hostilities" at the end of first paragraph as follows: "and to arrange for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces". Document so amended was returned to Shigemitsu last evening who promised to give matter consideration. Today he returned it to Lampson with the amendment reading "and then to discuss and determine arrangements for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces". Although the British Minister observed that the word "then" would probably be unacceptable to the Chinese Government the Japanese Minister replied that a discussion of Japanese withdrawal could only follow agreement regarding  
cessation

REP

3- from Shanghai, Mar. 9, 7p.m.

cessation of hostilities. Lampson is seeing Quotaichi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, tonight and will show him Japanese draft and endeavor to obtain Chinese counter document. (END GRAY)

Five. Quotaichi intimated to me last evening that it was his personal belief that Chinese might be willing to consider a discussion of Shanghai situation at a conference which would include in its agenda the question of Manchuria.

JOHNSON

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CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 8 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 10 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

March 8, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND  
THE CHINESE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM, DR. HAWKLING YEN.

Resolution of the Assembly.

The Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, Dr. Hawkling Yen, called on me to show me a telegram which he had received from Dr. Yen, at Geneva, in which Dr. Yen recited the resolution of the Assembly, apparently the one of Saturday, and asked the Chargé to see me in order that our Minister might be instructed that the Conference at Shanghai was to be carried on in accordance with that resolution. The Chargé was in some confusion as to when this resolution of the Assembly took place - he thought it passed today. I told the Chargé that I thought he was mistaken and that it was passed Saturday; that I had already instructed Johnson to attend the Conference and that I thought that my instructions to him accorded with the resolution of the Assembly. I told him that my view was that the military situation in Shanghai should be liquidated by itself and that the Conference should not be carried on in a way which would permit outside questions to be brought up against China under the pressure of the military occupation. The Chargé expressed himself as satisfied with my statement and

afterwards

F/LS 793.94/4654  
MAR 14 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

afterwards he told me that he wished to express also the great satisfaction which his Government and his people took in my expressions towards China in the Borah letter. I told him that in those expressions I tried to state the historic policy of this country which would continue as the policy of this Government but, of course, this did not mean that this Government was taking sides in any other way in the present controversy. The Chargé said he understood that perfectly.

HLS.

S HLS:CBS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LATIN-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

Conversation



February 28, 1932



F/L S 793.94/4655

Señor Don Gonzalo Zaldumbide,  
Minister of Ecuador.

The Ecuadoran Minister came in to ask, under instructions from his Government, whether we had been invited by the League of Nations to take part in a conference on Far Eastern affairs. I said that I assumed he referred to the meeting of the League Assembly early in March. After inquiry of Mr. Boal I informed the Minister that we had not been invited by the League to take part in any such meeting.

Edwin O. Gustafson

ECW/EMG

MAR 12 1932  
FILED

REC'D  
Dep. of State  
The American Legation at Peiping



AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE  
American Consulate General,  
Nanking, China.

7/3.94  
7/3.94  
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axck

January 27, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 2 0 1932  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping.

Division of  
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 1 0 1932  
Department of State

F/L/S 793.94/4656

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, in duplicate,  
a Memorandum of my conversation of today's date with  
Mr. Wang Ching-wei. An extra copy is enclosed for  
possible reference to the Department of State.

Respectfully yours,

Paul W. Meyer,  
American Consul

For the Consul General.

MAR 30 1932

FILED

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Interview with Mr. Wang Ching-wei,  
dated January 27, 1932.

In duplicate to the Legation.

800

WRP:ECH

No Carbon Copies  
Received *[Signature]*

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

January 27, 1932

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Wang Ching-wei  
Mr. Peck.

Mr. Peck called on Mr. Wang by appointment at 9 a.m. in the residence of Mr. T. V. Soong, former Minister of Finance.

Mr. Peck told Mr. Wang that he had asked for an interview in order to obtain information which would enable him to give to the American Minister and the American Government an accurate picture of the situation of the Chinese Government, a matter in which the American Government was greatly interested. Mr. Wang invited Mr. Peck to ask any questions he might desire.

Mr. Peck said that the subject of greatest interest was whether a stable Government would continue in Nanking.

Mr. Wang said that in replying to this question he would first refer to the departure of Dr. Sun Fo, the President of the Executive Yuan. He said Dr. Sun Fo had visited Mr. Wang and General Chiang Kai-shek at Hangchow and had urged that one of them take over from him the post of President of the Executive Yuan. Dr. Sun Fo's departure from Nanking on Sunday, January 24, and his resignation, had been with the object of transferring his responsibility to other shoulders. Mr. Wang said that within a day or two another person would be elected to the post of President of the Executive Yuan, and that after this was done it was

hoped

- 2 -

hoped by everybody that Dr. Sun Fo would return to join the Government in Nanking. He said that the resignation of Dr. Sun Fo had nothing to do with the resignation of Mr. Eugene Chen, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Wang then explained the reasons for the resignation of Mr. Eugene Chen. Mr. Wang said that the resignation of Mr. Eugene Chen had been brought about by the refusal of the Government to adopt his policy of severing relations with Japan. He said that Mr. Chen's idea in severing relations with Japan was to create a situation which would compel the intervention of foreign nations in the controversy between China and Japan, and thus bring about its solution. Mr. Wang thought that the foreign powers had ample ground for intervening in the matter already, in view of the violation of their rights and interests by Japan. He was against the severing of relations, because Japan's violations of China's territory and sovereignty had carried the matter far beyond the scope of such a diplomatic expedient. As against Japan only a declaration of war would be adequate.

Mr. Wang said that he would also explain his relations with General Chiang Kai-shek. For several years he had not been working with General Chiang, on account of differences of view in regard to internal political matters. Because of the critical condition of China's foreign relations, however, Mr. Wang and General Chiang were now working together with a single object and this state of affairs would continue unchanged, for the present.

A great deal of the conversation was devoted to the subject of possible solution of the controversy with Japan. Briefly summarized, Mr. Wang's remarks were as follows:

Japan has in recent months violated the Nine Power Treaty,

the

- 3 -

the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, as well as all other Treaties with China. Japan has not only violated the sovereignty and territory of China, but also the Open Door Policy and the treaty rights and interests of foreign powers. China has sought to obtain assistance from the Nine Power Treaty, the League of Nations, and the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, and has achieved very little success. The only course which remains to China is to have recourse to negotiations with Japan. Wang pointed out that Japan by insisting on the preliminary acceptance of the Five Principles made it impossible for China to enter into direct negotiations with Japan, but China would be willing to negotiate with Japan if the foreign powers would assist in the negotiations or would have representatives present at the negotiations.

Mr. Wang said that when he came to Nanking he asked the authorities who were in charge of China's foreign relations whether they had appealed to the United States under the terms of the Nine Power Treaty. They had replied that China had made numerous references to this Treaty, but the United States had not made its attitude clear.

Mr. Peck then informed Mr. Wang regarding Mr. Eugene Chen's inquiry of the Department, through Mr. Peck, concerning the matter of summoning a conference of the Nine Powers. Mr. Wang had not heard of this inquiry, nor of the reply. Mr. Peck pointed out, however, that the American Government had made its attitude toward the Japanese activities in Manchuria extremely clear in its Note to Japan and China on January 7. Mr. Peck

pointed

- 4 -

pointed out, also, that the United States was the only nation which had taken so positive a step in an individual capacity, since the other nations had acted in concert. Mr. Wang acknowledged this fact.

Mr. Wang then said that since the American Government believed that it would be inexpedient to ask for a conference of the Nine Powers, he would be extremely glad to know what the ideas of the American Government were in regard to a method of arriving at a solution of the Manchurian problem. Mr. Peck said that he had no instructions and no authority to say anything on this point, but he observed that the American Government had mentioned in its Note of January 7 its belief that the League Commission of Inquiry would materially facilitate a friendly settlement between Japan and China and undoubtedly the American Government would be gratified if Japan and China could come to a friendly settlement between themselves through negotiations. Mr. Peck said that he wished to make it quite clear, however, that he had not come to Mr. Wang under any instructions from the American Government to attempt to bring about direct negotiations between China and Japan.

In regard to the situation at present obtaining in Shanghai, Mr. Wang said that if the Japanese military forces attempted to occupy Chinese territory the Chinese Government would resist with force. Aside from this, Mr. Wang said, the

Chinese

- 5 -

Chinese Government was adopting with the Japanese a mild policy at Shanghai. He said that the rights of foreign nations were being infringed upon by the Japanese at Shanghai and he urged that the Powers should intervene to protect their rights.

Mr. Wang said that a representative of a foreign power had come to him to inquire whether China would like that power to sound out other Governments with reference to an attempt to bring about direct negotiations between China and Japan with the assistance thereof of representatives of other Governments. Mr. Wang said that these discussions had not reached a stage where the identity of the representative referred to could be revealed, but Mr. Wang asked Mr. Peck whether he was aware of these proposals. Mr. Peck said that he had not been informed that any proposals of the sort just described had been made.

Mr. Peck told Mr. Wang that the information he had received from Mr. Wang was both interesting and valuable and in leaving he would only remark that the hope of everyone was the same, that is, that a resumption of friendly relations could be brought about on a just basis.

Mr. Wang said that he would like to keep in close touch with Mr. Peck in the future, either in personal visits or through the medium of Mr. Chen, who had acted as interpreter.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*Handwritten initials and scribbles*

NO. 72.

*793-94  
893-102  
Tientsin*

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, February 2, 1932.

SUBJECT: Japanese Demands at Tientsin.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 25 1932

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 25 1932  
*(Handwritten initials)*

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FAR EASTERN SECTION  
MAR 10 1932  
*(Handwritten initials)*

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of my  
despatch No. 117 of this date, to the Legation at Peiping,  
on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

*(Handwritten signature)*

F. P. Lockhart,  
American Consul General.

800

FPL/DA

Enclosure!

To Legation, February 2.

Original and 4 copies to Department.

F/LS  
793.94/4657

MAR 25 1932

No. 117.

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch  
No. 12, Dated February 2, 1932  
From the American Consulate General  
at Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, February 2, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Japanese Demands at Tientsin.

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of January 31 - 2 p.m. concerning certain demands said to have been made on the Mayor of Tientsin by the local Japanese Consul General, and to state that a further investigation has been made of this matter, the result of which is set forth in the enclosed confidential memorandum prepared by the interpreter of this Consulate General. It appears that a protest, as reported, was lodged with the Mayor concerning certain statements published in the YI SHIH PAO and that the Mayor accepted the demand that an apology be made but that the Italian Consul, in whose concession the YI SHIH PAO is published, flatly declined to take any action in the matter. The demand concerning the cessation of anti-Japanese activities appears to have been lodged about two weeks ago, to which a reply was made to the effect that the anti-Japanese Association would no longer be permitted to function.

Respectfully yours,

F. F. Lockhart,  
American Consul General.

800

FVL/BA

Enclosure:  
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Original and 1 copy to Legation.  
In quintuplicate to the Department.

A true copy of  
the signed origi-  
nal. *DD*

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

The undersigned heard a rumor yesterday (Sunday) that the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin had presented an ultimatum to the Mayor of Tientsin, containing the following demands:

1. That in connection with the publication of an article concerning the attempted assassination of the Japanese Emperor, by the YI SHIH PAO, apologies be made both by the Mayor of Tientsin and the paper, and that they should also be appropriately punished;
2. That Japanese troops be permitted to visit Chinese territory;
3. That all anti-Japanese activities in Tientsin be prohibited; and
4. That henceforth Japanese be allowed to make raids on secret anti-Japanese meetings which may be held in the Chinese city.

The foregoing was not reported to the Consul General as the source of information was not considered reliable and as no confirmation could be obtained from any one in the Chinese official or independent circles - yesterday being Sunday.

I telephoned to Mr. Shen, Chief of the Third Department of the Municipal Government, as soon as I got to the office this morning and found he was still in bed. He called me later. I asked him to confirm the ultimatum which is reported to have been sent to the Mayor by the local Japanese authorities and which is stated to have expired at 6 p.m. last Saturday. Mr. Shen informed me personally and confidentially that no such ultimatum had been received, and that a protest concerning the YI SHIH PAO affair had, however, been addressed to the Municipal Government by the Japanese Consul General, demanding:

1. That an apology be made by the Mayor of Tientsin;
2. The suspension of issue for a short period;
3. The apology of the Management of YI SHIH PAO;
4. That the letter of apology be published in the paper; and
5. The punishment of the responsible editors.

He added that the first demand had been accepted by the Mayor, but the Italian Consul flatly declined to take any action over the other four demands against the YI SHIH PAO, which is located in the Italian Concession.

In reply to my enquiry as to whether there was a protest or ultimatum in connection with the anti-Japanese activities, Mr. Shen said that the last protest which was lodged was about two weeks ago, to which a reply was given to the Japanese Consul General informing him that, under orders of the central authorities, the Anti-Japanese Association, which was not recognized by the Chinese authorities as a legal body, would no longer be permitted to function.

On behalf of the Consul General, I thanked him for the foregoing information.

(Sgd) F. J. C. Liu,  
F. J. C. Liu,  
Interpreter.

February 1, 1938.

K FEE

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note  
793.94119  
893.102 Hankow  
693.9412

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY



FROM

Hankow via NR

Dated March 9, 1932

Recd 11:51 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND



40, March 9, 5 p.m.

F/LS

793.94/4658

FILED

Reports that the Japanese Consul General at Hankow has presented certain demands to the ~~advantage of~~ local Chinese authorities are prevalent here. With the thought that these reports may have been made the subject of news despatches I beg to report as follows:

General Ho Chen Chun's chief secretary informs me that General Ho has not received any demand or warning from the local Japanese authorities but has received a request from the Japanese Consul General that the boycott of Japanese goods be stopped so that Japanese trade may return to normal. The Japanese Consul General has just informed me that he has not made any "specific demands" upon the local Chinese authorities. He stated, however, that he had had a very private conversation with the "<sup>a</sup>side of General Ho Chen Chun" in which he had stated that the Shanghai affair was now closed and that he thought that public confidence

-2- # 40 from Hankow.

confidence would be restored if the Chinese and Japanese authorities at Hankow would simultaneously do away with the military preparations which they had made. The Japanese Consul General said that in making this proposal he had in mind the barricades of the Japanese concession and the trenches which the Chinese had prepared facing the Japanese concession on both the Wuchang and Hankow sides of the river. He said that the Chinese had agreed "in principle" to his proposal. The Japanese Consul General added that he is nearly every day urging the Chinese to stop the boycott of Japanese goods. He stated that while the boycott organization had been broken up in Wuhan, some of the members of this organization were working privately to continue the boycott. He concluded by saying that he thought that there would be no disturbance at Wuhan involving the Chinese and Japanese. He said that Japanese naval officer had informed the senior Chinese naval officer at Hankow that Admiral Shio<sup>sawa</sup>savur would arrive in Hankow within a few days for the purpose of looking over the situation. The Japanese thought that the report of this approaching visit may have caused some of the rumors circulating in Hankow.

ADAMS

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

FROM

Secretary of State  
Washington

GREEN  
GENEVA

Dated March 9, 1932

Rec'd 8:55 p.m.



Tele. to  
Shanghai

F/LS  
793.94/4659

68, March 9, 11 p.m.

In conversation today with Simon I mentioned the fact reported by Johnson conveyed to me in paragraph A of your 36, March 8, 1 p.m., to the effect that the British Minister had received no instructions concerning negotiations at Shanghai. Simon stated that he had sent a copy of the Assembly's resolution March 4 and that since this had been concurred in by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain he had assumed that this was sufficient authorization. He stated that he would be glad to furnish Lampson at once with more specific instructions and asked the nature of the instructions which you had sent to Johnson in order that his might be drafted along similar lines. I conveyed to him the tenor of the instructions you had given Johnson as furnished me in the non-confidential part of your 29, March 5, 10 p.m., and he has informed me that instructions will be sent

MAR 16 1932

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2- #68, from Geneva, March 9, 1932

sent to Shanghai this evening.

At a meeting of the Assembly Bureau this afternoon, at which were also present representatives of all states who had submitted resolutions to the General Commission, a text of a resolution was tentatively agreed upon of which the final paragraph reads as follows:

"Pending the decisions which it may ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute which has been submitted to it;

"Reaffirms the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris".

This text will come before the Bureau again for final consideration but debate is anticipated more on the early paragraphs which contain the premises than on the final resolution itself. Inasmuch as all members present agreed to hold this matter confidential for the time being I request that you be good enough to so regard it.

WILSON

F7 CX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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PM RECD  
TELEGRAM SENT

1-128  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State



Washington,

March 10, 1932.

MAR 10 1932

*Ray*

*6pm*

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

*41*

Your 68, <sup>4659</sup> March 9, 11 p.m., first paragraph.  
Department has informed Johnson.

793.94/4659

*793.94/4659*

*Stinson*

*Stinson*

FE:SKH:AT

*RAM*  
FE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 15 1932  
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
GENEVA

FE  
WE

man

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated March 9, 1932

Rec'd 4:46 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 9 1932  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of  
MAR 10 1932  
Department of State

URGENT

67, March 9, 8 p.m.

An Assembly document (Aextr 27.1932.7) dated March 8 circulates a letter from Yen to the Secretary General in which he quoted a telegram from the Chinese Legation in Washington as follows:

"The two understandings contained in your statement in the Assembly before the adoption of the resolution calling on the Chinese and Japanese Governments to enter into negotiations for a definite armistice in Shanghai were brought to the notice of Mr. Stimson, American Secretary of State. Mr. Stimson stated that they were agreeable to the American position. In fact he had telegraphed to Minister Johnson on Saturday authorizing the latter to participate in discussing the liquidation of the military phase of the situation leaving the rest if necessary to a later conference at Shanghai or elsewhere.

HC

F/LS

793.94/4660

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MAR 16 1932

nam

2- 467, from Geneva, March 9, 1932

He presumed that China would place police in evacuated area to keep order". (END GRAY)

I have telephoned Olds who promises me to ascertain from Yen whether he had any authority from you to circulate such a message. Sato of the Japanese Delegation has already asked me if I knew anything about it to which I replied in the negative. He was particularly disturbed by the last sentence in reference to the policing of the evacuated area.

Please instruct me as to your attitude on this matter particularly in regard to the last sentence. Is it your view that the evacuated area should be immediately taken over by Chinese troops or that eventually the Chinese troops should take it over after peaceful conditions have been restored perhaps under patrol by neutral forces? It would seem that since such a telegram has been circulated by Yen it may be necessary to give the Japanese some reassurance as to the maintenance of order by neutrals for the time being in the evacuated region.

WILSON

FJ OX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD  
TELEGRAM SENT

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PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

1-128  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
~~CONFIDENTIAL CODE~~  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  X

Department of State

OR  
Charge to  
\$

This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to agents.

Washington,

March 10, 1932.

MAR 10 1932

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA, (SWITZERLAND).

TRIPLE PRIORITY <sup>40</sup>CONFIDENTIAL.

Your <sup>4660</sup>67, March 9, 8 p. m.

Dr. Yen's letter was unauthorized and inaccurate.

I expressed no opinion to Hawking Yen and <sup>have</sup>~~had~~ formulated  
no plan as to the maintenance of order in the occupied area  
at the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. This seems to me  
a matter to be <sup>discussed</sup>~~arranged~~ at the conference to be held in  
Shanghai in pursuance of the Assembly resolution. So far  
as I know, no one has as yet undertaken to specify what the  
arrangements must be. You may inform any responsible  
inquirer of the facts and my views as above.

Stimson

S HLS:BMS

CR  
Mar 10 1932

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

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
FROM Peiping via NR

Dated March 10, 1932

Recd 4 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.



322, March 10, 1 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Shanghai, March ninth:

"General Shirakawa issued the following statement yesterday:

Animated by a desire for a peaceful solution I issued on March third a declaration voluntarily to discontinue any further operations. Nevertheless the Chinese forces have subsequently constructed fresh positions with vigour near Meili and Quinsan and by bringing back the troops have concentrated their forces around Tatsatg and a portion of their troops have been spying out the Japanese patrol line at close range.

Such an attitude on the part of the Chinese forces, which is tantamount to a disregard of the good faith of the Japanese Army, is to us a source of profound regret. If a Chinese detachment should hereafter enter into a line connecting those points hereunder mentioned we

F/LS 793.94/4661

MAR 14 1932  
FILED

-2- # 322 from Peiping.

we cannot warrant the impossibility of a clash with our men on patrol duty. Should trouble arise therefrom resulting in aggravation of the situation, the Chinese force must assume responsibility for it.

The defense lines are from north of Lopankac, Fojaochen, Yowongtze, Kwaikangchen, Antinochen and Peihukongchen, and eastward from this village to the International Settlement along the Soochow Creek line.

For the Minister  
PERKINS

JS OIB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


*H.S. reports*

*DER  
FE*



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM



October 21, 1931.

Manchuria Situation: Facts and Comments as Reported to the Department of State by Officers of the American Government in Manchuria.

F/LS  
793.94/4662

*793.94  
note  
693.9412  
893.6463*

American observers report that according to Japanese authorities, the military movement on the morning of October 14, 1931, was directed against approximately five thousand bandit soldiers located north of Hsinlungtien, Japanese forces consisting of two thousand six hundred fifty troops with artillery, aircraft and a six inch gun. Japanese authorities further announced that said troops would be withdrawn as soon as the bandits had been dispersed.

On October 16, additional reports on activities in the Taonanfu area were to the effect that the twenty-three Japanese residents in Taonanfu departed on September 20 and that the six hundred Japanese troops which occupied the city on the 25th, following withdrawal of seven thousand Chinese troops on the 24th, were extremely well behaved. The Japanese commander informed General Chang that his forces were sent to protect Japanese residents and the Ssuningai-Taonanfu Railway and to search for the murderers

FILED  
AUG 15 1931

of

-2-

of Captain Nakamura. Japanese reports that the Chinese had invited their occupation to prevent brigand attack were denied by the Chinese.

General Chang stated that on October 15 he would assume office as North Liao Ninghai Mongolian Border Administrator by virtue of appointment by Chang Hsueh Liang and election by Chinese and Mongols in the area. He denied that his assumption of control over independent territory had been at the request of the Japanese.

On October 15 Japanese expeditionary forces returned to Mukden after dispersing bandits, casualties being slight on both sides. Traffic over the Peiping Mukden Railway was resumed on the same date.

The Talin Chanonliao Yuantungliao Railway was reported occupied by two thousand Mongols on October 13 and Yuantung, also by Mongols, on the 14th. Japanese forces had been moving westward along said Railway on the 13th.

Traffic on the Peiping Mukden Railway was interrupted on October 14 due to anti-bandit movement of heavy Japanese forces including artillery, planes and armored train, their object being to clear the area east of the Liao River and north of Peiping Mukden Railway between Mukden and Hsinmin. Japanese forces returned October 15 after driving Chinese irregulars numbering around five thousand to the westward

of

-3-

of the Liao River. Probable repetition of this movement was admitted by Japanese headquarters.

On October 16, foreigners, Koreans and also Japanese civilians, fearing bombing by planes and promiscuous firing by garrison troops, were making frantic efforts to leave Tsitsihar for points south. Officials at Anghsia were equally panic stricken. Movement of fifteen to twenty thousand troops under General Chang, who has Japanese material, was halted indefinitely due to damage caused Nonni River bridge by Tsitsihar troops.

Interpreting departure of Japanese Consul and subjects from Tsitsihar as proof that General Chang will have the support of Japanese bombing planes, once he has crossed the Nonni River, caused greatly increased concern among Chinese officials who are doing utmost to protect foreigners and especially Japanese. Conditions at Hailar remained quiet but tense. Telephone and telegraph communication with Tsitsihar City continues but radio service impossible due to dismantling of equipment by retreating troops.

On October 16, anti-Japanese boycott organizations at Chefoo stated that, beginning on the 17th, no Japanese merchandise would be permitted to be discharged or handled in any way.

note  
693,9412

Reports

- 4 -

Reports from Mukden, dated October 17, state that the Chinese City of Antung, with the exception of the Post Office, was taken complete charge of, on September 19, by approximately fifty Japanese soldiers from Shingishu, Korea. Simultaneously, Japanese South Manchuria Railway guards from Liutaokow disarmed and sent by rail to Mukden, the only Chinese soldiers in the vicinity of Antung, a force numbering several hundred. Three or four days later, Japanese soldiers in Antung were replaced by Japanese gendarmes, the telegraph office was closed and strict censorship of mail was put into effect. The Chinese electric light plant, which owes the American firm of Anderson Meyer \$90,000 gold, was put out of commission, this step, according to the statement of the Japanese Consul at Antung, being necessary for military reasons. Cooperation between Japanese authorities and Chinese Customs officials ceased with the closing of the Customs inspection sheds at the Antung end of the Yalu River bridge, the effect of said act being to practically throw open the free entry of large amounts of goods into Manchuria. Chinese officials at Antung were immediately placed under careful observation by Japanese authorities and were also prevented from receiving any instructions from either Chingchow or Nanking. Japanese officials, both civil and military, stated that their occupation of the city was

made

*note  
893.6463*

-5-

made necessary in order to prevent any possible attack on the Japanese concession where most of their nationals reside. On October 16, Japanese troops at Antung were withdrawn to Korea but the city remained completely under Japanese control by virtue of the gendarmes. It is generally believed that the Chinese are not only anxious but <sup>fully</sup> also/capable of protecting Japanese life and property at Antung and that there is no justification for continued Japanese control. No bloodshed has occurred except one brief local disturbance created through a misunderstanding on the part of a Chinese policeman.

FE:RCM:EMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED  
MAR 8 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

February 1, 1932.

SECRETARY OF STATE  
FEB 1 1932

PROPOSAL FOR GOOD OFFICES.

The decision that the American and British Govern-  
ments shall simultaneously make the proposal outlined  
in the five points discussed brings us at once to the  
question of method and channels.

It would seem desirable that the submission of the  
proposals, on behalf of the American and the British  
Governments, to the Japanese and the Chinese Govern-  
ments, be effected simultaneously. If the proposals are  
submitted by the American and the British representatives  
at Tokyo and at Nanking, simultaneity could be effected  
by setting an hour (sufficiently in advance to ensure  
the action being taken at the hour set) at which the  
representatives of the two powers at the two capitals  
should call on the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The  
proposals might be submitted by the two representatives  
at each of the two capitals either jointly or concurrently.

It would seem that the texts of what is submitted on  
behalf of each of the two Governments at both capitals  
should be the same.

It is suggested that (a) agreement be reached between  
Washington and London with regard to the exact phraseology  
of a text; that (b) the two Ambassadors at Tokyo and the

American

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793.94/4663

MAY 11 1932  
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- 2 -

American Counselor (or the Minister, if he arrives in time) and the British Counselor be instructed to call together on the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, respectively, and present the text as the joint American-British proposal; and (c) that they be instructed to present the proposal in Tokyo at eleven o'clock a.m. and at Nanking at twelve, noon, on whatever day may be chosen.

FE:SKH/ZMF

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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GRAY

Shanghai via NR

Dated March 10, 1932

Recd 3 p.m.



793.94  
Notes  
893.1022  
893.0146  
841.23

Secretary of State

Washington.

PRIORITY.

176, March 10, noon.

Referring to Department's telegram No. 86,  
March 9, 5 p.m., paragraph two, no repeat no. This  
morning's press reports that local conditions permitting,  
the second battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers will  
sail for England on March 18th. They will be replaced  
by the second battalion of the East Lancastershire  
regiment scheduled to arrive March 22nd.

CUNNINGHAM.

GIB JS

F/LS 793.94/4665

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MAR 16 1932


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
FROM



London  
Dated March 10, 1932

Rec'd 8:55 a.m. MAR 12 1932

*Tel. to London*



Secretary of State,  
Washington

100, March 10, noon.

*793.94*

I understand Department has compiled pamphlet of official communications exchanged on Far Eastern situation. If available I should appreciate by next pouch some 20 copies for distribution among interested observers here.

ATHERTON

RR

WVO

*LS*  
*793.94/4666*

MAR 14 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT AM. REC'D

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State



12  
Washington, March 11, 1932.

11 am  
MAR 12 32

Amembassy,  
London.

89 /4666  
Your 100, March 10, noon.

Twenty copies will be sent in pouch leaving Department  
March 15.

793.94/4666

793.94/4666

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793.94/4666

FE: EOC

M.W.H.  
FE

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Enciphered by MW

Sent by operator M., 1932

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94  
500.0111  
893.102S  
793.94119

REP




FROM

GRAY & GREEN

Geneva

Dated March 10

Rec'd 8:50 a. m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

112, March 10, 10 a. m.

The Secretary General circulated the following from the Japanese Delegation which is described as the substance of a telegram dated Tokyo March 8th received from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"The Japanese Government having accepted the report of the League Assembly March 4, the General Staff sent instructions once again to the Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary forces in Shanghai to observe strictly the proclamation of March 3 for the cessation of hostilities. At the same time the Japanese Government charged the Japanese Minister at Shanghai to the effect that, in conformity with the above mentioned resolution of the League, he should do his best to expedite negotiations for the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities with the Chinese with the assistance of the representatives of the powers interested. So far as the Japanese Government are concerned they are ready to effect at any time the withdrawal of the Japanese

793.94/4667

MAR 16 1932

FILED

REP

2-#112, from Geneva, Mar. 10, 10a.m.

Japanese forces from the position they are now occupying as soon as the satisfactory arrangements for that purpose are arrived at through these negotiations. Notwithstanding that, the Chinese are putting off the opening of the negotiations for the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities and are engaged in pernicious propoganda against Japan. It goes without saying that it is impossible for the Japanese forces now facing directly the Chinese army to withdraw without the necessary arrangement. Even from the point of view of safety of these forces it will be patent for everybody that before their withdrawal arrangements for the stoppage of the advance and offensive action on the part of the Chinese forces as well as for the maintenance of order and security in the zones evacuated by the Japanese forces should be made."

GILBERT

WSB

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 10 1932  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

*[Handwritten initials and marks]*

Conversation.

January 9, 1932.

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
JAN 11 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Italian Ambassador  
Mr. Hornbeck. SECRETARY OF STATE  
JAN 11 1932

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAY 11 1934  
Department of State

Subject: Manchuria.

793.94  
note  
123C 353

The Italian Ambassador called and said that he would like to inquire with regard to certain matters.

He said that he would like to have any information which I might feel free to give him with regard to the Chamberlain incident: particularly, he would like to know whether it was closed.

I replied that the Japanese Government had, as was stated in the press, expressed through the Japanese Ambassador here its regret and that Japanese officials in Manchuria had conspicuously expressed their regret. I said that this Government had been gratified with this and had so stated publicly, but that there was another angle to the matter -- an angle concerning which we were not giving publicity and which we were seeking to deal with quietly. I said that, for his confidential information, we were hoping that the Japanese Government would take adequate action with regard to the perpetrators of the assault. We did not wish to have that angle of the matter made a subject of discussion until we see how it is coming out.

The

F/LS 793.94/4668

MAY 12 1934  
FBI

- 2 -

The Ambassador said that he was glad to know this, as he thought that it was desirable, and he appreciated and would respect the confidence.

The Ambassador then said he would like to inquire whether we knew what action any other governments were going to take in relation to the action taken by this Government in sending the notes of January 7.

I replied that I was not informed on that point and that I presumed that the various governments interested and concerned were making up their minds.

The Ambassador then referred to the rumors, which he said were being discussed in diplomatic circles as well as in the press, of special understanding between France and Japan.

I said that I had seen something on that subject in the press.

The Ambassador said that it was difficult to know what to believe. He then talked at some length on the Manchuria situation and said that he wanted to explain the failure of the Italian Government to take any action at the time when the Japanese declared their intention of advancing on Chinchow: he said that the news had reached them too late. He then went on to say that the Italian Government was greatly interested in the possibilities of the Disarmament Conference and shared the hopes of the American Government with regard to that Conference.

AS

- 3 -

As the Ambassador rose to leave, I inquired whether it would be possible for him to give me any indication of the reaction of his Government to this Government's action of January 7 and the course which his Government might be thinking of adopting.

The Ambassador said that he had cabled the text of our note and that his Government was doubtless considering it and he supposed they would inquire what the British and the French Governments were doing before making up their own minds.

FE:SKH/ZMF


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94  
note  
893.102 S  
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REP




FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 10, 1932

Rec'd 9:50 a. m.



F/LS 793.94/4669

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

March 10, 4 p. m.

My March 9, 7 p. m.

British Minister received today Chinese reply to the Japanese document and is transmitting it to the Japanese Minister. It reads as follows:

"The Chinese Government having accepted the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th is prepared to enter into negotiations with the Japanese authorities in accordance with the terms of the said resolution and on the understanding as stated by its chief delegate Dr. W. W. Yen that (One) such negotiations are limited to matters pertaining only to the definite cessation of hostilities and the complete withdrawal of Japanese forces and (Two) no condition is to be attached to <sup>such</sup> withdrawal.

The Chinese Government has already announced through its chief delegate at Geneva its readiness to enter into negotiations for the purposes and on the understandings as above mentioned and has presumed that the Japanese authorities have

MAR 14 1932  
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- from Shanghai, Mar.10, 4p.m.

have been fully aware of this fact.

The receipt through Sir Miles Lampson at 5:30 p. m.  
March 9th of the communication from the Japanese authorities  
makes it clear that they are equally ready to enter into  
the proposed negotiations. The Chinese Government considers  
therefore the way open for commencing such negotiations."

JOHNSON

RR

WSB

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D. *FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*793.94  
notes  
893.1025  
793.94119*

MET



FROM

PLAIN

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 10, 1932

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington



PRIORITY.

March 10, 6 p.m.

My March 9, 3 p.m. was an unnumbered preliminary report. Joint situation report number one follows:

"One. On morning of March sixth Japanese had occupied points along a line running roughly from north-west of Liuho on the Yangtze sea Lutug, one mile west of Kiating, to Huangtu, on Shanghai-Nanking Railway west of Nanziang, and thence bending east covering Chenju along Soochow Creek with a few patrols south of the Creek. Skirmishes were then taking place such as are involved in the case of troops occupying a new front. Japanese report occasional skirmishes between patrols but no casualties March 7th. Japanese reinforcements were disembarking at Woosung Railway wharves on the morning of March 7th. We have received no information of any

F/LS 793.94/4670

MAR 18 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2--from Shanghai via N.R.,  
March 10, 6 p.m.

of any change in the situation since but both sides charge  
the other with responsibility for fighting northwest of  
Liuho. We are taking steps to verify facts in this  
connection.

Two. Owing to geographical difficulties resulting  
from Chinese withdrawal we are at present only able to  
secure first hand information from Japanese side of front  
but we are endeavoring to make arrangements for maintain-  
ing contact with Chinese side also".

JOHNSON

RR

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MEET

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 10 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND  
CONSULTATIONS

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 10, 1932

Rec'd 10:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 10 1932  
Department of State

March 10, 3 p.m.

Today's joint situation report number three:

"One. Situation generally unchanged. Troops of Japanese Fourteenth Division (General Matuski) have relieved Ninth Division in the left sector.

Two. Chinese official reports of skirmishes and minor engagements continue to reach foreign military attaches. The places referred to as the areas where these engagements took place are all with one exception inside the Shirakawa patrol zone given in situation report number two.

Japanese headquarters state that while it is possible patrols have exchanged shots during last few days with the Chinese, nothing in the nature of an engagement has taken place.

JOHNSON

RR-WWC

F/LS 793.94/4671

793.94  
note  
893.102-5

MAR 18 1932


*FE*

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FROM

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


GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 10, 1932

Rec'd 10:50 a. m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

177, March 10, 4 p. m.

FOLLOWING FROM CAPTAIN MAYER FOR WAR DEPARTMENT.

"28. Despite highly exaggerated Chinese reports,

Japanese headquarters state no action worthy of mention has taken place last few days. Ninth Division less one remaining at Chenju, is now billeted in Yangtzepoo.

Twenty-fourth Mixed Brigade is billeted at Paoshan.

Fourteenth Division now occupies old Ninth Division sector and when completely debarked will be 20,000 strong."

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLF

HPD

F/LS 793.94/4672

FILED

MAR 18 1932

*793.94  
note  
893.102-5*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

# INTERNATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL

Composed of the following Organizations

NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA  
SOCIÉTÉ BELGE DE MISSIONS PROTESTANTES AU CONGO  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF CHINA  
CONSEIL PROTESTANT DU CONGO  
DANSK MISSIONSRAAD  
DEUTSCHER EVANGELISCHER MISSIONSBUND  
SOCIÉTÉ DES MISSIONS ÉVANGÉLIQUES DE PARIS  
CONFERENCE OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN GREAT  
BRITAIN AND IRELAND

NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF INDIA, BURMA, AND  
CEYLON  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF JAPAN  
KOREAN NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL  
COMMITTEE ON COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA  
NEAR EAST CHRISTIAN COUNCIL  
NEDERLANDSCHE ZENDINGSRaad  
NETHERLANDS INDIA  
NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND  
NORSK MISSIONSRAAD

FOREIGN MISSIONS CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICA  
(UNITED STATES AND CANADA)  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINE  
ISLANDS  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF SIAM  
MISSIONARY SOCIETIES OF SOUTH AFRICA  
SUOMEN LÄHETYSSEUROSTO  
SVENSKA MISSIONSRADET  
ASSOCIATION OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN SWITZER-  
LAND

Chairman: JOHN R. MOTT, 230 Park Avenue, New York City  
Secretaries: J. H. OLDHAM; WILLIAM PATON, 2 Eaton Gate, London, S.W. 1  
A. L. WARNSHUIS, 419 Fourth Avenue, New York City

CABLEGRAMS: INTMISSION, NEW YORK  
MISSIONS CODE  
TELEPHONE: CALEDONIA 5-1271

419 FOURTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK, N. Y.

February 6, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
FEB 9 1932  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
DIVISION OF

February 6 1932  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
FEB 9 1932  
Department of State  
*W. L. Warnshuis*

S/LF 793.94/4673

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,  
State Department,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Hornbeck:

This morning we received the following cablegram from the  
National Christian Council in Tokyo, dated February 6th, 6.35 P.M.:-

"JAPAN N.C.C. FACING THREAT TO WORLD PEACE IN FAR EAST REQUESTS IMC TO  
IMPLORE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO USE FORBEARANCE SETTLE DISPUTE BY  
PEACEFUL MEANS RENOUNCING USE OF FORCE FURTHER THAT SIMILAR REPRESENTA-  
TIONS TO RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS BE URGED UPON CHRISTIAN BODIES IN  
EACH COUNTRY."

You can interpret the meaning of this message as well as I can. It seems to  
suggest that the Japanese people are convinced that they are being attacked and  
must defend themselves.

I am sending the message to you simply for your information  
and without any further comment.

The mission boards have been receiving cablegrams daily from  
their representatives in Shanghai and most of these messages have been shared  
with me. I have not troubled you with any of them because they did not seem  
contain any information that you would not have from your own official repres-  
tatives and from the newspapers. Should any message of special significance come  
through, I shall forward it as I am doing in this case.

May I not add an expression of our high appreciation of the  
of the policy of our government with relation to these tragic developments in the  
Far East and of its efforts to restore peace and to obtain a just settlement of  
the controversies.

With most cordial greetings, I am

Yours very sincerely, *A. L. Warnshuis*

ALW/MHS

MAR 10 1932

FILED

793.94

-2-

Dr. Hornbeck

Feb. 6, 1932.

P. S. It occurs to me that the cablegram from Japan may be an answer to a message which was sent from Geneva and about which we were informed yesterday in the following cablegram:-

"The following cablegram just forwarded Christian Council Japan: Quote:-

"SECRETARIES CHRISTIAN WORLD ORGANIZATIONS GENEVA URGE YOU USE INFLUENCE  
CONVINCE AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC OF GROWING VOLUME MORAL WORLD OPINION  
AGAINST JAPAN INCREASING USE MILITARY ACTION. OUR LOVE FOR JAPAN AND  
RESPECT FOR HER MORAL STANDING IN WORLD AFFAIRS IMPELS THIS MESSAGE." Unquote:

"Unite in urging you cable National Christian Council similar sense. Also suggest you study with Axlring and Koo wisdom and possibility united measures Christian Councils Japan China. (Signed) Gethman, Nevin, Davis, T'hooft."

Those who signed this cablegram are the secretaries of the World Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., Merle Davis of our office, and the secretary of the World Student Christian Association. When this message was received yesterday we decided not to take any action principally on the ground that it was not fair to make the small body of Christians in Japan represented in the National Christian Council be the spokesmen for American opinion.

A.L.W.

*A.L.W. Warnhuis*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 8, 1932.

Dear Dr. Warnshuis:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of February 6, 1932, quoting the text of a cablegram dated February 6, received by the International Missionary Council from the National Christian Council in Tokyo. As you know, I appreciate very much your courtesy in bringing to my attention messages of this character.

The expression of your appreciation of the policy of the Government with relation to developments in the Far East is welcome indeed, and I wish to thank you particularly for it.

Yours cordially and sincerely,

*[Handwritten signature]*

793.94/4673

CR  
Kew  
Feb 9, 1932

The Reverend A. L. Warnshuis,  
419 Fourth Avenue,  
New York, New York.

*OK*

A true copy of  
the signed original

MMH:REK  
*mmh*



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*per file*

February 18, 1932.

Dear Dr. Warnshuis:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of February 16, 1932, quoting the text of a cablegram dated January 31, received by the Young Women's Christian Association from the Association's American staff in Shanghai, protesting against Japanese action at Shanghai. I appreciate your courtesy in making available to the Department the text of this cablegram.

793.94/4674

Yours sincerely,

*S. K. Harbo*

The Reverend A. L. Warnshuis,  
419 Fourth Avenue,  
New York, New York.

A true copy of  
the original  
of

Feb. 19 1932.

MMH|REK  
*MMH*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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COMMITTEE ON COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA  
NEAR EAST CHRISTIAN COUNCIL  
NEDERLANDSCHE ZENDINGRAAD  
NETHERLANDS INDIA  
NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND  
NORSKE MISSIONSRAAD


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(UNITED STATES AND CANADA)  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINE  
ISLANDS  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF SIAM  
MISSIONARY SOCIETIES OF SOUTH AFRICA  
SUOMEN LAHETYSNEUVOSTO  
SVENSKA MISSIONSRADET  
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CABLEGRAMS: INMISSION, NEW YORK  
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Chairman: JOHN R. MOTT, 230 Park Avenue, New York City  
Secretaries: J. H. OLDHAM; WILLIAM PATON, 2 Eaton Gate, London, S.W. 1  
A. L. WARNSHUIS, 419 Fourth Avenue, New York City

419 FOURTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK, N. Y.

February 19, 1932.



793.94

793.94/4675

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,  
State Department,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Hornbeck:

I enclose a copy of a letter which I received this morning and which I am sending for your information. The sender of the cablegram is Mr. W.W. Lockwood who has for many years been the General Secretary of the Y.M.C.A. in Shanghai and who is now on the staff of the National Committee of that Association in China.

Yours very sincerely,

Enc.

ALW/MBS

*A. L. Warnshuis*

*Ans'd Feb. 24, 1932 mf*  
February 24 1932

FEB 24 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy

The National Council of the Young Men's Christian Associations  
of the United States of America,  
347 Madison Avenue,  
New York, N.Y.

February 17, 1932.

Dr. A.L. Warnshuis,  
419 Fourth Avenue,  
New York City.

My dear Dr. Warnshuis:

Colton has asked me to share with you copy of the  
cablegram received from Will Lockwood designed for Senator Watson  
of Indiana. I quote the cablegram as follows:-

"Communicate Senator Watson general appreciation efforts American  
Government. However ~~growing bitterness among Chinese because~~  
~~International Settlements being used as base war against China~~  
Leading Chinese industrialist employing forty thousand men believes  
continued Japanese aggression will inevitably result complete dis-  
integration responsible authority and substitution radical elements  
My fear impossible avoid eventual International War unless Japan  
military effectually restrained Communicate President"

Apparently the entire message is designed for Senator  
Watson and we have therefore relayed it to him as such.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Charles A. Herschleb.

1213  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*BCR  
index  
file mf*

February 23, 1932.

Dear Dr. Warnshuis:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of February 19, 1932, enclosing for the information of the Department a copy of a letter dated February 17, 1932, containing the text of a cablegram from Mr. W. W. Lockwood, General Secretary of the Y. M. C. A. in Shanghai, in reference to the situation at Shanghai.

793.94/4675

Yours sincerely,


*Stanley K. Hornbeck*

The Reverend A. L. Warnshuis,  
419 Fourth Avenue,  
New York, New York.

*Feb. 24. 1932*

MMH/REK

*mmh*



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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note NO. 67.  
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893.105 2

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
*Handwritten initials and scribbles*



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, January 20, 1932.

MAR 9 32



SUBJECT: French Police Control of Lao Hsi-kai,  
an Area Adjoining French Concession.

THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of my  
despatch No. 105 of January 16, 1932, to the Legation at  
Peiping, on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

*F. P. Lockhart*  
F. P. Lockhart,  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:  
To Legation, January 16, 1932.

800  
EPL/DA:w

Original and 4 copies to Department.

F/L S 793.94/4676

MAR 25 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 105

Exchange No. 1 in Despatch  
No. 67, Dated Jan 20/32  
From the American Consulate General  
of Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, January 16, 1932.

Subject: French Police Control of Lao Hsi-kai,  
an Area Adjoining French Concession.

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the reported extension of authority of the French Municipality at Tientsin over the area known as Lao Hsi-kai, which is the triangular territory located on the southeastern point of the French concession and shown on the map of Tientsin transmitted with my despatch No. 76 of December 9, 1931. During the disturbances in Tientsin in November, 1931, there occurred a great influx of refugees from the Japanese concession and the Chinese City to the Lao Hsi-kai district. When the various foreign military contingents were called out temporarily to do guard duty a few days after the first outbreak of disorders on November 8 the French despatched troops to this area for the protection of the French concession. The French troops, however, remained on patrol in the area for only a short while and on the withdrawal of the patrol the Chinese inhabitants, due to the influx of refugees as above-stated, entertained fears, it is understood, that the small police force which had been maintained in this area for some years by the French Municipality would

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be inadequate to preserve peace and order; subsequently the French authorities despatched about 40 police constables to the area. The report that the French authorities have recently instituted a system of levying taxes on the residents of the area is wholly untrue, according to the French authorities. The Lao Hsi-kai area has long been looked upon as a "no man's land" and the events leading up to the uncertain status of the area are fully described in despatches Nos. 244 and 270 of October 24, 1916, and November 28, 1916, respectively. The French authorities at present do not exercise any municipal control of the area except to provide a police patrol.

The recent report that the Chinese authorities had lodged a protest with the French authorities in connection with the increase of the police force in the Lao Hsi-kai area is not correct. The action of the Chinese authorities did not go beyond making enquiry as to the stationing of additional police. The reply of the French authorities was to the effect that police protection was believed to be inadequate in view of the recent disorders and that an additional 40 men would be required. The civil administration, it is understood, is composed entirely of landlords of the Lao Hsi-kai district.

Since the action taken by the French authorities was due entirely to conditions brought about by the recent local disorders, it is not believed that the question will develop, as did the controversy of 1916, into a serious one. Local

RECAPITULATE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

Newspapers have contained no comment on the subject for several days.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,  
American Consul General.

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FPL/DA

Original to Legation.  
In quintuplicate to Department.

A true copy of  
the signed original.  


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2318.

Paris, March 1, 1932.

The Sino-Japanese Conflict



*FE WE*

793.94



F/LS 793.94/4677

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from February 26 to March 1, 1932, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

*Walter E. Edge*  
Walter E. Edge.

Enclosures.....

*Emily*

MAR 19 1932  
FILED

- 2 -

Enclosures (single copy):

Clippings from the following newspapers:

February 26, 1932.

- No. 1 - L'AMI DU PEUPLE
- 2 - L'AVENIR
- 3 - LA DEPECHE DE TOULOUSE
- 4 - FIGARO
- 5 - L'INFORMATION
- 6 - L'INTRANSIGEANT
- 7 - LE JOURNAL
- 8 - LE MATIN
- 9 - L'OEUVRE

February 27, 1932.

- No. 10 - L'ACTION FRANCAISE
- 11 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 12 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
- 13 - LE JOURNAL
- 14 - LE MATIN
- 15 - LE POPULAIRE

February 28, 1932.

- No. 16 - L'ACTION FRANCAISE
- 17 - L'INFORMATION
- 18 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 19 - LE POPULAIRE
- 20 - LE QUOTIDIEN
- 21 - LE TEMPS

February 29, 1932.

- No. 22 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
- 23 - L'OEUVRE
- 24 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 25 - LE TEMPS

March 1, 1932.

- No. 26 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 27 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
- 28 - FIGARO
- 29 - LE JOURNAL
- 30 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS
- 31 - L'OEUVRE
- 32 - LE POPULAIRE
- 33 - LA REPUBLIQUE

In quintuplicate.  
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Annex 26

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AMI DU PEUPLE, February 26, 1932.

## LA GUERRE SINO-JAPONAISE LA BATAILLE DE CHANGHAI

Le 18 février, à la porte d'une élégante villa de la concession française — au nom gracieux de « villa des Lilas » — s'arrêtaient successivement, vers neuf heures, deux automobiles. Deux groupes d'officiers en descendaient, l'un, Chinois, conduit par le général Fah Chi Wou — l'autre, Japonais, dont le chef était le major général Tashiro, chef d'état-major du corps expéditionnaire nippon.

Le vice-consul de France fait les présentations. Claquements de talons, saluts rigides et corrects de part et d'autre. Bien que des sièges fussent préparés tous les assistants restent debout autour d'une grande table sur laquelle le général Tashiro déploie une carte barrée de deux grosses lignes, l'une verte, l'autre rouge.

La « conférence », dont on espérait un heureux résultat, fut un bref dialogue... presque un monologue!

« L'armée chinoise, dit le chef d'état-major japonais, évacuera ses positions actuelles et reculera vers le Nord. Le 20 février, elle devra, à cinq heures matin, être au delà de cette ligne verte. Le même jour, à cinq heures soir, elle devra avoir atteint cette ligne rouge, qui est à dix milles de la concession internationale et s'y tenir.

« En outre, nous demandons :

« 1° La démilitarisation permanente de la zone du Delta du Yang-Tsé-Kiang ;

« 2° Le démantèlement et la destruction des forts de Wou-Sung ;

« 3° Le démantèlement des forts qui dominent la colline du Lion à Nankin. »

Le général chinois, qui a écouté impassible, répond simplement : « Vos conditions sont inadmissibles et absolument inacceptables. » Saluts courtois réciproques et séparation. La parole est au canon!

Les Chinois semblent décidés à résister. Leurs effectifs ont triplé par

l'arrivée de renforts de Sou-Tchéou et de Nankin. Ils approfondissent avec fièvre leurs tranchées, multiplient les réseaux de fil de fer, font des abris de mitrailleuses partout, sur le sol, sur les toits, dans les maisons. Le village de Kiang-Ouan, à cinq kilomètres est de Changhaï, est mis en état très sérieux de défense. Certaines zones extérieures ou intérieures sont minées pour arrêter les chars d'assaut japonais.

Le même jour, 18 février, à midi, le général Uyéda, commandant en chef japonais, adresse un « ultimatum » au général commandant la 19<sup>e</sup> division (ou armée) chinoise. Cette fois, le mot « ultimatum », proscrit en Mandchourie, a été prononcé et écrit. On ne songe plus guère à la S. D. N. D'après cette sommation, le feu s'ouvrira le 20 février, à sept heures, si les troupes chinoises n'ont pas évacué le terrain.

La 19<sup>e</sup> division qui tient la région de Chapeï et de Wou-Sung appartient au gouvernement de Canton et son chef en a avisé les autorités de Changhaï — Japonais compris — par une déclaration précise. Il a spécifié qu'il ne reçoit d'ordres que du gouvernement du Sud. Mais alors, quelle est la situation des 87<sup>e</sup> et 88<sup>e</sup> divisions qui sont à Kiang-Ouan, côte à côte avec les troupes de Canton et appartiennent, elles, à l'armée de Nankin, où elles constituent la garde particulière de Chang Kai Chek ?

L'ancien dictateur désirerait régler pacifiquement le conflit avec le Japon. La preuve en est que tout combat a, depuis dix jours, cessé à Nankin. Après un simulacre de bombardement et de débarquement, on a causé — on s'est mis d'accord — on a cessé la guerre et les canons des croiseurs japonais mouillés devant la ville sont au poste de mer, recouverts de leurs housses de toile!... La preuve, encore, est la disparition de Chang Kai Chek pendant trois jours — les allées et venues Changhaï-Nankin et vice-versa, de diplomates japonais tourriants!...

Que signifie cet imbroglio? Il semble bien que les Japonais, négociant en secret avec le gouvernement de Nankin, espéraient régler la question à l'amiable et que le gouvernement rival de Canton (bolchevik), en poussant, pour son compte, sa 19<sup>e</sup> division ait, volontairement ou non, réduit ces projets à néant. Visiblement, les Japonais sont déçus dans leurs espoirs. Ils s'attendaient à une mise en scène destinée à sauver la face mais non à une défense énergique, héroïque, comme celle à laquelle ils se heurtent. Pour la première fois, ils comprennent qu'ils ont mis le pied dans une fourmière et ont, par leur attaque même, réalisé — non pas certes la cohésion de la Chine entière — mais, sans doute, l'union momentanée des meilleures troupes chinoises du Sud et du Nord.

Et le choc sera dur. Car, pendant que les Japonais débarquaient de nouvelles forces — près de deux divi-

sions — les généraux chinois poussaient leurs armées vers Changhaï. De sorte que la situation du début, où une poignée de Japonais se heurtait à la multitude chinoise, n'est modifiée que par la proportion des renforts arrivés. Le corps japonais est toujours très inférieur en nombre à ses adversaires! Evidemment, les troupes d'élite auxquelles se heurtent les Nippons aujourd'hui, organisées et équipées à l'européenne, sont peu nombreuses. Elles s'useront. La cohue armée qui suivra pèsera peu devant le remarquable instrument de guerre qu'est l'armée japonaise. Mais il ne faut pas oublier l'appoint et les conseils des instructeurs européens. Allemands pour les forces de Nankin. Russes pour celles de Canton.

Le soldat chinois, combattant très médiocre en rase campagne est, comme le Turc, d'une solidité inébranlable derrière un retranchement qu'il excelle, d'ailleurs, à créer et à organiser. Le Chinois est un grand remueur de terre. Nous en avons fait, au Tonkin, de multiples et sanglantes expériences qui se nomment Son-Tay, Tuyen-Quang (Hoa-Moc), Lang-Son! On ne déluge ces défenseurs tenaces que par la manœuvre. Indéracinables par les attaques frontales, les Chinois fuient, éperdus, à la moindre menace sur leur ligne de retraite. L'infériorité numérique japonaise permettra-t-elle cette manœuvre ?

La bataille de Changhaï se déroule sur un front d'une trentaine de kilomètres autour de trois points d'appui principaux : Chapeï (faubourg nord de Changhaï) à gauche, le village et les forts de Wou-Sung à droite, vers le centre, à cinq kilomètres est de Changhaï, le gros village de Kiang-Ouan. L'étendue de ce front et l'énergique résistance ennemie ont incité le général Uyéda à demander des renforts au gouvernement de Tokio.

Général Henri NOGUES.

Avenir 26

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AVENIR, February 26, 1932.

## Babel et les Chinois



Il est curieux de lire, dans la dépêche d'Albert Jullien que publiait hier matin le Petit Parisien, l'histoire des petites manœuvres accomplies par le secrétariat de la S. D. N. pour amener les Etats-Unis à participer aux réunions de l'assemblée chargée de régler une fois de plus le conflit sino-japonais. Le gouvernement de Washington, qui refuse de se mêler aux autres nations quand il y a des responsabilités à prendre, et se borne à déléguer auprès d'elles des observateurs qui le renseignent sur le meilleur moyen de brouiller les cartes en temps utile, s'est bien aperçu qu'au moins pour une fois il avait intérêt à entrer dans la ronde. Mais comment faire? Comment bénéficier des avantages présents de la coopération sans s'engager pour l'avenir? Le secrétariat s'est entremis pour trouver à ce problème épineux une solution qui ne soulève les observations de personne et qui n'autorise pas les autres membres non participants à invoquer le précédent: sans quoi nous aurions à Genève deux séries de délégations: celles qui collaborent généralement au conseil et endossent des ennuis plus souvent qu'elles n'enregistrent des succès, et celles qui mangeraient les marons tirés du feu par les premières. A l'activité montrée par le secrétariat en cette affaire, on mesure le danger qu'il y a à laisser une trop grande marge d'initiative à cette institution; Albert Jullien emploie le mot de maquignonnage. Il n'est pas trop fort.

Ainsi, dans cette malheureuse histoire sino-japonaise, Genève aura jusqu'au bout opéré avec la plus grande maladresse. Si on avait, au moment de l'affaire mandchourienne, pris le soin d'étudier les dessous du conflit, avant de s'entremettre fougueusement, et invité d'abord les Chinois à constituer un gouvernement

homogène et responsable, on aurait gagné du temps, et les deux peuples jaunes, qui ont l'habitude d'échanger des nasar-des puis de conclure quelque subtil compromis, auraient réglé eux-mêmes leur différend. L'intervention des conciliateurs malchanceux, et d'ailleurs hésitants, n'a eu d'autre résultat qu'encourager les Chinois à étendre le boycottage et à intensifier les actes de brigandage qui ont provoqué la guerre. Aujourd'hui on se bat sérieusement. Les Chinois font preuve de bravoure et ont arrêté l'élan nippon, et c'est très bien. Mais l'état de guerre existe et la S. D. N. ne trouve rien de mieux, pour influencer l'un des belligérants, que recourir à l'appui intéressé d'une nation qui a toujours manifesté pour elle une profonde méfiance. Ainsi l'aveu d'impuissance est doublement exprimé: d'abord par la carence, ensuite par cet S. O. S. aux Etats-Unis.

Le conseil, pour se consoler, pourra méditer la réponse du Japon à ses propositions. M. Yoshizawa parle peu, mais bien. Il rappelle aux puissances qu'elles-mêmes ayant considéré la Chine comme un Etat non organisé, ont profité de cette circonstance pour s'y installer, y envoyer des troupes, bombarder Nankin, et se livrer à certains exercices du même genre « en diverses autres occasions dont on se souviendra facilement ». On n'est pas plus orientalement poli. M. Yoshizawa n'a pas dit que les Manons repenties font d'édifiantes chanoinesses et les anciens bandits des gendarmes rigoureux, mais que leur passé devrait les incliner à ne pas se lancer aventureusement dans la littérature morale. Mais, au fond, c'est bien cela. Et peut-être touchons-nous là à un autre vice de la S. D. N. — car elle en a plus d'un: pour glorifier la vertu, nos vieilles nations ont trop de choses à se faire pardonner.

SENATUS.

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA DEPECHE DE TOULOUSE, February 26, 1932.

## L'Assemblée extraordinaire de la S. D. N.

Si les gouvernements avaient eu le courage, ou la possibilité, d'appliquer strictement le Pacte de la Société des Nations dans son article 16, qui prévoit les sanctions contre l'Etat agresseur, la situation serait aujourd'hui la suivante : Tous les Etats auraient isolé le Japon, interdit toutes relations économiques, commerciales, financières et même privées entre les habitants de leurs territoires et les sujets du Mikado; de son côté, le Conseil aurait recommandé aux différents gouvernements les effectifs militaires, navals et aériens nécessaires à obliger, par la force, le gouvernement délinquant à rentrer dans la légalité. Dans son sens primitif, le Pacte prévoyait, en effet, que le recours à la force en violation de ses stipulations, constituait *ipso facto* un acte de guerre contre tous les membres de la Société et devait déclencher automatiquement les sanctions.

On sait que, depuis lors, les interprétations et les édulcorations du Pacte ont fait leur chemin et que la pratique est loin de la théorie. Il faut avouer d'ailleurs que le système du Pacte tenait peu de compte des réalités et que son application automatique aurait pu présenter de réels dangers. A l'heure actuelle, si l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis, qui se sont fait octroyer à la Conférence de Washington, sous couleur de désarmement naval, la mission d'être les policemen des mers, se mettaient en devoir de rétablir l'ordre, il leur en coûterait probablement assez cher. C'est parce qu'ils ne tiennent point à voir détruire Hong-Kong, Singapour, et à laisser couler un certain nombre de bateaux qu'ils restent dans l'expectative. Les gouvernements sont patients parce qu'ils se croient éternels. La S. D. N. aussi. Dans plusieurs occasions précédentes, lors de l'affaire de Corfou, lors du conflit gréco-bulgare, et même lors de l'agression polonaise sur Vilna, on a persisté à employer les procédures de conciliation sans recourir aux sanctions. Il est indéniable que des résultats ont été obtenus dans la plupart des cas. La politique actuelle se défend donc, bien qu'elle ne soit guère reconfortante.

Sur la demande de la Chine, qui d'ailleurs n'a pas, jusqu'ici, réclamé le recours aux sanctions, le Conseil a essayé en faveur de l'Assemblée qui sera convoquée extraordinairement le 3 mars. Jusque-là le Conseil peut encore essayer de prendre certaines mesures de pacification, demander au Japon un arrêt des hostilités; lui signifier, comme il l'a fait dans l'appel des Douze et dans sa séance du 19 février, qu'il le tient pour responsable et que toute action entreprise par lui, soit en Mandchourie, soit ailleurs, sera considérée comme nulle et non avenue et, du point de vue juridique, ne constituera aucun titre. Il est vraisemblable que cela n'arrêtera point les hostilités, le gouvernement de Tokio étant entièrement dans la main de son état-major en proie à un accès de folie impérialiste. L'Assemblée se réunira donc. La seule chose qu'elle pourra faire sera d'élaborer une recommandation qui, une fois acceptée par la Chine, comportera juridiquement au regard du Japon l'obligation de cesser les hostilités. Il est possible que, cette fois encore, le geste soit vain et que l'on se retrouve devant le problème angoissant des sanctions. On aura tout au moins gagné ceci que, moralement, la situation japonaise sera encore affaiblie et que peut-être, à cette époque, la situation militaire et économique permettra aux cabinets européens et américains de parler sur un ton plus ferme. N'oublions pas qu'il a fallu trois ans à M. Wilson pour déclencher l'intervention américaine dans la guerre de 1914.

De toute façon, on aura poussé jusqu'à ses extrêmes limites l'expérience nécessaire de l'efficacité ou de l'inefficacité de la S. D. N. Cela ne signifie pas qu'il faille considérer l'affaire sino-japonaise comme un cas type. L'éloignement du théâtre du conflit, la situation spécialement précaire et désorganisée de la Chine, la puissance

qu'il s'agit de réaliser quelque chose d'effectif.

Problème de la représentation au sein de la S. D. N. d'autres forces sociales que les gouvernementales qui, étant par nature pusillanimes, indécises, rétrogrades et imbues de la vieille fiction de souveraineté, ne cherchent, depuis douze ans que la Société existe, qu'à émasculer tous les articles du Pacte et à se dérober à leurs obligations les plus évidentes. Il faut faire à la S. D. N. ce qu'on a fait à l'Organisation internationale du travail : y représenter, à côté des délégués gouvernementaux, des patrons et des ouvriers, des délégués multiples du peuple mondial, de la Société du Droit des Gens. Il n'y a pas dans les Etats que des politiciens et des partis politiques. Il y a des intérêts professionnels, économiques, religieux, scientifiques, humanitaires. Il y a, heureusement, encore des masses entières qui aspirent à la paix, à la justice, au travail honnête et pacifique. C'est de ces milieux sains qu'il faut s'efforcer d'extraire des représentants qui feront contrepoids, dans l'Assemblée et dans le Conseil, au monopole actuel des gouvernements politiques.

Il y a le problème de la décentralisation ou du régionalisme international qui permettra de graduer et de spécialiser les efforts et les activités de la S. D. N. L'initiative Briand en faveur de l'Union européenne était un premier pas dans cette voie. Naturellement, elle a été étouffée sous une conspiration d'intérêts et d'ignorances.

Il y a le problème de l'organisation interne de la S. D. N., qui est celui même de son efficacité, et qui exige que l'on abandonne enfin la règle néfaste de l'unanimité pour celle de la majorité, sans laquelle il n'y a aucune action politique possible.

L'Assemblée extraordinaire qui va se réunir ne peut évidemment surcharger son ordre du jour d'une telle masse de questions, dont plusieurs nécessitent une longue étude technique et une longue préparation diplomatique. Elles surchargeraient le bateau à couler, mais tout cela se présentera inévitablement à l'esprit des délégués et devant l'opinion. On peut convoquer non pas une, mais plusieurs Assemblées extraordinaires. Il n'est pas jusqu'à certaines propositions relatives au désarmement, notamment celles de la délégation française, qui ne soulèvent de la façon la plus nette le problème de l'unanimité. On conçoit bien, par exemple, que la réquisition des moyens de guerre offensifs par le Conseil de la S. D. N. ne soit qu'une pure plaisanterie s'il suffit d'un veto d'un des membres du Conseil pour que ces engins restent à la disposition des Etats.

L'opinion publique ne doit pas souffrir longtemps qu'on la berne. Si l'on veut la paix, il faut vouloir les moyens pour l'obtenir, et ces moyens se résument en un seul, que Woodrow Wilson avait déjà définis : « L'organisation d'une force internationale supérieure à toute force nationale ou à toute combinaison de forces internationales. » Nous serions bien étonnés si cette Conférence du désarmement et cette première Assemblée extraordinaire ne constituaient pas le début d'une ère nouvelle. Le commencement d'une réforme fondamentale et nécessaire de la Société des Nations, la gestation, en un mot, de la seconde Société des Nations, celle qui sera fondée sur le réalisme et non plus sur l'idéologie, sur l'effectivité du pouvoir supra-national, et non plus sur les baises Lamouréttu des bonnes âmes, dont, vraiment, nous n'avons plus que faire!

Georges SCELLE.

*Despatch 26*

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA DEPECHE DE TOULOUSE, February 26, 1932.

## L'Assemblée extraordinaire de la S. D. N.

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On sait que, depuis lors, les interprétations et les édulcorations du Pacte ont fait leur chemin et que la pratique est loin de la théorie. Il faut avouer d'ailleurs que le système du Pacte tenait peu de compte des réalités et que son application automatique aurait pu présenter de réels dangers. A l'heure actuelle, si l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis, qui se sont fait octroyer à la Conférence de Washington, sous couleur de désarmement naval, la mission d'être les policemen des mers, se mettaient en devoir de rétablir l'ordre, il leur en coûterait probablement assez cher. C'est parce qu'ils ne tiennent point à voir détruire Hong-Kong, Singapour, et à laisser couler un certain nombre de bateaux qu'ils restent dans l'expectative. Les gouvernements sont patients parce qu'ils se croient éternels. La S. D. N. aussi. Dans plusieurs occasions précédentes, lors de l'affaire de Corfou, lors du conflit gréco-bulgare, et même lors de l'agression polonaise sur Vilna, on a persisté à employer les procédures de conciliation sans recourir aux sanctions. Il est indéniable que des résultats ont été

obtenus. L'éloignement du théâtre du conflit, la situation spécialement précaire et désorganisée de la Chine, la puissance de l'agresseur rendaient particulièrement difficile le jeu du Pacte. Il en serait sans doute autrement en Europe et à une tout autre époque. Ajoutons, pour être tout à fait net, que l'attitude observée par le Secrétariat de Genève dans cette affaire n'était pas faite pour galvaniser l'énergie des puissances et qu'elles y ont trouvé à leur faiblesse de regrettables encouragements.

Quoi qu'il en soit, si l'on ne peut dire que la S. D. N. ait fait faillite, il est déjà patent que dans certaines circonstances elle demeure impuissante. Ce qui importe aujourd'hui, ce n'est pas de jeter le manche après la cognée, c'est, au contraire, de consolider ce qui existe ou, mieux, de bâtir sur de nouveaux plans. Si une nouvelle conflagration se produisait malgré l'existence de la S. D. N., elle démontrerait simplement qu'une autre S. D. N. est nécessaire.

L'Assemblée extraordinaire ne pourra guère se dispenser de faire ces constatations, que tout esprit raisonnable et même quelques gouvernements ont déjà faites. Il faut souhaiter qu'elle en tire les conclusions nécessaires. La Conférence du désarmement qui réunit à Genève non seulement les représentants des Etats membres de la S. D. N., mais, en outre, une demi-douzaine d'Etats qui lui sont restés étrangers, fournit tous les éléments nécessaires pour étudier ces problèmes.

Problèmes de la coopération de la S. D. N. genevoise avec cette autre S. D. N. mondiale que l'on est bien obligé de convoquer toutes les fois

qu'il s'agit de réaliser quelque chose d'effectif.

Problème de la représentation au sein de la S. D. N. d'autres forces sociales que les gouvernementales qui, étant par nature pusillanimes, indécises, rétrogrades et imbues de la vieille fiction de souveraineté, ne cherchent, depuis douze ans que la Société existe, qu'à émasculer tous les articles du Pacte et à se dérober à leurs obligations les plus évidentes. Il faut faire à la S. D. N. ce qu'on a fait à l'Organisation internationale du travail : y représenter, à côté des délégués gouvernementaux, des patrons et des ouvriers, des délégués multiples du peuple mondial, de la Société du Droit des Gens. Il n'y a pas dans les Etats que des politiciens et des partis politiques. Il y a des intérêts professionnels, économiques, religieux, scientifiques, humanitaires. Il y a, heureusement, encore des masses entières qui aspirent à la paix, à la justice, au labeur honnête et pacifique. C'est de ces milieux sains qu'il faut s'efforcer d'extraire des représentants qui feront contrepoids, dans l'Assemblée et dans le Conseil, au monopole actuel des gouvernements politiques.

Il y a le problème de la décentralisation ou du régionalisme international qui permettra de graduer et de spécialiser les efforts et les activités de la S. D. N. L'initiative Briand en faveur de l'Union européenne était un premier pas dans cette voie. Naturellement, elle a été étouffée sous une conspiration d'intérêts et d'ignorances.

Il y a le problème de l'organisation interne de la S. D. N., qui est celui même de son efficacité, et qui exige que l'on abandonne enfin la règle néfaste de l'unanimité pour celle de la majorité, sans laquelle il n'y a aucune action politique possible.

L'Assemblée extraordinaire qui va se réunir ne peut évidemment surcharger son ordre du jour d'une telle masse de questions, dont plusieurs nécessitent une longue étude technique et une longue préparation diplomatique. Elles chargeront le bateau à couler, et tout cela se présentera invinciblement à l'esprit des délégués et devant l'union. On peut convoquer non pas une Assemblée, mais plusieurs Assemblées extraordinaires. Il n'est pas jusqu'à cer-

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DES NUTRES PAR MILLIONS

FIG. 26

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, February 26, 1932.

## L'AGGRAVATION DE LA SITUATION EN CHINE

Par le D<sup>r</sup> A. LEGENDRE

Il se passe d'étranges choses en ce moment à Genève et à Shanghai.

A Genève, on entend M. Yen faire de stupéfiantes déclarations avec un aplomb qui impressionne un Conseil qui ignore tout de ce monde chinois. Mais de quelle autorité est investi M. Yen ? Il est le délégué de qui ? Certainement pas du peuple chinois.

Il prétend bien parler au nom de la Chine, mais de quelle Chine ? De celle du gouvernement de Nankin ? Mais elle comprend deux provinces au plus sur dix-huit. Il est vrai que ce gouvernement, éduqué par Moscou, a été reconnu en 1928 par les Puissances, prises d'aberration, et par la S. D. N. qui en est devenue la servante et la risée sous la conduite de son secrétaire ; adopté aussi par la II<sup>e</sup> Internationale, en l'espèce M. Vandervelde qui, en 1930, alla lui porter sa bénédiction de pontife socialiste, croyant ainsi, dans sa candeur, préparer les voies pour un grand empire marxiste que la faction de Nankin se déclarait prête à édifier.

Mais revenons à M. Yen : il a déclaré à Genève, le 13 février, que « l'unification de la Chine était enfin réalisée et que le gouvernement d'union nationale a l'appui du peuple entier. Il existe bien un peu de désordre, mais il est dû à l'évolution démocratique », ajoute-t-il.

Que faut-il penser de cette déclaration ? Tout simplement que M. Yen se moque du Conseil des Douze. La sanglante anarchie actuelle, la jacquerie communiste si menaçante donnent au délégué le démenti des faits, de réalités poignantes : des millions de Chinois disparus par le fer, par la faim. Et une tyrannie, féroce dans son absolutisme, qualifiée « démocratique » par M. Yen.

Il existe un gouvernement national, affirme encore M. Yen. Or, depuis six mois, c'est dans le panier de crabes Kono ming Tang, justement célèbre, des luttes plus enragées que jamais entre clans pour l'accaparement du pouvoir et ses bénéfices. Aussi, ce gouvernement, où donc le trouver aujourd'hui ? Est-il à Changhaï, à Nankin, à Loyang ou à Canton ? La vérité, c'est qu'il est complètement disloqué, qu'il s'est évanoui, que le maître aujourd'hui est le clan cantonnais s'appuyant à Changhaï sur son armée de reîtres amenés par Tchêng Ming Chou pour parer à une attaque de Nankin. Ces reîtres, qui vivent aujourd'hui dans l'abondance et comptent sur un beau pillage prochain, sont si bien armés et entraînés par des étrangers, si bien alimentés aussi en munitions, qu'ils résistent aux valeureuses troupes du Japon. Mais qui donc leur fournit tant d'armes et de munitions,

à ces soudards ? Qui leur fournit même des avions ? Qu'en pense la S. D. N. qui autorise ce trafic intensif d'armes ? Quand on songe que 300 Canadiens s'offrent, si l'on en croit la presse, pour servir dans cette armée de pillards d'autant plus inquiétante qu'elle est chaque jour renforcée, en particulier, par des groupes volontaires communistes ! Or, la S. D. N. encourage indirectement ces bandes en mobilisant tous les pacifistes envoûtés des deux continents. Ce monde d'agités, de fanatiques, victime de ses illusions, ne rêve plus que plaies et bosses ; il somme les Etats-Unis, l'Angleterre de se jeter sur le Japon ou tout au moins de l'étrangler par une guerre économique en attendant l'autre, qui ne tarderait pas. Bref, la S. D. N., avec tous ses « croyants », vole au secours de qui ? Du peuple chinois, des masses dolentes massacrées sans répit ? Nullement : au secours d'un baron féodal, de ses reîtres, dont les tristes exploits, depuis des années, ne se comptent plus.

Une division de cette armée cantonnaise est bien connue : la 61<sup>e</sup>. C'est à elle que nous devons la poignante tragédie de Nankin en 1927. Des Européens et Américains, médecins et professeurs dévoués à la cause chinoise, dont deux Français, furent sauvagement mutilés, puis égorgés par ces reîtres. Il y a pire : des femmes de notre race furent violées avec de sadiques raffinements. Jamais encore la race blanche n'avait subi pareille souillure. Celui qui a vécu en Chine saisit vite le douloureux symbolisme de cette honte qui n'a jamais été lavée. « Paix ! Conciliation ! », continuaient de bêler nos bergers et les augures de Genève.

C'est cette même division cantonnaise dont les pacifistes anglais et américains souhaitent aujourd'hui la victoire sur les Japonais ! Dans leur frénésie de paix mystique, ils ont déjà tout oublié.

Il conviendrait cependant de songer un peu à toutes les femmes, à tous les enfants de notre race qui peuplent les concessions : quelle terrible tragédie si ces reîtres, exaltés par leur succès, se jetaient sur les concessions ! Ils sont déjà plus de 50.000 et d'autres hordes s'ébranlent à tous les points de l'horizon, au sud, au nord, à l'ouest, attirées par l'espoir d'une belle curée. Elles croient l'heure venue d'enlever ces concessions, d'en chasser la race blanche et surtout de vider les coffres-forts de ses banques où les chefs de ces hordes voient de fabuleuses richesses qui affolent leur imagination. Qu'on se rappelle 1927 ! Et c'est à pareil moment que le président du Conseil de la S. D. N. envoie une note comminatoire au seul Japon, le rendant ainsi responsable du chaos présent. On croit rêver. Est-ce toujours l'influence néfaste du secrétariat de la S. D. N., aussi ignorant que dangereusement partial ?

En Angleterre se dessine toutefois une réaction. Certains milieux éclairés reconnaissent que le Japon ne fait pas autre chose que réagir dans l'intérêt de toutes les Puissances. Ils se refusent aussi à mettre la flotte anglaise au service de l'impérialisme américain. Et le général Ian Hamilton se dresse contre certains pacifistes anglais qui, dit-il, « ne craignent pas de « beat the war drum », de « battre le tambour de guerre » et de chercher à lancer leur pays contre le Japon. « C'est vrai : la S. D. N. et ses partisans qui crient « au feu » en Chine, ne se rendent pas compte qu'ils l'attisent en soufflant dessus sottement.

Il faut conclure : la S. D. N. et ses partisans d'Europe et d'Amérique encouragent donc aujourd'hui les 5 millions de réîtres et de bandits qui tiennent le pauvre peuple chinois sous leur botte. Aussi de puissantes hordes s'ébranlent-elles vers Changhaï, fascinées qu'elles sont par nos riches concessions. Qu'advient-il ? L'obligation pour les Puissances d'entreprendre une grande expédition militaire. Et si Changhaï peut être sauvé, que de sang versé toutefois, et que de ruines !

S'il ne se produit une réaction de bon sens, c'est par cette tragédie que finiront le vaudeville joué à Genève et la croisade contre le gendarme japonais, *contre la paix pour l'anarchie*. Comme elle travaille bien pour Moscou, la S. D. N. ! Elle s'emploie surtout à acculer le Japon du côté Russie et Allemagne. Se rend-elle compte de la terrible responsabilité qu'elle assume ? *Errare humanum est, sed perseverare diabolicum.*

La Société des Nations devient un danger pour la paix.

D' A. Legendre.

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris,

Extract from L'INFORMATION, February 26, 1932.

## Le désarmement à Genève et la guerre sino-japonaise

(DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL)

Genève, 25 février (par téléphone)

En disant que le gouvernement soviétique ne peut laisser passer l'occasion d'une conférence universelle sans poser le problème du désarmement général et total, M. Litvinoff a souligné avec franchise le caractère de son exposé de ce matin, exposé de propagande, intervention dictée par le désir de gêner les représentants des puissances réunis à Genève au moment où le bon sens les contraignait d'écarter un irréalisable projet. La réponse aurait pu être donnée sur-le-champ puisque personne, et pas même l'honorable représentant des Soviets, ne peut croire à la possibilité de réaliser un miracle soudain. Mais la Commission générale s'est perdue dans une interminable discussion. En effet, les représentants de la Turquie et de la Perse étaient contraints de s'associer avec plus ou moins de conviction aux vues de la Russie ; M. Nadolny, qui songeait sans doute au traité de Rapallo, leur voulait donner un coup de chapeau au nom de l'Allemagne et M. de Madariaga a fait de la philosophie et de la morale en réclamant la suppression des armements, situation paradoxale pour le représentant d'un gouvernement que chaque jour oblige à répondre par des fusillades aux attentats d'anarchistes inspirés par les doctrines sociales de M. Litvinoff !

Séul, M. Politis, en quelques phrases brèves et concises, est revenu tout à la fois au sens commun et à la méthode en rappelant que, depuis que le monde existe, toutes les civilisations, tous les Etats ont toujours été contraints, pour maintenir un minimum d'ordre, d'entretenir une force armée. La Commission générale de la Conférence de Genève évoquait donc ce matin ce qui aurait pu être une assemblée parlementaire dans la tour de Babel. Si les orateurs des soixante nations assemblés pour s'entendre ne sont pas capables d'ordonner leurs interventions et de mettre un frein à leur goût de discourir, on attendra longtemps la conclusion du débat de Genève. Mais n'est-ce point précisément ce spectacle qui réjouissait M. Litvinoff et qui servait le mieux ses desseins ?

Enfin, le projet de la Russie soviétique n'a recueilli que deux voix : la sienne et celle de la Perse. Mais ce résultat ne devait pas suffire à régler le débat que tout le monde pensait devoir se terminer ce matin. Tant de temps fut perdu en discours, et aussi en conciliabules durant une longue suspension, que la Commission générale vit arriver finalement 13 heures 30 sans avoir pu voter la résolution de sir John Simon, augmentée par M. de Madariaga de considérants destinés à tenir compte des idées de M. Litvinoff et à ne point lui laisser ainsi tout le bénéfice de la propagande du désarmement total et immédiat. N'ayant pu terminer un débat qui renouait ainsi sans cesse, M. Henderson leva finalement la séance pour la reprendre cet après-midi à 4 heures. C'est M. Benès qui, une fois de plus, parla le langage de la raison en exprimant l'espoir que ce qui aurait dû être accompli pourra être terminé ce soir. Mais encore n'est-ce point au train où on laisse aller les discussions les plus simples.

Tandis que la Conférence pour la limitation et la réduction des armements s'efforce, en fixant une procédure concertée, d'écarter de sa route les principaux obstacles, les événements d'Extrême-Orient, relégués dans l'ombre jusqu'à l'ouverture de l'assemblée, sont cependant la véritable préoccupation. Il n'est plus possible de ne point prononcer le mot de guerre. La guerre existe. Elle est l'évidence que découvre le rapport reçu, il y a quinze jours, de Changhaï, par le

qu'elle prend, sont les preuves d'une modification d'esprit capable de jouer un grand rôle. En résulte d'abord que le conflit et les opérations guerrières se prolongeront et entraîneront sans doute des modifications basées sur la force. Il en résulte aussi pour l'avenir une conséquence qui inquiète vivement les Etats-Unis, dont la politique, depuis longtemps, faisait fond sur la puissance japonaise pour maintenir le *statu quo* en Chine. C'est pourquoi ceux qui n'avaient pas vu sans étonnement le Japon s'engager dans son action contre la Chine toujours plus avant, sans égard aux objections et aux désirs américains, aperçoivent maintenant, avec crainte, que le fond même de l'affaire risque de changer et que tous les pays, commerçants ou colonisateurs, peuvent avoir promptement à tenir compte d'une Chine entièrement différente que la politique américaine ou européenne était accoutumée à considérer.

FERNAND DE BRINON.

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris,

Extract from L'INFORMATION, February 26, 1932.

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Finalement, le projet de la Russie soviétique n'a recueilli que deux voix. Les obstacles, les événements d'Extrême-Orient, relégués dans l'ombre jusqu'à l'ouverture de l'assemblée, sont cependant la véritable préoccupation. Il n'est plus possible de ne point prononcer le mot de guerre. La guerre existe. Elle est l'évidence que découvre le rapport reçu, il y a quinze jours, de Changhaï, par le secrétariat de la Société des Nations, et elle a, depuis lors, développé ses effets. Maintenant, elle précipite ses conséquences. Des actions de large envergure, montées par l'état-major japonais avec des réserves importantes, se sont engagées en deux batailles successives. C'est un fait que l'armée de progression de l'armée japonaise en direction de Chapei a échoué. C'est une autre certitude que le Japon n'en restera pas là. Mais déjà la diminution de prestige qu'il subit en Extrême-Orient appelle des observations.

Les Américains, qui sont bons connaisseurs des choses de la Chine, de par les intérêts qu'il y possèdent, signalent depuis quelques jours un phénomène nouveau. La Chine prend rapidement conscience de sa force et, dans cette mesure, elle devient intransigeante et militariste. Les offres de matériel de guerre qui lui sont faites, la manière dont elle les accueille, les commandes qu'elle passe et les dispositions

qu'elle prend, sont les preuves d'une modification d'esprit capable de jouer un grand rôle. Il en résulte d'abord que le conflit et les opérations guerrières se prolongeront et entraîneront sans doute des modifications basées sur la force. Il en résulte aussi pour l'avenir une conséquence qui inquiète vivement les Etats-Unis, dont la politique, depuis longtemps, faisait fond sur la puissance japonaise pour maintenir le *statu quo* en Chine. C'est pourquoi ceux qui n'avaient pas vu sans étonnement le Japon s'engager dans son action contre la Chine toujours plus avant, sans égard aux objections et aux desirs américains, aperçoivent maintenant, avec crainte, que le fond même de l'affaire risque de changer et que tous les pays, commerçants ou colonisateurs, peuvent avoir promptement à tenir compte d'une Chine entièrement différente que la politique américaine ou européenne était accoutumée à considérer.

FERNAND DE BRINON.

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INTRANSIGEANT, February 26, 1932.

## A Chang-Hai

Le général japonais Uyeda ayant été disgracié par son gouvernement s'est dit que, à tout prendre, mieux valait courir le risque d'un retour de chance que de rentrer, l'oreille fendue, au pays de ses ancêtres. Et il a déclenché une nouvelle offensive contre les Chinois. Offensive de grand style, à la manière européenne, avec pré-bombardement des positions ennemies, mouvement en avant de l'infanterie, des tanks et des automobiles blindées, cependant que de fortes escadrilles bombardaient les lignes.

Cet effort insolite n'a pas réussi. Les Chinois ont tenu. Si nous vivions encore au temps des Samouraïs, le général Uyeda, qui cumule sur sa tête la révolte et la défaite, ne serait plus qu'un ventre ouvert et sanglant.

— Comment, dit-on en Europe, ces bandes chinoises qu'on affirmait divisées en factions, irrésolues, et non préparées à la guerre, peuvent-elles fournir tout à coup une résistance aussi dure à l'un des peuples dont l'armement est le plus moderne et dont le courage est indiscutable ?

— Nous n'en savons rien, à la vérité. Le grand quartier général chinois a bien donné toutes facilités aux correspondants de journaux étrangers pour se renseigner sur place, et il les a même invités à déjeuner, ce qui témoigne tout au moins d'un état d'esprit assez civilisé, alors qu'au contraire les lignes japonaises sont rigoureusement interdites à toute la presse étrangère.

Mais la vérité est difficile à connaître, parce qu'elle siège plus haut et plus loin. Que veut Tokio ? Que pensent Canton, Nankin et Pékin ? Quels appuis, quelles alliances, quels secours financiers surtout sont promis à l'un ou à l'autre des belligérants ?

Notre ambassadeur à Washington, M. Paul Claudel, a cru devoir, et il a bien fait, infliger un démenti formel aux bruits qui présentent la France comme ayant une entente secrète avec le Japon et l'encourageant dans sa lutte actuelle.

Si notre représentant a parlé, c'est en réponse à des imputations, à des plaintes venues de l'Amérique, ce qui prouve, au surplus, que cette puissance prend très au sérieux les événements de Chang-Hai, et s'inquiète d'en trouver les responsables. La lettre de M. Stimson à M. Borah en témoigne. Il est fâcheux que le gouvernement de M. Hoover ne se soit pas découvert plus tôt et n'ait pas accepté d'appuyer à Genève, dès les premiers jours, les efforts tentés par les puissances européennes pour arrêter la guerre — car c'est une guerre. La vérité semble être que le Japon a trop présumé de ses forces, qu'il a cru avaler d'une bouchée la résistance chinoise et qu'il est en train de payer son erreur assez cher. Quand il aura jeté sur le théâtre des opérations que cent mille hommes, la moitié de son armée actuelle, il sera dangereusement exposé, et son prestige l'obligera à aller jusqu'au bout.

C'est Canton qui a résisté seul d'abord aux Japonais. Mais Nankin s'est mis ensuite de la partie. Une vague de patriotisme a rassemblé toutes ces bandes pour qui la vie n'est rien, et qui accoutumées aux malheurs et aux privations, aiment autant se jeter au feu japonais que s'exposer aux représailles de l'arrière.

Le conflit s'aggrave ainsi chaque jour. La France ne fera rien pour y mettre le doigt. Mais elle risque d'être atteinte par les contre-coups du choc, comme tous les peuples civilisés et forts qui n'ont pas osé se servir de la S.D.N. quand il en était encore temps.

LÉON BAILBY.

Int. 26

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

**M. SATO**  
**nous fait**  
**une déclaration**

... sur les causes de la bataille  
de Chang-Haï

Genève, 26 février (de notre envoyé  
spéc.). — Voici les déclarations que  
M. Sato, ambassadeur du Japon à  
Bruxelles et chef de la délégation japo-  
naise à Genève, a bien voulu faire pour  
nos lecteurs :

— Le Japon déplore profondément les  
événements actuels de Chang-Haï; ce  
n'est pas de gaieté de cœur qu'il voit  
tomber ses fils, détruire des vies huma-  
ines et des biens considérables, boulever-  
ser la vie laborieuse de la grande cité  
internationale. Et, quoi qu'on en dise, ce  
n'est pas lui qui est allé chercher que-  
relle en Chine.

« Il faut se rendre compte d'une  
chose : les événements d'aujourd'hui  
sont le résultat d'une situation qui dure  
depuis des années. Vous connaissez le  
chaos, la désorganisation profonde qui  
règne en Chine depuis plus de vingt ans.  
L'espoir des puissances de voir une  
Chine unifiée et pacifiée ne s'est pas  
réalisé. Les diverses factions rivales  
tentent de se rallier les suffrages de la  
masse par une action antiétrangère.

« On élève la jeunesse dans la haine  
de l'étranger. Les manuels scolaires en-  
seignent les « humiliations » que la na-  
tion chinoise aurait subies. Cette jeu-  
nesse forme le parti nationaliste qui  
dirige aujourd'hui la Chine.

« J'ai dû faire voir les choses telles  
qu'elles sont au conseil de la S. D. N.,  
et j'ai expliqué pourquoi le Japon, com-  
me auparavant d'autres puissances, s'est  
vu contraint de recourir à la force pour  
défendre la vie et les biens de ses res-  
sortissants.

« Le péril était imminent et il n'y  
avait pas d'autre moyen. Depuis des an-  
nées nous avons épuisé tous les moyens  
diplomatiques et tous les autres aussi  
pour essayer de faire respecter nos droits  
et nos intérêts. Le monde se récrie con-  
tre les mesures militaires que, bien à  
contre-cœur, nous avons dû adopter, mais  
il ignore la longue suite de provoca-  
tions, de vexations, d'humiliations même,  
que nous avons dû subir, dans un vain  
espoir de conciliation. A moins de nous  
résigner à être chassés de Chine, il fal-  
lait agir avec décision.

Et, en ce moment, si nous nous bat-  
tons à Chang-Haï, c'est pour sauvegar-  
der notre sécurité certes, mais c'est aus-  
si, en définitive, pour celle de toutes les  
puissances. Mais c'est nous qui récoltons  
tout le blâme.

J'ai également expliqué comment les  
conditions prévalant en Chine corres-  
pondent à celles prévues par le Pacte.  
Elles exigent des anomalies telles que  
la présence de troupes et de navires  
étrangers sur le territoire et dans les  
eaux chinoises pour la protection des  
étrangers qui ne peut être assurée que  
d'une façon locale par les Chinois.

Le Japon a, dès les premières heures,  
collaboré à l'œuvre de la S.D.N. et dé-  
sire continuer à le faire. Il accepte tou-  
tes les obligations que lui impose le  
pacte ; mais il demande aussi la justi-  
ce. Il n'a ni le désir ni l'intention de  
renoncer à sa coopération à l'œuvre de  
paix et d'ordre de la Société des Na-  
tions.

La nation japonaise ne pourrait cé-  
pendant pas sacrifier à cette coopéra-  
tion la juste sauvegarde des droits vi-  
taux nécessaires à son existence. — A.  
DE GORANT.

for 26  
Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, February 26, 1932.

Où l'on découvre  
de nouveaux arguments  
en faveur du plan français  
d'organisation internationale

La réponse que le Japon vient de faire à l'appel de conciliation des douze puissances membres du conseil de la Société des nations met en lumière certaines réalités qu'il est tout à fait nécessaire de ne pas perdre de vue, au moment où les aspirations mêmes d'apaisement doivent tendre vers l'idéal, mais se méfier soigneusement des utopies. C'est très bien de chercher à conjurer la guerre et c'est mieux encore de poursuivre l'organisation de la paix ; pourtant, il ne faut pas négliger les difficultés qui résistent aux conceptions les plus rationnelles et aux engagements les plus précis.

Le Japon soulève d'abord la question de la légitime défense. Pas de droit plus incontestable. La vie privée elle-même est bien obligée de l'admettre, en dépit des lois, des tribunaux, des gendarmes et d'un désarmement aussi total que le souhaiterait M. Litvinof.

Il n'y a pas aussi de frontière plus incertaine que celle qui sépare l'agression de la défense. Devons-nous rappeler que même un cas d'attaque aussi caractérisé que celui du mois d'août 1914 a donné et donne lieu encore à des divergences d'interprétation ? Tout ce que l'on a pu trouver de mieux en théorie pour résoudre le problème a été la définition de l'agression par un tribunal d'arbitrage. Mais où est le tribunal vraiment indépendant ? Comment admettre que le droit s'arrête au seuil d'un tribunal ne disposant d'aucun moyen de sanctions ? La violation du droit peut d'ailleurs être la conséquence d'un état d'anarchie autant que d'une préparation délibérément préméditée.

C'est le second point que soulève la note japonaise. Fort opportunément, le Japon affirme qu'il n'y a pas en Chine d'autorité capable de faire respecter les droits, la vie même, de ses ressortissants. La preuve est d'autant plus saisissante que l'état d'anarchie s'y prétend affubler d'apparences d'ordre. Ici encore nous devons nous souvenir que la difficulté peut se présenter ailleurs qu'en Extrême-Orient. Il n'y a pas qu'en Asie que les passions et les appétits peuvent échapper à la discipline gouvernementale. Il y a beaucoup plus près de nous de grands pays qui ne sont séparés de l'état d'anarchie que par une marge fort étroite. Et que de gouvernements faibles même dans notre vieille Europe !

Ainsi on est obligé de constater, une fois de plus, que l'interdiction de la violence ne peut être établie par de simples déclarations, ni par des traités, ni par des organismes théoriques ; c'est une question d'organisation et de discipline réelles.

La note japonaise est peut-être le plaidoyer le plus fort que l'on ait prononcé à ce jour en faveur du plan français d'organisation internationale.

*Matin 26*

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, February 26, 1932.

## « UN RECORD DE PAPIER »

*Un record de papier* : telle est l'amusante formule dont se sert notre confrère Walter Lippmann, dans le *Herald Tribune*, pour définir le bilan de la S. D. N. dans la sanglante bagarre d'Extrême-Orient. Et remarquez que Walter Lippmann n'est pas un ennemi de la S. D. N. Il fut l'un des plus fidèles amis du président Wilson, qui est le père putatif de la ligue genevoise. Il en a été longtemps, dans le *World*, le défenseur solitaire et courageux. Mais il met la réalité des faits au-dessus de toutes les conceptions de la théorie. Et il écrit, de Genève même, ce qui suit :

*L'échauffourée d'Extrême-Orient a servi d'épreuve à toute la machinerie de paix montée après-guerre. Elle a servi d'épreuve à la S. D. N. Elle a aussi servi d'épreuve au pacte Briand-Kellogg, que les Américains avaient cherché à substituer à la S. D. N. Et le résultat de l'épreuve est que, au moins en ce qui concerne l'Extrême-Orient, les ressources de la machinerie de paix sont incapables d'empêcher un conflit... La S. D. N. s'est montrée sans pouvoir parce qu'elle ne peut mettre en action les flottes britannique et américaine. Elle n'a réussi à établir qu'un record de papier...*

Cependant, ne voulant pas plétiner les dernières illusions, Walter Lippmann ajoute avec une condescendance quelque peu cruelle :

*Peut-être, s'il s'agissait de l'Europe seule, la S. D. N. ne montrerait-elle pas la même impuissance... En Europe, elle peut continuer à jouer un rôle ; mais les espoirs qu'on avait fondés sur elle pour en faire une sorte d'agence mondiale de la paix universelle viennent d'être rudement dégonflés.*

Hélas ! rien ne prouve que les espoirs européens ne subissent pas un jour le même dégonflement que les espoirs mondiaux. La même loi de logique inexorable qui gouverne le monde gouverne aussi l'Europe. Et cette loi veut que l'autorité, chargée de faire régner l'ordre et la paix, dispose de moyens matériels pour assurer, au besoin par la force, cette paix et cet ordre. « La S. D. N. s'est montrée sans pouvoir en Extrême-Orient, écrit Lippmann, parce qu'elle ne peut mettre en action les flottes britannique et américaine. » Croit-on qu'elle montrera plus de pouvoir en Europe, si elle ne peut mobiliser des armées, des canons, des avions ? Croit-on qu'un tribunal quelconque disposerait d'un pouvoir quelconque, s'il n'avait pas de gendarmes à sa disposition ?

Quand, en 1928, M. Ramsay MacDonald, qui n'était pas alors premier ministre, vint nous rendre visite à Paris, il fit à la Cour de cassation une conférence où je l'entends encore s'écrier :

— Pourquoi chercher toujours la protection dans les armes ?... Tenez, moi, par exemple, je me sens, en France, au milieu de vous, en parfaite sécurité. Et pourtant je n'ai pas de revolver dans ma poche...

A quoi M. Paul-Boncour, lequel n'est pourtant pas exempt de tout idéalisme, lui répondait, quelques jours plus tard, du haut de la tribune du Palais-Bourbon :

— C'est vrai, M. MacDonald n'avait pas de revolver dans sa poche. Mais il savait bien qu'il y avait des sergents de ville dans la rue...

Cette affaire des sergents de ville est la grande pierre d'achoppement entre nos amis idéologues d'Angleterre ou d'Amérique et nous. Ils en ont de haute stature, avec de rudes biceps et de solides bâtons dans leurs rues nationales. Et ils poussent des cris effarouchés quand on parle d'en mettre dans les avenues internationales. Pourquoi ?

Il n'est évidemment pas certain que, même si elle avait des sergents de ville à sa disposition, la S. D. N. saurait s'en servir. On peut garder des inquiétudes là-dessus. Et la preuve reste à faire. Mais la preuve est, en tout cas, faite que, sans gendarmes, elle ne sait, en présence du canon qui gronde, qu'« établir des records de papier ».

Et ça donne froid dans le dos à ceux qui veulent la paix...

Stéphane Lauzanne.

Deuxième 26

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, February 26, 1932.

## Autres temps...

Selon l'explication officielle — qui semble bien être la bonne — le Japon a envoyé ses meilleures troupes à Changhaï pour faire cesser une campagne d'excitation tendant à boycotter les produits japonais.

Voilà, je crois, un motif de conflit dont on ne s'était pas encore avisé. Il est, d'ailleurs, tout aussi légitime que les autres. Dans le monde moderne, tel qu'il est organisé, le refus par une nation d'acheter des marchandises étrangères doit constituer un *casus belli*. Aussi, je me demande ce qu'attend le gouvernement français pour envoyer quelques fusiliers marins occuper Londres, dont les habitants refusent obstinément de manger nos pommes de terre et poussent même l'insolence jusqu'à placarder un peu partout cette consigne provocatrice : « *Buy British* ». Achetez anglais !

Mais revenons à notre histoire de boycottage brisé par la force des armes. Il est vraiment heureux que de pareils faits se produisent de temps à autre, cela nous permet de mesurer les progrès accomplis dans la stupidité par le genre humain depuis l'origine des âges ! Jadis, lorsque le monde était encore régi par une logique grossière, mais saine — la belle logique des sauvages — certains peuples batailleurs et paresseux se jetaient périodiquement sur d'autres peuples, pacifiques et laborieux pour les dépouiller du fruit de leur travail. Telle fut l'origine des premières guerres. Il s'agissait, pour le vainqueur, de faire travailler l'autre à son profit, soit en le réduisant en esclavage, soit en le frappant d'un lourd tribut, ce qui revient au même.

Depuis ces temps reculés, tout a changé. S'il existe encore aujourd'hui pas mal de peuples batailleurs, il n'y a plus de paresseux. Tout le monde s'est mis à travailler et, comme les méthodes de travail de plus en plus perfectionnées assurent un rendement inconnu jusqu'ici, il en résulte une surabondance universelle de tous les produits, tant naturels que manufacturés. De toutes parts, des stocks s'amoncellent dont il est impossible de trouver le placement. Aussi l'idéal de chaque nation moderne est-il de vendre à ses voisins le plus de marchandises possible sans jamais rien leur acheter en échange, ce qui reviendrait à leur faire incessamment des cadeaux.

Ces cadeaux, nul ne peut malheureusement les accepter, puisque chacun est encombré de sa propre production invendue. Pour sortir de cette situation, on pourrait, semble-t-il, se décider de part et d'autre à travailler un peu moins et à consommer davantage, mais c'est une idée qui n'est encore venue à personne. On préfère fermer ses portes au voisin tout en essayant de forcer les siennes. S'il résiste, vous n'avez plus d'autres ressources que de lui faire la guerre pour l'obliger à accepter bon gré mal gré vos présents. C'est ce qui se passe actuellement en Extrême-Orient.

En somme, le grand changement survenu dans la façon de conclure les conflits armés, c'est qu'autrefois le vainqueur prétendait se faire nourrir par le vaincu ; aujourd'hui il tient absolument à le gaver. Obliger un autre pays à manger votre pain, à brûler votre charbon ou votre pétrole, à se vêtir de votre coton, cela s'appelle « s'ouvrir des débouchés ». Cette vérité comporte un corollaire. Autrefois, les pays fertiles et bien pourvus de toutes choses étaient particulièrement exposés aux risques d'agression. A présent, c'est le contraire : les peuples que l'on attaquera le plus volontiers sont ceux qui ont le plus de besoins à satisfaire.

A la réflexion, ceci nous explique pourquoi la Chine excite depuis longtemps d'aussi nombreuses convoitises. Pensez donc, une nation qui ne produit rien et où quatre cents millions d'hommes et de femmes vivent dans le plus complet dénuement, un pays où la famine règne à l'état endémique, quel magnifique débouché !

Bernard Gervaise

## Pourquoi les Japonais sont pressés de vaincre

Quoi qu'il en coûte en argent, en hommes, en matériel, en considération, à tout prix, il faut au Japon une victoire militaire devant Changhaï.

Chaque jour de retard ruine davantage, dans le monde, son prestige fondé sur les armes.

Chaque jour de retard rend intenable la position diplomatique qu'il a prise.

Tendre un rideau de fumée diplomatique sur ses opérations militaires jusqu'à ce qu'elles soient assez avancées pour que la reddition militaire de la Chine coïncide exactement avec sa propre révérence diplomatique à la S. D. N. et aux Puissances, c'était faisable s'il allait vite.

Mais, quand une action militaire dissimulée traîne, faire trainer parallèlement une action de dissimulation diplomatique ? Le Japon y a employé ses plus beaux dons d'adresse et tout son talent. Notes-réponses, notes spontanées, déclarations de ministres, d'ambassadeurs, de généraux, d'amiraux, démarches-réponses, démarches spontanées à Tokio, à Londres, à Washington, à Genève, à Changhaï même, aura-t-on jamais vu un aussi formidable arsenal de diplomatie ?

Seulement, aujourd'hui, la diplomatie japonaise est à bout de ressources. Le succès militaire ne peut la rattraper. Elle ne peut conclure.

Or, voici qu'après une longue réserve et, semble-t-il, l'examen de délicats motifs d'hésitations, contre cette double action essoufflée, se prononce, soudain, une offensive diplomatique des Etats-Unis.

Dans une lettre dont le texte complet dactylographié n'emplit pas moins de dix feuillets grand format, M. Stimson, Secrétaire d'Etat américain aux Affaires Etrangères, a répondu aux déclarations violemment non-interventionnistes du sénateur Borah.

Traité essentiel : il n'y défend pas seulement, au nom du pacte Kellogg, le principe de paix arbitrale accepté par le Japon, ni seulement, au nom du Traité des Neuf Puissances, le principe de la « porte ouverte ». Mais il lie celui-ci — et il y insiste, textes en mains — au principe de l'intégrité du territoire chinois, en vue, dit-il, de donner au peuple chinois, exposé depuis des siècles, à des démembrements, le temps de se reconstituer en nation avec un gouvernement fort.

Oh ! tout cela reste encore soigneusement officieux et discret ! Mais le problème international du Pacifique avec tous ses termes, tous ses traités, toutes ses conséquences, est là, posé à nouveau.

On comprend alors, n'est-ce pas, la hâte du Japon à tenter l'impossible pour en finir, s'il le peut, avant le 3 mars ! Car le 3 mars, à l'Assemblée générale de la S. D. N., qu'ils y assistent ou non, les Etats-Unis, cette fois, seront présents.

Et c'est la raison du brusque effort d'hier, avec des troupes fatiguées, sans attendre.

Mais, comme la veille, et l'avant-veille, il a échoué.

HENRI HERTZ.

A.F. 27

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ACTION FRANCAISE, February 27, 1932.

#### IV. Le soldat fait la paix

Ennemi de la Paix au fond, comme il est ennemi de la France, M. William Martin se découvre : c'est un « belliciste » aurait dit Souday. Non, c'est un guerrier. Son article d'hier au JOURNAL DE GENEVE est un hymne à la « résistance chinoise », c'est-à-dire, pour lui, dans sa logique, un hymne à la guerre.

Ecoutez, écoutez le chant triste et sauvage. Notre Barbare, notre Indien quitte le sentier de la paix :

*Déjà, sur les pas du Japon, les obstacles s'accroissent. On assure que l'emprunt japonais à Paris a échoué, et que le gouvernement américain a invité les banquiers de Wall Street à ne plus faire de crédit au Japon. Le boycottage des produits japonais s'organise aux Etats-Unis. La flotte américaine vient de franchir le canal de Panama, et L'ESPRIT DE GUERRE COMMENCE, EN AMERIQUE, A SE REVEILLER. Tous les témoignages concordent sur ce point.*

L'esprit de guerre? Non.

L'esprit du guerrier qui, nous le disons sans cesse, est seul, en dernière analyse, à pouvoir maintenir la paix.

Si le morceau de la résistance chinoise est trop dur, le Japon reculera peut-être. S'il ne l'avait pas été, il eût poussé, avancé, et continué... On peut essayer de se soustraire par toutes sortes de torsions et de contorsions à cette évidence, elle est là qui se voit, se touche, encore une fois, comme ailleurs et comme partout, c'est le Guerrier qui fait la paix. Le savant, le prêtre, le poète, la mère éplorée, le vieillard tremblant, peuvent l'espérer, l'appeler, la bénir, la sacrer et l'appeler encore, mais c'est le soldat qui la fait: *miles pacificus*, disait le moyen âge catholique, lequel en invoquait le Dieu des armées.

(Il est vrai que la SEMAINE RELIGIEUSE DE PARIS nous apprend que Sabaoth ne veut plus dire ce que disait l'ancien Sabaoth, le mot s'appliquera désormais aux « milices » des anges et aux « milices » des astres, pas du tout aux « milices » des hommes, sauf, il faut le supposer, à des « milices » d'hommes allemands, qui doivent s'identifier aux légions angéliques sous le Pontificat le plus allemand de l'histoire... Cette explication du Sabaoth n'est pas nouvelle. Les lettrés de ma génération l'ont vue, mais un peu moins crue, vers 1886, dans les romans antimilitaristes de Joséphin Péladan, réputé alors simple fol.)

Quoi qu'il en soit, il ne faudrait pas s'imaginer que les extravagances de M. William Martin réussissent à voiler le fond des choses à ses compatriotes, et nous lisons dans la GAZETTE DE LAUSANNE :

*C'est le retour de ce que l'on croyait proscrit, de ce que condamne la conscience humaine.*

*Cela se produit sans même qu'on invoque le prétexte d'une déclaration de guerre; et tout ce qu'on a fait pour assurer la paix, les pactes, les promesses, l'organisation de Genève, se révèle IMPUISSANT A ARRÊTER LA TUERIE.*

*Il arrive donc que, en dépit de tous les discours, la situation d'autrefois n'a pas changé : c'est la force qui gouverne le monde, et, pour la réprimer, il n'y a que la force.*

A supposer que le Japon soit coupable (ce que personne ne sait) et les bandits chinois de petits saints tout prêts à nous obéir, le Japon n'eût été bien retenu et réprimé, qu'au moyen de gouvernements européens capables d'appuyer « un ultimatum » d'une « démonstration navale » et, sans doute, cette démonstration navale

d'un bon débarquement terrien... C'est ce qu'il fallait démontrer.

Soutenir (comme on le voit inscrit sur un papier qui souffre tout), que notre armement n'a pourtant pas pu empêcher la guerre en 1914, signifie qu'on oublie un fait, celui qui domine tous les autres, à savoir que nous n'étions pas armés en 1914, que nous commençons à peine à réparer les plaies de treize années de désarmement dreyfusard : ce désarmement par la voie budgétaire, ce désarmement des économies sanguinaires, avoué par M. Messimy à la tribune du Sénat les 13 et 14 juillet 1914, le même désarmement que le cabinet Tardieu nous ramène sous le nom de son Compteur de la Défense nationale, le plus belliqueux des ministres, M. Piétri.

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ACHO DE PARIS, February 27, 1932.

## LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS ET LA S.D.N.

# Que va faire l'Assemblée du 3 mars ?

L'Assemblée de la *Société des Nations* se réunira, en session extraordinaire, jeudi prochain 3 mars, pour essayer d'apaiser la querelle sino-japonaise. Pour essayer d'apaiser la querelle sino-japonaise ? Chacun sait qu'elle n'y réussira point, puisqu'il ne se rencontrera point de gouvernement, grand ou petit, pour risquer dans l'aventure un bateau, un soldat, une marchandise. Du seul fait de ses délibérations et réclamations, l'Assemblée ne pourra que rendre les deux belligérants plus intraitables, qu'ajouter à la violence du conflit autour de Shanghai. Les Japonais perçoivent cette conséquence inéluctable des beaux discours de Genève. Aussi se hâtent-ils de mener leur offensive à bonne fin avant que la première séance de l'Assemblée ne soit ouverte. Mais sont-ils assez forts pour l'emporter dans ce bref laps de temps ?

Pour l'instant, essayons de dénombrer et de mesurer les ruines.

Un coup terrible a été porté au statut fondamental de Genève, au *Covenant*. Même rigoureusement observé, il n'aboutit pas à de grands résultats. Supposons que la procédure engagée devant l'Assemblée se déroule régulièrement : qu'arrive-t-il ? Simplement ceci. Dans la meilleure hypothèse, une « recommandation » est votée par la majorité de l'Assemblée et par toutes les puissances représentées au Conseil, les parties non comptées. Dans ce cas, les Etats membres de la *Société* ne sont pas autorisés à prêter le moindre secours à la partie qui refuse de se conformer à cette « recommandation ». C'est tout et ce n'est pas grand chose. Mais le *Covenant* n'a pas été rigoureusement observé. Cité tout d'abord devant le Conseil (la procédure est la même que devant l'Assemblée), le Japon a dû attaquer sans attendre l'expiration du délai de trois mois qui doit s'interposer entre la « recommandation » et tout acte d'hostilité. Et le Conseil n'a point osé appliquer les sanctions prévues à l'article 16 du *Covenant* contre tout Etat qui en viole les articles. Du reste, il eût été bien en peine de les appliquer, puisque, par une étrange aberration, les parties ne sont pas exclues du vote sur les sanctions — telle est du moins l'opinion juridique la plus autorisée — alors que l'unanimité est requise. S'enfonçant peu à peu dans cette procédure ridicule, le Conseil a tenté de se dégager par toutes sortes d'innovations juridiquement très contestables : formation d'un comité de 12 membres du Conseil délibérant en dehors des parties, etc. Sur la requête de la Chine, le Conseil s'est dessaisi. L'Assemblée ne fera pas mieux. Et la vanité de l'institution genevoise s'étale à tous les regards.

Mis en présence de ces faits, les croyants de la *Société des Nations* ont accoutumé de dire : après tout, l'affaire sino-japonaise est un cas-limite. Appelés à se prononcer sur un problème européen, le Conseil ou l'Assemblée seraient mieux à même de manifester leurs pouvoirs. Voilà justement ce que nous nions. En Extrême-Orient, le conseil ou l'Assemblée sont privés de moyens d'action mais, les intérêts étant lointains, ils atteignent plus aisément à l'unanimité ou à la majorité requises. En Europe, par contre, les Etats seraient sans doute plus capables de s'entremettre, mais ils se révéleraient, alors, irrémédiablement divisés. Du reste, il ne faut pas exagérer le degré d'unanimité obtenu au conseil dans le conflit sino-japonais. Le jour où l'« appel » des douze fut câblé à Tokio, les délégués allemands vinrent déclarer à la délégation japonaise qu'ils l'avaient signé à contre-cœur.

On peut donc affirmer que le *Covenant* sort de l'entreprise en morceaux. Mais ce n'est là sans doute que le moindre des dégâts. Depuis un quart de siècle, le Japon, étroitement associé aux puissances occidentales dans les affaires de Chine, s'acquittait, en Extrême-Orient, d'un rôle conservateur. L'initiative prise par lui, en Mandchourie, le 18 septembre, n'était point susceptible par elle-même de mettre fin à cette collaboration et, d'ailleurs, si tant est que cette collaboration avait été vraiment troublée, le devoir d'une diplomatie prudente eût été de la rétablir. Enchaînée à des règles universelles, ne voulant ou ne pouvant distinguer entre les cas d'espèce, la *Société des Nations* est en train de créer une antinomie profonde entre ces deux causes étroitement liées jusqu'ici : la cause japonaise et la cause européenne en Chine. Il est temps de mettre le holà à cette entreprise absurde : car, pour peu qu'elle continue, les concessions européennes en Chine et l'Indochine elle-même peuvent en faire les frais. En effet, si, par malheur, la lutte se prolonge, si des armées chinoises tant soit peu organisées entrent en ligne (ravitaillées par les industries de guerre du monde entier), qu'advient-il de Shanghai, de Tien-Tsin et des autres villes étrangères ? Qu'advient-il même de l'Indochine ?

On dira : Périssent les colonies européennes d'Extrême-Orient plutôt que la *Société des Nations* ! Mais supposons que M. Stimson, le secrétaire d'Etat américain, mette à exécution sa récente menace et dénonce tous les traités conclus à Washington, en 1922, y compris le traité na-

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

val des cinq puissances, pour ne  
point parler du traité naval des trois  
puissances de 1930, quel sera le sort  
de la conférence du désarmement et,  
par contre-coup, de la Société des  
Nations ? PERTINAX.

Enc 27

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, February 27, 1932.

# Débat diplomatique en vue

par Albert MILHAUD

A peine disait-on le sort de la Mandchourie réglé par l'organisation d'un état indépendant, sorte de république placée sous la dictature de Pou yi, le dernier des souverains de la Chine, que tout ce château de cartes se trouve menacé. L'arrangement était ingénieux et habile. L'influence japonaise était voilée. Les Chinois de 1912, qui avaient bouté dehors le représentant de la dynastie mandchoue comme un étranger, pourraient-ils s'élever, vingt ans après, contre la formule « la Mandchourie aux Mandchoux » ? Il paraissait hasardeux de contester la légitimité de l'autonomie de ces provinces, naguère réputées étrangères. La diplomatie britannique semblait admettre le nouveau statut de la Mandchourie. M. Eden, secrétaire parlementaire du ministère des affaires étrangères, disait ces jours-ci, à la Chambre des communes : « Une déclaration d'un Etat indépendant comprenant les quatre provinces du Nord-Est de la Chine a été publiée le 18 février. Un conseil administratif a été constitué, qui doit formuler les détails de l'organisation et de la constitution du nouveau gouvernement. Puisque cette déclaration a été faite par les autorités chinoises locales, il ne semble pas qu'il y ait de raisons pour que le gouvernement britannique agisse aux termes du traité des neuf puissances de 1922. »

Mais, à peine cette thèse avait-elle été portée devant le Parlement britannique que s'affirmait l'antithèse américaine sous forme d'une lettre privée de M. Stimson à M. Borah. Le ministre des Etats-Unis écrit au président de la commission des affaires étrangères du Sénat que, selon lui, « si l'on continue à ignorer le traité des neuf puissances, ainsi d'ailleurs que le pacte Briand-Kellogg, tout l'édifice de l'accord de Washington, aux termes duquel les Etats-Unis ont consenti à limiter leur marine et leurs fortifications sur le Pacifique, se trouverait en sérieux danger » (voir le Temps du 26 février, p. 2). Depuis dix ans, tout agrandissement par les armes, au détriment de la Chine était interdit. Si l'interdiction n'est pas respectée, les Etats-Unis vont-ils considérer la Conférence de Washington de 1922 comme caduque ?

Dans ce cas, les conséquences seraient formidables, et ce mot aurait toute sa valeur. Qu'on en juge. Les Américains avaient abandonné la suprématie navale, la course aux armements; ils avaient renoncé à la construction des cuirassés géants. Ils avaient également accepté le démantèlement des fortifications de Guam et des Philippines. Naturellement, la porte ouverte devait être maintenue en Mandchourie. Tels sont les principaux arguments. Le Japon riposte avec vigueur. Voici trois cabinets aux prises : celui de Londres, celui du Japon, celui de Wash-

ington très orientale qui fut élaborée en Mandchourie, et où le fameux général chinois Ma Chan Shan, le héros de la bataille sur les bords de la Nonni, était, en vérité, « de mèche » avec les Japonais, dont il est aujourd'hui le grand ami, allant jusqu'à accepter l'hospitalité de son soi-disant adversaire, le général Honjo. »

Les Chinois se prépareraient donc à combattre sur deux fronts : celui de Changhaï et celui de Mandchourie. Le Japon verrait remettre en question tout le bénéfice de ses opérations depuis le 18 septembre 1931. Devant lutter au Nord contre Chan Kai Chek, et au Sud contre Feng Yu Siang, sa tâche militaire se compliquerait. Evidemment, l'on n'est pas surpris en apprenant que le gouvernement du mikado est préoccupé non seulement des difficultés qu'il rencontre du côté de Changhaï, mais encore en Mandchourie, sans compter les complications diplomatiques.

On dit que l'ambiance de la Conférence du désarmement de Genève serait affectée par ce nouvel imbroglio. Assurément. Les bons apôtres qui n'ont jamais pris leur parti, ni de la S. D. N. ni du pacte Briand-Kellogg, accusent maintenant les « pacifistes » d'avoir créé le grabuge sur le Pacifique. Ah ! si l'on avait laissé rosser les Chinois sans rien dire ! N'a-t-on pas encouragé leur résistance ? Ces dangereux sophismes font leur chemin, alors qu'il n'est pas douteux que les amis les plus avisés du Japon et de la Paix sont, dans tous les pays, les hommes qui s'efforcent d'empêcher les Japonais de s'engager plus à fond dans le guépier. Sans doute, l'amour-propre national est-il exaspéré. Jamais il n'a été plus opportun de rappeler une pensée de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup>, qui le conduisit à sa perte : « Quand on a tort, disait-il, il faut aller jusqu'au bout. Ça donne raison. » Pas toujours. Souhaitons l'apaisement du conflit oriental. Redoutons son aggravation et ses ricochets trop faciles à prévoir.

Enc. 27

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Mais, à peine cette thèse avait-elle ~~été formulée~~ devait être maintenue en Mandchourie. Tels sont les principaux arguments. Le Japon riposte avec vigueur. Voici trois cabinets aux prises : celui de Londres, celui du Japon, celui de Washington. Bien entendu, on ne peut désirer, en Grande-Bretagne, que le respect intégral des décisions de la Conférence de 1922. Sinon, tous les dispositifs concernant le désarmement naval seraient caducs. Londres et Washington rapprocheront leurs doctrines.

Ainsi que nous l'avons marqué avec insistance, ici, ces affaires d'Extrême-Orient ne peuvent être détachées de la diplomatie mondiale. Les neuf puissances qui ont signé en 1922 étaient : les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, le Japon, la France, l'Italie, la Belgique, la Hollande et le Portugal. Le Japon et les Américains ne sont pas seulement intéressés, mais aussi les signataires européens. Et puis, il y a Genève et la Société des nations.

Au moment où les chancelleries traquent déjà leur opposition à Washington et à Tokio, les Chinois adoptent une résolution fort grave. Ils décident de tenter militairement la reconquête de la Mandchourie, qui a été livrée aux Japonais par des intrigues, hier même rendues publiques dans le *Matin* : « Il y a lieu de rappeler la com-

binaison très orientale qui fut élaborée en Mandchourie, et où le fameux général chinois Ma Chan Shan, le héros de la bataille sur les bords de la Nonni, était, en vérité, « de mèche » avec les Japonais, dont il est aujourd'hui le grand ami, allant jusqu'à accepter l'hospitalité de son soi-disant adversaire, le général Honjo. »

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jour. 27

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, February 27, 1932.

### LA LETTRE DE M. STIMSON au sénateur Borah

L'intangibilité des traités  
y est opportunément affirmée  
avec le droit des nations  
à juger de leurs besoins défensifs

La longue lettre que M. Stimson vient d'adresser au sénateur Borah, pour exposer la politique des Etats-Unis dans le différend sino-japonais, est un document capital, tant en raison de l'influence qu'elle peut avoir sur l'évolution du conflit que par l'affirmation des principes sur lesquels elle s'appuie.

Que contient cette lettre ? M. Stimson, après avoir rappelé l'attachement des Etats-Unis pour le respect des traités, pour le principe de la porte ouverte en Chine, pour le maintien du statu quo dans le Pacifique, indique nettement qu'une révision du traité des neuf puissances aurait pour conséquence certaine une dénonciation de la part de l'Amérique des accords de Washington sur les armements navals.

Le but de M. Stimson était tout à fait clair et son intention fort louable. Il avait pensé, par un avertissement dont chacun des deux belligérants pouvait prendre sa part, puisqu'il ne nommait personne, amener les Japonais et les Chinois à plus de modération. Le malheur est que, si le Japon s'est senti visé et a répondu immédiatement qu'il ne faisait que défendre ses droits, rien n'autorise à penser que les Chinois, dont les violations des traités sino-japonais sont la cause première du conflit, aient tiré le moindre profit de la philippique de l'éminent secrétaire d'Etat américain. De sorte qu'il est à craindre que la Chine ne puise, dans la lettre de M. Stimson, surtout un encouragement indirect à persévérer.

Ceci dit, nous n'aurons garde d'oublier les principes et les raisons sur lesquels M. Stimson a bâti son argumentation. La nécessité d'observer les traités est une affirmation qui, si naturelle qu'elle soit, sonne agréablement à nos oreilles au moment où certains, en Europe, affectent de vouloir déchirer impunément les contrats qu'ils ont librement signés.

M. Stimson soutient encore cette thèse que l'Amérique n'a accepté les réductions navales de l'accord de Washington qu'en fonction de sa politique asiatique de non-intervention. L'Amérique fait donc sienne la thèse française d'après laquelle les armements sont fonction des nécessités politiques.

Comme tout cela serait réconfortant, si nous ne savions que pour les Américains les thèses les plus lumineuses et les idées les plus généreuses ne sont pas toujours des articles d'exportation, et qu'elles perdent souvent leur vertu en franchissant l'Atlantique.

Matin 27

Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, February 27, 1932.

## La Société des nations doit choisir entre la force et la mort

*C'est ce que démontrera certainement le débat de la prochaine assemblée extraordinaire de Genève convoquée à propos du conflit sino-japonais*

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 26 février. — Par téléphone. — Et voilà revenue la journée apparemment creuse.

Malheureusement, on ne saurait s'en aller prendre l'air, car c'est alors justement que se trament des arrangements matériellement impossibles lorsque tous les délégués se trouvent en séance, surveillés par la presse, le public et les photographes.

La bonne marche de la conférence étant désormais assurée après les deux jours d'efforts de M. André Tardieu, tout l'intérêt des excellents manœuvriers genevois se reporte à nouveau maintenant sur la prochaine assemblée plénière de la Société des nations convoquée pour l'examen du conflit sino-japonais.

Nous étions beaucoup à croire que cette assemblée était absolument inutile, voire dangereuse.

Ce n'est pas l'avis de la délégation française, car le propre d'une bonne politique consiste à tirer parti de toute occasion, surtout si, par ailleurs, il n'était pas possible de l'éviter.

L'assemblée, c'est certain, ne pourra aboutir à aucune solution pratique. Le problème, après avoir été tourné et retourné par les orateurs, retombera finalement sur la table du conseil, présidé par M. Paul-Boncour.

D'ailleurs, quel que soit le président de l'assemblée, il semble maintenant que l'élection de M. Hymans soit assurée; c'est à M. Paul-Boncour, rapporteur et président en exercice du conseil, qu'il appartient d'orienter les débats. Il fera longuement l'historique des événements. Après quoi, il proposera à l'assemblée des conclusions.

Dès lors, les délégués qui se succéderont à la tribune ne pourront que constater la lamentable impuissance de la Société des nations.

Voilà pourquoi cette assemblée plénière, loin de rester en marge de la conférence du désarmement, pourra servir de démonstration éclatante, de démonstration par l'absurde, si l'on veut, de l'efficacité des propositions françaises.

Tous les orateurs devront se rendre à l'évidence que la Société des nations ne pourra être prise au sérieux que si elle est appuyée par une force internationale. Jamais le conflit de la Mandchourie n'aurait pu éclater si la Société des nations avait disposé, à l'origine des troubles, d'une gendarmerie capable de maîtriser — c'était bien facile au début — les bandes chinoises violentes, au jour le jour, les traités ratifiés par le pouvoir central.

Bref, le seul intérêt de cette assemblée consistera à apporter des arguments irrésistibles à l'appui de la thèse française qui exige, avant tout désarmement, la « fortification » de la Société des nations, l'organisation de la paix et de la sécurité fondée sur un pouvoir réel d'exécution.

Ce fut ce soir l'objet d'une longue conversation entre M. Paul-Boncour et Sir John Simon. Au cours de cet entretien, M. Paul-Boncour a développé la pensée suivante :

« Il faut, dans le désarmement général, une Société des nations armée, autrement, elle est condamnée à disparaître. »

C'est bien le sens d'une sévère critique adressée à la S.D.N. par le *Matin*, sous la signature de M. Stéphane Lauzanne. Ce n'est pas l'abolition de l'institution genevoise que réclame l'opinion publique française, mais seulement un remède à son incapacité ridicule et dangereuse.

Fort heureusement, ce remède existe déjà. Nous avons l'ordonnance qui nous offre ce fortifiant : dix pages dactylographiées de la proposition française.

La commission politique créée dans la journée d'hier aura pour tâche de veiller que cette ordonnance soit exécutée dans son ensemble, conformément aux intentions de ceux qui l'ont patiemment rédigée.

Quant à l'assemblée plénière extraordinaire, qui s'ouvrira le 3 mars, il lui appartiendra de démontrer qu'en dehors de ce remède loyalement proposé il n'y a pas de salut.

C'est le 3 mars, justement, que la S.D.N. se trouvera au tournant le plus dangereux de sa brève histoire. Il lui faudra choisir entre la force et la mort.

Pop. 27

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, February 27, 1932.

## LA GUERRE EN EXTREME-ORIENT

# Vladivostok menacé!

On lira plus loin le télégramme de Moscou, transmis par l'Agence Tass. Il rend compte d'un entretien entre M. Hirota et Karakhan au sujet du transport des troupes japonaises sur le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois.

Pour aujourd'hui, laissons de côté les détails techniques, juridiques et politiques discutés par les interlocuteurs. Ce qui importe, c'est le fond de la demande japonaise. Le Japon veut transporter ses troupes de Kharbine à Imengpo et à Pogranitchnaya. Le prétexte invoqué est toujours le même : protection des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie.

Mais regardons la carte de la Mandchourie. Le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois traverse ce pays. Il commence au nord-ouest, à la station « Mandchourie », où il se relie au Transsibérien. Il finit au sud-est, à la station « Pogranitchnaya » où il passe sur le territoire russe et rejoint un peu plus loin de nouveau le Transsibérien qui fait le tour de la Mandchourie, le long de la frontière du nord, et qui descend vers Vladivostok. En deux endroits, le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois croise des lignes ferroviaires mandchoues : à Tsitsikar et Kharbine.

Ces deux gares importantes sont depuis longtemps occupées par les Japonais. Ils ont ainsi le contrôle du chemin de fer qui relie, par la voie la plus courte, le port de Vladivostok au Transsibérien. Ils peuvent donc le couper à tout instant. Mais Vladivostok reste néanmoins en communication avec la Sibérie par la ligne qui longe la frontière mandchoue.

Les Japonais manifestent à présent l'intention d'occuper d'abord Imengpo, à 160 kilomètres de Kharbine, et de pousser ensuite jusqu'à Pogranitchnaya à environ 600 kilomètres de Kharbine. Ils se trouveront alors à la frontière russe, à environ 150 kilomètres de Nikolsk-Oussouryski, où la ligne de la Mand-

chourie se relie avec le Transsibérien. Il suffira aux Japonais d'occuper cette dernière ville pour couper le Transsibérien et pour isoler Vladivostok. Ce ne sera, pour les Japonais, qu'un jeu d'enfant de mettre la main sur ce port important. Les prétextes ne manqueront pas : avec l'aide de leurs alliés — les Russes-blancs de Kharbine et de Vladivostok — ils provoqueront facilement des incidents « antijaponais ». Et alors ils occuperont la ville pour protéger leurs ressortissants.

L'occupation une fois accomplie, rien n'empêchera le commandement japonais d'organiser — avec l'aide des mêmes contre-révolutionnaires russes — un Etat « indépendant » qui comprendra toute la région maritime et la presqu'île du Kamchatka.

D'ailleurs, comme par hasard, la question épineuse des pêcheries japonaises dans les eaux russes, revient sur le tapis et une discussion est engagée à ce sujet entre Moscou et Tokio. Cette discussion peut également fournir au Japon le prétexte voulu pour occuper Vladivostok.

Ainsi se confirment les appréhensions que je n'ai pas cessé de manifester ici, depuis le commencement du conflit sino-japonais. Après la Chine, c'est la Russie qui est menacée. Le conflit s'élargit. Et cet élargissement n'est qu'une étape vers un élargissement plus important encore. L'occupation de la côte russe du Pacifique est, pour le Japon, une mesure préventive en vue de la guerre contre les Etats-Unis.

Si l'U. R. S. S. et l'Amérique du Nord ne bougent pas, le Japon aura conquis un grand empire continental englobant l'extrême Est de la Sibérie, la Mandchourie et la Corée.

Si l'U. R. S. S. et l'Amérique du Nord s'y opposent, c'est la grande guerre que le Japon cherche, que le Japon veut.

Laissera-t-on le militarisme nippon mettre délibérément le feu au monde ?

O. ROSENFELD.

A.F. 28

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ACTION FRANÇAISE, February 28, 1932.

## Sus au Japon ?

par J. DELEBECQUE.

Les difficultés rencontrées à Changhaï par les Japonais, que les Chinois réussissent à tenir beaucoup plus longtemps qu'on ne l'aurait cru, sont accueillies avec une vive satisfaction par les pacifistes et par les révolutionnaires qui, une fois de plus, fraternisent dans une touchante communion. La Chine démocratique, la Chine républicaine, la Chine qui s'éveille aux idées nouvelles, résiste au Japon monarchiste et militariste : quelle victoire du progrès des lumières sur la barbarie et l'obscurantisme !

En vain les gens qui connaissent l'Extrême-Orient montrent-ils, avec preuves à l'appui, qu'il est absurde de parler d'une Chine une et indivisible, qui n'a jamais existé dans le cours de l'histoire et qui existe aujourd'hui moins que jamais, en vain répètent-ils — ce qui est l'évidence — que la République chinoise n'est qu'une fiction ridicule et que son représentant à Genève n'a aucune qualité pour parler au nom des trois cents millions d'infortunés qui vivent dans cet immense pays en proie à la misère et à l'anarchie. On les écoute

avec impatience. On oublie, on veut oublier le passé pourtant tout récent, les scènes affreuses de Nankin, la menace sur Hankeou, les horreurs sans nom commises par les bandes de mercenaires et de brigands qui infestent le pays, les Européens et les Américains torturés et massacrés. Crise de croissance, excès insupportables de l'éveil d'un grand peuple à la liberté, convulsions laborieuses auxquelles succédera la régénération.

Ces funestes billevesées troublent et empoisonnent une grande partie de l'opinion publique et faussent son jugement. Nous n'avons jamais aimé la politique de sentiment, qui a trop souvent causé à la France de lamentables déboires. Mais, en l'espèce, notre intérêt, qui se confond avec celui de la civilisation occidentale tout entière, est que les Japonais sortent à leur honneur de l'aventure dans laquelle ils semblent s'être jetés avec un peu d'imprudence. Un succès décisif des troupes chinoises ou du gouvernement de Nankin élèverait à la dixième puissance l'arrogance chinoise et augmenterait les dangers déjà sérieux qui menacent l'Indochine française, la Birmanie et l'Insulinde. C'est alors que le fameux péril jaune tant de fois évoqué, deviendrait une réalité.

Le docteur Legendre, dans son intéressant ouvrage *L'Asie contre l'Europe*, insiste avec raison « sur l'importance du rôle joué par le Japon sur l'échiquier mondial en tant que facteur de stabilité, de conservation sociale aussi bien que d'équilibre politique ». Les Soviets l'ont bien compris et ils jouent leur jeu en s'appliquant à créer au gouvernement de Tokio mille difficultés. Derrière Nankin et Canton, il y a Moscou : il faut être aveugle pour refuser de le voir. Et, mettant à profit l'embarras où sont provisoirement les Japonais, le commissaire soviétique adjoint aux affaires étrangères vient de demander à l'ambassadeur du Mikado des « explications » sur la situation en Mandchourie.

Aux Etats-Unis, le sentiment public est également hostile au Japon. La lettre de M. Stimson au sénateur Borah, qui marque une réaffirmation de la politique américaine en Extrême-Orient et qui, consultée, après quelques semaines d'effacement, une sorte de rentrée en jeu, a été, s'il faut en croire le correspondant du *Times* à Washington, « accueillie avec une approbation marquée en Amérique ». C'est un ~~compte~~ ~~document~~ ~~document~~ adressé à l'Angleterre, à qui M. Stimson rappelle « l'adhésion des grands hommes d'Etat conservateurs à la politique que les Etats-Unis cherchent maintenant à suivre », politique de la porte ouverte et de l'intégralité territoriale et administrative de la Chine, politique fondée « sur une foi solide dans l'avenir du peuple chinois ». Peu importe si ces belles formules sont creuses et vides : elles sont toujours bonnes pour le langage des notes et des memorandums.

Oni, les puissances européennes et l'Amérique ont d'immenses intérêts matériels et financiers en Chine. Mais ce n'est pas par l'action japonaise que ces intérêts sont menacés, c'est par l'anarchie chinoise que les puissances européennes et l'Amérique ont laissé complaisamment se développer quand elles ne l'ont pas encouragée. Vain continuer dans cette voie ? Dans quelques jours, le Japon, faisant figure d'accusé, va comparaître à Genève devant un tribunal où la Lituanie et le Guatemala seront appelés, au même titre que la France et l'Angleterre, à tenir l'emploi de juges. Les milieux du secrétariat de la S. D. N., qui obéissent à je ne sais quelles influences obscures, s'agitent pour obtenir qu'on décrète contre le Japon des mesures de pression économique. Il faut espérer qu'on ne commettra pas la suprême sottise, celle de donner les farrets au gardien de l'ordre qui, quels que soient les motifs de sa conduite, est pourtant, par la force des choses, le seul qualifié pour arrêter les progrès du flot révolutionnaire en Extrême-Orient.

J. DELEBECQUE.

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Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INFORMATION, February 28, 1932.

## La résistance chinoise

Il y a trois jours, l'envoyé spécial d'un grand journal anglais à Changhaï recueillait de la bouche du commandant Hizata, attaché à l'état-major du général japonais Uyeda, cet aveu significatif : « La résistance des troupes chinoises s'est révélée plus forte que nous ne l'avions prévu. Les conditions du terrain rendent difficiles non seulement les mouvements de l'artillerie, mais aussi le ravitaillement en munitions et en vivres. Tout cela a retardé notre avance. L'existence d'enceintes de protection, de canaux, de digues, de barrages et même de tranchées profondes gêne nos mouvements. Nous ne pouvons avancer qu'avec une extrême prudence. »

La surprise éprouvée par les Japonais, en rencontrant de la part des Chinois cette résistance inattendue, semble partagée en ce moment par une fraction considérable de l'opinion européenne. Elle s'explique d'ailleurs beaucoup mieux chez les Européens que chez les Nippons. Cependant, même chez nous, on aurait pu tenir compte d'un certain nombre de faits, que nous rappellerons brièvement. Lorsqu'en 1929 les deux divisions soviétiques commandées par le général Blücher pénétrèrent en Mandchourie pour demander raison des sanglants attentats de Karbine, on s'étonna du soin avec lequel les Russes évitaient le contact avec les troupes de Tchang-so-Lian. Moscou s'empressa alors d'expliquer que si l'on avait arrêté les opérations, c'était par crainte de compromettre les heureux effets de la propagande bolchevique dans la vallée du Yang-Tsé. En réalité, le général Blücher avait reculé devant le danger d'exaspérer, par une campagne de répression, un sentiment patriotique, nationaliste et xénophobe dont il avait reconnu la force latente.

Deux ans plus tard, l'aviateur italien, capitaine Riva, qui résidait alors en Chine, faisait connaître à Rome l'étonnement qu'il avait éprouvé en voyant les prouesses accomplies par des officiers chinois sur des appareils très imparfaits. « Pour peu que les Chinois réussissent à mettre sur pied une école d'aviation, — déclarait l'observateur italien, — pour peu qu'ils parviennent à créer un « esprit aviateur national » et à disposer d'un corps d'officiers pilotes capables d'opérer sur cette terre immense et surpeuplée, nous verrons bientôt les ennemis de la Chine dans un sérieux embarras. »

Tout récemment, quelques diplomates européens, qui avaient assisté au débarquement et à l'embarquement de troupes sudistes, provenant du front du Fleuve Jaune et renvoyées vers Tien-tsin et la Grande Muraille, admiraient la rapidité et la précision d'une manœuvre dont les troupes occidentales les mieux entraînées ne se tirent jamais sans quelques à-coups. C'est que, sans qu'on y ait prêté grande attention, les soldats chinois, enrôlés tour à tour sous le drapeau de tel ou tel partisan, mais constamment sous les armes, sont arrivés à un remarquable degré d'entraînement. Ceux qui comptent sept, dix et même douze ans de service, — et de service en campagne — sont assez

nombreux pour instruire et encadrer fortement les nouveaux venus.

D'autre part, on signale, soit dans la troupe, soit dans les états-majors, la présence d'un nombre considérable d'officiers étrangers. Russes blancs, Allemands et Australiens, qui, presque tous, ont servi pendant la grande guerre et font profiter l'armée chinoise de l'expérience qu'ils ont acquise sur les champs de bataille européens. C'est par leur intervention qu'on explique l'habileté consommée avec laquelle l'état-major chinois a organisé les transports de troupes et les ravitaillements par voie ferrée. Enfin, si l'on songe que, depuis l'écrasement de la coalition du Nord, les meilleures troupes chinoises, se concentrant dans la région du Yang-Tsé, sont allées renforcer les divisions de Tchang-Kai-Tchek — lui-même ancien élève de l'Ecole de guerre de Tokio — on s'étonnera moins de trouver en Chine les éléments d'une force militaire aguerrie, disciplinée, capable de manœuvre, et à qui il ne manquait plus guère que le sentiment de l'unité nationale. Cette lacune, l'attaque japonaise s'est chargée de la combler.

Mais dira-t-on, les Japonais n'ignoraient rien de tout cela. Assurément. Depuis longtemps ils observaient avec inquiétude les symptômes qui traduisaient le réveil du sentiment national en Chine. Mais ils savaient aussi que cette évolution menaçante ne pouvait être interrompue que par un échec infligé tout ensemble aux forces militaires chinoises et à la confiance que les Fils du Ciel commençaient à reprendre en eux-mêmes et dans les destinées de leur empire.

Les Japonais avaient été, en Asie, les grands vainqueurs de la guerre mondiale : la victoire leur assurait le Chantoung, une partie de la Sibérie orientale, les îles du Pacifique au sud de l'Equateur. Leur commerce trouvait de nouveaux débouchés en Asie méridionale, dans l'Inde britannique, en Egypte, et jusque dans l'Afrique du Sud. La Conférence de Washington, en 1921, traduisit en mesures sévères l'inquiétude que les progrès trop rapides du Japon avaient inspirée aux puissances anglo-saxonnes : le Japon dut renoncer au Chantoung et à plusieurs des fameux vingt et un points imposés à la Chine en 1915. Bientôt commença au Japon la période de dépression commerciale ; le tremblement de terre de 1923 aggrava les effets de la crise économique. L'attitude toujours plus revêchée des banques anglaises et américaines contribuait encore à réduire des possibilités que les Japonais, durant quelques années, avaient crues sans limite.

Aujourd'hui le Japon défend en Mandchourie et à Changhaï ses dernières chances de progrès. La Chine, c'est pour l'industrie japonaise la source indispensable de matières premières, et, pour le commerce nippon, le débouché nécessaire. La Mandchourie du Sud est devenue un organe essentiel de l'économie japonaise. Et le Japon sent, impérieusement, le besoin d'agir d'une façon décisive avant que la régénération de la Chine ne soit devenue un fait accompli, et pour lui, un obstacle insurmontable.

COLLON DE HERAINE D'ARRAUD.

PP 28

Enclosure No. 18 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, February 28, 1932.

## LE CONFLIT SINO-NIPPON

### Le Japon fait preuve à Genève de dispositions plus conciliantes

Genève 27 février.

D'UN DE NOS ENVOYÉS SPÉCIAUX

Comme on le sait, l'assemblée extraordinaire de la S. D. N., convoquée pour le 3 mars, va examiner le conflit sino-japonais.

Pour l'instant et pendant les tout prochains jours, c'est sur ce grave problème que va continuer à se concentrer l'attention.

La proximité de cette réunion de l'assemblée paraît préoccuper quelque peu le gouvernement de Tokio dont les représentants ici déploient une activité particulière. Hier soir, M. Matsudeira a eu une longue conversation avec sir John Simon. Ce matin, M. Sato, qui avait déjà vu le futur président, M. Hymans, est venu conférer longuement avec M. Paul-Boncour et ce soir ce dernier a reçu à nouveau la visite de sir John Simon.

Naturellement, on observe sur ces entretiens la plus grande discrétion.

Nous sommes en mesure d'affirmer, néanmoins, qu'on se trouve actuellement en présence de dispositions plus conciliantes de la part du Japon. Il ne s'agit pas évidemment d'arrêter les opérations militaires en cours. Ce serait, en effet, mal connaître les Japonais que de les supposer capables de rester sur l'insuccès relatif de Changhaï. Les sondages auxquels se livrent présentement les délégués nippons ont trait à la situation qui suivra le refoulement des forces chinoises par les troupes japonaises à la distance de 20 kilomètres de la concession internationale, distance fixée par le commandant en chef japonais.

Ils ont notamment donné l'assurance que, ce refoulement accompli, les détachements nippons seraient ramenés en arrière dans le secteur japonais et dans la concession internationale, ce qui créerait entre celle-ci et l'armée chinoise une zone neutre dont il faudra assurer le respect. Le

cabinet de Tokio serait alors prêt à examiner, de concert avec les ministres des puissances intéressées : France, Grande-Bretagne, Etats-Unis et Italie, réunis en conférence, comment on pourrait faire face à l'état de choses ainsi créé, empêcher par exemple une réoccupation de cette zone neutre par les Chinois et préparer par des négociations le retour à une situation normale.

A cet égard, nous croyons savoir que MM. Matsudeira et Sato auraient une fois de plus assuré leurs interlocuteurs que si les troupes japonaises ont été envoyées à Changhaï, ce n'est ni pour réaliser des visées territoriales ni pour y conquérir de nouveaux droits, mais pour défendre les droits acquis.

— Le Japon, ont-ils dit, n'a nullement l'intention de créer à Changhaï une concession exclusivement japonaise ; il se propose seulement de défendre le statut actuel.

C'est très vraisemblablement la thèse que le représentant du gouvernement de Tokio à l'assemblée développera à la fin de la semaine, dans sa réponse au délégué de la Chine, et à laquelle il désire préparer les principaux délégués.

Il ne faut pas oublier, en effet, que M. Paul-Boncour, en sa qualité de président du conseil de la Société des nations, va avoir à faire un exposé complet des événements qui se sont succédé depuis septembre et que sir John Simon n'a pas caché, en ce qui le concerne, son intention d'intervenir dans le débat pour affirmer la communauté des vues et la solidarité des grandes puissances.

Signalons en terminant qu'on paraît avoir désormais abandonné toute idée de faire participer à titre d'observateur des représentants des Etats-Unis, de la Russie soviétique et du Brésil à la commission spéciale qui sera nommée par l'assemblée.

Albert JULLIEN

Pop. 28

Enclosure No. 19 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, February 28, 1932.

# LES PROBLEMES DU JOUR

## Vers l'occupation de Vladivostok

**O**FFICIELLEMENT, il n'y a pas de guerre. Les relations diplomatiques ne sont pas rompues entre le Japon et la Chine. Mais les opérations militaires prennent une envergure de plus en plus grande.

A l'heure présente, les effectifs militaires japonais en Mandchourie s'élèvent à quatre divisions. A Changhaï, ils concentrent sept divisions. L'armée japonaise en temps de paix compte 19 divisions. Par conséquent, plus de la moitié de l'armée permanente du Japon est déjà engagée en Chine. Il est facile de prévoir que, d'ici quelques semaines, l'Empereur du Japon, chef suprême de l'armée, se verra dans l'obligation de décréter la mobilisation.

D'autant plus que, loin de s'arrêter, le grand état-major japonais élargit encore le théâtre des opérations.

On apprend que les troupes nippones de Kharbine ont déjà commencé leur marche vers l'Ouest, dans la direction de la frontière russe et de Vladivostok. Comme l'administration du chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois et le gouvernement de Moscou ont refusé d'autoriser le transport de ces troupes par la voie ferrée, elles avancent par la route. Du moins, les Agences le disent. Mais ce fait — s'il est exact — ne peut que retarder de quelques jours l'événement fatal de l'arrivée des Japonais à proximité de Vladivostok.

Il est possible que le commandement japonais, se rendant compte des difficultés qu'il rencontre par suite de la résistance inattendue des Chinois à Changhaï, cherche à relever son prestige par un succès facile dans le Nord. L'occupation de la région maritime appartenant à la Russie peut, dans ces conditions, être tentée, même si pour des raisons politiques le gouvernement de Tokio la redoute.

Mais si, au point de vue militaire, le Japon est dans une situation assez favorable, sa situation économique et financière est par contre très précaire. Le boycottage anti-japonais en Chine lui cause les plus graves préjudices. Le boycottage qui nous ne sommes pas assez riches pour le faire, n'est-ce pas, ma femme ? Voyons, voyons, vous n'allez pas le boycotter.

— Voyons, voyons, vous n'allez pas le boycotter. Il en est enfin fait pour ainsi dire. Que faire ? Il faut leur rendre qui l'envahissent et le rendre. Mme Dardieu devient raide. M. Dardieu sent soudain comme une chose. Elle allait répondre quand elle entendit passer du pale au pale. — C'est gentil, n'est-ce pas ? — remuant les épaules, alors il m'a offert

Pop. 28

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# LES PROBLEMES DU JOUR

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Se trouvera-t-il un seul gouvernement pour consentir des crédits au brigand international qu'est le mikado ? Se trouvera-t-il un seul parlement pour autoriser un emprunt au Japon ?

L'assemblée de la S. D. N., convoquée sur la demande de la Chine, se réunira le 3 mars. Se décidera-t-elle au moins à interdire des ouvertures de crédits à l'agresseur ?

Quot. 28

Enclosure No. 20 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, February 28, 1932.

## Le problème sino-japonais

Aux dernières nouvelles, Kiang-Ouan était occupé par les Japonais, qui auraient décidé de porter à 100.000 hommes leurs troupes expéditionnaires et même de débarquer, en cas de nécessité, dans la concession internationale.

Les opérations vont être poussées, par le cabinet de Tokio, avec la plus grande activité. Il y va de son prestige, sans compter des intérêts nationaux que les nationalistes nippons estiment de la plus haute importance.

Il s'en faut d'ailleurs que l'opinion japonaise soit unanime. Il y a là-bas un parti de la paix, il y a même des divergences notables dans les conseils du gouvernement, ainsi qu'en témoigne la récente démission du ministre des Finances : en Asie, comme en Europe, l'argent est le nerf de la guerre !

Le doute subsiste sur l'issue de la lutte, malgré la résolution japonaise. Devant le danger qui les menace, les Chinois s'efforcent à l'union, les rivalités des chefs disparaissent ; les armées se concentrent. Les opérations vont recommencer en Mandchourie, afin que l'ennemi soit contraint de se défendre sur les deux théâtres des hostilités.

Ce n'est plus seulement une série d'escarmouches négligeables, c'est le conflit armé ; c'est bien la guerre entre deux puissantes nations, aidées clandestinement ou ouvertement par des puissances qui disposent de techniciens et de matériel.

Qui peut prévoir la fin d'une aussi formidable aventure ? Quels en peuvent être les résultats, pour l'Asie et pour le monde entier ?

Il est à croire que les Japonais veulent arriver à la « décision » avant l'Assemblée de la S. D. N., prévue pour le 3 mars, afin de mettre les délégués devant le fait accompli.

Que fera, que peut faire la Société des Nations ?

Il est acquis que ses membres ne doivent accorder aucun concours à la partie qui refuse de se soumettre à ses recommandations ou avis, mais ce n'est là qu'un acte en quelque sorte négatif.

D'autre part, l'application des sanctions prévues par l'article 16 n'est possible qu'après un vote unanime. Or, les deux belligérants appartenant à la Société, l'unanimité est irréalisable, donc l'article 16 demeure inopérant.

Dans ces conditions, les débats qui vont s'ouvrir jeudi prochain ne pourront que donner au conflit une acuité nouvelle, au cas où l'on en viendrait à blâmer l'une des deux puissances aux prises...

Si l'Assemblée de Genève ne peut apporter aucune solution efficace au grave problème qui lui est posé, les nations se verront, désormais contraintes de recourir, faute de mieux, à leur action autonome.

LE QUOTIDIEN.

TEMPS 28

Enclosure No. 21 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, February 28, 1932.

#### LES PUISSANCES ET LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

La bataille continue à Shanghai, où les Japonais ont fait chaque jour une tentative pour rompre le front chinois, sans réussir à atteindre leur objectif. Toutefois, on annonce ce matin qu'ils ont occupé Kiang-Ouan, mais ils ne progressent que très difficilement et doivent céder parfois à la pression des contre-attaques chinoises, de telle sorte que, pour l'ensemble du champ des opérations, les deux armées aux prises demeurent, en réalité, sur leurs positions. Il apparaît bien que les Nippons attendent les renforts importants qui leur sont envoyés avant d'entreprendre une offensive qui, dans leur esprit, doit être décisive. Ils se contentent, pour l'instant, de consolider leurs positions de départ et de préparer le terrain, par des attaques limitées, en vue d'une opération de grand style. Il n'en est pas moins vrai que la résistance des Chinois est un fait nouveau dont il importe de tenir compte. La supériorité numérique des forces auxquelles se sont heurtés les Nippons ne suffit pas à tout expliquer et l'on ne peut contester que le commandement chinois a fait preuve d'une valeur tactique que l'on ne soupçonnait point. Est-il exact, comme l'assurent des informations de la presse anglaise, qu'il le doit à la présence de deux officiers supérieurs allemands, anciens collaborateurs de Ludendorff?

Toujours est-il que la résistance des troupes chinoises telle qu'elle s'affirme depuis dix jours est une surprise pour tout le monde et qu'elle a eu pour effet de compliquer singulièrement la tâche des Japonais. Au lieu de la simple opération de police décidée d'abord à Tokio pour mettre fin à la campagne de boycottage dont le centre était à Shanghai, le Japon se trouve engagé maintenant dans une véritable expédition militaire, qui pourrait l'entraîner fort loin, beaucoup plus loin, en tout cas, qu'il ne se proposait d'aller pour amener la Chine à se prêter à un règlement d'ensemble des questions qui se posent entre les deux pays en prenant pour base la confirmation des traités existants. Tenu par son opinion publique et par l'influence prépondérante de l'élément militaire, le gouvernement du mikado ne peut rester sur un échec. Il ne s'agit pas seulement ici d'une question de prestige, mais des intérêts vitaux du Japon dans un pays où cette puissance a acquis des droits en vertu de traités qu'elle tient pour formels et qui représentent pour son commerce et son industrie un débouché indispensable à sa prospérité. Les moyens diplomatiques et militaires mis en œuvre par le Japon pour atteindre son but immédiat constituent certainement une faute, mais l'opinion publique japonaise ne permettrait pas au gouvernement de Tokio de modifier l'attitude prise par lui avant qu'un résultat précis soit obtenu sur le terrain.

Ce résultat ne peut être que l'éloignement de l'armée chinoise à une certaine distance de Shanghai, soit que cette armée se retire volontairement dans des conditions à fixer en conclusion de négociations entre états-majors, soit qu'elle doive reculer sous la pression des troupes du mikado. Lorsque se réalisera l'une ou l'autre éventualité, le moment sera venu de conclure un arrangement mettant fin aux hostilités et assurant le règlement pacifique des questions qui se posent entre Nankin et Tokio. Si la Chine ne peut raisonnablement escompter une intervention plus directe que celle tentée par la Société des nations et les puissances amies dans un large esprit de conciliation — car personne ne se soucie de transformer en une crise générale un conflit qui a jusqu'ici un caractère local — le Japon,

parce qu'il est une grande puissance ayant conscience de ses responsabilités, ne peut demeurer indifférent à l'appel des gouvernements qui se réclament de l'esprit et de la lettre des pactes pour écarter la menace d'une véritable guerre. Il ne s'agit pas de prendre parti pour un des deux pays aux prises, d'intervenir par des moyens de force ou une pression économique dans un sens déterminé. Il s'agit d'éviter le pire en facilitant une détente, en favorisant la conciliation, en ouvrant la voie à des pourparlers au moment où ils pourront s'engager utilement.

Il ne faut pas se dissimuler que la durée même du conflit et la situation de fait réellement tragique à Shanghai provoquent dans tous les milieux internationaux de vives inquiétudes et font peser sur le monde entier un malaise qu'il importe de dissiper le plus vite possible alors que de tous les côtés on s'efforce de remédier politiquement et économiquement à la crise générale dont tous les peuples ressentent durement les effets. La menace qui a brusquement surgi en Mandchourie d'abord, à Shanghai ensuite, a déterminé une nervosité des esprits d'autant plus grande qu'il a bien fallu constater que le conseil de la Société des nations, dans l'état présent des moyens dont dispose l'institution internationale de Genève, n'est pas en mesure de conjurer en toute certitude le péril. Ce fut une erreur, pensons-nous, de saisir le conseil, au mois de septembre de l'année dernière, d'un différend de caractère local qui pouvait être réglé sur le terrain par les autorités nippones et les autorités chinoises, alors que toute intervention de tierces puissances ou d'un organisme international devait avoir pour effet de pousser le Japon à l'intransigeance par ces raisons de prestige qui restent décisives dans la politique de l'Orient lointain en face d'une Chine inorganisée. Cette première erreur ayant été commise à Genève, il ne restait qu'à en limiter les effets, en procédant avec mesure et circonspection, en s'efforçant de ne laisser échapper aucune occasion de

préparer l'apaisement tout en maintenant des principes sur lesquels ni la Société des nations ni les puissances signataires des pactes et des traités ne peuvent transiger. C'est ce qu'a fait la France en s'associant loyalement aux efforts accomplis à Genève et à toutes les démarches diplomatiques tentées à Tokio et à Nankin.

Il est nécessaire de persévérer dans cette voie. Les ambassadeurs des Etats-Unis, de Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie ont fait hier une nouvelle démarche à Tokio pour demander que les renforts japonais ne débarquent point à la limite de la concession internationale de Shanghai et pour suggérer qu'une zone neutre soit créée par le retrait simultané des forces chinoises et japonaises du faubourg de Chapei. Cette démarche témoigne de l'esprit amical dans lequel continuent à agir les puissances et qui ne s'inspire en rien des suggestions de ceux qui voudraient voir se produire une intervention par voie de sanctions au risque de provoquer des complications générales. On s'étonne que dans certains milieux internationaux, où l'on est pourtant très attaché à la cause du maintien de la paix générale, on veuille interpréter la lettre récente du secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. Stimson, au sénateur Borah, comme marquant le début d'une nouvelle politique des Etats-Unis en Extrême-Orient et, comme ayant le caractère d'une menace indirecte au Japon. En réalité, M. Stimson n'a fait qu'exposer la situation créée par les traités existants et qu'insister sur le respect dû à ceux-ci, ce qui est juste et ce qui vaut également, on ne peut manquer de le souligner, pour les traités relatifs aux problèmes européens. Ni à Washington ni à Londres on ne songe sérieusement à peut le croire, à s'engager dans un aventurisme sur lequel même le plus aveugle ne peut raisonnablement que les circonstances ont pu donner aux bons offices des puissances toute leur efficacité.

Enclosure No. 22 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, February 29, 1932.

## Editorial

Des femmes, des enfants, atrocement mutilés, apeurés, gémissants, emplissent les vieux temples sacrés de Changhaï; jour et nuit le canon tonne et la ville ouverte de Chapeï peu à peu s'effondre; sur ce seul théâtre plus de 100.000 hommes de troupes régulières sont en présence; 13.000 soldats tués dans les deux partis; d'innombrables victimes dans la population civile; des avions laissent chaque jour tomber des tonnes de bombes sur les villes, les villages ou les camps; voilà, d'après des témoins oculaires, d'authentiques dépêches, ce qui se passe en Chine.

Qui donc osera soutenir encore que cela n'est pas la guerre? Qui donc, en lisant cela, n'évoquera pas les heures atroces que nous avons vécues en 1914? Non, soyons francs. Pas d'hypocrisie verbale! C'est dans toute son horreur la guerre elle-même, la guerre mise hors la loi, condamnée par la quasi unanimité des nations.

Mais alors ces pactes, ces engagements solennels, ne sont que chiffons de papier? Il ne se trouvera personne pour les faire respecter? Voilà la question que tous les peuples se posent à l'heure où la S. D. N. délibère, donnant le lamentable spectacle de ses vaines controverses, de ses hésitations et de ses lenteurs.

Disons-le nettement. Il faut que cela cesse. Sans doute, nous n'ignorons pas, comme le déclarait si justement hier Paul-Boncour, que la Société des Nations s'est trouvée en présence d'un conflit fort éloigné et fort complexe. Mais, pour cette raison précisément, elle eût dû agir, avec d'autant plus de rapidité et de vigueur.

Or cette énergie, cette autorité nécessaires, elle ne les possédera que le jour où elle aura la supériorité des forces matérielles et les moyens modernes de coercition dont l'emploi immédiat et judiciaire non seulement arrêtera les conflits, mais les empêchera même de naître.

Aussi bien ceux qui à l'heure actuelle hésitent ou proposent d'armer d'un glaive le bras de la justice internationale commettent-ils la faute la plus grave qu'il soit possible de commettre contre la paix.

Qu'ils ne prétendent pas qu'il suffise à la S. D. N. d'une grande, d'une incontestable autorité morale pour remplir la tâche qui lui est dévolue. Cette autorité morale, elle-même, disparaît quand la S. D. N. se montre incapable de se faire obéir, et elle ne peut se faire obéir qu'à la condition d'avoir tous les moyens modernes de coercition.

Concluons: les événements d'Extrême-Orient ont démontré la nécessité et l'efficacité du plan français et nulle argumentation ne prévaudra contre cette terrible réalité.



Oeuvre 29

Enclosure No. 23 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, February 29, 1932.

## Les secrets de Changhaï

L'autre jour, à « L'EUROPE NOUVELLE », les causes et les conséquences de la bataille qui se livre, actuellement, devant Changhaï ont été examinées dans un débat organisé par l'UNION POUR LA PAIX. A ce débat ont pris part le professeur PAUL LANGEVIN et M. WILLIAM MARTIN, directeur du Journal de Genève.

Le premier a fait partie d'une mission envoyée en Chine par la S. D. N. pour enquêter sur le développement des organisations sociales sous le nouveau régime républicain. Le 14 janvier, ayant quitté Pékin pour regagner l'Europe par le transsibérien, il a pu, au passage, saisir ou deviner quelques-uns des secrets du Japon en Mandchourie.

M. William Martin s'est appliqué, de son côté, à laisser entrevoir certains secrets dont, à Genève, pâtit, parfois, le libre fonctionnement de la S. D. N.

Ces secrets, liant de grandes puissances, ou, au contraire, les séparant, se retrouvent à Changhaï. Plusieurs y ont même leur source. De gros intérêts de tous ordres : politiques, commerciaux, stratégiques, font que, dans la concession internationale, sous couleur de collaborer, Anglais, Américains, Français, Japonais surtout se surveillent et s'épient.

Il y a, en outre, des secrets entre Chinois. Le Kuomintang républicain, vainqueur des Russes Rouges, a conservé de cette lutte des craintes contre lesquelles il s'arme d'une terrible vigilance.

On imagine quel réseau d'espionnage, pour toutes ces raisons, est tendu de Canton à Nankin, de Nankin à Changhaï, de Changhaï à toutes les capitales du monde.

A côté des conflits politiques, des guets-apens, des guerres qui en résultent, il en naît des drames individuels, non moins tragiques.

C'est ainsi qu'un citoyen suisse, PAUL RUEGG, mêlé au mouvement syndicaliste et venu à Changhaï en 1919 pour y soutenir les revendications des ouvriers étrangers, se trouva, en juin 1931, pris sur les pistes et les listes de la police secrète anglaise de la concession, qui l'arrêta avec sa femme.

Ils furent livrés aux autorités chinoises et transférés à Nankin. A Nankin, les inquisiteurs de Tchâng Kai Cheik leur appliquèrent les cruels procédés de défense dont ils usent contre les Rouges. L'« Intelligence Service » accepta d'en être complice. Un dossier d'accusation criminelle fut constitué. Les avocats de Ruegg eurent beau invoquer le motif de « faux », la violation de l'exterritorialité de la concession. Rien n'y fit. Une cour martiale condamna à mort Ruegg et sa femme. De véhémentes protestations s'élevèrent. Le jugement fut cassé. Mais une nouvelle cour martiale, la « Longway military court », reprit l'affaire sur le seul fait de menées révolutionnaires. Elle est en cours.

Dans toutes les parties du monde, avec l'appui des plus grands noms, un énorme mouvement de consciences révoltées se développe à présent et se précise.

Paul Ruegg et sa femme échappent-ils au labyrinthe international compliqué qui les a conduits des prisons anglaises de Changhaï aux oubliettes du Kuomintang de Nankin ? Telle est la question.

Puisque cette question, devant la S. D. N., sera, en assemblée plénière, solennellement invoquée. Le Droit, cette question, aussi, doit y être posée.

HENRI HERTZ.

PP. 29

Enclosure No. 24 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, February 29, 1932.

## LE CONFLIT SINO-NIPPON

### On espère à Genève voir cesser bientôt les opérations de guerre à Changhaï

Genève, 28 février.

D'UN DE NOS ENVOYÉS SPÉCIAUX

M. Paul-Boncour est allé passer une partie de son dimanche de l'autre côté de la frontière, dans le département de l'Ain. Après l'activité diplomatique qu'il a déployée dans le plus grand secret au cours de ces derniers jours, il avait besoin de cette diversion.

Je vous ai signalé hier les dispositions plus conciliantes constatées du côté japonais. Je crois pouvoir dire aujourd'hui que cette amélioration — qui, d'ailleurs, s'est encore accentuée — est due dans la plus large mesure aux efforts déployés par lui. Profondément attristé de l'impuissance où s'était trouvé le conseil de la S. D. N. au moment où allait, à Changhaï, expirer l'ultimatum japonais, M. Paul-Boncour a cherché, depuis, comment il pourrait, à la veille de l'assemblée, empêcher cette dernière de donner un spectacle aussi peu réconfortant. Il a donc, en sa qualité de président du conseil, engagé près des deux parties — chinoise et japonaise — une action diplomatique qui a trouvé auprès de sir John Simon l'appui le plus cordial et dont nous sommes peut-être sur le point de constater les heureux résultats.

Au cours d'entretiens successifs avec M. Sato et avec M. Yen, il a demandé aux deux gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin de consentir : 1° à une cessation immédiate des hostilités en cours à Changhaï, et 2° à la création entre les armées des deux belligérants d'une zone neutre au sujet de l'administration de laquelle il conviendrait de s'entendre ultérieurement. C'est la réponse à cette démarche faite, nous l'avons dit, avec le plus complet appui de sir John Simon, que MM. Matsudeira et Sato ont apportée hier au représentant de la France et au ministre britannique et dont le *Petit Parisien* a été en mesure de souligner le caractère conciliant.

Pour être tout à fait exact, il convient de rappeler que le gouvernement de Tokio était dans une certaine mesure allé au devant de cette initiative en proposant lui-même la création de la zone neutre en question. En somme, ce soir, la situation que sir John Simon a examinée en détail aujourd'hui au cours d'entretiens rapides à l'hôtel Beau-Rivage avec les Américains, les Italiens, les Japonais et les Chinois est la suivante :

Le gouvernement nippon est disposé à accepter :

1° La cessation immédiate des hostilités, à condition que les forces chinoises se retirent à 20 kilomètres de la concession internationale de Changhaï, et 2° la création d'une zone neutre intermédiaire en retirant, ainsi que nous l'indiquons hier, leurs troupes dans le secteur japonais et dans la concession internationale. Le progrès accompli depuis hier consiste donc dans l'acceptation par Tokio de la cessation immédiate des hostilités si Nankin, de son côté, consent à éloi-

gner ses forces. Quant au maintien et à la surveillance de la zone neutre, c'est bien, comme nous l'avons dit, à une conférence de cinq puissances, c'est-à-dire comprenant les ministres de France, de Grande-Bretagne, des Etats-Unis, d'Italie et du Japon qu'il appartiendrait d'en fixer les détails.

Les dépêches de Changhaï ont annoncé que les ministres de France et de Grande-Bretagne étaient partis pour Nankin. Ils ont évidemment usé de leur influence pour décider le gouvernement chinois à faire preuve, lui aussi, de bonne volonté et d'esprit de conciliation. Toutefois, si nous en croyons les renseignements reçus ici par la délégation japonaise, ils ont, avant leur départ, rendu visite à leur collègue nippon, M. Shijemitsu, et l'on assure qu'ils seraient de retour à Changhaï dans deux ou trois jours et même avant si c'était nécessaire. Ils resteront en somme en communication avec lui.

Bref, ce soir, aussi bien à Changhaï qu'à Genève, l'impression paraît sensiblement meilleure. On a même le sentiment, d'après les câblogrammes parvenus de Tokio, qu'au Japon également les dispositions sont plutôt favorables à l'arrangement amiable signalé plus haut. Les difficultés imprévues auxquelles se sont heurtées les opérations militaires, qu'on avait escomptées beaucoup plus rapides, l'impossibilité où on se trouve, faute de déclaration de guerre, de mobiliser les réserves nippones et, enfin, des embarras financiers évidents sont naturellement pour beaucoup dans ce changement d'attitude.

Il est indéniable, cependant, que le Japon, à qui son organisation militaire assurerait fatalement le succès final, a le plus sincère désir de répondre aux appels extrêmement pressants qui lui ont été adressés par M. Paul-Boncour au nom du conseil, afin de ne pas discréditer la S. D. N. en faisant, une fois de plus, éclater son impuissance. Ce désir est d'autant plus vif qu'il n'est plus question, ainsi que nous l'annoncions hier, de faire participer les Etats-Unis aux travaux de la commission spéciale à titre d'observateurs.

Si la détente qui se manifeste ce soir réussit à se matérialiser, c'est-à-dire si le gouvernement de Nankin accepte, de son côté, de refouler ses troupes de façon à empêcher tout contact entre forces chinoises et japonaises, l'assemblée qui doit se tenir jeudi pourrait, en fin de compte, ne tenir qu'une session de pure forme. Tous les amis de la paix souhaitent ardemment qu'il en soit ainsi et que les efforts communs de M. Paul-Boncour et de sir John Simon se trouvent, de la sorte, couronnés de succès.

Dès demain après-midi, le conseil des Douze se réunira à 15 heures, et il est probable que M. Paul-Boncour en profitera pour mettre ses collègues au courant de cette amélioration sensible de la situation.

Albert JULLIEN

TEMPS 29

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From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, February 29, 1932.

#### LES SOVIETS ET LE JAPON

L'attitude du gouvernement des Soviets, en présence des développements pris par la politique du Japon en Mandchourie, retient une fois de plus l'attention. On sait qu'au moment où la crise mandchoue entraînait dans sa phase la plus aiguë, où les soldats du mikado atteignaient Tsitsikar et au moment où, plus récemment, ils entraient à Kharbine, on fut surpris du calme avec lequel Moscou observait ces mouvements. Alors que d'aucuns s'attendaient à une réaction violente, tout se borna, en somme, de la part des Soviets, à quelques déclamations banales contre l'impérialisme des puissances dites capitalistes, ce qui avait surtout pour but d'entretenir le zèle révolutionnaire des masses bolchevisées et de servir la propagande communiste dans les pays étrangers. En réalité, les dirigeants du Kremlin firent preuve d'une passivité surprenante, et si quelques troupes furent massées à la frontière sibérienne à Manchouria, on n'eut certainement pas l'impression qu'il s'agissait d'entreprendre quoi que ce fût de nature à gêner sérieusement le Japon. On le vit bien lorsque les Nippons obtinrent de l'administration de l'Est-Chinois, qui est sous le contrôle de l'Union soviétique, le transport de leurs troupes par la ligne de Tchang-Tchoun à Kharbine.

Y a-t-il un fait nouveau depuis lors qui soit de nature à décider le cabinet de Moscou à adopter une autre attitude? Le refus opposé par M. Karakhan, commissaire adjoint aux affaires étrangères de l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques, à la demande du Japon de transporter des troupes à Imenpo, cette fois par la grande ligne de l'Est-Chinois, tendrait à le faire supposer. M. Karakhan a fait valoir que cette question dépassait la compétence de la direction de l'Est-Chinois, parce que ce transport de troupes japonaises vers la frontière de l'Union soviétique — la frontière de la province maritime — aurait non plus un caractère technique, mais politique, et qu'il affecterait, par conséquent, les traités existant entre la Russie soviétique et le Japon, d'une part, entre la Russie soviétique et la Chine, d'autre part. A Tokio, on a accueilli la réponse de M. Karakhan à M. Hirota, ambassadeur nippon à Moscou, avec quelque dépit et on y a répliqué aussitôt par la constatation que d'importants mouvements de troupes russes ont lieu aux frontières de l'Oussouri et de l'Amour, mouvements dans lesquels on ne voit pourtant qu'une manifestation des inquiétudes qu'éprouvent les Soviets au sujet de la situation nouvelle.

Tout cela ne laisse pas d'être assez intéressant. La création du nouvel Etat mandchou, dont la capitale ne sera plus Moukden, mais Tchang-Tchoun, la ville située au terminus du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien qui est sous le contrôle des Japonais, cause certaines appréhensions au cabinet de Moscou parce qu'il redoute que les Russes-Blancs, très nombreux dans cette région, ne se rallient au nouvel Etat dans l'espoir d'y trouver un statut quelque peu stable. Cette préoccupation se fait jour dans les explications que le commissaire adjoint pour les affaires étrangères a demandées à l'ambassadeur du Japon sur la nature du nouvel Etat en formation et sur l'activité des émigrés russes qui auraient été armés en Mandchourie et seraient vivement encouragés par les autorités japonaises. A Tokio, on dément naturellement toute connivence avec les Russes-Blancs, mais, ces derniers étant établis déjà dans le pays, on ne peut les empêcher de constituer un élément plus ou moins important dans un Etat où tout est à créer.

Il ne semble pas qu'un malentendu grave puisse se produire entre Moscou et Tokio au sujet de la situation de fait en Mandchourie, car le gouvernement des Soviets n'a pu se tromper un seul instant sur les intentions du Japon lorsque celui-ci a commencé, au mois de septembre dernier, son action à Moukden. Il n'a pas réagi, comme le Japon n'avait pas réagi lors du différend sino-russe et de la soudaine poussée de l'armée rouge en plein territoire mandchou. La Russie soviétique n'ignore pas que, les avantages que le Japon pourra gagner dans le sud du pays, elle pourra espérer les obtenir un jour prochain dans le nord, et si l'organisation de la Mandchourie en Etat-tampon l'inquiète pour les raisons que nous indiquons plus haut, elle n'est certainement pas disposée à chercher querelle aux Nippons à ce sujet. Un conflit russo-japonais est en dehors de toutes les prévisions. Aussi, ne faut-il pas se tromper sur les effets de la nervosité dont on fait preuve dans certains milieux russes et que les Japonais constatent avec beaucoup de sérénité parce qu'ils savent pertinemment que les Soviets ne songent pas à leur faire la guerre.

Si Moscou est obligé de manifester de temps à autre avec quelque éclat, c'est uniquement pour tenir en haleine sa clientèle communiste, mais l'Union soviétique est pour l'instant dans l'impossibilité absolue de s'engager dans une aventure, quelle qu'elle soit, car celle-ci provoquerait sans doute un effondrement intérieur qui marquerait la fin du régime. Se débattant dans de graves difficultés financières et économiques, tous ses efforts tendant à la réalisation du fameux plan quinquennal, la Russie soviétique n'a pas d'autre but de politique extérieure à cette heure que celui de s'accommoder bon gré mal gré des circonstances qu'elle ne peut éviter, afin de s'assurer le répit nécessaire pour l'achèvement de l'organisation économique par laquelle elle croit pouvoir trouver le salut. Les dispositions pacifiques qu'elle manifeste à toute occasion, son désir de conclure des pactes de non-agression avec tous ses voisins, alors qu'elle n'a cessé de dénoncer les pactes et les traités de conciliation comme n'ayant aucune portée pratique et n'apportant que des garanties illusoire pour mieux dissimuler les véritables desseins du prétendu impérialisme capitaliste,

la souplesse dont elle a fait preuve jusqu'ici en présence de l'action du Japon en Mandchourie, tout cela confirme qu'elle cherche surtout à gagner du temps dans l'espoir que son heure sonnera lorsqu'elle sera outillée et armée pour la lutte décisive.

Chercher des crédits et gagner du temps, c'est toute la politique actuelle des Soviets. Il n'est pas certain qu'ils trouveront l'argent ni surtout qu'ils pourront soutenir leur effort jusqu'au bout. Les peuples s'usent terriblement vite au régime de la tyrannie et du travail forcé. Avant que le plan quinquennal devienne une réalité — s'il peut le devenir jamais — la famine menacera encore plus d'une fois ces masses russes qui n'ont plus la force morale nécessaire pour se sauver elles-mêmes de la plus tragique épreuve que l'esprit de désordre et d'anarchie ait jamais imposée à une grande nation.

ECHO 1  
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## UNE MEDIATION BRITANNIQUE DANS LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS.

### Projet de création d'une zone neutre occupée par les troupes des tierces puissances

Genève, 29 février.

L'affaire sino-japonaise prend une orientation nouvelle ? Ne nous hâtons pas trop de l'affirmer. Cependant, un fait nouveau est intervenu il y a deux jours : une médiation britannique de grand style.

Profitant de l'issue indécise des combats qui se déroulent depuis huit jours, des appréhensions qu'inspirent aux Chinois les renforts amenés par les Japonais, de l'hésitation des Japonais devant la lourde tâche où ils se sont engagés et devant le mouvement hostile de l'opinion anglaise et américaine, tirant argument de la saison des pluies qui commencera, paraît-il, la semaine prochaine et rendrait impraticable la continuation de la bataille, l'amiral anglais Kelly, qui commande à Shanghai, a réuni en conférence, hier après-midi, les chefs des armées adverses, en présence des délégués des puissances dites « intéressées ». Auparavant, Sir John Simon avait accompli les préparatifs diplomatiques nécessaires à Washington, Paris et Rome.

Comme il y a trois semaines, le plan d'apaisement consiste dans l'établissement d'une zone neutre, mais des innovations y ont été introduites. On ne demande plus aux Chinois de reculer sur une distance de 20 milles, mais de se retirer en deux étapes. La première de 5 kilomètres, la seconde de 15. Quant aux Japonais, ils n'auront point à évacuer le quartier habité par leurs nationaux au nord de la concession internationale. Enfin, les troupes des puissances « intéressées » prendraient la charge de la zone neutre et, bien que ce détail fondamental ne semble pas avoir été précisé très nettement, elles défendraient, au besoin, cette zone neutre contre un retour offensif des Chinois.

Telles sont, en somme, les dispositions que les belligérants ont acceptées hier et sur lesquelles les gouvernements de Nankin et de Tokio ont maintenant à se prononcer. On raconte que les représentants japonais à Genève ont télégraphié à leur gouvernement de ne point refuser son assentiment. Or, l'un d'eux, M. Matsudaira, ambassadeur à Londres, dont la fille épousa le prince héritier du

Japon, est puissant à la cour. Mais, dans la conjoncture, l'impulsion du grand état-major de Tokio hanté par des considérations de prestige et celle du gouvernement de Nankin qui tient par-dessus tout à dresser l'Europe et l'Amérique contre le Japon, ne peuvent pas être prévues. Donneront-ils l'ordre d'arrêter les hostilités, le premier point du programme arrêté hier à Shanghai ?

Quoi qu'il en soit, la délégation japonaise de Genève a fait remettre dès samedi soir aux membres permanents du Conseil une déclaration de M. Yoshizawa, ministre des affaires étrangères, favorable en principe à une conférence de la Table Ronde et à l'aménagement d'une zone neutre.

Si les puissances, y compris les Etats-Unis, consultées par téléphone cet après-midi, sont disposées à faire respecter la zone neutre, j'ai l'impression qu'une entente n'est pas impossible. Mais les Etats-Unis, qui ont ajourné leur avis à cet essai de médiation, acceptent-ils des responsabilités susceptibles de tourner contre eux le nationalisme chinois ? Mieux vaut ne pas trop s'avancer.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations, réduit à l'immobilité depuis la lamentable séance du 16 février, s'est jeté avidement sur la médiation anglaise afin de rétablir en sa faveur quelques apparences. Dans cet esprit, au cours de la séance des « douze membres du Conseil », où fut arrêté le scénario de la séance publique qui devait suivre à 6 heures, M. de Madariaga s'est hâté de proposer que la conférence de Shanghai fût immédiatement transformée en organisme régulier de Genève. Il n'a pas été écouté, mais son intervention indique clairement dans quel sens vont les vœux du secrétariat que les débats du Conseil, ce soir, n'ont pas complètement satisfait, bien qu'autour de la médiation britannique ses membres aient bourdonné un peu à la manière de la mouche du coche. On lira par ailleurs le détail de cette séance réglée à l'avance comme un morceau de musique.

A la vérité, grâce à la démarche

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

anglaise et à la déclaration de M.  
Yoshizawa, la négociation relative  
au conflit japonais quitte Genève  
et se transporte à Shanghai, trois  
jours avant la réunion de l'assem-  
blée spécialement convoquée pour  
en connaître et pour l'appuyer.

PERTINAX.

## La position française à Shanghai

Les événements d'Extrême-Orient, et surtout ceux de Shanghai, ont déjà fait couler beaucoup d'encre et beaucoup de sang.

L'opinion publique française, un peu déconcertée par une multiplicité de renseignements qui ne concordent pas entre eux, hésite, parce qu'elle se rend bien compte qu'elle ne reçoit que des détails de seconde main et des impressions déformées par le nombre des intermédiaires entre les oreilles françaises et le fait sino-japonais. C'est donc une bonne fortune, rare et singulière, qui vient d'échoir au Comité de l'Indochine, d'avoir pu convoquer et d'avoir entendu un de nos principaux agents de Shanghai, qui a été chargé d'installer et de répartir sur notre concession les forces de police françaises, et qui revient dans la métropole après quatre ans d'un labeur entêté, au cours desquels il a vu bien des choses et rendu bien des services à son pays.

On ne s'étonnera pas si les convictions de ce témoin oculaire — convictions étayées sur des faits certains, et adoptées à l'instant par ses auditeurs indochinois — ne sont pas toujours conformes aux opinions qui nous sont servies, mécaniquement et toutes faites, par une diplomatie soucieuse surtout d'éviter des nouveautés, et qui n'est pas absolument libre de liens dans le passé.

Or, nous l'avons souvent dit, une fausse orientation de notre opinion se répercutant sur notre politique extérieure peut devenir extrêmement délicate et même dangereuse, étant donné les relations continues et les traclations actuelles en cours entre l'Indochine et le Japon. Il faut dire, une fois de plus, que les intérêts français en Extrême-Orient forment bloc, et que, en matière surtout de politique extérieure, ce qui se passe à Shanghai a un contre-coup immédiat à Hanoi et à Saïgon.

Depuis qu'a échoué l'essai d'unification de la Chine du Nord avec la Chine du Sud (conférence de Shanghai, novembre 1931), le chaos le plus indescriptible règne dans la Chine tout entière; tandis que les gouvernants et les généraux chinois savent l'impossibilité, pour la Chine, d'entrer en lutte ouverte, les étudiants chinois, les élèves des deux sexes des écoles moyennes, enivrés d'avoir contraint à la retraite deux ministres des affaires étrangères, MM. C. T. Wang et Wellington Koo, sont, dans les grandes villes, les maîtres de la rue, et convient, à une déclaration de guerre au Japon, une armée qui n'a guère fait ses preuves que dans la guerre civile. L'essai de triumvirat, tenté par le Kuomintang, n'a donné aucun résultat: les membres de ce comité central politique refusent de se réunir, ou n'osent pas. Dans cette Chine ruinée, qu'habite une race digne d'un meilleur sort, on ne peut trouver une ombre de tranquillité que dans les concessions européennes, où les Chinois eux-mêmes se sont réfugiés en aussi grand nombre qu'ils ont pu.

La France possède, comme on le sait, à Shanghai, une concession qui lui est particulière, et cette situation unique lui confère un prestige à la fois national et économique, dont elle n'a pas encore tiré tout le parti désirable. Depuis quatre ans, en face des troubles sans cesse grandissants, cette concession a été armée et fortifiée dans des conditions qu'il est, à l'heure présente, utile de préciser.

hautes grilles qu'on ferme à la moindre alerte. La garde municipale française, chargée de la police et de la défense, est militairement instruite, commandée par des officiers de l'armée active et continuellement entraînée à son rôle de défense et de protection. Ses effectifs, en 1931, ont été portés normalement à 1,500 hommes (250 Français et Russes, 500 Tonkinois de la garde indigène et 750 à 800 Chinois). Ce personnel est doté d'un armement modèle très complet, fusils, mitrailleuses, grenades, etc.

Il dispose en outre de 6 autos-mitrailleuses, de 2 canons de 65 et d'un groupe de police, organisé il y a deux ans seulement. Vingt camions permettent de transporter rapidement la troupe aux lieux menacés. Des stocks importants de munitions et tout un matériel de défense permettent de résister à un assaut, et même à un siège sévère et long. La police française comprend en outre un corps de 250 détectives.

Depuis les troubles de 1927, la garde municipale de notre concession a été renforcée de deux bataillons d'infanterie coloniale, d'une section d'artillerie de montagne et d'une section de chars de combat. Dernièrement, deux nouveaux bataillons ont été envoyés, en renfort à Shanghai, l'un venant de Tientsin, l'autre de l'Indochine. Ajoutons à cet effectif déjà sérieux l'appoint (d'un énorme prestige) de la division navale d'Extrême-Orient, dont les unités se relèvent sur le Hoang-Hou (rivière de Shanghai), pour appuyer directement le système défensif français. Le *Waldeck-Roussau*, toujours présent ou proche, peut encore débarquer deux compagnies de fusiliers-marins. Au total, nous disposons, à Shanghai, d'au moins cinq mille fusils.

ALBERT DE POUVOURVILLE.

## La position française à Shanghai

Les événements d'Extrême-Orient, et surtout ceux de Shanghai, ont déjà fait couler beaucoup d'encre et beaucoup de sang.

L'opinion publique française, un peu déconcertée par une multiplicité de renseignements qui ne concordent pas entre eux, hésite, parce qu'elle se rend bien compte qu'elle ne reçoit que des détails de seconde main et des impressions déformées par le nombre des intermédiaires entre les oreilles françaises et le fait sino-japonais. C'est donc une bonne fortune, rare et singulière, qui vient d'échoir au Comité de l'Indochine, d'avoir pu convoquer et d'avoir entendu un de nos principaux agents de Shanghai, qui a été chargé d'installer et de réparer sur notre concession les forces de police françaises, et qui revient dans la métropole après quatre ans d'un labeur entêté, au cours desquels il a vu bien des choses et rendu bien des services à son pays.

On ne s'étonnera pas si les convictions de ce témoin oculaire — convictions étayées sur des faits certains, et adoptées à l'instant par ses auditeurs indochinois — ne sont pas toujours conformes aux opinions qui nous sont servies, mécaniquement et toutes faites, par une diplomatie soucieuse surtout d'éviter des nouveautés, et qui n'est pas absolument libre de liens dans le passé.

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Les autorités françaises ont fait une vraie place fortifiée de cette concession, dans laquelle 400.000 habitants peuvent trouver une sauvegarde contre les dangers de toute sorte. La concession a été entourée d'une ceinture d'ouvrages bétonnés qui, sous l'extérieur pacifique de postes téléphoniques et de police, constituent de solides blockhaus, dans chacun desquels une quarantaine d'hommes peuvent s'abriter. Des meurtrières, habilement ménagées, permettent de prendre en flanc, avec des armes automatiques, toutes les voies du territoire chinois donnant accès sur la concession. Les extrémités des rues aboutissant à la cité chinoise sont pourvues de

hautes grilles qu'on ferme à la moindre alerte. La garde municipale française, chargée de la police et de la défense, est militairement instruite, commandée par des officiers de l'armée active et continuellement entraînée à son rôle de défense et de protection. Ses effectifs, en 1931, ont été portés normalement à 1.500 hommes (250 Français et Russes, 500 Tonkinois de la garde indigène et 750 à 800 Chinois). Ce personnel est doté d'un armement modèle très complet, fusils, mitrailleuses, grenades, etc.

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ALBERT DE POUVOURVILLE.

Enclosure No. 27 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, March 1, 1932.

## De Verdun à Changhaï

par Louis LALOY

La première phase de ce que l'histoire appellera sans doute la bataille de Chang-haï se termine par une déception pour l'agresseur. Comme les Allemands devant Verdun, les Japonais espéraient rompre la ligne de défense par la violence d'une attaque massive. Ils ont rencontré non seulement une résistance qu'ils n'attendaient pas, mais une habileté de manœuvre qui, par deux fois, permit rapidement les troupes au point faible de leur ligne et les menaçant d'enveloppement, leur a fait perdre le peu de terrain qu'ils avaient gagné.

Finalement, les Chinois ont dû céder une ligne de positions devenue intenable, bouleversée par les bombardements, inondée et remplie de cadavres. C'est ainsi que samedi dernier, après huit jours de lutte, les Japonais se sont établis dans le village de Kiang-wan, dont ils avaient beaucoup trop tôt annoncé, dès le début, la conquête : ce n'est plus qu'un amas de ruines où tenaient encore, héroïques, quelques groupes de mitrailleurs. Encore n'est-il pas certain qu'ils l'occupent tout entier.

Les renforts qu'ils attendent porteront leurs effectifs dans la région de Chang-haï à une centaine de mille hommes. La marine chinoise, ne disposant que de canonnières, ne peut s'opposer au débarquement, protégé par des croiseurs et des contre-torpilleurs. L'artillerie et l'aviation japonaises sont en ce moment très nettement supérieures.

Ce n'est pas que les Chinois en manquent autant qu'on pourrait le croire, mais leur matériel est disséminé sur différents points de leur immense territoire. Il faut du temps pour l'amener, le grouper, l'organiser. Quant aux hommes, ils n'en manquent pas, et l'on a vu que le soldat chinois vaut bien le japonais, dans les récents combats où le nombre était à peu près égal : une trentaine de mille hommes de part et d'autre.

Dans ces conditions, on peut prévoir encore si la bataille continue, de durs combats, et peut-être l'abandon forcé d'autres positions, quand les retranchements auront été détruits par l'artillerie ennemie. C'est ce qui nous est arrivé devant Verdun, aussi longtemps que nous n'avons pas eu les moyens d'opposer à notre tour nos feux d'artillerie à ceux de nos adversaires. Mais le temps travaillait pour nous,

comme il travailla aussi à l'avantage des Chinois.

Nous n'avons guère de nouvelles, en France, que par les communiqués de l'état-major japonais. Ceux de nous qui se souviennent de la guerre européenne savent comment il faut déchiffrer un communiqué officiel. Quand les Japonais annoncent que les Chinois ont eu des pertes trois ou quatre fois supérieures aux leurs, ou que les soldats chinois sont démoralisés, ils parlent pour leurs concitoyens, dont il faut soutenir le moral. Mais ils parlent de ce qu'ils ignorent.

Est-ce une grande guerre qui commence ? Les Allemands, eux aussi, en 1914, pensaient nous mettre en quelques semaines hors de combat. L'empereur du Japon, comme Guillaume II, pourra dire, en voyant se lever un grand peuple pour la défense de son territoire et de sa liberté : « Ce n'est pas cela que je voulais. »

A moins toutefois qu'un armistice n'intervienne, pendant qu'il en est temps encore. Mais le parti militaire, au Japon, s'y opposera de toute sa force, qui est grande.

Louis LALOY.

FIG. 1

Enclosure No. 28 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, March 1, 1932.

# L'éternel conflit sino-japonais

## Les entretiens de M. Tardieu

GENÈVE, 29 février. (De notre envoyé spécial, par téléphone.)

Les diverses commissions de la Conférence de désarmement ne siègent pas encore, mais l'activité diplomatique genevoise n'en est pas moins très grande. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations s'est occupé, cet après-midi, du conflit sino-japonais. M. André Tardieu a eu, toute la journée, d'importantes conversations au sujet du désarmement.

A vrai dire, la réunion du Conseil n'était pas prévue. C'est à cinq heures seulement que la décision a été prise. Le bruit s'est vite répandu, et, à six heures, chacun était en séance. Cette réunion subite a été motivée par un télégramme arrivé de Londres, annonçant que des représentants chinois et japonais s'étaient rencontrés hier à Changhaï, à bord du bateau amiral britannique, et étaient tombés d'accord pour soumettre à leurs gouvernements une proposition de cesser les hostilités, de retirer simultanément leurs troupes et de confier à des neutres la surveillance de la zone évacuée.

Le Conseil s'est aussitôt paré des plumes du paon. La décision survenue à Changhaï, grâce au sentiment de lassitude qui se manifeste entre belligérants et grâce aux bons offices de la Grande-Bretagne, a été présentée comme un succès de la Société des Nations. Il y avait un autre motif pour que la réunion eût lieu. L'assemblée de la Ligue est convoquée pour le 3 mars, afin de s'occuper du différend sino-japonais; les membres du Conseil ont tenu à montrer, auparavant, qu'ils avaient abouti à un résultat.

Le résultat est assez maigre. Le Conseil a voté une résolution de plus. Elle tend à instituer à Changhaï une conférence des gouvernements ou seraient représentés la Chine, le Japon et les puissances qui ont des concessions dans cette ville. La conférence aurait pour objet d'amener la fin des hostilités. Le Japon reconnaîtrait qu'il n'a aucune visée politique ou territoriale, qu'il ne désire pas établir une concession à Changhaï ou favoriser d'une manière quelconque ses intérêts. La Chine s'engagerait à garantir la sécurité et l'intégrité de la concession internationale et de la concession française. Les décisions à intervenir ne modifieraient en rien l'attitude prise antérieurement par la Société des Nations ou un Etat quelconque vis-à-vis des affaires sino-japonaises. Ce projet a reçu

l'adhésion des puissances représentées au Conseil et des Etats-Unis. Il a été communiqué aux gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin. On espère recevoir leur réponse mercredi au plus tard.

Le Conseil semble vendre la peau de l'ours avant de l'avoir tué. Chacun de ses membres, ce soir, était plein d'optimisme. Cependant, il n'est pas certain que les négociations engagées à Changhaï aboutissent et que le projet de résolution du Conseil soit adopté par les deux parties. Il faut le souhaiter. On veut même l'espérer. Mais les délégués chinois et japonais n'ont pu que témoigner de leur désir d'aboutir. Ils ont réservé leur réponse. La session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée, convoquée à la demande de la Chine, se réunira jeudi, ainsi qu'il avait été prévu. C'est M. Paul-Boncour qui représentera la France. Il prendra la parole dès le premier jour, en sa qualité de président en exercice du Conseil. Si les hostilités ont cessé à Changhaï, la Ligue en reportera sur elle tout le bénéfice, alors qu'elle n'a fait que compliquer la situation. Si les événements se sont encore aggravés, la Société des Nations ne pourra qu'étaler son impuissance aux yeux du monde.

Enclosure No. 29 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, March 1, 1932.

## Un tableau significatif de l'activité de M. André Tardieu dans les milieux de la Société des nations

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 29 février. — Le calendrier de la Conférence porte au programme de la présente journée : néant. Ce n'est pas, évidemment, pour l'enregistrer que M. André Tardieu est venu passer cette journée à Genève, entre deux nuits de chemin de fer.

De fait, le tableau de son activité, le 29 février, est assez éloquent. Arrivée à 9 heures. Conversation avec M. Paul-Boncour, puis conférence plénière de la délégation française. 11 h. 30 : réception de l'ambassadeur Nadolny, premier délégué d'Allemagne. 12 h. 15 : réception de M. Benès, rapporteur de la commission générale et de la commission politique. 13 h. 15 : déjeuner chez M. Zaleski, ministre des affaires étrangères de Pologne. 15 heures : réception de M. Raoul do Rio-Branco, ministre du Brésil à Berne.

Après quoi, la Yougoslavie entre en scène en la personne de M. Marinkovitch. La Roumanie est représentée par M. Antoniadès, en l'absence de M. Titulesco, et la Hongrie par le comte Apponyi.

Arrivent ensuite les Japonais, représentés par l'ambassadeur Matsu-deira et M. Sato.

Puis c'est le tour de l'Autriche, avec M. Pflugel.

La Chine intervient ensuite avec M. Yen.

Et c'est le tour de la Grande-Bretagne, avec sir John Simon, puis de l'Italie, avec M. Grandi.

La séance se termine enfin par une nouvelle intervention de M. Benès. C'est ce qu'on peut appeler une journée !

### Convocation inopinée

Et nous n'avons pas dit le principal. Une séance publique du conseil de la Société des nations, convoquée inopinément pour appuyer la manœuvre pacificatrice préparée par l'Angleterre à Changhaï, l'espoir d'une suspension des hostilités, la présentation d'un plan français élaboré par M. Paul-Boncour et par M. André Tardieu, tendant à élargir le débat de manière à réunir une conférence pour le règlement général du statut international de Changhaï : tout cela n'était pas, évidemment, prévu, puisque les représentants du Guatemala et du Pa-

nama, attardés à Paris, brillaient par leur absence.

Cependant, on ne peut pas dire que l'événement ait surpris ceux qui ont suivi l'évolution des faits. La situation s'est présentée d'une façon très simple. Les Japonais se sont trouvés en face d'un effort militaire bien plus considérable que celui auquel ils s'attendaient. Les Chinois ont entrevu l'opportunité de rester sur un succès qui peut-être serait sans lendemain. Les Anglais ont saisi la balle au bond, afin de tâcher de prévenir le gâchis de l'assemblée extraordinaire. L'affaire n'a jamais évolué très rapidement et le conseil de la Société des nations s'est précipité à la rescousse.

### Impression confirmée

Dès ce matin, on avait l'impression que de gros événements se préparaient du côté de Changhaï. On apprenait, en effet, que, sur l'initiative de l'amiral anglais Kelly, une conférence avait eu lieu, à bord de son croiseur *Kent*, entre les chefs

militaires japonais et chinois. Du côté japonais, il y avait l'amiral Nomura, commandant en chef des forces navales, et M. Matsuoka, délégué spécial du chef du gouvernement de Tokio, M. Inukai. Du côté chinois, il y avait M. Wellington Koo, délégué du gouvernement de Nankin, et le général Wang, représentant le maréchal Tchang Kai Chek.

Cette conférence, qui a duré deux heures et demie, avait envisagé les moyens de préparer la suspension des hostilités et la création d'une zone neutre pour le retrait simultané des troupes sous contrôle neutre.

Dans la matinée, M. Paul-Boncour avait eu un important entretien avec un délégué américain, M. Norman Davis. Il avait essayé en vain de rencontrer sir John Simon, mais il avait pris rendez-vous avec celui-ci pour le début de l'après-midi.

Aussitôt après cet entretien, on apprenait que les Douze, réduits à dix, se réunissaient au bureau du secrétariat, à 15 h. 30. Et, une heure après, on apprenait la convocation du conseil.

Aussitôt, des rumeurs sensationnelles commençaient à circuler dans les couloirs du secrétariat. On parlait d'un armistice, voire d'un ajournement de la conférence. Anticipations d'aujourd'hui qui seront, espérons-le, les réalités de demain ou d'après-demain.

### La séance publique du conseil

A 18 h. 15, M. Paul-Boncour ouvre la séance publique du conseil en annonçant qu'il avait cru indispensable de ne pas laisser passer une occasion d'arrêter le drame de l'Extrême-Orient. Et il donne immédiatement la parole à sir John Simon « pour une communication ».

Le ministre des affaires étrangères britannique communique aussitôt les nouvelles de Changhaï que nous avons relatées plus haut. Il ajoute qu'au cours de la conférence sino-japonaise, on était tombé d'accord sur les moyens de suspendre les hostilités et qu'on avait envisagé aussi les modalités du contrôle neutre pour le retrait des troupes. Ces modalités avaient été soumises d'urgence aux gouvernements de Nankin et de Tokio pour approbation.

### La proposition française

M. Paul-Boncour remercie sir John Simon de cette communication, dont il tire sur-le-champ la conclusion. Une perspective d'arrangement s'ouvre. Il ne faut pas se contenter de la suspension des hostilités; il faut envisager aussi le règlement du conflit. Dès maintenant, la France propose le plan suivant :

1° Institution immédiate, à Changhaï, d'une conférence composée des représentants des gouvernements de la Chine, du Japon et des autres puissances intéressées au statut international;

2° Les bases de la discussion de la conférence seraient les suivantes :

a) Le Japon n'a ni visée politique ou territoriale, ni intention d'établir une concession japonaise à Changhaï ou de favoriser de telle autre manière les intérêts exclusivement japonais.

b) La Chine participe à la conférence, étant entendu que la sécurité et l'intégrité des concessions internationales et de la concession française seront maintenues en vertu d'accords qui garantiront contre tout danger les zones et leurs résidents.

3° La réunion de la conférence est subordonnée à la cessation effective des hostilités aussi rapidement que possible. On propose que les autorités militaires, navales et civiles des principales puissances représentées à Changhaï prêtent toute l'assistance possible en vue de faciliter des arrangements.

Après une adhésion chaleureuse de M. Grandi, sir John Simon apporte la nouvelle sensationnelle — et qui pourtant, ici aussi, n'est pas une surprise — que les Etats-Unis ont été consultés et que l'Angleterre se porte garante de leur acceptation.

M. Paul-Boncour remercie et ne manque pas de signaler l'importance du fait que, pour la première fois, les Etats-Unis acceptent officiellement de collaborer avec le conseil.

Mais voici le moment décisif. La parole est aux parties. M. Sato, le premier, déclare qu'il compte exposer au conseil, dès qu'il le pourra, le détail des négociations. En attendant, il accepte en principe le plan Boncour, sous réserve de confirmation de son gouvernement. Il tient pourtant à rappeler :

1° Que, dans l'affaire de Changhaï, le Japon n'a eu qu'une préoccupation, celle de conjurer de graves périls menaçant tous les étrangers ;

2° Que le Japon est prêt à collaborer à un règlement international de la situation de Changhaï ;

3° Que le Japon n'a jamais eu l'intention, à Changhaï, de chercher des avantages particuliers ;

4° Que le Japon n'a jamais songé à proposer la création de zones neutres dans les principaux ports chinois.

M. Yen apporte, de son côté, l'adhésion amicale de la Chine. Il donne aussi des renseignements intéressants sur la négociation. A l'entendre, l'accord envisagé comporterait deux étapes. D'abord, les troupes chinoises se retireraient sur une ligne à l'ouest de Chapeï pendant que les Japonais rentreraient dans leur concession. Ensuite, les Chinois reculeraient jusqu'à telle station de la ligne de Nankin et le Japon rembarquerait ses troupes.

Le délégué japonais, M. Sato, paraît assez embarrassé par la communication de ces détails. Il fait des réserves portant sur la question de l'embarquement des troupes en attendant l'acceptation de son gouvernement.

Mais M. Paul-Boncour clôt la séance en constatant l'importance du résultat obtenu, et en exprimant l'espoir que l'assemblée extraordinaire pourrait se réunir dans des conditions beaucoup plus favorables qu'on ne l'avait prévu.

### Les entretiens de M. Tardieu et l'organisation de la conférence du désarmement

Il faut maintenant parler des conversations de M. Tardieu, qui se sont terminées, dans la soirée, par un dîner avec les Américains. Ces conversations ont porté, naturellement, en grande partie sur l'affaire de Changhaï, mais elles ont porté également sur la mise en train de la conférence, qui traîne un peu.

Le retard est dû à une erreur commise par le bureau, qui a prétendu demander au rapporteur, M. Benès, d'établir un tableau complet, juxtaposant les questions nouvelles soulevées par chacun des articles du projet de la commission préparatoire. Si on se flattait de faciliter ainsi la tâche, il a fallu déchanter et arriver vite à la constatation d'une confusion extraordinaire.

On voit très bien ce que le bureau a cherché. Il a cru pouvoir éviter la discussion générale politique sur les bases fondamentales en fragmentant cette discussion par articles. C'est une illusion. Il y a des questions de principe essentielles qu'on ne pourra pas esquiver et qu'il faudra, au contraire, se décider à traiter à fond. Le tout est de savoir quand devra venir cette discussion et jusqu'à quel point les discussions préliminaires peuvent préparer efficacement le terrain.

Celle que M. Tardieu a eue, le matin, avec M. Nadolny, a été particulièrement importante. — S.-B.

## LA MANŒUVRE RUSSE en Extrême-Orient

D'un côté les Soviets autorisent  
les transports militaires japonais,  
de l'autre ils concentreraient  
des forces à Vladivostok

*Bien qu'il ne soit pas toujours facile de démêler la vérité au milieu des nouvelles, plus ou moins contradictoires, qui arrivent d'Extrême-Orient, les deux armées de Changhaï paraissent manifester un peu d'essoufflement. Cette circonstance ne peut manquer de faciliter la tâche des négociateurs.*

*C'est, en tout cas, plus que jamais le moment pour les puissances d'observer une grande prudence et de s'abstenir de toute intervention ou initiative susceptible d'amener de nouvelles complications. Cette règle de conduite a, d'ailleurs, été scrupuleusement observée depuis le début du conflit par les gouvernements de Paris, de Londres, de Rome et de Washington. L'inquiétude, si inquiétude il devait y avoir, viendrait uniquement des intentions de Moscou.*

*Ça n'a pas été l'une des moindres surprises de cette extraordinaire affaire que de constater la passivité avec laquelle les Russes ont accepté la nouvelle politique du Japon en Chine. Leur réaction s'est surtout manifestée jusqu'à maintenant par des discours contre l'impuissance de la S. D. N. et contre les puissances capitalistes. On a pu croire, il y a deux jours, que le veto opposé par M. Karakhan au transport des troupes japonaises par la ligne de l'Est chinois, pouvait être l'indice d'un changement d'attitude. En réalité, il s'agissait d'une simple manœuvre de politique intérieure, destinée à sauver la face vis-à-vis des masses communistes, puisque le commissaire adjoint aux affaires étrangères a finalement consenti au transport des troupes japonaises de Kharbine à Imienpo. On parle maintenant de concentration de troupes russes dans la région de Vladivostok. Jusqu'à preuve du contraire, il paraît cependant difficile que la Russie veuille créer des difficultés au Japon.*

*Il est certain que le gouvernement de Moscou compte bien tirer un jour dans le nord de la Mandchourie les avantages que le Japon vient de s'assurer dans le sud. Mais cette raison n'est pas prédominante. La vérité est que l'U.R.S.S., qui n'a pas oublié certains épisodes de l'histoire tsariste, ne veut pas risquer dans une aventure incertaine ses efforts présents et tous ses projets d'avenir. Les dirigeants des Soviets travaillent d'abord à la révolution universelle dont la réussite paraît liée pour eux à la réalisation du fameux plan quinquennal.*

*L'heure n'est pas encore venue. Mais, quand il se sentira suffisamment fort, c'est l'Occident d'abord que l'ours dont parlait spirituellement l'autre jour M. de Madariaga à la Conférence du désarmement, tentera d'étouffer.*

Enclosure No. 30 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris,

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, March 1, 1932.

### La S. D. N. et les suggestions japonaises

C'est jeudi que se réunit à Genève l'assemblée de la S. D. N. convoquée à la demande de la Chine. Si la situation ne se modifie pas d'ici là, elle sera certainement fort embarrassée. On pense généralement qu'après avoir entendu les deux parties, elle constituera une commission. Mais que fera-t-on ensuite ? Nul ne saurait le dire. Il y a aussi des difficultés au sujet des conditions dans lesquelles la collaboration de la Ligue et des Etats-Unis pourra être maintenue. Cette question est très importante. Aucune action diplomatique internationale ne paraît, en effet, possible en Extrême-Orient sans la participation ou au moins le consentement de l'Amérique.

Dans ces conditions, il est naturel qu'on désire vivement voir se produire quelque événement qui tire d'affaire l'assemblée. Or, précisément, quelques symptômes de détente se manifestent. A la suite de démarches qui ont été faites par les principaux membres du Conseil de la S. D. N., notamment par son président, M. Paul-Boncour, le gouvernement japonais a indiqué qu'il accepterait une cessation immédiate des hostilités si les troupes chinoises se retirant à vingt kilomètres de Changhaï, une zone neutre était établie en avant de la concession internationale; il suggère aussi la réunion à Changhaï d'une sorte de Conférence internationale à laquelle participeraient, avec les représentants du Japon et de la Chine, les ministres des Etats-Unis, de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie, et qui, tout en surveillant la zone neutre, déterminerait le statut futur de Changhaï, où les Japonais disent ne pas avoir d'ambition particulière, leur avis étant qu'il conviendrait seulement d'élargir la concession internationale. On apprend qu'au même moment ce programme a été discuté par des délégués chinois et japonais, à bord d'un navire britannique et en présence de l'amiral anglais Kelly.

L'initiative est venue du Japon. Il semble donc qu'à Tokio on désire prouver, à la veille de la réunion de l'Assemblée, que les opérations en cours n'ont pas pour but des acquisitions territoriales. D'après les derniers télégrammes, les Chinois se montrent méfiants, ce qui est compréhensible; aucun résultat positif n'aurait été obtenu au cours des pourparlers. Mais il est possible qu'une certaine pression diplomatique s'exerce à Nankin pour amener le gouvernement chinois à accepter un arrangement. D'autre part, les Japonais, qui ont reçu des renforts, semblent reprendre leur offensive. Ce fait ne signifie pas qu'ils ne désirent pas une suspension des hostilités; il est clair que tant que les négociations n'auront pas abouti, ils continueront leurs opérations.

Au point où l'on en est il faut souhaiter qu'une entente se réalise et arrête le plus vite possible les combats. Au mois de septembre, la S. D. N. aurait peut-être pu empêcher la véritable guerre qui s'est engagée; puisqu'elle a manqué alors le coche, ce qui met à sa charge une responsabilité évidente, elle ne peut pas prétendre agir en mars 1932 comme elle aurait pu le faire en septembre 1931, alors surtout qu'aucune puissance n'entend se lancer dans une aventure extrême-orientale. Les Etats-Unis eux-mêmes se montrent fort prudents et les délégués de pays qui n'auraient aucun risque à courir auraient mauvaise grâce à exiger des autres ce qu'eux-mêmes ne seraient pas du tout disposés à faire. Ce que cette expérience a rappelé, c'est que, contrairement aux idées des purs théoriciens, la S. D. N. n'existe pas par elle-même, mais qu'elle n'est en quelque sorte que le lieu de rencontre des divers gouvernements. A l'heure actuelle il s'agit de sauver la face pour les Japonais et les Chinois et de leur faciliter un accord honorable. Quand on aura réussi à liquider cette malheureuse histoire, on pourra essayer d'en tirer, en vue de l'avenir, les conclusions pratiques. Pour le moment, le mieux qu'on puisse faire, c'est de mettre fin à la tuerie et d'aider les deux parties à tomber d'accord.

PIERRE BERNUS.

Deafone 1

Enclosure No. 31 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, March 1, 1932.

### Une suspension d'armes et une conférence sont envisagées à Changhaï avant jeudi

Demain, mercredi, reprise des travaux de la Conférence du Désarmement. Après-demain, jeudi, réunion de l'assemblée plénière de la Société des Nations.

Reste-t-il quelque chose des incidents qui marquèrent la dernière séance de la Conférence du Désarmement? Il y en eut deux, vous vous souvenez: 1° une discussion fort vive entre M. Nadolny, délégué de l'Allemagne, et M. Tardieu; 2° plus vive encore celle entre M. de Madariaga, délégué de l'Espagne, et M. Litvinof, délégué de la Russie, toutes deux autour du projet russe.

La première se termina à l'amiable, puisque M. Nadolny se rallia à la majorité contre celui-ci.

La seconde se termina par une rupture, et c'est regrettable. Elle fit manquer un essai de jonction du projet russe au projet de convention de la Commission préparatoire adoptée comme base des travaux ultérieurs de la Conférence. Cette jonction n'aurait peut-être pas eu grande valeur pratique. Elle eut, du moins, affirmé la volonté de solidarité que M. Litvinof avait exprimée dans son premier discours. Tandis que, depuis, la presse russe ne décolère pas. Les Isvetzia multiplient les quolibets et les soupçons contre les intentions de tout le monde.

A qui la faute? Est-ce M. Litvinof qui se laissa aller à l'un de ces coups de mauvaise humeur qui l'ont rendu célèbre à Genève? Est-ce M. de Madariaga qui accompagna son ingénieuse initiative de trop de remarques longues et susceptibles? Je vois que la presse, notamment le Journal des Nations, le lui reproche.

A la fin de la journée, hier, le Conseil de la Société des Nations s'est réuni en hâte afin d'examiner s'il ne serait pas opportun d'ajourner l'assemblée plénière du 3 mars.

La raison? Une journée particulièrement anxieuse et chargée à Changhaï et à Tokio. Une pression militaire intense des Japonais au delà de Chapei, au delà de Kouang-Ouân, pendant qu'à Héraï du nord, un amiral anglais, le Kent, une rencontre avait lieu entre les amiraux japonais, M. Wellington-Kou et le chef d'état-major de la 19<sup>e</sup> armée chinoise; pendant que, dans la concession, on envisageait une conférence diplomatique générale, une Table Ronde; pendant qu'à Genève MM. Matsudeira et Sato transmettaient au Conseil de la Société des Nations un aide-mémoire en cinq points.

Double offensive acharnée du Japon. Offensive de guerre. Offensive de paix. Tâcher, tâcher encore une fois, selon la méthode suivie depuis un mois, de forcer la chance des champs de bataille, de faire patienter les diplomates, de rétablir le parallélisme des deux initiatives et de les conclure au même moment. Mais quelle différence avec les précédentes semaines! La diplomatie, alors, pouvait s'attarder. Le commandement militaire se croyait sûr de la débâcle. Tandis qu'à présent, une seule journée a dû contenir ce suprême rassemblement d'efforts. Et il semble bien que la nécessité d'organiser une action définitive, d'arriver à une action militaire décisive et près de réussir.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations, dans la soirée, a enregistré cette probabilité avec joie.

L'assemblée de jeudi n'a pas été décommandée, d'ailleurs.

Si les choses tournent ainsi, certains disent que la Société des Nations aura eu chaud et qu'elle aura vu la mort de près.

Il sera plus juste de dire que, malgré sa faiblesse et, sans doute, ses faiblesses, ce grand tout de même sa présence et sa parole qui auront brouté, morcelé, arcelé, et, en suscitant l'émulation d'autres interventions, fait échouer à l'autre bout du monde, de trop vastes projets.

HENRI HERTZ.

## Les ennemis de la S.D.N.

Le développement des hostilités sino-japonaises a fourni aux nationalistes français l'occasion de redoubler de fureur dans leurs attaques contre la Société des Nations. Que lui reprochent-ils? Le sang qu'elle laisse couler à Changhaï, son impuissance à maintenir la paix. Et que proposent-ils pour conclure? De renforcer moralement et matériellement l'autorité de l'Assemblée internationale? Non. Ils réclament — avec quel accent de haine et quel déchainement d'insultes — la suppression pure et simple de cette assemblée.

Car ils reprochent à la Société, non seulement de n'avoir pas éteint l'incendie, mais encore de l'avoir attisé. D'aucuns lui reprochent d'avoir, en prenant le parti de la Chine contre le Japon, pris le parti du désordre et de l'anarchie contre « l'ordre et le progrès ». Voilà, cette fois, qui est net : l'ordre et le progrès, c'est donc l'impérialisme et le militarisme, l'appétit qui se satisfait, la force organisée qui, de prétendus torts lui étant causés, se fait justice elle-même au mépris des pactes signés, des arbitrages proposés, des efforts conciliateurs de toutes les puissances du monde. L'ordre et le progrès, c'est une armée disciplinée sous les ordres d'un gouvernement ambitieux, ce sont des mitrailleuses bien graissées, des tanks solides, des avions judicieusement garnis de bombes, c'est l'invasion des territoires ennemis et le massacre des peuples pacifiques. L'ordre et le progrès, c'est la sauvagerie modernisée assassinant la civilisation véritable.

Et bien, en vérité, nous ne pensons pas qu'une telle conception de l'ordre et du progrès soit de nature à supplanter facilement dans notre opinion publique, malgré tous les efforts qui pourraient être tentés dans ce sens, la conception toute différente défendue dans la mesure de ses moyens, hélas! encore faibles, par la Société des Nations. Nous croyons que le principe d'arbitrage, de solutions juridiques remplaçant les solutions sanglantes, nous croyons que ce principe, maintenant qu'il est posé et qu'il a pris corps, l'emportera toujours, sans lutte possible, dans l'esprit des peuples, et dominera un jour les événements.

L'égoïsme national dont s'alimentent les passions réactionnaires verra de plus en plus lui échapper l'appui de l'opinion. C'est que celle-ci comprend mieux, de jour en jour, que l'égoïsme devient sans cesse davantage un inadapté, que la science a rendu notre globe trop restreint pour que les peuples y puissent vivre désormais sans solidarité, sans fraternité. Ce que la bonté n'a pu obtenir, la nécessité nous l'impose. Le choix qui nous est offert, c'est de nous accorder ou de mourir; c'est de construire la paix ou de sombrer ensemble dans le désastre définitif que « l'ordre et le progrès », aidés de la chimie moderne, mettent à notre disposition. Il n'en coûterait à l'espèce humaine, pour se suicider, que quelques centaines de milliards et un certain nombre de mois ou d'années d'une guerre particulièrement magnifique, véritable apothéose de la civilisation. Nous avons le choix, il faut le redire sans se lasser, entre cette fin grandiose et la construction de la paix.

Je crois fermement que l'opinion publique du monde, dans sa grande majorité, a opté pour la construction de la paix, si difficile qu'elle puisse apparaître aux diplomates, pour la construction de la paix sur des bases durables, réédifiées en commun par tous les intéressés, conscients de l'urgente nécessité de la sagesse. Je crois fermement que, de plus en plus, la Société des Nations, réalité encore bien incomplète sans doute, mais unique, mais perfectible de coordination mondiale, revêtira aux yeux des peuples, malgré toutes ses provisoires insuffisances, un caractère sacré parce qu'en l'idée qui l'anime

se rejoignent, comme il est normal, comme il est inévitable qu'ils se rejoignent, comme ils finissent toujours par se rejoindre, le plus haut idéal humain et le réalisme lucide.

La prétendue faillite de la Société des Nations, désespérément proclamée par ses ennemis, n'est pas pour bientôt, ni même pour un avenir perceptible. La rage de ses adversaires n'est qu'un symptôme de plus de la souterraine croissance de sa force, nourrie de toutes les forces démocratiques du monde, animée de toute la vitalité du vieil instinct individuel de conservation que rien ne pourra plus empêcher de s'étendre à la collectivité des peuples, devenus, volontairement ou non, solidaires, comme les organes d'un même corps.

Gaston Arthuis

P.P.1

Enclosure No. 32 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA POPULAIRE, March 1, 1932.

## QUI ALIMENTE LA GUERRE ?

Si le destin me conduisait ces jours-ci dans la salle où se discute à Genève le conflit sino-japonais, je tiendrais le langage suivant aux graves et illustres personnages qui délibèrent :

« Chinois et Japonais, messieurs, ne pourriez-vous pas, si les grandes puissances ne leur en fournissaient les moyens.

« Les Français leur ont envoyé des mitrailleuses de chez Hotchkiss, des tanks de chez Renault, des canons du Creusot — et de la Skoda (Tchécoslovaquie) ».

« Les Anglais, ainsi que cela ressort des déclarations faites aux Communes le 4 février par M. Runciman, président du « Board of Trade », ont dirigé vers la Chine et le Japon des armements et munitions pour 5.075.000 fr. aux Chinois et 18.375.000 fr. aux Japonais.

« Aux Etats-Unis, devant le comité des Affaires étrangères, M. Paul Linebarger, conseiller légal auprès du gouvernement national chinois, a accusé banquiers et fabricants d'armes d'avoir livré au Japon pour 180 millions de dollars de munitions.

« Si tout cela est vrai, messieurs, vous êtes de sinistres farceurs, car vous avez en mains le moyen d'arrêter immédiatement la guerre, c'est de ne plus l'alimenter. Ne le faisant pas, c'est que vous ne le voulez pas. Alors, qu'est-ce que vous êtes venus faire à Genève ? »  
Voilà mon discours fini.

Seulement, les choses que j'ai dites plus haut et les chiffres que j'ai rapportés ne connaîtront pas la lumière de la publicité s'il faut en croire l'information suivante :

« Le correspondant du Baltimore Sun dit que le département d'Etat, les gouvernements français et anglais auraient décidé de décourager toutes les discussions parlementaires au sujet de la vente d'armes et de munitions à la Chine et au Japon. Le journal ajoute qu'à la demande du département d'Etat, la Commission des Affaires étrangères avait décidé d'abandonner la semaine dernière la discussion publique de la résolution présentée par M. Fish, tendant à autoriser le président Hoover à mettre l'embargo sur les munitions destinées aux belligérants. Le département d'Etat semble également avoir ordonné le secret le plus complet concernant les expéditions faites actuellement. »

Qu'est-ce à dire, sinon que les marchands d'armes tiennent les gouvernements et la presse sous leur coupe en France, en Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis ?

Tant qu'il en sera ainsi, la cause du désarmement et de la paix n'avancera pas d'un pouce.

Les incendiaires ne sont pas qualifiés pour devenir pompiers.

Pas plus qu'on ne confie son argent à des voleurs et sa sécurité à des brigands.

PAUL FAURE

# On parle de paix à Changhaï

## MAIS LA BATAILLE CONTINUE

### En Mandchourie, les troupes japonaises avancent avec l'autorisation de l'U.R.S.S.

UN nouveau coup de théâtre ! Au moment même où d'importants renforts japonais débarquent à Changhaï, un arrangement serait sur le point d'être conclu entre le Japon et la Chine. Du moins c'est ce qui a été annoncé à Genève et à Londres.

On lira plus loin le compte rendu de la séance extraordinaire du Conseil de la Société des Nations, au cours de laquelle furent indiquées les conditions de l'armistice. Un autre télégramme de Genève nous apprend que d'après les déclarations faites au Conseil par M. Yen, délégué de la Chine, « un premier repli chinois d'environ cinq kilomètres, correspondrait à un repli des forces japonaises jusque dans la concession. Les Chinois se retireraient ensuite à environ dix kilomètres jusqu'à la hauteur de la station de Nan Chang (ligne Changhaï-Nankin), tandis que les Japonais se rembarqueraient. »

Si c'est exact, si les négociations sino-japonaises ne sont pas une nouvelle ruse de la part du Japon, nous ne pouvons que nous réjouir de la cassation des hostilités à Changhaï. A une condition, toutefois : que la paix de Changhaï ne soit pas la consécration de l'état de fait créé par l'agression japonaise; autrement dit, que le départ des troupes japonaises de Changhaï ne soit pas compensé par la reconnaissance par la Chine et les puissances de l'annexion de la Mandchourie. Le rétablissement du *statu quo ante* à Changhaï ne doit pas légaliser l'invasion de la Mandchourie.

Mais je le répète : jusqu'à confirmation officielle de la conclusion de la paix à Changhaï, il est prudent de ne pas se fier aux promesses du Japon.

♦ ♦ ♦  
Il est vrai que le gouvernement japonais a tout intérêt à sortir le plus vite possible du guépier dans lequel il s'est engagé à Changhaï. L'opinion publique lui devient de plus en plus hostile. Un télégramme de Washington annonce que le « département de la marine a ordonné l'envoi dans le Pacifique de la plus grande partie de la flotte américaine ». On l'explique officiellement par des grandes manœuvres navales qui doivent avoir lieu prochainement. Mais la véritable raison n'est pas difficile à discerner.

Dans ces conditions, le Japon a tout intérêt à ramener ses troupes et ses navires de guerre au Japon. D'autant plus qu'il a manifestement l'intention de se livrer à des opérations de grande envergure en Mandchourie.

Nous avons publié hier, en dernière heure, le compte rendu transmis par l'agence soviétique « Tass » des entretiens entre le ministre japonais à Moscou et Karakhan, commissaire-adjoint des affaires étrangères. Cédant devant la menace japonaise le gouvernement soviétique a autorisé les transports de troupes nippones sur le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois à Imyanpo et à Hailin (Imyanpo est à 160 kilomètres de Kharbine, et Hailin à environ 350 kilomètres, dans la direction de Vladivostok). Cette capitulation des Soviets a été accueillie avec satisfaction à Tokio. Cela se comprend. Non seulement l'U.R.S.S. trahit ainsi la Chine — puisque le mouvement des troupes japonaises est dirigé, du moins officiellement, contre les Chinois — mais elle facilite encore la marche des Japonais vers la frontière soviétique et notamment vers Vladivostok. Rien ne peut plus arrêter l'occupation par les Japonais de ce port et de la région maritime.

Certes, des informations de source japonaise annoncent que les Russes auraient fait de grands préparatifs de guerre pour protéger leur province orientale. Je ne le crois pas. Je pense plutôt que ces nouvelles sont lancées par les Japonais afin de justifier leur action militaire prochaine. En fait, le Japon a déjà mis la main sur le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois et l'U.R.S.S. qui avait cru devoir défendre par les armes ses droits sur ce chemin de fer, quand la Chine les menaçait en 1929, est à présent prête à les céder, moyennant quelques roubles, à l'impérialisme japonais.

C'est un coup terrible que le Japon vient de porter au gouvernement soviétique et qui peut avoir les plus graves conséquences, surtout s'il est suivi de l'occupation de Vladivostok.

Ainsi se confirme la crainte que nous avons exprimée ici il y a cinq mois : la politique aveugle de Moscou l'a placé devant ce douloureux dilemme, à savoir, de capituler devant le Japon ou de se laisser entraîner dans une guerre. L'U.R.S.S. a commencé à capituler, mais même cette capitulation ne lui évitera peut-être pas la guerre.

O. ROSENFELD.

P. S. — Aux dernières nouvelles, la bataille commencée à Changhaï depuis hier matin, a continué jusque tard dans la nuit, malgré l'annonce de l'arrangement dont j'ai parlé dans mon article. Les positions de Chapel ont changé de mains six fois, ce qui prouve que la bataille est acharnée. Que valent, dans ces conditions, les promesses de paix formulées par le Japon à Genève ? — O. R.

Ref 1  
Enclosure No. 33 to Despatch No. 2318 of March 1, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, March 1, 1932.

## EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT

# Serait-ce la paix ?

Voici une bonne nouvelle. On se bat toujours à Changhaï, mais il paraît que Japonais et Chinois se seraient rencontrés à bord d'un navire de guerre anglais et qu'une entente serait en vue. Les deux armées se retireraient tant soit peu l'une et l'autre. Le Japon demanderait que la concession internationale fût élargie. Et le 3 mars, nous aurions à Genève les délégués d'une Chine pacifique et d'un Japon assagi, bénissant la paix et se demandant comment s'y prendre pour la bien asséoir.

N'oublions pas cependant — nous le rappelons il y a quelque temps — que le Japon est à la fois engagé à Changhaï et en Mandchourie. ~~Peut-être voudrait-il faire un troc, abandonner Changhaï contre la reconnaissance par la Chine de l'indépendance mandchoue.~~ Le fait est que les Soviétiques ont l'air de se croire menacés et que des travaux de défense sont hâtivement poussés autour de Vladivostock et le long du fleuve Amour. Un autre fait à l'appui de l'hypothèse que le Japon transporterait peut-être bientôt sa principale base d'action en Mandchourie est le suivant : les Japonais ont saisi le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois qui est placé ou devrait l'être sous le contrôle de la Russie et ils l'emploient à transporter des troupes.

Cependant, l'attitude de l'Amérique reste toujours singulièrement énigmatique, et si le président Hoover et la plupart des ministres sont opposés au boycottage des produits japonais, croyons que l'opinion publique, surtout à San Francisco et dans les ports californiens, pourrait fort bien leur forcer la main. Or, l'opinion publique japonaise a déjà souligné que ce boycottage serait considéré au Japon comme un *casus belli*.

En d'autres termes, si les choses s'arrangent ou paraissent s'arranger à Changhaï, la question de Mandchourie demeure ouverte et le problème du Pacifi-

que demeure en suspens. Comment pourrait-il en être autrement ?

Nous ne cesserons ici de répéter que toute la politique du Japon est dominée par le fait qu'en soixante ans, la population de l'archipel japonais a plus que doublé, que cet archipel ne peut pas nourrir 70 millions d'habitants, qu'il a donc fallu que le Japon passât de l'état agricole à l'état industriel, que dans ces conditions il est obligé d'importer des matières premières et des produits alimentaires, et qu'il ne peut — le voudrait-il — se passer de la Mandchourie.

Il est trop facile (ceci dit pour l'Amérique et pour l'Australie, donc pour l'Angleterre) d'interdire l'immigration japonaise et puis de crier contre la politique expansionniste du Japon. Il faut nourrir ces soixante-dix millions de bouches, Tokio le veut, le peuple japonais l'exige et l'esprit logique n'est pas satisfait de voir un Japon surpeuplé et une Australie — ce continent grand comme la moitié de l'Europe — peuplée de six millions d'habitants.

Alors ?

Organiser les grandes migrations humaines ? Jeter pacifiquement 10 ou 15 millions de Japonais en Australie ? Oui, mais les Australiens ne veulent pas. Ni Londres. Ni Washington. Et voilà pourquoi le problème du Pacifique est si grave. C'est un problème d'alimentation.

Pierre DOMINIQUE.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 1932

At the press conference this morning Secretary Stimson announced the receipt of information from the Ambassador in Tokyo and from Consul General Cunningham in Shanghai to the effect that hostilities had been stopped.

793,94  
A correspondent enquired whether the Secretary had any information regarding the conference among the Japanese, the Chinese and the neutrals which was supposed to have been held aboard H.M.S. KENT today. The Secretary replied in the negative.

A correspondent called attention to the fact that press despatches said nothing of the Chinese attitude toward a truce and that everything received had been with reference to the Japanese views. The Secretary replied that the Department had nothing from the Chinese side.

A correspondent asked if the cessation of hostilities included the Tientsin situation. The Secretary replied that there was no reference to that in the despatches received. They referred entirely to Shanghai. The correspondent observed that the report of a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai did not necessarily mean then that the Japanese would not attack Tientsin. A correspondent asked if any information had been received about the landing of Japanese arms at Tientsin. The Secretary replied that nothing in that respect had been received today. He had a recollection of having heard news that the Japanese landed arms in Tientsin some days ago. A correspondent enquired whether the Secretary had any information that the Japanese had landed field artillery at Taku. Mr. Stimson replied that Taku was a village about 25 miles from Tientsin at the mouth of the river leading to Tientsin.

A correspondent asked what was expected to occur at Shanghai in view of the League of Nations' proposal. The Secretary declined to make any prophecies. The correspondent said he was

793.94/4678

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MAR 10 1932

-2-

not asking for prophecies, but that so many truce proposals had been made and there had been so many references to a round-table conference that he was confused as to what was expected to happen at Shanghai. The Secretary said, in reply, that he had heard no revocation of what had been announced, but as to what was going to happen, he would make no prophecies. The correspondent asked when the conference was expected to take place. The Secretary said he did not think any date had been set. In answer to an enquiry concerning the machinery of the proposed conference, the Secretary said that was all in the hands of the local authorities at Shanghai.

A correspondent asked if Minister Wilson would attend the meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations today. The Secretary replied that Mr. Wilson would not sit with the members of the League, although he might attend the meeting as a spectator.

A correspondent asked whether Consul General Cunningham, in his report regarding the cessation of hostilities, hazarded any opinion as to what might come out of the truce in the way of permanent peace. The Secretary replied in the negative.

M. J. McDermott.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P.R./220 FOR resp. #2618

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED Feb. 22, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Conflict.  
Discussion of in the British  
Parliament.

793.94/4679

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The hostilities between Japan and China have been the subject of frequent discussion in Parliament, when questions were put by members of the Labor Opposition regarding the intention of the British Government to encourage the application by the League of Nations of various sanctions upon Japan as a means of bringing an end to the hostilities. It cannot be said that the debates brought forth any information either of interest or of value, other than of affording proof of the wholehearted support which the Labor and advanced wing of the Liberal Parties are giving the League of Nations. The Government's replies were largely confined to a general review of the causes of the conflict and reiterated statements of its intention to refrain from making any decision other than that of offering its good services as an intermediary between the disputant parties. As the Embassy has reported in its telegrams from time to time, the British Government has been greatly embarrassed by the extension of hostilities to Shanghai. It is clear that it did not wish to participate in severe measures against Japan, but at the same time it was greatly alarmed over the possibility that the fighting which ensued after the landing of Japanese armed forces within the Settlement might

lead to the damage of the important British interests at Shanghai. It hesitated to concert measures with the United States designed against Japan, and yet it seemed to realize that action through the League would not produce substantial results.

Some weeks ago a Committee was set up within the Cabinet to follow the Far Eastern situation. This Committee comprises the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Baldwin, the Secretary for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary for India, and the Secretary for the Dominions. This Committee is predominantly Tory in politics, and it was certain that whatever its decisions were, they would not fail to reflect in large measure Conservative feelings, which are on the whole not unsympathetic towards the Japanese point of view.

On February 18th, Lord Ponsonby, who is a member of the Labor Party, again raised in the House of Lords the question of the effect upon British policy in the Far East of the dispute between China and Japan. Lord Hailsham, Secretary for War, replying for the Government, deplored the indifference of the Japanese Government to various appeals to refrain from further hostilities; at the same time, he said, the controversy had, at the request of China, been transferred to the Assembly of the League of Nations;

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

with Japan and advises it for the present to confine  
its efforts to mediation between the disputants and  
to protecting British interests in China.

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that the British Government was continuing in co-operation with the United States its efforts to bring about a settlement; but that it was of the opinion that it could not at this conjuncture join any measures hostile to Japan, as to do so would be to prejudge the merits of the case.

Meanwhile, supporters of the League of Nations in private quarters and certain sections of the press, notably those which speak for the Labor and the Liberal Parties, have been carrying on a vigorous campaign for the application against Japan of the sanctions provided by article 16 of the Covenant of the League. A resolution along these lines was adopted and promulgated by the League of Nations Union; and Lord Cecil and several other prominent members of the Union addressed to the London TIMES a letter in which they said that the domination of the Far East by a Japan animated by such a policy as was now evident in China would have disastrous consequences in India and would disrupt the Empire; They added that unless Britain would join in a concerted effort to restrain Japan, it could not avail itself of the League in the event that Japan threatened any of the British Dominions in the Pacific area. Despite these expressions of alarm, the Conservative press as a whole cautions the Government against embarking on a course which would lead to hostilities

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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793.1025  
793.94119

*Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities*  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 7 1932  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
*Jap. Land. March 3*

SEAL OFFICE OF STATE  
MAR 4 1932

Division of  
REGISTRATION  
MAR 4 1932  
Department of State

The Imperial Japanese land forces since their arrival in Shanghai and its vicinity had, in conjunction with the Imperial naval forces, made every effort to achieve the object of protecting Japanese residents by peaceful means. However, proposals based on such a desire were not, to their regret, acceded to by the nineteenth route army of China and at last hostilities were started.

Chinese forces have now retreated to positions beyond the distance originally requested by the Imperial forces, and signs are seen of peace of the Shanghai settlements being recovered and safety of the Japanese residents being reassured.

I have therefore decided to order the forces to halt for the time being at points actually held and to stop fighting, provided that the Chinese forces will not resort to further hostile actions.

General Yoshinori Shirakawa  
Chief of the Imperial Japanese land Forces

Shanghai, March 3, 1932.

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FILED  
MAR 7 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 8, 1932.

~~SEH:~~

There is attached a draft telegram to Peiping in regard to participation in plans to reorganize the municipal government of Harbin.

As this instruction will have an important bearing upon our whole policy toward the changes brought about or to be brought about in Manchuria by the creation of new Chinese authorities in that area under the domination of the Japanese, it should be given most careful consideration. My views are found in the draft telegram and in the memorandum attached and tagged (1).

For a brief account of the development of municipal government at Harbin, see my memorandum tagged as (2).

The other papers attached and tagged (3), (4) and (5) are telegrams relating to this case.




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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

*DCR*

March 8, 1932.



HARBIN SITUATION MAR 10 1932  
DIVISION OF

*file 87*

Subject: Reorganization of the Municipal Government of Harbin.

*793.94  
note  
893.101-Harbin  
893.102-Harbin*

As a result of the dispersal by pro-Japanese, Chinese forces, assisted by the Japanese military, of the Chinese authorities at Harbin representing the Nanking Government, the question of reorganizing the municipal government of that city appears likely to arise. (Peiping's 265, February 24, 11 a.m.). In reporting this fact, the Consul General at Harbin stated that he believed it advisable for the Consular Body or the extraterritorial consuls to attempt to participate in the reorganization of this municipal government with a view to obtaining for American nationals representation therein and an equitable system of taxation. The Consul General also inquired whether, in the event of such reorganization, he should attempt to obtain American representation.

In reply to this inquiry, the Department, in its telegram No. 68, February 25, 6 p.m., to Peiping, stated that, before considering the question, the Department desired to be informed briefly (a) to what extent the Consular

793.94/4681

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Consular Body at Harbin, immediately prior to the present situation, participated in the municipal affairs of Harbin;

(b) likewise, to what extent did American nationals participate; and (c) on whose initiative, the Consular Body or the extraterritorial consuls expected to act. For their immediate guidance, the Department referred the Legation and the Consul General (a) to our note of January 7, 1932, to the Chinese and Japanese Governments, which the Department felt would preclude its representative at Harbin from participating in such action, and (b) to the communication to the Japanese representative at Geneva by the President of the League Council of February 16, 1932, which the Department felt would govern the action of the other interested governments.

On February 27, 1932, the Consul General at Harbin replied (Peiping's 301/<sup>4564</sup> March 4, 1 p.m.) to the three questions raised by the Department as follows:

1. With regard to participation in the municipal government immediately prior to the present situation, the Consul General stated that neither the Consular Body nor any American national had participated.

2. The Consul General stated that in raising the question of reorganizing the municipal government, it was contemplated that the Consular Body or the extraterritorial consuls would act upon their own initiative.

3.

- 3 -

3. The Consul General then goes on to state that some years ago the Japanese Consul General made a temporary arrangement with the Chinese authorities whereby Japanese at Harbin would pay municipal taxes in return for Japanese representation on the Taxation Committee of the Municipality. However, the Japanese now desire not a confirmation of that temporary agreement but a reorganization of the municipality so that its status would be similar to that created by the Anglo-Russian Municipal Agreement of 1914. The Consul General further states that it is evident that the Japanese will bring into existence municipal government at Harbin satisfactory to them and one which undoubtedly will control the native city of Fuchiatien and other suburbs. He expresses the belief that this new municipality, if organized, will undoubtedly last for a long time irrespective of whether Manchuria becomes an independent state or remains a part of China under Japanese domination. If there is a possibility of other foreigners obtaining municipal representation either direct or through the Consular Body, he inquired whether Americans should not also avail themselves of this privilege.

In commenting on the Consul General's remarks and inquiry, the Legation states that it does not believe that he should take the initiative in calling for a reorganization of the Harbin municipal government but that, if a reorganization is effected whereby foreign residents,

chiefly

- 4 -

chiefly Russians and Japanese, have a greater voice in municipal affairs than formerly, there would seem to be no sufficient reason why the American Consul General, in association with his colleagues, should not seek to obtain equitable and non-discriminatory treatment for American residents and rights and interests, particularly in regard to all matters relating to taxation. The Legation further states that it has been the practice to give consular officers the greatest latitude in protecting the local interest of Americans irrespective of the actual status of local governments with which they have to deal and that any other principle would constantly prejudice the protection of American interests throughout the whole of China.

As it now appears that American nationals and the representatives of the American Government at Harbin did not participate in the Harbin municipal government immediately prior to the present situation, it is not believed that the Consul General either individually or in collaboration with his colleagues should take any initiative in trying to bring about a reorganization of that municipality. However, if such a reorganization is attempted by others and <sup>it</sup> <sup>th</sup> would appear that such reorganization would result in a discrimination against

American

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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American nationals, it would seem <sup>appropriate</sup> ~~only just and fair~~ that efforts should be made by the American Consul General at Harbin to see to it that American interests at Harbin were accorded similar privileges on the basis of equity and non-discriminatory treatment. A telegram along these lines has, therefore, been drafted and is attached hereto.

For further information in regard to the history of municipal government at Harbin see separate memorandum entitled "Brief Account of the Municipal Government of Harbin." *893.101-Harbin/14*

*[Signature]*  
VEJ/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.77/2843 FOR Despatch # 86.  
(# 109 to Legation).

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED Jan. 19, 1932.  
TO NAME 1-117 ...

REGARDING:

Interruption of passenger and freight service  
of the Peiping-Liaoning Line as a result of  
the military activities of the Japanese Army.

hs

793.94/4682

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 66.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, January 19, 1938.

SUBJECT: Attempt to Resume Through Traffic on  
Peiping-Liaoning Railway.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of my  
despatch No. 109 of January 19, 1938, to the Legation  
at Peiping, on the above-mentioned subject.


Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,  
American Consul General.

Enclosures:  
As stated.

800  
FPL/DA:W

Original and 4 copies to Department.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quifson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 109.

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch  
No. 66, Dated Jan. 19, 1932  
From the American Consulate General  
at Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, January 19, 1932.

SUBJECT: Attempt to Resume Through Traffic  
on Peiping-Liaoning Railway.

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, as of possible interest, a copy of Senior Consul Circular No. 3/1932, dated January 16, 1932, transmitting certain documents in connection with the recent attempt of the Managing Director of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway to resume through service on the line between Peiping and Mukden. The correspondence explains itself and is transmitted herewith in order that information may be available indicating the unsuccessful efforts put forth by the railway authorities to restore through traffic on the above-mentioned line.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:  
As stated.

800  
FPL/DA:W

Original and 1 copy to Legation.  
In quintuplicate to the Department.

A true copy of  
the signed copy  
sent.

DEUTSCHES

GENERALKONSULAT

Tientsin, January 18th, 1932.

S. C. Circular Nr. 3/1932.

The Senior Consul has the honour to  
circulate

1. Copy of a communication from the Managing Director of the Peping-Liaoning Railway, dated January 15th, 1932, with an attached translation of a statement re: Interruption of Passenger & Freight Service of the Peping-Liaoning Line;
2. Draft of a proposed despatch to the Senior Minister;
3. Draft of a reply to the Managing Director of the Peping-Liaoning Railway.

The proposed letters to the Senior Minister and to the Managing Director of the Peping-Liaoning Line will be sent on Wednesday, January 20th, at noon, unless in the meantime Dr. Betz is advised of objections.



CHINESE GOVERNMENT RAILWAYS

Peping-Liaoning Line

Tientsin, 15th January 1938.

Dr. H. Bets,  
Senior Consul-General,  
Consul-General for Germany,  
Tientsin.

Dear Sir,

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 6th instant regarding our undertaking for the resumption of passenger and goods traffic on our line.

In spite of our repeated efforts both at Shanhaikuan and Mukden, I regret that nothing has materialized. To acquaint you with full facts regarding the case, I have prepared a statement as per attached, to which I beg to respectfully invite your attention.

I understand that a separate railway administration has been organized by the puppet government set up under the Japanese auspices at Mukden to exercise control over our line from Mukden to Shanhaikuan.

Aside from the fact that the Chinese Government is bound by our Loan Agreement of 1898 not to alienate or part with the Railway Lines to a foreign power, I cannot, on the ground of operating economy and convenience to the general public, give my consent to any movement tending to disrupt the central control of the Line. I have telegraphically instructed our Mr. Steele not to hand over the control of our Outside-Wall Section to any body of pseudoadministrators, unrecognizable by law and subversive to the national interests. Pending definite instructions from my superiors to the contrary, I must del

I must

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
I must declare as null and void any undertakings entered into by any third party or parties with the aforesaid unlawful organization either in the assumption of liabilities on the part of the Peping-Liaoning Railway or in the disposal of funds or properties lawfully belonging to this Railway.

I shall be very grateful to you to make this declaration known to the Consular Body in Tientsin and thence to the respective Home Governments and their nationals through the Diplomatic Body in Peiping, and if you would be good enough to use your kind influence for the preservation of the integrity of the Peping-Liaoning Railway and the early restoration of through passenger and goods service over our whole Line and Branches.

Yours faithfully,

(sd) 高紀毅

Managing Director.

2. 1973 DECE 12  


Translation

A Statement

Re Interruption of Passenger & Freight Service of  
Peping-Liaoning Line.

As a result of the military activities by the Japanese Army along the Peping-Liaoning Line, passenger and freight traffic between Shanhaikuan and Mukden which had been interfered with for some months past came to a complete stoppage on 29th December, 1931.

Following the occupation of Chinchow by the Japanese on January 3rd I telegraphed to Mr. H. H. Steele, our Superintendent of Transportation then stationed at Mukden, to at once arrange for resumption of traffic. After considerable negotiation with the Japanese Military Headquarters at Mukden, Mr. Steele only succeeded in obtaining consent to run one service train carrying Mr. Newmarch, our Engineer, for an inspection trip. Mr. Newmarch's train left Mukden on the evening of the 7th and arrived at Shanhaikuan on the 10th, after 50 hours trip on the line.

On January 5th our train 101 Down carrying passengers and mails left Shanhaikuan, preceded by a special train in charge of Mr. James Park, our Chief Controller, and Captain Magata of the Japanese Garrison at Shanhaikuan together with a number of  
Japanese

- 2 -

Japanese soldiers and interpreters.

With the aid of Captain Magata, Mr. Park obtained consent from the Commander of the Japanese advance forces then at Hsingcheng to run our trains to Chinchow and thence onward to Huangkutun, escorted by the Railway armed police.

In spite of this arrangement, our train was held at Paimisotzu, first station west of Hsingcheng, for over 48 hours. A number of Japanese soldiers disarmed our Railway Police at the point of the bayonet, and kept them in confinement for two days and nights, and otherwise subjected them to great sufferings and privation. All our train hands as well as passengers were chased away from the train and had to walk to Hsingcheng for safety.

Another passenger train was dispatched from Shanhaikwan on the morning of the 7th also under the escort of Mr. Park and Locomotive Inspector Engstrom, carrying a quantity of mails. This train succeeded in reaching Chinchow, but was forced to stop there, unable to advance further or to return.

Only after considerable negotiation, these train stocks were at last brought back to Shanhaikwan by Messrs. Park and Coppin on the 7th and 13th respectively.

Whilst at Chinchow, our Traffic Inspector Mr. Coppin again approached the Japanese Commander to arrange for resumption of passenger trains. He received a written reply signed by Major Aomura of

the

- 3 -

of the Japanese Army saying that a Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway Administration had been organized and that all negotiations for train services must first be carried out with Administration.

Mr. W. O. Leitch, our Engineer-in-Chief, proceeded to Suichungshien on the 10th accompanied by Engineer Newmarch and interviewed the Commander of the Japanese advance forces there to arrange for the return of a number of Railway employees to their respective home stations on our Outside-Wall Section as well as sending money and provisions to alleviate the sufferings of our staff left at all roadside stations.

None of these requests were granted by the Japanese Officers. As to the resumption of passenger trains, the reply was that train running would not be safe on account of bandits. Furthermore, they said that this question must be referred to the Military Headquarters at Mukden.

In view of all these obstacles, my Administration is compelled to discontinue further efforts to run trains through from Shanhaikwan to Mukden and vice versa. The responsibility rests entirely with the Japanese Army which after needlessly destroying considerable railway tracks and structures by aerial bombs and after dispersing our railway staff by subjecting them to innumerable acts of cruelty and ignominy, has deliberately obstructed the restoration of our normal transportation service

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so very necessary to the welfare and commercial interest of all the people, both Chinese and foreign, living in North China.

Kuo Chi-Yi,

Managing Director,

Peking-Liaoning Railway.

14th January, 1932.

Copied by: *Jo*

Compared with: *Lee*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**DRAFT OF A PROPOSED DESPATCH TO THE  
SENIOR MINISTER, PEPING.**

GERMAN CONSULATE-GENERAL.

Tientsin, January 20th, 1932.

Excellency,

At the request of the Managing Director of the Peping-Liaoning Railway I have the honour to transmit for the consideration of the interested Foreign Ministers copy of a communication from the Managing Director of the Peping-Liaoning Railway, dated January 15th, 1932, with an attached translation of a statement re: Interruption of Passenger and Freight Service of the Peping-Liaoning Line.

Accept, Excellency,

etc. etc.

His Excellency

Mr. J. Garrido Cisneros,

Minister for Spain and

Senior Minister,

PEPING.

RECEIVED  
JAN 21 1932  
M. O. GUSTAFSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**DRAFT OF A PROPOSED LETTER TO THE MANAGING  
DIRECTOR OF THE PEPING-LIAONING RAILWAY.**

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DEUTSCHES GENERALKONSULAT

Tientsin, January 20th, 1932.


Dear Sir,

In reply to your letter of the 15th instant I beg to inform you that complying with your request I have circulated your letter and the attached translation of a Statement re: Interruption of Passenger and Freight Service of the Peping-Liaoning Line to the Members of the local Consular Body and transmitted a copy of same to the Senior Minister in Peping.

Yours faithfully

etc. etc.

Kao Chi-Yi, Esquire,  
Managing Director,  
Peping-Liaoning Railway,  
TIENTSIN.

FOR OFFICE OF  
M. O. GUSTAFSON  


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/4683

SEE 711.94/663 FOR communication

FROM Navy Department (Lammers) DATED Mar. 1, 1932  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Manchurian situation. Information received from Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to effect that Vice Admiral Nomura has expressed deep concern with respect to present anti-American sentiment in Japan, which seems stronger than any other anti-foreign sentiment.

tfy

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./50 FOR Despatch # 488.

FROM Japan (Forbes) DATED Feb. 12, 1932.

TO NAME 1-1127 ..

REGARDING:

Occupation of Chinchow by Japanese forces  
took place on January 3rd and thereupon  
the Japanese considered their campaign  
for the occupation of South Manchuria had  
reached its objective.

hs

794.00/  
793.94/4684

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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hs

794-007  
793.94/4684

- 2 -

B. Chamberlain Affair.

The incident in which United States Consul Calver B. Chamberlain was assaulted at Mukden by a Japanese interpreter and two soldiers, occurred on January 3rd.

II. POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

A. Occupation of Chinchow.

The long expected occupation of Chinchow by Japanese forces took place on January 3. Japanese troops of the 20th Division, numbering approximately 5,000, under Lieutenant General Muro peacefully entered the city from which the Chinese forces of General Chang Hsueh-liang had withdrawn without resistance, southward of the Great Wall. The advance of the Japanese on this occasion, as compared with their campaign of November\* was made slowly, evidently giving the Chinese troops ample opportunity to evacuate their position without fighting.

With Chinchow in their hands, the Japanese considered that their campaign for the occupation of South Manchuria had reached its objective and that major military operations had come to an end. The first major action had been against General Ma in the north\*\*, and with that successfully completed, there had remained  
opposed

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\* See Embassy's despatch No. 404, of December 4, 1931.

\*\* Ibid.

- 3 -

opposed to them in Manchuria only the Chinese troops in Chinchow, besides, of course, numerous bands of "bandits". The Harbin situation which later required action by Japanese troops, had not arisen.

B. Anti-Bandit Campaign.

With the occupation of Chinchow all organized resistance to Japanese authority was driven beyond the borders of Manchuria. Throughout the month of January, however, there have been constant reports of clashes between the Japanese troops and bandits. Some of the latter are the "hungtuzes", long the scourge of Manchuria, while others are remnants of the defeated Chinese forces and practically indistinguishable from the older bands of outlaws.

The majority of these clashes have occurred within a radius of a hundred miles of Mukden, in regions where Japanese garrisons are posted. Outside of this district there are, no doubt, numberless bands of Chinese irregular soldiers and bandits who carry on depredations with little molestation. The Japanese invaders have no little problem before them in subduing these roving marauders.

The most serious of these engagements was at Chinhai, west of Chinchow, where on the 10th of January a cavalry regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Koga encountered a superior force of Chinese and was nearly wiped out, the commanding officer himself being killed.

C. The Harbin Campaign.

On January 13, General Hsi Chia, Chairman of the new Kirin provincial government and understood to be a  
Japanese

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

March 8, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (CHINA)

82 CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE MINISTER.

In view of the intricacies of the Shanghai situation, I have taken this occasion to attempt further to clarify to you my views and the reasons underlying them. I desire that you should feel free to comment and I look to you for constructive suggestions at all times as the occasions arise because of my personal confidence in your judgment and your intimate knowledge of the existing situation and the practical problems in which we are faced and will be facing.

One. I have given to you at some length in my 77/4589d  
March 5, 9 p.m., my interpretation of the resolution passed by the Assembly of the League of Nations. After reading the debates in the Assembly at the time of its passage, I believe that my strict interpretation as to the scope of the proposed conference does not differ from that of the Assembly. In other words the immediate conference

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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proposed is a conference limited to a liquidation of the present military situation looking to a prompt withdrawal of the Japanese troops. The Assembly, in harmony with the position of the American Government, appears to have definitely taken the position that permanent concessions, either territorial or otherwise, are not to be wrung from China under the pressure of Japanese military occupation.

Two. In spite of the limited scope of the conference immediately proposed there will nevertheless arise difficult problems. Because of their practical nature, I have informed Geneva that I agreed with the suggestion of members of the Assembly that the agenda for the conference had better be worked out by the representatives of the interested powers at Shanghai in conjunction with representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments and military authorities. One of the first questions to be dealt with as suggested in your March 7, <sup>4617</sup> 8 p.m. will be the question of the security of Japanese and other foreign nationals living within the area now occupied by Japanese troops. This is typical of the questions which will have

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**Department of State**

*Washington,*

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to be worked out immediately at Shanghai by those familiar with the problems and as to which I should like your views as they develop.

Three. The reason why I have felt the scope of the coming conference should be strictly limited as described in my 77<sup>4589d</sup> March 5, 9 p.m., is the importance of keeping absolutely clear the broad issue of treaty violation which has now crystallized in the public mind throughout the world. Present indications are that the Assembly of the League of Nations will take action in line with the suggestion contained in the letter to Senator Borah which will result in further clarification and vindication of the important principle involved. In view of these considerations, it would be most unfortunate to have this issued obscured and the position weakened by an attempt of the nations who are interested in Shanghai to take advantage of the Japanese military operations to secure further permanent concessions from China in regard to the International Settlement.

Four. A strong influence will inevitably develop among foreigners in Shanghai, including Americans, to avail themselves of this opportunity to clear up long-

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Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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standing grievances against the Chinese. Realizing as I do the justice of many of these complaints and the merits from a practical point of view of some of the suggestions that will be made and without any desire on my part to be inflexible, I nevertheless believe that the main principle of the conference immediately proposed must be that no concessions of a permanent character should be demanded without the consent of the Chinese Government until the military situation has been liquidated. Otherwise all nations participating in this conference will put themselves in Chinese eyes, as joint violators with Japan of the Kellogg Pact.

Five. If and when the military situation at Shanghai is liquidated, it may be that a subsequent conference will be in order with a somewhat larger scope. In such a conference a more flexible attitude on the part of all participants, including the American representatives may be in order. The representatives of the Chinese Government themselves may find it practicable to make compromises in which all could acquiesce. At the present writing it is difficult to see how such a conference could omit consideration of the Manchurian question as one of the essential

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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elements in the problem. At such a conference the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods might be a proper subject for discussion, particularly if the Manchurian question is part of the agenda. On the subject of the boycott, however, I would be very loath to have this Government join in any pressure on China to induce her to abandon a pacific boycott, her most effective weapon against Japanese aggression in Manchuria or elsewhere, unless the problems relating to that aggression were concurrently solved. I realize the difficulties in the boycott problem and in particular the practical difficulty of separating violent boycott measures from peaceful boycott measures and I should welcome your comments on this subject.

Our policy at Geneva will be to take no further initiative and to await action by the Assembly along the lines of the Borah Letter. At the same time we are doing what we can to encourage unanimity on the strict interpretation of the Assembly's resolution in proposal of the Shanghai conference. In a telegram to Wilson yesterday I indicated the importance of having the representatives at

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Department of State

Washington,

-6-

Shanghai of the neutral powers instructed along the lines  
of my instructions to you contained in my 77<sup>4589d</sup>, March 5,  
9 p.m.

*Stinson*  
(a.d.k.)

SA:ATK:VGN

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Sent by operator M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 11, 1932

(London Embassy's despatch  
No. 2635, dated March 1)

I suggest that you may wish to  
glance at the marked parts of the  
last enclosure to this despatch.  
They refer to discussions in the  
House of Commons on the new Manchurian  
state, recognition thereof, etc.

B/  
*[Handwritten initials]*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM. RECD

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London, March 1, 1932.

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The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Supplementing my telegram No. 88, February 26, 1 p.m.,  
I have the honor to enclose copies of editorials from the  
London TIMES, TELEGRAPH and CHRONICLE and the MANCHESTER  
GUARDIAN, all of February 26th, and of the Sunday TIMES and  
OBSERVER of February 28th, which refer to or discuss the  
recent letter from the Secretary to Senator Borah regarding  
the Far Eastern policies of the United States.

I have good reason to believe that the Foreign Office  
did not encourage discussion of the Secretary's letter; but  
I am convinced from conversations which I have had with  
responsible Englishmen that the Secretary's references to  
the/

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
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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the sanctity which is attached in England, no less than in the United States, to contractual obligations have made beneath the surface a profound impression.

I enclose, as of interest in this relation, an editorial from yesterday's issue of the TIMES on the recent movements towards a truce at Shanghai, and a copy of the report of the discussions on February 29th in the House of Commons on the status of Manchuria as it may be affected by the establishment there of an independent Government.

Respectfully yours,



Ray Atherton  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures:  
Newspaper clippings as stated.

Copy sent to E.I.C., Paris.

PAPER THE TIMES

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Feb. 26, 1932.

### THE CASE FOR COLLECTIVE POLICY

Military and diplomatic activities continue side by side in the Far Eastern conflict to an extent that must be hard to parallel in any war of modern times. While new commanders-in-chief were reported yesterday to have been appointed to both armies, and portions of the tactically important village of Kiangwan were changing hands between attackers and defenders, diplomatic relations between the combatant nations have never been severed. The CHINESE MINISTER in Tokyo continues to discuss the latest developments with the officials of the Japanese Government, while the JAPANESE MINISTER does not cease to press his country's point of view in whichever city he may find the Chinese Government temporarily quartered. And in all the important capitals of the world, and particularly at this moment at Geneva, diplomatic discussions are very properly continued with a view to collective mediation at the earliest opportune moment. That—and not the sort of aggressive intervention which would merely extend the range of hostilities—must be the objective of every Government if a satisfactory term is to be put to this war that is no war, and an agreed settlement found for what is not a merely Sino-Japanese but an international problem. The very existence of the League of Nations, and the immensity of the interests of other countries in China—these of themselves make the continuance of diplomatic action unavoidable; and it is worth the serious attention of the Tokyo Government that the tendency of diplomatic and public opinion must almost inevitably become more unfavourable to Japan the longer the conflict continues. It is not that the fundamental justice of the Japanese grievances is forgotten or disregarded; but all the principal Treaties relating to China, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and the Covenant of the League, are collective instruments; and Japan, though a signatory of all of them, has chosen to act single-handed. Japan therefore is bound to be placed in one category, the other Powers in another. It is not that the other Powers are willingly dissociating themselves from Japan, for it is the last thing that any of them desire to do; but that Japan has deliberately dissociated herself from the other Powers.

This separation of Japan from her colleagues on the Council and from the United States is vividly exhibited in the Note which the Japanese Government has just addressed to the League of Nations and in the letter written by MR. STIMSON to SENATOR BORAH and circulated yesterday to all the members of the League. The American Secretary of State particularly brings out not only the collective nature of the Treaties concluded about China, but also the essential interdependence of the group of Treaties signed at Washington in the winter of 1921-22. Taken together with the Kellogg-Briand Pact, MR. STIMSON says, they form the charter of a policy of self-denial in regard to China. No one of them can be disregarded without disturbing "the general understanding and equilibrium" which the group of agreements were intended to effect. Two instruments in particular, he declares, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, constitute a programme of protection for China. The Powers at Washington, in fact, forswore the advantage which superior organization and the command of armed forces gave them over that vast disorganized country. They entered into an explicit undertaking not to exploit China's weakness. They pledged themselves in favour of "orderly development," instead of the unseemly scramble for influence and even for territory which sometimes characterized the policy of the Powers in China in the not too distant past. This self-denying ordinance must obviously be respected by all, if it is not to become merely a handicap to the nations that are true to their word. And MR. STIMSON reaches a grave conclusion. "It is clear beyond peradventure," he wrote to MR. BORAH, "that a situation has developed which cannot in any circumstances be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants of these two treaties." Furthermore, because all the Washington treaties are interrelated, "the willingness of the American Government to surrender its then commanding lead in battle-ship construction, and to leave its position at

that Japanese troops began operations in Manchuria without any previous notification having been made to—much less consultation having been taken with—the League, and that a battle was recently begun outside Shanghai in direct defiance of an urgent appeal from Geneva. Again, the complaint is made by the Japanese Government that the last Note was dispatched by the League to Japan alone, and not to China. From the very outset of the present dispute the League has been scrupulously impartial at least in form, whatever some of its more vocal supporters may have been; and it is but another example of the process which, as a direct result of Japanese policy, is separating Japan from the other Powers, that in this last instance the appeal of the Council Committee was unanimously felt to be appropriate only to Japan. MR. SARO indeed virtually admitted, in his statement before the Council on February 19, that Japan had committed "acts of aggression," and he justified them by calling attention to what he considered similar action by other Powers in recent years.

But there is wide difference between, for instance, the landing of British troops in Shanghai in 1927 and the recent landing of Japanese troops. The Shanghai Defence Force, as its name betokens, was sent, at a time of widespread Chinese unrest and danger to the foreign communities, to defend the lives and the property of British subjects in Shanghai, and for no other purpose. The League of Nations was duly notified; the force did not use the Settlement as a basis of operations or fight a battle outside Shanghai. No one for a moment denies the Japanese argument that China is not "an organized people." That is of course the reason why special international Treaties have been concluded relating to that country. When in 1927 Great Britain found it absolutely necessary to take special measures to ensure the safety of her nationals, other Powers, including Japan, did the same; and their action was taken in the spirit of the international understandings reached at Washington and roused no misgivings at Geneva. The present policy of Japan is differentiated from the measures then taken in being deliberately individual and contrary to the recommendations of the League. It is perhaps the most reassuring element of the present situation that the other signatories of the relevant Treaties are determined to pursue together the policy which they commonly adopted at Washington. They respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and will continue to help that country by all the means in their power to acquire an effective and stable system of government. They stand united—and backed by the League—for the principle of friendly collaboration. Is it too much to hope that Japan will yet join them in their constructive task?

PAPER THE TIMES

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

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### THE CASE FOR COLLECTIVE POLICY

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It is denied in Tokyo that the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty have been violated; and in their Note to the League the Japanese Government state that they are ready to stand by the obligations contained therein. One of its clauses is to the effect that the signatories will "refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States"; and by another the contracting Powers agree not to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory. Japan therefore stands once more pledged to negotiate the final settlements in Manchuria and in Shanghai in the spirit of these articles, and hope will therefore continue that closer and more understanding contact will soon have been re-established between Japan and the other Powers having interests in China. At present the tendency is all the other way. A whole difference of outlook is betrayed in the Note which Japan addressed to the League. "Japan has participated unreservedly in the process of settlement provided by the Covenant" is one of its sentences which is hardly intelligible to Western minds. They cannot but remember

that Japanese troops began operations in Manchuria without any previous notification having been made to—much less consultation having been taken with—the League, and that a battle was recently begun outside Shanghai in direct defiance of an urgent appeal from Geneva. Again, the complaint is made by the Japanese Government that the last Note was dispatched by the League to Japan alone, and not to China. From the very outset of the present dispute the League has been scrupulously impartial at least in form, whatever some of its more vocal supporters may have been; and it is but another example of the process which, as a direct result of Japanese policy, is separating Japan from the other Powers, that in this last instance the appeal of the Council Committee was unanimously felt to be appropriate only to Japan. MR. SATO indeed virtually admitted, in his statement before the Council on February 19, that Japan had committed "acts of aggression," and he justified them by calling attention to what he considered similar action by other Powers in recent years.

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PAPER DAILY TELEGRAPH

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Feb. 26, 1932.

### MR. STIMSON'S HINT TO JAPAN

MR. STIMSON's letter to Senator BORAH is an event in the development of the Far Eastern imbroglio. Letters, however, do not demand an official answer from third parties. Had the same document been despatched as a Note from Washington to Tokio such an answer would have been required by courtesy, and it might not have been of the sort that turneth away wrath. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government are now fully apprised of the mind of the American Government on what they hold to be a vital matter of American policy. Unofficially, the Japanese Foreign Office makes virtually the same reply to the letter as was made a few days ago to the League Committee of Twelve. Japan's contention is that she has not violated either the Nine Power Pact or the KELLOGG Pact, that she remains faithful to what Mr. STIMSON describes as "the covenant of self-denial" with respect to China, that she is loyally attached to the policy of the "Open Door," and that it is China, and not herself, which is troubling the peace of the Far East.

In effect, the letter to Senator BORAH completely traverses these protestations. It says bluntly that the present situation would have been avoided had the covenants been faithfully observed. It pointedly recalls the earlier American Note, which formally notified both Japan and China that the United States would not recognise any situation, treaty or agreement in violation of the covenants safeguarding American rights, and it counters the Japanese argument based upon China's chaotic condition by saying that it was well understood by all the Powers at the Washington Conference that China was "entitled to the time necessary to accomplish her development" into an ordered State.

It will be observed that Mr. STIMSON draws no distinction between China proper and Manchuria, and omits any allusion to the special privileges of Japan in the latter country. He also refers to the time question in terms which would command more general assent if, during the last ten years, successive Chinese Governments had made a serious effort to set their house in order and had loyally carried out their Treaty obligations. These omissions alone would make it impossible for Great Britain to subscribe without careful qualification to Mr. STIMSON's statement of the case, though Great Britain, and for precisely the same reasons as the United States, no less heartily desires the maintenance of the Open Door. But, as we urged the other day, it is no time for the exchange of Notes while the parties primarily concerned are talking with guns. Tokio, by now, fully understands how world opinion regards the deplorable position at Shanghai, and in particular how it is viewed in the United States. Nor will Japanese statesmen fail to take note in Mr. STIMSON's letter of the guarded but palpable allusion to the possible reaction of Japanese policy in China upon the terms of the Washington Naval Agreement.

PAPER NEWS CHRONICLE

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Feb. 26, 1932.

## AMERICA, JAPAN AND OURSELVES

Two facts underline the extreme importance of Mr. Stimson's letter to Senator Borah. The first is the excitement and even alarm which this letter has created at Tokio, as shown in the angry apologetics of the Japanese Foreign Office. The second is the warm support which the views expressed in the letter have received from both the great American parties and apparently from all sections of American opinion.

These facts would be grave enough in any case. They become far greater when the content of the Note is considered. For the essence of that is that if the violation of the Nine Powers Treaty is to be tolerated—and, of course, no denial can make the occupation of Manchuria and the invasion of Chinese territory at Shanghai other than a violation of the Nine Powers Treaty—all the other treaties connected with it, including the Washington Convention, become in the view of the American Government automatically void with it.

The reception given to the letter in the United States shows how deeply American opinion is stirred on this issue. Its reception in this country may determine for years the warmth or otherwise of Anglo-American relations.

There is fortunately no reason to suppose that the relations between the British and the American Governments are at the moment other than extremely cordial. But it is not doubtful that even friendly and moderate American opinion feels, as the passages we quoted the other day from the Scripps-Howard newspapers show, that American action in the Far East has been hampered with very unfortunate results by the caution and lukewarmness of the European Governments, not excepting our own.

This opinion may be unfair, but it is highly desirable that the impression of our lukewarmness should be removed as completely and as early as possible and it would be something of a disaster if it should grow by mishap into a fixed conviction.

PAPER MANCHESTER GUARDIAN NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Feb. 26, 1932.

### America and the Far Eastern Crisis

Unlike the other Powers concerned in the Far Eastern crisis, America has from the beginning had a consistent policy. This policy has been expressed with great lucidity in a letter, whose summary was published yesterday and whose full text is now to hand, from Mr. Stimson to Senator Borah. Various spokesmen of the Japanese Government have tried to explain away their country's contravention of treaties by arguing that, since China is disorganised, they do not apply in her case. Mr. Stimson points out that it was precisely the disorganised condition of China that made the Washington Nine-Power Treaty necessary; that, in fact, the treaty was made on the assumption that for some years to come China would be in a disorganised condition. Realising that a scramble amongst the Powers for territorial and commercial advantages must lead to conflict amongst themselves and to the final ruin of China, it was decided to leave China alone in order that she might have a guaranteed period of tranquillity in which to evolve an orderly system of Government and in order that all nations might trade in China on equal terms. Again, as Mr. Stimson points out, the Nine-Power Treaty is itself only an element in a whole series of agreements making for equilibrium in the Pacific, and a consequence of Japan's repudiation of it, if condoned, would be the general upsetting of that equilibrium. As far as America is concerned, she will under no circumstances recognise any territorial or other readjustments brought about in China as a result of Japanese aggression there. Such an attitude ought to have created a firm basis for co-operation between the United States and the League. Unhappily, so far as can be seen, the League Council is taking virtually no advantage of this almost unique opportunity.

PAPER SUNDAY TIMES

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Feb. 26, 1932.

## JAPAN AND THE POWERS

THOSE who have been impatient for a more definite policy by the Powers in relation to the Sino-Japanese dispute should not fail to note the significance of the recent trend of events. It may be that greater resolution when the operations first began in Manchuria would have lessened the risks now too evident at Shanghai: it may be, but it is not certain. What is certain is that the only way to judge the situation realistically now is to judge it as it is taking shape at the present, not as it might be if such and such a course had been pursued at such and such a moment in the past. And the situation as it is to-day, black as it remains on the surface, and still pregnant with perils, looks a good deal more hopeful than it did a few weeks ago for the cause of right and reason. There is quite a prospect that the Japanese move may defeat itself.

The rulers of Japan no less than her people must be coming to see that the task to which they have set their hands is far more arduous than they had supposed, and the advantages far less certain. To begin with, the cost in lives and money is turning out to be a serious item. More and more troops are being mobilised for the war, more and more millions voted. Meanwhile the yen is falling, and Japan's economic position, none too bright when the trouble began, is growing measurably worse. Japanese banks abroad are finding great difficulty in obtaining accommodation, and the reaction on Japan's trade and industry is likely to become increasingly severe. All these factors, when they come to be fully realised, are calculated to discredit the venture of the militarists in the eyes of the rest of the nation.

There are other considerations. Even supposing the operations are completely successful, is it certain that Japan will profit? The Shanghai campaign has been ostensibly undertaken to raise the Chinese boycott of Japanese trade; but, as "SECRETATOR" inquired pertinently on this page last Sunday, if the Chinese Government is already so weak that it cannot repress a boycott spontaneously imposed by its citizens, what likelihood is there of its being in a better position to do so when it has been further weakened and humiliated by Japanese intervention?

Japan has undertaken her task in the face of the growing opposition of the world. In acting as she has done she is disregarding the commercial

interests of friendly Powers and flouting their moral convictions. The United States has let it be known through the STIMSON Letter that her Government will not recognise the legality of any title or right which Japan may seek to obtain out of the present dispute by pressure or treaty violation. The Letter warns Japan in the plainest words of the grave implications of her action, and calls for the support of other countries. This week the Assembly of the League will consider at Geneva the request of China that it should invoke Article 15 of the Covenant, under which the signatory Powers would be obliged to declare an economic blockade of Japan. In the face of a consolidating world displeasure, and with so heavy a sacrifice of men and material demanded for such dubious results, it may be that Japan will decide to think again before pressing her plans to their fateful conclusion.

PAPER THE OBSERVER

NUMBER

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LONDON

DATE Feb. 28, 1932.

## JAPAN AND CHINA.

### THE ONE PLAIN WAY.

## TRUCE AND DIRECT NEGOTIATION.

When "face," or what we call honour, is at stake in the Far East, no bad psychologist can be a good statesman. Meddlers and muddlers in the name of peace only make it almost impossible for Japan to stop fighting. It is plainer than ever that direct negotiation between Tokyo and China is the straight means towards truce and settlement in the Far East. Those who stand in the way of that method and who directly or indirectly encourage Nanking to refuse it, are not effective friends of peace or the League, however exemplary in intention. All sane statesmen must beware of the sinister precedent of 1895, when Japan, after her victories and the Treaty of Shimonoseki, was forced off the mainland by the combined pressure of Tsarist Russia, France, and Germany. That event did as much as any single episode to make inevitable the ultimate World War.

\* \* \*

Last autumn matters might have been more delicately handled. Then, by unfortunate procedure, the question of "face" was raised publicly at Japan's expense. Now, any sort of combined intervention, impossible to devise without conveying some further suggestion of pressure in China's favour, would be more certainly the harbinger of disaster than the sequel of Shimonoseki. The other Powers, without committing themselves otherwise in any way beforehand, should encourage direct negotiation and await the suggested results:

\* \* \*

Right or wrong, the whole Japanese people believe that honour is at stake. And honour, as they see it, happens to be as much to them as better recognition of their Right to Live.

\* \* \*

At Shanghai, where Chinese resistance is stubborn and the ground difficult, Japanese reinforcements are required and will be sent to the extent necessary. This is another certainty which it is futile to blink. The War threatens to take a still graver form. "Keep out of it" is, we repeat, the irrevocable determination of the British people.

\* \* \*

By intervention ten thousand miles away we could gain no moral nor material good, and we would have everything to lose. Neither Russia, France, nor Italy will embroil themselves. Germany cannot. Neither America nor Japan in the last World War were bled and strained as we were. For them, it was in no way the same exhausting ordeal. We cannot give twice the blood and treasure already given. As a nation we need years to recuperate. Meanwhile we shall not be driven to take up arms except for national or Imperial defence in the strictest sense. Vast expense on distant and unprovoked hostilities would be our financial and commercial ruin.

\* \* \*

No journal is more devoted than are we to the cause of Anglo-American friendship and co-operation. But this country cannot really serve any good causes by courting a choice between suicide and humiliation.

\* \* \*

The time for effective mediation, whether combined or concerted, may come; but it has not come yet. MR. STIMSON'S letter to SENATOR BORAH contains for ultimate use one powerful principle to which we can all subscribe. The principle is that in future no territorial nor other advantages acquired by arms and conquest can receive diplomatic recognition until international supervision is sought.

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Meanwhile the lessons of the Far Eastern tragedy are fourfold. First, if Japan ignores restraining wisdom altogether, she will pay for it one day, though not now. Second, the way to prevent war is to deal in advance with the causes plainly tending to its outbreak. Third, this cannot be done without some kind of regular co-operation, instead of intermittent contact, between America and the League. And last, to advocate both Disarmament and Sanctions in one breath is about the climax of human absurdity.

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PAPER THE TIMES

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DATE Mar. 1, 1932.

### MEDIATION

The exertions of the Powers having interests in the Far East and of the Council of the League have so far succeeded in their task of mediation that Chinese and Japanese representatives met on Sunday night in a British warship off Shanghai. They discussed the possibility of first obtaining a cessation of hostilities and then calling a round-table conference to lay down the terms of a political settlement; and communications of a similar nature and to the same purpose have passed between the Japanese Government and the States members of the Council. ADMIRAL SIR HOWARD KELLY, who commands the British Fleet in Far Eastern waters, and who incidentally, having been for some time British naval representative to the League of Nations, has had previous experience on the borderland of diplomacy and naval service, was present as observer at the Shanghai meeting. On the Chinese side there came MR. WELLINGTON KOO and the CHIEF of STAFF of the 19th (Cantonese) Army; and on the Japanese side ADMIRAL NOMURA and MR. MATSUOKA, who is the personal representative of the JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER. It may be noticed in passing that no representative of the Japanese army was present; but that the Tokyo proposals are recognized as most important is shown by their simultaneous presentation, however informally, by MR. MATSUDAIRA to the members of the Council at Geneva. The conditions on which Japan is willing to cease hostilities are understood to be that both the Chinese and the Japanese armies should withdraw a stipulated distance, that a Commission should be formed to supervise the withdrawal, that the Commission should be primarily Sino-Japanese but assisted by neutral members, and that arrangements should then be made for the policing—an international policing is obviously suggested—of the evacuated area.

In the meantime hostilities continue, and Japanese reinforcements are being poured into the zone of battle. The plucky resistance of the Chinese troops has obviously not weakened in the least the Japanese resolution to have available as many troops as are necessary to achieve their objective. The purpose of the Japanese military operations is once more clearly set forth in MR. SATO's statement to the Council yesterday. The Chinese 19th Army, which is recruited in the Canton area and is reputed to contain a considerable Communist element, is regarded as a danger to the important Japanese colony which lives not only in the International Settlement but also, in normal times, to a large extent outside it. According to the statement the Japanese Government have no territorial design, do not wish to establish a separate—still less, it may be presumed, an enlarged—Settlement in Shanghai, and do not seek exclusive privileges. But they are determined to achieve the restricted objective of removing the forces which, in their opinion, protect and strengthen the anti-Japanese boycott movement; and if they do not now achieve it by diplomacy they imply that they will achieve it by force. Nor, in spite of the stubborn Chinese defence, does there seem any reason to doubt their ability to succeed. No doubt the ground round Shanghai lends itself to the defensive. It is low, flat, and intersected by innumerable creeks. It is thickly populated and consequently built over. Though many of the civilian population have gone many remain, and they supplement with rifle-fire the machine-gun practice of the Regulars. The terrain is in fact ideal for the defenders; and, under the peculiar conditions of this warfare which is not war, the Japanese soldiers are being shot at by occasional snipers from any window or any screen of bamboos in their front, their flanks, or their rear. The creeks provide admirable emplacements for the Chinese machine-guns, which even the Japanese tanks have not hitherto been able to silence. Nor, in the prevailing flatness, can the Japanese gunners often find satisfactory observation posts for their artillery fire. Nevertheless the Japanese military authorities have now taken the measure

settlement, such as the policing of the demilitarized zone to be created between the opponent armies, about which the military authorities on the spot are alone able to give a competent opinion; but the main negotiations must be under general direction from Geneva, where the Chinese and Japanese representatives are in contact with responsible Ministers of the interested Powers and with the Council of the League. Prompt decisions may be necessary, and it is important that the negotiations should not become too dispersed.

Geneva provides the obvious clearing-house; and the PRESIDENT of the COUNCIL yesterday laid down a programme of negotiation which seems admirably suited to rally all the elements making for peace. It includes the setting up of a Conference of the interested Powers in Shanghai, which will set about its work on the principles already enumerated—that Japan has no territorial designs and that international rights in Shanghai will be respected; and it presupposes the cessation of hostilities. SIR JOHN SIMON has been the principal figure in the Geneva negotiations which have led up to this well-contrived diplomatic programme; and he had the exceptional satisfaction of being able to expound the views of the United States at the Council table, and to show the absolute solidarity between British and American views during the present crisis. The preliminary condition that hostilities must first cease depends for its arrangement and fulfilment upon the ability of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to control their naval and military commanders in the battle zone. The most encouraging symptom of the last two days is that diplomacy seems to be getting the upper hand over force; but it might nevertheless be desirable that the meeting of the Special Assembly, fixed for next Thursday, should be postponed until it is possible to see whether a preliminary settlement has been obtained, and, if not, who is responsible for the failure.

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It is therefore probably an error of judgment to take the latest Japanese proposals as a piece of bluff or a desire to gain time, as there seems to be an inclination in some quarters to take them. If the Japanese authorities were bluffing they might be expected to insist upon a purely Sino-Japanese settlement, the negotiation of which they could break off at their chosen moment. But they have specifically invited the collaboration of the Powers having interests in the Far East, and it is hardly conceivable that they would seek to engage their exertions in promoting peace only to throw them over in favour of war. The moment is one for every party concerned to contribute everything possible to a peaceful settlement—not by insistence upon national interests nor yet by their abdication, but by the reconciliation of the interests of all. Shanghai has been built up by foreign trade, in which Great Britain holds the foremost place. Great Britain also has more troops in the area than any other foreign nation except Japan; but there is certainly no desire in this country to claim any particular precedence in the settlement or to assume any responsibilities beyond those of other countries—just as there is not the slightest support for the pusillanimous counsel of MR. LANSBURY "to withdraw our forces completely from that area and evacuate our nationals." There are certain difficult points in the proposed

settlement, such as the policing of the demilitarized zone to be created between the opponent armies, about which the military authorities on the spot are alone able to give a competent opinion; but the main negotiations must be under general direction from Geneva, where the Chinese and Japanese representatives are in contact with responsible Ministers of the interested Powers and with the Council of the League. Prompt decisions may be necessary, and it is important that the negotiations should not become too dispersed.

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(House of Commons)

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this kind of co-operation is still continuing. There is the fact that a number of

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Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)  
Attlee, Clement Richard  
Batey, Joseph  
Buchanan, George  
Cocks, Frederick Seymour  
Cripps, Sir Stafford  
Daggar, George  
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)  
Edwards, Charles

No. 47

attention of the House is the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington on 6th February, 1922, the signatories including ourselves, America, Japan and China. According to the first Clause the signatories agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China. Under Article 7 it was agreed that there should be full and frank communication between the contracting powers concerned whenever a situation arose which involved the application of the Treaty in the opinion of any one of them. How does the British Government regard these Clauses? On 13th July, 1928, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) then Foreign Secretary, said in this House:

"The Government regard Manchuria as being part of China; they do not recognise Japan as having any special interests in that territory, other than those conferred by Treaty."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th July, 1928; col. 2637, Vol. 219.]

On 30th July the same right hon. Gentleman said:

"We do not recognise Manchuria as anything but a part of China. We recognise that Japan has great interests in Manchuria. . . . But our interest is in a united China under one Government."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th July, 1928; col. 1835, Vol. 220.]

On 28th November the right hon. Gentleman said:

"Relations between Great Britain and Japan . . . are based on the obligations of full and frank communication specified in Article 7 of the Washington China Treaty, 1922. . . . In these circumstances the two Governments have agreed informally that the close contact which they desire to maintain can best be promoted and developed by constant communication and consultation between their respective Ministers at Peking."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th November, 1928; col. 395, Vol. 223.]

I should like to know whether that constant communication has been carried

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on during the last nine months. I now wish to refer to the events of last autumn. After certain regrettable incidents during the summer, on 18th September, the Japanese military representative at Mukden stated that certain Chinese soldiers had destroyed a portion of the railway—a very small portion, only a matter of a few yards—close to Mukden. On the following day the Japanese military authorities seized Mukden, the capital of Manchuria, and other centres on the line. The operations were carried out with great precision, and seemed, in fact, to be the result of previous preparation. The Chinese troops, acting under orders, piled arms and put them back in store and made no resistance. The Chinese Government immediately appealed to the League of Nations and said that they were willing to do anything which the League suggested and agree to anything laid down by the League. I think it may be taken that ever since, the Chinese Government consistently carried out that policy and decided that they would agree to anything suggested by the League. A certain number of Treaties exist, or are alleged to exist, between China and Japan relating to Manchuria. Some of them date back to pre-War times, and some are secret Treaties. Others the Chinese Government say that they have not agreed to, but they have stated before the League that they are ready to submit all these Treaties to arbitration or judicial settlement. Consistently, the Japanese Government have said that in no circumstances whatever will they allow those Treaties to be settled by the League, by arbitration, or in any other way than by direct negotiations with China, without the intervention of any third party or neutral Power.

During the autumn, in spite of the appeals of the League and the action of certain Powers, the Japanese military authorities gradually got control of the whole of Manchuria, and at the same time threats were made that they did not intend to recognise any Chinese administration in Manchuria and that they did intend to set Manchuria up as an independent State.

A few days ago that independent State was set up at Mukden, and all relations were broken off with the Chinese Republican Government at Nanking, and it

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MANCHURIA.

Motion made and Question proposed,  
"That this House do now adjourn."—  
[*Captain Margesson.*]

**Mr. COCKS:** I desire to raise the question of Manchuria in the time left at our disposal and I shall be brief as I hope we shall have an opportunity of discussing it on another occasion. I hope that any remarks that I do make will be made

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with that restraint which the situation demands. Manchuria, as the House knows, is a province of China nearly as large as France and Germany combined. There is a very large population of Chinese—some 20,000,000—and a very small population of Japanese—under 1,000,000—and owing to the climate I understand that Manchuria will never be an outlet for the surplus population of Japan. The diplomatic history of Manchuria is long and complicated and I do not intend to try to unravel it to-night.

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[Mr. Cocks.]

was stated that the new State would have as perpetual life President the ex-Emperor of China, formerly known as the boy Emperor. On 7th January, the United States of America sent a very important Note to Japan in which they stated:

"With the recent military operations about Chinchow the last remaining administration, authority, or Government of the Chinese Republic in Manchuria, as it existed prior to 18th September, 1931, has been destroyed. . . . In view of the present situation the United States Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto* nor does it intend to recognise any treaty or agreement entered into between these Governments or their agents which may impair the Treaty rights of the United States. . . . including those which relate to the sovereignty or independence of the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China. . . . The United States Government does not intend to recognise any situation or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris."

His Majesty's Government did not send a similar note, but issued a communique in which it stated that, as China had agreed to the principle of the open door, they did not consider it necessary

"to address any formal Note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the American Government's Note."

I consider that that was regrettable. Not only does it give a false impression that we do not mind so much a treaty being broken as long as the open door is maintained, but that we should tolerate an injustice if we could get a share of the spoils. It undoubtedly gave encouragement to the militarist party in Japan, and I must say that I fear that the Government cannot altogether divest themselves of some responsibility for the increasingly aggressive attitude which was adopted by the Japanese Government afterwards.

A few days ago a very important letter was published by Mr. Stimson, the American Secretary of State, and, after reviewing the circumstances of the signature of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, he stated:

"It is clear beyond a peradventure that a situation has developed which cannot under any circumstance be reconciled with the obligations of the Covenants of

these two Treaties and that if the Treaties had been faithfully observed such a situation could not have arisen."

He goes on to suggest that unless these Treaties are kept, there will have to be a reconsideration of the Three Power Naval Treaty, particularly in respect to battleship construction and the fortification of Guam and the Philippines. He also suggests that if the Governments of the world would act along the lines of his Note of 7th January

"a caveat will be placed upon such action"—

that is, the violation of Treaties and Covenants—

"which we believe will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or Treaty violation."

It is clear that there has been violation of three different Treaties, the Nine Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, and the Covenant of the League of Nations, and I trust that His Majesty's Government will do their best to influence such other Powers as they can to adhere to the position adopted by the United States. I hope that we shall inform as many Powers as possible that we shall refuse to recognise any agreement brought about by violence or the breaking of the Treaty. I hope there will be no attempt to recognise the situation in Manchuria as a price in return for a settlement at Shanghai. I think that that is very important. The Government has a great responsibility and a great deal depends upon its decisions. There is the question of disarmament, especially as applied to the Pacific. There is the question of the sanctity of international obligations, the question of the peace of the world and the security of the British Empire. All those things are involved to a certain extent in what is happening at the present time. I know that action may be troublesome, but as Hamlet found, the consequences of inaction and hesitation lead to greater catastrophies.

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Eden): I certainly make no complaint that the hon. Member wishes to discuss the important matter of the position of Manchuria. I do not think I can do better than briefly state the position as it is now, for as to that there seems to be some confusion. It is true that an independent

917

Manchuria.

administrative council has in Manchuria and that the consists entirely of Chinese actually amongst its member golian princes. This Council late details as to the orga constitution of the new Gove hon. Member said that he should not recognise that No application whatever had to us to recognise it so that has not even been considered attitude of Japan to the ment, the hon. Member rat belie his own criticisms. M Friend told the House that Ambassador in Tokio report had been officially inform Japanese Government that now know to be the case, ent State be proclaimed by in Manchuria the Japanese are no more likely to that new State than any o ment. I would remind the this is what is relevant to of our own country in the Japan has stated categorica occasions that she has no t bitions in Manchuria, and n interfering either with the the open door, or—as the man laid such emphasis provisions of the Nine P We should certainly not ag the terms of the Nine-P flouted, but in face of t given by the Japanese Gve see no justification for our anything of the kind is l place. On the 8th January, Ambassador gave a defini gorical assurance to my righ and similar assurances hav both before and after the hon. Member stated that setting up the independe Manchuria seemed to offer for independent action Government. He critici reminded us that inactio more harmful than action agree that this particular setting up of a Chinese G Manchuria would be in it for action by His Majesty's

This is not the first time Governments have been se since the Washington Tre have been many simila

PAPER PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES  
(House of Commons)

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Feb. 29, 1932.

Manchuria. 916

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SECRETARY OF STATE

AIR (Mr. Eden):

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917

Manchuria.

29 FEBRUARY 1932

Manchuria.

918

administrative council has been formed in Manchuria and that the council consists entirely of Chinese and numbers actually amongst its members two Mongolian princes. This Council is to formulate details as to the organisation and constitution of the new Government. The hon. Member said that he hoped we should not recognise that Government. No application whatever has been made to us to recognise it so that that matter has not even been considered. As to the attitude of Japan to the new Government, the hon. Member rather seems to belie his own criticisms. My right hon. Friend told the House that His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokio reported that he had been officially informed by the Japanese Government that if, what we now know to be the case, an independent State be proclaimed by the Chinese in Manchuria the Japanese Government are no more likely to recognise that new State than any other Government. I would remind the House—and this is what is relevant to the position of our own country in the matter—that Japan has stated categorically on several occasions that she has no territorial ambitions in Manchuria, and no intention of interfering either with the principle of the open door, or—as the hon. Gentleman laid such emphasis upon it—the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty. We should certainly not agree to seeing the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty flouted, but in face of the assurance given by the Japanese Government I can see no justification for our assuming that anything of the kind is likely to take place. On the 8th January, the Japanese Ambassador gave a definite and categorical assurance to my right hon. Friend, and similar assurances have been given both before and after that date. The hon. Member stated that the action of setting up the independent State in Manchuria seemed to offer some grounds for independent action by our own Government. He criticised us and reminded us that inaction might be more harmful than action. I cannot agree that this particular action of the setting up of a Chinese Government in Manchuria would be in itself a reason for action by His Majesty's Government.

This is not the first time independent Governments have been set up in China since the Washington Treaty. There have been many similar instances. As

is to be expected in the disturbed conditions which have ruled in China in recent years, events such as this, the setting up of independent or quasi-independent Governments, of schismatic Governments claiming to be free from the central authority, has been of frequent occurrence. Hon. Members will recollect the setting up of such a Government at Canton not many years ago. As a further illustration of the consequences of the little control of the central authority in China for many years past, there has been the setting up of the present position in Outer Mongolia, which was described by one who, I am sure, will commend himself to the hon. Member—Mr. Henderson, the late Foreign Secretary—in these words:

"It has for many years enjoyed complete independence from its suzerain, China."

Yet I do not remember Mr. Henderson making any representations about its independence, and I cannot even recollect the hon. Member rising in his place to suggest that such representations should be made.

There are much stronger reasons than this precedent, or the series of precedents which I have cited, why His Majesty's Government would, in our view, be wrong to take any independent action in respect of Manchuria. The events there are at present, as the House knows, definitely *sub judice* by the League of Nations. A commission appointed by that body, with the full consent, be it remembered, of the Chinese and Japanese Governments, will very shortly arrive in Manchuria, and it will be the task of that commission to hear evidence and investigate the situation on the spot. It would be wholly improper for the Government of this country, which is a member of the League of Nations, to express by action on its own account independent of the League its judgment upon a matter which is now under investigation. There is all the less justification for such a course in the fact that the Assembly of the League has been summoned to meet on 3rd March. I would ask the House to remember that this country, in this respect, unlike the United States, which the hon. Member quoted, has a double duty to discharge—its duty as a signatory to the Nine Power Treaty, which we admit and intend to fulfil, and its duty as a member of the League of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAPER PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES NUMBER  
(House of Commons)

CITY LONDON

DATE Feb. 29, 1932.

919

Manchuria.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Manchuria.

920

[Mr. Eden.]  
Nations. We are fully conscious of the former responsibility, and we could not be excused were we to neglect the latter. It has been our policy throughout the long course of this anxious business to collaborate fully, frankly and faithfully with the League of Nations and with the Government of the United States.

We shall continue in that policy. We will continue to seek for that dual co-operation until this quarrel is settled and tranquillity is restored. I think I can promise that success in the achievement of a solution of this problem is definitely nearer than it was a few days ago. I

think the justification of the policy that has been pursued is even stronger than ever it was. It is not our intention to depart from that policy in any instance. I am confident that in seeking to cooperate at once with the League and the United States, and to find a peaceful solution of the problem, we are interpreting the wishes of the House and of the country, and in that policy we shall persist.

—  
*It being half-past Eleven of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FROM

GRAY

Peiping via NR

Dated March 11, 1932

Recd 5:20 a.m.



Secretary of State  
Washington.

328, March 11, 3 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"March 11, 5 p.m. Mounted bandits estimated at 500 again attacked Mukden early today but were repulsed with a loss of two killed. A number of policemen were reported disarmed. Although there is much uneasiness among the native populace due to the advancing of bandits in the vicinity, no apprehension is felt for foreigners.

A large reception in celebration of the establishment of the new state was held at noon today at the Governor's palace which was attended by about 1000 persons, the majority being Japanese. The Commanding General of the Japanese (?) was the only Japanese speaker."

For the Minister  
PERKINS

WSB

F/LS 793.94/4686

FILED

MAR 14 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*WFE*  
*WE*

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*note*  
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*Anti-war*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**  
CORRECTED FIRST PAGE

man

GRAY

FROM GENEVA

**COPIES SENT TO  
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Dated March 10, 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 10 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Rec'd 4:15 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 11 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State  
Washington

URGENT

69, March 10, 6 p.m.

The Committee referred to in my 68, March 9, 11 p.m.,  
has completed draft Assembly resolution which is to be  
circulated as Document A ext R C G one March 10. The  
resolution in this form will be presented to the General  
Commission of the Assembly tomorrow morning. It will be  
noted that although the Pact of Paris is not mentioned  
in the final paragraph of the first resolution, neverthe-  
less, it is specifically bound with this action in the  
premises. Text follows:

"One. The Assembly, considering that the provisions  
of the Covenant are entirely applicable to the dispute,  
more particularly as regards:

(one), the principle of a scrupulous respect  
for treaties;

(two), the undertaking entered into by members  
of the League of Nations to respect and preserve as  
against external aggression the territorial integrity  
and existing political independence of all the members  
of the

F/LS 793.94/4687

MAR 18 1932

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2- #69, from Geneva, March 10, 1932

of the League;

(three), their obligation to submit any dispute which may arise between them to procedures for peaceful settlement; adopting the principles laid down by the President in office of the Council, Mr. Briand in his declaration of December 10th 1931; recalling the fact that twelve members of the Council again invoked these principles in their appeal to the Japanese Government on February 16th, 1932, when they declared 'that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any member of the League brought about in disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognized as valid and effectual by members of the League of Nations'. *on the Part of Paris*

Considering that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the League, above referred to, are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris which is one of the cornerstones of the peace organization of the world and under Article 2 of which 'the high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature and whatever origin they may be ~~which~~ may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means'.

Pending the <sup>steps</sup> decisions which it may ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute which has been referred to it,

Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions

man

3- #69, from Geneva, March 10, 1932

provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Two. The Assembly,

Affirming that it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be sought under the stress of military pressure on the part of either party,

Recalls the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and on December 10, 1931, in agreement with the parties;

Recalls also its own <sup>resolution</sup> ~~relation~~ of March 4, 1932, adopted in agreement with the parties with a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and notes that the powers members of the League of Nations having special interests in the Shanghai settlements are prepared to give every assistance to this end and requests those powers if necessary to cooperate in maintaining order in the evacuated zone.  
Three.

man

4- #69, from Geneva, March 10, 1932

Three. The Assembly,

In view of the request formulated on January 29th by the Chinese Government invoked the application to the dispute of the procedure provided for in Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In view of the request formulated on February 12th by the Chinese Government that the dispute should be referred to the Assembly in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 9, of the Covenant and in view of the Council's decision of February 19th,

Considering that the whole of the dispute which forms the subject of the Chinese Government's request is referred to it and that it is under an obligation to apply the procedure of conciliation provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant and if necessary the procedure in regard to recommendations provided for in paragraph 4 of that same article,

Decides to set up a committee of nineteen members, namely, the President of the Assembly who will act as Chairman of the Committee, the members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute and the ~~representatives~~  
tives

man

5- #69, from Geneva, March 10, 1932

~~representatives of~~ six other members to be elected by  
secret ballot.

This committee exercising its functions on behalf  
of and under the supervision of the Assembly shall be  
instructed:

(One), to report as soon as possible on the cessa-  
tion of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements  
which shall render definitive the said cessation and *shall*  
regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in con-  
formity with the Assembly resolution of March 4th, 1932.

(Two), to follow the execution of the resolutions  
adopted by the Council on September 30th and December 10th,  
1931.

*200\*  
116 from Geneva*

(Three), to prepare the drafts of an agreement to  
be submitted to the Assembly, for the purpose of facili-  
tating, in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3 of  
the Covenant, the settlement of the dispute;

(Four), to propose if necessary that the Assembly  
submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice  
a request for an advisory opinion;

(Five), to prepare, if need be, the draft <sup>of the</sup> report  
as soon

mam

6- #69, from Geneva, March 10, 1932

as soon as provided for in Article 15, paragraph 4, of  
the Covenant;

(Six), to propose any urgent measure which may ap-  
pear necessary;

(Seven), to submit a first <sup>report</sup> report to the Assembly  
as soon as possible and at latest on May 1, 1932.

The Assembly requests the Council to communicate  
to the Committee, together with any observations it may  
have to make, any documentation that it may think fit  
to transmit to the Assembly.

The Assembly shall remain in session and its Presi-  
dent may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary".

WILSON

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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MAR 11 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM  
GRAY  
GENEVA

Dated March 10, 1932  
Rec'd 6:53 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

MMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 11 1932  
RECEIVED  
MAR 11 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/4688

70, March 10, 10 p.m.

Supplementing my 69, March 10, 6 p.m., apparently  
reference to the Kellogg Pact was omitted in the final  
paragraph of part one of the text of the resolution for  
the reason that the point was raised that certain mem-  
bers of the League of Nations were not signatories to  
the Kellogg Pact. However, this question is being agi-  
tated tonight and discussion is taking place as to  
whether it will not be possible to insert a final  
phrase reading somewhat as follows:

"or in so far as concerns signatories of the Pact  
of Paris by means contrary to that Pact".

WILSON

FW OX

MAR 18 1932

WILSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FE

793.94  
note  
893.1025  
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REP


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Shanghai via N. R.

FROM Dated March 11, 1932

Rec'd 8:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



March 11, 2 p. m.  
My March 10, 4 p. m.

Japanese Minister this morning handed the British Minister the following letter dated March 10th which Sir Miles in turn handed to the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"I am in receipt of your note of today's date together with its enclosure, a copy of a statement from Mr. Kuo Tai Chih expressing preparedness to enter into negotiations with us.

I should very much like to have our representatives meet you and other colleagues and the Chinese representatives at your office tomorrow as suggested. But I regret to say that as the Chinese have now brought forth, as the basis of negotiations, conditions which I understand were not embodied in the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations, I am unable to do so, unless I feel myself sure as to the exact meaning of these conditions. One refers to a reservation made by Dr. W. W. Yen, I wonder what that

"no

F/LS

793.94/4689

MAR 15 1932

FILED

REP

2- from Shanghai, Mar. 11, 2p.m.

"no condition" exactly means. I am wiring to Geneva to enquire about its meaning and as to how that ex parte reservation was treated.

Another refers to the wording "complete withdrawal". Would you not be kind enough to make enquiry with the Chinese if they attach some particular meaning to the word "complete", this word is not found in the resolution.

In the meanwhile, I wish to assure you, and through you the Chinese side, that we have been confining our stand within the wording of the League resolution, no more no less."

JOHNSON

RR

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



January 31, 1932.

I have discussed this matter with  
Mr. Joslin of the Executive Offices, White  
House. We have reached the conclusion that  
no action is required. Mr. Joslin states  
that acknowledgment has been made by The  
White House of the receipt of Mr. Moore's  
letter.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED

JAN 30 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 5 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

January 29, 1932

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
JAN 30 1932  
Department of State

793.94/4690

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Please find enclosed herewith  
the original of a letter from Mr. Frederick  
Moore. I am not acquainted with him  
personally, but it is possible that his  
information may be of some use.

Yours faithfully,

*Herbert Hoover*

793.94

FE  
*W.P. fu*

MAR 5 1932  
PENDING

THE CENTURY ASSOCIATION  
7 WEST FORTY-THIRD STREET  
NEW YORK

July 28 '32

Dear Mr President,

I am deeply concerned over the situation that has arisen between the U.S. and Japan. I cannot believe the reports that our government contemplates anything in the nature of a boycott of Japan (as the newspapers say) but I view with alarm the continued working up among Americans of hostility to the Japanese and the consequent resentment on their part towards us. After twenty-five years of American interference in Far Eastern affairs (which has not helped but harmed China) the Japanese are now

in a mood to tolerate  
it no longer.

I feel it a duty to offer  
you the benefit of my long  
and intimate study of  
the situation and I hope  
that you will let me  
speak to you on the  
subject. I have no interest  
or desire but to assist  
you.

I will be in Washington  
to morrow, and can be  
reached by telephone  
at my home, 3117-35 St. NW.

I remain, Mr President,

Respectfully yours

Frederick Moore

To the Honorable  
Herbert Hoover.

Mr. Cusack

Do you know anything  
about this letter? Our  
records fail to disclose  
such correspondence.

Kraus  
412

JAN 28 / 32  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DCR-412

I think the  
letter from Chester  
Rowell is in  
the Secretary's  
office

~~LS~~

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 28, 1932.

DCR:  
Mr. Drissel.

The letter from Chester Rowell relates to "currents and undercurrents in Chino-Japanese politics." He also refers to a conversation with Mr. Neville in Tokyo.



FD/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

January 16, 1932

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have read with interest the letter from Mr. Chester Harvey Rowell of January 1, and enclosures, which you were so good as to send to me; and the memoranda have been read by officers of the Far Eastern Division of this Department. I wish to thank you for your courtesy in making this material available to me.

793.94/4690A

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Wky

The Honorable  
Ray Lyman Wilbur,  
Secretary of the Interior.

FE:SKH/ZMF      FE  
1/13/32

A true copy of  
the signed original

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
11 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS

GRAY  
Geneva  
FROM  
Dated March 11, 1932  
Rec'd 8:5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 11 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State  
Washington.

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 11 1932  
Department of State

114, March 11, 10 a. m.

The Secretary General has circulated the following information received from the Netherlands Delegation, March 7:

"The Netherlands Consul General in Shanghai communicates on March 7 that skirmishes have taken place in the north sector near Liuho and that the Commander of the Chinese 19th Army states that his army took no part therein but that it was perhaps the 47th Division recently arrived which was engaged. Contradictory rumors were in circulation regarding the fusillades in the central sector; as regards the Japanese activity beyond the line mentioned in the communication of March 5th (see document a extraordinary). It seems that the Japanese have occupied the station of Wangtu six kilometers to the west of Nanziang and the village of Wangtu situated about three kilometers to the south of the railway line. The Netherlands Consul General was seeking confirmation of this information. He adds that the Chinese civilian population of the countryside to the

F/L S 793.94/4691

FILED  
MAR 13 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#114, from Geneva, Mar. 11, 10 a.m.

to the southwest of Shanghai is leaving in the direction  
of Hangchow and that the Chinese soldiers have taken away  
the machinery of the Lunghua arsenal situated near the  
Whangpu River some kilometers above Shanghai."

GILBERT

KLP

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 10 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Tokyo, February 14, 1932

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 7 - 1932  
Department of State

*FE*  
*Letter drafted*  
*to Forber Mar 2*  
*1932*  
*Mild*  
*across*

*note*  
*1/19.25*  
*793.94*

Dear Mr. Stimson:

I would like to give you as full an account of what has been going on as I have it before the steamer goes this morning.

We were not surprised that you should have looked somewhat askance at the part we played and from the way it was presented to you I rather feared this might happen.

After the discussion of your five points with Yoshizawa, I endeavored to work out a formula calculated to accomplish the purposes and at the same time accommodate the views that I knew the Japanese were holding from what Mr. Yoshizawa had said. I had got as far as thinking that the first point -- the cessation of hostilities -- might be elucidated by an agreement on the part of Japan not to regard isolated instances of hostilities as justification of general retaliatory movements. It seemed to me the second point might be put in fourth place, namely, the cessation of hostilities, and have it contingent on the withdrawal having taken place. The Japanese had, so far as I can see, not accepted any of the points, as I think I indicated in my telegrams to you. They merely said in regard to the ~~second~~, third, and fourth that they were willing to have their representatives in Shanghai talk about them, and I had as indicated in my cable to smoke Yoshizawa out by getting him to say that we could construe this as an acceptance in principle; but while he said "in principle," he indicated that the details had to be worked out on the ground, and I inferred from his position that there was going to be difficulty in controlling the neutral territory. I had reason to suspect that the Japanese were determined to participate in that. It seemed to me highly desirable that that be avoided because the feeling was running so high between the Japanese and Chinese that these patrols were almost sure to get into active fighting at one point or another.

*regard to further*

*preparation of further*

F/LS 793.94/4692

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

MAR 14 1932

- 2 -

*note  
119.25*

I asked Neville to talk these things over with Sir Francis Lindley, which he did. My next step was to do what I have always done in other activities: to develop the position of the other person without revealing my own. As I cabled you, this was with the object of getting some concrete suggestion to send back to you as my recommendation for your next move. I wanted to find out what the Japanese felt about the wisdom of the next representations coming from a concert of Powers or whether it had best come as developments in Shanghai, apparently growing out of negotiations there. My reason for this was very difficult to send you by our incomplete and imperfect code system. I had been informed by McIlroy that his code had not been changed for a year and a half and was utterly unsafe. Johnson, while he did not say how long since his code was changed, said it was long enough so that he did not dare send any really important messages by it. Neville said merely that his code was unsatisfactory. All this accounts for sending the three messages by my own personal code, where there is no chance of the Japanese breaking it unless they could get into my files, which of course I keep locked up all the time.

The critical point was that the British Ambassador, who is not an alarmist, believed that the Japanese Army was so much out of hand and not under the control of the conservative element of the government that there was an actual danger of their attacking Hongkong and sweeping down and taking over the coast cities of China; and that they might even launch an attack against the United States fleets with submarines in the hope of crippling our Navy to a point that would be of less magnitude than theirs. He said they knew it would be suicidal to do this, but the Japanese had worked themselves up to a frenzy of patriotism, and suicide is a national and established method of expressing themselves. While I did not believe these things to be imminent or possible, I could not ignore the views of my colleague; and the situation was so tense here that such careful observers as Fleisher, who said that never in his experience had there been anything like it and had questioned us about the personal safety of himself and wife, all of which you know; and another long-time observer, like Mr. Moss, the engineer, said the situation was tense. Some Americans who live near the Embassy would not move to other parts of the city, as by being near the Embassy they could get refuge in the compound for their children in case of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

mob violence. The police guards were redoubled around the Embassy, and there was a tremendous feeling of bitterness and excitement, due in part to war psychology and in part to the resentment to the repeated protests with which we have punctuated the Japanese movements, and in part to the intense feeling incident to election time, with a change in government impending and the different factions hurling violent epithets at each other and unfortunately culminating in the assassination of Inouye. With the young element in the Army so much in control, the older heads seemingly unable to handle them, it was very hard to say what would happen. The situation was delicate in the extreme, and it was just at this juncture that Neville and McIlroy went out to get information that I wanted.

They represented that they did not represent their Governments in any sense, coming wholly without orders; all that I had asked them to get was how any new proposition had best be presented, and not what the proposition was to be. I did not ask them to discuss that. They did, however, take occasion to point out to the Japanese with whom they talked the very unfortunate position that Japan was placing herself in internationally, and in what an unfavorable light they were getting into, owing to their unwillingness to make concessions. They urged conciliatory policies and a willingness to make some concessions, so that this intolerable situation of constant warfare would be ended. As I cabled you, they were at first coldly received, although Nagai, with whom Neville talked, said that the position in the Foreign Office was extremely difficult and that it was felt that Japan did not have a friend in the world; the only country that had given any encouragement to them was Spain, all the others condemned their activities. But I have a very strong suspicion that the controlling influence in the change of attitude which took place during the day was that Takahashi, the Finance Minister, had realized that all this was running his Government into bankruptcy and that there was no possible way of financing with <sup>foreign</sup> loans any of these activities of war. He had got the Ministers of War, the Navy, and the Foreign Office thoroughly frightened, and they were ready to grasp at any feasible solution.

Both Neville and McIlroy had been told that the

- 4 -

Japanese thought that any new proposition should develop at Shanghai and the reason, I have no doubt, was the tense feeling that was forming against the United States and the idea that if these things were ordered by a concert of Powers it would be an indignity to Japan and an act almost of hostility -- something they could not accept without loss of prestige. At any rate, both Neville and McIlroy were asked to come back and were met with enthusiasm, cordiality, and a readiness on the part of the Japanese to make concessions such as were indicated to you as a suggested basis of compromise.

I knew nothing of all this, as the first interviews they had were so inconclusive and meaningless that they did not even report that they had had them. But the next day, which was Saturday, apparently the Foreign Office, the naval Chief of Staff, and the military authorities had conferred and agreed to instruct their representatives in Shanghai to enter into negotiations along the lines I have indicated to you by a cable of that day.

*but there is no doubt*  
I was naturally considerably disturbed, as I was afraid that my formula might have been presented to them and served as a suggested basis for their proposition, but Neville assured me that he had not shown them anything ~~although~~ *although* the Japanese proposition ~~did not~~ *followed* arise ~~out of~~ the conversations they had with our representatives. Meanwhile, the Secretary of the Navy had sent Admiral Toyoda to talk with the British Ambassador. Apparently the British embassies are much freer to act than ours and have authority to deal with their representatives for the British Ambassador immediately reported the Japanese suggestion and stated that he had plenty of China authority to telegraph to his representative in Shanghai to enter into negotiations along those lines. The Japanese wanted me to do the same, but I said that I could take no steps without first communicating with Washington and that I had no authority to deal with Cunningham, and the most that I could do was to telegraph him that I was asking Washington to authorize him, Cunningham, to start negotiations. The exact wording of my telegram to him was contained in the one I sent to you simultaneously.

Your strict caution to us not to indicate the approval of our Government in these new steps came in at this time, but we had given no indication whatever of the position of our Government, the officers of our

- 5 -

staff acting wholly as individuals and expressly stating they did not represent their Government. I ~~have~~ had no personal contact with any of the ministers or their subordinates, in fact, I had not moved in the matter so far as contact with the Japanese were concerned at all.

On Sunday morning, Admiral Toyoda came and spent two hours with me, outlining the whole Japanese historical sequence of events. And two days later, Mr. Matsumoto was sent to see me by Prime Minister Inukai and Mr. Yoshizawa.

I was naturally very much disturbed at getting your telegram saying that what we had done here had embarrassed your negotiations there. The effect here was extremely fortunate, and I am unable to see where the situation has been in any way injured. The tenseness has disappeared, and the relations that we now have with the Foreign Office, the Navy, and the military are much more cordial. Captain Johnson is now getting much more information and is better received; the feeling of hostility and tenseness has passed.

There is no doubt at all that there was a very strong feeling among the Americans and Japanese that war was imminent between our countries on Friday and that now this seems very largely to have gone by, to the intense relief of everybody in this vicinity.

The only unfavorable comment which has reached us from any direction is that contained in your cables. And yet, while we might have given you fuller information as to these steps as they were occurring, looking back, I cannot see anything with which to blame myself or the staff, and I cannot see how the situation has in any way been injured by what has been done. The Japanese were going ahead to send their troops to China, whatever we said or did. The only thing to stop it would have been an agreement by the Chinese to stop hostilities and also to withdraw beyond the effective distance of artillery of median range. Yesterday, as I am cabling you today, at a hurried conference of five ambassadors held in the course of our reception at the Embassy, all five were agreed (the British, French, Italian, German and yours truly) that a quiescent policy on the part of the Powers was the only safe one at the present time and that the Japanese should be allowed to carry out their plans in

- 6 -

regard to the neutral zone at Shanghai.

At this reception, Mr. Araki, the Secretary of War, and Admiral Osumi, the Secretary of the Navy, were most cordial, a rather unusual thing in times like these. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Yoshizawa, was also there; the Prime Minister did not come. There were seven Princes of the Blood, including Prince Chichibu and Takamatsu and their Princesses. All were most cordial.

Respectfully yours,

*W. Cameron Forbes*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 5, 1932.

Dear Mr. Forbes:

As a matter of form, I am acknowledging the receipt of your letter of February 14, 1932, although I realize that it is quite possible that you will have left on your return to the United States before this letter reaches you. I shall not take the time at this moment to reply but shall count on having an opportunity to talk the matter over with you when you come to Washington.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

The Honorable  
W. Cameron Forbes,  
American Ambassador,  
Tokyo.

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

*SKH*

MAR 8 1932

A true copy of the signed original

793.94/4692

Confidential File

*ACE*  
*WE*  
~~SECRET~~

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Geneva

Dated March  
Rec'd 9:10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
11 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 17 1932  
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 11 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

113, March 11, 9 a. m.

The Secretary General has circulated the following communication received from the Chinese delegation:

"For the information of the Assembly I have the honor to communicate to you the following telegram dated March 8th which I have just received from the Honorable Mr. T. V. Soong, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and concurrently Minister of Finance.

Inspector General F. W. Maze reported receipt of the following telegrams dated March 8th from R. M. Talbot, Commissioner of Customs at Antang, Manchuria:

(One) 'The Japanese Consul privately informs me to be prepared for request from the Superintendent to hand over possibly at once'.

(Two) 'The Superintendent received instructions from the Northeast Administrative Committee that the customs be under its control; that the Superintendent carry on; and that a certain Japanese has been 'invited to be adviser of your office'. When there is any question you are to consult with him how to carry on'.

Two other Japanese appointees have arrived to assist in taking over but no indication as yet how the new customs

is to

*793.94*  
*note*  
*500.0112*  
*693.0029 Manchuria*

E/LS  
793.94/4693

NOV 18 1932

FILED

REP

2-#113, from Geneva, Mar. 11, 9a.m.

is to be staffed. The Consul says the present customs employees have the option of joining up but the old salaries, et cetera, will not be paid.

In submitting the above I have the honor to state that my Government will not for a moment countenance the (of?) usurpation or its administrative powers by the so-called Northeast Administrative Committee at the instigation of the Japanese authorities for the taking over of such customs revenues cannot but disrupt the services of domestic and foreign loans secured thereon. W. W. Yen."

GILBERT

WSB

HED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FILE*  
*WE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

Geneva

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
11 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION

Dated March 11, 1932

Rec'd 9:25 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 15 1932  
DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 11 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington

115, March 11, 11 a.m.

The Secretary General has circulated the following communication received from the Chinese delegation March 10:

*793.94*  
*note*  
*500.C111*  
*793.94117*  
*893.102-5*

"Referring to my letter of March 9, in which I informed you that my Government had communicated to the Japanese Minister in China through Sir Miles Lamson, H. B. M. to China, its readiness to enter into armistice negotiations on the basis of the Assembly resolutions of March 4th and of my understandings of the same, I have now the honor to communicate to you the reply of my Government to His Excellency's Mr. Shigemitsu's communication on the subject, received by my Government through Sir Miles Lamson at 5:30 p.m., on March 9: the Chinese Government having accepted the resolution of the League of Nations of March 4th is prepared to enter into negotiations with the

F/LS 793.94/4694

MAR 16 1932

FILED

the

MET

2-#115 from Geneva, March 11,  
11 a.m.

the Japanese authorities in accordance with the terms of paragraph three of the resolution and on the understanding as stated by its chief delegate, Dr. W. W. Yen, in accepting the said resolution that;

(one), such negotiations are limited to matters pertaining only to the definite cessation of hostilities and the complete withdrawal of Japanese forces and

(two), no condition is to be attached to such withdrawal.

"The Chinese Government has already announced <sup>through</sup> its chief delegate at Geneva, its readiness to enter into negotiations for the purpose and on the understanding as above mentioned and has presumed that the Japanese authorities have been fully aware of this fact.

The receipt through Sir Miles Lamspon at 5:30 p.m. on March 9th of the communication of the Japanese authorities makes it clear that they are equally ready to enter into the proposed negotiations. The Chinese Government considers therefore the way open for commencing such negotiations". W. W. Yen".

WWS-KLP

GILBERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*WEE*  
*WE*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 11 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 15 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
Geneva

FROM

Dated March 11, 1932  
Rec'd 10:05 a.m.

MET  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

71, March 11, 2 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 1 1932  
Department of State

*793.94*  
*note*  
*500.0111*  
*711.0012 - anti-war*  
*793.94119*  
*893.102-S*

Gilbert is reporting events of this morning's session  
of the General Commission of the Assembly, (see his 116,  
*not yet received*  
March 11, 2 p.m.).

After sending my telegram No. 70, <sup>4688</sup> March 10, 10 p.m.,  
our advice was repeatedly sought on the question of insert-  
ing in the final paragraph of part one of the resolutions  
a reference to the Pact of Paris. We took the position  
that the inclusion of such a reference in the forcible  
portion of the resolution could not fail to call attention  
to the reasons for cooperation between the members of the  
League and the United States as well as providing in the  
future a common ground on which we might act.

Early this morning Simon asked me to call and spoke  
of the matter. I took the same line with him which he  
declared was entirely in accordance with his own thoughts  
and said he would raise the question in the open meeting.

You will

F/LS 793.94/4695

FILED

MAR 16 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#71 from Geneva, March 11,  
2 p.m.

You will see from Gilbert's report that he did this effectively and that the words "or contrary to the Pact of Paris" were inserted at the end of the final paragraph of part one.

Confidentially I learn that Sato has received instructions to abstain from voting on the resolution at this afternoon's meeting and to explain the reasons therefor.

WILSON

RR-WEB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94  
note  
893.1025  
893.124  
REP



COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.,  
Dated March 11, 1932  
Rec'd 10 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

181, March 11, 5 p. m. /4646

In continuation of my 174, March 9, 4 p. m., I desire to advise the Department that Fessenden called to discuss the sanitation of Extra Settlement areas now in the control of the Japanese Charge d' Affairs and I invited ~~to~~ *consultation* Brennan to participate. It was learned that the Shanghai Municipal Council had a very extensive report from the chief medical officer of the Council regarding conditions existing in the districts to the east of the railway beyond the Settlement limits and a general report in regard to Chapei. The most insanitary part is that part east of Saygin Creek. Thereupon the Consular Body meeting was convened of the consular representatives concerned to the end that Fessenden might make a statement to the entire Consular Body. At the meeting at 2 o'clock Fessenden stated that the Council felt that it alone possessed the organization and equipment to cope immediately with the menace and accordingly Fessenden and the Chairman of the Council had called on Mayor Wu of the Shanghai Municipality that morning



F/LS 793.94/4696

FILED

MAR 15 1932

REP

2-#181, from Shanghai, Mar. 11, 5p.m.

morning and represented the hygienic dangers of the situation to him, and expressed the desire of the Council to remove, through the Shanghai Municipal Council, public health and public works departments, the threat in the Chapei districts to public health in the Shanghai areas and asked the Mayor if he had any objection to the Council undertaking this work at once. The Mayor replied that he agreed in principle, but wanted us informed in detail concerning the proposed work, in pursuance of which he suggested that his Commissioner of Public Health call on the Shanghai Municipal authorities 3 p. m.; this visit was agreed to. The work would be done entirely at the expense of the Council. The Council understood the Japanese authorities would not oppose the work (Consul General Murai confirmed this statement on the proviso that he was first informed when and where the Council proposed to enter on its sanitary activities in Chapei) and if the consent of those concerned could be obtained the Council proposed to commence operations on March 13th or 14th. The Council's representative had also told the Mayor that the Council was willing to turn this sanitary work in Chapei over to the local authorities immediately those authorities announced they were in a position to undertake it. He stated that the Council realized that in carrying out health  
measures

REP

3-#181, from Shanghai, Mar. 11, 5p.m.

measures in Chapei it was, strictly speaking, going outside its province, but it felt its action was justified in the interest of public health of all the Shanghai areas. Accordingly the Council wanted the Consular Body to support it in its action, or at least to say that it did not disapprove of its projected course. The Council expected to exchange official written communications with the Mayor on the subject of its proposed sanitary work in Chapei, which communications would be made available to the Consular Body. Fessenden in reply to inquiries stated that the Council intended to confine its work to sanitation and that it was to be done on behalf of the Chinese administration but at no expense to it. The Consular Body unanimously stated that it would seem that the Shanghai Municipal Council should be commended for the proposal since its limitations were so definite as stated by Fessenden.

Repeated to Legation and Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM REGU  
TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Collect  
Charge Department

or  
Charge to \$

This code was sent in Confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.



Washington,

March 10, 1932.

MAR 10 32

793.94/4696A

WILSON,  
BERGUES,  
GENEVA (Switzerland).

89 793.94/A  
monte  
893.102-S  
Nov 893.046

Confidential  
code

42 At the press conference this morning the question was asked, presumably on the basis of newspaper reports, whether the United States was planning to take the 31st infantry out of Shanghai and the answer was made that we have no present intention of withdrawing the 31st infantry and that the question of withdrawal is not repeat not under consideration.

You may so inform inquirers.

Confidential  
code

For your confidential information and guidance, in case such reports are brought to your attention and questions are asked by responsible persons: some discussion of such a possible move appears to have been indulged in by some American authorities in the Far East.

FE: SKH: CLS      FE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

136

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

PM RECD  
TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR



Department of State

Washington, *Ray*

Charge to  
\$ 1/A

March 10, 1932. *Cepm*

*793.94/A*  
*893.0146*  
*817.23*  
*893.102-S*

**MAR 10 1932**

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
SHANGHAI (China).

793.94/4696B

**90** At the press conference this morning the question was asked, presumably on the basis of newspaper reports, whether the United States was planning to take the 31st infantry out of Shanghai and the answer was made that we have no present intention of withdrawing the 31st infantry and that the question of withdrawal is not repeat not under consideration.

~~You may so inform inquirers.~~

*Stinson*

*SKH*

FE:SKH:CLS

FE

*SKH*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

March 10 1932.

No. 1997

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,  
American Minister,  
Berns.

Sir:

The Department encloses, for your information, copies of telegrams, as listed below, received by the Department in regard to developments in Manchuria for the period January 1 to February 29, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your communicating the information contained in the enclosure to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in these messages.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

JAMES GRANTON ROGERS

Enclosures:

Telegrams from Peiping:

- (20) January 5, 5 P.M. (Extract)
- (32) January 7, 5 P.M. (Extract)
- (45) January 11, 10 A.M. (Extract)
- (61) January 18, 2 P.M. (Extract)
- (77) January 16, 10 A.M.
- (81) January 16, 5 P.M.
- (83) January 17, noon (Extract)
- (100) January 20, 3 P.M. (Extract)
- (107) January 22, 3 P.M. (Extract)

March 8, 1932. L.

793.94/4696C

793.94/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

(121) January 25 (Extract)  
 (128) January 26, 1 P.M. (Extract.)  
 (138) January 28, 5 P.M. (Extract)  
 (144) Undated  
 (147) January 29, 4 P.M.  
 (171) February 1, 4 P.M. (Extract)  
 (186) February 3, 1 P.M. (Extract)  
 (169) February 3, 4 P.M.  
 (201) February 6, 11 A.M.  
 (207) February 7, 5 P.M. (Extract)  
 (230) February 15, 6 P.M. (Extract)  
 (235) February 16, 1 P.M. (Extract)  
 (249) February 19, 10 A.M. (Extract)  
 (260) February 21, 2 P.M.  
 (266) February 24, noon  
 (269) February 25, noon  
 (272) February 25, 4 P.M. (Extract)  
 (277) February 27, 10 A.M.  
 (279) February 27, noon. (Extract)

MAR 8 1952 P.M.  
 3427X  
 MMS

FE:RFB:KC  
 3/4/32

FE  
 SIK

COPY:KC

EXTRACT

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 5, 1932

Rec'd 2:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

20, January 5, 5 p.m.

Following from Harbin:

"January 4, 4 p.m.

One. On January second and third the business section of Harbin seethed with excitement, due to a Russian crowd gathering in front of a Chinese shop whose employees were accused of beating a Russian customer on December 31st. To disperse the crowd the Chinese police blocked off a portion of Kitakukaia Street, and on both days at odd times fired from rifles up and down the street. Six Russians and one Chinese police were killed and over 20 Russians were wounded, some very seriously.

Four. American, British, French and Japanese consuls held an informal meeting yesterday to discuss the situation and decided to point out to the Chinese authorities the seriousness of the situation and to request them to take all possible measures to safeguard the lives and interests of our respective nationals."

JOHNSON

KLP  
CSB

EXTRACT

MET

2-#32 from Peiping via H.R.,  
January 7, 1932.

guard troops, assured the Consular Corps through the Senior Consul that he could maintain peace and order here".

"January 6, 10 a.m. No serious incidents occurred last night at Harbin. In addition to large numbers of police a big force of General Ting Chu's railway guard soldiers patrolled the streets which were deserted because the frightened population stayed indoors. Shops, theatres and restaurants have suffered heavily financially owing to petite reign of terror caused by the Chinese police shooting up and down the street which put a damper upon the Christmas holiday spirit of the Russians. Soldiers and police still much in evidence this morning".

JOHNSON

WSB

COPY:KC

EXTRACT

REP

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 11, 1932

Rec'd 3 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

48, January 11, 10 a.m.

Following from Consul General at Harbin:

"January 9, 11 a.m.

One. At noon on January 7 at Tsitsihar General Chang Ching Hui announced that he had on January 3rd taken over the control of all military and civil affairs in Heilungkiang Province with the title of Shengchang and notified Chinese Government orally in only Mukden, Kirin and Harbin to this effect."

JOHNSON

JHR-WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:KC

EXTRACT

Peiping via N.R.

REP

Dated January 13, 1932

Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

61, January 13, 2 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"January 11, 2 p.m.

Local Chinese officials and press state that yesterday at 2 p.m. a Japanese airplane dropped bombs Pinhsien where meeting of representatives from districts not under control of Hsi Chia was taking place and that some casualties and damage resulted. Report confirmed by an American missionary who sent Chinese doctor to treat wounded, but Ohashi informed me that the Japanese military mission here stated that it had received no report of such bombing."

JOHNSON

HPD  
KLP

EXTRACT

NR

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated January 17, 1932

Rec'd 3:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

83, January 17, noon.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"January 16, 1 p.m.

One. Local Chinese officials have received a telegram from Yushu stating that very early yesterday afternoon and at three p.m. aeroplanes dropped nine bombs that town wounding several people and that it was feared bombing would be repeated today and requesting that an appeal be sent to Kirin asking for cessation of attacks in order to spare the lives of the inhabitants.

Two. Ohashi admits the bombing but states that he has no detailed report concerning it."

JOHNSON

KLP

**EXTRACT**

**MET**

**Peiping via N.R.**

**Dated January 20, 1932**

**Rec'd 4:40 a.m.**

**Secretary of State,  
Washington**

**100, January 20, 3 p.m.**

**Following from American Consul General at Harbin:**

**"January 19, 3 p.m. In the course of desultory rifle firing by Chinese police last night Standard Oil Company storage tank was pierced by bullet. Resulting damage slight".**

**"January 19, 5 p.m.**

**One. Chinese officials confirm Chinese and Russian press reports of elimination of the Pinhsien Government.**

**Two. Director of Radio and Telegraph Hsu Shih Fa, a prominent Kuomintang leader, resigned today.**

**Three. Report confirmed that the staff of Japanese military mission in Harbin is being increased and will be headed by General Doihara within a week".**

**JOHNSON**

**WSB-HPD**

COPY:KC

EXTRACT

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 22, 1932

MET

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

107, January 22, 3 pm.

Following from Lieutenant Brown at Mukden:

"Preparations being made Tsitsihar for increase in Japanese forces there, commanding officer states necessary in order to clear bandits. Chinese forces recently brought there from the South now withdrawn.

Through Railway traffic operating Tsitsihar to Mukden via Taonan with a mixed Chinese-Japanese staff and equipment which it is planned to use competition channels. This line guarded by the Japanese and a new Chinese army, Meng Ning special army, Japanese equipped."

JOHNSON

WSB-HPD

COPY:KC

EXTRACT

met

Peiping via N.R.  
Dated January 25, 1932  
Rec'd 6:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

121, January 25.

Legation's 113, January 23, 1 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"January 21, 3 p.m.

One. Advance guard of General Ma's troops entered  
Tsitsihar yesterday and General Ma is expected to enter  
that city tomorrow.

Three. New Kirin official appointees yesterday took  
over charge of the Harbin Electric Company and river and  
Fuchiatien police administrations.

Four. General Ting Chao commanding the 16th Brigade,  
and other commanders including those of the 22nd and 26th  
brigade and the Commissioner at Sanhsing have pledged  
their allegiance to Hsi Chia."

JOHNSON

KLP-HPD

COPY:KC

EXTRACT

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JOHNSON

KLP-HPD

EXTRACT

REP

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 26, 1932

Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

128, January 26, 1 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"January 25, 4 p.m.

One. Chung Yu, local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, has had his resignation accepted and will be replaced by Kuan appointee.

Two. General Yu Huang Chou, commander of Kirin troops, has been appointed by Hsi Chia as Commander-in-Chief of Chinese Eastern Railway guard troops in the place of Ting Chao, who retains his concurrent post of Commissioner for Puchiatien.

Three. Old Kirin troops on January 17th and 24th did some looting at Erhtsengtientse and threatened Ashiho on the eastern line of the railway. A large number of foreign and Chinese residents withdrew from the latter place by special trains. Situation there now quiet as railway guards were reenforced."

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

- 2 - No. 132 from Peiping via N.R.,  
January 28, 1932, 5 pm

had been asked to mediate but had refused. Ohashi has delayed departure. Japanese aeroplane circled over Harbin January 26th dropping leaflets while three planes were circling around combatants on the morning of January 27th.

Three. At Hanson's suggestion Japanese Consul General asked British and French Consuls to attend a meeting at his residence to discuss situation. It was decided to have Ohashi send a telegram to Hsi Chia and telephone to Ting Chao requesting that General Yu be ordered to do his utmost to prevent danger to lives or damage to property of foreign community at Harbin.

JOHNSON

WSB-KLP

EXTRACT

Peiping via N.R.

Dated February 1, 1932

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

171, February 1, 4 p.m.

Legation's 151, January 29, 8 p.m.

One. Hanson reports January 31, noon, that local Foreign Office confirmed press reports that Japanese and Chinese troops clashed at Shruanchenpu, 51 kilometers from Harbin.

Two. That increasing pressure is better brought to bear by the Soviets to permit Russian railway technical staff to aid in transportation of Japanese troops and that Ohashi informed him that Soviets would agree if Chinese railway officials, who are being pressed by Hsichia, Japanese protege, would do likewise.

Three. "The board of the railway has protested to the headquarters of the railroad's guard troops against damage being done by other Chinese troops to the railway line and has asked it to take the necessary steps to prevent this. "

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

RR WSB

COPY:KC

Peiping via NR

Dated February 3, 1932

Rec'd 8:42 p.m.

EXTRACT

Secretary of State

Washington

186, February 3, 1 p.m.

Legation's 171, February 1, 4 p.m.

Following from Harbin:

One. "February 2, noon. Night passed without any untoward incident. Ohashi has informed me that it has been announced in Mukden that Japanese forces will attack today but Ting's Chief of Staff informed me that he expects the attack tomorrow as the Japanese are still bringing up reenforcements."

Two. Soviet Consul General unofficially informed Lilliestrom that Japanese military had made it plain to him that their troops would advance west of Harbin using Chinese Eastern Railway rolling stock.

For the Minister

PERKINS

KLP

COPY:KC

EXTRACT

Peiping via NR

Dated February 15, 1932

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

230, February 15, 6 p.m.

Following has been received from American Consul  
General at Harbin:

"February 13, 11 a.m., number 15.

One. Working through Dohihara the Japanese are daily increasing their influence in municipal, political and financial affairs despite assurances officially that the army came here solely to protect local Japanese residents at Harbin and are spreading rumors to the effect that brigand attacks are increasing alarmingly on eastern and western lines of the railway. Soviet general manager of the railway has stated that he has received no reports substantiating these rumors. Japanese aerodrome at Harbin is being enlarged.

For the Minister

PERKINS

RR-WSB

COPY:KC

EXTRACT

MET

Peiping via N.R.

Dated February 16, 1932

Rec'd 6:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

235, February 16, 1 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"February 15, 4 p.m.

One. Chang Ching Hui on February 8th, new Mayor Pao Kuan Chen on the 10th, and General Ma on the 14th gave elaborate banquets at Harbin for the Japanese command, the Japanese Consul General and local Chinese officials. Pao desired to invite, but did not, the other consuls, as I intimated that this might cause a misunderstanding. Chinese railway officials, but not Soviet, will give a banquet this evening to the Japanese military officers.

Two. Ohashi left this morning for a month's stay in Tokyo, leaving me as senior consul. Dohihara is dominating the situation here. Through his and Ohashi's efforts

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EXTRACT

MET

2-#235 from Peiping via N.R.,  
February 16, 1 p.m.

efforts long disputed land question at Harbin has been  
settled satisfactorily to the Japanese and incidentally to  
those landholders that have extraterritorial rights."

For the Minister,

PERKINS

HFD-WSB

COPY:KC

EXTRACT

Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 18, 1932

Rec'd 5:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

249, February 19, 10 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

One. "February 17, 8 p.m. Have learned that a meeting was held at Governor's Palace today at which a supreme political council consisting of Chang Ching Hui elected chairman and Tsung Shih Yi, Ma Chan Shan and Chia Chia was formed. Other persons present were three representatives of Mongolia and one of Jehiel. The Council is a temporary body organized to make arrangements for the formation of the new state."

Two. "February 18, 6 p.m. The new central body is called the new administration commission. It consists of seven members, the four mentioned in the above telegram, and Tang Lin, represented by his son, and two Mongols, Chi Wang and Ling Sheng. A declaration was issued today under their names declaring the independence of the four northeastern

EXTRACT

MEMO

3-7272 from Peiping via N.S.,  
February 25, 4 p.m.

Ling Sheng, the Hulun Peier delegate of Mukden, informed me that the leading Mongols of Barga are enthusiastically in favor of an independent Manchurian Government with Pu Yi at its head but not so in case a Chinese heads the new Government. The official Mongol leaders stated that they wanted peace and quiet, that they were weary of the Republican Government with its incessant civil wars and attending miseries and that they desired the return of the Ching dynasty, under which the Mongols had enjoyed living.

Three. General Uping Wen, commander of the railway guard troops at Hailar, informed me that he was obeying the orders of General Ma Chan Shan and that on February 22nd the Manchou Li representative of the Harbin-Japanese Military

Mission

EXTRACT

2-#279 from Peiping.

Russian railway officials state that conditions are quiet along the line.

Four. The Japanese military have assured the Soviet Consul General that their troops would be despatched solely to protect the lives and property of Japanese and would not be stationed near the frontier."

For the Minister.

PERKINS

CIB JS



MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN  
SECRETARY STIMSON AND HUGH WILSON, AT GENEVA, FRIDAY,  
MARCH 11, 1932, AT 4:45 P.M.

MR. WILSON: Hello, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY: Hello, Wilson. I have just gotten your resolution and have read it and it seems to be a very good one. I am very much gratified over it. I shall communicate with Simon as you suggested in one of your cables.

MR. WILSON: Yes, I understand, Mr. Secretary. Have you got the telegram in which I sent Drummond's letter?

SECRETARY: Yes, I have that.

MR. WILSON: We prepared a tentative offer to submit for your approval.

SECRETARY: Wait a minute. First, I want to know what is the right language in the last line of that letter. The words read "in which the Assembly addresses a request to the powers members of the League of Nations which have such special interests." Is that right?

MR. WILSON: Yes, Sir.

SECRETARY: That does not include the United States.

MR. WILSON: No, it does not because they did not want to put us in a resolution of the League.

SECRETARY: I ask that question simply because a newspaper report had put in the word "and" between "powers" and "members". The newspapers included us.

MR. WILSON: That is a mistake.

SECRETARY: Yes, I see, so that this letter of Drummond does not, and the resolution in it on terms does not demand an answer.

MR. WILSON: No, Sir. It does not, Mr. Secretary, but this evening, in addition to what Drummond said, Simon said he hoped we could see our way to make an answer if possible.

SECRETARY:

793.94/4696 1/2

CONFIDENTIAL  
JUL 12 1932

- 2 -

SECRETARY: What kind of an answer have they in mind?

MR. WILSON: We had in mind something like this:

"With reference to your letter of today's date in which you were good enough to transmit to me a copy of the resolution adopted in the Assembly this afternoon and in which you invite the attention of my Government, particularly of part two thereof, you will recall that my Government, as I informed you on March 5, is cooperating with the other powers under the resolution of March 4th, and is now instructing its representatives in Shanghai to cooperate if necessary in the sense of today's resolution."

SECRETARY: Now, what would that mean?

MR. WILSON: It means that if they find it necessary in negotiating on the spot to utilize neutral forces to protect the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, we are willing to cooperate.

SECRETARY: I would like to think that over. I want to know what the situation is. You realize that the people on the spot so far, not only our military people, but some of the others, have rather advised against that.

MR. WILSON: No, I did not realize that.

SECRETARY: So I think it better be thought over a little more. We had better not hurry. We will continue our cooperation, but I would rather not pledge specifically that action right now.

MR. WILSON: Mr. Secretary, we thought of another paragraph which I might read to you to complete the note.

"My Government is gratified that the nations of the world are now united on a policy of non-recognition of the validity of the results of acts of force in violation of treaties. This is a distinct contribution

to

- 3 -

to international law and/<sup>a</sup>constructive basis for peace."

SECRETARY: Yes. Have you anything further?

MR. WILSON: No, that is the end. If you will think the thing over perhaps you could send me a telegram after considering it.

SECRETARY: They seem to be in a great deal of a hurry. You see I have just received these papers and I have been a little more out of it than you have.

MR. WILSON: Yes, of course, I understand.

SECRETARY: We will cooperate, of course, and the only question is the exact method of cooperation in respect to that one problem of the policing of that zone. Have you any assurance that the Japanese are going to withdraw so that there won't be any zone?

MR. WILSON: There was a statement made by Sato that the Army had received already orders to withdraw to certain geographical positions. I can't give you the names of these geographical positions.

SECRETARY: Have you any assurance as to the attitude of the Chinese in respect to that zone?

MR. WILSON: No, Sir.

SECRETARY: I mean we would have to be careful in assuming any position which might be resented by the Chinese connected with negotiations on the spot.

MR. WILSON: Mr. Secretary, I have talked with Yen and he seemed to understand that there would have to be some form of neutral protection for the retreating of Japanese forces.

SECRETARY: Yes, I think that is so, but don't you see I don't want to make any commitment as to what we would do -- what form of protection we would agree to share in until I know more about what is going to be the problem.

MR. WILSON:

- 4 -

MR. WILSON: I will take no action until I receive instructions from you as to what form of letter to send.

SECRETARY: Yes. Now, Wilson, you may assure them, generally and verbally, of our cooperation and of our gratification of what has been done.

MR. WILSON: Yes, I will do that.

SECRETARY: And we will probably make some public statement here of our gratification.

MR. WILSON: If you make such a public statement, could you send me a copy to transmit to Drummond?

SECRETARY: Yes, but I think there are a number of steps we must take here and we must have time for a little consultation so that I don't want to do this in a hurry.

MR. WILSON: May I bring up one further thought in connection with the use of troops to protect the retreat. That would be according to the decisions of the negotiations in Shanghai and, of course, if our Minister vetoed it our troops would not be used.

SECRETARY: Not necessarily, he would not have a complete veto on our decision here in Washington, but we should consider very carefully his recommendation and the others will probably feel the same way, Wilson. I mean the British, French and the Italians. In other words, I think that we must wait until those people there have reached some recommendation on those subjects. At present we do not know for sure that the Japanese are going to withdraw; we do/<sup>not</sup>know for sure what the Chinese are going to do and I see no way for us to receive assurance except from the conference of the Ministers in Shanghai. I do not think that you can rely too implicitly upon what Yen tells you on that subject about the attitude of the Chinese Government.

- 5 -

Government.

MR. WILSON: I agree. Yen has no instructions yet.

SECRETARY: I feel equally certain that you cannot rely too implicitly upon what Sato says on the attitude of the Japanese Government or rather the Japanese Commanders, so I think that those subjects will have to wait until they are discussed at Shanghai.

MR. WILSON: All right, I understand. Now one other thing. Gibson has gone away for the night but he asked me to give you a message suggesting that you might wish to send Senator Swanson some kind word of recognition for his suggestions the other day.

SECRETARY: What suggestions do you mean?

MR. WILSON: The suggestion about a resolution suggesting that Robinson put up a resolution in Congress.

SECRETARY: I am very much interested in that but I have not dared to speak to Robinson about it because I had no authority from Swanson and I do not know what Robinson will do.

MR. WILSON: The Senator wanted you to talk it over.

SECRETARY: He did not say so. I did not know, for that reason, whether he wanted me to read it. I did read it because it passed through here but I kept silent.

MR. WILSON: It was for that purpose. Let me get the telegram, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY: Hold on. I have read it and I will do whatever Swanson wants but I have not talked with Robinson about it yet because I felt delicate about it.

MR. WILSON: Certainly he wants you to talk to Robinson. That was the whole purpose of it.

SECRETARY: Excuse me - he said he wanted Robinson to talk to me and Robinson has not been near me.

MR. WILSON:

- 6 -

MR. WILSON: I want to get the telegram, Mr. Secretary.

Let me send you another despatch from Senator Swanson.

SECRETARY: Do that, but remember that I think that was a very valuable suggestion but I have no authority about it.

MR. WILSON: Yes, I see. Well, we will speak to Senator Swanson tonight about it.

SECRETARY: Here is what Swanson says, that he wanted me to have copies of these documents in order that I might be in a position to give them full consideration before hearing from Robinson, but I have heard nothing from Robinson.

MR. WILSON: I will cable Robinson and we will have that taken right up, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY: I think it was a valuable suggestion but it is a thing which, I understand, Swanson wanted to initiate with Robinson and not from the State Department.

MR. WILSON: That is true, Sir.

SECRETARY: All right. Let me ask you one thing more. When do you think that Drummond wants a reply to this letter? We must think it over and take time.

MR. WILSON: You must think it over and take your time but we want it fairly soon on account of the press.

SECRETARY: If I send it tonight or tomorrow it will be all right, won't it?

MR. WILSON: Yes, Sir. Thank you very much. I guess that is all then.

SECRETARY: Goodnight.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.E. Tientsin/43 FOR #62 (#101-to Legation)

FROM Tientsin (Loebhart) DATED Jan. 7, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1187 ...

REGARDING:

Tientsin situation.  
December quiet. Chinese in unsettled state of mind and during first half of month were slow returning to their homes in Chinese City. Atmosphere disturbed by Japanese actions, which included sending reinforcements of 1700 men to Tientsin. Rumored that Japanese objective in North China is Tientsin and Peiping.

Jr

793.94/4697

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

49394  
C  
GENERAL CONDITIONS.

The month of December at Tientsin, by contrast with the previous month, was quiet so far as any outbreak of disorders was concerned. The Chinese continued to be in an unsettled state of mind, however, and during the first half of the month they were very slow in returning to their homes in the Chinese City. This movement did not reach substantial proportions until after the middle of the month. Notwithstanding the comparative calm that prevailed, the general political atmosphere was somewhat disturbed from time to time by local events which were interpreted as tantamount to threats on the part of the Japanese. Among these events might be mentioned the sending of Japanese reinforcements, numbering approximately 1700 men, to Tientsin on December 26 and 27, the almost daily visits of Japanese

-2-

Japanese military patrols in the areas outside of the Japanese concession to the southwest, south and southeast, and, furthermore, to the decision of the Japanese military authorities to conduct target practice for five days just before and after new year at the French Arsenal, which necessitated the marching of some 800 to 1,000 troops for several miles each day through Chinese territory. These activities on the part of the Japanese military were not conducive to any peace of mind on the part of the Chinese, who have for some time entertained a strong suspicion that the zone of activities of the Japanese army in China might possibly be extended to the Tientsin-Beiping area; nor did these activities tend to cultivate any better understanding between the local Japanese and Chinese authorities. In addition to the above-mentioned obstacles to a resumption of normal relations between the Japanese and Chinese, the despatch of Japanese men-of-war to Chinwangtao and Tangku, the reconnoitering of Japanese airplanes over Shanhaikwan and the gradual addition to the Japanese garrison at Chinwangtao also served to stimulate the feeling of distrust and suspicion in the minds of the Chinese. The fall of Chinchow to the Japanese on January 3 was a still further factor in making the period under review one from which the Chinese could scarcely emerge with any feeling of confidence for the new year so far as the welfare of their own country was concerned. While no actual outbreak occurred between the Chinese and Japanese at Tientsin during December, the bitterness which had been engendered

BY

-3-

by recent events here and in Manchuria makes one wonder how much longer the present state of affairs can exist without further outbreaks, the consequence of which might well be more far reaching than those of November.

Rumors still persist that the Japanese objective in North China is Tientsin and Peiping. There is a divergence of opinion on this point, however, among political observers in Tientsin. There are those who believe that conditions will arise, or that a situation will be created, which will give the Japanese an opportunity to extend their military operations to the Tientsin-Peiping zone. Views on this point are largely speculative, but it would seem that if the Japanese had expected to extend their zone of operations in this region to areas outside of their concession they would have most likely seized Tientsin during the outbreaks in November; it would seem reasonable to assume that reinforcements in very large numbers also would have been despatched to this area long before now. On the other hand there might well be questions of military strategy or tactics involved which would completely set at naught this theory. If such a plan is in the minds of the Japanese, however, the number of troops at Tientsin, Tangku and Chinwangtao at present would appear to be totally inadequate for the launching of such an enterprise in the immediate future. The local Japanese military authorities have repeatedly announced in press releases that they do not intend to extend military operations to points outside of the Japanese concession at Tientsin, but there is always a proviso to the effect that there must be no provocative act on the part of the Chinese.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11827 FOR Tel. #313-4pm

FROM China ( Perkins ) DATED Mar. 8, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

election of General Chiang Kai Shek, as Chairman of  
Military Council of China. Manifesto of Second Plenary  
Session of Kuomintang says all-armed forces of country  
should carry out prolonged struggle against Japan.

jr

793.94/4698

REP

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 8, 1932

Rec'd 5:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

313, March 8, 4 p. m.

Following from Kuowen News Agency, Loyang, March sixth:

"General Chiang Kai Shek was elected chairman of the Military Council at this afternoon's meeting of the Central Political Council. Marshal Yen Shi Shan, Marshal Feng Yu Hsiang, General Li Chung Jen, Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang, General Chen Chi Tang, General Li Lieh Chun and General Chei Ming Shu were appointed members of the Council.

In view of the decision of the second plenary session of the Kuomintang to alter the regulations of the Military Council so that the chairman of the Council shall concurrently hold the post of Commander-in-Chief of the National Land Naval Air Forces, the appointment of General Chiang means reinstatement in the position which he held before his retirement last December.

Speaking

893.00/11827

REP

2-#313, from Peiping, Mar. 8, 4p.m.

Speaking at today's closing exercises of the second plenary session of the Kuomintang, Mr. Jag Ching Wei chairman of the Executive Yuan of the National Government, sounded a warning to those who prefer to indulge in criticism of the Government at this moment of national crisis instead of coming out to offer their services to the country. The greatest mission of this session is to consolidate the government in China, Mr. Wang concluded.

The manifesto of the session to the country says that the imperative task of the moment is to resist foreign aggression. For this purpose all the armed forces in the country should be determined to carry out a prolonged struggle against Japan. Anyone who tries to shirk this responsibility shall be denounced by the whole nation.

The manifesto then makes the significant statement that whatever policy the Government will adopt in regard to the diplomatic crisis will be based on the welfare of the people and will not be framed to meet the exigency of the domestic situation.

JS - CIB

FOR THE MINISTER  
PERKINS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE .....793.94 Commission/133 ..... FOR ..... Tel. #105 10am .....

FROM Geneva ..... ( Gilbert ) DATED Mar. 7, 1932  
TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1187 ...

REGARDING: text of fourth report of the Shanghai Commission  
received by the Council.

1s

793.94/4699

REP

GRAY & GREEN

Geneva

Dated March 7, 1932

Rec'd 10:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

105, March 7, 10 a. m.

The following is the text of the

"Fourth report of the Shanghai (\*) which I have just received from Drummond. It is dated March 5, 2:41 a. m. local time and is signed "Ciano, President."

"With reference to our third report the hostilities which commenced on February 20 continued without interruption up to March 1 along the line from Woosung to Chapei. Japanese attempting to enforce their demand that the 19th Route Army should withdraw from the area specified in our previous report.

The fighting was of a very severe character and caused destruction among villages and isolated buildings in the area of hostilities.

On February 23 Japanese airships bombed and destroyed Hungjao airdrome and on February 26 bombed the Hangchow airdrome.

On February 29 Japanese Consul General notified to the  
Mayor

REP

2-#105, from Geneva, Mar. 7, 10 a.m.

Mayor of Shanghai that the Japanese had information that Chinese military were concentrating reinforcements around Shanghai by means of railway. Therefore if this concentration continued Japanese forces in self-defense might be compelled to destroy the railway line and military trains between Kashing and Shanghai and between Soochow and Shanghai on and after March 2nd. The period of grace was given to allow Chinese civilians to evacuate these areas. The Mayor at once replied stating that since night of January 28th Japanese forces had repeatedly invaded Chinese territory and murdered Chinese people committing depredations in violation of international law and treaties and offenses against humanity. Action of the Chinese troops had on the other hand been confined to self-defense and if Japanese forces should continue to attack Chinese forces latter would be compelled to defend themselves, all responsibilities in this connection must rest entirely Japanese.

The 11th Japanese Division arrived in Chinese waters on February 28th and 29th. Some of these troops were landed at Woosung but the main body was disembarked near Liuho on the Yangtze Kiang after preliminary bombardment of the Shihtzulin forts in that neighborhood. Some troops were landed in the Settlement on February 29th and on preceding day but the Japanese maintained that these were replacements  
for the

REP

3-#105, from Geneva, Mar. 7, 10a.m.

for the 9th Division and 24th Mixed Brigade.

On March 1st two explosions took place in the Whangpoo close to Japanese flagship and the Japanese cruiser. Japanese state that those were caused by submerged mines laid by Chinese in (order to?) destroy the vessels.

In the early morning of March 2nd Japanese aeroplanes in fulfillment of threat made on February 29th destroyed a portion of Shanghai-Nanking Railway track near Quinsan.

On the afternoon of March 1st fire broke out in Chapei which developed into a huge conflagration causing enormous damage. It is not certain which side was responsible.

The landing of the 11th Division near Liuho exposed the flank of the Chinese position. At the same time the Japanese launched a strong offensive in Kiangwan area and about 4 p. m. on March 1st Chinese military authorities issued orders for general withdrawal from the whole Shanghai area including Nantao and Lunghua. Japanese followed up retreating Chinese forces and by midday March 3rd had occupied the whole area as far west as Kiating and Nanziang. Woosung, which had not been evacuated at the same time as the rest of the area, was assaulted and occupied by the Japanese forces on the morning of March 3rd.

Early in the afternoon the Japanese military commander  
issued

REP

4-#105, from Geneva, Mar. 7, 10a.m.

issued an announcement that as the Chinese forces had retreated out of the area designated in the Japanese demands dated February 18th thereby removing the menace to the safety of the Japanese nationals as well as of the International Settlement he had decided to order the Japanese forces to halt for the time being at the points actually held and to stop fighting provided the Chinese forces did not resort to further hostile actions. Japanese naval commander issued announcement in the same sense. In the evening Chinese commander also announced he had ordered all Chinese forces to cease hostilities against Japanese troops unless attacked by them.

Important to make clear that all attempts to obtain an agreed armistice have hitherto failed.

Japanese have ceased their advance for the time being but local fighting nevertheless occurred in outlying districts during the night.

Interference by the Japanese with the police and other municipal functionaries, reported in our second telegram, continued during the whole of the period under review and formed the subject of repeated protests to the Japanese authorities."

GILBERT

WSB

HPD  
(\* ) Apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 125.3974/100 FOR Tel.#60-5 pm  
(Sino-Japanese series)

FROM Switzerland ( Wilson ) DATED Mar. 7. 1932  
TO NAME 1-1173 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese dispute  
Kindly instruct how February bill for trans-Atlantic telephone  
calls on -- and future bills should be paid for.

793.94/4700

118

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

GRAY

Geneva

Dated March 7, 1932

Rec'd 11:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

60, March 7, 5 p. m.

February bill for trans-Atlantic telephone calls on  
Sino-Japanese matters totals 4255 Swiss francs. Kindly  
instruct how this and future bills should be paid for.

WILSON

WSB

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MARCH 10 1932  
DIVISION OF OPERATIONS AND RECORDS

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 7, 1932.

Subject: Japanese Military Forces at Shanghai

W  
SCR  
DCR  
JEE  
SHT

RECEIVED  
E/LS  
MAR 7 - 1932  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

79394  
note  
893.1025  
894.0146

Mr. Secretary:

today,  
^

According to the War Department, the Japanese forces at Shanghai are as follows:

Army Contingents in Forward Lines.....	32,000
Army Contingents in Rear Lines.....	10,000
Naval Contingents Ashore (in the International Settlement).....	<u>5,000</u>
Total.....	47,000

SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 8 1932  
HLS

793.94/4701

The War Department also states that it understands

that approximately 3,000 troops are expected in a

few days to replace the casualties which number

about 3,500. The War Department also understands

that approximately 15,000 more troops are either en

route or ready to embark.

- 3500  
+ 300  
- 500

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. HAYDEN  
OCT 16 1943  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Srett

47000  
15000  
62000  
- 500  
500

Possible total →

OCT 1 8 1943

JED/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 751.62/180 FOR Despatch WD 1015

FROM France (Dawson) DATED Feb. 29, 1932  
TO NAME 1-117 ...

793.94/4702

REGARDING: Events in Far East. Statement of Marquis de Montmort that it was feeling of all Army officers with whom he had spoken that American policy was both wise and prudent. He himself seemed to feel particularly strongly about necessity for agreement among France, U. S. and Great Britain in their Far Eastern policy.

fp

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

With reference to events in the Far East, the Marquis de Montmart told me it was the feeling of all the Army officers with whom he had spoken that the American policy

was both wise and prudent, and that the known improvement in Japano-American relations in recent years brought a feeling of assurance, serious as the situation in the Far East now was.

He himself seemed to feel particularly strongly about the necessity for agreement among France, the United States, and Great Britain in their Far Eastern policy.

He told me that France did not expect to find herself involved in war over the Rhineland, difficult as it would be to reoccupy the territory after evacuating it; France's mistake had been to leave it. But he was convinced that a resolute though unaggressive policy on the part of France would allow the occupation operations to be carried out while avoiding incidents of a nature to precipitate hostilities.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE  
WE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94  
893.102  
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REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 11 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GREEN  
Geneva  
Dated  
Recd. 1:56 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 18 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

WESTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 12 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

116, March 11, 2 p. m.

The proceedings in the meeting of the General Committee of the Assembly which took place at 10 a. m. today were entirely confined to the consideration of amendments to the draft resolution reported in Wilson's 69 March 10, 6 p. m. These amendments which involve any changes in meaning are as follows:

Part I, paragraph numbered three, paragraph six "pending the decisions" now reads "pending the steps".

Part I, paragraph numbered three, end of final paragraph, add "or to the Pact of Paris". Part III paragraph five, delete "the representatives of". Part III, paragraph numbered one, "and regulate" now reads "and shall regulate". Part III paragraph numbered three, now reads in full as follows:

"To endeavor to prepare the settlement of the dispute in agreement with the parties, in accordance with Article 15, paragraph three, of the Covenant, and to submit a statement

F/LS 793.94/4703

MAR 18 1932

FILM

\*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#116, from Geneva, Mar. 11, 2p.m.

statement to the Assembly."

Part III, paragraph numbered 5 "the draft report" now reads "the draft of the report".

Part III, paragraph numbered seven "submit a first progress report".

The draft resolution as amended will be brought forward at meeting of the General Committee set for 5 o'clock this afternoon when it is anticipated the Japanese and Chinese representatives, having by then received instructions from their Governments, will be prepared to join in the discussion of it.

GILBERT

KLP

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quistrom NARS, Date 12-18-75

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5-00.2111


FE  
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET



FROM



Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

MMF



DOUBLE PRIORITY.

73, March 11, 8 p.m.

F/LS 793.94/4704

Assembly passed resolution unchanged from text reported in Gilbert's 116, March 11, 2 p.m.

Drummond handed me at once letter of which text follows.

"I beg to enclose herewith for the information of your Government the text of a resolution relative to the Sino-Japanese dispute which was adopted this afternoon by the Assembly of the League of Nations.

In view of the collaboration which has on several occasions in the course of recent events been effected between the Government of the United States and the governments of other powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement, perhaps you will allow me to draw your

MAR 18 1932

17

MET

2-473 from Geneva, March 11,  
2 p.m.

your particular attention to Part Two of the Assembly resolution in which the Assembly addresses a request to the powers members of the League of Nations which have such special interests".

In giving me this letter he explained that it seemed more tactful not to ask for an answer from the American Government but merely to draw attention to part two of the resolution, but that of course if you cared to give an answer it would complete the record of cooperation which has been maintained throughout this negotiation.

WILSON

HPD-WFO

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

AM REC'D

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
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PLAIN

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

Washington,

March 12, 1932.

WILSON,

BERGUES,

MAR 12 32 pm

GENEVA (Switzerland).

46 Your 73 / 4704  
March 11, 8 p.m.

One. You may communicate to Drummond the following:

QUOTE I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 11 enclosing for the information of the American Government the text of a resolution relative to the Sino-Japanese dispute which was adopted this afternoon by the Assembly of the League of Nations.

I am instructed by my Government to express to you its gratification at the action taken by the Assembly of the League of Nations. My Government is especially gratified that the nations of the world are united on a policy not to recognize the validity of results attained in violation of the treaties in question. This is a distinct contribution to international law and offers a constructive basis for peace.

You suggest that I note particularly part two of the resolution. In this, the Assembly <sup>recalls</sup> refers to several resolutions <sup>and ~~notes~~ cites</sup> especially its own resolution of March 4, 1932 / ~~which was~~ adopted in agreement with the parties with

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/4704  
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793.94/4704

5224

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

- 2 - Washington,

a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. My Government, as one of the powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlement, has already authorized its representatives at Shanghai to assist, in cooperation with the representatives of other powers similarly situated, toward the consummation of those objectives UNQUOTE.

*Stimson*  
*Stupp*

*In collaboration  
with A.F.K.*

FE:SKH/ZMF FE

Enciphered by .....  
Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94  
note  
500.0111

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
MR. KLOTS

FE  
WE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED MAR 14 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 11 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

GREEN MR. KLOTS

REP

FROM Geneva

Dated March 11 1932  
Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 14 1932  
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 11 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

74, March 11, 9 p. m.

In view of the fact that Drummond's letter (see my  
73, March 11, 8 p. m.) will be known to the press you may  
desire to have me make urgent reply thereto.

Also if you are contemplating any statement or comment  
following the precedent of your statement of December 10th  
it would be perhaps advisable that I should have this for  
transmission to Drummond at the earliest possible moment.

I, therefore, propose to call you by telephone at  
approximately 4 o'clock Washington time.

WILSON

WSB - HPD

MAR 18 1932

PTL:MD

F/LS 793.94/4705

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 811.516 93/58 FOR Tel.#324-5pm

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Mar.10,1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Ying Hsun, appointed by civil administrator Chang Ching Hui, manager of the official Northeastern Steamship Company, desires to draw out funds of the Northeastern Steamship Co., deposited in the National City Bank of New York by Wang Shih Tse, former manager, who fled to Tientsin taking with him seals with which checks should be chopped. Question of maintaining intercourse with local de facto officials in the matter.

793.94/4706

4706

tfv

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 10, 1932

Rec'd 8:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

324, March 10, 5 p. m.

One. Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

March 9, 5 p.m., number 29.

(1)- Ying Hsun, appointed last month by civil administrator Chang Ching Hui, manager of the official Northeastern Steamship Company formerly controlled by Chang Hseh Liang, desires to draw out funds of this company deposited in the National City Bank of New York by Wang Shih Tse, who was former manager and who fled to Tientsin taking with him seals with which checks should be "chopped". Bank is unwilling to pay out funds to him although requested to do so by Ying Hsun unless officially informed through the Consul General that he is legally the manager with the authority to draw funds.

(2)- As it appears it will be necessary to maintain intercourse with the local de facto officials, does the Legation perceive any objection to this office's receiving from these authorities of the assurances in writing that Ying Hsun is the manager and passing them to the bank  
without any

REP

2-#324, from Feiping, Mar. 10, 5p.m.

without any comment on the authority of this office?"

Two. If the Department approves, the Legation proposes to instruct Hanson that he may transmit verbatim to civil administrator Chang Ching Hui the bank's inquiry as to the authority of Ying Hsun to withdraw the funds in question, and that the reply of the de facto authorities may in turn be transmitted to the bank with a waiver of entire responsibility by the Consulate General in respect of any legal aspects of the matter. Please ~~explain.~~ *instruct.*

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

RR

WSB

142  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11832 FOR Tel. # 325, noon.

FROM China (Perkins) DATED March 11, 1932.  
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING:

Resolutions adopted by the second plenary session of the Central Executive Committee's Fourth National Congress provide for: (a) government's policy vis a vis diplomatic crisis; (b) adoption of Sun Fo's proposal for prolonged resistance.

793.94/4707

hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 11, 1932

Rec'd 2:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

325, March 11, noon.

One. The second plenary session of the Central Executive Committee's Fourth National Congress was convened at Loyang on March 1st and closed on March 6th.

Two. Manifesto issued by the session summarizes the more important published resolutions adopted;

(a) creation of a military council, see Legation's 313, March 3, 4 p. m.;

(b) full publicity to be given to government financial transactions;

(c) drastic retrenchments to be effected;

(d) financial commission to be established and function without interference;

(e) no military man in active service to hold concurrently any high administrative post;

(f) popular representative organizations to be established during period of political tutelage;

(g) government's policy vis a vis diplomatic crisis (see Legation's 313, March 3, 4 p. m., paragraph 5).

(h)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#325, from Peiping, Mar. 11, noon.

(h) Chinese Government welcomes foreign capital in development of country provided sovereign rights are not impaired;

(i) regarding temporary and secondary capitals (see Legation's 310, March 7, noon);

Among secret resolutions adopted regarding military and foreign affairs is one dealing with Manchuria in connection with which a concrete procedure is said to have been adopted.

Three. Session not attended by Sun Fo, Eugene Chen, Yu Han Min, Chang Hsueh Liang, Yen Hsi Shan or Han Fu Chu but the majority were represented. Sun Fo's proposal regarding prolonged resistance was adopted but that regarding the establishment of political councils at five or six places was modified to Peiping and Canton.

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

WSB

142  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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7/3/74  
notes  
243.132  
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 13 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GRAY  
Geneva

Dated March 11,

Rec'd 8:30 P.M.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOT  
MAR 18 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

F/L/S 793.94/4708

75, March 11, midnight.

In confirmation of my telephone conversation I am quoting text of proposed letter to Sir Eric for your consideration.

"With reference to your letter of today's date in which you were good enough to transmit to me a copy of the resolution adopted in the Assembly this afternoon and in which you invite the attention of my Government, particularly of part two thereof, you will recall that my Government, as I informed you on March 5, is cooperating with the other powers under the resolution of March 4th, and is now instructing its representatives in Shanghai to cooperate if necessary in the sense of today's resolution.

MAR 18 1932

My Government is gratified that the nations of the world are now united on a policy of non-recognition of the validity of the results of acts of force in violation of treaties. This is a distinct contribution to international

law

42

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 75 from Geneva

law and a constructive basis for peace."

WILSON

FW-OX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
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MAR 11 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 16 1932  
GRAY AND GREEN  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FROM Dated March 11, 1932  
Recd 8:18 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.E.

RECEIVED  
MAR 22 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State  
Washington.

117, March 11, 9 p.m.

Consulate's 116, March 11, 2 p.m.

The consideration of the Sino-Japanese question was continued this afternoon at 5 o'clock in a meeting of the General Commission of the Assembly and in a meeting of the Assembly. The chief features are as follows:

General Commission.

- (A) Statement by Sato.
- (B) Discussion of draft resolution by Sato.
- (C) Adoption of draft resolution.

Assembly.

- (A) Adoption of resolution.
- (B) Statement by Yen.
- (C) Election of Committee of 19.
- (D) Future program.

General Commission

(A) Sato took the floor first to make an announcement concerning the action taken by his Government pursuant to the Assembly's resolution of March 4 relating to the cessation of hostilities. After reasserting the acceptance by Japan of this

F/LS  
793.94/4709

MAR 17 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- # 117 from Geneva.

of this resolution he explained that the delay in beginning the negotiations had been due to the lack of word from the Chinese authorities regarding their acceptance. He added that now, since the Japanese Government had been informed through Lampson of the intention of the Chinese to enter into negotiations, the latter would begin as soon as detailed instructions had been received by the Japanese authorities at Shanghai. He then made the following statement.

"My Government authorizes me to declare that the Japanese forces will withdraw from their present positions and retire, to begin with, to the neighborhood of Shanghai and Woosung when the cessation of hostilities is finally assured in accordance with paragraph one of the resolution, and when, as regards the arrangement provided for in paragraph two, appropriate measures have been decided upon to prevent the advance or the taking of offensive measures by the Chinese forces and to ensure the supervision of the zone evacuated by the Japanese forces; our forces thus brought back will reembark as quiet is restored. Our authorities on the spot have already received general instructions in that connection and we therefore entertain good hopes of rapid progress towards a settlement of the situation."

(3) On the invitation of the President, Sato then set forth his Government's position on the draft resolution under consideration. He began by stating that the Japanese Government is entirely in agreement with the fundamental principles set forth

1421

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- # 117 from Geneva.

set forth in the resolution and reaffirmed its intention to be guided in its conduct by those principles. He asserted that Japan had faithfully observed the provisions of the Covenant and the Pact of Paris. He reaffirmed that Japan does not seek to encroach upon the political independence and existing territorial integrity of China.

He stated that the Japanese Government was particularly happy to note that the principle of a scrupulous respect for treaties appears at the very beginning of the resolution and went on to re-assert the position taken by Japan during the past months regarding the failure of China to observe those principles after noting with satisfaction that the draft resolution mentions the resolutions of the Council dated September 30 and December 10. He made the following statement:

"The Council, under the terms of Article Eleven of the Covenant, proposed to send to the Far East a Commission of Inquiry which was to furnish the elements of the fundamental solution. That Commission is about to begin its work. You will remember that in the Council meetings of January 29th and 30th the Japanese delegation raised objections to the application of Article Fifteen with regard to the whole of the Sino-Japanese conflict having in view the continuation of the procedure which I have just made possible.

The attitude of the Japanese Government has, I hope, been sufficiently clearly demonstrated by what I have just said. Its attitude was defined in the declaration made in response to the

-4- # 117 from Geneva.

to the appeal by the twelve members of the Council. Thus it is subject to certain reservations as to the applicability of Article Fifteen that Japan attends the Assembly and consequently it is unable to cast its vote in favor of the resolution before us.

In these circumstances the Japanese delegation will, in order not to prevent the passing of the resolution, merely abstain from voting."

(C) A vote on the draft resolution was taken by a show of hands and the resolution was adopted. Sato and Yen abstained from voting.

Assembly.

(A) A vote on the resolution was taken by roll call. At the conclusion of the voting the President made the following announcement:

"The result of the voting is as follows: Forty five states voted in favor of the proposal; two states abstained. We apply paragraph five of article nineteen of the rules of procedure as follows: "For the purposes of this rule representatives of States which abstain from voting shall be considered as not present." Therefore I can declare that this resolution has been adopted unanimously."

(B) Yen then explained that his abstention was not to be taken as a sign of opposition to the resolution but merely that as yet he had not received a reply to his request to his Government for instructions.

(C) The

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5- #117 from Geneva.

(C) The Assembly then proceeded to vote by secret ballot for six members of the committee as envisaged in part III paragraph four of the resolution, each ballot to contain the names of not more than six States, a majority to consist of a majority of proper ballots cast. The President announced the result as follows: number of ballots; absolute majority necessary twenty-four; States elected with respective number of votes as follows: Switzerland thirty-eight, Czechoslovakia thirty-five, Colombia thirty-one, Portugal twenty-six, Hungary twenty-four, Sweden twenty-four; and that thus the Committee would consist of the President of the Assembly, the twelve members of the Council except China and Japan, and the States just elected.

(D) The President declared the Assembly adjourned until he should convene it again and stated that he would convene the Committee in the first days of next week.

GILBERT

FW OX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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793.94/119  
893.102 S  
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram ~~must~~ be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 18 1932  
FROM THE DIVISION OF  
RECEIVED  
MARCH 11, 1932  
TO London and Geneva.

MAR 12 1932 Rec'd 3:35 p.m.

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

72, March 11, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

In a conversation this morning with Sir John Simon he declared that he was anxious that you should understand the efforts he had been making to harmonize his action in the Assembly with your views. This he added had in some cases not been easy as he had been attacked from different parties in England for his procedure but had kept in front of him the guiding principle of the necessity of complete unity in policy between the United States and Great Britain. I gathered the impression that he would be greatly reassured and would feel his position strengthened at home if any recognition of his action could be expressed by the American Government.

He is leaving tonight for Paris and reaches London, Sunday; he

F/LS

793.94/4710

MAR 21 1932

FILED

DEPT. OF STATE  
MAR 12 1932  
FOR FAST DELIVERY  
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#72 from Geneva, March 11,  
7 p.m.

Sunday; he will be available by telephone between 9 and 10 p.m., London time, Sunday night, at the residence of the Prime Minister or, of course, telegrams could reach him Sunday in London.

We all feel that part one of this resolution was largely due to his insistence based on his desire to cooperate with you and that if you felt it expedient to send him a word of recognition it would be appreciatively received.

WILSON

KLP

RPF

143

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT **AM** **REC'D** 138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

This cable was sent in confidence. It should be carefully examined and its contents not divulged to anyone.

March 12, 1932.  
MAR 12 32

2 pm

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

45

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR WILSON.

Your 72, <sup>4710</sup> March 11, 7 p.m.

A personal letter from the Secretary to Sir John Simon has been cabled to London.

Stinson  
A.T.K.

793.94/4710

793.94/4710

SA:ATK:VGN

RECEIVED

Enciphered by PT

Sent by operator M., 1932

Index Bu.—No. 50.

1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.L. AND C.L.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94  
893-1025  
793-94119  
894.23  
893-0146

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
MAR 12 1932

FROM GRAY  
Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated March 12, 1932  
Rec'd 5:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

MAR 12 1932  
Department of State

March 12, 10 a. m.  
My March 11, 2 p. m.

Following is Quo Tai Chi's reply dated March 11th  
to the Japanese Minister's letter.

"With reference to Mr. Shigemitsu's letter to you  
of yesterday, March 10, a copy which you were good enough  
to hand me this noon, I wish to state that the expression  
'complete withdrawal' in our reply yesterday implies  
withdrawal of the Japanese forces and revert to the position  
prior to their advance on the night of January 28."

In communicating a copy of the above to the Japanese  
Minister Sir Miles said that he assumed Shigemitsu would  
let him know when he feels that the time has arrived for a  
meeting with the Chinese.

RR - KLP

JOHNSON

F/LS 793.94/4711  
F.L.M.D. MAR 16 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*EF*

793.94  
notes  
893.102  
793.94119  
REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED  
MAR 12 1932  
DIVISION OF  
AFFAIRS

FROM PLAIN  
Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated March 12, 1932

Received 1:40 a. m.  
Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 12 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

March 12, 3 p. m.

Joint situation report number four yesterday:

"No change in the situation."

Report number five today:

"One. Generally all quiet.

Two. Japanese headquarters staff report an attack at 9:30 o'clock yesterday March 11th by thirty mounted Chinese on an outpost company at Lutang. After an hour's fighting Chinese were repulsed with loss. No Japanese casualties.

Three. All the fighting portion of the Fourteenth Division and attached units have now been disembarked.

Four. Japanese continue daily air reconnaissances toward Soochow and Hangchow."

JOHNSON

RR

KLP

F/LS  
793.94/4712

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.E.

MAR 6 1932  
FILED

*W W F E*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED *W*

REP

FROM

SHANGHAI

Dated March 12, 1932

Rec'd 6:02 a. m.

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

March 12, 11 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

RECEIVED  
MAR 13 1932  
DIVISION OF  
AFFAIRS AND RECORDS

F/LS 793.94/4713

*793.94  
note  
893.102-5  
793.94119  
500.0111  
893.0146*

French Minister yesterday read to us in confidence a report from French Ambassador at Tokyo referring to instructions which Yoshizawa was sending to Sato concerning a statement which the latter should make at Geneva. I suppose these instructions to cover Japan's attitude toward resolution now before League Assembly and to mean that the Japanese have no intention of evacuating their forces from Shanghai in the immediate future. The statement if made would hedge about Japanese evacuation with all manner of conditions.

(GRAY) Japanese reinforcements continue to arrive and enormous quantities of military supplies and engines of war are being landed daily. Wooden hangars are being substituted for the tents which have been used at the temporary landing field.

JOHNSON

KLP

*note  
893.0146*

FILED

1437

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

Washington,

March 11, 1932.

MAR 11 32

*6 me*

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

RECEIVED  
MAR 11 1932  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

*793.94/A*

*4*

793.94/4713A

I have given out to the press the following statement in regard to the resolution of the Assembly:

QUOTE The nations of the League at Geneva have united in a common attitude and purpose towards the perilous disturbances in the Far East. The action of the Assembly expresses the purpose for peace which is found both in the Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League of Nations. In this expression all the nations of the world can speak with the same voice. This action will go far toward developing into terms of international law the principles of order and justice which underlie those treaties and the Government of the United States has been glad to cooperate earnestly in this effort. UNQUOTE

CONFIDENTIAL I should be glad if you would inform Drummond.

CONFIDENTIAL I shall send you in the morning draft of a reply to Drummond's letter.

Enciphered by SA:ATK:VGN

*Stinson*  
*(A.T.K.)*

Sent by operator M., 19

1431

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*NA*  
*S*  
*DR*  
*FE*  
*Gile*  
*7/11/75*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 19, 1932.

SHANGHAI SITUATION

Newspaper Report from Tokyo that the Japanese Ambassador is under instruction to inquire of the Secretary of State on what basis the American Government objects to the landing of Japanese troops at the International Settlement at Shanghai.

F/LS 793.94/4714

In case the Japanese Ambassador calls and makes the inquiry referred to in the subject heading above, it is suggested that reply be made along somewhat the following lines:

*793.94*  
*893.102-5*  
*893.0146*

To the simple fact of landing of Japanese troops in the International Settlement at Shanghai, the American Government has not objected and would not object. Japan has the same right to land troops there that the United States and other powers have.

To the fact, however, of landing troops there under the circumstances and for the purposes which have attended the recent landings there of Japanese troops, coupled with the uses which have been made of Japanese troops and equipment ~~there~~ so landed there recently, the American Government has objected and does object.

MAY 1 1932

In connection with the use of force, it is frequently not easy to draw a clear line indicating at what point defensive action changes to offensive action, but it is in most cases possible to distinguish, when action has developed

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

developed beyond a certain point, between action in defense of a certain fixed position and action directed toward the attainment of a ~~definite~~<sup>new</sup> position. Whatever may have been the objective of the military movements made by Japan's bluejackets at midnight on January 28 (which motives the Japanese have declared to have been the protection of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in connection with the general problem of the protection of the International Settlement), it is indisputable that Japan's military operations have been conducted in such a manner as to have brought death or suffering to large numbers of a defenseless civilian population, to have jeopardized rather than ensured the safety of the International Settlement, to have destroyed rather than protected property, to have caused large losses (direct and indirect) to the commercial community of a great port, to have aroused and intensified animosities, to have occasioned a great deal of anxiety and trouble to the various governments and countries which have nationals and interests at Shanghai, and to have compelled the whole world to question Japan's motives and deplore her methods; and the objective which Japan's authorities now, both at Tokyo and at Shanghai, proclaim is that of compelling Chinese armed forces to withdraw not only from the position in proximity to the Settlement from which they undertook to evict them on the night of January 28, but to a distance of twenty kilometers from the

- 3 -

*Their latest  
statements feature  
the breaking of the  
Chinese boycott of  
their objectives.*

from the port of Shanghai itself. In connection with these developments, the Japanese naval and military authorities have seen fit to land troops and equipment in the International Settlement, to use their position there as a base, to use the facilities afforded by the Settlement as a channel, to use the air over the Settlement as a part of a route -- all in connection with military operations outside of and beyond the boundaries of the Settlement. The difference between this use of the Settlement and the use which has been made of it by the armed forces of other countries, such, for instance, as the use made by the British in 1927, can be illustrated by the difference between the action of policemen in holding back a mob and the action of an army toward annihilating an opposing army. Put briefly, there has been going on between Japan and China for five months a conflict in which military forces on both sides have been engaged; The operations at Shanghai are essentially military operations; Preparations are being made both by Japan and by China for a battle on a large scale just outside of the International Settlement; The Japanese are making use of the International Settlement in connection with those preparations. There is no precedent for such action, and it cannot be defended by reference to precedent. It is unfair both to ~~who cannot thus use the Settlement~~ and to the other nations which have legitimate interests at Shanghai. The

International

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

International Settlement is international and is regarded as essentially a neutralized area. Violations of its neutral or neutralized character bring into jeopardy the continuation of its existence as such an area. The plea that Japan's landing of large forces there and her use of those forces "for the protection of the Settlement" is specious in view of the fact that it is these very acts which have produced and continue to produce, in large part, the dangers to which the Settlement has been and is at this moment subjected.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 12, 1932.  
FEB 13 1932

Mr. Secretary:

Herewith a brief review of recent diplomatic effort, an estimate of immediate military possibilities or probabilities, and a query with regard to possible Chinese political reaction.

I hope that you will have time to read this before talking with Sir John Simon.

RECEIVED

~~FEB 21 1932~~

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

FE:SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE  
February 21, 1932.  
FEB-13 1932

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DEPT. OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
RECEIVED

SHANGHAI SITUATION.

FEB 21 1932

Estimate of Immediate Possibilities. SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Recent Diplomatic Effort.

A few days ago the American, the British, the French and the Italian Governments, in response to requests from both the Chinese and the Japanese, and under the leadership of the American Government, made certain proposals directed toward cessation of hostilities and steps toward peace on the part of China and Japan. It should be ~~kept~~ <sup>kept</sup> in mind that those proposals, given their form by the American government, were very comprehensive--more so than had been sought or desired by one at least of the disputants, Japan. To those proposals, the Chinese responded favorably, without reservation; of them, the Japanese said that they were favorable to some but could not accept the others. In relation to those proposals, the American Government, as the author of their form and the leader in the effort which resulted in their presentation, ~~the American Government~~ has a special responsibility.

While the Powers, having received the replies of the Chinese and the Japanese Governments, were deliberating with regard to the next step, there was injected a new suggestion. From Tokyo, the American Ambassador reported to the Department that the Japanese Government desired to proceed at Shanghai

F/L/S 793.94/4715

793.94  
note  
893/102-S  
793.94119

MAY 11 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE  
February 11, 1932.  
FEB 13 1932

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DEC  
FE  
File  
3MK

SHANGHAI SITUATION. FEB 21 1932

Recent  
Diplomatic  
Effort.

Estimate of Immediate Possibilities. SECRETARY'S OFFICE

A few days ago the American, the British, the French and the Italian Governments, in response to requests from both the Chinese and the Japanese, and under the leadership of the American Government, made certain proposals directed toward cessation of hostilities and steps toward peace on the part of China and Japan. It should be ~~kept~~ <sup>kept</sup> in mind that those proposals, given their form by the American government, were very comprehensive--more so than had been sought or desired by one at least of the disputants, Japan. To those proposals, the Chinese responded favorably, without reservation; of them, the Japanese said that they were favorable to some but could not accept the others. In relation to those proposals, the American Government, as the author of their form and the leader in the effort which resulted in their presentation, ~~the American Government~~ has a special responsibility.

While the Powers, having received the replies of the Chinese and the Japanese Governments, were deliberating with regard to the next step, there was injected a new suggestion. From Tokyo, the American Ambassador reported to the Department that the Japanese Government desired to proceed at Shanghai

F/L/S 793.94/4715

793.94  
note  
893/102-S  
793.94/119

MAY 11 1934

1445

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

with the inauguration of negotiations to the end that hostilities should cease and a neutral zone around the International Settlement be created. Whether the Japanese Government simultaneously put this matter up to the British and the French Ambassadors, as to the American Ambassador we have not been definitely informed. The American Ambassador told us that he had conferred with his British and his French colleagues and that they as well as he were informing their national representatives at Shanghai regarding the project. Two days later the American Ambassador informed us that the project had grown out of suggestions made by the Consular and the Military attaches of the American Embassy to various Japanese officers. Whatever may have been the genesis, the development and the manner of communication of the ideas, in Tokyo, the simple fact is that the American Government, immediately upon hearing of it from the American Ambassador to Japan, took the initiative toward discussion of it with the British Government. We talked with Sir John Simon before he had any news of it through his own channels, and we telegraphed to London with regard to it before we were approached by London in that connection. We also instructed our Consul General at Shanghai and after having done so sent to London for the consideration of the Foreign Office the text of the instructions which we had sent. Sir John Simon undertook, if I remember correctly, to confer with the French and the Italian Governments. It appears that the British Government sent to its Consul General at Shanghai instructions to cooperate with the American Consul General along the lines of the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

instructions which we had sent the latter. We have no definite information, as yet, with regard to action taken by the French and the Italian Governments. In view of these facts, it would seem that the American Government again has especial responsibility in relation to the suggestion reported by our Ambassador to have been made by the Japanese Government and in relation to the course of events which have flown from the action taken in reference thereto.

When it became apparent that the Japanese were not proceeding in accordance with the terms of their own suggestion as reported to us, the American Government took the initiative in informing our officers at Shanghai, at Tokyo and at London that we were disillusioned and that we would proceed no further either in reliance upon Japan, proposals or with any effort for the present along the line of good offices, and we instructed those officers so to inform the British authorities. This morning, we informed Sir John Simon of our views and our intentions. We have thus again assumed a position of special responsibility with regard to the problem of the Shanghai situation and the peace problem.

Notwithstanding the undoubted desire of the Chinese that hostilities be terminated and the willingness that a neutral zone be established around the International Settlement at Shanghai; notwithstanding the request both of China and of Japan for good offices; and notwithstanding the fact that four Powers united in an effort at the exercise of good offices, all efforts to bring about the cessation of hostilities and to make arrangements which would insure the safety

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

of the International Settlement of Shanghai and make possible negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese without further bloodshed have failed and are at a standstill. Just how and why will be a subject of speculation and of controversy. The written records do not show how or why the American Government arrived at the decision to discontinue its efforts. The record exists only in the minds of half a dozen men. Even the historian, who in years hence examines the documents, will not know exactly what were the facts and what was the line of reasoning. All that is or will be obvious will be that there was talk of peace, there were proposals for peace, those proposals were in part rejected by one of the disputant powers, the League of Nations did nothing, and the four Powers which had been for a few days active in regard to the matter discontinued their efforts. Meanwhile the hostilities continued, and thereafter ----- .

2.  
 Possible  
 military

It is probable that an extensive battle will take place in the area around Woosung and between there and Shanghai in the near future. A considerable number of Japanese and a

The section hereunder is my estimate of military possibilities, made last evening -- without consultation with the Army. It relates, not to the general military possibilities and probabilities, but to the question of the likelihood or unlikelihood that in the course of the battle which is impending the Chinese in the Chapei area would be driven in, southward, in such manner as to occasion an armed invasion of the International Settlement.

ave

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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2.  
Possible  
military  
obj-  
cts.

It is probable that an extensive battle will take place in the area around Woosung and between there and Shanghai in the near future. A considerable number of Japanese and a larger number of Chinese will be killed. The Chinese will probably be defeated and ~~will~~ retreat. The Japanese may or may not follow them.

It may be doubted whether the Japanese will succeed, if that be one of their objectives, in driving any considerable body of the Chinese forces against or into the International Settlement. If the Chinese commanders possess any military skill--and they seem to have exhibited some in the fighting of the past ten days-- they will get such troops as they have

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

in Chapei out, to the northward, in time to avoid their being bottled up in that convex sector. The natural line of evacuation is along the track of the railway which leads to Nanking, which tracks are entirely outside of the Settlement, leading off to the northwest. A few Chinese stragglers may be caught in the Chapei area and may seek entry into the Settlement. These can be handled by the forces which are guarding the Settlement. It will be necessary merely to disarm them and allow them to enter. If the Settlement authorities, having tolerated use of the Settlement as a highway for Japanese troops moving to the attack, refuse to permit entry by Chinese troops in retreat, it will be difficult indeed for them to defend themselves against a charge of partiality. However, even if they were so to refuse it may be doubted whether the defenders would have to beat off any large Chinese contingents seeking entry.

Study of the map leads to the conclusion that, from the military point of view, only one development could warrant a movement by Chinese troops, under command, either deliberate or in connection with a forced retreat, southward into the Settlement rather than northwestward into open country. That one thing would be a comprehensive use of the Settlement by the Japanese in connection with their operation of attack. An enveloping <sup>movement</sup> ~~movement~~ by the Japanese from the southwest, northward, cutting off the possibility of a Chinese retreat to the northwest and catching Chinese forces between a Japanese force to the west and a Japanese force on the northeast might drive

- 6 -

a Chinese force directly into the heart of the Settlement. Such a move could be effected, however, only by sending large bodies of Japanese troops through the Settlement or the French Concession, from east to west to a point at which they could turn northward for an enveloping movement. It is not believed that the Japanese will make any such attempt.

It is therefore estimated that, as the battle develops, the pressure on the International Settlement will be decreased rather than increased.

During the battle, the International Settlement may be endangered both from flying planes and from artillery fire.

However, the battle will probably result in large casualties and ultimate defeat for the Chinese.

It may be followed by the landing of Japanese troops at Nanking in an effort to catch the retreating Chinese forces from the rear and to inflict upon them more casualties and to drive them westward.

3.

Possible  
Chinese  
political  
reaction.

The resulting situation, in so far as foreign governments and diplomacy are concerned, will bring to the front this question: What will be the feeling of the Chinese authorities and the Chinese people with regard to the failure of the Powers both as regards the efforts of the various governments and as regards the Council of the League, to place any effective obstacle in the way of the Power which they, the Chinese, regard as the aggressor. In other words, may not the Chinese conclude that, having been led by the Powers to rely upon treaties elaborated in most part by the Powers, they have been left in the lurch by the others when one of those Powers has chosen to act

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

in defiance and disregard of the principles and expressed provisions of the treaties? Is not this feeling on the part of the Chinese likely to be accenuated by the fact that, peace proposals having been under discussion, the discussion ~~thereof~~ <sup>thereof</sup> was discontinued immediately in advance of the launching by the Japanese of an effective offense movement?

FB: SKH: FGH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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793.94  
note  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 11 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS

March 11 1932  
MAR 11 1932

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON.  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 2 1932

RECEIVED  
MAR 2 - 1932  
MR. KLOTS

Dear Dr. Hornbeck,

Some time ago, when we were discussing the Japanese reply to Mr. Stimson's note of January 7th, you expressed a wish to see the full text of the verbal statement made by the Japanese Ambassador in London on January 14th. I now enclose herewith a copy of the statement in question.

Yours sincerely,

*D. G. Deane*

RECEIVED  
MAR 1 1932  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

F/LS 793.94/4716

FILED  
JUL 2 1936

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,  
United States Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

145

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

Japanese Embassy,  
London, W.

Verbal Statement by Mr. Matsudaira to Sir John Simon.

I am instructed by my Government to state verbally that they highly appreciate the friendly attitude of the British Government, and that the Japanese Government confirm to the British Government the substance of the declaration made by the Japanese Delegate at the Council of the League of Nations in October last, to the effect that "Japan had no territorial ambitions in Manchuria and was the champion of the principle of equal opportunity and the "Open door" in that region, and of other similar declarations." The Japanese Government intend again to avow publicly on a suitable occasion in the near future, their policy of respecting the principle of equal opportunity and the "Open door" and the Nine-Power Treaty. They intend to mention this point also in their reply to the Note recently received from the American Government and to make public the said reply. In the circumstances, at the forthcoming Council of the League of Nations, Japan will be prepared to make a statement in the same sense if necessary.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*F/E*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

RECEIVED

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

MAR 12 1932

Dated March 12, 1932

DEVISION OF

Rec'd 9:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



F/LS 793.94/4717

March 12, 3 p. m.

Following from Colonel Drysdale for War Department:

"29. Colonel Drysdale arrived Shanghai by air twelve noon, March 12th. Lieutenant Wyman will arrive at Chinese military headquarters near Soochow today. Chinese military have volunteered <sup>every</sup> reasonable assistance to him in observing and reporting operations on their front. Vice Minister of War informed me that orders had been issued for suspension of hostilities. Situation generally quiet. Japanese report blamed Chinese attack upon outpost company at Lo (?). Their air service report Chinese moving troops from Soochow toward Chiashin via Grand Canal. Wyman will be asked to verify. All units of 14th Japanese Division except supply services have landed. Japanese strength: Ninth Division about 14,000, 11th Division about 11,000, 14th Division about 20,000, 24th Brigade about 2,500, navy still on shore 3,500, total 51,000.

Present distribution of Chinese troops difficult to obtain

793.94  
note  
120.5493  
793.94118  
793.94119  
893.102-S  
893.23  
894.23

MAR 21 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustofsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-from Shanghai, Mar.12,3 p.m.

obtain, believed to be as follows: On Nanking Railway east of Socchow 18th Route Army, 5th Route Army less independent brigade of 88th Division, and four regiments of 47th Division. On Hangchow Railway: at Hsingchuang 3rd and 4th regiments of independent brigades 88th Division under Mo Yung who relieved Ken Wang, at Minhong 6th regiment military police, at Sungchiang 1st regiment of above brigade, at <sup>Chaoching</sup> ~~Chiasig~~ 5,000 troops of 36th independent brigade 9th Route Army under Lu Tiao Ping, at Hangchow 5,000 troops of 9th Division under Chiang Ting Wen. As far as can be confirmed few reenforcements have reached Tsai's command. Pending negotiations further attacks in force by either belligerent improbable. I do not believe any reasonable Chinese will be a party to an agreement which entails demilitarized zone or loss of sovereignty in the Shanghai area. Japanese might insist upon demilitarized zone in which event negotiations may be expected to fail."

JOHNSON

HFD

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 13 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND  
INFORMATION

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 13, 1932

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
GEN. I. AND M. L. P.

MAR 13 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4718

March 13, noon.

Following from Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale for War Department.

*note  
893.102-5  
193.94119*

"50. Mayer's 25 reads Ninth Route Army at Hangchow not nineteenth. All facts available here on Chinese dispositions sent in number 29. Expect detailed dispositions on Nanking Railway from Wyman soon. Wyman reports that on March 12 Tsai stated he has not supervised patrol zone and there had been no military activity for last two days. Wyman states Nineteenth Route Army morale high and that they are prepared to fight. Japanese headquarters replying 14th Division headquarters now at Nanziang and that they have no information regarding Tokyo news despatches referring to contemplated

MAR 21 1932

FILED

withdrawal

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- # from Shanghai, Mar.13,noon,  
withdrawal of portion of Japanese forces here. There  
are no signs here indicating early withdrawal."

JOHNSON

HPD

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



AM RECD


LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peking, February 17, 1932.



No. 1487

MAR 12 32



F/LS  
793.94/4719

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 125 of  
January 26, 9 a.m., reporting the resignation of Mr.  
Sun Fo as President of the Executive Yuan, I have the  
honor to enclose a copy, in translation, of Foreign  
Office note No. L-412 of February 8, 1932, announcing  
the resignation of Mr. Sun Fo and the election of Mr.  
Wang Chao-ming (Wang Ching-wei) as his successor.

1/

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

*Mahlon F. Perkins*

MAHLON F. PERKINS,  
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:

Foreign Office Note  
No. L-412 of February  
8, 1932.

800.2

LHE/GL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1  
Despatch No. 1428

L-412

Translation of a formal note addressed by His Excellency Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, to the Honorable Nelson T. Johnson, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to China.

(Trans. EFS)

(Dated: February 8, 1932.)

(Recd.: February 15, 1932.)

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that Mr. Sun Fo, Director of the Executive Yuan of the National Government, of China, resigned and that Mr. Wang Chao-ming was elected to succeed him in an emergency meeting of the Central Executive Committee and assumed his duties on January 29th.

I have the honor, Mr. Minister, to indite this formal note for your information, and to request that you transmit the above to the American Government.

(Signed) Lo Wen-kan,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of China.  
-SEAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS-

The Honorable  
Nelson T. Johnson,  
Envoy Extraordinary and  
Minister Plenipotentiary of  
the United States of America  
to China.

February 8, 1932.

EFS:T

Peiping, February 17, 1932.

No. 1407

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 125 of  
January 26, 9 a.m., reporting the resignation of Mr.  
Sun Fo as President of the Executive Yuan, I have the  
1/ honor to enclose a copy, in translation, of Foreign  
Office note No. L-412 of February 8, 1932, announcing  
the resignation of Mr. Sun Fo and the election of Mr.  
Wang Chao-ming (Wang Ching-wei) as his successor.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Enclosure:  
Foreign Office Note  
No. L-412 of February  
8, 1932.

MARLON F. PERKINS,  
Counselor of Legation.

800.2

LHE/GL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

was trying to establish a protectorate over China. He said, "No, that was too big." She was trying, he thought, to hold a place of advantage in Shanghai, which had many economic and political advantages. He said that it was not only the Gibraltar, but the London and the Paris of the East, controlling the whole Yangtze Valley and that more than half of the commerce of China passed out through there and that we would find that Japan would try to retain some military force there as a bargaining point with China and the rest of the world. The Ambassador then went on to describe the weakness of Japan which, he thought, would eventually cause her to fail. He said that she was extremely poor and her people were discontented; even the landowners were very poor and therefore oppressed their tenants so the result was that Japanese peasants were living on entirely inadequate farms and food supplies. He therefore expected that this grave discontent might find an outlet in a revolution. The Ambassador referred also to the difference in the leaders of Japan now from what they were in the early part of the century. At that time, there were great men like Ito, Inouy<sup>f</sup>, and others that he mentioned; now they were all mediocre with minds not going beyond

893,102-S

\$94.00

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

beyond that of a military officer. He did not, therefore,  
look to Japan to succeed.

HLS.

S HLS:CBS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 531

79394  
copy  
of  
24d

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

January 16, 1932.

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
MAR 28 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 16 1932  
RECEIVED

SUBJECT: Transmitting Press Clippings

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Legation,  
Peiping, China.

M. J. [unclear]  
MAR 14 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4721

Sir:

As of possible interest to the Legation, I  
1/ have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of an  
article entitled "Foreign Correspondents in Man-  
churia Disapprove Stimson's Note to Japan" which  
appeared in The Osaka Mainichi of January 12, 1932.  
This office ventures to offer the suggestion that  
the Department might be interested in receiving a  
telegraphic resume of the article.

The correspondents in question with one excep-  
tion are no longer in Mukden and consequently it is  
impossible for this office to check the statements.  
It seems likely, however, that they made statements  
of this kind in conversation with the reporter of the  
Osaka Mainichi but under the definite understanding  
that they would not be quoted. At least this is my  
understanding of the conditions under which Mr. Keen,

the

MAR 29 1932  
RECEIVED

1465

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the New York Herald-Tribune correspondent, discussed  
the subject with the Hainicht reporter.

Three additional copies of this despatch are  
enclosed for possible transmission to the Department.


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.

1/ enclosure: Copy of newspaper article.

MSM:ARG  
891.



1465

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN MANCHURIA  
DISAPPROVE STIMSON'S NOTE TO JAPAN.

Most of American Journalists Outspoken in Criticizing  
Demarche as Uncalled-For And Ineffective to  
Undermine Japanese Interests

From The Osaka Mainichi, January 12, 1932.

MURDEN, Jan. 9. -- Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson's latest note to Japan on the Manchurian situation is causing quite a shock to the foreign correspondents, to say the least. As far as I (Kennoke Sato, Mainichi Staff Correspondent) can see, most of them consider the note extremely unwise and most uncalled-for.

Some of the leading correspondents whom I met have found the note so disagreeable that they cabled to their respective papers, making allusion to the obvious folly and danger embodied in the note.

Mr. Gorman of the Daily Telegraph, declared that to those who are acquainted with the actual conditions in Manchuria and Mongolia, Colonel Stimson's action is idiotic and that it will accomplish nothing but to irritate the people of Japan.

Mr. Hallet Abend of the New York Times said that Japan did not consider during the Washington Conference Manchuria and Mongolia as Chinese territory and that so far as Japan's vested rights were concerned, Japan absolutely refused to allude to them.

Manchuria Not in China.

It does not stand to reason therefore, he continued, that the Government of China can legally claim sovereignty over those regions merely because it entered into an agreement with General Chang Hsueh-liang.

Since Japan has paid dearly for maintaining peace and order in Manchuria and Mongolia, he went on, any attempt by a third party to nullify her efforts, must be regarded as positively unjustified.

He showed me the copy of his telegram to his paper, the gist of which reads:

1. The Nine Power Pacific Treaty does not apply to Manchuria and Mongolia.

2.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

2. The public sentiment in Japan will only be aggravated.
3. The American business men in Manchuria resent any and all measures to block Japan's move for executing the Open Door policy in Manchuria, which Japan is sincerely striving for.
4. China itself is powerless to maintain peace and order in and develop the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia.
5. Under Japan's guidance, there is every possibility of an independent civil government, able to administrate intelligently.

Diplomatic Stroke Ineffective.

Mr. Glenn Babb of the Associated Press said it would be absolutely impossible to undermine Japan's work in Manchuria by a mere diplomatic stroke, now that Japan has gone so far ahead.

"Manchuria and Mongolia are a matter of life and death to Japan," he went on. "Therefore she has to defend them at any cost. In this connection, the Nine Power Pacific Treaty is altogether too powerless. All other Powers, if they come in at all, are in the also-ran role.

"So far as the United States is concerned, public sentiment is not behind the Colonel's action, and he might as well have scrapped the note into a waste paper basket."

"American should have sent the note, if at all, on September 18, the day the present situation was created," said Mr. Keen of the New York Herald Tribune. "Why commit the folly of assuming an attitude of intervention, when Japan's work is nearing a fait accompli?"

I had the privilege of glancing over the copy of his cablegram to his paper, in which he stressed the fact that the Nine Power Treaty does not apply to Manchuria and Mongolia. Summing it all up, the foreign correspondents consider Colonel Stimson's action entirely unjustified and unwise.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, February 11, 1932.

No. 1403

EA

74394  
20/4  
693/9412

Office of Economic Advisor  
MAR 29 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Copy in FE  
MAR 14 1932  
new

F/LS 793.94/4722

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir: 793.94/3465

Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 44 of  
January 9, 2 p.m., and to previous communications with  
respect to the Anti-Japanese boycott now being carried  
1/ on in China, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a  
translation of a news item which appeared in a local  
Chinese newspaper giving the text of a notice issued  
by the Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association  
of Peiping directing the unsealing of all Japanese  
goods held by local merchants, and their registration  
with the Association. After registration Japanese  
goods

1-323

- 2 -

goods may be disposed of under certain conditions. It is possible that this modification of the former regulations governing the sale of Japanese goods may have been brought about by the Japanese themselves, although it is more than probable that the desire of local merchants to dispose of stocks was instrumental in the lifting of the ban against the sale of Japanese merchandise in Peiping shops.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

*Mahlon F. Perkins*

MAHLON F. PERKINS,  
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure: ✓

1. Translation of news item,  
in Hua Fei Jih Pao, February  
5, 1932.

610.21

LHE/GL

147  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quitsman NARS. Date 12-18-75

1  
148  
Translation of a news item appearing in the  
HUA PEI JIH PAO of February 5, 1932.

(Trans. EFS)

MERCHANTS AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE ASSOCIATION  
SATISFACTORILY COOPERATE: SEALS ON JAPANESE  
GOODS WERE COMPLETELY LIFTED LAST NIGHT.

-The Anti-Japanese Association yesterday  
issued a notice calling attention to  
five points-

Regarding the lifting of seals on and registration  
of Japanese goods, the Anti-Japanese and National  
Salvation Association of the Various Classes of the  
People of Peiping Municipality, having especially drawn  
up five points which the various business firms should  
obey, issued a circular notice yesterday to shops in  
Peiping. The notice reads as follows:

In accordance with the demand of representatives  
of the Chamber of Commerce, the Executive Committee of  
this Association held its 27th meeting on February 3rd  
and amended the procedure for the enforcement of public  
sale of Japanese goods. The Chamber of Commerce is to  
be held responsible for organizing corps of inspectors  
who shall be placed under the supervision and direction  
of this Association. All seals on Japanese goods which  
were affixed thereto on October 25, 1931, shall be  
actually lifted and the goods registered. The procedure  
for registration shall be completed before the 11th  
instant, and public sale shall commence. The various  
points which merchants should observe during the period

of

-2-

of registration are enumerated as follows:

(1) After the seals on Japanese goods kept by the various firms have been lifted, the goods should be registered in detail according to the form of registration issued by this Association. Neither more nor less than the actual quantity may be declared. Should anybody be found to have made a false report with intent to indulge in malpractices, his right of public sale shall be canceled and the Japanese goods kept by him confiscated. In addition, he should be fined according to penalty regulations.

(2) At the time of filling out the form of registration, the original cost should be filled in in the price column. Should anybody be found to purposely have given a lower price with intent to deceive, one portion of his Japanese goods should be confiscated according to the circumstances, and he should be fined according to the penalty regulations.

(3) After registration of Japanese goods, registration certificates of Japanese goods especially printed by this Association shall be affixed to the goods before they can be publicly sold.

(4) After registration Japanese goods should be moved to a separate place where a department of public sale is to be established, and should be separated from other goods.

(5) After the procedure of registration has been completed, this Association will issue certificates of public sale permitting such sales. Should anybody be found to have sold Japanese goods without the certificates of public sale, his right of public sale should be

canceled.

-3-

canceled.

In order to maintain the interests of Peiping merchants, this Association has fixed this procedure of a public sales department of Japanese goods as the result of considerable discussion. It is hoped that merchants in Peiping will understand this idea and will respect the public wishes of severance of economic relations with Japan. No more Japanese goods will be imported in future, in order to manifest the patriotic determination of merchants and discharge the duties of protest against Japan and uphold national salvation.

It is earnestly requested that the above points be noted and definitely carried out. Do not toy with the above. Offenders will be punished and fined.

This special notice is given to the various business firms in Peiping.

-ANTI-JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF THE VARIOUS CLASSES  
OF PEOPLE OF PEIPING MUNICIPALITY-

February 4th.

EFS:T

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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12  
FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
FROM  
DIVISION OF

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 12, 1932

Rec'd 6:43 a. m. 13th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

March <sup>13</sup> 9 a. m.  
My March 11, <sup>4689</sup> 2 p. m.

FAR EAST  
MAR 14 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4723

793.94  
note  
893.102-5  
793.94119  
500.c111

Following is further letter from <sup>Japanese Minister</sup> to Lampson dated

March 11th received yesterday:

"Pending my final reply to the enclosure of your note of yesterday I hasten to forward to you an excerpt of the minutes of the proceedings of the Assembly of the League of Nations bearing the adoption of the resolution in question, which is useful in throwing light on what may be touched upon in the course of discussion on the regulation of the withdrawal of our forces, envisaged under paragraph 3 of the resolution.

I enclose two copies of it so that you may forward one to the Chinese side, if you deem it advisable to do so."

WSB

JOHNSON

MAR 16 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
D.N.L. AND M.L.S.

WFE  
\*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 14 1932  
DIVISION OF

Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated March 13, 1932  
Rec'd 9:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

W  
MAR 14 1932

182, March 13, 2 p. m.

793.94  
note  
693.103-S  
793.94119

The following summarizes unreported incidents and conditions for the past week. Rumors of peace have absorbed public attention almost <sup>to the exclusion of</sup> everything else. To date so far as can be ascertained there is no substance to rumors. There are no indications that the Japanese intend to withdraw, Japanese reinforcements have been disembarking almost daily, military supplies and equipment in great quantities are being landed. The artillery included 8 eleven inch howitzers. This would indicate continued occupation and yet peace rumors continue and Japanese talk peace and disclaim any intention of permanent occupation.

Two. Unconfirmed reports state that Japanese are strengthening lines of defense and there is large concentration of Chinese troops at Hangchow. Chinese troops have been

F/LS 793.94/4724

MAR 16 1932  
FILED

REP.

2-#182, from Shanghai, Mar. 13, 2p.m.

been drifting back to Hungjao, Lunghwa and Siccawei in small groups during the last few days. These seem to be unorganized groups of soldiers and if sufficient numbers drift they will be a menace to the country south of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway. This is beyond the limits of the foreign controlled area.

Three. The foreign administered area has not presented any difficulties south of Soochow Creek since before "fire cracker" night on 4th. Curfew has been advanced to 11:30 o'clock. The Public Works Department which had suspended <sup>routine</sup> duties for military defense work has practically returned <sup>to</sup> public works of peace kind. Though yet unable to get complete control of Hongkew and Yangtzepoo the International Settlement functions therein are approaching normalcy with less Japanese interference generally. The Shanghai Municipal Council has offered to undertake sanitation in war zones contiguous to International Settlement believing that sanitation will reduce menace to health of the Settlement. Electric lighting is reappearing at all points in Hongkew and Yangtzepoo.

. Foreigners

147

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-#182, from Shanghai, Mar. 13, 2p.m.

Foreigners can move in that section with practical freedom.

Four. Japanese military have proclaimed peaceful intentions and have urged Chinese to resume vocations in war zones and it is surprising the number who are <sup>returning</sup> ~~requisitioned~~ to their labors in Hongkew, Yangtzepoo and <sup>other</sup> ~~official~~ settlement boundaries. The recent battlefield areas to north are not entirely open even to foreigners and travel in much of these and Chapei is attended with considerable risk. The Japanese have sympathetically considered practically every request which has been presented in the last five days by this Consulate General for assistance to preserve American industrial plants and property in war zone. Passes and protection have been given and accorded. Superficially the week has witnessed many improvements in conditions. Even the golf course which is but slightly to the west of the Kiangwan battlefield was open yesterday for play and the Chinese caddies were surprisingly easy to procure though that district is entirely in Japanese controlled area. Of course, this class does not understand what the trouble

was

147

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

4-#182, from Shanghai, Mar. 13, 3p.m.

was about nor has it any alternative but to return to work if it did know. It will take time to restore the devastated areas much of which probably will not be rebuilt for years. Much diplomatic work remains to be done before it can be determined whether or not the former owners are to be permitted to restore their plants. Chaos was produced in a few hours but it will take years to completely restore the destroyed area.

Repeated to Legation and Nanking, copy to the Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.S.

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 13, 1932

Rec'd 9:35 a. m.

FROM

793.94  
893.1025  
793-1025  
L-00. C111

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 14 1932  
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

March 13, 3 p. m.

My March 13, 9 p. m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 14 1932  
Department of State

In a further letter to Lampson dated today Shigemitsu states:

"Our representative at Geneva wires back to me in reply to my inquiry that he is not disposed to look upon Dr. W. W. Yen's reservation as modifying the declaration of the League resolution or as binding us in any way. As regards the expression 'complete withdrawal' I can hardly persuade myself to read Mr. Kuo Tai Chi's meaning into the resolution as it stands.

Permit me to reiterate the Japanese are prepared to enter into negotiation at any time on the basis of the League resolution. It would seem much better to expedite the matter if both sides stood simply on the resolution

F/LS 793.94/4725

FILED

MAR 16 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- from Shanghai, Mar. 13, 3p.m.

resolution itself and avoided at this state to bring in  
conditions or matters extraneous to it."

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AND M. I. D.

*FE*  
*EE*  
*cle*

No. 5327

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, February 16, 1932

DIVISION OF  
EASTERN EUROPEAN  
AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: ALLEGED SOVIET RUSSIAN AMMUNITION IN CHINESE ARMY

THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

FAR EASTERN  
MAR 14 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4726

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, as of possible interest to the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2319 1/ of even date with enclosure as indicated therein sent to the Legation on the subject of Soviet Russian ammunition allegedly found among the supplies left behind by fleeing Chinese troops.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson  
American Consul General

APR 6 1932

Enclosures as indicated

800  
TLL/tll

*8/23/11*

148

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2319

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA February 16, 1938

SUBJECT: ALLIRED SOVIET AMMUNITION IN CHINESE ARMY

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson

American Minister

Beiping, China

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter  
1/ dated February 11, 1938, written to me by a local American  
business man on the subject of Soviet ammunition allegedly  
discovered by him among the supplies abandoned by retreating  
Chinese troops. Although I am unable to check the truth  
of the statements made in the enclosure it is felt that they  
may be of interest to the Legation.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson  
American Consul General

1 enclosure as indicated

Copies have been sent  
to the Department.

800  
TLL/all

Copy of  
the original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

February 11, 1932.  
Harbin, Manchuria.

Mr. George C. Hanson,  
American Consul General,  
Harbin.

Dear Mr. Hanson:

Enclosed herewith please find two sets of photos. One has been taken by me on February 5th on the field of action around Intendantsky junction, and the other on February 8th at the Harbin station, depicting the parade of the Japanese troops.

With my two companions I was one of the first on the field of action, after the Chinese soldiers have retreated. The Japanese troops just started to trickle through in small groups.

I had ample opportunity to see things, as they were evidently hastily abandoned by the Chinese. Inspection of an armored train, shown in one of the pictures, gave some food for thought. We have found a Soviet machine gun, marked 1928 in one of the armored cars together with a large supply of Russian military machine-gun cartridges. In another place we have found two three-inch field pieces of Russian make. The cannons were marked 1903 and 1916, Kermisky Zavod, but the cannon ammunition was fresh Soviet made. The smaller calibre cannon on the armored train was a Soviet gun, and so was the large amount of ammunition for it. I have brought home several used cartridge cases for this latter gun. The writing on these cases clearly indicates their Soviet origin.

Machine gun cartridges cases found unopened (still soldered) were Soviet packed - there were quite a few of them in the armored train and around machine gun nests in the field close by.

Trusting that this information may be of service to you, I remain, Sir,


Respectfully yours,

.....



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE



March 18, 1932.

S. K. H.

The confidential despatch from the Tokyo Embassy hereunder dated February 16, 1932, reads more like a personal letter addressed to the Secretary than as a formal despatch.

It relates to many subjects including further explanation of the genesis of the abortive peace proposals in February; personal conversations with Yoshizawa, Baron Dan, Admiral Toyoda, and Matsuoka; and an account of a reported "run in" with Shiratori on the subject of the veracity of the Japanese officials.

The despatch (or letter) is mildly interesting but deals with subjects which have ceased to be "active".

*RSM*  
 RSM: emu

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, Japan, February 16, 1932.

793.94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAR 12 1932



CLASSIFICATION CANCELED  
Authority: Sumner letter Tokyo 2/11/1964  
By: W. H. ... Date: 11-18-64  
WHS

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 4 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4727

793.94  
note  
119.25  
893.102-S  
793.94/119  
894.00

The honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

My last letter to you had to be run off at top speed to get the PRESIDENT RADISON which was leaving at noon that day. As a matter of fact, the Dollar people were good enough to hold the boat for a few minutes so as to get the letter aboard.

I want merely to explain certain other things a little further in connection with the whole episode.

When Neville came back with the Japanese proposition, of which I telegraphed you I had grave doubts as to whether it would be safe to call it a Japanese proposition at all; and when your telegram came speaking of it as "Japanese proposition"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



- 2 -

119,25  
proposition" I could not help wondering whether, in view of the imperfection of our codes, this might not be read off by the Chinese secret service people, particularly as you did so express it in your telegram to Cunningham. This would immediately put the Chinese against the proposition and practically assure it of unfavorable reception. That I endeavored to cover in my later telegram to you, suggesting that the Japanese might want to wish the paternity of the idea upon us, merely for strategic reasons; and if there was any advantage to the situation in their doing so I can see no objection to it. The whole thing was a growth and a rising out of the conversations, as I have indicated in my letter, held in part by officers of our staff as individuals urging the Japanese to make concessions, and in part by conversation by a representative of the Japanese Navy with the British Ambassador; and also in large measure by consultation between the Japanese representatives of the Army and Navy and their general staffs.

In the joint conversations between the three ambassadors and Lt. Yoshizawa, the latter had informed us that the Japanese Cabinet had decided to send their troops to Shanghai, in number, according to him, of at least 12,000. He would not state the exact number but repeated rather firmly: "at least 12,000", intimating it would be probably something more, the inference being that he meant somewhere between 12,000 and 15,000. Recent advices indicate that 20,000 have arrived, not including the 7,000 marines who are in addition; this would give the Japanese an effective fighting force of 27,000. Since writing that I heard from

Yoshizawa

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



- 3 -

Yoshizawa that the total force is about 13,000 - 15,000 land troops and 3,000 marines.

The only way, in my opinion, and in that of my colleagues here, to have prevented these troops going would have been for us to have served notice on Japan that she would have to go to war with us and perhaps Great Britain and France simultaneously if she sent them - a step I cannot imagine our being prepared to take. The country at the time, as I have indicated before, was geared up to a high pitch of war psychology, there was a tremendous amount of excitement in the air, and it was not a time when peaceful measures stood much chance of prevailing.

I have indicated in my telegrams the position taken by Baron Dan. He has taken occasion three or four times to lead me aside and urge upon me with all the emphasis he could, that the conservative elements were organizing within Japan, that they were gaining ground, and that the war-like movements in Manchuria and Shanghai were not popular. There is, he said, a very strong feeling among the conservative and thoughtful people against them and that if the military party be not strengthened by opposition from without so that opposition from within seemed unpatriotic, pretty soon the conservative elements would gain the upper hand. When Japan comes to pay the bills she will have had time to sober down.

The best thought that I can reach is that the military clique that has pushed Japan into this predicament are sounding their own knell, digging their own graves, and the result will be the reorganization of Japan from within

with

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



- 4 -

with these militant elements shorn of their power.

Admiral Toyoda was very cordial, genial and frank, and he talked with a marked English lilt on his tongue, which he acquired as naval attaché in London. He went to great length in explaining the Japanese point of view. He admitted freely the existence of a rowdy and unruly element among the Japanese; <sup>in Shanghai</sup> these, he termed, were similar to what are known as "gangsters" in the United States, and which he said had committed all sorts of abuses; he indicated they had been gathered up and sent back to Japan. There is <sup>also in Shanghai</sup> a large population of unemployed Japanese, the Japanese factories which employed them having had to shut down owing to the boycott; these people are pretty nearly desperate, and when desperate they will go to almost any length. In fact before the outbreak of January 28th, as I think I have already written to you, the Japanese authorities indicated to us that their problem there <sup>(as in Shanghai)</sup> was more to keep their own people quiet in their unfavorable circumstances rather than keeping the Chinese quiet. I expressed the hope to Admiral Toyoda, as I had done also to Mr. Yoshizawa and later to Mr. Matsuoka, that the Japanese, in their settlement differences, were free to make suitable reparations for damages inflicted by this rowdy element by liberality in the matter of concessions in the interest of a fair and acceptable settlement of the international controversies. Admiral Toyoda indicated that what he hoped for was that the Japanese and the United States and other foreign troops would act in concert and present a united front against the Chinese in defense of the settlement and in the protection of foreign interests

in

1481

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

in Shanghai. I pointed out how difficult Japan had made this for us to do, and that I felt sure the position of my Government would be that we would take no position which could be construed as unfriendly to China.

Two days later Mr. Iatsuoka came and spent a long session with me and pointed out that he had been asked by the Prime Minister, Inukai, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yoshizawa, to give up his campaign activities (he is a candidate for the Diet) leaving his candidacy work to his friends, and go to Shanghai and assist in straightening out their affairs there. He reiterated the peaceful tendencies of Japan, their entire desire to settle the thing without a ~~dispute~~ <sup>clash</sup>, their hope to avoid all actual fighting there, but their insistence upon the withdrawal of the Chinese troops to a safe distance and the creation of a neutral zone. He said that his earnest effort would be to secure co-operation with the allies. I made the same comment to him that I had to Admiral Toyoda: that I felt sure that the United States would take no position that would be unfriendly to China. To Iatsuoka I dwelt quite extensively on the desirability of making the Chinese negotiators feel that they had won some sort of victory in the negotiations. I suggested he should use his ingenuity to devise some way by which the negotiations can be conducted in such a manner as to enable the Chinese negotiators to "save face" as otherwise they would be discredited by their own people, the negotiations repudiated, or the government that might agree to them would fall as a result. I hoped that Japan would be as liberal and conciliatory as possible.

note  
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I understand that Shiratori, in talking with the newspaper

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



- 8 -

newspaper men, had said I had told Mr. Yoshizawa that no more reliance could be placed on Japan's word and that the younger officers in the Foreign Office had said among themselves that if my departure was not impending that Japan might ask for my recall. As a result the United Press cabled to America a portion of this. I have not seen the message but I understand it was to the effect that I had spoken very bluntly to the Foreign Office and given offense and said that the Japanese word could no longer be trusted. Babb, the representative of the Associated Press, told me this story and I authorized him to say that I was not conscious of having said anything that could be construed in that way ; I knew well it would have been highly undiplomatic if I had done so. I assume that this arose from Yoshizawa reporting something I had said when, at the meeting of the three ambassadors, he announced that the Japanese cabinet had decided to send land troops to Shanghai solely for defensive purposes: I had asked him if he meant that in the Manchurian sense. When he asked me what that meant, I replied that in Manchuria that wherever the Chinese army was in existence the Japanese had launched an attack upon it, and in every instance they had called it a "defensive movement", and I commented that if they adopted the same policy in the neighborhood of Shanghai I could see where they would get into a very difficult situation. There was no questioning of the Japanese word in this, it was merely a matter of definition of what they meant when they said: "defensive". I had at a previous meeting when I was talking with Yoshisawa privately and not officially told him that the newspapers in the United States

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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States of which I had received copies put in quotation marks the Japanese claim with each of these moves that they were "defensive", and when they stated they were "obliged as a retaliatory measure" to attack Chinese organizations with bombs from airplanes, etc. I told him that the arguments put forth by the Japanese for the necessity for these actions were not convincing to the American public. This was merely apropos of the general disapprobation evinced on all sides to the war operations which were being conducted by Japan in Manchuria. This was in no sense in the course of an official interview but just a personal chat in which I was endeavoring to reinforce what Yoshizawa already knew about opinions as to the course the Japanese were pursuing as held in Europe by side lights as to how it was regarded in the United States from unofficial sources. I do not think there was anything in that conversation at which he could take offense. I have had no indication that he did take offence at anything I have said, except what Shiratori chose to read into it, and imagine he went off the handle on his own as he is more or less of a firebrand and is inclined to make trouble right along. It was he who gave out unauthorized the celebrated Stimson attack at the time of the misinterpreted Associated Press interview.

Respectfully yours,

*W. Cameron Forbes*

W. Cameron Forbes

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3 copies removed  
for notes in D.C.R. J.W.M.  
WCF/AA

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 18, 1932.


~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

The despatch hereunder (No. 508, February 27, 1932,) relates to representations to the Japanese Government requesting that their men-of-war at Shanghai be moved and that no more Japanese troops be landed in the Settlement.

Ambassador Forbes encloses a copy of a memorandum left by him with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on February 26 in response to the Department's telegraphic instructions of February 24, 1932, on the above subject.

As stated by Mr. Forbes in his telegram No. 80 of February 26, 5 p.m., this memorandum is a very close paraphrase of the Department's instructions referred to.

I think that the despatch might be sent to the files.

  
FE:RSM:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



RECD

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Tokyo, February 27, 1932.

FE

No. 508.

MAR 12 32

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 14 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4728

793.94  
note  
893.102-S

MAR 28 1932

FILED

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 80,  
February 26, 5 P.M., in regard to the request to the  
Japanese Government to move its men of war at Shanghai  
to a position where they would not be likely to draw  
the fire of the Chinese to the danger of the Settlement.

My colleagues here informed me that their instructions  
did not contemplate joint action to the extent of presenting  
identic notes or making a joint visit at the Foreign Office.

1/. I am enclosing the text of the memorandum which I left  
with

793.94/4419

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is, I am informed, substantially the same as that presented by the French, British and Italian Ambassadors.

Respectfully yours,



W. Cameron Forbes.

Enclosure:  
Copy of Note to  
the Foreign Office.

Embassy's File No.800 China.

ELN/SR

149  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The American Ambassador presents his compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and, by direction of his Government, has the honor to invite the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the military situation in Shanghai.

The American Government would be greatly gratified if the Japanese Government could see its way clear, (1) to move the Japanese men-of-war at Shanghai from their present moorings to a position further down the river where they will not be likely to draw fire from the Chinese as such fire might endanger the Settlement and the ships of other nations lying in the river; and (2) in the event that the Japanese Government is contemplating sending further reinforcements to Shanghai, to arrange not to land these forces in the Settlement but at such points as will not draw fire from the Chinese troops to the danger of the Settlement or its inhabitants or the ships of other nations lying in the river.

Tokyo, February 26, 1932.

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Feiping, February 15, 1932.



*FE*

No. 1405

13252

Stamp: FAR EASTERN DEPT  
MAR 14 1932  
Department of State  
*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

F/LS 793.94/4729

*793.94  
note  
899.102-S*

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to previous correspondence concern-  
ing the situation at Shanghai, I have the honor to  
1/ transmit herewith a copy of a translation of Foreign  
Office Note No. L-406 of January 30, 1932, the text  
of which was forwarded to the Department in Consul  
General Peck's telegram of January 30, 12 midnight.  
This translation was made by the Legation and checked  
with the English translation prepared by the Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs.

2/ There is likewise enclosed a copy, in transla-  
tion, of Foreign Office Note No. L-407 of January 31,  
1932, the text of which was forwarded to the Depart-  
ment in Mr. Peck's telegram of February 1, 1932. This  
translation was made by the Consulate General at Nan-  
king and was checked by the Legation.

Enclosures

*793.94/3765*

*793.94/3851*


1434  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Enclosures Nos. 3 and 4 consist of translations prepared by the Consul General at Nanking and checked by the Legation of Foreign Office Notes 3/4/ Nos. 409 and 410 of February 5, 1932, protesting against the use of the International Settlement at Shanghai as a base by the Japanese Army.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:



Mahlon F. Perkins,  
Counselor of Legation.

✓ Enclosures:

- 1: Copy of Note L-406,  
January 30, 1932.
- 2: Copy of Note L-407,  
January 31, 1932.
- 3: Copy of Note L-409,  
February 5, 1932.
- 4: Copy of Note L-410,  
February 5, 1932.

800.

LHE/js.

L-406

1.  
1405

Translation of a formal note addressed by His  
Excellency Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign  
Affairs of the Republic of China, to the Honorable  
Nelson T. Johnson, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister  
Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to  
China.

(Trans. FO-878)

(Dated: January 30, 1932.)

(Recd.: February 8, 1932.)

Sir:

Since the unprovoked Japanese military occupation  
of Mukden on September 18, 1931, Japan has been  
continuously pursuing, in the Three Eastern Provinces and  
the other strategic centers of China, her aggressive  
and positive military policy and has now even invaded  
Shanghai, the international trade center. On January  
28th at 1:45 p.m. the reply of Mr. Wu T'ieh-ch'ang,  
the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, in reference to the  
note of January 20th from the Japanese Consul, was  
accepted by the Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai  
as satisfactory; but at twelve o'clock the same night,  
the Commander of the Japanese Overseas First Squadron  
suddenly sent a notice to the Municipal Government  
demanding the withdrawal of Chinese troops in favor  
of the Japanese forces; at the same time the Japanese  
military forces rushed into Chapei District and first  
attacked the Chinese troops with machine guns,

and

The Honorable  
Nelson T. Johnson,  
Envoy Extraordinary and  
Minister Plenipotentiary of the  
United States of America  
to China.

-2-

and continued their attack on the 29th. Over twenty planes incessantly and indiscriminately bombarded Chapei, a thickly populated district, causing the said district to burn and resulting in the killing and injuring of countless civilians. Furthermore, the local administrative offices, transportation facilities, Chinan University, the Commercial Press, various cultural organizations and principal commercial enterprises have many of them been destroyed. Up to this moment they are still carrying on their hostile actions in flagrant violation of international law as well as the Kellogg Anti-War Pact and the Covenants of the League of Nations and in utter disregard of the various Resolutions adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. This is particularly in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington.

Such actions not only place the lives and properties of all nationals in great danger but also constitute a direct menace to the very foundations of humanity and civilization. Japan should bear the entire responsibility.

The Chinese Government, by observing the Resolutions of the League Council, has been exercising great restraint and toleration under various provocative and hostile actions, but Japan, disregarding our forbearance, suddenly instructed her troops to attack Shanghai and menace our National Capital. Japan in deliberately aggravating the situation by military action has forced the Chinese authorities to take necessary measures in the exercise of the legitimate right

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

right of national self-defense.

Since Shanghai, the international trade center of China, has now been placed in a critical situation, other important places in China may also be placed in great peril at any moment. Japan's violation of the Nine-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference is impairing the sovereignty and independence as well as the territorial and administrative integrity of China. As the American Government was the promoter of the said Treaty, I have the honor, Mr. Minister, to urgently request that you cable the American Government to observe its sacred obligations under the said Treaty by adopting prompt and effective measures to prevent Japanese military action of whatever nature within Chinese territory and all other such acts on her part as are in violation of the said Treaty so that its dignity and peace in the Far East may be maintained.

It is also hoped that you take immediate action and favor me with a reply.

(Signed) Lo Wen-kan,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of China.

-SEAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS-

January 30, 1932.

EFS:IT

J E U

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION

January 30, 1932.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Since the unprovoked Japanese military occupation of Mukden on September 18, 1931, Japan has been continuously pursuing, in the Three Eastern Provinces and the other strategic centers of China, her aggressive and positive military policy and has now even invaded Shanghai, the international trade center of China. On January 28th at 1:45 p.m. the reply of Mr. Wu Tsh-chen, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, in reference to the four demands of Japan, was accepted by the Japanese Consul-General with satisfaction; but at midnight of the same day, Admiral Shikawa, Commander of the Japanese Overseas First Squadron, delivered an ultimatum to the Shanghai municipality demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops for the occupation of the Japanese forces; at the same time the Japanese military forces took the initiative, rushed into Chapel District and attacked the Chinese troops with machine guns, and since then have been directing their attack continuously up to the 29th. Over twenty Japanese planes bombarded incessantly and indiscriminately along Chapel, the thickly populated district of Shanghai

causing

His Excellency

Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Minister.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

causing the said district in a state of conflagration and resulting in the killing of countless civilians. Furthermore, the local administrations, transportation facilities, the Chinan University, the Commercial Press, various cultural organizations and principal commercial enterprises have all been totally or partly destroyed. Up to this moment they are still carrying on their hostile actions in flagrant violation of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 as well as the Briand-Kellogg Anti-war Pact and the Covenants of the League of Nations and in utter disregard of the various Resolutions adopted by the Council of the League of Nations.

Such actions not only place the lives and properties of all nationals residing in Shanghai in great danger but also constitute a direct menace to the very foundation of humanity and civilization. It is obvious that Japan should bear the entire responsibility.

The Chinese Government, by observing the Resolutions of the League Council, has been exercising great restraint and toleration under various provocative and hostile actions, but Japan, disregarding our forbearance, suddenly instructed their marines to attack Shanghai and menace our National Capital. In deliberately aggravating the situation by military action on the part of Japan, the Chinese authorities are compelled to take necessary measures as self-defence and for the upholding of her sovereign rights.

With Shanghai in such a critical situation, the other places of China can be placed in great peril at

any

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

any moment. Japan's violation of the Nine-Power Treaty is impairing the sovereignty and independence as well as the territorial and administrative integrity of China. As Your Excellency's Government is the sponsor of the said Treaty I have the honour to urgently request that You will cable Your Excellency's Government to observe their solemn pledges and obligations, of the said Treaty by adopting prompt and effective measures in order to prevent further Japan's military actions within Chinese territory and all other such acts on her part as are in violation of the said Treaty, so that its sanctity may be preserved and peace in the Far East maintained.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration

LO WEN-KAN

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2.

1405

L-407

Translation of a formal note addressed by His Excellency Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, to the Honorable Nelson T. Johnson, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to China.

(Trans. WRP-)

(Dated: January 31, 1932.)

(Recd.: February 8, 1932.)

Sir:

I have the honor to state that the Municipal Government of Shanghai has reported by telegraph that there was recently held in the International Settlement a meeting to devise defense measures the participants being the Municipal Council and the British, American and French military commanders, and that although publicity was not given to the decision of the meeting regarding the allotment of areas for defense, nevertheless the Japanese Consul asserted in a public statement that the meeting designated the section of territory East of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway as the one to be defended by Japanese troops; moreover, the Commander of the Shanghai-Woosung Defense Force has reported by telegraph that in the International Settlement the area South of Soochow Creek and in the neighborhood of western Shanghai has hitherto

been

The Honorable  
Nelson T. Johnson,  
Envoy Extraordinary and  
Minister Plenipotentiary of  
the United States of America  
to China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

been guarded by British and American forces, and whereas on the present occasion when a state of emergency was declared British troops were assigned to guard this area, nevertheless, on the afternoon of January 30, Japanese troops suddenly replaced the British troops, and the Japanese troops openly utilized the area in question as a base of military operations.

I have the honor to observe that the Chapei area East of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway is purely Chinese-controlled territory, invasion of which by the troops of another nation is, of course, not permissible. If the reported meeting to devise defense measures attended by the Municipal Council and the American, British and French military commanders did actually designate that area for defense by Japanese forces, it was quite evidently an act which violated China's sovereignty; and, further, the Chinese Government regards it as most surprising that permission was granted to Japan to establish a base for military operations in the territory of the International Settlement.

I have the honor to request that you will at once issue telegraphic instructions to the American Consul at Shanghai and to the officer in command of the American military forces to put a stop at once to the military operations of the Japanese in the Chapei district and no longer to permit the Japanese forces to utilize the territory of the International Settlement for attacks on Chinese-controlled areas.

I have the honor to hope that you will take note of these requests and will take immediate action and give me a reply.

(Signed)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

(Signed) **Lo Wen-kan,**  
**Minister for Foreign Affairs**  
**of the Republic of China.**

-SEAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS-

January 31, 1932.

EFS:T

3.

1405

L-409

Translation of a formal note addressed by His Excellency Dr. Lo Wen-kam, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, to the Honorable Nelson T. Johnson, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to China.

(Trans. WRP)

(Dated: February 5, 1932.)

(Recd.: February 12, 1932.)

Sir:

I have the honor to state that the Shanghai Municipal Government submitted a telegraphic report on February 3, 1932, that the Japanese forces were still utilizing the International Settlement as a base of operations in attacks against the Chinese forces; that every day Japanese armed forces were passing through the International Settlement into the western part of Shanghai and other places, thereby increasing the anxiety of Chinese forces; and that a protest had already been filed with the Municipal Council of the International Settlement.

I have the honor to recall that this Ministry on January 31, 1932, addressed a formal note to you in reference to the act of the International Settlement in allowing the Japanese forces liberty to utilize Settlement area as a base for military operations, in which the Ministry requested that immediate telegraphic instructions be sent

to

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

Envoy Extraordinary and  
Minister Plenipotentiary of  
the United States of America  
to China.

150

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

to the American Consul at Shanghai and to the officer in command of the American forces there not to further permit the Japanese forces to use the territory of the International Settlement as a base from which to launch attacks on Chinese-controlled areas. But, according to the report of the 3rd instant, already referred to, the authorities of the International Settlement are still permitting Japanese armed troops to pass through the International Settlement to the western part of Shanghai and other places, thus adding to the anxieties of the Chinese forces. This is extremely improper. I therefore have the honor, Mr. Minister, again to request that you speedily take strict action in accordance with my formal note of January 31, 1932, and favor me with a reply.

(Signed) Lo Wen-kan,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of China.

-SEAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS-

February 5, 1932.

EFS:T

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4,  
Enclosure No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Despatch No. 1405

L-410

Translation of a formal note addressed by His Excellency Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, to the Honorable Nelson T. Johnson, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to China.

(Trans. WRP)

(Dated: February 5, 1932.)

(Recd.: February 12, 1932.)

Sir:

I have the honor to recall that this Ministry addressed you formal notes on January 31, 1932, and February 5, 1932, in reference to the action of the International Settlement in Shanghai in allowing Japan to utilize the Settlement at will as a base of military operations, in which notes it was requested that an immediate end be put to this state of affairs.

I have the honor to observe that China has been very adversely affected by the action of the International Settlement in permitting Japanese forces to utilize the Settlement as a base of military operations. I now have the honor again to solemnly request that you immediately telegraph to the American Consul at Shanghai and the officer in command of the American forces there that the International Settlement must not be used to protect the Japanese forces and that the Japanese forces must be strictly prevented from utilizing the Settlement

as

The Honorable  
Nelson T. Johnson,  
Envoy Extraordinary and  
Minister Plenipotentiary of  
the United States of America  
to China.

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-2-

as a base for launching attacks on the Chinese forces;  
otherwise China will not assume responsibility if  
through these causes the International Settlement becomes  
involved in any trouble. I have the honor to bring  
these facts to your attention and to request that you  
take speedy action and favor me with a reply.

(Signed) Lo Wen-kan,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of China.

-SEAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS-

February 5, 1932.

EPS:T

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1511

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT *REC'D*

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to:  
\$

Department of State

Washington,

March 12, 1932.  
MAR 12 32  
*2 pm*

AMEMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND)

90

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR 'ATHERTON' FROM THE 'SECRETARY.'

I request that you deliver the following personal letter from me to Sir John Simon:

*793.94/A  
note  
1.0017-anti-war  
7/11/41*

QUOTE My dear Sir John: I want you to know how sincerely I appreciate your constant and effective efforts for the incorporation by the Assembly of the League of Nations in Part One of its resolution of a proclamation which aligns the members of the League of Nations so harmoniously with the position taken by my Government in its note to China and Japan of January 7, 1932. The reference to the Kellogg Pact in the resolution is most gratifying evidence of a desire on the part of the members of the League who are also signatories of that treaty to find a common basis for action with the United States. I cannot but feel that the close cooperation of our Governments has resulted with your assistance in

793.94/4729A

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

1511

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

Washington,

-2-

Geneva, in an important contribution to the cause of  
peace. It has created a precedent of international  
practice which will, I believe, go far to effectuate the  
purposes which are common to both the Pact of Paris and  
the Covenant of the League of Nations. I can only  
assure you that it is my earnest hope and desire that  
our two Governments shall continue their efforts in the  
same spirit of constructive cooperation. Believe me,  
Yours very sincerely, HENRY L. STIMSON. UNQUOTE.

*Stimson*  
(L. S. K.)

SA: ATK: VGN

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

*file*

1932 March 8, 1932.

~~SMH:~~

The information on page 1 of this letter to the effect that the danger of a coup d'etat appears to be very much less now than it has been in the past is interesting and can probably be accepted as true.

This fact, however, does not dispose of the possibility that the present cabinet under Inukai may in the near future be replaced by a cabinet, under a military premier, in which the military will be de jure as well as de facto in full control.

The press reports from Tokyo this morning announcing that Prince Saionji is in Tokyo may signify that this change may be brought about at an early date.

As Mr. Forbes presumably will be sailing in about two weeks, I assume that no acknowledgment of this letter is called for.

*RSM*  
FB:RSM:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 7 1932

Tokyo, Japan, February 3, 1932.

RECEIVED

MAR 5 - 1932

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 7 1932  
Department of State

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Recently I had a very interesting talk with one of the most prominent Japanese, who desires that his name be withheld.

He was utterly opposed to the Japanese policy in Manchuria and said it had been very unwise; he also stated that the sober thought of thinking Japanese was very much opposed to the Military Regime.

The most <sup>important</sup> thing, however, that he told me - and in this he was particular in not being quoted - was to the effect that he felt that the danger of a coup d'etat on the part of the younger army officers was very much less now than it had been, because they were coming to a realizing sense that they could not depend upon their army, - upon the enlisted men; and that while the officers still felt their power and still had a desire to dominate, that the soldiery would not support them: that while they would go out and fight against

*Key -  
Confidential  
166  
FE  
DER*

*793.94  
m.c.*

*894.00*

*894.20*

793.94/4730

MAR 8 1932

Confidential File

151  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

people of another country, they would not fight against their own people. He said he thought that the realization of this was giving pause to the activities of the group of younger officers, the leaders of whom staged the abortive demonstration last autumn. This was a point of view I had not heard offered before.

Sir Francis Lindley tells me that Nagai, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs is completely out of sympathy with the operations of the Army in Manchuria, and with the policy of his Government in Manchuria, and had so expressed himself more than once quite definitely to him.

I have taken occasion, in talking with Nagai and also with Yoshizawa, to express to them that while I had a number of times spoken about the fact that the Japanese declaration of Open Door, had been made many times, it seemed to me to be lip service only because as a matter of fact the door wasn't open even a crack in Manchuria.

When I mentioned to Inukai the fact that under

693,001

-3-

the Japanese regime in Manchuria there was really no open door, and told him that there were numerous instances of interference with neutral business on the part of the Japanese, his official spokesman gave this fact out to the papers; and the next day one of the Japanese papers - I think the Times - commented that the American interests were really commercial and had to do with their trade and their pockets. In view of this fact I have taken occasion, in speaking to Nagai and Yoshizawa both, to impress upon them the fact that our interest was much more in the sanctity of treaties, the observance of pacts, and the use of peaceful means in the securing of national objects, than it was in promoting trade; and the fact that I had mentioned these trade things a number of times, as I felt it my duty to do, was in large measure due to the fact that I was, as a friend of Japan, <sup>anxious</sup> that they have as good a case as possible to present to the investigating mission of the League of Nations, and that I did not want any mistake to be made by them as a result of distortion of values. I impressed upon them that my instructions from Wash-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ington had laid emphasis, and continued to emphasize, the maintenance of peaceful relations.

Respectfully,



Ambassador.

The Honorable,  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D. **FE**

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 14, 1932

Rec'd 12:05 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
14 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND  
INFORMATION

Secretary of State,

Washington

March 14, 2 p.m.

My March 13, 3 p.m. / 4725

RECEIVED  
MAR 14 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4731

FILED

793.94  
note  
893.102-5  
793.94119  
500.c111

British Minister replied yesterday to Japanese Minister that in response to an inquiry he had received the following statement from the British Foreign Secretary regarding validity of the reservations made by Dr. Yen at the time of the League Assembly resolution March 4. "The translation of the report of the Chinese delegate stated that he understood it to mean that the negotiations mentioned in paragraph 3 thereof were armistice negotiations and not Shanghai conference which should follow armistice negotiations. He accepted the resolution on this understanding and on the further understanding that no condition should be attached to the withdrawal of the invader's troops.

No other delegate spoke and these undertakings were therefore presumably accepted by the Assembly".

Sir

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2--from Shanghai via N.R., March  
14, 2 p. m.

Sir Miles adds that this view apparently does not  
tally with the view expressed by the Japanese represen-  
tatives as stated in Shanghai's letter of March 13th.

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustofsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

RECEIVED  
MAR 14 1932  
DIVISION OF  
ASIAN AFFAIRS

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 14, 1932

Rec'd 12 noon

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

W  
S  
FAR EASTERN  
MAR 14 1932  
Department of State

March 14, 3 p. m.

Following from Colonel Drysdale for War Department.

"31. Following from British observer with Chinese:

Chinese hold line Antung - Taitang - Shatow - Hupukou,  
Chiang Kai Shek troops are on left, no indications of any  
contemplated attack by Chinese troops. Japanese continue  
to land supplies including six inch trench mortars.  
Japanese military requested China Airways to cease flying  
over war vessels and zone of operation. Note during bad  
weather such as is common now these aeroplanes have been  
keeping over the river, hence this request. Japanese  
report several instances of isolated sniping daily March 8th  
to 11th. General situation unchanged.

JOHNSON

WSB

KLP

793.94  
note  
893.102-S

FLS 793.94/4732

MAR 16 1932

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 8117

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*[Handwritten initials]*

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, January 25, 1932.

AM RECD  
DEPT OF STATE  
MAR 14 1932

MAR 12 1932

(G)

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 14 1932  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Explosion on Powder Lighters.

*[Handwritten notes: 1-13-44, 89B, 200]*

THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON.

F/L/S 795.94/4735

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a self-explanatory despatch No. 7127 of this date, with its enclosure, from this Consulate General to the Legation in regard to the subject above mentioned.

Respectfully yours,

*[Signature: Edwin S. Cunningham]*  
Edwin S. Cunningham,  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Shanghai Consulate General's despatch No. 7127, with enclosure.

ESC:NLH  
800

In quintuplicate

MAR 20 1932  
FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 7124

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,  
Shanghai, China, January 25, 1932.

Subject: Explosion on Powder Lighters.

The Honorable

Nelson Crusler Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that on January 24, 1932, while two lighters were conveying powder from a magazine in Footung to the Kiangnan Arsenal, an explosion occurred, as the result of which a number of men, variously reported as from 10 to 40, were killed. This explosion occurred at about 3:30 p.m. and its repercussions were felt over the entire city, the shock being particularly severe in the French Concession, and windows were shattered in many residences even as far east as Bubbling Well Road. Coming just at this time it almost created a panic in the city, as 1/ is evidenced by the enclosed memorandum of telephone calls which I received immediately thereafter. There is no claim that the explosion was due to any cause other than mere accident, a spark probably falling into one of the lighters either from the towing boat or from a passing boat. The powder was being conveyed to the Arsenal for use in the manufacture of munitions.

The

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The enclosed memorandum of telephone calls, which were received by me personally soon after the accident, includes practically none of my own calls which were placed for the purpose of ascertaining the nature and cause of the shock which was distinctly felt at the consulate general. The object in transmitting this memorandum of telephone calls is that the legation and department may know the tense condition that exists in Shanghai, and also the difficulties that one encounters in endeavoring to secure facts concerning some happening on which the entire town has some information to offer. Each one of the reports received would appear to furnish accurate information, whereas it was only after two hours that the real cause of the report was ascertained. It so happened that the Nanking mail airplane was returning at the moment of the explosion and it did circle round several times, no doubt in an effort to ascertain the cause of the explosion. This, of course, gave support to the impression, which every one was willing to believe and probably feared might have materialized, that it was a Japanese airplane carrying out their plans of securing a reply from the Mayor to the demands which have been made by the Japanese Consul General in connection with the assault on certain Japanese monks on January 20th.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,  
 American Consul General.

Enclosure of  
 the 1/7/72 Memorandum, as stated.

ESC:NLH WA  
 800

In triplicate  
 In quintuplicate to department

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 141 or 142 of W. Cunningham,  
 American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated  
 January 25, 1932, on the subject "Explosion on Tender  
 Lighters."

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

January 24, 1932.

At 3:30 p.m. approximately the effect of an explosion of some kind was felt plainly in the consular building. On looking out on the street it was found that many people had emerged from this and other buildings and were looking toward the south as if the explosion had been in that direction.

Mr. L. telephoned that the windows in his house were shattered and that his son thought that the explosion was caused by something dropped from an airplane which he had seen circling round. The son was not positive in regard to the description of the plane except that it had boats, which meant that it was a hydroplane. I asked Mr. L. to proceed to the Mayor's office and ascertain particulars, since he lived not far away. At 4:30 he telephoned that he had returned to his home, having been unable to get to the Mayor's office since the bridge across Locawai Creek was barricaded and the Chinese police were not permitting any one to pass over the bridge into Chinese territory, but he had learned from the French police stationed there, and from some bystanders, that the explosion was in the compound of the Mayor's office or in some vacant buildings on the property near by. The French police stated definitely that the explosion was caused by a hand grenade and that this was not dropped from the airplane. Mr. L. stated, however, that a British military officer, with considerable war experience, had stated as positively that if the explosion was a hand grenade it must have been a collection of them, as no single hand grenade could have caused the explosion just heard. Mr. L. stated that he was assured that the bomb was not dropped from an airplane, but that it was the mail airplane returning from Hanking which had been seen circling round a few times, the conclusion reached being that the occupants of the plane were simply curious and were trying to ascertain the cause of the explosion.

Mrs. S. telephoned in great excitement and inquired what was happening, stating that the windows had been broken in her home at No. 7 Rue Adina and that she saw smoke arise from the direction of the office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She stated she believed the explosion had been caused by a bomb dropped from an airplane, as she had seen an airplane circling round a number of times.

Mr. F. telephoned and inquired whether I had any information as to what was happening. I informed him I had not.

Mr. L.

1524

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Justafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Mr. L., a well known American missionary, telephoned me and informed me that not far from his home across Wicawei Creek there was an explosion and that his son saw an airplane circling round. The son described the airplane as having a red tail, and said that it had dropped a bomb which had caused the explosion.

PRIVELY CONFIDENTIAL. Mr. L. requested that I not give the source of my information in regard to an authentic report that there was to be a meeting at 4 p.m. this afternoon in the Bankers Club to consider the question of dealing with the serious local Japanese affair. He also stated that the Mayor was having a meeting this evening for a similar purpose. He stated that this information came from a source which was reliable, furnishing me the name of a Chinese gentleman whom I do not know. END CONFIDENTIAL

Major G., in reply to my inquiry stated that it was an explosion in Mantao but that he had no particulars.

Mr. . stated that he had been in communication with the office of the Dollar Wharf and that Mr. . had gone across the river to see what had occurred, as Mr. . believed that it was an explosion caused by a bomb dropped from an airplane in or near the Arsenal.

Mr. B. telephoned that it was not an explosion in Mantao but a boiler explosion in Footung and that he had been so informed by the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, who had telephoned him since I had talked with Mr. B. some fifteen minutes previously.

At 5 p.m. word was received that the explosion had occurred on an S.C. river tanker named the       , about two miles above the Kiangnan Lock where there is a spur track of the Shanghai-Kangchow Railway which runs down to the river. The tanker was lying there and an explosion had occurred which blew out one end of the boat, the cause not being ascertained. This information was obtained from Mr. . of the Dollar Steamship Company, who is stationed at the company's Footung Wharf, and who had gone to the scene of the explosion at the request of Mr. . and myself, and had seen the tanker surrounded by a huge crowd.

At 6 p.m. Mr. . telephoned that the explosion had been at the Lungwa Arsenal.

At 6:10 p.m. the Shanghai Municipal Police telephoned that the explosion had been on a lighter on the river, loaded with explosives and powder which was being conveyed from Footung to the Arsenal, and that 27 out of the 28 men on board had been killed.

mm -tr

BBC



No. 534.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

February 17, 1932.

SUBJECT: Banditry.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's telegram of February 11 5 p.m. to the Legation at Peiping instructing the Consulates General at Mukden and Harbin to keep the Department currently informed by telegram of important developments in the bandit suppression campaign of the Japanese and to submit substantial accounts by mail, I have the honor to report on banditry conditions and recent bandit suppression operations in South Manchuria.

It is claimed with good reason that banditry in recent years in any given area in China has varied in proportion to the number of troops in that area, and as the Chinese army is now probably larger than it has ever been before, disorder is likewise more rampant. Manchuria has been no exception to this rule, and according to Japanese reports  
and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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and to information from other sources, the districts west of the Liao River which were recently occupied by the Chinese troops have suffered most from bandit depredations and consequently the condition of the people there is the worst. The Japanese military occupation of South Manchuria was the direct cause of adding to the ranks of bandits large numbers of armed soldiers and police. Many other recruits were furnished by deserters during the hasty retreat westwards of the Fengtien (Liaoning) troops and with the disappearance of the central provincial administration at Mukden, governmental authority in the interior was weakened and disorder rapidly became widespread. Without any doubt South Manchuria during the past six months has suffered more severely from banditry than at any other time in recent history.

As was reported in my dispatch, No. 513, dated December 26, 1931, under the subject "Political Conditions", the Japanese commenced on December 21 a drive against bandits occupying the districts west of the South Manchuria Railway on a wide front extending between Saupingkai in the north and Mukden in the south, in which one regiment of the Chosen brigade and three battalions of railway guards were used. A few days later a drive started from various points on the South Manchuria Railway south of Mukden against bandits operating between that line and the Liao River. These operations failed to accomplish much in the way  
of

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of exterminating the bandits, for the main reason, possibly, that the troops were withdrawn to the Railway within a few days for the evident purpose of concentrating on the drive on Chihhsien (Chinchow is the old name). These operations were carried on on a wide front and with large bodies of troops, while in the anti-bandit operations conducted after the occupation of Chihhsien comparatively small bodies of troops were used. This no doubt increased the flexibility of the Japanese operations and rendered them more effective against the guerilla warfare of the Chinese.

Since the beginning of the year Japanese operations against bandits have been largely confined to the districts west of the Liao River which had only recently been evacuated by the Chinese troops. Practically the only information available in regard to these operations has emanated from Japanese sources. Occasionally reliable reports have been obtained from other sources. It scarcely needs be mentioned that both Japanese and Chinese are apt to fashion their reports in accordance with the impression that they desire to create; however, since September 18, 1931 there has been no free press in South Manchuria in which Chinese views or Chinese versions could be made public.

A few typical Japanese bandit reports which were given out during the month of January may be of interest. On January 7 a company of railway guards killed over 100 "hunghutzu" near Chenhsiangtun on  
the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

the Mukden-ntung Railway and wounded many others. The Japanese losses were 1 killed and 2 wounded. Near Liaoyang a band of 300 was surrounded, the Chinese losses being 40 killed and Japanese 1 killed. Near Fang'huangsch'eng the Japanese put 400 bandits to flight after an engagement lasting three hours, the Chinese losses being 43 killed and 1 prisoner taken and the Japanese 2 wounded. At another time in the same vicinity 16 were killed and 23 taken prisoner out of a total of 60 engaged. South of Tsinch'angtzu a group of bandits was "practically annihilated"; 50 were killed while the Japanese lost 1 killed and 3 wounded. Near Yentai on January 17 the railway guards killed 130 out of 500 bandits, no Japanese losses being reported. West of Lungliao a Japanese company put 1000 bandits to flight with a loss of 90 killed and 22 prisoners; the Japanese had no casualties. On January 17 it was reported that 393 bandits which formerly operated north of Yingkow had approached the Japanese with the request that they be organized into a local defense force. Headquarters announced that this was not the first case of this kind; that it is the practice to disarm bandits who surrender and put them on trial for sometime, and if found reliable they are given guns and used for local defense purposes. At about the same time the Japanese announced that 800 bandits were operating on the border of Faku district. On January 23 railway guards from Tishling with armored cars occupied Faku district city where they still remain

- 5 -

remain, or did so about a week ago. As of possible  
1/ interest, there is enclosed herewith a list of 73  
bandit activities which occurred during the month of  
January (published in The Manchuria Daily News, Feb-  
ruary 15, 1932.)

The Japanese suffered heavy losses in a few  
encounters with bandits in the districts west of the  
Liao River, the most severe being the complete annihi-  
lation of a detachment of 26 commissariat soldiers  
while escorting supplies from Lienshan to Chinhsi  
(Kinsi) on January 9, 1932. The bandits in that area  
comprising, no doubt, large numbers of Chinese deser-  
ters have been conducting guerilla warfare which has  
given the Japanese considerable trouble. From other  
sources it has been learned that Chinhsi, Hungleih sien  
and other towns in that area were looted during the  
latter part of January and that several thousand ban-  
dits were in occupation of the towns between Hsing-  
cheng and Suichung, stations on the Fengtien-Shanhaik-  
wan Railway. Excepting for occasional military trains  
running between Chinhsien and Suichung, there has been  
up to a few days ago no train service southwest of  
Chinhsien. On February 13, it may be added, a train  
service from Mukden to Shanhaikwan was inaugurated.

Although it is not possible to obtain confirmation  
of many Japanese reports, information has been received  
from reliable sources fully corroborating the exis-  
tence of intolerable conditions in many parts of the  
province due to banditry. In Faku districe, for in-  
stance, there have been cases wherein the bandits  
destroyed

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destroyed stocks of grain which they were unable to carry away. In certain cases crops were burned. Near Newchwangch'eng, from farmers who had no money to give to the bandits, hostages were taken to secure payments after the sale of their crops. About twenty miles from Mukden a band of armed robbers entered a small village which had been entirely evacuated except for an old woman whom they boiled alive. Along the Liao River in the Hsinmin and Tahushan districts it is reported that every village has been looted many times, that practically every woman has been raped and that all children up to twenty years old have been carried off for sale. Whole villages have been evacuated and all stocks of grain and all live stock have disappeared. Many men have perforce joined the ranks of bandits in order to gain a livelihood. It is expected that many farms will not be cultivated this year. In every large town along the railway there are refugees from the interior, most of whom are women. At Mukden their number is given at around 50,000 - press reports have given it as high as 70,000 -; in Liaoyang there are reported to be over 3000 refugees. According to published police statistics in connection with relief work, the total number of persons at Mukden requiring relief (as a result of the change) is given as 111,423. During the latter part of December it was reported in the press that the Governor had remitted the land tax for one year because of these conditions.

It

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It is fairly evident from some of the above Japanese reports of encounters with the bandits that their anti-bandit operations are ruthless. It is noteworthy that few Japanese official reports ever mention Chinese wounded - formerly they occasionally stated that the bandits carried off their wounded - the obvious inference being that there were no wounded. In fact, reliable reports are to the effect that the wounded are often bayoneted; it has even been heard that this occurred in the fighting against the Chinese troops near Tsitsihar last autumn. The Chinese no doubt do the same. Bandit prisoners are summarily shot. A few other instances might be mentioned as showing the Japanese tendency to indulge in intimidation, viz. the notorious bombing of Chinhsien on October 8, 1931, the bombing of Koupangtzu on December 30, 1931, the bombing of Newchwangoh'eng by three airplanes on January 3, 1932, resulting in the death of 51 civilians and the serious injury of 7 others and the destruction of over 20 houses and the destruction of part of a village along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway by artillery fire because of an attack on a Japanese escorted train in that vicinity. In this connection reference may be made to my despatch No. 428, of January 18, 1932, to the Department reporting certain alleged atrocities.

It is noted that the Japanese have started to use Chinese troops in their bandit campaigns, as reported in my despatch No. 530, of February 1, 1932, entitled "Political Conditions". A brigade from Heilungkiang

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Heilungkiang commanded by General Wang Tien-chung was brought south for use in the drive against the bandits in January. Apparently this experiment has proved very satisfactory as 6 battalions of infantry and 2 companies of cavalry belonging to the forces of General Yu Chih-shan, military commander of the Tungpian circuit, were recently moved to Tahu-shan and Taian to take up garrison duty in that bandit infested area. It is worthy of note that there has been relatively little banditry in the Tungpian circuit. Along and south of the Mukden-Lintung line there has been considerable, but except for the movements of dispersed soldiers immediately after September 18, the territory between the Shenyang-Hailung Railway and the Korean border has been fairly free from disturbances.

Information from some sources is to the effect that anti-bandit operations are impairing the morale of the younger Japanese officers in the field. The strain of constant vigilance against surprise attacks by groups vastly superior in numbers is having its effect and explains, so it is claimed, the change in tactics which has recently been adopted by the Japanese detachments in bandit suppression work. It seems that a serious effort is being made to enlist the bandits for local defense purposes. That the Japanese have accepted the surrender of some groups and assigned them to local defense duties is admitted, but whether the changed attitude toward these guerillas is induced

by

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by diminishing morale among the younger officers in the field may be questioned. It is probably true that guerilla warfare is the most effective way for the Chinese to combat the Japanese troops and possibly it is for that reason that Chinese troops are being used by the Japanese in some of the worst bandit areas and that bandit groups are being enlisted for local defense purposes.

The spokesman of Japanese Headquarters sometime ago classified bandits in two categories, namely, "friendly" and "hostile". "Friendly bandits" were not described but it is obvious that they comprise those who have an understanding with the Japanese and who are being actively used by them. It is fairly well established that in the past the Japanese have employed bandits in the districts along the Korean border to maintain a condition of unrest and there is reason to believe that they have some Manchurian bandits in their pay at present. In fact, reliable information is to the effect that one of the so-called Japanese "bandit chiefs" who is supposed to control a group of Chinese bandits operating in the interior was in Mukden recently. Without doubt this group could be described as "friendly bandits" who, it is to be inferred, operate under the general direction of their Japanese paymasters.

Under existing conditions, it is the opinion of competent observers that the Japanese, directly or indirectly through puppet Chinese governments, will not be able to suppress banditry in Manchuria. As banditry is fundamentally an economic problem, it is not

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not likely to disappear or be eradicated entirely until economic conditions have greatly improved and a co-ordinated system of communications including highways as well as railways exists. Should, however, highway construction be undertaken and employment given to ex-soldiery and bandits who will work - many undoubtedly are too inured to the life of a highwayman with its leisure and easy money ever to give it up willingly - an improvement in peace and order may be expected.

It was reported in the Japanese press today that altogether several thousands of bandits have surrendered and been organized as bandit suppression forces for the districts. It was further stated that as a result of consultations between Governor Tsang Shih-yi and the "authorities" it has been decided that after the establishment of the new national state, these bandit suppression forces will be re-organized as "Ankuochun" or "National Pacification Army" and that they will be assigned to garrison duties and bandit suppression work. If present reports can be relied upon, the movement for the establishment of the new state is being rapidly pushed at this time and according to these same reports it is expected to materialize within a few weeks. It would appear, therefore, that the Japanese are now aiming at, if they have not actually proposed the creation of a police force for Manchuria out of the same material that the former Chinese authorities had used. In the past the Japanese have severely contemned the Manchurian forces because of their bandit origin and now they seem ready to follow in the footsteps of the late government. Under these circumstances the

view

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view that the Japanese will not be able to suppress banditry in Manchuria gains added support.

A recent Japanese press report states that the provincial government has issued regulations governing the surrender of bandits, the chief points of which are as follows:

(1) Those bandits who were formerly law-abiding citizens and who took up banditry to gain a livelihood shall not be punished when they surrender and give up their arms and ammunition.

(2) At least two guarantees shall be required from those who surrender and these guarantees must be recorded at the nearest police station.

These regulations which went into effect on February 13 also make provision for the confiscation of horses and other things which are not the property of private individuals or whose owners cannot be found.


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,  
American Consul General.

Enclosure: List of Bandit Activities during January.

Original and one copy to Legation  
Five copies to Department.  
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MSM:MHP  
File No. 800



Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 382 of M. S. Myers, Consul General, Mukden, dated February 18, 1932 on the subject "Banditry".

HUNGHUDZE DIARY FOR MANCHURIA

During Last January

73 Events Listed

From The Manchuria Daily News, Monday, Feb. 15, 1932

Because of the Harbin Situation and the Shanghai Affair claiming our primary attention, we could chronicle very little hunghudze notes in Manchuria especially since the last turn of the year.

To prevent some mistaken impression from being formed that the hunghudze nuisance is practically over, it would not be out of place for us to give a sort of diary for last January, for which the major events reach 73.

To review these events in brief:-

- Jan. 1: North of Wulungpei north of Antung (Train operation interfered with and electric wires cut off. The neighborhoods cleared of the hunghudze).  
At Changwopeng southwest of Tahushan, the starting point of Tahushan-Paiyintala Lines (Some 200 - 300 hunghudze tackled and driven off).
- Jan. 2: Near Wulungpei, near Antung (Some 150 insurgent-raiders repulsed).  
At Hsiaoohupu east of Yentai, on S.M.R. Main Line (Some 90 insurgents fought and repulsed).  
Near railway bridge Hunho on S.M.R. Main Line (Japanese patrols fired upon by some 8 insurgents who they drove off).  
About Masanchiatzu (Some 50 brigands fought and repelled).  
About Tachia Station on Chengshiatun-Paiyintala Line (Some 400 hunghudze under Chang-haushjen tackled and driven off).
- Jan. 3: At Peitalkou west of Chiaotou, on Mukden-Antung Line (Some 100 insurgents attacked).
- Jan. 4: About Liuerhpu northwest of Anshan, the seat of the Iron & Steel Works on S.M.R. Main Line (About 600 insurgents repulsed. While in pursuit of the enemy, another hand of about 500 men with a few guns encountered and repelled).

At

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At Hsinmintun (about 500 insurgents having destroyed railway near the city and raided the town, attacked and repulsed).

Jan. 5: At Wangchuangtun, near Koupangtzu (50 - 60 mounted bandits attacked).  
At Tahantun, north of Hsinmintun (A large number of insurgents attacked).  
About Wuchiatun on Mukden-Antung Line (Some 100 insurgents repulsed).  
Near Nanfen on Mukden-Antung Line (About 100 insurgents driven off).  
About Shihchiaotzu on Mukden-Antung Line (Some 100 insurgents attacked at their base and heavy blow inflicted).

Jan. 6: About Liu'erhpu west of Liaoyang (A military unit sent out to confront and beat back a gang of insurgents).  
At Changtaltzu north of Liaoyang (400 insurgents tackled).  
At Toukou, 2 kilometres north of Yichow (Some 100 fugitive-soldiers beaten off after stubborn resistance).

Jan. 7: At Changhoyen southeast of Hsinmintun (The insurgents attacked according to the plan).  
At Mochiapu, west of Hunho, (A band of insurgents surrounded and captured).  
Near Tiehling (Hundreds of insurgents who raided Chinese Police and Prefectural Prison, Tiehling beaten back).  
At Tashaling (500 insurgents fought and repulsed).  
Near Sankuaishihshan north of Penchiu on Mukden-Antung Line (About 300 insurgents tackled and crushed).  
At Chinhsi, west of Chinchow (Hundreds of insurgents having delivered a surprise, beaten back).  
Southwest of Chenhsiangtun, on Mukden-Antung Line (Some 200 bandits reported to be plotting to raid Chenhsiangtun cleared out of the district).

Jan. 8: Near Koupangtzu Station (Some 30 insurgents beaten off).  
At Shahopu, southeast of Kaiyuan on S.M.R. Main Line (200 insurgents committing incendiarism and plunder, a gang of Japanese soldiers despatched).  
About Chaiho, north of Tiehling (Some 100 insurgents fought and beaten).  
About Tienchuangtai, north of Yingkow (At the news of hundreds of insurgents raiding Tienchuangtai, a Japanese military unit sent).  
About West Shihliho, northwest of Mukden (40 mounted brigades beaten off).

Jan. 9: About Sanchiatzu west of Shaho on S.M.R. Main Line (500 insurgents beaten off).  
Near Changwu on Tahushan-Paiyintala Line (A military unit sent against a gang of hunghudze who were driven off).

Jan. 10: About Paichi, southwest of Fenghuangcheng on Mukden-Antung Line (A clash with some 300 insurgents who were

beaten

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- beaten off southwestwards).  
About Tahushan (Some 100 insurgents repulsed after hard fighting).  
About Tangchiawopeng east of Tahushan (A large gang of insurgents appearing, a party of men sent out).
- Jan. 11: West of Chinsi, west of Chinchow (2,000 insurgents who raided the place repulsed).  
At Machiachai east of Tishling on S.M.R. Main Line (About 60 brigands fought and repelled).  
North of Chuliho near Heimintun (Insurgents in the vicinity cleared).  
At Chingshihling, southwest of Chinsi (400 hunghudze repulsed).  
North of Hsinlitun on Tahushan-Paiyintala Line, on the Mongolian border (1,500 insurgents encountered and the Japanese withdrawn to Hsinlitun after severe fighting).  
West of Tsitsihar (300 insurgents fought and repulsed).  
At Anchiawopeng north of Hsinchengtzu on S.M.R. Main Line, the third station north of Mukden (300 insurgents beaten off).
- Jan. 12-13: On Chengniatun-Paiyintala Line of Ssapingkai-Taonan Line (A Japanese force sent Paiyintala way); West of Mukden (The district cleared of hunghudze).  
About Old Newchwang & Tienchuangtai, north of Newchwang (Insurgents tackled).  
West of Tangaangtzu on S.M.R. Main Line (Insurgents hunted and attacked).
- Jan. 14: North of Tsitsihar.
- Jan. 15: Northwest of Hsinmintun; West of Chinsi.
- Jan. 16: About Shihchiapu, west of Chungku on S.M.R. Main Line.
- Jan. 17: At Hsiaoventai, 10 kilometres, northwest of Liaoyang; Old Newchwang; At Kochiayuantzu, west of Paiyintala; & north Paiyintala.
- Jan. 18: At Tangpaocheng, west of Fanghuangcheng on Mukden-Antung Line; Pataochia, north of Tahushan; East of Yichow half way between Chinchow and Peipiao.
- Jan. 20: Kaoshantau, west of Tahushan.
- Jan. 21: South of Shihchiatzu on Mukden-Antung Line.
- Jan. 22: About Hsinoheng south of Chinchow.
- Jan. 22-23: About Fakumen.
- Jan. 24: Northeast of Penchihiu, on Mukden-Antung Line; About Tashaling west of Liaoyang.

Jan.

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Jan. 25: At Shihshanchan and Talingho on Fengtien-Shanhaikwan Line; East of Kungohuling; south and west of Pakumen.

Jan. 26: Northwest of Tahushan; Tafangshen.

Jan. 29: Wushiatientzu, west of Shinliho on S.M.R. Main Line.

Jan. 30: Southeast of Chingchow (Hunt for hunghudze carried out in the district; north of the mouth of the Talingho River, on Fengtien-Shanhaikwan Line Hundreds of insurgents retreating northeastwards attacked and practically exterminated.

#### HUNGHUDZE - POLICE CLASHES

In addition, the hunghudze clashes and encounters with the Japanese police reach some 200 during the month of the last January alone.

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By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 13 1932  
DIVISION OF  
RECORDS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 16 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Dated March 14, 1932

Rec'd 2:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

77, March 14, 7 p.m.

Your 46, March 12, 2 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 14 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4735

I transmit herewith text of letter from Drummond written and received 14th instant.

"Geneva, March 14th, 1932. My dear Minister:

I write to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of March 12th in which you inform me, on the instructions of your Government, of its gratification at the action taken by the Assembly of the League of Nations. I am communicating the text of your letter to the members of the Assembly, by whom I am convinced the expression of your Government's views will be very highly appreciated.

MAR 18 1932

FTL:MD

Believe me my dear Minister, Yours very sincerely,

Eric Drummond."

(WYC-KLP)

WILSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tunnan/39 FOR despatch # 95

FROM Yunnanfu (Stevens) DATED Jan. 18, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING:

Tunnan anti-Japanese activities. Students being given military training, volunteer corps being formed and merchants being organized to tighten economic boycott.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

Anti-Japanese Boycott and Affiliated Activities:

During the month under review the anti-Japanese movement in Yunnan seems to have developed with less enthusiasm and outward activity than was shown in November. This was particularly noticeable among the student class who have been made to feel the physical discomforts associated with frequent drills and fatiguing military exercises under the supervision of army officers. The novelty of appearing before the public in a new uniform seems also to have worn off as their high estimation of their own prowess diminished with the receipt of reports of Japanese successes in the north. Nevertheless, the sincerity of the students' purpose and their patriotism cannot be doubted, nor can it be said that many of them would not willingly leave their classrooms for the battle front if given the opportunity to do so.

Contributions collected by the students early in December for the support of General Ma Chan-shan were rather disappointing. By December 23rd, after an intensive student campaign for funds, the Government was only able to remit Mexican \$1,000.00 to General Ma.

A series of military reviews were held in Yunnan during the month. The Students' Training Corps, Red Cross units, Girls' Salvage Corps, and several partly organized bodies

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NOTE



SEE 883.00 P.R. Hankow/55 FOR Despatch # 95. (#73 to  
Legation)

FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED Jan. 19, 1932.

TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Editorials appearing in the CENTRAL CHINA POST  
concerning the potentialities of the student  
movement and other factors affecting the  
Sino-Japanese situation.

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the Nanking Government's order that Chinchow be held at all costs against the Japanese and the almost simultaneous publication of the news that the Chinese troops had withdrawn from that place without resistance.



Chinese political maneuvers and events of political and economic interest in foreign countries were next in importance as news material in the order named. There was little space given to the anti-Japanese boycott. Flood relief activities and communist activities were given a fair amount of publicity in local news items. The visit of Chu Ch'ing-lan (朱慶瀾) to this area in the interest of flood relief work and dike construction, and the arrival of American wheat, caused more publicity to be given to the general subject of post flood reconstruction and rehabilitation than had been given during the preceding month.

(b) English Language Press. Throughout the greater part of the month the HANKOW HERALD gave its principal attention to the Sino-Japanese situation in Manchuria, the reorganization of the Nanking Government, student disturbances, developments of the world depression, and the Anglo-Indian situation. At the end of the month labor troubles at Hankow occupied a good deal of space.

The editorial columns of the CENTRAL CHINA POST were exceptionally colorful. They contained strong expressions of opinion on the dire distress of the Kuomintang and the potentialities of the student movement, and the question of the abolition of extraterritoriality.

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bodies of civilian volunteers, numbering in all about 17,000 persons, were reviewed by the Provincial Chairman on December 13th. During the review a large picture of General Ma Chen-shan was carried aloft on the parade ground by the students of the Tung Yi University. This picture bore characters meaning "Ma Chen-shan, our hero and model warrior". Some of the slogans shouted were:

- "Be loyal and brave citizens forever!"
- "Take oath to wipe away the national disgrace!"
- "Recover our lost territory from the dwarfed slaves!"
- "Unite all patriotic warriors of the nation by joining the volunteer corps that we may defend ourselves with military force!"
- "Hill and back as efficient warriors so as to resist the foreign invaders!"
- "Long live the Chinese Republic!"
- "Long live the Three Principles!"

During the review the Provincial Chairman, concurrently Chairman of the Committee for the Training of Volunteers, gave a moral teaching to the demonstrators, the following excerpt of which was of interest to foreign residents:

"It is my hope that from today you will attach great importance to discipline. Yesterday, myself, heard words of censure and misunderstanding about this demonstration. I was told that eccentric happenings would surely develop and that suspicion and fear has been aroused among the British, French and other nationals in Yunnanfu. The various foreign consuls have issued instructions to their nationals not to appear on the streets today. This sort of misunderstanding, which is entirely without foundation, is regrettable and must have been caused by some wicked persons. It is greatly declared that China's foreign affairs are affected by such rumors. If you will therefore observe order and strict discipline these rumors will be proven to be pure nonsense."

The organization of a Merchants' Volunteer Corps under the direction and auspices of the Yunnanfu Chamber  
of

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of Commerce is, perhaps, the most important recent extension of the anti-Japanese movement in Yunnan. The announced object of the new organization being to effect, by applying disciplinary measures to the merchants, a more complete severance of economic relations with Japan. All merchants between the ages of 16 and 40 were ordered to join by registering at the Chamber of Commerce.

The Yunnan Anti-Japanese Association, described more fully in this Consulate's despatch No. 84 of December 8, 1951, to the Department (Copies were sent to the Legation), has recently been reorganized along the same lines as before but under the name of "The Yunnan Provincial Anti-Japanese Association". The expenses of this reorganization, totaling Yunnan \$3,000.00 (U. S. \$180.00) were borne by the following offices:

The Provincial Bureau of Party Affairs Y.	\$1,000.
The Yunnan Municipal Government	500.
The Yunnan Chamber of Commerce	500.
The Provincial Bureau of Education	400.
The Provincial Bureau of Agriculture and Mining	300.
The Provincial Bureau of Reconstruction	300.

Officers of the new association took the following oath on December 28th:

"I solemnly swear to obey the teaching of our leaders, to act according to the Three Principles, to accept and carry out any commission entrusted to me by the Association, to lead the patriotic masses of the whole province in saving the nation from the Japanese invaders. I further swear that I will not seek to profit privately from any public employment; that I will not indulge in malpractices; and that I will never cooperate with the Japanese. I would rather die than abandon my mission to suppress the Japanese.

Should

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Should I not carry out strictly the whole of  
this oath, I will submit willingly to the  
judgment of the masses and consent to a severe  
punishment."

It may be stated that the boycott of Japanese goods  
in Yunnan is being rigidly enforced and that trade in  
Japanese goods, with the exception of stocks on hand, has  
been completely suspended.

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NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Canton/51 FOR # 106 to Legation.

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED Feb. 8, 1932.  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Cantonese attitude towards Nanking's policy  
toward Japan.

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of these organs would seem to indicate that the leaders here intend to have a politically autonomous regime, so that political unification with mainland China may be regarded as minimal.

Canton has been reacting with resentment against Japan over recent developments in Hong Kong and elsewhere, and widespread apprehensions of a Japanese threat to Canton reached the point of a panic by the end of the month. Although the Japanese Consul demanded no representations to the Mayor of Canton in connection with certain anti-Japanese press utterances, the Japanese Consul General is understood to have subsequently yielded on certain demands made by him after having received a verbal expression of regret from the Mayor, and both parties consider the matter closed, although the apprehensions of the authorities have not been entirely allayed.

Li Si-hu has publicly adopted a very non-critical attitude regarding the question of his assuming the post of Chairman of the Provincial Council, which has been vacant for nearly two months. It is understood that a hitch has arisen over his appointment to the post owing to a difference of views between him and Chen Chi-t'ung on the question of military appropriations.

Dissolution of Shingai National Government.

Although, as already reported, the so-called "National Government" at Canton ceased functioning on December 31, 1951, it was not until January 7, 1952, that a formal announcement of its dissolution was issued.

This

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somewhat larger position than that of a provincial chair.

Elimination of the "Ironclad" from Luoyi.

General Chang Su-huei and the "Ironclad", numbering about 7,000, are reported to have crossed the Luoyi frontier into Luoyi during the latter part of the month. Originally his announced intention was to join General Ma Chan Shan on the Hailuogiang front, but it is believed that his real objective is to be able to render the most effective support to Wang Ching-wei. Possibly, however, on account of the emergency at Luoyi he may be led upon after all to test his military prowess against the Japanese. From the point of view of Luoyi politics the chief significance of this development is that it leaves the Luoyi clique in undivided control of Luoyi province.

Continued Strife Towards Hankin's Policy via a vis Japan.

Chen Chi-t'ang has let it be known publicly that his forces are mobilized for instant action against Japan and that he is only awaiting an order from Hankin to set his forces in motion. Other military leaders have been trying to acquire merit with the public by announcing that they have petitioned the authorities to allow them to proceed to the front to stake their lives in the defense of the country. Nevertheless, while on the one hand the Szechwanese authorities have been loud in declaring their readiness to place themselves at the disposal of the Central Government, they have been doing their best to discredit the Hankin leaders with the public in order to carry out their own selfish ends in the matter of retaining political control in the South. Mr. Hu Han-min, although too "ill" to proceed to

Hankin

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Amoy/50 FOR # 15 to Legation.

FROM Amoy (Franklin) DATED Feb. 1, 1932.  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Publication of a slanderous article in the newspapers at Swatow and Foochow against the Japanese Emperor. Demands made by the Japanese Consul for an apology and a guarantee that such a thing would not reoccur.

hs

793.94/4739

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Justifson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 13 of Lynn S. Franklin, American Consul at Amoy, China, dated February 1st, 1938, on the subject "Summary of Events and Conditions: Amoy Consular District - January, 1938").

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Admiral Lin continued his vigilance over this city by closely watching and searching all new arrivals from the mainland particularly. On the 28th of January the Min Kuo Jih Pao (民國日報) newspaper and the Shang Pao (商報) newspaper, semi-official, published an article against the Japanese Emperor. I understand this article was also published in the newspapers at Swatow and Foochow. The Japanese Consul informed me that, after consultation with the Japanese Admiral in this port, he formally protested to Admiral Lin against the publication of this attack on the Emperor and demanded an apology from Admiral Lin and a guarantee that such a thing would not reoccur. The Japanese Consul also demanded the closure of the offices of the accused newspapers for three days, apologies from them and certain punishment to those responsible for the publication of the article. The Japanese Consul informed me on the 29th of January that his demands had been met satisfactorily and that the incident was closed. It appears that one of the newspapers closed its offices and stopped publication of its newspaper when requested to do so by Admiral Lin but that the other newspaper only did so when forced to by Admiral Lin's police.

The newspaper guild, the Chamber of Commerce and the anti-Japanese Boycott Association protested to Admiral Lin against his compliance with the Japanese Consul's demands. During the Japanese Consul's negotiations with Admiral Lin on this matter, the two Japanese destroyers were increased to four by the arrival of two more from Formosa. Admiral Lin in-

formed

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Enclosure no. 1 to despatch No. 11 of Lynn C. Franklin,  
American Consul at Amoy, China, dated February 1st, 1932,  
on the subject "Summary of Events and Conditions: Amoy  
Consular District - January, 1932").

- 4 -

formed me that he did not apologize to any Japanese official, that he simply stated that he was sorry that the article attacking the Emperor had been published; that he had a great deal of difficulty in keeping his people in order when the Japanese Consul's demands became known and that only by impressing them with the fact that they did not have sufficient force to oppose the Japanese, in case the Japanese willers were backed, was he able to quiet them. Admiral Lin fears that unless hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese in Shanghai and Manchuria cease quickly he will be unable to hold in check possible outbreak of the Chinese in Amoy against Japanese subjects and their property. As the month advanced anti-Japanese feeling grew more and more intense. At this writing there is every possibility of some unfortunate incident happening which the Japanese, in case it is their desire to capture Amoy, may seize upon as an excuse to do so.

MILITARY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.74/358 FOR MEMORANDUM

State Department  
FROM Undersecretary (Castle) DATED Feb. 1, 1932  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Wireless communication between Shanghai and the U.S.  
Conversation between Mr. Castle and Colonel Reber, of  
Radio Corporation of America, relative to maintaining --  
Colonel Reber stated he was authorized to negotiate  
purchase of two Chinese radio stations as a precau-  
tionary measure, owing to possible damage to R.C.A.  
station, which might put it out of commission. He also  
mentioned possible erection of a temporary station on  
the Race Course.

Jr

793.94/4740

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Commission/139 FOR #8112.

FROM Shanghai 8 ( Cunningham ) DATED Feb. 11, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: copy of first report of the Shanghai Commission, dated  
Feb. 6th, concerning situation at Shanghai.

793.94/4741

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 8112

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,  
Shanghai, China, February 11, 1932.

Subject: League of Nations, Shanghai  
Committee: First Report.

THE MEMORANDUM

TO: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

With reference to the Department's telegraphic instruction of February 5, 6 p.m. in regard to my cooperation with the members of the League of Nations, Shanghai Committee, I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the Department's information, a copy of the First Report of this committee, dated February 8, 1932.

1/

The committee consists of:

- J. F. Brunen, Consul General for Great Britain.
- S. Rocchini, Consul General for France.
- Baron Rudt von Collenberg, Consul General for Germany.
- Count Ciano di Cortellazzo, Consul General and Charge d'Affaires for Italy (Chairman).
- H. Aall, Consul General for Norway.
- Eduardo V. Ferrer, Consul General for Spain.

I cooperated with the committee in accordance with the American Minister's instruction of February 2, 6 p.m. (received February 5, 7 p.m.) and the Department's instruction of February 5, 6 p.m. (received February 6th).

In this connection reference is made to my telegram No. 17 of February 9, 6 p.m.

There

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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There is also enclosed a copy of my letter to the  
2/ Chairman of the Committee dated February 8, 1932,  
stating that I concur in general in the First Report.  
Copies of this report are being transmitted to the  
American Legation at Peking and to the American Minister  
at Shanghai.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,  
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/- League of Nations, Shanghai  
Committee, First Report.
- 2/- Copy of letter to Japanese  
Consul General, dated February  
8, 1932.

PRE MB  
800

B

In quintuplicate.

In Duplicate to Legation.

Copy to Minister.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 8115 of February 11, 1932.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SHANGHAI COMMITTEE

First Report

SHANGHAI, 12th February, 1932

The Committee appointed by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to report on the events in Shanghai and vicinity has established, on the basis of its own information, the following first Report, which may require subsequent correction in detail or amplification, and will be followed by reports on subsequent events. The Committee met with the co-operation of Mr. Cunningham, Consul-General of the United States of America.

The present Committee has been asked to report on the causes, the facts, and the developments of events in Shanghai and in the vicinity.

Anti-Japanese boycott, in existence since July as result of Kowloon affair, intensified by occupation of Manchuria and stringently enforced, caused enormous damage to Japanese trade. The boycott, which was fostered by the anti-Japanese Boycott Association formed by various Chinese commercial organizations, included picketing of shops, seizure of Japanese goods, fines and imprisonment of Chi see using or dealing in such goods, and other illegal acts for which no redress could be obtained through the Courts. A spirit of bitter hostility was consequently engendered against the Chinese. Student manifestations and demands by them for a declaration of war against Japan intensified Chinese feeling against Japan. In this state of acute tension incidents of violence frequently occurred. There were in addition derogatory references by Chinese to Emperor of Japan which infuriated Japanese, and demands by Japanese to their Government to take direct action to put end to intolerable position became insistent.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

/insistent.

On January 18th, five Japanese, some of them being Buddhist monks, whilst passing in front of the San Yen towel factory in Chapel, were attacked by Chinese, some of the assailants being probably members of a recently organized anti-Japanese volunteer corps. The Chinese police came too late to be able to arrest the culprits. Two of the Japanese were severely wounded, one of them, a Buddhist monk, dying subsequently from his wounds.

On January 19th, about fifty members of the Japanese Youth Protection Society, armed with daggers and clubs, proceeded to the San Yen towel factory, set fire to the building, and on their way back clashed with the Settlement Municipal Police. Three Chinese policemen were wounded, one of them dying subsequently. Three Japanese were shot by the police, one dying subsequently.

The same day, a mass meeting of Japanese residents was held in the Japanese Club to protest against the attacks on the priests and against derogatory references by the press to the Japanese Emperor. The meeting adopted a resolution asking the Japanese Government to send naval and military units for the complete suppression of the anti-Japanese movement. About half of them proceeded first to the Japanese Consul-General, and then to the Naval Headquarters in order to present the resolution. After having seen the Japanese Consul-General, who asked them to leave the letter in his hands, they clashed with the police of the International Settlement on their way to the Naval Headquarters. One British probationary sergeant was wounded. The Japanese authorities expressed their regrets. Seven Japanese subsequently surrendered to the Japanese authorities, and were arrested by them to be tried for the offences in Nagasaki, in accordance with Japanese law.

In the afternoon of the same day the Japanese Consul-General presented to the chief secretary of the Mayor of Greater Shanghai the following demands concerning the events which occurred on January 18th.-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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/19th.

- (1) A formal apology by the Mayor;
- (2) The immediate arrest of the assailants;
- (3) Payment of solatium and hospital bills;
- (4) Adequate control of anti-Japanese movements;
- (5) The immediate dissolution of all anti-Japanese organisations engaged in fostering hostile feelings and anti-Japanese riots and agitations.

On the morning of January 1st. the Mayor of Greater Shanghai communicated to the Japanese Consul-General that he was ready to consider the first three points, but found difficulties in complying with the last two. Later in the day a communiqué of the Admiral Commanding-in-Chief the Japanese Naval Forces was published in the press, copies being sent to the authorities of the Settlement, and the Bureau of Public Safety of the City of Greater Shanghai, stating that, in case the Mayor of Greater Shanghai failed to give a satisfactory reply to the Japanese and to carry out the demands without delay, the Admiral was determined to take appropriate steps in order to protect the rights and interests of the Empire of Japan.

On January 24th. Japanese naval reinforcements arrived off Shanghai. Rumours were also current that Chinese troops in Shanghai were being reinforced. The same day, the Japanese Consul-General communicated to the Mayor of Greater Shanghai that if no reply was forthcoming within a reasonable time, or if the reply was unsatisfactory, the Japanese Government reserved its right to take such action as circumstances might require. Meanwhile the Mayor, who had expressed to neutrals his intention of making every possible concession to avoid a clash, was endeavouring to induce leaders of the local Chinese community to put an end to anti-Japanese Boycott Association and agree to delete the words "anti-Japanese" from the title of other bodies, these words being

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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being regarded by the Japanese as a national offense. As a result the Association was closed and various offices were sealed by Chinese police on the night of January 17th.-20th.

On January 23th. the Japanese Consul-General notified the Mayor of Greater Shanghai that, without fixing a definite date, he would expect a preliminary reply by January 26th.

On January 27th. the Japanese Consul-General informed the Mayor that he must have a satisfactory reply to his demands by 6.00 p. m. on the following day, failing which the Japanese would take whatever steps they might consider necessary to enforce them.

On January 28th. at 7:30 a. m. the Japanese General notified the Commanders of the other national defense forces that he proposed to take action on the following morning, if no satisfactory reply had been received from the Chinese. The Municipal Council of the International Settlement held a meeting, in the course of the morning, and decided that a state of emergency should be declared as from 4.00 p. m. This decision was taken by the Municipal Council on its own responsibility. Declaration of a state of emergency is in effect notice to the commanders of the various national forces that they are expected to be prepared to defend their sectors.

The same day, early in the afternoon, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai transmitted to the Japanese Consul-General a reply accepting entirely the Japanese demands. At 4.00 p. m. the Japanese Consul-General informed the Consular body of the receipt of this reply, which he said was entirely satisfactory. He added that it remained to be seen whether the Mayor would be able to enforce the terms accepted, but he admitted that the demands had been carried out to a great extent and that for the time being no action would be taken.

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/taken.

In spite of this change in the diplomatic situation, there was a popular belief that the Japanese naval authorities were determined to take action in any event. Inflammatory statements were appearing in the Japanese Press Union Bulletin to the effect that the Chinese did not intend to carry out their promises, and that they were preparing to attack the Japanese. It was also anticipated that there might be a revolt among the Chinese population against the acceptance by the Mayor of the Japanese demands. These considerations made it advisable in the eyes of the Defence Committee that the state of emergency should nevertheless be enforced. Accordingly the state of emergency was enforced as from 4.00 p. m.

It is to be noted that the International Settlement Defence Committee, composed of the Garrison Commanders, the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council, the Commissioner of Shanghai Municipal Police, and Commandant, Shanghai Volunteer Corps, and presided over by the senior Garrison Commander, is not considered as entitled to give orders to the various commanders about the detailed measures they are expected to take in the defence of their sectors. It simply allots the sectors, helps in co-ordinating the action taken by the various Commanders, and fixes the main principles of defence.

The British and American troops started to occupy their respective sectors soon after the declaration of the state of emergency. The Italian troops occupied their sector on the 9th.

The Japanese sector consisted in the whole North Eastern area of the Settlement, limited on the Western side by North Hosen Road. It comprised, also, from the point of view of the Shanghai Defence Committee, an area outside the Settlement,

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/ settlement, limited on the east by North Hinggan Road and the  
 crossing railway; on the north by the northern border of Hongkew  
 Park; on the east by a line joining roughly the north-east  
 corner of Hongkew Park and the Karbin Road police station.

Many Japanese live in the region of Hongkew Park.  
 The Park itself and North Hinggan and Dixwell Roads, although  
 outside the settlement, are properties of the Shanghai Municipal  
 Council, and normally policed by it. It does not appear that  
 the Chinese authorities, previous to the events starting at  
 11.00 a. m., had received any communication about this outside  
 Japanese sector. The Japanese had made no attempt to occupy  
 the extra-settlement sector when the state of emergency came into  
 force, but it must be understood that Japanese warships have always  
 maintained posts along the above-mentioned Municipal roads in  
 this area for the protection of their nationals, and that their  
 Naval Headquarters are situated towards the far end of this settlement.

At 11.00 a. m. the Japanese Admiral issued two proclamations,  
 copies of which were served on the Mayor, who declared that  
 he had received them at 11.15 a. m. One of these referred to the  
 state of emergency and said that the Imperial Navy, feeling  
 extremely anxious about the situation in Coopei, where Japanese  
 nationals resided in great numbers, had decided to send out troops  
 to this section for the enforcement of law and order in that area.  
 In these circumstances he hoped that the Chinese authorities  
 would speedily withdraw the Chinese troops stationed in Coopei  
 to the west of the railway, and remove all hostile defences in  
 the area. The other proclamation stated that in the area given  
 to the Japanese to preserve order in the settlement, any action  
 considered necessary for the proper execution of the duty  
 involved in a state of emergency would be taken.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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/taken.

Japanese Marines and armed civilians, having mobilized at Naval Landing Force Headquarters, advanced along North Xuechuan Road and westwards along Hange Road as far as North Honan Road, dropping parties at the entrance of alleys as they went along, and at midnight, at a given signal, all these parties advanced westwards and northwards in the direction of the railway. The final party of about 100 Marines, accompanied by an armoured car, attempted to pass through the gate dividing the settlement from Chinese territory at the end of Honan Road but were prevented by the Shanghai Volunteer Corps in whose sector gate is situated. This gate leads to the Railway station.

The Chinese military authorities had not complied with the demand of the Japanese Admiral to withdraw their troops. It seems, moreover, that even had they decided to comply with this demand, it would have been impossible in the short time at their disposal to arrange for the actual withdrawal of the Chinese troops in that area. Account must also be taken of the tension created by the situation of the previous days, which would induce the Chinese authorities to interpret the measures taken by the Japanese naval authorities as representing a part of a larger military operation. The Japanese Marines consequently met with resistance on the part of the Chinese regular troops. They succeeded in reaching the railway line as far south as Heshing Road, but do not appear to have succeeded in reaching the line south of that point, and their line ran east of the railway until it reached the settlement boundary between North Honan and North Xuechuan Roads. Japanese were harassed by a Chinese armoured train which issued from the station and patrolled the Heshing line. It subsequently took refuge in the station, which was also

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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/also strongly defended by Chinese troops. Thereupon the Japanese during the course of 28th. January bombed the station and destroyed the train with aeroplanes. Other buildings along the Paothan Road were also set on fire by incendiary bombs, and it is generally believed that this was done deliberately, to destroy vantage points overlooking the Japanese lines. Casualties are not known, but it is believed that considerable loss of life resulted.

The Mayor of Greater Shanghai had lodged a protest against the Japanese action with the Consular authorities. The Japanese authorities contended that their action was not connected with the demands they had made, and which had been accepted, but was based on the necessity of protecting the Japanese population living in a part of the area they decided to occupy. They also maintained that their action--which met with armed resistance, and for which they took full responsibility--as within the limits admitted, in case necessity arose, by the late national settlement defence plan. Fighting continued during the greatest part of the 28th.

In the afternoon of the 28th., on the request of the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, the American and British Consuls-General succeeded in arranging for a truce, which started from the 28th. at 8.00 . . . The truce amounted only to an agreement to refrain from further firing.

On January 31st. at meetings held between the Japanese Consul-General, the Admiral commanding Japanese Naval Forces, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, and the commander of local Chinese troops in presence of the American and British Consuls-General, it was agreed that the Japanese Consul-General should report to his Government a suggestion that Japanese troops should be withdrawn from the salient. If the reply was unfavorable the Chinese would refer to their Government, and until a final reply was received both sides agreed that they would not fire unless first fired upon.

(Signed) IANU,

Copied by MB  
Compared with MB

Chairman.

1567

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustofsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

Inclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 8115 of Edwin S. Cunningham,  
American Consulate General at Shanghai, China, dated  
February 11, 1938, on the subject: League of Nations  
Shanghai Committee - First Report."

SECRET

AMERICAN CONSULATE SERVICE.

American Consulate General,  
Shanghai, China, February 9, 1938.

Subject: First Report of League of Nations  
Shanghai Committee.

Count G. Ciano di Cortellazzo,  
Consul General for Italy  
Chairman, League of Nations Shanghai Committee,  
118 Wubling Hill Road,  
Shanghai.

Sir and Dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you that I have received  
a copy of the First Report of the League of Nations,  
Shanghai Committee, on the causes, the facts and the  
development of events in Shanghai and vicinity.

This is to inform you that I concur, in general,  
in the First Report of the Committee on the understanding  
as set forth in the first paragraph thereof, that it may  
require subsequent correction in detail, or amplification.

I have the honor to be,

Sir and Dear Colleague,

Your obedient servant,

Edwin S. Cunningham,  
American Consul General.

ESG/SAC  
PMS IR

Copies by MRG  
Compared with HW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.00 P.R. Chefoo/54 FOR # - to Legation

FROM Chefoo (Webber) DATED Feb. 11, 1932.  
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Chefoo situation.  
District quiet. Active defence preparations continue.  
Anti-Japanese activities have ceased but boycott continues. Japanese relations with Chinese Military stated to be such that there is no danger of trouble in Shantung. Situation at Weihaiwei quiet.

Jr

793.94 / 4742

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quitsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Chefoo, China, February 11, 1938.

Subject: Political Situation at Chefoo.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that Chefoo and district continue to remain quiet. However, active defence preparations are still going on. A ring of mud trenches surround the city, while in and around the Yumen certain sand bag defence works have been built. About a week ago, all mules, carts and motor trucks were commandeered by the local military leader, General Liu Chen Nien, for the purpose of shifting his military supplies, guns and ammunition to the walled city of Tsisia, which is in the Hinterland and about 50 miles from Chefoo. Apparently General Liu intends to make the former mentioned place his base. He already has an arsenal there and is turning out hand grenades and "Stokes" mortars. Formerly these were all made at the local arsenal. Both General Ho I Sam, Vice Commander of the 21st (Liu's) Division, General Han Tung, Chief of Staff, and other senior officers

- 2 -

officers have sent their families to the Foreign Con-  
cession at Tientsin. Open anti-Japanese activities  
have ceased but the boycott still goes on. A sort  
of martial law is in effect after sunset and approaches  
to the Yamen, Forts and Barracks are closely guarded  
by police, soldiers and plain clothes men. People  
on the streets after dark are subject to challenge  
and possible search. However, the search part of  
the regulations does not extend to foreigners. A  
strict censorship is in force. A few days ago Reuters  
local representative's telegraphic messages containing  
references to Liu's defence preparations and the local  
situation were held up and not permitted to be sent.  
Another sign of the uncertainty of the situation in  
this district was the hurried re-exportation to Korea,  
which took place a few days ago, of over \$1,500,000  
worth of ginseng. This shipment had only recently  
been imported by the M. B. K. Company (Japanese) into  
Chefoo for drying purposes. Usually such shipments  
remain here for four or five months. There have been  
two Japanese destroyers stationed here since the begin-  
ning of the Shanghai trouble. During the recent more  
acute state, there were four here. There is also one  
destroyer at Lungkow (70 miles from Chefoo), where about  
140 Japanese reside. There is one British gunboat  
at the nearby port of Weihaiwei (44 miles from Chefoo).

Japanese Relations With Military:

The Japanese Consul intimated to me the other day  
that

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that their relations with General Han Fu Chu at Tainan and General Liu Chen Nien at Chefoo were such that there was no possible danger of any trouble or disturbance in Shantung. He added that Han Fu Chu had assured the Japanese Consul General at Tainan that even if Nanking did declare war, he (Han) would be guided by local conditions and most probably remain neutral. Further that both Liu and Han considered the Shanghai situation as a local affair, which should be settled amicably there and no cause for war or concern in these parts. While I know Liu Chen Nien is an opportunist and has, in the past, secured considerable quantities of arms and ammunition through local Japanese firms, yet I doubt whether his relations with them are so close and such that he has an agreement or understanding which he could respect should war be declared or the Central Government order him to act. This statement of the Japanese Consul was established by British Colleague (R. S. Pratt), to whom he had also repeated it, that the latter asked me whether I had heard of it and what I thought about it. Personally, I am of the opinion that it should be accepted with reserve. I have too frequently found my Japanese friend wrongly informed about conditions in Eastern Shantung.

Weihaimei:

The situation is quiet at Weihaimei. Captain Hsu Teu Shan, head of the Chinese administration there, has had a bit of difficulty trying to secure sufficient funds


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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funds to meet administration operating expenses. The Central Government has cut down his monthly allowance from \$20,000 to \$15,000. In view of this, it is reported that he will probably retain the stamp, wine and tobacco and probably land taxes. Just now he is trying to persuade the government to pay his allowance out of the Customs revenues (so as to be sure of it), but up to the time of writing, his efforts have been unsuccessful. He recently announced that he was not going to increase taxation in the Keihaiwei area and that the business tax would not be enforced. However, it is interesting to note that the business tax is purely provincial, and receipts arising therefrom would go to Han Fu Chu at Tainan and not to the Central Government; also that Captain Hsu is a protégé of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang and therefore not any too friendly with the present Shantung provincial regime headed by General Han Fu Chu.

Respectfully yours,



Leroy Webber,  
American Consul.

SGO.  
ERW:YCY

Original and one copy to Legation, Peking.  
In quintuplicate to Department.  
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.  
Copy to Consulate General, Tientsin.  
Copy to Consulate, Tainan.  
Copy to Consulate, Tsingtao.  
Copy to C-in-C, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.  
Copy to Consulate General, Nanking.

A true copy



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/44 FOR # 75. ( # 123 to Legation.)

FROM Tientsin ( Lockhart ) DATED Feb. 11, 1932.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING:

General conditions so far as maintenance of peace  
and order are concerned at Tientsin.  
Japanese soldiers frequently engaged in  
maneuvers in Chinese territory.

hs

793.94/4743

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Swatow/51 FOR # - to Legation.

FROM Swatow (Green) DATED Feb. 13, 1932.  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Last week of January was marked by a very serious controversy between the Swatow civil and military authorities on one side, and the Japanese Consul on the other.

hs

793.94/4744

1575

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

However, the last week of January was marked by a very serious controversy between the Swatow authorities, both civil and military, on one side, and the Japanese Consul backed by three Japanese destroyers on the other side. An article derogatory to the Emperor of Japan, which was published in the Shan Bao (Swatow Press), seems to have been the cause of the controversy which almost ended in open armed conflict between the Japanese destroyers and the Chinese land forces at Swatow.

Fortunately an amicable agreement was reached on the last day of the month, and, although there was a feeling of apprehension throughout the city, the impending conflict did not take place.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Commission/138 FOR #8118

FROM Shanghai ( Cunningham ) DATED Feb. 15, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: reply to two questions regarding the protection of the Settlement at Shanghai, which the Chinese delegate was requested to ask of the Shanghai Commission.

1s

793.94/4745

No. 8118

AMERICAN CONSULATE SERVICE.

American Consulate General,  
Shanghai, China, February 15, 1932.

Subject: League of Nations, Shanghai  
Committee: Special Report.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON.

Sir:

1/

I have the honor to transmit a copy of a telegram addressed by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to Mr. Haas on February 13, 1932, containing two questions which the Chinese delegate was requested to ask of the Shanghai Committee for further information on two points. These two questions were considered by the Shanghai Committee on the 13th and the reply to each of the questions is also enclosed herewith.

2/

I concur in the reply as drafted and transmitted herewith. Inasmuch as the reply to the first question is exceedingly important and possibly may throw some

additional

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

additional light upon the Proclamation of the State of  
Emergency, special attention is called to it.

Respectfully yours,

Dwight L. Cunningham,  
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/- Copy of telegram addressed by the Secretary-  
General of the League of Nations to Mr.  
Bass on February 12, 1932.
- 2/- Copy of reply of Shanghai Committee to two  
questions.

WGC/w  
500/500

copy of  
signed out-  
nal.

In duplicate.  
Copy to Legation.  
Copy to American Minister.  
Copy to Banking.

1574

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 4118 of Edwin C. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated February 12, 1932, on the subject, League of Nations, Shanghai Committee: Special Report.

Copy of telegram addressed by the Secretary-General  
of the League of Nations to Mr. Pass on  
February 12th.

---

Chinese Delegate requests me to ask for further  
information two points first report Shanghai Committee:

Firstly. Japanese Admiral, having notified 28th.  
January other commanders his intention take action next  
day against Chinese, why did municipal authorities declare  
State of Emergency which is effectively notice defend  
sectors? Was it meant defend settlement against Japanese  
or against Chinese, which were attacked party?

Secondly. Why did Volunteer Corps prevent party  
of 100 Japanese Marines crossing Nonan Road Gate? Did  
Volunteer Corps execute orders Municipal authorities?  
If so, were orders based on idea neutrality of settlement?

---

Copied by w  
Compared with woo

1511

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 8118 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated February 19, 1932, on the subject, League of Nations, Shanghai Committee: Special Report.

The Shanghai Committee has adopted the following text of reply to request for further information which you transmitted by your telegram February 12th.:

First question:

Declaration of State of Emergency brings into operation defense scheme. Purpose of defense scheme is twofold:

- (1) To protect foreign area from internal disorder, and
- (2) To defend it against external aggression.

When State of Emergency was declared Council had in mind that either

(a) Chinese would not accept Japanese terms, in which case Japanese would take some action and there might be a rush of excited refugees and possibly of disorganized military elements attempting to enter the Settlement, or

(b) That Chinese would accept Japanese terms in which case there might be a storm of protest in a part of Chinese population, resulting in rioting and disorder both inside and outside Settlement. Mayor himself was apprehensive of this.

Therefore, although there was reason to expect trouble, it was not known from what direction it would come, and declaration of State of Emergency was merely a precautionary measure not directed against any particular party.

Second question.

Honan Road Gate gives access from Settlement to Chinese territory not comprised in the Japanese scheme, and strict instructions, based on the principle that the

duties

153  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

duties of the defense force are defensive and not offensive,  
had been given by the Commandant of the Shanghai Volunteer  
Corps, in whose sector it is situated, that in no circum-  
stances was it to be opened to permit either entry or egress.

Shanghai,  
13/2/32.

Copied by w  
Compared with *woo*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94 / 4746

SEE 893.51-Salt Funds/94 FOR Memorandum  
State Department  
FROM FE (MacKay) DATED Feb. 18, 1932  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Outlines the attitude of the Department with regard to seizure of Chinese salt revenues.

tfv

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustofson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11836 FOR #-

FROM China (Peck) DATED Feb. 19, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:  
Eugene Chen's attitude towards the Japanese occupancy of Manchuria.  
Believes that it is to be permanent and that the Japanese military  
will seek other parts of China if no military opposition is interposed.

793.94/4747

ek

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/4748

SEE 761.93/1440 FOR Telegram #330 noon

FROM China ( Perkins ) DATED Mar. 12, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Decision of Central Executive Committee to avoid recognition  
of Soviet Russia, guard against Communism and continue resistance to  
Japan.

dc

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

PEIHING

Dated March 12, 1932

Rec'd 3:08 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

330, March 12, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Legation's March 1, noon.

General Shang Chen who has just arrived here from  
Loyang stated that the Central Executive Committee after  
considerable discussion decided to avoid Soviet alliance  
and to take measures to guard against Communist activities.  
Chinese fear eventually getting the worst of such a bargain.  
The General confirms decision to continue resistance to  
Japan.

FOR THE MINISTER

FERKINS

KLP - HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01-Manchuria/35 FOR Tel.#332-11am

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Mar.13,1932

TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING: Manchurian situation.  
Statement issued by Lin Sen and Wang Chingwei, declaring that organization of the new 'State' of Manchuria is unlawful, and Japan must be held responsible for violation of political integrity of China. During period of Japanese military occupation of Manchuria, any political organization therein will be regarded as a rebel organization by China.

793.94/4749

tfv

1 - 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cib

PLAIN

Peiping via NR

Dated March 13, 1932

Recd 2:15 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

332, March 13, 11 a.m.

Following from Reuter, Nanking, March twelfth:

"Lin Sen and Wang Chingwei have issued a statement declaring that the organization of the new 'State' of Manchuria is unlawful and that the ex-Emperor Hsuan Tung, is liable to punishment for high treason, while Japan must be held responsible for violation of the political integrity of China and the sanction of the Covenant of the League, the Nine Power Treaty and the resolutions of the League of Nations.

The statement says that the Chinese Government must declare that during the period of Japanese military occupation of Manchuria any political organization therein will be regarded as a rebel organization by *China* and the Chinese Government will not hold itself responsible for any actions taken by any puppet government as responsibility will rest entirely with Japan."

For the Minister

JS GIB

PERKINS

1581  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94  
893.102  
793.94111  
5-00. C111

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 15 1932  
Department of State

REP

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

SHANGHAI

Dated March 14, 1932

Rec'd 12:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RECEIVED  
MAR 15 1932

March 14, 11p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Your 77, March 5, 9 p. m.

One. Colleagues referred to hereafter consist of British and French Ministers and Italian Charge d' Affaires.

Two. Colleagues and I agreed today that time had come when we should invite Quo Taichi and Shigemitsu to meet informally with us to explore possibilities of commencing negotiations provided for by League resolution of March 4th for cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of troops.

Three. Shigemitsu and Quo accepted our invitation and met with us this evening. Meeting lasting from four thirty till seven fifteen p. m.

Four. After considerable discussion they agreed to an agenda of three points as a basis for formal negotiations to begin

F/LS  
793.94/4750

MAR 15 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2--from Shanghai, Mar. 14, 11p.m.

to begin probably Wednesday afternoon. (END GRAY)

Five. In course of discussion Shigemitsu brought up question of reaffirmation Mayor's letter of January 28th regarding anti-Japanese activities, et cetera. Quo volunteered the statement that his Government would be willing to reaffirm Mayor's letter but insisted that it should not be made a condition to negotiations. We supported him and after much argument Shigemitsu was persuaded to accept as an outside confidential gentleman's agreement a voluntary undertaking by Quo subject to reference to his Government that China would reaffirm Mayor's letter if, repeat if, points set forth under headings one, two, and three of agenda were accomplished.

Six. Mindful of Department's instruction I insisted that this reaffirmation by Chinese must be considered as a voluntary act. Matter was covered as above indicated purely as a voluntary offer by Quo to open way to negotiations for it was obvious to all of us that Japanese set much store upon this point.

Seven. I assume Department will have no objection to participation by American military and naval officers upon  
upon

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3 # from Shanghai, Mar. 14, 11p.m.

upon commission which will supervise withdrawal.

Eight. Question of policing area to be evacuated was not touched upon.

(GRAY) Nine. Texts of agenda and understandings are being separately telegraphed.

JOHNSON

JS

OIB

159  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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793.94  
893.102  
793.94119  
500.0111

FC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY  
FROM  
Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated March 15, 1932  
Rec'd 5:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

MAR 15 1932  
Department of State

March 15, 10 a. m.

My March 15, 5 a. m., last paragraph.

Following is draft of agenda and understandings:

"One. The Chinese troops to remain in their present positions pending a later settlement.

Two. The Japanese troops to withdraw to the International Settlement and the Extra Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of 28th January. It is, however, understood that in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas.

Three. A joint commission with neutral members to certify the mutual withdrawal.

NOTE. It is understood that no other questions of principle will be raised.

SEPARATE

F/LS 793.94/4751

MAR 15 1932

PLMAD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-from Shanghai, Mar. 15, 10a.m.

SEPARATE NOTE. (Subject to the approval of the Chinese Government). The following understanding is agreed upon.

Provided a definite agreement reached on the basis of the above points the Chinese side will voluntarily give an independent undertaking that Mayor Wu's letter of 28th January stands."

JOHNSON

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE ..... 893.00/11838 ..... FOR ..... #107(to Leg'n.) .....  
FROM ..... Canton ..... (Ballantine) DATED ..... Feb. 11, 1932 .....  
TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1127 ..... o.p.

793.94/4752

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.  
Mr. Fu Ping-chang, former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
has added his voice to the chorus of local leaders at Nanking,  
who have been taking every opportunity to discredit Chiang  
Kai-shek and the Nanking Government in its conduct of relations  
with Japan.

tfv

1596

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 197

*cc. Behr*

February 11, 1938.

Dear Sir:

RE: Statement of Mr. Fu Ting-chang regarding  
the situation in Hankin.

Enclosed

is a circular Johnson,

Warren Minister,

et al.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose a clipping from the  
1/- CHINESE DAILY SUN of February 10, 1938, containing a  
summarized report of a statement regarding the political  
situation at Hankin by Mr. Fu Ting-chang, who  
recently resigned his office as Vice Minister for  
Foreign Affairs, and who has just returned from the  
Capital.

Mr. Fu, who is closely identified with the political  
group in control here (the Sunmintang Right Wing),  
has added his voice to the chorus of the local leaders  
who have been taking every opportunity to discredit  
Chiang Kai-shek and the Hankin Government in its con-  
duct of relations with Japan. He charges Chiang's  
adherents with blocking a proposal for a moratorium of  
six months to relieve the heavy demands on the empty

national

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

national treasury, with betraying the country through the adoption of a humiliating policy against Japan, with having refused to send reinforcements to the Nineteenth Route Army because of having previously made an agreement with Japan to yield and with having given orders to the military commanders to yield at the first and withdraw their troops to Hankow.

I have been told by the Japanese Consul General that his Government is using Mr. Fu's statement as evidence that the Nineteenth Route Army attacked the Japanese after an agreement had been reached for a truce.

The Japanese Consul General also told me confidentially that he had had talks with various leaders here who have given him assurances that the Southwestern Provinces will not be drawn into the conflict with Japan. He mentioned specifically Mayor H. H. Shing and Mr. Hsueh, leader of the Western Hills group, who is president of the Sun Yat-sen University. On February 8, the Mayor gave a dinner to the Consular body, and there was no evidence on that occasion of any lack of cordiality among the Chinese present towards the Japanese Consul General and Vice Consul. Today the Japanese warship fired the customary Kigen Setsu (Japanese National Foundation Day) salute after having made arrangements therefor with the Chinese authorities, and a Chinese war vessel anchored near by has dressed ship for the occasion.

On the other hand public feeling against Japan is intense, and there have been celebrations of alleged

Chinese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Chinese victories over the Japanese at Chungking. Subscriptions are being raised among the public for the Nineteenth Route Army, and it has been announced that an air squadron of seven planes left Canton for Chungking yesterday flying overland. (This announcement may be only for public consumption, however.) Likewise there is no evidence that the local authorities are extending any practical support to Hanking, and it is now said that the plucky flight out by the Nineteenth Route Army is beginning to influence even Chiang Kai-shek and Kwei Lien in their desire to extend support to that army.

In my judgment, up to the present the principal objective of the local leaders is to retain control of the customs and salt revenues, which they lost in January, and the dissolution of the administrative apparatus. The most apparent means of regaining this revenue is to bring to an end the nominal adherence of this area to the National Government, and such a step would involve preparing public opinion by convincing it that the National Government is betraying national interests. On the other hand, the authorities have been afraid of taking any measures which might provoke Japan to taking notice here. Thus the apparently ambiguous attitude of the Cantonese authorities seems entirely consistent with their actual objective.

Although it is not to be doubted that the reestablishment of an independent regime would be welcomed by Japan

1597

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-1-

Japan, it is unlikely that Japanese agents are at work here to further such a movement, since it is not clear what part they could effectively play without jeopardizing its success.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. J. Holloman,  
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

1 - Slip from [unclear]

cc:

J. J. Holloman  
Copies sent:  
2 to Legation  
4 to Department  
1 to Banking

the [unclear]  
incl. 

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*The bantaw Daily Sun*

CHINA WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1932

## DR. FOO PING-SHEUNG DENOUNCES CHIANG KAI-SEEK & WANG CHING-WEI

### Agreements With Japanese Militarists

#### Order Of Withdrawal Ignored By The 19th Route Army

In his address at the weekly memorial service which took place on Monday morning at the provincial government building Dr. Foo Ping-sheung, LL.D., vice-minister of foreign affairs in Nanking, reported the present political situation in the north as follows:—

#### Empty Treasury

When Mr. Sun Fo, president of the Executive Yuan and Mr. Eugene Chen, minister of foreign affairs, and myself went to Nanking to study the existing conditions of the central administration before the new National Government was formed, we found that the national treasury was entirely empty. The revenue was about 6 million dollars per month and the current expenditures for up-keeping all the armies under the central government alone amounted to 15 million dollars.

During Chiang Kai-shek's tenure of office as president of the National Government in Nanking, Mr. T. V. Soong, the financial minister, issued bonds from time to time to meet the deficit with the result that the government had to set aside 15 million dollars each month to pay for the amortization and interest of the bonds.

Finding that such a state of things would send the national treasury to bankruptcy if remedy were not given in time, we proposed a moratorium for 6 months in order to somewhat relieve the heavy demands on the central treasury. This proposal was, however, strongly opposed by Chiang's fellows such as Chen Quo-fu, Meh Cho-chong, Chang Po-chun and Chang Ching-kiang.

#### Weak Diplomacy

Chinchow was lost to the Japanese military by Chang Hseuh-liang who again offered no resistance against the invasion of that town by the Japanese aggressors. This occurred on February 8th whereas Chang reported to the central government the entry of Japanese military into that town on Feb. 5.

In view of the futility of relying on the League of Nations to solve the Manchurian

problem, we proposed severance of diplomatic relation with Japan in order to create a new aspect to the question, with the hope of persuading the signatories of the Nine-Power pact to enforce articles 15 and 16 of the League Covenants for the settlement of the dispute with Japan.

However, this again received the disapproval of Chiang and his followers who maintained that a moderate policy be adopted toward Japan or else general disturbance may result in the country once Japan succeeded in blockading all the important Chinese seaports. Both Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei declared that China should accede to the demands of Japan if a satisfactory settlement of the Manchurian dispute is desired. They decided to estrange those who are opposed to their weak policy. Their betrayal of the country through the adoption of such humiliating policy, by selling Chinese territory like Yuan Shih-kai, is unforgivable.

#### Defence Of Shanghai

Seeing that Chiang and Wang had returned to Nanking by this time and their insincere cooperation to straighten out the affairs of the country, we left for Shanghai and resigned our posts. This happened a few days before the outbreak of hostilities between the Japanese marines and the 19th route army garrisoning Chapei, Shanghai.

The speaker confirmed the report that Chiang had given orders to the leading commanders of the army to yield and withdraw their troops to Nanking before the conflict took place but the gallant and patriotic soldiers and officers of the army refused to take his order and resisted against the Japanese attackers from encroachment upon Chinese territory under their jurisdiction.

(Continued on Page 10)

## DR. FOO PING SHEUNG DENOUNCES CHIANG KAI- SEEK & WANG CHING-WEI

(Continued from Page 1)

He disclosed that Chinag had sent no troops to reinforce the 19th route army to fight against the aggressors as he had previously made agreement with the Japanese militarists to yield. The crack troops trained by Chinag were assigned garrison posts along strategic points in places under his control.

Dr. Foo also briefly described the battles fought between the Chinese soldiers and the Japanese attackers in Shanghai and said that the Chinese were successfully repulsing the enemy.

He concluded by remarking that the foreign residents in Shanghai who were eye-witnesses of the conflict stongly criticized the Japanese marines for having used the Foreign Settlement as a base of operations and for having wantonly massacred countless innocent Chinese inhabitants.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.102 S/929 ..... FOR Despatch # 8126 .....

FROM Shanghai ..... ( Cunningham ..... ) DATED Feb. 19, 1932. .....

TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1127 020

REGARDING:

Scheme for consolidation of Municipalities of Greater Shanghai, and procurement of a charter from the Chinese Government for creation of a Free Port of Shanghai with complete jurisdiction over an area twenty miles wide around Shanghai, for the period of the agreement with China.

jr

793.94/4753

160

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8126

Shanghai, Sino, October 19, 1937.

Greater Shanghai; consolidation of  
municipalities.

1/

I have the honor to transmit a sketch which might furnish a basis, should occasion arise, of a proposal by which many questions that have threatened the existence of the international settlement for some years past would be eliminated, and any future invasion, under the guise of defense of the settlement, by any power for the purpose of carrying on a military campaign against the Chinese would be prevented. The particular object in transmitting this outline at the moment is to place it in the files of the Department so that it may be referred to economically by cable should occasion arise.

Mr. Justice Peckham in his report on Shanghai suggested that a charter might be procured from the Chinese Government, and therefore the word "charter" is well established in correspondence with reference to some form of municipal government for Greater Shanghai. This outline has been carefully prepared and has been favorably considered in

principles

-2-

principle by quite a few people. I look with considerable favor upon the proposal myself, generally speaking. I would not call the new administration the "Free Port of Shanghai," preferring to use the title "Greater Shanghai."

Things are happening so rapidly now that I am constrained to believe that an occasion may arise when such a proposal might be opportune. More than a fortnight ago I suggested that such a proposal should be made by the Chinese Government, and this seemed to be viewed with some favor for a few days. However, there is no chance at the present time of the proposal being made by the Chinese Government, and whether there will be in the future remains to be seen. The person responsible for this outline considers that it would be most desirable for the American Government to propose a scheme of this character for the settlement of all questions relative to this great port of Shanghai.

It is not improbable that before this despatch is received it may be considered desirable to cable a general outline, - I do not know, everything depends upon developments and opportunities. The Department is aware that I have spent a good many years endeavoring to find some solution for the various questions that concern the Shanghai Municipal Council, including the extra-territorial roads and consular questions. Some of those interested in this scheme at one time suggested that certain officers should be appointed by the League of Nations. This is no longer in favor locally, since the League of Nations

is

160

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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out of favor at the present time in Shanghai, and there-  
fore they have substituted the Permanent Court of Arbitra-  
tion at The Hague.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin L. Cunningham,  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Outline sketch for organization  
of Port of Shanghai.

A true copy of  
this signed  
original  
800

in quintuplicate  
in duplicate to location  
copy to Minister at Shanghai

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Article: To eliminate the number of international conflicts affecting the peace and good government of the Free Port of Shanghai.

Article: The establishment of the Free Port of Shanghai comprises the area hereinafter defined as:

1. The city of Szechwan, and
2. The international settlement.
3. The French concession.
4. The waters of water lying entirely within that area under the government which will supersede and replace existing governmental authorities and the establishment by international treaty, to which the Free Port of Shanghai shall be a party, of a neutral zone treaty (19) with an international zone.

Article:

1. The assignment of the entire area for an indefinite period to the inhabitants of the area, of all jurisdiction over the persons and property, both real and personal, within the area, with the exception:

- a. All rights and privileges guaranteed must revert to the government of China at the expiration of the treaty.
- b. The government of the Free Port of Shanghai shall have authority to negotiate and enter into treaties of commerce and other matters, but never with any foreign government, and shall have the right to the government of China.
- c. The government of China shall maintain in the Free Port of Shanghai the following offices for the purposes stated:
  1. The Chinese custom houses - for the collection of import duties on merchandise shipped from the Free Port of Shanghai to China.
  2. The Chinese post-office for the administration of all postal communications - except censorship.
  3. Such other offices as the Chinese government and the government of the Free Port of Shanghai may agree to.

d. The relinquishment forever by the foreign governments concerned of all extra-territorial rights and privileges within the area and the assignment, subject to the provisions of the charter of the Free Port of Shanghai, of such rights and privileges to the government of the Free Port of Shanghai.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3. The Government of the Republic of China shall have the authority to send its military forces to the Republic of China, and authority to be exercised by the Government-General of the Republic of China in the Republic of China shall be completely controlled over all civil and military activities within the Republic of China.

4. The Republic of China, which is a sovereign state, shall be withdrawn from the Republic of China and shall be replaced by the Republic of China. The Government-General shall have the authority to exercise the recall of a sufficient number of the Republic of China military forces or assist in providing the Republic of China with the Republic of China, but the number of military forces within the area, or within the Republic of China, shall not exceed the thousand (1,000) effectives of all ranks. All foreign and Chinese military forces shall have the right of passage within the Republic of China after the appointment of the Government-General and thereafter no military or naval forces may be maintained by any country within twenty (20) miles of the coastline of the Republic of China.

5. The Republic of China shall have the authority to maintain military forces sufficient to protect the Republic of China from attack and to preserve order within the Republic of China and the Republic of China. The Republic of China shall have the authority to maintain the Republic of China, and the Republic of China shall have the authority to maintain the Republic of China.

6. The Republic of China shall have the authority to maintain military forces sufficient to protect the Republic of China from attack and to preserve order within the Republic of China and the Republic of China. The Republic of China shall have the authority to maintain the Republic of China, and the Republic of China shall have the authority to maintain the Republic of China.

Annex:

The Government of the Republic of China shall be established under a charter granted by the Government of China to the inhabitants of the Republic of China. The terms of the charter shall be negotiated and accepted on behalf of the people of the Republic of China by a commission consisting of:

- 1. The Government-General;
- 4 representatives from the International Settlement; (1 British, 1 American, 1 Japanese, 1 Chinese).
- 2 representatives from the French Concession.
- 1 representative from the Municipality of Greater Shanghai.

Article

Notice of termination by either party to terminate the  
letter shall be given five years prior to such termination  
and such notice shall be given by either party until the  
letter becomes in effect for thirty-five years.

The letter shall provide for interpretation of its  
terms and provisions when necessary, and judicial authority  
shall be given to the jurisdiction of either party, and it shall  
also provide for arbitration for amendments.

The letter shall define the limits of the free port of  
Hampel and shall grant to the inhabitants thereof, all of  
the rights and privileges of local self-government within  
the area except as noted below:

- a. The imposition of import duties without the  
consent of the Chinese Government.
- b. The establishment of postal services without the  
consent of the Chinese Government.
- c. The negotiation or conclusion of treaties or  
agreements with foreign powers.

The Government of China undertakes that the  
free port of Hampel shall not be placed at  
any disadvantage as compared with any other  
town, city or part in China because of the  
foregoing exceptions, a, b, and c, and guaran-  
tees the free port of Hampel against all  
any kind of tax, custom or import, whether  
on imports or exports which may be levied  
in other parts of China, with respect to China.

The Government of China undertakes on a par-  
tial basis the free port of Hampel and the  
ports therefrom and imports thereto against  
all and any discriminatory legislation or  
taxation and in consideration of the revenues  
derived from its administration of the customs  
and post-office guarantees the free port of  
Hampel as favorable consideration in all  
aspects as may be enjoyed by any other town,  
city or part in China.

- d. The chief executive of the Government - the Govern-  
ment-General, shall be appointed by the League.

The legislative and administrative authority shall be  
vested in a Council of twenty (20) members of whom nineteen  
(19) shall be elected; one shall be appointed by the Govern-  
ment of China. The Government-General shall be the President  
Pro Tem of the Council with the privilege of casting the  
deciding vote in case of a tie.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

The membership of the Council shall be appointed as follows:

Chinese: Ten - of whom one shall be appointed by the Chinese Government,

British: Two;  
 American: Two;  
 French: Two;  
 Japanese: Two,

and one each from the nationals of the two nations not already represented, the total value of whose trade with the Free Port of Shanghai, as determined by the Chinese Customs returns for the three years immediately preceding the elections, that is larger than that of any nation other than those already represented.

The foreign members are to be chosen by the foreign consular associations in the manner determined in the Charter.

The Chinese members are to be elected in the manner to be determined in the Charter.

The term of office of members of the Council shall be at least two years and the members will serve without remuneration or perquisites of any description.

Vacancies in the quota of any nationality entitled to representation shall be filled by the appointment by the Governor-General of a member or members from among the qualified residents of the nationality concerned, who shall hold office until confirmed or replaced by a member or members duly elected in the manner prescribed by the Charter.

No person may become a member of the Council who has not attained the age of thirty years and who has not resided in the Settlement for a period of two consecutive years next preceding the date of his election.

The acts of the Council shall be subject to the veto of the Governor-General but the Council may, by a vote of three-fourths of the members thereof lodge with the League an appeal against such veto. The power of veto must be exercised within thirty days after the act has been communicated to the Governor-General.

All measures of taxation within the Free Port of Shanghai must originate with the Council.

In event notice is given to terminate the Charter then the Chinese Government shall at the same time make and publish provisions for the retirement, at face value, one year before the termination of the Charter, of all bonded obligations of the Free Port of Shanghai, which may be outstanding at that time, the proceeds of which have been used by the Government of the Free Port of Shanghai solely for capital expenditure.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The law of the settlement shall be the charter granted by the Chinese Government and the laws and regulations promulgated by virtue of that authority.

The judicial authority of the settlement shall be vested in a Supreme Court and such other courts as may be authorized from time to time by the Council.

The Supreme Court shall consist of five judges of whom one is to be appointed by the Government of China and four are to be appointed by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Council.

There shall not be more than one judge of any one nationality on the court. The language of the Supreme Court shall be the English language.

The law to be administered shall be that of the Free Port of Shanghai.

The establishment of other courts of original jurisdiction, the appointment of judges of inferior courts and all matters of procedure shall be determined by the Council.

The Chinese Government undertakes to maintain law and order within the neutral zone and shall maintain an adequate police force which shall never exceed 2,000 effectives. In the event such force is inadequate, the Chinese Government shall call upon the Government of the Free Port of Shanghai to assist.

The Governor-General shall be appointed for a term of four years and may be reappointed for successive terms upon the seventy-five per cent (75%) vote of the Council. He may be impeached, before the Supreme Court, upon three affirmative votes out of the five and in such event the Council shall appoint a successor.

The Free Port of Shanghai may import duty free upon approval of the Judge such arms, munitions of war and such equipment as may be necessary to maintain the status of the Free Port of Shanghai, but none of such shall ever be permitted to pass beyond the limits of the neutral zone or out of the control of the Free Port of Shanghai.

The Government of China undertakes to maintain, through its customs' service, a permanent embargo against the importation of all arms and munitions of war into, through or out of the Free Port of Shanghai, except as hereinafter provided for.

copied by mlh #71  
compared with MB 6

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 761.93/1436 ..... FOR despatch #68 .....

FROM Latvia ..... ( Skinner ) DATED February 19, 1932.  
TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Possibility of war between Soviet Russia and Japan, as result  
of Manchurian dispute, as appeared in INTERNATSIONAL MOLODEZHI,  
of Oct-Nov. 1931.

793.94/4754

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00/367 ..... FOR #512 .....

FROM Japan ..... ( Neville ..... ) DATED Feb. 27, 1932  
TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING:

Military dictatorship in Japan at present but its future success depends upon the outcome of the Sino-Japanese dispute.

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793.94/4755

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Tokyo, Japan, February 27, 1932..

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 512

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that many Japanese continue to regard profound political change as a possibility. Such change, if it occur, is apparently to be initiated by the military, supported by a part of the masses, the degree of this support depending on the measure of success of the Manchurian and Shanghai expeditions. If such a change fails to eventuate, many Japanese seem to anticipate an outbreak of rioting among the masses suffering from severe economic pressure. Those Japanese whose opinions in regard to the latter possibility have been obtained by the Embassy apparently do not believe that such disturbances will

will precipitate political changes of a fundamental nature.

The power of the military, a power that in some phases seems to be equivalent to a military dictatorship, has been discussed in several recent despatches of the Embassy. There are Japanese who feel that a dictatorship in name as well as in fact may be established, perhaps in the very near future. The military, especially the younger officers, are said to be very impatient with the two major political parties, which have attempted - at least negatively - to hinder the military in the consummation of some of their aims. (This dislike extends also to the capitalists who support these parties.) The most recent instances of impediment by the politicians are the reported warnings of the Minister of Finance in respect to the expenditure involved in the Manchurian and Shanghai adventures and the reported opposition of - in particular - the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the creation of an independent state in Manchuria. The Japanese military, especially the junior officers who are said to be in control of affairs in Manchuria, does not seem to realize the serious international consequences involved in the creation of such a state.\* I have heard from fairly reliable sources that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister are urging the military to be content with some sort of autonomous government in Manchuria. The creation or maintenance of such entity would not necessarily develop any serious situation with respect to treaties relating to China. The dislike of capitalists was recently illustrated by a speech over the radio of my

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\* Embassy's telegram of February 26, 1932, 611.2.  
No. 81

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By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

army officer. He said that in the past Manchuria has profited only capitalists but that in the future the people and not only the capitalists will receive the benefits. Before this attitude, it is not surprising that there are reports that capitalists are somewhat apprehensive about Manchurian investments.

There would seem to be many Japanese who regard the possibility of a dictatorship with equanimity, not only those who support the military wholeheartedly but also those who feel that parliamentary government in Japan has failed to solve the critical problems with which the country is now confronted (Despatch No. 509 of February 27, 1932). There are indications of such acquiescence.

Extreme reactionism has been increasingly evident since the beginning of the Manchurian affair. There have always been, of course, too many super-patriots in Japan ready to do violence against persons whose views may differ in respect to what is best for Japan. The danger which threatens a Japanese who expresses at present liberal opinions - that is, criticism of the military - is, I believe, very real. I have heard more than one Japanese say recently, more than half in earnest, that the present situation is equivalent to "a reign of terror", that a military dictatorship already exists except in name. The most extreme case is the recent assassination of Dr. Inouye, late Minister of Finance. There is a rumor in Tokyo at present that Baron Saidehara, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has been confined to bed for some time with a cold, is really suffering from a wound inflicted by a would-be assassin. This rumor has been denied by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. However, though the rumor may be untrue,

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untrue, the readiness of Japanese to believe it indicates the widespread feeling that opposition to the military may incur violence by super-patriots. A fortunately less grave illustration is the effect of an address which Dr. Nitobe made at the city of Matsuyama early this month, during which he is reported to have said that the two things most harmful to Japan are communism and the military clique, the latter being the more harmful of the two. This "injury to the honor of the military" angered the local ex-soldiers' association so that it aroused other ex-soldier associations and patriotic bodies in Central Japan and Tokyo to "open a campaign" for positive action against Dr. Nitobe, the character of the action to be undertaken not being reported in the press. Reactionary societies have recently published inflammatory advertisements, a recent one being an attack on Dr. Inouye which occupied about one-third of a page of a daily newspaper and which may very possibly have influenced the assassin to carry out his crime.

There are rumors to the effect that the army, or a part of the army, aims at the overthrow of the major political parties and the capitalists which support them (the money of the latter could be of great assistance in carrying out their ambitions). This group apparently believes that if such a move were made in the name of the Emperor it would have the support not only of the patriotic reactionary groups referred to above but a part of the proletarian political parties as well. The aim of the proletarian parties is similar to that of the army in so far as they both desire the overthrow of the capitalists. Since last autumn a considerable section of the Shakai

Minshuto

1014

Minshuto (Social Democratic Party) has declared itself in favor of "national socialism", which is interpreted as a kind of "fascism", a word which seems to be coming more and more into favor in Japan. (It will be recalled that a part of this party was said to be implicated in the plot last October to overthrow the Cabinet and establish a dictatorship.\*) A few members of the only other national proletarian political party, the Kenkoku Nono Taishuto (National Labor-Farmer Masses Party) are said also to be in favor of "fascism".

The reasons for this remove from socialism appear to be several. The proletarian political parties have been very unsuccessful under their original principles. Their weakness in the past three general elections under the so-called Universal Manhood Suffrage Law of 1925 is shown by the following figures:

<u>Year of Election</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Number of Diet Members</u>
1928	370,019	5
1930	521,550	5
1932	291,140	5

Perhaps the leaders realize that proletarian political parties on Western lines being a foreign importation do not suit the Japanese character. They may believe that an appeal based on benefits to the Emperor will find a far wider acceptance among the masses, whose outlook is still to a great degree feudal. Particularly at present there is an atmosphere created by the action of the army, which is feudal in character - that is, it in part derives  
from

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\* Despatch No. 382 of November 7, 1931.

from a desire to increase the glories of the Emperor. Consequently, these proletarians may consider it wisdom to ride with the tide in the hope that if things turn out right they may improve their position among civilians which is of practically no importance at present. Then too, socialism as they picture it may not seem to them at all remote from control of the state by a small group acting in the name of the Emperor.

A leader of the Hono Taishuto recently informed a member of my staff that the proletarian leaders have been groping for a way to attain their aims. The Shakai Minshuto has three main lines of thought - one group believing in the kind of "fascism" described above, a second group believing that "opposition to capitalism, communism, and anarchism, will attain their ends", and a third and much smaller group of disillusioned members advocating that nothing be done. His own party, this leader said, follows chiefly the lines of social democracy with some, like himself, only searching for a solution for the present situation, while a few are so-called fascists. He said that those in favor of fascism have reached the conclusion that their aims cannot be attained by communism or by socialism but by "a return to feudalism". He himself seemed to be groping for a solution of the present situation so far without success.

Some of his other remarks were of interest. He said that if the military succeeds in Shanghai and Manchuria - which he seemed to think improbable - the military will take over the government and be supported by the mass of the people. If the expeditions fail and the military take over the Government, within a few months they will be  
overthrown

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overthrown by communists, socialists, and other discontented groups.

In regard to rumors of a possible coalition Cabinet in the near future, reported in my telegram No. 73 of February 26th, he said that such an eventuality would be due to Prince Saionji's desire to prevent the establishment of a dictatorship. A coalition Cabinet would be a measure to meet the dissatisfaction of the military with the alleged opposition of the major political parties. A coalition cabinet - headed perhaps by a non-party man - would help to alleviate military discontent with parliamentary government, the preservation and progress of which seem to be the chief concern of the so-called only surviving Genro. He mentioned Hiranuma, vice-president of the Privy Council, as a possible Prime Minister in such a case. Hiranuma, it might be mentioned, is believed in some quarters to have been one of those who plotted last October for the overthrow of the Government and its replacement by a dictatorship.

There seems to be a definite recrudescence of feudal characteristics since the beginning of the Manchurian affair. The military action is in part derived from the feudal position of the army, the proletarian parties in part are speaking of it as a means to attain their ends, and it has also been brought to my attention that recently the ever-present tendency of the Japanese to regard themselves as a kind of "chosen people" having attributes peculiar only to themselves seems to have become stronger.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Embassy's file  
No. 800.-Japan.

LES/AA

Edwin L. Neville  
Counselor of Embassy

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00B/890 FOR Tel. #-, noon  
FROM Amoy (Franklin) DATED March 7, 1932.  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Riot in front of newspaper office, as result of police order  
prohibiting posting of war notes.

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793.94/4756

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 842.9111/71 ..... FOR desp. #718 .....

FROM Canada ..... ( Riggs ) DATED Mar. 11, 1932 .....  
TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict.  
Creation of a new "epublic of Ankuo in  
Manchuria - report on present status  
of -.

793.94 / 4757

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The reported establishment of the new Republic of Ankuo in Manchuria has not created very much comment in the Canadian press. The assurances of Japan that the new Republic will not be under Japanese domination are not taken seriously and a number of papers have expressed the opinion that complete Japanese control of Manchuria with its attendant security would be preferable to inefficient Chinese rule. The Liberal Toronto GLOBE again points out that Japan has real rights in Manchuria; that the latter has never been an integral part of China proper; and that if Manchuria is to be given over to Japanese control, the only necessity is for China to obtain ample compensation. The GLOBE is wholeheartedly opposed to any effort which Japan may make to obtain concessions from China in Manchuria by the use of force or intimidation. It says:

"It goes without saying that none of the honorable nations which have signed treaties guaranteeing the integrity of China will recognize any change in Manchuria's status based otherwise than on free and mutual acceptance. Japan cannot expect to annex Manchuria on the condition that she refrain from further aggression in China. If China is to relinquish any of her own rights in Manchuria she should be fairly compensated for so doing."

This view is also shared by other papers including the Liberal Ottawa CITIZEN which says:

"Belief in force is rampant on the Oriental side of the Pacific Ocean. Canada must necessarily be associated with the United States, at least to the extent of firmly declining to accept the Japanese military conquest of China."

The Canadian press is in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Stimson in his recent letter to Senator Borah, especially in regard to the statement that the treaties signed at the Washington Conference in 1922 are "interralated

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and interdependent" and that the violation of one of these treaties by Japan automatically relieves the other signatory powers from any of the obligations incurred in the other treaties. It is earnestly hoped, however, that this will not induce the United States to increase her naval establishment or to attempt to fortify her possessions in the western Pacific. To use the words of the Conservative Montreal STAR:

"This will be most emphatically a case in which deliberate preparations for war may lead to war. In a democratic country like the American Republic, it is impossible to work up enthusiasm for heavy expenditures on so exotic an arm as the Navy, especially in hard times like the present, without pointing definitely to a specific danger and a named enemy.

"If the Americans now go in for a larger Navy and for impregnable fortifications in the Philippines, it is absolutely certain that Japan will be pictured as the villain of the piece on a thousand hustings and in hundreds of newspapers. The American people will be educated to fear and hate Japan."

The STAR concludes:

"If Japan really intends to treat China as unorganized and properly exploitable territory, exactly contrary to the principles of the Washington treaties, it will throw all those agreements into the fire--and out of that fire may come sparks that will kindle not only the Shanghai war zone, but such hinterlands as Manchuria and even Korea. Uncle Sam may not be able to fight now, but it will be a very silly business to dare him to get ready to do so."

The entire Canadian press continues to oppose the suggestion of an economic boycott against Japan. The Conservative Toronto MAIL AND EMPIRE points out that if the League of Nations supports this policy it will undoubtedly lead to war and that the British Empire will be forced to bear the brunt of the fighting and the expense. It adds that Australia has emphatically expressed her disapproval of a boycott which would prove harmful to every section of the Empire. The present Canadian attitude

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toward the suggested boycott is best summed up by the following heading of an editorial in the MAIL AND EMPIRE:

"We British Should Mind Our Own Business."

Even now the Japanese tactics in China are not without defenders. These tactics and their bearing on the present arms conference at Geneva, are described as follows by the Canadian Forum, a monthly periodical with Liberal leanings:

"But while the moralist may deplore the ruthless tactics of the Japanese militarists, it must be admitted that there is not one of the great imperial nations that can afford to cast any stones at Japan. The use of force is an inevitable feature of imperialist policies, and the massacre of Chepei is only Amritsar on a somewhat larger scale. In recent years the French at Damascus, Spanish troops in Morocco, and the marines of the United States in Haiti and Nicaragua have used similar methods in order to obtain their objectives, and they have all used the degree of force that was necessary to ensure that weaker nations should adopt the proper attitude of humility and subjection. The atmosphere of unreality which pervades the peace conferences at Geneva is largely due to the fact that the great powers are unwilling to admit frankly that subject races cannot be kept in their place without the assistance of huge armaments.

"The politicians may talk about 'security', 'policing the seas', and 'defence of the trade routes', but one of the main reasons why the great powers are obliged to risk bankruptcy in order to support increasing armaments is that only by such means are they able to keep the colonial peoples in subjection--and incidentally protect their foreign investments."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
GRAY

MET

RECEIVED  
MAR 15 1938  
DIVISION OF

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 15, 1938

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

March 15 3 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 15 1938  
Department of State

Following from Colonel Drysdale to War Department.

"32. Wyman reports Chinese front line as follows:

Soochow Creek one mile west of Shirakawa zone -- Wanghsien-  
chiao -- Kelungchen -- Taitasang -- Miao-chiashih -- Shatow --  
Huangching, he reports position strong and that Chinese  
believe they can hold Japanese on that line, also states  
no indication that Chinese intend to attack and except for  
a brush between patrols on Liuho-Taitasang Road March 11,  
there has been little military activity. Chinese have  
requested Wyman not to send details of strength, disposi-  
tions, et cetera. It is reported that Japanese have landed  
siege artillery, probably 8 inch howitzers, and that orders  
are being issued for the withdrawal from the area of the  
11th Japanese Division and 24th Mixed Brigade starting about  
March 18th.

JOHNSON

KLP-WSB

F/L/S 793.94/4758

793.94  
note  
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MAR 21 1938  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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*WE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MET

GREEN

RECEIVED

FROM

Geneva

MAR 21 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Dated March 15, 1932

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 15 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington

119, March 15, 10 a.m.

Consulate's 117, March 11, 9 p.m.

Secretary General has circulated the following communication dated March 12th addressed by Yen to the President of the Assembly:

"In accordance with instructions from my Government I have the honor to inform you that the Chinese Government accepts the resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on the 11th instant. As I anticipated in my explanation to the Assembly for my abstention the acceptance of the resolution has been delayed because of the time required for telegraphic communication between Geneva and Nanking and for no other reasons.

My Government is gratified that practically all the principles of importance for which it has contended since the very inception of the Sino-Japanese dispute have been incorporated

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note  
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793.94119

F/LS 793.94/4759

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#119 from Geneva, March 15,  
10 a. m.

incorporated in the resolution of March 11th. My Government desires to refer in particular to three of these principles.

One. That the settlement of the dispute should not be sought under the stress of military coercion which it takes to mean that the evacuation of Japanese troops must precede negotiation.

Two. That it is the obligation of members of the League to submit any dispute which may arise among them to procedures for peaceful settlement which absolves the Republic of China from all responsibility for the present terrible state of affairs in Manchuria, Shanghai and other parts of China, and

Three. That it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, et cetera brought about contrary to the Covenant of the League or the Pact of Paris. The word "situation" must of course cover the present state of things created in Manchuria through Japanese manipulation, instigation and military support - in particular to the puppet Government in Manchuria.

I shall

112  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#119 from Geneva, March 15,  
10 a. m.

I shall be deeply obliged to you to bring the above  
to the knowledge of the Assembly<sup>4</sup>.

GILBERT

WSB

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MARCH 14 1932.

793.94/4759A

272

To the American Ambassador,  
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses herewith, for the information of the Ambassador, two copies of the text of a resolution passed by the League of Nations on March 11, 1932, in regard to the situation in China.

793.94/A

Enclosure:

Text of resolution passed by the League of Nations on March 11, 1932, in duplicate.

copy of  
signed orig.  
M

OR ✓  
MAR 14 1932.

~~FE:JES/NDM~~  
3/14/32

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m.m.H

MTH

1627

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAR 14 1932.

717  
To the American Minister,  
Peiping.

The Secretary of State encloses herewith, for the information of the Minister, two copies of the text of a resolution passed by the League of Nations on March 11, 1932, in regard to the situation in China.

793.94/4759B

Enclosure:

Text of resolution passed  
by the League of Nations on  
March 11, 1932, in duplicate.

793.94/A

~~FE~~  
FE:JEJ:EM

3/12/32

m.m.H.  
FE

~~Handwritten signature~~

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MAR 14 1932

MTH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

MARCH 11, 1932

Sino-Japanese

The American Minister to Switzerland, Mr. Hugh R. Wilson, reported to the Department of State today that the Assembly of the League of Nations today passed the following resolution:

PART ONE

The Assembly, considering that the provisions of the Covenant are entirely applicable to the dispute, more particularly as regards:

- (1) The principle of a scrupulous respect for treaties;
- (2) The undertaking entered into by members of the League of Nations to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the members of the League;
- (3) Their obligation to submit any dispute which may arise between them to procedures for peaceful settlement;

Adopting the principles laid down by the President in office of the Council, Mr. Briand in his declaration of December 10th, 1931;

Recalling the fact that twelve members of the Council again invoked those principles in their appeal to the Japanese Government on February 16th, 1932, when they declared that "no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any member of the League brought about in disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognized as valid and effectual by members of the League of Nations";

Considering that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the League, above referred to, are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris which is one of the cornerstones of the peace organization of the world and under Article 2 of which 'the high contracting parties agree that the Settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature and whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means';

Pending the steps which it may ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute which has been referred to it;

Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.

-2-

PART TWO

The Assembly,

Affirming that it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be sought under the stress of military pressure on the part of either party;

Recalls the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and on December 10, 1931, in agreement with the parties;

Recalls also its own resolution of March 4, 1932, adopted in agreement with the parties with a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and notes that the powers members of the League of Nations having special interests in the Shanghai settlements are prepared to give every assistance to this end and requests those powers if necessary to cooperate in maintaining order in the evacuated zone.

PART THREE

The Assembly,

In view of the request formulated on January 29th by the Chinese Government invoked the application to the dispute of the procedure provided for in Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

In view of the request formulated on February 12th by the Chinese Government that the dispute should be referred to the Assembly in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 9, of the Covenant and in view of the Council's decision of February 19th;

Considering that the whole of the dispute which forms the subject of the Chinese Government's request is referred to it and that it is under an obligation to apply the procedure of conciliation provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant and if necessary the procedure in regard to recommendations provided for in paragraph 4 of that same article;

Decides to set up a committee of nineteen members, namely, the President of the Assembly who will act as Chairman of the Committee, the members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute and six other members to be elected by secret ballot.

This committee exercising its functions on behalf of and under the supervision of the Assembly shall be instructed:

(1) To report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the said cessation and shall regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in conformity with the Assembly resolution of March 4th, 1932.

(2) To follow the execution of the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and December 10th, 1931.

(3) To endeavor to prepare the settlement of the dispute in agreement with the parties in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3 of the Covenant, and to submit a statement to the Assembly.

(4) To propose if necessary that the Assembly submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice a request for an advisory opinion.

-3-

(5) To prepare, if need be, the draft of the report provided for in Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant.

(6) To propose any urgent measure which may appear necessary.

(7) To submit a first progress report to the Assembly as soon as possible and at latest on May 1, 1932.

The Assembly requests the Council to communicate to the Committee, together with any observations it may have to make, any documentation that it may think fit to transmit to the Assembly.

The Assembly shall remain in session and its President may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary.

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1631

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 14 1932

To the American Consul General,  
Shanghai, China.

The Secretary of State encloses herewith, for the  
information of the Consul General, two copies of the text  
of a resolution passed by the League of Nations on March 11,  
1932, in regard to the situation in China.

793.94/4759C

Enclosure:

Text of resolution passed  
by League of Nations on  
March 11, 1932, in duplicate.

1932.04/A

~~FE:JEE:LM~~

3/12/32

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m.m.h.  
LVA  
@  
March 24, 1932

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

MARCH 11, 1932

Sino-Japanese

The American Minister to Switzerland, Mr. Hugh R. Wilson, reported to the Department of State today that the Assembly of the League of Nations today passed the following resolution:

PART ONE

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- (3) Their obligation to submit any dispute which may arise between them to procedures for peaceful settlement;

Adopting the principles laid down by the President in office of the Council, Mr. Briand in his declaration of December 10th, 1931;

Recalling the fact that twelve members of the Council again invoked those principles in their appeal to the Japanese Government on February 16th, 1932, when they declared that "no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any member of the League brought about in disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognized as valid and effectual by members of the League of Nations";

Considering that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the League, above referred to, are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris which is one of the cornerstones of the peace organization of the world and under Article 2 of which 'the high contracting parties agree that the Settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature and whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means';

Pending the steps which it may ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute which has been referred to it;

Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

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-2-

PART TWO

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Considering that the whole of the dispute which forms the subject of the Chinese Government's request is referred to it and that it is under an obligation to apply the procedure of conciliation provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant and if necessary the procedure in regard to recommendations provided for in paragraph 4 of that same article;

Decides to set up a committee of nineteen members, namely, the President of the Assembly who will act as Chairman of the Committee, the members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute and six other members to be elected by secret ballot.

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- (4) To propose if necessary that the Assembly submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice a request for an advisory opinion.

1 3 4  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

(5) To prepare, if need be, the draft of the report provided for in Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant.

(6) To propose any urgent measure which may appear necessary.

(7) To submit a first progress report to the Assembly as soon as possible and at latest on May 1, 1932.

The Assembly requests the Council to communicate to the Committee, together with any observations it may have to make, any documentation that it may think fit to transmit to the Assembly.

The Assembly shall remain in session and its President may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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LFE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
1932  
DIVISION OF  
AFFAIRS

March 8, 1932

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 9 1932  
Department of State

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH  
THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR

793.94  
note  
293,102-3  
761.94  
993.01-11/10/32

793.94/4760

The Italian Ambassador came in and read over a number of telegrams with reference to the Sino-Japanese situation and asked where we stood. The telegrams contained nothing of significance. One was from Tokyo to the effect that the Ambassadors felt that nothing should be addressed to Japan as the moderate forces now have a chance to get in control since the military forces had gained their objectives at Shanghai. He said this view was the prediction of a conference between the English, German, French, and Italian representatives. I said we had addressed nothing to Tokyo and had heard nothing of importance since the concurrent notes regarding ships and the landing of troops.

The Ambassador had several despatches from Shanghai, most of them out of date. He had also two or three from Moscow stating that a note of warning issued by the Russians to the Japanese was not taken seriously by the Japanese and that the belief in Moscow both of the Japanese and others was that Russia would avoid any serious measures. The Japanese did not seem concerned

MAR 10 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

by the threatening attitude. Moscow also believed that the new Manchurian state would include the eastern section of Mongolia and that the Japanese denial that it was under official Japanese auspices meant only that the government at Tokyo had not adopted the plans of the military.

He asked about our attitude. I told him we were awaiting an opportunity to cooperate in a conference in Shanghai but that nobody seemed to be entering a conference and we did not know why. I said I understood the Italian and French representative there had instructions to collaborate, but that the English seemed to have less definite directions. However, it would probably gradually clear up. I said there seemed to have been some misunderstanding about information to be given the League of Nations but that we had not been in any respect backward and if there was any confusion it was being cleared up.

I said that we were concerned for the moment, first, with avoiding any discussion of an addition to, or extension of, the Settlement at Shanghai as entirely inappropriate at this time. The Ambassador said he agreed and had no sympathy with such a move. Second, we were not going to encourage any discussion of the broad


1634

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Sino-Japanese issues, but were conforming strictly to the League policy that the Shanghai conferences should be concerned only with local military liquidation. Third, we felt that all the nations were bound to a maintenance of the Nine-Power policy in respect to Manchuria and that no variation of it should be permitted without conference and the concurrence of everybody. He said he agreed.

The Ambassador said the purpose of this, the third of his visits of this type, was to keep alive a sense of active cooperation with us in regard to the Oriental problems. He expressed a sense of the unreliability in any Japanese representations, but said it would take a long time to work out the situation.

  
JGR

A--R JGR\*IJ

163

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 9, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 11 1932  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SHANGHAI SITUATION  
Question of Withdrawing  
the 31st Infantry.

MAR 10 1932

793.94/4761

793.94  
note 10-23  
893-10-23  
893-10-46  
893-10-23

It would seem from Cunningham's 175, <sup>4645 cc</sup> March 9, 5 p.m. that General Hines, at Manila, wants the 31st Infantry returned to him; that the Commanding Officer, Colonel Gasser, and Admiral Taylor and Minister Johnson are in favor, in principle; and that Consul General Cunningham, though having some misgivings, is "inclined to take a chance by concurring".

Neither Cunningham nor Johnson have asked for an instruction, but it may be assumed that the question will be raised by the War Department.

This Division is of the opinion that, as to the military need for the presence of the regiment at Shanghai, we should be guided by the views of our representatives there. With regard to the diplomatic need, we believe that decision should be delayed for some days at least pending developments at Geneva and at Shanghai in relation to the proposed round table conference. With regard to procedure, we believe that any move which may be made by way of ordering the withdrawal of the regiment should be preceded by consultation with the British, the French and the Italian Governments (or their representatives at Shanghai

CONFIDENTIAL FILE  
MAR 14 1932  
MAH-141-AM

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Shanghai), especially the British. At the time when the various governments sent reinforcements to Shanghai, our action was taken in consultation with the British Government and on the basis of concurrence as to the need and of full desire reciprocally to cooperate. It was a part of our thought at that time that we would attempt to make our force as nearly as possible equal to that of the British, even though the British material interests at stake were greater than ours, in order that we might be in better position to call on Great Britain for diplomatic support in other connections. It would seem, therefore, that we should not withdraw any part of our forces without having consulted with and agreed with the British in regard to that move.

(Note: It might even be well to wait a little while and see whether an initiative may not come from the British).

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 11, 1932.

Mr. Secretary:

This has just come over from the Navy Department and they say that Admiral Pratt requests an early indication of your views.

In this telegram Admiral Taylor recommends that the 18th of March "be set for departure thirty-first infantry" and he says "Minister agrees. Defense Council disagrees....".

To FE it seems surprising that this recommendation should be made by Admiral Taylor and in this manner. Such a recommendation ought, properly, if and when made, be made by and through the Minister directly to the State Department, which Department in turn should take the matter up with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

(NOTE: Johnson himself has given us no word on the subject. We had what amounted to a "feeler" from Cunningham day before yesterday; and now we have this from Taylor.)

FE suggests that you advise the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy of your views and request that they send instructions to their respective officers at Shanghai informing those officers that the Administration does not consider it advisable to withdraw the 31st Infantry at this time and, as the problem involved is one of international relations, desires that such recommendations as they may wish to make with regard to the matter be made through the channel

of

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F/LS 793.94/4762

COMMUNICATIONS FILE

793.94  
893.02-S  
893.0146  
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811.30-2  
102.507  
127.41

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of the American Minister; also that, for diplomatic reasons,  
the Administration desires that discussion of this subject  
among American authorities in China be kept confidential.

SKE

SKE/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 11, 1932.

Mr. Secretary:

In the account of my conversation with Dr. Hawking Yen, the most important item is the copy of a telegram from Dr. W. W. Yen, which is appended -- at page 4.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

*M*  
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Conversation. March 10, 1932.

Dr. Hawking Yen  
Mr. Hornbeck.

SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 11 1932

RECEIVED  
MAR 11 1932  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

*notes*

Subject: Dr. W. W. Yen's Circulation of a Telegram at Geneva under date March 8.

793.94/4763

As instructed by the Secretary of State, Mr. Hornbeck asked Dr. Yen to call.

Mr. Hornbeck showed Dr. Yen a copy of Mr. Gilbert's telegram 110, <sup>4637</sup> March 9, 10 a.m., from Geneva. This telegram contains the text of a communication dated March 8 circulated by the Secretary General of the League at Geneva purporting to contain the text of a telegram received by Dr. W. W. Yen from the Chinese Legation in Washington.

Mr. Hornbeck stated that the Secretary was surprised and displeased at noting that a report of a conversation between himself and Dr. Hawking Yen had thus been circulated at Geneva. He especially objected to its having been made to appear that he had taken a position with regard to the manner in which the evacuated area was to be policed.

Dr. Yen stated that he had been surprised himself at noting in the morning papers that Dr. W. W. Yen had made this communication public at Geneva. He said that it must have occurred in a situation of emergency and was probably done for the purpose of refuting statements or intimations

made

*793.94  
note  
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164

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

made by representatives of some other states. He produced and read a telegram which he said he had just received from Dr. W. W. Yen -- of which he permitted Mr. Hornbeck to have made a copy (attached). He said that neither he nor Dr. W. W. Yen would wish to do or would under any circumstances intentionally do anything which might be embarrassing to the Secretary of State. They appreciated very greatly the position which the American Government was taking and it was not only their desire to be helpful but their desire to be in no way the opposite. He asked that Mr. Hornbeck assure the Secretary of that.

Mr. Hornbeck said that he was confident that such was the attitude of the Chinese representatives and that it was of course realized that Dr. W. W. Yen is waging a difficult diplomatic campaign and that things move rapidly; but that it would probably be safer to leave it to representatives of the American Government to express views of the American Government. Dr. Yen said that he quite understood that and he concurred. He said that he would convey that suggestion to Dr. W. W. Yen. He said that he was sure that Dr. W. W. Yen had undertaken to state what he had understood to be the American Government's position only because the American Government had no representative present in the meeting and it had seemed that the American Government's view should be made known at the moment. He again asked that this explanation and the substance of Dr. W. W. Yen's

telegram

104

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(3)

- 3 -

telegram be communicated to the Secretary with expression of regret if too great a liberty had been taken or any embarrassment occasioned.

Mr. Hornbeck said that he would inform the Secretary.

The conversation then turned to the subject of the situation and problem at Shanghai. Dr. Yen said that China, like the United States, desired that the matter be handled on the basis of justice. Mr. Hornbeck took occasion to say that, speaking unofficially, he felt that China should take into consideration not alone the question of justice but considerations of equity and considerations of practical expediency. He expressed the hope that the Chinese themselves would at the right moment come forward with some plan for dealing with the problem of the port of Shanghai on a basis which would take into consideration not alone the rights of China but the rights and the best interests of all concerned.

*SECRET*

*Cop of telegram from W.W. Yen attached*

*SECRET*

FE:SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 10, 1932.

Dr. Hawking Yen has just read me a telegram received from Dr. W. W. Yen, at Geneva, as follows:

"Please inform Mr. Stimson substance of his talk with you made public here by me because while views of member Governments of Assembly made known on open debate, American view unknown to members who often in such matters were misled through ~~tenacious~~ *tendentia* reports of American attitude, hope he will understand my motive."

F.W. - 793.94 / 4763

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SMH:CLS

1648

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 3, 1932.

~~PA~~  
FE  
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Conversation:

Congressman Britten;  
Mr. Miller.

Subject: Japan's violations of the Nine Power and other treaties.

793.94/4764

Congressman Britten called on the phone and said that he would like to have in the form of brief paragraphs specific instances of Japan's violations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Nine Power Treaty and other treaties negotiated at the Washington Disarmament Conference. He asked if we could suggest how he could get this material without causing us too much trouble.

I replied that a statement of concrete violations of the various treaties to which he referred would not be a simple matter since many of the questions that had arisen in relation to these treaties in recent months were not yet settled. I suggested that the correspondence which had been sent to the Senate narrated in concise form the course of events from which one might form his own opinion on the question raised by Mr. Britten. He said that he would send for a copy of this correspondence and would let us know if there was anything further which he might wish to ask.

Mr. Britten said that his purpose was to make some remarks

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MAR 15 1932

1644

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

remarks on the floor of the House emphasizing the need of a stronger navy; that it would not necessarily be an accusation but might be in the nature of a notification that we should feel free to proceed with fortification in the Philippines. I remarked that that would be a very advanced step to take at the present juncture. Mr. Britten replied that he had no serious intention of advocating such a step (as proceeding with further fortifications in the Philippines) but intimated that his purpose was rather to work up support for the naval program.

*RSM*  
FE:RSM:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 1, 1932.

SKH:

I have examined your memos in regard to the "Secret Protocols" of 1905 in regard to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of December 22, 1905.

I have nothing to add to these memos. I have, however, in looking through FE's confidential "Information Series" (in a cabinet in 379) found Series No. 1-B referred to in the Note on page 140 of Rockhill's Treaties. The information in that note was obtained from this confidential Information Series. In your study of this matter, I believe you will be interested in reading this entire pamphlet.




105

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 16, 1932.

MANCHURIA SITUATION  
The "Secret Protocols" of 1905.



*[Handwritten initials and marks]*  
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jm

F/DEW

793.94

The NEW YORK TIMES of January 15 prints a news despatch from Tokyo, January 14 (by Hugh Byas), which states that, --

The Foreign Office tonight published translations of the secret agreements concluded in 1905 when China confirmed the transfer to Japan of Russian rights in Manchuria. Of the sixteen agreements, two are of importance in Japan's charges of treaty violations. They are Article 3, by which China engages not to construct railway lines parallel to the South Manchuria Railway, and Article 10, by which China promises an administration which will guarantee the security of life and occupation. The treaties are published because of denials of their existence which have been made by Chinese officials.

It is not believed that Chinese officials make any "denial of their existence". What Chinese officials have been denying for twenty-five years and what they probably are denying now is that the provisions of the so-called "agreements" ever were agreed to.

793.94/4765

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

In this connection, this Division some time ago prepared a memorandum stating the essential facts. (Copy attached)

It seems now desirable to call attention to further facts, -- and to that end a new memorandum (first here-under) has been prepared and is here attached.

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1932.

12

## JAPAN REVEALS PACT WITH CHINA OF 1905

Terms of Secret Treaty Bar  
Railroads Parallel With the  
South Manchuria.

YOSHIZAWA TAKES OFFICE

New Foreign Minister Says Policy  
Toward Russia Is Important—  
Gold Embargo Is Upheld.

By HUGH BYAS.

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.  
TOKYO, Jan. 14.—The Foreign Office tonight published translations of the secret agreements concluded in 1905, when China confirmed the transfer to Japan of Russian rights in Manchuria. The agreements were kept secret at China's request and were merely recorded in the minutes of the proceedings.

Some of those agreements, totaling sixteen, are no longer of interest, but two are of capital importance in Japan's charges of treaty violation. Under Article 3 China engages not to construct any main lines parallel to the South Manchuria Railway or branch lines prejudicial to the South Manchuria's interests.

Japan asserts that this pledge was violated by the construction of a road running north and south via Tahushan, Tungliao, Chengchiatun, Taonan and Tsitsihar, and also by the continuation of the Peiping-Mukden line across the South Manchuria road at Mukden to Hailunchen, thence to be continued on to Kirin and Changchun.

Rail Plot Laid to China.

While what constitutes parallel lines is open to discussion, those two roads were planned to carry traffic away from Dairen to the new Chinese port of Huludao, which would have been prejudicial to the South Manchuria Railway. Japan did not oppose Chinese construction of those roads while a policy of cooperation was being tried out, but they were held to be part of a policy of squeezing out Japan, a policy which the Chinese pursued to their ultimate undoing.

Under Article 10 China promises an administration which will guarantee the security of life and occupation, which pledge, the Japanese assert, has proven beyond her power.

The treaties are published now because Dr. Wellington Koo, former Nanking Foreign Minister, and other Chinese officials have denied their existence. The Chinese copies may be among the many records that have been lost in recent years, but Japan's copies, signed by the Chinese and Japanese delegates, are here. The present publication is taken from the English version, confidentially communicated to the British and American Governments in 1906.

Kenkichi Yoshizawa arrived here from Paris tonight and went straight from the railway station to the palace. After changing his clothes in the waiting room he was formally installed by the Emperor as Foreign Minister of Japan within an hour of his arrival. His first official act tomorrow will be to hand to W. Cameron Forbes, United States Ambassador, Japan's reply to Secretary Stimson's note.

Mr. Yoshizawa was welcomed by a large crowd, including representatives of reservists' associations, who have forgotten the criticism directed at his diplomacy at Paris before the League of Nations Council.

Reporters who accompanied him on the train got little from this taciturn and cautious diplomat. "I am a sheet of blank paper about Manchuria, on which no concrete opinions have yet been written," he said. Yet he suggested there was something important in the background when, after saying he had discussed only general topics with Foreign Commissar Litvinoff and Assistant Foreign Commissar Karakhan in Moscow, he added that Japan's policy toward

and relieve the distress in rural districts and Manchuria.

Premier Inukai, addressing the Governors' conference, said Japan would respect and enforce the open door in Manchuria. The government, he said, desired to see Manchuria become a haven and refuge for the Chinese people from the maladministration and distress they had suffered owing to disturbed conditions.

## JAPAN PUNISHES FOUR FOR ATTACK ON CONSUL

Major General and Three Subordinate Officers Are Disciplined at Mukden.

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 14.—Major Gen. Ninamiya, Japanese commander of gendarmes, and his subordinate officers in Mukden, Manchuria, have been subjected to punishment because they were responsible for the discipline of the soldiers who attacked Culver B. Chamberlain, the United States Consul, on Jan. 3. Secretary Stimson had suggested that they should not be disciplined and that he would be satisfied with adequate punishment of the actual assailants of the Consul.

The Japanese Government acted before this word was received, according to a report to the State Department today from Myrl S. Meyers, the United States Consul General in Mukden.

Mr. Meyers said that Major Gen. Ninamiya, Major Kawashima, Captain Kawamoto and Sergeant Major Abe had been placed in "strict disciplinary confinement" for three, five, seven and five days, respectively. The humiliation visited upon these officers was viewed as indicating the lengths to which the Japanese Government was willing to go in closing the incident in a manner satisfactory to the United States.

Upon completion of his confinement Major Gen. Ninamiya called on Consul General Meyers, accompanied by the Japanese Consul General and Major Tsuma, vice commander of the gendarmes, and expressed sincere regrets for the incident and appreciation of the conciliatory spirit of the United States Government.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1932.

12

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Terms of Secret Treaty Bar  
Railroads Parallel With the  
South Manchuria.

### YOSHIZAWA TAKES OFFICE

New Foreign Minister Says Policy  
Toward Russia Is Important—  
Gold Embargo Is Upheld.

gested there was something important in the background when, after saying he had discussed only general topics with Foreign Commissar Litvinoff and Assistant Foreign Commissar Karakhan in Moscow, he added that Japan's policy toward Russia was important and her policy toward China required the greatest care.

Since Baron Shidehara as Foreign Minister restrained the Japanese Army from moving on Harbin in September, this is the first admission by a leading Japanese statesman that Russia's attitude is considered important. Now that military operations have ended, Mr. Yehizawa said, great constructive tasks have to be undertaken. Various plans had been formulated but must be studied before the government decided on its policy, he said. He announced he had no intention of calling a Far Eastern conference.

#### Railroad Earnings Paid.

Earnings of the Peiping-Mukden Railway amounting to 650,000 yen (\$350,000 at par), which was upheld during the Japanese military operations, have been paid to the railway officials in the presence of British and Japanese consuls. At present this important railroad is working in two sections, the northern section, between Shanhaikwan and Mukden, being controlled by the Mukden Government, which has renamed it the Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway, evidently with the intention of treating that portion as a Manchurian railroad.

Chang Hsueh-liang at Peiping controls the other half. Through service in the meantime has been suspended. The foreign debts of the former Manchurian Government are being handled by a consolidation committee appointed by the new government. Japanese influence is being used to effect payments.

Press agencies report that Hsi Hsia, pro-Japanese Governor of Kirin Province, Manchuria, has sent an ultimatum to Teng Cho, who disputes Hsi's overlordship of the province. Russians are concerned for the safety of the Chinese Eastern Railway in the event of fighting, as the Soviet Government has renounced the right to station railway guards in Chinese territory.

Japanese authorities attach little importance to Hsi's menacing gestures, and believe the two war lords will settle their differences without fighting. The real source of Russia's anxiety lies deeper, in the problem presented by the probability that an independent Manchurian State will soon arise with the blessing of Japan.

Finance Minister Takahashi, addressing a conference of Prefectural Governors of Japan, explained why the government had abandoned the gold standard. Adherence to gold had meant, he said, falling prices and declining industry. Economic pressure on Japan's citizens steadily increased, while the farmers' debts became so colossal that redemption was impossible, he continued.

Meanwhile gold continued to flow out of the country until the collapse of Japan's economic system threatened, he said. By replacing the gold embargo, he asserted, the government took the first urgent step toward relief. Minister Takahashi declared he did not fear a lower exchange rate because that would stimulate industry, invigorate agriculture

and relieve the distress in rural districts and Manchuria.

Premier Inukai, addressing the Governors' conference, said Japan would respect and enforce the open door in Manchuria. The government, he said, desired to see Manchuria become a haven and refuge for the Chinese people from the maladministration and distress they had suffered owing to disturbed conditions.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 14, 1932.

MANCHURIA  
"Secret Protocols" of 1905.

In 1908, Mr. W. W. Rockhill, American Minister to China, compiled a volume of treaties, conventions, etc., in Supplement to Rockhill's Treaties and Conventions with and concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904. This volume was printed for confidential use by the Department of State. It contains (at pages 137-140) the text of a "Summary of Secret Protocols to Peking Treaty of December 22d, 1905". This is introduced with a statement:

"The following was communicated by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Wilson, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Tokyo, and by him transmitted to the Department of State under date February 16, 1906, as a summary of certain protocols to the Peking Agreement signed by the plenipotentiaries of Japan and China:"

Its preamble reads:

"Whereas the protocols of the Conference recently held between the Plenipotentiaries of Japan and China with regard to Manchuria are to be kept strictly secret in deference to the desire of the Chinese Government, only such portions of those Protocols as possess the character of executory agreements are given in the following summary:"

Mr. Rockhill appended (on page 140) <sup>just</sup> a note, as follows:

"In

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

"In regard to the foregoing, see No. 1-B (?), Information Series, Far East, being a memorandum of a conversation of January 28, 1908, in the course of which Tang-shao-i, Governor of the Province of Fengtien, who signed the Peking Agreement, categorically denied the existence of any clause debarring China from paralleling the South Manchurian Railroad. Tang-shao-i further gave distinct assurance that there was no secret agreement between Japan and China and that all the Legations had been apprised of this fact upon the conclusion of the Komura negotiations. Tang-shao-i intimated that an agreement that China should not parallel the Japanese railroad had been sought and discussed, but not made, and implied that such discussion appeared in the signed minutes of the conference, the inference being that there was absolutely no agreement but simply evidence of a discussion of this subject."

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutzfsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 11, 1931.

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NOV 13 1931  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

NOV 14 1931  
NOV 20 1931  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

MANCHURIA:

SOVEREIGNTY AND "SECRET PROTOCOLS". 1905.

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note  
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~~761.93~~  
893.77

In the Treaty of Portsmouth, which concluded the Russo-Japanese War, ratified on September 5, 1905, Article III reads:

"Japan and Russia mutually engage:

"1. To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula . . . .; and

"2. To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

"The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

We find in Article IV the following:

"ARTICLE IV.-- Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria."

When, in confirmation of provisions of the above-mentioned treaty, Japan and China concluded at Peking, on December 22, 1905, what is known as the "Komura" Treaty, they also concluded an additional agreement. During the negotiations there was drawn up a set of "Secret Protocols". Until recently, the text of those Protocols was never given out officially. (NOTE: It became known unofficially more than twenty years ago. It was printed ten years ago in MacMurray's TREATIES (Volume I, pages 554-555).) The Chinese have claimed for twenty-five years that those "Protocols" were not a part of the treaty, that they consisted in part of minutes or drafts of provisions which had been discussed but not agreed upon by the Plenipotentiaries. The Japanese, however, have contended that they were a part of the agreement and that they are as binding as the treaty itself.

In 1929, the South Manchuria Railway published a volume called "Report on Progress in Manchuria". In this there appeared a set of appendices giving "Texts of Treaties, Protocols, Agreements, Notes, and Statutes of the Powers  
concerning

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

concerning Manchuria." Here, the South Manchuria Railway (which is now a Japanese Government agency) published (as No. 10) the text of "Protocols attached to the Treaty of Peking -- December 22, 1905".

In this group of "Protocols" there appears the often referred to provision that the Chinese are not to build railways parallel to and competing with the South Manchuria Railway. It reads:

"3. The Chinese Government engage, for the purpose of protecting the interest of the South Manchuria Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the above-mentioned railway."

On October 28, 1931, the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Debuchi, left with Mr. Castle various memoranda among which is one which bears the heading, "Protocol attached to Sino-Japanese Treaty relating to Manchuria, December 22, 1905." In this there is quoted Article 3, as given just above; also Article 10, which reads:

"10. The Chinese Plenipotentiaries declare that immediately after the withdrawal of the Japanese and Russian troops from Manchuria, China will proceed to take, in virtue of her sovereign right, full administrative measures to guarantee peace in that region and endeavor, by the same right, to promote good and remove evil as well as steadily to restore order,

- 4 -

order, so that the residents of that region, natives and foreigners, may equally enjoy the security of life and occupation under the perfect protection of the Chinese Government. As to the means of restoring order, the Chinese Government are to take by themselves all adequate measures."

The memorandum gives no history of the Protocols or of the fact that the Chinese contend that they have no standing as an agreement.

In view of the fact that the Japanese have always contended that these Protocols constitute a binding agreement, it is essential to examine the text in its entirety. At present it is particularly desirable to note the provisions of Article 14, in which appears the following:

"14.--The Japanese Plenipotentiaries declare that the Railway Guards stationed between Changchun and the boundary line of the leased territory of Port Arthur and Talien, shall not be allowed, before their withdrawal, to unreasonably interfere with the local administration of China or to proceed without permission beyond the limits of the railway."

(NOTE: Complete texts are available in FE.)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM. FEB 23 1932  
DEPT. OF STATE  
DIV. OF COM. & REC.

Peiping, January 22, 1932.

Division of Foreign Service Personnel  
MAR 18 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 9 1932

A. S. Chase, Esquire,  
American Consul,  
Tsingtao.

EAST  
MAR 16 1932  
DEPT. OF STATE

F/HS

Sir:

The Legation desires to commend you  
for your despatch No. 511 of January 18,  
1932, which contains an excellent report  
of the burning of the Kuomintang Head-  
quarters at Tsingtao by a Japanese mob on  
January 12, 1932.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) NELSON T. JOHNSON.

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Copy to Department.

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MAR 14 1932

STAND

Office of Emergency Records

N. V. D.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Peiping, January 22, 1932.

A. S. Chase, Esquire,  
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Tsingtao.

Sir:

The Legation desires to commend you for your despatch No. 511 of January 18, 1932, which contains an excellent report of the burning of the Kuomintang Headquarters at Tsingtao by a Japanese mob on January 12, 1932.

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(Signed) NELSON T. JOHNSON.

Copy to Department.

LME/js.

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Copy to Department.

LME/js.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Peiping, January 22, 1932.

A. G. Chase, Esquire,  
American Consul,  
Tsingtao.

Sir:

The Legation desires to commend you for your despatch no. 311 of January 16, 1932, which contains an excellent report of the burning of the Manchintang Headquarters at Tsingtao by a Japanese unit on January 12, 1932.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) NELSON T. JOHNSON.

Copy to Department.

LHE/js.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

A portion of this telegram <sup>FROM</sup> Shanghai  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated to  
anyone.

Dated March 16, 1932

Rec'd 12:44 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RECEIVED  
17 MAR  
DIVISION OF  
AFFAIRS

Far Eastern Affairs  
MAR 16 1932  
Department of State

PRIORITY.

March 16, 9 a. m.

My March 15, 10 a. m.

One. British Minister last evening forwarded  
to me the following text which had been given to him  
by the Japanese Minister as a substitute for paragraph  
3 of the original draft: "Three. A joint commission  
with neutral members to certify the carrying out of  
the agreement under paragraphs one and two and to watch  
and observe the general conditions in the evacuated  
area until a later settlement". (END GRAY).

Two. Please note carefully additional wording  
which seems to indicate Japanese desire that neutral  
commission police the evacuated area pending further  
settlement. Does the Department desire that I permit  
our agents to participate to this extent?

Three. I perceive in this an intention to raise  
question

F/LS  
793.94/4767

MAR 21 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - from Shanghai

question of policing this area at further conference.

JOHNSON

JS-CIB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.E. *10*

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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RECEIVED  
16 MAR 22  
DIVISION OF  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PLAIN

Shanghai via NR

Dated March 15, 1932

Recd 6 a.m., 16th.

Secretary of State

Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 16 1932  
Department of State

March 15, 11 p.m.

Joint situation report No. 6, March 14th.

"One. Nothing of importance occurred during past forty-eight hours. Headquarters of recently arrived Japanese Fourteenth Division is now in the line.

Two. Japanese headquarters state that Tokyo War Office is actively considering the withdrawal of portion of the troops now in Shanghai but no order has yet been received.

Three. Reports from foreign liason officers on Chinese front indicate that situation is gradually becoming stabilized. Very little activity at the front beyond minor clashes with Japanese cavalry *patrol* parties."

Report No. 7, March 15th.

"Reports regarding clashes between the opposing forces are becoming less frequent. Information from liason

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MAR 21 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- from Shanghai, dated March 15,  
11 p.m., 1932.

liason officers on Chinese side suggest that Chinese  
intend to remain on the defensive.

Orders for return to Japan of the Eleventh  
Division and Twenty-fourth Mixed Brigade have been  
received at Japanese army headquarters, Shanghai."

JOHNSON.

JS CIB

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

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DIVISION 21

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 16, 1932

Rec'd 6:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RECEIVED  
MAR 16 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4769

345, March 16, 6 p. m.

Following from Reuter, Shanghai, March fifteenth:

"Interviewed today regarding the prospect of opening  
peace negotiations Mr. <sup>Zuo</sup> ~~Mao~~ Tai Chi stated that the views  
of Chinese and Japanese had been brought closer as the  
result of yesterday's conference at the British Consulate.

This conference lasted two hours and was attended by  
the Ministers of the powers who are in Shanghai.

Mr. <sup>Zuo</sup> ~~Mao~~ said that the Chinese Government had been  
advised of later developments and he was now awaiting  
instructions before proceeding further on the question  
the proposed negotiations."

MAR 16 1932

From Reuter, Nanking, March sixteenth:

"The National Government has decided to appoint  
Mr. Wellington Koo as chief delegate in Shanghai for the  
peace conference."

From

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#345, from Peiping, Mar. 16, 6 p.m.

From Reuter, Tokyo, March sixteenth:

"Although details have not been divulged it is learned from authoritative quarters that the Japanese Government has cabled instructions to Shanghai approving of a compromise truce plan in principal, leaving the local commanders to settle detailed arrangements."

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 16, 1932.

The attached telegram No. 344 of March 16, 5 p.m., from the Legation refers to a check drawn by the Peiping-Liaoning Railway in favor of the Netherland Harbor Works and endorsed to the National City Bank to cover advances made by the Bank to the Harbor Works, the collection of which, at the time of presentation, was rendered impossible as a result of the attitude assumed by the Japanese advisers to the Chinese banks in Mukden. Although the Fengshan Railway does not desire that its payment of \$400,000 be considered as honoring the Peiping-Liaoning Railway's check for a like amount, it is assumed that the National City Bank's interest in this particular matter ceased with the receipt by it of the funds mentioned. Apparently progress is being made in the settlement of the Harbor Works' account with the National City Bank.

It is believed that no action by the Department is required.

RECEIVED

MAR 22 1932

*RCM*  
RCM:emd SECRETARY'S OFFICE *For H*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

167

79.94  
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
MAR 19 1932  
GRAY  
MR. KLOTS

F  
L  
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cib

FROM

GRAY  
MR. KLOTS

Peiping via NR

Office of Economic Adviser  
MAR 22 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

Dated March 16, 1932  
Recd 6:30 a.m., 16th.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

MAR 22 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

344, March 16, 5 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"March 15, 4 p.m. For the Department. The  
Consulate General today has secured payment of local  
\$400,000 to the National City Bank by the Fengtien-Shanhai-  
kuian Railway. This is the amount of the check described  
in my despatch No. <sup>793.94/3113</sup> 485, November 14, to the Legation (copies  
to the Department). The Fengshan Railway considers pay-  
ment as credit of municipal harbor works overdraft in the  
National City Bank and not as honoring Peking-Liaoning  
Railways check."

For the Minister

PERKINS

WSB

FILED 793.94/4770

MAR 22 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WAR DEPARTMENT AFFAIRS  
MAR 16 1932  
Department of State

793.94  
2-16  
121.5493

MET

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 16, 1932

Rec'd 8:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

March 16, 5 p.m.

Following from Colonel Drysdale for War Department:

"33. General situation here unchanged. Mayer  
leaves for short trip to Hangchow, March 17, 8 a.m."

JOHNSON

KLP-RR

F/LS 793.94/4771

FILED  
MAR 18 1932

1674

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN  
Washington, Naval Radio

March 12, 1932.

MAR 12 22

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
SHANGHAI (CHINA).

96

For the information of the Consul General and  
the Minister.

One. The Assembly of the League of Nations on  
March 11 passed a resolution. Excerpts follow:

QUOTE. Part One. The Assembly, considering that  
the provisions of the Covenant are entirely applicable  
to the dispute, . . . . declares that it is incumbent  
upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize  
any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought  
about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of  
Nations or to the Pact of Paris.

Part Two. The Assembly, affirming that it is  
contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement  
of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be sought under the  
stress of military pressure on the part of either party;

Recalls the resolutions adopted by the Council on  
September 30th and on December 10, 1931, in agreement  
with the parties;

Recalls also its own resolution of March 4, 1932,

Enciphered by ..... adopted  
Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/4771A

793.94/A

1675

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

adopted in agreement with the parties with a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and notes that the powers members of the League of Nations having special interests in the Shanghai settlements are prepared to give every assistance to this end and requests those powers if necessary to cooperate in maintaining order in the evacuated zone.

Part Three. The Assembly . . . . . decides to set up a committee of nineteen members, namely, the President of the Assembly who will act as Chairman of the Committee, the members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute and six other members to be elected by secret ballot.

This committee exercising its functions on behalf of and under the supervision of the Assembly shall be instructed:

(1) To report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the said cessation and shall regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in

conformity

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

1676

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Charge to  
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Washington,

- 3 -

conformity with the Assembly resolution of March 4th,  
1932.

.....

(6) To propose any urgent measure which may appear  
necessary.

(7) To submit a first progress report to the  
Assembly as soon as possible and at latest on May 1,  
1932.

.....

The Assembly shall remain in session and its President  
may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary. UNQUOTE.

Code ]

Two. Letters, not yet made public, were exchanged  
between Drummond and Wilson, the texts of which are as  
follows: <sup>for your confidential information</sup> ^ <sub>See</sub>

(a.) Drummond's letter: QUOTE. I beg to enclose here-  
with for the information of your Government the text of a  
resolution relative to the Sino-Japanese dispute which was  
adopted this afternoon by the Assembly of the League of  
Nations.

In view of the collaboration which has on several  
occasions in the course of recent events been effected

Enciphered by .....

between

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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Department of State

Washington,

- 4 -

between the Government of the United States and the governments of other powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement, perhaps you will allow me to draw your particular attention to Part Two of the Assembly resolution in which the Assembly addresses a request to the powers members of the League of Nations which have such special interests. UNQUOTE.

(b.) Wilson's reply: QUOTE. I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 11 enclosing for the information of the American Government the text of a resolution relative to the Sino-Japanese dispute which was adopted this afternoon by the Assembly of the League of Nations.

I am instructed by my Government to express to you its gratification at the action taken by the Assembly of the League of Nations. My Government is especially gratified that the nations of the world are united on a policy not to recognize the validity of results attained in violation of the treaties in question. This is a distinct contribution to international law and offers a constructive basis for peace.

You suggest that I note particularly part two of

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Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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OR  
Charge to  
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Department of State

Washington,

- 5 -

the resolution. In this, the Assembly recalls the several resolutions and cites especially its own resolution of March 4, 1932 adopted in agreement with the parties with a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. My Government, as one of the powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlement, has already authorized its representatives at Shanghai to assist, in cooperation with the representatives of other powers similarly situated, toward the consummation of those objectives. UNQUOTE.

Three. Copy<sup>ies</sup> of full text<sup>s</sup> of ~~resolution~~ will follow by mail.

*Stinson*  
*Stut*

*[Signature]*  
FE, JEN:EM

FE

*Stut*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

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MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 16 1932  
DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 16, 1932

Secretary of State,  
Washington

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.  
MAR 21 1932  
Department of State

185, March 16, noon.

Through arrangements which were stated by the Secretary of the Japanese Legation to have been perfected at Nanking the Japanese turned over yesterday 36 out of 37 combatant prisoners of war. The 37th is alleged to be a Japanese boy 17 years of age who enlisted in the 19th Route Army some weeks ago for his board. These are stated by the same official to be all the combatant prisoners of war that are now in their possession. It is claimed that yesterday two Japanese prisoners of war were turned over to the Japanese authorities at Nanking. The names and ranks of these two prisoners are not to be published.

Two. The delivery of the Chinese prisoners first came to my attention through a letter dated March 9th to the Senior Consul from the Japanese Consul General requesting a permit to transport the 36 prisoners from <sup>headquarters</sup> to

Sinza Road

F/LS 793.94/4772

FILED

MAR 21 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 2-#185 from Shanghai via N.R.,  
March 16, noon.

Sinza Road via Szechuen Road, Nanking Road, Bubbling Well Road and Carter Road to Sinza Road. This appears to me to be the height of imprudence and indiscretion since the Chinese residents must regard such a procession as a march of victory and it was sure to lead to disturbances in the thickly populated part of the city. I immediately got in touch with the Japanese authorities, the British Consul General, and the Shanghai Municipal Council authorities in an endeavor to secure a change of plans. I informed the American Minister of my proposal which met with his approval. Yesterday morning the First Secretary of the Japanese Legation called upon me and agreed to change the route so that the prisoners would be conveyed entirely around the Settlement to the western side for delivery to the Chinese, which was completed at 1:30 p.m.

Repeated to the Legation, copy to the Minister.

HPD-RR

CUNNINGHAM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

FOR EASTERN  
MAR 16 1932  
Department of State

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CONFIDENTIAL

March 11, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND  
THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, NOBILE GIACOMO DE MARTINO.

F/LS

Memorandum from Signor Grandi.

The Italian Ambassador came and read to me a memorandum from Rome setting forth Signor Grandi's impression of my letter to Senator Borah. He said this was in answer to my recent inquiry. The cable is as follows:

793.94/4773

"The considerations expressed by Mr. Stimson in his letter to Senator Borah were examined by Signor Grandi with the greatest appreciation and sympathy. Mr. Stimson has certainly pointed out the attitude which we have followed up to now with the purpose of preventing the prolongation and aggravation of the conflict between China and Japan from endangering the result of the Washington agreements. Signor Grandi agrees with Mr. Stimson in his serious preoccupation concerning the efficacy of the attempts which are going on for the solution of this problem. Up to now it does not seem that a common front of the great powers has been attained. Only this unity amongst the great powers could bring a pacification in the Far East. Those rumors circulating about the existence of secret agreements between France and Japan and

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Confidential File

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  

---

**THE SECRETARY**

- 2 -

and of renewed sympathies from England toward Japan have up to now hampered the efficacy of the action developed by the great powers in Tokyo and in Nanking.

"I equally agree with the thought of Mr. Stimson that a methodical and pacific evolution of China for her political and economical restoration demands a certain time. On the other side, the state of anarchy and disorder that prevails in China should not leave the great powers which have major interests in China indifferent. This state of anarchy offers a favorable opportunity for the diffusion of Russian influence and the Bolshevik menace, with the result that there might arise also the possibility of a formation in China of a situation of privilege in favor of Russia - a privilege in contradiction to the principle of an equal opportunity which has been a cornerstone of the Treaty of Washington."

The Ambassador pointed out that this was personal and confidential for me. I then told him that I would give him a memorandum which would be personal and confidential for Signor Grandi. The following is the memorandum I handed him:

"I

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
—  
THE SECRETARY

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"I have received the ideas of Signor Grandi with a deep appreciation of the spirit and purpose for which they were given. I am very deeply gratified that Signor Grandi has expressed his sympathy with the same objectives with which I wrote the letter to Mr. Borah.

"In respect to the dangers which Signor Grandi apprehends might come from the anarchy in China, let me say that I have also carefully followed and considered that situation, and I make the following suggestions:

"China is the most individualistic nation in the world. It therefore has naturally the least possible sympathy with the doctrines of Communism, and in spite of the efforts of some six years ago made by the Russian Communist Party in China, the trend of events in China was proceeding in the direction of eliminating Communism until these recent difficulties with Japan. The present occupation in China by Japanese troops, however, has renewed the danger of anarchy in China, but in my opinion the best method of preventing such dangers, including any danger of Communism, is by assuring China that the other powers of the world will do their best to assure to her the opportunities for peaceful development which were provided for in the Nine Power Treaty.

"I

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  

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THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

"I have heard many rumors and suggestions of the danger of Communism in China today but I have found that they nearly all came from Japanese sources."

HLS.

S HLS:BMS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM

March 11, 1932.

Personal and Confidential for Signor Grandi.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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AM 5800  
EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, Feb. 29, 1932



WD 16 32

SPECIAL REPORT No.  
W.D. 1016.



F/LS 793.94/4774

To the Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith  
Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W.D.  
1016, dated February 29, 1932.

MAR 14 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, February 29, 1932.

Serial No. W. D. 1016.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,  
 Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: An Article on China by Doctor  
 A. Legendre in FIGARO

Dr. A. Legendre, whose proposals of a solution of the Chinese problem, written prior to the present grave military situation and published in LE MERCURE DE FRANCE, was summarized in Special Report No. W. D. 1003 of February 6, 1932, published in FIGARO of February 26th an article entitled "An Aggravation of the Situation in China."

This article is principally a denunciation of the policy observed by the League of Nations, and also to a lesser degree by both the United States and Great Britain, in encouraging Chinese anarchy against Japan.

He is particularly severe in castigating the declarations made by Mr. Yen at the League of Nations, saying that he knows perfectly that the League is ignorant in all Chinese matters, and he is deliberately pulling the wool over their eyes. He certainly does not represent

the

1681

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the Chinese people, he may be able to speak on behalf of the Nanking Government but it represents only two provinces at most out of eighteen. One may ask whether the real Chinese Government is today at Shanghai, at Nanking, at Loyang, or at Canton. The truth is that it is completely dislocated and that the master of the situation is the Canton clan dependent upon the Shanghai Army of freebooters assembled by Cheng Ning Chow in order to ward off an attack from Nanking. This is the Army which is receiving support today in the way of training and arms and even munitions, as a consequence of which it is able to hold out against the Japanese troops.

Dr. Legendre recalls that it was the 61st Division of this same Cantonese Army which was responsible for the 1927 tragedy at Nanking, when American and European Doctors and Professors who had devoted themselves to the cause of China were savagely mutilated before being put to death, and women of white race were violated with the most horrible refinement. And these are the people whom American and English pacifists are today encouraging against Japan.

Dr. \_\_\_\_\_

1680

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Dr. Legendre notes with satisfaction that a certain reaction against such a policy may already be observed in England. But the League of Nations is still working in favor of anarchy against the cause of true peace, and seems to be endeavoring particularly to drive Japan into the arms of Russia and Germany.

Very respectfully,

*Warrington Dawson*

Warrington Dawson,  
Special Assistant.

Enclosure:

1. Article from FIGARO,  
February 26, 1932.

In quintuplicate

851,9111/6a

WD/DRS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. #1 to Special Report #WD 1016, February 29, 1932.

Article from FIGARO, February 26, 1932.

From the American Embassy, Paris.

## L'AGGRAVATION DE LA SITUATION EN CHINE

Par le D<sup>r</sup> A. LEGENDRE

Il se passe d'étranges choses en ce moment à Genève et à Changhaï.

A Genève, on entend M. Yen faire de stupéfiantes déclarations avec un aplomb qui impressionne un Conseil qui ignore tout de ce monde chinois. Mais de quelle autorité est investi M. Yen ? Il est le délégué de qui ? Certainement pas du peuple chinois.

Il prétend bien parler au nom de la Chine, mais de quelle Chine ? De celle du gouvernement de Nankin ? Mais elle comprend deux provinces au plus sur dix-huit. Il est vrai que ce gouvernement, éduqué par Moscou, a été reconnu en 1928 par les Puissances, prises d'aberration, et par la S. D. N. qui en est devenue la servante et la risée sous la conduite de son secrétariat ; adopté aussi par la II<sup>e</sup> Internationale, en l'espèce M. Vandervelde qui, en 1930, alla lui porter sa bénédiction de pontife socialiste, croyant ainsi, dans sa candeur, préparer les voies pour un grand empire marxiste que la faction de Nankin se déclarait prête à édifier.

Mais revenons à M. Yen : il a déclaré à Genève, le 13 février, que « l'unification de la Chine était enfin réalisée et que le gouvernement d'union nationale a l'appui du peuple entier. Il existe bien un peu de désordre, mais il est dû à l'évolution démocratique », ajoute-t-il.

Que faut-il penser de cette déclaration ? Tout simplement que M. Yen se moque du Conseil des Douze. La sanglante anarchie actuelle, la *jacquerie communiste* si menaçante donnent au délégué le *démenti des faits, de réalités poignantes* : des millions de Chinois disparus par le fer, par la faim. Et une tyrannie, féroce dans son absolutisme, qualifiée « démocratique » par M. Yen.

Il existe un gouvernement national, affirme encore M. Yen. Or, depuis six mois, c'est dans le panier de crabes Kouo ming Tang, justement célèbre, des luttes plus enragées que jamais entre clans pour l'accaparement du pouvoir et ses bénéfices. Aussi, ce gouvernement, où donc le trouver aujourd'hui ? Est-il à Changhaï, à Nankin, à Loyang ou à Canton ? La vérité, c'est qu'il est complètement disloqué, qu'il s'est évanoui, que le maître aujourd'hui est le clan cantonnais s'appuyant à Changhaï sur son armée de reîtres amenés par Tcheng Ming Chou pour parer à une attaque de Nankin. Ces reîtres, qui vivent aujourd'hui dans l'abondance et comptent sur un beau pillage prochain, sont si bien armés et entraînés par des étrangers, si bien alimentés aussi en munitions, qu'ils résistent aux valeureuses troupes du Japon. Mais qui donc leur fournit tant d'armes et de muni-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

tions, à ces soudards ? Qui leur fournit même des avions ? Qu'en pense la S. D. N. qui autorise ce trafic intensif d'armes ? Quand on songe que 300 Canadiens s'offrent, si l'on en croit la presse, pour servir dans cette armée de pillards d'autant plus inquiétante qu'elle est chaque jour renforcée, en particulier, par des groupes volontaires communistes ! Or, la S. D. N. encourage indirectement ces bandes en mobilisant tous les pacifistes envoûtés des deux continents. Ce monde d'agités, de fanatiques, victime de ses illusions, ne rêve plus que plaies et bosses ; il somme les Etats-Unis, l'Angleterre de se jeter sur le Japon ou tout au moins de l'étrangler par une guerre économique en attendant l'autre qui ne tarderait pas. Bref, la S. D. N., avec tous ses « croyants », vole au secours de qui ? Du peuple chinois, des masses dolentes massacrées sans répit ? Nullement : au secours d'un baron féodal, de ses reîtres dont les tristes exploits, depuis des années, ne se comptent plus.

Une division de cette armée cantonnaise est bien connue : la 61<sup>e</sup>. C'est à elle que nous devons la poignante tragédie de Nankin en 1927. Des Européens et Américains, médecins et professeurs dévoués à la cause chinoise, dont deux Français, furent sauvagement mutilés, puis égorgés par ces reîtres. Il y a pire : des femmes de notre race furent violées avec de sadiques raffinements. Jamais encore la race blanche n'avait subi pareille souillure. Celui qui a vécu en Chine saisit vite le douloureux symbolisme de cette honte qui n'a jamais été lavée. « Paix ! Conciliation ! », continuaient de bêler nos bergers et les augures de Genève.

C'est cette même division cantonnaise dont les pacifistes anglais et américains souhaitent aujourd'hui la victoire sur les Japonais ! Dans leur frénésie de paix mystique, ils ont déjà tout oublié.

Il conviendrait cependant de songer un peu à toutes les femmes, à tous les enfants de notre race qui peuplent les concessions : quelle terrible tragédie si ces reîtres, exaltés par leur succès, se jetaient sur les concessions ! Ils sont déjà plus de 50.000 et d'autres hordes s'ébranlent à tous les points de l'horizon, au sud, au nord, à l'ouest, attirées par l'espoir d'une belle curée. Elles croient l'heure venue d'enlever ces

concessions, d'en chasser la race blanche et surtout de vider les coffres-forts de ses banques où les chefs de ces hordes voient de fabuleuses richesses qui affolent leur imagination. Qu'on se rappelle 1927 ! Et c'est à pareil moment que le président du Conseil de la S. D. N. envoie une note comminatoire au seul Japon, le rendant ainsi responsable du chaos présent. On croit rêver. Est-ce toujours l'influence néfaste du secrétariat de la S. D. N., aussi ignorant que dangereusement partial ?

En Angleterre se dessine toutefois une réaction. Certains milieux éclairés reconnaissent que le Japon ne fait pas autre chose que réagir dans l'intérêt de toutes les Puissances. Ils se refusent aussi à mettre la flotte anglaise au service de l'impérialisme américain. Et le général Ian Hamilton se dresse contre certains pacifistes anglais qui, dit-il, « ne craignent pas de « beat the war drum », de « battre le tambour de guerre » et de chercher à lancer leur pays contre le Japon. « C'est vrai : la S. D. N. et ses partisans qui crient « au feu » en Chine, ne se rendent pas compte qu'ils l'atlissent en soufflant dessus sottement.

Il faut conclure : la S. D. N. et ses partisans d'Europe et d'Amérique encouragent donc aujourd'hui les 5 millions de reîtres et de bandits qui tiennent le pauvre peuple chinois sous leur botte. Aussi de puissantes hordes s'ébranlent-elles vers Changhaï, fascinées qu'elles sont par nos riches concessions. Qu'advient-il ? L'obligation pour les Puissances d'entreprendre une grande expédition militaire. Et si Changhaï peut être sauvé, que de sang versé toutefois, et que de ruines !

S'il ne se produit une réaction de bon sens, c'est par cette tragédie que finiront le vaudeville joué à Genève et la croisade contre le gendarme japonais, contre la paix pour l'anarchie. Comme elle travaille bien pour Moscou, la S. D. N. ! Elle s'emploie surtout à acculer le Japon du côté Russie et Allemagne. Se rend-elle compte de la terrible responsabilité qu'elle assume ? *Errare humanum est, sed perseverare diabolicum.*

La Société des Nations devient un danger pour la paix.

D<sup>r</sup> A. Legendre.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, February 29, 1932.

Serial No. W. D. 1016.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,  
Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: An Article on China by Doctor  
A. Legendre in FIGARO

Dr. A. Legendre, whose proposals of a solution of the Chinese problem, written prior to the present grave military situation and published in LE MERCURE DE FRANCE, was summarized in Special Report No. W. D. 1005 of February 6, 1932, published in FIGARO of February 26th an article entitled "An Aggravation of the Situation in China."

This article is principally a denunciation of the policy observed by the League of Nations, and also to a lesser degree by both the United States and Great Britain, in encouraging Chinese anarchy against Japan.

He is particularly severe in castigating the declarations made by Mr. Yen at the League of Nations, saying that he knows perfectly that the League is ignorant in all Chinese matters, and he is deliberately pulling the wool over their eyes. He certainly does not represent

the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the Chinese people, he may be able to speak on behalf of the Nanking Government but it represents only two provinces at most out of eighteen. One may ask whether the real Chinese Government is today at Shanghai, at Nanking, at Loyang, or at Canton. The truth is that it is completely dislocated and that the master of the situation is the Canton clan dependent upon the Shanghai Army of freebooters assembled by Cheng Ning Chow in order to ward off an attack from Nanking. This is the Army which is receiving support today in the way of training and arms and even munitions, as a consequence of which it is able to hold out against the Japanese troops.

not printed

Dr. Legendre recalls that it was the 61st Division of this same Cantonese Army which was responsible for the 1927 tragedy at Nanking, when American and European Doctors and Professors who had devoted themselves to the cause of China were savagely mutilated before being put to death, and women of white race were violated with the most horrible refinement. And these are the people whom American and English pacifists are today encouraging against Japan.

Dr. \_\_\_\_\_

1692

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Dr. Legendre notes with satisfaction that a certain reaction against such a policy may already be observed in England. But the League of Nations is still working in favor of anarchy against the cause of true peace, and seems to be endeavoring particularly to drive Japan into the arms of Russia and Germany.

Very respectfully,

*Warrington Dawson*

Warrington Dawson,  
Special Assistant.

Enclosure:

1. Article from FIGARO,  
February 26, 1932.

In quintuplicate

851.9111/6a

WD/DRS

Encl. #1 to Special Report #WD 1016, February 29, 1932.

Article from FIGARO, February 26, 1932.

From the American Embassy, Paris.

## L'AGGRAVATION DE LA SITUATION EN CHINE

Par le D<sup>r</sup> A. LEGENDRE

Il se passe d'étranges choses en ce moment à Genève et à Changhaï.

A Genève, on entend M. Yen faire de stupéfiantes déclarations avec un aplomb qui impressionne un Conseil qui ignore tout de ce monde chinois. Mais de quelle autorité est investi M. Yen ? Il est le délégué de qui ? Certainement pas du peuple chinois.

Il prétend bien parler au nom de la Chine, mais de quelle Chine ? De celle du gouvernement de Nankin ? Mais elle comprend deux provinces au plus sur dix-huit. Il est vrai que ce gouvernement, éduqué par Moscou, a été reconnu en 1928 par les Puissances, prises d'aberration, et par la S. D. N. qui en est devenue la servante et la risée sous la conduite de son secrétariat ; adopté aussi par la II<sup>e</sup> Internationale, en l'espèce M. Vandervelde qui, en 1930, alla lui porter sa bénédiction de pontife socialiste, croyant ainsi, dans sa candeur, préparer les voies pour un grand empire marxiste que la faction de Nankin se déclarait prête à édifier.

Mais revenons à M. Yen : il a déclaré à Genève, le 13 février, que « l'unification de la Chine était enfin réalisée et que le gouvernement d'union nationale a l'appui du peuple entier. Il existe bien un peu de désordre, mais il est dû à l'évolution démocratique », ajoute-t-il.

Que faut-il penser de cette déclaration ? Tout simplement que M. Yen se moque du Conseil des Douze. La sanglante anarchie actuelle, la *jacquerie communiste* si menaçante donnent au délégué le *démenti des faits, de réalités poignantes* : des millions de Chinois disparus par le fer, par la faim. Et une tyrannie, féroce dans son absolutisme, qualifiée « démocratique » par M. Yen.

Il existe un gouvernement national, affirme encore M. Yen. Or, depuis six mois, c'est dans le panier de crabes Kouo ming Tang, justement célèbre, des luttes plus enragées que jamais entre clans pour l'accaparement du pouvoir et ses bénéfices. Aussi, ce gouvernement, où donc le trouver aujourd'hui ? Est-il à Changhaï, à Nankin, à Loyang ou à Canton ? La vérité, c'est qu'il est complètement disloqué, qu'il s'est évanoui, que le maître aujourd'hui est le clan cantonnais s'appuyant à Changhaï sur son armée de reîtres amenés par Tcheng Ming Chou pour parer à une attaque de Nankin. Ces reîtres, qui vivent aujourd'hui dans l'abondance et comptent sur un beau pillage prochain, sont si bien armés et entraînés par des étrangers, si bien alimentés aussi en munitions, qu'ils résistent aux valeureuses troupes du Japon. Mais qui donc leur fournit tant d'armes et de muni-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

lions, à ces soudards ? Qui leur fournit même des avions ? Qu'en pense la S. D. N. qui autorise ce trafic intensif d'armes ? Quand on songe que 300 Canadiens s'offrent, si l'on en croit la presse, pour servir dans cette armée de pillards d'autant plus inquiétante qu'elle est chaque jour renforcée, en particulier, par des groupes volontaires communistes ! Or, la S. D. N. encourage indirectement ces bandes en mobilisant tous les pacifistes envoûtés des deux continents. Ce monde d'agités, de fanatiques, victime de ses illusions, ne rêve plus que plaies et bosses ; il somme les Etats-Unis, l'Angleterre de se jeter sur le Japon ou tout au moins de l'étrangler par une guerre économique en attendant l'autre qui ne tarderait pas. Bref, la S. D. N., avec tous ses « croyants », vole au secours de qui ? Du peuple chinois, des masses dolentes massacrées sans répit ? Nullement : au secours d'un baron féodal, de ses reîtres dont les tristes exploits, depuis des années, ne se comptent plus.

Une division de cette armée cantonnaise est bien connue : la 61<sup>e</sup>. C'est à elle que nous devons la poignante tragédie de Nankin en 1927. Des Européens et Américains, médecins et professeurs dévoués à la cause chinoise, dont deux Français, furent sauvagement mutilés, puis égorgés par ces reîtres. Il y a pire ; des femmes de notre race furent violées avec de sadiques raffinements. Jamais encore la race blanche n'avait subi pareille souillure. Celui qui a vécu en Chine saisit vite le douloureux symbolisme de cette honte qui n'a jamais été lavée. « Paix ! Conciliation ! », continuaient de bêler nos bergers et les augures de Genève.

C'est cette même division cantonnaise dont les pacifistes anglais et américains souhaitent aujourd'hui la victoire sur les Japonais ! Dans leur frénésie de paix mystique, ils ont déjà tout oublié.

Il conviendrait cependant de songer un peu à toutes les femmes, à tous les enfants de notre race qui peuplent les concessions : quelle terrible tragédie si ces reîtres, exaltés par leur succès, se jetaient sur les concessions ! Ils sont déjà plus de 50.000 et d'autres hordes s'ébranlent à tous les points de l'horizon, au sud, au nord, à l'ouest, attirées par l'espoir d'une belle curée. Elles croient l'heure venue d'enlever ces

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En Angleterre se dessine toutefois une réaction. Certains milieux éclairés reconnaissent que le Japon ne fait pas autre chose que réagir dans l'intérêt de toutes les Puissances. Ils se refusent aussi à mettre la flotte anglaise au service de l'impérialisme américain. Et le général Ian Hamilton se dresse contre certains pacifistes anglais qui, dit-il, « ne craignent pas de « beat the war drum », de « battre le tambour de guerre » et de chercher à lancer leur pays contre le Japon. « C'est vrai : la S. D. N. et ses partisans qui crient « au feu » en Chine, ne se rendent pas compte qu'ils l'attisent en soufflant dessus sottement.

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La Société des Nations devient un danger pour la paix.

D<sup>r</sup> A. Legendre.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 17, 1932.

(Reference: Paris Embassy's Special Report  
No. W.D. 1016, dated February 29, 1932.  
File No. 793.94/4774.)

In the attached memorandum, Consul Jacobs comments on the charge that the 61st Division of the 19th Army was guilty of the Nanking atrocities in 1927.

In a statement by the Chinese delegation (League Document C.252.M.143.1932.VII), the statement is made that the 19th Army with all its Divisions was at Hankow when the "Communists provoked the incidents at Nanking in 1927."

  
RPE/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 8, 1932.

CEG:  
MMH:  
SKH:  
RFB:

In the attached circular of the League of Nations (C.240.M.132.1932.VII.), second paragraph, it is stated that according to the Japanese delegation at the League of Nations the 19th Chinese Army at Shanghai contains a Division, the 81st, which instigated the disorders at Nanking in 1927.

According to information on file in the Department and information obtained by telephone from M.I.D., this allegation of the Japanese can not be correct. According to a report from Nanking, dated April 10, 1928, entitled "Military Organization of the Nationalist Régime" (file No. 893.20/80) it was the 6th Army consisting of Hunanese under command of General Cheng Chien who perpetrated the Nanking outrage and not the 19th Army, which according to M.I.D., was at the time in Chekiang Province and not at Nanking and which is composed of Cantonese and not Hunanese. Even allowing for the fact that the numbers of the various Chinese armies may have been changed since 1927, the fact remains that it was Hunanese troops which participated in the Nanking affair and not Cantonese. The Chinese troops participating at present at Shanghai, so far as is known, are all Cantonese.

(signed) J.E.J.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Berne, February 25, 1932

~~FE~~  
~~WE~~

793.94

No. 2498

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict; article  
by William Martin, JOURNAL DE GENEVE.



F/LS 793.94/4776

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

1 - I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation of an editorial by William Martin entitled "The Chinese Resistance" which appeared in the JOURNAL DE GENEVE of February 24, 1932.

MAR 18 1932

FILED

Respectfully yours,  
For the Minister:

Winthrop S. Greene  
Secretary of Legation

Enclosure:  
1. Translation, as stated.

File No. 711.

jcg:met

Translation of an article by William Martin,  
JOURNAL DE GENEVE, February 24, 1932

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#### THE CHINESE RESISTANCE

If the Japanese officers thought that they were going to make a military promenade in China, they must by now have lost their illusions. The magnificent resistance with which the Chinese army is meeting their invasion is all the more thrilling for the friends of just causes, because it is unexpected.

One of the numerous newspaper correspondants in the field whom the Japanese have been able to interest in their cause telegraphed the other day that the Chinese army was "an army of ragamuffins." We can easily believe that. Can more be said in their praise?

It is these ragamuffins who for four days have been fighting without weakening and struggling with success against the best equipped armies in the world. Since when has military valor been measured by the shine of the boots? The Chinese are proving that they have courage. This army, which has been so much laughed at because in the civil wars there were never any dead, has shown that it knew how to kill when it came to a question of defending the soil of the fatherland.

The generals themselves have for the moment put aside their rivalries. All the chiefs of clans and the chiefs of bands of yesterday, all those who have filled with their quarrels and their ambitions the internal history of modern China, the Ous, the Fengs, the Yens, have immediately put themselves at the disposal of their enemy, Chiang Kai-chek.

It

- 2 -

It is he who is the commander in chief at Shanghai. He has under his orders the famous Nineteenth Army, which, from a political point of view, was Cantonese, and his own guard, made up of about six divisions of eight thousand men each. These armies, accustomed to fighting one against the other, found no difficulty in forming a common front. If this war is a colonial expedition for the Japanese, it is a national war for the Chinese. And this proves what we have always thought, namely, that if the Chinese are divided internally, they are all united against the foreigner.

That is why it is absolutely false to pretend, as do the pro-Japanese newspapers, that the Government of Nanking represents nothing. As against Japan, it represents the whole of China. And it is almost unbelievable that the Government of Japan, lowering itself to insult a valiant adversary, should declare that China is in a state of anarchy and that the Covenant of the League of Nations cannot be applied to her. The Chinese are in the act of making the most pertinent of all possible replies to that statement, but there is another reply not less decisive. It is that China was elected a member of the Council of the League of Nations on the 14th of last September, unanimously, by forty-eight votes--that is to say, apparently with the vote of Japan, which made an open campaign in her favor. How can the Assembly, which believed China worthy to direct the destinies of the world, now pretend that its own constitution does not apply to that country? And how can Japan itself, which recommended that election to the Assembly, dare now to support such an absurd thesis?

The

- 3 -

The Chinese resistance is a fact charged with consequences. We do not know exactly what the Japanese military were looking for at Shanghai, but they certainly expected success. Success eludes them. There they are, engaged against a country with four hundred million inhabitants. From a military point of view and from a political point of view, the operation could not be successful unless it was successful at the first stroke. But they have failed to put it over as a surprise attack. Japan has found its Marne, between Wosung and Chapei, on the outskirts of Kiangwan, where the battle raged.

The analogy is striking. The Marne put an end to the prestige of the invincible German army. It shattered the German morale. It permitted the organization of the resistance and the awakening of public opinion. The war lasted four years, but its fate was decided on the Marne. No matter how long the Japanese expedition may last, its final fate is already decided.

In the path of Japan, obstacles begin to accumulate. It is reported that the Japanese loan at Paris has failed, and that the American Government has requested the Wall Street bankers not to give Japan any further credit. The boycott of Japanese products is being organized in the United States. The American fleet has just gone through the Panama Canal, and in America the spirit of war begins to awaken. The testimony of all witnesses agrees on this point.

It is no different in England, where the pressure of public opinion is felt more and more by the Government. Sir John Simon last week at Geneva spoke in a  
defeatist

- 4 -

defeatist spirit. Lord Hailsham, speaking three days later in the name of the British Government in the House of Commons, was much more clear. He declared without reservation that England would abide by its obligations under the Covenant. Unfortunately, he felt it necessary to add that the League of Nations had not yet pronounced upon the responsibilities of either side in the conflict.

The statement is exact, but the reasoning is a sophism. For the Council of the League of Nations, a gathering of the representatives of States, cannot pronounce unless the Governments themselves pronounce and engage their own responsibility. That is a guarantee upon which the States insisted. It is not just that they should now attempt to turn it against the League of Nations and to make of it a shield for themselves.

But if the League of Nations has not yet been able, because of the Powers, to speak ex cathedra and to make use of its infallibility, it has, nevertheless, already exercised a great influence upon the course of events. The Chinese know this and are grateful. The Japanese are far from denying it, since all their friends accuse the League of Nations of having complicated the affair. True, it has complicated it. If it had not existed, the whole thing would have been finished by now. The Japanese would be installed in Manchuria and the Chinese, abandoned by all, would have bowed down with a raging heart. International law would have counted one more treaty based upon a conquest.

That

- 5 -

That is what the League of Nations has prevented, not by action, but by its existence. It has given the Chinese a means of arousing public opinion. It has crystallized the sympathy which always goes out to justice and weakness. It has given China the assurance that she was not abandoned by all.

That is a great deal, but the League of Nations has done more. It has prevented Japan from mobilizing. The Japanese Government might easily have called to the colors some classes of reserves--about 200,000 men, it is said. It has not dared to mobilize, any more than it has dared to declare war. This complicates its task, diminishes its means of action, increases the chances of China. It is a positive though indirect aid that the League of Nations has brought to the Chinese. Today it is one of the elements of their resistance, tomorrow perhaps of their victory.

The League of Nations, like the heavens, can help effectively only those who help themselves. The Chinese did well not to resist in the beginning, thus making the responsibilities of the aggressor evident to all. But they do well to defend themselves at this juncture, for thus they lend powerful support to the mediating and pacifying action of the Assembly.

Now, time works for them. Let them hold on but a little longer--and they will win.

jcg:met

1705

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2333.


Paris, March 8, 1932.

The Sino-Japanese Conflict.

772



MAR 10 1932



F/LS  
795.94/4776

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from March 2 to March 7, 1932, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

(In d.)

*Walter E. Edge*  
Walter E. Edge

Enclosures....

MAR 18 1932  
FILED

- 2 -

Enclosures (single copy):

Clippings from the French press, as follows:

March 2, 1932.

- No. 1 - L'AVENIR
- 2 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 3 - EXCELSIOR
- 4 - L'INFORMATION
- 5 - LE JOURNAL
- 6 - L'OEUVRE
- 7 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 8 - LE POPULAIRE
- 9 - LE TEMPS

March 3, 1932.

- No. 10 - L'ACTION FRANCAISE
- 11 - L'AMI DU PEUPLE
- 12 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 13 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
- 14 - L'INTRANSIGEANT
- 15 - LE MATIN
- 16 - L'OEUVRE
- 17 - LE POPULAIRE

March 4, 1932.

- No. 18 - L'AVENIR
- 19 - FIGARO
- 20 - LA JOURNEE INDUSTRIELLE
- 21 - PARIS MIDI
- 22 - LE POPULAIRE
- 23 - LE TEMPS

March 5, 1932.

- No. 24 - L'AVENIR
- 25 - LA DEPECHE DE TOULOUSE
- 26 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
- 27 - FIGARO
- 28 - LE POPULAIRE
- 29 - LA REPUBLIQUE

March 6, 1932.

- No. 30 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 31 - FIGARO
- 32 - LE JOURNAL
- 33 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS
- 34 - LE MATIN
- 35 - LE PETIT PARISIEN

March 7, 1932.

- No. 36 - L'AVENIR
- 37 - LE POPULAIRE
- 38 - LE TEMPS

In quintuplicate.  
710.  
RS/jdk

Annex 7

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AVNIR, March 2, 1932.

## Les résultats du conflit du Yang-Tsé

### UN NOUVEL ETAT D'ESPRIT CHINOIS

L'Agence Reuter annonce que le Japon a accepté le plan de règlement du conflit de Changhaï que M. Paul-Boncour avait exposé au comité spécial de la S. D. N. Espérons que le canon se taira désormais du côté de Woosung et de Kiang Ouan. N'empêche qu'hier encore la bataille faisait rage : les blessés et les tués se comptent par milliers; les destructions et les frais de guerre sont tels que les deux pays cherchent à négocier des emprunts extérieurs. Pour quel résultat tant de deuils et de tristesses ? On ne le sait pas.

La principale cause du conflit du Yang Tsé est le boycott des marchandises japonaises par les Chinois : or, ces jours derniers, les cargos qui amenaient des troupes nippones fraîches sur le continent ne rentraient pas à vide à Sasebo; pleins à craquer, ils servaient au rapatriement des commerçants japonais de Changhaï. N'est-ce pas un paradoxe ? Ou n'en doit-on pas plutôt conclure que Tokio s'aperçoit que l'emploi des bombes n'engendre pas la bonne intelligence entre les deux peuples ? Ainsi toute cette entreprise serait demeurée stérile — pour les Nippons sinon pour les autres...

Il est curieux de citer à ce propos les pronostics que faisait l'autre jour *The Economist*, organe pondéré de la Cité de Londres.

« Les Japonais, écrivait-il, sont dans une situation désespérée, et leur débâcle finale est tout aussi certaine, en 1932, que celle de l'Allemagne l'était en 1914. Si l'on se risque à établir une analogie (entre les deux séries d'événements), on peut prétendre qu'il faudra trois ou quatre années pour que la tragédie aboutisse à ses conclusions logiques. Le Japon a déjà perdu sa mise de jeu : d'abord, il a sacrifié à des appétits militaristes son commerce en Chine; il a évacué Changhaï. Ses avoirs en Mandchourie se déprécieront graduellement, au fur et à mesure que la petite guerre d'embuscade se développera, selon les indications provenant du Midi. » En fin de compte, le journal des grands banquiers d'une des plus grandes villes commerciales du monde s'efforce de faire comprendre à ses lecteurs — sans le dire expressément, car il ne veut pas avoir l'air de manquer de tact international — que l'Europe pourrait gagner à voir s'éterniser le conflit de l'Extrême-Orient. Les marchandises japonaises seront remplacées par d'autres, provenant de pays moins agressifs, et le spectre du péril jaune ne menacera pas l'Occident tant que la haine présidera aux relations de deux grands pays de l'Orient.

Ainsi, à avoir fait la guerre, tous les intéressés — vainqueurs et vaincus — auront perdu.

Bien entendu, cette façon de voir n'est pas partagée par ceux qui continuent à voir dans les expéditions militaires un moyen politique infaillible. Prenons le dernier numéro du *Militar Wochenblatt* (Berlin), organe attitré de l'armée allemande. Y est-on d'accord avec les pensées que reproduit l'organe des commerçants anglais ? Loin de là. Pour le *Wochenblatt*, les perspectives qui s'ouvrent devant le Japon sont merveilleuses. « En occupant la Mandchourie, le Japon est devenu le Grand Japon (Gross-japan). Ses nouvelles acquisitions territoriales forment un ensemble qui dépasse la surface de la métropole. Trente millions de paysans, dociles et laborieux, vont s'ajouter à la population des îles. La Mandchourie produit toutes les matières premières dont on peut avoir be-

agi comme un catalyseur sur les masses amorphes du peuple chinois. Bêtement, pendant vingt ans, il avait dépensé ses forces en guérillas civiles. Dorénavant, on a posé devant lui un problème élémentaire qui doit impressionner le dernier des coolies : un étranger foule le sol de la patrie, et les énergies naissantes du nationalisme chinois savent comment et où il faut se dépenser. L'unité du peuple chinois — ou au moins le désir de l'unité — sera peut-être le premier résultat des expéditions japonaises. Mais il y a autre chose. Lors de la première guerre sino-japonaise, des milliers de Chinois fuyaient comme des lapins dès qu'ils s'affrontaient à trois Japonais avec une mitrailleuse. Cette fois, la 19<sup>e</sup> division du général Ma a enregistré presque des succès; elle a cédé, il est vrai, devant la poussée formidable des forces ennemies. Mais elle a combattu et même a longtemps tenu. Le mirage de l'invincibilité des Japonais n'est plus. Les journaux de Changhaï ont parlé tous les jours de victoires remportées sur les assaillants. Un revirement s'est accompli dans la mentalité des éternels vaincus; les conséquences de ce revirement seront lentes à se manifester, mais elles sont incalculables; et ce sera le Japon qui sera le premier à en pâtir.

AL. PILENCO.

Annex 2

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AVENIR, March 2, 1932.

## Les résultats du conflit du Yang-Tsé

### UN NOUVEL ETAT D'ESPRIT CHINOIS

L'Agence Reuter annonce que le Japon a accepté le plan de règlement du conflit de Changhaï que M. Paul-Boncour avait exposé au comité spécial de la S. D. N. Espérons que le canon se taira désormais du côté de Woosung et de Kiang Ouan. N'empêche qu'hier encore la bataille faisait rage : les blessés et les tués se comptent par milliers; les destructions et les frais de guerre sont tels que les deux pays cherchent à négocier des emprunts extérieurs. Pour quel résultat tant de deuils et de tristesses ? On ne le sait pas.

La principale cause du conflit du Yang Tsé est le boycott des marchandises japonaises par les Chinois : or, ces jours derniers, les cargos qui amenaient des troupes nippones fraîches sur le continent ne rentraient pas à vide à Sasebo; pleins à craquer, ils servaient au rapatriement des commerçants japonais de Changhaï. N'est-ce pas un paradoxe ? Ou n'en doit-on pas plutôt conclure que Tokio s'aperçoit que l'emploi des bombes n'engendre pas la bonne intelligence entre les deux peuples ? Ainsi toute cette entreprise serait demeurée stérile — pour les Nippons sinon pour les autres...

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Quelques heures à peine nous séparent du moment où la Société des Nations se prononcera sur les conséquences du conflit sino-japonais. Quoi qu'elle fasse, et même si le plan Boncour met fin aux hostilités, le conflit des deux mentalités que définissent les citations ci-dessus n'aura pas disparu. Chacun de nous, jusqu'au plus humble, doit se ranger soit du côté de l'*Economist* anglais, soit de celui du *Wochenblatt* allemand. Une seule question domine la situation : à Changhaï, comme en Mandchourie, comme partout ailleurs, la guerre peut-elle et doit-elle être un moyen de la politique extérieure ?

Il ne s'agit nullement d'être antijaponais ou prochinois. Il s'agit de se prononcer pour ou contre l'idée si simple qui préside au Pacte Kellogg. A la longue, le Japon gagnera-t-il à avoir déclenché une guerre contre la Chine ? Deux constatations sont possibles dès à présent. L'attaque venant de l'extérieur a

agi comme un catalyseur sur les masses amorphes du peuple chinois. Bêtement, pendant vingt ans, il avait dépensé ses forces en guérillas civiles. Dorénavant, on a posé devant lui un problème élémentaire qui doit impressionner le dernier des coolies : un étranger foule le sol de la patrie, et les énergies naissantes du nationalisme chinois savent comment et où il faut se dépenser. L'unité du peuple chinois — ou au moins le désir de l'unité — sera peut-être le premier résultat des expéditions japonaises. Mais il y a autre chose. Lors de la première guerre sino-japonaise, des milliers de Chinois fuyaient comme des lapins dès qu'ils s'affrontaient à trois Japonais avec une mitrailleuse. Cette fois, la 19<sup>e</sup> division du général Ma a enregistré presque des succès; elle a cédé, il est vrai, devant la poussée formidable des forces ennemies. Mais elle a combattu et même a longtemps tenu. Le mirage de l'invincibilité des Japonais n'est plus. Les journaux de Changhaï ont parlé tous les jours de victoires remportées sur les assaillants. Un revirement s'est accompli dans la mentalité des éternels vaincus; les conséquences de ce revirement seront lentes à se manifester, mais elles sont incalculables; et ce sera le Japon qui sera le premier à en pâtir.

AL. PILENCO.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2335 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ÉCHO DE PARIS, March 2, 1932.

## L'OFFENSIVE JAPONAISE ET L'ASSEMBLÉE DE LA S. D. N.

### Les négociations de Genève et de Shanghai aboutiront-elles ?

Genève, 1<sup>er</sup> mars.

Les dépêches annonçant une nouvelle offensive japonaise sur le front de Shanghai ont agité et désolé la Société des Nations. Beaucoup se sont hâtés de crier que le Japon avait déjà dénoncé l'armistice conclu dimanche à Shanghai. Mais, à la vérité, aucun armistice n'a été conclu à Shanghai. Les représentants chinois et japonais ont seulement proposé à leurs gouvernements de se déclarer prêts à négocier d'abord un armistice, puis la formation d'une zone neutre dans les conditions déjà indiquées. Le Japon, qui accepte le projet d'apaisement déballé dimanche sur le bateau de l'amiral Kelly et repris hier par le Conseil de Genève, n'a donc pas manqué de parole. Evidemment, il s'efforce, une fois de plus, avant que s'ouvre l'Assemblée, jeudi, à faire place nette. Mais y parviendra-t-il ? Dans l'après-midi, la délégation japonaise a reçu la nouvelle que le gouvernement de Tokio acceptait la proposition de Shanghai, devenue hier la proposition du Conseil.

Malgré tout, l'assemblée a toute chance de se réunir après-demain en pleine bataille. Doubtless peut-être qu'elle puisse faire d'utile besogne, la délégation anglaise estime qu'elle doit s'ajourner promptement, après avoir constitué son bureau et nommé sa commission, afin de laisser le champ libre aux puissances qui s'entremettent sur le lieu des hostilités. Mais les fanatiques de la Société des Nations,

Hollande, Norvège, Suède, Suisse, etc... ne l'entendent pas ainsi. Eux qui ne pourraient, et pour cause, risquer un canon dans l'entreprise, ils veulent que l'assemblée remplisse son rôle de justicier exactement, rapidement, implacablement, sans se laisser en rien déconcerter.

Quant au secrétariat, il consentirait, à l'impunité des temps actuels, un ajournement de quelques jours. Courage, fonctionnaires du secrétariat et haut les cœurs ! Ce soir, à la séance du bureau, vous avez fait distribuer, tirée au Ronéo, une lettre adressée à sir Eric Drummond par trois de ses compatriotes. Elle est propre à faire bien augurer des temps nouveaux.

Ces trois Anglais, ecclésiastiques éminents, informent le secrétaire général qu'ils se tiennent à la disposition de la Société des Nations pour entrer dans une armée de la paix. Avec ceux qui voudront bien les imiter, ils se placeront volontairement, dépourvus d'armes, entre les combattants. Le secrétaire général, en accusant réception de cette communication, exprime son admiration pour le dévouement à la cause de la paix dont font preuve les signataires, ainsi que les nombreux volontaires qui ont écrit à la Société des Nations en vue de se mettre à son service. Il ajoute toutefois qu'il lui sera impossible de présenter ces offres au Conseil, à moins qu'une demande formelle ne lui soit fournie par un Etat membre de la Société des Nations.

PERTINAX.

## A SHANGHAI

# Comment vint la lutte

### II

Les Français sont un peuple sentimental. Le sentiment, chose excellente entre individus, est moins recommandable entre nations : parfait dans les relations sociales, il est dangereux, fallacieux et trompeur dans les relations diplomatiques. A Shanghai, où, sous prétexte d'une opération de gendarmerie, le canon tonne, nous en faisons une bonne expérience.

Notre opinion publique, tournée et retournée au jour le jour par des incidents lointains qu'elle connaît assez mal, n'a pas eu de bases pour asseoir ses convictions successives ; elle ne sait, de ces événements « antipodiques » que ce que les agences télégraphiques internationales lui en veulent bien dire ; et, en somme, il ne sort, de ces ténèbres amoncelées, que des lumières fugitives, qui dénaturent singulièrement le visage de la vérité. Au réel, si le Français, si fier et peu patient, savait ce qui s'est passé et ce qui se passe là-bas, il penserait sans doute autre chose que ce qu'il pense.

Obéissant à une nécessité ethnique impérieuse, le Japon, dont la population augmente sans cesse, étouffe dans ses îles ; il lui a fallu se créer un débouché sur le continent : ce fut la Mandchourie et certains autres points de la Chine. Ce ne pouvait pas être ailleurs, le Japonais étant un homme des pays froids et ne pouvant presque pas vivre à Formose, et pas du tout en Indochine. Or, ce besoin ethnique commande une extension économique, et ne correspond pas du tout à une politique de conquête, que le Japon n'a jamais encore pratiquée, malgré qu'on en ait dit. Si le Japon avait voulu conquérir des territoires, il aurait conservé la Mandchourie méridionale et la région du Yalu, que le traité de Shimonooski (1894) lui avait reconnues. Si le Japon avait voulu conquérir, il était libre de le faire en 1905, après son éclatant triomphe sur la Russie. Sur les Blancs, comme on disait alors. Il s'est contenté de remplacer la Russie dans le Liaotung (traité de Portsmouth). Et c'est la Chine elle-même qui lui a demandé de protéger la voie Moukden-Antoung.

En 1915, intervint le traité dit des 21 demandes, qui accordait le Shantoung au Japon. Or, le Japon a spontanément, à la conférence de Washington, rendu le Shantoung à la Chine. Tout cela est marqué au coin de la modération, et ne dénote aucune avidité.

Pendant ce temps, la Mandchourie, grâce au Japon, devenait, suivant l'expression d'un diplomate anglais, « une oasis dans le désert qu'est devenue la Chine ». En 1927 déjà, le revenu de l'agriculture mandchourienne dépassait un milliard de yens ; et celle-ci était, sur l'appel même du Japon, aux mains des paysans chinois (90 0/0 de la population totale du pays) qui venaient chercher en Mandchourie l'ordre et la paix qui étaient disparus de la Chine. Cette situation excellente eût duré, sans l'ambition des deux « maréchaux du Nord », Tchang So Lin, aujourd'hui mort, et son fils, Tchang Sueliang. Contrairement à la lettre et à l'esprit des traités, ils firent construire des voies ferrées pour concurrencer le Sud-Mandchourien et soumettre les provinces mandchouriennes à l'autorité du gouvernement de Nankin. Dès lors, le banditisme chinois s'en donne à cœur joie en Mandchourie ; de 1928 à 1930, le gouvernement japonais releva et publia 53 cas de violation des traités et du droit des gens et constituant tous des *casus belli*. Encouragés par la patience nipponne, les bandits chinois, vers la fin de juillet 1931, massacrèrent la population coréenne de Wanpaoshan, en plein protectorat japonais : les Coréens répondirent par le massacre des Chinois de Séoul, capitale de la Corée. Dès lors, ce fut fini de la paix en Mandchourie. On sait comment, quotidiennement, les Chinois attaquaient les stations du Sud-Mandchourien, insuffisamment protégées par 10.000 Japonais. Devant ces guets-apens continus, et enfin lassé, le Japon occupa Moukden (19 septembre 1931) et étendit son occupation jusqu'à la Grande Muraille.

A cet acte énergique, le Kuomintang — c'est-à-dire le gouvernement chinois — répondit par le boycottage des biens et des marchandises nippons. Ce boycottage, naturellement, s'étendit aux personnes. Or, cet organisme de banditisme s'établit à Shanghai, dans la concession internationale, sous l'œil résigné du corps consulaire : ce boycottage servait d'ailleurs à la fois les intérêts commerciaux de la Grande-Bretagne et les vues politiques des Etats-Unis ; et il est superflu d'y insister davantage. Dès lors, à Shanghai un magasin japonais ne put rester ouvert sans être pillé : un sujet japonais ne put sortir de chez lui sans être attaqué et assassiné. Le 9 octobre 1931, la première sommation du Japon fut faite à Nankin par le ministre du Japon en Chine. Il ne

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

lui fut répondu que par les sanglants désordres (20 octobre, 19 novembre, 2 décembre 1931 et 21 janvier 1932) dans Hongkiou et deux autres quartiers de Shanghai. Et alors, le 28 janvier, les Japonais commencèrent, pour la protection de leurs nationaux, cette opération de police, dite de Chapel, qui n'a pas réussi, on se demande pourquoi.

ALBERT DE ROUVOURVILLE.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Luitel NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, March 2, 1932.

Il n'est question que du conflit sino-japonais dans les conversations entre ministres, diplomates et juristes à Genève. Comment se présente la situation à l'heure actuelle entre les deux puissances belligérantes? Du point de vue militaire, il semble bien que l'armée japonaise ait fait assez durement l'expérience d'une lutte de rues, d'embuscades et de tranchées avec nids de mitrailleuses. Les troupes chinoises avaient évidemment l'avantage de positions défensives faciles à ravitailler alors que les Japonais ne recevaient matériel et renforts que par voie maritime et se trouvaient exposés aux inconvénients de débarquements hasardeux. Toutefois il n'est pas douteux qu'en y mettant le temps et le prix nécessaires la décision ne pourrait être qu'en faveur du Japon. Le haut commandement japonais a dû calculer les sacrifices en hommes et en argent exigés par une guerre d'usure substituée à ce qu'ils espéraient être une action répressive rapide et limitée.

Du point de vue diplomatique, le gouvernement de Tokio doit s'être rendu compte que l'Amérique ne lui permettrait pas de recueillir les bénéfices d'une victoire chèrement acquise. Après de longs mois d'efforts qui eussent anémié ses réserves en hommes, désorganisé son budget, fatigué ses unités navales, épuisé ses stocks de munitions, le Japon eût pu se trouver en infériorité en regard des Soviets ou de l'Amérique. D'ailleurs la sanction des crédits commençait à jouer contre le Japon. Les banquiers et les hommes d'affaires japonais voyaient avec une inquiétude croissante baisser le yen qui avait déjà perdu 45 % de sa valeur; ils se demandaient s'ils n'allaient pas voir se fermer le marché américain à leurs exportations et si la prolongation d'une guerre malheureuse en Chine ne risquerait pas de tarir les importations des matières premières indispensables aux industries japonaises. C'est un fait que l'annonce des propositions de paix a suffi à relever très sensiblement le change de la devise japonaise.

D'autre part, il serait vain de se dissimuler que le Japon a perdu la bataille d'opinion publique où il s'est révélé en infériorité marquée en face de la Chine. Les jeunes intellectuels chinois, rompus aux méthodes publicitaires anglo-saxonnes, excellent à exploiter les idées et les sentiments favorables à leur cause. Selon toute vraisemblance, la majorité qui se fût dégagée de l'assemblée de la Société des nations, si des propositions de paix n'étaient pas intervenues, eût été plu-

tôt sympathique à la Chine, experte à jouer le rôle de victime, et qui avait réussi à faire oublier ses torts à l'origine du conflit.

Le public ignore généralement les conditions de la politique intérieure chinoise, ainsi que les rivalités d'influences, les âpres concurrences économiques, les conflits sociaux dont la nouvelle Chine est le théâtre. Nombre d'hommes d'Etat ne sont pas mieux renseignés sur la situation de ce pays. Parmi ceux qui ont eu des prises de contact plus ou moins superficielles avec la Chine, on compte beaucoup de dilettantes qui se sont laissé séduire par la culture artistique et philosophique et par l'exotisme pittoresque d'une civilisation plusieurs fois millénaire. La Chine n'a pas que son opium pour influencer les sensibilités et les mentalités occidentales. Le Japon, plus énigmatique, et qui surprend un peu l'étranger par le contraste de ses traditions anciennes et de son modernisme industriel, inquiète davantage par sa forte discipline et ses admirables vertus civiques et militaires; il devait fatalement recueillir moins de suffrages dans les milieux genevois pénétrés de doc-



ARRIVÉE DE TROUPES BRITANNIQUES  
A SHANGHAI

trines internationalistes, d'idéologie pacifiste et humanitaire et de thèses politiques et juridiques insuffisamment adaptées aux leçons expérimentales de l'histoire des peuples, à qui la Société des nations reconnaît des droits et impose des devoirs égaux sans se soucier de leurs inégalités naturelles.

Ces multiples considérations expliquent la nécessité où se trouvait le Japon de s'en tenir à Shanghai à un demi-succès, que d'aucuns jugent comme un demi-échec de ses opérations.

Les mêmes considérations pourraient tout aussi bien expliquer l'évolution ultérieure du conflit sino-japonais, qui peut aboutir à des conclusions assez différentes de celles que prévoient les augures de Genève. Rien ne permet encore de prévoir les conséquences d'une militarisation de la Chine et d'un repliement du Japon sur lui-même.

Pour l'heure la bataille continue à Shanghai, bien que le Japon ait verbalement confirmé ce soir à M. Paul-Boncour la dépêche Reuter de ce matin annonçant l'acceptation par le gouvernement de Tokio des propositions de paix formulées par le conseil de la Société des nations.

Dans la soirée d'aujourd'hui on attendait encore le télégramme officiel du gouvernement japonais acceptant la décision du conseil. Il y a bien des propositions de paix, mais les hostilités ne sont pas encore suspendues.

L'armistice, aurait dit M. Sato à M. Paul-Boncour, devra être discuté sur place.


Il se pourrait que le mouvement de repli des troupes japonaises, à plus forte raison leur rembarquement, suscite quelques difficultés, car la délégation japonaise ne se dissimule point que ces opérations dépendront du rétablissement de la sécurité des personnes et des biens, sécurité qui est encore loin d'être un fait accompli.

D'après M. Sato, ce serait la conférence internationale qui doit se réunir à Shanghai qui aurait à régler les conditions techniques de la cessation des hostilités.

En dépit de ces incertitudes, le sentiment qui prévaut à la veille de la réunion de l'assemblée générale de la

a tourné et retourné dans tous les sens ce projet d'invitation. Inutile de dire que du côté américain, ces tractations n'ont été nullement encouragées. Les Etats-Unis restent sur leur position bien connue de non-participation aux délibérations et aux décisions de la Société des nations à l'égard desquelles l'Amérique entend réserver son entière liberté d'action.

Marcel PAYS.



Société des nations est nettement optimiste. On se réjouit du regain de prestige d'autorité morale qu'apporte à l'organisme genevois l'adhésion de l'Amérique à une résolution du conseil, car c'est bien à la proposition de M. Paul-Boncour, en tant que président en exercice du conseil de la Société des nations, que s'est rallié le gouvernement américain et non à une initiative du gouvernement britannique.

#### Le rôle des Etats-Unis

Cette nuance, paraît-il, serait d'une grande importance juridique et d'une importance plus grande encore du point de vue de la politique intérieure des Etats-Unis, dont le gouvernement tient à ménager les susceptibilités du Congrès.

L'adhésion américaine aux propositions de paix formulées par le conseil, nous a-t-on dit dans les milieux américains de la conférence, est motivée par le pacte Briand-Kellogg, et non par les stipulations du pacte de la Société des nations auxquelles les Etats-Unis n'ont pas adhéré. Le gouvernement américain a donné cette adhésion de son propre chef et non parce qu'il a été sollicité par une autre puissance. C'est pour bien préciser cette nuance que M. Wilson a fait remettre hier et distribuer à l'issue de la séance du conseil sa lettre à sir Eric Drummond, secrétaire général de la Société des nations, lettre annonçant officiellement l'approbation du gouvernement américain.

Cette mise au point dissipe les illusions de quelques membres du conseil de la Société des nations qui avaient espéré que l'Amérique accepterait une invitation « non formelle » sinon d'assister à l'assemblée, tout au moins de siéger dans une commission réunissant, en même temps que le bureau désigné par l'assemblée, les délégués des Etats signataires du traité de Washington dit : traité des neuf puissances. Pendant deux jours, le secrétariat général de la Société des nations

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Extract from L'INFORMATION, March 2, 1932.

## Vers la fin des hostilités sino-japonaises?

(DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL)

Genève, le 1<sup>er</sup> mars.

Il est possible que les hostilités entre Chinois et Japonais approchent de leur fin. Il n'est pas sûr que le conflit qui trouble l'Extrême-Orient soit réglé pour cela. Telles sont les perspectives après quatre journées de démarches et d'entretiens diplomatiques, aboutissant hier soir à une manifestation de la Société des Nations qui tenait du coup de théâtre.

En effet, quand elle apprit les résultats de l'entrevue des parlementaires chinois et japonais réunis à bord du navire amiral par le chef de l'escadre anglaise, Genève cherchait les moyens d'ajourner l'assemblée générale convoquée pour le jeudi 3 mars. On voulait attendre, comme nous le disions hier, le moment où les efforts des médiateurs et l'évidente fatigue des adversaires permettraient d'espérer une issue favorable. Rien n'était préparé pour un dénouement brusqué. C'est un simple exposé objectif et chronologique qu'avait composé M. Paul-Boncour en matière de discours d'ouverture. Très sagement, il annonçait, avant-hier soir encore, aux représentants de la presse qu'il s'en tiendrait aux faits et que si ses exhortations à la paix étaient naturellement chaudes, elles seraient également sereines. Les nouvelles communiquées à la fin de la journée ont modifié une fois de plus le cours prévu des choses. Avec un sens de l'adaptation rapide, le secrétariat de la Société des Nations suivit la fortune offerte par les événements. C'est dans ces conditions que le Conseil fut convoqué hier soir. Il était trop mêlé depuis le mois d'octobre aux complications de l'Extrême-Orient pour ne pas tirer de la première occasion un avantage dont on ne tardera pas à connaître s'il n'a pas été trop précipité.

Dans cette succession de faits, nous tâcherons de voir clair et l'exacte chronologie sera seule capable de mettre de l'ordre et de faire saisir les enchaînements, puisque la manifestation de Genève est une conclusion à des initiatives qui se sont déroulées sur des plans différents. La voici :

C'est le vendredi 26 février que le gouvernement britannique, justement inquiet, en tant que grande puissance coloniale, de la tournure des combats de la région de Changhaï, entreprit de faire pression sur les belligérants en leur offrant ses bons offices. Le samedi, sir John Simon, agissant comme ministre des Affaires Etrangères, informait à Genève M. Massigli de l'initiative qu'il comptait prendre et le pria, en avisant M. André Tardieu à Paris, de lui demander si la France serait disposée à se joindre à une démarche de la Grande-Bretagne. Le même soir, le Président du Conseil français faisait répondre à sir John Simon que son pays était dans des dispositions identiques à l'égard du différend sino-japonais, qu'au surplus il avait d'importants intérêts à protéger

dans la concession internationale de Changhaï et qu'il était tout disposé à se joindre à toute démarche propre à apaiser pratiquement le conflit. Mais, en même temps, M. André Tardieu se permettait d'observer qu'il conviendrait d'agir en accord étroit avec les Etats-Unis et il demandait si cet accord était d'ores et déjà obtenu ou en voie de l'être.

La suite des négociations devait faire voir que la question ainsi posée était d'importance, puisque le gouvernement britannique, s'étant mis en rapport avec celui de Washington sur le thème et les conditions d'une démarche commune, la réponse fut que les Etats-Unis n'entendaient pas s'associer à une seule puissance européenne, mais qu'ils étaient disposés à suivre le Conseil de la Ligue des Nations s'il jugeait bon d'agir en Extrême-Orient dans le cadre politique tracé par la récente lettre de M. Stimson au sénateur Borah. Une nouvelle conversation s'engagea aussitôt sur ces bases, conversation qui occupa à Genève toute la journée de dimanche et dans laquelle sir John Simon déploya de persévérants efforts. Mais, entre temps, l'amiral sir Howard Kelly, exécutant sans doute et peut-être même dépassant les instructions qu'il avait reçues de son gouvernement la veille, prenait l'initiative de convoquer à bord du *Kent* l'amiral Nomura et M. Matsuoka du côté japonais et le Dr Wellington Koo et le général Wang du côté chinois. Leur conversation semblait fournir les bases possibles d'une cessation d'hostilités par le retrait mutuel des forces en présence.

C'est ainsi que sir John Simon, sans être contraint de s'attarder dans des négociations nouvelles, eut hier soir à Genève le bénéfice, précieux pour son pays, d'annoncer au Conseil de la Société des Nations que l'arrêt des combats entre Chinois et Japonais pouvait être envisagé grâce à une initiative britannique dont il voulait bien faire retomber l'honneur sur l'institution de Genève. C'est ainsi que M. Paul-Boncour put, lui aussi, donner un juste couronnement à ses éloquents efforts, en lisant aux membres du Conseil, brusquement assemblés, une note qui est le résumé des propositions que le Foreign Office a suggérées aux belligérants. La Grande-Bretagne aura rendu là un service éminent à la cause de la paix et, du même coup, à celle de la Société des Nations. Il faut saluer une politique traditionnelle qui tient ainsi compte des intérêts et de l'opportunité. Mais il reste encore à savoir — bien que beaucoup d'indices inclinent à penser qu'il ne vaudra ni ne pourra faire une longue résistance — si le Japon acceptera toutes les conditions mises à la retraite chinoise. Il ne faut pas oublier, surtout, que l'ébranlement trop profond du prestige japonais dans l'Extrême-Orient serait, pour les puissances colonisatrices ou commerciales, une menace dont la Grande-Bretagne et la France apprécient certainement les risques.

FERNAND DE BRINON.

1 0715

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, March 2, 1932.

**La visite de M. Sato  
au président  
du conseil de la S.D.N.**

Journal ——— 3/2

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 1<sup>er</sup> mars. — On a appris ce matin, à Genève, que le Japon accepte la proposition présentée, hier, au conseil de la Société des nations par M. Paul-Boncour. M. Sato est venu, à la fin de l'après-midi, en donner confirmation officielle au président du conseil de la Société des nations et lui a annoncé qu'une lettre confirmerait l'acceptation. Une démarche analogue a été faite d'ailleurs auprès de sir John Simon par l'ambassadeur Matsudeira.

Voilà, en vérité, qui n'a rien de surprenant. Comment les Japonais auraient-ils pu repousser une proposition qu'ils ont été les premiers à suggérer et qui va même au delà de ce qu'ils pouvaient réclamer ? Les Japonais n'ont cessé de dire et de répéter que ce qu'ils cherchaient à Changhaï, c'était uniquement des garanties collectives pour le respect de l'existence et des biens des étrangers. Or, non seulement la proposition du conseil consacre le principe de la solidarité internationale, sous la forme d'une conférence, mais elle indique le devoir de cette conférence : la Chine devra donner des garanties formelles pour la sauvegarde des droits des étrangers.

Si quelque chose peut donc surprendre, ce n'est pas que le Japon, qui a atteint ses objectifs, accepte de se tirer d'un guépier, c'est que la Chine, que l'on couronne de lauriers, accepte de consacrer volontairement les traités inégaux qu'elle avait la prétention de déchirer. Il y a là une question si délicate que l'on ne pourra vraiment enregistrer la conclusion du conflit que quand l'affaire sera pour de bon réglée.

La première question à régler, pour l'instant, est la suspension des hostilités. Même à ce point de vue, l'acceptation du projet Boncour par les Japonais est tout à fait intéressante. En effet, la déclaration présentée par M. Paul-Boncour au conseil déclare formellement qu'une conférence internationale s'ouvrira à Changhaï immédiatement, son objet étant d'assurer la cessation définitive des hostilités. Le Japon est donc parfaitement logique quand il affirme, comme M. Sato l'a fait à M. Paul-Boncour, que les soldats nippons sont prêts à suspendre immédiatement les combats, mais que le règlement définitif des conditions d'armistice appartient à la conférence.

Le Japon est d'accord pour la suspension immédiate des hostilités : voilà qui est clair. Les choses pourraient s'arranger s'il est vrai que le quartier général de la fameuse 19<sup>e</sup> armée cantonaise est en repli déjà jusqu'à une localité située à une vingtaine de kilomètres de Changhaï. Pourtant, il ne faudrait pas s'étonner outre mesure si les Chinois cherchaient à prolonger les hostilités jusqu'à la réunion de l'assemblée extraordinaire qui s'ouvre jeudi, pour empêcher que cette assemblée n'eût autre chose à faire que de voter des félicitations au conseil.

1 0716

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Darius 2*

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2533 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, March 2, 1932.

Avant hier, au moment où sur le navire amiral anglais embossé non loin du navire amiral japonais, dans le Whang-Poo, les autorités militaires japonaises commençaient des négociations avec les autorités chinoises, le maire de Changhaï recevait, d'une autre partie du commandement japonais, une sommation lui enjoignant d'empêcher qu'aucun transport de troupes ne se fit par l'épi de voies ferrées, terminus de la ligne de Hanghéou.

Ce n'était pas la première discordance de ce genre depuis le commencement du conflit. Il est de plus en plus admis que le grand quartier général en Corée s'est affranchi, par une initiative brusquée, en septembre dernier, des intentions du gouvernement japonais d'alors. Depuis, le gouvernement a changé et s'est mis à l'unisson des événements en cours. Et, depuis encore, il s'est, lui-même, assuré plus de stabilité dans ce sens, grâce à des élections générales qui ont renversé la proportion des partis à la Diète.

Mais cette sorte d'usurpation de pouvoirs, on l'a vue se reproduire à l'intérieur même de l'armée japonaise en campagne. Les « raids » sur Tsitsikar, Kharbine et Tchintchéou ont surpris le haut commandement de Moukden. Il les a, ensuite, approuvés et exploités. Sur le moment, ils lui ont échappé.

Faut-il craindre que cela n'arrive de nouveau ?

Toute la journée d'hier, on peut dire que Genève et le monde entier en ont été anxieux.

D'autant qu'à ces dernières heures, à ces dernières minutes, le désir de courir une suprême chance, l'espérance de profiter d'un relâchement de l'adversaire, distrait par les bruits de paix prochaine, doivent enflammer le monde militaire japonais, avide de ressaisir, en une victoire tardive, son renom, sa gloire, ses ambitions diminuées.

Le canon a tonné dur encore, dès 8 heures du matin, par delà Chapel et près de l'embouchure du Whang-Poo, où venait de débarquer la 11<sup>e</sup> division japonaise.

En fin de journée, après une pression violente et continue, cause de lourdes pertes des deux côtés, le feu s'est calmé sur une faible avance japonaise, aussi éloignée des objectifs primitifs que celles des jours précédents.

C'est quelques heures après, dans la nuit, quand ce résultat eut été pesé à Tokio, que M. Sato reçut l'instruction d'aviser officiellement la Société des Nations que son gouvernement se rangeait à sa suggestion.

Il était plus de 19 heures. Dans les chancelleries, malgré les indices les plus favorables, on commençait à s'inquiéter.

Les travaux des Commissions de la Conférence du Désarmement s'ouvriront, aujourd'hui, sur cet heureux augure. Et, demain, l'assemblée plénière de la Société des Nations causera une déception de plus à ceux qui s'étaient déjà publiquement mis dans le rôle de liquidateurs de sa faillite.

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75

Inclouure . . . 7 to Resparte . . .  
From the Embassy . . .

Extra et from J. J. JULIEN, RESIDEN, . . .

**On espère à Genève que les hostilités cesseront sous peu et que l'assemblée extraordinaire convoquée pour demain pourra se tenir dans une atmosphère de détente**

Genève, 1<sup>er</sup> mars.


D'UN DE NOS ENVOYÉS SPÉCIAUX

Le Japon accepte le plan d'action proposé au nom du conseil par M. Paul-Boncour en vue d'aboutir au rétablissement de la paix à Changhaï. Telle est la grosse nouvelle de la journée. Elle avait été transmise ici de Tokio au début de l'après-midi par une brève dépêche d'agence. Ce n'est toutefois qu'à 17 h. 30 exactement que la confirmation officielle en est parvenue à la délégation japonaise. M. Sato s'est immédiatement rendu à l'hôtel des Bergues pour en informer sans retard M. Paul-Boncour — dont on devine la satisfaction — tandis que M. Matsudeira faisait une démarche analogue auprès de sir John Simon et que M. Yoshida, l'ambassadeur du Japon à Rome, qui vient d'arriver à Genève comme délégué de son pays à l'assemblée, allait de même en prévenir M. Grandi.

Dans le courant de la soirée enfin — le président du conseil ne pouvant se contenter d'une notification verbale — M. Sato a fait parvenir à M. Paul-Boncour une lettre officielle confirmant l'acceptation sans réserve du cabinet de Tokio. La nouvelle, qui s'est aussitôt répandue dans les milieux de la S. D. N., y a causé un sentiment de détente d'autant plus net que l'adhésion chinoise était depuis hier considérée comme acquise.

Ce n'est, toutefois, qu'un premier pas. Les deux parties consentent à négocier autour de la table ronde en présence des représentants diplomatiques de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Italie et des Etats-Unis. Il s'agit maintenant — et c'est là le principal — d'assurer la cessation des hostilités.

On se doute que c'est sur cet arrêt des opérations militaires qu'a porté la première question posée par M. Paul-Boncour à M. Sato. Le délégué nippon ne put, malheureusement, pas donner à cet égard les éclaircissements et les apaisements officiels qu'eût souhaités le président du conseil. Il lui annonça, toutefois, que son gouvernement avait fait aujourd'hui une proposition de cessation immédiate des hostilités sur place... Ce qui signifie, si nous sommes bien rensei-



M. Hugh R. Wilson, ministre des Etats-Unis à Berne, qui vient de faire savoir à sir Eric Drummond, secrétaire général de la S. D. N., que le gouvernement de Washington adhère au plan proposé par M. Paul-Boncour pour le rétablissement de la paix en Extrême-Orient.

gnés, que le cabinet de Tokio, n'ayant pu souscrire à la proposition de l'amiral anglais Kelly prévoyant un retrait simultané et en deux étapes des forces adverses — la seconde étape comportant le rembarquement des troupes nippones — a fait, de son côté, une contre-proposition aux termes de laquelle les deux belligérants arrêteraient immédiatement le feu et s'en remettraient à la conférence du soin de fixer les conditions de détail de l'armistice.

Il était à craindre, en effet, que la seule expression de « rembarquement des troupes japonaises », même sans indication de date, ne provoquât un sursaut de l'opinion publique nipponne. C'est ce qui s'est produit, d'où la suggestion de confier à la conférence de Changhaï la mission de déterminer la durée de l'armistice, le mode de retrait des troupes en présence, la surveillance de la zone neutre qui se trouvera créée entre elles... suggestion qui ne signifie nullement, comme certains l'ont prétendu, un changement d'attitude de la part de Tokio. Le résultat immédiat étant le même, — c'est-à-dire la cessation instantanée des actes de guerre — on veut espérer ici que la contre-proposition japonaise sera agréée par les représentants chinois. M. Paul-Boncour a, en tout état de cause, vivement insisté ce soir auprès de M. Sato pour que cet arrêt des hostilités ait lieu avant la réunion de l'assemblée qui s'ouvrira ainsi jeudi à 11 heures dans une atmosphère de détente et de soulagement qu'on n'osait presque plus escompter.

Etant donné ce qu'on sait ici des dispositions japonaises, il y a toutes raisons de penser que cet espoir ne sera pas déçu. Ces assises extraordinaires se trouveront ainsi privées de tout caractère dramatique, mais, la tuerie ayant cessé, le prestige du conseil et l'autorité de la S. D. N., un moment compromis, en sortiront grandis. Or c'est là, avec le rétablissement de la paix, la seule chose qui importe...

Albert JULLIEN

P. 2

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, March 2, 1932.

## LA GUERRE EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT

# Une détente ? Non ! Une manœuvre du Japon

TROIS nouvelles importantes et contradictoires.

Le Japon a accepté l'arrangement proposé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Mais la bataille fait rage à Changhaï où les troupes japonaises ont déclenché hier matin une violente offensive.

Et la proclamation de « l'indépendance » de la Mandchourie est officielle.

Cette contradiction n'est qu'apparente. Une fois encore la diplomatie japonaise a réussi un coup de maître. Il est vrai qu'elle a été secondée — volontairement ou involontairement — par les cabinets de Londres et de Paris, ainsi que par le Conseil de la S.D.N. et le gouvernement de Washington.

Réfléchissons. Le 3 mars doit se réunir, sur l'initiative de la Chine, l'assemblée générale de la S.D.N. Quelle que soit la pression exercée par les grandes puissances impérialistes, l'assemblée sera hostile au Japon. La réunion publique des délégués de tous les Etats membres de la S.D.N. reflétera mieux l'état d'esprit des peuples indignés par l'agression japonaise, que ne le font les Douze qui siègent à huis-clos et intriguent dans la coulisse. Le gouvernement de Tokio le sait. Il doit donc essayer de désarmer ses adversaires en créant un semblant de « détente ».

D'autre part, les Etats-Unis ont ordonné à leur escadre de l'Atlantique de rejoindre celle du Pacifique. Plus de deux cents bateaux de guerre pourraient se réunir ainsi autour des îles Hawaï, qui sont une base navale pour des opérations contre le Japon. Celui-ci veut faire retarder l'arrivée de cette Armada. Il faut donc faire croire que la paix est sur le point d'être rétablie à Changhaï.

De là, l'arrangement de Genève, son acceptation par le Japon, la formidable publicité faite autour de cette « solution ».

Or, l'arrangement de Genève n'arrange rien du tout. En fait, il est subordonné à un accord militaire à Changhaï. On parlait hier de la retraite simultanée des deux belligérants. On envisageait même le débarquement des troupes japonaises. Mais aujourd'hui on n'en parle plus. Les Japonais ont déclenché une attaque furieuse. Ils annoncent une victoire décisive. Ils ne veulent plus en aller et exigent le départ des Chinois... bien que Changhaï soit, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, une ville chinoise. La Chine ne peut pas accepter la paix à de telles conditions.

Parions néanmoins que toute la presse capitaliste du monde, ainsi que les « milieux de la S.D.N. » accuseront demain la Chine d'intransigeance et de bellicisme, tandis qu'on vantera la sagesse et le pacifisme du Japon. Depuis le 18 septembre, c'est ainsi. Pourquoi cette presse pourrie changerait-elle ses habitudes ?

A Genève, à Paris, à Londres et à New-York on sait tout cela. On connaît les dessous des négociations. On n'est pas dupes de l'esprit conciliateur que manifeste le Japon. Mais on feint de croire à la sincérité du gouvernement de Tokio. On fait mine de prendre au sérieux ses promesses. Pourquoi ? Mais pour la même raison qu'on avait laissé le Japon s'emparer de la Mandchourie et bombarder Changhaï. On veut en profiter — commandes de guerre, emprunts avantageux, maintien de la Chine en état d'infériorité — et on veut à tout prix empêcher que l'opinion publique se réveille. Aussi an-

monde devant le fait accompli. Le cas échéant, le Japon consentira encore à discuter ses droits sur Changhaï, mais la question de la Mandchourie est déjà réglée. Au moins pour le Japon et les grandes puissances... Et pour la Russie.

Il est vraiment pénible de lire le télégramme de Moscou que nous publions plus loin. N'osant reconnaître franchement que pour ne pas être entraîné dans une guerre avec le Japon les Soviets préfèrent abandonner le chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois et laisser les Japonais s'installer dans la Mandchourie du Nord, le gouvernement de Moscou explique son attitude dans la question du transport des troupes nippones, par la demande... des autorités chinoises. Or, celles-ci sont à la solde du Japon. Elles demandent que le Japon rétablisse l'ordre dans la région, où des partisans chinois luttent désespérément contre le « gouvernement de Kirin ». Mais ce « gouvernement » n'est qu'une créature de l'état-major japonais. Et c'est pour lui faciliter la conquête du Nord, que les Soviets autorisent les troupes nippones à se servir du chemin de fer.

Je comprends que l'Humanité ait attendu vingt-quatre heures avant de publier les informations officielles de Tass, que nous avons données avant-hier. Je comprends qu'elle soit bien embarrassée pour expliquer l'attitude de Moscou. Mais il faudrait que les communistes français cessassent de nous présenter comme des agents de l'impérialisme japonais. C'est leur gouvernement bolcheviste de Moscou qui est aux ordres du Japon !

Certes, il ne peut pas faire autrement. Mais c'est là une autre question. Seulement, quand on sert Moscou qui trahit la Chine au profit du Japon, on devrait être un peu plus prudent vis-à-vis de ceux qui n'ont cessé de travailler pour mobiliser l'opinion publique contre l'agresseur.

O. ROSENFELD.

P. 2

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En même temps, une autre opération s'achève. Tandis que toute l'attention est concentrée sur Changhaï, le Japon a annexé la Mandchourie, dont il vient de proclamer « l'indépendance ». C'est l'histoire de la Corée qui recommence. Et voici le

monde devant le fait accompli. Le cas échéant, le Japon consentira encore à discuter ses droits sur Changhaï, mais la question de la Mandchourie est déjà réglée. Au moins pour le Japon et les grandes puissances... Et pour la Russie.

Il est vraiment pénible de lire le télégramme de Moscou que nous publions plus loin. N'osant reconnaître franchement que pour ne pas être entraîné dans une guerre avec le Japon les Soviets préfèrent abandonner le chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois et laisser les Japonais s'installer dans la Mandchourie du Nord, le gouvernement de Moscou explique son attitude dans la question du transport des troupes nippones, par la demande... des autorités chinoises. Or, celles-ci sont à la solde du Japon. Elles demandent que le Japon rétablisse l'ordre dans la région, où des partisans chinois luttent désespérément contre le « gouvernement de Kirin ». Mais ce « gouvernement » n'est qu'une créature de l'état-major japonais. Et c'est pour lui faciliter la conquête du Nord, que les Soviets autorisent les troupes nippones à se servir du chemin de fer.

Je comprends que l'Humanité ait attendu vingt-quatre heures avant de publier les informations officielles de Tass, que nous avons données avant-hier. Je comprends qu'elle soit bien embarrassée pour expliquer l'attitude de Moscou. Mais il faudrait que les communistes français cessassent de nous présenter comme des agents de l'impérialisme japonais. C'est leur gouvernement bolcheviste de Moscou qui est aux ordres du Japon !

Certes, il ne peut pas faire autrement. Mais c'est là une autre question. Seulement, quand on sert Moscou qui trahit la Chine au profit du Japon, on devrait être un peu plus prudent vis-à-vis de ceux qui n'ont cessé de travailler pour mobiliser l'opinion publique contre l'agresseur.

O. ROSENFELD.

TELETYPE  
Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, March 2, 1932.

#### LA DÉTENTE A SHANGHAI

Les perspectives de détente et d'apaisement que l'on découvrait depuis quarante-huit heures dans la situation à Shanghai se sont heureusement précisées hier après-midi. On a maintenant le sentiment très net que l'on marche vers la solution du conflit sino-japonais, que des possibilités d'accord sur le terrain, en vue de la suspension des hostilités, existent et que lorsque s'ouvrira jeudi, à Genève, l'Assemblée extraordinaire de la Société des nations, qui aura à connaître du différend, ce qui n'est encore qu'une promesse de règlement pacifique deviendra une réalité.

A l'heure même où débarquaient à Shanghai les renforts envoyés du Japon pour soutenir les troupes du mikado engagées dans la dure bataille qui se livre depuis dix jours entre Chapeï et Wou-Sung contre des forces chinoises très supérieures en nombre et dont l'endurance et la valeur militaire ont surpris tout le monde et constituent un fait absolument nouveau dans le monde de l'Orient lointain, une heureuse initiative a été prise par le commandant des forces navales britanniques à Shanghai, l'amiral Kelly. Il s'agissait d'assurer la prise de contact entre Japonais et Chinois et de poser la question d'une suspension des hostilités. Le gouvernement de Londres a favorisé cette initiative de toute son influence, s'efforçant d'obtenir la collaboration diplomatique des cabinets de Washington, de Paris et de Rome pour faciliter une médiation. Cette collaboration était d'autant plus indispensable, on le comprend, que la Grande-Bretagne, les Etats-Unis, la France et l'Italie ont constamment agi en plein accord dans les démarches qui furent faites à Tokio et à Nankin et que ces puissances tendent toutes à un même but, qui est de faire obstacle à la guerre et d'assurer le développement de l'activité internationale sur la base des pactes et des traités signés de bonne foi.

Aussi est-ce avec la plus vive satisfaction que l'on a appris hier, à Genève, par une communication du ministre des affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, sir John Simon, que les conversations engagées entre Japonais et Chinois à bord d'un bâtiment de guerre britannique portaient sur un projet d'armistice comportant le retrait simultané des troupes chinoises et des troupes nippones, dans des conditions telles que le contact serait effectivement rompu entre les deux armées et que, une fois le terrain ainsi déblayé, on pourrait négocier avec des chances de succès un règlement définitif. Il s'agit, en réalité, d'établir entre les deux forces aux prises une zone neutre dont les troupes internationales sur place auraient le contrôle. Etant donné ces pourparlers engagés entre le commandement japonais et le commandement chinois, le conseil de la Société des nations s'est réuni hier et a entendu sir John Simon exposer dans quelles conditions un projet d'armistice était soumis aux cabinets de Tokio et de Nankin, dont l'assentiment est évidemment indispensable. M. Paul-Boncour, président du conseil de la Société des nations, a saisi alors ses collègues d'une proposition formelle à laquelle les représentants de l'Italie et de la Grande-Bretagne ont immédiatement adhéré, sir John Simon se disant, de plus, autorisé à déclarer que le gouvernement américain s'associe à la pleine exécution du plan exposé par le représentant de la France au conseil.

Ce plan, comme on le verra plus loin, tend à organiser immédiatement à Shanghai une conférence à laquelle participeront, avec le Japon et la Chine, les autres puissances intéressées à la situation. Partant du principe que le Japon n'a pas de visées territoriales dans la

région de Shanghai et que la Chine admet que la sécurité et l'intégrité de la concession internationale et de la concession française doivent être maintenues, la conférence proposée aura pour objet de rétablir sans délai la paix dans la région de Shanghai, étant bien entendu que sa réunion restera subordonnée aux arrangements pouvant être pris sur place en vue de la cessation des hostilités. Comme, d'autre part, le cabinet de Tokio a suggéré, par une communication de M. Yoshizawa, ministre des affaires étrangères, au conseil de Genève la réunion d'une conférence en vue d'assurer dans l'avenir la sécurité des étrangers à Shanghai, centre dont le caractère international doit être maintenu, — ce qui exclut toute visée particulière de l'Empire du Soleil-Levant — il semble bien qu'il y ait maintenant les chances les plus sérieuses pour que les efforts concordants déployés actuellement soient finalement couronnés de succès.

On peut considérer que le moment est favorable à une médiation. Les bons offices des puissances sont aujourd'hui mieux accueillis qu'ils ne le furent jusqu'ici, alors que la résistance opiniâtre des troupes chinoises tenait les Nippons en échec à Shanghai et à Wou-Sung. Ce serait une erreur, pensons-nous, d'interpréter les dispositions actuelles du Japon à la conciliation comme une preuve de faiblesse ou un aveu du désir de se dégager à tout prix d'une aventure périlleuse. Comme nous l'avons dit déjà à cette place, le Japon a voulu entreprendre à Shanghai une opération de police pour mettre fin au boycottage de ses produits. Il s'est engagé dans cette affaire avec des moyens insuffisants et s'est heurté à de graves difficultés. Son prestige de grande puissance militaire ne lui permettait pas de rester sur un échec. Maintenant qu'il a rompu le front chinois à Kiang-Ouan et qu'il a amené des renforts suffisants pour atteindre en toute certitude son objectif — qui est l'éloignement des troupes chinoises de Shanghai — le gouvernement de Tokio peut accepter de traiter sur le terrain sans perdre la face, sans que son prestige militaire et son autorité politique puissent s'en trouver atteints. Ayant réuni les moyens militaires de l'emporter, il peut se prêter à un arrangement et faire ainsi la preuve de la sincérité de ses déclarations répétées qu'il n'a pas de visées territoriales dans la région de Shanghai et qu'il n'a agi qu'avec la préoccupation de mettre fin au boycottage et de protéger la vie et les biens de ses ressortissants.

Une suspension des hostilités est toujours assez délicate à négocier alors que la bataille fait encore rage, mais les considérations d'ordre essentiellement politique l'emportent à Tokio sur les vues qui prévalaient dans les milieux militaires. Le gouvernement japonais a accepté la proposition de M. Paul-Boncour. Il ne pouvait demeurer indifférent au malaise que la crise de Shanghai fait peser sur la situation internationale et aux manifestations de l'opinion publique dans les grands pays intéressés au maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient. C'est précisément parce que le Japon est une des principales forces politiques du monde que l'on considère sa collaboration permanente avec les autres puissances comme une des conditions essentielles de l'action d'ensemble par laquelle doit s'affirmer, dans une véritable pensée de solidarité internationale, la volonté commune d'une solide organisation de la paix. Sous ce rapport, on ne peut que se réjouir que les perspectives de détente à Shanghai se précisent à la veille même de la réunion de l'Assemblée de la Société des nations, qui pourra ainsi délibérer dans une atmosphère d'apaisement et de concorde et qui va se trouver après-demain devant une situation absolument nouvelle.

A.F.3

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ACTION FRANCAISE, March 3, 1932.

## Des messieurs très polis

Les Japonais, avec leur exquise politesse, ont accepté la médiation de l'amiral Kelly (qui, lui-même, non moins courtois, en a fait hommage à la Ligue de Genève), au moment où ils se savaient sur le point d'atteindre leurs objectifs à Changhaï. Ils ont négocié en combattant, ce qui leur était d'autant plus facile qu'ils avaient toujours affirmé qu'ils ne faisaient pas la guerre.

En résumé, la Société des Nations, d'un bout à l'autre de cette affaire, aura été traitée comme une personne vénérable que l'on affecte de respecter et dont on fait semblant de prendre les avis avec le ferme propos de ne pas les suivre. C'est une expérience pire que les échecs qui lui ont été reprochés, pire que l'impuissance puisqu'il est démontré qu'il est facile de se jouer de la Ligue et de tirer le canon tandis que les représentants des deux belligérants continuent de plaider devant elle.

L'assemblée extraordinaire convoquée à l'appel des Chinois va se réunir juste pour apprendre que la fameuse 19<sup>e</sup> armée chinoise est en déroute et que la force a encore décidé. Elle eût décidé dans tous les cas, si la Ligue eût possédé le moyen de réprimer l'agression (en admettant qu'elle eût possédé une pierre de touche pour désigner l'agresseur), ou si la 19<sup>e</sup> armée, comme l'y exhortait avec véhémence M. William Martin, eût remporté sur les Japonais la victoire de la justice et du droit.

Ce ne sont pas les événements de Changhaï qui avanceront le débat du désarmement. On a toutefois essayé d'en tirer parti en faveur de la proposition française. N'est-ce pas parce qu'il y avait à Changhaï, en raison même des conditions particulières du lieu, une force internationale que l'intervention a pu se produire sans être tout à fait platonique? L'utilité, la nécessité d'une gendarmerie de la paix seraient donc par là même démontrées.

Il n'est pas sûr que tout le monde tire les mêmes conclusions de l'expérience de Changhaï. Le contraire est même à peu près certain. Les Anglais n'ont jamais été favorables au fameux bras séculier de la S. D. N. parce qu'ils ont toujours pensé que la marine, c'est-à-dire la Grande-Bretagne elle-même, aurait la plus grosse charge d'une répression, le dernier moyen, *l'ultima ratio* de toute action internationale devant être le blocus. A Changhaï, si l'Angleterre a pu offrir ses bons offices, c'est parce qu'elle avait en rade des vaisseaux. Cela suffit. Elle n'entretient pas une flotte pour se mettre sur les bras des querelles à propos de la liberté des mers. La création d'une police de la paix sera encore pour une autre fois.

En attendant, nous ne saurions verser de pleurs sur la défaite de la 19<sup>e</sup> armée. Sa victoire eût été celle du nationalisme chinois. Pourquoi celui-là vaudrait-il mieux qu'un autre? Il eût même été plus dangereux étant donné ce qu'il y a derrière lui.  
— J. B.

1 1722

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 2533 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AMI DU PEUPLE, March 3, 1932.

L'ASSEMBLÉE  
DE LA S. D. N.  
QUI SE RÉUNIT  
CE MATIN  
VA SE TROUVER  
DANS UN CRUEL  
EMBARRAS

Après s'être rendus maîtres  
de la situation à Changhaï  
les Japonais ont fait parvenir  
aux autorités chinoises  
leurs conditions  
pour la suspension des hostilités

*Mais au cours d'une entrevue  
la nuit dernière, avec M. Paul-  
Boncour, le délégué de Nankin  
a déclaré s'en tenir à la propo-  
sition du Conseil de la S. D. N.*

L'assemblée de la S. D. N. qui se réunit ce matin, va se trouver dans une situation fort embarrassante. Non seulement le feu n'a pas cessé à Changhaï, comme on l'espérait hier, mais les troupes japonaises, après avoir encerclé Chapeï ont poursuivi leur avance vers le sud et bombardé la voie ferrée qui relie Changhaï à Nankin, coupant ainsi les communications entre la capitale chinoise et le théâtre des opérations militaires.

Il est maintenant évident que le gouvernement japonais ne se déclarera pas satisfait tant qu'il n'aura pas réussi à garantir ses droits en Chine. Pour y parvenir, il ne peut raisonnablement songer à traiter avec un pays en pleine anarchie et sans gouvernement régulier.

C'est ce qui explique la sévérité des conditions posées hier à Changhaï, par le commandant des forces japonaises, pour la suspension des hostilités. Si les Chinois ne donnent pas satisfaction à ce nouvel ultimatum, la Société des Nations aura beau multiplier ses encouragements et faire état des stipulations du Covenant, elle ne parviendra pas à convaincre les Japonais qu'ils doivent sacrifier des intérêts vitaux au respect de conventions qui reposent sur l'idéologie pure.

On imagine l'inquiétude qui règne à Genève. C'est le prestige de la S. D. N. qui sombrera si le sang continue à couler en Chine. Et, pour la plupart des hommes d'Etat, réunis à Genève, ce n'est pas le fait que la guerre fait rage qui constitue une catastrophe, c'est que la Société des Nations fait faillite.

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, March 3, 1932.

## La répercussion de la victoire japonaise sur l'Assemblée extraordinaire de Genève

*L'Assemblée essaiera-t-elle de venger le « Covenant » ou se contentera-t-elle de consacrer et d'ornez le fait accompli ?*

### LES NÉGOCIATIONS VONT REPREDRE A SHANGHAI

Genève, 2 mars.  
Les nouvelles officielles annonçant la retraite des Chinois retranchés aux alentours de Shanghai ont été reçues cet après-midi. A midi et demi (2 h. 30 du matin en Europe occidentale) les Japonais sont entrés à Tazang et, deux heures plus tard, à Chenzu. Autrement dit, le mouvement tournant parti du Nord-Est de Shanghai a atteint le Sud-Ouest et c'est dans cette direction que l'avance se poursuit maintenant. Les troupes chinoises se sont retirées sous la menace de l'encerclement et les abords immédiats de la métropole commerciale sont libérés. L'opération commencée le 16 février a abouti; mais, pour qu'elle fût menée à bien, force a été d'y mettre quatre divisions, soit 50,000 hommes.

Demain, quand l'Assemblée extraordinaire de la Société des Nations se réunira pour examiner le conflit sino-japonais, ce conflit aura donc été réglé par les armes. Pour la Société des Nations, la conjoncture est assez ridicule. Le gouvernement de Tokio, de l'aveu de M. Salo (à la séance tenue par le conseil le 16 février) a enfreint l'article 15 du Covenant et il n'a pas hésité à se faire justice lui-même, car, disait-il, nous ne pouvons compter que sur nous-mêmes. Cependant, il est demeuré tranquillement dans la Société des Nations sans que rien de particulièrement désagréable lui soit arrivé. Mardi, les troupes japonaises ont attaqué derechef, alors que le monde entier, qui ne s'arrête point à la lecture des textes et en retient seulement l'esprit, croyait l'armistice accompli. L'Assemblée imitera-t-elle l'équanimité, la passivité du Conseil? Ou, en dépit de sa faiblesse, essaiera-t-elle de venger le Covenant? Telle est la question qui se pose.

On entend des cris, des grincements de dents et aussi des appels à la vengeance dans les rangs du secrétariat qui a voulu que cette affaire sino-japonaise fût son affaire. Dans cet esprit, un haut fonctionnaire s'écriait aujourd'hui, comme il apprenait la déroute chinoise: « Voilà qui donnera à l'Assemblée, du cœur au ventre ! ». Ces sentiments sont partagés par les délégations des Etats moyens ou petits: Suède, Suisse, Hollande, etc., c'est-à-dire des Etats les moins capables d'action. Mais, les plus grands prennent une attitude réaliste. Dans une importante délégation, quelqu'un s'exclamait devant moi: « Maintenant que les Japonais ont nettoyé le terrain, il sera possible de faire la paix. Sans victoire japonaise, les hostilités n'eussent point été arrêtées. Jamais le gouvernement de Tokio n'eut été à même de céder sur le point d'honneur ! »

Pour l'Assemblée, pour la Société des Nations, le mieux est donc de consacrer le règlement obtenu par les troupes nippones, de faire contre mauvaise fortune bon cœur, de ne point revenir sur le passé, de ne point regarder de trop près au dommage subi par le Covenant et de tapasser gaillardement sur la rue. L'autre terme de l'alternative consisterait à répéter dans l'Assemblée la séance lamentable qui déshonora le conseil le 16 février. Il est probable que, prudemment, MM. Paul-Boncour et Hymans, appelé à tenir le premier rôle dans l'Assemblée de

les hostilités soient suspendues, le gouvernement chinois accepte les propositions de M. Paul-Boncour et il se déclare prêt à participer à la conférence de Shanghai à condition que le problème mandchourien n'y soit point discuté. » Cette nouvelle a semé le désarroi chez les plus fanatiques des pro-chinois. Comment se montrer, à Genève, plus chinois que les Chinois de Shanghai? A la vérité, la délégation chinoise avait redouté toute la journée d'être mise en présence d'une reprise des pourparlers sino-japonais. Pour cette raison, elle n'avait cessé de réclamer que la première séance de l'Assemblée fût tenue dès le matin, c'est-à-dire à un moment où le résultat des pourparlers de Shanghai ne pût être connu. D'où les décisions contradictoires prises par le président du conseil de la Société des Nations et par le secrétaire général. Une affiche était déjà collée faisant savoir que la séance de l'Assemblée était reportée à l'après-midi. L'horaire originel, 11 heures du matin, fut promptement rétabli.

La séance de demain matin sera marquée par un discours de M. Paul-Boncour qui préside l'Assemblée jusqu'à ce qu'elle ait fait choix de son président (discours assez bref et de simple appareil), par la vérification des pouvoirs et par l'élection de M. Hymans qui, bien entendu, devra, lui aussi, s'acquitter d'une harangue. L'élection des vice-présidents pouvait susciter une question assez délicate: le Japon, partie au conflit, devrait-il être représenté au bureau comme les autres grandes puissances du conseil? On semble devoir tourner la difficulté en excluant du bureau toutes les grandes puissances, en laissant le champ libre à des pays comme la Suède et la Suisse.

A la séance de l'après-midi seront produits le rapport de M. Paul-Boncour sur l'action du Conseil, les renseignements recueillis par sir Eric Drummond, les notes explicatives chinoise et japonaise. Puis, le docteur Yen et M. Matsudeira, ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, auront la parole. Le premier réclamera l'application des articles 15 et 16 du Covenant, non seulement au cas spécial de Shanghai, mais à l'ensemble du litige sino-japonais, y compris la Mandchourie. M. Matsudeira s'opposera à l'évocation du problème mandchourien; il donnera la version japonaise des événements de Shanghai et il définira une fois de plus la politique de Tokio.

Jusqu'à ce point, la marche de la séance est tout à fait prévisible. Ce qui suivra est beaucoup plus douteux. Débat général ou nomination de la commission de l'Assemblée chargée de rédiger le rapport? Ajournement permettant à la médiation britannique d'opérer? On ne sait. Quand la commission sera nommée, une question difficile appellera règlement. Les Etats-Unis seront-ils invités à dépêcher un observateur? Et, s'ils sont invités, les autres Etats non membres de la Société des Nations seront-ils laissés au dehors? Mais, conviendrait-il de faire entrer la Russie des Soviets dans les affaires sino-japonaises? Sur tous ces points les gens discutent à perte d'haleine et Byzance reprend ces droits dont, ici, elle n'est jamais tout à fait dépouillée.

PERTINAX

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ÉCHO DE PARIS, March 3, 1932.

## La répercussion de la victoire japonaise sur l'Assemblée extraordinaire de Genève

*L'Assemblée essaiera-t-elle de venger le « Covenant » ou se contentera-t-elle de consacrer et d'orner le fait accompli ?*

### LES NÉGOCIATIONS VONT REPRENDRE A SHANGHAI

Nations sans que rien de particulièrement désagréable lui soit arrivé. Mardi, les troupes japonaises ont attaqué derechef, alors que le monde entier, qui ne s'arrête point à la lecture des textes et en relieit seulement l'esprit, croyait l'armistice accompli. L'Assemblée imitera-t-elle l'équanimité, la passivité du Conseil? Ou, en dépit de sa faiblesse, essaiera-t-elle de venger le Covenant? Telle est la question qui se pose.

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Néanmoins, de cette séance, beaucoup sortiront déconcertés et inquiets. Sans doute, la victoire japonaise est, en Extrême-Orient, la victoire de la civilisation, et nul ne peut mesurer au juste ce qu'eussent été les conséquences d'un échec du gouvernement de Tokio et d'une exaltation militaire chinoise : la colonisation européenne, probablement, n'y eût pas résisté. Mais ceux qui avaient foi dans l'avenir de la Société des Nations ne peuvent être que désemparés. Et ceux qui, sans se fier outre mesure à la Société des Nations, veulent le respect de la loi internationale, sont bien forcés de s'alarmer des libertés qu'une grande puissance vient d'être contrainte de prendre avec les textes auxquels elle s'était liée. D'où le mécontentement de nos amis de l'Europe centrale et orientale et leur ressentiment envers le secrétariat, dont la témérité, en septembre, octobre et novembre, jeta le Japon plus loin qu'il n'eût été de son propre mouvement. Beaucoup de temps devra s'écouler pour que, dans l'esprit de la plupart, sir Eric Drummond et ses collaborateurs bénéficient d'une amnistie.

Ce soir, les représentants japonais communiquent aux délégations un télégramme qui leur parvient de Shanghai. L'amiral japonais qui commande dans les eaux de cette ville et M. Matsuoka se sont rendus sur le bateau-amiral de sir John Kelly et lui ont communiqué les conditions de paix du gouvernement de Tokio. Demain, à 1 heure (Europe occidentale : 4 heures du matin), sir John Kelly réunira à son bord les représentants japonais et chinois. Une communication de la délégation chinoise confirme ce renseignement : « A condition que

l'ennemi, devra, lui aussi, s'acquiescer d'une harangue. L'élection des vice-présidents pouvait susciter une question assez délicate : le Japon, partie au conflit, devrait-il être représenté au bureau comme les autres grandes puissances du conseil? On semble devoir tourner la difficulté en excluant du bureau toutes les grandes puissances, en laissant le champ libre à des pays comme la Suède et la Suisse.

A la séance de l'après-midi seront produits le rapport de M. Paul-Boncour sur l'action du Conseil, les renseignements recueillis par sir Eric Drummond, les notes explicatives chinoise et japonaise. Puis, le docteur Yen et M. Matsudeira, ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, auront la parole. Le premier réclamera l'application des articles 15 et 16 du Covenant, non seulement au cas spécial de Shanghai, mais à l'ensemble du litige sino-japonais, y compris la Mandchourie. M. Matsudeira s'opposera à l'évocation du problème mandchourien ; il donnera la version japonaise des événements de Shanghai et il dessinera une fois de plus la politique de Tokio.

Jusqu'à ce point, la marche de la séance est tout à fait prévisible. Ce qui suivra est beaucoup plus douteux. Débat général ou nomination de la commission de l'Assemblée chargée de rédiger le rapport? Ajournement permettant à la médiation britannique d'opérer? On ne sait. Quand la commission sera nommée, une question difficile appellera règlement. Les Etats-Unis seront-ils invités à dépêcher un observateur? Et, s'ils sont invités, les autres Etats non membres de la Société des Nations seront-ils laissés au dehors? Mais, conviendrait-il de faire entrer la Russie des Soviets dans les affaires sino-japonaises? Sur tous ces points les gens discutent à perte d'haleine et Byzance reprend ces droits dont, ici, elle n'est jamais tout à fait dépouillée.

P. PERTINAX.

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 2533 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ŒUVRE NOUVELLE, March 3, 1932.

## Editorial

Par une singulière fatalité, il semble bien que la S.D.N. dans tous ces événements d'Extrême-Orient joue un rôle qui était jusqu'à présent réservé aux carabiniers d'Offenbach. La commission Lytton chargée d'enquêter sur l'affaire de Mandchourie débarque à Tokio quand déjà les Japonais ont sur le terrain atteint tous leurs objectifs, ayant arraché à la Chine cette vaste et riche province. Et la proposition Paul-Boncour ne survient qu'à l'heure où, après des semaines de tuerie, les Japonais ont mis l'armée chinoise en déroute.

Fatalité, disons-nous ! Peut-être, mais à Genève on aide grandement cette fatalité. On y délibère quand les autres se battent ; on nomme des commissions quand il faudrait agir ; on agit seulement quand il n'y a presque plus rien à faire.

Certes nous avons applaudi à la proposition Paul-Boncour, nous avons loué cette initiative, mais nous avons espéré qu'elle ne serait pas trop tardive. Maintenant que par la force les Japonais sont arrivés à leurs fins, maintenant que des milliers d'hommes sont tombés, cette proposition servira à peine à sauver la face de la S.D.N.

En fait les Japonais acceptent de négocier ; mais ce n'est point parce que la S.D.N. les y contraint ; c'est seulement parce qu'ils ont remporté la victoire. C'est dire qu'on en est revenu aux pratiques anciennes : d'abord la guerre, ensuite l'arbitrage. Ce n'est certes pas ce que nous attendions de la S.D.N.

Il reste à savoir s'il peut en être autrement. A pareille question, nous répondrions en toute netteté : non ! Aussi longtemps du moins que la S.D.N. sera ce qu'elle est, c'est-à-dire une sorte d'académie politique ou économique, uniquement capable de formuler des vœux platoniques.

Pour que cela change, il faut que l'organisme de Genève soit pourvu d'une autorité incontestable et cette autorité ne peut lui être donnée qu'à la condition qu'il possède les moyens de coercition grâce auxquels ses décisions seront suivies d'effet.

Force armée internationale, moyens de pression économique, moyens de pression financière, voilà les armes qu'il faut mettre au service de la S.D.N., voilà ce qui lui confèrera l'autorité nécessaire.

Pour parvenir à ce but, il faut évidemment que chaque Etat abandonne une part de sa souveraineté. Sacrifice, sans doute, mais sacrifice indispensable. Et ceux-là seuls qui le consentiront prouveront qu'ils sont sincèrement attachés à la cause de la paix.



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Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 2353 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INTRANSIGEANT, March 3, 1932.

## Vers l'accord

Intran 3/3  
En même temps que le Japon acceptait de se prêter à un arrangement, dont les amiraux Nomura et Matsuoko jetaient les bases avec le délégué chinois, M. Wellington Koo, à bord du cuirassé de l'amiral Kelly, il dirigeait une nouvelle offensive contre les lignes chinoises au nord de Chang-Haï et il obligeait ces dernières à reculer de vingt kilomètres.

C'est précisément à cette libération de la concession internationale que tendait apparemment le Japon. Il assure même n'avoir pas eu d'autre but. En sorte que le succès militaire obtenu par son armée, en plaçant la Chine devant un fait accompli, ne devrait, en somme, que faciliter la conclusion d'un armistice souhaité par le monde entier.

Le fait, du moins, que M. Sato ait, hier, à Genève, déposé entre les mains de M. Paul-Boncour une acceptation définitive de l'arrangement proposé par la S.D.N. aux deux puissances laisse espérer que nous touchons au terme du conflit.

Les efforts de conciliation tentés par le Conseil de la Société des Nations et par son président, M. Paul-Boncour, en particulier, ont été méritoires. Mais ne nous faisons aucune illusion : ils n'auraient pas suffi à eux seuls à arrêter cette opération de police qu'on n'appelait pas la guerre, mais qui était bel et bien une guerre sino-japonaise.

Ce qui, vraisemblablement, a fait hésiter l'agresseur, c'est, d'une part, l'intervention possible de l'Amérique contre lui. La lettre de M. Stimson au sénateur Borah a fait comprendre à Tokio que les Etats-Unis n'étaient pas disposés à laisser compromettre leur prestige en Asie.

Ce qui était plus grave encore, c'est que le Japon manque de « liquidités », que sa situation financière est relativement assez obérée, et qu'il a compris qu'il n'avait à espérer aucun concours en espèces de la part des trois seules puissances qui à l'heure actuelle soient en état de décaisser les deux ou trois milliards nécessaires à une opération de quelque envergure.

Un diplomate de nos amis assure que si, avant d'engager aucune hostilité, le Japon avait seulement recouru à l'emploi de ce qui s'appelle à Londres la cavalerie de Saint-Georges, et versé entre les mains des généraux cantonnais de dix à vingt millions, il aurait obtenu sans coup férir la paix à Chang-Haï, pour laquelle il aura perdu des hommes et dépensé plus d'un milliard.

Quoi qu'il en soit, si des tentatives faites sur le lieu des opérations en même temps qu'à Genève peut sortir, avec l'armistice, une paix définitive, il faudra se féliciter de la chance inouïe qui sauve, *in extremis*, le prestige compromis de la Société des Nations. Toute l'Europe, occupée au désarmement, a besoin que l'organisme genevois se défende, et conserve son autorité.

LÉON BAILBY.

Martin 3

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, March 3, 1932.

**AUJOURD'HUI A GENÈVE  
ASSEMBLÉE  
EXTRAORDINAIRE  
A MOINS QU'ELLE NE SOIT  
AJOURNÉE**

*Martin 3/3*  
Les nouvelles arrivées hier de Chine  
ont trompé les espoirs  
mais on compte encore  
sur un armistice à bref délai

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 2 mars. — *Par téléphone.*  
— A la veille de l'assemblée extraordinaire, nous subissons cette nuit, au fur et à mesure des nouvelles qui nous arrivent, une bousculade de chaque instant.

Dans l'après-midi on considérait comme acquis que les objectifs militaires ayant été amplement atteints par l'état-major japonais, celui-ci arrêterait la poursuite des troupes chinoises en déroute. C'était à peu près le sens des renseignements apportés dans la journée par M. Sato à M. Paul-Boncour.

On espérait que la bataille étant terminée, sinon faute de combattants, du moins en raison de la disparition d'un des combattants, la séance de demain débiterait par un armistice de fait. Ce stade a été maintenant dépassé; les dernières dépêches, qui parviennent par voies diverses aux délégations, indiquent que le mouvement d'encerclement opéré par l'armée japonaise s'est développé avec une rapidité surprenante. L'on est bien obligé de convenir que c'est sur les champs de bataille et non point à Genève, ni même dans les chancelleries, que se joue maintenant la partie.

Tout ce que nous avons pu dire ou écrire ne signifie pas grand'chose devant la brutalité des faits relatés de minute en minute par le télégraphe.

Dans la nuit qui précède l'assemblée, c'est une veillée d'armes bien émouvante et l'on comprend l'angoisse de M. Paul-Boncour, auquel incombe la lourde responsabilité d'épargner à ce congrès extraordinaire des nations le désastre peut-être irréparable du ridicule.

Déjà, à plusieurs reprises, le secrétariat de la Société des nations comptant sur quelques nouvelles plus favorables, avait déplacé l'heure de l'ouverture de l'assemblée. Il n'est pas impossible maintenant qu'à l'aube — car personne ne s'endormira cette nuit à Genève — l'on arrive à ajourner l'assemblée.

C'est une bien cruelle leçon de choses pour la Société des nations et également pour les négociateurs du désarmement.

L'on aura quelque mal, après cette preuve finale, succédant à un bref instant d'espoirs excessifs, à recommander la suppression des armes comme seul moyen d'aboutir à une consolidation des relations pacifiques entre les peuples.

Henry de Korab.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972  
By *Milton O. Blumstein*  
NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Doc 3*

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ŒUVRE, March 5, 1932.

# LA PAIX SINO-JAPONAISE devant l'Assemblée de la S.D.N.

Le commandement japonais a encore déclenché  
une offensive. -- Le commandement chinois,  
en vue de faciliter l'armistice,  
a ordonné le repli de ses troupes

Mme Blaniaud voudrait que ce geste  
fût renouvelé, car...

Il vient d'un cœur sensible et intelligent. Ecoutez : il y a une quinzaine de jours, j'ai dû prendre part à une collecte pour offrir des fleurs à une personne décédée à l'âge de 89 ans et que je n'avais jamais vue, pas plus d'ailleurs que les autres personnes, qui ont ainsi jeté 130 francs. Cet envoi de fleurs était-il nécessaire pour que la fille de la décédée connaisse la part que nous prenions à sa peine ?

Et ne serait-il pas souhaitable que les personnes en deuil prennent toujours l'initiative du geste de M. Pomagalski ?

Evidemment, les marchands de fleurs et couronnes la trouveront « mauvaise » ! Mais faut-il mettre en avant même un instant leur intérêt

avec celui de ceux qui souffrent ?

Société des Nations l'enregistrera. Cette différence, l'assemblée de la de celles d'autrefois !

Telle est la nouvelle victoire du Japon sur la Chine. Que c'est loin l'ultimum et l'armistice japonais

limite de 20 kilomètres, prévue par façon à reporter leurs lignes à la avait commencé dans la nuit, de l'approche de la paix : leur repli

te. Les Chinois avaient déjà cédé à une suprême offensive enveloppante cette menace. Ils ont alors déployé gouvernement qui a brandi sur eux la menace de la paix. C'est leur

rc. Ils l'ont eue, peut-on dire, sous brusquement ils ont eu la victoire de février.

dents, à la cadence de tout le mois se, à la cadence des jours précédents, à la cadence des jours précédents, à la cadence des jours précédents

ils ne l'étaient pas. Le 1<sup>er</sup>, ils pour- dans quelles conditions ? Le 1<sup>er</sup>, ils l'ont été.

pour être vainqueurs, le 2<sup>e</sup>. généraux japonais feraient tout avons annoncé que les armées et dehors des voix des parties, nous

sanctions votées à l'unanimité, en qualification de l'agresseur et des articles 15 et 16, qui prévoient la

une conciliation, mais d'après les l'article 10 du Pacte, qui prévoit ger du conflit, non plus d'après

semble plénière le 3 mars pour ju- té des Nations se réunirait en as- Lorsqu'il fut décidé que la Société

hommes et du matériel. droit un jour, à force d'amener des jours, coûte que coûte, l'obtien-

jours dit que le commandement ja- Cette victoire, nous avons tou- n'est plus le beau passé.

gueres du dernier demi-siècle. Ce tout, aux vieux soldats des grandes armes, ont dû être amères, malgré

aux japonais la victoire de leurs Les dépêches qui ont annoncé

Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 2353 of March 8, 1952.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, March 3, 1952.

## L'ASSEMBLÉE EXTRAORDINAIRE DE LA S. D. N. L'U. R. S. S. et le Japon

L'Assemblée de la Société des Nations s'ouvrira ce matin à 11 heures. C'est une réunion extraordinaire. Elle a été convoquée, en effet, sur la demande de la Chine en vertu de l'article 15 du Covenant.

Mais elle est également extraordinaire par les circonstances dans lesquelles elle s'ouvre. Le Japon a, en effet, remporté à Changhaï une victoire complète. Les troupes chinoises battent en retraite. Le corps expéditionnaire nippon a atteint l'objectif qui lui était assigné. Par conséquent, le gouvernement de Tokio est « tout disposé de conclure la paix ». Il s'agit naturellement de la paix imposée par le vainqueur au vaincu.

L'Assemblée de la S. D. N. acceptera-t-elle le fait accompli ? Consentira-t-elle de jouer le rôle odieux du juge qui donne raison au plus fort parce qu'il est le plus fort ? Capitulera-t-elle devant le militarisme japonais comme son Conseil le faisait durant les derniers cinq mois ? Se laissera-t-elle baffouer comme son Conseil s'est laissé ridiculiser par la diplomatie japonaise au cours des derniers jours de la prétendue détenté ?

L'Assemblée a deux tâches immédiates à remplir : condamner l'action militaire du Japon et prendre les mesures pour faire cesser les hostilités. Ceci fait, elle devra exiger le rétablissement du « statu quo ante » en Chine et imposer la procédure arbitrale pour le règlement des litiges sino-japonais. Si elle ne le fait pas, si elle se laisse bernier par les promesses du Japon, si elle crée l'impression qu'elle n'ose pas condamner l'agresseur et défendre la victime, elle sonnera son propre glas. Les peuples s'en détourneront avec dégoût.

Mais pour réussir dans sa tâche de rétablir la paix et la justice en Extrême-Orient, la S. D. N. doit immédiatement provoquer la collaboration des Etats-Unis et de l'U. R. S. S. Rien ne pourra se faire d'utile sans la Russie, voisine immédiate du Japon et de la Chine, et sans les Etats-Unis, la principale puissance du Pacifique. Et qu'on ne nous dise pas que les statuts de la S. D. N. s'opposent à la collaboration de ces deux Etats qui ne font pas partie de l'institution internationale de Genève. Il y a des précédents. Et même s'il n'y en avait pas, on devrait les créer. La paix vaut bien une entorse aux règlements !

Et puisque je parle de la Russie, il faut que je résume ici mes observations concernant son attitude.

Dès le commencement du conflit sino-japonais, j'ai reproché au gouvernement de Moscou sa passivité. Attendre les événements, laisser les dangers de guerre s'accumuler, ce n'est pas faire une politique de paix. C'est se condamner soit à la capitulation, soit à la guerre, soit à l'une et l'autre presque simultanément.

Si dès le premier jour de l'agression japonaise contre la Chine, le gouvernement de Moscou, au lieu de proclamer et reproclamer sa neutralité — ce qui ne pouvait qu'encourager l'agresseur — avait pris l'initiative d'une action commune de toutes les puissances contre le Japon, celui-ci n'aurait pas osé poursuivre la conquête de la Mandchourie et l'attaque contre Changhaï. Et cette action commune aurait été efficace même sans recours aux moyens de pression économique. Aucun pays, si armé et fort qu'il soit, ne peut faire la guerre quand le monde entier est contre la guerre.

On me dira : mais la S. D. N. et les Etats-Unis n'auraient pas répondu à l'initiative soviétique. Peut-être, bien que je sois enclin de penser le contraire. Mais supposons que les gouvernements capitalistes aient refusé. Ne pense-t-on pas que l'appel des Soviétiques à l'opinion publique aurait

provoqué une telle émotion que les gouvernements auraient été dans l'obligation de céder ?

Les Soviétiques ne l'ont pas fait. Ils se sont ainsi isolés. Ils sont restés seuls en face du Japon qui avait manifestement l'intention d'entrer en conflit avec la Russie. Et de jour en jour, la position de l'U. R. S. S. s'affaiblissait.

Certes, la S. D. N. de son côté n'a rien fait pour inviter la Russie à collaborer avec elle. Le « Populaire » n'a pas cessé de dénoncer cette attitude de la S. D. N. Mais au lieu de faciliter aux gouvernements bourgeois réunis à Genève leur jeu japonais, les Soviétiques ne devaient-ils pas essayer au moins de l'empêcher ? C'est là une faute terrible que Moscou a commise.

Et comme l'U. R. S. S. ne veut pas de guerre, comme Staline veut à tout prix éviter la guerre avec le Japon, la Russie a été obligée, sous la menace du Japon, de s'effacer devant lui et de permettre aux troupes japonaises de se servir du chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois en vue de conquérir le Nord de la Mandchourie et de s'approcher de Vladivostok.

J'ai critiqué sévèrement l'attitude passée de Staline. Mais j'approuve avec la même force son attitude présente. Je crois que sa faute initiale a placé la Russie dans une situation très dangereuse : elle a ruiné les sympathies que les Chinois nourrissaient à l'égard de la Russie révolutionnaire ; elle a enhardi le militarisme japonais.

Mais, à l'heure présente, il est trop tard pour revenir en arrière. Si l'U. R. S. S. ne veut pas connaître les horreurs de la guerre, elle doit céder. C'est là le point de vue de Staline. Et Staline a raison. Ni le « prestige », ni les droits sur le chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois, ni même la perte d'une province lointaine ne peuvent ou plutôt ne doivent justifier la guerre.

Certes, il n'est pas facile de maintenir longtemps une pareille attitude. Nous l'avons vu dernièrement à Nankin, où le réveil du sentiment national a balayé le gouvernement qui ne voulait pas de guerre. Mais nous espérons que Staline réussira malgré l'opposition qui se dessine au sein du parti communiste et du gouvernement soviétique. Et s'il réussit à faire prévaloir la politique de paix à tout prix, il aura rendu un grand service à la Russie et au monde.

Dans les circonstances actuelles, c'est l'unique moyen d'empêcher le désastre que serait une nouvelle guerre russo-japonaise.

O. ROSENFELD.

avenir 4

Enclosure No. 18 to Despatch No. 2353 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L' VENIR, March 4, 1932.

## La trêve sino-japonaise



Les Chinois et les Japonais ne se battent plus. Il y a probablement, à cet heureux événement, plusieurs raisons : la situation financière des Nippons, la qualité de la résistance chinoise, que Tokio et le monde entier avaient sous-estimée, l'agitation des puissances dont les intérêts dans le Pacifique eussent été compromis si la guerre s'était prolongée et étendue, et enfin le fait qu'on a, faute de pouvoir mieux, laissé les belligérants s'arranger entre eux. La dépêche qu'Albert Londres a adressée au Journal donne beaucoup à penser sur les procédés diplomatiques des militaires jaunes et vous invite à conseiller aux arbitres blancs un peu de scepticisme et beaucoup de prudence. Car, les canons s'étant tus, la Société des Nations va pouvoir parler. Tout le monde aura ainsi « retrouvé la face ». Le Japon en rejetant les Chinois à vingt kilomètres de Changhaï, les Chinois en ayant tenu tête rigoureusement, Genève en se saisissant du problème dans le moment où il paraît résolu -- et où il ne l'est pas du tout.

Je ne raillerai pas la Société des Nations : elle a fait ce qu'elle a pu : mais elle ne pouvait rien, et son seul tort est d'avoir agi, au début, comme si elle pouvait quelque chose. Avant qu'on ait, des bords du Léman, le moyen d'empêcher deux peuples du Pacifique de s'envoyer des obus, il coulera de l'eau sous les ponts du Rhône ! Mais enfin, sinon malgré la Société des Nations, du moins sans elle, le calme est revenu ; et la discussion commence. Sur quoi va-t-elle porter ? Sur les responsabilités ? Il semble que l'on s'engage dans cette voie périlleuse. Si on s'obstine à régler le conflit sino-japonais en palabrant sur les articles X et Y des instruments diplomatiques, violés à qui mieux mieux, nous pouvons prédire aux Genevois qu'ils n'obtiendront pas, demain, de meilleurs résultats qu'hier. S'ils

se lancent dans cette entreprise, il leur faudra liquider non seulement l'affaire de Changhaï mais aussi celle de la Mandchourie, et ni le Japon ni la Chine ne le leur permettront : tous deux se méfient, comme s'ils connaissaient la fable de l'huître et des plaideurs. Craignons que les rigides et logiques esprits occidentaux ne soient submergés par le combat des deux Subtilités qui va se dérouler devant eux. Non, qu'ils ne s'appesantissent pas trop sur les responsabilités...

Mais qu'ils pensent bien à ceci : le conflit en est exactement au même point qu'il y a un mois. Le Japon a été exaspéré par le boycott chinois, et c'est là le fond de toute l'histoire. Par les excès excessifs des bandes chinoises en Mandchourie aussi, c'est entendu : mais le boycottage passe avant toute chose. Les Chinois y renonceraient-ils ? Il n'y a pas apparence. Le Japon évacuera-t-il la Mandchourie « indépendante » ? Encore moins. Alors ? La question n'a pas fait un pas depuis les premières opérations vers Moukden : sauf qu'ayant tâté de la guerre, les deux parties apprécient les avantages d'une détente. On peut profiter de l'occasion pour leur demander de s'entendre, comme il leur est souvent arrivé de le faire. Mais que messieurs les médiateurs prennent garde ! Il ne faut mettre le doigt ni entre le Corse et l'Arabe, ni entre le Céleste et le Nippon. Puisqu'on ne peut rien leur imposer, le mieux est de les laisser échanger leurs politesses, d'encourager leurs bonnes intentions, mais de toujours se souvenir qu'ils n'en ont fait jusqu'ici et n'en feront encore demain qu'à leur tête.

La Société des Nations part d'un bon sentiment, mais elle n'est pas encore parvenue à se persuader de « l'inégalité » des races humaines, comme disait Gobineau, ni même, plus simplement, de leur dissemblance

SENATUS.

FIG. 4

Enclosure No. 19 to Despatch No. 2553 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, March 4, 1932.

## LES NÈGRES DE GENÈVE



Nous ne savons encore si les négociations engagées entre Japonais et Chinois « ont abouti à un résultat satisfaisant », selon une formule éminemment diplomatique, car elle ne veut rien dire. Il s'agit de savoir pour qui ce résultat est satisfaisant ; il l'est rarement pour tout le monde. Dans la vie internationale, comme partout, ce qui est un succès pour l'un est un échec pour l'autre.

Au point de vue humain, il y aura résultat satisfaisant à Changhaï si le sang cesse de couler. Au point de vue des marchands de canons, les dieux seront favorables si les hostilités continuent et s'il y a encore de beaux jours pour leur trafic sur lequel la S. D. N. ferme pudiquement les yeux. La limitation des armements, du moins dans les pays pacifiques, ce qui aggrave les risques de guerre, est digne de sa sollicitude. Mais interdire l'exportation des canons, mitrailleuses, tanks et avions en Extrême-Orient serait contraire aux intérêts de l'institution. Ce serait rendre impossible ces guerres qui n'en sont pas, puisqu'on ne les déclare pas, mais qui en sont tout de même, puisqu'on les fait, et qui ont l'avantage de justifier l'emploi, et le traitement, de nos pacificateurs patentés. La S. D. N. doit avoir pour idéal secret de ne pas réaliser son idéal public, ce qui la rendrait sans objet.

Cet idéal secret, la S. D. N. y a été fidèle en Extrême-Orient. Elle n'a rien négligé pour y entretenir le conflit, en exaltant la xénophobie chinoise et en offensant l'amour-propre national du Japon. On sait qu'une première tentative de négociation directe entre les belligérants a échoué par l'intervention de la S. D. N. adressant au Japon, au moment où les choses s'arrangeaient toutes seules, un avertissement unilatéral qui l'a b'essé, tandis que la Chine l'interprétait comme un conseil de résistance.

Le résultat satisfaisant pour la S. D. N. consiste donc à favoriser la guerre sans en avoir l'air, puis, quand la paix se fait sans elle, d'avoir l'air d'y jouer le principal rôle. C'est pourquoi, à la veille de l'assemblée qui s'est réunie hier, le Conseil a, en toute hâte, adopté les bases arrêtées par les Chinois et les Japonais sous les auspices de la marine britannique. Leur proposition est aussitôt devenue la « résolution Paul-Boncour ». On n'insiste pas sur le fait que cette « résolution » est l'œuvre du délégué japonais, M. Sato, ce qui permet d'en présager l'acceptation par son gouvernement. C'est même la seule chance pour cette résolution d'être une solution.

M. Paul-Boncour a fait violence à sa modestie en ne déclinant pas cette paternité, de même qu'il a fait violence à sa sincérité, dimanche dernier, en proclamant devant un auditoire départemental, à Bourg, sa foi dans la S. D. N. malgré la rude épreuve du conflit sino-japonais. A l'en croire, son impuissance en Extrême-Orient est strictement régionale et on aurait tort d'en conclure qu'elle se manifesterait également en Europe. Puisque M. Paul-Boncour est un parlementaire et qu'il a une situation officielle à Genève, il est doublement qualifié pour ne dire que la vérité, surtout en ce qui concerne Genève. Sinon, nous lui ferions observer que, pour les profanes, c'est le contraire qui est la vérité. C'est une malchance, a-t-il dit, pour la S. D. N. d'avoir eu à régler un conflit si complexe sur un théâtre si éloigné. Or, le conflit, né d'une indiscutable violation des traités par les Chinois, est très simple. L'éloignement était une circonstance favorable, car il engendre, autant que possible, le désintéressement qui est la première condition d'un arbitrage. Aucune puissance européenne n'a d'intérêt absolument vital en Extrême-Orient ; les moyennes et petites puissances n'en ont aucun. En outre, c'est là seulement que la S. D. N. pouvait compter sur le concours des Etats-Unis. Enfin, la Chine est le lieu classique des interventions collectives, de sorte que les simulacres de Genève, loin d'être un progrès, sont une régression par rapport à l'ancienne diplomatie du temps où il n'y avait pas de S. D. N., mais où il y avait une Europe. Jamais tant de facilités ne seraient réunies dans un conflit plus proche dont le premier résultat serait de diviser les arbitres en deux camps.

A Genève, les puissances ne sont d'accord sur rien, sauf sur la nécessité de sauver, au prix de la vérité, la face de la S. D. N. en lui attribuant des résultats où elle n'est pour rien et que souvent elle a tout fait pour empêcher. Les délégués lui font signer des papiers qu'ils ont rédigés en tant que représentants de leurs pays respectifs. Ils écrivent pour elle ; ce sont des nègres, au sens que l'argot littéraire donne à ce mot. Ils vengent la liberté en mettant à l'ordre du jour de la session la lutte contre l'esclavage en Liberia.

Enclosure No. 20 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA JOURNAL INDUSTRIEL, March 4, 1932.

## Le règlement de Changhaï

Lorsque la session extraordinaire de la S. D. N., convoquée sur la demande de la Chine, en vertu de l'article 15 du pacte, pour examiner le conflit sino-japonais, s'ouvrait hier matin à Genève, M. Paul-Boncour a pu annoncer que les hostilités avaient cessé à Changhaï. Les Japonais avaient, en effet, atteint *in extremis* tous leurs objectifs, c'est-à-dire une zone qui dégagait Changhaï et ses entrepôts d'une vingtaine de kilomètres.

Le drame d'Extrême-Orient approche d'un dénouement qui ne sera pas définitif, puisque les subtilités du Pacifique défient le temps et son insaisissabilité. Il apparaissait d'abord, cet automne, comme une de ces querelles en miniature symbolisée sur d'antiques estampes. La rivalité des deux grandes races jaunes eut vite une autre allure et, tout en maintenant des effectifs de quinze mille hommes sans doute interchangeables, l'Empire du soleil levant sut préparer un protectorat. L'assimilation eût été un non-sens et, ne fût-ce que pour des considérations fiscales, il était élégant de sauver la face en appelant au pouvoir un membre de la famille impériale. Mais l'affaire mandchourienne, dictée par les nécessités de l'expansion économique d'un Japon surpeuplé, avait aussi des répercussions économiques, puisque la Chine se refusait, par xénophobie, à recevoir les produits du Japon et les boycottait. Rappelons la distribution des rôles : à la Mandchourie les hommes dans les exploitations minières et agricoles et à la Chine les marchandises. Mais MM. les étudiants chinois avaient d'autres velléités : l'heure de la cavalerie de Saint-Georges était passée. Changhaï était sans doute, militairement, le plus mauvais objectif, mais c'est la bouche de la Chine et de sa consommation et pour garder le marché, c'est là qu'il fallait donner le coup de poing. Voilà le dessein ; mais, en période de crise universelle, les Etats n'ont pas le moyen, sauf à courir le risque de catastrophe financière, d'engager des dépenses excessives. C'est donc avec un yen affaibli et dans des conditions stratégiques défavorables que le Japon engageait l'offensive par petits paquets, méthode rejetée par tous les précédents ; ajoutons que, à part ce conflit intérieur entre les finances et la défense nationale, il fallait compter avec trente-six diplomates et la T. S. F., car on ne peut plus, comme jadis, couper le télégraphe. Les compagnies de débarquement se sont, en outre, heurtées à toute une population, en rébellion à l'avant comme à l'arrière et qui n'avait donc aucun avantage à fuir et, sur le flanc, en con-

tact avec une zone internationale intangible. Les Japonais durent donc accumuler les moyens et c'est alors seulement qu'ils purent remporter une victoire.

Deux enseignements sont alors à retenir. Si la S. D. N. avait eu, dès le début, une force internationale, selon les propositions de M. André Tardieu, sans doute aurait-elle pu faire prévaloir son arbitrage d'une façon plus positive que par le papier qui ne désarme jamais, les palabres télégraphiques et les démarches collectives. Les troupes internationales, dès qu'elles ont été rassemblées, ont, en effet, exercé une influence certaine dans la solution du conflit. Deuxièmement, Changhaï, l'un des plus grands centres du négoce international, souffre depuis des années des désordres chinois dont les apparences sont intellectuelles pour la face genevoise et réclame avant tout de l'ordre. Aujourd'hui, c'est le statut de ce commerce qu'il faut fixer. M. Stimson a écrit à M. Borah le sentiment de son gouvernement au sujet du régime chinois et rappelle l'accord des puissances et son intangibilité, mais les Etats-Unis, dont le Pacifique est l'un des principaux clients, ont avant tout, comme nous, à ce que tous les pays en sous-consommation retrouvent leur pouvoir d'achat. Que M. Hymans, le nouveau président de la S. D. N., songe que nous sommes en crise et qu'avant tout il faut que les Chinois, victimes des politiciens et des condottieri, aient la possibilité d'acheter et retrouvent leur ancienne prospérité. Le commerce international doit, lui aussi, retrouver des garanties de sécurité qui lui font défaut depuis que les populations sont victimes de l'anarchie.

Décidés à combattre la crise, nous ne pouvons que souhaiter un règlement qui rétablisse l'ordre et, par là même, bénéficiera aux échanges. Les champs d'expansion doivent être, par ailleurs, définis. Le Japon a en Mandchourie et en Chine, pour ses enfants, son commerce et ses produits, un débouché naturel ; nous avons, quant à nous, en Indochine, et nous l'avons marqué souvent, un centre d'action pour lequel nous avons consenti les plus grands sacrifices : nous n'entendons pas accepter une négligence de nos droits et de nos initiatives. Sous le double aspect de la sécurité du commerce international en Chine et de l'économie indochinoise, le problème d'Extrême-Orient exige donc des solutions d'ordre économique qu'il ne faudrait pas négliger sous le prétexte d'une idéologie de chancellerie.

Pierre LYAUTEY.

Enclosure No. 21 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from PARIS MIDI, March 4, 1932.

## Le Japon a-t-il violé le pacte de la Société des Nations ?

*Telle est la question posée à la Commission générale*

(De notre envoyé spécial)  
Genève, 4 Mars.  
(Par téléphone.)

Nous avons entendu hier trois plaidoyers.

M. Paul-Boncour qui faisait de nouveaux débuts à la tribune de l'Assemblée, défendit avec brio une cause difficile à défendre, celle du Conseil de la S. D. N. Son éloquence, un peu mélodramatique peut-être, trop optimiste à coup sûr, comme les événements de la journée se chargeront de le démontrer, tomba à son grand étonnement, sur une assemblée gelée. Le nom de M. Briand, lancé à dessein à l'un des passages les plus pathétiques ne secoua même pas — ô ingratitude ! — les torpeurs.

Le docteur Yen, en redingote grise, les yeux cercés-d'écaïlle — tout a fait le type de l'intellectuel asiatique tel qu'on se le figure — fit un long et dramatique exposé des événements de Mandchourie et de Changhaï, à sa façon, en dénonçant les atrocités japonaises.

A sa façon aussi, M. Matsudeira petit et gros, qui a l'avantage d'être le beau-père du futur Mikado, les raconta en fulminant, lui, contre les atrocités chinoises.

Ces trois harangues, il fallait s'y attendre, ne nous apportèrent rien qu'on ne sût déjà. Il y a des mois et des mois qu'on ressasse les mêmes arguments sans aucun progrès.

En sorte qu'à la fin de la journée nous étions Gros-Jean comme devant et fort perplexes. Il y avait ce quoi. Le délégué japonais, fort habilement, avait commencé son discours par l'annonce que l'ordre avait été donné de cesser le feu ; le délégué chinois, par le refus d'accepter les propositions japonaises considérées comme un ultimatum et par l'annonce que les hostilités devaient malheureusement continuer. Si bien que la déchirure lumineuse entrevue par M. Paul-Boncour le matin même dans un horizon d'orange semblait se rétrécir jusqu'à zéro. D'ailleurs, les nouvelles les plus contradictoires ne cessaient de circuler. Se battait-on toujours ? Le canon s'était-il vraiment tu ? Négociait-on à Changhaï ? Avait-on rompu les pourparlers ? Personne ne savait rien.

La commission nommée sur place se montrait, en tout cas, d'une discrétion étonnante. On aurait volon-

tiers accueilli hier soir quelques lignes de sa prose.

A défaut de nouvelles précises on se contenta d'une nouvelle commission. C'est là, en effet, le principal résultat de la journée d'hier. Certains avaient pensé que la discussion générale pourrait continuer après les exposés des Etats en cause. M. Paul Hymans, d'ailleurs, avait invité les délégués qui voulaient prendre la parole à s'inscrire. Chose étonnante : alors que le matin les petits Etats voulaient tous parler, le soir, tout le monde était gelé si bien que dès hier soir, l'une des solutions que j'indiquais hier, celle du secrétariat, fut adoptée et une commission générale créée.

C'est cette commission qui commença ses travaux aujourd'hui même à 15 h 30. Il y a des chances pour que cet après-midi elle ne se livre qu'à des travaux préliminaires de pure forme : constitution du bureau, élections, etc... Sa vraie tâche ne commencera qu'après et Dieu sait quand elle se terminera.

Sans vouloir préjuger de ses décisions futures, c'est elle qui aura la lourde tâche de dire si elle entend lier les événements de Mandchourie et ceux de Changhaï, comme le voudraient les Chinois, ou n'envisager que les derniers. Et aussi, elle devra constater si le Japon a vraiment violé le pacte. La gravité de cette dernière question n'échappera à personne. Si le Japon a vraiment déchiré ses engagements, sans aucun doute les sanctions économiques prévues à l'article 16 devraient être automatiquement déclanchées.

Les amateurs d'émotions fortes en seront cependant, je crois, pour leurs frais. On n'ira pas jusque-là. Certes, il était curieux de constater hier le sentiment de l'assemblée. Quand le docteur Yen se dirigea vers la tribune, tous les délégués applaudirent. Quand ce fut le tour de M. Matsudeira, seuls, quelques battements de mains dispersés dans les travées de côté se firent entendre si ostensiblement qu'on songeait infailliblement à une claquette organisée. Ce menu fait tendrait à prouver que les sympathies de l'assemblée semblent plutôt aller à la Chine. Mais de là à conclure qu'elle décidera selon les vues du docteur Yen, il y a loin. Il est peu probable qu'elle envisage plus qu'une pression morale.

Très adroitement, d'ailleurs, le Japon lui a tiré hier une rude épine du pied en cessant à point les hostilités. Il paraît ainsi s'être donné le beau rôle et en même temps il a évité aux puissances un embarras terrible, celui d'avoir à discuter publiquement des sanctions prévues par le covenant.

Il est vrai qu'il pouvait se montrer généreux à bon compte. L'armée japonaise a atteint tous ses objectifs. Cela plus que tout, croyons-le bien a déterminé l'arrêt de l'offensive. La victoire indéniable qu'il a remportée lui donne un avantage considérable au moment même où vont s'ouvrir les négociations de la Table Ronde. Les puissances, si elles ne le voient pas encore, s'en apercevront vite. A chercher des exemples dans l'histoire, on peut douter que le Japon se retire maintenant sans une contrepartie très avantageuse. Peut-être voudra-t-il la payer aux grandes nations de quelques menues récompenses comme, par exemple, un léger accroissement du territoire des concessions.

Gardons-nous, cependant, de tomber dans le piège. D'abord, parce que si nous avons la monnaie, le Japon gardera les gros billets. Ensuite, parce qu'il y a des puissances qui n'attendent que cette occasion pour faire de la révision des traités d'Extrême-Orient le point de départ de celle des traités d'Europe.

En tout cas, soyez-en sûr, nous entendrons encore parler de la Chine... et du Japon.

Il vient de s'écrire à Changhaï la page d'un livre qui est loin d'être terminé. Son titre : *Manuel de l'impérialisme*. Ses auteurs: les militaires.

Tokio n'a plus rien à envier à Berlin.

Gabriel Perreux.

P.P. 4

Enclosure No. 22 to Despatch No. 2533 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris,

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, March 4, 1932.

## UNE HONTE !

UNE heure avant la réunion de l'Assemblée extraordinaire de la Société des Nations, M. Sato, représentant du Japon, a annoncé que les hostilités avaient cessé à Changhaï. M. Matsudeira, autre représentant du Mikado, pouvait donc se présenter devant les délégués de 47 Etats réunis à Genève comme messager de la paix. Du moins, il l'espérait.

Le porte-parole de la Chine a déjoué cette manœuvre abjecte. Il a fait un exposé excellent, et très précis des événements dont la Chine est victime. Il a formulé contre le Japon des accusations irréfutables. Il a montré, qu'en réalité, il n'y a pas d'armistice à Changhaï, puisque le commandement japonais veut rester dans cette ville.

Nous donnons ci-dessous un résumé assez complet du discours de M. Yen. Il faut qu'on le lise attentivement. Il faut qu'on se rende compte des horreurs commises par les troupes japonaises.

Et comme pour souligner encore l'exactitude de l'exposé de M. Yen, les troupes japonaises se sont livrées hier à la destruction de l'énorme ville chinoise. Elles ne se sont même pas arrêtées devant le massacre de la population paisible qui fuyait à l'approche de l'armée nipponne. Ainsi que le rapporte le correspondant du « Daily Herald », hommes, femmes et enfants ont été mitraillés sans pitié par ceux que notre presse représente comme les défenseurs de l'ordre et de la civilisation contre la barbarie chinoise.

En dehors des représentants de la Chine et du Japon, il n'y a eu hier à Genève que deux autres orateurs : Paul-Boncour et M. Huysmans. Tous les deux ont prononcé des discours protocolaires. C'est peut-être très bien et très correct. Les « milieux de la S.D.N. » en sont peut-être tout à fait satisfaits. Mais je crois que

l'opinion publique doit en être indignée.

L'heure est trop grave pour se livrer à des politesses diplomatiques. Il faut parler clairement. Le président du Conseil et le président de l'Assemblée ont devant eux trois faits incontestables : les troupes japonaises sont en Chine ; le gouvernement japonais refuse d'évacuer immédiatement la Mandchourie et Changhaï ; la Chine a demandé et demande encore vainement l'arbitrage. Ces trois faits, que le Japon ne nie pas, sont tout à fait suffisants pour désigner clairement l'agresseur. Les deux présidents ne l'ont pas fait. Il n'y ont même pas fait allusion. Ils ont été tellement « objectifs » que leur partialité saute aux yeux.

C'est une véritable honte :

Mais ce n'est pas tout. Le secrétariat de la S. D. N. a réussi une autre opération non moins honteuse. Pour empêcher les représentants de quelques puissances secondaires de condamner publiquement l'agression japonaise, la bureaucratie de Genève, avec la complicité du Conseil, a obtenu la clôture de la discussion générale avant qu'elle eût commencé. Après l'exposé du Chinois et du Japonais, la séance fut levée et l'affaire renvoyée à la Commission générale. Là il sera plus facile d'intriguer, de manœuvrer et surtout d'étouffer les débats. Le Japon est si susceptible !

... On a vu, en première page, notre information au sujet des fournitures de matériel de guerre au Japon. Les principaux membres de la S. D. N. y participent. Ils envoient au Japon même des gaz toxiques.

Qu'on rapproche ce qui se passe à Genève des expéditions d'armes de Hambourg.

Ceci explique cela.

O. ROSENFELD.

### L'EUROPE FOURNIT au Japon, des munitions, des armes et des gaz en quantité considérable

Nous apprenons de très bonne source, que des armements de toutes sortes sont embarqués à Hambourg, en quantité considérable, pour le Japon.

Ces chargements comprennent même des gaz toxiques.

Les pays producteurs sont notamment : l'Angleterre, la France, la Belgique, l'Allemagne, la Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne.

Toutes les expéditions sont faites par Hambourg, même une partie des expéditions françaises.

On aura une idée de l'importance de ces « affaires » par le fait que le montant d'une seule expédition française qui représente la moitié d'un convoi, est de CENT MILLIONS de francs français.

Nous publierons très prochainement des détails précis sur ce trafic honteux de matériel de guerre.

TEMPS 4

Enclosure No. 23 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1952.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LM TEMPS, March 4, 1952.

#### LA FIN DES HOSTILITÉS A SHANGHAI

Le conflit sino-japonais est en voie de règlement. L'armée chinoise qui opérait à Shanghai s'étant repliée à une vingtaine de kilomètres de la grande cité, la condition mise par le Japon à la conclusion d'un armistice se trouve remplie en fait, et on a reçu, ce matin, la nouvelle de source officielle que les hostilités sont suspendues. La conférence proposée par le conseil de la Société des nations, sur l'initiative du représentant de la France, M. Paul-Boncour, et acceptée en principe par les cabinets de Tokio et de Nankin, va donc pouvoir se réunir pour procéder à la liquidation définitive de ce conflit, qui a fait peser pendant des semaines une si grave menace sur la situation en Extrême-Orient. L'événement est capital par les répercussions qu'il ne peut manquer d'avoir, tant à Genève, où s'ouvre ce matin l'assemblée extraordinaire de la Société des nations convoquée pour connaître du conflit, qu'en Chine même.

Sous l'empire de quelles circonstances le dénouement s'est-il produit? Les informations que l'on possède à cette heure ne permettent pas encore de fixer les choses avec toute la précision désirable. Il semble bien que, sous la pression de la dernière offensive japonaise, l'armée chinoise, qui avait été refoulée ces jours-ci, courait le risque d'un encerclement étroit de ses positions. Ne recevant pas les renforts importants qui lui eussent permis de prolonger sa résistance, elle s'est repliée à une vingtaine de kilomètres de la ville internationale, rompant ainsi le contact avec les Nippons. Il est permis de supposer que des trahisons officieuses, qui eurent lieu à Shanghai et à Nankin, ne furent pas absolument étrangères à la décision qui est intervenue. Les Japonais ne voulant pas admettre les conditions d'un armistice impliquant le repli simultané des deux armées, ils ont poussé leurs opérations jusqu'à ce que fût acquis sur le terrain l'objectif de leur offensive, c'est-à-dire la retraite de la 19<sup>e</sup> armée chinoise. Ils auront mis quinze jours à obtenir ce résultat, et auront dû jeter dans la bataille près de 50,000 hommes, alors qu'il s'agissait, au début, d'une simple opération de police que quelques centaines de fusiliers marins étaient chargés de mener à bonne fin.

L'essentiel est que les hostilités soient arrêtées, que ce cauchemar prenne fin, que la raison et le droit reprennent le dessus là où le canon faisait obstacle jusqu'ici aux efforts de la diplomatie pour préparer un accord acceptable pour les deux parties. Avec ou sans déclaration de guerre, la bataille est toujours haïssable. Que les Chinois aient méconnu à Shanghai les droits du Japon et qu'ils aient créé, par leur campagne de boycottage des produits japonais, une situation de fait à laquelle le gouvernement de Tokio, qui a le devoir de protéger la vie et les biens de ses ressortissants en Chine, ne pouvait demeurer indifférent, on peut difficilement le contester; mais le Japon a eu recours à des moyens militaires difficiles à concilier avec le droit international, avec l'esprit et la lettre des pactes existants. Peut-être faut-il conclure de cette tragique aventure, comme on l'a fait de différents côtés, que les stipulations formelles des pactes ne sont pratiquement applicables qu'entre les Etats organisés, où des gouvernements responsables exercent effectivement le pouvoir et peuvent agir avec la certitude que leurs décisions seront exécutées et respectées, ce qui n'est malheureusement pas encore le cas pour la Chine. Il n'en est pas moins déplorable que l'on ait dû constater le recours à des actes de guerre pour le règlement d'un conflit de cette nature, alors que le pacte de la Société des nations et le pacte

Briand-Kellogg condamnent formellement la guerre et la mettent hors la loi internationale. Le gouvernement de Tokio a été obligé d'agir, suppose-t-on, sous la pression de son opinion publique, en présence de circonstances particulières qu'il n'avait pas créées; l'opération de police qu'il envisageait n'ayant pas donné les résultats qu'il en attendait, la conception qu'il a de son prestige de grande puissance militaire ne lui a pas permis de rester sur un échec. Tout cela, que l'on doit regretter d'un point de vue général, conduit à constater qu'en face des principes absolus qui constituent la base indispensable de toute organisation de la paix, il y a encore des réalités que l'on ne peut méconnaître dans l'état présent de l'évolution internationale.

Ce serait une erreur, pensons-nous, d'en conclure que tout ce qu'on a entrepris depuis douze ans pour assurer dans la mesure du possible le règlement pacifique des conflits est vain, que les pactes n'ont aucune portée pratique, que la Société des nations est impraticable à sauvegarder la paix générale. La vérité

est que l'organisation internationale telle qu'elle existe actuellement se révèle encore insuffisante, qu'il faut travailler sans relâche à la consolider, à la parfaire; qu'il importe, comme nous n'avons cessé de le soutenir ici, de doter la Société des nations des moyens d'assurer l'exécution de ses décisions. S'il y a un enseignement à tirer de la tragédie de Shanghai, c'est, d'abord, que les pactes, qui impliquent pour chacun des droits et des devoirs, ne prennent toute leur valeur qu'entre Etats organisés en situation de prendre en conscience leurs responsabilités; c'est, ensuite, que les garanties telles qu'elles résultent des pactes doivent être complétées par des sanctions fermes en toute certitude la porte à l'aventure.

Il est heureux que les hostilités aient pris fin à Shanghai avant la réunion de l'assemblée de la Société des nations. Celle-ci se trouve maintenant devant une situation absolument nouvelle, mais sa tâche n'en apparaît pas moins délicate. Dès l'instant où la Chine réclamait sa convocation aux termes de l'article 15 du pacte, on ne pouvait pas ne pas la réunir. Il faut souhaiter que l'assemblée fasse preuve dans ses délibérations de prudence et de sens politique. Elle a évidemment le devoir de défendre les principes qui sont à la base du covenant, et il importe qu'elle le fasse avec toute l'autorité qui s'attache à ses résolutions; mais, d'autre part, elle doit veiller à prévenir de nouvelles complications et à ne pas compromettre les chances d'accord qui existent maintenant à Shanghai. La conférence projetée est due à une initiative du conseil de Genève et il convient de lui laisser produire tous ses effets. Sans doute, des erreurs de procédure furent commises au début, quand on a saisi le conseil, au mois de septembre dernier, du différend sino-japonais en Mandchourie alors que celui-ci pouvait être liquidé par des pourparlers directs entre les deux parties, mais une fois saisi, le conseil de la Société des nations a fait son possible pour faciliter une solution. Avec les moyens dont il disposait et les méthodes qui doivent être les siennes, il ne pouvait que s'efforcer de préparer la conciliation en tenant compte du fait qu'il n'a pas les moyens de faire exécuter ses décisions si les parties refusent de s'incliner devant celles-ci. Il n'en est pas moins certain que son influence peut s'exercer maintenant efficacement en vue d'un règlement définitif.

Enclosure No. 24 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AVENIR, March 5, 1932.

## De Moukden à Memel en passant par Changhaï

L'Assemblée générale extraordinaire de la Société des Nations, convoquée à la demande de la Chine, est réunie pour examiner le conflit sino-japonais, c'est-à-dire, au fond, pour l'embrayer, dans le moment où ce conflit est pratiquement réglé par les armes.

Sa tâche s'en trouvera grandement facilitée. Car sans victoire japonaise, les hostilités n'eussent point été arrêtées. Les Japonais consentaient bien à négocier, mais tandis que M. Sato, leur représentant, siégeait à la table du Conseil de la S. D. N., ils poursuivaient leurs opérations militaires. Leurs buts atteints, ils acceptent la « médiation » dont Genève veut bien s'attribuer le mérite.

Ainsi, d'un bout à l'autre de cette histoire, le mécanisme de la Société des Nations a joué avec retard — ou mieux : on s'est joué de lui. On objectera que l'affaire était lointaine et compliquée, que les moyens d'action de la ligue sont encore à créer, et que la faute en incombe aux puissances qui siègent au Conseil. Soit.

Mais ce qui importe en histoire, ce sont moins les excuses possibles que les faits, et la leçon qui s'en dégage. Or, cette leçon, ce n'est pas seulement que l'impuissance matérielle de la S. D. N. à prévenir les conflits est manifeste, c'est, chose pire encore, qu'elle est incapable de déterminer nettement l'agresseur, ce qui est pourtant la clé de voûte du système de sanctions, et que chacun se borne à solliciter ou à provoquer ses avis, en se gardant de les suivre. Des messieurs très bien disent de la justice et du droit autour d'un tapis : mais, comme par le passé, c'est la force qui tranche le débat.

Quand les troupes japonaises ont commencé de sortir de leur zone en Mandchourie, le Conseil a décidé l'envoi d'une commission d'enquête sur place. Elle est partie avec trois mois de retard, et tandis qu'elle vogue vers Moukden, la Mandchourie entière est occupée par les Japonais, et une République mandchoue « indépendante » est proclamée.

Quand les Japonais, en réponse au boycottage chinois, ont débarqué des fusiliers marins à l'embouchure du Yang-Tsé, le Conseil a tenté d'intervenir pour arrêter les hostilités à leur début : après deux mois de palabres et de notes, le seul fait acquis est le refoulement de la 19<sup>e</sup> armée chinoise par 50.000 soldats japonais, qui tiennent maintenant solidement une zone de 20 kilomètres de rayon autour de Changhaï. L'expérience est concluante.

La S. D. N. aurait, du moins, des circonstances atténuantes si, dans un champ plus proche et plus restreint, elle pouvait arguer de succès tangibles.

Or, que voyons-nous ? Au nord-est de l'Europe, les traités ont érigé en territoire « libre » le port de Memel et sa banlieue. Un plébiscite, sous les auspices de la S. D. N., devait décider du sort définitif de la ville. Le plébiscite a été fait en 1923, sous forme d'un coup de main exécuté par des bandes lithuaniennes qui ont chassé le détachement français qui y assurait l'ordre. On s'est incliné devant le

fait accompli : le nouveau statut de Memel en a fait un territoire autonome sous la souveraineté lithuanienne.

Depuis lors, tous les efforts du gouvernement de Kovno ont tendu à annexer complètement Memel, débouché maritime naturel de la Lithuanie. La majorité pro-allemande de Memel a résisté. La Lithuanie est passée aux actes de violence : état de siège, destitution du président du Directoire, lutte contre la majorité à la Diète, etc. Le Reich en a appelé au Conseil de la S. D. N. Celui-ci a tenu une séance spéciale à propos de ce différend. Il en est sorti... un rapport, une enquête, des délibérations. Rien n'a été tranché, tout reste en état — ou plutôt va en empirant. Il faudra se résigner devant le fait accompli, comme à Moukden, comme à Changhaï.

Le pire dans tout cela, c'est que l'inaction de Genève, dont la mission serait d'écartier les conflits armés, les encourage. Après avoir joué des coudes, au temps de feu Stresemann, pour s'installer au Conseil, l'Allemagne déclare aujourd'hui qu'il serait dangereux de maintenir le peuple allemand dans cette illusion qu'on peut faire valoir ses droits sans armes. « Nous devons quitter la S. D. N. », écrivait les *Hamburger Nachrichten*, et si demain les soldats lithuaniens en civil entrent à Memel, ils nous donneront un excellent prétexte pour déclencher, à la mode japonaise, une opération de police contre des bandits. C'est le Conseil de la S. D. N. qui portera la responsabilité de cette « solution » du litige. »

Ainsi en va-t-il toujours : la faiblesse des gouvernements — et surtout d'un super-gouvernement — encourage les fauteurs de troubles.

P. BENAERTS.

Enclosure No. 25 to Despatch No. 2353 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L. DEPECHE DE TOULOUSE, March 8, 1932.

### **IDÉES ET DOCTRINES**

## **La S. D. N. à l'épreuve**

C'est bien la guerre, avec toutes ses horreurs, qui sévit en Extrême-Orient. Le fait qu'elle n'est pas officiellement déclarée ne sauve pas la face, mais aggrave, au contraire, d'hypocrisie l'agression japonaise, qu'expliquent peut-être, mais que ne justifient pas, l'anarchie et les fautes de la Chine. On ne saurait trop déplorer cette guerre, non seulement à cause des carnages, des destructions et des misères qu'elle accumule, mais à cause des conséquences qu'elle peut avoir par ailleurs. Que deviennent l'autorité de la S. D. N. et la force des traités quand on voit un Etat vice-président de son Conseil violer avec une telle évidence le covenant et la signature qu'il a mise en bas du pacte Briand-Kellogg mettant la guerre hors la loi? Comment espérer arrêter une agression analogue qui se produirait en Europe, quand on a vu un tel précédent se produire avec une telle impunité? Et quel fonds faire sur l'opinion publique quand on l'a vue si peu préoccupée des responsabilités du conflit et des moyens de l'arrêter? Fort heureusement, on est entré maintenant dans la voie de la médiation. Mais il est regrettable qu'elle n'ait pu se produire que lorsque l'agresseur a eu atteint ses objectifs et qu'elle soit le produit de la victoire plutôt que de la justice.

Faut-il en conclure que la S. D. N. n'est bonne à rien et jeter le manche après la cognée, comme le proclament avec une joie mal dissimulée les amis des munitionnaires? Ces événements, si on y réfléchit, sont, au contraire, en faveur de la S. D. N., j'entends d'une S. D. N. véritable et complète. De ce que les tribunaux, la police, la gendarmerie sont impuissants à empêcher ou à réprimer un crime, faut-il conclure à leur suppression ou bien à leur amélioration et à leur renforcement? De même, si le Japon a pu bafouer impunément l'organisation de Genève, qu'est-ce que cela prouve, sinon qu'elle n'est pas assez forte et que, par surcroît, elle ne veut ou ne peut user des moyens insuffisants dont elle dispose? Il s'agit de mettre fin à ces lacunes et à ces carences et non d'en faire état pour renoncer à toute action pacificatrice.

Ainsi apparaît, avec plus d'évidence que jamais, la nécessité de réaliser le programme de paix de la démocratie française. Que réclamons-nous, en effet, avec nos amis de gauche, avec la Confédération nationale des anciens combattants et victimes de la guerre? L'universalité de la S. D. N.; l'acceptation générale de l'arbitrage obligatoire et sanctionné; l'organisation progressive des moyens de coercition effectifs contre les Etats qui auraient recours à la guerre au lieu de se soumettre à l'arbitrage; la réduction simultanée, graduelle et efficacement contrôlée des armements nationaux, en corrélation avec l'accroissement des garanties internationales de sécurité, en vue du désarmement général.

La guerre d'Extrême-Orient démontre combien l'universalité de la S. D. N. serait nécessaire et contribuerait peut-être à y aboutir. En effet, les deux peuples les plus intéressés aux événements qui s'y déroulent : la Russie et les Etats-Unis, sont précisément en dehors de la S. D. N. Cette absence, qui rend si difficile une action concertée, des démarches collectives, un plan d'ensemble, fut l'une des causes essentielles de l'échec prolongé des tentatives de médiation. Plus les Soviets et les Etats-Unis auront à souffrir des conséquences de cette guerre, et mieux ils comprendront sans

doute la faute qu'ils commettent en persistant à rester à l'écart de la S. D. N. En tous cas, le devoir de tous est de les aider autant que possible à le comprendre.

Quant à l'arbitrage, le Japon l'a longtemps refusé tandis que la Chine le réclamait. S'il l'a refusé, c'est parce qu'il savait que la S. D. N. n'avait pas les moyens de l'imposer. Ainsi apparaît, à la lumière des faits, la nécessité d'une organisation non seulement juridique, mais économique, financière et militaire de la S. D. N., en vue de rendre ses sentences efficaces. Si tous les pays contractants avaient mis en jeu le boycottage économique et financier, le Japon y aurait regardé à deux fois avant de déclarer la guerre; et il n'aurait pas osé menacer de considérer cette attitude comme un *casus belli* si elle était généralisée. Quant à une force armée internationale, sans doute elle n'aurait pas la même efficacité dans des pays lointains qu'en Europe, mais elle pourrait cependant beaucoup, ne fût-ce que par l'envoi d'avions et d'officiers instructeurs pour des masses inorganisées. Quant à ceux qui affectent de railler cette idée d'une intervention internationale, que proposent-ils à la place pour éviter la guerre? Ils se conduisent exactement comme quelqu'un qui accuserait les gendarmes, la justice et les tribunaux de s'occuper de ce qui ne les regarde pas en arrêtant et en châtiant les malfaiteurs.

Seule, cette force donnée à la S. D. N. peut permettre le désarmement. Sinon, si on n'a pas cette garantie de sécurité, comment désarmer sans danger? L'exemple de la Chine est là encore pour le prouver. Si elle avait été armée, elle aurait contribué à la paix, car le Japon n'aurait pas osé l'attaquer. Ainsi les superpacifistes qui voudraient que la France fût seule à désarmer sont, au fond, presque aussi dangereux pour la paix que les chauvins. Mais si l'on admet le droit de chacun à s'armer, faute d'une sécurité garantie par la S. D. N., quelle limite peut-on assigner à cette défensive? C'est la course aux armements, avec la guerre au bout.

La conclusion est que la leçon des faits renforce les arguments de la raison. Pour assurer la paix, il faut une S. D. N. autant que possible universelle, exerçant l'arbitrage et capable de l'imposer. Moyennant quoi, les peuples pourront enfin désarmer et collaborer dans une paix véritable.

En attendant, de ce que la S. D. N. n'a pas tous les moyens dont elle aurait besoin, ce n'est pas une raison pour qu'elle use si peu et si mal de ceux dont elle dispose. Elle aurait pu, tout au moins, désigner et flétrir l'agresseur, au lieu d'avoir l'air de traiter avec la même modération l'assaillant et l'attaqué. Il paraît aussi que certains, à Genève, en présence de la faiblesse matérielle de la S. D. N., voudraient se consacrer surtout au désarmement moral. Sans doute, en effet, celui-ci conditionne le reste; mais il ne faudrait tout de même pas abriter la paresse et la pusillanimité derrière de simples prédications. Pour réaliser la paix, il faut la vouloir d'un cœur viril et l'organiser avec une méthode à la fois clairvoyante et ferme. Sinon, si on se borne à l'accepter passivement, sans se préoccuper des moyens de la maintenir et de l'imposer, elle risque fort, comme ce fut jusqu'ici le cas dans l'histoire de l'humanité, de n'être qu'un accident heureux, mais précaire.

Yvon DELBOS.

Enclosure No. 26 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, March 5, 1932.

# La bataille perdue

par Albert MILHAUD

La valeur militaire des combattants de la 19<sup>e</sup> armée cantonaise n'est plus contestée par personne. Le soldat chinois est réhabilité. On attribue le mérite de la stratégie de cette armée aux conseillers étrangers, mais c'est un problème délicat. Il y a lieu d'ajourner ce jugement. Disons-le en bref, ce fut une surprise générale lorsque l'on vit les Célestes tenir bon. Personne ne s'y attendait, ou fort peu d'initiés. On assure maintenant que, selon un cliché connu, ils ont battu en retraite « sur des positions préparées à l'avance », et qu'un nouveau front s'organise, à 20 kilomètres du précédent. Espérons, malgré certains signes précurseurs, qu'une nouvelle bataille ne s'engagera pas. Cette fois, personne ne pourrait plus soutenir qu'on se trouve simplement en présence d'une opération de police, et le coup qui serait porté à Genève serait si meurtrier que l'institution internationale ne se relèverait pas de nouvelles blessures.

Le Japon ne voudra pas encourir des responsabilités accrues. Il fait savoir que les opérations militaires sont arrêtées : il avait dû mettre en ligne 50,000 hommes pour atteindre le but qu'il se proposait. C'est un très gros effort. Le souvenir des résistances opposées à ses fusiliers marins de la première heure est effacé. Le Japon a les honneurs de la guerre. Il a gagné la partie. Même si les soldats chinois n'ont pas été soutenus, comme ils l'espéraient, faute de munitions, d'argent et d'un gouvernement fort et centralisé, ils se sont bien comportés, et l'éclat militaire des Japonais demeure au niveau de sa tradition.

Mais, en écrivant ces lignes, on s'attriste de penser que l'ambiance morale du passé n'a pas cédé au souffle de l'esprit nouveau. Pénible, mais nécessaire constatation. Heureusement qu'on ne va pas signer la paix sur le tambour. Les apparences seront sauvées. Peut-on vivre dans un monde d'apparences ? Tout est là. Au milieu des lentes et hésitantes procédures de Genève, chacun s'interroge sur le sort de son pays en cas d'accident.

En Grande-Bretagne, le cri d'alarme est poussé dans les journaux d'opposition, selon la règle du jeu. Mais avon-nous le droit, toute réserve faite sur l'aspect polémique de cette presse, de ne pas retenir des réflexions qui sont aussi pertinentes pour le public international que pour le public britannique ? Dans le *New Leader* du 26 février a paru un article très partial, dirigé contre le ministre anglais des affaires étrangères et aussi contre notre pays. Mais, malgré le ton agressif et violent dicté par le « devoir de l'opposition », M. H. N. Brailsford dénote une mentalité qu'il faut souligner : « Le Labour Party garde sa foi en la S. D. N. Il lui est impossible de supposer que le désarmement soit encore possible si la S. D. N. fait preuve d'...

cette invasion, tant par son objet que par sa manière, est exactement à l'image de ce que nous pouvons attendre par la suite. »

Il est précieux de noter que dans ce milieu britannique, si longtemps imperméable à l'idée d'une contrainte collective internationale, et qui a rejeté le Protocole de Genève de 1924, on accepte « l'interposition d'une armée de résistance passive » destinée à se placer entre les belligérants. En d'autres termes, on se rapproche des notions concrètes du plan français qui, depuis douze ans, ne cessait de passer pour chimérique.

A Changhaï, une bataille a été perdue. Mais qui donc a perdu la bataille ? Moralement, psychologiquement ? Telle est la question qui se pose. Si c'était la S. D. N., si c'était l'organisation de la Paix, si nous étions condamnés à cette *paix armée* qui, de 1871 à 1914, a été la loi de l'Europe et du Monde, alors les grands espoirs humains seraient évanouis, ce serait la régression fatale. Sur un terrain plus proche, c'est la menace de voir subsister les budgets de guerre au détriment de tous apaisements du contribuable et du citoyen. Ce serait le monde sans horizon de soulagement financier et de coordination économique.

Si de prochains et indispensables arrangements n'interviennent pas, qui donc aura été vaincu à Changhaï, dans la bataille de Wousung, à Chapei ? Est-ce le Chinois seulement ? Je vous le demande.

Enclosure No. 26 to Despatch No. 2533 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ÉPRE NOUVELLE, March 5, 1932.

# La bataille perdue

par Albert MILHAUD

La valeur militaire des combattants de la 19<sup>e</sup> armée cantonaise n'est plus contestée par personne. Le soldat chinois est réhabilité. On attribue le mérite de la stratégie de cette armée aux conseillers étrangers, mais c'est un problème délicat. Il y a lieu d'ajourner ce jugement. Disons-le en bref, ce fut une surprise générale lorsque l'on vit les Célestes tenir bon. Personne ne s'y attendait, ou fort peu d'initiés. On assure maintenant que, selon un cliché connu, ils ont battu en retraite « sur des positions préparées à l'avance », et qu'un nouveau front s'organise, à 20 kilomètres du précédent. Espérons, malgré certains signes précurseurs, qu'une nouvelle bataille ne s'engagera pas. Cette fois, personne ne pourrait plus soutenir qu'on se trouve simplement en présence d'une opération de police, et le coup qui serait porté à Genève serait si meurtrier que l'institution internationale ne se relèverait pas de nouvelles blessures.

Le Japon ne voudra pas encourir des responsabilités accrues. Il fait savoir que les opérations militaires sont arrêtées : il avait dû mettre en ligne 50.000 hommes pour atteindre le but qu'il se proposait. C'est un très gros effort. Le souvenir des résistances opposées à ses fusiliers marins de la première heure est effacé. Le Japon a les honneurs de la guerre. Il a gagné la partie. Même si les soldats chinois n'ont pas été soutenus, comme ils l'espéraient, faute de munitions, d'argent et de gages et aussi contre notre pays. Mais, malgré le ton agressif et violent dicté par le « devoir de l'opposition », M. H. N. Brailsford dénote une mentalité qu'il faut souligner : « Le Labour Party garde sa foi en la S. D. N. Il lui est impossible de supposer que le désarmement soit encore possible si la S. D. N. fait preuve d'impuissance à empêcher l'un de ses membres principaux d'envahir le territoire d'un autre de ses membres. Dans un monde comme celui-ci, c'est une nécessité pour nous tous de nous armer jusqu'aux dents. C'est la conception d'une paix organisée qui se trouve en jeu dans cette affaire. » L'auteur de ces lignes n'est pas un conservateur, ni surtout un Dye Hard extrémiste de droite. Il se réclame de la doctrine du Labour. Dans un long article passionné se détachent ces lignes de désenchantement et de regret. Même ton dans le *Manchester Guardian* du 27 février : « Si on ne peut prévenir l'invasion des voisins plus faibles par un peuple énergique, avide d'expansion, le monde sera périodiquement convulsé par les guerres. » Et ce journal, qui est l'un des plus favorables à la S. D. N., ajoute : « Le fait que la Société des Nations n'a pas pu prévenir l'invasion par le Japon de la Mandchourie d'abord, de Changhaï ensuite, ni même protester sérieusement, est d'autant plus lamentable que

cette invasion, tant par son objet que par sa manière, est exactement à l'image de ce que nous pouvons attendre par la suite. »

Il est précieux de noter que dans ce milieu britannique, si longtemps imperméable à l'idée d'une contrainte collective internationale, et qui a rejeté le Protocole de Genève de 1924, on accepte « l'interposition d'une armée de résistance passive » destinée à se placer entre les belligérants. En d'autres termes, on se rapproche des notions concrètes du plan français qui, depuis douze ans, ne cessait de passer pour chimérique.

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FIG. 5

Enclosure No. 27 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, March 5, 1932.

## Les conséquences économiques du conflit sino-japonais

Le conflit sino-japonais a pris des proportions inattendues ; le monde entier a maintenant les yeux fixés sur Changhaï.

Si le Japon lutte pour la civilisation et si, à ce titre, toutes les puissances européennes eussent dû, dès le début, se mettre à ses côtés, au lieu de prendre parti pour la Chine, la répercussion de cette lutte, devenue sanglante, peut avoir, du point de vue économique, des conséquences incalculables dont on ne s'est peut-être pas suffisamment occupé en Europe, et sur lesquelles nous devons aujourd'hui jeter un rapide coup d'œil.

Le professeur H. Lévy a consacré récemment, dans la *Vossische Zeitung*, une étude excellente à ce côté singulièrement intéressant et angoissant du conflit sino-japonais. Disséquons, en quelques mots, les considérations qu'il émet :

En 1902, l'exportation des cotonnades japonaises en Chine, aux Indes, aux Indes Néerlandaises, en Egypte, représentait 2 millions de livres sterling ; en 1929, 41 millions. En 1912, la Chine importait du Japon 20 0/0 de ses cotonnades ; en 1929, 66 0/0. La même situation caractérise l'importation japonaise aux Indes. Peu avant la guerre, celle des tissus de coton japonais était annuellement de 10 millions de yards. Elle est actuellement de 350 millions.

L'Angleterre se trouve en présence d'un terrible concurrent. Le commerce japonais, pour un pays dont l'entrée sur la scène du monde ne remonte guère qu'à soixante ans, est merveilleusement organisé.

Le Japon a su se plier à tous les procédés. Il est vraiment passé maître ! En 1925, la Chine possédait 26.000 métiers à tisser, dont 17.000 pour ses ressortissants ; quatre ans plus tard, ce chiffre s'élève à 30.000, dont onze mille aux mains des Japonais, alors que la participation chinoise s'est à peine modifiée.

Dans le nouveau volume de Freyda Utley sur le Lancashire et l'Extrême-Orient, on remarque que le Japon se présente en Chine, au regard des Anglais et des Américains, comme un véritable médiateur. Les Allemands Schrader et Fürtwangler ont décrit, de façon émouvante, les conditions vraiment effrayantes auxquelles sont soumis aux Indes les travailleurs. Freyda Utley a pu faire au Japon les mêmes constatations. Les détails en sont dramatiques. Dans les fabriques japonaises, et spécialement dans celles des textiles, les conditions du travail touchent à l'esclavage ! On voit des filles de douze à treize ans véritablement casernées dans ces usines, moyennant le paiement à leurs familles d'une année de salaires, et soumises au régime le plus dur. On saisit, par ces quelques détails, la vitale importance que représentent pour le Japon les débouchés indiens et chinois.

Pour lutter contre la concurrence anglaise aux Indes et l'élévation voulue des droits de douane dressés contre lui, le Japon s'est résolu à dévaluer, lui aussi, sa monnaie, et cette décision radicale tient, en partie, à ces considérations.

Mais les débouchés chinois ne sont pas moins indispensables à l'Empire du Soleil Levant. S'ils venaient à être entravés trop longtemps, que deviendraient ces dizaines de milliers d'ouvriers des fabriques japonaises, déjà assujettis à un régime déplorable, et dont l'existence serait alors encore pire ? Il y a là pour le Japon une question de vie ou de mort ! Un long « silence » dans les fabriques ne serait-il pas le signal d'une crise sociale d'une gravité extrême ?

« Tels sont, dit le professeur Hermann Lévy, les dessous économiques qui apparaissent dans les mesures politiques du Japon et les rendent indispensables ! »

Ce point de vue si important de la lutte sino-japonaise n'est pas moins bien démontré dans une récente étude du docteur Burgert, le spécialiste bien connu, dans le *Neue Reich*, de Vienne : 90 0/0 du capital d'exportation japonais vont en Mandchourie, où le Japon y recueille le charbon, le fer, le cuivre, le zinc, l'or, le graphite, etc. 186.000 Japonais seulement vivent en Mandchourie, où le climat ne leur convient pas. Mais, au point de vue agricole, ce pays, si important, est pour le Japon un vrai grenier. Le paysan mandchourien est le plus grand producteur de fèves du monde. 85 0/0 de ce que le Japon tire de la Chine viennent de Mandchourie. En sens inverse, celle-ci prend un tiers de tous les produits achetés par la Chine au Japon. Pour donner une idée concrète de la capitale importance que le Japon attache à cette province, il suffira de citer un chiffre : près de 14 milliards de francs papier y sont investis !!!

D'autre part, le Japon est surpeuplé. C'est le pays le plus surpeuplé de la terre : 65 millions d'habitants dans ces îles grandes comme l'Angleterre ou l'Italie. Le paysan japonais commence à murmurer. Il a tiré du sol le maximum, au prix d'efforts souvent héroïques. Le mécontentement se fait jour. Les généraux japonais espèrent le calmer par une victoire.

Depuis vingt-cinq ans, les Japonais ne sont pas encore arrivés à transformer la Mandchourie en colonie. Ils n'ont pas suffisamment étudié les mœurs et les habitudes du pays avec lequel ils ne sont pas encore familiarisés.

Et, pourtant, il est de toute nécessité que le Ja-

pon arrive à une collaboration intime avec la Chine et la Mandchourie.

Son existence économique même en dépend. Et, actuellement, dans le seul port de Changhaï, huit cent mille tonnes de produits japonais attendent des acheteurs !

Nous devons souhaiter ardemment un succès japonais et l'éducation de la Chine par Tokio. Seul, le Japon peut mettre à la raison les Soviets qui cherchent à diriger la Chine contre l'Europe.

Et quand on apprend que des officiers allemands et russes commandent une partie des troupes chinoises, comment ne pas redoubler de prévenances pour le cabinet de Tokio ?

Depuis 1920, la politique des Anglo-Saxons, tant en Europe qu'en Extrême-Orient, apparaît comme néfaste. Le comprendront-ils enfin ? La paix du monde, cette paix qui nous échappe sans cesse, qui semble nous fuir par toutes les fautes commises, dépend de notre énergie et de nos résolutions viriles !

E. de Guichen.

Page 5

Enclosure No. 26 to Despatch No. 2353 of March 5, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, March 5, 1932.

## La guerre en Extrême-Orient

# TANDIS QU'À GENEVE ON PARLE de la cessation des hostilités...

*...Les fabricants de canons et les marchands  
de munitions expédient au Japon du matériel de guerre*

*Nous avons annoncé hier que l'Europe fournissait au Japon des munitions, des armes et des gaz toxiques en quantité considérable et nous avions promis de donner à nos lecteurs des précisions sur ce honteux trafic.*

*Ces précisions, que nous tenons de bonne source, les voici*

Le 4 février un steamer a quitté Hambourg à destination de Yokohama avec un plein chargement d'explosifs.

Le 5 février, deux bateaux sont partis d'Hambourg pour le Japon, ayant à bord des grenades, de la dynamite et des pièces d'avion détachées.

Tous les navires quittant le grand port de l'Elbe pour l'Extrême-Orient emportent des centaines de tonnes de munitions destinées au Japon.

Le 7 février, les usines Skoda ont expédié de Hambourg 1.700 caisses de munitions.

Le 8 février, à bord d'un steamer norvégien, 1.000 caisses d'explosifs ont été embarquées, dans ce même port, pour le Japon.

Le même jour, on a également embarqué des mitrailleuses Hotchkiss pour une valeur de cent millions, constituant la moitié d'une commande passée à la firme française.

Le 10 février, on apprend que des agents japonais se trouvaient dans la région rhénane, pour passer des commandes importantes aux principales firmes de produits chimiques. Une seule de ces firmes aurait

déjà envoyé 36.000 tonnes d'acides propres à la fabrication d'explosifs. Le tout soigneusement camouflé dans des emballages portant la mention : Pianos.

Le 7 février, 4.000 caisses de munitions, dont 3.000 venaient d'Angleterre, ont quitté l'Allemagne à destination du Japon.

Les Japonais ont passé à une usine de la Silésie polonaise une commande de matériel de guerre s'élevant à trois millions de dollars.

D'autre part, on affirme qu'une mission officielle japonaise se trouve actuellement en Tchécoslovaquie pour y passer des commandes importantes.


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Et en ce moment, l'usine Skoda fabriquerait sur une grande échelle grenades et cartouches pour être expédiées au Japon par les ports d'Hambourg et de Trieste.

De leur côté, les usines du Creusot auraient déjà partiellement livré une commande de 20 tanks de grandes dimensions.

Enfin, 9 navires ont quitté Belfast, pour un port coréen, avec un chargement de matériel de guerre.

*Voilà des faits précis, irréfutables. Ils montrent, une fois de plus, comment l'Internationale des marchands de canons et de munitions accroît sa fortune scandaleuse en semant en Extrême-Orient la mort, la ruine et la misère.*



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## LE COMITÉ D'ACTION POUR LA PAIX PROTESTE CONTRE L'AGRESSION JAPONAISE

Le Comité d'action pour la paix, réuni hier, sur l'initiative de la Confédération Générale du Travail !

Emu par la gravité des événements d'Extrême-Orient ;

Proteste énergiquement contre l'agression caractérisée dont le gouvernement japonais, membre permanent du Conseil de la S.D.N. et signataire du pacte Briand-Kellogg, s'est rendu coupable à l'égard de la Chine ;

Réclame de l'Assemblée extraordinaire de la S.D.N., réunie à Genève, les mesures immédiates qui mettront fin au conflit ;

Il dénonce la complicité apportée au Japon par les gouvernements qui favorisent, acceptent ou tolèrent la fourniture de munitions et de crédits ;

Il demande que le Japon soit, devant l'Assemblée des Nations et devant l'opinion publique mondiale, dénoncé comme l'agresseur ;

Que tous les moyens de pression « politiques », économiques et financiers, dont dispose déjà la Société des Nations (rupture des relations diplomatiques, boycott), soient employés pour obliger le Japon au respect des conventions internationales ;

Que l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine soit sauvegardée et garantie par l'Assemblée des Nations ;

Il demande aux groupements pacifistes de tous pays de saisir sans re-

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La Volonté de Paix ;

Entente pacifiste internationale ;

Union fraternelle d'Action contre la Guerre.

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Enclosure No. 26 to Despatch No. 2353 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, March 5, 1932.

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
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Ligue française de l'Enseignement ;  
Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen ;  
Fédération nationale des Anciens Combattants républicains ;  
Fédération ouvrière et paysanne ;  
Délégation permanente des Sociétés françaises pour la Paix ;  
Parti socialiste ;  
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La Volonté de Paix ;

Entente pacifiste internationale ;

Union fraternelle d'Action contre la Guerre.

Enclosure No. 29 to Despatch No. 2565 of March 4, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, March 5, 1932.

# Défense de Genève

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Malgré quelques résultats d'apparence, les difficultés, les mécomptes de l'effort pacificateur et organisateur de la S.D.N. en Extrême-Orient ont épaissi l'atmosphère d'angoisse où se débat le monde. Seuls peuvent s'en réjouir les professionnels du bellicisme, les munitionnaires, les journalistes marrons, les écrivains promus chefs de pensée du nationalisme, etc...

Mais, en fait, les sceptiques sérieux, ceux qui doutaient avec sincérité de l'œuvre de Genève, et qui voyaient en Briand, en Stresemann, de purs rêveurs, ceux-là mêmes sentent, depuis quelques semaines, comme une vaste absence dans leur être intérieur : l'armature du monde leur paraît ébranlée.

Ils craignent de conclure à l'échec de l'idée internationale du fait que Genève est inapte à s'intégrer l'Extrême-Orient. Le découragement actuel de bien des esprits, et même de hauts esprits, a dans le fond, cette cause que la S.D.N. n'a pu empêcher les hostilités en Asie, ne disons pas la guerre — car n'est-ce pas là un progrès ? — aujourd'hui la guerre n'ose plus dire son nom...

Eh bien ! en vérité, y a-t-il lieu d'être découragés ? Y a-t-il même lieu de vitupérer l'organisation de Genève et son action tâtonnante et trop bornée, et trop illusoire, dans le conflit sino-japonais ? Faudrait-il tirer de ce cas asiatique des conclusions européennes ? Faudrait-il donc douter de l'Europe parce qu'en Asie ?...

Nous ne le croyons pas.

Anatole France disait : « La science ne trompe que si on l'interroge mal. » Permettez-nous de dire : « La S.D.N. ne déçoit que si on lui demande trop. »

Et c'est exiger d'elle une tâche surhumaine, impossible, utopique, que de lui enjoindre d'organiser en deux ou trois lustres la planète tout entière.

Comme s'il y avait une planète Terre, unanime, homogène, d'évolution assez égale pour être, d'un pôle à l'autre, et à tous ses méridiens, justiciable des mêmes lois !

Genève a échoué, dites-vous ? Mais Genève ne pouvait qu'échouer à appliquer une règle commune à deux mondes inégalement évolués, l'Europe et l'Asie (et je ne parle pas d'autres pays). L'Asie dont traitent ces messieurs de Genève, l'Asie de sir Eric Drummond, de MM. Thomas, Avenol, etc... est strictement fictive. Elle repose sur un château de cartes : celui que construisit à grands frais, par le truchement de Sun Yat Sen, l'Amérique en 1911.

Il ne s'agit pas ici de diminuer le caractère prophétique de cette grande figure : mais un précurseur ne suffit pas à faire en une génération d'un immense chaos de peuples, d'une innombrable humanité d'êtres attardés dans un stade féodal ou patriarcal de civilisation, des masses disciplinées de citoyens prêts à participer à une civilisation démocratique. Croire à une Chine policée, unie

que, à peine douée de quelques centres nerveux, il y a ici une Europe, qui, dans ses parties essentielles, est quasi homogène : le déterminisme de sa civilisation scientifique, autant que les plus hauts courants de sa culture, la poussent à s'unir chaque jour de façon plus étroite.

Vouloir régir, d'après les mêmes principes, deux corps pour longtemps encore aussi différents, c'est hors de toute sagesse. C'est pourtant ce qu'a prétendu accomplir Genève.

Utopie généreuse, mais utopie, car Genève n'est apte encore qu'à deux genres d'activité : l'arbitrage des nations policées et la tutelle des petites puissances. L'heure n'est pas venue encore, hélas ! où Genève pourra, à coup sûr, faire face à ce qui a toujours été considéré comme la plus extrême difficulté politique : empêcher en pleine atmosphère de moyen âge un Etat fort de s'étendre parmi les faibles. Cela, ce sera l'épreuve suprême de sa puissance, de sa perfection. Mais en attendant...

En attendant, ici en Europe, ce sont les esprits les plus résolument réalistes de la politique qui empruntent aux idéalistes d'hier ; c'est M. Tardieu qui emprunte à Léon Bourgeois et à Ferdinand Buisson, à Edouard Herriot, à Paul-Boncour, à Paul Painlevé, à Henry de Jouvenel, à Aristide Briand la conception d'une souveraineté politique supérieure à nos actuelles souverainetés nationales, et qui propose de vouloir, de réaliser au plus tôt un sur-Etat. Et ceci, au point de vue du simple intérêt national, froidement, pratiquement envisagé.

Qu'est-ce à dire ?

C'est qu'il faut en finir, en Eu-

rope, avec la liquidation de la guerre ; c'est qu'il faut et conjurer le danger de guerre et le danger de misère ; c'est qu'il faut faire la paix. Et pour cela ?

Pour cela, il faut fédérer l'Europe.

Je dis l'Europe, et non pas le globe ; et je me permets de rappeler que, l'an dernier, au cours d'une controverse avec quelques-uns des plus illustres de ce monde, les Wells, les Romain Rolland, les Gorki, j'eus la satisfaction de voir en fin de compte les plus exigeants d'entre eux admettre qu'il y a des étapes qu'on ne peut brûler, qu'entre l'étape nationale et l'étape planétaire il y a inévitablement l'étape continentale.

Avant le but magnifique, mais lointain : les Etats-Unis du monde, il y a le but immédiat, tangible : réaliser l'Europe, solution unique et urgente du problème actuel, réponse au dilemme tragique : « S'unir ou mourir ».

Donc, ne vitupérons pas la S. D.N. Ne doutons pas de Genève. Car, même si Genève ne devait être historiquement que la matrice toute transitoire de l'Union européenne, la mission serait glorieuse.

Or, treize ans à peine après les journées de Versailles, en septembre 1930, à Genève, au sein de la Société des Nations — cette récréation continue — Aristide Briand faisait voter à l'unanimité la fondation du Comité d'étude pour la Fédération européenne.

Comprenons la grandeur de l'événement : de l'œuf mystérieux de la S.D.N. est sorti, ce jour-là, le poussin Europe.

Il n'est que de le faire vivre. Nous verrons ensemble pourquoi il le faut.

Gaston RIOU.

RFS

Enclosure No. 29 to Despatch No. 2533 of March 7, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, March 5, 1932.

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Il ne s'agit pas ici de diminuer le caractère prophétique de cette grande figure : mais un précurseur ne suffit pas à faire en une génération d'un immense chaos de peuples, d'une innombrable humanité d'êtres attardés dans un stade féodal ou patriarcal de civilisation, des masses disciplinées de citoyens prêts à participer à une civilisation démocratique. Croire à une Chine policée, unie, moderne, parce que siège à Nankin une fiction de gouvernement, c'est vraiment de trop bon gré ignorer la géographie et l'histoire, et l'ethnographie au surplus.

Prenez-y garde, car c'est pure insanité — et laisser la part vraiment trop belle aux tenants acharnés et intéressés de la vieille politique des alliances, ces machines de guerre — c'est pure insanité que d'assimiler le rapport Japon-Chine au rapport France-Allemagne. Ici les problèmes sont neufs : il faut créer, de toutes pièces, presque, la paix. Là-bas, les conjonctures rappellent telle ou telle des conjonctures de notre histoire — l'époque des « Grandes Compagnies » — quand ce n'est pas l'histoire des temps les plus reculés. Les solutions de force, ici ou là-bas, n'ont pas une signification égale. Alors qu'il y a une Asie encore protoplasmique,

à peine douée de quelques centres nerveux, il y a ici une Europe, qui, dans ses parties essentielles, est quasi homogène : le déterminisme de sa civilisation scientifique, autant que les plus hauts courants de sa culture, la poussent à s'unir chaque jour de façon plus étroite.

Vouloir régir, d'après les mêmes principes, deux corps pour longtemps encore aussi différents, c'est hors de toute sagesse. C'est pourtant ce qu'a prétendu accomplir Genève.

Utopie généreuse, mais utopie, car Genève n'est apte encore qu'à deux genres d'activité : l'arbitrage des nations policées et la tutelle des petites puissances. L'heure n'est pas venue encore, hélas ! où Genève pourra, à coup sûr, faire face à ce qui a toujours été considéré comme la plus extrême difficulté politique : empêcher en pleine atmosphère de moyen âge un Etat fort de s'étendre parmi les faibles. Cela, ce sera l'épreuve suprême de sa puissance, de sa perfection. Mais en attendant...

En attendant, ici en Europe, ce sont les esprits les plus résolument réalistes de la politique qui empruntent aux idéalistes d'hier ; c'est M. Tardieu qui emprunte à Léon Bourgeois et à Ferdinand Buisson, à Edouard Herriot, à Paul-Boncour, à Paul Painlevé, à Henry de Jouvenel, à Aristide Briand la conception d'une souveraineté politique supérieure à nos actuelles souverainetés nationales, et qui propose de vouloir, de réaliser au plus tôt un sur-Etat. Et ceci, au point de vue du simple intérêt national, froidement, pratiquement envisagé.

Qu'est-ce à dire ?

C'est qu'il faut en finir, en Eu-

rope, avec la liquidation de la guerre ; c'est qu'il faut et conjurer le danger de guerre et le danger de misère ; c'est qu'il faut faire la paix. Et pour cela ?

Pour cela, il faut fédérer l'Europe.

Je dis l'Europe, et non pas le globe ; et je me permets de rappeler que, l'an dernier, au cours d'une controverse avec quelques-uns des plus illustres de ce monde, les Wells, les Romain Rolland, les Gorki, j'eus la satisfaction de voir en fin de compte les plus exigeants d'entre eux admettre qu'il y a des étapes qu'on ne peut brûler, qu'entre l'étape nationale et l'étape planétaire il y a inévitablement l'étape continentale.

Avant le but magnifique, mais lointain : les Etats-Unis du monde, il y a le but immédiat, tangible : réaliser l'Europe, solution unique et urgente du problème actuel, réponse au dilemme tragique : « S'unir ou mourir ».

Donc, ne vitupérons pas la S.D.N. Ne doutons pas de Genève. Car, même si Genève ne devait être historiquement que la matrice toute transitoire de l'Union européenne, la mission serait glorieuse.

Or, treize ans à peine après les journées de Versailles, en septembre 1930, à Genève, au sein de la Société des Nations — cette recreation continue — Aristide Briand faisait voter à l'unanimité la fondation du Comité d'étude pour la Fédération européenne.

Comprenons la grandeur de l'événement : de l'œuf mystérieux de la S.D.N. est sorti, ce jour-là, le poussin Europe.

Il n'est que de le faire vivre. Nous verrons ensemble pourquoi il le faut.

Gaston RIOU.

Enclosure No. 50 to Despatch No. 2353 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, March 6, 1932.

## L'ASSEMBLÉE DE GENÈVE ET LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

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Genève, 5 mars.

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Aujourd'hui, dans les discussions qui se sont déroulées, matin et soir, à la commission générale, on s'est bien gardé de revenir sur ce problème fondamental. Une douzaine d'orateurs ont été entendus. Trois d'entre eux, MM. Lojgren (Suède), Restrepo (Colombie), Buero (Uruguay) ont réclaté l'évacuation préalable à toute négociation de paix. Les autres ont jugé prudent de passer la question sous silence.

Tous les orateurs de cette dernière journée appartenaient sans exception à des Etats secondaires, c'est-à-dire incapables de fournir la moindre contribution militaire, de jeter dans la balance des poids assez lourds pour la faire pencher d'un côté ou de l'autre. N'ayant guère le sentiment d'une responsabilité quelconque, ils se sont laissés aller à des demandes que les grandes puissances, appelées à en assumer les frais, ne leur concéderont certainement pas. Bref, ils se sont plongés dans une démagogie assez facile.

### Nombre d'orateurs demandent une application précipitée de l'article 15

D'après l'article 15 du Covenant, la « procédure pour le règlement pacifique des conflits » se développe en deux temps. D'abord, efforts de conciliation, tentative de rétablir l'harmonie entre les deux Etats ennemis par des pourparlers à l'amiable. Ensuite, la recommandation. L'assemblée énonce dans un rapport la solution du conflit qu'elle croit équitable et presse les deux parties de s'y conformer. Si le rapport a obtenu dans l'assemblée l'approbation unanime des Etats représentés au Conseil et, en ce qui concerne les autres, la majorité des voix, celle des parties qui repousse le rapport ne peut compter sur l'assistance de personne. Par contre, la partie qui se soumet à la recommandation du rapport peut trouver des alliés. En outre, l'Etat qui résiste et engage des opérations militaires moins de trois mois après le vote du rapport est sensé avoir violé le pacte et, contre lui, des sanctions collectives peuvent être employées.

Telle est la procédure qui s'ouvre devant l'assemblée. Elle laisse place à beaucoup d'arbitraire et d'incertitude. Pour commencer, comme l'ont fait observer M. Motta et quelques autres, elle est depuis longtemps dépassée par les événements. Des actes de guerre ont été commis à l'encontre de l'article 12 du Covenant. En logique pure, l'heure des sanctions aurait donc déjà sonné. Mais après avoir signalé ce débordement du Covenant par le Japon,

police d'exercer ses talents sans risques ni périls.

### Les sages conseils de M. Politis

MM. Politis (Grèce) et Bénès (Tchécoslovaquie) se sont séparés de cette troupe d'idéologues. M. Politis a rappelé à ses auditeurs que, dans une affaire comme celle-ci, le premier devoir, si l'on veut aboutir, est de tenir compte du monde réel. Et il presse l'assemblée de se contenter pour l'instant de la procédure de conciliation prévue dans le troisième paragraphe de l'article 15, de ne pas brusquer les choses.

L'article 12 du Covenant accorde à l'assemblée six mois pour présenter le rapport dont nous avons parlé plus haut. Cette période de six mois, dans le litige actuel, expire le 3 septembre. Que l'on profite de ce délai, que, dans l'intervalle, une commission fasse, en quelque sorte, l'intérim de l'assemblée. Sa tâche consistera à surveiller la négociation de Shanghai et à saisir toutes les occasions qui pourront s'offrir de mettre en forme un règlement. Plus tard, on verra. Tel est le projet Politis. Il est éminemment raisonnable. Mais, en raison de sa modestie, il a soulevé la colère du secrétariat et il n'a pas rallié l'approbation des orateurs, dont nous avons enregistré les avis beaucoup plus rigoureux. « Traître infâme! » s'écriait un fonctionnaire de la Société des Nations, interrogé par un de nos amis américains. Les Américains présents à la séance ne cachaient pas leur désapprobation. Ce qui est assez comique, vu le peu de dévouement international dont les Etats-Unis font preuve en règle générale.

M. Bénès, lui, se place à un autre point de vue que M. Politis. Il lui importe par dessus tout de sauver le système de garanties internationales qui est supposé résider dans le Covenant. Si les articles 10 et 12 du Covenant sont violés, l'édifice entier du nouvel ordre international est en danger. Soit dit en passant, on pourrait former un recueil de toutes les constatations sinistres faites aujourd'hui par les uns et par les autres sur le compte de la Société des Nations.

M. Bénès supplie la Société des Nations de respecter ses lois. Mais il n'entre pas dans le détail. Il montre beaucoup de ménagements pour les Japonais, admet que le boycottage chinois est assimilable à une provocation, déclare que les affaires d'Extrême-Orient sont trop obscures pour permettre de porter un jugement sûr. Il reproche, en somme, au Japon, de n'avoir pas essayé de faire redresser ses torts à Genève et par Genève. (Mais l'établissement genevois eût-il été capable de donner satisfaction au Japon). Il admet la légitime défense, mais non point le droit de se faire justice soi-même. Où est la ligne de démarcation? Il ne l'indique pas. Répétons que, pour une fois, M. Bénès s'évertue bien moins à rechercher une solution pratique qu'à réserver pour l'avenir les possibilités d'entraide internationale contre l'agresseur. Puisque nous en sommes au chapitre des réalistes, notons l'allure prudente des ministres hollandais et portugais. L'étonnement n'est pas de mise. La Hollande et le Portugal sont possessionnés en Extrême-Orient.

### Vers la nomination d'une commission et l'ajournement de l'Assemblée.

Le bon sens est du côté de M. Politis. Aussi, M. Hymans, président de l'assemblée, et M. Paul-Boncour, président du Conseil, s'orientent-ils dans la direction qu'il a montrée. L'assemblée s'ajournerait mercredi prochain. Auparavant, elle aurait

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From the Embassy at Paris.

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Les Etats sud-américains et l'Es-

peut-être pas bien fort mais suffisamment. Avec une petite larme, Marinette dit à sa bonne :

« Tu sais, avec la culotte PETIT BATEAU, ça ne fait pas trop mal. »

POUR BIEN HABILLER LES ENFANTS  
LA CULOTTE "PETIT BATEAU"  
EST DE RIGUEUR.

EXIGEZ LA MARQUE



Enclosure No. 30 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, March 6, 1932.

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Les Etats sud-américains et l'Espagne voudraient faire insérer dans un document de ce genre que des créances, des concessions économiques, etc., ne peuvent conférer aucun droit d'occupation militaire d'un territoire étranger. C'est la doctrine constante des Etats de l'Amérique du Sud qui redoutent toujours les reprises du créancier yankee. Mais il est probable que de telles formules seront écartées : sans quoi la colonisation européenne en Chine n'aurait plus qu'à disparaître. Si le cœur lui en dit, l'assem-

blée pourra alléger sa besogne : le conflit sino-japonais en cours depuis cinq mois a naturellement fait surgir dans le Covenant toutes sortes de difficultés d'interprétation : compétence relative du conseil et de l'Assemblée, etc., définition du droit de légitime défense, fondement de la thèse japonaise. Il est peu probable que, pour l'instant, beaucoup de gens consentent à pénétrer dans ce maquis.

PERTINAX.

FIG. b

Enclosure No. 31 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, March 6, 1932.

## L'INGRATITUDE A GENÈVE



Dès que le conflit d'Extrême-Orient a éclaté, la Société des nations a prodigué ses faveurs à la Chine qui, reconnaissons-le, y avait tous les droits. Elle violait les traités, des « traités inégaux »; elle donnait donc un bon exemple et créait un utile précédent au moment où, sous les auspices de Genève, s'organisait un formidable assaut contre le traité de Versailles, autre traité inégal, puisqu'il a été imposé par la victoire, qui est une inégalité. En outre, les troupes chinoises étaient commandées par des officiers allemands et éclairées par une aviation soviétique. Enfin, elles se livraient aux pires attentats contre les Européens, boycottant, pillant, violant, massacrant. Ce sont des titres éminents à Genève. Le Japon, au contraire, représentait l'ordre, la stabilité, la civilisation en Extrême-Orient comme la France les représente en Europe. La S.D.N. a donc agité contre lui ses foudres de papier et lui a adressé, en octobre dernier, un ultimatum lui enjoignant d'évacuer la Mandchourie.

Bien entendu, le Japon n'en a rien fait; ou, plutôt, il a évacué certaines positions, mais en tournant le dos à la côte et en étendant son occupation dans le pays. C'est ce qui lui a valu aussitôt la considération de la S.D.N., qui a le mépris du droit et le respect de la force. On ne remarque pas assez que dans les récentes « résolutions » de Genève, il n'est pas question de la Mandchourie, ce qui permet d'apprécier comme il convient sa résolution d'octobre et ses résolutions en général. Celle d'hier qui, selon l'usage, sera détruite par celle de demain, ne vise que la situation à Changhaï, où la résolution d'octobre a encouragé de nouveaux attentats chinois qui ont imposé au Japon la résolution plus sérieuse d'y débarquer. La S.D.N. a donc réussi à prolonger, étendre, envenimer le conflit. Ce n'est qu'un demi-succès. Malgré ses efforts, ceux d'un professeur sinophile du Collège de France, et de M. Herriot, qui a sommé notre gouvernement de défendre la justice à la mode chinoise, ce conflit n'a pas encore dégénéré en guerre mondiale. Les pacifistes féroces du secrétariat de Genève n'ont même pu, comme dit M. Eugène Lautier, arroser leur fromage de sang français.

Or, la dernière « résolution » de Genève n'a été adoptée hier que grâce à la bonne volonté du Japon. Il a fait preuve de cette modération dont Bossuet disait qu'elle est le fruit d'une sagesse consonnée. En l'espèce, elle est aussi le fruit d'une ironie cachée et d'une bataille gagnée. Au contraire, c'est la Chine qui a ergoté, fait des façons et failli tout remettre en question. Elle n'en sera que plus choyée. Le gouvernement chinois est, pour la dame en enfance de Genève, un de ces favoris qui le sont d'autant plus qu'ils coûtent plus cher. Gageons qu'il en recevra de nouvelles caresses avant d'avoir payé ses vieilles cotisations qui sont en retard de sept ans.

L'ingratitude de ce protégé n'est dépassée que par celle de l'institution elle-même envers un de ses anciens favoris et apôtres, M. Briand lui-même. Celui-ci a fait pour elle plus encore qu'elle n'a fait pour la Chine. Voici qu'elle étonne le monde — le monde qui ne la connaît pas — par son ingratitude, tout comme, jadis, l'Autriche, avec laquelle elle a d'autres traits de ressemblance. L'Autriche aussi était une Société des nations; comme elle, celle de Genève est en retard d'une idée, d'une année, et surtout d'une armée. Comme elle enfin, elle n'existe plus, et pour la même raison, parce qu'elle a vendu son âme à l'Allemagne.

Les correspondants les plus officieux téléphonent que lorsque M. Paul-Boncour, anxieux de provoquer des applaudissements récalcitrants, a chanté un couplet à la gloire de M. Briand, son lyrisme a été accueilli par un silence encore plus glacial. Le crédit de M. Briand est un crédit gelé. Nous nous en consolons aisément si celui de la France ne l'était aussi. Avant-hier, au déjeuner du Comité Duplex, Louis Marin rapportait ce mot d'un de nos délégués: « A Genève, la France est traitée comme un paillason. » C'est le prestige mondial qui était le principal titre de M. Briand à la reconnaissance nationale. Nous ne disons pas que s'il en est ainsi, c'est parce que jusqu'ici, depuis 1924, nos délégués n'ont été, sur les tréteaux de Genève, que des paillasses. Nous ne le disons pas, parce que le rapprochement est trop facile et, surtout, parce que c'est la vérité. Or, la vérité est le comble de l'indécence dans un établissement qui, pour achalander sa foire aux vanités et nourrir sa ménagerie de chimères, se doit d'être avant tout une maison d'illusions.

FIG. 6

## LE JAPON ET LA CHINE

GENÈVE, 5 mars (de notre envoyé spécial, par téléphone) :

Si la Société des Nations voulait aggraver le conflit sino-japonais, elle ne procéderait pas de façon différente. On aurait pu croire qu'après le discours du président du conseil, l'exposé des deux parties, le vote d'une résolution unanime, l'assemblée se serait ajournée pour faciliter un accord entre les belligérants. Pas du tout ! C'est au moment précis où le canon se tait et où la voie semble s'ouvrir à la conciliation que l'assemblée amorce un grand débat sur le différend sino-japonais. Quinze discours — pas un de moins — ont marqué cette première journée de la discussion générale en commission. Et ce n'est pas fini...

Je ne me propose pas de vous transmettre le texte intégral de tous ces discours, qui ont occupé près de sept heures de séance, car je ne veux de mal à personne. Il serait cependant injuste de dénier toute valeur à certaines de ces harangues. Il ne s'agit point, sans doute, d'interventions de représentants de grandes puissances. Mais il y a à glaner en bien et en mal dans les déclarations des délégués de la Norvège, de la Colombie, du Mexique, de la Suède, de la Finlande, des Pays-Bas, du Danemark, de la Suisse, de l'Espagne, de l'Esthonie, de la Tchécoslovaquie, de la Grèce, de la Perse, de l'Uruguay et du Portugal (qu'on m'excuse d'une aussi longue énumération).

Parmi ces discours, deux semblent particulièrement intéressants, à des titres divers : ceux de M. Motta et de M. Benès. M. Motta, président de la Confédération helvétique, jout, à Genève, parmi ses collègues de la Société des Nations, d'une grande autorité. C'est le représentant d'une puissance neutre, sur le territoire de laquelle siège la Ligue. C'est un homme d'une grande probité intellectuelle, qui dit avec franchise ce qu'il pense, même lorsqu'il se trompe. M. Motta s'étonne que l'assemblée soit saisie en vertu de l'article 15 du pacte, qui prévoit le règlement des conflits, alors qu'on se trouve en présence d'une véritable guerre. Il estime cependant qu'on doit demander à cet article tout ce qu'il peut donner, il s'agit en premier lieu de tenter la conciliation entre les parties. La deuxième procédure est celle de la recommandation. Si un rapport est voté par l'assemblée à la majorité, y compris les membres du Conseil, mais à l'exclusion des parties, il est interdit de faire la guerre à l'Etat qui l'a accepté. Autrement dit, si le Japon reprenait les hostilités contre la Chine, les sanctions prévues par l'article 16 entreraient théoriquement en jeu. M. Motta estime que le Japon a violé l'article 12 du pacte, qui prévoit, pour tous les différends, le recours à l'arbitrage, au règlement judiciaire ou à la médiation du Conseil.

M. Benès, ministre des affaires étrangères de Tchécoslovaquie, représente un pays qui s'intéresse à la solution du conflit sino-japonais, non point tellement pour des raisons d'ordre moral, que parce qu'il peut être amené, dans le cas d'une agression allemande, à invoquer le précédent que l'on est en train de créer. On comprend donc parfaitement que M. Benès ait tenu à souligner qu'un pays n'a pas le droit de se faire justice lui-même, que tous les membres de la Société des Nations sont obligés de respecter l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique de chacun d'entre eux, que tous les Etats doivent recourir à la procédure pacifique des conflits prescrite par l'article 12 du pacte.

Il est, en effet, indispensable que la Société des Nations affirme ces grands principes qui sont à la base du Covenant, bien qu'elle ne soit pas en mesure de les faire appliquer. Mais il faut aussi qu'elle considère le conflit sino-japonais sous son aspect véritable. Elle doit se souvenir, d'une part, que la Chine est un pays à droits spéciaux, d'autre part, que le Japon a été l'objet de provocations incessantes.

L'argument du caractère particulier du conflit ne doit pas être invoqué, comme on le fait trop souvent, pour expliquer la carence de la Ligue, car elle se fût manifestée dans des cas différents, mais bien pour accorder à chacun des circonstances atténuantes. Ce n'est malheureusement pas ce qu'on semble vouloir faire. Le gouvernement de Tokio est accablé de reproches. Les orateurs sont rares qui prennent en considération les torts de la Chine. C'est à la fois injuste et malhabile, car le conflit pourrait être réglé sur place, si on ne l'envenimait pas.

James Donnadieu.

## Une journée de polémiques à l'assemblée réunie à Genève pour résoudre le conflit sino-japonais



Sous l'œil de soldats américains et japonais, les Chinois de Chapeï font la queue pour être admis dans la concession internationale.

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 5 mars. — Polémiques irritantes et lamentations stériles. Voilà le bilan de la journée à l'assemblée de Genève :

Pendant toute la première partie de la séance du matin, M. Sato et M. Yen ont bataillé à coups d'informations, se jetant à la tête des télégrammes d'agences, des articles de journaux et même des fonds de propagande. Jusqu'au moment où, avec son rude bon sens, M. Paul-Boncour a mis le holà en faisant remarquer que l'assemblée était en train de compromettre son caractère et sa dignité.

On voulait des renseignements précis ; il pouvait en apporter sous la forme d'un télégramme de l'attaché militaire français à Changhaï, ainsi conçu :

« Les hostilités ont cessé en fait le 4 mars, à 2 heures, de part et d'autre. »

Sir John Simon est venu à la rescousse, apportant, lui aussi, des informations officielles anglaises qui constatent que, depuis le moment où la fin des hostilités a été proclamée, il n'y a eu que des incidents sans importance.

Assaisonnant d'humour britannique la conclusion de M. Paul-Boncour, le chef

du Foreign Office a invité les Japonais et les Chinois à suspendre au moins les hostilités verbales à Genève.

Après ce délégué, la discussion générale a commencé et, malgré son caractère purement académique, elle a laissé entrevoir des arrière-pensées bien intéressantes.

Sous prétexte de défendre la justice et le droit, les Sud-Américains se sont livrés à une charge à fond contre la doctrine de Monroe.

Le représentant du Mexique, M. Romeo Ortega, a été relativement modéré, se contentant de donner la part d'intervention, mais le représentant de la Colombie, M. Restrepo, a montré jusqu'où peut aller la menace du *big stick*. Il a annoncé une déclaration de principe en quatre points, en vertu de laquelle il doit être interdit à toute nation de se servir de la force pour soutenir ses droits, pour faire respecter ses nationaux, pour faire payer les dettes et pour imposer un traité par pression militaire. Est-ce par cette proclamation du droit à l'anarchie et à la faillite que les Etats de l'Amérique latine comptent rétablir la confiance ?

Après les Sud-Américains, les Scandinaves et les Hollandais ont apporté les doléances des grands théoriciens du droit. Nous avons entendu, une fois de plus, le concert de gémissements qui retentit à chaque assemblée, sur la discipline des principes fondamentaux de la Société des nations, sur l'impuissance de la Ligue, sur la nécessité de faire régner la paix et la justice dans le monde si on ne veut pas trahir les espérances de l'ère nouvelle. Le plus agressif a été le Norvégien, M. Braatland, qui a déclaré que l'assemblée devrait adopter une résolution et, au besoin, recourir aux sanctions contre celle des parties qui n'en tiendrait pas compte.

Le plus logique a été le Finlandais, M. Erich, qui a eu, lui, au moins la franchise de reconnaître que l'on ne pourrait rien faire tant que l'on n'aura pas fait de la Société des nations une force capable d'assurer aux nations des garanties réelles de sécurité.

M. Beelaert von Blockland, sous prétexte de parler du conflit sino-japonais, s'est laissé entraîner à une véritable plaidoirie pour le désarmement.

Dans l'après-midi, on a vu se manifester l'entraînement des surenchères et, naturellement les plus ardents à brandir les foudres de la Société des nations ont été ceux qui ne pourraient lui apporter aucun concours.

Le représentant du Danemark, M. Munch, a soutenu des thèses plutôt scabreuses. Il a proposé de faire appel à la convention de prévention de la guerre votée en 1931, mais qui n'est pas ratifiée et n'a donc pas de valeur légale. En vertu de cette convention, on devrait formuler des demandes dont la violation constituerait *ipso facto* l'agression.

Avec M. Motta, nous sommes revenus à un sens plus exact des réalités juridiques. Le représentant de la Suisse a fait un exposé très clair des procédures qui sont à la disposition de l'assemblée. Il y en a deux : d'abord l'action conciliante, puis si celle-ci ne réussit pas, la recommandation appuyée de sanctions. Cette éventualité ne saurait être écartée, car, indiscutablement, les engagements de la charte de la Société des nations ont été violés et, si on continuait dans cette voie, que deviendraient les garanties de sécurité des petites puissances ?

La conclusion, très juste, de M. Motta, est qu'il ne s'agit pas du prestige de la Société des nations, mais bel et bien de son autorité.

Le représentant de la Suisse a fait une allusion précise au pouvoir de l'assemblée d'évoquer le conflit tout entier, y compris les faits de Mandchourie.

Le porte-parole de l'Espagne, M. Zulueta, va plus loin. Il déclare catégoriquement qu'aucune négociation ne doit être engagée avant l'évacuation totale, non seulement de Changhaï, mais de la Mandchourie.

L'intervention de M. Benès a provoqué un vif mouvement d'intérêt, car nous avons vu entrer en scène un des meilleurs champions de la Société des nations. De fait, le ministre des affaires étrangères de Tchécoslovaquie a prononcé un très habile plaidoyer en faveur du conseil, reprenant les arguments de M. Paul-Boncour et il a exprimé avec beaucoup de nuances le regret que le Japon n'ait pas porté devant la Société des nations la question du boycottage, de la violation des droits de ses nationaux et des traités. Cela aurait mieux valu que de créer un précédent de recours à la force.

M. Benès ne dissimule pas que c'est surtout ce précédent qui le préoccupe. Pour le conjurer, il ne suffit pas d'invoquer les dispositions du pacte, il faut renforcer la Société des nations ; lui donner des moyens propres à des investigations et surtout une police.

La nécessité d'une armée internationale est également soulignée par M. Politis, qui apporte, lui aussi, à la défense du conseil, le concours d'une éloquence persuasive et d'une argumentation subtile. On peut reconnaître d'ailleurs que pendant tout ce long débat, il n'y a pas eu une condamnation formelle du conseil.

L'intervention de M. Politis a eu un autre intérêt. Elle a soulevé le coin du voile qui couvre l'avenir. Tout le monde, en effet, se demande ce qui va sortir de cette discussion qui ne pourra plus se prolonger beaucoup. M. Politis a fait remarquer que l'assemblée a un délai de six mois pour se prononcer. Il ne peut être question de prolonger la session aussi longtemps. Il faudra donc se mettre d'accord sur une résolution dont les directives ne seront pas faciles à établir. Il faudra ensuite désigner une commission chargée de surveiller les événements, et ici une grosse question se posera. Cette commission sera-t-elle une délégation nouvelle, ce qui équivaudrait à un blâme du conseil, ou bien sera-t-elle le conseil lui-même, ce qui équivaudrait à un dessaisissement indirect de l'assemblée ?

M. Politis a conclu par une citation d'Eschvie que nous sommes obligés de relever. « Les hommes et les peuples, a dit le grand poète tragique, ne doivent pas oublier la mobilité du droit qui se déplace sans cesse et se retourne demain contre ceux qui l'invoquent aujourd'hui ».

C'est peut-être très grec, mais quel argument pour les Allemands ! — S.-B.

Enclosure No. 83 to Despatch No. 2533 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, March 6, 1932.

### Un débat confus

L'Assemblée de la S. D. N. semble fort embarrassée. On le serait à moins. Les délégués réunis à Genève ont deux préoccupations qui sont, sinon contradictoires, du moins assez difficilement conciliables à l'heure actuelle, celle de ne rien faire qui puisse empêcher l'apaisement local et celle de ne pas se laisser entraîner à violer les principes fondamentaux du pacte de la Ligue; les représentants des puissances qui, dans le cas d'une action de la S. D. N., seraient obligées d'assumer toutes les responsabilités pratiques sont naturellement plutôt dominés par la première et ceux des petits pays qui redoutent les conséquences futures de l'abandon de principes tutélaires en faveur d'un grand État par la seconde. Tout le drame qui se joue à Genève est là. C'est un drame qui prend d'ailleurs à certains moments la tournure d'une comédie, quand, par exemple, on voit l'Assemblée se transformer brusquement en commission générale, sans que rien soit modifié dans sa composition, et quand M. Hymans, véritable maître Jacques, annonce gravement qu'il a reçu une communication du président de la commission générale, c'est-à-dire de lui-même, présidant une réunion dont le nom seul a changé.

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'Assemblée a voté hier un projet de résolution, qui recommande particulièrement l'ouverture de négociations entre les délégués chinois et japonais, avec le concours des autorités militaires, navales et civiles des puissances représentées à Changhaï, en vue de la conclusion d'arrangements destinés à rendre définitive la cessation des hostilités et à régler le retrait des forces japonaises. Malheureusement, il résulte de la discussion qui a eu lieu à ce sujet que ce texte est interprété d'une façon très différente par les Chinois et par les Japonais, les premiers réclamant le retrait des troupes avant tout accord définitif et les seconds voulant le contraire. Par crainte de tout compromettre on s'est gardé de préciser le sens exact de la formule adoptée. D'autre part, les deux parties en cause ont continué à fournir des renseignements contradictoires: d'après les Chinois, les hostilités continuent et d'après les Japonais elles sont suspendues, sous la réserve d'incidents insignifiants. Aussi M. Paul-Boncour a-t-il constaté ce matin avec quelque agacement que si les « deux parties veulent continuer à échanger des renseignements contradictoires, toute la session pourra se passer à en discuter ». D'après des rapports français et anglais de Changhaï les combats auraient en réalité cessé.


Le débat a repris ce matin. On en trouvera le compte rendu en Dernière Heure. De nouvelles propositions ont été faites par certains délégués. Il faut souhaiter qu'elles soient examinées avec beaucoup de soin, particulièrement la motion du représentant de la Colombie dont le paragraphe premier pourrait toucher à l'application de certaines clauses du traité de Versailles. Tous les termes des résolutions qui seront soumises à l'Assemblée doivent être pesés. Cela dit, la seule conclusion à tirer pour le moment des discussions en cours est qu'il importe avant tout, si l'on veut aboutir à un résultat, que la bataille ne reprenne pas à Changhaï.

PIERRE BERNUS.

Enclosure No. 34 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, March 6, 1932.

Où l'on apprend finalement qu'une commission  
pourra être chargée de suivre les négociations  
de Changhaï, l'assemblée ayant six mois  
pour se prononcer



La ligne japonaise à la cessation des hostilités, le 4 mars  
est indiquée par des croix

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 5 mars. — Par téléphone. — Nous avons eu aujourd'hui deux séances inutiles de la commission générale de l'assemblée extraordinaire et plénière de la S. D. N.

Ce n'est pas là un avis personnel ; tout le monde admettra, en effet, que l'inutile est le contraire de l'utile.

Or, il était impossible de discuter utilement avant d'avoir en main les pièces du procès. La veille, l'assemblée avait constaté « à l'unanimité » qu'elle manquait d'informations impartiales. Elle avait transmis à Changhaï une résolution transférant des pouvoirs aux autorités locales et demandant des renseignements.

En bonne logique, il eût fallu s'en tenir là pour le moment et agir ensuite, après avoir obtenu les informations demandées. Eh bien non ! Histoire, peut-être, de passer le temps, l'on s'est réuni tout de même et encore deux fois dans la même journée.

Une mesure pour rien, direz-vous ? Pour rien ? Je ne le pense pas. Car il ne faut pas tenir pour rien un résultat manifestement négatif, résultat affligeant pour une politique — la nôtre — qui préconise le renforcement de l'institution genevoise affaiblie, maladroite, stérilement bavarde.

Aujourd'hui — j'écris ces mots avec un sentiment de réelle contrariété — Genève a donné au monde un spectacle lamentable, dont seul le tenancier du bar du Palais du Désarmement a pu se féliciter, car le public, fuyant l'insipide séance, prenait d'assaut son comptoir.

Le matin nous avons eu un meeting contradictoire, indigne même

de la Salle Wagram, tandis que l'après-midi s'est passé en vagues causeries, en dissertations sans rime ni raison, un « quatre à sept » politique pour dames âgées.

Ayant ainsi présenté les choses — je me rallie là à un avis très général — il est correct de ne point citer les orateurs à part M. Politis qui nous a donné des clartés précises sur le sort futur des travaux de l'assemblée.

Je ne priverai pas les lecteurs du *Matin* en passant résolument l'éponge sur ces deux cents pages d'éloquence. On peut les mettre d'autant plus froidement de côté qu'elles restent entièrement en dehors du conflit qui a provoqué tout ce branlebas.

Un novice pénétrant dans la salle H n'aurait jamais compris, à l'audition de ces discours, qu'il s'agissait du conflit sino-japonais : le verbiage l'avait noyé au point d'en détourner toute attention. Chacun ne vit dans cette discussion que l'occasion de livrer à un public, qui ne tenait d'ailleurs nullement à le savoir, ses petites idées sur les articles 10, 12 ou 15 du pacte, ou d'affirmer son attachement indéfectible aux principes gouvernant l'association des nations.

1755  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Tout ceci ne serait pas bien grave, sinon pour l'autorité d'un tribunal que l'on eût désiré suprême, sans le préambule de la matinée qui nous a offert un spectacle écœurant d'insinuations, de diffamations, voire même d'injures.

M. Yen a donné dans un ton de polémique propre à certains extrémistes asiatiques qui, généralement, se traduit au café par des coups de poing et se règle finalement au commissariat.

A bout d'arguments, il a accusé le monde entier de vénalité en déclarant que le Japon se défendait à coups de millions de yens, dont il avait corrompu l'opinion universelle.

Mis au pied du mur par M. Sato, sommé de s'expliquer et d'apporter des preuves, il s'est « dégonflé ». Il faut excuser ce terme vulgaire, mais il donne plus exactement l'idée de la tenue de cette assemblée plénière et extraordinaire de la S. D. N.

On comprend, dès lors, les applaudissements fervents qui ont salué l'exposé juridique ou, pour mieux dire, procédurier de M. Politis. On apprit par lui, en effet, avec soulagement, que le mécanisme du règlement de l'assemblée permettait d'en finir aussi rapidement que possible avec cette pénible exhibition.

L'assemblée a six mois pour se prononcer — jolie perspective, soit dit en passant, pour tout pays véritablement envahi — ce qui permettra de verser l'affaire à une commission siégeant à huis clos.

Il convient de souhaiter que cette solution intervienne au plus vite, car pareil spectacle de « règlement pacifique » se produisant comme intermède de la conférence du désarmement, ne peut qu'encourager les nations à compter sur elles-mêmes et à s'armer jusqu'aux dents.

Enclosure No. 35 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, March 6, 1932.

## Un clair et grand débat à la S. D. N. sur le différend sino-japonais

MM. Benès et Politis, en de lumineux exposés, ont  
dégagé la responsabilité de chacun des adversaires  
et examiné les ressources du pacte dans le conflit

Genève, 5 mars.

D'UN DE NOS ENVOYÉS SPÉCIAUX

« Il faut que l'Assemblée parle ! »  
avait dit hier avec autant d'autorité  
que de courage M. Paul Hymans, ce  
qui voulait dire : il faut qu'elle prenne  
ses responsabilités !

Cet appel du président a été entendu.  
Au cours des deux longues séances que  
nous avons eues aujourd'hui, quinze  
orateurs représentant les pays les plus  
divers — Norvège, Colombie, Mexique,  
Suède, Finlande, Pays-Bas, Danemark,  
Suisse, Espagne, Estonie, Tchécoslova-  
quie, Grèce, Perse, Uruguay et Portu-  
gal — ont pris la parole et l'on doit re-  
connaître que rarement débat a eu plus  
de tenue et fait davantage honneur à  
la Société des nations.

Les discours préparés d'avance avec  
le plus grand soin et avec un sens par-  
ticulièrement vif des responsabilités ont  
atteint une élévation de ton et de pen-  
sée vraiment remarquable.

Tous, d'ailleurs, procédaient du  
même dessein : renforcer dans toute  
la mesure du possible la portée de la  
résolution adoptée hier dans le double  
but de faire effectivement cesser les  
actes de guerre entre Japonais et Chi-  
nois et de faciliter entre eux, dans le  
plus bref délai, l'ouverture sur place  
des négociations. Dessein infiniment  
louable, on le voit, et qui ne se pou-  
vait réaliser que par une affirmation  
aussi nette qu'énergique de tous les  
principes qui sont à la base du pacte.

### Exposés juridiques

C'est donc à une longue série d'ex-  
posés juridiques que nous avons  
assisté, exposés de présentation et de  
valeur différentes, sans doute, mais où  
les mêmes arguments, inspirés par le  
même désir de sauvegarder la paix,  
revenaient sans cesse et où nous  
avons eu fréquemment la satisfaction  
de voir apparaître ces idées bien fran-  
çaises d'assistance mutuelle et de poli-  
ce internationale.

Est-ce à dire que toutes ces inter-  
ventions, qu'il serait vain de passer en  
revue, aient eu une égale utilité ?  
Evidemment non.

Beaucoup d'orateurs — nous pour-  
rions presque écrire la plupart d'entre  
eux — ont eu le tort de s'en tenir ser-  
vilement à la lettre du pacte, de rai-  
sonner dans l'absolu et d'aller même  
dans certains cas jusqu'à réclamer  
contre le pays en qui ils voient un  
agresseur l'application des sanctions  
prévues.

Toute leur argumentation était con-  
struite comme s'il s'agissait d'un conflit  
entre deux Etats également organisés,  
également policés et possédant l'un et  
l'autre un pouvoir central également  
obéi.

Ils ne tenaient compte ni des traités  
spéciaux qui autorisent le maintien en  
Chine de forces étrangères, ni de la  
situation spéciale du Japon en Mand-  
chourie, ni du nombre considérable de  
ressortissants nippons dont la vie, les  
biens et les intérêts se sont trouvés  
menacés du fait de l'anarchie chinoise  
et de l'observation par le gouverne-  
ment de Nankin de ses obligations  
internationales.

De même, trop de délégués se sont  
laissé induire en erreur par la théorie  
inexacte constamment développée, théo-  
rie d'après laquelle l'Assemblée est un  
tribunal et comme tel doit dire le droit.

M. Motta, qui avait déjà hier fait  
preuve d'un beau courage, a très net-  
tement et très heureusement combattu  
cet après-midi cette thèse absurde. Le  
rôle de la S. D. N., et par conséquent  
de ses divers organes — conseil ou as-  
semblée — est non de s'ériger en juge,  
mais de faire œuvre conciliatrice et  
d'empêcher la guerre en facilitant entre  
les parties des négociations directes.

### MM. Benès et Politis sur le plan des réalités

Ce qui donne aux deux interventions  
de MM. Benès et Politis une impor-  
tance capitale, ce qui les classe l'une  
et l'autre bien au-dessus de toutes  
celles qui les ont précédées ou suivies,  
c'est que les deux hommes d'Etat se  
sont placés non sur le terrain étroit  
des principes, mais sur celui des réalités,  
qu'ils ont tenu compte du caractè-  
re absolument spécial du conflit sino-  
japonais, qu'ils ont dégagé en toute  
impartialité la responsabilité de cha-  
cun des adversaires, qu'ils ont souli-  
gné sans les exagérer les ressources  
du pacte et qu'ils ont enfin nettement  
circonscrit l'usage qu'on peut en faire.

### Le discours de M. Benès

Tout serait à citer des remarquables  
discours du ministre des Affaires  
étrangères tchécoslovaque et du mini-  
stre de Grèce à Paris. Ecoutez M. Be-  
nès qui vient affirmer son accord avec  
M. Paul-Boncour sur la nécessité « de  
prendre en considération la situation  
tout à fait spéciale qui existe en Ex-  
trême-Orient » :

— Je voudrais, dit-il, souligner deux  
points importants, 1° la Chine et le  
Japon doivent avoir la certitude que  
nous procédons à leur égard comme  
nous procéderions à l'égard de n'im-  
porte quelle autre puissance ; 2° tout  
en prenant en considération la situa-  
tion spéciale au point de vue du droit  
international de certaines rivalités po-  
litiques en Chine, certains principes

le Japon qu'envers la Chine, mais qu'elle  
respecte entièrement, dans tous les cas,  
les prescriptions du pacte et qu'elle se  
rende compte du fait que nous établis-  
sons aujourd'hui des précédents d'une  
importance primordiale pour la vie et  
l'existence même de l'institution de Ge-  
nève.

### Les conclusions de M. Politis

Se plaçant à un point de vue plus ju-  
ridique, M. Politis est arrivé aux mêmes  
conclusions. Lui aussi veut tenir la ba-  
lance égale entre la Chine et le Japon  
car si l'un a violé l'intégrité territoriale  
et l'indépendance politique de l'autre,  
ce dernier a manqué « au respect de la  
parole donnée par les actes internatio-  
naux ». Lui aussi déplore que le conseil  
de la S. D. N. n'ait pas eu à sa dispo-  
sition « une force de police propre à  
s'entremettre entre les armées ad-  
verses ».

— Le conseil, ajouta le délégué de la  
Grèce, a fait ce qu'il pouvait faire :

Il s'est efforcé tout d'abord de réta-  
blir une ambiance pacifique propre à  
lui permettre ensuite de remplir la  
tâche que lui confie l'article 15. Il a  
commencé par vouloir mettre fin aux  
hostilités. Sa tâche a été interrompue  
par la requête qui a été adressée par la  
Chine à l'Assemblée.

Succédant au conseil, l'Assemblée  
doit suivre la même voie. Sa première  
tâche, elle a essayé de la remplir hier  
et nous sommes tous heureux d'avoir  
trouvé dans cet effort la collaboration  
des deux parties. Si, comme nous l'es-  
pérons, les deux objectifs visés par la  
résolution d'hier, la cessation définitive  
des hostilités et l'évacuation du  
territoire chinois, sont promptement  
réalisés, l'Assemblée pourra alors aller  
plus loin.

Après avoir rappelé qu'en tout état  
de cause le pacte impose à l'action de  
l'Assemblée un délai de six mois :

— Je pense, messieurs, a conclu  
M. Politis, que vous estimerez comme  
moi que la solution pratique sera de  
nommer une commission chargée de  
suivre les négociations qui auront  
lieu à Changhaï, d'en faire rapport à  
l'Assemblée et, pour le cas où malheu-  
reusement les négociations ne donne-  
raient pas de résultats à Changhaï, de  
prévoir elle-même la préparation né-  
cessaire pour la suite de l'œuvre de  
l'Assemblée.

Mais je le répète, je ne puis pas  
imaginer que devant les terribles res-  
ponsabilités qui pèsent sur l'une comme  
sur l'autre des deux parties, elles ne  
feraient pas à Changhaï, une fois l'am-  
biance pacifique rétablie, l'effort néces-  
saire pour que, au moyen de conces-  
sions réciproques, elles arrivent à un  
accord amiable sauvegardant les  
droits, les intérêts et la dignité des  
deux pays en présence.

Après ces deux interventions capi-  
tales, le rôle de l'Assemblée et le caractè-  
re de son intervention se trouvent  
ainsi clairement précisés. Ils le seront  
mieux encore lundi soir car MM. Za-  
leski, Titulesco, sir John Simon et pro-  
bablement aussi M. Paul-Boncour, dans  
sa qualité non plus de président du  
Conseil mais de premier délégué de la  
France, doivent également prendre la  
parole.

On espère en finir alors avec la dis-  
cussion générale et passer à l'élabora-  
tion du projet de résolution qui doit  
clôre l'intervention de l'Assemblée.

Nous avons indiqué déjà quels seront  
vraisemblablement les principaux  
points de cette résolution ; encore  
qu'il n'y ait guère de doute à cet  
égard, on s'attend que l'établissement  
de ce texte et son adoption donnent  
lieu à d'assez sérieuses difficultés.

Certains s'efforceront en effet de le  
faire couvrir non seulement les évé-  
nements de Changhaï mais encore  
ceux de Mandchourie, d'autres se pro-  
nonceront, comme ce soir M. Politis,  
pour l'institution d'une commission  
spéciale chargée de surveiller la situa-  
tion jusqu'à la prochaine assemblée,  
tandis que d'autres encore préféreront  
laisser au conseil dont l'œuvre a été  
unanimentement approuvée le soin de  
poursuivre sa tâche. Bref, il ne paraît  
guère possible qu'on en finisse avec  
l'affaire sino-japonaise avant les der-  
niers jours de la semaine prochaine.

Albert JULLIEN

Enclosure No. 35 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, March 6, 1932.

## Un clair et grand débat à la S. D. N. sur le différend sino-japonais

MM. Benès et Politis, en de lumineux exposés, ont  
dégagé la responsabilité de chacun des adversaires  
et examiné les ressources du pacte dans le conflit

Genève, 5 mars.

D'UN DE NOS ENVOYÉS SPÉCIAUX

« Il faut que l'Assemblée parle ! » avait dit hier avec autant d'autorité que de courage M. Paul Hymans, ce qui voulait dire : il faut qu'elle prenne ses responsabilités !

Cet appel du président a été entendu. Au cours des deux longues séances que nous avons eues aujourd'hui, quinze orateurs représentant les pays les plus divers — Norvège, Colombie, Mexique, Suède, Finlande, Pays-Bas, Danemark, Suisse, Espagne, Estonie, Tchécoslovaquie, Grèce, Perse, Uruguay et Portugal — ont pris la parole et l'on doit reconnaître que rarement débat a eu plus de tenue et fait davantage honneur à la Société des Nations.

Les discours préparés d'avance avec le plus grand soin et avec un sens particulièrement vif des responsabilités ont atteint une élévation de ton et de pensée vraiment remarquable.

Tous, d'ailleurs, procédaient du même dessein : renforcer dans toute la mesure du possible la portée de la résolution adoptée hier dans le double but de faire effectivement cesser les actes de guerre entre Japonais et Chinois et de faciliter entre eux, dans le plus bref délai, l'ouverture sur place des négociations. Dessein infiniment louable, on le voit, et qui ne se pouvait réaliser que par une affirmation aussi nette qu'énergique de tous les principes qui sont à la base du pacte.

### Exposés juridiques

C'est donc à une longue série d'exposés juridiques que nous avons assisté, exposés de présentation et de valeur différentes, sans doute, mais où les mêmes arguments, inspirés par le même désir de sauvegarder la paix, revenaient sans cesse et où nous avons eu fréquemment la satisfaction de voir apparaître ces idées bien françaises d'assistance mutuelle et de police internationale.

Est-ce à dire que toutes ces interventions, qu'il serait vain de passer en revue, aient eu une égale utilité ? Evidemment non.

Beaucoup d'orateurs — nous pourrions citer de Grèce à Paris, Ecoutez M. Benès qui vient affirmer son accord avec M. Paul-Boncour sur la nécessité « de prendre en considération la situation tout à fait spéciale qui existe en Extrême-Orient » :

« Je voudrais, dit-il, souligner deux points importants, 1° la Chine et le Japon doivent avoir la certitude que nous procéderons à leur égard comme nous le ferions à l'égard de n'importe quelle autre puissance ; 2° tout en prenant en considération la situation spéciale au point de vue du droit international de certaines rivalités politiques en Chine, certains principes du pacte doivent être respectés dans tous les cas et sans condition.

Malgré tous les renseignements que l'on pourrait avoir sur le fond du conflit, a poursuivi M. Benès, je ne prétends pas tout savoir, pouvoir juger, accepter d'avance les arguments pour ou contre ou faire des reproches à l'une ou l'autre partie. Cependant, le boycottage chinois dirigé contre le Japon constituerait, s'il était démontré, un procédé hostile qui pourrait faire l'objet de plaintes devant la S. D. N. Je regrette que le Japon n'ait pas pris l'initiative de porter ce fait devant l'institution de Genève, comme cela était et est son droit.

Par contre, en vertu du pacte, un pays, tout en ayant le droit d'assurer sa légitime défense, n'a pas le droit de se faire justice, sinon avec l'autorisation de la S. D. N. En l'absence d'une telle autorisation et en présence d'une action de grande envergure entreprise par le Japon, je ne peux pas ne pas rappeler les dispositions de l'article 10, un des articles fondamentaux du pacte, auquel me semble-t-il on a porté atteinte... Si les prescriptions du pacte ne sont pas maintenues c'est l'édifice entier du nouvel ordre international qui est mis en danger.

Un autre point que je voudrais souligner, c'est que l'Assemblée s'occupe pour la première fois d'une demande basée sur l'article 15. Ce précédent nous donne une leçon : pour les cas de cette nature, la S. D. N. devrait avoir ses instruments et ses organismes de travail perfectionnés, ses propres commissaires, ses propres commissions d'enquête et peut-être sa propre police. Mais c'est plus tard, après le règlement de ce grave conflit, qu'il faudra s'occuper de ces questions.

En somme, et ce fut la conclusion du ministre tchécoslovaque, je désire que la Société des Nations marque bien son intention d'être juste aussi bien envers

le Japon qu'envers la Chine, mais qu'elle respecte entièrement, dans tous les cas, les prescriptions du pacte et qu'elle se rende compte du fait que nous établissons aujourd'hui des précédents d'une importance primordiale pour la vie et l'existence même de l'institution de Genève.

### Les conclusions de M. Politis

Se plaçant à un point de vue plus juridique, M. Politis est arrivé aux mêmes conclusions. Lui aussi veut tenir la balance égale entre la Chine et le Japon car si l'un a violé l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique de l'autre, ce dernier a manqué « au respect de la parole donnée par les actes internationaux ». Lui aussi déplore que le conseil de la S. D. N. n'ait pas eu à sa disposition « une force de police propre à s'entremettre entre les armées adverses ».

Le conseil, ajouta le délégué de la Grèce, a fait ce qu'il pouvait faire :

Il s'est efforcé tout d'abord de rétablir une ambiance pacifique propre à lui permettre ensuite de remplir la tâche que lui confie l'article 15. Il a commencé par vouloir mettre fin aux hostilités. Sa tâche a été interrompue par la requête qui a été adressée par la Chine à l'Assemblée.

Succédant au conseil, l'Assemblée doit suivre la même voie. Sa première tâche, elle a essayé de la remplir hier et nous sommes tous heureux d'avoir trouvé dans cet effort la collaboration des deux parties. Si, comme nous l'espérons, les deux objectifs visés par la résolution d'hier, la cessation définitive des hostilités et l'évacuation du territoire chinois, sont promptement réalisés, l'Assemblée pourra alors aller plus loin.

Après avoir rappelé qu'en tout état de cause le pacte impose à l'action de l'Assemblée un délai de six mois :

« Je pense, messieurs, a conclu M. Politis, que vous estimerez comme moi que la solution pratique sera de nommer une commission chargée de suivre les négociations qui auront lieu à Shanghai, d'en faire rapport à l'Assemblée et, pour le cas où malheureusement les négociations ne donneraient pas de résultats à Shanghai, de prévoir elle-même la préparation nécessaire pour la suite de l'œuvre de l'Assemblée.

Mais je le répète, je ne puis pas imaginer que devant les terribles responsabilités qui pèsent sur l'une comme sur l'autre des deux parties, elles ne seraient pas à Shanghai, une fois l'ambiance pacifique rétablie, l'effort nécessaire pour que, au moyen de conces-



Enclosure No. 56 to Despatch No. 2353 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'EVENIR, March 7, 1932.

## La morale ou le canon



Ce qui se passe à Genève prouve bien que la Société des Nations, dans son état actuel, ne peut rien empêcher: on dit que son autorité se manifesterait bien plus sûrement si elle devait intervenir non pas dans un conflit lointain entre deux Etats dont l'un est inorganisé, mais dans un litige où les parties seraient deux nations européennes. Hum! On ne voit pas bien pourquoi. Ou l'une de ces nations serait résolue à recourir à la force et Genève serait également désarmée: ou toutes deux accepteraient son arbitrage: mais c'est supposer le problème résolu. Et puis, si l'un des Etats actuellement en cause est inorganisé, pourquoi la Société des Nations l'a-t-elle reçu en son sein?

Il ne s'agit pas, notons-le bien, de condamner définitivement l'institution genevoise. Mais ce n'est pas la servir que refuser de la voir telle qu'elle est et d'affirmer qu'elle fera respecter les pactes dans le moment où l'on constate que des circonstances qui n'ont rien d'exceptionnel la paralysent. Certes, les petites puissances qui voudraient entendre le Conseil désigner l'agresseur et prendre contre lui des sanctions ne tiennent pas compte des risques que comporterait une telle attitude; les conseillers ne sont pas les payeurs: mais elles ont raison en droit si en fait elles ont tort: et c'est précisément l'opposition qui saute aux yeux entre le droit et le fait qui crée le malaise actuel. La Société des Nations doit s'avancer prudemment entre cent embûches d'ordre politique: mais pendant qu'elle cherche sa voie le canon tonne. « N'oublions pas les réalités, qui peuvent vider de leur substance les principes du droit », s'écrie M. Politis. Oui. Mais le réalisme des militaires obtient des résultats immédiats; celui des diplomates tergiverse. On en arrive, faute de pouvoir prendre une

décision dont on ait la certitude qu'elle sera respectée, à envisager la création d'une commission chargée de suivre les négociations sino-japonaises. Avouons tous que c'est bien peu de chose.

La vérité ressort d'un mot de M. Benès: pourquoi le Japon, demande-t-il, n'a-t-il pas saisi la Société des Nations des incursions des bandes chinoises en Mandchourie et de l'organisation du boycottage anti-japonais? On touche ainsi le fond de la question. A quoi sert d'entrer dans une assemblée dont l'objet est d'empêcher les litiges internationaux de se résoudre dans la guerre, si on ne doit pas lui soumettre, dès l'origine, les éléments de ces litiges? On tourne, depuis des années, autour d'un problème encore insoluble: on veut munir la Société des Nations de moyens matériels de force. Mais le même raisonnement qu'on applique aux relations entre Etats est valable pour les relations de ces Etats avec la Société des Nations: la force est une ultima ratio dangereuse et immorale. Si une nation entre dans l'organisme genevois avec l'intention de ne céder qu'à la force, autant qu'elle demeure totalement indépendante! Au moins, on sera fixé. Mais si elle adhère à un groupement qui prend le caractère moral d'une juridiction, elle doit renoncer au droit, qu'elle a tiré jusqu'ici de sa souveraineté, de se faire justice elle-même; elle doit renoncer à ne s'incliner que devant la force matérielle de cette assemblée; elle doit admettre qu'elle s'est interdit de régler un conflit par un autre moyen que l'arbitrage de ses pairs.

Tant qu'on n'aura pas assuré le triomphe de cette morale, on pourra toujours chercher des canons, des avions et des munitions pour la Société des Nations: le monde n'aura pas fait un pas vers la paix.

SENATUS.

Enclosure No. 37 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, March 7, 1932.

## LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

par Jean ESCARRA

M. Jean Escarra n'est pas des nôtres. Il le dit d'ailleurs dans son article. Il est professeur à la Faculté de droit. Il connaît bien les questions d'Extrême-Orient, puisqu'il occupe le poste de conseiller du gouvernement chinois.

M. Escarra a demandé l'hospitalité de notre journal. Nous lui accordons très volontiers, parce que son article nous semble un apport utile pour l'examen du grave conflit sino-japonais. Et comme ses conclusions se rapprochent des nôtres — qui sont en opposition avec le point de vue de l'ensemble de notre presse — nous ne voyons qu'avan-tage à soumettre à nos lecteurs l'écrit de cet éminent juriste. — O. R.

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J'écris cet article dans toute l'indépendance de ma conscience de juriste. Je l'écris en oubliant mes attaches officielles avec le gouvernement chinois et en faisant abstraction de la nuance politique du journal qui m'offre l'hospitalité. C'est un article de bonne foi, destiné aux hommes de bonne volonté de tous les partis, indignés de voir une importante fraction de la presse française vendue aux Japonais et aux fabricants de munitions, tromper sciemment l'opinion en mettant en vedette, dans des articles d'une écœurante hypocrisie, toutes les inventions de la propagande mensongère à laquelle se livrent les hommes d'Etat et les agents diplomatiques du Japon pour justifier l'action de leur pays.

Il ne s'agit pas ici de faire état de préférences ou de sympathies personnelles. A vrai dire, ceux qui connaissent également bien Chinois et Japonais, placent sans hésiter les premiers au-dessus des seconds, quand ce ne serait que pour leur intelligence supérieure, leur originalité, leur esprit de finesse, leur leur ténacité. Mais si les Japonais ont en partage l'esprit de discipline et le sens national, ils savent bien que le jour où ces vertus seront courantes en Chine, ils ne seront plus de taille pour la lutte.

Pour déclencher son action militaire, le Japon a d'abord invoqué des prétextes parfaitement négligeables et auxquels lui-même n'a certainement pas attaché la moindre importance, à supposer qu'il ne faille pas voir ici l'œuvre d'agents provocateurs, ce qui serait entièrement conforme aux procédés habituels de la politique extérieure japonaise. Mais le meurtre d'un officier japonais ou l'assassinat de moines bouddhistes n'ont servi qu'à fixer l'heure « H » d'une action depuis longtemps réglée dans ses plus petits détails.

Le Japon veut, en réalité, rééditer en Mandchourie le coup réussi à l'égard de la Corée il y a un quart de siècle. La lutte pour Changhaï n'est que le geste qui consiste à serrer l'adversaire à la gorge jusqu'à ce qu'il demande grâce.

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Mais le Japon, pour expliquer son attitude vis-à-vis de la Mandchourie et, plus généralement, sa position à l'égard de la Chine, fait état d'arguments en apparence sérieux et dont il est nécessaire de faire justice.

Certes, la situation géographique du Japon par rapport à la Mandchourie, ainsi que ses conditions économiques, justifient pleinement ses prétentions à obtenir de la Chine certains avantages qui ne sauraient intéresser au même titre d'autres puissances. Cela, les Chinois ne l'ont jamais contesté, d'autant que leur intérêt se rencontre ici avec celui des Japonais.

Il est hors de doute qu'en restant sur le terrain des accords économiques, le Japon eût pu obtenir de la Chine, à moins de frais, probablement, plus de satisfactions que celles qu'il a arrachées à sa voisine par ses procédés agressifs. Mais cela n'eût pas fait l'affaire du parti militaire, tout-puissant au Japon, et sur lequel aucun gouvernement, en dépit du renom de discipline et d'ordre des Japonais, n'a réussi à prendre avantage.

Le Japon affirme que ses « intérêts spéciaux » en Mandchourie sont justifiés par des raisons démographiques. Il prétend défendre des droits régulièrement acquis par des traités. Il se pose enfin en champion de l'ordre en face de l'anarchie et du banditisme qui, à l'en croire, rendraient intenable la situation des étrangers en Chine.

La raison démographique ? La population japonaise s'accroît annuellement d'environ un million d'habitants. Depuis un quart de siècle, les Japonais ont toutes facilités pour émigrer en Mandchourie. On pourrait donc s'attendre à une population

japonaise de sept ou huit millions d'âmes, dans cette région, puisque les Japonais prétendent se trouver à l'étroit dans leur Ile. Or, d'après les statistiques japonaises, il n'y a en Mandchourie que 260.000 Japonais, environ un million de Coréens sujets japonais, il est vrai, et 28 millions de Chinois. La vérité est que la Mandchourie ne saurait être pour le Japon une colonie de repeuplement, à raison des conditions climatiques, que ne peuvent supporter les Japonais.

Les droits dérivant des traités ? Je prépare actuellement, à la demande de la délégation chinoise à Genève, un memorandum sur la position juridique du Japon en Mandchourie. Je crois avoir une certaine familiarité avec cette question que j'étudie depuis dix ans, et dont j'ai recueilli les données sur place.

Je déclare en toute franchise que déterminer avec certitude les droits qui appartiennent, sans contestation au Japon, en vertu de traités, est une tâche à peu près impossible à remplir. Ces traités sont innombrables, plusieurs sont restés secrets. Ils se superposent, se complètent, s'annulent, se contredisent. Il en est dont l'authenticité même est discutée. C'est le cas pour l'un des plus importants, le protocole secret du 22 décembre 1905, aux termes duquel la Chine se serait engagée à ne pas construire de chemins de fer susceptibles de concurrencer le Sud mandchourien.

Tout ce que l'on peut affirmer, c'est que si le Japon possède en Mandchourie un petit nombre de droits à peu près justifiés, sa position dans ce pays dérive avant tout des extensions, déformations, violations, etc., qu'il a infligées aux traités. A côté d'une condition légale, ne comprenant qu'un nombre restreint d'avantages, le Japon s'est créé de toutes pièces une formidable position de fait, uniquement grâce à sa supériorité matérielle et à la ténacité avec laquelle il a poursuivi sa politique d'agression.

Le Japon champion de l'ordre en face de l'anarchie et du banditisme qui sévissent en Chine ? Mais depuis quand un Etat a-t-il le droit de rétablir l'ordre dans un autre Etat indépendant ? Et comment se fait-il que le Japon ait attendu la chute de la livre sterling et l'aggravation de la crise économique mondiale pour s'apercevoir qu'il y avait en Chine du désordre et du banditisme ? Et encore d'où vient que, dans ce pays soi-disant en pleine anarchie, le commerce extérieur ait prospéré à ce point que les recettes des douanes maritimes soient passées de 180 millions de taëls en 1930, à 265 millions en 1931 ? Les étrangers de Changhaï étaient-ils donc si anxieux d'avoir la protection japonaise pour continuer leurs affaires ?

Si l'on pouvait encore conserver des doutes sur les véritables objectifs de la politique japonaise, il suffirait de citer les lignes suivantes, empruntées au premier rapport de la commission d'enquête consulaire de la S. D. N., à Changhaï, et qui se passent de commentaires :

« Des événements très graves se sont déroulés à Changhaï au cours des dix derniers jours et d'autres événements aussi graves se produisent encore. Des milliers d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants innocents ont été tués ou blessés par le bombardement des avions et des canons des troupes japonaises, et des milliers d'habitations ont été délibérément incendiées et détruites par les Japonais. Toutes les horreurs et les cruautés de la guerre ont été et sont encore commises par l'armée et la marine japonaises au cours de leur agression. »

Enclosure No. 38 to Despatch No. 2333 of March 8, 1932.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE THIAS, March 7, 1932.

LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS  
ET LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Le débat qui se déroule à l'assemblée de Genève crée de sérieuses préoccupations pour tous ceux qui mettent leur meilleur espoir dans l'influence de la Société des Nations. La confusion dans laquelle s'est engagée la discussion, le défaut d'informations absolument sûres en ce qui concerne la situation de fait à Shanghai, l'opposition des thèses en présence, tout cela contribue à faire peser sur les travaux de l'assemblée un malaise qu'on n'a pas réussi jusqu'ici à dissiper entièrement malgré les louables efforts du président et des principaux membres du conseil. Il est à souhaiter que cette épreuve ne se prolonge pas trop longtemps.

Il ne faut pas se dissimuler que la grande institution internationale de Genève fait une expérience pénible. Dès l'instant où l'assemblée était réunie pour connaître du conflit sino-japonais, il ne pouvait en être autrement. Il était inévitable, en effet, que la controverse s'engageât sur les grands principes inscrits dans le pacte, sur les stipulations qui constituent la plus sûre garantie aux yeux des peuples qui mettent toute leur confiance dans l'action de la Société des Nations et qui sont profondément troublés par la constatation que cette action peut ne pas suffire, dans certains cas, pour faire obstacle à la guerre, empêcher des hostilités, éviter le pire. On ne réfléchit pas assez au fait, pourtant évident, que le conflit sino-japonais, dans les circonstances et les conditions où il s'est produit, avec, d'une part, la méconnaissance par la Chine des droits que le Japon tient des traités, l'organisation de la campagne de boycottage, l'impuissance du gouvernement de Nankin à prendre ses responsabilités dans un pays en proie au désordre, et, d'autre part, avec l'erreur initiale du Japon d'avoir eu recours à des moyens militaires pour se faire lui-même justice, constitue le cas le plus difficile et le plus ingrat pour l'application des articles essentiels du pacte. Il n'est que trop certain que l'application de l'article 15, par exemple, apparaît pour le moins singulière dans l'état présent des choses.

On comprend parfaitement l'émoi des représentants des nations dites à intérêts limités qui ont fait entendre leur voix hier à l'assemblée. Si ces nations devaient en arriver à constater que les garanties du pacte peuvent ne pas jouer aux heures de crise, leur confiance dans la Société des Nations en serait ébranlée et la grande institution internationale perdrait tout prestige à leurs yeux. Ce serait un désastre moral pour toute l'œuvre de paix. Mais il faut se dire que les choses se passeraient tout autrement s'il s'agissait d'un conflit entre Etats véritablement organisés, d'un conflit dans le cadre européen, par exemple, où le conseil de Genève pourrait intervenir spontanément avec toute l'autorité nécessaire, comme il l'a fait chaque fois qu'a surgi une menace à l'horizon politique, ce qui vient à l'appui du projet d'union européenne mis en avant par la France il y a deux ans. Dans le cas actuellement soumis à l'assemblée, on est obligé de procéder avec la plus grande prudence afin de ne pas créer un péril plus grave encore que celui qu'il s'agit de conjurer. Certes, il faut que les principes du pacte soient maintenus dans toute leur force; il faut que les règles qui commandent la collaboration internationale en vue de maintenir la paix du monde soient respectées, mais il importe également d'éviter de donner un caractère plus général à un conflit jusqu'ici local. L'application de sanctions créerait, sans doute, sous ce rapport, des risques que personne ne peut envisager

de sang-froid. Ce serait commettre une faute politique, pensons-nous, que de se prononcer avant d'avoir épuisé tous les autres moyens pour des mesures de nature à provoquer de vives réactions de l'opinion japonaise, alors que précisément le gouvernement de Tokio paraît disposé à entrer dans la voie de la conciliation. La tâche de ce gouvernement n'est point facile, on le sait; il y aurait de sérieux inconvénients à la compliquer encore par des résolutions pouvant avoir pour effet de dresser l'opinion nipponne contre la Société des Nations et d'exaspérer les passions nationalistes dans l'Empire du Soleil-Levant.

Il est un autre aspect de la situation que n'ont pas le droit de négliger ceux qui, intransigeants sur les principes, réclament avec force des sanctions auxquelles ils n'auraient à prendre aucune part. Les principales puissances intéressées aux affaires d'Extrême-Orient, les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie, ont usé, en plein accord, de toute leur influence à Tokio et à Nankin pour obtenir l'arrêt des hostilités et faciliter la conciliation. Leur action diplomatique ne fut certainement pas inutile, car il est évident qu'elle a beaucoup contribué à calmer les esprits au Japon et à les détourner d'une action militaire de plus grande envergure. L'action ainsi exercée doit être maintenue sur le terrain diplomatique, car personne ne peut songer sérieusement, pas plus à Washington qu'à Londres, à prendre position contre le Japon.

Le langage de la raison a été tenu hier, à Genève, parmi d'autres orateurs, par le porte-parole de la Tchécoslovaquie, M. Benès, et par le représentant de la Grèce. Le premier a souligné l'aspect tout à fait spécial de la situation en Extrême-Orient et a constaté qu'on ne peut accepter d'avance les arguments présentés par les deux parties; le second a insisté sur le fait que deux principes essentiels ne peuvent être oubliés: le respect de l'intégrité du territoire et de l'indépendance politique des nations et, d'autre part, le respect de la parole donnée dans les actes internationaux, dont la méconnaissance équivaudrait à la négation de tout lien de droit entre les Etats et à un retour à la barbarie. Mais il a ajouté qu'il faut aussi avoir le souci des réalités pratiques, car l'oubli des réalités peut vider de leur substance les principes du droit et réduire ceux-ci à néant. C'est un avis de bon sens qui doit être entendu. Il a encore raison lorsqu'il exprime l'opinion que si le conseil avait eu à sa disposition des forces de police, les hostilités auraient pu être évitées à Shanghai et qu'il est probable que si l'organisation de la Société des Nations avait été plus complète, le conflit sino-japonais n'aurait pas pris l'ampleur qu'on lui voit actuellement.

C'est à compléter l'organisation de la Société des Nations, à doter celle-ci des moyens d'assurer l'exécution de ses décisions, qu'il faut travailler, nous ne nous lasserons pas de le répéter. La pénible expérience que l'on fait à cette heure doit du moins avoir ce résultat de convaincre tous les esprits de bonne foi de la nécessité de consolider l'institution de Genève afin de justifier pleinement la confiance des peuples dans son autorité morale et l'efficacité de son action pour maintenir la paix dans le monde.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED  
MAR 21 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RELATIONS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
MAR 21 1932  
MR. ROGERS

ADJUTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
MAR 19 1932  
MR. KLOTS

*m.m.j.*  
*JE*  
*Der*  
*file*

Translation of an extract from LE POPULAIRE,  
March 5, 1932 (Paris Embassy's despatch  
No. 2333, dated March 8, 1932, File No. 793.  
94/4776) NOTE: LE POPULAIRE is the party  
organ of the Socialist party.

FW 793.94/4776

"Yesterday we announced that Europe was furnishing  
Japan with munitions, arms, and poison gas in considerable  
quantities and we promised to give our readers the details  
of this shameful traffic.

"The details, which we have from a reliable source,  
are as follows:

"On February 4, a steamer left Hamburg for Yokohama  
with a full cargo of explosives.

"On February 5, two ships left Hamburg for Japan,  
having on board grenades, dynamite and parts of airplanes.

"All the ships leaving the Great Port of the Elbe  
for the Far East carried hundreds of tons of munitions  
destined for Japan.

"On February 7, the Skoda factories dispatched from  
Hamburg 1,700 cases of munitions.

"On February 8, a Norwegian steamer embarked 1,000  
cases of explosives at Hamburg, for Japan.

"The same day there were embarked Hotchkiss machine

guns

REC'D  
MAR 13 1932

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guns to the value of 100,000,000 (francs) constituting half of an order given to a French firm.

"On February 10, it was learned that Japanese agents were in the Rhine region for the purpose of placing important orders with the principal chemical firms.

"One of these firms has already dispatched about 36,000 carboys of acids for the manufacture of explosives. The whole shipment was carefully camouflaged in boxes labeled 'pianos'.

"On February 7, 4,000 cases of munitions, of which 3,000 came from England, were dispatched from Germany for Japan.

"The Japanese have given an order to a factory in Polish Silesia for war material in excess of \$3,000,000.

"From another source it is affirmed that an official Japanese mission is at present in Czechoslovakia for the purpose of placing important orders.

"One thousand eight hundred grenades and 2,000 gas bombs have been dispatched to Japan.

"At present the Skoda factories are manufacturing grenades and cartridges on a great scale to be embarked for Japan through the ports of Hamburg and Trieste.

"On the other hand the factories of Creusot have already dispatched a portion of an order for 20 large tanks.

"Lastly

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"Lastly, 9 ships have sailed from Belfast destined  
for a Korean port with cargoes of war materials."

  
RPB:KC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, March 4, 1932

No. 2328

DIVISION OF  
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS  
APR 19 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Alleged Franco-Japanese Military Alliance

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
APR 20 1932  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
APR 16 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
APR 21 1932  
MR. BUNDY

APR 26 1932

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Supplementing the Embassy's despatch No. 2319  
of February 29, 1932, regarding alleged purchases  
by Japan of munitions of war from various French  
concerns, I have the honor to inform the Department  
that an article appeared on February 26 in POPULAIRE,  
the organ of the Socialist party, which contained the  
statement quoted herewith in translation:

....Yesterday, I received two clippings from  
the GAZETTE DES TIRAGES OFFICIELS of February 6  
last.

They are worthy of reproduction.

Here . . .

*FE*  
*WE*  
*NE*  
*LA*  
*AB*

F/LS 793.94/4777

APR 29 1932  
FILED

*Mr. send copy with  
encl. to MID-*  
*APR 26 1932*

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NANS, Date 12-18-75

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Here is the first:


"The bourse retained this week a healthy outlook, which evidences optimism in the presence of the present political events. ONE IS VERY SYMPATHETIC TOWARDS JAPAN, AND EXPECTS MUCH OF ITS INTERVENTION IN CHINA, NOT ONLY HOWEVER BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS ORDER, but also because of the modifications that the Far Eastern events can entail in the European policy of America and England. OUR MARKET THEREFORE REMAINS WELL FAVORED..."

And here is the second:

"...As concerns WAR MATERIAL (of the Hotchkiss Company) THE RESULTS ARE SATISFACTORY: the company is notably delivering at present an order of 200 millions to Japan, of which about one-half has already been delivered, and another order of 500 millions for machine guns for Brazil. In buying this stock at the present quotation of 1,285, there is certainly an excellent profit to be realized during 1932..."

There is enclosed herewith for the information of the Department copy of a memorandum prepared by Secretary Scotten, based upon the conversation which he had on March 1 with one of the executives of the Hotchkiss Company, which I feel explains clearly the basis of the rumors which inspired the article in POPULAIRE.

Respectfully yours,

  
Walter E. Edge.

Enclosure:

No.1. Copy of memorandum  
dated March 2, 1932.

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RMS/WGS

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 202 of  
March 4, 1932, from Embassy at Paris.

(C O P Y)

AMERICAN EMBASSY

PARIS.

March 2, 1932.

M E M O R A N D U M

Last evening, I talked with Mr. B., a man in high authority in the Hotchkiss Company, and inquired regarding the truth of the story in the POPULAIRE of February 26 to the effect that this company had received an order of munitions from Japan, amounting to 2 hundred million francs, and an order from Brazil, amounting to 5 hundred million francs.

Mr. B. said frankly that he only wished this story were true as Mrs. B. would be wearing diamonds if it were so. He called my attention to the fact that when one part of a story is obviously false, generally the entire story is false. By this he meant that the story regarding the purchase by Brazil of 5 hundred million francs worth of munitions was so absurd that it scarcely needed to be denied. He stated that Brazil was absolutely broke and had no credit anywhere. He added that it was true that about six months ago the Hotchkiss Resident Agent in Brazil had stated that it might be possible to place an order for some machine guns for one of the Brazilian states (Mr. B. did not recall . . .

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recall the state but thought it was Sao Paulo. When it came to discussing the terms of payment, the Resident Agent said that the State proposed to pay in coffee. The Hotchkiss Company obviously turned down this offer.

Adverting to that part of the story relating to purchases by Japan, Mr. B. said that he would tell me the exact situation. His company had received recently, and was now in the process of manufacturing, an order for 20 pairs of naval anti-aircraft rapid-fire guns of approximately 1/2 inch caliber. He explained that these guns were sold in pairs. The total amount of this order, together with the ammunition which accompanied it, was approximately 8 million francs (about 320 thousand dollars). Mr. B. explained that this was absolutely the only order which his company had received from the Japanese.

He added that the Hotchkiss Company was busy on an order for the Chinese for anti-aircraft machine guns and ordinary machine guns, which, together with the ammunition which accompanied it, amounted practically to the same sum as the Japanese order.

Coming back to the POPULAIRE article, he stated that this story had appeared in one of the financial sheets about a week ago, and that his company had immediately sent a denial which was published . . .

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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published in that sheet a few days later, and furthermore that his company had succeeded in tracing the story to its source. It appears that one of the men connected with the financial sheet was the owner of a few shares of Hotchkiss stock. He was acquainted with a man in the Hotchkiss automobile showroom and inquired of this man one day whether he would advise him to hold on to the Hotchkiss shares or sell them. The Hotchkiss employee replied that while he had no way of telling what the shares would do on the Bourse, he could say that the company was doing very well. The employee of the financial paper in question thereupon wrote a purely imaginary story, which resulted in sending the Hotchkiss shares up a few points within 48 hours. He then unloaded the shares in his possession!

Mr. B. informed me that although newspaper men were writing these stories, not one of them had come to the Hotchkiss Company to check up on the accuracy of the story. I informed Mr. B. that the newspaper men were claiming that the Hotchkiss and other companies were so busy that they were working night shifts. Mr. B. stated that while he could not answer for the other companies, the Hotchkiss Company, it was true; was very busy, but it was most certainly not working night shifts.

He stated that 75% of all the work being done  
by the . . .

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by the company was for the French government, and he specifically referred to the fortification system on the frontier. The other 25% was practically entirely taken up with a very large order for Rumania. He warned me that the newspapers would probably spring a new story about the Hotchkiss Company shortly as the latter was about to open a new plant. He explained that the reason for opening this plant was that the Hotchkiss Company had an old building which had not been in use for many years, and that they were transferring part of their gun carriage work to this building in order to make space in their regular plant.

I then asked Mr. B. if he could tell me whether the other large French companies, Brandt and Schneider, had received any orders from the Far East. Mr. B. stated that he had just lunched with Mr. Brandt and that the latter had informed him that his company was doing absolutely no business for either Japan or China. As regards the Schneider Company, Mr. B. stated that he understood that company had been negotiating with the Chinese for the past month for a fairly large order; he did not however have any idea of the amount. He added that Schneider at first was unable to accept the Chinese terms of payment, but that he understood that these terms had been bettered recently, and he assumed that the contract had . . .

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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had actually been consummated by now. Mr. B. knew nothing about any Japanese orders for Schneider, and stated that this company was very close-mouthed, and he doubted whether he or I could obtain any accurate information as to what they were going.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 22, 1932.

*MCH*

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Subject: French loan to Japan --  
SKH: French munitions for Japan.

*10 note*

In this despatch (No. 2319, Embassy, Paris, February 29, 1932---file No. 793.94/4778), Ambassador Edge transmits information obtained from various reliable sources indicating that

(1) No large loan (a loan of 800,000,000 yen was rumored), either private or governmental, for Japan is being considered in France.

(2) French munitions activities are normal-- no large orders have been received from either Japan or China.

*B/mj*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, February 29, 1932.

No. 2319

Subject: Alleged Franco-Japanese military alliance.

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~~NE~~  
~~Ac/c~~

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note  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 23 1932  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

F/L/S  
793.94/4778

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 16 1932  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK		Yes	No
To the Field			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
In U. S. A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
<u>ONS</u>			
<u>M.S.D.</u>			
<u>Concur</u>			
		<u>AW</u>	

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 20 1932  
DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS

The Honorable **MAR 29 1932**  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

MAR 30 1932  
FILED

Sir: Not for publication.

I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram  
793.94/4328a  
No. 67 of February 19, 3 p. m., and to the Embassy's telegrams  
793.94/4347  
No. 119 of February 20, 4 p. m., and No. 130 of February 25,  
793.94/4400  
11 a. m., with regard to a press report from Moscow to the effect  
"that Japan has bought French support with lavish orders to steel  
and munition concerns and France has lent Japan 800,000,000 yen."  
In the Embassy's telegrams above referred to, the Department was  
informed

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informed that this report appears to be without foundation.

As of possible interest to the Department, there are enclosed herewith copies of memoranda prepared by the Military Attaché, the Naval Attaché, the Commercial Attaché, and Mr. Howell, First Secretary of this Embassy, giving in detail the results of their investigations which were made following the receipt of the Department's above-mentioned inquiry.

Respectfully yours,



Walter E. Edge.

✓ List of enclosures:

- No. 1. Copy of memorandum from Military Attaché, dated February 23, 1932.
- No. 2. Copy of report prepared by Naval Attaché, dated February 24, 1932.
- No. 3. Copy of memorandum from Commercial Attaché, dated February 25, 1932.
- No. 4. Copy of memorandum prepared by Mr. Howell, dated February 20, 1932.
- No. 5. Copy of memorandum prepared by Mr. Howell, dated February 25, 1932.

In quintuplicate.

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WSH/MF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2819  
of February 29, 1932  
from the American Embassy, Paris.

COPY

AMERICAN EMBASSY  
THE MILITARY ATTACHE  
5, rue de Chaillot  
PARIS.

CONFIDENTIAL

February 23, 1932.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Armour

SUBJECT: Foreign Orders for Munitions.

An examination of available and reliable sources of information discloses that there are no large orders from Japan or China for munitions although there have been inquiries from both countries concerning the possibility of furnishing antiaircraft guns for Japan and machine guns for China.

The activities of munition factories of France cannot be considered abnormal and such as they are can be accounted for by reason of the necessary work on supplies both current and reserve for the French Government under the existing budgets.

It may be added, however, that munition manufacturers are in the state of mind of hoping that orders may be forthcoming.

(Signed) STANLEY H. FORD  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
Military Attaché.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2010  
of February 29, 1932  
from the American Embassy, Paris.

ISSUED BY OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT

Date February 24, 1932. Serial No. 71

Source of Information: Reliable.

MANUFACTURE OF MUNITIONS IN FRANCE FOR  
THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS.  
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1. Many rumors and reports have been current in Paris regarding extensive orders in French munition factories for ammunition and military equipment for the Japanese Government. An investigation of all available sources of information on this subject leads to the conclusions that there is no foundation for these reports. It is believed that a number of large munition manufacturers, notably the Hotchkiss, Schneider and Brandt Companies may have small orders on hand for both the Chinese and Japanese Governments but these orders are of long standing and are not connected with the present trouble in the Far East. The Japanese have no purchasing commission in France and it is not thought that they have received any credits or loans from the French Government or French banks to finance the purchase of war material. However, a number of enquiries have been received by French manufacturers through their Chinese and Japanese agents and the French companies are hopeful that some profitable business may result. No trouble is anticipated in obtaining export licences which the Government requires for the purchase of military material. The Chinese are interested in the purchase of machine guns and the Japanese in anti-aircraft guns.

2)...

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2). I am informed, from a confidential and reliable source, that the total value of the orders from both the Chinese and Japanese Governments on hand in the Hotchkiss Company is not in excess of \$300,000. They are in process of negotiation with the Chinese for an additional order amounting to about \$350,000 (probably for ammunition), but so far the Chinese Government has failed to make the required cash deposit.

3). The Brandt Company has on hand an order from the Chinese for mortar shells, but as they have no facilities for loading the shells and the Government controlled Service des Poudres (which has the monopoly on all powders and explosives) will not load for them, they are experiencing considerable difficulty in filling the order. The Service des Poudres will not sell directly to any foreign government but has no objection to selling to private French companies who may subsequently export the material.

4). It is very difficult to obtain any definite information regarding the activities of the Schneider company, but my informants who are in close touch with the munition business, do not believe that this company has any extensive orders from either China or Japan.

5). It is true that there is considerable activity in French munition plants, but this is due to the normal supply of military material and extensive reserve stock for the French Army which has been provided for in recent budgets.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 2010 of  
February 29, 1932, from Embassy at Paris.

Confidential.

February 25, 1932.

M E M O R A N D U M

To: The Ambassador.  
From: The Commercial Attaché.  
Subject: Report concerning Japanese Munition Orders  
in France.

Complying with Mr. Howell's request we have made a number of discreet inquiries concerning the reported placing of large orders for munitions, ordnance, and other military equipment with French manufacturers on the part of the Japanese government. The result of these inquiries has been negative. We have found nothing to indicate that the reports are accurate.

Mr. Maurice Fould, one of the owners of the important Forges de Strasbourg, leading French steel manufacturers, indicated in a conversation with me that his company had received no orders of this kind from Japan nor did he seem to expect any. It was his impression that Japan might attempt to obtain ordnance and munitions from German, English and American manufacturers.

Mr. René Fould, President of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, stated that there appeared to be no special activity from the transportation standpoint between France and Japan that might indicate shipments of French material to the latter country.

Mr. Finger, Assistant Commercial Attaché, informs me that inquiries he made in this connection of Monsieur du Castel, of the Comptoir Sidérurgique, resulted negatively. Monsieur du Castel knew of no special activity in the French steel industry resulting from Japan's orders. Monsieur du Castel is one of the Board of three appointed to supervise in a general way the production activities of all French steel manufacturers and to maintain liaison between them and the international steel cartel. He is in a position to speak with authority on the subject under discussion.

We have examined three statistical sources to ascertain if there has been any increase in French exports to Japan since July, 1931. The sources consulted are: (1) the regular French foreign trade statistics; (2) special statistics of French foreign trade in steel products, supplied to this office monthly by the Comité des Forges, and (3) special statistics maintained by the Customs Bureau for French shipments of munitions, ordnance, and war material.

None . . .

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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None of these sources showed any special shipments to Japan or any increase in exports to Japan in the period indicated.

(signed) F. W. ALLPORT

Commercial Attaché.

WGS.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 2410  
of February 29, 1932,  
from the American Embassy, Paris.

COPY

MEMORANDUM

This afternoon I talked with Colonel Taylor, European representative of the Dupont Company, about the alleged report that Japan is "lavishing" orders upon French steel and munition concerns. In reply to an enquiry from his home office about this same rumor, he told me that he sent the following message on February 18:

"CONFIDENTIAL - REFERRING TO YOUR CABLE 800 SITUATION TO DATE STOP NO JAPANESE PURCHASING COMMISSION IN FRANCE STOP JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE SAYS HE IS NOT PURCHASING STOP WE ARE INFORMED THE ONLY PURCHASING COMMISSION IS IN NEW-YORK STOP NO EXPORT PERMITS FOR JAPAN ISSUED HERE STOP CAN FIND NO TRACE JAPANESE ORDERS HERE STOP FRENCH MANUFACTURERS AGENTS IN JAPAN CABLE THAT THEY EXPECT TO RECEIVE ORDERS TO BE CONCLUDED IN JAPAN FOR DELIVERY FROM FRANCE STOP CHINA HAS CLOSED SMALL ORDERS HOTCHKISS CO OF FRANCE AND BRANDT WHICH HAVE BEEN PENDING LONG TIME STOP JAPANESE COMPANY NAMED OKURA LONDON OFFERING TO BUY IN ENGLAND STOP NO NEWS CZECHOSLOVAKIA STOP VERY LITTLE INTEREST THIS WAR IN FRANCE STOP EXPECT MORE NEWS SATURDAY"

Colonel Taylor said that he was sure about all of the information contained in the above message except the issuance of export permits for Japan and that the authorities never give such information to his company. He added that Mr. Benet of the Hotchkiss Company told him that no export permits for Japan had been issued and he considers this to be a reliable source.

I was also told by Colonel Taylor that Schneider & Company made it a rule never to give information about its munition orders, but he doubts whether that company is filling any orders for Japan because no  
munition...

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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munition order can be accepted until an export permit is secured.

Colonel Taylor said that he telegraphed his company to-day that the Imperial Chemicals Industry, London, had informed him that it had made no sales to Japan. He explained to me that the company owns the Kynock? Cartridge Company and Nobel Powder Company, the only manufacturers in England of cartridges and powder. While not sure, he does not think Vickers are shipping any machine guns or shells to Japan.

Colonel Taylor hopes to obtain during the coming week some information about orders alleged to have been given to the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia.

It is the personal opinion of Colonel Taylor that all the munitions required by Japan in its present conflict were obtained before last October, and that, should there be further requirements, the contracts will be made in New York.

(Signed) Wm.S. Howell, Jr.

February 20, 1932.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 to despatch No. 2019  
of February 29, 1932,  
from the Embassy at Paris.

Memorandum.

As a result of the Department's telegram No. 67 of February 18, 3 p. m., confidential inquiries have been discreetly made regarding the alleged French loan to Japan of 800,000,000 yen. The first inquiry was made of Mr. Nelson Dean Jay of Morgan and Company. He, in turn, made inquiries through his various banking connections in Paris, including all of those institutions which might be expected to make such a loan. Later, Mr. Jay informed me that he is satisfied that no such private loan is being considered. In regard to my specific question regarding the Franco-Japanese Bank, Mr. Jay said that that bank, with a capital of only 25,000,000 francs, could under no circumstances undertake such a loan without the assistance of larger banking institutions in France. As to a loan by the French Government, it is Mr. Jay's opinion that the present attitude of the Chamber of Deputies towards loans to foreign governments or concerns would make an operation of this sort very difficult.

I told M. Lacour-Gayet of the Bank of France that I had heard that the PRAVDA of Moscow carried a story that France has made a loan to Japan of 800,000,000 yen and asked if he had any information

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

upon the subject. He laughed at the rumor and said it was completely without foundation. I saw him a day or two later and he told me that the State Department had asked the French Ambassador at Washington for information regarding this same report.

Am. S. Howell, Jr.

February 25, 1952.

WSR/EF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Paris, March 8, 1932.

~~II~~  
~~WE~~

No. 2340

Subject: Sino-Japanese conflict

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note  
5/18/54

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 21 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
MAR 17 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4779

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

MAR 22 1932  
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I have the honor to report that a review of the past week's summaries of press comment on the League's deliberations concerning the Sino-Japanese conflict fails to disclose that France's attitude has in any way altered from that reported in the Embassy's digest of press reviews for the week ended February 28. In fact, such anti-League papers as FIGARO venture to infer that France is really indifferent to the outcome of the Sino-Japanese conflict since her interests in the Far-East are negligible.

Two .....

- 2 -

Two salient points, however, have been thrown in relief by commentators on the week's proceedings of the Assembly and its General Commission which are worthy of note:

(1) That France's principal preoccupation has resided in an effort toward the restoration and preservation of the League's prestige has been characterized in specific instances throughout the deliberations, notably the adoption as the League's very own by Paul-Boncour of the arrangement of an armistice between the contending parties initiated through British intervention at Shanghai.

(2) The other point, on which correspondents at Geneva and editorial writers in Paris have seized upon to play up on the eve of the sub-committee work in the Disarmament Conference which will be assumed this week, is the disclosure during the entire debate of such flagrant imperfections in the mechanism of the Covenant to prevent war as to provide a practical demonstration of the impotency of the League to effectively serve as an impelling power in the maintenance of security without the adoption of the French thesis of endowing it with an international force. Prominent among editorials stressing this point are those which have appeared in LE MATIN and LE TEMPS.

Generally speaking, French opinion, as expressed in the editorial columns, continues unwaveringly pro-Japanese.


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- 3 -

The same editorials (LE TEMPS and INTRANSIGEANT) underscore that Japan's fear of a changed attitude on the part of American has been the crowning reason for her hesitation to ignore the League's appeal for conciliation and mediation, and for the apparent check in further Japanese incursion upon Chinese territory. Transversely, the ECHO DE PARIS points out the delicacy of England's and America's position in view of the disinclination on the part of either to turn China's already highly aroused sentiment against them.

Summing up French press opinion regarding the significance of the Sino-Japanese conflict, as developed in the League debate, perhaps EXCELSIOR expresses the consensus of the conservative wing, namely, that the Assembly's deliberations have brought into relief (1) the grave problem of Shanghai's internationalization, (2) the economic expansion of Japan, (3) the national independence of China and her future political and social régime and, finally, (4) American designs in the Pacific.

Respectfully yours,



Walter E. Edge.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

VIA NAVAL RADIO  
Washington,  
March 14, 1933.

*3 jr*

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China).

*100*

Department's 96, March 12, 5 p.m., and 97, March 12,  
in regard to League Resolution of March 11.

Please repeat to Embassy at Tokyo the telegrams  
under reference.

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793.94/4779A

*Stinson*  
*JGP*

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

Naval Radio

March 12, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL, MAR 12 32

SHANGHAI (CHINA).

97-12th

For ~~the information of~~ the Consul General and the  
Minister.

In comment on the action taken by the Assembly of  
the League of Nations on March 11, 1932, a statement was  
made to the press by the Secretary of State, text as  
follows:

QUOTE The nations of the League at Geneva have united  
in a common attitude and purpose towards the perilous  
disturbances in the Far East. The action of the Assembly  
expresses the purpose for peace which is found both in  
the Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League of Nations.  
In this expression all the nations of the world can speak  
with the same voice. This action will go far toward  
developing into terms of international law the principles  
of order and justice which underlie those treaties and  
the Government of the United States has been glad to  
cooperate earnestly in this effort. UNQUOTE

FE:JEJ:LM FE

*Stamm*

Enciphered by *[Signature]*

*Sick*

Sent by operator *[Signature]* M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, MARCH 5, 1932

At the press conference this morning Secretary Stimson announced the confidential release of a speech to be delivered on March 12 by Mr. Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, on "Westernization in Turkey and Persia." The Secretary also announced the release of the Foreign Service changes made during the past week.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Mr. Stimson said there had been rumors current, especially among the Chinese, that American manufacturers had been selling large amounts of munitions to the Japanese Government, and that one rumor was to the effect that munitions valued at \$180,000-000 had been sold to the Japanese Government. The Secretary said furthermore that there was no basis in truth for those rumors. Information has been obtained from the Department of Commerce that during the calendar year 1931 our entire exports to Japan of ammunition and firearms amounted only to about \$12,000, and that during the month of January, 1932, these same exports were valued at only about \$1,800. So far as the Department is able to learn, therefore, there is not the slightest basis of truth that any of our manufacturers or dealers have been selling large quantities of munitions to Japan.

A correspondent observed that according to a despatch from Geneva the United States had been asked through Mr. Wilson to participate in the Conference at Shanghai. The correspondent then asked if the Department had received such an invitation and what the Department's policy pertaining thereto would be. SPEAKING FOR BACKGROUND AND NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION IN ANY WAY, the Secretary said there had been no change whatever in our policy but there is a great deal of confusion and doubt as to exactly what is going on at the present time and we do not expect to

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MAR 15 1932

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make any change in our policy when the conditions are perfectly clear. Asked if the League made a specific inquiry on that point, the Secretary replied in the negative and added that the Department had been keeping in touch with the situation right along and that he believed it was stated in open meeting that we were cooperating. Mr. Stimson then added furthermore that there had been no change in that respect.

A correspondent observed that "the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman was active again this morning" and that he had said that the United States and China probably would not be represented at the Peace Conference; that the United States seemed to have the wrong idea of the League Resolution of January 29; and that the United States appeared to think that Japan had accepted it, whereas she had only said she was going to look it over. Mr. Stimson, in reply, merely said that it had been his continuous and consecutive policy not to answer the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Observing that inasmuch as there had been reports in the newspapers regarding the lack of understanding between the United States and the League of Nations, a correspondent asked if the Secretary would state, NOT FOR BACKGROUND PURPOSES, just what our policy is. Mr. Stimson replied that he could not go into the details because the policy necessarily varies in detail as different situations come up. Our general policy since last September has been to cooperate as far as we could with the League and that policy has not changed. Asked if he would tell the correspondents what was likely to be the effect of the action taken yesterday by the Assembly of the League, the Secretary replied that he preferred not to speculate on the subject, and that the correspondents themselves must see from the news that the situation is in a state of flux and that the less said by him at this time the better it would be for both sides. The correspondent added that the question which was in his mind was whether there appeared to be any hopeful development.

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NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION OR QUOTATION, Mr. Stimson said that he had seen nothing to displease him in what had happened at Geneva.

A correspondent said that according to reports from Geneva the League would ask the four Admirals of the four Powers at Shanghai to cooperate in the evacuation of troops from Shanghai. In reply, Mr. Stimson said that there had been a request that the four Admirals endeavor to learn whether there had been a real cessation of hostilities and we are trying to cooperate with them. Observing that the situation at Shanghai was very complicated, a correspondent asked what other negotiations were going on. AGAIN PURELY FOR BACKGROUND, the Secretary said there had not been any negotiations and that there was nothing going on so far as he knew. Mr. Stimson added that the whole action of the League yesterday seemed to predicate its first step on learning whether there was a genuine cessation of hostilities. The League asked the four Admirals of the four Powers to endeavor to obtain that information. There was a direct issue on the floor of the Assembly of the League between Doctor Yen and Mr. Sato as to whether hostilities had ceased. Mr. Sato said that they had and that his Government at Tokyo had issued a manifesto that they had stopped. Doctor Yen then announced that he had a telegram to the effect that the Japanese were landing large numbers of troops, that the fighting was still going on, and that the Japanese were threatening the Chinese army (Mr. Stimson here said that he was speaking from information obtained in the newspapers). The conflicting statements of Doctor Yen and Mr. Sato made an issue and the League consequently asked the four Admirals on the ground to endeavor to learn the truth, and we have directed our Admiral to assist them. That is all that has been done so far and no conference has yet begun. Asked if despatches from Shanghai threw any light on whether the Japanese had landed additional or merely replacement troops, the Secretary said that he had not yet re-

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
ceived any official reports concerning the landing yesterday of Japanese troops.

A correspondent asked if he was to understand also that no negotiations were going on for the establishment of a neutral zone around Shanghai. In reply the Secretary said that there were no negotiations of that kind that he knew of and that certainly there were none in which we were participating. A correspondent asked if the Secretary had received any information from Tientsin concerning the Japanese actions at that place. He was informed in reply that a brief message was received a few days ago to the effect that the Japanese were landing some munitions but that we had received no information that they were landing troops. Furthermore, there was some question of whether the munitions which were landed were ordinary supplies or of an extraordinary character.

A correspondent asked if the State Department, in authorizing Admiral Taylor to cooperate with the other Admirals at Shanghai, would act through the Navy Department. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and added that the State Department does not communicate direct with naval officers unless arrangements are made whereby the Navy Department authorized such officers to communicate with our diplomatic representatives on the spot. In such cases the instructions sometimes go through our diplomatic representative, but ordinarily they always go through the Navy Department. Asked when Admiral Taylor was instructed to cooperate with the other Admirals at Shanghai, Mr. Stimson replied that the telegram went out last night.

M. J. McDermott.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, MONDAY, MARCH 7, 1932

At the press conference this morning Assistant Secretary Rogers said a number of small items would be issued as press releases after the conference.

SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION

A correspondent enquired whether the Department had protested directly to Tokyo in regard to the attack on Miss Marlowe. Mr. Rogers replied in the negative and explained that those matters were still resting with the local authorities in Shanghai, just as are all the other accumulated incidents. A correspondent asked if there was likely to be a blanket protest on the general subject of the Japanese civilian volunteers who seem to be causing so much trouble. Mr. Rogers replied that the Department had no plans and those things must develop as they go along.

A correspondent enquired whether any advice had been received from Admiral Taylor regarding the cessation of hostilities. Mr. Rogers said FOR ATTRIBUTION, NOT QUOTATION, that a brief statement would be issued indicating that apparently there is scattered fighting going on along the northern part of the line, but it is apparently relatively minor and not part of any wide struggle.

A correspondent called attention to an article in the morning's press to the effect that, first, the Japanese in official communiques have been referring to some towns in the Shanghai area by Japanese names lately, and, second, in the funeral oration over the body of a Japanese colonel, who was recently killed, reference was made to his having sacrificed his life to laying a new Japanese Empire in the Yangtze Valley. He enquired whether the State Department had received official reports tending to bear out the theory that Japan is attempting to set up a permanent sphere of influence. Mr. Rogers declined to comment.

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MAR 15 1932

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A correspondent asked if anything had been received regarding the likelihood of Japan's forces spreading up the Yangtze Valley. Mr. Rogers replied that nothing had been received on the matter except in press despatches.

A correspondent observed that despatches from Shanghai indicated that the Chinese feared that the Japanese intended to go on to Nanking with the new reinforcements. Mr. Rogers said he could not see that anything could be gained by commenting on the matter.

A correspondent asked if the Department had any information that Japanese warships were stationed off Vladivostok. The Assistant Secretary replied in the negative.

#### FRANCE

A correspondent enquired whether the Department had any statement to make on the death of Aristide Briand. He was informed that a telegram was being prepared and would be released later.

#### ARMAMENTS

A correspondent asked if any reports had been received from Geneva regarding sentiment among the delegates for suspending the arms conference. Mr. Rogers replied that the Department had heard nothing whatsoever of that sort, but that the indications were rather to the contrary. The correspondent explained that his question was based on the fact that some press despatches of yesterday contained intimations of that sort. Mr. Rogers agreed that, of course, that kind of gossip and talk had gone on in Geneva for a long time, but he knew nothing new on it, and, on the whole, the conference seems to be settling down to some real effort. Mr. Rogers added that his remarks WERE NOT FOR QUOTATION.

M. J. McDermott.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 1932

At the press conference this afternoon Secretary Stimson announced the release to the press of the text of a letter which the Mayor of Greater Shanghai addressed to Consul General Cunningham.

A correspondent enquired whether the Secretary had been informed of any results or plans arising out of instructions from Tokyo to their Minister at Shanghai to seek a settlement through the neutrals. The Secretary replied in the negative and added that he had heard rumors that some instructions were given to the Japanese Minister but that they had not reached him. FOR BACKGROUND, the Secretary said that we were sitting tight and waiting. We have instructed our Minister to go ahead along the lines of the Assembly's resolution, and there is nothing, so far as we are concerned, to stop other nations from going on in their efforts for peace.

A correspondent referred to a despatch from Geneva concerning the report of the four admirals at Shanghai and enquired whether the report would be available in Washington. The Secretary said that it had not reached him yet, but that he had suggested to some of his associates here that it would be a good plan for us to arrange to have a copy of the report sent here, and, if it is published in Geneva, he would be glad to let the correspondents have it. He pointed out that he could not do that, however, if the people to whom the reports are sent do not make them public.

A correspondent asked if we had any information that the other nations were making progress on the round-table conference. The Secretary said that, as he recalled it, two enquiries were set in motion by the Assembly. In the first place, they asked the four admirals for some purely military information, namely, whether hostilities had ceased, since there was a great deal of

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confusion on that point at the Assembly meeting. We authorized our Admiral Taylor to join with the British, French and Italian Admirals in that report.

The so-called round-table conference is an entirely different thing. That, as the Secretary understood it, was put in motion by the resolution of the Assembly, which was made public, suggesting that a conference be held between the Japanese and the Chinese and the powers immediately interested for the purpose of liquidating the military situation at Shanghai. It was in this that the Secretary authorized Mr. Johnson to participate along the lines of the resolution. They have not yet begun, but that is not our fault. The Secretary said that he did not know what had stopped it--if it had been stopped. He added that they might merely be slow in getting under way.

A correspondent enquired whether Admiral Taylor reported to the Assembly on the cessation of hostilities or whether he made his reports to Washington. The Secretary replied that he understood that the four admirals met and agreed, subject to the approval of their governments, to make a joint report, instead of four separate reports. We agreed to this. The joint report will be sent to the League and we have requested that a copy be sent to us. However, Admiral Taylor, of course, sends reports every day, as he has in the past, to the Navy Department. The correspondent said he wanted to know whether Admiral Taylor was reporting direct to us or to the League. The Secretary replied that, except for one joint report on a special subject which will go to the League, the Admiral has reported directly to his own Government. The correspondent asked if Admiral Taylor's reports would be released to the press. The Secretary replied that whenever the Admiral reported anything of importance we would try to see that it was given to the press, but that there had not been anything of importance lately.

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In order to clear up any possible misunderstanding about the joint report, the Secretary again told the correspondents that the four admirals--French, British, Italian and American--were preparing together a joint report on whether hostilities had ceased, in reply to a question of the League. The original of that report will go to the League, because the League requested it, but a copy of it will come to us. The correspondent said he still wanted to ask if Admiral Taylor was reporting to this Government. The Secretary replied in the affirmative. He added that every admiral out on duty reports to his home government, and particularly when they are in such an exciting place as Shanghai is at present. A correspondent observed that the despatch from Geneva indicated the admirals would make a daily report. The Secretary said he had been speaking from memory and that he did not mean only one report would be submitted.

#### DEBTS AND REPARATIONS

A correspondent enquired whether the Secretary had heard anything recently from Europe about the suspension of debts. The Secretary replied that the matter had not come to his attention for some time.

#### ARMAMENTS

A correspondent asked if the Secretary could say anything about any tentative plans he might have for a trip to Geneva. The Secretary replied in the negative.

M. J. McDermott.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 1932

At the press conference this morning Assistant Secretary Rogers announced the release to the press of a despatch from Mukden indicating some disorder in the suburbs of the city.

A correspondent asked if that was not the capital of the new Manchurian republic. Mr. Rogers replied that he did not think Mukden was to be the capital.

The Assistant Secretary said nothing had been received from Shanghai as to conditions there, from which we assumed that the situation was quiet.

A correspondent asked if we intended to remove the 31st Infantry from Shanghai. FOR ATTRIBUTION, Mr. Rogers replied that the correspondents might say positively that we had no present intention of removing the 31st Infantry. A correspondent asked if it was possible to say under what general circumstances we would withdraw the 31st Infantry. Mr. Rogers replied that the matter is not under consideration and that we have no plans for their withdrawal. A correspondent asked what lay behind all the agitation for the removal of the troops. CONFIDENTIALLY, Mr. Rogers replied that he was inclined to think that the soldiers were hurriedly embarked for Shanghai and had been uncomfortable during their stay there so that it was natural for them to suggest that they would like to get out. A correspondent asked if the troops had their proper winter equipment. Mr. Rogers said he presumed that they could be supplied with the proper equipment, but that he thought they went to Shanghai with the equipment they had at Manila. A correspondent volunteered the information that they had their woolen uniforms. Mr. Rogers said that, at any rate, we had no intention of doing anything at the present time about their withdrawal.

793.94/4783

MAR 15 1932  
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-2-

For background, a correspondent asked, in view of the interesting inauguration ceremonies in Manchuria yesterday, how our consular forces there would carry on. The Assistant Secretary declined to discuss the matter in conference. A correspondent pointed out that in the past all American consuls had dealt with the provincial governments which were in being in China. He recalled the situation when Feng Yu-Hsiang was head of the government in Kalgan while there was an entirely different government in Shanghai. He added that the American consul had dealt with Feng. FOR BACKGROUND, Mr. Rogers said that most of the business American consuls have to do is in connection with local authorities and the great mass of their business does not cover anything which would involve serious political issues. He pointed out that business might be carried on for a considerable time without a serious issue arising. In answer to further enquiries, the Assistant Secretary declined to comment on the matter.

A correspondent asked if the Department had any reports on the outbreak of fighting near Shanghai. FOR BACKGROUND, Mr. Rogers said that everything seemed quiet. The firing that had occurred was, apparently, very scattered. A correspondent asked if there were any disturbing signs in the way Japan was spreading out and sending new reinforcements to Shanghai. Mr. Rogers said that the condition was still unsettled, but that there was nothing very serious going on. A correspondent asked if Japan seemed to be sincere this time in her efforts for peace. Mr. Rogers replied that he would let the correspondents judge that for themselves.

A correspondent asked for confirmation of the article which appeared in yesterday's press to the effect that they were calling out a reserve class in Japan. Mr. Rogers declined to comment on the article.

-3-

FRANCE


A correspondent referred to an article in this morning's press from Paris regarding an embargo on American fruit and enquired whether the Department had any information on the subject. Mr. Rogers replied in the negative and added that we knew nothing concerning it except what appeared in the newspapers.

PAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE

A correspondent asked if there had been any further developments on the suggestion that the Pan-American Conference be postponed. Mr. Rogers replied in the negative. The correspondent enquired whether the matter had come to the attention of the Department. Mr. Rogers replied that it had not, so far as he knew.

M. J. McDermott.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75



MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, FRIDAY, MARCH 11, 1932

At the press conference this afternoon Secretary Stimson announced the release of some despatches from Mr. Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai.

Asked how the Far Eastern situation looked to him this afternoon, the Secretary replied that the question was rather broad and that he, furthermore, did not want to comment for publication. FOR BACKGROUND, Mr. Stimson said the situation was confused and that he preferred to reserve his opinion at this time. The situation today is about the same as it was yesterday, in that we do not know exactly what is happening. Referring to the recent action by the League at Geneva, the Secretary said he would wait until after the Assembly acts on the resolution which was drafted yesterday. After the Assembly takes this action, the Secretary will endeavor to sum up the whole picture for the correspondents, but he said it would be premature to do that now. A correspondent asked if the Secretary would make any comment on the action of the Assembly in including the Kellogg Pact in the resolution. Mr. Stimson replied that he preferred not to comment on the matter at the present time. Asked if he had received the text of the resolution, the Secretary replied in the affirmative. A correspondent asked if the text of the resolution would be made available to the press in Washington. The Secretary replied that it had been printed in the newspapers and that he saw no objection to its being given out here.

A correspondent asked if any reports had been received from General McCoy, concerning his work in the Far East. The Secretary replied in the negative.

A correspondent enquired at what stage of the Assembly's work the Secretary would feel justified in giving more background information to the correspondents. In reply, Mr. Stimson said

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MAR 15 1932

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that he felt that the passage of the resolution now in contemplation would mark a definite step in the work of the Assembly and that after the passage of the resolution he might talk to the correspondents about it. Mr. Stimson added, however, that he was not making a hard and fast promise.

Asked if it was safe to assume that the fighting at Shanghai was over, the Secretary replied in the negative and added that it was not safe to make any assumption concerning any situation the other side of the 180th meridian. Mr. Stimson explained that the impression which he wished to convey was that the situation had not changed materially since yesterday. He added that he thought a half step forward had been taken when the drafting committee of the League agreed on the resolution.


A correspondent called attention to reports that Admiral Taylor, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, had said that he thought the situation was easing considerably and, as a result thereof, he had ordered four destroyers to return to Manila. Mr. Stimson here explained that when he said there was no change in the situation he was not comparing the situation of today with that which existed some time ago, when troops were actively advancing, but that he was rather comparing it with the situation during the past few days. The lines of troops appear to have stopped their operations and to have become stabilized to a certain extent, but we do not know whether any new advances will be made by either side.

#### LINDBERGH KIDNAPPING

A correspondent asked if any instructions had been sent to our consular officers abroad instructing them to be on the alert because of the possibility that the Lindbergh child might be taken to Mexico, Canada, or even overseas. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said he did not think any such instructions had gone out.

M. J. McDermott.

793.94



FOR THE PRESS

MARCH 11, 1932

Sino-Japanese

The American Minister to Switzerland, Mr. Hugh R. Wilson, reported to the Department of State today that the Assembly of the League of Nations today passed the following resolution:

PART ONE

The Assembly, considering that the provisions of the Covenant are entirely applicable to the dispute, more particularly as regards:

- (1) The principle of a scrupulous respect for treaties;
- (2) The undertaking entered into by members of the League of Nations to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the members of the League;
- (3) Their obligation to submit any dispute which may arise between them to procedures for peaceful settlement;

Adopting the principles laid down by the President in office of the Council, Mr. Briand in his declaration of December 10th, 1931;

Recalling the fact that twelve members of the Council again invoked those principles in their appeal to the Japanese Government on February 18th, 1932, when they declared that "no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any member of the League brought about in disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognized as valid and effectual by members of the League of Nations";

Considering that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the League, above referred to, are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris which is one of the cornerstones of the peace organization of the world and under Article 2 of which 'the high contracting parties agree that the Settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature and whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means';

Pending the steps which it may ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute which has been referred to it;

Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.

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MAR 15 1932

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PART TWO

The Assembly,

Affirming that it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be sought under the stress of military pressure on the part of either party;

Recalls the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and on December 10, 1931, in agreement with the parties;

Recalls also its own resolution of March 4, 1932, adopted in agreement with the parties with a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and notes that the powers members of the League of Nations having special interests in the Shanghai settlements are prepared to give every assistance to this end and requests those powers if necessary to cooperate in maintaining order in the evacuated zone.

PART THREE

The Assembly,

In view of the request formulated on January 29th by the Chinese Government invoked the application to the dispute of the procedure provided for in Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

In view of the request formulated on February 12th by the Chinese Government that the dispute should be referred to the Assembly in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 9, of the Covenant and in view of the Council's decision of February 19th;

Considering that the whole of the dispute which forms the subject of the Chinese Government's request is referred to it and that it is under an obligation to apply the procedure of conciliation provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant and if necessary the procedure in regard to recommendations provided for in paragraph 4 of that same article;

Decides to set up a committee of nineteen members, namely, the President of the Assembly who will act as Chairman of the Committee, the members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute and six other members to be elected by secret ballot.

This committee exercising its functions on behalf of and under the supervision of the Assembly shall be instructed:

- (1) To report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the said cessation and shall regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in conformity with the Assembly resolution of March 4th, 1932.
- (2) To follow the execution of the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and December 10th, 1931.
- (3) To endeavor to prepare the settlement of the dispute in agreement with the parties in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3 of the Covenant, and to submit a statement to the Assembly.
- (4) To propose if necessary that the Assembly submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice a request for an advisory opinion.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-


- (5) To prepare, if need be, the draft of the report provided for in Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant.
- (6) To propose any urgent measure which may appear necessary.
- (7) To submit a first progress report to the Assembly as soon as possible and at latest on May 1, 1932.

The Assembly requests the Council to communicate to the Committee, together with any observations it may have to make, any documentation that it may think fit to transmit to the Assembly.

The Assembly shall remain in session and its President may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MARCH 11, 1932

Sino-Japanese

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The nations of the League at Geneva have united in a common attitude and purpose towards the perilous disturbances in the Far East. The action of the Assembly expresses the purpose for peace which is found both in the Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League of Nations. In this expression all the nations of the world can speak with the same voice. This action will go far toward developing into terms of international law the principles of order and justice which underlie those treaties and the Government of the United States has been glad to cooperate earnestly in this effort.

793.94/4786

793.94

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MAR 15 1932

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180

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

EGRAM RECEIVED

Shanghai

3 telegram  
paraphrased  
announced FROM

Dated March 16, 1932

Rec'd 9:14 a. m.

*Handwritten notes:*  
D  
Paragraph  
my ?  
Served  
10-30 am

*Handwritten notes:*  
W. C. Clegg  
Shanghai  
MAR 17 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4787

p.m. (SECTION ONE)

96, March 12, 5 p.m. to Shanghai.

invite Department's attention to part  
and requests those powers if necessary  
maintenance of order in the evacuated

zone". Japanese amendment to tentative agenda quoted  
in my March 16, 9 a.m. is based upon this provision of  
the resolution which Shigemitsu points out commits  
China and the other participating powers to more even  
than he has asked. (END GRAY) <sup>P.2</sup> In my discussions here  
I have taken the stand that we do not wish to become  
involved in the policing of the area which it is presumed  
the Japanese are about to evacuate. My British and French  
colleagues have been equally averse to it. I have felt  
from the beginning that evacuated area should be turned  
directly back by the Japanese to the Chinese and that the  
most that we could do would be to act possibly as official  
witnesses of the hand over. (END SECTION ONE)  
(WSB-RR)

MAR 21 1932

FILED

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET \_\_\_\_\_ Shanghai  
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated **FROM** Dated March 16, 1932  
to anyone. Rec'd 9:14 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

*Telegr. to Shanghai*  
FAR EAST  
MAR 17 1932  
Department of State

March 16, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

(GRAY) Your <sup>14771a</sup> 96, March 12, 5 p.m. to Shanghai.

*793,94  
note  
793,94119  
893  
500,011*

**P. 1** I desire to invite Department's attention to part two which reads "and requests those powers if necessary to cooperate in maintenance of order in the evacuated zone". Japanese amendment to tentative agenda quoted in my March 16, 9 a.m. is based upon this provision of the resolution which Shigemitsu points out commits China and the other participating powers to more even than he has asked. <sup>P. 2</sup> (END GRAY) In my discussions here I have taken the stand that we do not wish to become involved in the policing of the area which it is presumed the Japanese are about to evacuate. My British and French colleagues have been equally averse to it. I have felt from the beginning that evacuated area should be turned directly back by the Japanese to the Chinese and that the most that we could do would be to act possibly as official witnesses of the hand over. (END SECTION ONE)  
(WSB-RR)

JOHNSON

F/LS 793.94/4787

MAR 21 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.


SHANGHAI

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated March 16, 1932

Rec'd 10 p.m.

Secretary of State



Washington

March 16, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Three. For my own information and guidance I must know whether the American Government is committed in any way to the "maintenance of order in the evacuated zone". If the area is evacuated by Japanese troops there will be no need of foreign troops there provided Chinese police forces are available. In any case there is great deal of doubt here as to whether we have sufficient forces to control the peace of the settlement area and extend that force to the control of area outside in which there has recently been a tremendous amount of destruction and loss of life due to actual conditions of warfare. The question of unity of control will present difficulties well nigh insurmountable and last but not least I think there is no foreign force here in Shanghai that wishes to be saddled with the responsibility of handing over to the Chinese the ruined villages and desecrated countryside which the Japanese are leaving behind them. (END MESSAGE)

HSI OX

JOHNSON

1809

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

**Department of State**

Charge to \$

OR  
This message was sent in confidence.  
It should be carefully guarded and not  
be divulged to anyone.

Washington,

March 17, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (China).

103 *Confidential*  
FOR THE MINISTER.

Your March 16, <sup>4767</sup>9 a.m., paragraph two, and March 16, <sup>4787</sup>9 p.m.

One. I share your feeling that the evacuated area should be turned directly back by the Japanese to the Chinese. However, confronted with the problem which the actual situation presents, it may be essential to give some practical assistance toward making possible the liquidation of the present military situation.

Two. The American Government has not committed itself to participation in maintenance of order in the evacuated zone. I have throughout taken the position that I would make no commitments on this subject, which is primarily one for consideration by the men on the spot familiar with the problem until I had received recommendations from you.

Referring to the Assembly's Resolution of March 11, part two, third paragraph, you will note that the League asks QUOTE member powers . . . /if necessary/ to cooperate

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-138

*79394/4787*  
*204*  
*893/1025*  
*898/1026*  
*886/80146*  
*793/94/19*

793.94/4787

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
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Department of State

- 2 -

Washington,

in maintaining order in the evacuated zone. In  
acknowledging Drummond's letter to Wilson of March 11,  
this Government indicated that it was prepared to cooperate  
toward bringing about definitive cessation of hostilities  
and withdrawal of the Japanese forces, but it did not  
specify that that cooperation would take the form of  
participation in the policing of an evacuated area. I  
had expressed to Wilson before and I expressed to him on  
March 11, by telephone, the view that the question of the  
form which cooperation should take was one which should  
be considered at Shanghai. I authorized him to let my  
view be known to responsible persons.

Three. The position taken by the Assembly of the  
League and by this Government has been that hostilities  
must be terminated and Japan's armed forces must be with-  
drawn. It stands to reason that in process of the Japa-  
nese withdrawal some arrangement should be made to pre-  
vent contact between the Japanese troops as they withdraw  
and the Chinese troops. There would probably need to be  
an agreement by China not to advance its forces during  
that withdrawal. It would possibly assist the observance  
of that agreement if the neutral powers furnished observers

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

1811

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
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Department of State

- 3 - Washington,

in the /evacuated /territory /during the /withdrawal/ but I /  
see/ as you /do/ serious objections /to any /attempt/ by the /  
neutral powers /to hold /in force /such a /large /territory /as  
that /to be /evacuated/, and I /feel that /the whole /question /  
is one /on which /the first /recommendation /should /come from /  
you and /your /conferees /at /Shanghai. D

Four. / It is further /to be /expected that /the Japanese /  
will resist /any proposal /which would /permit /after the /Japa-  
nese /withdrawal /reoccupation /by Chinese troops /of the whole /  
area /from which /the Japanese /shall have /withdrawn/. It  
occurs to me /that this /might be /taken /care of /by a /pledge /  
by China /that /Chinese /soldiers /shall not come /within the /  
area /of the /municipality /of /Greater /Shanghai /together with /  
adequate /assurances /by the authorities /of that /municipality /  
that the /policing /of the /area /within the /municipality /of /  
Greater /Shanghai /by /Chinese /police /shall be /effective /  
against /violent /anti-foreign /activity /of any kind. / If an /  
attempt to /secure an /agreement /on this /should /reach an /  
impasse/, I should /then /be glad /to have /your /recommendations /  
as to whether /any /practical /contribution /can be made /by the /  
use of /neutral /military forces/.

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

- 4 - Washington,

Five. This problem as a whole is one which, in my opinion, can only be worked out by you and the other representatives on the spot. You should resist any efforts on the part of Japan or other powers to advance self-interests on the basis of the military situation. But you should be prepared to offer the cooperation of your Government and its agencies for assistance in connection with measures <sup>which may be necessary and</sup> pertinent to and restricted to steps taken <sup>in</sup> liquidation of that situation. This, in line with what I have said above, I authorize you to do. This will require the working out by you and your colleagues who represent neutral powers of some plan which will meet the exigencies of the problem.

Stimson

FE: SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by ATK

Sent by operator M., 19  

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94  
note  
893.102 S  
793.94119

REP



FROM

PLAIN

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 17, 1932

Rec'd 8 a. m.



F/LS  
793.94/4783

Secretary of State,

Washington.

March 17, 2 p. m.

Joint situation report No. eight, March 16th, "no change:

Report number nine, today:

"Quiet along both fronts press reports to the contrary:

there have been no important changes in troop dispositions

on either side. Beginning tomorrow Japanese commence

reembarkation of one mixed brigade."

JOHNSON

HPD

MAR 21 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11812 FOR #- (To Leg'n)

FROM Chefoo (Webber) DATED Jan. 5, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Manchurian situation.  
Substance of conversation with Mr. Aveling, First Secretary  
of the British Legation at Peiping, in which he stated that  
Japan will eventually realize that Manchuria is a costly  
proposition.

793.94/4789

tfv

1814

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Chefoo, China, January 5, 1932.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Conversation at Chefoo with  
Mr. F. A. Aveling of the  
British Legation, Peiping.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

As of possible interest to the Legation and probably of some value in comparing with information already in the Legation's possession, I have the honor to submit the following:-

On January 4th last, I went aboard the S.S. Tungshow, to say farewell to Vice Consul and Mrs. C. C. Sundell, who were proceeding to Amoy. On board I found F. A. Aveling, Esquire, First Secretary of the British Legation at Peiping, who was for sometime past also stationed at Nanking, China. From him I learned that according to British Intelligence the following is to be accepted:-  
General:

Chiang Kai-shek has his armies (or military leaders and their forces) so placed that they can come into power within 24 hours. If not in actual control of the government, yet they are at present in a position that, if necessary, they can secure, whenever they want to, the control of the revenue producing areas, including  
Shanghai.

1815

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Shanghai. Chiang has even taken his German and other foreign military advisers with him.

Further, that Feng Yu Hsiang proceeded to Nanking in accordance with a previous agreement with the present Nanking Government. Also that Feng Yu Hsiang was, strange to say, working with the "Leftist", Wang Ching Wei. He also stated that Marshal Feng was to be the real head of North China; Yang Hsi Shan, number two; and both of them, supported by Han Fu Chu, Fu Tso Yi, Sun Chuan Fang and Sun Tien Ying, were to be the heads of the new North China coalition. Further, that Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang's power was finished and he would be eliminated very shortly. Also that Liu Chen Nien (of Chefoo), who in the past was favored by both Northern and Southern leaders, (Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh Liang), would be in the coming Spring eliminated by General Han Fu Chu and others in the new Northern combination. He also stated that Han's troops are probably the best in North China, but they are at present short of supplies, ammunition and field guns.

Further, T. V. Soong, ex-Minister of Finance, would probably be back in power within three months (before April, 1932) and that the present Chinese Cabinet arrangement was only a makeshift one, which was more or less dependent on the good will of General Chiang Kai-shek, who could, under present conditions, wipe out any Nanking Government. He also mentioned that the Nanking Treasury was empty and the present government has neither funds nor an army to back it.

Extra territoriality

- 3 -

Extraterritoriality:

"Eventually it's coming, notwithstanding these temporary upheavals of government." Those in the outports would be just as well off without as with it. That was his comment on Extraterritoriality. Apparently the British draft agreement calls for a "full recognition without question" of existing title deeds and agreements. This is noteworthy because it furnishes a solution to a lot of the arguments brought forward by foreigners in outports against the abolition of extraterritoriality. It also shows that the British have already taken steps to confirm their nationals' present rights in China.

Rendition:

His observations were as follows: The few British-Chinese rendition agreements were working better than expected. (1) The Hankow (Chen-O'Malley) Agreement, other than a few petty annoyances caused by acts of the Chinese on the Hankow Bund, was operating fine and Britishers were no worse off than before the loss of the British Concession. (2) Chinkiang: notwithstanding the dire protests at the outset of negotiations, British there were better off now than before rendition. (3) Weihaiwei's trade was better, and the people there, both British and Chinese, were just as well off as before. This was also true of Amoy.

Tariff Autonomy:

Notwithstanding all the howls, beforehand, of the various foreign interests, especially British, the agreement has worked out satisfactory to all concerned.

Salt

1818

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Salt:

The salt re-organization has also worked out better than before. The British Government are very well pleased with the present working of the Salt Gabelle Administration, which is headed by Dr. Cleveland (American) assisted by the Foreign Secretary (G. Pearson, British). He also stated that apparently the Chinese were pleased because one of the last acts of T. V. Soong as Minister of Finance, was to approve of granting of gratuities to the foreign members of the staff, also approving various increases in their salaries.

Customs:

He stated that F. Maze, the present Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, much to the surprise of the Legation (although Sir Miles Lampson had recommended it), was made a Knight Commander of British Empire and that Maze had been waiting for this recognition and would now probably retire. He thought the new inspector general would be selected from the present Commissioner of Customs at Canton (French), Meyers (British) now at Tsingtao or some American. He added that Chang Fu Yun (Harvard graduate and T. V. Soong's henchman), present Director General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, is probably the most capable and efficient official of the present government and would make an ideal Inspector General.

Manchuria:

He stated that Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang had made an "ass" out of himself and didn't know where he was. That it was only a question of time now before he would be "altogether" finished; presumably in their estimation

he

181 C

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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he is already finished. Further, the Japanese were wrong but the League of Nations had "messed" so long with the situation that now nothing could stop Japan; but that Japan would eventually realize Manchuria was a costly proposition. He also stated that the anti-Japanese boycott by China would be unprofitable. He probably was referring to fact that both sides suffer from cessation of trade. He concluded his remarks on Manchuria by saying that foreign interests would suffer by Japanese occupation and control of Manchuria and that the commercial fight there would be between Soviet Russia and Japan.

China:

In his opinion China was now in a hopeless muddle. That after four years fighting they were back where they were four years ago. A paradox of Feng Yu Hsiang and Wang Ching Wei - a government without militarists but one that can be turned out within a few hours by militarists (Chiang Kai-shek). A government without funds, but one that Chiang Kai-shek can with a finger's movement gather in the Customs receipts of practically all of Central China. A case were the Tangpu, which two years ago ran the country was now the cause of the government's fall.

British Foreign Service:

According to Aveling, recommendation had been made or the matter was being considered as to the closing down of the British Consulates at Tainan, Yunnan and at some of the out of way places on the Yangtze and  
near

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near the Tibetan frontier. These places would be covered by a traveling consul or vice consul from the nearest large consulates or consulate general. This was to make for economy, efficiency and meet with the new conditions. I presumed he was referring to the abolition of extra-territoriality.

He stated that the British Foreign Service in the Far East is now controlled chiefly by one Sir or Mr. Ord, who has an adviser on Chinese affairs, Sir Lionel Pratt, but that the policy and the real power "behind the throne" is one (Sir or Mr., I do not recall) Richard or Oliver Wellesly, apparently an Under Secretary of State for foreign affairs.

About his own service members he made the following:-

That Sir W. Meyrick Hewlett was made a K.C.M.G., although on the recommendation but also to the astonishment of the British Minister (Sir Miles Lampson), and that Hewlett had done fairly good work at Nanking and had consolidated his position and ingratiated himself by having entertained many distinguished visiting Britishers (including Malcolm MacDonald, son of British Premier) and the various British delegations in a manner, which left nothing to be desired. Further that Hewlett, at times, got as many as the whole Executive Yuan to be present to honor visiting Britishers. In this respect, Aveling said he had it all over other foreign officials at Nanking. Apparently this went "over big" and did Meyrick Hewlett a whole lot of good. Further, Lady Evelyn (wife of Sir Meyrick) was a perfect hostess and

did

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did her part well. Also that upon return from leave Sir Meyrick Hewlett did not like the dual control and the British arrangement (diplomatic-counsellor) at Nanking and at his own request he was transferred and made British Consul General at Hankow, succeeding there my old colleague and friend, Russel Brown (Weihaimei-Cheroo).

Russel Brown: (British Consul General, who has just gone on leave).

"An autocrat, but apparently he satisfied Hankow people." Hewlett has a good man to follow.

Moss:

Appointed British Consul at Weihaimei (now on leave). "A fine chap", who probably will be transferred as soon as his term of duty at Weihaimei (2½ years) is over. He is, to use Aveling's remarks, "simply seeing rendition through."

Brenan:

He was referring to J. F. Brennan, British Consul General at Shanghai; the only fault they could find with Brennan was that he was so good an officer (sponsored by Sir Miles Lampson) that he had reached the pinnacle of the British consular ladder in China (Shanghai) and they didn't know what to do with him next but probably that after a few years longer in China he would be knighted and made minister at some other place, probably Abyssinia, like his predecessor.

American Foreign Service:

He made many complimentary observations regarding members of our service, mentioning in particular Messrs. Lockhart, Perkins, and Jacobs. The first mentioned he

stated

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
stated was the "uncrowned king" of Hankow and had ingratiated himself with everyone and was considered by them (British) an excellent officer and "A 1" man. I add - "Serus in oelum redeas".

Conclusion:

He concluded his remarks by saying that notwithstanding the so-called chaotic conditions in this country, the living conditions of foreigners (including foreign service officers) were better in China than any other place in the world. In this connection, I fully agree with him.

He stated he was going to Europe and will probably be assigned to a Scandinavian post, but that his heart and work was out here and that he was reluctant to leave China.

Respectfully yours,



Leroy Webber,  
American Consul.

800.

Submitted in duplicate.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
stated was the "uncrowned king" of Hankow and had ingratiated himself with everyone and was considered by them (British) an excellent officer and "A 1" man. I add - "Serus in coelum redeas".

Conclusion:

He concluded his remarks by saying that notwithstanding the so-called chaotic conditions in this country, the living conditions of foreigners (including foreign service officers) were better in China than any other place in the world. In this connection, I fully agree with him.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Foochow/49 FOR Despatch # 89. (# 55 to Legation)

FROM Foochow ( Burke ) DATED Feb. 10, 1932.  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese situation.  
Japanese version of the - as stated by  
Mr. T. Tamura, the Japanese Consul General.

793.94/4790

hs

1825

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Hongkong is an indication of his pessimism and unwillingness to be involved in the controversy.

Colonel Kwok Ying Yone (郭詠榮), Chief of the Bureau of Public Safety, tendered his resignation several times following the students' attack on the Japanese Consul General and Japanese naval officers on January 3, 1938 (see below under SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION). General Fang wished to appoint his brother-in-law Wu Shu (吳澍), Chief of the Water Police, to fill the vacancy, but due to certain unknown reasons he later found it impossible to effect the change. Colonel Kwok has been prevailed upon to remain in office for the time being.

#### II - SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION.

##### 1. Attack on the Japanese Consul General and Japanese Naval Officers. (See this Consulate's telegram of January 4, 1938, to the Legation.)

Japanese Version: Mr. T. Tamura, the Japanese Consul General, stated that on January 3, 1938, having received word that student demonstrations were being held on that day in the city - which demonstrations the Provincial Government had previously promised him to prohibit - he telephoned the Provincial Government to ascertain whether the reports were true. The Provincial Government informed him that no demonstrations were being held, but that some students had been assembled for certain exercises. The Japanese Consul General having again received reports that demonstrations were being held, decided to investigate the matter in person, taking

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tsingtao/47 FOR Despatch # 709. (# 514 to  
Legation)

FROM Tsingtao (Chase) DATED Feb. 13, 1932.  
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING:

Developments at Shanghai have increased anti-Japanese sentiment considerably. There have also been rumors of impending Japanese invasion of Shantung.

hs

793.94/4791

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Municipal authorities have so far found little difficulty in meeting their efforts.

793.94  
The developments at Shanghai have increased anti-Japanese sentiment considerably and aroused a spirit of suppressed patriotic excitement in the Chinese population.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01-Manchuria/37 FOR Tel. #334-3pm

FROM China ( Perkins ) DATED Mar. 13, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Manchurian situation.  
Unconfirmed report received from a Russian source to effect  
that Japanese are establishing a military post at Mergen on  
the Tsitsihar-Taheiho road. Japanese military at Ninguta  
are constructing a flying field there.

tfv

793.94/4792

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

CORRECTED COPY

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 13, 1932

Rec'd 2:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

334, March 13, 3 p.m.

Following from American Consul at Harbin:

"March 12, noon, number 31.

One. Press report of mutiny and looting by the Chinese garrison at Taheiho on March 10th have been confirmed by the Chinese agent of an American Oil Company at that place.

Two. An unconfirmed report has been received from a fairly reliable Russian source to the effect that the Japanese are establishing a military post at Mergen on the Tsitsihar-Taheiho road.

Three. Japanese military at Ninguta are constructing flying field there."

For the Minister,  
PERKINS

WSB

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 13, 1932

Rec'd 2:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
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Two. An unconfirmed report has been received from a fairly reliable Russian source to the effect that the Japanese are establishing a military post at Mergen on the Tsitsihar-Taheiho road.

Three. Japanese military at Ninguta are constructing (?) field artillery there."

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Rome, Italy



*Handwritten initials: FE, WE*

No. 1300.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict.

*Handwritten: 7/12-94*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 13 1932  
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPE  
*Handwritten: S.S.B.*

RECEIVED  
MAR 17 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.34/4793

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 1293 of February 25, 1932, on the Sino-Japanese controversy, I have the honor to inform the Department that the most recent developments in the fighting around Shanghai have begun for the first time to cause a few real misgivings to the Italian press as to the possible danger to the world which may derive from that situation. It cannot be said, however, that this feeling has crystallized into any definite attitude.

*Handwritten: 793.34/4793*

FILED

MAR 18 1932

Previous

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Previous to the announcement that some sort of settlement for the cessation of hostilities had been arranged, the TEWERE, commenting on the situation, stated that three new factors had arisen which aggravated matters. First it noted Japan's reply to the League, which it termed "apparently insolent" but possibly caused merely by irritation over recent military reverses in Shanghai. The only part of the note which was to be taken seriously, according to this newspaper, was the statement that Japan "considers inopportune and scarcely advisable a discussion of the terms of the Nine Power Treaty with nations which are not signatories thereto," since this might be the beginning of a new conference of the Nine Powers on the Chinese situation.

Second, the TEWERE evinced alarm over the warning of the Mayor of Shanghai to the effect that so long as the Japanese made the International Concession a base for their activities, the Chinese government could accept no responsibility for the consequences; the newspaper felt certain that the Japanese would continue to "make themselves militarily at home" in the Concession and that prospects were therefore extremely serious.

Third, from the tenor of Secretary Stimson's letter to Senator Borah and that of the Japanese reply, the TEWERE found grounds to believe that a conference of the Nine Powers might be convoked and felt that such a step would be the only concrete attempt so far made

toward

-3-

toward a pacific settlement; it was apparent, however, that the STABPA was not gambling heavily on the success of this hypothetical conference and that it perceived war between the United States and Japan lurking in the background.

Alfredo Signoretti in the STABPA voiced the common opinion of Italian editorial writers on the subject that the recent Japanese reverses made the situation more serious, since Japan would feel herself obliged to make up at any cost for the loss to her prestige, forcing diplomatic considerations to take second place, in view of the example which might be set for Chosen specifically and of the general possibility of compromising not only Japan's future expansion but the stability of the empire as it now stands. Moreover, the writer stated that if Japan had immediately won her objective of a commercial concession and a naval base at the mouth of the Yangsi, the western nations probably would have contented themselves with a comedy of protest similar to that produced on the occasion of the Manchurian occupation, whereas with the prolonging of the situation all sorts of delicate complications arise. Great Britain and the United States particularly, added the STABPA, would be forced now to take stronger stands than the moderate action hitherto pursued.

Japan, in the STABPA's opinion, had rightly counted on the reluctance of the United States under her present difficulties of assuming her traditional

policy

-4-

policy in the Far East, but to profit thereby it was necessary to act before American public opinion, "unmolested by associations whose influence on the executive is far from negligible," could be effectively mobilized. The question in the United States, continued the newspaper, is now one of national prestige, bolstered by anti-Japanese sentiment and sympathy with invaded China. The writer found that Secretary Stimson's letter gave an individual interpretation of the origin, spirit, and letter of the Nine Power Treaty which opened the way to the most serious possibilities; should this treaty become invalid, he pointed out, an armament race in the Pacific would result, and the Disarmament Conference and the London Naval Treaty would be irreparably exploded.

In a further article in the STAMPA, Signor Signoretti, referring to Mr. Stimson's open letter to Senator Borah, stated that "every passing day shows more clearly the great importance of the letter and the grave possibilities implied therein." He hinted that the chance that the United States might consider the naval agreements based upon the Pacific Treaty void has naturally had great influence on Great Britain, who cannot afford another armament race and has thus been brought more into line with a view to exercising some restraining pressure on Japan. The writer concluded:

"The

-3-

"The responsibility (for the conflict) which had been lightly tossed back and forth, must now be fixed, and England, who would gladly have kept her hands free, is again to the front, while all countries are waiting for her to speak the decisive word. This word, however, will perhaps mark an advantage for one or the other of the contenders at an inevitable cost to the British Empire."

So far the announcement of a prospective truce while Gilly reports has evoked little reaction, but the Vatican OSSERVATORE ROMANO in its first column in several days on the situation, speaks in radiant terms of the concrete effort made at Geneva to settle the Sino-Japanese differences, considering it an effective step toward peace. The Vatican organ then points out that this auspicious step took place the day following the Pope's renewed appeal on Sunday evening over the Vatican radio for peace among men and appears to see in the League Council's step a beginning of the long awaited collaboration between the respective wills of men and God.

The LAVORO FASCISTA states that "it is both too late and too early to speak of peace," since events in China have proceeded with such velocity as completely to destroy the "equilibrium of the Chinese situation." The newspaper hopes for some sort of settlement at Shanghai, but points out that since the Shanghai crisis, serious as it appears, is merely a diversion from the main problems -- Manchuria and the general subject of Sino-Japanese relations --

any

-3-

any settlement will serve only to delay in reaching the original questions. The LANCEN UNICEF still hopes for a truce not only of arms but of mental attitudes, but warns that this truce can never be anything but a truce and that a final solution of the difficult issues must be sought in international action. To this action, adds the newspaper, Italy, as has been stated, will legally contribute her support.

Signor Virginio Gayda stated in the GIORNALE D'ITALIA that the plenary session of the League Assembly will open with both China and Japan in a more reasonable mood. Japan's more moderate attitude, he claims, is due to a number of causes: the unforeseen resistance of the Chinese, the expense of prolonged operations, and the rise of some domestic opposition. Signor Gayda foresees a favorable turning for the Chinese case at Geneva, especially since the Assembly is dominated by the small nations, all of whom are eager to create a precedent for the defense of such nations through the League. However, says he, even though the conciliatory attitudes of the two nations toward each other are outwardly improved, nothing is certain: the Chinese distrust the new moderation in Japan, which they suspect is assumed for the benefit of the Geneva Assembly and for preparing new military operations. Signor Gayda then refers to the capture by the Chinese bandits of several Chinese missionaries in the last few days at Iachokow. He states:

"Italy

-7-

"Italy cannot remain indifferent to this repetition of tragic occurrences affecting the lives and property of her subjects who live and carry on peaceful works of civility on Chinese territory and who have the right to the protection of the Chinese authorities by virtue of treaties and customary practice in normal relations among civilized nations. The Chinese government, which today solicits European collaboration in the defense of her national position, has everything to gain, we feel, in guaranteeing the necessary cooperation for such collaboration."

After recalling similar incidents in the past, Signor Cagola concludes:

"We refer to these tragic facts because they constitute a precedent which today is again brought to the front by the new events at Lushanow and which must not be repeated; and also so that the Geneva Assembly may examine accurately the conditions in China with regard to international law.

"The help which China is asking at Geneva must entail certain general compensations satisfying the just moral and political exigencies of world civilization."

In connection with the above I might add that the Fascist press expresses much justification at the "energetic measures" undertaken by young Count Galeazzo Ciano, the acting Italian Consul General at Shanghai and the son-in-law of the Chief of Government. Count Ciano's activities have in general met with some approval throughout Italy, and the featuring of glowing reports on him have strengthened the belief entertained in certain circles that he was

being

-3-

being groomed for an important place in the Government. A rumor has even been circulated in Rome to the effect that Ciano is in daily communication with the Duce and with his father, the Minister of Communications, and that he receives advice and instructions from the Chief of Government direct rather than through his own ministerial hierarchy. The Department may recall that rumors were current to the effect that Ciano's first chief (the young man was at that time an attaché to the Italian Embassy at Rio de Janeiro) was removed because of complaints sent by Ciano out of official channels direct to his father as to his chief's lukewarm attitude toward Fascism.


In conclusion I may state that Italian public opinion on the whole remains entirely neutral. The press, however, in its write-ups and headlines of news articles tends to exaggerate American concern. Typical of such headlines are the following: "The wife of President Hoover refuses to wear a silk dress because of its Japanese origin," published only in the noon editions of the PICCOLO of February 21st, but never subsequently denied; "The American fleet is concentrating in the Pacific for a demonstration against Japan reluctant to carry out the San Francisco agreement," the QUOTIDIANO of March 2nd. Other examples of similar reports headlined as facts and sometimes entirely unsupported in the text of the news despatches, such as one some time ago to the effect that an entire

American

-9-

American army corps had been sent to Shanghai,  
could be cited. It is unfortunate that, whether  
through carelessness or a desire for sensational  
effects, such practices are permitted, since the  
average British reader, who reads a number of news-  
papers from first to last column, is naturally  
more impressed by the headlines than by the actual  
news.

Respectfully yours,

  
John W. Garrett.

Enclosures: ~~Clippings~~.

Copies to E.I.C. Paris.

SC/eh

710.

IL GIORNALE D'ITALIA, Rome.  
March 3, 1932.

Despatch No. 1300

page 1.

## Situazione incerta

Alla vigilia della convocazione dell'assemblea plenaria della Società delle Nazioni, il conflitto cino-giapponese per la questione di Sciangai si profila con apparenze alquanto più pacificanti ma con caratteri tali da non consentire ancora alcuna sicura prognosi conclusiva. Da una parte e dall'altra si delinea la tendenza a trovare una formula di conciliazione diretta. Molte cause spiegherebbero il nuovo spirito di moderazione che dimostra il Giappone: la resistenza cinese superiore alle previsioni, la gravità delle spese già sostenute per le operazioni militari che s'innestano su una crisi finanziaria nazionale già sensibile, l'opposizione di alcuni gruppi politici di Tokio contro la politica della mano forte del governo, ma soprattutto la reazione che si preannuncia vivace dell'assemblea plenaria di Ginevra. In questa assemblea dominano per numero i rappresentanti delle piccole e più deboli Potenze. E' evidente che essi si preoccupano di creare un preciso precedente, tale che valga a stabilire ben chiaro il diritto della difesa dei piccoli Paesi, a traverso la Società delle Nazioni, contro i grandi Paesi che fanno uso delle armi e conducono nei loro riguardi una politica indipendente e forte. E' evidente allora che la tesi cinese debba trovare a Ginevra migliore accoglienza di quella giapponese per quanto possano apparire fondate, da un generale punto di vista nazionale, le ragioni del Giappone. Questa tendenza antigiapponese, ispirata soprattutto dalla ricerca di un principio generale di garanzia a favore delle piccole Potenze, è apparsa già ben chiara nelle venti sedute segrete del Consiglio tenute a Parigi ed è stata esplicitamente fissata nell'ultima seduta pubblica del 10 dicembre scorso, nella quale i rappresentanti della Spagna, De Madariaga, del Guatemala, Matos, del Perù, Gonzales-Prada, e del Panama, Garay, hanno insistito sulla necessità di definire i diritti e limitare i mezzi delle grandi Potenze per la difesa delle loro ragioni.

Il Giappone non sembra dunque oggi più insistere nelle sue domande di un ritiro incondizionato delle forze cinesi a venti miglia dai confini di Sciangai e della demilitarizzazione delle zone circostanti la città.

A sua volta la Cina, per quanto sensibile al favore che i suoi casi raccolgono fra i piccoli Paesi a Ginevra, sembra avere compreso l'opportunità di non irrigidirsi in talune sue posizioni mentre la grave crisi economica, le sciagure di ogni genere, i dissensi politici e militari interni, la nuova ondata comunista la consigliano a non domandare troppo alla transitoria situazione politica internazionale più favorevole, nella quale opera la sua abile diplomazia.

Così stando le cose, parrebbe che alle sanguinose vicende violente degli ultimi giorni debba ora seguire un tempo di tregua, nel quale i giapponesi si ritirerebbero nelle così dette zone di difesa e i cinesi ripiegerebbero a loro volta su determinate posizioni che possano garantire le grandi Potenze.

Ma nulla appare ancora certo. I cinesi diffidano del nuovo spirito di moderazione che appare in Giappone. Ritengono che esso rifletta soprattutto un giuoco tattico, al duplice fine di superare senza gravi complicazioni l'esame di Ginevra e consentire intanto l'aprestamento di nuovi rinforzi e nuove operazioni. La posizione militare del Giappone è sempre dominante. A Sciangai segna lenti ma notevoli progressi. I tentativi del governo di Nanchino di sollevare contro il Giappone anche la zona settentrionale della Cina muovendo i generali, fra i quali è Chang Hsin Liang, con le loro truppe che si calcolano in trecentomila uomini, non sembrano avere ancora raggiunto alcun risultato.

Il problema di Sciangai rimane dunque ancora militarmente e politicamente aperto. Non è quindi impossibile che si riprenda in esame tutto il complesso di misure che per il definitivo assesto della sua zona ha indicato, nella sua voluminosa relazione, il giudice sud-africano Feetham, della quale già abbiamo dato notizia.

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Mentre la situazione di Sciangai segna giorni di pausa, giunge la notizia di una nuova cattura di missionari italiani. Il nostro incaricato d'affari a Sciangai è intervenuto con energia. Vogliamo sperare che le promesse fatte dal governo di Nanchino siano presto e interamente mantenute. La Nazione italiana non può assi-

simile, sofferto nella stessa regione, l'anno scorso da altri sudditi italiani. Ricordiamo i fatti, quali ci risultano dalle più attendibili delle fonti. Il 15 maggio 1931 un distaccamento dell'esercito comunista comandato da Ho Lung, che opera nel nord-ovest della provincia di Hupeh, attaccò improvvisamente il convento e il seminario francescano di Kia-Yuen-Kow, uccidendo tre preti cinesi e facendo prigionieri tre religiosi italiani e tre cinesi. Il giorno successivo, dopo avere catturato ancora monsignor Ermenegildo Ricci e il padre Iginio Checcani, si dirigeva con marcia forzata verso il villaggio di Shi Hwa Kai. Durante la marcia un vecchio prete cinese cadde affranto dalla fatica: fu senza pietà decapitato. Sette preti cattolici del vicariato di Laohokow — cinque italiani e due cinesi — si trovarono così prigionieri nelle mani dei soldati comunisti cinesi. Gli italiani erano: monsignor Ricci, padre Checcani, padre Germano Lazzari, padre Mansueto Maggini e fra Luca Santini. Ai primi

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ni. Monsignor Ricci, poi liberato, moriva il 23 novembre per le sofferenze patite nell'ospedale di Laohokow. L'autorità civile e militare cinese, sollecitata dalle autorità italiane, informata di ogni vicenda, dei movimenti e delle forze della divisione comunista, del loro dislocamento, delle possibilità favorevoli per un'azione di accerchiamento da parte delle truppe regolari, non si mossero mai. E ancor oggi non hanno provveduto alle riparazioni.

Ricordiamo questi fatti tragici perché essi costituiscono un precedente che torna oggi di attualità, per i nuovi fatti di Laohokow, e non può ripetersi. E anche perché l'assemblea di Ginevra consideri con esattezza le condizioni della Cina nei riguardi del diritto internazionale.

L'assistenza che la Cina domanda a Ginevra deve avere alcune contropartite d'ordine generale, che appaghino le giuste esigenze morali e politiche della civiltà mondiale.

v. g.

## Situazione incerta

Alla vigilia della convocazione dell'assemblea plenaria della Società delle Nazioni, il conflitto cino-giapponese per la questione di Sciangai si profila con apparenze alquanto più pacificanti ma con caratteri tali da non consentire ancora alcuna sicura prognosi conclusiva. Da una parte e dall'altra si delinea la tendenza a trovare una formula di conciliazione diretta. Molte cause spiegherebbero il nuovo spirito di moderazione che dimostra il Giappone: la resistenza cinese superiore alle previsioni, la gravità delle spese già sostenute per le operazioni militari che s'innestano su una crisi finanziaria nazionale già sensibile, l'opposizione di alcuni gruppi politici di Tokio contro la politica della mano forte del governo, ma soprattutto la reazione che si preannuncia vivace dell'assemblea plenaria di Ginevra. In questa assemblea dominano per numero i rappresentanti delle piccole e più meritevoli Potenze. E' evidente che essi si preoccupano di creare un preciso precedente, tale che valga a stabilire ben chiaro il diritto della difesa dei piccoli Paesi, a traverso la Società delle Nazioni, contro i grandi Paesi che fanno uso delle armi e conducono nei loro riguardi una politica indipendente e forte. E' evidente allora che la tesi cinese debba trovare a Ginevra migliore accoglienza di quella giapponese per quanto possano apparire fondate, da un generale punto di vista nazionale, le ragioni del Giappone. Questa tendenza antigiapponese, ispirata soprattutto dalla ricerca di un principio generale di garanzia a favore delle piccole Potenze, è apparsa già ben chiara nelle venti sedute segrete del Consiglio tenute a Parigi ed è stata esplicitamente fissata nell'ultima seduta pubblica del 10 dicembre scorso, nella quale i rappresentanti della Spagna, De Madariaga, del Guatemala, Matos, del Perù, Gonzales-Prada, e del Panama, Garay, hanno insistito sulla necessità di definire i diritti e limitare i mezzi delle grandi Potenze per la difesa delle loro ragioni.

nessi ripiegherebbero a loro volta su determinate posizioni che possano garantire le grandi Potenze.

Ma nulla appare ancora certo. I cinesi diffidano del nuovo spirito di moderazione che appare in Giappone. Ritengono che esso rifletta soprattutto un giuoco tattico, al duplice fine di superare senza gravi complicazioni l'esame di Ginevra e consentire intanto l'aprestamento di nuovi rinforzi e nuove operazioni. La posizione militare del Giappone è sempre dominante. A Sciangai segna lenti ma notevoli progressi. I tentativi del governo di Nanchino di sollevare contro il Giappone anche la zona settentrionale della Cina muovendo i generali, fra i quali è Chang Hsin Liang, con le loro truppe che si calcolano in trecentomila uomini, non sembrano avere ancora raggiunto alcun risultato.

Il problema di Sciangai rimane dunque ancora militarmente e politicamente aperto. Non è quindi impossibile che si riprenda in esame tutto il complesso di misure che per il definitivo assesto della sua zona ha indicato, nella sua voluminosa relazione, il giudice sud-africano Feetham, della quale già abbiamo dato notizia.

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L'episodio attuale di Laohokow ci richiama alla memoria quello

simile, sofferto nella stessa regione, l'anno scorso da altri sudditi italiani. Ricordiamo i fatti, quali ci risultano dalle più attendibili delle fonti. Il 15 maggio 1931 un distaccamento dell'esercito comunista comandato da Ho Lung, che opera nel nord-ovest della provincia di Hupeh, attaccò improvvisamente il convento e il seminario francescano di Kia-Yuen-Kow, uccidendo tre preti cinesi e facendo prigionieri tre religiosi italiani e tre cinesi. Il giorno successivo, dopo avere catturato ancora monsignor Ermenegildo Ricci e il padre Iginio Checcani, si dirigeva con marcia forzata verso il villaggio di Shi Hwa Kai. Durante la marcia un vecchio prete cinese cadde affranto dalla fatica: fu senza pietà decapitato. Sette preti cattolici del vicariato di Laohokow — cinque italiani e due cinesi — si trovarono così prigionieri nelle mani dei soldati comunisti cinesi. Gli italiani erano: monsignor Ricci, padre Checcani, padre Germano Lazzari, padre Mansueto Maggini e fra Luca Santini. Ai primi

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v. g.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

IL LAVORO FASCISTA, Roma.  
 March 1, 1932.

page 1.

Despatch No. 1300

## Pericoli di un conflitto

Davanti a Scianghai perdura, con alterna ed incerta vicenda, la lotta, e con ogni probabilità non se ne vedrà l'esito, se non quando — tra alcuni giorni — saranno entrati in azione i nuovi, considerevoli rinforzi, dei quali già è annunciata la partenza dal Giappone.

Com'è noto, i giapponesi, dopo aver sottoposto a violento bombardamento il forte di Vu Sung, allo scopo di avere indisturbato accesso al porto fluviale, erano riusciti a costituire una specie di testa di ponte, appoggiata al fiume, a nord, presso l'abitato di Vu Sung, e saldata a sud con la linea tenuta dai reparti da sbarco a Hou Kin ed a Ciapci. Il 18 febbraio essi intimarono un ultimatum di 48 ore, scaduto il quale, il generale Uyeda, comandante la 9. divisione sferrò un poderoso attacco contro le posizioni cinesi di Kiang Wan, grossa borgata a mezza strada tra Vu Sung e la stazione ferroviaria nord di Scianghai.

Grave è la sproporzione delle forze. Si sa, infatti, che il Maresciallo Chiang Kai Scek ha a sua disposizione la 19. armata cantonese e due divisioni delle forze regolari di Nanchino. Da parte giapponese, non v'è che la sola 9. divisione di fanteria, forte di sei reggimenti, oltre a reparti di marina e di riservisti locali, con numerosa artiglieria di medio e grosso calibro, autoblindate e carri d'assalto. I giapponesi hanno, anche, aliquote di cavalleria ed un buon nucleo di aviazione terrestre: dieci o dodici squadriglie da bombardamento e da ricognizione, di nove apparecchi ciascuna.

All'inferiorità numerica bisogna aggiungere, per i giapponesi, le difficoltà del terreno, eccezionalmente coperto, intersecato da fossi e da canali, pullulante di popolazione ostilissima e disposta, in tutti i modi, a favorire i difensori.

Così, l'attacco del giorno 20, pur essendo stato condotto con il consueto slancio nipponico, non riuscì ad aver ragione della difesa, parimenti valorosa, dei cinesi se non sopra un tratto ben limitato; né miglior sorte ebbe un secondo attacco, mercoledì 24.

Il giorno 27, finalmente, i giapponesi, grazie soprattutto alla stranezza delle loro artiglierie ed all'efficace concorso dell'aviazione da bombardamento, hanno potuto impadronirsi di Kiang Wan. I cinesi, però, sembra che abbiano potuto occupare nuove posizioni a brevissima distanza da quelle perdute e che vi si dispongano a nuova, tenace resistenza.

Quali saranno, quindi, gli ulteriori sviluppi della lotta? Riusciranno le Potenze, col loro intervento, ad ottenere una tregua dai belligeranti? Oppure i giapponesi insisteranno nel loro proposito di ricacciare i cinesi a quella distanza di venti miglia da Scianghai, ch'essi avevano posto come condizione per discutere?... E' quello che si vedrà nei giorni futuri. Riteniamo opportuno, intanto, esaminare brevemente l'ordinamento e l'efficienza attuale dei due eserciti orientali, che da un momento all'altro potrebbero scendere l'un contro l'altro, in guerra aperta, con tutte le bandiere spiegate.

L'esercito giapponese conta attualmente 16 divisioni di fanteria, ed una divisione della Guardia Imperiale, comprendenti 70 reggimenti, su 3 battaglioni ciascuno.

La cavalleria consta di 25 reggimenti, su 3 o 4 squadroni.

L'artiglieria comprende: 15 reggimenti da campagna, 8 pesanti-campali, 3 reggimenti ed 8 gruppi staccati, pesanti, 4 reggimenti da montagna, 1 controaerei, ed un gruppo autoportato.

Il genio infine, è ordinato su 17 battaglioni; più, due reggimenti di telegrafisti e due di ferrovieri.

Le forze aeree terrestri sommano a circa 850 apparecchi, più altri 300 apparecchi circa supplementari; quelle di marina a 470 apparecchi, più altri 330, portati da navi.

Gli effettivi di pace sommano a 259.304 uomini e 17.343 ufficiali; altri 7000 uomini circa servono nell'aeronautica.

Ricorderemo, infine, che la Marina da guerra nipponica comprende 10 corazzate ed incrociatori da battaglia, 14 incrociatori, armati con cannoni di calibro superiore ai 155 mm. e 24 armati con calibro inferiore; 4 navi porta-aeroplani; 119 cacciatorpediniere ed 80 sottomarini. Gli effettivi della Marina Imperiale raggiungono i

già incalcolabili dall'odio verso lo straniero invasore e dal furore nazionalista, sagacemente sfruttato dai Capi.

Per il bene dell'umanità è da sperare che l'urto immane non avvenga, e soprattutto che non dilaghi, così da attrarre nel vortice della lotta altri popoli ed altre bandiere. Certo, però, occorrerà che le Potenze agiscano con intima unità d'intenti e con molto accorgimento. Non si dimentichi che ben difficilmente il Giappone di oggi si rassegnerebbe a subire un dupplicato di Scimonoscki, quando l'avidità e la gelosia delle Potenze gli contesero e quasi annullarono i frutti della sua vittoria contro la Cina. Della umiliazione di allora i figli del Sol Levante si ripagarono più tardi, a Mukden ed a Tusushima; sarebbe ben difficile prevedere, ora, quali potrebbero essere le conseguenze di un'azione politica errata o, peggio ancora, di un grande incendio nel Pacifico.

AMEDEO TOSTI

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Notizie meno precise si hanno sull'esercito Cinese, soprattutto per la mancanza di un vero e proprio potere centrale e per il fatto che si ignora fino a qual punto, esattamente, siano giunti i lavori della Commissione, nominata nel 1929 dal Governo Nazionale per la riorganizzazione delle forze armate.

Le forze regolari comprendevano, allora, 114 divisioni di fanteria ed 8 di cavalleria; 13 reggimenti di artiglieria e 15 battaglioni del genio, con un complesso di circa 1.800.000 uomini.

Il programma di riordinamento prevedeva la costituzione di 65 divisioni di fanteria, 3 brigate di cavalleria, 16 reggimenti di artiglieria ed 8 del genio, con un complesso di meno di un milione di uomini.

Per quel che riguarda l'aviazione, era preveduta — per il 1935 — la fornitura di 23 squadriglie di aeroplani ed idroplani, 4 squadriglie di dirigibili ed 11 squadriglie da caccia.

La Marina da guerra comprende 6 incrociatori leggeri, 12 tra cacciatorpediniere e torpediniere, 40 tra cannoniere, avvisi, ecc.

Un'incognita è costituita dalle forze irregolari, che negli anni scorsi combatterono le une contro le altre e che facilmente potrebbero essere rinquadrare in caso di una grande guerra nazionalista.

In questa, i Giapponesi avrebbero, naturalmente il vantaggio della perfetta organizzazione, della dovizia di mezzi meccanici, della superiorità nella preparazione e nell'addestramento. I Cinesi, d'altra parte, avrebbero in loro favore la potenza straordinaria del numero: 450 milioni di abitanti contro meno di 70! Da una parte, quindi, l'intelligenza, la tecnica ed una grande tradizione militare; dall'altra la forza cieca di enormi masse, che potrebbero attingere ener-

gie incalcolabili dall'odio verso lo straniero invasore e dal furore nazionalista, sagacemente sfruttato dai Capi.

Per il bene dell'umanità è da sperare che l'urto immane non avvenga, e soprattutto che non dilaghi, così da attrarre nel vortice della lotta altri popoli ed altre bandiere. Certo, però, occorrerà che le Potenze agiscano con intima unità d'intenti e con molto accorgimento. Non si dimentichi che ben difficilmente il Giappone di oggi si rassegnerebbe a subire un duplicato di Scimonoski, quando l'avidità e la gelosia delle Potenze gli contesero e quasi annullarono i frutti della sua vittoria contro la Cina. Della umiliazione di allora i figli del Sol Levante si ripagarono più tardi, a Mukden ed a Tusushima; sarebbe ben difficile prevedere, ora, quali potrebbero essere le conseguenze di un'azione politica errata o, peggio ancora, di un grande incendio nel Pacifico.

AMEDEO TOSTI

# La flotta americana concentrata nel Pacifico per un'azione dimostrativa contro il Giappone riluttante a mettere in esecuzione l'accordo di Sciangai

GINEVRA 2 matt.

Le speranze che si nutrivano fino a ieri sull'ora di sera di poter portare all'Assemblea della Lega, indetta per domani, la notizia dell'armistizio già stipulato a Sciangai fra le forze belligeranti insieme con la proposta — già accettata unanimemente — della conferenza internazionale risolutiva del conflitto, possono considerarsi oggi completamente tramontate. Infatti a Sciangai le ostilità sono continuate pur con maggiore violenza, e di armistizio sembra non si voglia più parlare.

I giapponesi hanno tirato fuori una questione di prestigio militare sulla quale non sembrano disposti a cedere: essi non intendono ritirarsi dalla zona delle operazioni contemporaneamente alle forze cinesi, ma esigono che queste siano le prime a farlo.

## Cavilloso giuoco giapponese

Un diplomatico giapponese ha cercato di spiegare la evidente contraddizione fra l'accettazione della proposta della conferenza avanzata dalla Lega e la continuazione delle ostilità, con la necessità in cui si sarebbe trovato il governo di Tokio di lasciare al comandante delle operazioni militari la facoltà di scegliere il momento più opportuno per sospendere le ostilità.

Un rappresentante della delegazione cinese, interrogato a sua volta, ha detto che non c'è da sorprendersi se i giapponesi continuano le ostilità.


Per comprendere la condotta dei giapponesi bisogna tener presente che le proposte fatte da domenica scorsa ad oggi sono due: la prima è stata concretata sulla nave ammiraglia britannica per la cessazione immediata delle ostilità e la ritirata reciproca e simultanea delle truppe dell'una e dell'altra parte in conflitto, sotto la sorveglianza di forze neutrali; la seconda proposta è quella fatta ieri dal Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni, che prevede la riunione di una Conferenza internazionale, solo quando siano cessate le ostilità.

Il Governo cinese ha già accettato l'obbedire le proposte, mentre quello giapponese ha accettato la seconda, in quanto consente dilazioni e non ha ancora accettato, e quanto sappiamo, la prima, la quale dovrebbe segnare l'immediato inizio dell'armistizio.

Questo si spiega come mai la battaglia continui.

Del resto — ha concluso il diplomatico cinese — la condotta giapponese non deve stupire nessuno, perché non c'è stata mai concordanza fra quello che ha detto la diplomazia di Tokio e quello che hanno fatto i militari in Cina.

D'altra parte si ha da Sciangai che il generale Shirakawa, che ha assunto il comando di tutte le forze giapponesi ha pubblicato un comunicato in cui esprime il suo vivo desiderio di cooperare con i rappresentanti delle Potenze straniere allo scopo di garantire il rispetto dei vari diritti internazionali e dichiara che i cinesi accettano le richieste giapponesi ritirandosi immediatamente alla certa distanza dal perimetro della città di Sciangai, il comando giapponese darà ordine di sospendere ogni operazione militare. Il comunicato termina riaffermando il desiderio nipponico di localizzare il conflitto di Sciangai e di contribuire alla pace del mondo adoperandosi per fare ritornare la normalità in Oriente. Gli osservatori militari stranieri, però, dopo una ispezione compiuta lungo il fronte di combattimento hanno espresso la opinione che le truppe giapponesi non riusciranno ad obbligare i cinesi



Il ponte tra Ciapi e la Concessione internazionale di Shanghai.



Una via della Concessione internazionale brulicante di folla. Le soldatucce circola liberamente attraverso gli sbarramenti presidiati dalle truppe.

alla ritirata senza impegnare un'azione a fondo che costerà agli attaccanti almeno diecimila uomini fuori combattimento. Il che, a quanto sembra, non è nelle intenzioni del generale Shirakawa; ragione per cui è da ritenersi che le autorità giapponesi siano pronte ad accettare una qualsiasi proposta di tregua ragionevole, che non intacchi il loro onore militare.

## L'offensiva giapponese

Tuttavia, come abbiamo detto, la battaglia continua. I giapponesi hanno ripreso, ieri mattina la loro azione offensiva contro le posizioni cinesi del settore di Ta Zang. Apparecchi della marina e dell'esercito hanno bombardato dall'alto le linee cinesi, mentre carri armati tentavano di superare le trincee di Ta Zang con l'obiettivo obiettivo di aprire il varco per lo sfacelo della fanteria.

Le truppe imperiali hanno rinnovato infatti un attacco generale delle posizioni cinesi in questo settore, obiettivo principale della vasta manovra avvolgente nipponica. Le fanterie attaccanti sono riuscite a portare in avanti la loro linea nonostante l'efficace azione dei difensori cinesi. Il co-

mando diristionale imperiale di sera, ha confermato che le truppe sono riuscite ad avanzare per la profondità di circa un miglio conquistando alcuni ordini di trincee della linea principale di resistenza cinese. Aeroplani giapponesi hanno gettato diecimila bombe ed alto esplosivo sulla stazione merci di Mohkam Road danneggiando anche il binario di corso della linea Sciangai Nanchino. L'azione della artiglieria continua assai intensa, soprattutto da parte delle batterie giapponesi in posizione presso Hago Kow e Kiang Wan le quali hanno concentrato il loro fuoco sulle posizioni cinesi attorno alla stazione del nord.

Al tramonto però Ta Zang era ancora saldamente presidiata dai cinesi.

Un comunicato pubblicato dal Ministero della Marina giapponese annuncia che i cinesi si ritirano in disordine da Sciangai in seguito all'attacco generale lanciato dalle forze giapponesi ieri alle ore 10.30 contro le posizioni cinesi intorno a Ta Zang.

In seguito al bombardamento aerea terribile non è stato possibile seppellire i morti rimasti sul campo di battaglia dove i cinesi, dopo otto giorni di combattimento per la difesa di Sci-

angai, hanno dovuto ripetersi. Di conseguenza il gran numero dei cadaveri in decomposizione appaia l'aria con grave pericolo per il difensore di Sciangai.

Gli incendi provocati dal fuoco delle artiglierie e dal bombardamento aereo nel settore di Ciapi sono chiaramente visibili dai quartieri interni di Sciangai.

## Scoppio di due mine subacquee

Stamane è stato fatto esplodere una mina a quindici metri circa dalla nave ammiraglia giapponese «Idzumi» e l'altra presso un incrociatore giapponese ancorato nel fiume Whang Poo scavolendo tutta Sciangai; cui abitanti hanno creduto trattarsi di un terremoto.

L'esplosione verificatasi nella nave ammiraglia non ha recato alcun danno. Quella invece avvenuta sotto il bordo del cacciatorpediniere «Chi», ancorato poco distante, ha leggermente danneggiato lo scafo di questa nave. Il comando della flotta ritiene che entrambe le esplosioni siano state pro-

dotte da mine immerse nel fiume da una nave di Pootong sul lato entistante sponda internazionalizzata.

## L'azione dimostrativa della flotta americana

Un dispaccio dell'ultima ora da Tokyo dice che la notizia secondo la quale il Governo americano avrebbe ordinato il trasferimento di quasi tutta la sua flotta dell'Atlantico nell'Oceano Pacifico per la manovra alle isole Hawaii ha prodotto una impressione di sorpresa.

Quelli se queste notizie da New York sono, come sembra, autentiche, si attende a concentrarsi nel medio Pacifico la più imponente e la più formidabile delle squadre da guerra che si siano mai viste.

Già la sola squadra del Pacifico, che è arrivata alle isole Hawaii, costituisce un insieme di forze potentissime. Essa comprende, infatti, come è noto, tredici navi di linea, tutte di tipo superdreadnoughts, quindi incrociatori moderni, due delle più grandi navi porta aeroplani che vi siano al mondo, oltre a circa settanta navi minori: cacciatorpediniere, sottomarini e navi ausiliarie.

## Dichiarazioni del primo ministro giapponese alla commissione d'inchiesta per la Manchuria

Il primo ministro giapponese ha dichiarato da Tokio che la commissione d'inchiesta della Società delle Nazioni ha partecipato ad un pranzo dato per sera in suo onore dal Primo Ministro Inukai, il quale ha pronunciato un discorso nel quale ha detto: «Io non ho bisogno di allungarmi sul fatto che la politica estera del Giappone è stata indirizzata a mantenere la pace nell'Estremo Oriente e che il mantenimento di una concordia amichevole fra la Cina e il Giappone costituisce la base di questa politica per il Governo giapponese ha fatto ogni sacrificio ed ogni sforzo da parecchi anni».

Fortunatamente, negli ultimi tempi l'atteggiamento cinese è stato contrario allo scopo da noi prezzato, e attualmente è sfociato nell'attuale situazione.

La vita della Manchuria è di vitale importanza per il Giappone, politicamente, economicamente e socialmente, per la sua esistenza come nazione.

La storia ha ampiamente dimostrato le intime relazioni che legano la Manchuria al Giappone. Io credo che, se non si tiene conto di questo punto, sia impossibile affermare la vera origine del presente conflitto. Il caos politico della Cina, l'aggravazione xenofoba, le violente infrazioni ai trattati e gli abusi delle potenze costituiscono i più dolorosi aspetti delle attuali condizioni cinesi.

Con la più viva speranza il Governo giapponese attende la chiarificazione delle situazioni e il ristabilimento delle relazioni normali fra il Giappone e la Cina.

Lord Lytton, nel discorso di risposta, ha detto, fra l'altro: «Noi siamo stati nominati non solo per giudicare tra le pretese dei contendenti e indagare i fatti; ma anche per esaminare tutto il complesso di cause del presente conflitto e studiare le condizioni che formano il retroscena degli attuali avvenimenti, per rendere possibile alle due nazioni di trovare una base duratura di amicizia».

IL LAVORO FASCISTA, Rome.  
March 2, 1932.

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Despatch No. 1300

## Per una tregua

Trattative d'armistizio a Sciangai: trattative di composizione a Ginevra. Siamo alla pace? Bene: ma si può veramente parlare di pace in estremo oriente finché durino le crisi, le competizioni, i turbamenti che — dal tracollo dell'argento a quest'ultimo conflitto armato — hanno sconvolto tutta la situazione?

E' troppo tardi e troppo presto, insieme, per parlare di pace. L'equilibrio della situazione cinese è rotto da un pezzo. Il cannone che oggi tuona sul fiume Azzurro, le mitragliatrici che crepitano fra l'intrico delle concessioni internazionali, in nuove offensive e nuove battaglie non sono che una espressione violenta di questo formidabile travolgimento dei valori e dei fattori politici, economici, amministrativi che hanno portato allo sfacelo la formazione statale, la compagine nazionale dell'immensa Cina. Forse che le spaventose inondazioni dilaganti per interi territori, le tremende carestie, le epidemie libere da qualsiasi freno igienico, le stasi commerciali, le guerre civili, le enormi perdite di vite, di produttività, di ricchezza, non sono altrettante espressioni, violente e dannose, dell'instabilità di situazione e di rapporti in estremo oriente?

Quel che avviene a Sciangai di cattivo e di buono — scontri sanguinosi o armistizio — non può rappresentare, per ora, che un sintomo, un avviamento della critica fase che si sta attraversando. Questa sarà più o meno favorevole, a seconda che prevalgano influenze conciliative o azioni disgregatrici, senso di prudenza o nascosti appetiti: ma è chiaro che un odierno accomodamento per Sciangai (in fondo Sciangai ha rappresentato un diversivo) servirà solo a identificare i nuovi termini cui è giunto il vecchio problema. Non già a risolverlo. Per arrivare a qualche soluzione occorre ben altro. Bisogna affrontare tutta la questione, tutto l'immense fenomeno. Il che è anche all'infuori degli stessi contendenti: richiede la cooperazione sincera ed efficace delle maggiori Potenze, cioè delle grandi forze morali, politiche, economiche che sono nel mondo.

Dunque: per identificare quanto oggi sta avvenendo, bisogna limitarsi a parlar di tregua. E di una tregua, a sua volta, limitata alle azioni militari di Sciangai. E' sperabile che si tratti anche di una tregua di animi, di competizioni, di avidità. E non transitoria: ma durevole almeno tanto, da permettere l'assettamento delle questioni aperte con l'azione nipponica nello scacchiere di Sciangai: e, intanto, un utile sviluppo per tutto il resto dei problemi, che sono tornati all'ordine del giorno. La tregua d'armi, insomma, dovrebbe essere la prefazione sia alla Conferenza delle Potenze interessate per sistemare la situazione nel grande emporio internazionale, sia l'inizio di un più vasto esame della situazione cinese che — all'infuori di Sciangai — resterebbe sempre instabile e pericolosa.

Il Ministro Grandi, nelle sue dichiarazioni di ieri a Ginevra, ha lucidamente affermato il carattere degli avvenimenti che si delineano nel campo politico e il punto di vista con cui li considera l'Italia. Le iniziative attuali, cioè, si propongono di « non lasciar sfuggire nessuna occasione alla ricerca di mezzi per sospendere totalmente il conflitto armato » e si propongono di « scoprire la via per arrivare alla pace ».

Su questa via il Governo italiano è pronto a unire i suoi sforzi. Come ha già mostrato a Sciangai con l'opera instancabile del nostro rappresentante e l'apporto delle nostre forze navali a protezione dei cospicui interessi che abbiamo in comune con le altre potenze. Come anche ieri ha mostrato alla S. d. N. approvando immediatamente gli sforzi per giungere alla tregua. Ma la via della pace sarà ancora lunga.

# Aumentata tensione negli Stati Uniti: riunioni di ministri a Washington

## La signora del Presidente Hoover si rifiuta di indossare un vestito di seta perchè di tessuto giapponese - Prime manifestazioni di boicottaggio antinipponico - L'atteggiamento di Stimson e quello dei ministri della Guerra e della Marina

(Nostro servizio particolare)  
WASHINGTON, 27. — I Ministri hanno avuto numerosi colloqui fra di loro, ieri ed oggi, esaminando i vari aspetti del conflitto cino-giapponese. Nei circoli politici bene informati si assicura che i Ministri non hanno discusso alcun progetto tendente ad iniziare un movimento di pressione economica sul Giappone.

Secondo informazioni da Ginevra, l'Inghilterra e la Francia fanno opera tendente ad evitare che venga avanzata la proposta di boicottaggio economico contro il Giappone durante le prossime sedute dell'assemblea della Società delle Nazioni, sedute che, come è noto, saranno dedicate all'esame del conflitto cino-giapponese. (United Press).

### I commenti londinesi

#### alla situazione nell'Estremo Oriente

LONDRA, 29. — I giornali riferiscono che gli ambasciatori inglese, americano, francese ed italiano a Tokio hanno richiesto che rinforzi non vengano sbarcati nella concessione internazionale e che i giapponesi mantengano la loro attività militare fuori dei confini della concessione stessa. L'America ha altresì protestato per la presenza di navi da guerra giapponesi nelle acque della concessione.

Il Times riporta dal Populaire l'accusa contro il Governo francese di aver fornito materiale da guerra al Giappone ed aggiunge che una tempestiva dichiarazione pubblica in proposito, da parte del Governo, sarebbe assai bene accolta dall'opinione pubblica francese.

#### Azione autonoma degli Stati Uniti?

Il Manchester Guardian in un lungo editoriale, dedicato alla proposta di costituire un esercito di volontari disarmati per separare i combattenti a Sciangai, osserva che se non altro essa indica un atteggiamento mentale contrario a quello di coloro i quali immaginano che essendo la Manchuria e Sciangai tanto lontane e la Cina disorganizzata, il flagrante ripudio da parte del Giappone dei trattati firmati e la trionfale politica di aggressione, non disturberanno la pace e la sicurezza del resto del mondo.

Il redattore diplomatico del Daily Telegraph scrive che gli Stati Uniti hanno ancora una volta fatto chiaramente comprendere che non intendono partecipare ad eventuali sanzioni decise dalla Lega e si vedrebbero pertanto costretti a rifiutare l'invito di partecipare alla prossima assemblea. Lo scrittore aggiunge che in alcuni ambienti di Londra si nutrono delle preoccupazioni circa il significato del passo della lettera di Stimson relativa ai trattati di Washington e di Londra. Tuttavia nel caso in cui gli Stati Uniti decidessero di valersi della clausola di salvaguardia del Trattato navale di Londra, la posizione della Gran Bretagna sarebbe imbarazzante, in quanto essa non ha nemmeno costruito sino al limite massimo consentito dal trattato.

Il redattore diplomatico del Daily Telegraph afferma che l'abolizione della soprattassa francese del 15 per cento sul carbone sarebbe dovuta alle pressioni degli ambienti commerciali francesi di Londra i quali hanno fatto rilevare al Governo che la soprattassa avrebbe potuto provocare dannose mi-

sure di rappresaglia da parte del Governo britannico. Lo stesso giornale riporta che il Ministro Rollin ha espresso alla Camera la speranza che in cambio dell'abolizione della soprattassa sul carbone l'Inghilterra faccia breve delle concessioni alle frutta e ai prodotti orticoli francesi.

### Le preoccupazioni giapponesi

Le notizie che arrivano dagli Stati Uniti sono sempre peggiori. Il corrispondente da New York del New Chronicle telegrafa infatti che i sentimenti ostili contro il Giappone si vanno sempre più diffondendo. Tutta la stampa, sia repubblicana che democratica è unanime contro il Giappone.

Il Daily Express, esaminando la situazione diplomatica nipponica, scrive che questa nazione deve ora fronteggiare diverse difficoltà che il giornale così ricapitola: il boicottaggio anti-giapponese che va delineandosi in America; una minacciosa situazione finanziaria all'interno; proteste da parte di quattro grandi Potenze circa le operazioni di Sciangai; direzione tecnica degli Eserciti cinesi tenuta da eccellenti militari tedeschi.

Il corrispondente da Tokio dello stesso giornale rileva a sua volta le preoccupazioni dei circoli governativi per l'isolamento del Giappone come grande Potenza. Le notizie dall'America, — egli telegrafa, — indicano l'esistenza di un serio movimento di boicottaggio negli Stati Uniti. I commercianti di New York, Boston e altri centri si rifiutano di acquistare o vendere merci giapponesi. Si va determinando anche una notevole ansietà nei circoli finanziari di Tokio per l'aumentata pressione, da parte delle banche americane e delle organizzazioni commerciali, per l'immediato pagamento degli attuali debiti giapponesi.

Una notizia di cui non si nasconde la gravità è che la signora Hoover, la moglie del Presidente degli Stati Uniti, incoraggia con l'esempio il boicottaggio delle merci nipponiche. Essa si è rifiutata di indossare un abito di seta in un ricevimento alla Casa Bianca perchè la seta era proveniente dal Giappone, e ha preferito indossare un abito di cotone.

### Difficoltà finanziarie a Tokio

Un telegramma da Washington a Tokio, — continua lo stesso corrispondente, — dichiara che l'organizzazione nazionale che dispone il boicottaggio delle merci giapponesi ha inviato una circolare nella quale è messo in rilievo il contegno della signora Hoover, e si invitano i commercianti a seguirlo.

La situazione finanziaria del Giappone è parecchio critica. Tuttavia l'opinione degli uomini responsabili rimane sempre divisa circa la proposta di un blocco e di sanzioni economiche. Circolava oggi la voce che Stimson fosse favorevole al blocco, mentre gli elementi tecnici del Gabinete, e cioè i capi dei Dipartimenti della Guerra e della Marina si dimostravano contrari. Essi continuano a far presente che il blocco, prima o poi, finirebbe in una guerra. Hoover finora non si è pronunciato. Si reputa comunque che egli sia per la tattica dilatoria.

### L'azione diplomatica

#### I tentativi delle potenze per un accordo

(Dal nostro corrispondente)

LONDRA, 29. - (F.) — A pochi chilometri dalla linea del fuoco continuano ad apparire segni manifesti di una ripresa dell'attività diplomatica, e precisamente di una mediazione dell'Italia, Stati Uniti, Inghilterra e Francia, (a questo

proposito si rileva che a bordo di una torpediniera britannica il Ministro d'Inghilterra ha lasciato ieri Sciangai per raggiungere Nan-chino) fra i due avversari. Non si può sperare che gli sforzi dei rappresentanti dei Governi occidentali riescano in poche ore a risolvere la situazione: il Giappone è certamente disposto a pacifica-

zione di alcun genere se il suo prestigio militare dovesse uscirne menomato, ed è già un passo avanti il fatto che il Ministro nipponico abbia prospettato la possibilità di una soluzione intermedia che si potrà verificare nel caso che i cinesi accettino di ritirarsi. Comunque, l'azione pacificatrice delle potenze continua ininterrotta.

tirata su un territorio vastissimo, potrebbe finire con l'aver ragione del nemico, dissanguandolo con una campagna di durata illimitata.

Gli inviati speciali della stampa nordamericana rievano, intanto, segni manifesti di stanchezza nei due campi di lotta: da dieci giorni i combattenti sono impegnati in una battaglia disperata, costretti a muoversi sotto la pioggia o sotto la neve, ad una temperatura sempre bassa, ma che da ieri è insopportabilmente rigida; e si deve ritenere che tanto i giapponesi quanto i cinesi siano molto vicini a quel limite oltre il quale la resistenza fisica non può più reagire e rispondere a quelli che sono gli stimoli dello spirito bellico che si deve ritenere sempre alto.

## Lotta di esaurimento?

### Le prospettive di accordo e le possibilità di resistenza cinese - Primi segni di stanchezza fra i combattenti

(Dal nostro corrispondente)  
NEW YORK, 29. - (E.) — I giornali interpretano l'affermazione di Stimson, che il Giappone sarà disposto a trattare non appena ritoccati i cinesi oltre i 20 chilometri dalla circoscrizione, e altre voci raccolte a Tokio, come una conferma della sensazione diffusa nei circoli politici a Washington che comincerebbero ad apparire i primi segni di una possibile pace. Se i cinesi sembrano stancarsi a Tokio, non si nascondono una certa impazienza e una certa ansietà. La Campagna di Sciangai è già costata molto di più di quello che non si prevedesse; la situazione diplomatica appare non certo migliore di quella che fosse durante la controversia manchuriana. Non è detto che una vittoria a Sciangai debba far cessare del tutto il movimento antinipponico in Cina, u-

meno che i giapponesi non fossero disposti a portare l'offesa anche in altri centri.

Esiste poi un movimento nazionalista, il quale potrebbe forzare la mano ai governanti cinesi in caso di una sconfitta a Sciangai. La Cina risente fortemente i danni della guerra; ma questo momento potrebbe trarre anche i capi più prudenti. Chiang-Kai-Shek, sul quale si appuniano tutte le speranze, si giudica potrebbe approfittare di questo momento per consolidare la sua posizione mettendosi a capo degli eserciti cinesi e costringendo il Giappone così a una lunghissima campagna, per esso più dispendiosa di quello che non sarebbe per la Cina. Qualche grande Potenza potrebbe anche di sottomano aiutare la Repubblica. E', poi, evidente che anche un esercito replicatamente battuto e in ri-

### Il tradimento della fame

A proposito, anzi, di codesti «ausiliari» cinesi delle truppe nipponiche, costretti dalla fame a lavorare per il nemico, viene ampiamente diffuso tra le truppe che difendono le linee cinesi il seguente ordine del giorno emanato dal Comando della 88. Divisione: «I giapponesi hanno ingaggiato per venti centesimi di dollaro al giorno un centinaio di operai cinesi impiegandoli come spie e li hanno travestiti da facchini. Questi cinesi portano come segno di riconoscimento un bambù su una spalla. Daremo 5 dollari per ognuna delle loro teste».

Abbonatevi al PICCOLO

# I Giapponesi entrano in Kiang-uan dopo accaniti combattimenti

## Il quartiere di Ciapei raso al suolo dalle artiglierie

### La portata e il significato del nuovo richiamo delle Potenze al Governo di Tokio

#### Azione vigile e moderatrice

ROMA, 27 notte.

(L.C.) — Gli sviluppi della situazione in Estremo Oriente, forse più gravi e più vasti di quelli che lo stesso Governo giapponese poteva immaginare, giustamente preoccupano i Governi delle grandi Potenze che hanno interessi in Cina e che sono impegnate a considerare il progresso degli avvenimenti politici e militari sotto l'aspetto dei trattati che regolano le relazioni fra gli Stati interessati al mantenimento della pace, dell'ordine e dell'equilibrio in Cina e nell'Estremo Oriente.

La zona stessa scelta dai Giapponesi per iniziare le operazioni contro le truppe cinesi è di una particolare delicatezza, per la vicinanza immediata delle Concessioni internazionali, che potrebbero ricevere offese nelle persone degli abitanti stranieri neutrali ivi residenti, nelle residenze delle rappresentanze consolari, nei beni e negli averi dei cittadini italiani, inglesi, francesi e americani.

Il passo compiuto dagli ambasciatori d'Inghilterra, di Francia, d'Italia e degli Stati Uniti d'America a Tokio non sembra dunque che miri a premere unilateralmente sulle relazioni anormali correnti ora fra la Cina e il Giappone, né significa che le grandi Potenze abbiano l'intenzione di intervenire nel conflitto, se non per ricondurre i due popoli asiatici a relazioni quanto più possibile normali e amichevoli.

Anche per l'Italia siamo ancora sulla linea diplomatica di difesa degli interessi nostri in Cina, o più particolarmente nella città e nella zona dove si è manifestato l'urto fra le due parti in contesa, se non ancora in guerra.

Il Governo giapponese continua ad assicurare le Potenze e a ripetere a Ginevra che esso non ha mire territoriali in Cina e che non si propone di ritrarre, dalle operazioni iniziate ormai in grande stile nel settore di Sciangai, benefici economici e politici particolari in danno della Cina e col pregiudizio degli interessi delle Potenze europee e dell'America.

Appare chiaro che la condotta delle operazioni militari dei Giapponesi a Sciangai corrisponde ora a una questione di prestigio, dopo la valida e forse non sospettata resistenza opposta agli occupanti sbarcati dalle truppe inviate contro di loro dal Governo cinese. Ci sarebbe forse da osservare che la scelta fatta dai Giapponesi della zona ove spingere l'attacco a fondo contro le truppe del Governo di Nanchino non sia stata troppo felice, tenuto conto dell'immediata vicinanza delle Concessioni straniere, che limitano da un lato gli sviluppi delle operazioni, mentre dall'altro la zona è chiusa e limitata dall'ampio corso del Fiume Azzurro.

A ogni tentativo di allargare il fronte delle operazioni, se le truppe trovano ostacoli all'avanzata in profondità, corrispondono una minaccia più seria e un pericolo più immediato per le Concessioni limitrofe alla città cinese, e per le navi straniere ancorate nel porto o nell'estuario del gran fiume. Quindi il rinnovato richiamo dei rappresentanti delle grandi Potenze appare pienamente giustificato dalla situazione presente e più da quella che potrebbe essere determinata dagli immediati sviluppi della situazione militare.

E' confortante, d'altro lato, constatare come l'azione delle grandi Potenze sia concorde e corrisponda al desiderio comune di limitare i danni, la portata e la durata del conflitto. E' bene, e forse sarà anche giovevole, che i belligeranti sentano vicina, costante e presente l'azione concorde

delle grandi Potenze, che potrebbe essere, non una pressione verso alcuno, ma una garanzia e una promessa per la pace e per la definizione equa e più che sia possibile prossima e pacifica della vertenza.  
A questi concetti è ispirata naturalmente, e soprattutto, l'azione dell'Italia.

IL TELEFONO, Rome.  
February 26-27, 1932. page 1 .Despatch No. 1300

## Maltempo nel Pacifico

Il conflitto cino-giapponese, che minacciava d'assumere i vecchi colori oleografici delle remote guerre d'Estremo Oriente, s'arricchisce oggi di tre fatti nuovi non trascurabili. Primo, la risposta — discretamente insolente — del Giappone alla Società delle Nazioni; secondo, l'avvertimento del sindaco di Sciangai al corpo diplomatico straniero; terzo, le dichiarazioni — gravi se esattamente riferite — del Segretario di Stato Stimson.

I tre fatti nuovi — lo si può dir subito — non chiariscono affatto la situazione, anzi, la rendono più oscura e un pochino minacciosa.

La risposta del Giappone alla Società delle Nazioni suona, come abbiamo già detto, insolente; ma forse è stata dettata semplicemente dall'irritazione che l'insuccesso momentaneo delle operazioni intorno a Sciangai deve aver provocato a Tokio. In sostanza, la tesi del Giappone è la solita e i soliti sono gli argomenti da opporre. La Cina — dice il Giappone — non è un paese organizzato, è il caos; così come le sue truppe non sono truppe ma orde di banditi. C'è da rispondere che il Giappone non si oppone all'ammissione della Cina nella Società delle Nazioni, in parità assoluta con le altre nazioni, tanto da poter sedere anche al seggio presidenziale; c'è da rispondere che se la Cina non è un paese organizzato ai sensi del Patto della S. d. N., ingiustamente si lagna il Giappone che l'appello delle 12 potenze non sia stato rivolto « anche » ai cinesi. La nota giapponese, come si diceva, appare insolente; ma forse è soltanto irritata. Di essa non c'è da prendere in considerazione se non quel punto in cui è detto che il Giappone « ritiene inopportuno e poco conveniente discutere i termini del Trattato delle Nove Potenze con altre potenze non firmatarie ». Il che potrebbe esser l'annuncio d'una nuova conferenza delle Nove Potenze per la questione cinese.

Secondo fatto: l'avvertimento del Sindaco di Sciangai al corpo diplomatico. Dice quel personaggio che se i giapponesi continueranno a servirsi della Concessione Internazionale come base per le loro operazioni belliche, il governo cinese non dovrà esser chiamato responsabile delle conseguenze che potranno derivarne. Ora, poichè è certo che i giapponesi continueranno a fare il loro comodo militare nella Concessione, è certo anche che la Concessione stessa sarà presa nel bel mezzo della battaglia. Angosciosa prospettiva.

Terzo: le dichiarazioni di Stimson a Borah, per lettera aperta. Stimson si richiama al Trattato delle Nove Potenze sull'integrità della Cina e sull'equilibrio in Estremo Oriente. Stimson dice che l'America non ha continuato a rafforzare la sua posizione navale nel Pacifico soltanto perchè si sentiva garantita dal Trattato delle Nove Potenze. Se il Trattato delle Nove Potenze non serve più a garantire l'equilibrio in Estremo Oriente, è chiaro che si dovrà ricorrere all'arma abbandonata: armamenti navali e fortificazioni nel Pacifico. Grave ammonimento per il Giappone.

Se mettiamo ora in relazione questo richiamo americano al Trattato delle Nove Potenze e il passo della nota giapponese che allo stesso Trattato si riferisce, vediamo che forse da opposte parti e per diverse ragioni si potrà giungere alla riconvocazione d'una conferenza a Hove. La Società delle Nazioni potrà così esser messa fuori causa,

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Despatch No. 1300

## Maltempo nel Pacifico

Il conflitto cino-giapponese, che minacciava d'assumere i vecchi colori oleografici delle remote guerre d'Estremo Oriente, s'arricchisce oggi di tre fatti nuovi non trascurabili. Primo, la risposta — discretamente insolente — del Giappone alla Società delle Nazioni; secondo, l'avvertimento del sindaco di Sciangai al corpo diplomatico straniero; terzo, le dichiarazioni — gravi se esattamente riferite — del Segretario di Stato Stimson.

I tre fatti nuovi — lo si può dir subito — non chiariscono affatto la situazione, anzi, la rendono più oscura e un pochino minacciosa.

La risposta del Giappone alla Società delle Nazioni suona, come abbiamo già detto, insolente; ma forse è stata dettata semplicemente dall'irritazione che l'insuccesso momentaneo delle operazioni intorno a Sciangai deve aver provocato a Tokio. In sostanza, la tesi del Giappone è la solita e i soliti sono gli argomenti da opporre. La Cina — dice il Giappone — non è un paese organizzato, è il caos; così come le sue truppe non sono truppe ma orde di banditi. C'è da rispondere che il Giappone non si oppone all'ammissione della Cina nella Società delle Nazioni, in parità assoluta con le altre nazioni, tanto da poter sedere anche al seggio presidenziale; c'è da rispondere che se la Cina non è un paese organizzato ai sensi del Patto della S. d. N., ingiustamente si lagna il Giappone che l'appello delle 12 potenze non sia stato rivolto « anche » ai cinesi. La nota giapponese, come si diceva, appare insolente; ma forse è soltanto irritata. Di essa non c'è da prendere in considerazione se non quel punto in cui è detto che il Giappone « ritiene inopportuno e poco conveniente discutere i termini del Trattato delle Nove Potenze con altre potenze non firmatarie ». Il che potrebbe esser l'annuncio d'una nuova conferenza delle Nove Potenze per la questione cinese.

Secondo fatto: l'avvertimento del sindaco di Sciangai. Il punto della nota giapponese che allo stesso Trattato si riferisce, vediamo che forse da opposte parti e per diverse ragioni si potrà giungere alla riconvocazione d'una conferenza a nove. La Società delle Nazioni potrà così esser messa fuori causa, con soddisfazione reciproca, nipponica e ginevrina; gli Stati Uniti potranno costringere il Giappone a passare dalle dichiarazioni di principio a impegni concreti; il Giappone vedrà la discussione sul suo operato limitata soltanto agli aventi titolo d'intervento. Se per questa via si riuscirà ad arrestare le fiamme di guerra che si levano sulla sponda del Pacifico, bene; in ogni caso un tentativo sarà stato fatto: fra i tanti, il più concreto e serio.

## Rilievi sul conflitto cino-giapponese

*Già da parecchi giorni avevamo sul tavolo l'articolo che segue. Successivamente l'autore di esso — un valoroso ufficiale superiore, più volte decorato — ha dettato le note che hanno riferimento allo svolgersi degli avvenimenti, all'intento di mettere in evidenza le caratteristiche delle forze dei belligeranti e del loro impiego.*

### La Cina si raccoglie

Dopo la perdita della Manciuria, un nuovo alito di vita spira sulla Celeste Repubblica. Le truppe del colosso cinese, sorprese, divise, travolte, incalzate da vicino, si sono raccolte nel cuore della Patria in Sciangai, centro commerciale e posizione militare importantissima. Qui il colosso, come belva ferita, sanguinante ma sempre potente, ha volto il capo verso le sue sconfinata terre ed ha mandato un formidabile grido d'allarme, ha dato un potente scossone per aver libere le braccia, ha messo le spalle al muro ed ha ripetuto: «Basta, di qui non si passa».

E' la parola d'ordine che corre di terra in terra. I figli della Celeste Repubblica, messi da parte le rivalità e i vecchi rancori, si sentono fratelli; e, accomunati dal pericolo, accorrono, dove sventola la bandiera cinese di fronte al nemico e combattono bravamente.

Assistiamo così da parte dei cinesi ad una magnifica insospettata resistenza, dall'altra ad una incessante azione offensiva per non dar tempo al nemico di affermarsi nelle posizioni e far valere la grande superiorità numerica. L'offensiva giapponese è rinsanguata dal continuo arrivo di unità che vengono gettate nella voragine ardente della battaglia, mentre il duello tra il forte e la nave ci dà uno spettacolo che ci riempie di meraviglia.

Quali sono le cause della mutata condotta delle truppe cinesi e quali ne saranno le conseguenze?

Fin da quando fu invasa la Manciuria, le classi evolute cinesi hanno dato nuova vita allo spirito di nazionalismo, sviluppando l'idea della resistenza e spingendo il governo a prendere le misure necessarie per opporsi alle mire del Giappone. Fu spiegata una grande attività.

I migliori generali furono chiamati a preparare un esercito disciplinato, si fecero arrivare dall'Europa potenti mezzi di distruzione e la resistenza si è affermata.

### L'esercito cinese

Le truppe cantonesi furono le prime a sostenere l'urto giapponese; ed esse dalla lotta diurna hanno tratta l'esperienza e dal fervore della nazione traggono forza per resistere. In seguito si affiancarono le truppe scelte del gen. Ciang-Kai-Scek, truppe che hanno avuto una preparazione accurata, la preparazione dello spirito e quella disciplinare, oltre la tecnica, senza di che non sono possibili gli attacchi travolgenti, non sono possibili le resistenze ad oltranza, né si può acquistare fede nella vittoria. Questo esercito ha capito una cosa; che l'esercito del Sol Levante era imbattibile quando i cinesi non resistevano e che ora invece, non solo non riesce a vincere facilmente, ma subisce anche scacco. Se questa convinzione resterà e guadagnerà strada e se la convinzione che il numero è fattore di vittoria di primaria importanza quando sia accompagnata dalla disciplina, la situazione dei belligeranti potrà offrire delle sorprese. Le truppe ascendono a 50 mila uomini, molte mitragliatrici e bombe, poche artiglierie e pochi aeroplani.

### L'esercito giapponese

Le prime operazioni di attacco a Sciangai si sono svolte in un primo tempo sotto la direzione della Marina, che sperava nella riuscita di un colpo di mano. L'inaspettata resistenza obbligò il Governo giapponese ad affidare ai generali la condotta delle operazioni, inviando rinforzi successivi, i quali si dovettero impiegare a spizzico sotto l'imperio della necessità. Si dice che si arrivi a 20 mila uomini oltre le artiglierie, carri d'assalto, aeroplani.

Quando i generali giapponesi giunsero sul campo di battaglia si trovarono di fronte ad una situazione difficile perché le truppe avversarie si erano rafforzate magnificamente.

Al comandante in capo si presentano due ardui compiti:

mirare la regolarità e la precisione dei movimenti e dei tempi delle colonne d'attacco, precedute da carri armati sostenuti da reparti del genio, per l'assalto a Kiang-Uan, difesa disperatamente dai cinesi in lotte corpo a corpo. Il pronto contrattacco delle riserve fresche cinesi contro le truppe logorate giapponesi ha fatto perdere a questi le posizioni prese, obbligandole a ripetere le operazioni di attacco che le hanno portate a circondare il villaggio senza poterne scacciare i difensori. La linea cinese ha piegato lentamente, sempre combattendo, cosicché non si sono avute soluzioni di continuità. Degno di nota è stato anche l'aiuto dato dai reparti del genio ai carri armati per neutralizzare le mine disposte su vasta zona dai cinesi, come pure l'impiego di cortine fumigene per mascherare il passaggio di un corso d'acqua per parte dei giapponesi.

### La tattica cinese

Il generale Tsai-Ting-Kai, capo dell'esercito cinese, ha compreso la necessità di non compromettere le forze in una resistenza eccessiva su tutta la linea quando questa avrebbe prodotto lo sfondamento per parte dei giapponesi in un dato punto ed ha preferito ritirarsi lentamente, sempre combattendo, conservando la destra a Cia-pei e la sinistra appoggiata ai forti di Wusung. Il centro spostato indietro, Kiang-Uan funziona da centro di resistenza, che forma una spina nel fianco e nel tergo dei giapponesi che si volessero avanzare.

### La situazione

Fin quando potrà resistere Kiang-Uan non si sa; ma è certo che, per evitare atti controffensivi da parte dei difensori di Kiang-Uan in una successiva avanzata, i giapponesi sono costretti ad immobilizzare una parte delle forze. Anche Cia-pei immobilizza delle forze, mentre i forti tengono ancor duro. La situazione dei cinesi è ancora magnificamente sostenibile, mentre i giapponesi dovranno lottare ancora a lungo prima di raggiungere i successivi obiettivi.

### Azioni del 21 e del 22 febbraio

Gli aerei giapponesi hanno continuato a vomitare valanghe di bombe sulle posizioni nemiche, prendendo di mira specialmente i nodi ferroviari. Il secondo obiettivo parrebbe il villaggio di Pang-pu, sito sulla linea ferroviaria di Nanchino, raggiunto il quale sarebbe ottenuto l'isolamento di Cia-pei, che però è prevedibile resisterà ancora. Fino ad ora, tuttavia, le forze giapponesi non sono sufficienti a superare con decisione la resistenza avversaria, per quanta superiorità di mezzi abbiano. Gli attacchi a Kiang-Uan per il suo definitivo possesso non sono riusciti.

Successivi attacchi nella mattina del 22 contro Kiang-Uan sono stati arrestati dall'efficace tiro dei nidi di mitragliatrici bene appostati fra le rovine. La posizione ha assunto importanza capitale perché l'aggiornamento di Cia-pei non è possibile finché essa non è presa.

### I propositi dei cinesi

I generali cinesi, che prima del conflitto erano nemici tra loro, hanno depresso i vecchi rancori ai piedi dello stendardo insanguinato della Patria.

Ieri si trattava di Ciang-Kai-Scek; oggi è la volta del generale cristiano Feng, che affida al primo il suo esercito per la difesa della Patria comune; e l'esempio sarà seguito dagli altri. Questo spettacolo ha un significato che permette previsioni molto importanti; anzitutto che i cinesi resisteranno sino alla fine del conflitto. Le risorse della grande repubblica sono immense e, se nel primo periodo dell'azione difensiva, essa non ha potuto accumulare tutti i mezzi guerreschi necessari per schiacciare l'invasore, lo sta facendo ora. Ciò che si può pure prevedere è che, anche per questa ragione, l'esercito giapponese non ripeterà l'errore di Napoleone di inseguire il nemico nell'interno del suo paese. I Giapponesi lo avevano già dichiarato in precedenza: ma, poiché mai come presso i popoli orientali la parola è fatta per nascondere il pensiero, così si potrebbe pensare che le loro dichiarazioni di un programma minimo volessero garantirli di fronte ad un successo possibile. Il programma dei giapponesi si è detto consistere nel-

si che si lanciavano al contrattacco e li travolgevano in rotta dolorosa: unico ausilio il pietoso tiro d'interdizione dei camerati artiglieri.

Il vento della vittoria spirò, salutando le salme dei valorosi difensori della Patria cinese, e portò la gioia nella Celeste Repubblica, rinvigorendone i propositi di resistenza ad oltranza.

Una conclusione dobbiamo trarre da questa importante azione, cioè che il lancio delle bombe dagli aeroplani, sopra una sottile linea di trincee da un'altezza tale da rendere incolumi i velivoli dal tiro contro aereo, non è di efficacia decisiva e che è necessario che i velivoli si espongano al tiro efficace dei difensori per avere maggiore probabilità di successo. Anche il tiro dei medi calibri, sempre efficacissimo, non è bastato a scuotere la resistenza, sia pure per effetto dei rincalzi che al momento opportuno avranno impiazzato i vuoti dei cinesi.

Ben numerose altre forze sarebbero occorse con enorme sacrificio di vite per afferrare la vittoria, forze che ancora non sono agli ordini del generale Ujeda.

Anche qui, come nella difesa delle rovine di Kiang-Uan, i cinesi hanno fatto un saggio impiego delle loro numerose mitragliatrici, ripagandosi caramente dei danni avuti a causa dei maggiori mezzi di distruzione del nemico.

g. b.

## Rilievi sul conflitto cino-giapponese

*Già da parecchi giorni avevamo sul tavolo l'articolo che segue. Successivamente l'autore di esso — un valoroso ufficiale superiore, più volte decorato — ha dettato le note che hanno riferimento allo svolgersi degli avvenimenti, all'intento di mettere in evidenza le caratteristiche delle forze dei belligeranti e del loro impiego.*

### La Cina si raccoglie

Dopo la perdita della Manciuria, un nuovo alito di vita spira sulla Celeste Repubblica. Le truppe del colosso cinese, sorprese, divise, travolte, incalzate da vicino, si sono raccolte nel cuore della Patria in Sciangai, centro commerciale e posizione militare importantissima. Qui il colosso, come belva ferita, sanguinante ma sempre potente, ha volto il capo verso le sue sconfinata terre ed ha mandato un formidabile grido d'allarme, ha dato un potente scossone per aver libere le braccia. Ha messo le spalle al muro ed ha ripetuto: «Basta, di qui non si passa».

E' la parola d'ordine che corre di terra in terra. I figli della Celeste Repubblica, messi da parte le rivalità e i vecchi rancori, si sentono fratelli; e, accomunati dal pericolo, accorrono, dove sventola la bandiera cinese di fronte al nemico e combattono bravamente.

Assistiamo così da parte dei cinesi ad una magnifica insospettata resistenza, dall'altra ad una incessante azione offensiva per non dar tempo al nemico di affermarsi nelle posizioni e far valere la grande superiorità numerica. L'offensiva giapponese è rinsanguata dal continuo arrivo di unità che vengono gettate nella voragine ardente della battaglia, mentre il duello tra il forte e la natura si risolve in un'epica lotta.

Quando i generali giapponesi giunsero sul campo di battaglia si trovarono di fronte ad una situazione già difficile perchè le truppe avversarie si erano rafforzate magnificamente.

Al comandante in capo si presentano due ardui compiti:

- 1) Rendere la base d'operazione abbastanza forte per avere sempre a disposizione armi, munizioni, viveri, materiali e mezzi per organizzare i servizi logistici (specie a causa della mancanza di acqua potabile), nonché una buona riserva d'uomini.
- 2) Infliggere alla resistenza nemica un colpo mortale nel più breve tempo possibile, per impedire che su quel teatro d'operazione le cose vadano troppo per le lunghe.

### La manovra di sfondamento 20 febbraio

Si è iniziata alle ore 8 del mattino. Il generale in capo Ujeda si è subito rivelato quel comandante che era logico aspettarsi. Da parte delle truppe si è notata la buona prova al fuoco, malgrado fossero costituite da giovanissimi; ciò dimostra che esse sono molto bene inquadrate e che hanno avuto una preparazione accurata. Non sarebbe possibile altrimenti eseguire una manovra regolare, scientifica, nella quale per la prima volta dopo il conflitto mondiale si impiegano i migliori mezzi di distruzione come hanno fatto i giapponesi, una manovra nella quale si è constatata una perfetta cooperazione fra le varie armi, nella quale ogni operazione era preordinata, dall'azione degli aerei al tiro di spianamento delle artiglierie, seguito dal tiro di appoggio che precede le unità della fanteria nell'attacco o da quello di protezione fino a che non c'è il pericolo di colpire le proprie truppe, per passare poi al tiro di controartiglieria e di interdizione. Una manovra che, non potendo essere frontale per le gravi perdite che ne sarebbero seguite, aveva per obiettivo la posizione di Kiang-Uan e, sfondata la linea cinese in quel punto, l'obiettivo di aggirare da una parte la posizione di Cia-pei e dall'altra togliere alla sinistra cinese l'appoggio dei forti di Wusung. Si sono am-

mirate la regolarità e la precisione dei movimenti e dei tempi delle colonne d'attacco, precedute da carri armati sostenuti da reparti del genio, per l'assalto a Kiang-Uan, difesa disperatamente dai cinesi in lotte corpo a corpo. Il pronto contrattacco delle riserve fresche cinesi contro le truppe logorate giapponesi ha fatto perdere a questi le posizioni prese, obbligandole a ripetere le operazioni di attacco che le hanno portate a circondare il villaggio senza poterne scacciare i difensori. La linea cinese ha piegato lentamente, sempre combattendo, cosicché non si sono avute soluzioni di continuità. Degno di nota è stato anche l'aiuto dato dai reparti del genio ai carri armati per neutralizzare le mine disposte su vasta zona dai cinesi, come pure l'impiego di cortine fumigene per mascherare il passaggio di un corso d'acqua per parte dei giapponesi.

### La fatica cinese

Il generale Tsai-Ting-Kai, capo dell'esercito cinese, ha compreso la necessità di non compromettere le forze in una resistenza eccessiva su tutta la linea quando questa avrebbe prodotto lo sfondamento per parte dei giapponesi in un dato punto ed ha preferito ritirarsi lentamente, sempre combattendo, conservando la destra a Cia-pei e la sinistra appoggiata ai forti di Wusung. Il centro spostato indietro, Kiang-Uan funziona da centro di resistenza, che forma una spina nel fianco e nel tergo dei giapponesi che si volessero avanzare.

### La situazione

Fin quando potrà resistere Kiang-Uan non si sa; ma è certo che, per evitare atti controffensivi da parte dei difensori di Kiang-Uan in una lotta di popolo orientale la parola è fatta per nascondere il pensiero, così si potrebbe pensare che le loro dichiarazioni di un programma minimo volessero garantirli di fronte ad un insuccesso possibile. Il programma dei giapponesi si è detto consistere nell'abbattimento dei forti di Wu-sung e nella costituzione di una zona demilitarizzata intorno a Sciangai.

### L'azione del 23 febbraio

In mancanza di notizie precise non è possibile formulare giudizi completi; poichè, però, tutti i giornali sono concordi nel ripetere la dichiarazione del generale Ujeda che egli non aveva fretta, si può — senza tema di errare — affermare che si tratta di una magra scusa, perchè egli per primo sapeva che il tempo andava a favore dei cinesi. Da buon condottiero quale egli è si è accorto subito che i mezzi a sua disposizione non erano tali da consentirgli quell'immediato trionfo che era nel pensiero del governo di Tokio, e si è accinto all'ardua impresa con tutto l'ardore che il dovere e l'amor di Patria gli imponevano, dando al mondo una prova di energia e di capacità che tutti gli debbono riconoscere.

All'alba del 23 i giapponesi fecero un tentativo disperato per assicurarsi il definitivo possesso della posizione contesa di Kiang-Uan.

L'aviazione ha fatto prodigi di valore, abbassandosi a poca altezza dalle trincee cinesi per riuscire a colpire i difensori ed a mitragliarli. Sulle martoriolate trincee siugarono la loro ira i medi calibri con un tiro che nella guerra mondiale si chiamava di abbruttimento; poi a precedere la fanteria furono impiegate tutte le macchine guerresche, sopra un terreno completamente sconvolto o sul quale evidentemente la manovra non era facile, pur di non lasciare nulla di intentato: cosicché la valorosissima fanteria nipponica, protetta alla vista da nubi, portò l'urto formidabile delle sue schiere contro le trincee nemiche. Quella nube fu per molti il velo di morte che non scopri più le loro pupille annerchiate; per gli altri, quando ne uscirono, fu l'orrenda sorpresa delle baionette cinesi che si lanciavano al contrattacco e li travolgevano in rotta dolorosa: unico ausilio il pietoso tiro d'interdizione dei camerati artiglieri.

Il vento della vittoria spirò, salutano le salme dei valorosi difensori della Patria cinese, e portò la gioia nella Celeste Repubblica, rinvigorendone i propositi di resistenza ad oltranza.

Una conclusione dobbiamo trarre da questa importante azione, cioè che il lancio delle bombe dagli aeroplani, sopra una sottile linea di trincee da un'altezza tale da rendere incolumi i velivoli dal tiro contro aereo, non è di efficacia decisiva e che è necessario che i velivoli si espongano al tiro efficace dei difensori per avere maggiore probabilità di successo. Anche il tiro dei medi calibri, sempre efficacissimo, non è bastato a scuotere la resistenza, sia pure per effetto dei rincalzi che al momento opportuno avranno rimpiazzato i vuoti dei cinesi.

Ben numerose altre forze sarebbero occorse con enorme sacrificio di vite per affermare la vittoria, forze che ancora non sono agli ordini del generale Ujeda.

Anche qui, come nella difesa delle rovine di Kiang-Uan, i cinesi hanno fatto un saggio impiego delle loro numerose mitragliatrici, ripagandosi caramente dei danni avuti a causa dei maggiori mezzi di distruzione del nemico.

g. b.

## La battaglia di Sciangai

Per svolgere la loro azione di forza nei riguardi dei cinesi, a Sciangai, i giapponesi hanno dovuto, come è noto, cominciare con l'eliminazione del forte di Vu Sung, allo scopo di avere indisturbato accesso al porto fluviale. Il forte fu pertanto sottoposto ad intensissimi bombardamenti navali che lo hanno reso incapace di adempiere alla sua funzione di sbarramento, ma non lo hanno fatto cadere: ed ancor oggi, difatti, dopo circa un mese di energico trattamento, resiste ancora ed ancora costituisce buon appoggio per l'ala sinistra dello schieramento cinese.

Intanto però i giapponesi hanno eseguito gli sbarchi sulle banchine della loro concessione, hanno rinforzato la prima occupazione ai margini dei quartieri abitati dai loro connazionali ed hanno invaso la zona, a nord di Sciangai, compresa tra l'arco del fiume e la ferrovia.

Questa invasione ha avuto luogo, pare, senza notevoli contrasti, di mano in mano che le truppe prendevano terra sotto la protezione delle artiglierie navali e dei bombardamenti aerei, fatti probabilmente con prevalente scopo intimidatorio e infurianti soprattutto sul disgraziato sobborgo di Ciapci, dove alla loro maggioranza reagivano i cinesi.

### Le forze contrapposte

I giapponesi sono venuti così a costituire una specie di testa di sbarco o testa di ponte, appoggiata al fiume, a nord, presso il paese di Vu Sung, e saldata, a sud, con la linea già tenuta dai marinai dei reparti di sbarco a Hou Kiu e Ciapci. In questa fase i cinesi li hanno in realtà scarsamente ostacolati forse perché non ancora in numero sufficiente, forse anche perché interessati a combattere quanto più possibile vicino alla zona delle concessioni, per tener desta la preoccupazione degli stranieri e per stimolarne un più attivo intervento a loro favore.

Comunque si sia svolta questa fase preparatoria, sta di fatto che, verso il giorno 18 febbraio, quando i giapponesi comunicarono il noto ultimatum delle 56 ore, che doveva scadere alle ore 5 del sabato successivo, 20 febbraio, — indicheremo sempre le ore locali, avvertendo, per chi voglia tenerne conto, che esse rappresentano un anticipo di sette ore rispetto alle corrispondenti del tempo medio dell'Italia e dell'Europa centrale — i due avversari si trovavano a contatto lungo una linea, da Vu Sung paese — e cioè a sud del forte — alla stazione nord, oltre che nell'interno di Ciapci, parallela alla ferrovia ma di stante da essa, verso oriente, da due a quattro chilometri.

Le forze, che, nei primi giorni del mese, potevano essere valutate in circa 7-10.000 giapponesi, contro 25-30.000 cinesi, erano frattanto salite, rispettivamente, a 40.000 e 100.000.

Da parte giapponese si trovavano a terra, oltre a reparti di marina e riservisti locali, una divisione dell'esercito nazionale, la 9ª, su tre brigate di fanteria — sei reggimenti — con molta artiglieria di piccolo e di medio calibro, con autoblindate e carri d'assalto, con cavalleria e con un ben fornito nucleo di aviazione terrestre — dieci o dodici squadriglie di nove apparecchi ognuna — da combattimento e da bombardamento, per il quale era stato allestito un campo a nord-est della concessione internazionale.

Da parte cinese si trovavano in linea la 19ª armata cantonese comandata dal gen. Tsai Ting Kai e due divisioni, 87ª e 88ª, delle forze regolari di Nanchino. Presente, fra queste ultime, l'ex dittatore, maresciallo Ciang Kai Scek, che la patria in pericolo aveva fatto accorrere sul campo.

In sostanza i due avversari si fronteggiavano su una linea di 12-15 km. a traverso un terreno intersecato da fossi e canali; coperto di abbondante vegetazione; ricco di casolari, di capanne ed anche di popolosi paesi; pullulante di popolazione cinese, tenacemente attaccata alla sua terra, piena di odio mortale contro l'invasore, pronta a rendergli pericoloso ogni attimo, attaccandolo da ogni lato insidiosamente.

Grave la sproporzione numerica nei due campi: ed essa non poteva del tutto essere compensata, a favore dei giapponesi, né dalla perfetta organizzazione, né dalla durezza dei mezzi meccanici moderni, né dalla superiorità dell'addestramento. I giapponesi non avevano soltanto di fronte forze tre volte superiori per numero ed in continuo aumento, fornite di buone mitragliatrici e di discrete aliquote di artiglieria ed animate da un vero furore bellico, ma erano immersi, letteralmente, in un ambiente ostile destinato a trasformarsi in un pericoloso vespaio di franchi tiratori.

### L'azione del Comando giapponese

In tali condizioni il compito del generale Uyeda, comandante la 9ª divisione, di ricacciare cioè i cinesi sopra una linea distante 20 km. da Sciangai — e non si

brato, nessun nuovo vantaggio sensibile hanno conseguito i giapponesi, oltre quelli del primo giorno, nonostante che quotidianamente abbiano ripetuto nuovi sanguinosissimi attacchi.

I cinesi, d'altra parte, hanno contenuto l'urto giapponese entro una insaccatura non molto rilevante, ma non sono riusciti a riconquistare il terreno perduto.

Martedì sera sembrava quindi che la battaglia si dovesse stabilizzare e che i giapponesi, riconosciuta l'inermità dei propri sforzi, avessero deciso di attendere rinforzi dalla madre patria prima di rilentare la prova sanguinosa. Mercoledì mattina, 24, invece essi hanno attaccato nuovamente, con furore, più a nord di Kiang Uau, con direzione di sud-ovest, puntando contro il paese di Miou Hang Ceu, per rompere le linee cinesi, alleggerire la pressione contro le proprie truppe trincerate ai margini di Kiang Uau, e pervenire forse, con disperata ostinazione, a quella manovra che già era fallita sabato.

Non sono riusciti neppure questa volta ed hanno provocato una nuova violenta reazione cinese.

**La battaglia continua**

La battaglia di Sciangai prosegue quindi e non se ne vedrà l'esito se non fra parecchi giorni, dopo che saranno arrivate le nuove divisioni di cui è già annunciata la partenza dal Giappone.

Intanto le artiglierie tuonano incessantemente e l'aviazione si prodiga in azioni di bombardamento nelle stazioni delle ferrovie che dall'interno adducono a Sciangai, sugli aeroporti cinesi di Sciangai e di Hang Ciou, sugli sta-

Da sabato, 29, a martedì sera, 25 feb-

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bramenti industriali e sulle linee cinesi. L'attività aerea, in diretta collaborazione con i combattenti terrestri, è sempre intensa ed instancabile.

Ma poiché l'arma del cielo non ha dovuto combattere contro una forza aerea avversaria, vien fatto ora di domandarsi se sia possibile stabilire in qual misura essa abbia contribuito a sopperire all'enorme squilibrio dei combattenti terrestri — si dice che i cinesi siano ora circa 200.000 —; vien fatto soprattutto di pensare che nel valore di questa cooperazione dell'arma aerea nella lotta terrestre sta forse l'insegnamento più utile di Sciangai.

Nessuno, in occidente, avrebbe mai osato pensare che tre brigate di fanteria, pari a due divisioni dell'ultimo periodo della guerra mondiale, potessero tenere una fronte di 12-15 chilometri, contro forze enormemente soverchianti e calcolabili probabilmente in sei od otto divisioni, ed avere tuttavia ancora la capacità offensiva necessaria per sferzare, in cinque giorni, due attacchi poderosi, che non hanno avuto forse tutto il successo in programma, ma hanno certo procurato risultati sensibili. Molto ha giovato, in ciò, la indiscussa superiorità intrinseca dell'esercito giapponese, ma molto deve avervi contribuito l'azione aerea, che è il fattore veramente nuovo della guerra, quello che, fino ad oggi, non fu mai tanto intensamente sperimentato con criteri d'impiego veramente organici, quello sul quale è opportuno più che mai riflettere e medi-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

IL MESSAGGERO, Rome.  
February 28, 1942. page 1.

Despatch No. 1300

# La battaglia di Sciangai

Per svolgere la loro azione di forza, nei riguardi dei cinesi, a Sciangai, i giapponesi hanno dovuto, come è noto, cominciare con l'eliminazione del forte di Vu Sung, allo scopo di avere indisturbato accesso al porto fluviale. Il forte fu pertanto sottoposto ad intensissimi bombardamenti navali che lo hanno reso incapace di adempiere alla sua funzione di sbarramento, ma non lo hanno fatto cadere: ed ancor oggi, difatti, dopo circa un mese di energico trattamento, resiste ancora ed ancora costituisce buon appoggio per l'ala sinistra dello schieramento cinese.

Intanto però i giapponesi hanno eseguito gli sbarchi sulle banchine della foce alla sua terra, piena di odio morale contro l'invasore, pronta a rendergli il pericoloso ogni attimo, attaccandolo da ogni lato insidiosamente.

Grave la sproporzione numerica nei due campi: ed essa non poteva del tutto essere compensata, a favore dei giapponesi, né dalla perfetta organizzazione, né dalla durezza dei mezzi meccanici moderni, né dalla superiorità dell'addestramento. I giapponesi non avevano soltanto di fronte forze tre volte superiori per numero ed in continuo aumento, fornite di buone mitragliatrici e di discrete aliquote di artiglieria ed animate da un vero furore bellico, ma erano immersi, letteralmente, in un ambiente ostile destinato a trasformarsi in un pericoloso vespaio di franchi tiratori.

### L'azione del Comando giapponese

In tali condizioni il compito del generale Uyeda, comandante la 9. divisione, di ricacciare cioè i cinesi sopra una linea distante 20 km. da Sciangai — e non si sa se egli se lo sia imposto o se dall'alto gli sia stato ordinato — non poteva essere più difficile e più complesso. Certo non è ancora possibile pronunciare giudizi sull'azione di questo generale, ma già fin d'ora si può e si deve riconoscere che egli l'ha esplicata con ardimento e vigoria tali che sono senz'altro ammirabili. Sotto l'aspetto esclusivamente tecnico un giudizio, in proposito, dovrà forse limitarsi, anche in avvenire, a constatare che nessuno, quasi certamente, avrebbe potuto fare meglio di lui.

Forse fu errata l'impostazione strategica dell'azione di Sciangai: non furono calcolate con sano criterio le forze che l'avversario avrebbe opposto, non fu prevista la reazione spirituale che l'invasione avrebbe provocato, non fu valutato lo sforzo che sarebbe stato necessario di compiere: ma di tutto questo la colpa, se mai, risale a Tokio.

Il gen. Uyeda il giorno 18 consegnò l'ultimatum, certamente redatto a Tokio ed almeno approvato colà, ed il giorno 20 si trovò impegnato ad agire con la forza: ordinò dunque di attaccare.

### L'attacco di Kiang Uan

L'attacco venne sferrato alle ore 11 di sabato, dopo tre ore circa di preparazione di artiglieria, integrata da bombardamenti aerei estesi e metodici. Circa gli effetti di tali bombardamenti, terrestri ed aerei, è opportuno tener presente la natura soffice e melmosa del terreno.

Le fanterie della brigata Kanazava scattarono con lo slancio furibondo che è tradizionale nell'esercito nipponico, puntando decisamente contro Kiang Uan, grossa borgata a occidente della ferrovia ed a mezzo percorso fra la Stazione Nord e Woosung. Più che ad occupare l'abitato, pare che i giapponesi tendessero ad aggirarlo per passare oltre, cercare di aprirsi un varco a traverso le linee nemiche e dilagare poi sul tergo per far cadere la difesa cinese, su più ampio tratto, con la manovra.

Le fanterie, su più colonne fiancheggiate da cavalleria, erano appoggiate da artiglierie e da carri armati mentre l'aviazione stendeva dense cortine di nebbia artificiale. Il combattimento durò, anzi, fino alle 16,30. Vi intervenne anche la brigata Tokuno: furono fatti fierosi attacchi e contrattacchi; le linee furono più volte prese e perdute: più volte le fanterie si trovarono costrette ai violenti corpo a corpo con l'armata cinese: si rinnovarono gli eroismi della guerra contro i russi; si ripeterono le feroci dell'ultima guerra; l'uomo non è ancora come la macchina di oggi, più perfetta e più terribile.

Al fine della giornata i giapponesi trovarono ad aver spostato in avanti di oltre mezzo tratto della propria linea per circa 10 chilometri. Sbalzo notevole ma insufficiente per realizzare lo sfondamento cui avevano probabilmente mirato.

Da sabato, 20, a martedì sera, 23 feb-

braio, nessun nuovo vantaggio sensibile hanno conseguito i giapponesi, oltre quelli del primo giorno, nonostante che quotidianamente abbiano ripetuto nuovi sanguinosissimi attacchi.

I cinesi, d'altra parte, hanno contenuto l'urto giapponese entro una insaccatura non molto rilevante, ma non sono riusciti a riconquistare il terreno perduto.

Martedì sera sembra quindi che la battaglia si dovesse stabilizzare e che i giapponesi, riconosciuta l'invincibilità dei propri sforzi, avessero deciso di attendere rinforzi dalla madre patria prima di ritentare la prova sanguinosa. Mercoledì mattina, 21, invece essi hanno attaccato nuovamente, con furore, più a nord di Kiang Uan, con direzione di sud-ovest, puntando contro il paese di Miou Hang Ceu, per rompere le linee cinesi, alleggerire la pressione contro le proprie truppe trincerate ai margini di Kiang Uan, e pervenire forse, con disperata ostinazione, a quella manovra che già era fallita sabato.

Non sono riusciti neppure questa volta ed hanno provocato una nuova violenta reazione cinese.

### La battaglia continua

La battaglia di Sciangai prosegue quindi e non se ne vedrà l'esito se non fra parecchi giorni, dopo che saranno arrivate le nuove divisioni di cui è già annunciata la partenza dal Giappone.

Intanto le artiglierie tuonano incessantemente e l'aviazione si prodiga in azioni di bombardamento nelle stazioni delle ferrovie che dall'interno adducono a Sciangai, sugli aeroporti cinesi di Sciangai e di Hang Ciou, sugli sta-

bilimenti industriali e sulle linee cinesi. L'attività aerea, in diretta collaborazione con i combattenti terrestri, è sempre intensa ed instancabile.

Ma poiché l'arma del cielo non ha dovuto combattere contro una forza aerea avversaria, vien fatto ora di domandarsi se sia possibile stabilire in qual misura essa abbia contribuito a sopperire all'enorme squilibrio dei combattenti terrestri — si dice che i cinesi siano ora circa 200.000 —; vien fatto soprattutto di pensare che nel valore di questa cooperazione dell'arma aerea nella lotta terrestre sta forse l'insegnamento più utile di Sciangai.

Nessuno, in occidente, avrebbe mai osato pensare che tre brigate di fanteria, pari a due divisioni dell'ultimo periodo della guerra mondiale, potessero tenere una fronte di 12-15 chilometri, contro forze enormemente soverchianti e calcolabili probabilmente in sei od otto divisioni, ed avere tuttavia ancora la capacità offensiva necessaria per sferzare, in cinque giorni, due attacchi poderosi, che non hanno avuto forse tutto il successo in programma, ma hanno certo procurato risultati sensibili. Molto ha giovato, in ciò, la indiscussa superiorità intrinseca dell'esercito giapponese, ma molto deve avervi contribuito l'azione aerea, che è il fattore veramente nuovo della guerra, quello che, fino ad oggi, non fu mai tanto intensamente sperimentato con criteri d'impiego veramente organici, quello sul quale è opportuno più che mai riflettere e meditare.

(DAL NOSTRO INVIATO SPECIALE)

**L'attività diplomatica**

Roma, 27 notte.

Le ripercussioni diplomatiche del conflitto in Estremo Oriente si vanno tanto più estendendo quanto più ostinata si dimostra la resistenza delle truppe cinesi; il Giappone è tra i guai, il ginepraio in cui si è cacciato sembra inestricabile ed ecco che coloro i quali nei mesi passati avevano preferito schivare dei passi arrischiati tirano fuori la testa e lanciano non delle minacce (il che sarebbe sempre troppo pericoloso) ma degli avvertimenti che equivalgono a dei richiami.

Si può essere certi che se l'offensiva del generale Uyeda si fosse risolta in una facile avanzata, i disperati appelli della Cina avrebbero fatto la fine di quelli rivolti in occasione dell'occupazione della Manciuria; il vecchio proverbio « aiutate che il ciel t'aiuta », espressione popolare di un'eterna legge umana e politica, riceve in questi giorni un'altra luminosa conferma. Anche l'ambiente ginevrino sta rialzando la cresta e la speranza rinasce che il faticoso macchinismo societario possa inserirsi nelle nuove forze in azione per riguadagnare un poco del prestigio perduto. Ma è evidente che anche in questa fase non a Ginevra bisogna tenere fisso lo sguardo ma, oltre che ai campi di battaglia intorno a Sciangai, a Tokio, a Londra, a Washington e un poco anche a Mosca.

Il passo contemporaneo presso il Governo giapponese degli Ambasciatori delle quattro grandi Potenze che godono di diritto di privilegio alla foce dello Yang Tsee — Italia, Inghilterra, Stati Uniti e Francia — ha una sua caratteristica speciale, rispondente a una particolare situazione; perciò sarebbe erroneo e fuori luogo attribuirgli un significato di pressione che non ha: si tratta esclusivamente di mantenere alla Concessione internazionale la sua peculiarità di territorio neutrale; gli incidenti avvenuti nei giorni scorsi, tra essi il colpo di cannone caduto, per fortuna senza conseguenze, sulla nostra nave *Libia*, non debbono più ripetersi; le autorità militari cinesi sono state energicamente avvisate di essere molto attente nei loro tiri, ma d'altra parte sarebbe ingiusto che i giapponesi si servissero della Concessione come di una base di operazioni; i preannunciati sbarchi di truppe dovranno svolgersi — e si ha ragione di credere che il Comando giapponese abbia già così predisposto — su rive fuori della zona internazionale.

La posizione della Concessione che dal lato terrestre è completamente imbottigliata nel fronte di combattimento e che quindi non può assolvere più la funzione di emporio commerciale con danni ingenti, ha spinto e spinge tuttora le quattro Potenze a desiderare che il cerchio di ferro e di fuoco sia per lo meno allontanato nella parte più pericolosa, quella di Ciapi. Ritorna sul tappeto la questione della neutralizzazione; se da tale interesse particolare si potesse aprire lo spiraglio verso un orizzonte sereno di pace, l'iniziativa risulterebbe ancora più benefica di quanto si osi sperare.

Tutto ciò rientra nelle linee dell'attività diplomatica cominciata fin dal giorno dello sbarco dei marinai giapponesi; il fatto nuovo, rimane sempre la lettera di Stimson a Borah; ogni giorno che passa si comprende meglio la sua grande importanza e le gravi incognite che contiene nelle sue righe. La rivendicazione della libertà di costruire delle navi da battaglia di là dai limiti di Washington e di fortificare i possessi americani nel Pacifico va oltre l'avvertimento diretto al Giappone per sollevare la minaccia delle gare di armamenti navali e rimettere in discussione le proporzioni delle flotte; su questo argomento il punto più sensibile è Londra. Il Governo inglese non ha marciato come era nelle intenzioni della Casa Bianca, dove si comprende benissimo che nessuna pressione feconda, sia politica, che commerciale che militare, è possibile verso il Giappone senza un fronte unico degli Stati Uniti e della Gran Bretagna, le due massime Potenze navali del mondo.

L'allusione a un'Europa che vedrebbe con soddisfazione urtarsi i due più forti imperi extra-europei sperando così di riguadagnare delle posizioni di prestigio e di ricchezza perdute nella guerra, è sintomatica; ma essa può essere segno di forza o di debolezza a seconda dell'atteggiamento inglese più o meno favorevole a camminare a braccetto con Washington. La minaccia

sposta a piegarsi il Governo di Londra?

Ecco che non è affatto audace presagire che il conflitto in Estremo Oriente influenzerà indirettamente anche la soluzione del problema dei debiti di guerra; purché i debitori, e sopra tutto l'Inghilterra, non siano alieni dall'appoggiare la politica americana nel Pacifico, gli Stati Uniti saranno meglio disposti a considerare le possibilità di riduzioni.

Il mondo è diventato piccolo e la interdipendenza dei problemi apparentemente più diversi è all'ordine del giorno. Insieme con Washington, Mosca ha abbandonato l'atteggiamento di assoluta passività in cui si era mantenuta finora. Tale remissività aveva sorpreso sia per gli interessi che la Russia ha con la Cina, con cui è a contatto immediato, sia per la naturale inclinazione del comunismo ad approfittare delle rivalità così dette capitalistiche; in un primo tempo si spiegò la politica sovietica con una specie di tacita

intesa col Giappone il quale lasciò fare quando, tre anni or sono, il generale Blucher occupò la zona della ferrovia controllata dalla Russia; poi la giustificazione era per lo meno insufficiente e si capì che l'U.R.S.S. era rassegnata all'inerzia perché non voleva correre i rischi di una seria ostilità col Giappone.

Oggi che si accenna a una formidabile offensiva cinese in Manciuria, una nota di Mosca richiama l'attenzione di Tokio sulle formazioni militari di russi bianchi pronte, dagli estremi limiti della Siberia, ad appiccare il fuoco della controrivoluzione. Fantasie.

Lo spettro antibolscevico, così spesso agitato dal Governo sovietico, deve essere valutato come una buona arma di manovra, nella sua politica internazionale; la Russia vuole fare atto di presenza, mentre le difficoltà del Giappone aumentano ed i pericoli di complicazioni più vaste salgono minacciosi. All'occorrenza bisognerà tenere conto del fattore russo che unisce ora, ai pia-

ni ed alle necessità dell'antica politica zaristica, fermenti della propaganda comunista che, per l'Asia, si vale d'un motto sintetico: « L'Asia agli asiatici ».

Così, man mano, ritornano in pieno quelle forze la cui direzione virtuale era già catalogata in caso di un conflitto sul Pacifico. Le depressioni causate dalla crisi, i timori di urti fatali ed irreparabili, hanno permesso che lo sforzo di espansione nipponica si attuasse senza le previste opposizioni, ma, poiché il colpo di mano non è riuscito, tutto è di nuovo in discussione: le responsabilità schivate si impongono con maggiore esattezza e l'Inghilterra, che ne avrebbe fatto a meno volentieri, è di nuovo nel mezzo e tutti aspettano che dica la parola decisiva che, però, in un senso o nell'altro, segnerà forse il vantaggio di questo o quel concorrente, sempre ai danni dell'Impero britannico.

ALFREDO SIGNORETTI.

(DAL NOSTRO INVIATO SPECIALE)

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Le ripercussioni diplomatiche del conflitto in Estremo Oriente si vanno tanto più estendendo quanto più ostinata si dimostra la resistenza delle truppe cinesi; il Giappone è tra i guai, il ginepraio in cui si è cacciato sembra inestricabile ed ecco che coloro i quali nei mesi passati avevano preferito schivare dei passi arrischiati tirano fuori la testa e lanciano non delle minaccie (il che sarebbe sempre troppo pericoloso) ma degli avvertimenti che equivalgono a dei richiami.

Si può essere certi che se l'offensiva del generale Uyeda si fosse risolta in una facile avanzata, i disperati appelli della Cina avrebbero fatto la fine di quelli rivolti in occasione dell'occupazione della Manciuria; il vecchio proverbio « aiutati che il ciel t'aiuta », espressione popolare di un'eterna legge umana e politica, riceve in questi giorni un'altra luminosa conferma. Anche l'ambiente ginevrino sta rialzando la cresta e la speranza rinasce che il faticoso macchinismo societario possa inserirsi nelle nuove forze in azione per riguadagnare un poco del prestigio perduto. Ma è evidente che anche in questa fase non a Ginevra bisogna tenere fisso lo sguardo ma, oltre che ai campi di battaglia intorno a Sciangai, a Tokio, a Londra, a Washington e un poco anche a Mosca.

Il passo contemporaneo presso il Governo giapponese degli Ambasciatori delle quattro grandi Potenze che godono di diritto di privilegio alla foce dello Yang Tsee — Italia, Inghilterra, Stati Uniti e Francia — ha una sua caratteristica speciale, rispondente a una particolare situazione; perciò sarebbe erroneo e fuori luogo attribuirgli un significato di pressione che non ha: si tratta esclusivamente di mantenere alla Concessione internazionale la sua peculiarità di territorio neutrale: gli incidenti avvenuti nei giorni scorsi, tra essi il colpo di cannone caduto, per fortuna senza conseguenze, sulla nostra nave *Libia*, non debbono più ripetersi; le autorità militari cinesi sono state energicamente avvisate di essere molto attente nei loro tiri, ma d'altra parte sarebbe ingiusto che i giapponesi si servissero della Concessione come di una base di operazioni; i preannunciati sbarchi di truppe dovranno svolgersi — e si ha ragione di credere che il Comando giapponese delle navi da battaglia di cui i limiti di Washington e di fortificare i possedimenti americani nel Pacifico va oltre l'avvertimento diretto al Giappone per sollevare la minaccia delle gare di armamenti navali e rimettere in discussione le proporzioni delle flotte; su questo argomento il punto più sensibile è Londra. Il Governo inglese non ha marciato come era nelle intenzioni della Casa Bianca, dove si comprende benissimo che nessuna pressione feconda, sia politica, che commerciale che militare, è possibile verso il Giappone senza un fronte unico degli Stati Uniti e della Gran Bretagna, le due massime Potenze navali del mondo.

L'allusione a un'Europa che vedrebbe con soddisfazione urtarsi i due più forti imperi extra-europei sperando così di riguadagnare delle posizioni di prestigio e di ricchezza perdute nella guerra, è sintomatica: ma essa può essere segno di forza o di debolezza a seconda dell'atteggiamento inglese più o meno favorevole a camminare a braccetto con Washington. La minaccia della ripresa degli armamenti navali dovrebbe essere decisiva nel piegare la politica equilibrata di sir John Simon a una maggiore aderenza con le direttive americane.

Nell'Inghilterra, tutta protesa nello sforzo interno della ricostruzione economica, la prospettiva dei tremendi sacrifici finanziari che comporterebbe la costruzione di navi superiori alle 35 mila tonnellate deve far tremare le vene e i polsi; un'accentuazione degli sforzi per rendere il Giappone più conciliante è prevedibile fin d'ora, ma se domani le complicazioni militari arrivassero al punto da impegnare più profondamente l'onore e le forze dell'impero del Mikado, fin dove sarà di-

sposto a piegarsi il Governo di Londra?

Ecco che non è affatto audace presagire che il conflitto in Estremo Oriente influenzerà indirettamente anche la soluzione del problema dei debiti di guerra; purché i debitori, e sopra tutto l'Inghilterra, non siano alieni dall'appoggiare la politica americana nel Pacifico, gli Stati Uniti saranno meglio disposti a considerare le possibilità di riduzioni.

Il mondo è diventato piccolo e la interdipendenza dei problemi apparentemente più diversi è all'ordine del giorno. Insieme con Washington, Mosca ha abbandonato l'atteggiamento di assoluta passività in cui si era mantenuta finora. Tale remissività aveva sorpreso sia per gli interessi che la Russia ha con la Cina, con cui è a contatto immediato, sia per la naturale inclinazione del comunismo ad approfittare delle rivalità così dette capitalistiche; in un primo tempo si spiegò la politica sovietica con una specie di tacita

intesa col Giappone il quale lasciò fare quando, tre anni or sono, il generale Blucher occupò la zona della ferrovia controllata dalla Russia; poi la giustificazione era per lo meno insufficiente e si capì che l'U.R.S.S. era rassegnata all'inerzia perché non voleva correre i rischi di una seria ostilità col Giappone.

Oggi che si accenna a una formidabile offensiva cinese in Manciuria, una nota di Mosca richiama l'attenzione di Tokio sulle formazioni militari di russi bianchi oronte, dagli estremi limiti della Siberia, ad appiccare il fuoco della controrivoluzione. Fantasie.

Lo spettro antibolscevico, così spesso agitato dal Governo sovietico, deve essere valutato come una buona arma di manovra, nella sua politica internazionale; la Russia vuole fare atto di presenza, mentre le difficoltà del Giappone aumentano ed i pericoli di complicazioni più vaste salgono minacciosi. All'occorrenza bisognerà tenere conto del fattore russo che unisce ora, ai pia-

ni ed alle necessità dell'antica politica zaristica, fermenti della propaganda comunista che, per l'Asia, si vale d'un motto sintetico: « L'Asia agli asiatici ».

Così, man mano, ritornano in pieno quelle forze la cui direzione virtuale era già catalogata in caso di un conflitto sul Pacifico. Le depressioni causate dalla crisi, i timori di urti fatali ed irreparabili, hanno permesso che lo sforzo di espansione nipponica si attuasse senza le previste opposizioni, ma, poiché il colpo di mano non è riuscito, tutto è di nuovo in discussione: le responsabilità schivate si impongono con maggiore esattezza e l'Inghilterra, che ne avrebbe fatto a meno volentieri, è di nuovo nel mezzo e tutti aspettano che dica la parola decisiva che, però, in un senso o nell'altro, segnerà forse il vantaggio di questo o quel concorrente, sempre ai danni dell'Impero britannico.

ALFREDO SIGNORETTI.

LA STAMPA, Turin.  
February 26, 1962.

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Despatch No. 1300

## Sviluppi e pericoli

Roma, 25, notte.

L'aspra resistenza che le truppe cinesi offrono all'avanzata dei soldati giapponesi intorno a Sciangai, se da un lato costituisce la rivelazione sensazionale e suscita naturali simpatie, dall'altro lato non può che aggravare ed ampliare i termini del conflitto cino-nipponico, che, sino agli eroismi della 19<sup>a</sup> Armata, sembrava dovesse limitarsi nei suoi effetti diplomatici, giuridici e commerciali. Innanzi tutto, nei confronti diretti dei due antagonisti.

L'Esercito dell'Impero del Sol Levante, si era creato, con il titolo conquistato in lunghe e numerose guerre, le fama di imbattibilità: tecnicamente esso non è diminuito dal fatto militare di questi giorni, svoltosi su un terreno che è il più opportuno per una difesa ostinata a brevi settori ed a piccoli episodi; ma, nell'Oriente e nell'Asia, quanto più lontano ci spingiamo, le vibrazioni morali hanno risonanze più immediate e più vaste che non nei Paesi a civiltà occidentale. Oggi appare per la prima volta, che i soldati del Mikado sono degli esseri di carne ed ossa che possono essere fermati: il loro Stato Maggiore non è più quell'entità miracolosa che sempre minuziosamente prevede tutte le circostanze e tutte le supera.

La Cina, su cui più volte dalla guerra del '95 alla recente occupazione della Manciuria, i reggimenti giapponesi si erano esercitati come in un campo di grandi manovre, ha reagito in un primo momento con alcuni battaglioni, in una posizione nemmeno troppo regolare (non v'è da stupirsi) rispetto al Governo di Nanchino, poi, con un improvviso entusiasmo, che ha trascinato tutti i fattori, responsabili ed irresponsabili. Il movimento nazionalista di rinascita che fa capo al *Kuo-Ming-Tung*, e che ha espresso un uomo di indubbe qualità come Chiang-Kai-Cek, si era già imposto ad una attenzione seria e profonda, dopo la liquidazione dal suo seno del bolscevismo, che aveva avuto per anni i suoi agenti dittatoriali in Borodine ed in Karakan. Negli ultimi due anni, però, il ritorno ai separatismi ed alle lotte di fazione, avevano condotto ad una persuasione quasi fatalistica che l'anarchismo cinese fosse un fenomeno insopprimibile. Or bene, oggi è la prova decisiva che verrà sfruttata nelle sue conseguenze estreme: quale migliore occasione di una guerra condotta contro l'odiato invasore, per tentare di cementare delle forze unitarie che, in passato, si sono sempre sfaldate nell'urto fra nord e sud, nelle rivalità tra i generali?

Anche nel secolo XX, pervaso di ideologie umanitarie, il sangue resta sempre il coefficiente più mirabile di fusione, specie quando i sacrifici possono essere accompagnati dalla esaltazione di un ideale facile ad essere afferrato dalle masse più amorfe e capace di fare tacere ogni rancore dinanzi all'accusa di tradimento. Le migliaia di morti cinesi a Ciabei ed a Kiang Wan, segneranno l'inizio di una nuova epoca in cui la Cina ritroverà le virtù che sole potranno fare di essa una Nazione, uno Stato? Se così non fosse c'è da disperare sulla eventualità anche lontana di una fine del *caos* con la istituzione di un forte Governo centrale ubbidito da tutte le provincie. Intanto, il cinese che combatte con eroismo, che muore per la sua Patria, è un avvenimento che deve fare riflettere, non i soli nemici di oggi: è un'altra incognita sull'orizzonte corrusco del Pacifico.

La reazione delle truppe di Canton e di Nanchino non manca di produrre i suoi effetti nelle direttive di Tokio: il prestigio dell'Esercito giapponese dovrà essere salvato ad ogni costo; le preoccupazioni diplomatiche passano in seconda linea di fronte a questa suprema necessità. Quale sarebbe la situazione delle poche Divisioni che occupano la Manciuria se si diffondesse la sensazione che attaccando c'è qualche minima probabilità di successo? Gli stessi 20 milioni di coreani, i quali solo dal 1908 sono sudditi del Mikado, possono essere ritenuti alieni da qualche sorpresa? Non solo quindi la espansione futura sarebbe compromessa, ma l'Impero che è di origine recentissima, potrebbe mostrare delle crepe; quella guerra che per la Cina è fattore di coesione nazionale, è per il Giappone, oggi, necessità assoluta per le conquiste di domani e per la conservazione dell'alto grado di potenza raggiunta; non basta: più la guerra continua, più i pericoli di complicazioni internazionali aumentano e maturano. Immaginiamo che i giapponesi avessero potuto compiere una passeg-

le Grandi Potenze oceaniche che temono passi falsi in avventure che potrebbero aprire la strada alle peggiori catastrofi.

Finora Londra e Washington hanno agito con la necessaria prudenza: quando l'una si spingeva un poco avanti, sia pure con delle dichiarazioni verbali, l'altra attenuava la sua solidarietà, e viceversa. Solo i santoni custodi dello spirito societario lanciavano la loro maledizione contro il Giappone, ma erano voci senza eco e senza importanza. Con la intensificazione delle operazioni belliche, la cui vastità e la cui durata sono ormai nelle mani di Dio più che nella volontà degli uomini, è divenuto molto difficile, se non impossibile, continuare nell'atteggiamento di pavida attesa degli eventi che creino il fatto compiuto. Ecco gli Stati Uniti che cominciano a scoprirsi: il Governo di Tokio aveva giustamente calcolato sulla riluttanza della Casa Bianca, in un periodo di grandi preoccupazioni interne, ad assumere posizioni decisive, conforme alla tradizione diplomatica americana, in Estremo Oriente, ma bisognava far presto; l'opinione pubblica, manovrata da associazioni la cui influenza sull'esecutivo non è trascurabile, collegando l'interesse nazionale con il motivo

umanitario della simpatia verso coloro che difendono il proprio territorio; i piccoli nuclei di interessi che il Giappone aveva saputo rendersi amici con opportune ordinazioni pagate con oro sonante, non possono resistere alla campagna antinipponica; sugli elementi responsabili il senso del prestigio di una politica coerentemente condotta, dall'affermazione del principio della « open door » alla evacuazione dello Sciantung, al Trattato delle nove Potenze nel 1922, prende il sopravvento sul timore di arrischiarsi in una condotta più decisa; e Stimson parla come finora non aveva mai parlato: la sua lettera al Presidente della Commissione degli Affari Esteri, senatore Borah, risponde naturalmente a fini interni e non ha il carattere d'una nota ufficiale, ma le polemiche e le intenzioni in essa manifestate non possono essere ignorate.

Oltre che riaffermare la tesi già precisata a Tokio e a Nanchino il 7 gennaio scorso, da un preliminare rifiuto a riconoscere qualsiasi Trattato o Convenzione in violazione degli accordi di Washington, il Capo del Dipartimento di Stato dà una sua interpretazione sulle origini, sullo spirito e sulla lettera del Trattato delle nove Potenze, che lascia

aperte le più gravi eventualità. Ma ove quel Trattato diventasse caduco verrebbero meno per gli Stati Uniti le rinunzie a cui essi si adattarono per raggiungere una intesa, la costruzione di navi da battaglia superiori alle 35.000 tonnellate (il limite massimo di Washington), le fortificazioni nell'arcipelago delle Filippine e in altre isole del Pacifico. Nessuna minaccia di interventi diretti da parte dell'America per ora; ma basta considerare i problemi che sembravano risolti per sempre sollevati da Stimson perchè la gara agli armamenti nel Pacifico, faticosamente evitata per un decennio, si ripresenti con il carattere di una corsa precipitata al conflitto fra le due Potenze che mirano all'egemonia di quell'immenso oceano. Tutta l'impostazione della Conferenza del disarmo e, primo, il Trattato navale di Londra, salterebbero per aria senza alcuna possibilità di rattoppi.

Il cannone che tuona a Sciangai non permette più di turarsi le orecchie e di fingere di non udirlo; se non tacerà presto la sua eco servirà da punto di ritrovo dei suoi fratelli maggiori, i 381 delle *super-dreadnought*.

ALFREDO SIGNORETTI.

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LA STAMPA, Turin.  
February 26, 1952.

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Despatch No. 1300

## Sviluppi e pericoli

Roma, 25, notte.

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L'Esercito dell'Impero del Sol Levante, si era creato, con il titolo conquistato in lunghe e numerose guerre, le fama di imbattibilità: tecnicamente esso non è diminuito dal fatto militare di questi giorni, svoltosi su un terreno che è il più opportuno per una difesa ostinata a brevi settori ed a piccoli episodi; ma nell'Oriente e nell'Asia, quanto più lontano ci spingiamo, le vibrazioni morali hanno risonanze più immediate e più vaste che non nei Paesi a civiltà occidentale. Oggi appare per la prima volta, che i soldati del Mikado sono degli esseri di carne ed ossa che possono essere fermati: il loro Stato Maggiore non è più quell'entità miracolosa che sempre minuziosamente prevede tutte le circostanze.

disperare sulla eventualità anche lontana di una fine del caos con la istituzione di un forte Governo centrale ubbidito da tutte le provincie. Intanto, il cinese che combatte con eroismo, che muore per la sua Patria, è un avvenimento che deve fare riflettere, non i soli nemici di oggi: è un'altra incognita sull'orizzonte corrusco del Pacifico.

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ALFREDO SIGNORETTI.

IL MATTINO, Naples.  
February 24-25, 1962.Despatch No. 1300page 1.Quando la guerra  
non è la guerra

Che cos'è la guerra?

Una volta, quando gli eserciti di due nazioni s'incontravano e si prendevano scambievolmente a fucilate e a cannonate secondo le buone regole dell'arte militare, nessun dubbio era possibile: si trattava di guerra. Adesso no.

Adesso uno sbarco di truppe è una «precauzione»; un cannoneggiamento è una «pressione»; un assalto è una «misura protettiva». L'attacco di una città non è più che una «operazione di polizia» e una battaglia è la «preparazione di negoziati diretti». La guerra non c'è più.

Vedete quello che succede a Shanghai? Nessuno vuole ammettere che si tratti di guerra: né il Giappone, che dichiara di non essere in guerra con la Cina; né la Cina che rifiuta di considerarsi in guerra col Giappone: né Ginevra, la quale ufficialmente ritiene che la guerra possa essere evitata con un'inchiesta.

Ma allora, che cos'è la guerra?

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Dopo che con il Patto di Parigi tutte le nazioni del mondo, compreso l'Afganistan, si sono solennemente impegnate a non fare più la guerra, le cannonate hanno cambiato figura giuridica. Non sono più guerra. Nessun paese che trovi opportuno, o necessario, o indispensabile, bombardarne subito un altro, può ora convenire di essere un violatore di un così sacro trattato mondiale. Spara, ma si proclama in pace.

E si scopre che la sola differenza fra la guerra e un'attività militare del genere di quella che delizia adesso Shanghai, consiste in una dichiarazione. Se c'è una dichiarazione di guerra, allora è guerra. Ma se non c'è alcuna dichiarazione, la pace teoricamente non è irrimediabilmente interrotta.

La Cina, al fine di indurre la Lega delle Nazioni a qualche decisione energica contro l'intraprendenza giapponese, ha replicatamente agitato la minaccia di dichiarare la guerra. Questo atto diplomatico avrebbe fatto risuscitare formalmente la guerra, costringendo la Lega ad accorgersene. Il pericolo è stato scongiurato.

E cinesi e giapponesi si battono col dovuto rispetto al patto Kellogg.

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Gli eventi di Cina dimostrano che soltanto il disarmo può mantenere la pace. Non vi sono garanzie che valgano a impedire i conflitti, finché vi sono armamenti eccessivi che permettono il ricorso alla forza con probabilità di successo. Al momento della Conferenza di Ginevra non si poteva avere una prova più luminosa della necessità di un disarmo generale, a limiti minimi di armamento eguali per tutti: la formula del Duce.

Il resto è utopia. Mettere la guerra fuori della legge e armarsi fino ai denti, vuol dire mantenere i pericoli della guerra senza le salvaguardie e le limitazioni che circondavano i conflitti. La dichiarazione di guerra era quello che è la sfida in un duello. A poco a poco si sono eliminati gli elementi di lealtà e di cavalleria che mitigavano l'orrore degli urti di nazioni armate. Non è più sicuro che non ci si batta mai più, ma nelle condizioni attuali si è sicuri che ci si batterebbe senza preavvisi e senza rispetti. Non si impedisce un duello facilitando l'assassinio, ma togliendo le spade dalle mani dei possibili combattenti.

La guerra messa fuori della legge può significare la cancella-

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Ma allora, che cos'è la guerra?

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Dopo che con il Patto di Parigi tutte le nazioni del mondo, compreso l'Afganistan, si sono solennemente impegnate a non fare più la guerra, le cannonate hanno cambiato figura giuridica. Non sono più guerra. Nessun paese che trovi opportuno, o necessario, o indispensabile, bombardarne subito un altro, può ora convenire di essere un violatore di un così sacro trattato mondiale. Spara, ma si proclama in pace.

E si scopre che la sola differenza fra la guerra e un'attività militare del genere di quella che delizia adesso Shanghai, consiste in una dichiarazione. Se c'è una dichiarazione di guerra, allora è guerra. Ma se non c'è alcuna dichiarazione, la pace teoricamente non è irrimediabilmente interrotta.

La Cina, al fine di indurre la ~~Legge della guerra~~ Lega delle Nazioni a un patto di disarmo eguali per tutti: la formula del Duce.

Il resto è utopia. Mettere la guerra fuori della legge e armarsi fino ai denti, vuol dire mantenere i pericoli della guerra senza le salvaguardie e le limitazioni che circondavano i conflitti. La dichiarazione di guerra era quello che è la sfida in un duello. A poco a poco si sono eliminati gli elementi di lealtà e di cavalleria che mitigavano l'orrore degli urti di nazioni armate. Non è più sicuro che non ci si batta mai più, ma nelle condizioni attuali si è sicuri che ci si batterebbe senza preavvisi e senza rispetti. Non si impedisce un duello facilitando l'assassinio, ma togliendo le spade dalle mani dei possibili combattenti.

La guerra messa fuori della legge può significare la cancellazione di ogni patto umanitario, se il disarmo non mette la guerra fuori della realtà.

\*\*\*

Intanto si è arrivati a non sapere più quando una guerra è guerra.

E' un problema nuovo che si aggiunge all'altro enigma che occupa da tempo la Lega delle Nazioni: quello di sapere chi sia da considerarsi l'«aggressore» in un conflitto. E' chi spara per il primo? E' chi ha torto? E' chi ha provocato? E' chi gode le minori simpatie? Chi lo sa?

Il meccanismo della pace immaginato fuori del disarmo, è divenuto un cumulo complicato di bizantinismi, di formule, di dogmi, di formalità, che funziona benissimo finchè non spara il cannone. Ma il più piccolo rombo di artiglierie lo paralizza.

Se si riducessero le artiglierie?

IL MATTINO, Naples.  
February 24-25, 1932.

page 1 .

Despatch No. 1300

## Quando la guerra non è la guerra

Che cos'è la guerra?

Una volta, quando gli eserciti di due nazioni s'incontravano e si prendevano scambievolmente a fucilate e a cannonate secondo le buone regole dell'arte militare, nessun dubbio era possibile: si trattava di guerra. Adesso no.

Adesso uno sbarco di truppe è una «precauzione»; un cannoneggiamento è una «pressione»; un assalto è una «misura protettiva». L'attacco di una città non è più che una «operazione di polizia» e una battaglia è la «preparazione di negoziati diretti». La guerra non c'è più.

Vedete quello che succede a Shanghai? Nessuno vuole ammettere che si tratti di guerra: nè il Giappone, che dichiara di non essere in guerra con la Cina; nè la Cina che rifiuta di considerarsi in guerra col Giappone: nè Ginevra, la quale ufficialmente ritiene che la guerra possa essere evitata con un'inchiesta.

Ma allora, che cos'è la guerra?

\*\*\*

Dopo che con il Patto di Parigi tutte le nazioni del mondo, hanno accettato la formula di uguagliamento eguali per tutti: la formula del Duce.

Il resto è utopia. Mettere la guerra fuori della legge e armarsi fino ai denti, vuol dire mantenere i pericoli della guerra senza le salvaguardie e le limitazioni che circondavano i conflitti. La dichiarazione di guerra era quello che è la sfida in un duello. A poco a poco si sono eliminati gli elementi di lealtà e di cavalleria che mitigavano l'orrore degli urti di nazioni armate. Non è più sicuro che non ci si batta mai più, ma nelle condizioni attuali si è sicuri che ci si batterebbe senza preavvisi e senza rispetti. Non si impedisce un duello facilitando l'assassinio, ma togliendo le spade dalle mani dei possibili combattenti.

La guerra messa fuori della legge può significare la cancellazione di ogni patto umanitario, se il disarmo non mette la guerra fuori della realtà.

\*\*\*

Intanto si è arrivati a non sapere più quando una guerra è guerra.

E' un problema nuovo che si aggiunge all'altro enigma che occupa da tempo la Lega delle Nazioni: quello di sapere chi sia da considerarsi l'«aggressore» in un conflitto. E' chi spara per il primo? E' chi ha torto? E' chi ha provocato? E' chi gode le minori simpatie? Chi lo sa?

Il meccanismo della pace immaginato fuori del disarmo, è divenuto un cumulo complicato di bizantinismi, di formule, di dogmi, di formalità, che funziona benissimo finchè non spara il cannone. Ma il più piccolo rombo di artiglierie lo paralizza.

Se si riducessero le artiglierie?

Luigi Barzini

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

M E

**COPIES SENT TO**  
**O.N.I. AND M.I.D.** GRAY  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

793.94  
131029  
793-94119  
893-0146  
894-24

MET

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 17, 1932

FROM

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

RECEIVED  
MAR 17 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND

MAR 17 1932  
Department of State

March 17, 1 p.m.

F/LS  
793.94/4794

Following from Colonel Drysdale for War Department:

"Quiet, both fronts. Press reports to the contrary there have been no recent important changes in troops dispositions. Beginning tomorrow Japanese plan to begin embarkation of 24th mixed brigade to be followed by 11th Division; the 14th Division to take over front line positions now occupied by these units.

Chinese question right of Japanese planes to fly beyond Shirakawa patrol zone. Japanese are now using fixed balloon for observation of Chinese positions".

JOHNSON

MCL-WSB

MAR 21 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

✓ FE

793.94  
213.0146  
893.1025  
893.00

**COPIES SENT TO**  
**O.N.I. AND M.I.D.** GRAY  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**  
Tokio

MET

Dated March 17, 1932

Rec'd 6:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

FROM  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 17 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Washington

101, March 17, 5 p.m.

MAR 17 1932  
Department of State

F/LS  
793.94/4795

There is decidedly less political tension, from the international point of view, since the announcement of the prospective withdrawal of contingents from Shanghai. In Manchuria there are continued reports of banditry and disturbance. These reports are not given as much prominence in the press as was formerly the case and there seems to be a much calmer general atmosphere in regard to the China situation.

The domestic political situation seems far from settled. The Home Minister has resigned and the Prime Minister has taken the duties of that office in addition to his own. Rumors continue that there will be a Cabinet change after the close of the Diet. It is too early to predict anything definite as to personnel. Prince Saionji has been spending much time in Tokyo receiving visits from different

MAR 21 1932

FILED

MET

2-#101 from Tokio, March 17, 5 pm.

different political leaders. This has given rise to a great deal of speculation but no definite announcement has been made.

The Diet will meet in extraordinary session tomorrow. It has been called for the purpose of passing the special budget necessary to take care of the Shanghai and Manchuria military expeditions. The Privy Council insisted that further financial arrangements for military expenditure be made by the Diet and refused to accept the Government's contention that they were in the nature of emergency bills which the Government had power to act upon and refer to the Diet later. Indications are that the amount asked for by the Government will be in the neighborhood of 83,000,000 yen. It is anticipated that the Diet will remain in session for only a few days, that there will be no opposition to the Government proposals, that adjournment will be taken on the 22nd or 23rd of March.

FORBES

KLP\_WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 22, 1932.

U:  
M: ✓  
Subject: German press comment on the  
Secretary's letter to Senator  
Borah.

SKH: - *twice* ✓  
In this despatch (No. 1530, Embassy, Berlin,  
March 2, 1932--file No. 793.94/4796) Ambassador  
Sackett states that the Berlin press concurred in  
regarding the Secretary's letter "as an impressive  
warning which would not fail to impress Japan".

B/ *1/27*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Berlin, March 2, 1932.

No. 111

Subject: American Policy towards  
Sino-Japanese Conflict.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 17 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

7/3/84  
mjc  
509.24d

DISTRIBUTION - CHECK  
To the  
In U. S. A.

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
MAR 24 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

F/LS  
793.94/4796

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that Secretary of State Stimson's letter to Senator Borah concerning the violation of the Nine Power Agreement by Japan and its effect on the Washington Naval Agreement has attracted considerable attention in Germany. The local press concurred in regarding it as an impressive warning which would not fail to impress Japan. A part of the Nationalist press also professed to see in it a notification to England that unless she supported America against Japan, cooperation between the two countries was endangered.

Hugenberg's

MAR 24 1932

FILED

- 2 -

Hugenberg's LOKAL ANZEIGER (March 1) remarked that America's interest in the maintenance of the open door in China was especially great. It went on to say: "Secretary of State Stimson has already declared that the United States was compelled to carry out in full the naval construction program which had been postponed for a while, and to erect coast defences on Hawaii and the Philippines. A proof of the possibilities being considered in Washington and, at the same time, a nice commencement for disarmament."

Under the headline: "Stimson Becomes Outspoken. Sharp American Attitude Towards Japan," the independent Nationalist BERLINER BOERSEN ZEITUNG (February 25) published a full account of the letter to Senator Borah. On March 1 this journal added that America's warning to Japan was "extraordinarily serious as Japan would thus be exposed to the direct pressure of American power. It remains to be seen whether this hint will be understood in Tokyo." Stimson's reference to the naval program was a rough tread on England's toes. "America thus informs England that the naval truce of Washington - and with it of course also the London Naval Agreement - is off unless England is prepared to join America in forcing Japan to order. Stimson regards all Washington treaties as an indivisible whole and this confronts England with the alternative of relinquishing the entente with America, which she had bought at the price

of

- 3 -

of heavy sacrifices of prestige and national pride, or of placing herself at America's disposal for the Far East."

The militarist KREUZ ZEITUNG (February 25) was also of the opinion that America had voiced a "sharp threat against Japan."

Commenting on the situation in China, the Centrist GERMANIA (February 25) said that the Kellogg Pact had been brought about by American initiative and that the United States therefore were largely responsible for its enforcement. The events in Shanghai represented an attack on the part of Japan, and Stimson had expressed this openly in his letter to Borah. His reference to the endangering of the agreements would make an impression in Japan as "Japan knows she can never keep pace with America in competitive armament. Although we regard a war between America and Japan as being out of the question for the present, the decided American attitude indicates that all possibilities are being considered and that Japan has been warned in time. The impression of such an attitude on the part of America will probably be greater than that of all previous League resolutions."

The democratic VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG reported under a Washington date-line that condemnation of Japan was increasing in the American Senate and that both houses

were

- 4 -

were expected to pass the bill providing for naval construction up to the maximum conceded by the London Agreement. President Hoover had given up all opposition to the naval bill, and in case the situation in China became threatening, the necessary appropriations would be made.

The Social Democratic VORWAERTS (February 25) implied approval of America's action by heading its report: "America Against the War of Robbery. China Must Remain Inviolable."

The attitude of the VORWAERTS aroused the ire of the Communist ROTE FAHNE (February 26) which said: "In the hands of the Social Democratic editors ravenous wolves are transformed into snow-white lambs." In reality, this journal believed Stimson's letter was a threat on the part of "American imperialism" to interfere actively in the war in the Far East.

Respectfully yours,

*Frederic H. Sackett*  
Frederic H. Sackett.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.  
JCW-HCF:EM  
710



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Hague, Netherlands,  
March 5, 1932.

No. \_\_\_\_\_

*793.94  
509.24d*

SUBJECT: THE LETTER TO SENATOR BORAH.  
NY 16 32

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 22 1932  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
*file*  
MAR 17 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

F/LS  
793.94/4797

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

MAR 25 1932  
FILED

Sir:

*793.94 3681*

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 240,  
of January 12, 1932, and to report that your letter to  
Senator Borah, under date of the 24th ultimo, reaffirm-  
ing the American policy announced in your formal notifi-  
cation to Japan and China in the Note of January 7th,  
last, has attracted general attention and been the sub-  
ject of much favorable comment in official circles as  
well as in the press.

In an interview which I had with the Acting Minister  
for...

- 2 -

for Foreign Affairs on the first instant he spoke of your letter to Senator Borah with evident satisfaction, saying that it was a very strong statement and that "it was right". Mr. Snouck Hurgronje expressed the opinion that it was bound to have a powerful effect in Tokio. He informed me that a telegram had just been received from the Netherlands Minister to Japan stating that the financial strain on the country had become most embarrassing. He advised as friendly a tone as possible in the event of representations being made to Japan, being of the opinion that diplomatic language in that sense would have a tendency to strengthen the hands of the party of moderation.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is now attending a meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva, does not favor resorting to a boycott against Japan. He is in full sympathy with the course pursued by the Department of State with reference to Manchuria and Shanghai and would presumably be favorably disposed in case the Assembly is confronted with the question of associating the League with the American policy as set forth by you and so formally notifying Japan and China.

I transmit herewith translations of editorial comments that have appeared in the Dutch press on your recent letter to Senator Borah.

Respectfully yours,



Laurits S. Swenson.

Enclosures:  
Press comments.  
File No. 710  
In quintuplicate  
LSS:EMD

ENCLOSURE NO. I TO DESPATCH NO.

Translation from  
NIEUWE ROTTERDAMSCHER COURANT  
(Liberal) of Rotterdam  
February 27, 1932.

MR. STIMSON'S LETTER.

Mr. Stimson has written a letter to Senator Borah, with reference to certain questions put to him by the Senator, that is intended for the whole world. The Americans have taken good care that all the representatives now in Geneva shall be made cognizant of this letter, destined, however, in the first place, for Japan. The letter is, perhaps, the most serious utterance that has been addressed to the Japanese with reference to their action in China. For, so far, no one has allowed a menacing note to be heard and even though veiled threats have been made from the powers, among which were such things as the breaking off of diplomatic relations and even an economic boycott, these had but very comparative significance. In this instance, however, the Japanese have to do with an extremely grave risk. They may suppose that the powers will certainly think very well before taking any definite course, the end of which cannot be well foreseen. Tokio may reckon upon the fact that England and America whose interests are the most affected in Shanghai would not undertake a war against a desperate Japan. However great their supremacy might prove to be in the end, the certain losses and dislocation would, in any case, be so great that such a war, even for the triumphant two powers, would signify a catastrophe in all kinds of spheres. No positive advantages of great importance would be there to be set off against such catastrophes. Wars are now no longer begun in cool blood. It is only the fact that Japan has already lost its cool bloodedness which has allowed matters to go so far; for the present, however, Japanese speculation does not appear to be too venturesome. Mr. Stimson's letter, however, opens up quite other presumptions. The Secretary of State says, in very emphatic argument, that Japan has made a breach of the Nine-Power-Treaty of Washington. Japan's appeal to the disorderly state of affairs in China is of no effect, so says Mr. Stimson, for the treaty was concluded just for the emphatic reason that this disordered state of affairs made it necessary.

From this Mr. Stimson draws a very dangerous conclusion for Japan. If Japan does not abide by that part of the Washington arrangement, America will not consider itself bound by the other arrangements, it having entered into the obligations referred to because it considered its interests in the Far East safe under the Nine-Power-Treaty. Hence Japan's attitude may compel America to give notice of the termination of the two other Washington treaties, - that regarding naval obligations and the Four-Power Treaty by which

America...

- 2 -

America bound itself not to make naval bases of either the Philippines or Guam. As a naval base Guam would be a pistol aimed at Japan's breast and the termination of those two treaties would mean for Japan a resumption of the race in naval armaments upon the largest possible scale.

The Japanese say that they too made concessions in Washington in concluding the treaties about which Mr. Stimson writes. This, however, is only a formal truth. For then these treaties meant the cessation of a race that was bringing Japan directly to financial ruin. At that time more than half of Japan's budget had to be expended for military purposes. Japan's development suffered tremendously under this burden. Japan was relieved of that burden by Washington. It was then able safely to become a party to the naval treaty, as America's renouncement of the conversion of Guam and Manila into naval bases made the Japanese islands tactically impossible for an American fleet.

If these arrangements are annulled a very anxious time cannot but come for Japan in its already great financial and economic needs. It would probably not allow matters to take such a course, for if it drew no conclusions from what America would begin, it would then later be subjected to United States supremacy on the high seas. This then would be the result of its action in China.

Tokio is quite well aware that the carrying out of such a plan by America is not by any means an impossibility. The Big Navy Group would find unexpected allies.

Japan would also have to fear England. Mr. Stimson's letter proposes, not ambiguously, that England has a choice between America and Japan. No one has any doubt how that choice will be made.

In England there is a silent interest for the naval base Singapore; at present this is very clearly observable in the circles that are especially affected by Japan's action. These are, however, just the circles that formerly showed but little interest in Singapore as a naval base. The course of affairs threatens to develop into a real danger for Japan's position.

Meanwhile the cause of disarmament is not passing through good days.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 2 TO DESPATCH NO. 1000

Translation from  
TELEGRAAF (Liberal) of  
Amsterdam  
February 25, 1932.

CHINA AND JAPAN - A WARNING FROM WASHINGTON.

The letter from Mr. Stimson to Mr. Borah is virtually the severest note that America has so far issued in connection with the Sino-Japan conflict. The letter is to be considered as being an annex of that of January 7th, in which Washington reminded China and Japan of their obligations pursuant to the Nine-Power-Treaty of Washington of 1922.

The purpose of the Washington treaty was to prevent any extension of Japanese influence in China, to preserve China's integrity in its entirety and to maintain the open door policy. From the January note it has now clearly appeared that America considers the way in which Japan has been acting since September, 1931, a breach of treaty provisions. Even then America issued the warning that it will not recognize a single new fact that might be contrary to the Washington treaty. Hence no American diplomat has put in an appearance in the new State that has been founded to substitute China's eastern provinces under the auspices of Japan.

The Washington Government has now issued the concealed threat that it will take action against the latest Japanese actions not only by non-recognition. The other measures to which Mr. Stimson refers in his letter to Senator Borah are certainly of such a nature as to give food for thought in Japan.

Mr. Stimson draws a close connection between the Nine-Power-Treaty of February 6, 1922, and the naval treaty that was concluded upon the same date between the great maritime powers. Of that treaty it is Article 19 that is of special interest and which provides that, with respect to naval bases and reinforcements in the Pacific Islands, the prevailing situation should be maintained. Only for Hawaii was an exception made.

The significance of this was, as regards American-Japanese relations, that Japan was allowed a naval supremacy in the East Asiatic waters. As a matter of fact the American naval bases in the Philippines and Guam (1300 miles distant from Yokohama) might not be strengthened, while the distance between Yokohama and Hawaii (3400 miles) is so great that an American fleet leaving Honolulu would reach Japan out of breath and without resources and thus, even with a numerical majority, would only be able to act against the Japanese in their home waters.

America's...

- 2 -

America's reply to Japan's action in Manchuria and Shanghai is as follows: If the Japanese go on making breaches of the treaties of 1922 on one point, the moment will come when America will say that another point will be of no effect; ten years ago we gave you the hegemony in East Asia because you had promised to keep your hands off China's integrity; if you violate China we shall reserve to ourselves the freedom to equip ourselves more comfortably and for you more dangerously in the Philippines and Guam.

Naturally this is not said in so many words in Mr. Stinson's letter to Senator Borah. Anyone, however, can read between the lines and this is well understood also in Tokio, which sees the warning and cannot ignore it.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 15 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
MAR 14 1932  
MR. KLOTS

MAR 17 1932  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 4, 1932.

SHANGHAI SITUATION

Estimate of Immediate Possibilities - February 11, 1932.

Under date February 11 this office sent forward an estimate under heading as above.

It is interesting at this point to recall certain items in that estimate. For that purpose there is quoted the following:

" -4-

"Military.

It is probable that an extensive battle will take place in the area around Woosung and between there and Shanghai in the near future. A considerable number of Japanese and a larger number of Chinese will be killed. The Chinese will probably be defeated and will retreat. The Japanese may or may not follow them.

It may be doubted whether the Japanese will succeed, if that be one of their objectives, in driving any considerable body of the Chinese forces against or into the International Settlement. If the Chinese commanders possess any military skill--and they seem to have exhibited some in the fighting of the past ten days-- they will

*Longitudinal  
to FE -  
A. J. K.  
of course. It  
has been a delight  
to watch FE  
JGP*

~~SA~~  
~~A-R~~  
~~FE~~  
~~W~~

793.94/4798

MAR 17 1932

- 2 -

will get such troops as they have

" -5-

in Chapei out at a convenient moment, to the northward, in time to avoid their being bottled up in that convex sector. The natural line of evacuation is along the track of the railway which leads to Nanking, which tracks are entirely outside of the Settlement, leading off to the northwest. A few Chinese stragglers may be caught in the Chapei area and may seek entry into the Settlement. These can be handled by the forces which are guarding the Settlement. It will be necessary merely to disarm them and allow them to enter. If the Settlement authorities, having tolerated use of the Settlement as a highway for Japanese troops moving to the attack, refuse to permit entry by Chinese troops in retreat, it will be difficult indeed for them to defend themselves against a charge of partiality. However, even if they were so to refuse it may be doubted whether the defenders would have to beat off any large Chinese contingents seeking entry.

Study of the map leads to the conclusion that, from the military point of view, only one development could warrant a movement by Chinese troops, under command, either deliberate or in connection with a forced retreat, southward into the Settlement rather than northwestward into open country. That

one

- 3 -

one thing would be a comprehensive use of the Settlement by the Japanese in connection with their operation of attack. An enveloping movement by the Japanese from the southwest, northward, cutting off the possibility of a Chinese retreat to the northwest and catching Chinese forces between a Japanese force to the west and a Japanese force on the northeast might drive

" -6-

a Chinese force directly into the heart of the Settlement. Such a move could be effected, however, only by sending large bodies of Japanese troops through the Settlement or the French Concession, from east to west to a point at which they could turn northward for an enveloping movement. It is not believed that the Japanese will make any such attempt.

It is therefore estimated that, as the battle develops, the pressure on the International Settlement will be decreased rather than increased.

During the battle, the International Settlement may be endangered both from flying planes and from artillery fire.

However, the battle will probably result in large casualties and ultimate defeat for the Chinese.

It may be followed by the landing of Japanese troops at Nanking in an effort to catch the retreating Chinese forces from the rear and to inflict upon them more casualties and to drive them westward."

FE:SKH:CLS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 693.002 Manchuria/2 FOR Tel. # 340, 10 a.m.

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Mar. 16, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: **Japanese adviser has been installed in office of local Superintendent of Customs, Commissioner of Customs has refused to fly the flag of new regime. Local postoffice is flying new flag.**

793. 94 / 4799

WP

GRAY

Peiping

Dated March 16, 1932

Rec'd 3:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

340, March 16, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General Harbin:

"March 15, 4 p. m.

One. A Japanese adviser has been installed in the office of the local Superintendent of Customs. The Commissioner of Customs has refused to fly the flag of the new regime.

Two. The local postoffice is flying the new flag not as a sign of submission to the new regime but as a conciliatory measure".

For the Minister.

PERKINS

JS-CIB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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20 South Twelfth Street  
Philadelphia  Pennsylvania

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Associate Secretaries  
William B. Harvey J. Barnard Walton  
Walter C. Woodward

15 February 1932

President Herbert Hoover  
The White House  
Washington D C

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
FEB 18 1932  
Department of State

793.94/4800

Dear Friend:

Along with some of the other citizens of this country I am becoming concerned more and more lest the United States relapse into the use of armed force in the Far East. I know that you are strongly opposed to anything of this kind and I am writing to encourage you in this stand because I know of the pressure which is being brought to bear against you from various sources.

I fully realize that we cannot retreat from this situation. The peace of the world is at stake but the alternatives are not armed violence or defeat. Dollar for dollar, man for man and week for week, the economic boycott is less costly and much more effective provided it eventually becomes necessary to use active coercive measures. It seems to me that we have an unusual opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of non-military measures as over military force. If you can, by your patience and farsighted statesmanship, lead in giving such a demonstration to the world, you will have done much to discredit military force as an instrument of international policy and to forward international stability.

Let me assure you that in your effort to maintain justice through peaceful processes you have the good wishes of millions of men and women throughout the world.

Sincerely:

  
Ray Newton  
Secretary Peace Section

RN: BH

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FEB 19 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# American Friends Service Committee

20 South Twelfth Street  
Philadelphia  Pennsylvania

793.94.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 3-1-32  
FEB 27 1932  
MR. ROGERS

Honorary Chairman, RUFUS M. JONES  
Chairman, HENRY J. CADBURY  
Treasurer, WILLIAM R. FOGG

Telephone  
RITTENHOUSE 2765  
Executive Secretary, CLARENCE E. PICKETT

Vice-Chairmen  
HENRY TATNALL BROWN  
HANNAH CLOTHIER HULL  
W. O. MENDENHALL  
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Hugh W. Moore Winifred A. Wildman  
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COAL RELIEF SECTION  
Chairman, HENRY TATNALL BROWN  
Director, BERNARD G. WARING

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
FEB 28 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

MARCH 1 1932

James Grafton Rogers  
Assistant Secretary  
Department of State  
Washington D C

793.94/4801

Dear Friend:

I understand that the State Department prevented the hearing of the Fish-Burton Bill to prevent shipment of arms either directly or indirectly to belligerents. I am very much interested in the reason why this was done. I have been led to believe arms and ammunitions are in fact being sent to Japan. Of course we may be misinformed on both of these points, but I know no better way of getting the correct information than through you.

I want to express my appreciation for the work that you personally and your Department have done to maintain the peace of the world. I believe that the situation in the Far East is a real test between the military and the peaceful methods of nations getting along in the world together. I have a feeling that if the peace machinery breaks down, China and India and many other countries will lose their faith in peaceful processes and rely upon nationalistic militarism which sooner or later means disaster for most of the world. I want you to know that I personally and the Society of Friends are very much interested in promoting peaceful processes and we will be very glad to do anything which we think will further these methods.

Personally I would like to urge the closest cooperation with the League of Nations short of military sanctions but including the economic boycott if it becomes necessary. I want to distinguish between the boycott and blockade. By the latter we could let food ships pass but refuse to buy goods from Japan or sell goods to her. Such a move on our part would go far in strengthening the faith on the part of the Chinese and perhaps of the people of India in the efficacy of public opinion and organizations cooperating for peace.

FILED

MAR 14 1932

Sincerely:

  
Ray Newton  
Secretary Peace Section

RN:BH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

70

March 1, 1932

Dear Mr. Newton:

The situation in China has been so complex that it is impossible adequately to explain each step taken by the State Department without a complete background of all surrounding circumstances, the sequence of events, and the situation at the particular moment when specific action is taken.

793.94/4801

I know that you will appreciate that the Department has been using its efforts toward maintaining the peace of the world. The question of arms shipment is but one of the elements of the problem.

I was glad to get your views as to the question of boycott and appreciate your attitude toward the Department and me personally.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS

Mr. Ray Newton,  
American Friends Service Committee,  
20 South Twelfth Street,  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

MAR 1, 1932.

A-R JGR:IJ

AM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Miss Emily Greene Balch*

*17 Roanoke Road  
Wellesley, Mass.*

RESIDENCE  
3935 PACKARD STREET  
LONG ISLAND CITY, N. Y.

PHONES  
OFFICE STUYVEBANT 9-8182  
HOME STILWELL 4-8191

TUCKER P. SMITH

387 BIBLE HOUSE, ASTOR PLACE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
COMMITTEE ON MILITARISM IN EDUCATION

NEW YORK CITY

393

RAY NEWTON

INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE  
TWENTY SOUTH TWELFTH STREET  
PHILADELPHIA, PA.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 2 - 1932  
Department of State  
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file

March 2 1932  
SECRETARY OF STATE

MAR 3 - 1932  
MR. BUNDY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 10 1932  
DIVISION OF  
AFFAIRS AND

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH

Miss Emily Greene Balch;  
Mr. Tucker P. Smith, Chairman of the Emergency  
Peace Committee;  
Mr. Ray Newton of the American Friends Service  
Committee.

795.94/4802

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The above were referred to me by the Secretary. They came primarily for the purpose of calling to the attention of the Department the Emergency Peace Committee's letter of February 16, 1932 and a supplemental letter of March 1, 1932. They wanted to call to the attention of the Department, as indicated in their letter of March 1, that they have now come to the conclusion that events have gone so far that possibly the use of some kind of economic pressure would be essential. They expressed the fear that if we adopt only the policy of not recognizing treaties, that the military element of Japan in the meantime might gain so much prestige that it would be most unfortunate and that something ought to be done to prevent their gaining this prestige. They agreed that the action of the Government so far had been in harmony with many of their recommendations in their letter of February 16 and were very appreciative of that fact.

MAR 14 1932

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V.L. SKI

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Their whole attitude was very friendly and approving. They did not seem to be at all rabid or insistent on their views. They appreciated the danger of an economic boycott although they felt that a measure which took the form of prohibiting the importation of Japanese goods by law involved only a minimum danger, since no force would be required to put it into effect. They realized, of course, the danger from the ill feeling that might be aroused.

In answer to direct questions, Klots informed them that the taking of economic measures had not been under consideration by this Government and pointed out some of the dangers; that there had not been evidenced any where in the world any real disposition to apply economic measures and that public opinion in this country seemed not in favor of it.

Miss Balch brought up the subject of voluntary boycott. She wondered whether we had considered the fact that a voluntary boycott instead of being inflammatory might be an effective outlet for the feelings and efforts of people who might otherwise engage in agitation of a much more inflammatory character. She wanted us to have

this

-3-

this consideration in mind. Klots said it was interesting but expressed no opinion on the subject.

Mr. Smith expressed the fear that the Borah letter had been interpreted in some quarters as a military threat to Japan or England and asked whether something could not be done to counteract that feeling. Klots explained that there was no such intention in the letter; that it was merely explanatory of the interdependence of the treaties. Klots also said that he felt that the view expressed by Mr. Smith had not been taken very seriously or received any widespread adoption and Mr. Smith apparently agreed. At any rate he did not press the matter any further or seem to attach any serious importance to it.

They asked whether there was anything I could say about the pending bills for an embargo on arms. Klots pointed out the treaty provisions which would have to be considered. They seemed to be in favor of an embargo on the shipment of arms applied to all nations alike which would not be discriminatory and hence would probably not violate the treaties.

Q. J. K.  
ATK.

SA:ATK:VGN

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMERGENCY PEACE COMMITTEE

104 East 9th Street

New York City

March 1, 1932

Hon. Henry L. Stimson  
State Department  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The undersigned believe that the continued and increasing hostilities in the Far East call for strengthening the program outlined in our letter of Feb. 15, 1932. May we respectfully submit for your consideration the following measures which we shall support and urge others to support as means for restoring peace?

We urge that the United States join immediately with members of the League of Nations, with signatories of the Pact of Paris, or with signatories of the Nine Power Treaty in measures of economic non-cooperation with Japan calculated to demonstrate the dependence of the Japanese, as of all other peoples, upon the cooperation and trade of friendly nations, and to lead the Japanese to observe their pledges to seek the settlement of all disputes by pacific means.

We suggest the following steps toward this end:

- a. An embargo upon shipments of arms and other supplies for military operations,
- b. Restricting all loans and credits to Japan; and, as ultimate measures,
- c. The refusal of entry to Japanese exports, and
- d. The refusal of clearance for shipments intended for Japan, other than foods necessary for the civil population.

We recommend these economic measures because of our opposition to war methods and, therefore, hold that they should neither be carried out through nor accompanied by military methods, nor take the form of a blockade of Japan.

We urge this policy in no spirit of national self-righteousness and with no hatred of the Japanese people. There is much to criticize in the records of many governments, including our own; but nations have now solemnly agreed to renounce war as an instrument of national policy and have pledged themselves to settle their disputes by pacific means. These pledges must be observed by all.

Respectfully yours,

*Ducker P. Smith*  
Chairman

FW

793.94/4602

MAR 14 1932

## EMERGENCY PEACE COMMITTEE

Room 386

104 EAST 9th STREET  
NEW YORK CITY

TUCKER P. SMITH  
*Chairman*  
DOROTHY DETZER  
NORMAN THOMAS  
*Vice-Chairmen*

ALVIN C. GODDARD  
*Treasurer*  
MARTHA P. FALCONER  
*Secretary*

For Release, Feb. 16, 1952

### Sino-Japanese Peace Program Given Hoover

#### Withdrawal of American Military Forces Urged in Letter to President

President Hoover was addressed today in a letter from the Emergency Peace Committee signed by executives of several national organizations, including the World Peace Commission of the Methodist Church, the American Friends Service Committee, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and the League for Independent Political Action, calling upon him not to allow the United States, under any circumstances, to be drawn into acts of military force or warfare in the Far East.

This letter urges that in accord with the spirit of the Kellogg Pact, only pacific means should be used as instruments of United States policy, and that United States' citizens, war vessels and armed forces should be withdrawn from conflict areas, and pacific measures of action relied upon to uphold American rights and international treaties.

The letter with its signatories follows:

Dear Mr. President:

The undersigned believe that millions of American citizens and the general membership of the organizations with which we are connected, look with concern upon the dispatch of United States military forces to Shanghai and of a great battle fleet to Hawaii, which lies on the way to the Far East's danger zone. We cannot forget that sentiment for a useless war with Spain was precipitated by the destruction of the Maine -- perhaps accidental -- in Spanish territorial waters.

Militarism and warfare like fire and explosion tend to spread, but they need ingredients to feed upon. The World War demonstrated that

-2-

they are not checked by the application of more military force. They can be satisfactorily overcome only by persuasion, or pressure, which is wholly non-military in character. The Pact of Paris is founded upon this truth.

We beg to assure you therefore that we would support and urge others to support a programme of action by our Government along the following lines:

1. That in accordance with the spirit of the Pact of Paris, the United States under no circumstances should allow itself to be drawn into a war with Japan or join in any measures of military coercion; that instead it should rely wholly on pacific methods of action.
2. That American citizens be advised to withdraw from the areas of threatened conflict.
3. That the United States withdraw its war vessels and armed forces from the same areas.
4. That the United States declare an embargo on the export of arms and war supplies to Japan and China.
5. That the State Department declare that it is contrary to public policy for loans to be made to Japan and China which might be used to assist military operations.
6. That immediate measures be instituted for humanitarian relief for civilians in areas of military activities.
7. That the United States call the attention of Japan to the fact that all nations whose citizens have been injured or whose property has been damaged by the acts of Japan will expect just indemnity.
8. That the United States hold resolutely to the position in Secretary Stimson's note of January 7, that it will refuse to recognize any treaty which violates "the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China" or "the International policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door Policy" and that the United States will refuse to "recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris."
9. That the United States should cooperate with the League of Nations and other governments, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the fullest extent possible for the achievement of the foregoing programme.

Yours respectfully,

TUCKER P. SMITH, Chairman,  
Emergency Peace Committee

DOROTHY DETZER, Executive Secretary,  
Women's Intnat'l. League for Peace and Freedom

-3-

JOHN DEWEY, President,  
People's Lobby

ALVIN C. GODDARD, Executive Secretary,  
World Peace Commission, I.E.Church

BENJAMIN MARSH, Executive Secretary  
People's Lobby

JOHN HAYNES HOLMES, Chairman,  
War Resisters' League

HARRY A. CVERSTREET, Vice-Chairman,  
Committee on Militarism in Education

KIRBY PAGE, Editor,  
The World Tomorrow

CLARENCE E. PICKETT, Executive Secretary,  
American Friends Service Committee

JOHN NEVIN SAYRE, Executive Secretary,  
Fellowship of Reconciliation

CLARENCE SENIOR, Executive Secretary,  
Socialist Party of America

HOWARD Y. WILLIAMS, Executive Secretary,  
League for Independent Political Action

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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500.2111

*Handwritten initials*

Geneva

MET  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Rec'd 6:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

RECEIVED  
MAR 17 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND  
PROPAGANDA

*Handwritten signature*  
MAR 18 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

F/LS  
793.94/4803

78, March 16, 9 p.m.  
Following report from Sweetser.

"The Assembly Committee of nineteen members appointed  
to follow the Sino-Japanese affair held its first meeting  
in private this afternoon. Hymans as President stated that  
Sato had authorized him to state:

- (First) that the withdrawal of troops from  
Shanghai had already begun and,
- (Second) that the two parties had in cooper-  
ation with the four principal powers reached a  
provisional agreement which was still secret but  
which Sato hoped might soon be published.

Londonderry confirmed this information stating that  
another meeting was scheduled at Shanghai for this after-  
noon.

The Committee all felt that the center of interest  
now lies in Shanghai and that the only useful action possi-  
ble at Geneva would be to sustain the action of the powers  
there and bring any possible pressure to bear upon the  
parties to induce them to arrive at an immediate and final  
agreement.

*Handwritten notes*  
MAR 18 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

133

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**NET**

2-#78 from Geneva, March 16,  
9 p.m.

agreement. It was, therefore, agreed that a public meeting with the two parties present should be called for tomorrow afternoon at which it would be hoped Sato would ~~repeat~~ publicly what he had said to Hymans privately and that thereupon various members of the committee would make declarations as to the need of haste. Should this program prove feasible and the hopes of a definitive early settlement be realized the Committee would then be able to adjourn for the three weeks of the Disarmament Conference adjournment. Should any smaller difficulty arise the Secretary General could negotiate it by telephone with Hymans; should a major difficulty arise Hymans could always reconvene the Committee.

In reply to a question as to sources of information for the Committee, Drummond stated they were three. The first was the original Lytton Commission created by the Council under Article 11 and now in Shanghai. This Commission was leaving shortly for Nanking for a few days and then for Manchuria and had been asked to make an interim report to the Council as soon as possible. The Council would

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3-#78 from Geneva, March 16,  
9 p.m.

would undoubtedly study this report as soon as it came and pass it on to the Assembly Committee with any comment it cared to make. The second was the original Shanghai Committee instituted by himself at the outbreak of the crisis and still subject to call if desired. He thought however that this would be unnecessary because of the third <sup>third</sup> ~~to~~ information through the principle powers which <sup>system of</sup> was giving satisfactory results.

An inconclusive exchange of views also took place as to whether the committee's meetings should be in public or not. Benes and Motta felt that in principle public sessions were highly desirable; Hymans, Boncour and Apponyi however felt that a delicate mediation could best be conducted in private. No formal decision was reached except that tomorrow's meeting with the two parties should be public<sup>n</sup>.

WILSON

WSB-HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

23 Wall Street  
New York

MAR 20 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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March 11, 1932.

MAR 12 1932


SECRETARY'S OFFICE

793.94

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Referring to my telephone conversation with you yesterday in regard to the petition which President Lowell of Harvard has been circulating, I am attaching herewith for your information copy of a letter which I have addressed to him.

Sincerely yours,



Honorable Henry L. Stimson,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

F/HS

793.94/480371/3

- 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

23 Wall Street  
New York

NO 1003  
MAR 12 1932

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RECEIVED March 11, 1932.

MAR 12 1932


SECRETARY'S OFFICE

793.94

Dear Mr. Secretary:

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Sincerely yours,



Honorable Henry L. Stimson,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

F/HS

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1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 19, 1952.

Dear Mr. Lowell:

I am sorry that my office failed to forward to me promptly a copy of your telegram of February sixteenth, so that I could have given it immediate attention and have replied to you earlier. I should have been unwilling to sign the proposed appeal, and I will venture to give you my reasons for my reluctance to do so:

(A) I am thoroughly in accord with the principle that private citizens have every right and duty to express themselves quite candidly and openly on any question of public moment that arises. In fact, I have no doubt that it is always a help to the Federal Administration at Washington to be made aware of the trends of public opinion on any pending question. At the same time in an exceedingly complex situation like that prevailing in the Far East, in which presumably our Government is lending its best efforts towards composition, I have great reservation as to the wisdom of private citizens banding together, so to speak, and publicly appealing to the Government to undertake a certain course of action. That reservation would largely disappear in the event that, upon proper consultation with the Department of State, it appeared that the proposed group action was one that ran parallel and not counter to the efforts of the Department itself. I have been frequently invited to join in appeals to the Federal Government on various pending questions, both domestic and foreign, but if the situation in any instance has been of large importance I have always suggested that first of all the proper officials at Washington be consulted. If that be done, then, of course, the group would be perfectly free to use its own judgment as to further procedure.

(B) I have felt that in this Far Eastern situation no private citizen or group of citizens has yet had information adequate to justify any final judgment or proposed course of action. While I would not for one moment attempt to justify the Japanese course at Shanghai - and while in fact I have spoken in no uncertain terms to my Japanese friends on this subject - nevertheless, I, for one, feel that the press reports from Shanghai have been far from adequate. They have naturally almost all emanated from Chinese sources, and it is by no means clear that the Chinese themselves have not been guilty at times of highly provocative and even aggressive tactics against the Japanese. I am not attempting to argue a case for the Japanese. I am simply saying that my information is as yet too inadequate for me to form a final judgment. Having been in the Far East for considerable periods and at considerable intervals, I am particularly aware of the extraordinary complexity of the situation out there and of the facts that in the ordinary course of affairs the press reports of events there are likely to be most inaccurate.

(C) While in framing the appeal which you have proposed you doubtless had no intention of pre-judging the case, nevertheless, the public

- 1 -

both in this country and Japan, reading your appeal is bound to gain the general impression that you are advocating an economic boycott. The very phrase at the end of the appeal, namely, "We appeal to the President and Congress to signify to the League that we will concur in economic measures, etc." would to the lay mind indicate that a judgment of the case had already been arrived at.

(D) While I have always been in general a strong advocate of the League of Nations' methods and, in fact, for years advocated the entry of the United States into the League; while I am well aware of the clauses of the Covenant that point out the possibility of economic sanctions; nevertheless, it seems to me that this whole question of an economic boycott should be approached with the utmost caution. I, myself, regard an economic boycott as practically tantamount to war. Any careful study of the historical effect of economic blockades, any survey of the effects of such blockades today only serves to convince me in my belief that economic warfare of this nature is liable to be fully as destructive as military operations themselves. Certainly, the invoking of an economic boycott is just as much an appeal to force as the employment of armies and navies. As has been often said before, the effect in human suffering is likely to be equally heavy. Was it not the continued economic blockade of Germany, more than the force of the Allied arms, which finally broke Germany down and brought about its defeat? In my judgment for the United States Government to declare an economic boycott against the Japanese people is simply to undertake the waging of a war against that people. Any such course, it seems to me, must be entered upon, or even proposed, only after the most careful examination and only with the greatest exercise of patience and caution. It is conceivable that things may reach such a pass that such a step might have to be taken, but I can see nothing in the situation that as yet warrants that step.

(E) You may say that my observations are beside the mark, because your appeal does not in itself commit its signers to an economic boycott, but simply brings the matter forcibly to the attention of the governments concerned and perhaps is in itself calculated to act as an effective warning. Unfortunately I cannot conceive of the Japanese people being in a state of mind when any such gesture on the part of a group of American citizens will be considered as a friendly warning. On the contrary, any such action is bound to arouse deep resentment among the Japanese people. I think we must remember that as a whole the Japanese people, in so far as they are informed at all, are convinced that they are well within their rights and, in fact, that the Chinese are the aggressors. They undoubtedly regard any serious group proposal over here, directed against them, as a preliminary to war. And we succeed in arousing the very sentiments and passions which, as peace lovers, it is our purpose to allay. I recall that during a visit to Japan in the early spring of 1920 the whole Japanese people were thrown into a panic and almost frenzy by a cabled announcement from Washington, reporting that the then Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, had asked for the construction of an American navy far exceeding anything that had ever been proposed before. To the ill-informed Japanese people this meant one thing and one thing only, namely, an aggressive naval warfare on the part of the United States against Japan. Poor and tax ridden as they were, the Japanese people immediately began to wonder how they could squeeze out more millions themselves for naval defense. One unfamiliar with conditions in Japan can have little conception of certain inferiority complexes which they have and

- 3 -

of the feeling of resentment and resistance into which they are thrown by foreign gestures which in themselves are not intended to be unfriendly, but which bear that semblance.

(F) Simply as a matter of technical procedure I should be sorry to see our Government commit itself in advance to any specific course which the League might adopt. By adopting any such course as your petition suggests, our Government would be committing itself in advance to vote in a certain way upon questions which presumably were to be the subject of long-continued and illuminating debate in the League itself. In other words, our Government would be in advance assuming a very grave responsibility, without being able on the spot to share in the deliberations of the League and gain all the information and light upon the subject that might emanate from the discussions at Geneva. I do not mean to indicate that our Government is not fully informed as to the daily occurrences at Geneva, because undoubtedly it is so informed. But to anticipate by so far as your petition suggests the deliberative action of the League seems to me to be treading on unsafe ground.

(G) Secretary Stimson in his declaration of January ninth, last, (I think that was the date) outlined the American position very clearly. It seems to me now that every effort should be made to encourage the Chinese and Japanese to settle the difficulties as between themselves. In my judgment they are entirely capable of doing so. As long as the Chinese feel that we are ready to continue to fight all their troubles for them, undeserved or deserved, as the case may be, just so long will they continue to hang back and make it more difficult for the Japanese to come to terms with them.

(H) This letter has dragged out to interminable length, and I almost despair of your even reading it. But I have for so many years been deeply interested in Far Eastern questions and have such a feeling of friendliness for both the Chinese and Japanese that I venture thus to go into the matter very fully.

With great respect and regard, I am,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Thomas W. Lamont

President A. Lawrence Lowell,  
Harvard University,  
Cambridge,  
Massachusetts.

TWL.LC

(Copy for Secretary Stimson)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

23 Wall Street  
New York

RECEIVED

MAR 12 1932

March 11, 1932.

Read from S  
file  
DAS

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

*Ans NZA 2/4/32*

F/H/S

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

For your information I attach herewith copy of a letter that I have delivered today to Mr. S. Sonoda, New York Manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank. Mr. Sonoda tells me that he plans to transmit this by cable to his people in Tokyo. The letter is prompted by the circumstances which I explained to you over the telephone.

Sincerely yours,

*J. Lambert*

793.94/4803-2/3

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

FILED

1932

March 10, 1932

Personal

Dear Mr. Sonoda:

When you are next communicating through your Tokyo office, I should be glad if you will ask them to say to Finance Minister Takahashi that I am greatly relieved by the report that the difficulties between the Japanese and Chinese in the Shanghai area are about to be amicably composed. I hope with all my heart that this report is true and that the composition will be carried out as expeditiously and smoothly as possible.

I hardly have to say that the whole Shanghai situation has been very heavily on my mind. It is not for me to render judgment upon the issues involved. Even recognizing that the issues and the events themselves may not have been correctly reported in the American press, yet by this time it must be plain to the Japanese authorities that the bombing of certain of the civilian areas in Shanghai by the Japanese naval and military contingent has created a most painful impression in this country and has aroused a public opinion against Japan that causes me, like all other friends of Japan, much alarm. While I do not attach too much importance to the talk of governmental boycotts, nevertheless, so far as the effect upon Japan is concerned private action might be equally or more detrimental. One never can tell how far an aroused public opinion will move.

Fortunately for Japan her government requires no present foreign credit. If it did, of course it would be quite impossible to arrange any credit, either through investment or banking circles. The effect which the Shanghai disturbance has had upon outstanding Japanese obligations here is only too obvious.

I realize the many complexities in the situation and the fact that Japan has certain national interests to protect. At the same time it is possible that Japan might pay too highly for the protection of such interests, if by such action she incurred the continuing ill-will and disaffection of the people of the United States and of many of the other so-called Western nations. It is certainly manifest that Japan must take such measures as shall demonstrate to the world its essentially peaceful intent, and its determination to adjust the Shanghai situation promptly.

You will understand that this letter to you is inspired only because of my known friendliness to the people of Japan and because of the personal regard in which I hold Minister Takahashi and the officers of your good institution.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Thomas W. Lamont.

S. Sonoda, Esq.,  
Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd.,  
120 Broadway,  
New York City.

1901

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

*Thomas W. Lamont  
read with  
very much  
interest*

March 14, 1932.

By sending me  
President Lowell and  
him of them with very

Very yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Thomas W. Lamont, Esquire  
23 Wall Street,  
New York City

*Thomas W. Lamont, Esquire, 793.94/4803-2/3*

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal *J*

1902

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Lamont, Thomas W. 795.94/4803-2/3*

March 14, 1932.

Dear Mr. Lamont:

I wish to thank you for sending me  
copies of your letters to President Lowell and  
Mr. Sonoda. I have read both of them with very  
much interest.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Thomas W. Lamont, Esquire  
23 Wall Street,  
New York City

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal *h*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01-Manchuria/39 FOR Tel.#336-8pm  
FROM China (Perkins) DATED Mar.14,1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

793.94/4804

REGARDING: Manchurian situation. On March 12 about 100 Chinese soldiers at Manchuli looted several shops and killed two Chinese shop owners and one Japanese drug store owner. Local Japanese controlled press is agitating in favor of the redemption of the Chinese Eastern Railway through purchase by new state of Manchukuo. General Honjo is expecting to arrive at Harbin today.

tfv

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 14, 1932

Rec'd 10 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

336, March 14, 9 p. m.

Following from American Consul at Harbin:

"March 14, noon. No. 32.

One. On March 12th at midnight about 100 Chinese soldiers at Manchuli got out of hand, looted several shops, killed two Chinese shop keepers and one Japanese owner of a drug store while so doing and fled toward Chalainor. On the 13th there was no shooting but all shops and residences were boarded up.

Two. During the looting at Tabeiho mentioned in my telegram No. 31 the Chinese post office there suffered a loss of 3000 Harbin dollars through robbery.

Three. Soviet Government is buying here and shipping into Siberia very large quantities of wheat. Recent arrivals from Vladivostok report that passenger service has been suspended between Maharovsk and Vladivostok, the Usuri Railway being used for military transport only.

Four. The local Japanese controlled press is  
agitating

REP

2-#336, from Peiping, Mar. 14, 8p.m.

agitating in favor of the redemption of the Chinese  
Eastern Railway through purchase by the new state Manchukuo.

Five. General Honjo is expecting to arrive at  
Harbin today."

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

WSB

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Copy for the Department of State  
For the file of the Commercial  
Office*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

ERD/erd

American Consulate, Kobe, Japan, February 2, 1932.

The Honorable

W. Cameron Forbes,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo Office of Economic Adviser

FEB 11 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*No distribution  
m.m.l.*

EA  
793.94/4805

Sir:

I have the honor respectfully to offer the suggestion that if, as a result of Japan's military and naval activities in China, it becomes necessary or desirable to exert pressure on Japan, it appears to me that the method most readily available and the one which would impose the greatest pressure in the least time would be that of refusing loans to Japanese governmental organizations, banks and industrial concerns. This could be accomplished by using the influence of the Department of State to induce financiers in New York to refuse to issue new loans, to renew outstanding loans, or to refund bond issues when they mature. The co-operation of financiers in London and Paris would of course be desirable but not entirely necessary.

I have no exact figures available, but it appears from newspaper accounts that the Yokohama Specie Bank borrowed the equivalent of Yen 127,000,000 in the New York short-term money market, through a group of financiers headed by J. P. Morgan and Company, during the months from September to December, 1931, to assist in covering the Bank's dollar sales. These loans came due on January 10, 1932, but were renewed for three months and now fall due on or about April 10, 1932. The Toho Electric Power Company's 6% bond issue of 1929, amounting to \$ 11,450,000 (all outstanding), issued through the Guaranty Trust Company, matures in June, 1932. The South Manchurian Railway 5% sterling bond issue of 1907-08, amounting to £ 6,000,000 (all outstanding), issued in

London

1907

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

London, matures in July, 1932. At the present rates of exchange these loans are equivalent approximately to the following amounts:

Short-term loans in New York . . . . .	Yen 127,000,000
Toho Electric bond issue . . . . .	" 32,700,000
South Manchurian bond issue . . . . .	" 60,000,000
Total . . . . .	" 219,700,000

In addition, interest payments on these and other outstanding external bond issues will amount to 80 or 90 million yen in 1932. All together, external payments during the year will total around 300 million yen. part of this amount will be met with credits in the London short-term money market, and a part will be met with funds obtained from export bills. In the present condition of Japan's export trade, however, it is unlikely that any great amount can be obtained from export bills. nother part will undoubtedly be met by the sale of external Japanese bonds acquired by Japanese interests. I surmise, however, that a considerable part of the debts falling due, according to present plans, are to be covered by raising new loans or by refunding old loans. If this procedure is disapproved by the Governments of the lending countries, the only alternatives will be the shipment of gold (which Japan cannot afford at present, as the gold reserve has fallen to Yen 430,000,000) or repudiation.

For these reasons I believe that the restriction of loans to Japanese interests will provide an effective means of exerting pressure without directly interfering with commerce. Moreover, with the present weak condition of Japan's external accounts and the prospect of inflation in Japan, it is presumed that American financiers are not eager to loan further sums to this country or to extend loans already made.


Respectfully yours,

*E. R. DICKOVER*  
E. R. Dickover  
merican Consul

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal. *[Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7/13/97  
8/13/94  
8/13/94  
8/13/94  
8/13/94



CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



THE SECRETARY

March 15, 1932.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Withdrawal of Japanese Forces.  
Recognition of the New State of Manchuria.

The Japanese Ambassador said he came to tell me that his Government was withdrawing the Twenty-fourth Mixed Brigade, which was half of the Twelfth Division, and the Eleventh Division; that the Twelfth Division was part of the first landing force sent by Japan, and the Eleventh Division was part of the later reinforcements. I then asked the Ambassador what he had heard about the meeting of the Conference in <sup>Shanghai</sup> Japan, and he reported that he had heard that they met on the fourteenth, and gave me an account of the meeting and of the matters discussed, which corresponded substantially with the information I had heard already from Minister Johnson. The Ambassador said he understood that China was insisting on not discussing matters which were questions of policy apart from the evacuation, but that he was glad to hear that they had been willing to discuss the ratification of Mayor Wu's promise of January twenty-eighth. I told the Ambassador that I understood that this meeting was to be confined to the liquidation of the military situation and that I realized

F/LS 793.94/4806

END

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

realized that, while it should not take up matters of policy not connected with the Shanghai incident, it was quite proper and necessary that it should take up questions of the violence which had been directly concerned with the military incident. He said he understood my position. The Ambassador said that he hoped that some way would be found to take care of the territory evacuated by the Japanese Army; that he had heard that at first the Chinese representatives had refused to promise that the Chinese Army would not immediately advance into that territory but that later they had agreed to stand still temporarily. I said I had heard the same thing. The Ambassador asked me whether I had any ideas as to what should be done for policing that zone eventually. I told him that I recognized that it was a problem produced by the situation and that some solution must be found for it, but I had none to suggest and was leaving the suggestions to the people who were on the ground and were familiar with it. I reminded him that I had always contended with him that it would be to the advantage of both Japan and China to have neutral observers present in these discussions and that this seemed to be borne out by the success of this first meeting. The Ambassador laughed and said he remembered

it

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

it and that now that we had so many neutrals present it ought to be successful. I told him that, although I had no close knowledge of the situation, it seemed to me that one of the great difficulties of the evacuated zone was that China did not have an adequate police force to take care of it; that even if the neutral powers should police it for awhile with military forces, that could only be temporary, and that the only suggestion which had come to me in my experience was the training of a Chinese constabulary under foreign instructors. I told the Ambassador of my experience in Nicaragua; that we had trained up a very efficient constabulary for the Nicaraguan Government, and that immediately after the election in Nicaragua next November we were going to withdraw our instructors and leave Nicaragua a very good force. Possibly something like that could be done in China, but I had not suggested it to the negotiators. The Ambassador said that was very interesting and that as I had had so much experience with that sort of a situation, both in Nicaragua and in the Philippines, he hoped I would make the suggestion some time.

✓ The Ambassador then told me that he was instructed to say that his Government was going very slowly about the recognition of the new State of Manchuria and that it would

be

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  

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THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

be a long time before they decided. In reply, I took up a copy of the Nine-Power Treaty and asked the Ambassador to read Article 2, which he did. I told him that I was of the opinion that that Article forbade us from recognizing the new State of Manchuria and I suggested that he bring that Article to the attention of his Government as it appeared to be equally binding upon Japan.

HLS.

S HLS: CBS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 858.00 P. R./109 FOR Despatch #445

FROM Sweden (Morehead) DATED March 4, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

793.94/4807

REGARDING: Sino- Japanese conflict. Appointment on February 26th  
of Foreign Minister and two others as Sweden's delegates  
to extraordinary Assembly of the League called to deal with, - .  
General feeling that League Assembly will accomplish little  
and reported that Sweden is attempting to take lead among the  
smaller states.

fp

## 2. THE LEAGUE ASSEMBLY AND THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT:

On February 26 the Foreign Minister and two others were appointed Sweden's delegates to the extraordinary Assembly of the League, called to deal with the Sino-Japanese conflict. On March 3 the Crown Prince Regent held a special Council meeting at which it is understood the instructions to the delegates were discussed. It is believed that a secret session of the Riksdag will be held March 4 to enable that body to consider the instructions before the departure of the Foreign Minister for Geneva on March 5.

The general feeling is that the League Assembly will accomplish little, but there have been reports current that Sweden was attempting to take the lead among the smaller states, especially those signatory of the Oslo Convention, to bring about concentrated action on the part of the smaller states at the Assembly in the interests of peace. Just what such action might be is not made clear.

3. SWEDISH-



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Berne, February 23, 1932

FE  
WE

No. 2483

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PH 4444

793.94  
2/25/32

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 19 1932 PM  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/4808

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

Under instructions from the Minister, I have the honor to submit a report of a conversation which took place at a dinner given by the Diplomatic Corps at Berne in honor of the President of the Swiss Confederation and the members of the Federal Council on Saturday evening, February 20.

MAR 21 1932

FT:MD

Prior to the dinner, I was talking to the Chinese Minister, Mr. James Woo Kaiseng, when the Japanese Minister, Mr. Schichitarô Yada, joined us, shook hands cordially with the Chinese Minister as well as with me, and looking at his watch, said to the Chinese Minister in a half humorous tone, "Well, I suppose we are now fighting." The Chinese Minister looked at his

- 2 -

his own watch and said, "Yes, we have been fighting some hours, I am afraid."

At this juncture I said that I was much distressed at the fighting to which they referred, whereupon the Japanese Minister replied that it was indeed very distressing; that he felt it very deeply; and that he believed that if he had been in Shanghai, he might have been able to bring sufficient influence to bear upon both parties to avoid that fighting.

The Department will recall that Mr. Yada was Consul General of Japan at Shanghai for several years. He is reputed to have enjoyed a great deal of influence at that time, and he also is held in very high esteem by his own Government.

The Japanese Minister said further that a great many, if not all, of his colleagues at Geneva felt as badly about the situation as he did, but that it appeared now that there was nothing that could be done.

A few minutes later, after the Japanese Minister left, the Chinese Minister stated that he was sure Mr. Yada was sincere. He felt confident that practically all Japanese diplomats and many of the Government deplored the action of the military party in Shanghai. He himself, even though members of his family were at present in and near the firing zone about Shanghai, a fact which caused him the deepest personal concern, could not feel hostile toward the Japanese Minister or toward those Japanese who, like Mr. Yada, were as distressed about the situation as he was.

After

- 3 -


After the dinner, as I was again talking with the Japanese Minister, who was even more frank than he had been in the presence of the Chinese Minister, he said that he felt that the activities in and about Shanghai could not bring about any results of permanent value to the Japanese Government.

It was to be noted, not only at the dinner on Saturday referred to above, but also on February 22, at a large reception given by the American Minister in honor of George Washington, that there was much cordiality and fraternising among the subordinate members of the Chinese and Japanese Legations.

I have the honor to append hereto a memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Joseph C. Green and Mr. Shinro Miyazaki, Third Secretary of the Japanese Legation.

The views of both the Japanese Minister as referred to above as well as those of the Third Secretary alluded to in Mr. Green's Memorandum will of course be considered in the utmost confidence by the Department.

Respectfully yours,

  
Winthrop S. Greene  
Secretary of Legation

Enclosure: Memorandum

File No. 711:701.1

wsg:met

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Received

JM

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Mr. Joseph C. Green and Mr.  
Shinro Miyazaki, Third Secretary  
of Japanese Legation, Berne.

Berne, February 20, 1932.

At the dinner given on February 20 by the Diplomatic Corps in honor of the President of the Confederation and the members of the Federal Council, I sat next to Mr. Miyazaki, Secretary of the Japanese Legation at Berne. I made some reference to the situation in the Far East, and Mr. Miyazaki, who is a devout Christian, replied by stating that he prayed every night that the Sino-Japanese conflict would come to an end. He expressed horror at the idea that the Japanese should be fighting the Chinese at Shanghai. He went on to say that the situation in Japan was like the situation in Prussia before the war: "We are in the hands of the military. We are helpless. They have full control. They are ignorant of world affairs and they do not understand where they are leading us." He said that all Japan really wanted was order in China, and that this fighting was not necessary to attain that end.

I asked Mr. Miyazaki whether Japan would be willing to submit her difficulties with China to arbitration. He said that he thought not. His reason was that Europe and America could not possibly understand the

special

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

special relations which exist between Japan and China. I asked him whether he thought there was any possibility of Japan's withdrawing from the League of Nations, and he replied that he was absolutely certain that Japan would not withdraw, no matter what action was taken by the League.

It was noticeable that both before and after the dinner the Japanese Minister and the Japanese Secretaries seemed to make a point of talking in the most friendly manner with their Chinese colleagues.

jcg:met

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, 6:15 P.M., MARCH 11, 1932

At the press conference this afternoon Secretary Stimson read the following statement to the correspondents:

"The nations of the League at Geneva have united in a common attitude and purpose towards the perilous disturbances in the Far East. The action of the Assembly expresses the purpose for peace which is found both in the Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League of Nations. In this expression all the nations of the world can speak with the same voice. This action will go far toward developing into terms of international law the principles of order and justice which underlie those treaties and the Government of the United States has been glad to cooperate earnestly in this effort."

The Secretary said that he would not go into the background tonight, but would give it to the correspondents tomorrow. The matter came up a little more quickly than anyone supposed. The Secretary understood from some of the newspaper reports that the resolution would not be passed until Monday.

A correspondent enquired to what the Secretary referred when he said "The Government of the United States has been glad to cooperate earnestly in this effort." The correspondent enquired in what way we cooperated and whether the Secretary was referring to the January 7 statement. The Secretary said that we feel that we have cooperated a great deal in getting this resolution passed in the sense that the statement of January 7 stated the principles of order and justice which underlie the treaties. A correspondent said that there had been some editorial comment to the effect that the League in doing this had not gone as far as we did in our statement of January 7. The Secretary said he was not going into that, because he thought there was glory enough for everybody. A correspondent enquired whether the action of the League Assembly today goes as far as we would have been glad to see them go. The Secretary said he thought that was a little captious and to remember that the Assembly is speaking as an organization and is making a suggestion

793.94/4809

MAR 17 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

to its constituent members. The Secretary did not know whether  
it was constitutional, but he was inclined to think it would  
probably be the extent of its power. He would say that certainly  
the Assembly has gone as far as most constituent bodies would go  
in making suggestions to its units. The Secretary added that  
he makes no criticism of the Assembly's action, if anybody  
else does. NONE OF THE FOREGOING WAS FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION

M. J. McDermott.

73.94



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, MARCH 12, 1932

At the press conference this morning Assistant Secretary Rogers said the Secretary had intended to give the correspondents some background information on the Sino-Japanese situation, but that another matter had come up which interfered with his plans. The Assistant Secretary said he had nothing in the way of information from Shanghai for the correspondents.

A correspondent asked if the Assistant Secretary had any word as to what steps were being taken in Shanghai to put into effect the League resolution. FOR BACKGRUND, Mr. Rogers replied that nothing had been received from Shanghai in respect to the machinery to be used since the League resolution was passed. He added that there was no indication of any action there that was not already under way. A correspondent asked if Mr. Rogers could give the press guidance as to what the next steps might be. Mr. Rogers replied that the next step under the League resolution was obviously a conference of some sort with the four powers bringing the Chinese and Japanese together and attempting to work out a permanent cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Japanese troops. That has been in the air for some days, but we have no news of its actually being convened. A correspondent referred to Mr. Rogers' statement that it would be a conference of the four powers. Mr. Rogers explained that we continued our attitude of cooperation and when he said the four powers he meant Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States.

A correspondent enquired whether the United States had been asked to cooperate in the new proposition which the League resolution put forward. Mr. Rogers replied in the affirmative and added that the United States had received notification of the resolution through the Secretary of the League who simply called our attention to it. We have not replied yet, but will

793.94/4810

MAR 17 1932

M.L.S.

-2-

do so in due course simply along the lines of expressing a continuance of our cooperation. More specifically, a correspondent enquired if the United States was going to cooperate in any way with the work of the Committee of nineteen. Mr. Rogers answered that we had not been asked to do so and that he did not anticipate any such action. He pointed out that the committee was a League committee. A correspondent asked if we would continue to supply information through American representatives in China, if requested to do so. Mr. Rogers said that we would continue to supply military information as we have in the past under a previous resolution of the League. A correspondent asked if cooperation by this country with the committee of nineteen would not have precedent in our representation on the League's Manchurian Investigating Committee. Mr. Rogers explained that we have no governmental representation on that committee. There is an American member who was called in as a military expert, but he is not a representative of this government.

A correspondent recalled that Japan had said the boycott movement in China would have to be suppressed before they withdrew from China. He asked whether that matter was still undetermined. Mr. Rogers replied that he did not think he could add anything to what the correspondents themselves gathered from the resolution and action of the League.

A correspondent recalled that a week ago Secretary Stimson gave the press figures from the Department of Commerce regarding American munitions shipped to Japan, which indicated that only \$1800 worth of munitions were shipped in January, 1932. He enquired whether those figures covered the nitrates shipped to Japan. Mr. Rogers replied that he would have to look the matter up, but he did not think it took into consideration anything except the arms and munitions which were shipped to Japan. The correspondent enquired whether the State Department had any

-3-

knowledge of the amount of nitrate shipments from the United States to Japan. Mr. Rogers declined to comment. The correspondent asked if the State Department had been keeping check on general shipments, not only munitions, of materials which make a base for munitions leaving this country for Japan. Again Mr. Rogers declined to comment.

A correspondent asked if the note which Secretary Stimson gave the correspondents last night was all the action that would be taken on the League resolution. Mr. Rogers pointed out that what the Secretary gave the press last night was a statement for the public and was not addressed to the League. The correspondent said he understood that it was communicated to the League by the State Department. Mr. Rogers said that it was made public in Geneva just as it was here, but that was all.

#### EL SALVADOR

A correspondent enquired whether representatives of the British and American Governments had been discussing the question of recognition of El Salvador. Mr. Rogers declined to comment on the subject.

M. J. McDermott.

Mar. 19

~~S/A~~

① The Chinese  
"Appeal" is an  
excellent document,  
very useful for  
reference purposes.

② "Japan's 54 Cases"  
is also useful for  
reference purposes.

I detached 2 of the  
copies, 1 for FE  
& 1 for the library.

H.



1926

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

With the compliments of  
*Mr. Hankley, You*  
*Chung K. Wu*  
*Chinese Legation*  
*Washington*

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
LEAGUE OF NATIONS SECTION  
MAY 01 1932  
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APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT  
MAY 17 1932  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
PUBLICATIONS SECTION  
MAY 18 1932

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAY 18 1932  
Department of State

793.94

F/L S 793.94/4811

### STATEMENT

communicated by the Chinese Delegation  
in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 2,  
of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

APR 11 1932

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

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
### STATEMENT

communicated by the Chinese Delegation  
in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 2,  
of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

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1421

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



STATE BOUNDARIES  
 BOUNDARIES OF MANDCHURIA  
 BOUNDARIES OF PROVINCES  
 CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY  
 SOUTH MANDCHURIAN RAILWAY  
 CHINESE RAILWAY IN EXPLOITATION  
 PROJECTED CHINESE RAILWAY  
 PROJECTED JAPANESE RAILWAY

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN  
COMPLIANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT  
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

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I. INTRODUCTION.

The Sino-Japanese dispute in its entirety has now been submitted to the League of Nations by formal invocation of its powers and authority under Articles 10, 11 and 15 of the Covenant. The Council has already indicated that the procedure under Article 11 is in no way suspended or superseded by the invocation of other Articles. The problem created by the Japanese aggression against China is therefore squarely before the League in all its aspects.

The gravity of the issue thus presented can hardly be exaggerated. A great country with a population of approximately 400,000,000 inhabitants is here virtually staking its national existence on the practical application and enforcement of the League's Covenant. The supreme test of the effectiveness of the League in a capital emergency is at hand.

Naturally, it is for the League itself in the first instance to construe and apply its own fundamental law. As M. Tardieu, representing France, frankly stated in his address to the Disarmament Conference on February 8th, "the tendency in the past, when interpreting the Covenant, has been that it has been constantly interpreted along the line of least resistance, and that there has been in this respect a definite lack of boldness". Unfortunately, the line of least resistance, which has been followed thus far in this as in other matters, has been closed by the march of events. Nothing short of a courageous and firm stand now seems possible if the Covenant is henceforth to command respect.

It is perhaps useful at the outset to distinguish between the fundamental task of adjusting Sino-Japanese relations, with particular reference to the North-Eastern Provinces of China, so as to lay the bases of permanent peace in the Far East, on the one hand; and the immediate and urgent business of stabilising the situation, in the sense of the Council's resolutions of September 30th and December 10th, so as to permit the final settlement to be made.

The first of these operations is one of wide envergure and necessarily will require time. Inevitably there must be long and attentive negotiations. There are vast complexities and treaty rights and interests, extending even beyond those of the parties to the dispute, to be considered. On this branch of the subject, two positions maintained by China from the very beginning should be kept in mind: (1) negotiations between China and Japan under pressure of military occupation of any part of the former's territory by the latter cannot, for obvious

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reasons, be contemplated; (2) any ultimate adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations with a view to permanent peace must not only safeguard all rights of third parties, but also be in strict accord with the principles laid down in the Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine-Power Treaty. Both of these points will be hereinafter dealt with in detail.

The emergency part of the undertaking—to stop the fighting and loss of life, to liquidate the Japanese occupation, and, in general, to re-establish the *status quo ante* permitting a consideration of the main problem—is of course the one demanding instant attention. We are dealing, not with something which is done and finished, but with an uncontrolled and continuing military aggression by one nation on the territory of another.

The Council has long recognised that the situation is intolerable and brooks of no delay. To stress its extreme urgency from every point of view is quite unnecessary. It is probably no exaggeration to say that there has been no comparable international crisis since 1914. On the threshold of the enquiry lies the question of the proper significance and effect to be attributed to the Japanese aggression as an indisputable fact. That Japan launched the attack, that her armed forces have relentlessly advanced for nearly five months, and that they are now in occupation of a vast extent of Chinese territory in two widely separated parts of the country cannot be controverted. A formidable invasion with all the terrible concomitants of war has taken place and is going on. The scale of the operation and the period of time over which it has persisted have removed all possibility of characterising it as casual, or incidental.

Article 10, the very corner-stone of the Covenant, is being shattered. That Article reads:

“ The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. ”

Japan is a Member of the League of Nations solely by virtue of the fact that she has acceded “ without reservation ” to this as well as the other Articles (see Article 1).

China points to the forcible occupation of 200,000 square miles of her territory, to the attack on Shanghai, to the bombing of Nanking, her capital, and to numerous other specific acts of armed violence as constituting external aggression (and not merely the threat or danger of it) against her territorial integrity and political independence in plain violation of Article 10. The proposition appears so axiomatic as not to fall within the domain of argument.

But Japan asserts that these acts complained of do not constitute such aggression: because, in her opinion, Japan's nationals in China were not receiving fair treatment and in some cases their lives and property were in danger; because Japan conceives it her duty to establish and maintain law and order in Manchuria, at Shanghai and elsewhere; because the Chinese people are refusing to buy goods of Japanese origin; because the Chinese have not welcomed the invading army and it has had to advance in self-defence in order to protect the positions it has occupied; and finally because, after all, Japan has no design to keep the territory which she has taken, and intends to give it up when, in her judgment, the safety of her nationals permits, when the boycott is abandoned, and when China, by direct negotiation (under pressure of the occupation), settles all outstanding disputes with Japan to the latter's satisfaction.

While all of these pretexts and excuses are discussed in the following pages, there is a certain risk of confusion, if one does not keep in mind the primary issue of whether any pretext, however persuasive, can be entertained as a justification for resort to armed force, instead of peaceful means, for the settlement of international differences. The alleged grievances referred to by Japan are all obviously susceptible of arbitration and judicial settlement—which China has proposed.

The basic feature of Japan's plea which calls for notice at this point is the extraordinary contention that the sending of an army to take forcible possession of the territory of a foreign State is divested of all aggressive import if the invading Power issues a simple disclaimer of permanent territorial ambitions and of any intention to stay longer than seems to itself necessary. This position cannot be ignored because it strikes at the root of the whole matter. The League must either reject the Japanese contention or write its Covenant down to a pious declaration that aggression depends upon the self-asserted state of mind of the aggressor, thus converting the Covenant from a guarantee of peace into an invitation to war.

## II. — HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

The region popularly designated as Manchuria, but known to the Chinese as “ The Three Eastern Provinces ”, is a large fertile area with enormous possibilities of economic development. An idea of its size may be gained by recalling the fact that it is somewhat greater than France and Germany combined as they appear on the map of Europe. From time immemorial, Manchuria has belonged to the Chinese national domain; historically, ethnically and politically, it is an integral

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part of China. From the name usually given to these Chinese Provinces collectively, it has been sometimes mistakenly assumed that they are the land of the Manchus, who are said to be in no way allied to the rest of the Chinese by blood. The truth is that China is made up of five races, of which the Manchu is one. Moreover, the population of the region to-day—some thirty millions—is, ethnically speaking, strictly and overwhelmingly Chinese.

That Manchuria is territorially and administratively an integral part of China has repeatedly been recognised by the international circle in all treaties bearing upon the subject, notably those entered into by the Powers at the Washington Conference in 1921-22. The suggestion was never made at that Conference, even by the Japanese, that Manchuria did not fall within the purview of pledges then made guaranteeing China's sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity. Among the latest definite and official reiterations of this position is the reply of Sir Austen Chamberlain, then British Foreign Secretary, to a question in the House of Commons on July 13th, 1928,<sup>1</sup> when he declared that Great Britain considered Manchuria as part of China. Mr. Kellogg, the American Secretary of State, in a statement to the Press on May 21st, 1928,<sup>2</sup> said that, so far as the United States of America was concerned, Manchuria was essentially Chinese soil.

Furthermore, on January 1st, 1926, Baron Shidehara, then Foreign Minister of Japan, addressed the Japanese Diet, in opposition to the "Positive Policy" in Manchuria at that time advocated by the followers of Baron Tanaka, in the following terms:

"No doubt the complete tranquillity of the whole region of the Three Eastern Provinces, undisturbed by any scourge of war, is very much to be desired in the interest of the native population, as well as of the Japanese residents. It is, however, a responsibility that properly rests upon China. The assumption of that responsibility by Japan without just cause would be manifestly inconsistent with the fundamental conception of the Washington Treaties, and with the repeated declarations of the Japanese Government. By taking such course we would forfeit our national honour and pride once for all. In no case, and by no means, can we be party to so improvident an action."<sup>3</sup>

The advent of Japan in the arena of Asiatic continental affairs is comparatively recent. Her attention was first directed to the little Kingdom of Korea, over which China had exercised an age-long suzerainty. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 was the result. By the Treaty of Peace signed at Shimonoseki on April 17th, 1895, China was compelled "to recognise definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea"; and was also forced to cede to Japan in full perpetuity and full sovereignty portions of the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and Dalny, and to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 Kuping Taels.

Subsequently, at the insistence of Russia, France and Germany, who regarded the cession of Liaotung as injurious to their interests and menacing to the peace of the Far East, Japan was induced reluctantly to retrocede the said Peninsula to China in return for an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 Kuping Taels.

Russia at once took advantage of the opportunity to gain a foothold in Manchuria by extorting from China the concessions for the Chinese Eastern Railway with a branch down to the sea at Dalny and Port Arthur; and, later, acquired for herself the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

Japan's turn to advance her ambitious projects on the mainland of Asia came again in 1905, when she declared war upon Russia. The war was fought almost entirely on Chinese territory, and it will be remembered that peace was largely brought about through the good offices of Theodore Roosevelt, then President of the United States of America.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed September 5th, 1905, Japan and Russia mutually engaged: to evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula; to restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria then occupied by their troops respectively, with the exception of said Peninsula; and "not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China might take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria". Both parties further declared, in Article 3, that they had not "in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferences or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity".

The Treaty then provided for the transfer from Russia to Japan (with the consent of China, which the parties undertook mutually to secure) of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, as well as the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur, now known as the South Manchuria Railway.

China's consent to these transfers from Russia to Japan was given in the Sino-Japanese Treaty signed at Peking (now Peiping) on December 22nd, 1905. That was the sole *raison d'être*

<sup>1</sup> London Times, July 14th, 1928, page 13.

<sup>2</sup> United States Daily, May 22nd, 1928, page 2.

<sup>3</sup> Peking Leader, January 24th, 1928.

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of the Peking Treaty, which contained but two substantive Articles, the first of which recorded the consent to the transfer of the leased territory and to the assignment of the railway concession involved.

Article 2 embodied a specific engagement by Japan that, as regards the leased territory and the concessions to be taken over, she would, "so far as circumstances permit, conform to the original agreements concluded between China and Russia"; and that, in case any question arose in the future on these subjects, it would be decided in consultation with the Chinese Government.

Simultaneously with the Peking Treaty, a so-called Additional Agreement was signed by Japan and China with the declared purpose of regulating for their guidance certain questions in which they were both interested in Manchuria. By Article 1, China agreed, as soon as possible after the evacuation by Japan and Russia of their forces, that she would herself open up "as places of international residence and trade" sixteen designated towns. In Article 2, Japan agreed, as soon as tranquillity had been re-established in Manchuria and China was able to afford full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, to withdraw her railway guards simultaneously with Russia.<sup>1</sup> In passing, it may be noted here that, since 1917, Russia has withdrawn her railway guards from the Chinese Eastern Railway areas, while Japan still retains hers, thereby increasing the friction between the Chinese and the railway authorities, especially when the said railway guards outstepped their bounds and attempted to exercise jurisdiction in areas under Chinese control on the pretext of arresting bandits and apprehending criminals.<sup>2</sup>

Article 6 gave Japan the right to maintain and work the military railway line constructed between Antung and Mukden and to improve the same "so as to make it fit for the conveyance of commercial and industrial goods of all nations". This right was conceded for a period of fifteen years from the date of the completion of the improvements and, at the expiration of that term, the railway was to be sold to China at a price to be fixed by foreign expert appraisal.

It will be observed that none of these Treaties and Agreements conferred upon Japan any special or exclusive right to finance or construct railways in South Manchuria. Such a grant, it goes without saying, would have been inconsistent with the principle of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity, which Article 3 of the basic Treaty of Portsmouth reaffirmed. It is equally apparent that Japan's subsequent demands that the lease be extended to 99 years and that China should be precluded from building railways in the area in question, even with her own capital, contravene these Treaties of 1905. Either the principle laid down in the Portsmouth Treaty had to be adhered to or China must be deemed to have been released from her undertakings in the Treaty of Peking which was based upon it.

Nevertheless, from the date of the signature of the Peking Treaty and the Additional Agreement to the present day, Japan has contended that attached to these documents were secret protocols wherein China agreed not to construct, prior to her recovery of the said railway, any main line in the neighbourhood of and parallel to the South Manchuria Railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of that railway. No reliable evidence of the existence of such alleged secret protocols has ever been produced. No official copy has ever been published, nor was anything purporting to embody their terms filed with the United States Government in conformity with the eleventh resolution of the Washington Conference dealing with Far-Eastern affairs. What actually took place in 1905 was that an agreement that China should not parallel the Japanese railway was sought by the Japanese and the matter was discussed. What was mentioned in the Minutes was that China would not construct parallel lines *in the vicinity* of the South Manchuria Railway. The first time the subject came up between China and Japan was in 1907 when the Chinese Ministry of Railways decided to extend the Peking-Mukden Railway from Hsinmin to Fakumen and from thence to Taonan and Heilungkiang. The Japanese Minister in Peking protested and the Chinese Foreign Office replied as follows:

"You must know that, when the Minute was discussed, the Chinese plenipotentiaries pointed out that 'parallel' was very vague and therefore the number of miles must be stated. The Japanese objected by saying that, if this was done, the other Powers might think that Japan was trying to obstruct Chinese railway development. The Chinese wanted European and American precedents to be followed in such a matter, and the Japanese reply was that precedents were not identical. Finally, the Japanese declared that Japan would never obstruct measures on the part of China to develop Manchuria. As we regard that he was speaking in all sincerity and was inspired by feelings of friendship, what he said should be obeyed by both parties."

Nebulous as is this undertaking concerning parallel lines, Japan has used it frequently to block the railway development of Manchuria by China with her own as well as with foreign capital. The two best-known instances are: the case of the projected Hsinmin-Fakumen Railway in 1907-8, when the construction under arrangement with a British firm was frustrated; and the case of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway in 1909-10, when the execution of a contract concluded with an Anglo-

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix VI.  
<sup>2</sup> See Appendix VII.

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American company was similarly blocked. Japan in each instance invoked her alleged treaty rights with the practical result of defeating this development—this notwithstanding the provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty above quoted.

In view of later developments, and of the fact that the whole structure of Sino-Japanese treaty relations affecting Manchuria is founded, according to the Chinese contention, upon the 1905 Treaties and Agreements, it is important to note that the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula to Russia was for a period of twenty-five years, dating from 1898, and therefore expired in 1923; and that, by the terms of the Chinese Eastern Railway contract (which is applicable to the present South Manchuria Railway), it is provided that the whole enterprise should revert to China free of charge after a period of eighty years from the date on which the line was completed and opened to traffic. The line having been so opened in 1903, it will revert to China in 1983. There was also in the Railway Contract a clause permitting China to purchase the line on certain terms at the expiration of thirty-six years from the date of completion—that is to say, in 1939.

Japan, however, contends that the 1905 arrangements have been supplemented and modified by an entirely new series of arrangements concluded under duress in 1915. This is the celebrated affair of the Twenty-one Demands which, during the World War, were presented by Japan, not through ordinary diplomatic channels, but to the President of the Chinese Republic in a manner calculated, if possible, to secure extreme secrecy, and accompanied by an ultimatum expressing clear intention to use armed force if the demands were not complied with. The President, Yuan Shi-Kai, was in the circumstances forced to capitulate, virtually at the point of the pistol.

The so-called Agreements extorted in this fashion involved, among other things: extension of the terms of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway to 99 years—that is to say, until the year 2002; the cancellation of China's right to redeem the South Manchuria Railway by purchase in 1939; the extension of the term of the Antung-Mukden Railway until the year 2007; the granting of a preference to Japanese capitalists in all negotiations for loans to provide funds for building railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; the undertaking by China to negotiate with Japanese capitalists first when making future loans on the security of taxes in the said regions; the undertaking by China to employ first Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters, when such advisers or instructors are required in South Manchuria; and the undertaking that the Chinese authorities in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall come to an understanding with the Japanese Consul before enforcing police laws and ordinances and taxation against Japanese subjects.

The 1915 dictated "Agreements" cannot be read as a whole with an eye to their cumulative effect without arriving at the conclusion that they were intended to lead to, if not actually establish, a virtual protectorate over that part of China which they concerned. The Chinese Government and people have characterised them as invalid and of no effect. The Government immediately after their signature issued a formal public statement of protest,<sup>1</sup> disclaiming responsibility for any consequent violation of treaty rights of other Powers and disassociating itself from any such attempted revision of the various international conventions and agreements concluded relating to the maintenance of China's territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the *status quo* and the principle of equal opportunity with the commerce and industry of all nations in China. The question was raised by China at the Paris Conference in 1919, but no action was taken. At the Washington Conference of 1921-22, China spread upon the records the reservation of the right on all future appropriate occasions to seek a solution of this problem.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Hughes made a statement summing up the American position.<sup>3</sup> Finally, it should be pointed out that the 1915 so-called "Agreements" have never been ratified by the Chinese Parliament as the Constitution of the Republic requires. On the contrary, the Parliament, in January 1923, mindful of the approaching expiration of the original lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, adopted a resolution formally declaring the Treaties of 1915 null and void and calling upon the Government to act accordingly. By a note dated March 10th, 1923, the Chinese Government brought the matter to the attention of the Japanese Government, stating that the Agreements in question should forthwith be abrogated, saving, of course, those regarding which a satisfactory settlement had already been reached. The Japanese Government replied that it was apprised of the position which had been taken by the Chinese Government and reasserted its own position that the Agreements continued in force. Concededly, the treaty situation affecting Manchuria, and indeed the relations between China and Japan as a whole, are complex and difficult. At the same time, it is clear that the issues are all such as to call for arbitration or judicial settlement and cannot on any recognised theory

<sup>1</sup> Appendix I.

<sup>2</sup> Appendices II and III.

<sup>3</sup> Appendix IV.

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be held to justify to resort to armed force to resolve them. The Covenant of the League is itself emphatic on this subject. Paragraph 2 of Article 13 reads as follows:

"Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement."

With further reference to the 1915 arrangement, it may be recalled that the United States Government, on May 13th, 1915, sent the following identic note to both Japan and China:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognise any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the 'Open-Door Policy'."

### III. — EVENTS SINCE SEPTEMBER 18TH, 1931.

#### *The Japanese Attack.*

At 10 o'clock on the night of September 18th, 1931, regular troops of Japanese soldiers, without warning of any kind, suddenly opened rifle and artillery fire upon Chinese troops in the immediate vicinity of the city of Mukden, bombarded and looted the arsenal and barracks of the Chinese soldiers, set fire to the ammunition depot, attacked and disarmed the Chinese troops in Changchun, Kwanchengtse and other places. Within forty-eight hours they were in occupation of these cities, as well as Antung and other places and, by holding the chief strategic points along the railways, were in effective control of an area as large as the British Isles.

#### *Japanese Premeditation and Violence.*

The smoothness and swiftness with which this operation was carried out indicated premeditation. This, indeed, was confirmed from many sources, both neutral and Chinese.

The Council has been apprised of some of this evidence. Council document C. 733. 1931, of October 20th, contains the text of a telegram from Mr. Robert Lewis, an American citizen of high standing, containing the following passage:

"I have proof that on Friday night, September 18th, the Japanese army sent through Antung from Korea into Manchuria seven trains loaded with soldiers. On Saturday night, September 19th, they sent four additional trains loaded with soldiers into Manchuria through the same place. On Sunday, September 20th, they sent eight further trainloads through the same point into Manchuria. These nineteen trains are now part of their occupying force in Manchuria. (Antung is 161 miles from Mukden, on the Korean border.)"

The Chinese delegate, Dr. Sze, on October 13th, read a telegram addressed to him on October 12th by Mr. Sherwood Eddy, whom he described as an American "who has devoted his entire life to the promotion of good-will and a better understanding among the nations of the world". This telegram reads:

"I was present at capture Mukden. Evidence of many witnesses interviewed at time and on spot points to premeditated carefully prepared offensive plan of Japanese army without provocation of any Chinese attack producing bitter resentment when China suffering with flood disaster and world preoccupied. Japanese troops not withdrawn but all strategic points Southern Manchuria still held by Japanese and Chinchow bombed. I have testified, under oath sent Nanking and Geneva, to evidence of efforts to establish puppet independence governments Manchuria under Japanese military control. I have forwarded sworn statement of interviews with Chinese leaders Manchuria who testify to repeated pressure of Japanese to induce them to head independence Governments. Universal indignation in China taking

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form economic boycott which Government cannot control. Efforts of Nanking Government still peaceful non-resistance which imperil Government if pacific settlement fails. Situation critical grave developments imminent. All Orient looking to League of Nations and Kellogg Pact signatories for action. Asia believe League and Pact are on trial as well as Japan and China. Notable turning towards Soviet Russia as an ally and Communism is developing threatening widespread anarchy if League and Pact fail in this supreme crisis and menace of war."

In connection with the question of premeditation, it may be mentioned as a highly significant circumstance that the semi-official *Japan Times* published on the morning of September 19th an elaborate special supplement on Manchuria, which must have taken some time to prepare. The supplement had a sensational heading asking whether war between China and Japan in Manchuria was inevitable and was devoted to discussing Manchuria as a potential second Korea.

A word must also be said as to the acts of violence and cruelty committed by the Japanese forces in their surprise attack. Council document C.604 of September 24th, 1931 (pages 6 and 7), reports the following:

" Japanese troops at Kungchuling Kirin have launched another attack on Chinese soldiers. Massacre of Chinese in Kirin City even more serious than in Mukden. Chinese civil and military officials were ruthlessly killed; about 200 met their death. . . . Many Chinese civilians in Changchun slain. Chouyuping, director of Changchun Municipal Administration, found lying dead on roadside with seven bullet wounds, fifty-one bayonet cuts; fifteen members of his family were also butchered. When first occupied Changchun Japanese troops bombed city twenty times in five hours, ruining large number of houses."

The practice of savagely bombing from aeroplanes open and undefended towns in peace-time has been introduced by Japan as an innovation in the practice of civilised nations and has been pursued steadily in Manchuria (Changchun, Chinchow and Kowpangtse are cases in point). The deeds perpetrated by Japan's bombing planes over Chapei, one of the most thickly populated sections of the municipality of Greater Shanghai, the incendiary activities of Japanese marines and the refusal to allow the Settlement fire brigades to combat the conflagration are still fresh in every one's mind. On that occasion, thousands of innocent civilians—men, women and children alike—lost their lives. These methods have characterised Japanese activities in Manchuria since September 18th, and are still continuing.

The pretext alleged by the Japanese Government—that one rail had been removed from the sleepers—for the outbreak of September 18th is so trivial and inadequate as scarcely to require comment: but it may be repeated here that the Chinese Government flatly denies that there was any tampering with the railways at any point on the South Manchurian Railway, and that, since the Japanese Government refused the neutral enquiry for which the Chinese Government immediately asked, its version is *prima facie* suspect. The testimony of Mr. Robert Lewis, quoted above, shows that Japanese troop trains were beginning to move north from the Korean frontier before the occurrence of the alleged incident.

*China's Appeal and the September 30th Resolution.*

The Chinese Government, on September 21st, 1931, invoked Article 11 of the Covenant before the Council (document C.585.1931) and asked that the latter should take immediate steps: (a) to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations; (b) to re-establish the *status quo ante*; and (c) to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to the Republic of China.

The Government of China added that it was fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it might receive from the Council and to abide by whatever decisions the League of Nations might take in the premises.

The upshot of the first phase of the Council's deliberations on this subject was the resolution of September 30th, 1931, in which Japan concurred and by which the Japanese Government is bound. This resolution reads:

" The Council:

" 1. Notes the replies of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the urgent appeal addressed to them by its President and the steps that have already been taken in response to that appeal;

" 2. Recognises the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria;

" 3. Notes the Japanese representative's statement that his Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the

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railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be;

" 4. Notes the Chinese representative's statement that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are re-established;

" 5. Being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation;

" 6. Requests both Parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them and for that purpose to continue and speedily complete the execution of the above-mentioned undertakings;

" 7. Requests both Parties to furnish the Council at frequent intervals with full information as to the development of the situation;

" 8. Decides, in the absence of any unforeseen occurrence which might render an immediate meeting essential, to meet again at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14th, 1931, to consider the situation as it then stands;

" 9. Authorises its President to cancel the meeting of the Council fixed for October 14th should he decide, after consulting his colleagues, and more particularly the representatives of the two Parties, that, in view of such information as he may have received from the Parties or from other Members of the Council as to the development of the situation, the meeting is no longer necessary."

On the occasion of the adoption of this resolution, the President of the Council made a statement to the Assembly on September 29th, 1931, in which he informed the latter body, with the knowledge and approval of the Japanese delegate, in the following terms:

" I only wish to allude to several essential points: First, the affirmation by the Japanese Government and by its representative that it never had or will have any intention of occupying Manchuria militarily; secondly, the fact that the Japanese Government has on several occasions insisted before the Council on its intention to withdraw as soon as possible the Japanese forces to within the railway zone gradually as the safety of its nationals and their property is effectively guaranteed; thirdly, the fact that this intention has, according to the declaration made yesterday to the Council by the Japanese representative, been, during the last two days, translated into definite action and that outside the railway zone Japanese troops are only stationed in a few localities.

" The Council has noted these reassuring statements by the Japanese Government. It feels certain that, in this very difficult affair, as in other affairs which have been laid before it, the good-will of the parties and their loyalty to international engagements constitute the best guarantee for the peace of the world."

*The Bombing of Chinchow and the Japanese Army Proclamation.*

That the assurances given by the Japanese Government, as quoted above, were very far from corresponding to the facts of the situation was brought home in a painful manner to the Council by the bombing of Chinchow a few days before the October session of the Council was to begin. Chinchow, it should be remembered, was the temporary capital of the Mukden Government, whereof its head was Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang, and was a long distance from the areas occupied by the Japanese troops. The bombardment was accompanied by much destruction and loss of life. The Chinese Government at the time communicated to the Council the text of the following handbill dropped by Japanese planes over Chinchow:

" Chang Hsueh-Liang, that most rapacious wanton, stinking youth, is still failing to realise his odiousness and has established a Provisional Mukden Government at Chinchow to plot intrigues in the territories which are safely under the rule of the troops of the Great Japanese Empire, when the heart of the Manchurian mass is no longer with him, his ground is lost and the four provinces of the North East are going to revolt against him. The Imperial Army, which, in accordance with the principles of justice, is endeavouring to safeguard its interests and to protect the masses, will never recognise the Provisional Government of Chang Hsueh-Liang at Chinchow, and therefore it is obliged to take drastic measures to suppress such a government. The people of Chinchow should submit to the kindness and power of the army of the Great Japanese Empire and should oppose and prevent the establishment of Chang Hsueh-Liang's government, otherwise they will be considered as decidedly opposing the army of the Great Japanese Empire, in which case the army will ruthlessly destroy Chinchow. The people of Chinchow are hereby enjoined carefully to consider their situation and to take such decisions as they will deem wise."

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The terms of this proclamation cast a lurid light upon the policy being pursued by the Japanese Army in Manchuria as contrasted with the assurances given by the Japanese Government in Geneva. At the subsequent Council meeting, Lord Cecil declared: "The British Government has been made extremely uneasy by the bombing incidents that have taken place during this dispute and finds it extremely difficult to see how those incidents can be justified by any known principle of international law."

Further testimony was communicated to the Council on October 20th, 1931 (document C.733-1931), by the Chinese Government in the form of a telegram from Mr. Robert Lewis, stating:

"The Japanese Army is feverishly consolidating its hold on all the principal towns of Manchuria, outside the railway zone, northward including Kirin and Taonan, from Korea on the east into Mongolia on the west. They are trying to induce the Mongolian princes to sign away their rights and to set up an independent government under Japanese protection. The Japanese Army is rooting out at all centres the Chinese civil government, who are offering no resistance, and are forcing unwilling Chinese individuals to organise puppet independent governments in all the main areas. They openly refuse to recognise Chinese national and civil authority in Manchuria.

"The Japanese have seized the reserves and deposits of the larger Chinese banks, the records of corporations, and large quantities of both military and industrial supplies. They are feverishly extending their telegraph and power plants and cutting out the Chinese service. They have seized the Chinese short-wave and other radio plants and the Chinese telegraphs and telephone systems; they are now opening mail in the Chinese post offices, including private letters of Europeans. The Japanese are censoring all Press despatches; we have proved instances, including those of neutral pressmen, where the censor has changed the meaning to the exact opposite of that intended.

"The Japanese moved four heavily loaded trains of soldiers from Mukden on the night of October 13th to the west, seized the Peking-Mukden Railway, and now control that line in Manchuria. All other Chinese railways in Manchuria have also been seized by the Japanese. The local police in all the major towns have been re-organised to be under the control of the Japanese Army. On October 14th, they seized the Chinese mining administration, throwing 15,000 men out of employment. While the negotiations in Geneva have been in progress, the Japanese Army has been steadily pushing the seizure and commandeering of Chinese property, including the private residences of high Chinese officials and of civil organisations."

#### *The October 22nd Resolution.*

At the October, or second phase, of the League Council's handling of this dispute, the position of both Parties was made perfectly clear when the Members of the Council other than the Parties presented the draft resolution of October 22nd, 1931, which was accepted by the Chinese delegate and rejected by Japan. The text of the October 22nd resolution was as follows:

"The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed on September 30th, and noting that, in addition to the invocation by the Government of China of Article 11 of the Covenant, Article 2 of the Pact of Paris has also been invoked by a number of Governments:

"(1) Recalls the undertakings given to the Council by the Governments of China and Japan in that resolution, and in particular the statement of the Japanese representative that the Japanese Government would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and the statement of the Chinese representative that his Government will assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone—a pledge which implies the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

"(2) Recalls, further, that both Governments have given the assurance that they would refrain from any measures which might aggravate the existing situation, and are therefore bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action and to take measures to suppress hostile agitation;

"(3) Recalls the Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Nine-Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged 'to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China';

"(4) Being convinced that the fulfilment of these assurances and undertakings is essential for the restoration of normal relations between the two Parties;

"(a) Calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council;

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“(b) Calls upon the Chinese Government, in execution of its general pledge to assume the responsibility for the safety and lives of all Japanese subjects resident in Manchuria, to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other Powers, in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements;

“(5) Recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory, so that they may proceed smoothly and without delay;

“(6) Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments, as soon as the evacuation is completed, to begin direct negotiations on questions outstanding between them, and in particular those arising out of recent incidents as well as those relating to existing difficulties due to the railway situation in Manchuria. For this purpose, the Council suggests that the two Parties should set up a conciliation committee or some such permanent machinery;

“(7) Decides to adjourn till November 16th, at which date it will again examine the situation, but authorises its President to convoke a meeting at any earlier date should it in his opinion be desirable.”

#### *China's Position.*

Dr. Sze, the Chinese delegate, in informing the Council on October 23rd that the Chinese Government was prepared to accept the resolution, did so in a statement from which the following extracts may be quoted:

“In the view of the Chinese Government, the heart of the proposal is contained in the provision that the Council should meet again on November 16th, that it calls upon the Japanese Government to begin its withdrawal immediately, to proceed progressively with that withdrawal, and to complete it before the above date, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated to make arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated and ensuring the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there representatives of other Powers, in order that such representatives may follow the execution of these arrangements.

“The Chinese Government accepts this proposal and declares its readiness to carry out to the full all the obligations it lays upon China. Not only does my Government accept, it is willing to go further and to do everything possible to dissipate the apprehensions of the Japanese representative with regard to the safety of Japanese lives and property in the areas re-occupied by the Chinese authorities. I believe these apprehensions to be entirely unfounded. In the view of the Chinese Government, the insecurity and disorder that have arisen within the area occupied by the Japanese troops have their origin precisely in the Japanese occupation, will grow the longer the occupation continues, and will disappear with its termination. But I wish to state that I owe it to courtesy to declare that I am convinced the Japanese Government's anxiety is genuine, and I would ask my Japanese colleague in return to believe that the Chinese Government is sincerely desirous to remove any possible apprehensions on this score.

“So strong is this desire, indeed, that, not only do I accept the proposal in the resolution to invite neutral officers, but I am prepared to go further and to assure the Japanese representative and other Members of the Council [that the Chinese Government is willing to examine in the most conciliatory spirit here and now any proposals for extending the system of neutral officers or, with the help of the League, devising any other arrangements on the spot to guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property in the re-occupied territory, in order to dispel any apprehensions the Japanese Government may entertain as to the danger to its subjects that might result from compliance with the Council's resolution.

“The terms ‘evacuation’ and ‘taking over of evacuated territory’ in the resolution I understand to include all Japanese forces of a military or quasi-military character, such as gendarmerie, police and aeroplanes of all kinds, the restoration to Chinese possession of all property, real and personal, public and private, which has been seized by the Japanese since the night of September 18th, and the release from all forms of restraint of Chinese authorities and citizens, and banking or other commercial or industrial establishments. In short, that, so far as possible, the *status quo ante* shall be re-established.

“Now I come to one more point, which the Chinese Government regards as crucial. Paragraph 6 of the resolution before us makes it clear that withdrawal is the only subject before the Council at present and that, until withdrawal has been completed, no other issue arises. But I should like to make it quite plain that, in the view of the Chinese Government,

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the only immediate issue arising out of the present situation besides withdrawal is the question of responsibility and assessing damages for the events that have occurred since September 18th. The Chinese Government is willing—nay, anxious, and has been from the beginning—to submit to any form of neutral third-party judgment on this issue, in accordance with the League principles and precedents and in conformity with elementary justice.

“ Any attempt to make the military invasion of Manchuria the occasion for pressing for the solution of other claims would be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant and a violation of Article 2 of the Pact of Paris. China will not discuss any subject with any Power under the pressure of military occupation of her territory, nor, what amounts to the same thing, under the pressure of accomplished facts resulting from the use of force during such occupation. This point is vital and goes to the root of the whole controversy before the Council; it is, indeed, the basic principle on which the Covenant and the Pact of Paris are founded. It is because, in the view of the Chinese Government, this point is vital and fundamental that I have stressed it, and it is for the same reason I add that the Chinese Government is assured that, in adopting this attitude, it has, as a matter of course, the full and unqualified moral support of every Member of the League and signatory of the Pact of Paris.

“ It further goes without saying that any discussions between China and any other Power on any subject must take place on the basis of China's rights and obligations under the Covenant and Pact of Paris, and must respect the principles laid down at the Washington Conference of 1922 with regard to the relations between China and other Powers.

“ In this connection, I wish to say very clearly and deliberately that, once this unhappy incident is settled and normal relations restored between China and Japan, the Japanese Government will find us not only willing, but also anxious, to discuss every issue between the two countries in the most friendly spirit. China has but one desire—to live at peace with all countries and particularly so with her neighbours, and hopes that the very magnitude of the shock to the relations of the two countries that has brought them before the League will result in the stubborn resolve on both sides to put these relations on a new and better footing and to lay the foundation for permanent peace in the Far East. It is in this spirit that the Chinese Government welcomes the Council's proposal of a permanent conciliation commission, or similar body, and it is in this spirit, too, that I wish to assure the Council that the Chinese Government, for its part, will not only scrupulously observe all its obligations under international law and practice to promote good relations with Japan, but will do everything in its power to turn the thoughts of its people to peace and amity, forgetfulness of the bitter past, and hope for a better future.” (*Official Journal*, December 1931, pages 2345 and 2346).

#### *Japan's Position.*

The Japanese representative, with curious logic, again complained that the presence of Chinese forces on their own territory in proximity to the invading army of Japan constituted a menace, and absolutely declined any arrangement fixing a date for evacuation. “ That does not mean to say, in any way,” he went on, “ that it is not the Japanese Government's firm intention to bring them back, nor does it mean that it has any desire to leave them where they are in order to secure from China further concessions or special privileges of whatsoever kind . . . there is no question of our attempt to wrest concessions or privileges from China.” He proceeded with the statement that his Government had carefully thought out a number of fundamental points upon which normal relations between China and Japan should be based; but he still failed to disclose what these points were (*Official Journal*, December 1931, pages 2347 and 2348). The Japanese representative concluded by suggesting counter-proposals, which in substance invited the Council to take the position that the withdrawal of Japanese forces should not take place until there had been a previous agreement between China and Japan on the mysterious fundamental principles.

#### *The Council's View.*

The Council pressed the Japanese representative to state the nature of the principles to which it was asked to subscribe, and he maintained his demand that the Council should sanction them in ignorance of their character. In the course of the discussion, the President, M. Briand, said:

“ There is one point with regard to which I should like to ask our Japanese colleague for further explanation, for I think it is the crucial point.

“ There are two ways in which the two Governments can engage in conversations; these conversations—or negotiations, if you like to call them negotiations—may bear upon two very different subjects or groups of subjects.

“ The first group relates to the statements made by the Parties and repeated to-day, regarding the conditions of security which must first be established in order to enable the

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Japanese Government to withdraw its troops in satisfactory circumstances—for example, with the certainty that the Japanese nationals and their property in an evacuated area will not be subject to reprisals after the troops have left. In regard to this kind of discussion, the representative of Japan is entirely at one with the Chinese representative.

“ On this point, I therefore believe agreement should be easy, because it concerns police measures, administrative measures, possibly military measures; these are questions which can rapidly be settled.

“ The second group includes questions on which, for a long time past, the two countries have been unable to agree. If, before evacuation, matters which have not been settled for months and even for years must be discussed between the two Governments, obviously the time-limit contemplated by the Council is far too short to enable results to be achieved. On this point there is complete disagreement between the two Parties. The Chinese view is that negotiations of this nature must be postponed to a date when military pressure no longer exists. They are rejected as a condition of evacuation.

“ That is the problem, and I think that agreement depends on the solution of that problem.

“ When reference is made to ‘ fundamental principles ’ in Point 4 of the Japanese text, is there any idea of bringing under this term any of the questions which are to form the subject of the fundamental negotiations, as constituting an element of security? If so, the whole problem, with all its difficulties, is again before us.” (*Official Journal*, December 1931, page 2349.)

The next day, October 24th, the Council once more pressed the Japanese delegate to state whether fundamental principles meant only what the President defined as security—if so, there seemed no good reason why the Japanese representative should not accept the Council resolution; or if, in addition to executive and administrative details of evacuation, he meant discussion of some political questions. “ If so ”, said Lord Cecil, speaking for the British Government, “ I beg him, with all the strength at my command, to say so quite plainly and clearly in order that we may know exactly where we are ”. “ Did Japan desire ”, further asked Lord Cecil, “ to enter into a discussion of treaty obligations with China concerning Manchuria before evacuation? If this was so, let him state the fact plainly. . . .

“ The League could, at any moment, obviously express the view that all treaties ought to be carried out; but that is not the question before us. The treaties hold; but to discuss up to what point they bind the contracting parties would seem to me to be definitely reversing the order of things. Evacuation must take place first. Discussion of the treaties may follow. It is an important matter, but is not one which directly affects the safety of the nationals of Japan, and therefore is not one which ought to be discussed before the Japanese troops retire from the territory which they occupy.” (*Official Journal*, December 1931, page 2354.)

The Spanish delegate, M. de Madariaga, pointed out that the Council had a twofold duty: namely, not only to settle the conflict between the two Powers, but to maintain intact the League of Nations, on which the peace of the world depended. The League of Nations was based on respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of its Members. The idea of security was at the very centre of the life of the League:

“ As representative of a European State, of a State which has to watch over the possibility of disputes, I see a danger in allowing anyone to claim the right to remain on the spot when that party has invaded a territory in which it has no right to be, by stating that there is no security, particularly as in certain respects at least the party is partially responsible for the state of insecurity.

“ That is a first point to which I wish, very respectfully, but very firmly to draw the attention of my Japanese colleague.

“ There is a second point which seems to me still more dangerous and which obliges me to support very strongly the attitude adopted here by the British representative. Do the famous fundamental points really derive from security and nothing but security, from evacuation and nothing but evacuation? If there is anything else, what we really have is a linking up of concepts, a line of reasoning which would allow the conceptions of security to be extended *ad infinitum*.” (*Official Journal*, December 1931, pages 2352 and 2353.)

The President then stated:

“ The Council has two texts before it—the draft resolution prepared and adopted by all the Members of the Council except the two parties to the case, and the counter-proposal submitted by the representative of Japan, which we have already discussed at great length.

“ The fundamental point on which the two texts differ is the measures proposed with a view to ensuring the safety of property and persons, as has been promised by China to enable Japan to withdraw her troops.

“ I must say—and I am sure the representative of Japan will agree with me—that the Council's text at any rate possesses the merit of being absolutely clear. No part of it has been discussed on the grounds that it might be interpreted in several ways. . . .

" The text adopted by the Council is based on a desire to ensure respect for treaty obligations, on the undertakings already entered into by the Parties, and, in particular, on the statement by the Japanese representative accepted in the resolution of September 30th—that is to say, before the dispute had become heated, and when therefore matters could be viewed more calmly. This is the declaration made at the time by the Japanese representative:

" ' The Japanese Government will continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be. '

" This declaration refers, in the matter of safety, to steps which cannot fail to be taken rapidly; otherwise, the Japanese Government would not at that date have commenced evacuation and have promised to complete that evacuation at an early date. When negotiations have to be conducted between Governments regarding the interpretation of treaties and railway questions, it is impossible to be sure that a conclusion will be reached in a short space of time. The Japanese representative, with his long diplomatic experience, knows how difficult it is, when a political case arises between two Governments, to reach a conclusion; how slow the negotiations are, and what patience is required to achieve a result. The Japanese Government therefore intended to refer to precautions for assuring safety, decided upon jointly and with the least possible delay in order to allow rapid evacuation.

*Article 10 of the Covenant and Article 2 of the Paris Pact.*

" Article 10 of the Covenant does not call for any commentary. It says that all Members of the League must undertake to respect the territorial integrity of the other Members and refrain from any act which might prejudice the political independence of others.

" Article 2 of the Paris Pact, which has been invoked here, is also very clear:

" ' The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means. '

" This is a dispute which has been laid before the Council. There can be no question of dealing with it by other than pacific means. Japan, who always so scrupulously honours her obligations, could not dream of adopting other means.

" I do not wish to dwell unduly on this point; but public opinion would not readily admit that a military occupation under these circumstances could be regarded as coming under the heading of pacific means. To prolong this situation would be to perpetuate a state of anxiety which has already lasted too long. . . .

" It seemed to me that the Japanese Government intended to begin negotiations concerning the substance of certain delicate problems which have long existed. That intention caused me uneasiness. But our colleague has told us: ' That is not the case. We quite admit that negotiations should be begun with regard to these great problems after the evacuation '. I wish to endorse the observation of the Spanish representative that, as clear evidence of the good-will of both countries, these negotiations should be begun on the very day on which evacuation is completed. But the Japanese representative states that the terms of his counter-proposal do not refer to questions of a general nature but only to security. Nevertheless, on this point there has been a hesitancy which it has been impossible to overcome in spite of the good-will displayed on every side this morning. The mere fact that such hesitancy exists shows that it would be better to have a clearer text.

" What is the essential point? The representative of Japan states: ' We are prepared to go; but we do not want our nationals to be the victims of reprisals immediately we have left. We wish to be sure that they will be protected. ' The Chinese Government recognises that this desire is a natural one and states that it is ready to enter into immediate negotiations in order to regulate the conditions of evacuation and provide the guarantees of safety which Japan desires.

" That can be done very rapidly. There are precedents. Troops are about to leave a territory which they have administered, in which they have organised municipal service, police and various administrative departments. These various bodies have to be replaced. But that can be settled after a few hours', or at most a few days', discussion."

In spite, however, of these eloquent and cogent appeals and arguments, the Japanese delegate maintained his insistence on preliminary agreement on unnamed fundamental principles between the Chinese and Japanese Governments, to be reached in direct negotiations, as a condition precedent to evacuation. The text of these principles has never been disclosed to this day, although an indication of their general character has been given by the Japanese Government. It was made clear in the course of the discussions at the time of the November-December Council meeting that the Japanese Government regarded these fundamental principles as merely a summary, each with its own chapter of demands, to be disclosed to the Chinese Government when direct negotiations

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had begun and to be accepted by the Chinese Government in the form of a treaty or treaties before Japanese evacuation began.

*China and Japan's Positions on Arbitration and Respect for Treaty Rights.*

In the course of the Council's deliberations, Lord Cecil pointed out:

"The Covenant sets out as one of the main purposes of the League the 'maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another'. . . . Of course, it is quite possible that there may be a dispute between the Parties to treaties as to the validity of a treaty or as to the interpretation of a treaty. Fortunately, any such dispute as that can now be settled authoritatively by an appeal to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, over which, as it happens, a Japanese national at the moment presides. It is certain that any such question would be discussed with absolute fairness and impartiality at The Hague." (*Official Journal*, December 1931, page 2354.)

Immediately after the Council adjourned, the Chinese delegate addressed the following communication to the President:

"With reference to the observations on treaty obligations made in the Council this morning by the honourable delegate for Great Britain, with which I am in hearty agreement, I am authorised by my Government to make the following declaration:

"China, like every Member of the League of Nations, is bound by the Covenant to 'a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations'. The Chinese Government for its part is determined loyally to fulfil all its obligations under the Covenant. It is prepared to give proofs of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement, as provided in Article 13 of the Covenant.

"In pursuance of this purpose, the Chinese Government is willing to conclude with Japan a treaty of arbitration similar to that recently concluded with the United States, or to those concluded of recent years in increasing numbers between Members of the League."

When the Chinese representative stated, in the Council meeting of January 29th, 1932, that Japan had violated her obligation under Article 12 of the Covenant, which binds Members of the League to submit disputes to arbitration, judicial settlement or enquiry by the Council, and not to resort to war, the Japanese representative replied:

"The Chinese delegate has stated that Japan has never submitted this conflict to arbitration or to pacific settlement, as is required in accordance with Article 12. That is perfectly true; but it is a well-known fact that Japan is not prepared to accept arbitration with every country irrespectively."

This is a formal admission by the representative of the Japanese Government that his country is violating Article 12 of the Covenant.

The issue was therefore left perfectly clear by the October meeting of the Council and revealed a widening gap between Japan's policy on the one hand and her treaty obligations under the Covenant, the Paris Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty on the other. It also gave the Chinese Government heartening proof that its attitude in refusing direct negotiations under the pressure of military occupation as being incompatible with these treaties was endorsed by the Governments Members of the Council, notably the French Government, represented by its Foreign Minister, M. Briand, who was the President, and by the British Government, represented by Lord Cecil.

*China's Position on the Issue of Direct Negotiations.*

As this issue, in the view of the Chinese Government, is fundamental and there is unfortunately no reason to believe that Japan has abandoned her intention of dictating a settlement under military pressure, it is desirable to explain China's position a little more fully, with special reference to the analogy that is often drawn between the Japanese position in Kiaochow after the World War and the present situation in Manchuria. At the time of the Washington Conference, the Chinese and Japanese Governments (with Mr. Hughes for the United States of America, and Sir Arthur, afterwards Lord, Balfour for the British Empire, acting as neutral "referees") negotiated an agreement covering the terms on which the latter should evacuate the former German leased territory of Kiaochow in Shantung. The negotiations lasted months and involved a number of political and economic issues.

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*The False Analogy of Shantung.*

But there is a fundamental difference between Japan's position in Kiaochow in 1922 and Japan's position in Manchuria to-day. Whereas Japanese occupation of Kiaochow during the World War might have been justified as an act against Germany, and as such was given political sanction by the Versailles Peace Treaty, the invasion of Manchuria occurred in peace-time and, so far from obtaining any international recognition, is a direct violation of the Covenant, the Peace Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. The Chinese Government was compelled to bargain with Japan as to the terms on which she would surrender her position in Shantung, but considers that to negotiate with Japan on the basis of the latter's military occupation of Manchuria would be, not only condoning Japanese violation of these treaties, but would also actually amount to a violation of her treaty obligations by China. This view has been flatly endorsed by the United States of America in its Note of January 8th, 1932, to the Chinese and Japanese Governments,<sup>1</sup> and by the President of the Council in the declaration made on January 25th in the name of all the Members of the Council except the Parties.<sup>2</sup> The Note and the declaration make it clear that any settlement arrived at by means incompatible with the Peace Pact—and the President of the Council on October 23rd last, has pointed out in said declaration that military occupation is not a pacific means of settlement in the sense of Article 2 of the Peace Pact—or any settlement which by its nature is incompatible with the Covenant (particularly Article 10) or the Nine-Power Treaty (particularly Article 1) will not be recognised by the United States of America or endorsed by the League of Nations.

*Japan's Disclaimer of Intent to use Armed Pressure and Insistence on the Fundamental Principles.*

Soon after the October meeting, the Japanese Government, in a note dated October 26th (document C.764.1931), informed the Council that, "as has been repeatedly emphasised by the Japanese Government, the whole Manchurian affair was occasioned solely by the violent and provocative attack launched by the Chinese army on the railway zone. Certain small contingents of Japanese soldiers still remaining at a few points outside that zone are insistently demanded by the danger to which the large population of Japanese in that region are exposed in life and property. The presence of such a limited number of troops is quite incapable of being represented as a means of dictating to China Japan's terms for the settlement of present difficulties. Nothing is farther from the thoughts of Japan than to bring armed pressure to bear upon China in the course of these negotiations". It then complained of anti-Japanese feeling, which was said to be displayed by text-books used in various schools in China and to be deeply seated in the Chinese mind, and of the agitation against Japan's rights and interests which was said to be going on in China. The risks and dangers to Japanese subjects caused by this situation were so great, the Japanese Government informed the Council, that it could not withdraw its troops without provision being first made to remove national antipathies and suspicion between the two countries, for which reason they should come to an agreement on basic principles which related to the following five matters:

- (1) Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct;
- (2) Respect for China's territorial integrity;
- (3) Complete suppression of all organised movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred;
- (4) Effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects;
- (5) Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria.

In its comments (document C.783.1931) on this note, the Chinese Government expressed its satisfaction at "the emphatic denial of the Japanese Government that it has any intention to bring armed pressure to bear in its negotiations with China. But the Chinese Government feels constrained to point out that, if this be the view of the Japanese Government, the only way to give effect to it is to cease to demand, as a condition precedent to the evacuation of its troops, that China should come to an agreement with Japan on basic principles which are to govern the whole of the future relations of the two countries."

*The President of the Council's Views.*

On October 29th, the President of the Council sent a reply (document C.776.1931) to the Japanese note, from which the following passages may be quoted:

"Independently of the vote taken at the last Council meeting, which retains its full moral force, we still have before us, from the juridical standpoint, a valid resolution—namely, that which was unanimously adopted on September 30th and which retains its full executory force.

<sup>1</sup> *Vide infra*, page 23.  
<sup>2</sup> *Vide infra*, page 24.

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" In that resolution, the Council noted the statement made by the Japanese representative that the Japanese Government ' will continue as rapidly as possible with the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be '. No indication whatever was given at that time by the Japanese representative that matters such as an agreement as to the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria were in any way connected with the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals.

" It is further to be noted that, in the two draft resolutions submitted to the Council on October 24th, the first three paragraphs are exactly the same, Your Excellency having withdrawn the amendment to paragraph 3 which you had submitted. It may therefore be assumed that these paragraphs express the will of the two Parties. In its declaration of October 26th, the Japanese Government further stated that, when it referred to certain fundamental principles, it had in mind the following:

" (1) Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct—Paragraph 2 of the two drafts submitted on October 24th states that ' the two Governments are bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action '.

" (2) Respect for China's territorial integrity. Paragraph 3 of the two drafts records an undertaking to that effect.

" (3) Complete suppression of all organised movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred. Paragraph 2 of the two drafts declares that the two Governments ' are bound to take measures to suppress hostile agitation ';

" (4) Effective protection throughout Manchuria in order to allow Japanese nationals to engage there in any peaceful pursuits. Paragraph 1 of both drafts declares that the Chinese Government is pledged to the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria.

" The fact that, on the one hand, the Chinese representative accepted the terms of the resolution which I proposed on behalf of my colleagues and that, on the other hand, the counter-draft of the Japanese representative contained the three paragraphs to which I have referred, shows that the two Governments are in complete agreement on these four points.

" There remains only the last point: ' Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria '.

" With regard to this point, I would call Your Excellency's attention to the letter addressed to me by the Chinese representative on October 24th, in which Dr. Sze declares that ' China, like every Member of the League of Nations, is bound by the Covenant to a " scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations ". The Chinese Government for its part is determined loyally to fulfil *all* its obligations under the Covenant. It is prepared to give proofs of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement, as provided in Article 13 of the Covenant '.

" It therefore appears to me, and I feel sure that my colleagues on the Council, including, I trust, Your Excellency, will agree that the Chinese Government has given to the Council of the League, on which Japan has a permanent representative, pledges which cover the various fundamental principles raised by the Japanese Government.

" In these circumstances, I feel confident that the Japanese Government, being desirous of fulfilling the undertaking which is solemnly contracted under the terms of the resolution of September 30th and which, moreover, it repeatedly confirmed by its declarations during the last session of the Council, at the meetings of October 22nd, 23rd and 24th, will continue as rapidly as possible with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone and that it will thus be able to carry out that intention to the full in the shortest possible time."

#### *Japan's Reply.*

The Japanese reply to the President's note declared that the phrases used in the Council resolution (and incidentally, as the President had pointed out, in the Japanese counter-proposals) were not sufficiently explicit and comprehensive to cover all implications of the Japanese points, and reaffirmed the Japanese Government's unalterable insistence upon reaching a settlement on the basis of the fundamental principles in direct negotiations as a condition precedent to evacuation (document C.814.1931).

#### *Extension of Japanese Occupation.*

Meanwhile, the Japanese army was steadily extending and consolidating its illegal occupation. The driving-out and slaughter of the lawful Chinese authorities was followed by the setting-up of puppet authorities under Japanese control; Japanese advisers and controllers were established in banks, commercial enterprises, municipal administrations and public and private institutions of every kind; the salt revenues were seized by Japanese soldiers and made over to these puppet authorities; Chinese-owned coal-mines were occupied and the land registers and title deeds found in the archives of the provincial capitals were falsified or destroyed on a large scale so as to make over the land to Japanese subjects.

In a note (document C.789.1931) dated November 3rd, the Chinese delegation expressed its concern at these developments in the following terms:

" The Chinese Government is gravely concerned over the developments in Manchuria since the adjournment of the Council. The attached memorandum, which contains a summary of these developments, shows that, although ten days have elapsed since the adjournment of the Council on October 24th and more than a month since the adjournment of September 30th, not only has there been not the slightest preparation for withdrawal, but, on the contrary, the Japanese Army is steadily extending and consolidating its grip on South Manchuria and is making attempts to penetrate into North Manchuria that are causing anxiety in Moscow.

" It may be remembered that, in the resolution of September 30th, which was accepted by and is binding upon Japan, it was stated that the Japanese Government ' will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured '. The declaration, made over a month ago, that withdrawal had already been begun is unfortunately not substantiated by the facts. Not only has withdrawal not been begun, but the Japanese Government now refuses to honour the promise it made before the Council and declares that it will not begin withdrawal until it has negotiated an agreement with China on certain ' fundamental principles '. This new policy was set forth in the Japanese Government's note to the Chinese Government on October 9th, and again before the Council on October 23rd and 24th. This position was reiterated a few days ago, when the Japanese Government refused to appoint representatives to discuss with the representatives of the Chinese Government the details and methods of withdrawal as proposed in the resolution submitted by the Council on October 22nd. The measures proposed in this resolution, which retains its full moral force, are merely indications of how to carry out the policy to which both parties were pledged by the resolution of September 30th. It is this which makes the Japanese Government's change of attitude and insistence upon an agreement upon ' fundamental principles ', by means of direct negotiations, as a preliminary to withdrawal, so profoundly disquieting.

" This attitude of Japan, as was pointed out in the Council on October 23rd and 24th, is in violation of Article 10 of the Covenant and Article 2 of the Pact of Paris. The Chinese Government must reiterate its firm determination never, in any circumstances, to agree to negotiations under the pressure of military occupation and confidently looks to the Members of the League and the United States of America not to suffer the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Washington Nine-Power Treaty to be trampled underfoot. "

*The November-December Council Meeting.*

The opening of the November Council meeting practically coincided with the taking of Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang, the northermost of the North-Eastern Provinces. This city is to the north of the Chinese Eastern Railway and hundreds of miles from the nearest point on the South Manchurian line, and the Japanese Government had given pledges in Washington, London and Paris not to take Tsitsihar.

*The December 10th Resolution and the Committee of Enquiry.*

The outcome of the November-December meeting of the Council was the December 10th resolution, which reads as follows:

" The Council:

" 1. Reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30th, 1931, by which the two Parties declare that they are solemnly bound. It therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution, so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution.

" 2. Considering that events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24th, notes that the two Parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.

" 3. Invites the two Parties to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation.

" 4. Invites the other Members of the Council to furnish the Council with any information received from their representatives on the spot.

" 5. Without prejudice to the carrying out of the above-mentioned measures,

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"Desiring, in view of the special circumstances of the case, to contribute towards a final and fundamental solution by the two Governments of the question at issue between them:

"Decides to appoint a Commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends.

"The Governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to assist the Commission.

"The two Governments will afford the Commission all facilities to obtain on the spot whatever information it may require.

"It is understood that, should the two Parties initiate any negotiations, these would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the Commission, nor would it be within the competence of the Commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either Party.

"The appointment and deliberations of the Commission shall not prejudice in any way the undertaking given by the Japanese Government in the resolution of September 30th as regards withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone.

"6. Between now and its next ordinary session, which will be held on January 25th, 1932, the Council, which remains seized of the matter, invites its President to follow the question and to summon it afresh if necessary."

The President, M. Briand, read an explanatory statement on the resolution in the following terms:

"It will be observed that the resolution which is before you provides for action on two separate lines: (1) to put an end to the immediate threat to peace; (2) to facilitate the final solution of existing causes of dispute between the two countries.

"The Council was glad to find during its present sittings that an enquiry into the circumstances which tend to disturb the relations between China and Japan, in itself desirable, would be acceptable to the Parties. The Council therefore welcomed the proposal to establish a Commission which was brought before it on November 21st. The final paragraph of the resolution provides for the appointment and functioning of such a Commission.

"I shall now make certain comments on the resolution, paragraph by paragraph:

"*Paragraph 1.* — This paragraph reaffirms the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council on September 30th, laying particular stress on the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone on the conditions described therein as speedily as possible.

"The Council attaches the utmost importance to this resolution, and is persuaded that the two Governments will set themselves to the complete fulfilment of the engagements which they assumed on September 30th.

"*Paragraph 2.* — It is an unfortunate fact that, since the last meeting of the Council, events have occurred which have seriously aggravated the situation and have given rise to legitimate apprehension. It is indispensable and urgent to abstain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting, and from all other action likely to aggravate the situation.

"*Paragraph 4.* — Under Paragraph 4, the members of the Council other than the Parties are requested to continue to furnish the Council with information received from their representatives on the spot.

"Such information having proved of high value in the past, the Powers which have the possibility of sending such representatives to various localities have agreed to do all that is possible to continue and improve the present system.

"For this purpose, these Powers will keep in touch with the two Parties, so that the latter may, should they so desire, indicate to them the localities to which they would desire the despatch of such representatives.

"*Paragraph 5.* — Provides for the institution of a Commission of Enquiry. Subject to its purely advisory character, the terms of reference of the Commission are wide. In principle, no question which it feels called upon to study will be excluded provided that the question relates to any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends. Each of the two Governments will have the right to request the Commission to consider any question the examination of which it particularly desires. The Commission will have full discretion to determine the questions upon which it will report to the Council and will have power to make interim reports when desirable.

"If the undertakings given by the two Parties according to the resolution of September 30th have not been carried out by the time of the arrival of the Commission, the Commission should as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation.

"It is specially provided that 'should the two Parties initiate any negotiations, these would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the Commission, nor would it be within the competence of the Commission to interfere with the military arrangements

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of either Party'. This latter provision does not limit in any way its faculty of investigation. It is also clear that the Commission will enjoy full liberty of movement in order to obtain the information it may require for its reports." (Page 71 of the December number of "The League and Manchuria".)

The Japanese representative, on behalf of his Government, accepted the resolution with this single observation of substance:

"With regard to paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, I am happy to accept it on behalf of the Japanese Government, on the understanding that this paragraph is not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria. Such action is admittedly an exceptional measure called for by the special situation prevailing in Manchuria, and its necessity will naturally be obviated when normal conditions shall have been restored in that region."

The Chinese delegate said he accepted the resolution with the following observations and reservations in point of principle:

"I. China must and does fully reserve any and all rights, remedies and juridical positions to which she is or may be entitled under and by virtue of all the provisions of the Covenant, under all the existing treaties to which China is a party, and under the accepted principles of international law and practice.

"II. The present arrangement evidenced by the resolution and the statement made by the President of the Council is regarded by China as a practical measure embodying four essential and interdependent elements:

- "(a) Immediate cessation of hostilities;
- "(b) Liquidation of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria within the shortest possible period of time;
- "(c) Neutral observation and reporting upon all developments from now on;
- "(d) A comprehensive enquiry into the entire Manchurian situation on the spot by a Commission appointed by the Council.

"The said arrangement being in effect and in spirit predicated upon these fundamental factors, its integrity would be manifestly destroyed by the failure of any one of them to materialise and be effectively realised as contemplated.

"III. China understands and expects that the Commission provided for in the resolution will make it its first duty to enquire into and report with its recommendations on the withdrawal of the Japanese forces if such withdrawal has not been completed when the Commission arrives on the spot.

"IV. China assumes that the said arrangement neither directly nor by implication affects the question of reparations and damages to China and her nationals growing out of the recent events in Manchuria, and makes specific reservation in that respect.

"V. In accepting the resolution laid before us, China appreciates the efforts of the Council to prevent further fighting and bloodshed by enjoining both China and Japan to avoid any initiative which may lead to further fighting or any other action likely to aggravate the situation. It must be clearly pointed out that this injunction should not be violated under the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by a state of affairs which it is the very purpose of the resolution to do away with. It is to be observed that much of the lawlessness now prevalent in Manchuria is due to the interruption of normal life caused by the invasion of the Japanese forces. The only sure way of restoring the normal peaceful life is to hasten the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and allow the Chinese authorities to assume the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order. China cannot tolerate the invasion and occupation of her territory by the troops of any foreign country; far less can she permit these troops to usurp the police functions of the Chinese authorities.

"VI. China notes with satisfaction the purpose to continue and improve the present system of neutral observation and reporting through representatives of other Powers, and China will from time to time, as occasion requires, indicate the localities to which it seems desirable to despatch such representatives.

"VII. It should be understood that, in agreeing to this resolution, which provides for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces to the railway zone, China in no way recedes from the position she has always taken with respect to the maintenance of military forces in the said railway zone.

"VIII. China would regard any attempt by Japan to bring about complications of a political character affecting China's territorial or administrative integrity (such as promoting

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so-called independence movements or utilising disorderly elements for such purposes) as an obvious violation of the undertaking to avoid any further aggravation of the situation."<sup>1</sup>

In adopting this resolution, M. Matos, the delegate of Guatemala, made the following observation:

"It is obvious, according to existing treaties, that it is inadmissible that disputes arising between States, whatever their nature or origin, should be settled by other than pacific means. Nor is it admissible that the respect for and execution of treaties between countries can depend upon the will of one of the Parties. Such methods would be completely destructive of the international order, and hence of the maintenance of peace . . .

"I should like to say, however, that it would have been impossible for me to vote for the resolution if it had not embodied the principle proclaimed by M. Briand at the end of our October meeting. This principle is that the military occupation of the territory of a Member of the League cannot be used by another Member of the League to impose direct negotiations on questions that are pending. It is because this great principle has been safeguarded that I cannot oppose the resolution which has been adopted."

The following reservation made by M. Gonzalez-Prada, the Peruvian delegate, should also be noted:

"Nothing in the text to which I have given my approval in order not to raise any obstacle to the pacific settlement of a dispute must be interpreted as affecting certain principles without which the existence and the rights of weak countries would not have that security which makes force unnecessary, this being the main purpose pursued by the Covenant of the League.

"Some of these principles are as follows:

"1. No State has the right to effect a military occupation of the territory of another in order to ensure the execution of certain treaties;

"2. No State is entitled to oblige another—having invaded its territory—to enter upon direct negotiations on the bearing and legal value of treaties previously existing between the two States;

"3. The exercise of the right possessed by each State to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its nationals must be limited by respect for the sovereignty of the other State; no State being entitled, in order to provide such protection, to authorise its military forces to penetrate into the territory of the other for the purpose of carrying out police operations.

"4. The fact that a State has certain rights, claims, economic concessions, etc., in regard to another State does not entitle the former to effect the military occupation of the territory or to seize the property of the debtor State. Any recovery of debts by compulsion is illicit, in accordance with the principles adopted by the Second Peace Conference (The Hague, 1907).

"Even if the measures which have been accepted by the two Parties concerned, and which we have adopted exceptionally in the special case of Manchuria, may be justifiable for the immediate purpose of averting war, they must in no case be interpreted as implying a renunciation of the principles of international law which have reference to the defence of the rights and interests of weak countries and which constitute the main safeguard of their independence."

#### *The Taking of Chinchow.*

At the conclusion of the December Council meeting, the Japanese Government gave separate assurances to the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France that the city of Chinchow, which was the last remaining foothold of the lawful Chinese Government in the North-Eastern Provinces, would not be attacked. In his note of December 27th, 1931, to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, the American Secretary of State said:

"Your Excellency will remember that, on November 24th, in response to my representations through Ambassador Forbes, you assured me, with the concurrence of the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff that there would be no movement of Japanese troops in the direction of Chinchow and informed me that orders to that effect had been given to the Japanese troops."

This pledge was in addition to the undertakings given to the Council and embodied in the resolutions of September 30th and December 10th, 1931, to refrain from doing anything to aggravate the situation. The observers in Chinchow of the various Members of the Council reported

<sup>1</sup> *Official Journal*, December 1931, pages 2376 and 2377.

frequently that all was quiet in this sector and that there were no signs of any Chinese troop concentration or activity, nor of any intention to take hostile action. There were practically no Japanese subjects in and around Chinchow, and the neutral observers reported public order fully maintained in the city and its vicinity. Nevertheless, the Japanese army, in spite of the Government's pledges, brushed aside the testimony of the neutral observers on the allegation that they were ignorant or misinformed, and occupied Chinchow with, as usual, the heavy bombing from aeroplanes of the various towns and junctions in its path, entailing much loss of civilian life and destruction of property.

On January 8th, 1932, the United States Government addressed the following note to the Governments of both Japan and China:

" With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the Neutral Commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But, in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto*, nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments or agents thereof of which may impair treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China or the international policy relative to China commonly known as 'The Open-Door Policy', and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan as well as the United States are parties. "

China immediately replied as follows:

" It is amply evident that the American Government takes the most serious view of the lawless acts of the Japanese military forces in the three Eastern Provinces and that it upholds also the dignity of the international covenants and of the Pact against War. The Chinese Government, from the time that the present events in the North-East began on September 18th, 1931, and up to the present day, has in every respect fulfilled its duties as prescribed in the Pact against War, and the Chinese Government therefore has taken no steps of any nature whatever calculated to aggravate the situation, but has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the existing international covenants, asked that signatory Powers direct their special attention to these events. The Japanese military forces, on the contrary, following the adoption of the resolution of the League of Nations on September 30th, 1931, and the meeting of the Council on October 24th, 1931, have still continuously extended the field of their invasion, and, even after the passing of the League's resolution on December 10th, 1931, have openly invaded and seized Chinchow, the seat of the Chinese local government. More recently, Japan has occupied Suichung and advanced to Shanhaikwan, and has increased the numbers of the Japanese vessels and troops at Chinwangtao, Tientsin and other places. In addition to this, there are indications of the intention to attack Jehol.

" Those violations of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact against War, and this disregard of the repeated decisions of the League, are facts which it has not been possible to conceal. The Japanese Government therefore must bear full responsibility for all the events involved.

" With reference to the notification of Your Excellency's Government that in this matter it does not recognize as legal any situation *de facto*, I have the honour to state that the Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged with the Japanese Government gravest protests against the various invasions and lawless acts perpetrated by the Japanese troops since September 18th, 1931, and has made it known internationally that the Chinese Government accords them no recognition whatever.

" With regard to the treaties or agreements referred to in the note under reply, I have the honour to state that the Chinese Government, basing its position on its sovereignty and independence and on the principle of territorial and administrative integrity, has absolutely no intention of concluding any treaties or agreements of the categories described.

" It is the sincere hope of the Chinese Government that Your Excellency's Government will continue to promote the effectiveness of the international covenants in order that their dignity may be conserved. "

The Council, in its turn, supported the Chinese and American point of view in the declaration read by the President on January 29th, 1932, in the name of all the Governments Members of

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the Council except the Parties. In the course of this declaration the President said:

"In that note, the United States Government called the attention of the two Parties to the treaties which are binding upon them. For our part, we felt bound to assert in the statement that we had prepared that a settlement of the difficulties between the two Governments, Members of the League of Nations, could not be sought in arrangements inconsistent with their international obligations, more especially those arising out of Article 10 of the Covenant, by which they had undertaken to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of all Members of the League, and we concluded the statement which had been prepared in these words: 'It would be impossible for the League to endorse a settlement secured by means contrary to the obligations above referred to.'"

The Chinese Government understands this declaration to mean that the Members of the Council consider it would be a violation of the obligations of Members of the League under Article 20, paragraph 1, of the Covenant<sup>1</sup> to recognise any treaty or agreement which violates Article 10 or Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty, by impairing China's sovereignty, independence, or territorial or administrative integrity, or which has been concluded by means incompatible with the Paris Pact.

Japan's reply to the American Government, dated January 16th, 1932, is, both in tone and in substance, almost unique in diplomatic annals. It reads as follows:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's note dated January 8th, which has had the most careful attention of this Government.

"The Government of Japan was well aware that the Government of the United States could always be relied on to do everything in their power to support Japan's efforts to secure the full and complete fulfilment in every detail of the treaties of Washington and the Kellogg Treaty for the outlawry of war. They are glad to receive this additional assurance of the fact.

"As regards the question which your Excellency specifically mentions of the policy of the so-called 'Open Door', the Japanese Government, as has so often been stated, regard that policy as a cardinal feature of the politics of the Far East, and only regrets that its effectiveness is so seriously diminished by the unsettled conditions which prevail throughout China. In so far as they can secure it, the policy of the 'Open Door' will always be maintained in Manchuria, as in China proper.

"They take note of the statement by the Government of the United States that the latter cannot admit the legality of matters which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens or which might be brought about by means contrary to the Treaty of August 27th, 1928. It might be the subject of an academic doubt whether in a given case the impropriety of means necessarily and always avoids the ends secured, but, as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means, that question does not practically arise.

"It may be added that the treaties which relate to China must necessarily be applied with due regard to the state of affairs from time to time prevailing in that country, and that the present unsettled and distracted state of China is not what was in the contemplation of the high contracting parties at the time of the Treaty of Washington. It was certainly not satisfactory then; but it did not display that disunion and those antagonisms which it does to-day. This cannot affect the binding character of the stipulations of treaties; but it may in material respects modify their application, since they must necessarily be applied with reference to the state of facts as they exist.

"My Government desires further to point out that any replacement which has occurred in the personnel of the administration of Manchuria has been the necessary act of the local population. Even in cases of hostile occupation—which this was not—it is customary for the local officials to remain in the exercise of their functions. In the present case, they for the most part fled or resigned; it was their own behaviour which was calculated to destroy the working of the apparatus of government. The Japanese Government cannot think that the Chinese people, unlike all others, are destitute of the power of self-determination and of organising themselves in order to secure civilised conditions when deserted by the existing officials.

"While it need not be repeated that Japan entertains in Manchuria no territorial aims or ambitions, yet, as your Excellency knows, the welfare and safety of Manchuria and its accessibility for general trade are matters of the deepest interest and of quite extraordinary importance to the Japanese people. That the American Government is always alive to the exigencies of Far-Eastern questions has already been made evident on more than one occasion. At the present juncture, when the very existence of our national policy is involved, it is agreeable to be assured that the American Government is devoting in a friendly spirit such sedulous care to the correct appreciation of the situation."

<sup>1</sup> "The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof."

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*The Attack on Shanghai and the Bombardment of Nanking.*

During the January Council meeting and on the eve of the Disarmament Conference, the Japanese Army and Navy attacked the Chinese city of Shanghai amid circumstances of barbarity and horror too well remembered by the Members of the Council to need recapitulation. This further wanton act of aggression reinforced the idea of the Chinese Government that it was necessary, in addition to Article 11 of the Covenant, under which the Council remains seized, to invoke Articles 10 and 15. This was done by the Chinese representative, Dr. W. W. Yen, on January 29th in the following terms:

"Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour hereby to give notice as follows:

"1. A dispute between two Members of the League of Nations—to wit, China and Japan—arising from the aggression of the latter against the territorial and administrative integrity and political independence of the former in violation of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, exists.

"2. This dispute has not been submitted to arbitration or to judicial settlement in accordance with any of the Articles of the Covenant.

"3. The said dispute has now reached a state when it is likely to lead to an immediate rupture between China and Japan.

"4. China hereby invokes the application (not in derogation of the measures taken, or which may be taken by the League in the exercise of its functions under Article 11, but in addition thereto) both of Article 10 and of Article 15 of the Covenant to said dispute and formally submits the said matter to the Council for all appropriate and necessary action under both of said Articles.

"5. For this purpose, China begs leave to refer to, and hereby adopts as and for the statement of its case comprising the relevant facts and papers in relation to said matter, all the statements and papers heretofore made and submitted by China in the proceedings of the Council taken in said controversy under Article 11 of the Covenant from September 18th, 1931, to the date hereof."

At the meeting of the Council held in the afternoon of January 29th, Dr. W. W. Yen, the Chinese representative, said:

"My Government is sincerely appreciative of the efforts which the Council of the League of Nations, while proceeding since September 18th last under Article 11 of the Covenant, has made to bring about a satisfactory adjustment of the pending controversy between China and Japan. It is with profound disappointment and regret that China is obliged to recognise that these efforts have thus far proved ineffectual. As the victim of persistent external aggression in one of its most violent forms, China can no longer refrain from seeking remedies under other provisions than those of Article 11. The territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China has been destroyed, and its political independence gravely threatened, by external aggression. The fact is not and cannot be challenged. The Covenant is explicit and emphatic on the subject. A specific solemn obligation has been imposed and accepted by us all to respect and *preserve* against external aggression (and even the threat or danger of it) the territorial integrity and political independence of every Member of the League. I beg to quote Article 10:

"The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

"China respectfully submits that the obligation specified in the first sentence of Article 10 has become operative beyond any question, and that it remains only for the Council now to 'advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled'. As to the means to be employed, the choice is plainly one for the Council to make. It goes without saying that they must be adequate and effective, otherwise the obligation will not be fulfilled.

"Japan's disregard of her engagements under the Covenant is flagrant. The use of armed force without submitting the entire matter to arbitration or judicial settlement and without awaiting the outcome of enquiry by the Council is in direct violation, not only of the spirit, but also of the letter of the Covenant.

"The time has now come when the Chinese Government must, in justice to her cause, take affirmative steps to strengthen the hands of the League by placing the League in possession of this controversy, not only under Article 11, but also under other Articles of the Covenant where her rights and remedies as a Member of the League of Nations are more specifically defined. It was therefore my duty, acting under instructions from my Government, to present this morning the notice which has just been read by the Secretary-General."

The Council immediately appointed a Committee of Enquiry, composed of the representatives at Shanghai of some of its members, to report on the circumstances and nature of the Japanese

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attack. Two reports have to date been submitted. The first was preliminary and dealt only with the events at Shanghai from January 18th to January 28th. It substantially corroborated the information which had been furnished by the Chinese representative. The second report, which arrived on February 14th, states, among other things:

" Since February 3rd a state of open war exists, any pretence of a truce being abandoned. Firing continues intermittently, both in the Chapei and Woosung area, with the use of artillery and, on the side of the Japanese, by aerial bombardment. The offensive is entirely in the hands of the Japanese, whose declared object is to capture the Woosung forts and drive all Chinese troops a considerable distance from Shanghai. "

The report further refers to " numerous excesses committed by the Japanese marines and reservists, probably actuated by a spirit of revenge. A reign of terror resulted. "

Meanwhile, as the British representative reported to the Council on February 2nd, 1932, the British and American Governments, with which the French, Italian and German Governments associated themselves, presented to both Japan and China a formal request:

- " (1) That all acts of violence and preparations for hostilities shall be brought to an end;
- " (2) That in the Shanghai area both sides shall withdraw their troops and that, as further protection to the International Settlement, a neutral zone shall be arranged;
- " (3) That negotiations shall then be immediately begun to settle outstanding differences in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the Council resolution of December 9th last. "

China forthwith accepted these proposals *in toto*. Japan rejected them in all their essential features.

On February 12th, 1932, China exercised her right under paragraph 9 of Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to request that the dispute be referred to the Assembly. The request was as follows:

" With regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute, of which the Council has been seized under Articles 10, 11 and 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, I have the honour to observe that, according to Article 15, paragraph 9, of the said Covenant, it is within the competence of the Council to refer the case to the Assembly. At the same time, it is also provided that the dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

" In view of the time limit imposed, the Chinese Government is constrained hereby to request that the said dispute be referred to the Assembly. If, however, it should be the pleasure and intention of the Council to refer the said dispute at its own initiative to the Assembly or in virtue of the general powers vested in it to summon the Assembly for consideration of the dispute, the Chinese Government will then be prepared to withdraw the request on its part."

On February 16th, 1932, the following urgent appeal was addressed to the Government of Japan by the President of the Council in the name of all his colleagues with the exception of the representatives of the Parties to the dispute:

" The President of the Council, on behalf of his colleagues, pointed out on January 29th in an appeal to both Parties, ' good relations between States could only be secured by co-operation and mutual respect, and that no permanent solution could be achieved by force, whether military or merely economic, and that the longer the present situation continued the wider the breach between the two peoples would become and the more difficult the solution would be, with all the disasters that would mean, not only to the two nations directly involved, but to the world in general '.

" The Members of the Council other than the Chinese and Japanese representatives feel constrained to-day to make a pressing appeal to the Government of Japan to recognise the very special responsibilities for forbearance and restraint which devolves upon it in the present conflict, in virtue of the position of Japan as a Member of the League of Nations and a permanent Member of its Council.

" The situation which has developed in the Far East during the past months will be fully studied by the Commission appointed with the consent of both Parties. But, since the Commission was set up, there have occurred and are still occurring events at and in the region of Shanghai which have intensified public anxiety, which endanger the lives and interests of the nationals of numerous countries, add to the unexampled difficulties with which the world is faced during the present crisis, and threaten to throw new and serious obstacles in the path of the Disarmament Conference.

" The twelve Members of the Council are far from disregarding the grievances advanced by Japan and throughout all these months have given her the full confidence which they owed to an associate of long standing who had ever been punctilious in the fulfilment of all her obligations and duties as a member of the community of nations. They cannot but regret, however, that she has not found it possible to make full use of the methods of peaceful

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

settlement provided in the Covenant and recall once again the solemn undertaking of the Pact of Paris that the solution of international disputes shall never be sought by other than peaceful means. They cannot but recognise that, from the beginning of the conflict which is taking place on her territory, China has put her case in the hands of the League and agreed to accept its proposals for a peaceful settlement.

"The twelve Members of the Council recall the terms of Article 10 of the Covenant, by which all the Members of the League have undertaken to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all other Members. It is their friendly right to direct attention to this provision, particularly as it appears to them to follow that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought about in disregard of this Article ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by the Members of the League of Nations.

"Japan has an incalculable responsibility before the public opinion of the world to be just and restrained in her relations with China. She has already acknowledged this responsibility in most solemn terms by becoming one of the signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, whereby the contracting Powers expressly agreed to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. The twelve Members of the Council appeal to Japan's high sense of honour to recognise the obligations of her special position and of the confidence which the nations have placed in her as a partner in the organisation and maintenance of peace."

Japan answered this earnest appeal on the part of the twelve Members of the Council with an ultimatum to the Chinese authorities at Shanghai, which was delivered on the very next day at 9.0 p.m. (February 18th), demanding that the Chinese cease hostilities and completely evacuate their first lines by 7.0 a.m. February 20th and the whole area by 5.0 p.m. on the same day to a depth of 20 kilometres beyond the boundaries of the International Settlement. The ultimatum also demanded the permanent dismantling of all fortifications and military works in the evacuated area, including the Woosung Forts, and the cessation of all anti-Japanese manifestations and activities. Failing to comply with these demands, the Japanese commander would take necessary action.

At the request of Dr. W. W. Yen, the Chinese representative, the Council met on the eve of the pending battle (February 19th), to consider the Japanese ultimatum. In opening this extraordinary session, the Chinese representative said:

"We are on the eve of a great battle, wherein some hundred thousand men, equipped with all the modern weapons of war, and on the side of Japan aided by some forty ships of war, will participate; and why? Because it is the will and pleasure of the Japanese military that our troops who are on their own national territory should withdraw, while the Japanese soldiers are to remain in their position of offensive and provocation. The situation is simply intolerable.

"I have the honour, therefore, to request that the Council will, in virtue of the powers with which it is invested by the Covenant, consider immediately and put into execution conservatory measures, to the end that the bloodshed which will begin to-morrow through the outrageous demand of the Japanese military, and for which they will be entirely responsible, may be stopped."

Mr. Sato, the Japanese delegate, as was his wont, rehearsed once again for his country the pleas of self-defence and of the maintenance of peace and order. The Japanese delegate charged that China was in a state of utter disorder and anarchy, and therefore thought that "the League of Nations could not in the present circumstances apply the Covenant to us rigorously as it would naturally be applied under normal conditions". He then complained that, in the League of Nations, his country failed to find an effective safeguard of her rights and was therefore compelled to adopt measures similar to those adopted in years past by other countries. Manchuria also took up much of the Japanese representative's time, who gave public approval, contrary to the declared policy of his Government, to the independence movement or what he called the "Manchuria for the Manchus" movement, which he said had been supported by Japan.<sup>1</sup>

In reply to these remarks and charges of the Japanese delegate, the Chinese representative said in part as follows:

"While I admit there is a certain amount of disorder, it must be remembered that China is as large as Europe and has a population of four hundred million people. . . that China was an absolute monarchy and was suddenly transformed into a republic. In the process of readjustment, there must be a certain amount of unrest and commotion; but to describe China as being in a state of chaos and of anarchy is a libel of the clearest kind.

"The Japanese delegate speaks of a well-organised State. I am wondering whether a State like Japan, with the army and navy running amok and out of the control of the Government, is an organised State. When her diplomats come to the Council table and give promises one after another, apparently in sincerity and good faith, and when these same promises are violated the very next day, does that represent a well-organised Government? The Japanese gave solemn promises to the Governments of two or three great Powers not to

<sup>1</sup> Appendix VIII.

go to Chinchow, but in a few days they were there. Does that represent a well-organised Government? Our people have been massacred in Japan itself during the earthquake, and over a hundred innocent Chinese merchants were killed in Korea only in the past year or so in pogroms: Does that represent a well-organised Government?

"To my mind, however, the Japanese delegate is somewhat contradictory in what he has said. On the one hand, he says China has no organised Government, that there is chaos and anarchy, and, on the other hand, Japan insists on negotiating with that very same Government. If it is a disorganised Government, why should Japan insist on direct negotiations with it? Why not have the matter settled in the League of Nations? That certainly is very difficult for me to understand.

"I may say at once that, if there has been disorder and civil war in China, a large part of the blame must be put on the shoulders of Japan, because she has subsidised and helped one party against the other from year to year. . . . Why is this? It is because Japan does not want to see China united and strong. . . .

"It is to me amusing to hear the Japanese delegate complain that he gets no protection from the League. What kind of protection does he want? I should imagine that, so far from protection, Japan is deserving of some severe punishment. After the setting up of a puppet government in Manchuria, after all the bombardment that has gone on, Japan comes now to the League of Nations and asks for protection. I think that such a request is nothing short of absurdity.

"Japan has invaded China this time and done it in contradiction to the great virtues which we have always praised. There is, first, benevolence. China was suffering from enormous floods and some forty millions of people were rendered starving and destitute. . . . and yet Japan has taken the opportunity of attacking and invading us in direct contradiction to our conception of the idea of benevolence. Japan is famed for her knightlihood, bravery and courage, and yet she is fighting this moment against China in an undeclared war and refusing to shoulder its responsibilities. Is that bravery? Is that courage?

"Lastly, Japan, I think, has not acted wisely. I was a friend of Japan, but I must say that, in the present instance, by using force and by using aggression, she is only antagonising our people, who formerly were really keen on becoming friends with Japan. Is that wise? Because I can assure you that no settlement this time with Japan through the use of force and menaces and threats will ever be a permanent settlement, and, if it is not going to be a permanent settlement, it is the height of folly for Japan to act in the way she has done. . . .

"To speak of Manchuria as the land of the Manchus is absolutely absurd. Manchuria was Chinese a thousand years ago, and with the coming of the Manchus into China the relations between the two parts have become very close and intimate. As you know, China is a Republic composed of five races, so the Manchus are one of the five races of China. But to-day the majority of the Manchus are no longer in Manchuria; they followed their emperors to China and are now scattered all over China. So to-day Manchuria is absolutely and purely Chinese. Manchuria is politically, historically and ethnically Chinese. The attempt of the Japanese delegate to make you believe that Manchuria is Manchu and non-Chinese is not a thing at all to be believed. . . .

"The Japanese delegate said, and he has said it repeatedly, that Japan has no intention to annex Manchuria. I am very much gratified to hear that; but, if my memory does not fail me, I think some years ago I heard the same thing about Korea. Japan was never to annex Korea, and yet to-day, if I am not mistaken, Korea is an integral part of the Japanese Empire. So that these assertions of the Japanese delegate are not always to be taken at their face value. . . .

"We are on the eve of a great battle. . . . What is the Council going to do to attempt to put a stop to the bloodshed which is going to begin in about a few hours' time—7 o'clock to-morrow morning, Shanghai time? That, it seems to me, is the urgent matter which is before us, and I wish sincerely to hear from the Council what its decision is."

In view of the impending catastrophe, the Council, other than the Parties to the dispute, made a last-minute appeal to the Japanese Government in the following touching words of M. Boncour, the President:

"The Japanese delegate said as soon as the operations which are now in preparation have ensured that his nationals shall be safeguarded, then there will be no question of remaining on the ground that will by then perhaps be the field on which a battle has been won. I would urge the Japanese delegate to consider if there is not a terrible contradiction between his territorial disinterestedness and the possibility that the ground which they are going to evacuate as soon as they have attained their object will be the ground that has been strewn with the dead resulting from a great battle. The Japanese delegate has himself indicated rapidly but surely the means by which this may be prevented. He said that afterwards it would be easy to set up a neutral zone and to entrust to neutral authorities the guaranteeing of Japanese rights and the protection of Japanese rights. I would urge most strongly that it is not afterwards that that should be done; surely now is the time when such action should be taken. . . . If the delegate of Japan could extend the ultimatum, could prevent

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its expiring in a few hours, what an example he would give, what a service he would perform to the League of Nations. I urge this most sincerely with all my deepest conviction."

This appeal again fell on deaf ears. In the words of the Third Report of the Shanghai Committee:

"During the night, February 19th—February 20th, Japanese reinforcements were moved from their base in the International Settlement to the Japanese lines, and, after preliminary reconnaissance which satisfied the Japanese that the Chinese had not evacuated their lines in conformity with the demand, the Japanese opened attack February 20th at 7.30 a.m. in the Kiangwan and Woosung areas. Hostilities continued whole day."

The Council, at its meeting on February 19th, in compliance with China's request of February 12th, also adopted a resolution transferring the consideration of the Sino-Japanese dispute to the Assembly. The text of the resolution reads as follows:

"The Council,

"(1) Considering the request submitted by the representative of China, under the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 15 of the Covenant, to the effect that the Sino-Japanese dispute should be referred to the Assembly:

"Decides that the said dispute is referred to the Assembly in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 9, of the Covenant.

"2. Considering that delegations from almost every Member of the League are now present in Geneva in order to take part in the Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, thereby enabling the Assembly to meet at short notice:

"Decides that a meeting of the Assembly shall be held on March 3rd.

"3. Notes that the measures which have already been instituted in order to obtain information necessary for the consideration of the dispute will be continued.

"4. Requests the Parties to the dispute to use all diligence in communicating to the Secretary-General for the use of the Assembly the statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers as provided for in Article 15, paragraph 2.

"5. The duty of the Council to continue its work for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the Covenant remains unaffected by the present decision."

#### IV. — THE REASONS ADVANCED BY JAPAN IN EXCUSE OF HER POLICY.

The preceding recital of events since September 18th rests upon the official records in the proceedings of the Council. The fundamental facts cannot be seriously controverted. Japan's plea, reduced to its lowest terms, is one of confession and avoidance. Unless the obligations assumed by Japan under the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty are to be regarded as purely illusory and meaningless, there has been an admitted flagrant violation of the provisions of all three of these multilateral treaties. None of them contains any language which can conceivably be interpreted to permit resort to invasion or armed force on any pretext whatever in order to settle an international dispute. On the contrary, both the letter and the spirit of these instruments call imperatively for the employment of pacific means exclusively in every case without the slightest qualification or exception; no provocation or excuse is recognised. To concede that intervention by armed force can be resorted to *on any ground, however plausible*, is to admit that the treaties can, in specific cases, be set aside by unilateral action, and thus to undermine and destroy the entire peace structure which they support.

Assuming, however, that the plea of confession and avoidance can be listened to at all, let us examine briefly the various excuses which Japan has offered:

(a) The initial pretext was that, on the evening of September 18th, some rails were removed from the South Manchurian line just south of Mukden. China has denied this assertion flatly. Even if the incident occurred, its triviality and inadequacy as a justification for invasion and occupation of 200,000 square miles of Chinese territory is too apparent to require further comment.

(b) Having once embarked upon this enterprise and plunged all of Manchuria into chaos, Japan invoked the plea of self-defence, which is still put forward, strangely enough, to justify the attack upon Shanghai and the bombardment of the capital of China. Nowhere in the Japanese case is cynical disregard for the plain facts more patent than in this shameless and futile attempt to reverse the roles. The invocation of self-defence in behalf of an invading army suddenly launched upon China's territory in a time of profound peace is an affront to intelligence.

The Council has authoritatively stated that the right of self-defence must be interpreted in relation to the obligations under the Covenant. It is clearly not a plea open to the Covenant-breaker.

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The British Foreign Minister, Sir Austen (then Mr.) Chamberlain, in his capacity of rapporteur on the Greco-Bulgarian dispute, which began with a local combat between sentries and developed into the penetration into one party's territory of troops of the other, spoke as follows before the Council at its extraordinary session in October 1925:

"I call particular attention to the obligations of Articles 10 and 12 of the Covenant. Such incidents as that which has caused our present meeting have sometimes had very serious consequences in the past, when there was no machinery such as that offered by the League for their peaceful adjustment and for securing justice to both parties; but it would be an intolerable thing—I go so far as to say that it would be an affront to civilisation—if, with all the machinery of the League at their disposal and with the good offices of the Council immediately available, as this meeting shows, such incidents should now lead to warlike operations instead of being submitted at once for peaceful and amicable adjustment by the countries concerned to the Council, which will always have regard to their honour and to the safety and security of their nations."

The President, who at that time, as during the greater part of the Sino-Japanese conflict, was M. Briand, the French Foreign Minister, said:

"He had understood the representative of Greece to indicate that all these incidents would not have arisen if his country had not been called upon to take rapid steps for its legitimate defence and protection. It was essential that such ideas should not take root in the minds of nations which were Members of the League and become a kind of jurisprudence, for it would be extremely dangerous. Under the pretext of legitimate defence, disputes might arise which, though limited in extent, were extremely unfortunate owing to the damage they entailed. These disputes, once they had broken out, might assume such proportions that the Government which started them under a feeling of legitimate defence would be no longer able to control them.

"The League of Nations, though its Council, and through all the methods of conciliation which were at its disposal, offered the nations a means of avoiding such deplorable events. The nations had only to appeal to the Council. It had been shown that the criticisms which had been brought against the League of Nations, to the effect that its machinery was cumbersome and that it found it difficult to take action in circumstances which required an urgent solution, were unjustified. It had been proved that a nation which appealed to the League when it felt that its existence was threatened could be sure that the Council would be at its post ready to undertake its work of conciliation."

These sentiments were endorsed by several Members of the Council. The following passage may be quoted:

"Mr. Austen Chamberlain said that the declaration which the President had made as to the role which the League of Nations could play in cases such as that which had brought about the present meeting, and as to the restraint which nations concerned in unfortunate incidents of this character might be expected to exercise in view of the fact that the Council could be immediately convened and could use its good offices to reconcile disputants, was of such consequence for the position of the League of Nations and for the guidance of nations in future that he would like, on behalf of his Government, to express his complete concurrence in all the President had said and to thank him for having so completely defined the duties of nations and the duties of the League of Nations.

"Viscount Ishii (Japan) said that he entirely agreed with the statement made by the representative of the British Empire endorsing the declaration made by the President."

(c) Japan further alleges the need to protect the lives and property of her subjects. But even the Japanese do not seriously pretend that there was any danger to the lives and property of their nationals before September 18th. It therefore follows that, if the danger they now profess to fear be real, it has been created by their own violence and injustice and so will disappear with its cause. The Chinese Government has from the outset emphasised this fact, pointed to the efficient protection of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the territory controlled by China, stated that it assumed full responsibility for protecting life and property and restoring and maintaining public order in the areas taken over from the Japanese troops, agreed to accept the suggestion for neutral participation made by the Council in October last, and to go further and co-operate with the Council in devising any measures on the spot with the assistance of the League that would satisfy the Council or its agents of the efficacy of such protection.

(d) A further pretext alleged is the need for suppressing bandits. Here, too, the danger of which the Japanese now complain has, in so far as it is real, been created by their own action. Just as gangs of criminals exist even in the great cities of the most highly civilised countries, it is not surprising to find that, among the agricultural population and nomads of frontier provinces like Manchuria, there are lawless elements who band themselves together and take to the mountains.

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But before September 18th, 1931, there were only about 2,000 such bandits throughout the vast area of Manchuria split up into small bands whose area of operations and numbers were known to the Chinese Government and which were incapable of seriously disturbing public order. The present conditions are due to the military occupation itself, which has destroyed every vestige of Chinese administrative authority.

The pretext of banditry should be treated with reserve, as it was part of the propaganda circulated at the end of December last by the Japanese Government to discredit the testimony of the neutral observers in South-West Manchuria and to afford an excuse for the taking of Chinchow in violation of the Japanese Government's pledges. In addition, the Chinese Government has reason to state<sup>1</sup> that the Japanese Army authorities in Manchuria have been arming and encouraging brigands on a large scale, first with the object of creating trouble for the local authorities, and, secondly, in order to furnish a pretext for extending and consolidating the military occupation. So long as the Japanese occupation lasts, so long will every patriotic Chinese in and out of Manchuria deem it his sacred duty to combat the occupation and its puppets by every means in his power.

(e) The Japanese contend that they stand for law and order in Manchuria. It has just been shown that, from a practical and realistic point of view, Japanese attempts to maintain order in Chinese territory are doomed in the nature of the case to produce increasingly acute and disastrous disorder. Commenting on the exactly similar position when the Japanese Army occupied Eastern Siberia and alleged that it did so in self-defence to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects and to maintain order, the United States Government, in a note dated May 31st, 1931, pointed out that:

"In its view, continued occupation of the strategic centres in Eastern Siberia . . . . . and the establishment of a civil administration which inevitably lends itself to misconception and antagonism tend rather to increase than to allay the unrest and disorder in that region."

From a moral and legal point of view, Japanese pretensions in the name of law and order have been condemned in advance by no less an authority than the Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, in his address to the Japanese Diet on January 1st, 1926, already quoted.<sup>2</sup>

To all this may be added the observation that a Government which, like the Japanese, is apparently unable to control its own Army and Navy, with results that have astounded the world, would appear estopped to plead law and order as an excuse.

(f) An even more paradoxical plea advanced by Japan is that she is acting in defence of treaty rights. The extremely controversial nature of many of Japan's alleged treaty rights in Manchuria and the dubious methods by which the Japanese Government seeks to interpret and apply these rights have already been indicated in the first section of this statement. All that need be said about Japan's claim to exercise unlimited violence in repudiation of her undoubted treaty obligations under the Covenant, the Paris Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty in order to enforce her own view of her disputed treaty rights in Manchuria is that, if the claim be admitted, treaties would for all practical purposes cease to exist and lawless force would become the arbiter of international relations.

(g) Still another attempt at justification made by the Japanese Government is that its acts are necessitated by the Chinese people's boycott of Japanese goods and the alleged anti-Japanese agitation.

On this matter the Council may be referred to the statement made before it by the Chinese delegate on October 23rd, 1931:

"Once this unhappy incident is settled and normal relations restored between China and Japan, the Japanese Government will find us not only willing, but also anxious to discuss every issue between the two countries in the most friendly spirit. . . . The Chinese Government for its part will not only scrupulously observe all its obligations under international law and practice to promote good relations with Japan, but will do everything in its power to turn the thoughts of its people to peace and amity, forgetfulness of the bitter past and hope for a better future."

As regards specifically the question of the boycott, the Chinese Government, in a reply (document C.708.1931) to the Japanese memorandum of October 6th, circulated to the Council on October 13th, stated:

"Freedom to choose one's purchases is an individual right with which no Government interferes, and, while it is the duty of every Government to protect foreign nationals, it is

<sup>1</sup> Cf. documents C.679, C.789, C.868, 1931.

<sup>2</sup> *Vide supra*, page 5.

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bound neither by any recognised standard of governance nor by any principle of international law to prohibit or punish exercise of an elementary right of citizenship. If there be responsibility at all in the matter, it entirely lies with Japan, since the Wanpaoshan incident created this general prejudice against Japanese merchandise."

The boycott is nothing but a natural reaction of the people of China to the acts of aggression of the Japanese Government and its Army and Navy. No Government—no power on earth—can compel the Chinese people to buy Japanese goods so long as Japanese troops are on Chinese soil.

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This brief examination of Japan's pleas shows, not only that each explanation is individually unsound, but also that their very multiplicity and mutual inconsistency render their sincerity suspect. Japan stands condemned as a violator of her solemn treaty obligations; and there is here no question of a merely juristic or technical violation. The appalling moral and material loss which has already been inflicted and the grave threat to general peace are altogether too real to be ignored on any technical considerations.

#### V. — CONCLUSION.

China comes to the League of Nations as the acknowledged trustee of international order and justice with a case which is classic in its simplicity. She has kept the Covenant; she has offered, and still offers, in the most sweeping terms, to adopt and carry out any programme that may be formulated and applied for the peaceful adjustment of her differences with Japan; she has placed herself unreservedly in the League's hands. China cannot believe that she has committed a blunder in relying upon a Covenant which was brought into existence at the cost of 10,000,000 dead and 30,000,000 wounded, and is now backed by 55 nations.

China asks only to work out her destiny in peace—in the words of the Nine-Power Treaty, "the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government". Is there anything unreasonable in this? And yet one of the signatories of the Covenant, and of the Pact of Paris, and of the Nine-Power Treaty, is to-day ravaging her territory, destroying her territorial and administrative integrity and her political independence, and threatening her very existence as a member of the family of nations. The Shanghai effort is but a continuation of the aggression which started in Manchuria on September 18th, 1931.

The issue presented is unmistakable and urgent. The Right Honourable Mr. Arthur Henderson, President of the Disarmament Conference, in his opening address on February 2nd, did not fail to emphasise the true significance of the crisis in the Far East when he said:

"Before passing on to my main subject, I feel bound to refer to the tragic fact that, at the moment when this Conference, the very purpose of which is to take further steps towards the maintenance of peace, begins its work, we are confronted with a situation of such extreme gravity as that which now exists.

"It is imperative that all of the signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris should make it their business to ensure the strict observance of these two great safeguards against acts of violence and war."

The intolerable situation was fully realised by the British representative when he stated at the Council's meeting of February 2nd: ". . . it is impossible that the present position in the Far East should be allowed to continue . . . War in everything but name is in progress. To such a state of things the Members of the League of Nations cannot be indifferent. If it is allowed to go on, the Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine-Power Treaty must inevitably lose the confidence of the world." The British representative did not attempt to state the obvious alternative which must be in the mind of every informed observer. China stands or falls with the entire peace structure which has been so laboriously built up in recent years. The consequences of a collapse cannot be contemplated without the gravest apprehension. Could there be any better way to set the stage for another world war?

Japan stands at the bar of public opinion and at the Council table of the League as the protagonist of an antiquated and barbarous system which has been deliberately and formally discarded by every nation, including Japan. Her appeal to arms cannot be reconciled with the new order of things, recorded in solemn treaties upon which the hope for a civilised and peaceful world now rests. We are at the cross-roads, and the decision to go the way of peace or that of war is squarely

before us all. There is no middle course: if Japan is right in this matter, then militarism and brute force resume their sway over the affairs of nations; if the new order is to be preserved, the hour has struck to defend it.

It is appropriate here, therefore, to reiterate the position of the Chinese Government as contained in the statement filed by it on February 9th, 1932, which reads as follows:

" The official records of the League of Nations in the proceedings taken before the Council since September 18th last disclose the following undisputed facts:

" 1. On the evening of September 18th, 1931, Japan without warning launched a violent attack with armed forces upon the territory of China.

" 2. Notwithstanding the active efforts of the Council, in the exercise of its conciliatory function under Article 11 of the Covenant, this attack has been steadily and consistently developed into a formidable invasion and occupation, not only of Manchuria, but also of other parts of China.

" 3. Japan has failed to comply with the resolutions of the Council providing for the cessation of her hostile action and the withdrawal of her armed forces. The resolutions of September 30th and of December 9th, consented to by Japan herself, have not been carried out either in letter or in spirit.

" 4. The efforts of Members of the League acting in collaboration with the United States of America have likewise proved unavailing to bring about a cessation of Japan's armed aggression, which still continues, not only in Manchuria, but also at Shanghai and elsewhere. Nanking, the capital of China, has been bombarded and is threatened with further bombardment; the Government has been obliged to transfer its seat from Nanking to Loyang.

" 5. The violation by Japan of the League Covenant, of the Pact of Paris and of the Nine-Power Treaty is a fact which has been made so clear as to admit of no dispute.

" 6. China respectfully submits that the elementary facts of the situation as above stated plainly call for the exercise of the full powers of the League under its Covenant to bring about an immediate cessation of hostile and aggressive action by Japan, the prompt evacuation of China's territory by Japanese forces and the settlement of the entire controversy between China and Japan by peaceful means. "

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

February 22nd, 1932.

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Appendix I.

OFFICIAL STATEMENT BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT RESPECTING THE CHINO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS BROUGHT TO A CONCLUSION BY CHINA'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM DELIVERED ON MAY 7TH, 1915.

At three o'clock on the afternoon of May 7th, 1915, His Excellency the Japanese Minister in Peking delivered to the Chinese Government in person an Ultimatum from the Imperial Japanese Government, with an accompanying Note of seven articles. The concluding sentences of the Ultimatum read thus:

"The Imperial Government hereby again offer its advice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by six o'clock p.m. on the ninth day of May. It is hereby declared that, if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the specified time, the Imperial Government will take such steps as it may deem necessary."

The Chinese Government—having received and accepted the Ultimatum—feels constrained to make a frank and plain statement of the facts connected with the negotiations which were abruptly terminated by this drastic action on the part of Japan.

The Chinese Government has constantly aimed, as it still aims, at consolidating the friendship existing between China and Japan, and, in this period of travail in other parts of the world, has been particularly solicitous of preserving peace in the Far East. Unexpectedly, on January 18th, 1915, His Excellency the Japanese Minister in Peking, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, adopted the unusual procedure of presenting to His Excellency the President of the Republic of China a list of twenty-one momentous demands, arranged in five groups. The first four groups were each introduced by a preamble, but there was no preamble or explanation to the fifth group. In respect of the character of the demands in this group, however, no difference was indicated in the document between them and those embodied in the preceding groups.

Although there was no cause for such a *demarche*, the Chinese Government, in deference to the wishes of the Imperial Japanese Government, at once agreed to open negotiations on those articles which it was possible for China to consider, notwithstanding that it was palpable that the whole of the demands were intended to extend the rights and interests of Japan without securing a *quid pro quo* of any kind for China.

China approached the pending conferences in a spirit of utmost friendliness and with a determination to deal with all questions frankly and sincerely. Before negotiations were actually commenced, the Japanese Minister raised many questions with regard to the number of delegates proposed to represent China, the number of conferences to be held in each week, and the method of discussion. The Chinese Government, though its views differed from those of the Japanese Minister, yielded in all these respects to his contentions in the hope of avoiding any delay in the negotiations. The objections of the Japanese Minister to the customary recording and signing of the minutes of each conference, which the Chinese Government suggested as a necessary and advisable precaution, as well as one calculated to facilitate future reference, were also accepted. Nor did the Chinese Government retaliate in any way when, in the course of the negotiations, the Japanese Minister twice suspended the conferences, obviously with the object of compelling compliance with his views on certain points at the time under discussion. Even when delay was threatened owing to the unfortunate injury sustained by the Japanese Minister as a result of a fall from his horse, the Chinese delegates, in order to avert interruption, proposed that the conferences should be continued at the Japanese Legation, which proposal was accepted. Later, when, on March 22nd, the Japanese Government despatched large bodies of troops to South Manchuria and Shantung for the ostensible purpose of relieving the garrison—whose term of service had not then expired—the Japanese Minister stated at the conference, in reply to a direct question as to when the retiring troops would be withdrawn, that this would not be done until the negotiations could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Although this minatory step caused much excitement, indignation and alarm on the part of the Chinese people, and made it difficult for the Chinese Government to continue the conferences, it successfully exerted efforts to avert a rupture and thus enabled the negotiations smoothly to proceed. All this demonstrates that the Chinese Government was dominated by a sincere desire to expedite the progress of the conferences; and that the Japanese Government recognised this important fact was made clear on March 11th, when the Japanese Minister conveyed to the Chinese Government an expression of his Government's appreciation of China's frankness and sincerity in the conduct of the negotiations.

From February 2nd, when the negotiations were commenced, to April 17th, twenty-four conferences were held in all. Throughout this whole period the Chinese Government steadfastly strove to arrive at an amicable settlement and made every concession possible.

Of the twenty-one demands originally submitted by Japan, China agreed to fifteen, some in principle and some textually, six being initialled by both parties.

IN THE MATTER OF THE DEMANDS TO WHICH CHINA AGREED:

At the first conference, held on February 2nd, China agreed in principle to the first article of the Shantung group of demands which provides that China should give her assent to the transfer of Germany's rights in Shantung to Japan. The Chinese Government maintained at first that the subject of this demand related to the *post bellum* settlement and, therefore, should be left over for discussion by all the parties interested at the Peace Conference. Failing to persuade the Japanese Minister to accept this view, the Chinese Government agreed to this demand in principle and made certain supplementary proposals.

One of the supplementary proposals was in these terms:

"The Japanese Government declares that, when the Chinese Government gives its assent to the disposition of the rights above referred to, Japan will restore the Leased Territory of Kiaochow to China, and further recognises the right of the Chinese Government to participate in the negotiations referred to above between Japan and Germany."

The provision for a declaration to restore Kiaochow was clearly not a demand on Japan, but only a reiteration of Japan's voluntary statement in her Ultimatum to Germany on August 15th, 1914 (a copy of which was officially transmitted to the Chinese Government for perusal on August 15th), and repeated in public statements by the Japanese Premier. Appreciating the earnest desire of Japan to maintain the peace of the Far East and to cement her friendship with China, as evidenced by this friendly offer, the Chinese Government left the entire question of the conditions of restoration to be determined by Japan and refrained from making any reference thereto in the supplementary proposal. The suggestion relating to participation in the conference between Japan and Germany was made in view of the fact that Shantung, the object of future negotiation between Japan and Germany, is a Chinese Province, and that therefore China is the Power most concerned in the future of that territory.

Another supplementary proposal suggesting the assumption by Japan of responsibility for indemnification of the losses arising out of the military operations by Japan in and about the Leased Territory of Kiaochow was necessitated by the fact that China was neutral *vis-à-vis* the war between Japan and Germany. Had China not inserted such a provision, her position in relation to this conflict might have been liable to misconception—the localities in which the operations took place being a portion of China's territory—and might also have exposed herself to a claim for indemnification of losses for which she was in no way responsible.

In a further supplementary proposal, the Chinese Government suggested that, prior to the restoration of the Kiaochow Territory to China, the Maritime Customs, the telegraphs and post offices should be continued to be administered as heretofore; that the military railway, the telegraph lines, etc., which were installed by Japan to facilitate her military operations, should be removed forthwith; that the Japanese troops now stationed outside of the Leased Territory should be first withdrawn, and those within the Territory should be recalled at the time when Kiaochow is returned to China. Shantung being a Chinese Province, it was natural for China to be anxious concerning the restoration of the *statu quo ante bellum*. Although the Chinese Government was confident that the Japanese Government would effect such restoration in pursuance of its official declaration, it was necessary for China, being neutral throughout the war, to place these matters on record.

At the third conference, held on February 22nd, China agreed to the second demand in the Shantung group not to cede or lease to any Power any territory or island or land on the sea border of Shantung.

At the fifth conference, held on February 28th, China agreed to give Japan the preference, provided Germany abandoned the privilege, to supply the capital for the construction of a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, in the event of China's deciding to build that railway with foreign capital.

At the sixth conference, held on March 3rd, China, in the interest of foreign trade, agreed to open certain important cities in Shantung as trade marts under regulations approved by the Japanese Government, although this was a demand on the part of Japan for privileges additional to any that hitherto had been enjoyed by Germany and was not an outcome of the hostilities between Japan and Germany, nor, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, was its acceptance essential to the preservation of peace in the Far East.

At the eighth conference, held on March 9th, China agreed (1) to the extension of the term of the lease of Dairen and (2) Port Arthur, and (3) of the South Manchurian and (4) Antung-Mukden Railways, all to ninety-nine years.

Owing to the bitter experiences which China sustained in the past in connection with the leased portions of her territory, it has become her settled policy not to grant further leases or to extend the term of those now in existence. Therefore, it was a significant indication of China's desire to meet Japan's wishes when she agreed to this exceptional departure from her settled policy.

At the same conference, the Chinese Government also agreed to refrain from raising objections to the principle of co-operation in the Hanyeh-ping Company, if the latter should arrive at an agreement in this respect with the Japanese capitalists concerned. With reference to this question, it was pointed out to the Japanese Minister that, in the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, Chinese subjects are guaranteed the right of protection of their property and freedom to engage in any lawful occupation. The Government was precluded, therefore, from interfering

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with the private business of the people and could not find any other solution than the one thus agreed to.

As regards the single article of the fourth group, and the preamble thereto, the Chinese Government held that they were inconsistent with Chinese sovereignty. However, China, at this conference, expressed her readiness to meet the wishes of Japan so far as it was possible without infringing her sovereignty and agreed to make a voluntary pronouncement that she would not alienate any portion of her coast-line.

In connection with the South Manchuria Railway, it is worthy of note that the provision regarding the re-purchase period in the agreement (thirty-six years from 1902) was not mentioned in Japan's original proposal. Subsequently, the Japanese Government, on the ground that the meaning of this provision was not clear, requested China to agree to its cancellation. To this request the Chinese Government acceded, though well aware that the proposed change could only benefit Japan. China thus relinquished the right to re-purchase the railway at the expiration of another twenty-three years.

In connection with the Antung-Mukden Railway, the article, which was originally initialled at the conference, provided for the reversion of the railway to China at the end of ninety-nine years without payment, but, at the subsequent meeting, the Japanese Minister requested that the reference to the reversion without payment be deleted from the initialled article. In acceding to the Japanese Minister's request, China again showed her sincere desire to expedite matters and to meet Japan's wishes even at the sacrifice of a point in her favour, to which Japan had already agreed.

At the eleventh conference, held on March 16th, China agreed to give Japan preference in regard to loans for railway construction in South Manchuria.

At the thirteenth conference, held on March 23rd, China agreed (1) to the amendment of the Kirin-Changchun Railway loan agreement; (2) to give preference to Japan if the revenue of South Manchuria were offered as security for loans; (3) to give preference to Japanese in the event of the employment of advisers for South Manchuria; (4) to grant to Japanese the right of mining in nine specified areas in South Manchuria.

In its original form, the demand with reference to mining in South Manchuria tended to create a monopoly for Japanese subjects, and therefore was entirely inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity. The Chinese Government explained that it could not, in view of the treaty rights of other Powers, agree to this monopoly, but it readily gave its acceptance when Japan consented to the modification of the demand so as to mitigate its monopolistic character.

In connection with the Kirin-Changchun Railway, the amendment agreed to involves a fundamental revision of the original agreement on the basis of the existing railway loan concluded by China with other foreign capitalists, as well as an engagement on the part of the Chinese Government to extend to this railway any better terms which may be hereafter accorded to other railway concessionaires in China. The capital of this railway was originally 50 per cent Chinese and 50 per cent Japanese. The effect of this undertaking is to transfer the capital originally held by the Chinese, as well as the full control and administration of the railway, to the Japanese.

At the twenty-first conference, held on April 10th, China agreed, in regard to the demands concerning Fukien Province, to give Japan an assurance in accordance with Japan's wishes at a future time.

As regards demands 2 and 3 in the "Manchurian group", relating to the ownership of land for trade, manufacture and agricultural enterprises as well as for the right of settlement in the interior of South Manchuria, the Chinese Government, after discussion at several conferences, agreed to them in principle, but desired to introduce certain amendments concerning the control and protection of the Japanese subjects who might avail themselves of these rights. The course of the negotiations in connection with these amendments will be referred to subsequently.

#### IN THE MATTER OF THOSE DEMANDS TO WHICH CHINA COULD NOT AGREE:

Of the twenty-one demands there were six, as previously mentioned, to which China could not agree on the ground that they were not proper subjects for international negotiation, conflicting as they did with the sovereign rights of China, the treaty rights of other Powers, and the principle of equal opportunity.

Thus, for example, the second article of the Hanyeh-ping question in the original third group in particular seriously affected the principle of equal commercial and industrial opportunity.

The proposal that there should be joint administration by China and Japan of the police in China was clearly an interference with the Republic's domestic affairs and consequently an infringement of her sovereignty. For that reason, the Chinese Government could not take the demand into consideration. But when it was explained by the Japanese Minister that this referred only to South Manchuria and he suggested that his Government would be satisfied if China agreed to engage Japanese as police advisers for that territory, the Chinese Government accepted the suggestion.

The two articles relating to the acquisition of land for schools, hospitals and temples, as well as to the right of missionary propaganda, would, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, have

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presented grave obstacles to the consolidation of the friendly feeling subsisting between the two peoples. The religions of the two countries are identical and therefore the need for a missionary propaganda to be carried on in China by Japanese does not exist. The natural rivalry between Chinese and Japanese followers of the same faith would tend to create incessant disputes and friction. Whereas Western missionaries live apart from the Chinese communities among which they labour, Japanese monks would live with the Chinese, and the similarity of their physical characteristics, their religious garb, and their habits of life would render it impossible to distinguish them for purposes of affording the protection which the Japanese Government would require should be extended to them under the system of extra-territoriality now obtaining in China. Moreover, a general apprehension exists among the Chinese people that these peculiar conditions favouring conspiracies for political purposes might be taken advantage of by some unscrupulous Chinese.

The demand for railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley conflicted with the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Agreement of March 6th, 1908, the Nanking-Changsha Railway Agreement of March 31st, 1914, and the engagement August 24th, 1914, giving preference to British firms for the projected line from Nanchang to Chaochowfu. For this reason the Chinese Government found itself unable to consider the demand, though the Japanese Minister, while informed of China's engagements with Great Britain, repeatedly pressed for its acceptance.

In respect to the demand for the appointment of influential Japanese to be advisers in political, financial and military affairs, the policy of the Chinese Government in regard to the appointment of advisers has been similar to that which has presumably guided the Japanese Government in like circumstances—namely, the selection of the best-qualified men irrespective of their nationality. As an indication of its desire to avail themselves of the services of eminent Japanese, one of the earliest appointments made to an advisership was that of Dr. Ariga, while later on Dr. Hirai and Mr. Nakayama were appointed to the Ministry of Communications.

It was considered that the demand that Japanese should be appointed in the three most important administrative departments, as well as the demand for the joint control of China's police, and the demand for an engagement to purchase a fixed amount of arms, and ammunition from Japan or to establish joint arsenals in China, so clearly involved the sovereignty of the Republic that the Chinese Government was unable even to consider them.

For these reasons, the Chinese Government, at the very outset of the negotiations, declared that it was unable to negotiate on the demands; but, in deference to the wishes of the Japanese Minister, the Chinese delegates consented to give the reasons for declining to enter into a discussion of them.

IN THE MATTER OF THE QUESTIONS OF DISPUTE INVOLVED IN SOME OF THE FOREGOING DEMANDS.

The demand by Japan for the right of her subjects in South Manchuria to lease or own land, and to reside and travel, and to engage in business or manufacture of any kind whatever was deemed by the Chinese Government to obtain for Japanese subjects in this region a privileged status beyond the terms of the treaties existing between the two nations and to give them a freedom of action which would be a restriction of China's sovereignty and a serious infringement of her administrative rights. Should Japanese subjects be granted the right of owning land, it would mean that all the landed property in the region might fall into their hands, thereby endangering China's territorial integrity. Moreover, residence in the interior was incompatible with the existence of extra-territoriality, the relinquishment of which is necessary to the actual enjoyment of the privilege of inland residence, as evidenced in practice of other nations.

Japan's unconditional demand for the privilege of inland residence accompanied with a desire to extend extra-territoriality into the interior of China and to enable Japanese subjects to monopolise all the interests in South Manchuria was also palpably irreconcilable with the principle of equal opportunity. For this reason, the Chinese Government was, in the first instance, unable to accept this demand as a basis of negotiation. Its profound regard for the friendly relations of the two countries, however, persuaded it to exert its utmost efforts, in spite of all the inherent difficulties, to seek a solution of a question which was practically impossible to solve. Knowing that the proposal made by Japan was incompatible with treaties, it nevertheless sought to meet her wishes within the limits of treaties. Accordingly, it submitted a counter-proposal to open more places in South Manchuria to international trade and to establish Sino-Japanese joint reclamation companies.

This suggestion was made in the belief that the places to which Japanese subjects would desire to resort for purposes of trade could not be other than important localities; if all these localities were opened to commerce, then they could reside, trade, and lease land there for joint reclamation. Thus Japanese subjects might enjoy the essence of the privilege of inland residence and would still be able to reconcile their position with China's treaties and the principle of equal opportunity.

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After the Japanese Government declined to accept this suggestion, China withdrew it and replaced it with an amendment to the original articles. It was proposed in this amendment to grant to Japanese subjects the extra-treaty privilege of inland residence with the provisos that Japanese subjects in places outside of trade marts should observe Chinese police regulations and pay taxes in the same manner as Chinese; and that civil and criminal cases involving such Japanese subjects should be adjudicated by Chinese authorities, the Japanese Consul attending merely to watch the proceedings. This suggestion was not an innovation: it was based upon the *modus operandi* now in force as regards the Korean settlers in inland districts in Chientao. But the Japanese Government again declined to accept it.

The Chinese Government thereupon made a third proposal along the line of what constitutes the present practice in Turkey, making a distinction, however, in favour of Japanese subjects, in the exercise of jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. This was once more objected to by the Japanese Government.

Then the Chinese Government proposed to concede still another step—the fourth endeavour to meet Japan's wishes. They proposed to agree to the full text of Articles 2 and 3 relative to the question of inland residence, except that "the right of owning land" was changed into "the right of leasing land" and to the phrase "cultivating land" was added this clause: "the regulations for which shall be determined separately"; and, further, to add a supplementary article which embodied a *modus operandi* which the Chinese Government had constrained itself to make out of a desire to come to a settlement over this question. The view advanced in this supplementary article was based upon the Japanese Minister's declaration made on March 6th, 1915, that a separate article embodying some compromise might be added to the original Articles 2 and 3 for the purpose of avoiding any conflict with China's sovereignty or the system established by treaties.

These suggestions made by the Chinese Government were not accepted by Japan.

As regards Eastern Inner Mongolia, not only have no treaties been entered into with Japan concerning this region, but also the people are so unaccustomed to foreign trade that the Chinese Government invariably feels much anxiety about the safety of foreigners who elect to travel there. The Chinese Government therefore considered that it would not be in the interest of foreigners to open the whole territory to them for residence and commerce, and on these grounds based their original refusal to place Eastern Inner Mongolia on the same footing as South Manchuria. Still, its desire to meet the wishes of the Japanese Government eventually prompted it to offer to open a number of places in the region to foreign trade.

#### IN THE MATTER OF JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS.

The foregoing is an outline of the negotiations up to April 17th. It was hoped by the Chinese Government that the Japanese Government, in view of the great concessions made by China at the conferences held up to this time, would see a way of effecting an amicable settlement by modifying its position on certain points. In regard to these it had, by this time, become manifest that China would encounter almost insuperable difficulties in making further concessions.

The Japanese Government, however, suspended the negotiations until April 26th, when they surprised the Chinese Government by presenting a new list of twenty-four demands and requested the Chinese Government to accord its acceptance without delay, adding that this was its final proposal. At the same time, the Japanese Minister stated that the Japanese Government would restore the leased territory of Kiaochow to China at an opportune time in the future and under proper conditions if the Chinese Government would agree to the new list of twenty-four demands without modification.

In this new list, although the term "special position" in the preamble of the Manchurian group was changed to "economic relations" and although the character of the articles in the original fifth group was altered from demands to a recital of alleged statements by the Chinese Foreign Minister, four new demands were introduced concerning Eastern Inner Mongolia. In deference to the wishes of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government gave the revised list the most careful consideration; and, being sincerely desirous of an early settlement, offered new concessions in its reply presented to the Japanese Minister on May 1st.

In this reply, the Chinese Government reinserted the proposal in reference to the retrocession of Kiaochow which they advanced at the first conference on February 2nd and which was postponed at the request of the Japanese Minister. This, therefore, was in no sense a new proposal.

The Chinese Government also proposed to agree to three of the four articles relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia. There was some difficulty in determining a definition of the boundaries of Eastern Inner Mongolia—this being a new expression in Chinese geographical terminology—but the Chinese Government, acting upon a statement made at a previous conference by the Japanese Minister that the Japanese Government meant the region under Chinese administrative jurisdiction, and taking note, in the list presented by the Japanese Minister, of the names of places in Eastern Inner Mongolia to be opened to trade, inferred that the so-called Eastern Inner Mongolia

is that part of Inner Mongolia which is under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol circuit; and refrained from placing any limitations upon the definition of this term.

The Chinese Government also withdrew its supplementary proposal reserving the right of making regulations for agricultural enterprises to be undertaken by Japanese settlers in South Manchuria.

In respect of the trial of cases involving land disputes between Japanese only, or between Japanese and Chinese, the Chinese Government accorded to the Japanese Consul the right to depute an officer to watch the proceedings.

The Chinese Government also agreed to accept the suggestion of the Japanese Government to modify the term "police law and ordinances" into "police rules and regulations", thereby limiting the extent of control which the Chinese would have over Japanese subjects.

As regards the Hanyehping demand, the Chinese Government accepted the draft made by the Japanese Government, embodying an engagement by the Chinese Government not to convert the company into a State-owned concern, nor to confiscate it, nor to force it to borrow foreign capital other than Japanese.

In respect of the Fukien question, the Chinese Government also agreed to give an assurance in the amplified form suggested by the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government had not given its consent to any foreign nations to construct a dock-yard or a coaling station, or a naval base, or any other military establishment along the coast of Fukien Province; nor did it contemplate borrowing foreign capital for the foregoing purposes.

Having made these concessions, which practically brought the views of China into line with those of Japan, and having explained in a note accompanying the reply the difficulty for China to make further concessions, the Chinese Government hoped that the Japanese Government would accept its reply of May 1st, and thus bring the negotiations to an amicable conclusion.

The Japanese Government, however, expressed itself as being dissatisfied with China's reply and withdrew the conditional offer to restore Kiachow to China made on April 26th. It was further intimated that, if the Chinese Government did not give its full compliance with the list of twenty-four demands, Japan would have recourse to drastic measures.

Upon receiving this intimation, the Chinese Government, inspired by the conciliatory spirit which had been predominant from the very beginning of the negotiations and desirous of avoiding any possible rupture in the relations of the two countries, made a supreme effort to meet the situation and represented to the Japanese Government that it would reconsider its position and make another attempt to find a solution that would be more satisfactory to Japan in respect to those articles which China had declared could not be taken up for consideration, but to which Japan attached great importance. Even in the evening of May 6th, after the Japanese Minister had notified the Chinese Government that the Ultimatum had arrived in Peking, the Chinese Government in the interests of peace still exerted efforts to save the situation by offering to meet Japan's wishes.

These overtures were again rejected, and thus was exhausted the means at the disposal of the Chinese Government to prevent an *impasse*.

It is plain that the Chinese Government proceeded to the fullest extent of possible concession in view of the strong national sentiment manifested by the people throughout the whole period of negotiations. All that the Chinese Government strove to maintain was China's plenary sovereignty, the treaty rights of foreign Powers in China and the principle of equal opportunity.

To the profound regret of the Chinese Government, however, the tremendous sacrifices which it had shown itself ready to make proved unavailing, and an Ultimatum, was duly delivered to them by the Japanese Minister at three o'clock on the afternoon of May 7th.

As to the allegations made in the Ultimatum against China, the Chinese Government hopes that the foregoing outline of the history of the negotiations constitutes a clear, dispassionate, and complete reply.

In considering the nature of the course they should take with reference to the Ultimatum, the Chinese Government was influenced by a desire to preserve the Chinese people, as well as the large number of foreign residents in China, from unnecessary suffering and also to prevent the interests of friendly Powers from being imperilled. For these reasons the Chinese Government was constrained to comply in full with the terms of the Ultimatum, but, in complying, the Chinese Government disclaims any desire to associate itself with any revision, which may thus be effected, of the various conventions and agreements concluded between other Powers in respect of the maintenance of China's territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the *status quo*, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

Appendix II.

BARON SHIDEHARA'S STATEMENT AT THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON  
FEBRUARY 2ND, 1922, WITH REFERENCE TO THE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OF 1915.

At a previous session of this committee, the Chinese delegation presented a statement urging that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915 be reconsidered and cancelled. The Japanese delegation, while appreciating the difficult position of the Chinese delegation, does not feel at liberty to concur in the procedure now resorted to by China with a view to cancellation of international engagements which she entered into as a free sovereign nation.

It is presumed that the Chinese delegation has no intention of calling in question the legal validity of the compacts of 1915, which were formally signed and sealed by the duly authorised representatives of the two Governments, and for which the exchange of ratifications was effected in conformity with established international usages. The insistence by China on the cancellation of those instruments would in itself indicate that she shares the view that the compacts actually remain in force and will continue to be effective, unless and until they are cancelled.

It is evident that no nation can have given ready consent to cessions of its territorial or other rights of importance. If it should once be recognised that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and everywhere.

The statement of the Chinese delegation under review declares that China accepted the Japanese demands in 1915, hoping that a day would come when she should have the opportunity of bringing them up for reconsideration and cancellation. It is, however, difficult to understand the meaning of this assertion. It cannot be the intention of the Chinese delegation to intimate that China may conclude a treaty, with the thought in mind of breaking it at the first opportunity.

The Chinese delegation maintains that the treaties and notes in question are derogatory to the principles adopted by the Conference with regard to China's sovereignty and independence. It has, however, been held by the Conference on more than one occasion that concessions made by China *ex contractu*, in the exercise of her own sovereign rights, cannot be regarded as inconsistent with her sovereignty and independence.

It should also be pointed out that the terms "twenty-one demands", often used to denote the treaties and notes of 1915, is inaccurate and grossly misleading.

It may give rise to an erroneous impression that the whole original proposals of Japan had been pressed by Japan and accepted *in toto* by China. As a matter of fact, not only "Group 5", but also several other matters contained in Japan's first proposals were eliminated entirely or modified considerably, in deference to the wishes of the Chinese Government, when the final formula was presented to China for acceptance. Official records published by the two Governments relating to those negotiations will further show that the most important terms of the treaties and notes, as signed, had already been virtually agreed to by the Chinese negotiators before the delivery of the ultimatum, which then seemed to the Japanese Government the only way of bringing the protracted negotiations to a speedy close.

The Japanese delegation cannot bring itself to the conclusion that any useful purpose will be served by research and re-examination at this Conference of old grievances which one of the nations represented here may have against another. It will be more in line with the high aim of the Conference to look forward to the future with hope and with confidence.

Having in view, however, the changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915, the Japanese delegation is happy to avail itself of the present occasion to make the following declaration:

1. Japan is ready to throw open to the joint activity of the international financia consortium recently organised the right of option granted exclusively in favour of Japanese capital, with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and, second, to loans to be secured on taxes in that region; it being understood that nothing in the present declaration shall be held to imply any modification or annulment of the understanding recorded in the officially announced notes and memoranda which were exchanged among the Governments of the countries represented in the consortium and also among the national financial groups composing the consortium, in relation to the scope of the joint activity of that organisation.

2. Japan has no intention of insisting on her preferential right under the Sino-Japanese arrangements in question concerning the engagements by China of Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters in South Manchuria.

3. Japan is further ready to withdraw the reservation which she made, in proceeding to the signature of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915, to the effect that group 5 of the original proposals of the Japanese Government would be postponed for future negotiations.

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It would be needless to add that all matters relating to Shantung contained in those Treaties and Notes have now been definitely adjusted and disposed of.

In coming to this decision, which I have had the honour to announce, Japan has been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation, having always in view China's sovereign rights and the principle of equal opportunity.

Appendix III.

CHINESE STATEMENT AT THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

The Chinese delegation has taken note of the statement of Baron Shidehara made at yesterday's session of the Committee with reference to the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of May 25th, 1915.

The Chinese delegation learns with satisfaction that Japan is now ready to throw open to the joint activity of the banking interests of other Powers the right of option granted exclusively in favour of Japanese capital with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and, second, to loans secured on taxes in that region; and that Japan has no intention of insisting upon a preferential right concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers or instructors in political, financial, military or police matters in South Manchuria; also that Japan now withdraws the reservation which she made to the effect that group 5 of her original demands upon China should be postponed for future negotiations.

The Chinese delegation greatly regrets that the Government of Japan should not have been led to renounce the other claims predicated upon the Treaties and Notes of 1915.

The Japanese delegation expressed the opinion that abrogation of these arguments would constitute "an exceedingly dangerous precedent", "with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and everywhere".

The Chinese delegation has the honour to say that a still more dangerous precedent will be established, with consequences upon the stability of international relations which cannot be estimated if, without rebuke or protest from other Powers, one nation can obtain from a friendly but, in a military sense, weaker neighbour, and under circumstances such as attended the negotiation and signing of the Treaties of 1915, valuable concessions which were not in satisfaction of pending controversies and for which no *quid pro quo* was offered. These treaties and notes stand out, indeed, unique in the annals of international relations. History records scarcely another instance in which demands of such a serious character as those which Japan presented to China in 1915 have, without even pretence of provocation, been suddenly presented by one nation to another nation with which it was at the time in friendly relations.

No apprehension need be entertained that the abrogation of the agreements of 1915 will serve as a precedent for the annulment of other agreements, since it is confidently hoped that the future will furnish no such similar occurrences.

So exceptional were the conditions under which the agreements of 1915 were negotiated that the Government of the United States of America felt justified in referring to them in the identical note of May 13th, 1915, which it sent to the Chinese and Japanese Governments. That note began with the statement that, "in view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as the result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic (Japan) that it cannot recognise any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the 'Open-Door Policy'."

Conscious of her obligations to the other Powers, the Chinese Government, immediately after signing the agreements, published a formal statement protesting against the agreements which she had been compelled to sign, and disclaiming responsibility for consequent violations of treaty rights of the other Powers. In the statement thus issued, the Chinese Government declared that, although it was "constrained to comply in full with the terms of the (Japanese) ultimatum" it nevertheless "disclaims any desire to associate itself with any revision, which may be thus effected, of the various conventions and agreements concluded between the other Powers in respect of the maintenance of China's territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the *status quo* and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China."

Because of the essential injustice of these provisions, the Chinese delegation, acting in behalf of the Chinese Government and of the Chinese people, has felt itself in duty bound to present to this Conference, representing the Powers with substantial interests in the Far East, the question as to the equity and justice of these agreements and therefore as to their fundamental validity.

If Japan is disposed to rely solely upon a claim as to the technical or juristic validity of the agreements of 1915, as having been actually signed in due form by the two Governments, it may be said that, so far as this Conference is concerned, the contention is largely irrelevant, for this gathering of the representatives of the nine Powers has not had for its purpose the maintenance of the legal *status quo*. Upon the contrary, the purpose has been, if possible, to bring about such

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changes in existing conditions upon the Pacific and in the Far East as might be expected to promote that enduring friendship among the nations which the President of the United States spoke of in his letter of invitation to the Powers to participate in this Conference.

For the following reasons, therefore, the Chinese delegation is of the opinion that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Exchange of Notes of May 25th, 1915, should form the subject of impartial examination with a view to their abrogation:

1. In exchange for the concessions demanded of China, Japan offered no *quid pro quo*. The benefits derived from the agreements were wholly unilateral.
2. The agreements, in important respects, are in violation of treaties between China and the other Powers.
3. The agreements are inconsistent with the principles relating to China which have been adopted by the Conference.
4. The agreements have engendered constant misunderstanding between China and Japan and, if not abrogated, will necessarily tend, in the future, to disturb friendly relations between the two countries, and will thus constitute an obstacle in the way of realising the purpose for the attainment of which this Conference was convened. As to this, the Chinese delegation, by way of conclusion, can perhaps do no better than quote from a resolution introduced in the Japanese Parliament, in June 1915, by Mr. Hara, later Premier of Japan, a resolution which received the support of some one hundred and thirty of the members of the parliament.

The resolution reads:

"*Resolved*, that the negotiations carried on with China by the present Government have been inappropriate in every respect; that they are detrimental to the amicable relationship between the two countries, and provocative of suspicions on the part of the Powers; that they have the effect of lowering the prestige of the Japanese Empire; and that, while far from capable of establishing the foundation of peace in the Far East, they will form the source of future trouble".

The foregoing declaration has been made in order that the Chinese Government may have upon record the view which it takes, and will continue to take, regarding the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Exchange of Notes of May 25th, 1915.

#### Appendix IV.

#### STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The important statement made by Baron Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Government makes it appropriate that I should refer to the position of the Government of the United States as it was set forth in identical notes addressed by that Government to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government on May 13th, 1915.

The note to the Chinese Government was as follows:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognise any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the 'Open-door Policy'.  
"An identical note has been transmitted to the Imperial Japanese Government."

That statement was in accord with the historic policy of the United States in its relation to China, and its position as thus stated has been, and still is, consistently maintained.

It has been gratifying to learn that the matters concerning Shantung, which formed the substance of group 1 of the original demands, and were the subject of the Treaty and Exchange of Notes with respect to the province of Shantung, have been settled to the mutual satisfaction of the two Parties by negotiations conducted collaterally with this Conference, as reported to the plenary session on February 1st.

It is also gratifying to be advised by the statement made by Baron Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Government that Japan is now ready to withdraw the reservation which she made, in proceeding to the signature of the Treaties and Notes of 1915, to the effect that group 5 of the original proposals of the Japanese Government—namely, those concerning the employment of influential Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers; land for schools and hospitals; certain railways in South China; the supply of arms, and the right of preaching—would be postponed for future negotiations. This definite withdrawal of the outstanding questions under group 5 removes what has been an occasion for considerable apprehension on the part alike of China

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and of foreign nations which felt that the renewal of these demands could not but prejudice the principles of the integrity of China and of the "Open Door".

With respect to the Treaty and the Notes concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, Baron Shidehara has made the reassuring statement that Japan has no intention of insisting on a preferential right concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters in South Manchuria.

Baron Shidehara has likewise indicated the readiness of Japan not to insist upon the right of option granted exclusively in favour of Japanese capital with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; and, second, with regard to loans secured on the taxes of those regions; but that Japan will throw them open to the joint activity of the international financial consortium recently organised.

As to this, I may say that it is doubtless the fact that any enterprise of the character contemplated which may be undertaken in these regions by foreign capital would in all probability be undertaken by the consortium. But it should be observed that existing treaties would leave the opportunity for such enterprises open on terms of equality to the citizens of all nations. It can scarcely be assumed that this general right of the Treaty Powers of China can be effectively restricted to the nationals of those countries which are participants in the work of the consortium, or that any of the Governments which have taken part in the organisation of the consortium would feel themselves to be in a position to deny all rights in the matter to any save the members of their respective national groups in that organisation. I therefore trust that it is in this sense that we may properly interpret the Japanese Government's declaration of willingness to relinquish its claim under the 1915 Treaties to any exclusive position with respect to railway construction and to financial operations secured upon local revenues, in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

It is further to be pointed out that, by Articles II, III and IV of May 25th, 1915, with respect to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Chinese Government granted to Japanese subjects the right to lease land for building purposes, for trade and manufacture, and for agricultural purposes, in South Manchuria, to reside and travel in South Manchuria, and to engage in any kind of business and manufacture there, and to enter into joint undertakings with Chinese citizens in agriculture and similar industries in Eastern Inner Mongolia.

With respect to this grant, the Government of the United States will, of course, regard it as not intended to be exclusive, and, as in the past, will claim from the Chinese Government for American citizens the benefits accruing to them by virtue of the most-favoured-nation clauses in the treaties between the United States and China.

I may pause here to remark that the question of the validity of treaties as between China and Japan is distinct from the question of the treaty rights of the United States under its treaties with China; these rights have been emphasised and consistently asserted by the United States.

In this, as in all matters similarly affecting the general right of its citizens to engage in commercial and industrial enterprises in China, it has been the traditional policy of the American Government to insist upon the doctrine of equality for the nationals of all countries, and this policy, together with the other policies mentioned in the note of May 13th, 1915, which I have quoted, are consistently maintained by this Government. I may say that it is with especial pleasure that the Government of the United States finds itself now engaged in the act of reaffirming and defining, and I hope that I may add revitalising, by the proposed Nine-Power Treaty, these policies with respect to China.

Appendix V.

STATEMENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

February 12th, 1932.

With full realisation of its responsibility to the civilised world and willingness to submit the accuracy of those statements to impartial international enquiry and adjudication, the Chinese National Government presents the following summary of the Sino-Japanese conflict from its inception:

At no time since the Russo-Japanese War has the Chinese Government doubted the purpose of Japan to seize Manchuria whenever an opportune occasion arose. At the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, which was fought chiefly on China's soil against China's protests, Japan put strong pressure on China to implement Japan's gains from Russia and to grant Japan additional special privileges, impairing China's sovereignty and contravening the "open-door" policy in Manchuria. China resisted those demands to the utmost of her ability.

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When the World War arose, Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of the Powers and China's military weakness to present the twenty-one demands which, if conceded, would have destroyed China's sovereignty, not only in Manchuria, but in other parts of China as well. Under Japan's ultimatum, China was forced to concede some of those demands, which she did under protest and so notified all the friendly Powers.

At the Paris Conference, at the Washington Conference, and before the League of Nations, China reiterated her protests against those exactions of Japan and repudiated them all at suitable occasions. At the Washington Conference, China refused to conduct separate negotiations with Japan and insisted that Sino-Japanese questions must be discussed in purview of the whole Conference. By signing the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, China's territorial integrity and administrative autonomy were guaranteed by all the Powers and it was definitely stated that Manchuria is an integral part of China's territory. That Treaty also provided for appeal to the signatory Powers in the event of disagreement about the interpretation of the Treaty and the infraction of its terms.

Subsequent to signing the Nine-Power Treaty, the Chinese Government has invariably in its relations with Japan and other Powers insisted upon observing the terms and the principles of that Treaty, but, owing to Japan's continuously trying to step outside the Treaty and to insist upon having special rights in China, especially in Manchuria, the Chinese Government has been unable to avoid disputes and frictions with Japan which, when serious, China tried to refer to the League of Nations and the Court of International Justice. China gladly became party to the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing force as a means to settle international disputes and obtain political objectives and has associated herself with all similar plans to secure peace. On several occasions, China sought without success to invoke provisions of the League of Nations Covenant that obsolete and unsatisfactory treaties might be revised.

This, broadly, was the situation last September when, without provocation, Japanese troops attacked Chinese troops at Mukden and usurped control there. A careful analysis shows without doubt that Japan's military coup was premeditated and carefully planned. Dispositions were commenced days before September 18th.

It is scarcely necessary to review events in Manchuria since then. Using various pretexts, the Japanese army has overturned Chinese authority in Manchuria and taken control almost of the whole of these provinces, while China appealed in vain to the League of Nations and the peace pacts.

At times since the Mukden attack, Japan tried to draw the Chinese Government into separate negotiations, but China, following precedents set at Paris, Washington and Geneva, has refused to negotiate without the presence or participation of neutral Powers, knowing full well that she cannot singly resist Japan's pressure backed by unbridled military force which aims at the annexation of Manchuria.

Those tactics failing to frighten the Chinese Government, Japan decided to carry military action into the heart of China, showing her contempt for and indifference to world opinion, with the purpose of convincing the Chinese that it was hopeless to appeal for outside help. During the four months of continuous Japanese military aggression, the indignation of the Chinese people was aroused to the highest pitch, while the Chinese Government, already harassed by natural calamities, was faced with the task of dealing with invasion from without and restraining popular feeling within.

Having sent naval forces to Shanghai with the stated purpose of protecting Japanese residents and property there, the Japanese Government presented through the Japanese Consul-General certain demands to the Chinese local authorities at Shanghai, requiring complete acquiescence by six o'clock p.m. on January 28th. At two o'clock that afternoon, the Chinese replied fully accepting Japan's demand and were assured by the Japanese Consul-General that the reply was satisfactory. Nevertheless, at midnight that night, Japanese naval forces advanced into Chinese territory and attacked the Chinese police and garrison troops. The Chinese Government has no doubt that disinterested foreigners on the scene have more or less correctly informed the world of events at Shanghai since January 28th, but the Chinese Government wishes to emphasise the following points:

The Japanese naval and military forces have used the International Settlement at Shanghai both as a base for their attacks on the Chinese police and troops and as a sanctuary where they can retire when repulsed and for recuperation and re-supply.

The Chinese troops, in defending China's soil from ruthless invaders, have been unable to reply effectively to the Japanese attacks without endangering the lives and property of thousands of friendly neutral foreigners residing in the International Settlement and surrounding suburbs and have been unable to pursue their Japanese attackers without risking a conflict with friendly neutral foreign police and troops protecting the Settlement.

The Japanese naval and military forces have used the river-front docks within the International Settlement to land troops, artillery and supplies. Japanese warships anchored in the

Whangpoo River alongside the International Settlement fire over the Settlement at Chinese forces resisting Japanese attacks in Chinese territory outside the Settlement, and Chinese artillery cannot reply effectively without gravely endangering scores of neutral vessels in port. The Japanese flagship with the Japanese admiral and staff directing attacks lies alongside the wharf near the centre of the Settlement.

Japanese airplanes bombed all parts of Chinese districts of Shanghai, also parts of the International Settlement and then withdrew over the mid section of the International Settlement.

Japanese military forces and civilian un-uniformed elements have killed and injured presently large number of Chinese peaceable unarmed men, women, children, estimated between one and two thousand, and imprisoned, maltreated many others and executed many without trial.

Japanese bombings and fires started by bombs already have destroyed property roughly estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars.

The Japanese Government excuses these atrocities by alleging the military peril due to proximity of Chinese troops. The Chinese Government solemnly declares that such excuse is a transparent pretext, as it is impossible to send Japanese troops anywhere in China without being surrounded by Chinese population and near Chinese troops occupying their regular stations. Japanese military forces have pushed forward into China's territory, always making the excuse that nearby Chinese troops constitute a menace. It is evident that such reasoning provides excuse for the complete conquest of China by Japan.

When the United States of America and Great Britain, supported by France, Germany and Italy, recently presented to Japan and China a note in five points designed to end hostilities and to bring about the liquidation of this situation worse than war, the Chinese Government without hesitation accepted the proposals of the Powers in full.

In flatly turning down, first, the proposals of the International Shanghai Defence Committee, then the Powers' five proposals and more recently still the British Admiral Kelly's scheme, Japan is thus closing every avenue to peace, leaving China no alternative but to continue to adopt appropriate measures for self-defence to the best of her ability.

The Chinese Government asks the world to contrast known facts of Japan's acts in China during recent months with the Japanese Government's latest statement that "it is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure tranquillity in the Far East". Also to contrast Japan's statement that "her troops in China are only to discharge an international duty" with the efforts of the League of Nations and Washington Treaty Powers to induce Japan to withdraw her troops from China and to cease warfare. Also contrast Japan's frequent declarations that she has no territorial ambitions *vis-à-vis* China with her refusal to submit the Manchurian and other Sino-Japanese questions before a conference of Treaty Powers. Also contrast Japan's acts at Shanghai causing immense destruction of the property of all nationals and loss of lives with her statement that she acted in Shanghai in co-operation with the other foreign defence forces and foreign municipal authorities and with the latest statement of the Shanghai foreign Municipal Council that "Japanese Government and not the Municipal Council is solely responsible for acts of the Japanese armed forces in Shanghai".

The Chinese Government positively denies that the Chinese violated the temporary truce arranged on January 29th. Because of the suddenness of the armistice, it was not possible to get orders to all outposts resulting, during the night, in desultory firing between the outposts on both sides. The Japanese command resumed attacks at daybreak of January 30th.

Since Japan's astounding action in Mukden last September, it has been the unswerving policy of the Chinese Government to avoid, by all means at its command, a state of war and to that end it has endured intense humiliation, risked its own existence in face of popular feeling, in the hope that the worldwide pacific measures might check Japan's reckless course. Despite the failure so far of the pacific agencies, the Chinese Government adheres to its faith in world justice, but it cannot passively submit to Japan's invasion of China's territory and slaughter of Chinese people. It therefore solemnly declares to the world that China will continue to resist in self-defence Japan's attacks at all points and with all the forces at its commands.

The Chinese Government further declares that it is China's desire to settle issues in connection with the present crisis in purview of interested Powers and in accordance with principles guaranteeing world peace and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China.

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#### Appendix VI.

##### RAILWAY GUARDS.

Railway guards were kept by Japan along the railways after the Russo-Japanese War originally on the ground of the *post bellum* disorder in Manchuria, but have been maintained there ever since against Chinese protests. They consist of the following kinds:

- (a) One division of regular troops, with headquarters at Liaoyang and garrison points at Changchun, Kungtsuling, Tiehling, Mukden, Liaoyang and Haicheng, besides Port Arthur in the Leased Territory; and
- (b) Six battalions of specially organised guards stationed along the railways, with headquarters at Kungtsuling.

The railway guards are under the control of the Commander of the Kwantung Army, with headquarters in the Leased Territory, who, according to the Japanese Imperial Ordinance of April 12th, 1919, is to "have command over the military forces in the Kwantung Province and South Manchuria"; to "be responsible for the defence of the Kwantung Province and the protection of the railway lines in South Manchuria"; and to "have the power to employ military forces" in discharging his duties, "when he deems it necessary." The article containing the last provision continues:

"The Commander shall comply with the request of the Governor of Kwantung for the despatch of troops necessary for the preservation of peace and order in the region under the Governor's jurisdiction, as well as in connection with police affairs in the lands attached to the South Manchuria Railway; but he may adopt such expedient military measure as occasion may require in case of emergency too urgent to wait for a request from the Governor.

"Any such contingencies as the foregoing shall be reported to the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff."

#### Appendix VII.

##### WITHDRAWAL OF THE RAILWAY GUARDS.

With regard to railway guards, the claim that they have a treaty basis of their own cannot be any better sustained. Article V of the Chinese Eastern Railway contract reads:

"The Chinese Government will take measures to assure the safety of the railway and of the persons in its service against any attack.

"The Company will have the right to employ at will as many foreigners or natives as it may find necessary for the purpose of administration, etc.

"Criminal cases, lawsuits, etc., upon the territory of the railway, must be settled by the local authorities in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaties."

The foregoing translation from the French text may also be compared with a translation from the Chinese text, which reads:

"The said railway and its employees the Chinese Government will take measures to protect. As to the personnel, Chinese and foreign, necessary for the operation of the railway, the said Company is permitted to employ at will. All criminal cases, lawsuits, etc., upon the lands of the railway shall be administered by the local authorities in accordance with Treaties."

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Japan did not have a right to maintain railway guards.

That such is the case is, it may be added, recognised by Japan herself. In Additional Article I in the Portsmouth Treaty, Japan reserves with Russia "the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria," the number of such "not to exceed fifteen per kilometre". In Additional Article II in the Peking Treaty of 1905, under the protest of China, she, however, not only makes no claim to a "right", but undertakes to withdraw the guards under certain conditions. This Article, translated from the Chinese text, reads:

"Since the Chinese Government declares that it earnestly hopes that Japan and Russia will rapidly withdraw their troops now in Manchuria as well as the railway guards, the Japanese

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Government is prepared to meet China's wishes. When Russia agrees to withdraw her railway guards, or when China and Russia agree to adopt other proper measures, the Japanese Government will consent to take similar steps. Again, when the order of Manchuria is restored and China is in the position to give full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan will also simultaneously with Russia withdraw the railway guards."

Since Japan has no right to maintain the guards and has so admitted, their withdrawal is but a matter of duty. It may also be added that, even on the basis of the two alternative conditions she imposed for carrying out her duty, she has no reason to tarry. "When Russia agrees", runs the first condition, "to withdraw her railway guards, or when China and Russia agree to adopt other proper measures, the Japanese Government will consent to take similar steps." It is a common knowledge that Russia has so agreed. "The Governments of the two Contracting Parties," says Article IX, Section I, of the Sino-Russian Peking Agreement of May 31st, 1924, "declare that, with the exception of matters pertaining to the business operations which are under the direct control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, all other matters affecting the right of the National and Local Governments of the Republic of China, such as \*\*\* matters relating to \*\*\* military administration \*\*\* shall be administered by the Chinese authorities." "When the order of Manchuria is restored", runs the alternative Japanese condition, "and China is in the position to give full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan will also, simultaneously with Russia, withdraw the railway guards." It is scarcely necessary to say that the restoration to a normal, from a *post bellum*, situation, which is contemplated in the text and is the only condition that could have been contemplated there, must have taken place not long after the cessation of armed conflict between Japan and Russia. At least, there has been no indication to the contrary ever since the re-organisation of the Manchurian administration in 1907, from which time twenty-five years have now elapsed.

#### Appendix VIII.

#### CHINESE STATEMENT ON MANCHURIA'S PUPPET GOVERNMENT (FEBRUARY 22ND, 1932).

The Three Eastern Provinces, also known as Manchuria, are always an integral part of China and any usurpation or interference with the administration therein constitutes direct impairment of China's territorial and administrative integrity. Article of the Organic Law of the National Government of October 4th, 1928, which was proclaimed in the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) as well as in other provinces of the Republic, provided that the National Government shall exercise all governing powers in the Chinese Republic. The Provisional Constitution of June 1st, 1931, expressly provides that the territory of the Chinese Republic consists of the various provinces, Mongolia, and Tibet, and that the Republic of China shall be a unified Republic forever.

The territorial, political and administrative integrity of the Chinese Republic, besides being an attribute of a sovereign State and of international law, is guaranteed by Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty. Such guarantee has been implemented by Japan when she adhered to the League Council resolution of September 30th last, which reads partly as follows:

"The Council recognises the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria; . . . being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation . . ."

In the resolution of October 24th last, the Council emphasised the importance of these assurances, saying that it "recalls the Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and of the Nine-Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged 'to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China'."

The Council further states in the resolution of December 10th last that, "considering that events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24th, notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life."

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This resolution was also accepted by Japan. The Chinese delegate who endorsed it declared: "China would regard any attempt by Japan to bring about complications of a political character affecting China's territorial or administrative integrity (such as promoting so-called independence movements or utilising disorderly elements for such purposes) as an obvious violation of the undertaking to avoid any further aggravation of the situation."

Now, in defiance of all law and solemn obligations, the Japanese authorities who are in unlawful occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces are endeavouring to set up in these provinces a so-called independent government and are trying to compel Chinese citizens to participate in the puppet organisation. The National Government has repeatedly and emphatically protested against the illegal actions of the Japanese Government in this regard, and hereby again declares that it will not recognise the secession or independence of the Three Eastern Provinces, or any part thereof, or any administration which may be organised therein without its authority and consent.

1975

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

copy

Tsitsihar, Heilungchiang,  
February 8th, 1932.

G. C. Hanson, Esquire,  
American Consulate,  
Harbin, China.

Dear Mr. Hanson:

I thought you might be interested in the present situation in this city, though no doubt there has been enough going on in Harbin recently to keep the Consulate busy.

Two "t'uan" or approximately 2,000 men of General Ma Chan-shan's army have arrived here and been here for a couple of weeks. They seem to be here ostensibly for operations against bandits. They are quartered outside the city, part to the northeast in a barracks formerly occupied by Chinese troops, and part are said to be at the Provincial Communications School west of the city across the Nonni River. I called twice at the former place with Christian literature for the soldiers and was very courteously received both times.

The Japanese are still here, that is the troops, said to number several hundred, at the East Station (Tsitsihar-Taonan R.R.). The Japanese troops have built sand-bag barricades at several prominent places in the city, including directly in front of the Lungkiang Hotel. The Hsin Ta Lu She Hotel, in which we lived for six weeks, is feeding about 100 Japanese civilian officials of some kind. In front of this establishment are very large sand-bag barricades built by the Japanese troops.

The Kuomintang building is again flying the Japanese flag. It was down for a while but up again. The Lungkiang Hotel apparently grew weary of changing flags and have recently been flying a large white cloth with four red characters LUNG KIANG PAN TIEN. The bank of China was ousted from its premises, almost directly opposite Lungkiang Hotel. It was stated that these premises were the property of the Kwang Hsin Company (bank which prints the Heilungchiang currency) and as the Japanese took over the latter the Bank of China also had to move. The erstwhile Bank of China moved to temporary quarters in the rear of the Bank of Communications, on the South Main Street. The Bank of Communications is locked up tight and has been for some weeks. There may be a rear entrance but it is not evident from the street.

The Post Office is doing business as usual, including money orders. For money order business, they give and accept only Harbin banknotes or Heilungchiang notes stamped by a Harbin bank.

Chinese new year passed with practically no fire-cracker shooting. We heard that the Japanese issued an order forbidding it.

The Japanese have not molested us in any way.

Our mail has been held up to some extent by the interruption in service of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Up to two days ago we have had no mail from Peiping, Tientsin, etc., for quite a while, but it seems to be coming through again.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) J. G. Vos



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*FE  
EE*

No. 109

Riga, March 4, 1932.

Subject: News Communications by Cable for the  
Department.

*copy to EE*  
DIVISION OF  
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.  
MAR 11 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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3 28*

*APR 11 1932*

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 13 1932  
Department of State

AM RECD  
STATE DEPT.  
COMM. SEC.

*793.92  
701  
194.6046*

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK		Yes	No
To the Field	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
In U. S.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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F/LS 793.94/4812

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

In order that I may more accurately gauge  
the Department's wishes in matters of this kind,  
I bring attention to the following facts and  
should be glad to be instructed thereon:

The London press, and presumably also the  
New York press, of February 27, reported somewhat  
extensively a meeting between the Japanese Amba-  
sador at Moscow and the Acting Commissar for For-  
eign Affairs, Karakhan, at which time there was a  
discussion

APR 5 - 1932

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discussion of troop movements on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Two days later the same information was found in the Russian press which, in the meantime, had reached Riga, and a telegram was prepared in the Russian Section of the Legation, which was forwarded as No. 31<sup>793,94/4490</sup> of February 29. It was my first inclination to refrain from sending the telegram No. 31 in question, or at least to reduce it to a dozen words, but <sup>I</sup> was persuaded not to do so on the theory that the Department would desire authentic confirmation of important Russian announcements, such confirmation being based on the first available original Russian sources, regardless of the fact that the same details had already appeared in the press. I gathered that the Department did not desire to be obliged to place any reliance whatever upon ordinary press reports, and would wish to have telegrams of this kind sent on from the Legation even though the Legation might be several days behind the press. Obviously the newspaper correspondents both in Moscow and Riga are in a position to transmit reports ahead of the Legation, which must await the arrival of Moscow morning papers on the third day after their appearance, whereas Moscow correspondents are at the scene of events, and Riga correspondents obtain their materials by radio.

If the matter were left exclusively to my own judgment, as at present informed, I should communicate with the Department by cable respecting Russian matters

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matters only when in possession of authentic information of original character, or in very exceptional circumstances. As the Department possibly has excellent reasons for preferring me to follow another course, I call attention to Legation telegrams Nos. 19, 21, and 31 of February 1, 2, and 29 respectively, copies of which are enclosed, with the request that I be instructed whether or not to continue cabling such messages or, hereafter, to submit the same matter in more complete form as ordinary despatches.

Respectfully yours,

  
Robert P. Skinner.

Enclosures:

Telegrams as stated.

(In quintuplicate)

RPS/lr

710R-Japan-China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Glutzon NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

AMERICAN LEGATION, RIGA.

TELEGRAM SENT

Cipher: Grey TRUE READING  
To: Secstate, Washington  
From: Amlegation, Riga  
No: 21  
Date: Feb. 2, 6 p.m., 1932.

Following is summary of Molotov's remarks on foreign policy Izvestia Jan. 21st: Soviet policy is one of peace but we must be prepared for unexpected eventualities in Far East. Under foreign protection White Russians in Paris and Manchuria preparing to create separate buffer state in Far East. Miliukov and Kerensky plotting against Soviets in Czechoslovakia.

Skinner.

WMG

JBF

COPY

AMERICAN LEGATION, RIGA.

TELEGRAM SENT

Cipher: Grey TRUE READING  
To: Secstate, Washington  
From: Amlegation, Riga  
No.: 19  
Date: Feb. 1, 6 p.m., 1932.

Pravda January 30th reports interview between Japanese Ambassador Hiroto and Karakhan concerning transportation Japanese troops on Chinese Eastern. Hiroto instructed to declare that troops were sent to Harbin only to defend lives and interests of Japanese subjects, Japanese Government has no intention of infringing upon interests of railway and will pay for transportation. Karakhan replied that conduct of Japanese authorities in Harbin region had led to very misunderstanding Japanese Government wishes to avoid, Japanese troops having entrained and moved north twelve hours before permission was asked of Kuznetsov Vice President of Chinese Eastern, furthermore that transportation of troops depends primarily on Chinese railway authorities, if they find possible to transport Japanese troops towards Harbin region Russia has no reason to oppose provided interests of Chinese Eastern not affected. Instruction in this sense sent to Kuznetsov January 28th.

Skinner.

WMG  
JBF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

AMERICAN LEGATION, RIGA.

TELEGRAM SENT

Cipher: Grey TRUE READING  
To: Secstate, Washington.  
From: Amlegation, Riga  
No.: 31  
Date: February 29, 7 p.m., 1932.

*ant Peoples Commu*  
Izvestia February 26 reports that Russian Minister  
for Foreign Affairs asked Japanese Ambassador: Has  
the Japanese Government knowledge of the request of  
Japanese military commander in Harbin to the Chinese  
Eastern, First, to transport troops to Imianpo and  
to Pogranichnaya on the Soviet frontier. Second,  
fifty per cent fare reduction for these troops and  
free for the railway guards. Third, Japanese pro-  
tection and direct support to White Guards in Man-  
churia disagree with the previous assurances. Fourth  
information also asked for concerning the free state  
newly created in Manchuria.

Skinner.

FC

FC-JBF

1982

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 4 1932.

41  
The Honorable  
Robert B. Skinner,  
American Minister,  
Riga.

Sir:

The Department has received your despatch No. 109 of March 4, 1932, requesting instructions as to the nature of information to be telegraphed to the Department with respect to the present situation in Manchuria.

In reply you are informed that the question as to whether a particular item of information should be submitted to the Department by telegraph is one that must necessarily be decided by you after due consideration of all facts known to you in a given situation. In this connection reference is made to the following indicated provisions of Instructions to Diplomatic Officers of the United States:

Chapter XVII-13, particularly section (d).

-15.

Chapter VIII-3, particularly section (d).

It may be added for your general guidance that the Department desires to receive brief cables from time to time, as the situation appears to you to warrant, based on authentic information from sources other than the Soviet press and, in exceptional circumstances, on information

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198

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

information contained in the Soviet press indicating important developments in Soviet policy or action with respect to the present Manchurian situation. In this connection it may be stated that American press reports from Moscow, based on editorials, announcements, statements, official communiques, et cetera, appearing in the Moscow press, are frequently insufficient for the Department's purposes, since they do not always accurately interpret the significance of information contained in such press material, and, in any case, are less authoritative than telegraphic reports from the Legation based on identic Moscow press material. Bearing in mind that in any particular instance the Department may request a more detailed telegraphic report, your telegrams should be as brief as is consistent with clarity. It is, of course, anticipated that you will keep your expenditures for telegrams within the allotment granted your office.

I may add that the Department found of interest at the time of their receipt your telegrams No. 19 of February 1 and No. 31 of February 29; that your telegram No. 21 of February 2 was of little value and, in any case, should have been prepared and sent promptly after the receipt by the Legation of the information contained therein; and that the substance of the information embodied in your despatch No. 122 of March 8, 1932, indicating a probable change of Soviet policy toward Japan, might have been submitted to the Department promptly in a brief telegram,

supplemented

1984

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

supplemented subsequently by the mail transmission of the full text of the INVESTIA editorial.

In most instances the Legation should supplement its telegrams by forwarding the complete data upon which they are based. Only in exceptional cases, namely, when the Legation's telegrams have themselves contained all the pertinent data, will such action be unnecessary.

From time to time the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, in accordance with the existing practice, will submit informal comment on the Legation's telegrams, as received, giving you the benefit of the views of the Department with respect to their content and value.

Very truly yours,

W. E. [unclear]  
Acting Secretary of State

793.94/4812

A true copy of the signed original.  
*M*

*gwp*  
*RLK*  
E: [unclear]

*W. E.*  
[unclear]

*M. O. L.*  
MIL 3 [unclear] 1962.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D. ~~FE~~ ~~a-g/k~~

NO. 5326

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, February 12, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
APR 11 1932  
SUBJECT: *Handwritten initials*  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

CONDITIONS AT TSITSIHAR

*(M)*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 13 1932  
Department of State

793.94

THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

F/L S  
793.94/4813

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2318, of even date, addressed to the Legation at Peiping on the subject of conditions at Tsitsihar, Heilungchiang Province, North Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

*G. C. Hanson*

G. C. Hanson  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 2318 to the Legation.

800  
TH/th

1984

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 2318

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, February 12, 1932.

SUBJECT: CONDITIONS AT TSITSIHAR.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

For the information of the Legation, I have the  
1/ honor to enclose herewith a copy of a letter dated  
February 8, 1932, received from Mr. J. G. Vos, an  
American missionary, describing conditions at Tsitsihar,  
Heilungkiang Province, where he resides.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of letter dated February 8, 1932,  
received from J. G. Vos at Tsitsihar.

800  
TH/th

5 copies to the Department;  
1 copy to the Consulate General at Mukden.

Two copy of  
the original  
-----

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P.R./221 FOR desp. #2636

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED Feb. 29, 1932  
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese Conflict.

Statement made in Parliament by the  
leader of the Opposition concerning  
the Government's views on the -.

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fc

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The hostilities between Japan and China at Shanghai has almost continuously been discussed in Parliament. On February 23rd Mr. Lansbury, the leader of the Opposition, prefaced a request for a statement of the Government's view upon the situation in Shanghai by expressing the hope of the Labor Party that British civilians and troops would be evacuated from Shanghai. He expressed his conviction that the League of Nations should exert all the power at its command to bring the hostilities to an end. The Foreign Secretary, in reply, first gave a general review of recent events in Shanghai as brought out by the reports of the Consular Committee of the League of Nations. He regretted that despite all efforts to secure a peaceable settlement of the dispute, the fighting should continue. The British Government, he said, was giving its full support to the League

1980

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of Nations in the hope that peace might be restored. He denied the truth of reports that there was a secret undertaking by Great Britain to support Japan, and he observed in conclusion that the League was bound to hear both sides of a dispute which had been brought before it.

The Secretary of State's letter to Senator Borah has received very little official comment, but the importance of this statement of policy is fully realized and there is every evidence that the letter has created below the surface a most profound and lasting impression. In the opinion of Washington correspondents of certain London papers, the letter was intended to interest Britain as much as Japan, as the reference to the interlocking relationships of the Washington Treaties and to the corollary that a breach of one treaty would necessarily affect the validity of others, could not but be a matter of profound concern to the English people. As reported in the Embassy's telegram No. 88 of February 26th, 1 p.m., this point has virtually passed unnoticed. It is generally admitted that the letter has clarified beyond all possibility of misunderstanding the position taken by the United States, and all sections are agreed in crediting the Secretary with a valuable contribution to the peace movement made by the forceful enunciation of the principle that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

There can be no recognition of the legality of any right or privilege which may be obtained by means of force and in violation of treaties.

The Chinese Legation in London has published a statement issued by the Nationalist Government of China protesting against the declaration of independence by the Manchurian regime as controverting the organic laws of China, article 10 of the Covenant, and article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty. The Nationalist Government declared that it would not recognize either the secession or independence of Manchuria. In this relation the question was asked in Parliament whether the British Government would recognize the new regime in Manchuria; and the Government replied that as no request for recognition had been received, the question had not officially arisen.

The week ended with the raising of hopes by reports that Japan had drafted new proposals for the termination of hostilities. It is understood that these proposals provide for the holding of a conference of the disputant powers and of the powers interested in China as soon as arrangements have been made for the mutual withdrawal of the hostile forces from the Shanghai area.

AM RECD

*FE*  
*WE*

No. 245.Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, March 5, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
LEAGUE OF NATIONS SECTION

MAR 18 1932 MAR 17 32

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

*793.94*  
*note*  
*504*  
*893*  
*1025*  
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*Government*

SUBJECT: Statement of the Chinese Government under Article 15 of the Covenant and Explanatory Note of the Japanese Government.

THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAY 5 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of each of the following documents:

- A.(Extr.) 1. 1932. VII.
- A.(Extr.) 6. 1932. VII.

The first of these documents is the statement communicated to the Secretary-General by the Chinese Delegation in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 2 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The second document is an explanatory note communicated to the Secretary-General by the Japanese Delegation which, as explained in the covering letter, is not properly speaking the statement referred to in the second paragraph of Article 15, but simply an explanation from the Japanese point of view of what has occurred in Shanghai. It will be noted that the Japanese note does not discuss the Manchuria question but only the situation at Shanghai. This would seem to be in accordance with the Japanese reservations concerning the application of Article

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MAY 5 - 1932

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- 2 -

15 to the occupation of Manchuria and with the evident  
desire of the Japanese Government to confine the applic-  
ation of that article to the situation at Shanghai only.

Respectfully yours,

*Prentiss B. Gilbert*  
Prentiss B. Gilbert,  
American Consul.

✓  
Enclosures:  
2 documents as quoted above.

Original and Five Copies to Department of State.  
One copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

[Communicated to the Assembly,  
to the Council and the Members  
of the League.]

Official No.: **A. [Extr.] 1.** 1932. VII.

Geneva, February 29th, 1932.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

**APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT  
UNDER ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT**

**STATEMENT COMMUNICATED BY THE CHINESE DELEGATION  
IN CONFORMITY WITH ARTICLE 15, PARAGRAPH 2.**

*Note by the Secretary-General.*

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate a letter from the Chinese Delegation, dated February 22nd, 1932, to which is attached a statement of the Chinese Government's case.

Geneva, February 22nd, 1932.


*To the Secretary-General.*

Referring to my letter of February 9th, 1932, I have the honour to submit herewith a more complete statement of the Republic of China with respect to the Sino-Japanese dispute, of which the Council has been seized under Articles 10, 11, and 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and which has now been referred to the Assembly by virtue of the Council resolution of February 19th, 1932, the duty of the Council to continue its work for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the Covenant remaining, however, unaffected by the transference of the said dispute to the Assembly.

In submitting the enclosed statement, I beg leave to reserve the right to submit hereafter other statements of papers which my Government may deem necessary and appropriate. As to the statements and papers heretofore made and submitted by my Government in the proceedings of the Council in the said controversy, I have the honour to state that my Government considers them as comprising part of the relevant facts and papers of the case as it did in my note to you of January 29th, 1932.

(Signed) YEN.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS Date 12-18-75



STATE BOUNDARIES  
 BOUNDARIES OF MANDCHURIA  
 BOUNDARIES OF PROVINCES  
 CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY  
 SOUTH MANDCHURIAN RAILWAY  
 CHINESE RAILWAY IN EXPLOITATION  
 PROJECTED CHINESE RAILWAY  
 PROJECTED JAPANESE RAILWAY

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN  
COMPLIANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT  
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

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I. INTRODUCTION.

The Sino-Japanese dispute in its entirety has now been submitted to the League of Nations by formal invocation of its powers and authority under Articles 10, 11 and 15 of the Covenant. The Council has already indicated that the procedure under Article 11 is in no way suspended or superseded by the invocation of other Articles. The problem created by the Japanese aggression against China is therefore squarely before the League in all its aspects.

The gravity of the issue thus presented can hardly be exaggerated. A great country with a population of approximately 400,000,000 inhabitants is here virtually staking its national existence on the practical application and enforcement of the League's Covenant. The supreme test of the effectiveness of the League in a capital emergency is at hand.

Naturally, it is for the League itself in the first instance to construe and apply its own fundamental law. As M. Tardieu, representing France, frankly stated in his address to the Disarmament Conference on February 8th, "the tendency in the past, when interpreting the Covenant, has been that it has been constantly interpreted along the line of least resistance, and that there has been in this respect a definite lack of boldness". Unfortunately, the line of least resistance, which has been followed thus far in this as in other matters, has been closed by the march of events. Nothing short of a courageous and firm stand now seems possible if the Covenant is henceforth to command respect.

It is perhaps useful at the outset to distinguish between the fundamental task of adjusting Sino-Japanese relations, with particular reference to the North-Eastern Provinces of China, so as to lay the bases of permanent peace in the Far East, on the one hand; and the immediate and urgent business of stabilising the situation, in the sense of the Council's resolutions of September 30th and December 10th, so as to permit the final settlement to be made.

The first of these operations is one of wide envergure and necessarily will require time. Inevitably there must be long and attentive negotiations. There are vast complexities and treaty rights and interests, extending even beyond those of the parties to the dispute, to be considered. On this branch of the subject, two positions maintained by China from the very beginning should be kept in mind: (1) negotiations between China and Japan under pressure of military occupation of any part of the former's territory by the latter cannot, for obvious

- 4 -

reasons, be contemplated; (2) any ultimate adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations with a view to permanent peace must not only safeguard all rights of third parties, but also be in strict accord with the principles laid down in the Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine-Power Treaty. Both of these points will be hereinafter dealt with in detail.

The emergency part of the undertaking—to stop the fighting and loss of life, to liquidate the Japanese occupation, and, in general, to re-establish the *status quo ante* permitting a consideration of the main problem—is of course the one demanding instant attention. We are dealing, not with something which is done and finished, but with an uncontrolled and continuing military aggression by one nation on the territory of another.

The Council has long recognised that the situation is intolerable and brooks of no delay. To stress its extreme urgency from every point of view is quite unnecessary. It is probably no exaggeration to say that there has been no comparable international crisis since 1914. On the threshold of the enquiry lies the question of the proper significance and effect to be attributed to the Japanese aggression as an indisputable fact. That Japan launched the attack, that her armed forces have relentlessly advanced for nearly five months, and that they are now in occupation of a vast extent of Chinese territory in two widely separated parts of the country cannot be controverted. A formidable invasion with all the terrible concomitants of war has taken place and is going on. The scale of the operation and the period of time over which it has persisted have removed all possibility of characterising it as casual, or incidental.

Article 10, the very corner-stone of the Covenant, is being shattered. That Article reads:

“ The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. ”

Japan is a Member of the League of Nations solely by virtue of the fact that she has acceded “ without reservation ” to this as well as the other Articles (see Article 1).

China points to the forcible occupation of 200,000 square miles of her territory, to the attack on Shanghai, to the bombing of Nanking, her capital, and to numerous other specific acts of armed violence as constituting external aggression (and not merely the threat or danger of it) against her territorial integrity and political independence in plain violation of Article 10. The proposition appears so axiomatic as not to fall within the domain of argument.

But Japan asserts that these acts complained of do not constitute such aggression: because, in her opinion, Japan's nationals in China were not receiving fair treatment and in some cases their lives and property were in danger; because Japan conceives it her duty to establish and maintain law and order in Manchuria, at Shanghai and elsewhere; because the Chinese people are refusing to buy goods of Japanese origin; because the Chinese have not welcomed the invading army and it has had to advance in self-defence in order to protect the positions it has occupied; and finally because, after all, Japan has no design to keep the territory which she has taken, and intends to give it up when, in her judgment, the safety of her nationals permits, when the boycott is abandoned, and when China, by direct negotiation (under pressure of the occupation), settles all outstanding disputes with Japan to the latter's satisfaction.

While all of these pretexts and excuses are discussed in the following pages, there is a certain risk of confusion, if one does not keep in mind the primary issue of whether any pretext, however persuasive, can be entertained as a justification for resort to armed force, instead of peaceful means, for the settlement of international differences. The alleged grievances referred to by Japan are all obviously susceptible of arbitration and judicial settlement—which China has proposed.

The basic feature of Japan's plea which calls for notice at this point is the extraordinary contention that the sending of an army to take forcible possession of the territory of a foreign State is divested of all aggressive import if the invading Power issues a simple disclaimer of permanent territorial ambitions and of any intention to stay longer than seems to itself necessary. This position cannot be ignored because it strikes at the root of the whole matter. The League must either reject the Japanese contention or write its Covenant down to a pious declaration that aggression depends upon the self-asserted state of mind of the aggressor, thus converting the Covenant from a guarantee of peace into an invitation to war.

## II. — HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

The region popularly designated as Manchuria, but known to the Chinese as “ The Three Eastern Provinces ”, is a large fertile area with enormous possibilities of economic development. An idea of its size may be gained by recalling the fact that it is somewhat greater than France and Germany combined as they appear on the map of Europe. From time immemorial, Manchuria has belonged to the Chinese national domain; historically, ethnically and politically, it is an integral

part of China. From the name usually given to these Chinese Provinces collectively, it has been sometimes mistakenly assumed that they are the land of the Manchus, who are said to be in no way allied to the rest of the Chinese by blood. The truth is that China is made up of five races, of which the Manchu is one. Moreover, the population of the region to-day—some thirty millions—is, ethnically speaking, strictly and overwhelmingly Chinese.

That Manchuria is territorially and administratively an integral part of China has repeatedly been recognised by the international circle in all treaties bearing upon the subject, notably those entered into by the Powers at the Washington Conference in 1921-22. The suggestion was never made at that Conference, even by the Japanese, that Manchuria did not fall within the purview of pledges then made guaranteeing China's sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity. Among the latest definite and official reiterations of this position is the reply of Sir Austen Chamberlain, then British Foreign Secretary, to a question in the House of Commons on July 13th, 1928,<sup>1</sup> when he declared that Great Britain considered Manchuria as part of China. Mr. Kellogg, the American Secretary of State, in a statement to the Press on May 21st, 1928,<sup>2</sup> said that, so far as the United States of America was concerned, Manchuria was essentially Chinese soil.

Furthermore, on January 1st, 1926, Baron Shidehara, then Foreign Minister of Japan, addressed the Japanese Diet, in opposition to the "Positive Policy" in Manchuria at that time advocated by the followers of Baron Tanaka, in the following terms:

"No doubt the complete tranquillity of the whole region of the Three Eastern Provinces, undisturbed by any scourge of war, is very much to be desired in the interest of the native population, as well as of the Japanese residents. It is, however, a responsibility that properly rests upon China. The assumption of that responsibility by Japan without just cause would be manifestly inconsistent with the fundamental conception of the Washington Treaties, and with the repeated declarations of the Japanese Government. By taking such course we would forfeit our national honour and pride once for all. In no case, and by no means, can we be party to so improvident an action."<sup>3</sup>

The advent of Japan in the arena of Asiatic continental affairs is comparatively recent. Her attention was first directed to the little Kingdom of Korea, over which China had exercised an age-long suzerainty. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 was the result. By the Treaty of Peace signed at Shimonoseki on April 17th, 1895, China was compelled "to recognise definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea"; and was also forced to cede to Japan in full perpetuity and full sovereignty portions of the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and Dalny, and to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 Kuping Taels.

Subsequently, at the insistence of Russia, France and Germany, who regarded the cession of Liaotung as injurious to their interests and menacing to the peace of the Far East, Japan was induced reluctantly to retrocede the said Peninsula to China in return for an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 Kuping Taels.

Russia at once took advantage of the opportunity to gain a foothold in Manchuria by extorting from China the concessions for the Chinese Eastern Railway with a branch down to the sea at Dalny and Port Arthur; and, later, acquired for herself the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

Japan's turn to advance her ambitious projects on the mainland of Asia came again in 1905, when she declared war upon Russia. The war was fought almost entirely on Chinese territory, and it will be remembered that peace was largely brought about through the good offices of Theodore Roosevelt, then President of the United States of America.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed September 5th, 1905, Japan and Russia mutually engaged: to evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula; to restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria then occupied by their troops respectively, with the exception of said Peninsula; and "not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China might take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria". Both parties further declared, in Article 3, that they had not "in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferences or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity".

The Treaty then provided for the transfer from Russia to Japan (with the consent of China, which the parties undertook mutually to secure) of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, as well as the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur, now known as the South Manchuria Railway.

China's consent to these transfers from Russia to Japan was given in the Sino-Japanese Treaty signed at Peking (now Peiping) on December 22nd, 1905. That was the sole *raison d'être*

<sup>1</sup> London Times, July 14th, 1928, page 13.

<sup>2</sup> United States Daily, May 22nd, 1928, page 2.

<sup>3</sup> Peking Leader, January 24th, 1928.

— 6 —

of the Peking Treaty, which contained but two substantive Articles, the first of which recorded the consent to the transfer of the leased territory and to the assignment of the railway concession involved.

Article 2 embodied a specific engagement by Japan that, as regards the leased territory and the concessions to be taken over, she would, "so far as circumstances permit, conform to the original agreements concluded between China and Russia"; and that, in case any question arose in the future on these subjects, it would be decided in consultation with the Chinese Government.

Simultaneously with the Peking Treaty, a so-called Additional Agreement was signed by Japan and China with the declared purpose of regulating for their guidance certain questions in which they were both interested in Manchuria. By Article 1, China agreed, as soon as possible after the evacuation by Japan and Russia of their forces, that she would herself open up "as places of international residence and trade" sixteen designated towns. In Article 2, Japan agreed, as soon as tranquillity had been re-established in Manchuria and China was able to afford full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, to withdraw her railway guards simultaneously with Russia.<sup>1</sup> In passing, it may be noted here that, since 1917, Russia has withdrawn her railway guards from the Chinese Eastern Railway areas, while Japan still retains hers, thereby increasing the friction between the Chinese and the railway authorities, especially when the said railway guards outstepped their bounds and attempted to exercise jurisdiction in areas under Chinese control on the pretext of arresting bandits and apprehending criminals.<sup>2</sup>

Article 6 gave Japan the right to maintain and work the military railway line constructed between Antung and Mukden and to improve the same "so as to make it fit for the conveyance of commercial and industrial goods of all nations". This right was conceded for a period of fifteen years from the date of the completion of the improvements and, at the expiration of that term, the railway was to be sold to China at a price to be fixed by foreign expert appraisal.

It will be observed that none of these Treaties and Agreements conferred upon Japan any special or exclusive right to finance or construct railways in South Manchuria. Such a grant, it goes without saying, would have been inconsistent with the principle of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity, which Article 3 of the basic Treaty of Portsmouth reaffirmed. It is equally apparent that Japan's subsequent demands that the lease be extended to 99 years and that China should be precluded from building railways in the area in question, even with her own capital, contravene these Treaties of 1905. Either the principle laid down in the Portsmouth Treaty had to be adhered to or China must be deemed to have been released from her undertakings in the Treaty of Peking which was based upon it.

Nevertheless, from the date of the signature of the Peking Treaty and the Additional Agreement to the present day, Japan has contended that attached to these documents were secret protocols wherein China agreed not to construct, prior to her recovery of the said railway, any main line in the neighbourhood of and parallel to the South Manchuria Railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of that railway. No reliable evidence of the existence of such alleged secret protocols has ever been produced. No official copy has ever been published, nor was anything purporting to embody their terms filed with the United States Government in conformity with the eleventh resolution of the Washington Conference dealing with Far-Eastern affairs. What actually took place in 1905 was that an agreement that China should not parallel the Japanese railway was sought by the Japanese and the matter was discussed. What was mentioned in the Minutes was that China would not construct parallel lines *in the vicinity* of the South Manchuria Railway. The first time the subject came up between China and Japan was in 1907 when the Chinese Ministry of Railways decided to extend the Peking-Mukden Railway from Hsinmin to Fakumen and from thence to Taonan and Heilungkiang. The Japanese Minister in Peking protested and the Chinese Foreign Office replied as follows:

"You must know that, when the Minute was discussed, the Chinese plenipotentiaries pointed out that 'parallel' was very vague and therefore the number of miles must be stated. The Japanese objected by saying that, if this was done, the other Powers might think that Japan was trying to obstruct Chinese railway development. The Chinese wanted European and American precedents to be followed in such a matter, and the Japanese reply was that precedents were not identical. Finally, the Japanese declared that Japan would never obstruct measures on the part of China to develop Manchuria. As we regard that he was speaking in all sincerity and was inspired by feelings of friendship, what he said should be obeyed by both parties."

Nebulous as is this undertaking concerning parallel lines, Japan has used it frequently to block the railway development of Manchuria by China with her own as well as with foreign capital. The two best-known instances are: the case of the projected Hsinmin-Fakumen Railway in 1907-8, when the construction under arrangement with a British firm was frustrated; and the case of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway in 1909-10, when the execution of a contract concluded with an Anglo-

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix VI.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix VII.

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American company was similarly blocked. Japan in each instance invoked her alleged treaty rights with the practical result of defeating this development--this notwithstanding the provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty above quoted.

In view of later developments, and of the fact that the whole structure of Sino-Japanese treaty relations affecting Manchuria is founded, according to the Chinese contention, upon the 1905 Treaties and Agreements, it is important to note that the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula to Russia was for a period of twenty-five years, dating from 1898, and therefore expired in 1923; and that, by the terms of the Chinese Eastern Railway contract (which is applicable to the present South Manchuria Railway), it is provided that the whole enterprise should revert to China free of charge after a period of eighty years from the date on which the line was completed and opened to traffic. The line having been so opened in 1903, it will revert to China in 1983. There was also in the Railway Contract a clause permitting China to purchase the line on certain terms at the expiration of thirty-six years from the date of completion--that is to say, in 1939.

Japan, however, contends that the 1905 arrangements have been supplemented and modified by an entirely new series of arrangements concluded under duress in 1915. This is the celebrated affair of the Twenty-one Demands which, during the World War, were presented by Japan, not through ordinary diplomatic channels, but to the President of the Chinese Republic in a manner calculated, if possible, to secure extreme secrecy, and accompanied by an ultimatum expressing clear intention to use armed force if the demands were not complied with. The President, Yuan Shi-Kai, was in the circumstances forced to capitulate, virtually at the point of the pistol.

The so-called Agreements extorted in this fashion involved, among other things: extension of the terms of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway to 99 years--that is to say, until the year 2002; the cancellation of China's right to redeem the South Manchuria Railway by purchase in 1939; the extension of the term of the Antung-Mukden Railway until the year 2007; the granting of a preference to Japanese capitalists in all negotiations for loans to provide funds for building railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; the undertaking by China to negotiate with Japanese capitalists first when making future loans on the security of taxes in the said regions; the undertaking by China to employ first Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters, when such advisers or instructors are required in South Manchuria; and the undertaking that the Chinese authorities in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall come to an understanding with the Japanese Consul before enforcing police laws and ordinances and taxation against Japanese subjects.

The 1915 dictated "Agreements" cannot be read as a whole with an eye to their cumulative effect without arriving at the conclusion that they were intended to lead to, if not actually establish, a virtual protectorate over that part of China which they concerned. The Chinese Government and people have characterised them as invalid and of no effect. The Government immediately after their signature issued a formal public statement of protest,<sup>1</sup> disclaiming responsibility for any consequent violation of treaty rights of other Powers and disassociating itself from any such attempted revision of the various international conventions and agreements concluded relating to the maintenance of China's territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the *status quo* and the principle of equal opportunity with the commerce and industry of all nations in China. The question was raised by China at the Paris Conference in 1919, but no action was taken. At the Washington Conference of 1921-22, China spread upon the records the reservation of the right on all future appropriate occasions to seek a solution of this problem.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Hughes made a statement summing up the American position.<sup>3</sup> Finally, it should be pointed out that the 1915 so-called "Agreements" have never been ratified by the Chinese Parliament as the Constitution of the Republic requires. On the contrary, the Parliament, in January 1923, mindful of the approaching expiration of the original lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, adopted a resolution formally declaring the Treaties of 1915 null and void and calling upon the Government to act accordingly. By a note dated March 10th, 1923, the Chinese Government brought the matter to the attention of the Japanese Government, stating that the Agreements in question should forthwith be abrogated, saving, of course, those regarding which a satisfactory settlement had already been reached. The Japanese Government replied that it was apprised of the position which had been taken by the Chinese Government and reasserted its own position that the Agreements continued in force. Concededly, the treaty situation affecting Manchuria, and indeed the relations between China and Japan as a whole, are complex and difficult. At the same time, it is clear that the issues are all such as to call for arbitration or judicial settlement and cannot on any recognised theory

<sup>1</sup> Appendix I.

<sup>2</sup> Appendices II and III.

<sup>3</sup> Appendix IV.

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be held to justify to resort to armed force to resolve them. The Covenant of the League is itself emphatic on this subject. Paragraph 2 of Article 13 reads as follows:

"Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement."

With further reference to the 1915 arrangement, it may be recalled that the United States Government, on May 13th, 1915, sent the following identic note to both Japan and China:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognise any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the 'Open-Door Policy'."

### III. -- EVENTS SINCE SEPTEMBER 18TH, 1931.

#### *The Japanese Attack.*

At 10 o'clock on the night of September 18th, 1931, regular troops of Japanese soldiers, without warning of any kind, suddenly opened rifle and artillery fire upon Chinese troops in the immediate vicinity of the city of Mukden, bombarded and looted the arsenal and barracks of the Chinese soldiers, set fire to the ammunition depot, attacked and disarmed the Chinese troops in Changchun, Kwanchengtse and other places. Within forty-eight hours they were in occupation of these cities, as well as Antung and other places and, by holding the chief strategic points along the railways, were in effective control of an area as large as the British Isles.

#### *Japanese Premeditation and Violence.*

The smoothness and swiftness with which this operation was carried out indicated premeditation. This, indeed, was confirmed from many sources, both neutral and Chinese.

The Council has been apprised of some of this evidence. Council document C. 733. 1931, of October 20th, contains the text of a telegram from Mr. Robert Lewis, an American citizen of high standing, containing the following passage:

"I have proof that on Friday night, September 18th, the Japanese army sent through Antung from Korea into Manchuria seven trains loaded with soldiers. On Saturday night, September 19th, they sent four additional trains loaded with soldiers into Manchuria through the same place. On Sunday, September 20th, they sent eight further trainloads through the same point into Manchuria. These nineteen trains are now part of their occupying force in Manchuria. (Antung is 161 miles from Mukden, on the Korean border.)"

The Chinese delegate, Dr. Sze, on October 13th, read a telegram addressed to him on October 12th by Mr. Sherwood Eddy, whom he described as an American "who has devoted his entire life to the promotion of good-will and a better understanding among the nations of the world". This telegram reads:

"I was present at capture Mukden. Evidence of many witnesses interviewed at time and on spot points to premeditated carefully prepared offensive plan of Japanese army without provocation of any Chinese attack producing bitter resentment when China suffering with flood disaster and world preoccupied. Japanese troops not withdrawn but all strategic points Southern Manchuria still held by Japanese and Chinchow bombed. I have testified, under oath sent Nanking and Geneva, to evidence of efforts to establish puppet independence governments Manchuria under Japanese military control. I have forwarded sworn statement of interviews with Chinese leaders Manchuria who testify to repeated pressure of Japanese to induce them to head independence Governments. Universal indignation in China taking

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form economic boycott which Government cannot control. Efforts of Nanking Government still peaceful non-resistance which imperil Government if pacific settlement fails. Situation critical grave developments imminent. All Orient looking to League of Nations and Kellogg Pact signatories for action. Asia believe League and Pact are on trial as well as Japan and China. Notable turning towards Soviet Russia as an ally and Communism is developing threatening widespread anarchy if League and Pact fail in this supreme crisis and menace of war."

In connection with the question of premeditation, it may be mentioned as a highly significant circumstance that the semi-official *Japan Times* published on the morning of September 19th an elaborate special supplement on Manchuria, which must have taken some time to prepare. The supplement had a sensational heading asking whether war between China and Japan in Manchuria was inevitable and was devoted to discussing Manchuria as a potential second Korea.

A word must also be said as to the acts of violence and cruelty committed by the Japanese forces in their surprise attack. Council document C.604 of September, 24th, 1931 (pages 6 and 7), reports the following:

" Japanese troops at Kungchuling Kirin have launched another attack on Chinese soldiers. Massacre of Chinese in Kirin City even more serious than in Mukden. Chinese civil and military officials were ruthlessly killed; about 200 met their death. . . . Many Chinese civilians in Changchun slain. Chouyuping, director of Changchun Municipal Administration, found lying dead on roadside with seven bullet wounds, fifty-one bayonet cuts; fifteen members of his family were also butchered. When first occupied Changchun Japanese troops bombed city twenty times in five hours, ruining large number of houses."

The practice of savagely bombing from aeroplanes open and undefended towns in peace-time has been introduced by Japan as an innovation in the practice of civilised nations and has been pursued steadily in Manchuria (Changchun, Chinchow and Kowpangtse are cases in point). The deeds perpetrated by Japan's bombing planes over Chapei, one of the most thickly populated sections of the municipality of Greater Shanghai, the incendiary activities of Japanese marines and the refusal to allow the Settlement fire brigades to combat the conflagration are still fresh in every one's mind. On that occasion, thousands of innocent civilians—men, women and children alike—lost their lives. These methods have characterised Japanese activities in Manchuria since September 18th, and are still continuing.

The pretext alleged by the Japanese Government—that one rail had been removed from the sleepers—for the outbreak of September 18th is so trivial and inadequate as scarcely to require comment: but it may be repeated here that the Chinese Government flatly denies that there was any tampering with the railways at any point on the South Manchurian Railway, and that, since the Japanese Government refused the neutral enquiry for which the Chinese Government immediately asked, its version is *prima facie* suspect. The testimony of Mr. Robert Lewis, quoted above, shows that Japanese troop trains were beginning to move north from the Korean frontier before the occurrence of the alleged incident.

#### *China's Appeal and the September 30th Resolution.*

The Chinese Government, on September 21st, 1931, invoked Article 11 of the Covenant before the Council (document C.585.1931) and asked that the latter should take immediate steps: (a) to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations; (b) to re-establish the *status quo ante*; and (c) to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to the Republic of China.

The Government of China added that it was fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it might receive from the Council and to abide by whatever decisions the League of Nations might take in the premises.

The upshot of the first phase of the Council's deliberations on this subject was the resolution of September 30th, 1931, in which Japan concurred and by which the Japanese Government is bound. This resolution reads:

" The Council:

" 1. Notes the replies of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the urgent appeal addressed to them by its President and the steps that have already been taken in response to that appeal;

" 2. Recognises the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria;

" 3. Notes the Japanese representative's statement that his Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the

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railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be;

" 4. Notes the Chinese representative's statement that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are re-established;

" 5. Being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation;

" 6. Requests both Parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them and for that purpose to continue and speedily complete the execution of the above-mentioned undertakings;

" 7. Requests both Parties to furnish the Council at frequent intervals with full information as to the development of the situation;

" 8. Decides, in the absence of any unforeseen occurrence which might render an immediate meeting essential, to meet again at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14th, 1931, to consider the situation as it then stands;

" 9. Authorises its President to cancel the meeting of the Council fixed for October 14th should he decide, after consulting his colleagues, and more particularly the representatives of the two Parties, that, in view of such information as he may have received from the Parties or from other Members of the Council as to the development of the situation, the meeting is no longer necessary."

On the occasion of the adoption of this resolution, the President of the Council made a statement to the Assembly on September 29th, 1931, in which he informed the latter body, with the knowledge and approval of the Japanese delegate, in the following terms:

" I only wish to allude to several essential points: First, the affirmation by the Japanese Government and by its representative that it never had or will have any intention of occupying Manchuria militarily; secondly, the fact that the Japanese Government has on several occasions insisted before the Council on its intention to withdraw as soon as possible the Japanese forces to within the railway zone gradually as the safety of its nationals and their property is effectively guaranteed; thirdly, the fact that this intention has, according to the declaration made yesterday to the Council by the Japanese representative, been, during the last two days, translated into definite action and that outside the railway zone Japanese troops are only stationed in a few localities.

" The Council has noted these reassuring statements by the Japanese Government. It feels certain that, in this very difficult affair, as in other affairs which have been laid before it, the good-will of the parties and their loyalty to international engagements constitute the best guarantee for the peace of the world."

*The Bombing of Chinchow and the Japanese Army Proclamation.*

That the assurances given by the Japanese Government, as quoted above, were very far from corresponding to the facts of the situation was brought home in a painful manner to the Council by the bombing of Chinchow a few days before the October session of the Council was to begin. Chinchow, it should be remembered, was the temporary capital of the Mukden Government, whereof its head was Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang, and was a long distance from the areas occupied by the Japanese troops. The bombardment was accompanied by much destruction and loss of life. The Chinese Government at the time communicated to the Council the text of the following handbill dropped by Japanese planes over Chinchow:

" Chang Hsueh-Liang, that most rapacious wanton, stinking youth, is still failing to realise his odiousness and has established a Provisional Mukden Government at Chinchow to plot intrigues in the territories which are safely under the rule of the troops of the Great Japanese Empire, when the heart of the Manchurian mass is no longer with him, his ground is lost and the four provinces of the North East are going to revolt against him. The Imperial Army, which, in accordance with the principles of justice, is endeavouring to safeguard its interests and to protect the masses, will never recognise the Provisional Government of Chang Hsueh-Liang at Chinchow, and therefore it is obliged to take drastic measures to suppress such a government. The people of Chinchow should submit to the kindness and power of the army of the Great Japanese Empire and should oppose and prevent the establishment of Chang Hsueh-Liang's government, otherwise they will be considered as decidedly opposing the army of the Great Japanese Empire, in which case the army will ruthlessly destroy Chinchow. The people of Chinchow are hereby enjoined carefully to consider their situation and to take such decisions as they will deem wise."

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The terms of this proclamation cast a lurid light upon the policy being pursued by the Japanese Army in Manchuria as contrasted with the assurances given by the Japanese Government in Geneva. At the subsequent Council meeting, Lord Cecil declared: "The British Government has been made extremely uneasy by the bombing incidents that have taken place during this dispute and finds it extremely difficult to see how those incidents can be justified by any known principle of international law."

Further testimony was communicated to the Council on October 20th, 1931 (document C.733-1931), by the Chinese Government in the form of a telegram from Mr. Robert Lewis, stating:

"The Japanese Army is feverishly consolidating its hold on all the principal towns of Manchuria, outside the railway zone, northward including Kirin and Taonan, from Korea on the east into Mongolia on the west. They are trying to induce the Mongolian princes to sign away their rights and to set up an independent government under Japanese protection. The Japanese Army is rooting out at all centres the Chinese civil government, who are offering no resistance, and are forcing unwilling Chinese individuals to organise puppet independent governments in all the main areas. They openly refuse to recognise Chinese national and civil authority in Manchuria.

"The Japanese have seized the reserves and deposits of the larger Chinese banks, the records of corporations, and large quantities of both military and industrial supplies. They are feverishly extending their telegraph and power plants and cutting out the Chinese service. They have seized the Chinese short-wave and other radio plants and the Chinese telegraphs and telephone systems; they are now opening mail in the Chinese post offices, including private letters of Europeans. The Japanese are censoring all Press despatches; we have proved instances, including those of neutral pressmen, where the censor has changed the meaning to the exact opposite of that intended.

"The Japanese moved four heavily loaded trains of soldiers from Mukden on the night of October 13th to the west, seized the Peking-Mukden Railway, and now control that line in Manchuria. All other Chinese railways in Manchuria have also been seized by the Japanese. The local police in all the major towns have been re-organised to be under the control of the Japanese Army. On October 14th, they seized the Chinese mining administration, throwing 15,000 men out of employment. While the negotiations in Geneva have been in progress, the Japanese Army has been steadily pushing the seizure and commandeering of Chinese property, including the private residences of high Chinese officials and of civil organisations."

#### *The October 22nd Resolution.*

At the October, or second phase, of the League Council's handling of this dispute, the position of both Parties was made perfectly clear when the Members of the Council other than the Parties presented the draft resolution of October 22nd, 1931, which was accepted by the Chinese delegate and rejected by Japan. The text of the October 22nd resolution was as follows:

"The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed on September 30th, and noting that, in addition to the invocation by the Government of China of Article 11 of the Covenant, Article 2 of the Pact of Paris has also been invoked by a number of Governments:

"(1) Recalls the undertakings given to the Council by the Governments of China and Japan in that resolution, and in particular the statement of the Japanese representative that the Japanese Government would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and the statement of the Chinese representative that his Government will assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone—a pledge which implies the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

"(2) Recalls, further, that both Governments have given the assurance that they would refrain from any measures which might aggravate the existing situation, and are therefore bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action and to take measures to suppress hostile agitation;

"(3) Recalls the Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Nine-Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged 'to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China';

"(4) Being convinced that the fulfilment of these assurances and undertakings is essential for the restoration of normal relations between the two Parties;

"(a) Calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council;

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"(b) Calls upon the Chinese Government, in execution of its general pledge to assume the responsibility for the safety and lives of all Japanese subjects resident in Manchuria, to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other Powers, in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements;

" (5) Recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory, so that they may proceed smoothly and without delay;

" (6) Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments, as soon as the evacuation is completed, to begin direct negotiations on questions outstanding between them, and in particular those arising out of recent incidents as well as those relating to existing difficulties due to the railway situation in Manchuria. For this purpose, the Council suggests that the two Parties should set up a conciliation committee or some such permanent machinery;

" (7) Decides to adjourn till November 16th, at which date it will again examine the situation, but authorises its President to convoke a meeting at any earlier date should it in his opinion be desirable."

*China's Position.*

Dr. Sze, the Chinese delegate, in informing the Council on October 23rd that the Chinese Government was prepared to accept the resolution, did so in a statement from which the following extracts may be quoted:

" In the view of the Chinese Government, the heart of the proposal is contained in the provision that the Council should meet again on November 16th, that it calls upon the Japanese Government to begin its withdrawal immediately, to proceed progressively with that withdrawal, and to complete it before the above date, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated to make arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated and ensuring the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there representatives of other Powers, in order that such representatives may follow the execution of these arrangements.

" The Chinese Government accepts this proposal and declares its readiness to carry out to the full all the obligations it lays upon China. Not only does my Government accept, it is willing to go further and to do everything possible to dissipate the apprehensions of the Japanese representative with regard to the safety of Japanese lives and property in the areas re-occupied by the Chinese authorities. I believe these apprehensions to be entirely unfounded. In the view of the Chinese Government, the insecurity and disorder that have arisen within the area occupied by the Japanese troops have their origin precisely in the Japanese occupation, will grow the longer the occupation continues, and will disappear with its termination. But I wish to state that I owe it to courtesy to declare that I am convinced the Japanese Government's anxiety is genuine, and I would ask my Japanese colleague in return to believe that the Chinese Government is sincerely desirous to remove any possible apprehensions on this score.

" So strong is this desire, indeed, that, not only do I accept the proposal in the resolution to invite neutral officers, but I am prepared to go further and to assure the Japanese representative and other Members of the Council that the Chinese Government is willing to examine in the most conciliatory spirit here and now any proposals for extending the system of neutral officers or, with the help of the League, devising any other arrangements on the spot to guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property in the re-occupied territory, in order to dispel any apprehensions the Japanese Government may entertain as to the danger to its subjects that might result from compliance with the Council's resolution.

" The terms 'evacuation' and 'taking over of evacuated territory' in the resolution I understand to include all Japanese forces of a military or quasi-military character, such as gendarmerie, police and aeroplanes of all kinds, the restoration to Chinese possession of all property, real and personal, public and private, which has been seized by the Japanese since the night of September 18th, and the release from all forms of restraint of Chinese authorities and citizens, and banking or other commercial or industrial establishments. In short, that, so far as possible, the *status quo ante* shall be re-established.

" Now I come to one more point, which the Chinese Government regards as crucial. Paragraph 6 of the resolution before us makes it clear that withdrawal is the only subject before the Council at present and that, until withdrawal has been completed, no other issue arises. But I should like to make it quite plain that, in the view of the Chinese Government,

the only immediate issue arising out of the present situation besides withdrawal is the question of responsibility and assessing damages for the events that have occurred since September 18th. The Chinese Government is willing—nay, anxious, and has been from the beginning—to submit to any form of neutral third-party judgment on this issue, in accordance with the League principles and precedents and in conformity with elementary justice.

“ Any attempt to make the military invasion of Manchuria the occasion for pressing for the solution of other claims would be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant and a violation of Article 2 of the Pact of Paris. China will not discuss any subject with any Power under the pressure of military occupation of her territory, nor, what amounts to the same thing, under the pressure of accomplished facts resulting from the use of force during such occupation. This point is vital and goes to the root of the whole controversy before the Council; it is, indeed, the basic principle on which the Covenant and the Pact of Paris are founded. It is because, in the view of the Chinese Government, this point is vital and fundamental that I have stressed it, and it is for the same reason I add that the Chinese Government is assured that, in adopting this attitude, it has, as a matter of course, the full and unqualified moral support of every Member of the League and signatory of the Pact of Paris.

“ It further goes without saying that any discussions between China and any other Power on any subject must take place on the basis of China's rights and obligations under the Covenant and Pact of Paris, and must respect the principles laid down at the Washington Conference of 1922 with regard to the relations between China and other Powers.

“ In this connection, I wish to say very clearly and deliberately that, once this unhappy incident is settled and normal relations restored between China and Japan, the Japanese Government will find us not only willing, but also anxious, to discuss every issue between the two countries in the most friendly spirit. China has but one desire—to live at peace with all countries and particularly so with her neighbours, and hopes that the very magnitude of the shock to the relations of the two countries that has brought them before the League will result in the stubborn resolve on both sides to put these relations on a new and better footing and to lay the foundation for permanent peace in the Far East. It is in this spirit that the Chinese Government welcomes the Council's proposal of a permanent conciliation commission, or similar body, and it is in this spirit, too, that I wish to assure the Council that the Chinese Government, for its part, will not only scrupulously observe all its obligations under international law and practice to promote good relations with Japan, but will do everything in its power to turn the thoughts of its people to peace and amity, forgetfulness of the bitter past, and hope for a better future.” (*Official Journal*, December 1931, pages 2345 and 2346).

#### *Japan's Position.*

The Japanese representative, with curious logic, again complained that the presence of Chinese forces on their own territory in proximity to the invading army of Japan constituted a menace, and absolutely declined any arrangement fixing a date for evacuation. “ That does not mean to say, in any way,” he went on, “ that it is not the Japanese Government's firm intention to bring them back, nor does it mean that it has any desire to leave them where they are in order to secure from China further concessions or special privileges of whatsoever kind . . . there is no question of our attempt to wrest concessions or privileges from China.” He proceeded with the statement that his Government had carefully thought out a number of fundamental points upon which normal relations between China and Japan should be based; but he still failed to disclose what these points were (*Official Journal*, December 1931, pages 2347 and 2348). The Japanese representative concluded by suggesting counter-proposals, which in substance invited the Council to take the position that the withdrawal of Japanese forces should not take place until there had been a previous agreement between China and Japan on the mysterious fundamental principles.

#### *The Council's View.*

The Council pressed the Japanese representative to state the nature of the principles to which it was asked to subscribe, and he maintained his demand that the Council should sanction them in ignorance of their character. In the course of the discussion, the President, M. Briand, said:

“ There is one point with regard to which I should like to ask our Japanese colleague for further explanation, for I think it is the crucial point.

“ There are two ways in which the two Governments can engage in conversations; these conversations—or negotiations, if you like to call them negotiations—may bear upon two very different subjects or groups of subjects.

“ The first group relates to the statements made by the Parties and repeated to-day, regarding the conditions of security which must first be established in order to enable the

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Japanese Government to withdraw its troops in satisfactory circumstances—for example, with the certainty that the Japanese nationals and their property in an evacuated area will not be subject to reprisals after the troops have left. In regard to this kind of discussion, the representative of Japan is entirely at one with the Chinese representative.

" On this point, I therefore believe agreement should be easy, because it concerns police measures, administrative measures, possibly military measures; these are questions which can rapidly be settled.

" The second group includes questions on which, for a long time past, the two countries have been unable to agree. If, before evacuation, matters which have not been settled for months and even for years must be discussed between the two Governments, obviously the time-limit contemplated by the Council is far too short to enable results to be achieved. On this point there is complete disagreement between the two Parties. The Chinese view is that negotiations of this nature must be postponed to a date when military pressure no longer exists. They are rejected as a condition of evacuation.

" That is the problem, and I think that agreement depends on the solution of that problem.

" When reference is made to ' fundamental principles ' in Point 4 of the Japanese text, is there any idea of bringing under this term any of the questions which are to form the subject of the fundamental negotiations, as constituting an element of security? If so, the whole problem, with all its difficulties, is again before us." (*Official Journal*, December 1931, page 2340.)

The next day, October 24th, the Council once more pressed the Japanese delegate to state whether fundamental principles meant only what the President defined as security—if so, there seemed no good reason why the Japanese representative should not accept the Council resolution; or if, in addition to executive and administrative details of evacuation, he meant discussion of some political questions. " If so ", said Lord Cecil, speaking for the British Government. " I beg him, with all the strength at my command, to say so quite plainly and clearly in order that we may know exactly where we are ". " Did Japan desire ", further asked Lord Cecil, " to enter into a discussion of treaty obligations with China concerning Manchuria before evacuation? If this was so, let him state the fact plainly. . . .

" The League could, at any moment, obviously express the view that all treaties ought to be carried out; but that is not the question before us. The treaties hold; but to discuss up to what point they bind the contracting parties would seem to me to be definitely reversing the order of things. Evacuation must take place first. Discussion of the treaties may follow. It is an important matter, but is not one which directly affects the safety of the nationals of Japan, and therefore is not one which ought to be discussed before the Japanese troops retire from the territory which they occupy." (*Official Journal*, December 1931, page 2354.)

The Spanish delegate, M. de Madariaga, pointed out that the Council had a twofold duty: namely, not only to settle the conflict between the two Powers, but to maintain intact the League of Nations, on which the peace of the world depended. The League of Nations was based on respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of its Members. The idea of security was at the very centre of the life of the League:

" As representative of a European State, of a State which has to watch over the possibility of disputes, I see a danger in allowing anyone to claim the right to remain on the spot when that party has invaded a territory in which it has no right to be, by stating that there is no security, particularly as in certain respects at least the party is partially responsible for the state of insecurity.

" That is a first point to which I wish, very respectfully, but very firmly to draw the attention of my Japanese colleague.

" There is a second point which seems to me still more dangerous and which obliges me to support very strongly the attitude adopted here by the British representative. Do the famous fundamental points really derive from security and nothing but security, from evacuation and nothing but evacuation? If there is anything else, what we really have is a linking up of concepts, a line of reasoning which would allow the conceptions of security to be extended *ad infinitum*." (*Official Journal*, December 1931, pages 2352 and 2355.)

The President then stated:

" The Council has two texts before it—the draft resolution prepared and adopted by all the Members of the Council except the two parties to the case, and the counter-proposal submitted by the representative of Japan, which we have already discussed at great length.

" The fundamental point on which the two texts differ is the measures proposed with a view to ensuring the safety of property and persons, as has been promised by China to enable Japan to withdraw her troops.

" I must say—and I am sure the representative of Japan will agree with me—that the Council's text at any rate possesses the merit of being absolutely clear. No part of it has been discussed on the grounds that it might be interpreted in several ways. . . .

" The text adopted by the Council is based on a desire to ensure respect for treaty obligations, on the undertakings already entered into by the Parties, and, in particular, on the statement by the Japanese representative accepted in the resolution of September 30th—that is to say, before the dispute had become heated, and when therefore matters could be viewed more calmly. This is the declaration made at the time by the Japanese representative:

" ' The Japanese Government will continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be. '

" This declaration refers, in the matter of safety, to steps which cannot fail to be taken rapidly; otherwise, the Japanese Government would not at that date have commenced evacuation and have promised to complete that evacuation at an early date. When negotiations have to be conducted between Governments regarding the interpretation of treaties and railway questions, it is impossible to be sure that a conclusion will be reached in a short space of time. The Japanese representative, with his long diplomatic experience, knows how difficult it is, when a political case arises between two Governments, to reach a conclusion; how slow the negotiations are, and what patience is required to achieve a result. The Japanese Government therefore intended to refer to precautions for assuring safety, decided upon jointly and with the least possible delay in order to allow rapid evacuation.

*Article 10 of the Covenant and Article 2 of the Paris Pact.*

" Article 10 of the Covenant does not call for any commentary. It says that all Members of the League must undertake to respect the territorial integrity of the other Members and refrain from any act which might prejudice the political independence of others.

" Article 2 of the Paris Pact, which has been invoked here, is also very clear:

" ' The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means. '

" This is a dispute which has been laid before the Council. There can be no question of dealing with it by other than pacific means. Japan, who always so scrupulously honours her obligations, could not dream of adopting other means.

" I do not wish to dwell unduly on this point; but public opinion would not readily admit that a military occupation under these circumstances could be regarded as coming under the heading of pacific means. To prolong this situation would be to perpetuate a state of anxiety which has already lasted too long.

" It seemed to me that the Japanese Government intended to begin negotiations concerning the substance of certain delicate problems which have long existed. That intention caused me uneasiness. But our colleague has told us: ' That is not the case. We quite admit that negotiations should be begun with regard to these great problems after the evacuation '. I wish to endorse the observation of the Spanish representative that, as clear evidence of the good-will of both countries, these negotiations should be begun on the very day on which evacuation is completed. But the Japanese representative states that the terms of his counter-proposal do not refer to questions of a general nature but only to security. Nevertheless, on this point there has been a hesitancy which it has been impossible to overcome in spite of the good-will displayed on every side this morning. The mere fact that such hesitancy exists shows that it would be better to have a clearer text.

" What is the essential point? The representative of Japan states: ' We are prepared to go; but we do not want our nationals to be the victims of reprisals immediately we have left. We wish to be sure that they will be protected. ' The Chinese Government recognises that this desire is a natural one and states that it is ready to enter into immediate negotiations in order to regulate the conditions of evacuation and provide the guarantees of safety which Japan desires.

" That can be done very rapidly. There are precedents. Troops are about to leave a territory which they have administered, in which they have organised municipal service, police and various administrative departments. These various bodies have to be replaced. But that can be settled after a few hours', or at most a few days', discussion."

In spite, however, of these eloquent and cogent appeals and arguments, the Japanese delegate maintained his insistence on preliminary agreement on unnamed fundamental principles between the Chinese and Japanese Governments, to be reached in direct negotiations, as a condition precedent to evacuation. The text of these principles has never been disclosed to this day, although an indication of their general character has been given by the Japanese Government. It was made clear in the course of the discussions at the time of the November-December Council meeting that the Japanese Government regarded these fundamental principles as merely a summary, each with its own chapter of demands, to be disclosed to the Chinese Government when direct negotiations

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had begun and to be accepted by the Chinese Government in the form of a treaty or treaties before Japanese evacuation began.

*China and Japan's Positions on Arbitration and Respect for Treaty Rights.*

In the course of the Council's deliberations, Lord Cecil pointed out:

"The Covenant sets out as one of the main purposes of the League the 'maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another'. . . Of course, it is quite possible that there may be a dispute between the Parties to treaties as to the validity of a treaty or as to the interpretation of a treaty. Fortunately, any such dispute as that can now be settled authoritatively by an appeal to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, over which, as it happens, a Japanese national at the moment presides. It is certain that any such question would be discussed with absolute fairness and impartiality at The Hague." (*Official Journal*, December 1931, page 2354.)

Immediately after the Council adjourned, the Chinese delegate addressed the following communication to the President:

"With reference to the observations on treaty obligations made in the Council this morning by the honourable delegate for Great Britain, with which I am in hearty agreement, I am authorised by my Government to make the following declaration:

"China, like every Member of the League of Nations, is bound by the Covenant to 'a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations'. The Chinese Government for its part is determined loyally to fulfil all its obligations under the Covenant. It is prepared to give proofs of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement, as provided in Article 13 of the Covenant.

"In pursuance of this purpose, the Chinese Government is willing to conclude with Japan a treaty of arbitration similar to that recently concluded with the United States, or to those concluded of recent years in increasing numbers between Members of the League."

When the Chinese representative stated, in the Council meeting of January 29th, 1932, that Japan had violated her obligation under Article 12 of the Covenant, which binds Members of the League to submit disputes to arbitration, judicial settlement or enquiry by the Council, and not to resort to war, the Japanese representative replied:

"The Chinese delegate has stated that Japan has never submitted this conflict to arbitration or to pacific settlement, as is required in accordance with Article 12. That is perfectly true; but it is a well-known fact that Japan is not prepared to accept arbitration with every country irrespectively."

This is a formal admission by the representative of the Japanese Government that his country is violating Article 12 of the Covenant.

The issue was therefore left perfectly clear by the October meeting of the Council and revealed a widening gap between Japan's policy on the one hand and her treaty obligations under the Covenant, the Paris Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty on the other. It also gave the Chinese Government heartening proof that its attitude in refusing direct negotiations under the pressure of military occupation as being incompatible with these treaties was endorsed by the Governments Members of the Council, notably the French Government, represented by its Foreign Minister, M. Briand, who was the President, and by the British Government, represented by Lord Cecil.

*China's Position on the Issue of Direct Negotiations.*

As this issue, in the view of the Chinese Government, is fundamental and there is unfortunately no reason to believe that Japan has abandoned her intention of dictating a settlement under military pressure, it is desirable to explain China's position a little more fully, with special reference to the analogy that is often drawn between the Japanese position in Kiaochow after the World War and the present situation in Manchuria. At the time of the Washington Conference, the Chinese and Japanese Governments (with Mr. Hughes for the United States of America, and Sir Arthur, afterwards Lord, Balfour for the British Empire, acting as neutral "referees") negotiated an agreement covering the terms on which the latter should evacuate the former German leased territory of Kiaochow in Shantung. The negotiations lasted months and involved a number of political and economic issues.

*The False Analogy of Shantung.*

But there is a fundamental difference between Japan's position in Kiaochow in 1922 and Japan's position in Manchuria to-day. Whereas Japanese occupation of Kiaochow during the World War might have been justified as an act against Germany, and as such was given political sanction by the Versailles Peace Treaty, the invasion of Manchuria occurred in peace-time and, so far from obtaining any international recognition, is a direct violation of the Covenant, the Peace Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. The Chinese Government was compelled to bargain with Japan as to the terms on which she would surrender her position in Shantung, but considers that to negotiate with Japan on the basis of the latter's military occupation of Manchuria would be, not only condoning Japanese violation of these treaties, but would also actually amount to a violation of her treaty obligations by China. This view has been flatly endorsed by the United States of America in its Note of January 8th, 1932, to the Chinese and Japanese Governments,<sup>1</sup> and by the President of the Council in the declaration made on January 25th in the name of all the Members of the Council except the Parties.<sup>2</sup> The Note and the declaration make it clear that any settlement arrived at by means incompatible with the Peace Pact—and the President of the Council on October 23rd last, has pointed out in said declaration that military occupation is not a pacific means of settlement in the sense of Article 2 of the Peace Pact—or any settlement which by its nature is incompatible with the Covenant (particularly Article 10) or the Nine-Power Treaty (particularly Article 1) will not be recognised by the United States of America or endorsed by the League of Nations.

*Japan's Disclaimer of Intent to use Armed Pressure and Insistence on the Fundamental Principles.*

Soon after the October meeting, the Japanese Government, in a note dated October 26th (document C.764.1931), informed the Council that, "as has been repeatedly emphasised by the Japanese Government, the whole Manchurian affair was occasioned solely by the violent and provocative attack launched by the Chinese army on the railway zone. Certain small contingents of Japanese soldiers still remaining at a few points outside that zone are insistently demanded by the danger to which the large population of Japanese in that region are exposed in life and property. The presence of such a limited number of troops is quite incapable of being represented as a means of dictating to China Japan's terms for the settlement of present difficulties. Nothing is farther from the thoughts of Japan than to bring armed pressure to bear upon China in the course of these negotiations". It then complained of anti-Japanese feeling, which was said to be displayed by text-books used in various schools in China and to be deeply seated in the Chinese mind, and of the agitation against Japan's rights and interests which was said to be going on in China. The risks and dangers to Japanese subjects caused by this situation were so great, the Japanese Government informed the Council, that it could not withdraw its troops without provision being first made to remove national antipathies and suspicion between the two countries, for which reason they should come to an agreement on basic principles which related to the following five matters:

- (1) Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct;
- (2) Respect for China's territorial integrity;
- (3) Complete suppression of all organised movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred;
- (4) Effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects;
- (5) Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria.

In its comments (document C.783.1931) on this note, the Chinese Government expressed its satisfaction at "the emphatic denial of the Japanese Government that it has any intention to bring armed pressure to bear in its negotiations with China. But the Chinese Government feels constrained to point out that, if this be the view of the Japanese Government, the only way to give effect to it is to cease to demand, as a condition precedent to the evacuation of its troops, that China should come to an agreement with Japan on basic principles which are to govern the whole of the future relations of the two countries."

*The President of the Council's Views.*

On October 29th, the President of the Council sent a reply (document C.776.1931) to the Japanese note, from which the following passages may be quoted:

"Independently of the vote taken at the last Council meeting, which retains its full moral force, we still have before us, from the juridical standpoint, a valid resolution—namely, that which was unanimously adopted on September 30th and which retains its full executory force.

<sup>1</sup> *Vide infra*, page 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Vide infra*, page 24.

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" In that resolution, the Council noted the statement made by the Japanese representative that the Japanese Government ' will continue as rapidly as possible with the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be '. No indication whatever was given at that time by the Japanese representative that matters such as an agreement as to the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria were in any way connected with the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals.

" It is further to be noted that, in the two draft resolutions submitted to the Council on October 24th, the first three paragraphs are exactly the same, Your Excellency having withdrawn the amendment to paragraph 3 which you had submitted. It may therefore be assumed that these paragraphs express the will of the two Parties. In its declaration of October 26th, the Japanese Government further stated that, when it referred to certain fundamental principles, it had in mind the following:

" (1) Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct—Paragraph 2 of the two drafts submitted on October 24th states that ' the two Governments are bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action '.

" (2) Respect for China's territorial integrity. Paragraph 3 of the two drafts records an undertaking to that effect.

" (3) Complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred. Paragraph 2 of the two drafts declares that the two Governments ' are bound to take measures to suppress hostile agitation ';

" (4) Effective protection throughout Manchuria in order to allow Japanese nationals to engage there in any peaceful pursuits. Paragraph 1 of both drafts declares that the Chinese Government is pledged to the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria.

" The fact that, on the one hand, the Chinese representative accepted the terms of the resolution which I proposed on behalf of my colleagues and that, on the other hand, the counter-draft of the Japanese representative contained the three paragraphs to which I have referred, shows that the two Governments are in complete agreement on these four points.

" There remains only the last point: ' Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria '.

" With regard to this point, I would call Your Excellency's attention to the letter addressed to me by the Chinese representative on October 24th, in which Dr. Sze declares that ' China, like every Member of the League of Nations, is bound by the Covenant to a " scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations ". The Chinese Government for its part is determined loyally to fulfil *all* its obligations under the Covenant. It is prepared to give proofs of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement, as provided in Article 13 of the Covenant '.

" It therefore appears to me, and I feel sure that my colleagues on the Council, including, I trust, Your Excellency, will agree that the Chinese Government has given to the Council of the League, on which Japan has a permanent representative, pledges which cover the various fundamental principles raised by the Japanese Government.

" In these circumstances, I feel confident that the Japanese Government, being desirous of fulfilling the undertaking which is solemnly contracted under the terms of the resolution of September 30th and which, moreover, it repeatedly confirmed by its declarations during the last session of the Council, at the meetings of October 22nd, 23rd and 24th, will continue as rapidly as possible with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone and that it will thus be able to carry out that intention to the full in the shortest possible time."

#### *Japan's Reply.*

The Japanese reply to the President's note declared that the phrases used in the Council resolution (and incidentally, as the President had pointed out, in the Japanese counter-proposals) were not sufficiently explicit and comprehensive to cover all implications of the Japanese points, and reaffirmed the Japanese Government's unalterable insistence upon reaching a settlement on the basis of the fundamental principles in direct negotiations as a condition precedent to evacuation (document C.814.1931).

#### *Extension of Japanese Occupation.*

Meanwhile, the Japanese army was steadily extending and consolidating its illegal occupation. The driving-out and slaughter of the lawful Chinese authorities was followed by the setting-up of puppet authorities under Japanese control; Japanese advisers and controllers were established in banks, commercial enterprises, municipal administrations and public and private institutions of every kind; the salt revenues were seized by Japanese soldiers and made over to these puppet authorities; Chinese-owned coal-mines were occupied and the land registers and title deeds found in the archives of the provincial capitals were falsified or destroyed on a large scale so as to make over the land to Japanese subjects.

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In a note (document C.789.1931) dated November 3rd, the Chinese delegation expressed its concern at these developments in the following terms:

"The Chinese Government is gravely concerned over the developments in Manchuria since the adjournment of the Council. The attached memorandum, which contains a summary of these developments, shows that, although ten days have elapsed since the adjournment of the Council on October 24th and more than a month since the adjournment of September 30th, not only has there been not the slightest preparation for withdrawal, but, on the contrary, the Japanese Army is steadily extending and consolidating its grip on South Manchuria and is making attempts to penetrate into North Manchuria that are causing anxiety in Moscow.

"It may be remembered that, in the resolution of September 30th, which was accepted by and is binding upon Japan, it was stated that the Japanese Government 'will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured'. The declaration, made over a month ago, that withdrawal had already been begun is unfortunately not substantiated by the facts. Not only has withdrawal not been begun, but the Japanese Government now refuses to honour the promise it made before the Council and declares that it will not begin withdrawal until it has negotiated an agreement with China on certain 'fundamental principles'. This new policy was set forth in the Japanese Government's note to the Chinese Government on October 9th, and again before the Council on October 23rd and 24th. This position was reiterated a few days ago, when the Japanese Government refused to appoint representatives to discuss with the representatives of the Chinese Government the details and methods of withdrawal as proposed in the resolution submitted by the Council on October 22nd. The measures proposed in this resolution, which retains its full moral force, are merely indications of how to carry out the policy to which both parties were pledged by the resolution of September 30th. It is this which makes the Japanese Government's change of attitude and insistence upon an agreement upon 'fundamental principles', by means of direct negotiations, as a preliminary to withdrawal, so profoundly disquieting.

"This attitude of Japan, as was pointed out in the Council on October 23rd and 24th, is in violation of Article 10 of the Covenant and Article 2 of the Pact of Paris. The Chinese Government must reiterate its firm determination never, in any circumstances, to agree to negotiations under the pressure of military occupation and confidently looks to the Members of the League and the United States of America not to suffer the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Washington Nine-Power Treaty to be trampled underfoot."

*The November-December Council Meeting.*

The opening of the November Council meeting practically coincided with the taking of Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang, the northernmost of the North-Eastern Provinces. This city is to the north of the Chinese Eastern Railway and hundreds of miles from the nearest point on the South Manchurian line, and the Japanese Government had given pledges in Washington, London and Paris not to take Tsitsihar.

*The December 10th Resolution and the Committee of Enquiry.*

The outcome of the November-December meeting of the Council was the December 10th resolution, which reads as follows:

"The Council:

"1. Reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30th, 1931, by which the two Parties declare that they are solemnly bound. It therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution, so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution.

"2. Considering that events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24th, notes that the two Parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.

"3. Invites the two Parties to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation.

"4. Invites the other Members of the Council to furnish the Council with any information received from their representatives on the spot.

"5. Without prejudice to the carrying out of the above-mentioned measures,

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"Desiring, in view of the special circumstances of the case, to contribute towards at final and fundamental solution by the two Governments of the question at issue between them:

"Decides to appoint a Commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends.

"The Governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to assist the Commission.

"The two Governments will afford the Commission all facilities to obtain on the spot whatever information it may require.

"It is understood that, should the two Parties initiate any negotiations, these would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the Commission, nor would it be within the competence of the Commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either Party.

"The appointment and deliberations of the Commission shall not prejudice in any way the undertaking given by the Japanese Government in the resolution of September 30th as regards withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone.

"6. Between now and its next ordinary session, which will be held on January 25th, 1932, the Council, which remains seized of the matter, invites its President to follow the question and to summon it afresh if necessary."

The President, M. Briand, read an explanatory statement on the resolution in the following terms:

"It will be observed that the resolution which is before you provides for action on two separate lines: (1) to put an end to the immediate threat to peace; (2) to facilitate the final solution of existing causes of dispute between the two countries.

"The Council was glad to find during its present sittings that an enquiry into the circumstances which tend to disturb the relations between China and Japan, in itself desirable, would be acceptable to the Parties. The Council therefore welcomed the proposal to establish a Commission which was brought before it on November 21st. The final paragraph of the resolution provides for the appointment and functioning of such a Commission.

"I shall now make certain comments on the resolution, paragraph by paragraph:

"*Paragraph 1.* — This paragraph reaffirms the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council on September 30th, laying particular stress on the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone on the conditions described therein as speedily as possible.

"The Council attaches the utmost importance to this resolution, and is persuaded that the two Governments will set themselves to the complete fulfilment of the engagements which they assumed on September 30th.

"*Paragraph 2.* — It is an unfortunate fact that, since the last meeting of the Council, events have occurred which have seriously aggravated the situation and have given rise to legitimate apprehension. It is indispensable and urgent to abstain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting, and from all other action likely to aggravate the situation.

"*Paragraph 4.* — Under Paragraph 4, the members of the Council other than the Parties are requested to continue to furnish the Council with information received from their representatives on the spot.

"Such information having proved of high value in the past, the Powers which have the possibility of sending such representatives to various localities have agreed to do all that is possible to continue and improve the present system.

"For this purpose, these Powers will keep in touch with the two Parties, so that the latter may, should they so desire, indicate to them the localities to which they would desire the despatch of such representatives.

"*Paragraph 5.* — Provides for the institution of a Commission of Enquiry. Subject to its purely advisory character, the terms of reference of the Commission are wide. In principle, no question which it feels called upon to study will be excluded provided that the question relates to any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends. Each of the two Governments will have the right to request the Commission to consider any question the examination of which it particularly desires. The Commission will have full discretion to determine the questions upon which it will report to the Council and will have power to make interim reports when desirable.

"If the undertakings given by the two Parties according to the resolution of September 30th have not been carried out by the time of the arrival of the Commission, the Commission should as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation.

"It is specially provided that 'should the two Parties initiate any negotiations, these would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the Commission, nor would it be within the competence of the Commission to interfere with the military arrangements

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of either Party'. This latter provision does not limit in any way its faculty of investigation. It is also clear that the Commission will enjoy full liberty of movement in order to obtain the information it may require for its reports." (Page 71 of the December number of "The League and Manchuria".)

The Japanese representative, on behalf of his Government, accepted the resolution with this single observation of substance:

"With regard to paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, I am happy to accept it on behalf of the Japanese Government, on the understanding that this paragraph is not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria. Such action is admittedly an exceptional measure called for by the special situation prevailing in Manchuria, and its necessity will naturally be obviated when normal conditions shall have been restored in that region."

The Chinese delegate said he accepted the resolution with the following observations and reservations in point of principle:

"I. China must and does fully reserve any and all rights, remedies and juridical positions to which she is or may be entitled under and by virtue of all the provisions of the Covenant, under all the existing treaties to which China is a party, and under the accepted principles of international law and practice.

"II. The present arrangement evidenced by the resolution and the statement made by the President of the Council is regarded by China as a practical measure embodying four essential and interdependent elements:

"(a) Immediate cessation of hostilities;

"(b) Liquidation of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria within the shortest possible period of time;

"(c) Neutral observation and reporting upon all developments from now on;

"(d) A comprehensive enquiry into the entire Manchurian situation on the spot by a Commission appointed by the Council.

"The said arrangement being in effect and in spirit predicated upon these fundamental factors, its integrity would be manifestly destroyed by the failure of any one of them to materialise and be effectively realised as contemplated.

"III. China understands and expects that the Commission provided for in the resolution will make it its first duty to enquire into and report with its recommendations on the withdrawal of the Japanese forces if such withdrawal has not been completed when the Commission arrives on the spot.

"IV. China assumes that the said arrangement neither directly nor by implication affects the question of reparations and damages to China and her nationals growing out of the recent events in Manchuria, and makes specific reservation in that respect.

"V. In accepting the resolution laid before us, China appreciates the efforts of the Council to prevent further fighting and bloodshed by enjoining both China and Japan to avoid any initiative which may lead to further fighting or any other action likely to aggravate the situation. It must be clearly pointed out that this injunction should not be violated under the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by a state of affairs which it is the very purpose of the resolution to do away with. It is to be observed that much of the lawlessness now prevalent in Manchuria is due to the interruption of normal life caused by the invasion of the Japanese forces. The only sure way of restoring the normal peaceful life is to hasten the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and allow the Chinese authorities to assume the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order. China cannot tolerate the invasion and occupation of her territory by the troops of any foreign country; far less can she permit these troops to usurp the police functions of the Chinese authorities.

"VI. China notes with satisfaction the purpose to continue and improve the present system of neutral observation and reporting through representatives of other Powers, and China will from time to time, as occasion requires, indicate the localities to which it seems desirable to despatch such representatives.

"VII. It should be understood that, in agreeing to this resolution, which provides for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces to the railway zone. China in no way recedes from the position she has always taken with respect to the maintenance of military forces in the said railway zone.

"VIII. China would regard any attempt by Japan to bring about complications of a political character affecting China's territorial or administrative integrity (such as promoting

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so-called independence movements or utilising disorderly elements for such purposes) as an obvious violation of the undertaking to avoid any further aggravation of the situation."<sup>1</sup>

In adopting this resolution, M. Matos, the delegate of Guatemala, made the following observation:

"It is obvious, according to existing treaties, that it is inadmissible that disputes arising between States, whatever their nature or origin, should be settled by other than pacific means. Nor is it admissible that the respect for and execution of treaties between countries can depend upon the will of one of the Parties. Such methods would be completely destructive of the international order, and hence of the maintenance of peace . . .

"I should like to say, however, that it would have been impossible for me to vote for the resolution if it had not embodied the principle proclaimed by M. Briand at the end of our October meeting. This principle is that the military occupation of the territory of a Member of the League cannot be used by another Member of the League to impose direct negotiations on questions that are pending. It is because this great principle has been safeguarded that I cannot oppose the resolution which has been adopted."

The following reservation made by M. Gonzalez-Prada, the Peruvian delegate, should also be noted:

"Nothing in the text to which I have given my approval in order not to raise any obstacle to the pacific settlement of a dispute must be interpreted as affecting certain principles without which the existence and the rights of weak countries would not have that security which makes force unnecessary, this being the main purpose pursued by the Covenant of the League.

"Some of these principles are as follows:

"1. No State has the right to effect a military occupation of the territory of another in order to ensure the execution of certain treaties;

"2. No State is entitled to oblige another—having invaded its territory—to enter upon direct negotiations on the bearing and legal value of treaties previously existing between the two States;

"3. The exercise of the right possessed by each State to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its nationals must be limited by respect for the sovereignty of the other State; no State being entitled, in order to provide such protection, to authorise its military forces to penetrate into the territory of the other for the purpose of carrying out police operations.

"4. The fact that a State has certain rights, claims, economic concessions, etc., in regard to another State does not entitle the former to effect the military occupation of the territory or to seize the property of the debtor State. Any recovery of debts by compulsion is illicit, in accordance with the principles adopted by the Second Peace Conference (The Hague, 1907).

"Even if the measures which have been accepted by the two Parties concerned, and which we have adopted exceptionally in the special case of Manchuria, may be justifiable for the immediate purpose of averting war, they must in no case be interpreted as implying a renunciation of the principles of international law which have reference to the defence of the rights and interests of weak countries and which constitute the main safeguard of their independence."

#### *The Taking of Chinchow.*

At the conclusion of the December Council meeting, the Japanese Government gave separate assurances to the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France that the city of Chinchow, which was the last remaining foothold of the lawful Chinese Government in the North-Eastern Provinces, would not be attacked. In his note of December 27th, 1931, to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, the American Secretary of State said:

"Your Excellency will remember that, on November 24th, in response to my representations through Ambassador Forbes, you assured me, with the concurrence of the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff that there would be no movement of Japanese troops in the direction of Chinchow and informed me that orders to that effect had been given to the Japanese troops."

This pledge was in addition to the undertakings given to the Council and embodied in the resolutions of September 30th and December 10th, 1931, to refrain from doing anything to aggravate the situation. The observers in Chinchow of the various Members of the Council reported

<sup>1</sup> *Official Journal*, December 1931, pages 2376 and 2377.

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frequently that all was quiet in this sector and that there were no signs of any Chinese troop concentration or activity, nor of any intention to take hostile action. There were practically no Japanese subjects in and around Chinchow, and the neutral observers reported public order fully maintained in the city and its vicinity. Nevertheless, the Japanese army, in spite of the Government's pledges, brushed aside the testimony of the neutral observers on the allegation that they were ignorant or misinformed, and occupied Chinchow with, as usual, the heavy bombing from aeroplanes of the various towns and junctions in its path, entailing much loss of civilian life and destruction of property.

On January 8th, 1932, the United States Government addressed the following note to the Governments of both Japan and China:

" With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the Neutral Commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But, in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto*, nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments or agents thereof of which may impair treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China or the international policy relative to China commonly known as ' The Open-Door Policy ', and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan as well as the United States are parties. "

China immediately replied as follows:

" It is amply evident that the American Government takes the most serious view of the lawless acts of the Japanese military forces in the three Eastern Provinces and that it upholds also the dignity of the international covenants and of the Pact against War. The Chinese Government, from the time that the present events in the North-East began on September 18th, 1931, and up to the present day, has in every respect fulfilled its duties as prescribed in the Pact against War, and the Chinese Government therefore has taken no steps of any nature whatever calculated to aggravate the situation, but has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the existing international covenants, asked that signatory Powers direct their special attention to these events. The Japanese military forces, on the contrary, following the adoption of the resolution of the League of Nations on September 30th, 1931, and the meeting of the Council on October 24th, 1931, have still continuously extended the field of their invasion, and, even after the passing of the League's resolution on December 10th, 1931, have openly invaded and seized Chinchow, the seat of the Chinese local government. More recently, Japan has occupied Suichung and advanced to Shanhaikwan, and has increased the numbers of the Japanese vessels and troops at Chinwangtao, Tientsin and other places. In addition to this, there are indications of the intention to attack Jehol.

" Those violations of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact against War, and this disregard of the repeated decisions of the League, are facts which it has not been possible to conceal. The Japanese Government therefore must bear full responsibility for all the events involved.

" With reference to the notification of Your Excellency's Government that in this matter it does not recognize as legal any situation *de facto*, I have the honour to state that the Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged with the Japanese Government gravest protests against the various invasions and lawless acts perpetrated by the Japanese troops since September 18th, 1931, and has made it known internationally that the Chinese Government accords them no recognition whatever.

" With regard to the treaties or agreements referred to in the note under reply, I have the honour to state that the Chinese Government, basing its position on its sovereignty and independence and on the principle of territorial and administrative integrity, has absolutely no intention of concluding any treaties or agreements of the categories described.

" It is the sincere hope of the Chinese Government that Your Excellency's Government will continue to promote the effectiveness of the international covenants in order that their dignity may be conserved. "

The Council, in its turn, supported the Chinese and American point of view in the declaration read by the President on January 29th, 1932, in the name of all the Governments Members of

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the Council except the Parties. In the course of this declaration the President said:

"In that note, the United States Government called the attention of the two Parties to the treaties which are binding upon them. For our part, we felt bound to assert in the statement that we had prepared that a settlement of the difficulties between the two Governments, Members of the League of Nations, could not be sought in arrangements inconsistent with their international obligations, more especially those arising out of Article 10 of the Covenant, by which they had undertaken to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of all Members of the League, and we concluded the statement which had been prepared in these words: 'It would be impossible for the League to endorse a settlement secured by means contrary to the obligations above referred to.'"

The Chinese Government understands this declaration to mean that the Members of the Council consider it would be a violation of the obligations of Members of the League under Article 20, paragraph 1, of the Covenant<sup>1</sup> to recognise any treaty or agreement which violates Article 10 or Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty, by impairing China's sovereignty, independence, or territorial or administrative integrity, or which has been concluded by means incompatible with the Paris Pact.

Japan's reply to the American Government, dated January 16th, 1932, is, both in tone and in substance, almost unique in diplomatic annals. It reads as follows:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's note dated January 8th, which has had the most careful attention of this Government.

"The Government of Japan was well aware that the Government of the United States could always be relied on to do everything in their power to support Japan's efforts to secure the full and complete fulfilment in every detail of the treaties of Washington and the Kellogg Treaty for the outlawry of war. They are glad to receive this additional assurance of the fact.

"As regards the question which your Excellency specifically mentions of the policy of the so-called 'Open Door', the Japanese Government, as has so often been stated, regard that policy as a cardinal feature of the politics of the Far East, and only regrets that its effectiveness is so seriously diminished by the unsettled conditions which prevail throughout China. In so far as they can secure it, the policy of the 'Open Door' will always be maintained in Manchuria, as in China proper.

"They take note of the statement by the Government of the United States that the latter cannot admit the legality of matters which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens or which might be brought about by means contrary to the Treaty of August 27th, 1928. It might be the subject of an academic doubt whether in a given case the impropriety of means necessarily and always avoids the ends secured, but, as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means, that question does not practically arise.

"It may be added that the treaties which relate to China must necessarily be applied with due regard to the state of affairs from time to time prevailing in that country, and that the present unsettled and distracted state of China is not what was in the contemplation of the high contracting parties at the time of the Treaty of Washington. It was certainly not satisfactory then; but it did not display that disunion and those antagonisms which it does to-day. This cannot affect the binding character of the stipulations of treaties; but it may in material respects modify their application, since they must necessarily be applied with reference to the state of facts as they exist.

"My Government desires further to point out that any replacement which has occurred in the personnel of the administration of Manchuria has been the necessary act of the local population. Even in cases of hostile occupation—which this was not—it is customary for the local officials to remain in the exercise of their functions. In the present case, they for the most part fled or resigned; it was their own behaviour which was calculated to destroy the working of the apparatus of government. The Japanese Government cannot think that the Chinese people, unlike all others, are destitute of the power of self-determination and of organising themselves in order to secure civilised conditions when deserted by the existing officials.

"While it need not be repeated that Japan entertains in Manchuria no territorial aims or ambitions, yet, as your Excellency knows, the welfare and safety of Manchuria and its accessibility for general trade are matters of the deepest interest and of quite extraordinary importance to the Japanese people. That the American Government is always alive to the exigencies of Far-Eastern questions has already been made evident on more than one occasion. At the present juncture, when the very existence of our national policy is involved, it is agreeable to be assured that the American Government is devoting in a friendly spirit such sedulous care to the correct appreciation of the situation."

<sup>1</sup> "The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof."

*The Attack on Shanghai and the Bombardment of Nanking.*

During the January Council meeting and on the eve of the Disarmament Conference, the Japanese Army and Navy attacked the Chinese city of Shanghai amid circumstances of barbarity and horror too well remembered by the Members of the Council to need recapitulation. This further wanton act of aggression reinforced the idea of the Chinese Government that it was necessary, in addition to Article 11 of the Covenant, under which the Council remains seized, to invoke Articles 10 and 15. This was done by the Chinese representative, Dr. W. W. Yen, on January 29th in the following terms:

" Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour hereby to give notice as follows:

" 1. A dispute between two Members of the League of Nations—to wit, China and Japan—arising from the aggression of the latter against the territorial and administrative integrity and political independence of the former in violation of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, exists.

" 2. This dispute has not been submitted to arbitration or to judicial settlement in accordance with any of the Articles of the Covenant.

" 3. The said dispute has now reached a state when it is likely to lead to an immediate rupture between China and Japan.

" 4. China hereby invokes the application (not in derogation of the measures taken, or which may be taken by the League in the exercise of its functions under Article 11, but in addition thereto) both of Article 10 and of Article 15 of the Covenant to said dispute and formally submits the said matter to the Council for all appropriate and necessary action under both of said Articles.

" 5. For this purpose, China begs leave to refer to, and hereby adopts as and for the statement of its case comprising the relevant facts and papers in relation to said matter, all the statements and papers heretofore made and submitted by China in the proceedings of the Council taken in said controversy under Article 11 of the Covenant from September 18th, 1931, to the date hereof."

At the meeting of the Council held in the afternoon of January 29th, Dr. W. W. Yen, the Chinese representative, said:

" My Government is sincerely appreciative of the efforts which the Council of the League of Nations, while proceeding since September 18th last under Article 11 of the Covenant, has made to bring about a satisfactory adjustment of the pending controversy between China and Japan. It is with profound disappointment and regret that China is obliged to recognise that these efforts have thus far proved ineffectual. As the victim of persistent external aggression in one of its most violent forms, China can no longer refrain from seeking remedies under other provisions than those of Article 11. The territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China has been destroyed, and its political independence gravely threatened, by external aggression. The fact is not and cannot be challenged. The Covenant is explicit and emphatic on the subject. A specific solemn obligation has been imposed and accepted by us all to respect and *preserve* against external aggression (and even the threat or danger of it) the territorial integrity and political independence of every Member of the League. I beg to quote Article 10:

" ' The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. '

" China respectfully submits that the obligation specified in the first sentence of Article 10 has become operative beyond any question, and that it remains only for the Council now to ' advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled '. As to the means to be employed, the choice is plainly one for the Council to make. It goes without saying that they must be adequate and effective, otherwise the obligation will not be fulfilled.

" Japan's disregard of her engagements under the Covenant is flagrant. The use of armed force without submitting the entire matter to arbitration or judicial settlement, and without awaiting the outcome of enquiry by the Council is in direct violation, not only of the spirit, but also of the letter of the Covenant.

" The time has now come when the Chinese Government must, in justice to her cause, take affirmative steps to strengthen the hands of the League by placing the League in possession of this controversy, not only under Article 11, but also under other Articles of the Covenant where her rights and remedies as a Member of the League of Nations are more specifically defined. It was therefore my duty, acting under instructions from my Government, to present this morning the notice which has just been read by the Secretary-General."

The Council immediately appointed a Committee of Enquiry, composed of the representatives at Shanghai of some of its members, to report on the circumstances and nature of the Japanese

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attack. Two reports have to date been submitted. The first was preliminary and dealt only with the events at Shanghai from January 18th to January 28th. It substantially corroborated the information which had been furnished by the Chinese representative. The second report, which arrived on February 14th, states, among other things:

" Since February 3rd a state of open war exists, any pretence of a truce being abandoned. Firing continues intermittently, both in the Chapei and Woosung area, with the use of artillery and, on the side of the Japanese, by aerial bombardment. The offensive is entirely in the hands of the Japanese, whose declared object is to capture the Woosung forts and drive all Chinese troops a considerable distance from Shanghai. "

The report further refers to " numerous excesses committed by the Japanese marines and reservists, probably actuated by a spirit of revenge. A reign of terror resulted. "

Meanwhile, as the British representative reported to the Council on February 2nd, 1932, the British and American Governments, with which the French, Italian and German Governments associated themselves, presented to both Japan and China a formal request:

- " (1) That all acts of violence and preparations for hostilities shall be brought to an end;
- " (2) That in the Shanghai area both sides shall withdraw their troops and that, as further protection to the International Settlement, a neutral zone shall be arranged;
- " (3) That negotiations shall then be immediately begun to settle outstanding differences in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the Council resolution of December 9th last. "

China forthwith accepted these proposals *in toto*. Japan rejected them in all their essential features.

On February 12th, 1932, China exercised her right under paragraph 9 of Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to request that the dispute be referred to the Assembly. The request was as follows:

" With regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute, of which the Council has been seized under Articles 10, 11 and 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, I have the honour to observe that, according to Article 15, paragraph 9, of the said Covenant, it is within the competence of the Council to refer the case to the Assembly. At the same time, it is also provided that the dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

" In view of the time limit imposed, the Chinese Government is constrained hereby to request that the said dispute be referred to the Assembly. If, however, it should be the pleasure and intention of the Council to refer the said dispute at its own initiative to the Assembly or in virtue of the general powers vested in it to summon the Assembly for consideration of the dispute, the Chinese Government will then be prepared to withdraw the request on its part. "

On February 16th, 1932, the following urgent appeal was addressed to the Government of Japan by the President of the Council in the name of all his colleagues with the exception of the representatives of the Parties to the dispute:

" The President of the Council, on behalf of his colleagues, pointed out on January 29th in an appeal to both Parties, ' good relations between States could only be secured by co-operation and mutual respect, and that no permanent solution could be achieved by force, whether military or merely economic, and that the longer the present situation continued the wider the breach between the two peoples would become and the more difficult the solution would be, with all the disasters that would mean, not only to the two nations directly involved, but to the world in general. '

" The Members of the Council other than the Chinese and Japanese representatives feel constrained to-day to make a pressing appeal to the Government of Japan to recognise the very special responsibilities for forbearance and restraint which devolves upon it in the present conflict, in virtue of the position of Japan as a Member of the League of Nations and a permanent Member of its Council.

" The situation which has developed in the Far East during the past months will be fully studied by the Commission appointed with the consent of both Parties. But, since the Commission was set up, there have occurred and are still occurring events at and in the region of Shanghai which have intensified public anxiety, which endanger the lives and interests of the nationals of numerous countries, add to the unexampled difficulties with which the world is faced during the present crisis, and threaten to throw new and serious obstacles in the path of the Disarmament Conference.

" The twelve Members of the Council are far from disregarding the grievances advanced by Japan and throughout all these months have given her the full confidence which they owed to an associate of long standing who had ever been punctilious in the fulfilment of all her obligations and duties as a member of the community of nations. They cannot but regret, however, that she has not found it possible to make full use of the methods of peaceful

settlement provided in the Covenant and recall once again the solemn undertaking of the Pact of Paris that the solution of international disputes shall never be sought by other than peaceful means. They cannot but recognise that, from the beginning of the conflict which is taking place on her territory, China has put her case in the hands of the League and agreed to accept its proposals for a peaceful settlement.

"The twelve Members of the Council recall the terms of Article 10 of the Covenant, by which all the Members of the League have undertaken to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all other Members. It is their friendly right to direct attention to this provision, particularly as it appears to them to follow that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought about in disregard of this Article ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by the Members of the League of Nations.

"Japan has an incalculable responsibility before the public opinion of the world to be just and restrained in her relations with China. She has already acknowledged this responsibility in most solemn terms by becoming one of the signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, whereby the contracting Powers expressly agreed to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. The twelve Members of the Council appeal to Japan's high sense of honour to recognise the obligations of her special position and of the confidence which the nations have placed in her as a partner in the organisation and maintenance of peace."

Japan answered this earnest appeal on the part of the twelve Members of the Council with an ultimatum to the Chinese authorities at Shanghai, which was delivered on the very next day at 9.0 p.m. (February 18th), demanding that the Chinese cease hostilities and completely evacuate their first lines by 7.0 a.m. February 20th and the whole area by 5.0 p.m. on the same day to a depth of 20 kilometres beyond the boundaries of the International Settlement. The ultimatum also demanded the permanent dismantling of all fortifications and military works in the evacuated area, including the Woosung Forts, and the cessation of all anti-Japanese manifestations and activities. Failing to comply with these demands, the Japanese commander would take necessary action.

At the request of Dr. W. W. Yen, the Chinese representative, the Council met on the eve of the pending battle (February 19th), to consider the Japanese ultimatum. In opening this extraordinary session, the Chinese representative said:

"We are on the eve of a great battle, wherein some hundred thousand men, equipped with all the modern weapons of war, and on the side of Japan aided by some forty ships of war, will participate; and why? Because it is the will and pleasure of the Japanese military that our troops who are on their own national territory should withdraw, while the Japanese soldiers are to remain in their position of offensive and provocation. The situation is simply intolerable.

"I have the honour, therefore, to request that the Council will, in virtue of the powers with which it is invested by the Covenant, consider immediately and put into execution conservatory measures, to the end that the bloodshed which will begin to-morrow through the outrageous demand of the Japanese military, and for which they will be entirely responsible, may be stopped."

Mr. Sato, the Japanese delegate, as was his wont, rehearsed once again for his country the pleas of self-defence and of the maintenance of peace and order. The Japanese delegate charged that China was in a state of utter disorder and anarchy, and therefore thought that "the League of Nations could not in the present circumstances apply the Covenant to us rigorously as it would naturally be applied under normal conditions". He then complained that, in the League of Nations, his country failed to find an effective safeguard of her rights and was therefore compelled to adopt measures similar to those adopted in years past by other countries. Manchuria also took up much of the Japanese representative's time, who gave public approval, contrary to the declared policy of his Government, to the independence movement or what he called the "Manchuria for the Manchus" movement, which he said had been supported by Japan.<sup>1</sup>

In reply to these remarks and charges of the Japanese delegate, the Chinese representative said in part as follows:

"While I admit there is a certain amount of disorder, it must be remembered that China is as large as Europe and has a population of four hundred million people. . . that China was an absolute monarchy and was suddenly transformed into a republic. In the process of readjustment, there must be a certain amount of unrest and commotion; but to describe China as being in a state of chaos and of anarchy is a libel of the clearest kind.

"The Japanese delegate speaks of a well-organised State. I am wondering whether a State like Japan, with the army and navy running amok and out of the control of the Government, is an organised State. When her diplomats come to the Council table and give promises one after another, apparently in sincerity and good faith, and when these same promises are violated the very next day, does that represent a well-organised Government? The Japanese gave solemn promises to the Governments of two or three great Powers not to

<sup>1</sup> Appendix VIII.

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go to Chinchow, but in a few days they were there. Does that represent a well-organised Government? Our people have been massacred in Japan itself during the earthquake, and over a hundred innocent Chinese merchants were killed in Korea only in the past year or so in pogroms: Does that represent a well-organised Government?

"To my mind, however, the Japanese delegate is somewhat contradictory in what he has said. On the one hand, he says China has no organised Government, that there is chaos and anarchy, and, on the other hand, Japan insists on negotiating with that very same Government. If it is a disorganised Government, why should Japan insist on direct negotiations with it? Why not have the matter settled in the League of Nations? That certainly is very difficult for me to understand.

"I may say at once that, if there has been disorder and civil war in China, a large part of the blame must be put on the shoulders of Japan, because she has subsidised and helped one party against the other from year to year. . . . Why is this? It is because Japan does not want to see China united and strong. . . .

"It is to me amusing to hear the Japanese delegate complain that he gets no protection from the League. What kind of protection does he want? I should imagine that, so far from protection, Japan is deserving of some severe punishment. After the setting up of a puppet government in Manchuria, after all the bombardment that has gone on, Japan comes now to the League of Nations and asks for protection. I think that such a request is nothing short of absurdity.

"Japan has invaded China this time and done it in contradiction to the great virtues which we have always praised. There is, first, benevolence. China was suffering from enormous floods and some forty millions of people were rendered starving and destitute. . . . and yet Japan has taken the opportunity of attacking and invading us in direct contradiction to our conception of the idea of benevolence. Japan is famed for her knightlihood, bravery and courage, and yet she is fighting this moment against China in an undeclared war and refusing to shoulder its responsibilities. Is that bravery? Is that courage?

"Lastly, Japan, I think, has not acted wisely. I was a friend of Japan, but I must say that, in the present instance, by using force and by using aggression, she is only antagonising our people, who formerly were really keen on becoming friends with Japan. Is that wise? Because I can assure you that no settlement this time with Japan through the use of force and menaces and threats will ever be a permanent settlement, and, if it is not going to be a permanent settlement, it is the height of folly for Japan to act in the way she has done. . . .

"To speak of Manchuria as the land of the Manchus is absolutely absurd. Manchuria was Chinese a thousand years ago, and with the coming of the Manchus into China the relations between the two parts have become very close and intimate. As you know, China is a Republic composed of five races, so the Manchus are one of the five races of China. But to-day the majority of the Manchus are no longer in Manchuria; they followed their emperors to China and are now scattered all over China. So to-day Manchuria is absolutely and purely Chinese. Manchuria is politically, historically and ethnically Chinese. The attempt of the Japanese delegate to make you believe that Manchuria is Manchu and non-Chinese is not a thing at all to be believed. . . .

"The Japanese delegate said, and he has said it repeatedly, that Japan has no intention to annex Manchuria. I am very much gratified to hear that; but, if my memory does not fail me, I think some years ago I heard the same thing about Korea. Japan was never to annex Korea, and yet to-day, if I am not mistaken, Korea is an integral part of the Japanese Empire. So that these assertions of the Japanese delegate are not always to be taken at their face value. . . .

"We are on the eve of a great battle. . . . What is the Council going to do to attempt to put a stop to the bloodshed which is going to begin in about a few hours' time—7 o'clock to-morrow morning, Shanghai time? That, it seems to me, is the urgent matter which is before us, and I wish sincerely to hear from the Council what its decision is."

In view of the impending catastrophe, the Council, other than the Parties to the dispute, made a last-minute appeal to the Japanese Government in the following touching words of M. Boncour, the President:

"The Japanese delegate said as soon as the operations which are now in preparation have ensured that his nationals shall be safeguarded, then there will be no question of remaining on the ground that will by then perhaps be the field on which a battle has been won. I would urge the Japanese delegate to consider if there is not a terrible contradiction between his territorial disinterestedness and the possibility that the ground which they are going to evacuate as soon as they have attained their object will be the ground that has been strewn with the dead resulting from a great battle. The Japanese delegate has himself indicated rapidly but surely the means by which this may be prevented. He said that afterwards it would be easy to set up a neutral zone and to entrust to neutral authorities the guaranteeing of Japanese rights and the protection of Japanese rights. I would urge most strongly that it is not afterwards that that should be done; surely now is the time when such action should be taken. . . . If the delegate of Japan could extend the ultimatum, could prevent

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

its expiring in a few hours, what an example he would give, what a service he would perform to the League of Nations. I urge this most sincerely with all my deepest conviction."

This appeal again fell on deaf ears. In the words of the Third Report of the Shanghai Committee:

"During the night, February 19th—February 20th, Japanese reinforcements were moved from their base in the International Settlement to the Japanese lines, and, after preliminary reconnaissance which satisfied the Japanese that the Chinese had not evacuated their lines in conformity with the demand, the Japanese opened attack February 20th at 7.30 a.m. in the Kiangwan and Woosung areas. Hostilities continued whole day."

The Council, at its meeting on February 19th, in compliance with China's request of February 12th, also adopted a resolution transferring the consideration of the Sino-Japanese dispute to the Assembly. The text of the resolution reads as follows:

"The Council,

"(1) Considering the request submitted by the representative of China, under the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 15 of the Covenant, to the effect that the Sino-Japanese dispute should be referred to the Assembly:

"Decides that the said dispute is referred to the Assembly in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 9, of the Covenant.

"2. Considering that delegations from almost every Member of the League are now present in Geneva in order to take part in the Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, thereby enabling the Assembly to meet at short notice:

"Decides that a meeting of the Assembly shall be held on March 3rd.

"3. Notes that the measures which have already been instituted in order to obtain information necessary for the consideration of the dispute will be continued.

"4. Requests the Parties to the dispute to use all diligence in communicating to the Secretary-General for the use of the Assembly the statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers as provided for in Article 15, paragraph 2.

"5. The duty of the Council to continue its work for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the Covenant remains unaffected by the present decision."

IV. --- THE REASONS ADVANCED BY JAPAN IN EXCUSE OF HER POLICY.

The preceding recital of events since September 18th rests upon the official records in the proceedings of the Council. The fundamental facts cannot be seriously controverted. Japan's plea, reduced to its lowest terms, is one of confession and avoidance. Unless the obligations assumed by Japan under the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty are to be regarded as purely illusory and meaningless, there has been an admitted flagrant violation of the provisions of all three of these multilateral treaties. None of them contains any language which can conceivably be interpreted to permit resort to invasion or armed force on any pretext whatever in order to settle an international dispute. On the contrary, both the letter and the spirit of these instruments call imperatively for the employment of pacific means exclusively in every case without the slightest qualification or exception; no provocation or excuse is recognised. To concede that intervention by armed force can be resorted to *on any ground, however plausible*, is to admit that the treaties can, in specific cases, be set aside by unilateral action, and thus to undermine and destroy the entire peace structure which they support.

Assuming, however, that the plea of confession and avoidance can be listened to at all, let us examine briefly the various excuses which Japan has offered:

(a) The initial pretext was that, on the evening of September 18th, some rails were removed from the South Manchurian line just south of Mukden. China has denied this assertion flatly. Even if the incident occurred, its triviality and inadequacy as a justification for invasion and occupation of 200,000 square miles of Chinese territory is too apparent to require further comment.

(b) Having once embarked upon this enterprise and plunged all of Manchuria into chaos, Japan invoked the plea of self-defence, which is still put forward, strangely enough, to justify the attack upon Shanghai and the bombardment of the capital of China. Nowhere in the Japanese case is cynical disregard for the plain facts more patent than in this shameless and futile attempt to reverse the roles. The invocation of self-defence in behalf of an invading army suddenly launched upon China's territory in a time of profound peace is an affront to intelligence.

The Council has authoritatively stated that the right of self-defence must be interpreted in relation to the obligations under the Covenant. It is clearly not a plea open to the Covenant-breaker.

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The British Foreign Minister, Sir Austen (then Mr.) Chamberlain, in his capacity of rapporteur on the Greco-Bulgarian dispute, which began with a local combat between sentries and developed into the penetration into one party's territory of troops of the other, spoke as follows before the Council at its extraordinary session in October 1925:

"I call particular attention to the obligations of Articles 10 and 12 of the Covenant. Such incidents as that which has caused our present meeting have sometimes had very serious consequences in the past, when there was no machinery such as that offered by the League for their peaceful adjustment and for securing justice to both parties; but it would be an intolerable thing—I go so far as to say that it would be an affront to civilisation—if, with all the machinery of the League at their disposal and with the good offices of the Council immediately available, as this meeting shows, such incidents should now lead to warlike operations instead of being submitted at once for peaceful and amicable adjustment by the countries concerned to the Council, which will always have regard to their honour and to the safety and security of their nations."

The President, who at that time, as during the greater part of the Sino-Japanese conflict, was M. Briand, the French Foreign Minister, said:

"He had understood the representative of Greece to indicate that all these incidents would not have arisen if his country had not been called upon to take rapid steps for its legitimate defence and protection. It was essential that such ideas should not take root in the minds of nations which were Members of the League and become a kind of jurisprudence, for it would be extremely dangerous. Under the pretext of legitimate defence, disputes might arise which, though limited in extent, were extremely unfortunate owing to the damage they entailed. These disputes, once they had broken out, might assume such proportions that the Government which started them under a feeling of legitimate defence would be no longer able to control them."

"The League of Nations, though its Council, and through all the methods of conciliation which were at its disposal, offered the nations a means of avoiding such deplorable events. The nations had only to appeal to the Council. It had been shown that the criticisms which had been brought against the League of Nations, to the effect that its machinery was cumbersome and that it found it difficult to take action in circumstances which required an urgent solution, were unjustified. It had been proved that a nation which appealed to the League when it felt that its existence was threatened could be sure that the Council would be at its post ready to undertake its work of conciliation."

These sentiments were endorsed by several Members of the Council. The following passage may be quoted:

"Mr. Austen Chamberlain said that the declaration which the President had made as to the role which the League of Nations could play in cases such as that which had brought about the present meeting, and as to the restraint which nations concerned in unfortunate incidents of this character might be expected to exercise in view of the fact that the Council could be immediately convened and could use its good offices to reconcile disputants, was of such consequence for the position of the League of Nations and for the guidance of nations in future that he would like, on behalf of his Government, to express his complete concurrence in all the President had said and to thank him for having so completely defined the duties of nations and the duties of the League of Nations."

"Viscount Ishii (Japan) said that he entirely agreed with the statement made by the representative of the British Empire endorsing the declaration made by the President."

(c) Japan further alleges the need to protect the lives and property of her subjects. But even the Japanese do not seriously pretend that there was any danger to the lives and property of their nationals before September 18th. It therefore follows that, if the danger they now profess to fear be real, it has been created by their own violence and injustice and so will disappear with its cause. The Chinese Government has from the outset emphasised this fact, pointed to the efficient protection of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the territory controlled by China, stated that it assumed full responsibility for protecting life and property and restoring and maintaining public order in the areas taken over from the Japanese troops, agreed to accept the suggestion for neutral participation made by the Council in October last, and to go further and co-operate with the Council in devising any measures on the spot with the assistance of the League that would satisfy the Council or its agents of the efficacy of such protection.

(d) A further pretext alleged is the need for suppressing bandits. Here, too, the danger of which the Japanese now complain has, in so far as it is real, been created by their own action. Just as gangs of criminals exist even in the great cities of the most highly civilised countries, it is not surprising to find that, among the agricultural population and nomads of frontier provinces like Manchuria, there are lawless elements who band themselves together and take to the mountains.

But before September 18th, 1931, there were only about 2,000 such bandits throughout the vast area of Manchuria split up into small bands whose area of operations and numbers were known to the Chinese Government and which were incapable of seriously disturbing public order. The present conditions are due to the military occupation itself, which has destroyed every vestige of Chinese administrative authority.

The pretext of banditry should be treated with reserve, as it was part of the propaganda circulated at the end of December last by the Japanese Government to discredit the testimony of the neutral observers in South-West Manchuria and to afford an excuse for the taking of Chinchow in violation of the Japanese Government's pledges. In addition, the Chinese Government has reason to state<sup>1</sup> that the Japanese Army authorities in Manchuria have been arming and encouraging brigands on a large scale, first with the object of creating trouble for the local authorities, and, secondly, in order to furnish a pretext for extending and consolidating the military occupation. So long as the Japanese occupation lasts, so long will every patriotic Chinese in and out of Manchuria deem it his sacred duty to combat the occupation and its puppets by every means in his power.

(e) The Japanese contend that they stand for law and order in Manchuria. It has just been shown that, from a practical and realistic point of view, Japanese attempts to maintain order in Chinese territory are doomed in the nature of the case to produce increasingly acute and disastrous disorder. Commenting on the exactly similar position when the Japanese Army occupied Eastern Siberia and alleged that it did so in self-defence to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects and to maintain order, the United States Government, in a note dated May 31st, 1931, pointed out that:

" In its view, continued occupation of the strategic centres in Eastern Siberia . . . . . and the establishment of a civil administration which inevitably lends itself to misconception and antagonism tend rather to increase than to allay the unrest and disorder in that region. "

From a moral and legal point of view, Japanese pretensions in the name of law and order have been condemned in advance by no less an authority than the Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, in his address to the Japanese Diet on January 1st, 1926, already quoted.<sup>2</sup>

To all this may be added the observation that a Government which, like the Japanese, is apparently unable to control its own Army and Navy, with results that have astounded the world, would appear estopped to plead law and order as an excuse.

(f) An even more paradoxical plea advanced by Japan is that she is acting in defence of treaty rights. The extremely controversial nature of many of Japan's alleged treaty rights in Manchuria and the dubious methods by which the Japanese Government seeks to interpret and apply these rights have already been indicated in the first section of this statement. All that need be said about Japan's claim to exercise unlimited violence in repudiation of her undoubted treaty obligations under the Covenant, the Paris Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty in order to enforce her own view of her disputed treaty rights in Manchuria is that, if the claim be admitted, treaties would for all practical purposes cease to exist and lawless force would become the arbiter of international relations.

(g) Still another attempt at justification made by the Japanese Government is that its acts are necessitated by the Chinese people's boycott of Japanese goods and the alleged anti-Japanese agitation.

On this matter the Council may be referred to the statement made before it by the Chinese delegate on October 23rd, 1931:

" Once this unhappy incident is settled and normal relations restored between China and Japan, the Japanese Government will find us not only willing, but also anxious to discuss every issue between the two countries in the most friendly spirit. . . . . The Chinese Government for its part will not only scrupulously observe all its obligations under international law and practice to promote good relations with Japan, but will do everything in its power to turn the thoughts of its people to peace and amity, forgetfulness of the bitter past and hope for a better future. "

As regards specifically the question of the boycott, the Chinese Government, in a reply (document C.708.1931) to the Japanese memorandum of October 6th, circulated to the Council on October 13th, stated:

" Freedom to choose one's purchases is an individual right with which no Government interferes, and, while it is the duty of every Government to protect foreign nationals, it is

<sup>1</sup> Cf. documents C.679, C.789, C.868, 1931.

<sup>2</sup> *Vide supra*, page 5.

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bound neither by any recognised standard of governance nor by any principle of international law to prohibit or punish exercise of an elementary right of citizenship. If there be responsibility at all in the matter, it entirely lies with Japan, since the Wanpaoshan incident created this general prejudice against Japanese merchandise."

The boycott is nothing but a natural reaction of the people of China to the acts of aggression of the Japanese Government and its Army and Navy. No Government—no power on earth—can compel the Chinese people to buy Japanese goods so long as Japanese troops are on Chinese soil.

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This brief examination of Japan's pleas shows, not only that each explanation is individually unsound, but also that their very multiplicity and mutual inconsistency render their sincerity suspect. Japan stands condemned as a violator of her solemn treaty obligations; and there is here no question of a merely juristic or technical violation. The appalling moral and material loss which has already been inflicted and the grave threat to general peace are altogether too real to be ignored on any technical considerations.

#### V. — CONCLUSION.

China comes to the League of Nations as the acknowledged trustee of international order and justice with a case which is classic in its simplicity. She has kept the Covenant; she has offered, and still offers, in the most sweeping terms, to adopt and carry out any programme that may be formulated and applied for the peaceful adjustment of her differences with Japan; she has placed herself unreservedly in the League's hands. China cannot believe that she has committed a blunder in relying upon a Covenant which was brought into existence at the cost of 10,000,000 dead and 30,000,000 wounded, and is now backed by 55 nations.

China asks only to work out her destiny in peace—in the words of the Nine-Power Treaty, "the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government". Is there anything unreasonable in this? And yet one of the signatories of the Covenant, and of the Pact of Paris, and of the Nine-Power Treaty, is to-day ravaging her territory, destroying her territorial and administrative integrity and her political independence, and threatening her very existence as a member of the family of nations. The Shanghai effort is but a continuation of the aggression which started in Manchuria on September 18th, 1931.

The issue presented is unmistakable and urgent. The Right Honourable Mr. Arthur Henderson, President of the Disarmament Conference, in his opening address on February 2nd, did not fail to emphasise the true significance of the crisis in the Far East when he said:

"Before passing on to my main subject, I feel bound to refer to the tragic fact that, at the moment when this Conference, the very purpose of which is to take further steps towards the maintenance of peace, begins its work, we are confronted with a situation of such extreme gravity as that which now exists.

"It is imperative that all of the signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris should make it their business to ensure the strict observance of these two great safeguards against acts of violence and war."

The intolerable situation was fully realised by the British representative when he stated at the Council's meeting of February 2nd: ". . . it is impossible that the present position in the Far East should be allowed to continue . . . War in everything but name is in progress. To such a state of things the Members of the League of Nations cannot be indifferent. If it is allowed to go on, the Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine-Power Treaty must inevitably lose the confidence of the world." The British representative did not attempt to state the obvious alternative which must be in the mind of every informed observer. China stands or falls with the entire peace structure which has been so laboriously built up in recent years. The consequences of a collapse cannot be contemplated without the gravest apprehension. Could there be any better way to set the stage for another world war?

Japan stands at the bar of public opinion and at the Council table of the League as the protagonist of an antiquated and barbarous system which has been deliberately and formally discarded by every nation, including Japan. Her appeal to arms cannot be reconciled with the new order of things, recorded in solemn treaties upon which the hope for a civilised and peaceful world now rests. We are at the cross-roads, and the decision to go the way of peace or that of war is squarely

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before us all. There is no middle course: if Japan is right in this matter, then militarism and brute force resume their sway over the affairs of nations; if the new order is to be preserved, the hour has struck to defend it.

It is appropriate here, therefore, to reiterate the position of the Chinese Government as contained in the statement filed by it on February 9th, 1932, which reads as follows:

"The official records of the League of Nations in the proceedings taken before the Council since September 18th last disclose the following undisputed facts:

"1. On the evening of September 18th, 1931, Japan without warning launched a violent attack with armed forces upon the territory of China.

"2. Notwithstanding the active efforts of the Council, in the exercise of its conciliatory function under Article 11 of the Covenant, this attack has been steadily and consistently developed into a formidable invasion and occupation, not only of Manchuria, but also of other parts of China.

"3. Japan has failed to comply with the resolutions of the Council providing for the cessation of her hostile action and the withdrawal of her armed forces. The resolutions of September 30th and of December 9th, consented to by Japan herself, have not been carried out either in letter or in spirit.

"4. The efforts of Members of the League acting in collaboration with the United States of America have likewise proved unavailing to bring about a cessation of Japan's armed aggression, which still continues, not only in Manchuria, but also at Shanghai and elsewhere. Nanking, the capital of China, has been bombarded and is threatened with further bombardment; the Government has been obliged to transfer its seat from Nanking to Loyang.

"5. The violation by Japan of the League Covenant, of the Pact of Paris and of the Nine-Power Treaty is a fact which has been made so clear as to admit of no dispute.

"6. China respectfully submits that the elementary facts of the situation as above stated plainly call for the exercise of the full powers of the League under its Covenant to bring about an immediate cessation of hostile and aggressive action by Japan, the prompt evacuation of China's territory by Japanese forces and the settlement of the entire controversy between China and Japan by peaceful means."

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

February 22nd, 1932.

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Appendix I.

OFFICIAL STATEMENT BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT RESPECTING THE CHINO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS BROUGHT TO A CONCLUSION BY CHINA'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM DELIVERED ON MAY 7TH, 1915.

At three o'clock on the afternoon of May 7th, 1915, His Excellency the Japanese Minister in Peking delivered to the Chinese Government in person an Ultimatum from the Imperial Japanese Government, with an accompanying Note of seven articles. The concluding sentences of the Ultimatum read thus:

"The Imperial Government hereby again offer its advice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by six o'clock p.m. on the ninth day of May. It is hereby declared that, if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the specified time, the Imperial Government will take such steps as it may deem necessary."

The Chinese Government—having received and accepted the Ultimatum—feels constrained to make a frank and plain statement of the facts connected with the negotiations which were abruptly terminated by this drastic action on the part of Japan.

The Chinese Government has constantly aimed, as it still aims, at consolidating the friendship existing between China and Japan, and, in this period of travail in other parts of the world, has been particularly solicitous of preserving peace in the Far East. Unexpectedly, on January 18th, 1915, His Excellency the Japanese Minister in Peking, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, adopted the unusual procedure of presenting to His Excellency the President of the Republic of China a list of twenty-one momentous demands, arranged in five groups. The first four groups were each introduced by a preamble, but there was no preamble or explanation to the fifth group. In respect of the character of the demands in this group, however, no difference was indicated in the document between them and those embodied in the preceding groups.

Although there was no cause for such a *demarche*, the Chinese Government, in deference to the wishes of the Imperial Japanese Government, at once agreed to open negotiations on those articles which it was possible for China to consider, notwithstanding that it was palpable that the whole of the demands were intended to extend the rights and interests of Japan without securing a *quid pro quo* of any kind for China.

China approached the pending conferences in a spirit of utmost friendliness and with a determination to deal with all questions frankly and sincerely. Before negotiations were actually commenced, the Japanese Minister raised many questions with regard to the number of delegates proposed to represent China, the number of conferences to be held in each week, and the method of discussion. The Chinese Government, though its views differed from those of the Japanese Minister, yielded in all these respects to his contentions in the hope of avoiding any delay in the negotiations. The objections of the Japanese Minister to the customary recording and signing of the minutes of each conference, which the Chinese Government suggested as a necessary and advisable precaution, as well as one calculated to facilitate future reference, were also accepted. Nor did the Chinese Government retaliate in any way when, in the course of the negotiations, the Japanese Minister twice suspended the conferences, obviously with the object of compelling compliance with his views on certain points at the time under discussion. Even when delay was threatened owing to the unfortunate injury sustained by the Japanese Minister as a result of a fall from his horse, the Chinese delegates, in order to avert interruption, proposed that the conferences should be continued at the Japanese Legation, which proposal was accepted. Later, when, on March 22nd, the Japanese Government despatched large bodies of troops to South Manchuria and Shantung for the ostensible purpose of relieving the garrison—whose term of service had not then expired—the Japanese Minister stated at the conference, in reply to a direct question as to when the retiring troops would be withdrawn, that this would not be done until the negotiations could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Although this minatory step caused much excitement, indignation and alarm on the part of the Chinese people, and made it difficult for the Chinese Government to continue the conferences, it successfully exerted efforts to avert a rupture and thus enabled the negotiations smoothly to proceed. All this demonstrates that the Chinese Government was dominated by a sincere desire to expedite the progress of the conferences; and that the Japanese Government recognised this important fact was made clear on March 11th, when the Japanese Minister conveyed to the Chinese Government an expression of his Government's appreciation of China's frankness and sincerity in the conduct of the negotiations.

From February 2nd, when the negotiations were commenced, to April 17th, twenty-four conferences were held in all. Throughout this whole period the Chinese Government steadfastly strove to arrive at an amicable settlement and made every concession possible.

Of the twenty-one demands originally submitted by Japan, China agreed to fifteen, some in principle and some textually, six being initialled by both parties.

IN THE MATTER OF THE DEMANDS TO WHICH CHINA AGREED:

At the first conference, held on February 2nd, China agreed in principle to the first article of the Shantung group of demands which provides that China should give her assent to the transfer of Germany's rights in Shantung to Japan. The Chinese Government maintained at first that the subject of this demand related to the *post bellum* settlement and, therefore, should be left over for discussion by all the parties interested at the Peace Conference. Failing to persuade the Japanese Minister to accept this view, the Chinese Government agreed to this demand in principle and made certain supplementary proposals.

One of the supplementary proposals was in these terms:

"The Japanese Government declares that, when the Chinese Government gives its assent to the disposition of the rights above referred to, Japan will restore the Leased Territory of Kiaochow to China, and further recognises the right of the Chinese Government to participate in the negotiations referred to above between Japan and Germany."

The provision for a declaration to restore Kiaochow was clearly not a demand on Japan, but only a reiteration of Japan's voluntary statement in her Ultimatum to Germany on August 15th, 1914 (a copy of which was officially transmitted to the Chinese Government for perusal on August 15th), and repeated in public statements by the Japanese Premier. Appreciating the earnest desire of Japan to maintain the peace of the Far East and to cement her friendship with China, as evidenced by this friendly offer, the Chinese Government left the entire question of the conditions of restoration to be determined by Japan and refrained from making any reference thereto in the supplementary proposal. The suggestion relating to participation in the conference between Japan and Germany was made in view of the fact that Shantung, the object of future negotiation between Japan and Germany, is a Chinese Province, and that therefore China is the Power most concerned in the future of that territory.

Another supplementary proposal suggesting the assumption by Japan of responsibility for indemnification of the losses arising out of the military operations by Japan in and about the Leased Territory of Kiaochow was necessitated by the fact that China was neutral *vis-à-vis* the war between Japan and Germany. Had China not inserted such a provision, her position in relation to this conflict might have been liable to misconception—the localities in which the operations took place being a portion of China's territory—and might also have exposed herself to a claim for indemnification of losses for which she was in no way responsible.

In a further supplementary proposal, the Chinese Government suggested that, prior to the restoration of the Kiaochow Territory to China, the Maritime Customs, the telegraphs and post offices should be continued to be administered as heretofore; that the military railway, the telegraph lines, etc., which were installed by Japan to facilitate her military operations, should be removed forthwith; that the Japanese troops now stationed outside of the Leased Territory should be first withdrawn, and those within the Territory should be recalled at the time when Kiaochow is returned to China. Shantung being a Chinese Province, it was natural for China to be anxious concerning the restoration of the *statu quo ante bellum*. Although the Chinese Government was confident that the Japanese Government would effect such restoration in pursuance of its official declaration, it was necessary for China, being neutral throughout the war, to place these matters on record.

At the third conference, held on February 22nd, China agreed to the second demand in the Shantung group not to cede or lease to any Power any territory or island or land on the sea border of Shantung.

At the fifth conference, held on February 28th, China agreed to give Japan the preference, provided Germany abandoned the privilege, to supply the capital for the construction of a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, in the event of China's deciding to build that railway with foreign capital.

At the sixth conference, held on March 3rd, China, in the interest of foreign trade, agreed to open certain important cities in Shantung as trade marts under regulations approved by the Japanese Government, although this was a demand on the part of Japan for privileges additional to any that hitherto had been enjoyed by Germany and was not an outcome of the hostilities between Japan and Germany, nor, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, was its acceptance essential to the preservation of peace in the Far East.

At the eighth conference, held on March 9th, China agreed (1) to the extension of the term of the lease of Dairen and (2) Port Arthur, and (3) of the South Manchurian and (4) Antung-Mukden Railways, all to ninety-nine years.

Owing to the bitter experiences which China sustained in the past in connection with the leased portions of her territory, it has become her settled policy not to grant further leases or to extend the term of those now in existence. Therefore, it was a significant indication of China's desire to meet Japan's wishes when she agreed to this exceptional departure from her settled policy.

At the same conference, the Chinese Government also agreed to refrain from raising objections to the principle of co-operation in the Hanyeh-ping Company, if the latter should arrive at an agreement in this respect with the Japanese capitalists concerned. With reference to this question, it was pointed out to the Japanese Minister that, in the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, Chinese subjects are guaranteed the right of protection of their property and freedom to engage in any lawful occupation. The Government was precluded, therefore, from interfering

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with the private business of the people and could not find any other solution than the one thus agreed to.

As regards the single article of the fourth group, and the preamble thereto, the Chinese Government held that they were inconsistent with Chinese sovereignty. However, China, at this conference, expressed her readiness to meet the wishes of Japan so far as it was possible without infringing her sovereignty and agreed to make a voluntary pronouncement that she would not alienate any portion of her coast-line.

In connection with the South Manchuria Railway, it is worthy of note that the provision regarding the re-purchase period in the agreement (thirty-six years from 1902) was not mentioned in Japan's original proposal. Subsequently, the Japanese Government, on the ground that the meaning of this provision was not clear, requested China to agree to its cancellation. To this request the Chinese Government acceded, though well aware that the proposed change could only benefit Japan. China thus relinquished the right to re-purchase the railway at the expiration of another twenty-three years.

In connection with the Antung-Mukden Railway, the article, which was originally initialled at the conference, provided for the reversion of the railway to China at the end of ninety-nine years without payment, but, at the subsequent meeting, the Japanese Minister requested that the reference to the reversion without payment be deleted from the initialled article. In acceding to the Japanese Minister's request, China again showed her sincere desire to expedite matters and to meet Japan's wishes even at the sacrifice of a point in her favour, to which Japan had already agreed.

At the eleventh conference, held on March 16th, China agreed to give Japan preference in regard to loans for railway construction in South Manchuria.

At the thirteenth conference, held on March 23rd, China agreed (1) to the amendment of the Kirin-Changchun Railway loan agreement; (2) to give preference to Japan if the revenue of South Manchuria were offered as security for loans; (3) to give preference to Japanese in the event of the employment of advisers for South Manchuria; (4) to grant to Japanese the right of mining in nine specified areas in South Manchuria.

In its original form, the demand with reference to mining in South Manchuria tended to create a monopoly for Japanese subjects, and therefore was entirely inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity. The Chinese Government explained that it could not, in view of the treaty rights of other Powers, agree to this monopoly, but it readily gave its acceptance when Japan consented to the modification of the demand so as to mitigate its monopolistic character.

In connection with the Kirin-Changchun Railway, the amendment agreed to involves a fundamental revision of the original agreement on the basis of the existing railway loan concluded by China with other foreign capitalists, as well as an engagement on the part of the Chinese Government to extend to this railway any better terms which may be hereafter accorded to other railway concessionaires in China. The capital of this railway was originally 50 per cent Chinese and 50 per cent Japanese. The effect of this undertaking is to transfer the capital originally held by the Chinese, as well as the full control and administration of the railway, to the Japanese.

At the twenty-first conference, held on April 10th, China agreed, in regard to the demands concerning Fukien Province, to give Japan an assurance in accordance with Japan's wishes at a future time.

As regards demands 2 and 3 in the "Manchurian group", relating to the ownership of land for trade, manufacture and agricultural enterprises as well as for the right of settlement in the interior of South Manchuria, the Chinese Government, after discussion at several conferences, agreed to them in principle, but desired to introduce certain amendments concerning the control and protection of the Japanese subjects who might avail themselves of these rights. The course of the negotiations in connection with these amendments will be referred to subsequently.

IN THE MATTER OF THOSE DEMANDS TO WHICH CHINA COULD NOT AGREE:

Of the twenty-one demands there were six, as previously mentioned, to which China could not agree on the ground that they were not proper subjects for international negotiation, conflicting as they did with the sovereign rights of China, the treaty rights of other Powers, and the principle of equal opportunity.

Thus, for example, the second article of the Hanyeh-ping question in the original third group in particular seriously affected the principle of equal commercial and industrial opportunity.

The proposal that there should be joint administration by China and Japan of the police in China was clearly an interference with the Republic's domestic affairs and consequently an infringement of her sovereignty. For that reason, the Chinese Government could not take the demand into consideration. But when it was explained by the Japanese Minister that this referred only to South Manchuria and he suggested that his Government would be satisfied if China agreed to engage Japanese as police advisers for that territory, the Chinese Government accepted the suggestion.

The two articles relating to the acquisition of land for schools, hospitals and temples, as well as to the right of missionary propaganda, would, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, have

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presented grave obstacles to the consolidation of the friendly feeling subsisting between the two peoples. The religions of the two countries are identical and therefore the need for a missionary propaganda to be carried on in China by Japanese does not exist. The natural rivalry between Chinese and Japanese followers of the same faith would tend to create incessant disputes and friction. Whereas Western missionaries live apart from the Chinese communities among which they labour, Japanese monks would live with the Chinese, and the similarity of their physical characteristics, their religious garb, and their habits of life would render it impossible to distinguish them for purposes of affording the protection which the Japanese Government would require should be extended to them under the system of extra-territoriality now obtaining in China. Moreover, a general apprehension exists among the Chinese people that these peculiar conditions favouring conspiracies for political purposes might be taken advantage of by some unscrupulous Chinese.

The demand for railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley conflicted with the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Agreement of March 6th, 1908, the Nanking-Changsha Railway Agreement of March 31st, 1914, and the engagement August 24th, 1914, giving preference to British firms for the projected line from Nanchang to Chaochowfu. For this reason the Chinese Government found itself unable to consider the demand, though the Japanese Minister, while informed of China's engagements with Great Britain, repeatedly pressed for its acceptance.

In respect to the demand for the appointment of influential Japanese to be advisers in political, financial and military affairs, the policy of the Chinese Government in regard to the appointment of advisers has been similar to that which has presumably guided the Japanese Government in like circumstances—namely, the selection of the best-qualified men irrespective of their nationality. As an indication of its desire to avail themselves of the services of eminent Japanese, one of the earliest appointments made to an advisership was that of Dr. Ariga, while later on Dr. Hirai and Mr. Nakayama were appointed to the Ministry of Communications.

It was considered that the demand that Japanese should be appointed in the three most important administrative departments, as well as the demand for the joint control of China's police, and the demand for an engagement to purchase a fixed amount of arms, and ammunition from Japan or to establish joint arsenals in China, so clearly involved the sovereignty of the Republic that the Chinese Government was unable even to consider them.

For these reasons, the Chinese Government, at the very outset of the negotiations, declared that it was unable to negotiate on the demands; but, in deference to the wishes of the Japanese Minister, the Chinese delegates consented to give the reasons for declining to enter into a discussion of them.

IN THE MATTER OF THE QUESTIONS OF DISPUTE INVOLVED IN SOME OF THE FOREGOING DEMANDS.

The demand by Japan for the right of her subjects in South Manchuria to lease or own land, and to reside and travel, and to engage in business or manufacture of any kind whatever was deemed by the Chinese Government to obtain for Japanese subjects in this region a privileged status beyond the terms of the treaties existing between the two nations and to give them a freedom of action which would be a restriction of China's sovereignty and a serious infringement of her administrative rights. Should Japanese subjects be granted the right of owning land, it would mean that all the landed property in the region might fall into their hands, thereby endangering China's territorial integrity. Moreover, residence in the interior was incompatible with the existence of extra-territoriality, the relinquishment of which is necessary to the actual enjoyment of the privilege of inland residence, as evidenced in practice of other nations.

Japan's unconditional demand for the privilege of inland residence accompanied with a desire to extend extra-territoriality into the interior of China and to enable Japanese subjects to monopolise all the interests in South Manchuria was also palpably irreconcilable with the principle of equal opportunity. For this reason, the Chinese Government was, in the first instance, unable to accept this demand as a basis of negotiation. Its profound regard for the friendly relations of the two countries, however, persuaded it to exert its utmost efforts, in spite of all the inherent difficulties, to seek a solution of a question which was practically impossible to solve. Knowing that the proposal made by Japan was incompatible with treaties, it nevertheless sought to meet her wishes within the limits of treaties. Accordingly, it submitted a counter-proposal to open more places in South Manchuria to international trade and to establish Sino-Japanese joint reclamation companies.

This suggestion was made in the belief that the places to which Japanese subjects would desire to resort for purposes of trade could not be other than important localities; if all these localities were opened to commerce, then they could reside, trade, and lease land there for joint reclamation. Thus Japanese subjects might enjoy the essence of the privilege of inland residence and would still be able to reconcile their position with China's treaties and the principle of equal opportunity.

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After the Japanese Government declined to accept this suggestion, China withdrew it and replaced it with an amendment to the original articles. It was proposed in this amendment to grant to Japanese subjects the extra-treaty privilege of inland residence with the provisos that Japanese subjects in places outside of trade marts should observe Chinese police regulations and pay taxes in the same manner as Chinese; and that civil and criminal cases involving such Japanese subjects should be adjudicated by Chinese authorities, the Japanese Consul attending merely to watch the proceedings. This suggestion was not an innovation: it was based upon the *modus operandi* now in force as regards the Korean settlers in inland districts in Chientao. But the Japanese Government again declined to accept it.

The Chinese Government thereupon made a third proposal along the line of what constitutes the present practice in Turkey, making a distinction, however, in favour of Japanese subjects, in the exercise of jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. This was once more objected to by the Japanese Government.

Then the Chinese Government proposed to concede still another step—the fourth endeavour to meet Japan's wishes. They proposed to agree to the full text of Articles 2 and 3 relative to the question of inland residence, except that "the right of owning land" was changed into "the right of leasing land" and to the phrase "cultivating land" was added this clause: "the regulations for which shall be determined separately"; and, further, to add a supplementary article which embodied a *modus operandi* which the Chinese Government had constrained itself to make out of a desire to come to a settlement over this question. The view advanced in this supplementary article was based upon the Japanese Minister's declaration made on March 6th, 1915, that a separate article embodying some compromise might be added to the original Articles 2 and 3 for the purpose of avoiding any conflict with China's sovereignty or the system established by treaties.

These suggestions made by the Chinese Government were not accepted by Japan.

As regards Eastern Inner Mongolia, not only have no treaties been entered into with Japan concerning this region, but also the people are so unaccustomed to foreign trade that the Chinese Government invariably feels much anxiety about the safety of foreigners who elect to travel there. The Chinese Government therefore considered that it would not be in the interest of foreigners to open the whole territory to them for residence and commerce, and on these grounds based their original refusal to place Eastern Inner Mongolia on the same footing as South Manchuria. Still, its desire to meet the wishes of the Japanese Government eventually prompted it to offer to open a number of places in the region to foreign trade.

#### IN THE MATTER OF JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS.

The foregoing is an outline of the negotiations up to April 17th. It was hoped by the Chinese Government that the Japanese Government, in view of the great concessions made by China at the conferences held up to this time, would see a way of effecting an amicable settlement by modifying its position on certain points. In regard to these it had, by this time, become manifest that China would encounter almost insuperable difficulties in making further concessions.

The Japanese Government, however, suspended the negotiations until April 26th, when they surprised the Chinese Government by presenting a new list of twenty-four demands and requested the Chinese Government to accord its acceptance without delay, adding that this was its final proposal. At the same time, the Japanese Minister stated that the Japanese Government would restore the leased territory of Kiaochow to China at an opportune time in the future and under proper conditions if the Chinese Government would agree to the new list of twenty-four demands without modification.

In this new list, although the term "special position" in the preamble of the Manchurian group was changed to "economic relations" and although the character of the articles in the original fifth group was altered from demands to a recital of alleged statements by the Chinese Foreign Minister, four new demands were introduced concerning Eastern Inner Mongolia. In deference to the wishes of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government gave the revised list the most careful consideration; and, being sincerely desirous of an early settlement, offered new concessions in its reply presented to the Japanese Minister on May 1st.

In this reply, the Chinese Government reinserted the proposal in reference to the retrocession of Kiachow which they advanced at the first conference on February 2nd and which was postponed at the request of the Japanese Minister. This, therefore, was in no sense a new proposal.

The Chinese Government also proposed to agree to three of the four articles relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia. There was some difficulty in determining a definition of the boundaries of Eastern Inner Mongolia—this being a new expression in Chinese geographical terminology—but the Chinese Government, acting upon a statement made at a previous conference by the Japanese Minister that the Japanese Government meant the region under Chinese administrative jurisdiction, and taking note, in the list presented by the Japanese Minister, of the names of places in Eastern Inner Mongolia to be opened to trade, inferred that the so-called Eastern Inner Mongolia

is that part of Inner Mongolia which is under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol circuit; and refrained from placing any limitations upon the definition of this term.

The Chinese Government also withdrew its supplementary proposal reserving the right of making regulations for agricultural enterprises to be undertaken by Japanese settlers in South Manchuria.

In respect of the trial of cases involving land disputes between Japanese only, or between Japanese and Chinese, the Chinese Government accorded to the Japanese Consul the right to depute an officer to watch the proceedings.

The Chinese Government also agreed to accept the suggestion of the Japanese Government to modify the term "police law and ordinances" into "police rules and regulations", thereby limiting the extent of control which the Chinese would have over Japanese subjects.

As regards the Hanyehping demand, the Chinese Government accepted the draft made by the Japanese Government, embodying an engagement by the Chinese Government not to convert the company into a State-owned concern, nor to confiscate it, nor to force it to borrow foreign capital other than Japanese.

In respect of the Fukien question, the Chinese Government also agreed to give an assurance in the amplified form suggested by the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government had not given its consent to any foreign nations to construct a dock-yard or a coaling station, or a naval base, or any other military establishment along the coast of Fukien Province; nor did it contemplate borrowing foreign capital for the foregoing purposes.

Having made these concessions, which practically brought the views of China into line with those of Japan, and having explained in a note accompanying the reply the difficulty for China to make further concessions, the Chinese Government hoped that the Japanese Government would accept its reply of May 1st, and thus bring the negotiations to an amicable conclusion.

The Japanese Government, however, expressed itself as being dissatisfied with China's reply and withdrew the conditional offer to restore Kiachow to China made on April 26th. It was further intimated that, if the Chinese Government did not give its full compliance with the list of twenty-four demands, Japan would have recourse to drastic measures.

Upon receiving this intimation, the Chinese Government, inspired by the conciliatory spirit which had been predominant from the very beginning of the negotiations and desirous of avoiding any possible rupture in the relations of the two countries, made a supreme effort to meet the situation and represented to the Japanese Government that it would reconsider its position and make another attempt to find a solution that would be more satisfactory to Japan in respect to those articles which China had declared could not be taken up for consideration, but to which Japan attached great importance. Even in the evening of May 6th, after the Japanese Minister had notified the Chinese Government that the Ultimatum had arrived in Peking, the Chinese Government in the interests of peace still exerted efforts to save the situation by offering to meet Japan's wishes.

These overtures were again rejected, and thus was exhausted the means at the disposal of the Chinese Government to prevent an *impasse*.

It is plain that the Chinese Government proceeded to the fullest extent of possible concession in view of the strong national sentiment manifested by the people throughout the whole period of negotiations. All that the Chinese Government strove to maintain was China's plenary sovereignty, the treaty rights of foreign Powers in China and the principle of equal opportunity.

To the profound regret of the Chinese Government, however, the tremendous sacrifices which it had shown itself ready to make proved unavailing, and an Ultimatum, was duly delivered to them by the Japanese Minister at three o'clock on the afternoon of May 7th.

As to the allegations made in the Ultimatum against China, the Chinese Government hopes that the foregoing outline of the history of the negotiations constitutes a clear, dispassionate, and complete reply.

In considering the nature of the course they should take with reference to the Ultimatum, the Chinese Government was influenced by a desire to preserve the Chinese people, as well as the large number of foreign residents in China, from unnecessary suffering and also to prevent the interests of friendly Powers from being imperilled. For these reasons the Chinese Government was constrained to comply in full with the terms of the Ultimatum, but, in complying, the Chinese Government disclaims any desire to associate itself with any revision, which may thus be effected, of the various conventions and agreements concluded between other Powers in respect of the maintenance of China's territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the *status quo*, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

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Appendix II.

BARON SHIDEHARA'S STATEMENT AT THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON  
FEBRUARY 2ND, 1922, WITH REFERENCE TO THE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OF 1915.

At a previous session of this committee, the Chinese delegation presented a statement urging that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915 be reconsidered and cancelled. The Japanese delegation, while appreciating the difficult position of the Chinese delegation, does not feel at liberty to concur in the procedure now resorted to by China with a view to cancellation of international engagements which she entered into as a free sovereign nation.

It is presumed that the Chinese delegation has no intention of calling in question the legal validity of the compacts of 1915, which were formally signed and sealed by the duly authorised representatives of the two Governments, and for which the exchange of ratifications was effected in conformity with established international usages. The insistence by China on the cancellation of those instruments would in itself indicate that she shares the view that the compacts actually remain in force and will continue to be effective, unless and until they are cancelled.

It is evident that no nation can have given ready consent to cessions of its territorial or other rights of importance. If it should once be recognised that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and everywhere.

The statement of the Chinese delegation under review declares that China accepted the Japanese demands in 1915, hoping that a day would come when she should have the opportunity of bringing them up for reconsideration and cancellation. It is, however, difficult to understand the meaning of this assertion. It cannot be the intention of the Chinese delegation to intimate that China may conclude a treaty, with the thought in mind of breaking it at the first opportunity.

The Chinese delegation maintains that the treaties and notes in question are derogatory to the principles adopted by the Conference with regard to China's sovereignty and independence. It has, however, been held by the Conference on more than one occasion that concessions made by China *ex contractu*, in the exercise of her own sovereign rights, cannot be regarded as inconsistent with her sovereignty and independence.

It should also be pointed out that the terms "twenty-one demands", often used to denote the treaties and notes of 1915, is inaccurate and grossly misleading.

It may give rise to an erroneous impression that the whole original proposals of Japan had been pressed by Japan and accepted *in toto* by China. As a matter of fact, not only "Group 5", but also several other matters contained in Japan's first proposals were eliminated entirely or modified considerably, in deference to the wishes of the Chinese Government, when the final formula was presented to China for acceptance. Official records published by the two Governments relating to those negotiations will further show that the most important terms of the treaties and notes, as signed, had already been virtually agreed to by the Chinese negotiators before the delivery of the ultimatum, which then seemed to the Japanese Government the only way of bringing the protracted negotiations to a speedy close.

The Japanese delegation cannot bring itself to the conclusion that any useful purpose will be served by research and re-examination at this Conference of old grievances which one of the nations represented here may have against another. It will be more in line with the high aim of the Conference to look forward to the future with hope and with confidence.

Having in view, however, the changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915, the Japanese delegation is happy to avail itself of the present occasion to make the following declaration:

1. Japan is ready to throw open to the joint activity of the international financial consortium recently organised the right of option granted exclusively in favour of Japanese capital, with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and, second, to loans to be secured on taxes in that region; it being understood that nothing in the present declaration shall be held to imply any modification or annulment of the understanding recorded in the officially announced notes and memoranda which were exchanged among the Governments of the countries represented in the consortium and also among the national financial groups composing the consortium, in relation to the scope of the joint activity of that organisation.

2. Japan has no intention of insisting on her preferential right under the Sino-Japanese arrangements in question concerning the engagements by China of Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters in South Manchuria.

3. Japan is further ready to withdraw the reservation which she made, in proceeding to the signature of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915, to the effect that group 5 of the original proposals of the Japanese Government would be postponed for future negotiations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

It would be needless to add that all matters relating to Shantung contained in those Treaties and Notes have now been definitely adjusted and disposed of.

In coming to this decision, which I have had the honour to announce, Japan has been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation, having always in view China's sovereign rights and the principle of equal opportunity.

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Appendix III.

CHINESE STATEMENT AT THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

The Chinese delegation has taken note of the statement of Baron Shidehara made at yesterday's session of the Committee with reference to the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of May 25th, 1915.

The Chinese delegation learns with satisfaction that Japan is now ready to throw open to the joint activity of the banking interests of other Powers the right of option granted exclusively in favour of Japanese capital with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and, second, to loans secured on taxes in that region; and that Japan has no intention of insisting upon a preferential right concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers or instructors in political, financial, military or police matters in South Manchuria; also that Japan now withdraws the reservation which she made to the effect that group 5 of her original demands upon China should be postponed for future negotiations.

The Chinese delegation greatly regrets that the Government of Japan should not have been led to renounce the other claims predicated upon the Treaties and Notes of 1915.

The Japanese delegation expressed the opinion that abrogation of these arguments would constitute "an exceedingly dangerous precedent", "with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and everywhere".

The Chinese delegation has the honour to say that a still more dangerous precedent will be established, with consequences upon the stability of international relations which cannot be estimated if, without rebuke or protest from other Powers, one nation can obtain from a friendly but, in a military sense, weaker neighbour, and under circumstances such as attended the negotiation and signing of the Treaties of 1915, valuable concessions which were not in satisfaction of pending controversies and for which no *quid pro quo* was offered. These treaties and notes stand out, indeed, unique in the annals of international relations. History records scarcely another instance in which demands of such a serious character as those which Japan presented to China in 1915 have, without even pretence of provocation, been suddenly presented by one nation to another nation with which it was at the time in friendly relations.

No apprehension need be entertained that the abrogation of the agreements of 1915 will serve as a precedent for the annulment of other agreements, since it is confidently hoped that the future will furnish no such similar occurrences.

So exceptional were the conditions under which the agreements of 1915 were negotiated that the Government of the United States of America felt justified in referring to them in the identic note of May 13th, 1915, which it sent to the Chinese and Japanese Governments. That note began with the statement that, "in view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as the result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic (Japan) that it cannot recognise any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the 'Open-Door Policy'."

Conscious of her obligations to the other Powers, the Chinese Government, immediately after signing the agreements, published a formal statement protesting against the agreements which she had been compelled to sign, and disclaiming responsibility for consequent violations of treaty rights of the other Powers. In the statement thus issued, the Chinese Government declared that, although it was "constrained to comply in full with the terms of the (Japanese) ultimatum" it nevertheless "disclaims any desire to associate itself with any revision, which may be thus effected, of the various conventions and agreements concluded between the other Powers in respect of the maintenance of China's territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the *status quo* and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China."

Because of the essential injustice of these provisions, the Chinese delegation, acting in behalf of the Chinese Government and of the Chinese people, has felt itself in duty bound to present to this Conference, representing the Powers with substantial interests in the Far East, the question as to the equity and justice of these agreements and therefore as to their fundamental validity.

If Japan is disposed to rely solely upon a claim as to the technical or juristic validity of the agreements of 1915, as having been actually signed in due form by the two Governments, it may be said that, so far as this Conference is concerned, the contention is largely irrelevant, for this gathering of the representatives of the nine Powers has not had for its purpose the maintenance of the legal *status quo*. Upon the contrary, the purpose has been, if possible, to bring about such

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changes in existing conditions upon the Pacific and in the Far East as might be expected to promote that enduring friendship among the nations which the President of the United States spoke of in his letter of invitation to the Powers to participate in this Conference.

For the following reasons, therefore, the Chinese delegation is of the opinion that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Exchange of Notes of May 25th, 1915, should form the subject of impartial examination with a view to their abrogation:

1. In exchange for the concessions demanded of China, Japan offered no *quid pro quo*. The benefits derived from the agreements were wholly unilateral.
2. The agreements, in important respects, are in violation of treaties between China and the other Powers.
3. The agreements are inconsistent with the principles relating to China which have been adopted by the Conference.
4. The agreements have engendered constant misunderstanding between China and Japan and, if not abrogated, will necessarily tend, in the future, to disturb friendly relations between the two countries, and will thus constitute an obstacle in the way of realising the purpose for the attainment of which this Conference was convened. As to this, the Chinese delegation, by way of conclusion, can perhaps do no better than quote from a resolution introduced in the Japanese Parliament, in June 1915, by Mr. Hara, later Premier of Japan, a resolution which received the support of some one hundred and thirty of the members of the parliament.

The resolution reads:

"Resolved, that the negotiations carried on with China by the present Government have been inappropriate in every respect; that they are detrimental to the amicable relationship between the two countries, and provocative of suspicions on the part of the Powers; that they have the effect of lowering the prestige of the Japanese Empire; and that, while far from capable of establishing the foundation of peace in the Far East, they will form the source of future trouble."

The foregoing declaration has been made in order that the Chinese Government may have upon record the view which it takes, and will continue to take, regarding the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Exchange of Notes of May 25th, 1915.

#### Appendix IV.

#### STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The important statement made by Baron Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Government makes it appropriate that I should refer to the position of the Government of the United States as it was set forth in identical notes addressed by that Government to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government on May 13th, 1915.

The note to the Chinese Government was as follows:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognise any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the 'Open-door Policy'.

"An identical note has been transmitted to the Imperial Japanese Government."

That statement was in accord with the historic policy of the United States in its relation to China, and its position as thus stated has been, and still is, consistently maintained.

It has been gratifying to learn that the matters concerning Shantung, which formed the substance of group 1 of the original demands, and were the subject of the Treaty and Exchange of Notes with respect to the province of Shantung, have been settled to the mutual satisfaction of the two Parties by negotiations conducted collaterally with this Conference, as reported to the plenary session on February 1st.

It is also gratifying to be advised by the statement made by Baron Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Government that Japan is now ready to withdraw the reservation which she made, in proceeding to the signature of the Treaties and Notes of 1915, to the effect that group 5 of the original proposals of the Japanese Government—namely, those concerning the employment of influential Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers; land for schools and hospitals; certain railways in South China; the supply of arms, and the right of preaching—would be postponed for future negotiations. This definite withdrawal of the outstanding questions under group 5 removes what has been an occasion for considerable apprehension on the part alike of China

and of foreign nations which felt that the renewal of these demands could not but prejudice the principles of the integrity of China and of the "Open Door".

With respect to the Treaty and the Notes concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, Baron Shidehara has made the reassuring statement that Japan has no intention of insisting on a preferential right concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters in South Manchuria.

Baron Shidehara has likewise indicated the readiness of Japan not to insist upon the right of option granted exclusively in favour of Japanese capital with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; and, second, with regard to loans secured on the taxes of those regions; but that Japan will throw them open to the joint activity of the international financial consortium recently organised.

As to this, I may say that it is doubtless the fact that any enterprise of the character contemplated which may be undertaken in these regions by foreign capital would in all probability be undertaken by the consortium. But it should be observed that existing treaties would leave the opportunity for such enterprises open on terms of equality to the citizens of all nations. It can scarcely be assumed that this general right of the Treaty Powers of China can be effectively restricted to the nationals of those countries which are participants in the work of the consortium, or that any of the Governments which have taken part in the organisation of the consortium would feel themselves to be in a position to deny all rights in the matter to any save the members of their respective national groups in that organisation. I therefore trust that it is in this sense that we may properly interpret the Japanese Government's declaration of willingness to relinquish its claim under the 1915 Treaties to any exclusive position with respect to railway construction and to financial operations secured upon local revenues, in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

It is further to be pointed out that, by Articles II, III and IV of May 25th, 1915, with respect to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Chinese Government granted to Japanese subjects the right to lease land for building purposes, for trade and manufacture, and for agricultural purposes, in South Manchuria, to reside and travel in South Manchuria, and to engage in any kind of business and manufacture there, and to enter into joint undertakings with Chinese citizens in agriculture and similar industries in Eastern Inner Mongolia.

With respect to this grant, the Government of the United States will, of course, regard it as not intended to be exclusive, and, as in the past, will claim from the Chinese Government for American citizens the benefits accruing to them by virtue of the most-favoured-nation clauses in the treaties between the United States and China.

I may pause here to remark that the question of the validity of treaties as between China and Japan is distinct from the question of the treaty rights of the United States under its treaties with China; these rights have been emphasised and consistently asserted by the United States.

In this, as in all matters similarly affecting the general right of its citizens to engage in commercial and industrial enterprises in China, it has been the traditional policy of the American Government to insist upon the doctrine of equality for the nationals of all countries, and this policy, together with the other policies mentioned in the note of May 13th, 1915, which I have quoted, are consistently maintained by this Government. I may say that it is with especial pleasure that the Government of the United States finds itself now engaged in the act of reaffirming and defining, and I hope that I may add revitalising, by the proposed Nine-Power Treaty, these policies with respect to China.

Appendix V.

STATEMENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

February 12th, 1932.

With full realisation of its responsibility to the civilised world and willingness to submit the accuracy of those statements to impartial international enquiry and adjudication, the Chinese National Government presents the following summary of the Sino-Japanese conflict from its inception:

At no time since the Russo-Japanese War has the Chinese Government doubted the purpose of Japan to seize Manchuria whenever an opportune occasion arose. At the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, which was fought chiefly on China's soil against China's protests, Japan put strong pressure on China to implement Japan's gains from Russia and to grant Japan additional special privileges, impairing China's sovereignty and contravening the "open-door" policy in Manchuria. China resisted those demands to the utmost of her ability.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

When the World War arose, Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of the Powers and China's military weakness to present the twenty-one demands which, if conceded, would have destroyed China's sovereignty, not only in Manchuria, but in other parts of China as well. Under Japan's ultimatum, China was forced to concede some of those demands, which she did under protest and so notified all the friendly Powers.

At the Paris Conference, at the Washington Conference, and before the League of Nations, China reiterated her protests against those exactions of Japan and repudiated them all at suitable occasions. At the Washington Conference, China refused to conduct separate negotiations with Japan and insisted that Sino-Japanese questions must be discussed in purview of the whole Conference. By signing the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, China's territorial integrity and administrative autonomy were guaranteed by all the Powers and it was definitely stated that Manchuria is an integral part of China's territory. That Treaty also provided for appeal to the signatory Powers in the event of disagreement about the interpretation of the Treaty and the infraction of its terms.

Subsequent to signing the Nine-Power Treaty, the Chinese Government has invariably in its relations with Japan and other Powers insisted upon observing the terms and the principles of that Treaty, but, owing to Japan's continuously trying to step outside the Treaty and to insist upon having special rights in China, especially in Manchuria, the Chinese Government has been unable to avoid disputes and frictions with Japan which, when serious, China tried to refer to the League of Nations and the Court of International Justice. China gladly became party to the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing force as a means to settle international disputes and obtain political objectives and has associated herself with all similar plans to secure peace. On several occasions, China sought without success to invoke provisions of the League of Nations Covenant that obsolete and unsatisfactory treaties might be revised.

This, broadly, was the situation last September when, without provocation, Japanese troops attacked Chinese troops at Mukden and usurped control there. A careful analysis shows without doubt that Japan's military coup was premeditated and carefully planned. Dispositions were commenced days before September 18th.

It is scarcely necessary to review events in Manchuria since then. Using various pretexts, the Japanese army has overturned Chinese authority in Manchuria and taken control almost of the whole of these provinces, while China appealed in vain to the League of Nations and the peace pacts.

At times since the Mukden attack, Japan tried to draw the Chinese Government into separate negotiations, but China, following precedents set at Paris, Washington and Geneva, has refused to negotiate without the presence or participation of neutral Powers, knowing full well that she cannot singly resist Japan's pressure backed by unbridled military force which aims at the annexation of Manchuria.

Those tactics failing to frighten the Chinese Government, Japan decided to carry military action into the heart of China, showing her contempt for and indifference to world opinion, with the purpose of convincing the Chinese that it was hopeless to appeal for outside help. During the four months of continuous Japanese military aggression, the indignation of the Chinese people was aroused to the highest pitch, while the Chinese Government, already harassed by natural calamities, was faced with the task of dealing with invasion from without and restraining popular feeling within.

Having sent naval forces to Shanghai with the stated purpose of protecting Japanese residents and property there, the Japanese Government presented through the Japanese Consul-General certain demands to the Chinese local authorities at Shanghai, requiring complete acquiescence by six o'clock p.m. on January 28th. At two o'clock that afternoon, the Chinese replied fully accepting Japan's demand and were assured by the Japanese Consul-General that the reply was satisfactory. Nevertheless, at midnight that night, Japanese naval forces advanced into Chinese territory and attacked the Chinese police and garrison troops. The Chinese Government has no doubt that disinterested foreigners on the scene have more or less correctly informed the world of events at Shanghai since January 28th, but the Chinese Government wishes to emphasise the following points:

The Japanese naval and military forces have used the International Settlement at Shanghai both as a base for their attacks on the Chinese police and troops and as a sanctuary where they can retire when repulsed and for recuperation and re-supply.

The Chinese troops, in defending China's soil from ruthless invaders, have been unable to reply effectively to the Japanese attacks without endangering the lives and property of thousands of friendly neutral foreigners residing in the International Settlement and surrounding suburbs and have been unable to pursue their Japanese attackers without risking a conflict with friendly neutral foreign police and troops protecting the Settlement.

The Japanese naval and military forces have used the river-front docks within the International Settlement to land troops, artillery and supplies. Japanese warships anchored in the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustofson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Whangpoo River alongside the International Settlement fire over the Settlement at Chinese forces resisting Japanese attacks in Chinese territory outside the Settlement, and Chinese artillery cannot reply effectively without gravely endangering scores of neutral vessels in port. The Japanese flagship with the Japanese admiral and staff directing attacks lies alongside the wharf near the centre of the Settlement.

Japanese airplanes bombed all parts of Chinese districts of Shanghai, also parts of the International Settlement and then withdrew over the mid section of the International Settlement.

Japanese military forces and civilian un-uniformed elements have killed and injured presently large number of Chinese peaceable unarmed men, women, children, estimated between one and two thousand, and imprisoned, maltreated many others and executed many without trial.

Japanese bombings and fires started by bombs already have destroyed property roughly estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars.

The Japanese Government excuses these atrocities by alleging the military peril due to proximity of Chinese troops. The Chinese Government solemnly declares that such excuse is a transparent pretext, as it is impossible to send Japanese troops anywhere in China without being surrounded by Chinese population and near Chinese troops occupying their regular stations. Japanese military forces have pushed forward into China's territory, always making the excuse that nearby Chinese troops constitute a menace. It is evident that such reasoning provides excuse for the complete conquest of China by Japan.

When the United States of America and Great Britain, supported by France, Germany and Italy, recently presented to Japan and China a note in five points designed to end hostilities and to bring about the liquidation of this situation worse than war, the Chinese Government without hesitation accepted the proposals of the Powers in full.

In flatly turning down, first, the proposals of the International Shanghai Defence Committee, then the Powers' five proposals and more recently still the British Admiral Kelly's scheme, Japan is thus closing every avenue to peace, leaving China no alternative but to continue to adopt appropriate measures for self-defence to the best of her ability.

The Chinese Government asks the world to contrast known facts of Japan's acts in China during recent months with the Japanese Government's latest statement that "it is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure tranquillity in the Far East". Also to contrast Japan's statement that "her troops in China are only to discharge an international duty" with the efforts of the League of Nations and Washington Treaty Powers to induce Japan to withdraw her troops from China and to cease warfare. Also contrast Japan's frequent declarations that she has no territorial ambitions *vis-à-vis* China with her refusal to submit the Manchurian and other Sino-Japanese questions before a conference of Treaty Powers. Also contrast Japan's acts at Shanghai causing immense destruction of the property of all nationals and loss of lives with her statement that she acted in Shanghai in co-operation with the other foreign defence forces and foreign municipal authorities and with the latest statement of the Shanghai foreign Municipal Council that "Japanese Government and not the Municipal Council is solely responsible for acts of the Japanese armed forces in Shanghai".

The Chinese Government positively denies that the Chinese violated the temporary truce arranged on January 29th. Because of the suddenness of the armistice, it was not possible to get orders to all outposts resulting, during the night, in desultory firing between the outposts on both sides. The Japanese command resumed attacks at daybreak of January 30th.

Since Japan's astounding action in Mukden last September, it has been the unswerving policy of the Chinese Government to avoid, by all means at its command, a state of war and to that end it has endured intense humiliation, risked its own existence in face of popular feeling, in the hope that the worldwide pacific measures might check Japan's reckless course. Despite the failure so far of the pacific agencies, the Chinese Government adheres to its faith in world justice, but it cannot passively submit to Japan's invasion of China's territory and slaughter of Chinese people. It therefore solemnly declares to the world that China will continue to resist in self-defence Japan's attacks at all points and with all the forces at its commands.

The Chinese Government further declares that it is China's desire to settle issues in connection with the present crisis in purview of interested Powers and in accordance with principles guaranteeing world peace and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China.

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Appendix VI.

RAILWAY GUARDS.

Railway guards were kept by Japan along the railways after the Russo-Japanese War originally on the ground of the *post bellum* disorder in Manchuria, but have been maintained there ever since against Chinese protests. They consist of the following kinds:

- (a) One division of regular troops, with headquarters at Liaoyang and garrison points at Changchun, Kungtsuling, Tiehling, Mukden, Liaoyang and Haicheng, besides Port Arthur in the Leased Territory; and
- (b) Six battalions of specially organised guards stationed along the railways, with headquarters at Kungtsuling.

The railway guards are under the control of the Commander of the Kwantung Army, with headquarters in the Leased Territory, who, according to the Japanese Imperial Ordinance of April 12th, 1919, is to "have command over the military forces in the Kwantung Province and South Manchuria"; to "be responsible for the defence of the Kwantung Province and the protection of the railway lines in South Manchuria"; and to "have the power to employ military forces" in discharging his duties, "when he deems it necessary." The article containing the last provision continues:

"The Commander shall comply with the request of the Governor of Kwantung for the despatch of troops necessary for the preservation of peace and order in the region under the Governor's jurisdiction, as well as in connection with police affairs in the lands attached to the South Manchuria Railway; but he may adopt such expedient military measure as occasion may require in case of emergency too urgent to wait for a request from the Governor.

"Any such contingencies as the foregoing shall be reported to the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff."

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Appendix VII.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE RAILWAY GUARDS.

With regard to railway guards, the claim that they have a treaty basis of their own cannot be any better sustained. Article V of the Chinese Eastern Railway contract reads:

"The Chinese Government will take measures to assure the safety of the railway and of the persons in its service against any attack.

"The Company will have the right to employ at will as many foreigners or natives as it may find necessary for the purpose of administration, etc.

"Criminal cases, lawsuits, etc., upon the territory of the railway, must be settled by the local authorities in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaties."

The foregoing translation from the French text may also be compared with a translation from the Chinese text, which reads:

"The said railway and its employees the Chinese Government will take measures to protect. As to the personnel, Chinese and foreign, necessary for the operation of the railway, the said Company is permitted to employ at will. All criminal cases, lawsuits, etc., upon the lands of the railway shall be administered by the local authorities in accordance with Treaties."

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Japan did not have a right to maintain railway guards.

That such is the case is, it may be added, recognised by Japan herself. In Additional Article I in the Portsmouth Treaty, Japan reserves with Russia "the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria," the number of such "not to exceed fifteen per kilometre". In Additional Article II in the Peking Treaty of 1905, under the protest of China, she, however, not only makes no claim to a "right", but undertakes to withdraw the guards under certain conditions. This Article, translated from the Chinese text, reads:

"Since the Chinese Government declares that it earnestly hopes that Japan and Russia will rapidly withdraw their troops now in Manchuria as well as the railway guards, the Japanese

Government is prepared to meet China's wishes. When Russia agrees to withdraw her railway guards, or when China and Russia agree to adopt other proper measures, the Japanese Government will consent to take similar steps. Again, when the order of Manchuria is restored and China is in the position to give full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan will also simultaneously with Russia withdraw the railway guards."

Since Japan has no right to maintain the guards and has so admitted, their withdrawal is but a matter of duty. It may also be added that, even on the basis of the two alternative conditions she imposed for carrying out her duty, she has no reason to tarry. "When Russia agrees", runs the first condition, "to withdraw her railway guards, or when China and Russia agree to adopt other proper measures, the Japanese Government will consent to take similar steps." It is a common knowledge that Russia has so agreed. "The Governments of the two Contracting Parties," says Article IX, Section I, of the Sino-Russian Peking Agreement of May 31st, 1924, "declare that, with the exception of matters pertaining to the business operations which are under the direct control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, all other matters affecting the right of the National and Local Governments of the Republic of China, such as \*\*\* matters relating to \*\*\* military administration \*\*\* shall be administered by the Chinese authorities." "When the order of Manchuria is restored", runs the alternative Japanese condition, "and China is in the position to give full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan will also, simultaneously with Russia, withdraw the railway guards." It is scarcely necessary to say that the restoration to a normal, from a *post bellum*, situation, which is contemplated in the text and is the only condition that could have been contemplated there, must have taken place not long after the cessation of armed conflict between Japan and Russia. At least, there has been no indication to the contrary ever since the re-organisation of the Manchurian administration in 1907, from which time twenty-five years have now elapsed.

#### Appendix VIII.

#### CHINESE STATEMENT ON MANCHURIA'S PUPPET GOVERNMENT (FEBRUARY 22ND, 1932).

The Three Eastern Provinces, also known as Manchuria, are always an integral part of China and any usurpation or interference with the administration therein constitutes direct impairment of China's territorial and administrative integrity. Article of the Organic Law of the National Government of October 4th, 1928, which was proclaimed in the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) as well as in other provinces of the Republic, provided that the National Government shall exercise all governing powers in the Chinese Republic. The Provisional Constitution of June 1st, 1931, expressly provides that the territory of the Chinese Republic consists of the various provinces, Mongolia, and Tibet, and that the Republic of China shall be a unified Republic forever.

The territorial, political and administrative integrity of the Chinese Republic, besides being an attribute of a sovereign State and of international law, is guaranteed by Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty. Such guarantee has been implemented by Japan when she adhered to the League Council resolution of September 30th last, which reads partly as follows:

"The Council recognises the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria; . . . being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation . . ."

In the resolution of October 24th last, the Council emphasised the importance of these assurances, saying that it "recalls the Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and of the Nine-Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged 'to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China'."

The Council further states in the resolution of December 10th last that, "considering that events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24th, notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life."

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This resolution was also accepted by Japan. The Chinese delegate who endorsed it declared: "China would regard any attempt by Japan to bring about complications of a political character affecting China's territorial or administrative integrity (such as promoting so-called independence movements or utilising disorderly elements for such purposes) as an obvious violation of the undertaking to avoid any further aggravation of the situation."

Now, in defiance of all law and solemn obligations, the Japanese authorities who are in unlawful occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces are endeavouring to set up in these provinces a so-called independent government and are trying to compel Chinese citizens to participate in the puppet organisation. The National Government has repeatedly and emphatically protested against the illegal actions of the Japanese Government in this regard, and hereby again declares that it will not recognise the secession or independence of the Three Eastern Provinces, or any part thereof, or any administration which may be organised therein without its authority and consent.

[Distributed to the Assembly,  
the Council and the Members  
of the League.]

Official No.: **A. [Extr.] 6.** 1932. VII.

Geneva, March 2nd, 1932.

**LEAGUE OF NATIONS**

**APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT  
IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT**

**EXPLANATORY NOTE COMMUNICATED  
BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT**

*Note by the Secretary-General:*

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate the following letter from the Japanese delegation, dated March 2nd, 1932, communicating an Explanatory Note by the Japanese Government.

[*Translation.*]

*To the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.*

With reference to your note of February 26th, quoting part of the resolution adopted by the Council on February 19th, and asking me when you could count on receiving from me a statement of the Japanese case, I have the honour, acting on instructions from my Government, to forward herewith an explanatory note on the Shanghai incidents. As I mentioned in my note of February 29th, informing you of the appointment of our delegates to the Extraordinary Assembly, Japan will participate subject to the reservation mentioned in that communication. The explanatory note attached hereto is not, properly speaking, the statement referred to in the second paragraph of Article 15, but rather simply an explanation of what has occurred at Shanghai. I trust, however, that you will find in it the necessary information and the essential facts. I should be grateful if you would communicate it to the Assembly.

(Signed) N. SATO,

*Representative of Japan on the  
Council of the League of Nations.*

[Distributed to the Assembly,  
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of the League.]

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
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# SHANGHAI



**REFERENCES:**

	SETTLEMENTS
	EXTENSION ROADS
	SECTORS OF DEFENCE
<b>A.</b>	= AMERICAN FORCE
<b>B.</b>	= BRITISH FORCE
<b>B.V.</b>	= BRITISH and VOLUNTEERS
<b>F.</b>	= FRENCH FORCE
<b>I.</b>	= ITALIAN FORCE
<b>J.</b>	= JAPANESE FORCE
<b>R.</b>	= RESERVE
<b>C.</b>	= CHINESE FORCE

LITH. SONOR S. A. GENÈVE.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By *M. J. O. D. J. S. M.* NARS, Date 12-18-75

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## EXPLANATORY NOTE FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

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### I. REVOLUTIONARY POLICY OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT.

1. The Chinese military and revolutionary Government, formed in 1912 by the Nationalist Party, of which Sun Yat Sen was the founder, adopted the so-called three "Min" policy recommended by the latter. That policy was based on equality of races and the principle of nationalities, the rights of the people (democracy) and the right of every individual to the means of livelihood. Foreign policy more particularly took as a basis the first axiom and proclaimed the liberation of the Chinese people and anti-imperialist tenets.

The principles adopted in 1913 by the Nationalist Party in regard to foreign policy were as follows :

(a) Abolition of all rights based on "unequal" treaties, more particularly extritoriality, administration of Customs by foreigners, foreign political influences in China prejudicial to the latter's sovereignty. Substitution for such treaties of other treaties on a footing of reciprocal equality.

(b) Recognition of most-favoured-nation status for all countries which might voluntarily relinquish their privileges and for all countries prepared to abrogate treaties according them rights prejudicial to Chinese sovereignty.

(c) Modification of other treaties, concluded between China and the Powers, prejudicial to the interests of China.

(d) Pledging and repayment of loans would be agreed to only in so far as China suffered no damage from a political or economic standpoint. The Chinese people does not consider itself responsible for loans concluded by Governments whose undertakings it cannot endorse—for example, a Government elected in virtue of money, such as the Peking Governments under the former Presidents.

The Nationalist Government's foreign policy was, in short, to come to an agreement with countries which relinquished their rights and to oppose those which failed to do so. Its fundamental basis was the unilateral denunciation, without any consideration for the wishes of the other party, of all foreign rights, more particularly loans and so-called "unequal" treaties. After the death of Sun Yat Sen, the Nationalist Party and the Government of the nationalist and revolutionary army pursued this policy, proclaiming even more energetically their anti-imperialist tenets. In 1926 Chiang Kai Shek, the Head of the Government, marched northwards again with his armies against the Northern generals. During his expedition he proclaimed : "If the nationalist revolution succeeds, China will immediately denounce all unequal treaties".

2. The Revolutionary army won a series of victories, and at the beginning of 1927 was on the point of seizing Nanking and Shanghai. The attitude of the Nationalist Party and of the Revolutionary Government became increasingly arrogant. Frequent attempts were made against the life and property of foreigners wherever the revolutionary Army appeared, especially in the Wuchang and Hankow region, where the nationalist Left and communist elements had set up the Wuhan Government. The Communist Party's activities were particularly violent and the anti-imperialist movement was becoming increasingly dangerous. The anti-foreign movement took the form of direct action, the most memorable example being the taking by force of the British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang early in 1927. The Wuhan Government had not officially taken part in that action, but the latter had, in point of fact,

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C. = CHINESE FORCE

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been carried out under the direction of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, on which the Wuhan Government depended. That was conclusive proof of the will of the Chinese leaders to deprive foreigners of the rights which they enjoyed.

3. The Wuhan Government's rival—that is, the Nanking Government, consisting of the nationalist Right—appeared more moderate, at all events from a formal standpoint. Actually, however, its tendencies were as violent as those of the rival party, and both had adopted as their fundamental policy the denial of foreign rights and interests—a policy which coloured all their actions.

The Nanking Government lost no opportunity of declaring its intention of denouncing "unequal" treaties, and reiterated openly that it had entered into an undertaking with the Chinese people to sweep away the rights and interests of foreigners. On December 28th, 1929, it promulgated a law abolishing extraterritoriality as from January 1st, 1930. The Powers all protested against this attempt to abrogate international undertakings by means of an internal law.

In the face of this attitude the Chinese Government sought to temporise; in December 1931 it published a declaration full of threats to the effect that if a satisfactory solution was not found for the question of extraterritoriality before the end of February 1932, it would pursue its policy by means other than diplomatic means. Lastly, it officially declared its firm intention of denouncing treaties unilaterally, by promulgating the "Regulations concerning judicial procedure in regard to foreigners".

The statements of responsible officials concerning the taking by force of the foreign Concessions and "Settlements", the appeals for concerted anti-foreign action, are all so many examples proving how impossible it is to apply to such a policy the customary rules for international relations.

## II. THE AGITATION AGAINST FOREIGNERS IN CHINA.

1. As has been shown above, the foundations of Chinese policy under the direction of the Nationalist Party are the denunciation of "unequal" treaties and the withdrawal of the legitimate rights and interests of foreigners.

The weapons used by the party to achieve its purposes are anti-foreign agitation and boycotting.

The agitation is directed against all the foreign Powers and not against one or a few of them. Unless it abandons all the rights and interests which it possesses, every Power is liable to find itself at any moment the object of this agitation.

2. The latter should be considered from two different aspects: first, that of anti-foreign education and organisation which have been pursued secretly and continuously for many years, and, secondly, that of the sporadic violent agitation and boycotting directed for a time against one or several individual nations.

(a) The methods employed to consolidate the anti-foreign attitude of the nation are chiefly education inculcating a hatred of foreigners and the celebration of days of national humiliation.

The Nationalist Government has laid down as a basis of the national education the teaching of the three principles of Sun Yat Sen. Article 47 of the Provisional Law of 1931 lays this down clearly. One of the compulsory subjects for the civil service examinations is the study of the principles of the Nationalist Party. Anti-foreign text-books have been compiled for the elementary and secondary schools, where their use is compulsory. These text-books present the facts in a misleading or false light. They stir up hatred of the foreigner and openly encourage feelings of revenge. Instead of educating the Chinese nation, it must unfortunately be recognised that they poison it.

The Nationalist Government, in instituting and celebrating days of national humiliation and similar commemorations, endeavours to keep alive in the hearts of the nation the memory of conflicts with foreign countries. It thus develops a narrow patriotism and an anti-foreign spirit.

The number of these days of humiliation is very large. They are observed by the Nationalist Party and the Chinese Government, as well as by public organisations. They are often public holidays. Special commemorative ceremonies are even organised.

(b) The Nationalist Government is aware of the difficulty and disadvantages of organising a general movement against all foreign countries. It therefore first of all attacks one or several countries, chosen according to the necessities of the moment, provisionally moderating the agitation against other nations.

3. For example, at the time of the so-called V.30 case (May 30th, 1925), the chiefs of the Nationalist Party ordered the students' organisations to concentrate their efforts against Great Britain, and the members of the Canton Military Government openly gave the same directions to their subordinates. This agitation imperilled British trade and the lives, rights and interests of British nationals in China. British concessions were even taken back by force. Before these events Great Britain had, since December 1926, adopted an extremely conciliatory attitude towards China: at the Peking Customs Conference, for example, she

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had proposed to the Powers parties to the Washington Treaty concerning the Chinese Customs tariff the unconditional acceptance of the surtax provided for by this Treaty; and in January of the following year she had proposed the most liberal concessions to the Chinese Government for the settlement of the questions pending between Great Britain and China.

The latter showed no appreciation of these efforts at conciliation, and on the contrary directed against Great Britain the violent campaign which has just been mentioned, and as a result of which Great Britain was compelled, in order to protect her nationals and her rights and interests in China, to send large armed forces there in January 1927.

The anti-British movement became more and more violent and on March 23rd a premeditated attack was made against the foreign consuls and foreign nationals at Nanking by the regular Chinese troops. The losses suffered by the Japanese, British, Americans and French were enormous. Ordinary remedies were unavailing, and British and American warships were obliged to bombard Nanking.

The anti-British movement was extended to Americans also and soon developed into a campaign against all foreigners. On April 3rd, the Japanese concession at Hankow was attacked by a Chinese crowd; numerous Japanese were wounded, and houses were pillaged. The movement spread all through the valley of the Yangtse, which the Japanese had to leave, withdrawing to Shanghai or returning to Japan.

The Nationalist Army proceeded towards the north. The Japanese Government then decided to send troops to Shantung so as not to leave the numerous Japanese nationals inhabiting these provinces at the mercy of the Nationalist soldiers. The anti-Japanese campaign then redoubled in violence. It attained its height after the fighting which took place at Tsinan, where the Nationalist forces entered the town and attacked the Japanese troops who were quartered there. A communication was sent to the League of Nations at that time by the Japanese Government.

4. Since then the anti-Japanese campaign has continued, whereas the anti-British and anti-American agitation has abated. This does not prove, however, that China has changed her attitude towards other countries. She knows well enough that a general campaign would unite all the Powers against her, and she understands that she would be in an impossible situation. The anti-Japanese campaign is at present engaging her attention too exclusively for her to be able to disperse her efforts. The experience of the past shows that she would soon turn against the other Powers if her present campaign were successful or if a favourable occasion presented itself.

### III. ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENTS IN CHINA.

1. We shall begin by summarising briefly the principal anti-Japanese movements in China since 1908.

(a) A whole series of boycotts have occurred in 1908, after the Japanese protest against the illegal seizure of the s.s. *Tatsu-Maru*, which was taken to Canton; again, in 1908, after the decision of the Japanese Government to extend the Antung-Mukden Railway under the terms of the agreement concluded with China; in 1915, in connection with the Sino-Japanese negotiations; in 1919, as a protest against the articles of the Versailles Treaty relating to Shantung; and in 1923, in consequence of the refusal to cede the leased territory at Kwantung.

(b) In 1925 the movement, which at the outset was solely anti-British, later became general, becoming anti-American and anti-Japanese (see Part II).

(c) In June 1927, serious disturbances occurred at Tsinan. The National troops committed outrages against the Japanese residents, just as they had indulged in looting and cruelties against British and American nationals in Central and South China. In the course of the Tsinan disturbances thirteen civilians, women and children among them, were killed under the most barbarous circumstances, while twenty-eight persons disappeared. A year later serious trouble again occurred in the same region.

(d) The present anti-Japanese movement is the most serious since 1908.

It began in June after the Wanpaoshan incident (flagrant denial of justice to Korean peasants in Chientao, interference of the Chinese authorities, reprisals by Koreans on Chinese at Jinsen, Seoul, etc.). The incidents which subsequently occurred at Shanghai will be discussed in detail in Part IV.

2. The anti-Japanese campaigns and the movement for the boycotting of Japanese goods had been increasing steadily during the last fifteen years. Since the Nationalist Party came into power, these movements have been not only tolerated or encouraged by the Chinese Government, but have been under the direct or indirect control of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang). Where the population did not support the movement, severe penalties were exacted. It is a case, therefore, of an organised campaign conducted for purposes of foreign policy, in which the population is compelled to join whether it wishes to or not.

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No doubt can exist as to the anti-Japanese agitation. It is conducted under the orders of the Nationalist Party with the encouragement of the Chinese Government.

The organization which is the mainspring of the entire movement is the association for the support of anti-Japanese movements which has taken the name "Anti-Japanese Association for the Defence of the Country". It is a private organization, but set up by the agency of the Nationalist Party, and is recognised by the Chinese Government. It has sections throughout the country. Its heads are the leaders of the party or of local sections and the principal members of the chambers of commerce. Administrative authorities have also on numerous occasions given orders of an anti-Japanese character. Thanks to the concerted action of the anti-Japanese associations, the movement has been strongly organized and identical action has been taken throughout the country. It is in the districts which are under the direct authority of the Nanking Government in the Yangtse valley that the anti-Japanese campaign has been most violent and most successful.

The anti-Japanese associations issue the following instructions :

1. Not to buy Japanese goods ;
2. Not to use Japanese goods ;
3. Not to transport Japanese goods ;
4. Not to use Japanese currency ;
5. Not to use Japanese vessels ;
6. Not to have personal relations with Japanese ;
7. Not to work for Japanese ;
8. Not to deposit money in Japanese banks ;
9. Not to supply Japanese with food ;
10. Not to go to Japan on business or for study.

In order to force Chinese merchants to conform to these rules, the anti-Japanese associations have taken steps

- (1) To enforce the registration of Japanese goods in the hands of Chinese : it is proposed to take steps to check and confiscate such goods ;
- (2) To compel Chinese in the employment of Japanese to leave their employment or to go on strike ;
- (3) To keep a watch on Chinese who have relations with Japanese ;
- (4) To exact various penalties such as confiscation of goods or property or corporal punishment. (Offenders are liable to be dragged through the city or put in cages and exposed to the public view.)

Since July, the anti-Japanese campaign at Shanghai has attained an unexampled degree of intensity. Not only has a large quantity of Japanese goods in the hands of Chinese been confiscated, but goods belonging to Japanese have also been looted or seized.

Towards the end of September, the anti-Japanese campaign extended over practically the whole of China and was highly effective. Commercial relations with Japan were *de facto* interrupted. The big Japanese spinning concerns had their contracts cancelled. They could not obtain transport. Goods accumulated in the factories. They were compelled to reduce the length of the working day and ultimately to suspend activities altogether. Japanese Banks ceased entirely to do business with Chinese. Shipping companies were compelled to lay up a number of ships. The Japanese population was exposed to vexations and in many cases to actual violence, and was frequently compelled to leave its dwellings in order to take refuge in districts where safety was assured. In many localities the women and children had to be evacuated.

Japanese living in places where they were dependent on Chinese for their food supply were also compelled to quit their residences. Our consulates at Chenchow, Chentu, Yunnanfu and Chihfeng had to be evacuated at the end of October. At the end of December, the number of Japanese compelled to evacuate different places in central China was over 1,700. Full details on this subject have been communicated by the Japanese delegation to the League of Nations. <sup>1</sup>

The Japanese Government protested repeatedly against this campaign ; on October 9th, 1931, it despatched a formal note of protest to the Chinese Government. In communicating this note to the League (document C.690.M.296.1931.VII), it submitted to the opinion of the world the proceedings to which the Nationalist Government had had recourse. No improvement, however, was to be noted. On the contrary, the Chinese authorities maintained that the campaign was no more than a spontaneous expression of Chinese patriotism, and did nothing but encourage—and thereby appreciably aggravate—the situation. This attitude did not fail to produce incidents. On December 31st, Japanese were assassinated at Canton. On January 2nd, 1932, Japanese officials were assaulted and insulted at Fuchow. The Chinese Press published articles containing insults to the Japanese Imperial house, and the nervousness and indignation of Japanese nationals in China increased from day to day. It was at this juncture that the Shanghai incident occurred.

<sup>1</sup> See documents : C.678.M.285.1931.VII. — C.695.M.300.1931.VII. — C.703.M.309.1931.VII. — C.715.M.320.1931.VII. — C.727.M.332.1931.VII. — C.730.M.335.1931.VII. — C.732.M.337.1931.VII. — C.859.M.437.1931.VII. — C.971.M.534.1931.VII. — C.997.M.553.1931.VII.

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IV. THE SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

1. The recent anti-Japanese agitation and the various forms in which it manifested itself have been succinctly described in the previous chapter. We will now examine the Shanghai incidents.

Shanghai is the most important centre of Japanese commerce and shipping in Central and Southern China. Japan possesses interests in Shanghai amounting to several hundred million yen.<sup>1</sup> The Japanese residents number about 27,000. The extent of their interests has been increasing every year.

Since the Wanpaoshan incident (see above, page 5), Shanghai has been the centre of that anti-Japanese agitation which has now extended all over China. In Shanghai itself the anti-Japanese associations had been strongly organised under the direction of the Nationalist Party and had for several months been indulging without restraint, both inside and outside the Settlement, in the most reprehensible acts of violence. It would be difficult to give a list of the quantities of goods belonging to Japanese which have been seized in course of transport. Children going to school, Japanese women and girls have been insulted and molested in the street. Up to December 1931 more than 600 cases of this kind occurred, the number of victims being more than 1,000. Since September the Chinese authorities had been adopting vexatious measures of every kind, such as refusing to accept correspondence; the interception of newspapers; and refusing or hindering telephone calls. By the end of September, Chinese agents and employees in banks and business firms had almost all been forced to quit their employers. At the beginning of October, a strike was engineered among the lightermen. Certain Chinese merchants refused to sell to Japanese articles of primary necessity such as rice and coal.

The anti-Japanese organisations conducted their campaign with particular violence under the cloak of a patriotic movement, calling themselves "Anti-Japanese Associations for the Defence of the Country". Since the middle of October they have frequently attacked Japanese mills and shops, causing serious damage, and have forced the Chinese workers to go on strike. When these matters were brought before the Chinese Courts, the latter merely inflicted light fines on the offenders and even in certain undoubted cases of robbery with violence, the Courts, considering that these acts had been committed on patriotic grounds, only punished the offenders with a very small fine. The penalties themselves were not really enforced: time and again offenders have been bound over, a fact which has naturally tended to encourage further acts of violence.

As a result of this state of affairs, Japanese trade and shipping have borne the heaviest losses they had ever suffered hitherto, and although it is difficult to estimate these losses accurately in figures they certainly amount to several hundred million yen.

Japanese business firms at Shanghai are at present unable to transact any business direct with the Chinese. Shipping companies have curtailed the number of their sailings, while more than half of their vessels are laid up. Undertakings of every kind are in a critical condition. The business of most of the merchants and manufacturers has, since the beginning of November, been completely at a standstill: many of our nationals have in fact been deprived of their means of livelihood.

The action of the anti-Japanese organisations referred to has not merely dealt a serious blow at the commercial and industrial activity of the Japanese; it possesses another and—by no means negligible—aspect. It has fomented and encouraged among the Japanese masses violent feelings of contempt and hostility towards Japan. Obviously and naturally such feelings on the part of the Chinese, coupled with the sufferings caused by the heavy losses incurred by the Japanese, have found their echo among the Japanese themselves. These circumstances were such as might produce the most deplorable effect on the relations between China and Japan. Aware of this regrettable state of affairs, the Japanese Minister and the Consul-General at Shanghai on several occasions requested the Nationalist Government and the local Chinese authorities to put a stop to this anti-Japanese agitation. These requests never produced any result, although our authorities made every effort, while the Japanese marines stationed at Shanghai had to be maintained continuously on the alert in order to protect our nationals.

2. Such was the atmosphere at Shanghai when on January 9th this year the *Minkuo Daily News*, organ of the Nationalist party at Shanghai, published an article insulting the Japanese Imperial house. Following on an energetic protest by the Japanese Consul-General, the Municipality of Greater Shanghai admitted the culpability of the newspaper and made an official apology; the director of the newspaper was dismissed, the editor directly responsible was punished and the paper itself published a rectification and an apology. The affair was thus terminated officially, but it had produced among Japanese nationals a readily comprehensible emotion owing to the particular veneration in which the Imperial family is held in Japan.

At this juncture, on January 18th, two Japanese monks, accompanied by three of their followers, were, without any provocation, attacked by workmen from a Chinese factory, well known as a centre of the anti-Japanese agitation and situated in the Chinese quarter near the eastern boundary of the Settlement. The five Japanese were all wounded; one of them subsequently died as a result of his wounds. A group of Japanese attacked this factory on January 20th by way of reprisal.

<sup>1</sup> See document C.214.M.111.1932.VII.

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3. The Japanese Government could not but conclude that an attack on its nationals such as that which occurred on January 18th was the result of the enmity to and hatred of the Japanese that had long been fomented by anti-Japanese associations. The Chinese authorities had up to then tolerated and even made use of the action of these illegal anti-Japanese associations and, in spite of frequent warnings from the Japanese authorities, had shown no sincere desire effectively to repress their activities. It was natural therefore that they should be held responsible for the consequences of their inaction or ill-will. If the outrages against Japanese were to be stopped, it was absolutely necessary that these illegal organisations should be abolished. Consequently, on January 21st, the Japanese Consul-General addressed to General Wu, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, the following demands:

- (1) Apologies to be made by the Mayor;
- (2) Punishment of the guilty persons;
- (3) Compensation to be paid to the victims;
- (4) Repression of illegal and improper acts by the Chinese population directed against Japan, and, in particular, the immediate dissolution of all the Shanghai anti-Japanese patriotic committees and all anti-Japanese associations.

On January 25th, a further note was handed in explaining these requests in greater detail. The Mayor was also informed that, failing proof of sincerity on the part of the Chinese, Japan would be obliged to take the necessary protective steps.

Meanwhile, on January 21st, the *Minkuo Daily News* had published a statement to the effect that the attack on the Chinese factory by Japanese had taken place under the protection of marines. The latter could not ignore such a slur on their prestige and honour, and on January 23rd, after the Municipal Council of the International Settlement had been notified, the officer commanding the Japanese Landing Corps forwarded an energetic protest to the Chinese newspaper. The latter published a rectification, but would not publish an apology. While the Japanese naval authorities were considering what steps they should take, the Municipal Council of the International Settlement having also come to the conclusion that the presence within the Concession of this newspaper and the central organ of the anti-Japanese associations was a menace to public order, caused the offices of the *Minkuo Daily News* to be closed on January 26th and stated that it was ready to co-operate with the Japanese authorities if the latter decided to take action against the central organ of the anti-Japanese associations.

4. The Municipal authorities of Greater Shanghai gave the impression that they intended to comply loyally with the Japanese demands; a whole week had, however, elapsed since those terms were received and as yet no reply was forthcoming. On January 25th, an extraordinary meeting of the Central Council of the Nationalist Government was held at which (it was reported) the decision was taken that the Chinese troops stationed at Shanghai should make important defensive preparations. It was also decided to encourage acts of anti-Japanese agitation in every way, provided such acts did not amount to personal attacks on, and did not directly affect the life and property of, the Japanese. Moreover, the question of the breaking off of economic relations with Japan had been on the agenda since January. These circumstances encouraged the authorities and population to adopt an increasingly hostile attitude. Chinese forces were rapidly being concentrated in the neighbourhood of Shanghai and barricades of sandbags with barbed wire entanglements were erected, while trenches were dug in the region of Chapai, which borders on the quarters of the Settlement and the Extension where the greatest number of Japanese reside. It was rumoured that in case of conflict, 6,000 Chinese gendarmes and the Chinese naval forces were ready for action.

A feeling of the utmost alarm began to spread among the Japanese and Chinese inhabitants and there was ground for fearing a panic with the most appalling results. The Japanese consul-general accordingly decided, on January 27th, to ask for a reply from the Mayor of Shanghai by 6 p.m. on the following day and sent notice of this step to the British, American and French Consuls-General and to the authorities of the International Settlement and the French Concession.

At the same time he informed the police of the Municipal Council that, in the event of the demands not being accepted, he would be forced to take direct action against the Central Association. He asked to be informed whether the municipal police was intending to take steps to occupy the buildings in question. He added that he would not fail to notify the municipal authorities in the event of its being decided that action would be taken by the Japanese forces.

The Municipal Council, in view of the notorious lack of discipline among the Chinese troops and of the hordes of refugees who were crowding into the Settlement, feared that disturbances might break out, whether the Japanese demands were accepted or no. A meeting, therefore, attended by the commanders of the British, American and other troops, was held on January 26th to consider what protective measures should be taken. As soon as the Japanese note was received, a further meeting was held on January 27th, at which the commanders of the foreign forces were present, and it was decided that in case of need the Municipal Council would proclaim a state of emergency and that the foreign troops would occupy the positions assigned to them in a joint defence scheme which had been drawn up in August 1931.<sup>1</sup> This scheme had been prepared by the commanders of the international forces

<sup>1</sup> Document C.154.M.67.1932.VII.

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at the request of the Municipal Council and communicated to the respective Governments for approval. At noon on the 28th, the Municipal Council met again and decided to proclaim a state of emergency at 4 p.m. At 5 p.m. the British and American troops took up their positions, followed by the other foreign forces.

5. At 3.15 p.m. on the same day the principal secretary of the Mayor of Shanghai went to the Japanese Consul-General and handed him a note in which the Mayor intimated his acceptance of the Japanese demands. The Consul-General, regarding this reply as satisfactory, accepted the note and at the same time insisted that energetic action should be taken without delay to suppress the anti-Japanese associations. He also pointed out the possible danger of disturbances occurring after the publication of the Chinese reply and urged that adequate measures should be adopted to ensure the maintenance of order. He drew the Chinese authorities' attention likewise to the provocative attitude of the Cantonese forces in the Chapei district and insisted on a stop being put to the forward movements of the troops and of the removal of the military works put up by the Chinese soldiers.

The Mayor replied that he would make every exertion to meet the Japanese authorities on these various points and undertook to assume entire responsibility for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese nationals.

The Japanese authorities accordingly decided to watch the way in which the Chinese carried out their promises, while the naval authorities made their arrangements for the maintenance of order. In the evening of the 27th, the Chinese municipal authorities had given secret orders to the Police and the Municipal Social Bureau to proceed to break up the various anti-Japanese associations (document C.154.M.67.1932), and the Chinese Press announced that, on the morning of the 28th, six of them, inside and outside the settlement, had been dissolved. Events, however, were destined to prove how little reliance could be placed on the Chinese promises. On the morning of the same day, a bomb was thrown at the Japanese Consulate General by members of the "shock troops of the Anti-Japanese Associations". In the afternoon of the same day, about 5,000 students went to the Town Hall and violently attacked General Wu, censuring him for having accepted the Japanese demands. Ever since the morning, hooligans and students had been attacking civilians and the Japanese Police inside and outside the settlement. The concentration of the Chinese troops and the digging of entrenchments were pushed on actively near the settlement boundary, more particularly in Chapei. The strength of the troops was over 30,000, and as their attitude was becoming increasingly hostile, the Chinese residents, fearing a clash, took refuge *en masse* in the settlement. Towards the end of the afternoon of the 28th, the Chapei police forces had fled, and the only result was increased disorder. The lives and property of Japanese nationals were thus exposed to more and more imminent danger. It became plain that it was neither the honest intention nor within the power of the Chinese municipal authorities to control the Chinese soldiers and fomentors of disorder.

6. The acceptance of the Japanese demands made it unnecessary for the naval authorities to take direct action against the anti-Japanese associations. The task assigned to them, however, in consequence of the proclamation of the state of emergency, of effectively protecting a sector of the International Settlement, and likewise the large number of Japanese residing in the Chapei district, called for the urgent despatch of adequate forces to their defence posts in the Japanese sector. The state of utter confusion caused by the Chinese refugees in the Chapei district hampered the rapid occupation of their positions by the Japanese marines. These positions were to be in the vicinity of the points occupied by the Chinese troops. To obviate any incident, the commander of the Japanese forces announced, at 8.30 p.m. on January 28th, that he was about to take steps for the protection of the zone assigned to him in consequence of the state of emergency. He published at the same time a proclamation requiring the speedy removal of the works constructed by the Chinese forces concentrated in the Chapei district. These proclamations were communicated to the Chinese municipal authorities of Shanghai and to the Municipal Council of the International Settlement. Towards midnight the Japanese marines proceeded to their posts in the vicinity of the North Szechuan Road. That road and also the Dixwell Road belong to the Settlement, of which they form an extension. The Japanese nationals are particularly numerous in that district. The marines had of necessity to pass through the neighbouring Chinese quarters in order to reach their posts. <sup>1</sup> While doing so they were attacked by Chinese snipers in civilian clothing and then by regulars. The Japanese marines had received strict orders not to fire unless they were attacked. In the circumstances they were compelled to reply to the Chinese fire in order to perform their duties as part of the defence force. The clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops accordingly occurred in consequence of the provocation and attacks of snipers and Chinese regulars. There is no question on this point, and the Chinese version, according to which the Japanese forces, notwithstanding the satisfactory reply given by the Mayor, nevertheless took the offensive against the Chinese, is absolutely opposed to the facts. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See, in this connection, the First Report of the Committee, page 6, French text and hereunder, Part V, No. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Documents C.152.M.66.1932.VII.; C.154.M.67.1932.VII.; C.161.M.74.1932.VII.

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7. After the first engagements, an agreement was concluded through the Consuls-General of Great Britain and the United States of America with a view to a truce, which was to begin on the 29th at 8 p.m.<sup>1</sup> The Chinese troops violated this first truce and, on the morning of the 20th, began to bombard the Japanese positions with field guns. The Japanese forces, in order to prevent any aggravation of the situation, temporarily withdrew and informed the Consuls-General of Great Britain and the United States of America of the violation of the truce by the Chinese, requesting them to issue a warning to the latter. In spite of this warning, the Chinese forces continued to fire and several shells fell into the Settlement.

On the 31st, a proposal to establish a neutral zone was drawn up at a meeting held in the presence of the commanding officers of the foreign forces. It was understood that hostilities would be suspended until an agreement was reached. The Chinese forces again violated this arrangement; on the 31st, at 11 p.m., they opened artillery fire in the vicinity of the Commercial Library; on February 1st, from 1 to 5 p.m., there was heavy firing from their posts by the Northern Railway Station of Shanghai and shells fell as far as the Whangpoo, in an entirely different direction from that in which the Japanese sector was situated. At the same time, the activities of the soldiers in civilian clothes redoubled in violence, and a large number of Japanese civilians were killed or wounded by them (document C.155.M.168.1932.VII). The concentration of the Chinese troops in the direction of Shanghai continued. An armoured train was approaching the Northern Station, and there was every sign that an offensive was about to begin.

To have allowed such a situation to develop would have meant exposing the Japanese marines and Japanese nationals to the gravest perils. The Japanese forces, which were very few in number, were obliged to engage in street fighting under extremely difficult conditions. The vigorous repulse of the Chinese forces without delay was becoming essential if the Japanese marines were to accomplish the mission of protection which had been entrusted to them. Consequently, on February 2nd at 10 a.m., the Japanese forces decided to reply to the Chinese fire. Naval aeroplanes, which had been sent out to reconnoitre, were also attacked, and in their turn they bombed the Chinese positions. Meanwhile, on February 3rd, three Japanese warships, which were proceeding downstream to take back to Japan the bodies of men who had fallen in the recent fighting, came under Chinese gunfire off Woosung.

8. From the outset of the present engagements, the Japanese Consul-General had considered that the only means of saving the situation was for the Chinese to cease their attacks and to consent to withdraw their troops a certain distance; he had several times made representations to this effect, but without any result (document C.220.M.115.1932.VII). Neither had the proposal to establish a neutral zone led to any positive result. In the meantime, the Chinese redoubled their attacks and brought up additional forces. On February 12th, a new truce was concluded at the request of Father Jacquinet of the Catholic Mission for the purpose of evacuating civilians from the area of hostilities. The Chinese again broke the truce and opened fire on our troops who, according to their instructions, did not reply.

As stated above, the Japanese forces had been obliged to carry out their task under extremely unfavourable conditions and their losses were very heavy. It was becoming dangerous to continue the struggle with such small effectives, who were tired out after fighting for more than a week against an enemy outnumbering them by ten to one. The foreign Powers, in view of the gravity of the situation, were bringing reinforcements. Their total strength was shortly to be increased to over 18,000 men. The Japanese Government accordingly decided to send, as reinforcements, some 15,000 men of the land forces to co-operate with the marines in protecting Japanese nationals and accomplishing their international mission of protecting the Settlement. In its declaration of February 7th, the Japanese Government mentioned the reasons for this movement of troops and stated that the despatch of reinforcements would be limited to the strength required for the above purposes, and that their action would be guided by the policy of protecting the common interests of the Powers (document C.187.M.92.1932.VII).

The disembarkation of these land forces was completed on February 16th. The Japanese authorities, in order not to create any difficulties for the International Settlement, took care to land the troops as far as possible outside the Settlement. They were, however, forced to land some troops in the Settlement itself. On February 14th, the Consuls-General of Great Britain and the United States of America protested against this landing of troops, asserting that the International Settlement was thus being used as a base for military operations.

It must be remembered that the British and American forces have always landed in the Settlement. Moreover, every officer commanding foreign forces has the right to land the troops necessary for the protection of the sector which is assigned to him. The Japanese Consul-General, while stressing these arguments, replied to his colleagues' protest by assuring the Powers that with the object of preventing any danger to the Settlement, the Japanese soldiers would be transferred outside the latter within as brief a time as possible.

The Japanese authorities considered that, in order to avert the imminent danger which threatened the Settlement and its inhabitants, it was necessary to remove the Chinese forces rapidly out of gun range. Although in principle the foreign representatives at Shanghai shared the views of the Japanese authorities, they did not desire to act in concert with the latter; and although, through the intermediary of the British Minister, the Japanese military

<sup>1</sup> Documents C.152.M.66.1932.VII.; C.160.M.73.1932.VII.; C.163.M.76.1932.VII.

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authorities conferred with the Chinese authorities, with a view to an amicable settlement of the situation, no agreement was reached. The movement of Chinese troops continuing actively, and the attitude of the Canton forces becoming increasingly hostile, the Japanese Consul-General addressed the following demands, at 9 p.m. on February 19th, to the Mayor of Shanghai :

- (1) Withdrawal of the Chinese first-line by 7 a.m. on February 20th ; withdrawal of all troops to a distance of 20 kilometres north of the boundary of the International Settlement before 5 p.m. the same day. The Japanese troops would be withdrawn within the roads of the Extension of the Settlement at Hongkew directly the effective withdrawal of the Chinese troops had been established.
- (2) Further negotiations with regard to the protection of foreigners in the Shanghai region.
- (3) Carrying out by the Mayor of the undertakings entered into on January 28th concerning the prevention and punishment of anti-Japanese movements.

At the same time, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces addressed demands, couched in practically identical terms to the Officer commanding the Nineteenth Cantonese Army, informing him that, in the event of non-compliance with those demands, the Japanese Army would take whatever measures might be deemed necessary. The Chinese would be held responsible for any consequence arising out of such action (document C.283.M.170. 1932.VII).

On the evening of the same day, the Mayor of Shanghai informed the Japanese Consul-General in reply that the Japanese demands were such that he could not transmit them to the Chinese forces, but that he would refer the matter to the Central Government.

The Officer commanding the Nineteenth Army replied to the Officer commanding the Japanese forces that, as the Nineteenth Army was under the authority of the Nationalist Government, he would ask the Officer commanding the Japanese Forces to apply to the latter.

As no direct or indirect reply had been received from the Nationalist Government by 7 a.m. on February 20th, and as the Chinese forces were still occupying their front lines and continuing their fire, the Japanese forces accorded them half-an-hour's grace and began operations at 7.30 a.m. on February 20th.

V. REMARKS ON THE REPORTS OF THE SHANGHAI CONSULAR COMMITTEE.

The description we have just given of the origin of the Shanghai incidents is decisively confirmed in the first report of the Shanghai Consular Committee ; and, as in such cases it is the origins of the conflicts which are of capital importance, we may briefly recall that, as the report says, the boycott which had been in force since July was applied with extreme severity ; that it was accompanied by numerous illegal acts for which no redress could be obtained before the Courts ; and that a spirit of bitter hostility was developed and led to an increase in the number of acts of violence.

The reports then describe the succession of grave occurrences which led the Japanese forces to take energetic measures of protection. Taken as a whole, these indications correspond to the description we have given of the facts. But, as the reports are relatively short, they inevitably present certain omissions. Accordingly, we must submit the following observations in connection therewith.

I. FIRST REPORT.

1. The report states that " Resulted that association was closed and various offices were seized by Chinese Police during the night January 27th-28th."

This sentence might convey the idea that the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai had suppressed the Anti-Japanese Association. It was in reality the Municipal Council of the Settlement which, on its own initiative, closed the offices of the *Minkuo Daily News* and decided also to close the central organisation of anti-Japanese associations, situated in the International Settlement.

2. The report says : " 11 p.m. Japanese admiral issued two proclamations, copies of which were served on the Mayor, who declared he had received them at 11.15 p.m."

The Japanese admiral published his declaration at 8.30 p.m. and immediately informed the authorities concerned. When the Consul-General of Japan received the reply from the Chinese Mayor agreeing to the Japanese demands at 3.15 p.m. on the same day, he had already asked the Mayor that steps might be taken for the withdrawal of the Chinese troops.

3. The report says : " Japanese marines consequently met with resistance on the part of Chinese regular troops."

It must be observed that this sentence is ambiguous. Japanese marines on their way to their posts were attacked by soldiers in civilian clothes and afterwards by regular troops themselves ; they retaliated only in fulfilment of the duty that had been entrusted to them of protecting the Settlement.

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- 12 -

2. SECOND REPORT.

The following observations were made by the Japanese delegation concerning this report (document C.244.M.135.1932.VII) :

" 1. The report mentions that the offensive is entirely in the hands of the Japanese. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the present combats are merely the outcome of the clash between the Chinese forces and the Japanese troops who were proceeding to occupy their line of protection on January 28th. At first, the Japanese marines numbered only 1,500 and this small force, which subsequently reached some 3,000 men, had to defend a large sector inhabited by some 30,000 Japanese against hostile forces numbering more than 30,000 men. The Japanese delegation has already mentioned the special circumstances in which the Nineteenth Chinese Army was placed and which explain the violence of its attitude.

" Efforts were made to bring about a suspension of hostilities, which was naturally desired by us in view of the disproportion between the conflicting forces. In spite of the truce arranged, a Chinese armoured train opened fire against us on the 30th at about 5.20 a.m. and this firing lasted for an hour and a half. At about 9 a.m. the Chinese opened fire on the Japanese headquarters and on our position along the railway. On the 31st, at 1.20 and 4.40 p.m., they again violated the truce and by dawn about 100 soldiers were advancing near the Rokusan Garden and opened fire on our headquarters. Moreover, plain-clothes soldiers, whose activities are referred to in the report, continued to invade our lines. The second attempted truce was again violated on February 1st and 2nd, while the Chinese forces were manœuvring for the purpose of surrounding us.

" It was becoming evident that the Chinese could not be trusted to observe the truce ; a pacific attitude on our part led to increasingly greater losses and the movements of the Chinese forces, who brought up reinforcements and surrounded the salient of the Extension, rendered the position of our marines more and more critical. It was on this account that, from February 3rd onwards, our forces were compelled to attack the Chinese positions.

" 2. It is not quite correct to speak of the mobilisation of reservists. No general measure of this kind was adopted. A small number of volunteers armed with pistols was deputed to take action against Chinese snipers and to assist the Police. These volunteers were disarmed some time ago and only a few reservists are still employed as interpreters, guides, etc.

" 3. As regards the slowing-down of the municipal activities of the Settlement authorities, it should be noted that the municipal Police forces had at one time abandoned their posts. Their return and co-operation were requested by the Japanese authorities and they have now resumed their normal work. As regards the firemen, in particular, their co-operation was requested even for the quarters neighbouring on the Settlement and the Extension. (The normal activity of the Municipal Council's firemen is in principle confined to the Settlement and the Extension.) The Japanese authorities hope that the other municipal activities will shortly be fully resumed.

" The flight of the Police forces and the evacuation of schools and hospitals mentioned in the report were certainly due only to the dangers of the situation and were not a consequence of the measures taken in this connection by the Japanese authorities. It is, however, true that, at the commencement of the incidents, in the general disorder, a few Chinese policemen were disarmed by mistake. On the other hand the co-operation of the Chinese Municipal Police having proved ineffective in the struggle against soldiers in mufti, these Police were on certain occasions temporarily replaced by Japanese forces.

" Owing to this struggle, barricades had been built at various points, but they have at present been taken down.

" 4. The report says that excesses were committed by sailors, reservists and other elements having no official standing. The Japanese delegation feels bound to deny this assertion as regards the sailors and reservists.

" The report mentions the attitude which the Japanese authorities adopted with regard to undesirable elements, against whose activities very severe action was taken. Many of these individuals are now in custody at the Consulate-General, while others have been deported.

" 5. As regards the number of Chinese whose fate is unknown, it should be noted that very probably a large number of these have taken refuge in the outskirts of Shanghai and in other towns (anyone who knows China will agree how difficult it is to follow the movements of the population in that country, particularly in large inhabited areas like Shanghai).

" 6. It is to be regretted that the report has not mentioned certain facts which, though denied by the Chinese, are indisputable, as, for instance, the firing by the Woosung forts on three Japanese vessels which were leaving Shanghai on February 3rd. These vessels were taking back to Japan the mortal remains of our sailors killed during the fighting of the previous days and, that being their mission, they would certainly not have opened fire on the forts. This action, which took place in full daylight, and which the Chinese deny, affords a further example of the value of allegations from Chinese sources.

- 13 -

" If it is correct that orders were given to the Chinese soldiers regarding the truce, the frequent disregard of those orders by the said soldiers bears eloquent witness to the state of disorder and indiscipline existing in the Chinese forces. As regards the Japanese forces, orders had been issued that they should fire only in the case of hostile acts on the part of the Chinese in violation of the truce. The known discipline of the Japanese troops is sufficient guarantee that these orders were obeyed.

3. THIRD REPORT.

The following observations were made by the Japanese delegation concerning this report (document C.283.M.170.1932.VII) :

" 1. The text of the demands addressed on February 18th by the Officer Commanding the Japanese forces to the Officer Commanding the Nineteenth Army does not appear to have been taken from the official communication of the Japanese authorities, but from a document probably of Chinese origin. It does not indicate correctly the limits of the zone to be evacuated.

" 2. The last paragraph of the report suggests that all the Japanese forces had made the Settlement their basis of operations. The report omits to state that a large part of the Japanese forces were stationed outside the Settlement, and commenced operations from Woo-Sung."

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 18 1932  
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

GREEN AND GRAY  
Geneva

Dated March 17, 1932

Rec'd 11:18 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

79, March 17, 10 p. m.

(GREEN) Sweetser reports as follows concerning private meeting of the nineteen held after the plenary session this afternoon.

Hymans presented to the Committee a memorandum handed to him and Drummond this morning by Yen (distributed document number A Extra 62, March 17, 1932) regarding the action to be taken following adjournment and suggesting: first, that the Committee inform the powers at Shanghai that the Assembly resolution of March 4th precluded any political conditions regarding withdrawal; second, that the Committee request the parties to supply information on steps already taken to execute the Council's resolutions of <sup>September</sup> ~~December~~ 30 and <sup>December</sup> ~~September~~ 10; third, that the Committee lay out the skeleton of the report foreseen in Article 15, paragraph 3; fourth,

F/LS  
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FILED

REP

2-#79, from Geneva, Mar. 17, 10 p.m.

fourth, that it instruct the Lytton Commission to make a first report on conditions in Manchuria in time for the next meeting; and fifth, that it announce its plans for keeping in touch with events and for acting in case of emergency.

The Committee felt that the situation had already been clarified on points one and five in the public debate.

It also had no difficulty in agreeing on the second point; deciding that the President should request both China and Japan to present the action taken to Executive Council's resolutions of ~~December~~ <sup>September</sup> 30 and ~~September~~ <sup>December</sup> 10.

The third point was left in abeyance for the time being.

The fourth point, however, developed a long and important debate. On the first part of that question, namely, the request to the Lytton Commission to make a first report on conditions in Manchuria as soon as possible, there was immediate agreement with only some slight discussion of procedure to preserve the constitutional formality due to the fact that the Lytton Commission was appointed by the ~~Commission~~ <sup>Council</sup> and should technically be approached by the Assembly

REP

3-#79, from Geneva, Mar. 17, 10p.m.

the Assembly only through the President of the Council. It was felt important to safeguard this constitutional procedure in order not to give either party to the dispute a chance to question the legality to the Commission's action and report.

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A strong difference of opinion, however, developed as to whether the Commission should be specifically requested to report on the new Manchurian state. Motta first threw this suggestion out somewhat indirectly. Londonderry thought that the request to the Lytton Commission for a report would be quite sufficient and that it would be premature to do anything further for the moment. Drummond suggested that he was in constant touch with Haas and could privately ask for a full report on the new government at the earliest possible moment. Hymans brought out that the Commission would obviously report on the new government; it was inconceivable it would overlook it. Madariaga agreed with this viewpoint but he urged that the Commission should show world public opinion it is preoccupied in the matter.

Londonderry, however, urged that it was premature to take any such specific action. Ramel, Sweden, quoted the  
Assembly resolution

RP

4-#79, from Geneva, Mar. 17, 10p.m.

Assembly resolution regarding nonrecognition and felt that some step might well be taken to inform public opinion of the Committee's interest. Benes thought everyone agreed that the Committee must occupy itself with the problem though actual procedure of so doing was not important. Motta then urged that the Committee publicly emphasize its interest in the new state and say so quite frankly.

(GRAY) Colban, however, wondered what the effect on the Commission might be at the time of its arrival in Manchuria if the Committee had already taken this action in Geneva. Pilloti, Italy, raised the same question as to the opportunity of the suggested action and confessed that he could see little advantage and considerable disadvantage in it. Hymans felt that the suggested action would after all be largely an emphasis without great practical value but with a considerable possibility of compromising the situation at Shanghai. Madariaga presented a definite draft requesting the Council to instruct the Lytton Commission saying that he did not think the  
Committee

REP

5-#79, from Geneva, Mar. 17, 10p.m.

Committee ought to allow public opinion to think that it had not immediately occupied itself with the creation of a new government. Drummond, however, urged that the Assembly had already taken definite action regarding nonrecognition and that the mere application of the principle to a specific case would not greatly strengthen the principle but would very definitely on the other hand risk a dangerous effect on negotiations at Shanghai. Lester, Ireland, felt that Manchuria is the touchstone; any delay now would cause greater trouble later; the pressure for withdrawal of troops would probably bring about the automatic collapse of the new state.

Benes agreed fully with the importance of meeting the issue of the new state but thought the present moment premature for raising it. (GREEN) He did not favor any kind of public action nor did he think it was necessary, in view of the fact that the substance of this discussion would reach the press. Hymans finally stated what he thought would be the general consensus of opinion - that the establishment of a new state in Manchuria was perhaps one of the most important questions before the Commission; that it

REP

6- #79, from Geneva, Mar. 17, 10 p.m.

that it would unquestionably be the first preoccupation of the Lytton Commission, but that to take it up formally at this particular moment might prejudice both the negotiations at Shanghai which are now proceeding and the effectiveness of the Lytton Commission both in Shanghai and in Manchuria. The Committee accepted this viewpoint and adjourned subject to the call of the President or until the reopening of the Disarmament Conference.

WILSON

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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793.94  
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893.1025  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

DIVISION OF

Dated March 18, 1932

Rec'd 8:40 a.m.  
Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington

March 18, 4 p.m.

Following from Colonel Drysdale for War Department:

Quiet along both fronts. One and one half battalions  
of 24th Mixed Japanese Brigade embarked for Moji today.  
The remainder of the Brigade is scheduled to leave tomorrow,  
to be followed later by the 11th Division.

JOHNSON

KLP

ARL

F/LS 793.94/4817

MAR 21 1932

MAR 21 1932

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 18, 1932

Rec'd 2:23 a.m.

FOR EAST ASIAN DIVISION  
MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington

353, March 18, 3 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Shanghai, March seventeenth:

"It is learned from Chinese sources that the terms for a provisional agreement between China and Japan in the Shanghai area provide:

First, the Chinese troops shall remain in their present positions beyond the twenty kilometer zone while the Japanese forces withdraw from the occupied territory.

Second, the evacuated areas shall be policed and administered by the Chinese authorities.

Third, a joint Sino-Japanese committee shall be formed to supervise, with the assistance of neutral representatives, the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and the administration of the evacuated areas.

For the Minister,

PERKINS

JS

F/LS 793.94/4818

FILED

MAR 21 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DIVISION OF  
INTELLIGENCE


FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated March 18, 1932

Secretary of State,  
Washington

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.



March 18, 2 p.m.

Situation report number 10 today.

"No activity during past twenty-four hours except continued Japanese air reconnaissances over Chinese positions. Japanese also propose to employ an observation balloon and have issued statement that its use does not imply offensive action".

JOHNSON

KLP-HPD

*793.94  
note  
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F/LS 793.94/4819

MAR 21 1932

PTL:GPD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDER SECRETARY

793,94

~~Mr. Hamilton~~

Would you be willing to write an acknowledgment of receipt of this letter expressing appreciation for this person's interest in the FE situation? This could probably not be back for a couple of weeks. /c.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
FEB 24 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Geneva.  
MRS. J. D. LELAND  
BRUSH HILL ROAD, MILTON  
HYDE PARK P. O.  
MASSACHUSETTS

RECEIVED  
EASTERN OFFICE  
MAR 11 1932  
Department of State

Added  
MAR 11 1932  
755.94/4820  
MAR 16 1932

My dear Mr. Secretary  
I am a special correspondent  
here for the Boston Globe, and  
have interviewed a number of  
the delegates but I can not say  
that these interviews have had  
anything to do with my conviction  
that the United States is making  
one of the great mistakes in her  
history in not definitely siding  
with China against Japan. In  
spite of being a pacifist I can  
see the trend of nations

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2.

MRS. J. D. LELAND  
BRUSH HILL ROAD, MILTON  
HYDE PARK P. O.  
MASSACHUSETTS

the scenes amongst the powers  
we can only guess. What  
commercial bargains are being  
made, what commercial groups  
are dictating our policy, we  
can not know till too late but  
that our commercial relations  
with the future China which  
will again be a great nation  
because it has ideals and  
is on the whole more honest  
than most nations, merely to  
satisfy the needs & demands

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
FEB 21 1932  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MRS. J. D. LELAND  
BUSH HILL ROAD, MILTON  
HYDE PARK P. O.  
MASSACHUSETTS

Geneva.

EX-100-100  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 11 1932  
Department of State

My dear Mr. Secretary

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here for the Boston Globe, and  
have interviewed a number of  
the delegates but I can not say  
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MAILED 16 1932  
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

policies, and I deplore the lack of foresight in the U.S.A. in not realizing that it even for selfish reasons alone, she should uphold China against Japan. We have in the distant past been considered by China as her friend but, except for our protests against the 21 demands which treaties were accepted in essential points under the threat of force by Japan, we have allowed Japan to move steadily toward the conquest of China. What is going on behind

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2.

MRS. J. D. LELAND  
BRUSH HILL ROAD, MILTON  
HYDE PARK P. O.  
MASSACHUSETTS

the scenes amongst the powers  
we can only guess. What  
commercial bargains are being  
made, what commercial groups  
are dictating our policy, we  
can not know till too late but  
that our commercial relations  
with the future China which  
will again be a great nation  
because it has ideals and  
is on the whole more honest  
than most nations, merely to  
satisfy the needs & demands

of some of our traders, is to  
be short sighted.

We know that France is  
moving with Japan; the two  
nations have many characteristics  
in common; one unfortunate  
is their belief in lies as useful  
on occasion. The United States  
and Great Britain seem to be  
moving together which is hopeful,  
but I hope that our Statesmen  
can convince our commercial  
interests of the need of having a  
vision and that the China of  
tomorrow must be our friend.

Very Sincerely

Walter T. Anderson

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MRS. J. D. LELAND  
BRUSH HILL ROAD, MILTON  
HYDE PARK P. O.  
MASSACHUSETTS

P. S. I suppose you know  
that Charles Dumont, French  
delegate here and Secretary of  
the Navy is President of the  
Franco-Japanese bank; that  
C. A. Armand de Saint Sauveur  
is on the bank's administrative  
council and that he is brother  
in law of Eugene Schneider  
of the Brenot munitions factory.  
Like our Mr. Shearer, this  
is a public scandal and  
will weaken the French position,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

and the peoples confidence  
in this Disarmament Conference.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



*Mr William R Castle Jr*  
*Under Secretary of State*  
*Washington*  
*D.C.*  
*U.S.A.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DM 1.  
793.92

March 15 1932

Mrs. J. D. Leland,  
Brush Hill Road, Milton,  
Hyde Park Post Office, Massachusetts.

793.94/4820

Madam:

In the absence of the Under Secretary, I am  
acknowledging, with thanks, the receipt of your recent  
letter from Geneva, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese  
dispute.

The views and the information contained in your  
letter are of interest to the Department and will be  
brought to the attention of Mr. Castle on his return  
to the Department in the near future.

Very truly yours,

Maxwell M. Hamilton,  
Assistant Chief,  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

✓  
CK  
Mar. 15, 1932.

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being FROM communicated to anyone.

SHANGHAI

Dated March 18, 1932

Rec'd 6:14 a. m.

Secretary of State, **RECEIVED**  
Washington.

**DIVISION OF**

March 18, 3 p. m.

**CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.**

*W. A. S. H.*  
**FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS**  
**MAR 18 1932**  
Department of State

**F/LS 793.94/4821**

One. When the League Commission arrived here on March 14th my colleagues and I had already arranged for the commencement of discussions between the Japanese and Chinese. Lord Lytton was present when my colleagues and I had our usual meeting on the 15th and offered to assist in any way that might be acceptable to us. We discussed among ourselves the suggestion that we invite Lytton to be present with us at the negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese. This suggestion was never carried out, however, for the reason that we subsequently agreed it would be better to have the Commission as a kind of court of appeal in case the discussions in our presence should become deadlocked.

Two. Last night an intimation was conveyed through Lytton's Secretary to Lampson that the Commission would like to have us inquire of the League whether it would permit the Commission to remain in Shanghai for a while to assist

**MAR 21 1932**

**FILED**

REF

2-from Shanghai, Mar. 18, 3p.m.

to assist in these local negotiations. As a result the following telegram has been despatched by the British Minister to his Foreign Office with the concurrence of Lord Lytton.

(GRAY) "My colleagues and I would be glad to learn whether in the event of the move appearing opportune to us and with the concurrence of both parties, the Special Committee appointed under the resolution of March 11th would be prepared to authorize the Commission of Inquiry to delay their departure from Shanghai in order to assist in any way that might at given moment seem appropriate to us in the present negotiations respecting cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Japanese troops.

Could this be ascertained through Secretary General of the League?"

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD



1078

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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Department of State

- 2 - Washington,

Commission may be able to make by remaining in Shanghai. If, however, your view in any way coincides with the above, it is suggested that you informally and on your own account point out to General McCoy in confidence these aspects of the matter.

*John Gann*  
*SKH* *m.m/h*

Enciphered by FE:SKH/ZMF  
Sent by operator M. 19      
Index Bu.—No. 50.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*793.94  
893.94  
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RB

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 18, 1932

Rec'd 9:35 a. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

RECEIVED  
MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

PRIORITY.

March 18, 7 p. m.

By March 18, 3 p. m.

There is to be a formal meeting between Chinese and Japanese at 10 tomorrow evening at which my colleagues and I will be present.

JOHNSON

RP

HFD

F/LS 793.94/4822

MAR 21 1932  
FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.248/46 FOR report  
FROM Military Attache,  
Germany (Wuest) DATED Feb. 6, 1932  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1--1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict.  
Information to effect that airplanes for China and Russia are being manufactured at the Heinkel airplane works in Warnemunde, Germany. Attempt of two Japanese to visit the airplane plant for purpose of securing information of purchases made by their enemies in the Far East.

tfv

753.94/4823

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE ~~894.50/54a~~ 894.50/54a FOR Tel.# 75

FROM ~~Japan~~ ( -- ) DATED Mar. 14, 1932.  
TO Japan NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Present Japanese economic and financial situation.  
Requests report on the --.

jr

793.94/4824

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
MAR 19 1932  
MR. KLOFF

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 19 1932  
MR. ROGERS

RB  
This telegram must be  
loosely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Peiping  
Dated March 18, 1932  
Rec'd 4:37 a. m.

FROM

Secretary of State  
Washington.

RECEIVED  
MAR 19 1932  
DIVISION OF

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

F/DEW  
793.94/4825

*793.94  
note*

350, March 18, 11 a. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The following has been obtained through the medium of  
Dr. Ferguson of Peiping as an expression of the views of a  
very highly placed Japanese now traveling in China for  
purposes of official investigation.

*893.01-Manchuria*

One. Japan does not intend to annex Manchuria but will  
insist upon a government there which does not interfere with  
the railway or undermine Japan's other interests. Japan  
is not greatly concerned over the activities of the League  
Commission; for Japan would prefer to give up the League  
rather than yield upon any matters in Manchuria considered  
necessary for her safety.

*893.102-S*

Two. The Shanghai affair is a muddle from which Japan  
would be glad to extricate herself by any reasonable face-  
saving process.

MAR 23 1932  
FILED

Three. Japan is convinced that she cannot live side  
by side with China dominated by the Kuomintang and Japan  
will continue to pound away until that organization is  
replaced by

RR

Page 2-1050 from Peiping

replaced by some kind of government with which satisfactory relations may be maintained. Chiang Kai Shek has been in constant communication with the Japanese and desires to see present difficulties patched up. Should Chiang get loose from the Kuomintang he might well be a leader of China with whom Japan might deal.

Four. Japan is determined that Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang must go and is endeavoring to bring about his retirement. He must eventually be gotten out, even if an incident has to be created for the purpose. Japan does not take seriously the reports of a proposed punitive expedition of the new regime in Manchuria.

894.10  
Five. The Japanese Government finds great difficulties in its own internal administration since the military branches refrain from reporting upon matters in which they exceed the scope of their government's instructions. It is only when special investigators are sent that the complete facts are ascertained; and, meanwhile, through lack of knowledge of the "whole truth" the Government becomes embarrassed in its relations with other Governments.

Repeated to the Minister.

For the Minister,

RPF:WSB

PERKINS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

713.94  
813.10  
713.94  
500.0111  
793.94 - *Communication*

*FEE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAY 13 1932  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FROM

Geneva

Dated March 18, 1932

Rec'd 1:18 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington

125, March 18, noon.

Wilson's 79, March 17, 10 p.m., paragraph two.

The following is the text of the Chinese memorandum:

"In view of the coming recess of the Disarmament Conference and the departure from Geneva of members of the special committee set up under the Assembly resolution of March 11th necessitating perhaps the adjournment of the committee itself until April, I respectfully suggest the following points for consideration.

'According to the Assembly resolution of March 11th the committee has certain functions with regard to the execution of (a) the Assembly resolution of March 4th and (b) the Council resolutions of September 30 and December 10.

One. As regards (a) its task is to report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the said

cessation

F/LS 793.94/4826

FILED

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#125 from Geneva, March 18, 1945

cessation and shall regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in conformity with the Assembly resolution of March 4th. At the time of the passing of the March 4th resolution it was made quite clear by the Assembly that the resolution ruled out the attaching of any conditions to the withdrawal of Japanese troops as being incompatible with the Covenant and that the withdrawal must be complete. It was on these two understandings that the Chinese Government accepted the resolution and these two understandings were subsequently endorsed by the United States Government. Yet it is clear from a recent telegram that the Japanese Government are attempting to do precisely what the Assembly and United States of America have condemned, namely, to impose political conditions as the price of Japanese withdrawal. Indeed, they are trying under cover of the Assembly's resolution to force the Chinese Government to accept a Japanese ultimatum.

It would in the circumstances appear imperative for the committee to inform the representatives of the powers at Shanghai and the Chinese and Japanese Government what is meant by the Assembly resolution of March 4th.

Two.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#125 from Geneva, March 18, noon

Two. As regards (b) the committee is to follow the execution of the Council resolution of September 30 and December 10. The former resolution imposes the obligations on the Japanese Government to 'continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, which had already begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nation<sup>als</sup> is effectively assured' and on the Chinese Government to 'assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are reestablished'.

The December 10th resolution reaffirmed the September 30th resolution and called upon 'the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution'. The resolution went on to state explicitly that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was without prejudice to carrying out these measures. These two resolutions  
and

MET

4-#125 from Geneva, March 18, noon

and the discussion in the Council on October 23rd (see the extracts quoted on pages 12-16 of the (extraordinary one) together with the Assembly's condemnation of the idea of a settlement under military pressure, makes it clear that the withdrawal of Japanese troops is the essential preliminary to settlement based on the Covenant.

It would appear to follow that the first task of the committee is to implement this part of the Assembly's resolution by requesting the parties to supply information on what steps they have already taken or proposed to execute their obligations under the September 30th and December 10th resolutions and what they are prepared to do to carry out these obligations in full. The parties might be asked to supply this information in time for the first meeting of the committees after the Easter recess.

Three. Since the danger of military pressure has been removed by securing Japanese evacuation the committee is instructed 'to endeavor to prepare the settlement of the dispute in accordance with Article 15 paragraph 3 of the Covenant and to submit a statement'.

This no doubt will be a lengthy and complex task to

be

MET

5-#125 from Geneva, March 18, noon

be carried out only in the light of the data received from the Commission of Inquiry on the spot. But it would appear appropriate and consonant with League precedents if the committee were to give instructions to the Secretariat forthwith to prepare for its consideration a draft programme or agenda indicating for instance the types of question with which it might expect to deal, the available sources of information, the ways in which and the issues on which League machinery, such as the court and the technical organizations, could most appropriately be used, et cetera.

Four. According to the seventh paragraph referring to the committee's functions, it has to submit a first progress report to the Assembly as soon as possible and at the latest on May 1st, 1932. The committee's report will, it is believed, take into account reports from the Commission of Inquiry as well as from other committees or agents acting on behalf of the League. It may therefore be suggested that the Commission of Inquiry be instructed to make a first report on conditions in Manchuria in time for the next meeting. In view of the statement made by the President of the Council on December 10th when officially

interpreting

MET

6-#125 from Geneva, March 16, noon

interpreting the resolution of that date that 'if the undertakings given by the two parties according to the resolution of September 30th have not been carried out by the time of the arrival of the Commission of Inquiry, the Commission should as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation,' this first report would presumably deal with the extent to which Japan has carried out her obligations under the September 30th and December 10th resolutions and what she is prepared to do to complete their execution.

Five. My Government feels great anxiety at the present tense situation in Shanghai and Manchuria and feels that the best check on Japanese aggressive activities is the sense of vigilant and constant League supervision. I have no doubt the President fully appreciates this aspect of the matter and intends to take appropriate measures to keep in touch with events and to have the committee and if necessary the Assembly itself summoned at short notice should unexpected developments occur. But it would relieve my Government's anxiety to have information as to such measures, I therefore respectfully suggest that the arrangements

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

7-#125 from Geneva, March 18, noon

arrangements contemplated under this head should be publicly  
announced as soon as possible.

GILBERT

WSB

HPD

110911

DECLASSIFIED BY: E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(a) and 5(D)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State  
Washington,  
March 17, 1932.  
It should be carefully paraphrased, and not being commingled to anyone.  
MAR 17 1932

793.94/A

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
SHANGHAI (China).

104

Confidential for the Minister

The following is quoted, for your information, from a telegram received from Minister Wilson at Geneva transmitting a confidential report of a private meeting held on March 16 of the Committee of Nineteen operating under the Assembly's resolution of March 11:

QUOTE The Committee all felt that the center of interest now lies in Shanghai and that the only useful action possible at Geneva would be to sustain the action of the powers there and bring any possible pressure to bear upon the parties to induce them to arrive at an immediate and final agreement. UNQUOTE

5 pm

793.94/4826A

M  
FE:FPB:CLS

R.H. W.H.  
FE

Stinson  
S.H.

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PHONE MADISON 5713

FROM  
REV. WILLIAM A. CRAWFORD-FROST  
1407 EUTAW PLACE  
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

793.94  
note  
500.242

RECEIVED  
MAR 18 1932

SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 16 1932

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 17 1932  
Department of State

March 17 1932

Hon. H.L. Stimson,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED

MAR 16 1932

March 15, 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

anset, March 17, 1932  
SMF

793.94/4927

My dear Mr Stimson:

I have read your letter of February 23 to  
Senator Borah and with deep appreciation.

It is most important to bring out clearly that the Disarma-  
ment and Nine Power Treaties were inter-related.

You say, page 5, "The willingness of the American Government  
to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction  
and to leave its positions at Guam and in the Philippines without  
further fortification, was predicated upon, among other things,  
the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine Power Treaty,  
which assured the nations of the world X X X against the military  
aggrandisement of any other power at the expense of China".

I wish these words had been printed in black letter, or Italics,  
because they show that, in breaking faith with China, Japan was  
breaking faith in a shameless way with the United States.

We would not have done what we did about disarmament if we  
had thought Japan would break her word.

As usual, you have said what ought to be said. I wish this  
point were emphasized so that the Senators and Congressmen  
might fully grasp its significance.

With kindest regards, believe me, Sincerely yours,  
*W. A. Crawford Frost*

MAR 18 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 17, 1932.

My dear Mr. Crawford-Frost:

I am pleased to have your letter of March 16, 1932, expressing agreement with my letter of February 23 to Senator Borah in regard to the difficulties presented by the present situation in the Far East.

I wish to assure you that your endorsement of the action taken and the spirit which prompted you to write in this way are very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

The Reverend  
William A. Crawford-Frost,  
1407 Eutaw Place,  
Baltimore, Maryland.

egc.  
RE:EGC

SE  
m.m.f.

Routine  
MAR 17 1932.  
MAX

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal.

793.94/4827

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 123 Forbes, W. Cameron/160 FOR Tel. #103 7pm  
*Confidential File*

FROM Japan (Forbes) DATED Mar. 18, 1932  
~~XXXX~~ NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING: Chinese-Japanese relations: Comment of the Emperor regarding,  
at audience with Ambassador Forbes, this date.

✓  
emc

793.94/4828

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

GRAY

Tokio

Dated March 18, 1932

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

103, March 18, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

At my audience today the Emperor broached the subject of Chinese-Japanese relations and expressed satisfaction at hearing that the withdrawal of Japanese troops which has begun had created a good impression in the United States. I assured him this was so and that further withdrawal would materially help the situation.

He was good enough to express regret at my approaching departure and expressed appreciation of my work here which, he said, had been consistently in favor of a better understanding between Japan and the United States. I told him that I felt that the worst was now over and that the situation ought now steadily to improve. He replied that he shared this optimistic view and felt sure that that would be the case.

Count

MET

2-#103 from Tokio, March 18, 7 pm.

Count Makino spoke in the same vein.

I should have spoken a little more freely with the Emperor had not that arch trouble-maker, Shiratori, been there acting as interpreter.

There seems to be an earnest effort on all sides to hold out a friendly hand toward the United States. The Minister of Marine gave me a farewell lunch at which he made very complimentary remarks. The Minister of War attended the farewell dinner last night given by the American-Japan Society at which Mr. Yoshizawa was the orator, and his remarks were evidently intended to be as friendly and conciliatory as possible.

From all sources I gathered that the situation is still tense but is calming down. We can now hope that in time the conservative elements will make themselves felt in the administration.

FORBES

KLP-ARL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*FE*  
*WE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GRAY

*WAT*  
MAR 24 1932

Geneva

DIVISION OF

Dated March 18, 1932

*WE* *FE* *WE* *FE* *WE* *FE*  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

FROM

MAR 18 1932

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS

Secretary of State,

Washington

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 18 1932  
Department of State

124, March 18, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

Wilson's 78/<sup>4803</sup> March 16, 9 p.m.

The Special Committee of the Assembly held a public meeting yesterday afternoon which lasted up into the evening. The meeting was opened by the Chairman's reading Drummond's letter of March 11th to Wilson concerning the Assembly resolution of that date and Wilson's reply.

(See Wilson's 73/<sup>4704</sup> March 11, 8 p.m. and Department's 46/<sup>4704</sup> March 12, 2 p.m.)

Sato then spoke informing the Committee that the Fourteenth Division, a mixed brigade, and a special corps comprising in all about 14,000 men had been ordered back to Japan and that preparations were now under way for their return. He said further that preliminary negotiations for the conclusion of an armistice had begun on March 14th but as it had been understood that these

negotiations

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F/LS 793.94/4829

FILED

MAR 24 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#124 from Geneva, March 18,  
10 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

negotiations would be kept entirely secret he was not in a position to give details. He added that he had no information as to the Japanese Government's intention as regards the basis upon which negotiations should take place at Shanghai.

The remainder of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the questions raised in the following telegram dated March 16th received by Yen from his Government which he now read to the Committee:

"On Monday (the 14th instant) Mr. Quo Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs attended a tea party given by Sir Miles Lampson, His Britannic Majesty's Minister; Mr. Johnson, the American Minister; Mr. Wilden, the French Minister; and Mr. Ciano, the Italian Consul General, and met Shigemitsu the Japanese Minister. The following draft agenda for the armistice meeting was drawn up subject to the approval of the Chinese and Japanese Governments:

1. Chinese troops to remain in their present positions pending a later settlement.
- Two. Japanese troops are to withdraw to the International Settlement and the Extra Settlement Roads

MET

3-#124 from Geneva, March 18,  
10 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

Roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident, viz. January 28. It is understood however that in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas.

Three. A joint commission with neutral members is to certify to the mutual withdrawal.

NOTE: It is understood that no other question of principle will be raised.

SEPARATE NOTE (subject to the approval of the Chinese Government): The following understanding is agreed upon: Provided a definite agreement is reached on the basis of the above points, the Chinese side will voluntarily give an independent undertaking that Mayor Wu's letter of January 28 stands'.

Yesterday Minister Shigemitsu visited Sir Miles Lampson making the following change in paragraph three of the original draft: 'A joint commission with neutral members is to certify to the carrying out of the agreement under paragraphs one and two and watch and observe the general conditions in the evacuated area until a later settlement'.

A formal meeting was arranged for this afternoon 16th instant to adopt the draft agenda but is postponed upon the request of Minister Shigemitsu on the ground that no instruction has been received from Tokyo. The above information has been communicated to the Lytton Commission of Inquiry.

The

10

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-#124 from Geneva, March 18,  
10 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

The Chinese Government considers the proposed amendments by the Japanese Minister as unacceptable. In the opinion of the Chinese Government the separate note as mentioned above should not be raised at the armistice negotiations because it is tantamount to a political condition for the evacuation of the Japanese forces".

(END SECTION ONE)

GILBERT

WSB

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Geneva

FROM

Dated March 18, 1932

Rec'd 2:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

124, March 18, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Yen then commented on this telegram stating that the Chinese Government could not accept the separate note attached to the agenda quoted above nor the supplementary amendment proposed by the Japanese to paragraph three of the agenda since they constituted political conditions and were contrary to the terms and spirit of the Assembly's resolution of March 4. He maintained that the Chinese Government could not allow an invader to participate in a mixed commission to supervise the evacuation. As regards the separate note he pointed out that this was purely a political condition requiring in fact the acceptance of an ultimatum issued under military pressure.

Hymans as Chairman then proceeded to an analysis of the implications of the separate note and of the proposed Japanese amendment to paragraph three of the agenda. In his opinion the proposed amendment did not differ essentially from

MET

2-#124 from Geneva, March 18,  
10a.m. (SECTION TWO)

from the original and did not seem to embody a political condition nor appear to be contrary to the Assembly's resolution. In this connection he recalled that before the adoption of the resolution of March 4 the Japanese delegation had proposed an amendment requesting the insertion of "conditions" in connection with the methods for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. On account of the numerous objections raised the Japanese delegation had not insisted on its amendment. Thus the number recommended by the Assembly although including questions pertaining to order and security excluded every political condition and any conditions not having a direct bearing upon the withdrawal of the troops.

The Chairman then read the separate note and stated that if this was merely a proposal the Chinese Government would be free to refuse it but if it were a condition this would mean that it was a political condition and one contrary to the resolution of March 4.

At the request of Benes for an explanation concerning the proposed amendment to Article three the Chairman stated

that

MET

3-#124 from Geneva, March 18,  
10 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

that the amendment could not be considered as conforming to the resolution and be accepted unless it concerned merely the supervision and observation of facts relating to the withdrawal of the Japanese troops.

Boncour agreed with the Chairman in regard to his interpretation of the nature of the separate note and of the proposed amendment. In reply to the Chinese objection to the participation of Japan in the Mixed Commission he stated that it was but natural that each party should observe the manner in which the other evacuated the field of battle, -with the assistance of neutral powers. Moreover, he recalled that the resolution of March 4 did not envisage the assumption by the neutral powers of complete responsibility for the supervision of the withdrawal of the forces but merely their cooperation. It was therefore only proper that the commission should be a joint commission and not a neutral commission.

Sato at this juncture explained the position of his Government in regard to the separate note attached to the provisional agenda. He stated that although Japan desired earnestly

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEY

4-#124 from Geneva, March 18,  
10 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

earnestly to negotiate with China in order to put aside anti-Japanese movements Japan had not laid this down as a condition; she had merely desired that if possible this point should be negotiated before the conclusion of the armistice but if this were not possible now it could be done later. On account of its importance to Japan the question would certainly be raised during the contemplated Shanghai conference to take place after the conclusion of an armistice.

Motta then spoke taking note of the Japanese statement and expressing agreement with the Chairman in his interpretation of the two points under discussion. He thought that the Commission might recommend the acceptance of the Japanese amendment but that as regards the separate note and especially a political condition which the Chinese Government was not free to accept as it was not in conformity with the Assembly's resolution.

Sato then initiated a discussion on the question of the role and competence of the special committee. He whether inquired/it would confine itself to recording the progress of the

MET

5-#124 from Geneva, March 18,  
10 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

of the work or whether it intended also to lay down guiding principles for the negotiations. As regards the latter he did not consider that such action fell within its competence and asked for an explanation.

Motta in reply stated that it would be difficult to define accurately and completely the role of the committee. Two points, however, were clear (first) that the committee could not direct the negotiations nor deal with the details but (second) as it was the organ of the Assembly it was bound, if appraised of facts contrary to the Assembly resolution/<sup>to</sup>proclaim that these facts were contrary to its decisions. Thus by way of example he stated that it was possible to declare that the separate note discussed above contained a condition contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Assembly's resolution.

The Chairman agreed with Motta and thought that the committee would be unanimous in holding this point of view. As the committee had been delegated by the Assembly it must supervise the execution of its resolutions but it was not its duty to dictate the terms of the armistice which must

be

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

6-#124 from Geneva, March 18,  
10 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

be negotiated by the parties on the spot with the assistance of neutral powers. The committee must supervise the observance of the spirit and the letter of the Assembly's resolutions and must stand ready to respond if appealed to.

At the close of the discussion Yen expressed satisfaction with the Commission's interpretation of the Japanese amendment and the separate note and intimated that he would cable his Government on these points. He then brought up the question of the discussion of the boycott at the Shanghai conference which had been discussed previously by Sato. He called attention to the fact that boycotting existed not only in Shanghai but in the whole of China and stated that it formed a part of the whole of the Chinese-Japanese dispute and would cease to exist as soon as Japan had withdrawn her troops from Shanghai. He reiterated that the Chinese Government had not prohibited the purchase of Japanese wares but it was the Chinese people that had refused to buy them and that boycotting would cease naturally after the settlement of the dispute by the League. He therefore objected to having it stated that the question

would be

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

7-#124 from Geneva, March 18,  
10 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

would be dealt with at the Shanghai conference since this would convey the impression that the conference had been summoned to deal with this, which was not the case.

The Chairman then intervened by stating that the Shanghai conference would have to handle everything touching the restoration of peace and that the members of the conference would themselves have to consider whether boycotting fell under this heading.

Sato expressed disagreement with the Chinese delegate and insisted that it was essential that the question of boycotting be discussed at the Shanghai conference in order to speed up its termination. The public meeting ended at this point.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GILBERT

KLP-WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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REP

DEPT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
110 K02  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS

FROM PLAIN

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 19, 1932

Rec'd 7:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FOR EASTERN DEPARTS  
MAR 19 1932  
Department of State

March 19, 1 p. m.

Joint situation report number eleven March nineteenth:

"One. Embarkation of one Japanese mixed brigade for  
Japan continues.

Two. Commander Nineteenth Route Army protests to  
neutral observers against the continued flights of Japanese  
aircraft beyond the Shirakawa patrol zone. Reports from  
Chinese sources that civilians have been injured owing to  
fire from aeroplanes have not been verified."

JOHNSON

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**MICROCOPY**

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**ROLL**

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