

MICROCOPY

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 18

1930-39

793.94/5021-5175
Mar.-May 1932



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECD



No. 121.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
COM. & A.

Hankow, China, March 15, 1932.

APR 9 32

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Subject: Undeclared Sino-Japanese War.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to supplement my political report covering February, 1932, by enclosing herewith a copy, in quintuplicate, of my report No. 97 of March 15, 1932, addressed to the Legation at Peiping on the subject of "Undeclared Sino-Japanese War."

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

American Consul General, Hankow, to American Legation, Peiping, L. No. 97, March 15, 1932, with 3 sub-enclosures.

In quintuplicate.

800

WAA:TMC

F/DEW

793.94/5021

8 16 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

L. No. 97.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Hankow, China, March 15, 1932.

Subject: Undeclared Sino-Japanese War.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to supplement my political
report covering February, 1932, by enclosing
herewith the Chinese texts and English translations
of the following correspondence:

- (1) Letter, dated March 4, 1932, from the
Japanese Consul General, Hankow, to
General Hsia Tou-yin, Garrison Commander
for Wuhan, Hankow,
- (2) Letter, dated March 6, 1932, from General
Hsia Tou-yin, Wuhan Garrison Commander,
Hankow, to the Japanese Consul General,
Hankow,
- (3) Circular letter, dated March 10, 1932,
issued by the Wuhan Garrison Headquarters,
Hankow.

The Chinese texts of the above correspondence
have just been obtained by a member of the staff
of this Consulate General.

Despite the strong wording of the letter from
the Japanese Consul General to General Hsia Tou-yin,
the letter is not considered by the Chinese authorities
here to constitute an ultimatum. The letter is nearly
two weeks old, and there are still no indications of a
disturbance

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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disturbance at Wuhan involving the Japanese and Chinese. Accordingly, I am not telegraphing the information contained in the above letters to the Department of State. The short time required for the despatch of mail from Hankow to Peiping will enable the Legation, without undue delay, to telegraph the information contained in the correspondence to the Department if the Legation deems that to be desirable.

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.


Enclosures:

3 as stated.

In duplicate to the Legation at Peiping,
In quintuplicate to the Department (no Chinese texts),
Copy to Commander of Yangtze Patrol, Hankow (ditto),
Copy to American Consulate General, Shanghai (ditto),
Copy to American Consulate General, Nanking (ditto).

800

WAA/MYH



300

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

Translation.

Mr. J. Sakane, Japanese Consul General, Hankow, to
General Hsia Tou-yin, Garrison Commander for Wuhan,
Hankow.

Dated March 4, 1932.

Sir:

Ever since the Manchurian affair Japanese merchants residing at Hankow have experienced much difficulty in the transaction of their business; this is due to obstruction caused by anti-Japanese organizations, with the result that during the past half year they could not trade regularly. Recently the Shanghai affair was settled, but the anti-Japanese organizations in this municipality are still preventing business relations with the Japanese merchants. Now a number of the Japanese merchants resident at Hankow have reported to this Consulate General stating that they being unable to transact business as usual are suffering very much, and I feel extreme anxiety for them. Should this condition continue indefinitely, it would be difficult to imagine if the Japanese residents here should take direct action for self-protection, or the Japanese Navy at Hankow for the protection of the business of the Japanese merchants here should be obliged to start an unfortunate incident to the anti-Japanese organizations mentioned above. Moreover the Shanghai incident was caused by the obstruction raised by the anti-Japanese organizations there. If measures were not taken at this port to maintain the trade between China and Japan as in the past, the Shanghai incident may be taken as an example.

The recent status of the anti-Japanese movement in Wuhan has become much worse than in the past. Ever since the dissolution of the Anti-Japanese Society the various anti-Japanese organizations under directions of the Party Chapters are secretly and methodically continuing their work to the detriment of the Japanese trade.

During the past days local papers published in Chinese have fabricated libelous news items in the hope of creating ill feeling among the community in the anti-Japanese movement. Therefore on public streets and thoroughfares not a few anti-Japanese pictures have recently been posted; among these is one depicting Japanese soldiers insulting a Chinese woman. The Japanese Navy at Hankow is extremely indignant about it. Should this exist, it is sincerely feared that an unfortunate incident similar to that at Shanghai will occur. I have always done my best in taking steps to stop the indignation on the part of local Japanese in the hope of maintaining peace and order. But in view of the circumstances described above I am afraid that our efforts in the past will become a bubble, for which result I cannot assume responsibility.

I would request that you will take more strenuous efforts in enforcing the restricting measures of the past.

0004

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Translation.

General Hsia Tou-yin, Wuhan Garrison Commander, Hankow,
to Mr. J. Sakane, Japanese Consul General, Hankow.

Dated March 6, 1932.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
your letter No. 30 of March 4, reading as follows:

(See letter attached hereto)

Your letter states that "the Japanese residents here should take direct action for self-protection". I am greatly surprised to read it. Ever since the incident of September 18, although the community of this municipality have been vehement in expressing their patriotism, yet under the efforts put forth by this Headquarters for maintenance of order, they have not done anything irregular, and this Headquarters has been extremely careful in protecting your nationals resident here; this is witnessed by all the world. During the past few months no incident whatever, like the assault of a Japanese subject or the attack on a Japanese shop, has taken place. Even if by any chance an incident occurred, it should be justly and equitably adjusted by the authorities of the two countries. Therefore there is no cause for any direct action on the part of the Japanese residents, nor is there any reason whatever for any Japanese residents to take any direct action. The Japanese residents at Hankow are all intelligent persons, and moreover they are under your responsible leadership; therefore no direct action which is not reasonable or lawful can possibly arise.

The impossibility for the Japanese merchants to transact business regularly during the past half a year was due to popular feeling and military operations, because business transactions between two nationals are based on friendly relations, and successful trade depends on peace. Therefore I sincerely hope that the nationals of the two countries will quickly restore their friendly relations and that the Japanese army will stop its invasion so that a genuine equality and friendly relations may be obtained; then the merchants of the two countries will be mutually benefitted.

You also state that anti-Japanese organizations under the secret direction of the Party Chapters are still working in the dark. I have investigated and found that this is not true. Although India has perished, yet the Indians are still boycotting (British goods) openly. The citizens of this country in an attempt to restore the friendly relations between the two nations have voluntarily removed the anti-Japanese organizations; there is no necessity for any secret movement to continue.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

You also mention anti-Japanese pictures in which Japanese troops are shown to be insulting a Chinese woman. I have made a wide investigation, and I have not found any of them. This may be due to a mistake made by your reporter who has been misinformed.

With regard to the war news on the Sino-Japanese war published in local newspapers, the facts will of course prove whether they are correct or not. Inasmuch as war conditions change greatly in a glance, and as Hankow is distant from Shanghai, not only the reports in Chinese newspapers differ occasionally, but Japanese and British newspapers frequently come under the same condition. In fact these points do not deserve our attention.

I regret very much that the excessive statements made by the Japanese merchants who have been upset by the sufferings due to a suspension of their business have brought forth the strict statements contained in your letter under acknowledgment. But adhering to my peace-permeating spirit I express the hope that you will kindly advise your nationals and the Japanese Navy at Hankow jointly to maintain peace and order, so that the friendly and cordial relations which have existed between the authorities, soldiers, and nationals of the two countries for a number of years at Hankow may become more satisfactory. This is my earnest hope.

00006

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Translation

A circular letter issued by the Wuhan Garrison Headquarters,
Hankow.

Dated March 10, 1932.

Gentlemen:

During the past few days a rumor concerning the serious situation in foreign relations suddenly was circulated in the Wuhan community. It became worse when it was spread, and caused greater speculation on the part of the community. In fact the rumor is absolutely without any basis.

On the 6th instant this Headquarters received an unofficial letter, without either an official seal or a private chop, from the Japanese Consul at Hankow (See attached letter). On the same date this Headquarters made a reply thereto on the basis of reason. Inasmuch as such a letter is not a formal diplomatic note, there is no necessity to make it public; therefore it was not delivered to newspapers for publication. During the past few days more rumors have been spread in the community, and they have confused the facts. Therefore I have quoted the Japanese Consul's letter and this Headquarters' reply thereto, in full, for your information and would request that you notify the persons interested so that the rumors may be stopped.

Signature of Hsia Tou-yin, Commander.

Enclosures:

1. Letter from the Japanese Consul,
2. This Headquarters' Reply.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via NR

Dated April 12, 1932

Recd 3:50 a.m.

F/HS

793.94/5022

Secretary of State

Washington.

PRIORITY.

April 12, 9 a.m.

Your 136, April 11, 5 p.m.

Meeting planned for yesterday 3 p.m. did not

take place as Quo informed us he had no instructions

from Nanking. No date set for the next meeting.



JOHNSON

JS CIB

APR 19 1932

FILED

793.94
note
893.102-S

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased beFROM
fore being communicated
to anyone.

SHANGHAI

Dated April 12, 1932

Rec'd 5:55 a. m.

Secretary of State, APR 12 1932

Washington.

April 12, 5 p. m.

My April 12, 9 a. m.


I have just seen Quo who tells me that he has
telegraphed again urging Yen to obtain an interpretation
to be used in connection with the agreement if a time
limit cannot be obtained. He showed me a number of
telegrams from Geneva indicating reactions there.
Chinese apparently desire to take advantage of meeting
of League committee which was to have met on the 11th.
For the moment interest lies in attitude of League
and negotiations here are indefinitely postponed. Quo
hopes to have instructions within a fortnight.

Lampson informs me that he has booked passage to
return to Peiping via Nanking leaving here on Saturday
April 16th. He has asked me whether I have any plans.
I propose to remain in Shanghai until I am satisfied
that there is definitely no further need for me to
remain.

JOHNSON

VS8

KLP



0005

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

PM TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

April 14, 1932.

5pm

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China)

FOR THE MINISTER.

Your April 12, 5 p. m.

Department heartily approves your decision to remain at

Shanghai as per last sentence your telegram under reference
and last sentence Department's 122, March 29, 6 p.m. In
view of latest press despatches regarding Japanese diplomatic
action at Shanghai and developments at Geneva, it is believed
that your departure from Shanghai should not repeat not co-
incide with or too closely follow that of the British Minister.

Therefore, in case you find it necessary ^{for prompt and effective} carrying out
instruction contained in Department's 140, April 13, 6 p. m.,
to go to Nanking, you should in advance give out a press state-
ment that you are going to Nanking on the Baker case and that
you will return to Shanghai within a few days.

FE:SKH/MMH:EMU

FE

Castle, Acting

SKH

APR 14 1932 PM

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/5023

793.94/5023

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note
393.1111-
Baker. Shantung.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 13, 1932.

~~Mr. Clegg:~~

~~Mr. Glavin:~~

~~Mr. Ladd:~~

~~Mr. Nichols:~~

~~Mr. Rosen:~~

~~Mr. Tracy:~~

~~Mr. Carson:~~

~~Mr. Egan:~~

~~Mr. Gurnea:~~

~~Mr. Hendon:~~

~~Mr. Jones:~~

~~Mr. Quinn:~~

~~Mr. Nease:~~

~~Mr. Gurnea:~~

~~Mr. Ladd:~~

~~Mr. Nichols:~~

~~Mr. Rosen:~~

~~Mr. Tracy:~~

~~Mr. Carson:~~

~~Mr. Egan:~~

~~Mr. Gurnea:~~

~~Mr. Hendon:~~

~~Mr. Jones:~~

~~Mr. Quinn:~~

~~Mr. Nease:~~

~~Mr. Gurnea:~~

~~Mr. Ladd:~~

~~Mr. Nichols:~~

~~Mr. Rosen:~~

~~Mr. Tracy:~~

~~Mr. Carson:~~

~~Mr. Egan:~~

~~Mr. Gurnea:~~

~~Mr. Hendon:~~

Consul General Hanson transmits here-
with a sample of an Anti-Japanese circular
which is being distributed in Harbin. See
the translation of the circular attached to
the despatch. I suppose that it is activities
of this kind which are fostering anti-
Japanese opposition in Manchuria and causing
the Japanese much trouble.



JEJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECD
NO. 5353
DEPT. OF STATE
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
HARBIN CHINA, March 16, 1932.

F/E
a-etc

APR 11 32

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SUBJECT: ANTI-JAPANESE PROPAGANDA.
THIS ADVISORY
2/3
7861
THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 12 1932
Department of State

F/HS

793.94/5024

FILED
APR 20 1932

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith copies
of my despatch No. 2336 of March 16, 1932, to the
Legation in Peiping, on the subject of "Anti-Japanese
Propaganda," together with its enclosures.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

✓ Enclosure:

1/ Copy of despatch No. 2336 of March 16, 1932,
to the Legation in Peiping (Single copy only of
the second sub-enclosure in Chinese).

800
CBG/th

IN QUINTUPPLICATE.

0012

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 2336

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, March 16, 1932.

SUBJECT: ANTI-JAPANESE PROPAGANDA.

The Honorable

Helson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose a translation of an anti-Japanese circular received by this Consulate General through the mails on March 14, 1932, the cover being addressed to me personally in English. It was evidently posted locally. The Chinese
- 2/ original, a single copy of which is likewise enclosed, is written in a rather crude Chinese long hand, apparently stencilled on unofficial letter paper, headed with the portrait and will of Dr. Sun Yat Sen. With it was enclosed a sheet inscribed with anti-Japanese doggerel verses in Chinese.

The circular, over the grandiose title of "The North China Headquarters of the Revolutionary Army" would appear to be the handiwork of some Chinese student organization. It is being transmitted as indicative

- of the -

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of the type of anti-Japanese literature which this
Consulate General has reason to believe has a wide
circulation in this district.

Respectfully yours,
G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

1. Anti-Japanese circular;
2. Chinese original of the circular, copy of.
(single copy)

800
GBC/th

Original and copy to the Legation;
5 copies to the Department of State;
1 copy to the Embassy at Tokyo;
1 copy to the Consulate General at Nankin.

True copy of
the original.

/

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Translated by SCC
Checked by GBC

Circular issued by the North China Headquarters of the
Revolutionary Army.

Dated: March 10, 1932. Rec'd: March 14, 1932.

SUBJECT: ANTI-JAPANESE PROPAGANDA.

The organization of the People's Revolutionary Army of this country has as its object the promotion of welfare for all nations, the acquisition of freedom and equality for the Chinese people and the prevention of another world war. It will work for the downfall of the Japanese imperialism, which has ever been encroaching upon and persecuting the Chinese people, and it will do away with the "Ta Tung" traitors, who form an illegal body to serve Japanese interests. It will in the near future restore to this country the lost territory in North China, as well as Port Arthur and Dairen, which is considered as a very important task. When necessary, detective, assassinating, poisoning, bombing and supervising bodies will be sent out to commence operations. During this period no assistance should be rendered to the traitors. When this Government is established, equal and reciprocal treaties will be concluded, which will benefit the whole world. This circular is issued for your information.

本國民革命軍之成立爲謀世界民族之幸福與中華民族之自由平等殲除
第二次世界大戰爲宗旨打倒侵略無靈期的暴虐中華民族的日帝國主義
重打倒爲日利用的不法組織的大同運賊在最近期內恢復華北國土收還
版圖大進海爲最要急務必要時由探訪隊毒藥隊破壞隊監察隊等即日行
動在此期內切勿助進須待本政府成立另訂平等互惠條約世界民族有厚
幸矣特此通知

華北革命軍總司令部啓三月十日

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


NO. 102

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Foochow, China, March 14, 1932.

SUBJECT:
1-1065 GPO

COMPLAINT OF JAPANESE AUTHORITIES AGAINST
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY CHINESE STUDENTS
OF AMERICAN MISSIONARY SCHOOL.



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



793.94/50257

PM RECD
SIR

793.94/2917
note
393.1164

I have the honor to refer to this Consulate's
despatch No. 52 of October 30, 1931 concerning anti-
Japanese demonstrations by students of the Fukien
Christian University, and to enclose for the informa-
tion of the Department a copy, in quintuplicate, of
this Consulate's despatch No. 58 of today's date to
the American Minister at Peiping, China, entitled
"Complaint of Japanese Authorities against Political
Activities by Chinese Students of American Missionary
School."

Respectfully yours,

G. L. Burke

Gordon L. Burke,
American Vice Consul.

Enclosure:

Mr. Burke to Mr. Johnson, dated
March 14, 1932.

700
GLB/HCY

In quintuplicate.

101

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 102 of Gordon L. Burke,
American vice consul at Foochow, China, dated March 14,
1932, on the subject "Complaint of Japanese Authorities
against Political Activities by Chinese Students of
American Missionary School."
No. 58

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Foochow, China, March 14, 1932.

Subject: COMPLAINT OF JAPANESE AUTHORITIES
AGAINST POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY
CHINESE STUDENT OF AMERICAN MIS-
SIONARY SCHOOL.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's
instruction, dated February 1, 1932, and to this
Consulate's despatch No. 52 of October 30, 1931 to
the Department concerning anti-Japanese demonstra-
tions by students of the Fukien Christian University.
Particular reference is made to that part of the
Department's instruction No. 654 of December 22, 1931
to the Legation, which formed an enclosure to the
Legation's above-mentioned instruction to this Con-
sulate, stating that it seems to the Department that,
rather than to have written to the President of the
University, Mr. Burke should in the premises have
replied to the Japanese Consul General, stating that
the Fukien Christian University, although financed in
part by American funds, thereby creating an American
interest, is administered and controlled by the
Chinese, and that as the question involved in this
case was one of administration it would seem that

complaints,

0018

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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complaints, if any, should be addressed to the administrative authorities.

In reply, the Legation is respectfully informed that the Japanese Consul General's strong protest was made over the telephone and not by letter, as stated in the Department's instruction No. 654 of December 22, 1931. As mentioned in the foregoing despatch of this office, the Japanese Consul General made his protest in the belief that the Fukien Christian University was an American controlled institution. The Consul General stated that he would "take positive and drastic measures (using the word shoot) to see that they (the demonstrations) were not again repeated." At that time there was a guard of about forty Japanese sailors stationed in the Japanese Consulate General and in a building just across the street from it. The Japanese Consul General also stated that he might not be able to withstrain these sailors from firing. The situation was tense and the writer realized that the Japanese meant business. He also feared that the Chinese authorities might either procrastinate, or be unable to check the activities of the Tang Pu - the instigators of student demonstrations. Prompt and definite action was imperative to afford the lives of American men, women, and children all the protection possible. Immediately after the above-mentioned telephone conversation the writer called on American citizens connected with American institutions of learning located on Nantai Island, and informed them orally of the situation, and left the handling of the question to their discretion. The Fukien Christian University, however,

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is several miles down the river, and furthermore has no telephone communication with Foochow. The quickest and surest means of communication was by post.

There is enclosed a copy of this Consulate's letter, dated January 20, 1932, to the heads - all of whom are Chinese - of the institutions of learning in Foochow operated by American Missions. This letter was drawn up in consultation with Bishop John Cowdy of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Both Bishop Cowdy and the writer were of the opinion that this letter was necessary for the protection of American property. The writer had decided to address this letter to Americans connected with the various schools, but upon being advised by Bishop Cowdy that it would strengthen the hands of the Chinese principals, the letter was addressed to the Chinese heads of the schools. The Legation's attention is very respectfully invited to the following quotations:

1. Page 3 of the Department's instruction No. 871 of May 23, 1928, to the Legation, which formed an enclosure to the Legation's circular No. 252 of June 28, 1928:

"The Department would deprecate, for instance, a statement so categorical as the following, contained in a letter dated July 12, 1927, from the Consul at Foochow, addressed to 'All Mission Schools, Foochow' and transmitted with the despatch already referred to:

'Subject to instructions to the contrary, I am prepared to state that any institution registered under the regulations cited is entirely Chinese, and, as such, has no right to the recognition or assistance of the American Government.'

2. Page 5 of the Department's instruction No. 1402 of

November

1020

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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November 15, 1929 to the Legation, which formed an enclosure to the Legation's circular No. 403 of January 11, 1930:

"They should be advised that, although the Department takes with regard to questions of educational administration the view set forth in this instruction, it desires that the vigilance of its officers in the protection of the unquestionable rights, including property rights, of American citizens and organizations engaged in educational projects in China be in no way relaxed."

American missionaries have in the main been of the same mind as, and have cooperated with the writer in this most difficult question of preventing American interests from suffering through reckless student demonstrations, which the legitimate authorities assert that they are endeavoring to control, and which the Tang Pu instigate. (There have been no student demonstrations for the past two months.) American missionary institutions have a definite American interest, which seem to carry with it a certain responsibility. On numerous occasions Americans connected with Mission schools have approached the writer with the request that the Japanese Consul General be informed of the difficulties facing those in authority (the Chinese) in the schools. The writer has unofficially and orally done as requested, and has always found the Japanese Consul General a sympathetic listener. The Japanese Consul General has in turn unofficially asked that these school authorities be informed of his complaints. The writer has done this through Americans connected with the schools concerned. The writer feels

that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that by keeping the confidence of both the authorities of American missionary educational institutions and the Japanese Consul General, and by taking unofficial action, he has been able to explain away many trivial pin pricks, which might otherwise have become magnified; thereby protecting American lives and property to the fullest extent. The results thus far appear to have justified this action. If the writer had replied to the Japanese Consul General in writing (the status of American missionary institutions of learning was explained in detail orally to the Japanese Consul General by the writer) denying any responsibility in the matter, neither the American mission school authorities nor the Japanese authorities would thereafter have consulted this office. This Consulate would then have lost entire control of and contact with the situation. Then it would not have been able to exert a moderating influence; thereby causing American lives and property to be endangered.

It would seem that the various instructions which pertain to the question of jurisdiction over educational institutions under Chinese administration and control had in mind the American Government vis-a-vis the Chinese Government, and did not contemplate the interjection of a third party, which the present Sino-Japanese conflict has resulted in. The problem which occurred to the writer was that should he disclaim any responsibility in the premises, what action could be taken in the event the Chinese authorities failed to exercise control and the Japanese then invaded American property; a contingency which appears rather remote at the present

writing,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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writing, but not at the time of the emergency.

The Legation's instruction under acknowledgment will be complied with in the future. This Consulate will, however, continue to extend its good offices in such matters, unless otherwise instructed.

Respectfully yours,


Gordon L. Burke,
American Vice Consul.

Enclosure:

Copy of letter, dated January 20, 1932, addressed to the Chinese heads of American educational institutions.

700
GLB/HCY

In quintuplicate to the Department.



002

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 58 of Gordon L. Burke,
American vice consul at Foochow, China, dated March
14, 1932, on the subject "Complaint of Japanese
Authorities Against Political Activities by Chinese
Students of American Missionary School."

American Consulate, Foochow, China, January 20, 1932.

To the Chinese Heads of
American Educational Institutions,
Foochow.

Sirs:

It has been brought to the attention of this
Consulate that certain persons have in the past made
it a practice to trespass on property, registered
in this Consulate as American owned and used for
educational purposes, with the view to inciting the
students by various methods of propaganda. This
Consulate is further informed that this has often
been done without the knowledge of the heads of the
institutions concerned.

Since student disturbances are likely to
endanger the property on which they occur, it is
requested that you take prompt and effective measures
to see that no person, whose purpose is to incite
the students, be permitted to enter your premises.
Should such persons continue in their attempts to
trespass on your property, you are requested promptly
to inform this Consulate thereof, and measures will
be taken to prevent such illegal action. In order
to put in force the foregoing, it is requested that
your gate-keeper be instructed to obtain the cards of
any such persons that may apply for admission, and that
these cards be forwarded to this office. Any person
refusing to give his card should be prohibited from
trespassing upon the premises.

In the event of any trouble ensuing - which is
very unlikely - please promptly inform this Consulate.

Very truly yours,

Gordon L. Burke,
American Vice Consul.

350
GLB/HCY

702
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94116/7 FOR Despatch # 8158.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED March 10, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Bombing by Japanese airplanes of flooded
refugees' camp on February 5, 6 and 7, 1932.

hs

793.94/5026

702
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Shanghai/44 FOR Despatch # 8159.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED March 8, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.
Crisis in the - came to a head on the
night of January 28th, when Japanese
forces landed and proceeded to occupy a
portion of Chapei.

793.94/5027

hs

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

written Shanghai has gone through one of the most, if not the most, critical period in its history, as a result of Sino-Japanese relations and subsequent hostilities. The crisis came to a head on the night of January 28th, when Japanese forces landed and proceeded to occupy a portion of Chapei. This event relegated all other local affairs to the background and this report will be confined to the local Sino-Japanese situation and its various concomitant problems.

In attempting to evaluate the causes and provocation which the Japanese may have had leading up to their action on January 28th, this report will merely set forth the various local incidents and causes leading up to the clash and will not attempt to speculate on what may have motivated

102
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.P. Shanghai/44 FOR Despatch # 8159.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED March 8, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Publication of article to the effect that
Japanese marines had been concerned in
setting fire to the San Yu Towel Factory
which resulted in a clash between the
Chinese police and Japanese civilians on
the morning of January 20th.
Assault on Japanese monks by Chinese
workers.

793.94/5028

1028
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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instruct the paper to publish a statement canceling the sub-heading and expressing the paper's regret.

The paper again ran afoul of the Japanese through the publication of an article to the effect that Japanese marines had been concerned in setting fire to the San Yu Towel Factory which resulted in a clash between the Chinese police and Japanese civilians on the morning of January 26th and which is referred to below. Fearing that the Japanese marines would take direct action against the paper the Shanghai Municipal police closed it on January 26th, after which the premises were guarded by police. This incident is reported in detail, as it has been referred to in Japanese reports as having stirred the Japanese community both here and abroad to a high pitch of indignation.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

ASSAULT UPON JAPANESE MONKS:

A second incident which has been made much of in Japanese reports is the assault on January 18th on two Japanese monks and three of their lay followers by Chinese workers in the Ying Hsiang Kong district just outside Settlement limits. These five Japanese were passing the San Yu Towel Factory and were attacked by a crowd of Chinese. Two of the Japanese were seriously injured while the other three escaped with slight injuries. One of those seriously injured died a few days later.

OTHER CLASHES:

From this point on events began to move with great rapidity. Disturbances and demonstrations took place daily in the Settlement but the initiative in these

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/121 FOR #1441

FROM China (Perkins) DATED March 17, 1932
TO NAME 1-1137 ...

REGARDING: Declaration issued by head of the National Government
repudiating present organizations of Manchuria and
holding Japan responsible.

Gives full text of the - from a newspaper source.

793.94/5029

kfc

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/45 FOR Despatch # 91. (# 137 to Legation).

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED March 8, 1938.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Shanghai situation.
Local newspapers have given much space
to the - and the editorial comment is
distinctly favorable to the Chinese side
of the controversy.

hs

793.945030

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chastain NARS, Date 12-18-75

Local newspapers, both foreign and vernacular, have devoted many columns of space to the situation at Shanghai. Editorial comment in the foreign press is distinctly favorable to the Chinese side of the controversy. While sympathy among the foreign population in general cannot be said to be wholly centered on the Chinese side, there is undoubtedly a preponderance of such sentiment in favor of the Chinese. Foreigners who follow the trend of political events in China admit that so long as the present tense situation prevails at Shanghai there is little chance for any factional wars between the Chinese.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A15 A4/977 FOR Memo.

FROM State Department, S (Stimson) DATED April 7, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

793.94/5031

REGARDING:

Conversation with Japanese Ambassador who inquired whether
 the Secretary's trip to Geneva was to link disarmament with the Far East.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.0011/77 FOR Tel#10am

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED April 11, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING:

Japanese Consul General's oral demand on the Mayor of Canton in connection with articles published in a local newspaper that were derogatory to the Imperial House.

ek

793.94/5032

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

GRAY

Canton via N. R.

Dated April 11, 1932

Rec'd 1:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

April 11, 10 a. m.

The following telegram was delayed due to the absence of an American gunboat finally it was sent to Hong Kong but the gunboat returned before receiving it.

April 7, 5 p. m. Japanese Consul General informs me that he has orally presented to the Mayor four demands in connection with an article derogatory to the Imperial House, which was published yesterday in a vernacular newspaper and which he believes was deliberately inspired by political opponents of the local administration in order to embarrass it. The demands which are not in the form of an ultimatum, call for an apology by the Mayor, punishment of the editor, publication by the paper of an apology and suspension of the newspaper. The Consul General is hopeful of a settlement but intimates that his Government may take a strong attitude if satisfaction is not obtained in two or three weeks.

Repeated to Department, Legation and Nanking.

BALLANTINE

RR - WWC

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.102 S/1071 FOR # 8155

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED March 11, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

793.94/5035

REGARDING:

Minutes of the Consular Body meetings in which the question of pilotage service to Japanese warships and transports, the use of the International Settlement as a base of operations by the Japanese, and the maintenance of trade and shipping, were discussed.

ek

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Shanghai, China, March 11, 1932.

minutes of Consular Body Meetings:
 Pilotage Service to Japanese Warships
 and Transports: Use by Japanese Forces
 of International Settlement as Base of
 Operations: Maintenance of Trade and
 Shipping

1/2/

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of minutes of Consular Body meetings held on February 17 and 26 respectively. It is believed these minutes will be of interest to the Department and the Legation.

The meeting of February 17th discussed the pilotage question, which was the subject of my telegrams of February 16, 3 p.m. and of February 18, 4 p.m. to the Legation (No. 59 of February 16, 3 p.m. and No. 70 of February 18, 4 p.m. to the Department). Other subjects discussed at this meeting were the use of the International Settlement as a base of operations by Japanese forces, the flight of Japanese military airplanes over the Settlement, and the maintenance of trade and shipping of various countries during the crisis. These subjects have been referred to in various telegrams and despatches from this office.

The

7035
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-E-

The meeting of February 26th discussed a letter from Mayor Wu Te-chun dated February 24, 1932, protesting against the use by the Japanese authorities of the International Settlement as a base of operations and asking that foreign nationals and ships be evacuated from the war zone (see telegram No. 106, February 24, 11 p.m. to the Department). The question of pilotage was also discussed at this meeting.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

1/2 Copy of minutes of Consular Body
meetings held February 17, 1932,
and February 26, 1932.

A true copy of
the signed ori-
ginal
PAJ:MA
801

In duplicate.

In triplicate to Legation.

0040

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CIRCULAR NO. 67-G-V.)

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF CONSULAR BODY MEETING, FEBRUARY 17, 1962.

THE SENIOR CONSUL PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS HONORABLE COLLEAGUES AND HAS THE HONOR TO CIRCULATE THE FOLLOWING MINUTES OF CONSULAR BODY SPECIAL MEETING HELD AT THE AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL ON WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1962, COMMENCING AT 12: 11. FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

Present:

Consul General for U.S.A. & S.C.	-E. S. Cunningham, Esquire,
Consul General for Norway	-N. Aall, Esquire,
Consul General for Belgium	-J. Van Haute, Esquire,
Consul General for Sweden	-J. de Lilliehöök, Esquire,
Consul General for France	-E. Koechlin, Esquire,
Consul General for Great Britain	-J. F. Brennan, Esquire, C.M.G.,
Consul General for Denmark	-Ove Lunn, Esquire,
Consul General for Japan	-K. Murai, Esquire,
Consul General for Spain	-E. V. Ferrer, Esquire,
Consul General for Portugal	-Dr. J. B. Ferreira da Silva,
Consul General for Chile	-Carlos Beccerra, Esquire,
Consul General for Switzerland	-E. Lardy, Esquire,
Vice Consul for Italy	-Count G. Bono,
Secretary in Charge of Consulate for Czechoslovakia	-K. Malinovsky, Esquire,
In Charge, Polish Delegation, Consular Section	-J. Krysinski, Esquire.

PILOTAGE SERVICE

The Senior Consul said the first item he would like his colleagues to consider was that forming the subject of the communications in circular No. 62-E-IV, regarding pilotage service to Japanese warships and transports. As he viewed it, the subject fell under two headings, namely,

(a) whether or not the Consular Body wished to support the wishes of the Chinese Government as expressed in the Inspector-General of Customs' letter of February 13,

(b) if so, whether or not a meeting of the General Pilotage Authority should be convened, and assuming the answer to be in the affirmative the attitude the Consular Body as a unit should adopt at that meeting.

The Consul General for Germany (Consular representative on the Pilot Board) said that in his opinion the request of the Inspector General of Customs should not be complied with. His view is that the Pilots' Association is a private concern the members of which were obliged to obey the orders of the Harbor Master only in certain aspects of their service such as those connected with the safety and welfare of the harbor and of shipping therein. As he conceived it the Chinese Government, or its organ, the Chinese Maritime Customs, were not entitled to give the Pilots Association orders of the kind implied in the Inspector General's letter. If any authority had the power to give such orders it was, in his submission, the General Pilotage Authority. He

thought

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

thought the General Pilotage Authority should discuss the matter as, among other things, the pilots should be protected from possible consequences which might arise from their refusal to accede to the Chinese Government's wishes as revealed in the Inspector General's letter.

The Senior Consul enquired whether or not he was correct in his understanding that his German Colleague, wished the Consular Body, as a member of the General Pilotage Authority, to take the attitude that it was not in favor of transmitting the purport of the Inspector General's letter to the Pilots Association.

The Consul General for Germany replied in the affirmative but reiterated that in adopting the attitude the Consular Body should at the same time take on the responsibility of protecting the pilots from the possible consequences of it.

Continuing he said he could understand the Chinese Government assuming a position of authority in this matter had that Government taken over the pilotage service as it had often declared its intention to do. However neither the Chinese Government or any of its organs had contributed to the income of the pilots and therefore he thought its rights and duties should be limited to those pertaining to traffic and other harbor or waterway conditions.

The Consul General for Belgium enquired whether or not any question was decided by a majority vote at meetings of the General Pilotage Authority and if the Consular Body had only one vote at such meetings. The Consul-General for Germany replied in the affirmative to both questions, remarking that these points had been settled in 1930.

Answering a query from the Senior Consul the Consul General for Germany said he did not think it would be necessary for the Inspector General's proposal to be first discussed by the Pilot Board. The pilotage regulations had no specific provision on this point of preliminary discussion by the Pilot Board but only mentioned that when a unanimous decision could not be reached by the Pilot Board the matter was to be referred to the General Pilotage Authority.

The Consul General for Denmark enquired as to the attitude of the pilots vis-a-vis the Inspector General's proposal, and received the reply from his German colleague that he was not in a position to disclose information on that point without authority as he was informed confidentially concerning it.

The Senior Consul read the letter of February 14, from the Consul General for Japan (circular No. 62-E-IV) and remarked that his Japanese colleague does not intimate the Chinese Government are taking definite action, his complaint being based, apparently, on a rumor.

The

The Consul General for Germany rejoined that the Consular Body alone was not competent to determine whether or not the General Pilotage Authority could or could not give orders to the Pilotage Authority. That was a question which would have to be decided by all the members of the General Pilotage Authority.

The Consul General for Sweden said he was of the opinion that the Consular Body should take a definite position with regard to the piloting into Shanghai by members of the Pilots' Association, of Japanese war ships and vessels carrying war material. As a matter of fact a state of war existed between China and Japan and in his view the services of the Pilots' Association in piloting such vessels was inconsistent with Settlement neutrality.

The Consul General for Norway said that speaking for himself he would be obliged to dissociate himself from any move designed to prevent ships of a friendly Power (i.e. friendly to Norway) from engaging pilotage services.

The Consul General for Great Britain remarked in connection with this statement that the question before the meeting was not what individual nations would do with regard to the piloting of Japanese ships, but whether or not the Consular Body, as a member of the General Pilotage Authority could or could not support the proposal of the Inspector General of Customs.

The Consul General for Norway rejoined that nevertheless if all his colleagues shared the view he had intimated, it would then be the view of the entire Consular Body.

The Consul General for Great Britain said that if the General Pilotage Authority accepts the Inspector General's request and instructs the pilots not to pilot Japanese vessels, the implication would be that the General Pilotage Authority considers Japan to be a belligerent Power. Whatever the national sympathies might be in the present conflict, as a legal state of war did not exist, he did not personally think the Consular Body, as an international body, could support any such instruction to the pilots.

The Consul General for Belgium enquired whether or not it would be possible to avoid the issue, to which the Consul General for Germany gave his opinion in the negative adding that it would leave the pilots in a very difficult position. The pilots Association existed to give pilotage service and should not be forced to take sides in a political conflict. They should also be protected from possible penalties which may be inflicted on them by the Chinese Government.

The Consul General for Great Britain said he did not agree with his German colleague on his last statement. If the Chinese Government adopted punitive measures against the pilots for not submitting to its wishes, it was for the individual pilot to appeal to his national authorities for redress. They had as yet no reason to assert that penalties would

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individual consuls could reserve judgment on the point.

The Senior Consul agreed with these remarks of his British colleague and continuing said that in his opinion the issues before the meeting were clear cut as a reference to the correspondence would show. If the meeting decided that the Consular Body would not support the Chinese Government's wishes that the Pilot Association be instructed not to pilot Japanese war vessels or transports, then the matter ended so far as the Consular Body was concerned. He therefore proposed that the question be put before the meeting forthwith.

This was done and on a show of hands it was unanimously decided that the Consular Body would not support the wishes of the Chinese Government referred to. It was also decided to use the following statement as the basis of the reply which the Consul General for Germany would make to the Harbor Master:

That in view of the fact that no legal state of war exists between China and Japan, the General Pilotage Authority being an International body is not in a position to give instructions to the Pilot Association which would imply that one of the parties to the dispute is a belligerent."

USE OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT AS BASE OF OPERATIONS
 BY JAPANESE FORCES.

The Consul General for France referred to the letter of February 8, from Mayor Wu, which he presumed had been sent to all the Heads of Consulates, and said he understood that his American and British colleagues had already sent individual replies thereto. In that letter Mayor Wu disclaimed responsibility on behalf of the Chinese Government for any loss or damage in the Settlements as the result of Chinese attacks on the ground that the Municipal Councils had acquiesced in or failed to stop the Japanese from using the International Settlement as a base of operations. He (the Consul General for France) suggested that in addition to any individual replies the Senior Consul should send one reply on behalf of the Consular Body as a whole.

The Consul General for Germany said that as the representative of a non-extraterritorial Power he was not sure whether or not he would associate himself with a collective letter to the Mayor on the same footing as his "extraterritorial" colleagues. However no doubt the Senior Consul could get over the difficulty of using the phrase "Interested Colleague" or some such distinction.

The other interested colleagues having supported the suggestion of the Consul General for France, the Senior Consul promised to bear the point of his German colleague in mind in preparing a draft letter to the
Mayor

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Mayor for the approval of his interested colleagues, which he would do that afternoon.

The Consul General for France also suggested that his interested colleagues should ask the Senior Consul on behalf of all of them to send a letter to their Japanese colleague, protesting against the use of the International Settlement by the Japanese forces as a base of operations in the same terms as he understood had already been done by his British and American colleagues. Interested members of the meeting having supported his suggestion, the Senior Consul promised to circulate the draft of such a letter for consideration and approval.

FLIGHT OF MILITARY AEROPLANES OVER THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT

The Senior Consul recalled that at the instance of the Shanghai Municipal Council he had addressed letters to his Japanese colleague and to Mayor Wu requesting them to urge upon their respective authorities to refrain from flying military aeroplanes over the Settlement. He had now received a reply dated February 16, from the Consul General for Japan the second paragraph of which reads as follows:

"In compliance with your request, the purport of your letter has been duly notified to the Japanese Authorities concerned who in reply have informed me that, as strict instructions have been given to Japanese aviators to refrain from flying over the Settlement, unless absolutely necessary, the practice will naturally be discontinued in the future."

Addressing his Japanese colleague, the Senior Consul enquired as to the precise meaning of the words "unless absolutely necessary" explaining that they appeared somewhat ambiguous and might mean much or little. Could he interpret them as meaning that Japanese military aeroplanes would not make flights over the Settlement in operations unconnected with the defense of the Settlement? Before transmitting the Japanese Consul General's reply to the Council he would like the words clarified.

The Consul General for Japan said that after returning to his office he would study the matter and send the Senior Consul a letter of explanation.

THE MAINTENANCE OF TRADE AND SHIPPING OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES DURING THE PRESENT CRISIS.

The Senior Consul said it appeared to him there was one vital factor in the present crisis which should not be overlooked, namely the importance of maintaining the trade and shipping of various countries. As one means of promoting this object, he would like to suggest that identic letters be addressed to his Japanese colleague and to Mayor Wu expressing the hope that neither side in the present conflict would interfere with trade and shipping.

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ping of the various countries of Europe and America at this port. As American Consul General he was prepared to despatch such a letter immediately, but would be glad to have the cooperation of his colleagues if they wished to extend it.

The Consul General for Germany remarked there was no doubt that shipping was being very much inconvenienced because of the present congestion, but it must be remarked that it was not only the Japanese warships and transports which caused the congestion but also the unusual number of warships belonging to other nationalities. It might be anticipated that a reply to the Senior Consul's suggested letter would make mention of this fact.

The Senior Consul replied that nevertheless that feature of it need not detract from the value of his proposed attempt to elicit from both sides an assurance that neutral trade and shipping would not be molested.

It was unanimously agreed to request the Senior Consul to prepare the drafts of letters to Mayor Wu and his Japanese colleague expressing the objects he had enunciated. This the Senior Consul promised to do immediately saying the drafts would be circulated for consideration and approval the next morning. (Circular No. 68-M-XIII).

NEUTRALITY OF THE SETTLEMENT.

The Senior Consul referring to a letter from the Council dated February 10, (Circular no. 51-M-XIII) to the Chinese Authorities against the firing of shells into the Settlement, which had caused a number of casualties, read the draft of a proposed letter to the Mayor on the subject (Circular No. 61-M-XIII.)

The Consul General for France thought that the letter to the Mayor should concern itself mainly with the matter of the shells falling into the Settlement, and should not enlarge on the Settlement's neutral position or the status of the Shanghai Municipal Council.

The Senior Consul and the meeting generally having accepted his views, it was decided to eliminate paragraphs 2 and 3 of Circular No. 51-M-XIII, and to make suitable amendments because of this deletion in the other paragraphs, the amended draft to be recirculated (N. 51A-M-XIII)

THE MEETING THEN TERMINATED.

Circulated February 19, 1932.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CIRCULAR NO. 94-G-V.)

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF CONSULAR BODY MEETING FEBRUARY 26, 1932.

THE SENIOR CONSUL PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS HONORABLE COLLEAGUES AND HAS THE HONOR TO CIRCULATE THE MINUTES OF CONSULAR BODY MEETING ON FEBRUARY 26, 1932, AT THE AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL COMMENCING AT 12:10 P.M.

Presents:

Consul General for U.S.A. & S.C.	-E. S. Cunningham, Esquire,
Consul General for Norway	-H. Aall, Esquire,
Consul General for Belgium	-J. Van Haute, Esquire,
Consul General for Sweden	-J. de Lilliehöök, Esquire,
Consul General the Netherlands	-F. E. H. Groenman, Esquire,
Consul General for France	-E. Roehlin, Esquire,
Consul General for Germany	-Baron H. Rüdiger von Collenberg,
Consul General for Great Britain	-J. F. Brennan, Esquire, C.I.G.
Consul General for Denmark	-Ove Lunn, Esquire,
Consul General for Japan	-I. Murai, Esquire,
Consul General for Spain	-E. V. Ferrer, Esquire,
Consul General for Finland	-H. de Knorring, Esquire,
Consul General for Portugal	-Dr. J. B. D. da Silva,
Consul General for Chile	-Carlos Baccerra, Esquire,
Consul General for Switzerland	-E. Lardy, Esquire,
Consul for Brazil	-A. E. de Almeida, Esquire,
Vice Consul for Italy	-Count G. del Bono,
Secretary in Charge of Consulate for Czechoslovakia	-K. Malinovsky, Esquire,
In Charge, Polish Legation, Consul Section	-J. Krynski, Esquire.

The Senior Consul mentioned he had acceded with pleasure to the wish of several of his colleagues that a meeting be held in order that Mayor Wu's letter of February 24, which he presumed had been sent to the various Heads of Consulates, might be considered by all of them sitting together. That letter conveyed a further protest regarding the use by the Japanese authorities of the Settlement as a base of operations, made a further disclaimer of responsibility for consequences arising therefrom, and asked that certain foreign nationals and warships be evacuated from the "war zone" for the sake of security. The Senior Consul said the meeting was open to discussion on the subject.

The Consul General for Denmark recalled that on previous occasions the Senior Consul had sent a joint letter to the Mayor on behalf of his interested colleagues with regards to matters connected with the present crisis and suggested this course he pursued in the present instance.

The Consul General for France enquired if his colleagues intended making a reply to Mayor Wu's letter.

The Senior Consul replied that as American Consul General he proposed making a reply, which would in substance reiterate what

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what he had already told the Mayor, namely, that he had protested against the Settlement being used as a base of operations by the Japanese authorities, but that he must continue to hold both sides to the present dispute responsible for loss or damage as a result of the dispute.

The Consul General for Portugal said he would like to remark, en passant, that at the beginning of the trouble most all nationals had evacuated from Hongkew and Yangtse-poo, virtually under compulsion of Japanese authorities. They had now taken up residence in the French Concession. The Senior Consul rejoined that Americans had also been evacuated from these areas, but this fact did not absolve both sides from responsibility for loss or injury to property there or from claims which may arise therefrom.

The Consul General for Norway said he was unaware which locality the Mayor meant when he referred to the "war zone"

The Consuls General for the Netherlands, France, Norway, and Switzerland favored a collective reply to the Mayor, the latter remarking he thought it quite appropriate for such a reply to be sent in view of the earlier precedents. The reply should reiterate the position already taken by the Consular body in this matter. All of these gentlemen made it clear that a collective reply need not preclude Heads or Consulates from making individual replies as well.

The Consul General for Great Britain said he had no objection to a joint reply, but as large British interests were involved, he felt constrained to make a separate British reply as well.

The Consul General for Germany said he was especially interested in this question, because in addition to the Mayor's letter he had received private verbal warnings to evacuate his consulate which he would not do, but would remain there under any circumstances. However he realized his consulate was in a physical situation of great danger and he wondered if it were not possible for his Japanese colleague to prevail upon the Japanese naval authorities to remove the Japanese flagship from its berth alongside the Japanese Consulate, where it was drawing the fire of the Chinese? So far the Chinese shells directed at the flagship had fallen on the side away from his consulate, but they might easily fall on his side, with disastrous consequences to his consulate. After the warning he had received yesterday he regarded the situation as really very serious.

The Consul General for France remarked that his German colleague had greater freedom, due to his special position, to make representations to the Mayor, and possibly to the Japanese on the subject. The Consul General for Germany replied that he had already asked his Legation to make representation to Nanking in the premises, and he intended replying to the Mayor personally but he would welcome to joint reply by the Senior Consul as well.

The Consul General for Japan said his flagship was moored alongside his Consulate for the protection of the
Consulate.

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consulate. General Uyeda, who was engaged in operations against the Chinese 19th Route Army, had his headquarter at Kiangwan. The Japanese forces had no military base in the Settlement.

The Senior Consul enquired if it were not true that the presence of the Japanese flagship alongside the Japanese Consulate-General acted as a "magnet" to draw the Chinese fire?

The Consul General for Japan said he had an unconfirmed report that the Chinese had agreed not to shoot in the Settlement, or rather not to shoot "in the port"

after further discussion it was decided

- (a) that a joint reply on behalf of interested Heads of Consulates would be sent,
- (b) that it would more or less reiterate the statements and reservations previously made to the Mayor on the same subject.

The Senior Consul promised to circulate a draft joint reply to the Mayor for the approval of his colleagues to be given within 24 hours.

The Consul General for Sweden said that if a joint reply was going to be made to the Mayor, he thought that similar statements should again be made to the Consul General for Japan at the same time. The real cause of the trouble was the use by the Japanese of the Settlement as a base of operations, and while both letters (to the Mayor and the Japanese Consul General) might not have any effect, he thought that similar statements should be reiterated to both sides.

The Senior Consul said that the question before the meeting was one of a reply to the Mayor who had sent a letter on the subject mentioned to various Heads of Consulates which the Consul General for Japan had not. However, he had no objection to sending a similar letter to the Japanese Consul General if there was a general desire for it.

As no further remarks were made on the subject, it was allowed to drop.

The Consul for Brazil inquired if the Consular Body was not responsible for the protection of residents in the Settlement who had no consular representation. The Senior Consul replied that he believed the answer to the question, if he understood it aright, was that primarily the Shanghai Municipal Council was responsible, without liability for protection of life and property in the International Settlement a responsibility shared, however, in times of emergency like the present, by the various national forces which were here for the purpose.

SHANGHAI BICENTENNIAL PILOTS ASSOCIATION

The Senior Consul referred to the copy of a letter dated February 26 from the Harbor Master to the Shanghai
 Harbour

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Licensed Pilots' Association, threatening a cancellation of the licence of any pilot who piloted Japanese men-of-war (see circular 94-E-IV) and asked his German Colleague if he had anything to propose regarding it.

The Consul General for Germany (after reading the letter) said he thought the Consular Body should await a communication from the Pilots Association on the subject.

The Consul General for Great Britain said that he had prepared a letter to the Senior Consul which referred to the letter from the Harbor Master requesting that the General Pilotage Authority should register an expression of opinion against the piloting of Japanese warships by members of the Pilots Association. He had prepared the letter without knowing that the Harbor Master had written to the Pilots' Association threatening to cancell pilots licences in certain circumstances. The Senior Consul invited his British colleagues to read the letter which the latter did forthwith. (see circular no. 95-E-IV.)

The Consul General for Great Britain said that in other words his view is that the General Pilotage ~~Pilotage~~ Authority cannot make an order or express an opinion on the subject, but if anybody had the authority to make such an order it was, in his submission, the Harbor Master. If the Harbor Master did make such an order he would advise British Pilots not to dispute it, provided his colleagues followed the same course.

The Consul General for the Netherlands said that by adopting such a position the Consular Body would be acting inconsistently with the attitude adopted at the previous meeting when it was decided that the Consular Body could not give any instructions to the pilots which would imply that one of the parties to the dispute is a belligerent. In other words the Consular Body then did not want to support the Harbor Master and if it did support him now it would be contrary at least in spirit if not in letter to the attitude previously expressed.

The Consul General for Great Britain remarked that he understood the Harbor Master had not wanted to issue the order to the Pilots, but had wanted to foist the responsibility for it on to the General Pilotage Authority. His intention was to show that the General Pilotage Authority, an international body, was not empowered to make such an order, and that if anybody did have the power to do so, that person was the Harbor Master.

The Consul General for the Netherlands rejoined that if the Consular Body changed its attitude in this matter, it must be prepared with arguments to support the change. As he understood it, the object of his British Colleague in putting forward the letter she had read was to secure the agreement of the Consular Body to the position he had taken therein. That position, he maintained was a departure from the attitude previously assumed by the Consular Body and therefore if the change was to be agreed to it should be backed up with convincing arguments.

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The Consul General for Germany said that in his opinion the regulations were framed to give the Harbor Master certain powers to be exercised in normal times; it was never contemplated that the Harbor Master should be empowered to act, in abnormal times like the present, in the manner revealed in his letter to the Pilots' Association.

The Consul General for Great Britain reminded the meeting that the Consular Body had already told both sides to the present dispute that it was trying to preserve a correct attitude in very difficult circumstances, so that if the Consular Body allowed the pilotage of Japanese war-vessels it might be interpreted as taking sides in the dispute. To this the Consul General for the Netherlands rejoined that of course the Harbor Master had no intention of interfering with the piloting of Chinese war-vessels which showed he was attempting unilateral action.

The Consul General for Norway expressed the view that it would be a dangerous precedent to allow the Harbor Master to discriminate against the vessels of a Power who technically was not at war with China. This time it was Japan another time it would be another Power. Moreover the pilots should not be left unprotected from arbitrary threats, that their licences would be suspended.

The Consul General for Great Britain referring to the last remark, said that of course there was always an appeal to the consul concerned. After further discussion the Senior Consul said it appeared to him the best course to follow would be to await representations from the individual pilots to their respective consuls, or possibly from the Pilots Association to the Consular Body. When these representations were forthcoming the interested Consuls could consult together with a view to ascertaining what course of action each one proposed to pursue. It was pointed out that it was trying to preserve a correct attitude in very difficult circumstances, so that in the meeting endorsed this suggestion, interested heads of Consulates pledged themselves to consult one another before giving definite instructions to their respective pilots. The Senior Consul announced that in the meantime the letter from the Harbor Master and from his British colleague would be circulated for information.

MAINTENANCE OF COMMERCE AND SHIPPING expressed the view that it would be a dangerous precedent to allow the Harbor Master to discriminate against the vessels of a Power who technically was not at war with China. This time it was Japan another time it would be another Power. Moreover the pilots should not be left unprotected from arbitrary threats, that their licences would be suspended. The Senior Consul said that a letter dated February 24 had just been received from the Mayor in reply to his letter on the above subject. His Japanese colleague's reply had already been circulated (86-M-XIII). He then proceeded to read the Mayor's reply (see Cir. 93-M-XIII) and remarked that the Mayor contended the use of the settlement by the Japanese as a base had already produced a disastrous effect on the trade and shipping of the port. was always an appeal to the consul concerned.

CONSULAR

After further discussion the Senior Consul said it appeared to him the best course to follow would be to await representations from the individual pilots to their respective consuls, or possibly from the Pilots Association to the Consular Body. When these representations were forthcoming the interested Consuls could consult together with a view to ascertaining what course of action each one proposed to pursue.

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CONSULAR BODY COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY AND INVESTIGATION

The Consul General for Norway, President of this Committee, said a Mr. Lockwood (connected with the Y.M.C.A.) had addressed a letter to the Senior Consul asking that he and three other associates be allowed to do certain work principally of a humanitarian character in connection with the Chinese being detained by the Japanese. Mr. Lockwood's letter would be circulated (89M-XIII) together with one from him (the Consul General for Norway) on the same subject (89-M-XIII). The four persons concerned were: Father Jacquinet, Messrs. E. R. Hughes, and W. A. Lockwood, and Miss Ida Belle Lewis, and he thought the best way would be for his colleagues to authorize their addition to his committee. They would not interfere with their duties given in the terms of reference to the original committee, (57-A-M-XIII) (one member of which had resigned) but he thought the inclusion of these four persons would be very useful in humanitarian labor.

Consul


On enquiry from the Senior, the Consul General for Japan said he had seen the letter from Mr. Lockwood and agreed, in general, to allow the work suggested therein to be carried out.

It was decided to give provisional authorization to the Consul General for Norway to coopt the four persons mentioned in his committee on the terms mentioned by him. Confirmation of this authorization to be assumed if no objection was received after the correspondence had been circulated.

THE MEETING THEN TERMINATED.

Circulated February 27, 1932.

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No. 2429.

Paris, April 1, 1932.


Subject: The Sino-Japanese Conflict.

APR 12 32

F/HS



793.94/5034



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from March 16 to March 29, 1932, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

Walter E. Edge.

Enclosures.....

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Enclosures (single copy):

Clippings from the following newspapers:

March 16, 1932.
No. 1 - FIGARO

March 17, 1932.
No. 2 - L'OEUVRE

March 20, 1932.
No. 3 - LA REPUBLIQUE

March 22, 1932.
No. 4 - LE POPULAIRE

March 23, 1932.
No. 5 - LE POPULAIRE
6 - LE TEMPS

March 24, 1932.
No. 7 - ACTUALITES
8 - LE MATIN

March 29, 1932.
No. 9 - LE TEMPS

In quintuplicate.
710.
RTP/jdk

FIG. 16

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2429 of April 1, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, March 16, 1932.

L'Amérique et l'Extrême-Orient

Par BERNARD FAY

Toute la flotte des Etats-Unis est maintenant massée dans le Pacifique. Les grandes manœuvres de terre et de mer ont eu lieu aux îles Hawaï. Les journaux discutent chaque jour l'attitude que le peuple et le pays doivent prendre en face du conflit sino-japonais. Dans toutes les villes d'Amérique les blanchisseurs (chinois) organisent le boycott des marchands de thé (japonais). Dans les Universités les étudiants tiennent des réunions où ils invitent le consul japonais et le consul chinois à venir échanger des arguments, puis ils votent des résolutions antijaponaises. Les clubs de dames s'agitent. On parle de guerre.

On réclame la paix. Les grands journaux d'Amérique sont tous en faveur de la paix. M. Hearst et sa presse veulent la paix ; les journaux libéraux et éclairés, comme le *New York Times*, veulent la paix et la préconisent à toute occasion. Les journaux patriotes et portés à soutenir avec énergie les droits des Etats-Unis, ceux que l'on ne peut suspecter d'internationalisme, telle la *Tribune de Chicago*, veulent la paix. Il semble bien aussi que le Département d'Etat veuille la paix, et que M. Hoover, dans la mesure où il veut quelque chose, veuille la paix aussi. Il n'y a pas jusqu'au sénateur Borah, qui, utilisant l'occasion favorable, n'en ait profité pour déclarer solennellement, et avec l'éclat qu'il aime à mettre en de telles occasions, qu'il était tout en faveur de la paix. Devant des manifestations aussi variées et aussi significatives on pourrait penser que tout le monde veut la paix et qu'il y a en Amérique une unanimité telle que tout danger d'intervention et toute menace de secousse brutale sont éliminés. Il n'en est rien.

Un courant se dessine depuis quelques semaines en Amérique qui pourrait conduire les Etats-Unis, par une série de mouvements, lents d'abord puis accélérés, jusqu'à un état de guerre. Il ne s'agit point du vieux fonds d'hostilité contre le Japon, jadis fort aigu, aujourd'hui bien assoupi, mais encore vivace et que l'on retrouve surtout répandu sur la côte ouest. C'est là une force qui, quelque jour, pourra entrer en jeu, mais qui pour l'instant est inefficace. Il ne s'agit point non plus de la propagande, très efficace du reste, faite à travers les Etats-Unis par les éléments chinois. Le Chinois résidant dans l'Amérique du Nord est en effet fort patriote ; qu'il soit blanchisseur, comme le plus grand nombre, ou tenancier de « Chop Suei » (restaurant oriental), ou étudiant dans une Université, le Chinois des Etats-Unis n'est point du tout un philosophe impassible. La

fièvre du nouveau monde l'a gagné, il est actif, nerveux et rusé. Il se faufile partout et il profite du prestige intellectuel, artistique, historique dont jouit la Chine pour tailler des coupures au Japon, lequel apparaît comme le parvenu de l'Extrême-Orient et n'a point réussi à se constituer en terre américaine des foyers de sympathie très ardents. L'opinion est donc portée à favoriser la Chine, mais elle y mettrait peu de passion et ne serait point entraînée fort loin par les artifices des Chinois si d'autres éléments n'entraient en jeu.

L'un des plus voyants s'est révélé l'autre jour. En effet, une longue adresse de « citoyens influents » vient d'être publiée dans les principaux journaux, et d'objurguer le peuple américain de prendre, en ce conflit immoral, une attitude énergique, seule digne de sa moralité.

Les « citoyens influents » et pacifistes, parmi lesquels se trouve M. Lawrence Lowell, président de l'Université Harvard, ne se font point scrupule d'inciter les Etats-Unis à déclarer un boycott contre les produits et marchandises japonais. Ce document a retenu l'attention du public et suscité des commentaires innombrables. Les associations antijaponaises se sont efforcées d'en tirer le meilleur parti ; on est allé jusqu'à imprimer que Mme Hoover s'était jointe à un groupe de maîtresses de maison qui avaient décidé de boycotter séance tenante tous les produits japonais. Mme Hoover, fort ennuyée de ce propos, fut contrainte de faire démentir par une de ses secrétaires. Mais le public avait été impressionné.

Le peuple américain n'est point assez aveugle pour méconnaître qu'un boycott mènerait fort loin. Et, il faut l'avouer, toute une partie des masses populaires envisage cette éventualité sans indignation.

En effet, quels qu'aient été les efforts récents de M. Hoover, du Congrès, des banquiers et des financiers, la crise, qui paraît s'atténuer et dont on peut, d'un point de vue philosophique et scientifique, déclarer la fin venue, n'en est pas moins encore bien présente. Les prix continuent à descendre dans les restaurants. Les grands industriels continuent à déclarer qu'il faut pousser le public à acheter le plus possible et le plus tôt possible. M. Ford annonce qu'il va « risquer son tout » pour faire sortir une série nouvelle d'automobiles magnifiques à huit cylindres, et que, dût-il s'y ruiner, il poussera ses compatriotes vers la prospérité. De telles déclarations, si elles rappellent celles de Léonidas aux Thermopyles, n'ont rien de très encourageant. Et le peuple américain est d'autant moins encouragé, d'autant moins confiant, que c'est là pour lui un refrain ancien, dont il est las.

En se promenant dans les boutiques les plus populaires des grandes villes, l'un des propos que l'on entend le plus souvent est celui-ci : « Ah ! si seulement on avait une bonne guerre, cela ferait remonter les prix ! » Dans les omnibus où les ménagères et les employés s'empilent on entend circuler la même rumeur. Et le soir, en quittant leur banque, plus d'un banquier inquiet de ce long marasme lève les bras au ciel et s'écrie : « Ce serait à souhaiter une guerre. »

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De profonds politiques prétendent enfin que la seule façon dont M. Hoover pourrait assurer sa réélection, si gravement compromise, serait par l'entrée rapide et brillante en une guerre extrême-orientale, qui secouerait la léthargie du peuple, réveillerait les affaires et ferait de lui le grand héros national. Un tel geste serait, à n'en pas douter, accueilli avec faveur par les masses profondes de la nation. Il n'en serait pas moins fort dangereux, et on voit mal M. Hoover, quaker et pacifiste, s'aventurant en une telle entreprise.

Le danger de guerre est donc lointain à l'heure actuelle. Toutefois, si le conflit d'Orient se prolongeait et si la crise économique américaine ne s'atténuait pas, il paraît probable que les efforts pieux des pacifistes américains entraîneraient leur gouvernement dans la voie qui mène à la guerre. Le gouvernement ne s'y engagerait qu'à regret, mais le gouvernement, à l'heure actuelle, est aux abois. Il s'épuise en vains efforts, et moins que jamais il peut mépriser les tendances profondes du peuple. Or, le peuple est las de la dépression, le peuple est fatigué des encouragements platoniques, le peuple réclame du neuf, fût-il brutal.

Aussi les Japonais, s'ils sont sages, ne prolongeront-ils pas indéfiniment la bataille de Changhaï. Elle n'a que trop duré pour leur prestige. Elle est malsaine pour les nerfs des Américains. Elle emplit le Pacifique d'un bruit dangereux.

En temps de crise économique il ne faut jamais donner à ses voisins la tentation d'un grand geste sauveur, surtout quand il peut leur ouvrir un marché économique.

Bernard Fay.

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CHANGHAI ET GENÈVE

Les enjeux du différend

Par LORD ROBERT CECIL

C'est non seulement la nécessité des événements, mais encore la nécessité de la logique qui a fait suspendre la Conférence mondiale du Désarmement, afin de permettre à l'Assemblée, spécialement réunie à Genève pour la première fois dans l'histoire de la Société des Nations, de juger de quel côté était le droit dans un recours effectif à la guerre et d'aviser aux moyens d'y mettre fin. Dès le début, la Conférence du Désarmement a été hantée par la vision des hostilités entre la Chine et le Japon. D'un côté l'on peut dire que cette recrudescence de militarisme accentue la nécessité de la réduction des armements. Mais il est clair que l'on ne peut déterminer la nature et l'étendue de cette réduction avant de savoir si la Société des Nations a ou non fait respecter son autorité en Extrême-Orient. Il ne suffit pas de conclure hâtivement une trêve ; il ne suffit pas d'établir à Changhaï et aux alentours une paix d'épuisement incertaine. Un règlement qui ne châtierait pas une agression injuste, qui ne repousserait pas une politique militariste, qui n'assurerait pas à un membre loyal de la Société des Nations le remède au préjudice dont il a souffert ou sa réparation, un tel règlement constituerait un attentat désastreux à la moralité internationale. Le monde ne veut pas seulement qu'il n'y ait pas la guerre ; il veut aussi assister à une grande victoire morale de la paix.

C'est pourquoi je suis d'avis qu'il est très important que nous ayons constamment présentes à l'esprit les circonstances principales du différend qui a mené aux hostilités, à une situation qui a tout de la guerre, sauf le nom. Avant tout, il faut se rendre compte que la Société des Nations a à trancher deux litiges bien distincts. L'un embrasse tout l'ensemble des griefs économiques et autres qui constitue le différend sino-japonais. Il y a là tous les différends ferroviaires et territoriaux en Mandchourie. Il y a ce qu'on appelle le boycottage chinois, qui va souvent beaucoup plus loin que son nom ne l'implique. Il y a toutes les accusations de mauvaise foi d'une part et d'arrogance de l'autre, les accusations de militarisme japonais et de mauvaise administration chinoise. Mais toutes ces questions font l'objet de l'enquête de la Commission de la Société des Nations présidée par Lord Lytton, qui est déjà arrivée au Japon, Commission à la nomination de laquelle les deux pays ont consenti.

Le second point, absolument distinct du premier, concerne la responsabilité des graves hostilités qui ont eu lieu à Changhaï. Même si le Japon, comme il est fort possible, avait des griefs très réels dus aux mesures économiques prises par la Chine ou à l'incident du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien, il est impossible de le justifier d'avoir bombardé et occupé le territoire chinois avant d'avoir essayé tous les moyens qu'il avait de faire valoir ses droits par la médiation et l'arbitrage. Le pacte de la Société des Nations et le pacte Kellogg faisaient aux deux parties une obligation de soumettre leurs différends internationaux à ces modes pacifiques de règlement. A plusieurs reprises, la Chine s'en est remise à la Société des Nations et a accepté des propositions d'arbitrage. Mais jusqu'à présent, les Japonais n'ont pas voulu donner leur accord.

On affirme, et cette affirmation n'a pas été contestée, que malgré la considérable agitation causée en Chine par l'occupation japonaise de la Mandchourie, aucun sujet japonais n'avait été tué sur tout le territoire chinois jusqu'au meurtre d'un moine bouddhiste survenu lors d'une émeute à Changhaï le 19 février.

Le 21, l'amiral Shiozawa, commandant les forces navales japonaises dans les eaux chinoises, adressa aux autorités chinoises une demande de réparation et de mesures préventives à l'occasion de cet attentat ; il menaçait de faire prendre des mesures énergiques par sa flotte au cas où l'on ne ferait pas droit à ses demandes. Six jours après, le consul japonais avertit les autorités chinoises que le délai accordé pour l'exécution des demandes japonaises expirerait le lendemain à 18 heures. Des avions japonais et d'autres renforts arrivèrent alors sur le terrain. Le point culminant de la crise fut atteint le 28 janvier. Le matin, de bonne heure, l'amiral Shiozawa avertit les autorités étrangères chargées de la défense de la concession internationale qu'il avait l'intention de prendre des mesures contre les Chinois dans les vingt-quatre heures. A treize heures, le maire de Changhaï laissa entendre que les demandes japonaises étaient acceptées dans leur intégralité. A 21 heures, le consul japonais se déclara satisfait de l'acceptation par les Chinois de l'ultimatum, et en informa le corps consulaire. Cependant, à 22 heures, l'amiral japonais annonça son intention de faire débarquer des fusiliers marins, afin de protéger les ressortissants japonais, et le débarquement eut lieu à minuit. Prenant la concession internationale comme base d'opérations, et après l'avoir

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traversée, les fusiliers marins essayèrent d'occuper la ville chinoise de Chapei. Les Chinois résistèrent vigoureusement, et les navires de guerre japonais bombardèrent les forts situés au confluent du Wang-Pou et du Yang-Tse, à une distance considérable de Changhaï. Dès lors, la guerre fit rage, sans que l'on en prononçât le nom. Malgré deux trêves d'ailleurs courtes et incomplètes, la lutte s'intensifia et les pertes ne cessèrent de croître. Des milliers de civils ont été tués par le bombardement aérien, et plus récemment encore par le feu de l'artillerie et de l'infanterie qui les a balayés.

La Chine en ayant appelé à la Société des Nations en vertu de l'article 15 du Pacte, le secrétaire général, comme c'était son devoir, demanda aux consuls des puissances représentées à Changhaï de lui rapporter exactement ce qui s'était passé. Le Comité international des consuls tint plusieurs réunions et envoya deux rapports. Dans le second rapport, on trouve cette déclaration importante : « Un état de guerre ouverte existe depuis le 3 février. » Plus loin, le rapport dit que « l'offensive était entièrement entre les mains des Japonais ». Tel est le fait qui se dégage de cette enquête internationale. De quelque côté qu'ait été le droit dans le différend fondamental entre le Japon et la Chine, il est incontestable qu'à partir du 3 février, l'activité du Japon n'était pas défensive mais offensive, et que le Japon était l'agresseur, dans le sens habituel et raisonnable que l'on donne à ce terme.

On a récemment publié une déclaration du vicomte Ishii, disant que le Japon n'a aucune ambition territoriale en Chine et se retirera sitôt la protection de ses nationaux assurée. Il est fort possible que si le vicomte Ishii disposait d'une voix décisive dans les affaires de son pays, ces déplorables incidents ne se seraient pas produits. En vérité, les amis de la Chine et du Japon aujourd'hui rassemblés à Genève doivent tâcher et espérer que des conseillers éclairés prennent le dessus à Tokio, et que les éléments modérés et libéraux que je sais être très nombreux dans les milieux politiques japonais réussissent à se faire entendre. Mais comment ceux des Japonais qui sont sincèrement attachés à l'ensemble de notre système d'organisation de la paix peuvent-ils être surpris de l'extrême anxiété qu'ont provoquée dans mon pays et dans toute l'Europe et l'Amérique l'injustifiable recours à la violence qui s'est produit à Changhaï et les horribles dévastations qu'il a causées ?

Si j'avais eu une partialité quelconque au début de cette controverse, le 18 septembre, je pense qu'elle eût été tout autant en faveur du Japon que de la Chine. Je sais tout ce que l'on a dit des difficultés du gouvernement chinois ces dernières années. Je sais combien peu raisonnablement, à mon avis, ce gouvernement s'est comporté en diverses occasions. J'étais très prêt à croire que, dans l'ensemble, le Japon avait des griefs très réels. Mais il aurait dû être disposé à traiter la question dans le véritable esprit d'un membre de la Société des Nations. Je dois admettre qu'en présence du développement de la situation, j'ai été obligé de conclure que la politique du Japon n'était pas dictée par les éléments que le vicomte Ishii représente si admirablement, mais par des éléments purement militaristes. Il était manifeste pour moi que les obligations du Pacte n'étaient pas observées ; l'enquête, lorsqu'elle fut pour la première fois proposée, fut refusée ; à plusieurs reprises, on vit émaner de sources apparemment plus ou moins autorisées, la menace d'un abandon par le Japon de la S. D. N., au cas où cette dernière interviendrait ; et cette déplorable

attitude fut couronnée par les actes de violence extrême qui se déroulèrent à Changhaï.

C'est pourquoi je suis convaincu qu'il est nécessaire que la S.D.N., en même temps que l'Amérique, ne pardonne pas, et qu'elle répudie ouvertement et formellement l'action si incorrectement entreprise par les autorités militaires japonaises. Mon espoir le plus sincère est que les conditions d'un armistice acceptable par les deux parties auront été réalisées avant que ces lignes paraissent. Je crois qu'il est d'une importance capitale qu'une zone neutre soit établie par l'autorité de la Société des Nations et confiée à la surveillance d'une force internationale. Cependant, au cas où la puissance qui s'est montrée l'agresseur rendrait l'armistice impossible, ou au cas où la zone neutre serait refusée, il faudrait que l'Assemblée demandât aux membres de la S. D. N. d'exercer une pression diplomatique et économique générale sur la puissance qui a violé le Pacte, et qu'elle invitât officiellement les Etats-Unis à collaborer à cette mesure.

Cependant, notre principale tâche doit être d'arrêter le combat, et d'affirmer l'autorité de la S. D. N., afin que l'on puisse examiner calmement les points sur lesquels la Commission Lytton doit faire son rapport au Conseil, et travailler ainsi à la reconstruction de la Chine et à l'établissement d'une véritable unité dans ce pays. Cela est essentiel, non seulement pour la Chine, mais encore pour tous les pays qui entretiennent des relations commerciales et financières avec l'Extrême-Orient. Le problème du chômage en Europe et en Amérique serait en grande partie résolu s'il était possible à une Chine unie et prospère de développer son énorme marché en puissance. C'est également à quoi le Japon a véritablement intérêt. On n'arrive pas à faire faire à un homme des affaires avec vous en l'assommant : on n'y arrive qu'en lui permettant de mettre sa maison en ordre et en entretenant des relations amicales avec lui. Je crois qu'il y a au Japon des gens qui se rendent compte de cette vérité. Nous avons eu des indices encourageants du désir du peuple japonais de revenir sur le sentier de la paix. Nous ne voulons pas lui rendre la tâche plus difficile ; nous voulons la lui faciliter dans toute la mesure du possible. Car dans notre lutte pour l'établissement d'une ère nouvelle dans les relations internationales, nous avons besoin de l'aide de tous.

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EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT

Le nouvel Etat de Mandchourie

Il y a deux cent quatre-vingt-huit ans, en 1644, le jeune chef de la puissante tribu des *Nu-Chen*, après avoir expulsé de Mandchourie les représentants de la dynastie chinoise des *Ming*, envahissait la Chine du Nord, prenait la capitale Pékin et s'y installait. Il y fondait, à son tour, la dynastie des *Hsing*, l'une des plus puissantes de celles qui ont gouverné l'ingouvernable *Empire du Milieu*, en lui donnant une apparence d'unité politique et administrative, inconnue depuis les origines reculées du formidable conglomerat géographique chinois. Cependant, les vrais fils de Han, les Chinois de Chine, ont toujours impatiemment supporté le joug des usurpateurs mandchous. L'honneur — si honneur il y a — de les avoir jetés à bas du trône revient à un obscur Cantonais, médecin-dentiste de profession, au révolutionnaire *Sun Yat-Sen*, qui s'efforça de donner une âme nationale à 400 millions d'individus que tout séparait, sauf l'habitude de courber le dos sous la tyrannie impériale et mandarinale.

Il n'a pas réussi dans cette tâche formidable, et ses acolytes du *Kouo-min-tang* pas davantage, sinon sur le papier. Depuis la chute de la dynastie mandchoue et la fondation de la première République, en 1911, la Chine est retombée dans le chaos le plus profond, tel qu'il était deux cents ans avant l'ère chrétienne, sous les *Tang*. Il semble être le milieu naturel dans lequel se complait cet étrange pays.

Mais voici que le sort prend sa revanche sur les agitateurs impuissants qui ont fait de la Chine une proie aux appétits des factions.

Après avoir végété dans les concessions internationales de Tien-Tsin et de Dairen, dans une médiocrité voisine de la misère, le dernier descendant de la dynastie mandchoue, empereur dès l'âge de 3 ans et détrôné à l'âge de 5 ans, se voit ramené par la Fortune au pays de ses ancêtres. La Fortune, ici, ce sont d'abord et avant tout les *Japonais*, mais aussi les Mandchous qui refusent de courber la tête devant les Cantonais.

Le 1^{er} mars 1932, le successeur légitime d'une dynastie trois fois séculaire sortit de Mandchourie, le citoyen *Henri Pou Yi* se voit intronisé *Président de la République de Mandchourie*. Les cinq couleurs du nouveau drapeau ont remplacé le vieux dragon du drapeau impérial et le drapeau du gouvernement nationaliste.

Un nouvel Etat est né aux confins de l'Asie, à une heure et dans des conditions particulièrement troubles. Vivra-t-il ? Quel rôle jouera-t-il dans les années à venir ? Deux questions sur lesquelles je voudrais essayer de jeter quelque lumière.

I. — Il ne faut jamais perdre de vue, quels que soient les droits dont se réclame la Chine sur les quatre provinces de l'Est (ainsi s'appelait en dernier lieu la Mandchourie), que cette

province a presque toujours vécu en marge de la Chine. En particulier, de 1911 à 1929, le vieux vice-roi *Tchang Tso Lin* affectait d'ignorer pratiquement tous les liens qui rattachaient cette province à la Chine proprement dite.

Les Japonais, héritiers des droits russes en Mandchourie, avaient compté sur lui pour faire de la Mandchourie un pays indépendant. Mais le vieux renard espérait mieux. Il rêvait de commander à la Chine entière. Il tenta le coup deux ou trois fois au cours de ces vingt dernières années : il échoua et mourut déchiqueté par une bombe partie d'on ne sait quelles mains.

Son faible fils, *Chang Sue Liang*, hérita de ses ambitions, mais non de son sens politique. En 1929, il se rallia politiquement au gouvernement de Nankin pour en tirer un prestige personnel et se brouilla ainsi définitivement avec les Japonais, et la lutte commença, lutte du pot de terre contre le pot de fer. Elle s'est précipitée à propos des événements de Moukden et s'est terminée, comme l'on sait, par l'expulsion complète de Chang et de ses armées hors de la Mandchourie.

Ainsi libérée par les soldats japonais de la dictature militariste des Chang, la Mandchourie ne pouvait rester en l'air. Il y avait trois solutions en présence pour régler le sort de cette province.

1^o La rendre à l'influence du gouvernement de Nankin, nationaliste, xénophobe et anti-japonais ;

2^o La laisser tomber directement sous le protectorat japonais, préparant une annexion future ;

3^o La faire s'ériger en Etat indépendant et pleinement autonome.

Si les seuls citoyens mandchous

avaient été consultés sur ce qu'ils auraient répondu que portait le régime, pourvu qu'il y eût une monnaie saine, la liberté du trafic, la paix pour leurs biens.

Mais en ces affaires, le Japonais n'avaient jamais consulté. C'est un politicien véreux ou de médiocrité qui prétend fixer les masses qu'ils exploitent.

Les Japonais n'avaient pas leur grand coup de torchon dans le pays, où ils ont de si rudes, et tombât aussitôt sous une administration analogue à la précédente, encore moins sous la férule des nationalistes cantonais, qui ont voulu bouleverser la Chine. Ils se sont opposés à toute tentative de sécession de la Mandchourie à la Chine. Ils n'y ont pas non plus cela ils ont eu avec eux tous les Mandchous que Chang Sue Liang avait humiliés en assassinant le chef Yang Ya Ting en 1929.

D'autre part, les Japonais n'avaient ni ne voulaient la Mandchourie, ni même de la Chine. Elle aucune sorte de protection internationale. Le traité de Washington s'y oppose, aussi l'opinion mondiale. Il est archi évident qu'ils avaient perdu et peu à gagner à une annexion, leur but précis était de développer en paix, en collaboration avec tous, les intérêts économiques qu'ils possèdent en Mandchourie. C'est dans ce but que le premier ministre Inukai avait déclaré : « Même si on n'a rien fait en toute propriété nous ne pouvons pas le faire cadeau. »

Il ne restait donc qu'une solution : laisser la Mandchourie s'ériger en Etat indépendant.

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avaient été consultés sur ces questions, ils auraient répondu que peu leur importait le régime, pourvu qu'ils eussent une monnaie saine, la liberté du travail et du trafic, la paix et la sécurité pour leurs biens.

Mais en ces affaires, le peuple n'est jamais consulté. C'est une bande de politiciens véreux ou de militaires ambitieux qui prétend fixer le sort des masses qu'ils exploitent.

Les Japonais n'avaient pas donné leur grand coup de torchon pour que le pays, où ils ont de si grands intérêts, retomât aussitôt sous une administration analogue à la précédente, et encore moins sous la férule des nationalistes cantonais, qui ont achevé de bouleverser la Chine. Ils devaient donc s'opposer à toute tentative de rattachement de la Mandchourie au statut de la Chine. Ils n'y ont pas manqué ; en cela ils ont eu avec eux tous les Mandchous que Chang Sue Liang avait brimés et humiliés en assassinant leur chef Yang Ya Ting en 1930.

D'autre part, les Japonais ne pouvaient ni ne voulaient annexer la Mandchourie, ni même déclarer sur elle aucune sorte de protectorat. Le traité de Washington s'y opposait et aussi l'opinion mondiale. D'ailleurs, il est archi évident qu'ils avaient tout à perdre et peu à gagner à une telle opération, leur but précis étant de pouvoir développer en paix, en collaboration avec tous, les intérêts vitaux d'ordre économique qu'ils possèdent en Mandchourie. C'est dans ce sens que le premier ministre Inukai déclarait naïvement : « Même si on nous la donnait en toute propriété nous refuserions ce cadeau. »

Il ne restait donc qu'une alternative : laisser la Mandchourie s'ériger en Etat

autonome, indépendant de la Chine marâtre qui, après l'avoir usurpée, l'avait totalement méconnue jusqu'au jour où la technique patiente japonaise en eut fait une province modèle.

Cette solution, disons-le hardiment, était prévue et préparée entre les Japonais et les adversaires de Chang Sue Liang depuis le jour où ce dernier se fut rallié au *Kouomintang* de Nankin. C'est elle qui a prévalu et dont nous voyons, en ce moment, la réalisation.

II. — Le nouvel Etat est-il viable ? Très certainement, avec l'aide des Japonais, aide qui ne lui fera défaut sur aucun terrain, si ce n'est peut-être le terrain financier, le Japon étant lui-même dans de sérieux embarras pour le moment.

La Mandchourie comprend quatre provinces : Moukden (Liaoning), Kirin, Heilungkiang et Jéhol (Mongolie extérieure). Sa superficie est à peu près celle de la France et de l'Italie réunies ; sa population d'environ 30 millions, dont les trois quarts de Chinois immigrés pour fuir la misère de la mère-patrie. Ses richesses naturelles sont immenses, à condition de les faire valoir méthodiquement. A preuve, c'est que depuis l'occupation japonaise du Sud-Mandchourien, le bilan commercial est passé de 16 millions de taëls à plus de 520 millions (8 à 9 milliards de francs) en 1929.

Les habitants sont en grande majorité de paisibles agriculteurs ou des manœuvres. Les troubles ne viendront pas d'eux. Les seuls éléments de désordre à craindre pendant peu de temps ce sont les pseudo-militaires, qui, au temps passé, vivaient sur le paysan. Mais le nouveau gouvernement a déclaré qu'il entendait mettre fin à ce régime de l'omnipotence militaire ; tout

sera civil, exclusivement civil. Les Japonais, au nom des droits qu'ils ont à protéger et en vertu de nouveaux accords précis avec la République de Mandchourie, se chargeront d'achever le nettoyage des derniers brigands : (ainsi nomme-t-on les partisans intéressés de l'ancien régime, sans parler des vrais brigands qui sont une variété connue de la gent militaire en ces parages).

Précédemment, 80 p. 100 des taxes levées sur le peuple allaient dans la cassette du gouverneur Chang pour ses besoins personnels et pour son armée. La monnaie avait cours forcé ; le *jeng-piao* et le *tiano* n'étaient garantis par rien. C'en est fini de cet arbitraire. Une banque centrale d'émission va être érigée en avril, avec des principes et une surveillance sévères, comme tout ce qui est japonais. Les taxes sont d'ores et déjà réduites et leur emploi contrôlé.

De ces seuls points de vue, autant pour les 30 millions de Manchous que pour l'Asie en général, la création d'un Etat modèle dans la Chine chaotique s'annonce événement heureux, dont les conséquences sont incalculables.

III. — Comment l'accueilleront les puissances étrangères ?

Les Japonais ont pris le seul moyen qui coupe court à toute vaine récrimination. Ils n'ont rien annexé ; ils ne sont rien, officiellement, dans le nouvel Etat. Mais ils sont partout, à titre de conseillers, de guides, de bailleurs de fonds. Ils sont vraiment ici le *deus ex machina*. La machine marchera, elle marche déjà, parce qu'ils la font mouvoir. Les Mandchous ont disposé d'eux-mêmes. Ils ont eu dans l'Histoire tant de prédécesseurs qu'il serait puéril de les critiquer et que personne ne s'y risquera bien longtemps.

Au nom de quoi, par exemple, l'Amérique, qui, évidemment, a trouvé son maître dans le Japon, peut-elle refuser sa reconnaissance à l'Etat mandchourien ? Elle a reçu notification de sa naissance. Elle se tait, et c'est tout ce qu'elle peut faire. Mais ça ne durera pas. L'Angleterre, la France ont également reçu la lettre de faire part. J'ai l'impression que n'était la crainte de déplaire à Washington, elles auraient déjà donné leur assentiment à la nouvelle République.

La position la plus curieuse et la plus embarrassante est certainement celle de l'U. R. S. S. En sa qualité de libératrice des peuples opprimés, elle ne peut que se réjouir de l'émancipation mandchoue de la tutelle des nationalistes chinois. Elle le ferait sans arrière-pensée si le Japon n'était pas le paragon de cette émancipation dont il bénéficiera plus que personne, sinon seul. Quant à la Chine, ses efforts seront vains. Elle le sait.

On dit : première étape vers l'annexion, comme il fut fait de la Corée, par le Japon. Avec le grand spécialiste américain Rodney Gilbert, nous n'hésitons pas à dire le contraire, du moins pour plusieurs générations. Car tel n'est pas l'intérêt actuel du Japon. Plus tard, bien plus tard, peut-être... Mais alors, le Japon sera en plein accord avec une Chine régénérée et leur ennemi sera commun. Sans le nommer, comme le fait R. Gilbert, tout le monde l'a deviné.

Toute question juridique mise à part, économiquement parlant, la création de la Mandchourie, Etat indépendant épaulé par le Japon, nous apparaît plutôt comme un événement heureux.

J. C. BALET.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

P.F. 22.

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 2429 of April 1, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, March 22, 1932.

LA GUERRE EN EXTREME-ORIENT

L' "internationalisation" de Changhaï

Les négociations continuent à Changhaï en vue de la cessation définitive des hostilités. Il semble toutefois qu'on soit encore loin d'un accord. Les informations à ce sujet sont d'ailleurs assez contradictoires.

Le Japon procède au rapatriement d'une partie de ses troupes. Il faut en déduire que le gouvernement de Tokio n'a pas l'intention de reprendre les opérations militaires dans la région de Changhaï. Mais cela ne veut pas dire qu'il soit prêt à rétablir le « statu quo ante ». On annonce, en effet, que les Japonais se retranchent fortement dans le secteur occupé et qu'ils y maintiendront au moins deux divisions.

D'ailleurs, l'amiral japonais Abo, membre du Conseil supérieur de la guerre, qui avait été chargé d'examiner sur place la situation à Changhaï, a fait des déclarations importantes à la presse. L'« Agence Ren-go », qui est l'agence officielle du gouvernement de Tokio, les résume ainsi :

L'amiral Abo a déclaré que la zone de Changhaï ne saurait être entièrement abandonnée aux Chinois, après le retrait des troupes japonaises.

Il apparaît, a-t-il dit, que la meilleure solution, tant dans l'intérêt des Chinois que dans celui des étrangers, serait l'établissement d'une zone de sécurité, à l'intérieur de laquelle chacun pourrait vaquer à ses affaires dans la paix et la sécurité. Les Japonais ne défendent pas que leurs intérêts, mais aussi ceux de toutes les nations et si les Chinois et les étrangers pouvaient comprendre les réelles in-

et 1.000.
système qualité 800 à 850. Extrêmes : 760
950 : deuxième qualité 850 à 900 : trois-
poids mort : Première qualité 900 à
125 : vendus 125 : invendus néant. Prix
Vaches. — En réserve 11 : exposés
mes : 200 et 350.
76 : vendues 32 : invendues 24. Extrê-
Vaches. — En réserve 6 : exposées
Extrêmes : 200 et 500.
360 à 420 : troisième qualité 300 à 360.
poids vif : 420 à 480 : deuxième qualité
485 : vendus 380 : invendus 155. Prix au
Bœufs. — En réserve 74 : exposés
BORDAUX
vente difficile, cours en baisse sur porcs.
me, cours maintenus sur moutons ;
cours en hausse sur veaux : vente cal-
hausse sur gros bétail : vente bonne.
Observations. — Vente calme, cours en
qualité 828 : troisième qualité 614.
neant. Première qualité 928 : deuxième
Pores. — Aménés 3.213 : invendus
qualité 1.060 : troisième qualité 860.
680. Première qualité 1.510 : deuxième
Moutons. — Aménés 15.113 : invendus
lité 1.020 : troisième qualité 820.
Première qualité 1.270 : deuxième qua-
Vaches. — Aménés 2.079 : invendus 58.
lité 660 : troisième qualité 620.
65. Première qualité 630 : deuxième qua-
Taurins. — Aménés 442 : invendus
qualité 660 : troisième qualité 630.
165. Première qualité 880 : deuxième
Vaches. — Aménés 1.376 : invendus
qualité 690 : troisième qualité 660.
340. Première qualité 880 : deuxième

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 2429 of April 1, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

**Non mais,
sans blague!**

Non, mais, sans blague ! On parle sérieusement de la reconnaissance de l'Etat mandchou « indépendant » ? Si les événements des derniers six mois ne nous avaient pas habitués à ne plus nous étonner de rien, nous aurions ri aux éclats. Mais, hélas ! depuis le commencement de la guerre en Extrême-Orient, nous avons vu les choses les plus abracadabrantes !

Les Japonais ont attaqué Chang-haï, détruit Chapeï, bombardé la ville chinoise et ses alentours, durant trois semaines, massacré les soldats chinois ainsi que la population paisible, vieillards, femmes et enfants. Mais Messieurs les membres du Conseil de la S. D. N. n'ont vu là aucune agression de la part du Japon. Dans leur sagesse gouvernementale, ils ont laissé l'agresseur achever son œuvre. Et il n'a été question de la cessation des hostilités que le jour où le vainqueur a bien voulu arrêter son offensive.

Le gouvernement « indépendant » est établi dans ce pays par le commandement japonais. L'administration est entre les mains des Japo-

Cinémas
 Actualités Cinéphone (2, Bd des Italiens):
 Spectacle permanent de 50 minutes de
 midi à minuit.
 Actualités « Le Journal » et
 mondiales paritaires et soopres.
 (Jean Bastia).
 Théâtre de l'Humour : Soyez des nôtres
 (revue)
 Théâtre de Dix-Heures : Pido et Rado
 chéansonniers.
 Noctambules : Salade printanière, avec
 chant.
 Montpardo : Attractions et tours de
 force.
 Luna-Rouge : A la Loren (revue).
 Palais-Royale : Nuits de folies.
 Moulin-Rouge : Attractions (Opéris).
 Moulin-Rouge : Attractions diverses.
 Moulin-Rouge : Attractions diverses.

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TEMPS 23

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2429 of April 1, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, March 23, 1932.

LA SITUATION POLITIQUE AU JAPON

L'ouverture de la session de la nouvelle Diète japonaise, qui a eu lieu dimanche, en présence du mikado, a fourni l'occasion au Parlement d'adresser solennellement des remerciements aux officiers, aux soldats et aux marins de l'empire du Soleil-Levant qui ont pris part aux récentes opérations en Mandchourie et à Shanghai. Par là, la représentation nationale a voulu se solidariser avec les troupes qui ont accompli une rude tâche dans des circonstances particulièrement difficiles et on trouve ici une manifestation de cet ardent patriotisme japonais qui subordonne toutes les luttes intérieures aux considérations de politique extérieure. Mais cela ne signifie pas que l'opinion soit unanime au Japon sur l'action entreprise en Mandchourie et à Shanghai, ou du moins sur les conditions dans lesquelles cette action a été conduite. Les difficultés auxquelles on s'est heurté sur le terrain militaire, l'obligation où l'on s'est trouvé de donner les développements d'une véritable expédition, comportant l'envoi de 50,000 hommes, à ce qui ne devait être au début qu'une opération de police, les mécomptes éprouvés à Chapei et à Wou-Sung, où l'objectif militaire n'a pu être atteint qu'au prix de sacrifices importants, enfin, la situation financière assez difficile à laquelle doit faire face le Japon à la suite de la dévalorisation du yen, tout cela provoque un malaise politique et crée à Tokio une atmosphère de crise.

Dans certains milieux on laisse entendre qu'il est possible que les éléments militaires songent à profiter de cet état de choses pour imposer un gouvernement fort, résolu au besoin à avoir recours aux méthodes et aux procédés de la dictature pour maintenir la prépondérance du vieil esprit des Samouraï; mais dans les milieux généralement bien informés, on dément toute intention de ce genre et on pense, au contraire, qu'il importe de constituer un gouvernement de coalition où les deux grands partis, le parti conservateur Seiyunkai, et le parti libéral Minseito, seraient représentés, de manière à assurer le partage des responsabilités dans la pratique d'une large politique nationale. Il est possible que le cabinet Inukai subisse des remaniements du fait de la démission du ministre de l'intérieur et de deux autres membres de la combinaison actuelle, mais si un changement doit survenir, ce ne sera évidemment qu'après la session de la Diète, qui sera d'ailleurs de très courte durée. En réalité, les conservateurs sont absolument maîtres de la situation au Parlement, ou les élections du mois dernier leur ont assuré 301 sièges contre 140 sièges au parti Minseito, 5 au parti des prolétaires et 11 aux indépendants. Le cabinet Inukai, soutenu par cette majorité conservatrice, s'est donné pour tâche de stabiliser la situation politique, d'assainir la situation financière, d'exécuter un grand programme d'organisation de l'industrie et, enfin, de régler les questions qui se posent entre le Japon et la Chine. Il est possible que l'on envisage, surtout en raison des mesures financières qui s'imposent, la nécessité d'un gouvernement de coalition ayant la confiance de la nation entière, mais rien ne permet d'affirmer jusqu'ici que M. Inukai soit disposé à entrer dans cette voie, alors que la majorité dont il dispose à la Diète lui permet de gouverner en toute indépendance. Ce n'est pas la situation parlementaire qui suscite des difficultés au cabinet. Le malaise résulte plutôt de l'état de l'opinion publique qui se montre inquiète de l'avenir immédiat et c'est la pression que celle-ci peut exercer qui semble devoir favoriser la formation éventuelle d'un cabinet de coalition.

En ce qui concerne la politique du Japon à l'égard de la Chine, l'exposé que le ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Yoshizawa, a fait hier à la Diète, projette quelques clartés sur les positions actuelles du gouvernement de Tokio. M. Yoshizawa a rappelé les raisons qui ont déterminé le Japon à agir à Shanghai, l'agitation antinipponne en Chine, menée avec une vigueur particulière, les injures d'un journal chinois à l'adresse de la famille impériale, l'assassinat d'un prêtre et de plusieurs ressortissants japonais; tous les arguments invoqués dans les exposés faits au nom du gouvernement du mikado à Genève se retrouvent ici dans un raccourci qui ne laisse pas d'être assez impressionnant. La thèse de M. Yoshizawa est que le Japon a tout fait pour éviter une aggravation du conflit, mais que les perspectives d'accord ont été constamment compromises par l'action de l'armée chinoise. Pour l'intervention de la Société des nations, le cabinet de Tokio a toujours considéré que le conflit de Shanghai était une affaire purement locale qui n'était pas susceptible d'entraîner une rupture avec la Chine et que la question de Mandchourie était aux mains du conseil de la Société des nations, en vertu de l'article 11 du pacte. De là sa protestation contre l'application de l'article 15 et l'abstention des délégués du Japon lors du vote de la résolution du 2 mars de l'Assemblée.

Le véritable intérêt de l'exposé de M. Yoshizawa réside dans les passages où le ministre des affaires étrangères du Japon traite de la position de son gouvernement à l'égard de la Mandchourie et de l'Union soviétique. Pour la première, il a dit que Tokio avait reçu, le 12 mars, une communication annonçant l'établissement d'un nouvel Etat indépendant de Mandchourie, communication à laquelle le Japon s'est borné à répondre par un accusé de réception non officiel. Mais M. Yoshizawa a ajouté qu'il est persuadé qu'il est conforme à l'intérêt du nouvel Etat « que son gouvernement respecte réellement, comme l'annonce sa déclaration, les traités existants, les droits et les intérêts des étrangers et qu'il adhère loyalement au principe de la porte ouverte ». Tout porte à penser que si le ministre des affaires étrangères du Japon a cru devoir exprimer officiellement

sa conviction à cet égard, c'est que son gouvernement a reçu des assurances formelles à ce sujet. Il est d'ailleurs intéressant de rapprocher ce passage de l'exposé de M. Yoshizawa des déclarations faites par le premier ministre du nouvel Etat mandchou à la presse britannique pour affirmer que la Mandchourie indépendante est résolue à remplir toutes les obligations lui incombant en vertu des traités existants, mais qu'elle n'admettrait la politique de la « porte ouverte » qu'à la condition que celle-ci ne portât pas atteinte à ses droits souverains. Quant aux relations avec les Soviets, le ministre des affaires étrangères nippon considère comme tout à fait désirable que les négociations en cours depuis un an avec Moscou aboutissent et que Tokio continue ses efforts pour sauvegarder les droits du Japon dans la question des pêcheries qui, on le sait, est âprement discutée entre les deux gouvernements.

Ce qu'il faut retenir surtout de cet exposé, c'est que le Japon considère que ses intérêts en Mandchourie ont une importance capitale du point de vue politique, tandis que les intérêts qu'il possède en Chine sont plutôt économiques que politiques. De là les deux méthodes, très différentes, par lesquelles le Japon entend régler le conflit de Mandchourie et le conflit de Shanghai. Encore faut-il que la Chine admette ce double point de vue et que certaines puissances — notamment les Etats-Unis — se prêtent au règlement du conflit mandchou tel qu'on le conçoit à Tokio.

act 24

Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 2429 of April 1, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from ACTUALITES, March 24, 1932.

Le règlement de l'affaire de Shanghai

Par M. FRANÇOIS DE TESSAN

Depuis le 3 mars, on ne se bat plus dans la zone de Shanghai. Après cette date, quelques accrochages ont pu se produire encore entre Chinois et Japonais, mais l'ensemble des opérations militaires était terminé. Les troupes nipponnes ayant dégagé la ville sur un rayon de 20 kilomètres et obligé la 19^e armée chinoise à se replier — tandis que les forts de Woosung étaient pris — la face des généraux de l'Empire du Soleil Levant était sauvée, le Cabinet de Tokio se déclarait prêt à conclure un armistice. A Genève, M. Sato, au nom de son Gouvernement, annonçait qu'il faciliterait de son mieux la tâche de la S. D. N. pour le rétablissement complet de l'ordre. De leur côté, les Chinois étaient désireux d'éviter de nouvelles hostilités et souhaitaient l'évacuation rapide de leur territoire. Il semblait donc que l'on devait arriver assez rapidement à un règlement du conflit. Cependant, quantité de difficultés imprévues allaient entraver la marche des négociations...

La Chine commençait par dire qu'elle n'entendrait rien tant que les Japonais n'auraient pas retiré leurs troupes. Le Japon soutenait cette thèse que l'évacuation aurait lieu lorsqu'il serait en possession des garanties de sécurité qu'il juge indispensables non seulement pour lui, mais pour toutes les colonies étrangères. L'organisme de Genève était fort embarrassé devant ces revendications contradictoires, et il multipliait les avis, les conseils, les résolutions, afin que fussent pris au plus tôt « les arrangements destinés à rendre définitive la cessation des hostilités ».

Les délégués chinois auraient voulu obtenir une condamnation morale de leurs adversaires pour rupture du pacte avant les pourparlers de Shanghai et ils auraient désiré faire régler la question de l'armistice par la S. D. N. Les représentants du Japon, en revanche, liaient la question de l'armistice à toute une série de problèmes d'ordre politique, administratif et juridique à étudier et à traiter *sur place*. Quant aux membres de la S.D.N., ils n'étaient disposés ni à approuver toutes les attitudes de la Chine ou du Japon, ni à donner à l'un ou l'autre de ces pays le prétexte de se retirer. Il leur fallait sauvegarder le prestige de l'Assemblée, trouver une solution pratique qui ne heurtât point les sentiments des deux peuples asiatiques, préparer aux yeux du monde l'acheminement vers la paix réelle. Tâche bien délicate!

C'est pourquoi fut nommée une Commission chargée de suivre les négociations de Shanghai, et c'est dans cette ville que se déroulent les discussions relatives à l'armistice définitif qui remplacera la trêve provisoire établie au début du mois.

Les Japonais, au fond, ne demandent pas mieux que de sortir du guépier dans lequel ils se sont fourrés. Ils ont compris que leur tactique, à Shanghai, leur avait aliéné de nombreuses sympathies parmi les nations, notamment en Grande-Bretagne et aux Etats-Unis. Au boycottage pratiqué par les Chinois à l'égard du commerce nippon, se sont ajoutées des menaces de boycottage anglais et américain. Sans doute, le mouvement n'a pas pris une grande ampleur, mais il a été un avertissement. Il ne faut pas oublier que les Etats-Unis achètent 80 % des soieries fabriquées du Japon. Il a suffi d'un certain nombre de commandes annulées pour jeter l'émoi dans les milieux commerçants de Tokio.

Quant au boycottage chinois, ses effets sont désastreux pour le pays du Mikado. Les importations nipponnes en Chine ont diminué de 40 % par rapport aux chiffres de 1930 et de 55 % par rapport à ceux de 1929. C'est, surtout, dans la Chine centrale et méridionale que le négoce japonais a été le plus fortement touché. Hong-Kong et la Chine du Nord ne viennent qu'après. Mais, en ces derniers mois, le ralentissement des affaires a été tel que les transactions du Japon n'ont été que de 20 % à 30 % de ce qu'elles étaient l'an dernier pour le premier trimestre!

Si l'on ajoute à ce manque à gagner les frais de l'expédition qui seraient d'un milliard de francs — tant pour Changhaï que pour la Mandchourie — on conçoit aisément que le Cabinet de Tokio soit avide d'en finir honorablement. Pour témoigner de sa bonne volonté il a déjà retiré de Chine une partie de ses contingents et rappelé le gros de ses escadres à la base de Sasebo. Mais il doit tenir compte d'une opinion nationaliste très surexcitée et il n'agit, au cours des négociations qui ont pris une tournure plus favorable depuis le 14 mars, qu'avec beaucoup de circonspection. Il cherche à obtenir des gages pour la cessation du boycottage qui le gêne terriblement.

Quant aux négociateurs chinois, ils sont aussi ballottés entre des sentiments divers. Ils savent bien que leur pays est incapable de mener une guerre à bonne fin, mais ils redoutent les critiques des clans bellicistes ou des extrémistes de Canton. Le ministre des Affaires Etrangères Quo Taï Chi, qu'assistent les deux généraux de la 19^e armée, Tchang Kouang Nai et Taï Tchi, reçoivent continuellement des sommations pour qu'ils pratiquent une résistance énergique, pour qu'ils réclament au Japon des indemnités énormes en réparation des dégâts causés durant les combats autour de Changhaï, pour que l'affaire soit réglée sans aucune garantie pour les étrangers.

Ce sont ces manœuvres, ces accès de xénophobie, ces prétentions outrancières qui font trainer les négociations et paralysent l'esprit de conciliation qui anime les représentants des puissances à la conférence sino-japonaise de Changhaï. Malgré tant de palabres et d'à-coups, les pourparlers avancent pourtant et l'on a l'impression que l'on s'entendra sur les positions qui devront être occupées par les troupes chinoises, aussi bien que sur la manière dont seront retirées les forces japonaises. Si les dernières propositions connues sont acceptées, une Commission mixte composée de membres des puissances amies surveillera l'exécution du programme ainsi arrêté.

Il n'est donc pas douteux que les choses s'arrangeront dans la zone de Changhaï. Ce n'est plus sur ce terrain que les complications internationales ont des chances de s'aggraver. Mais la question de Mandchourie — surtout depuis la création d'un Etat indépendant — reste entière. Les nations qui ont signé les traités relatifs à l'indépendance de la Chine que feront-elles? Quelle sera l'attitude de l'U. R. S. S.? Et des Etats-Unis? Là, nous n'en sommes qu'au début d'une affaire autrement ample et importante que celle de Changhaï...

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Matin 24

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 2429 of April 1, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, March 24, 1932.

LE BOYCOTTAGE N'EST-IL PAS LA GUERRE ?

Quand les Japonais dénoncent en termes véhéments le boycottage chinois, on n'est évidemment pas obligé de les croire sur parole ; mais, quand les Américains, qu'on ne saurait accuser de partialité en faveur des Japonais, certifient avec des exemples saisissants ce boycottage, on est bien forcé de s'arrêter et de réfléchir.

Le témoignage qu'un des premiers « spécialistes » des Etats-Unis en matières extrême-orientales, M. Rodney Gilbert, vient d'apporter au *Herald Tribune Magazine*, est à cet égard la plus convaincante plaidoirie qui pouvait être prononcée pour le Japon et le plus terrible acte d'accusation qui pouvait être dressé contre la Chine...

Et d'abord, comment naît et se déroule le boycottage en Chine ?

« Un beau matin, nous explique M. Rodney Gilbert, des affiches sont apposées dans les grands centres. Elles sont rédigées en un jargon hystérique et font appel aux 400 millions de frères chinois pour secouer la domination étrangère et venger l'honneur national. Deux ou trois jours plus tard, dans les rues des mêmes centres, des cortèges de jeunes gens vêtus de robes de coton, se déroulent, comme par hasard, portant des pancartes et distribuant des tracts : l'étranger qu'il faut bouter dehors y est précisé et désigné... »

« Si les autorités locales sont secrètement d'accord avec les manifestants, la procession se termine par la remise d'une pétition où le gouvernement national est invité à ne pas tolérer un jour de plus la présence sur le sol chinois des tyrans du dehors. En même temps, une association des Sauve-la-Patrie est formée par des agents du Kuo-min-tang et elle nomme un comité directeur. Ledit comité ordonne aussitôt la saisie et la confiscation des biens ennemis, la perquisition des boutiques et des banques, l'interdiction de commercer ou d'héberger les nationaux du pays en interdit. »

Dès lors, le mouvement est déclenché. La chasse aux marchandises et la chasse à l'homme s'organisent. Rien ne les arrêtera plus.

Dans l'affaire actuelle, c'est le 23 septembre dernier, à un énorme meeting populaire qui se tint à Nankin même, en présence de fonctionnaires du gouvernement, que le mot d'ordre fut lancé de boycotter partout le Japon. Les associations des Sauve-la-Patrie devaient s'intituler : « Association anti-japonaise » et le cri du ralliement devait être : « A mort le Japon ! »

On compte que, depuis 1908, c'est le huitième boycottage auquel le Japon a eu à faire face.

la victime, était un enfantillage. L'Amérique pourtant ne le prit pas en plaisantant. Le département d'Etat envoya à Pékin une note comminatoire prévenant la Chine qu'il considérait ce boycottage comme « une conspiration contre le commerce, une violation des traités et un acte d'hostilité ». En même temps, la flotte du Pacifique recevait l'ordre d'appareiller... Cela suffit pour que, dans les quarante-huit heures, le taotai de Changhaï fit cesser l'interdit. Par ailleurs, la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis a défini le boycottage : « UNE ARME CRUELLE ET IMMORALE D'AGRESSION ».

Qu'en pense à son tour la Société des nations ?

Lord Lytton, président de la commission d'enquête envoyée par Genève en Extrême-Orient, a prononcé à cet égard des paroles d'une fermeté irréprochable :

— Quand un pays, a-t-il déclaré au cours d'un banquet, s'emploie à susciter des sentiments haineux et agressifs à l'égard d'un autre pays, il ne doit pas s'attendre à ce que la S. D. N. intervienne et le préserve des conséquences qui en pourraient résulter...

Excellent verdict. Parfaite doctrine. On aimerait la voir ratifier par une assemblée, où l'on a entendu récemment beaucoup de gémissements sur le fait que le Japon avait porté la guerre en Chine et très peu de réprobation sur le fait que la Chine avait eu recours à « une arme cruelle et immorale d'agression » contre le Japon.

Stéphane Lauzanne.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C'est le même boycottage auquel le Japon a eu à faire face. Mais celui-ci dépassa, selon M. Rodney Gilbert, tout ce qu'on peut imaginer en violence et en brutalité. Comme une trainée de poudre, la croisade prêchée par les chefs du Kuomintang, qui est l'équivalent chinois de la Gépéou russe, gagna Changhaï, Hankéou, Canton, Fou-Tchéou et les grands centres commerciaux: toutes les principales boutiques furent fouillées et les marchandises japonaises furent saisies et emportées; des milliers de Chinois qui étaient employés par des firmes japonaises reçurent l'ordre d'avoir à démissionner sur l'heure; les banques chinoises se virent interdire de négocier papiers, traites, chèques de ressortissants japonais et même de faire la moindre tractation avec une banque japonaise; aucun Chinois ne fut autorisé à prendre passage sur un navire japonais en partance et ceux qui descendaient de navires arrivés étaient rossés par la foule, en présence de la police. Bref, en moins de quinze jours, un lacet gigantesque avait été passé autour de l'immense commerce japonais et ce commerce avait été proprement étranglé et ramené sur les statistiques au chiffre zéro.

On ne s'en tint pas là. Les résidents japonais, mis en interdit, se virent refuser toute vente de nourriture et pratiquement affamer. On les assaillit, les dévalisa, les rançonna. On en assomma quelques-uns, le soir, entre chien et loup, au coin des rues. A Changhaï, le consulat japonais reçut les plaintes de quarante-vingt-onze familles dont les gosses avaient été cruellement maltraités au sortir de leur école. Il est vrai que, par mesure de compensation, on emprisonna tous les Chinois qui s'étaient montrés tièdes dans la lutte, on les traduisit en justice et on les condamna — quand on ne les lyncha pas.

Voilà le tableau esquissé à grands traits.

M. Rodney Gilbert rappelle — et l'évocation de ce souvenir historique est intéressante — qu'en 1905 le gouvernement des Etats-Unis, ayant promulgué une loi restreignant l'émigration étrangère, se trouva en présence d'un boycottage chinois qui, à côté de celui dont le Japon vient d'être

EXPLSC: FLOW DE FORMID' NALCH 24' 1925.

FLOW THE EMPRESS 24' 1925.
 FUGIOABLE NO. 2 TO DEBATCH NO. 2488 OF WHITT J' 1925.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEMPS 29

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 2429 of April 1, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, March 29, 1932.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS ET LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Le conflit sino-japonais traîne en longueur. Jusqu'au moment où les négociations engagées à Shanghai en vue de la conclusion d'un armistice auront définitivement abouti, il est toujours à craindre qu'à la suite de quelque incident sur le terrain les hostilités ne reprennent. On ne saurait être surpris, dès lors, que les controverses qui se sont instituées à Tokio et à Nankin — et qui sont dominées dans la capitale nipponne par l'influence du Seyiukaï, lequel dispose de la majorité au Parlement, et des milieux militaires, et dans la capitale chinoise par la pression du Kuomintang sur un gouvernement sans autorité — compliquent singulièrement la situation et rendent difficile la conclusion ferme d'un accord.

Moins que jamais les deux questions qui se posent actuellement en Extrême-Orient — celle de Mandchourie et celle de Shanghai — ne peuvent être liées. En ce qui concerne Shanghai, on était en droit d'espérer que l'entente se ferait assez rapidement, le Japon n'ayant aucun intérêt à pousser plus loin ce qui ne devait être qu'une opération de police et ce qui est devenu, par la force des circonstances, une expédition militaire de grande ampleur, tandis que la Chine, de son côté, est incapable de soutenir une véritable guerre après l'effort fourni par la 10^e armée devant Shanghai. Pourtant, les deux adversaires éprouvent beaucoup de peine à s'entendre sur les termes d'un armistice définitif, l'un et l'autre étant préoccupés surtout de sauver la face pour leur opinion publique. Il en résulte qu'on s'obstine à discuter sur des mots et des formules qui ne sauraient changer en quoi que ce soit la situation de fait.

Les propositions faites par le Japon au cours des pourparlers de Shanghai tendent, on le sait, à stipuler le maintien des troupes chinoises sur leurs positions actuelles, à plus de vingt kilomètres de la ville, tandis que les troupes nipponnes se retireraient à l'intérieur de la concession internationale, certains effectifs devant rester temporairement sur le territoire contigu à la route en dehors de ladite concession. Il serait entendu, de plus, que la commission mixte composée de civils et militaires chinois, japonais, français, anglais, américains et italiens, serait chargée non seulement de certifier le retrait des forces nipponnes et chinoises, mais de prendre des décisions concernant l'exécution de la retraite des deux armées. Or, du côté chinois, on n'admet pas que la limite de la concession internationale puisse être étendue de la sorte du fait même de la présence des troupes japonaises en dehors de la zone de la concession. L'entente finira sans doute par se faire, comme il arrive toujours en conclusion de négociations avec la Chine, sur une formule que chacun pourra interpréter en faveur de sa thèse, mais qui n'en aura pas moins pour effet d'arrêter définitivement les hostilités.


Ce qui est de nature à faire naître certaines préoccupations en ce moment, c'est le mouvement d'opinion qui se dessine au Japon en faveur d'une rupture de l'empire du Soleil-Levant avec la Société des nations. C'est à propos de l'intervention de l'institution internationale de Genève dans le conflit sino-japonais en Mandchourie que se précisent des intentions qui ne laissent pas d'être inquiétantes. Dès le premier jour où le conseil de Genève fut saisi, en septembre de l'an dernier, du conflit mandchou, le Japon marqua sa volonté de n'admettre l'ingérence d'aucun tiers dans le règlement des questions qui se posent entre lui et la Chine. Ce fut une erreur, sans doute, de porter devant le conseil un conflit de caractère local pouvant être réglé rapidement par des négociations directes entre les autorités chinoises et

japonaises en Mandchourie; mais une fois le conseil officiellement saisi, celui-ci ne pouvait que s'arrêter aux décisions qu'il a prises. Le gouvernement de Tokio a admis l'envoi sur place d'une commission d'enquête, à la condition que cette commission n'interviendrait en rien ni dans les opérations de police jugées nécessaires par les forces nipponnes qui ont la garde du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien, ni dans le règlement même du différend. La thèse japonaise est que le conseil n'a été saisi du conflit mandchou qu'en vertu de l'article 11 du pacte, qui vise uniquement la conciliation, et que la Société des nations ne peut prétendre appliquer au conflit mandchou l'article 15 du pacte, en vertu duquel la Chine a demandé la convocation d'une assemblée extraordinaire pour examiner le conflit de Shanghai.

Il y a quelques jours déjà, la presse japonaise a laissé entendre que le cabinet de Tokio se propose d'informer la Société des nations de l'intention du Japon de quitter l'institution internationale de Genève au cas où celle-ci insisterait sur l'application de l'article 15 en ce qui concerne le conflit mandchou. On considérerait qu'il y avait là simplement un argument de polémique, mais que le gouvernement du mikado n'envisage pas sérieusement une telle éventualité, dont les conséquences seraient graves du point de vue de la politique internationale. Or, voici que dans des déclarations publiques le général Araki, ministre de la guerre, affirme que le Japon est résolu à faire en sorte que sa politique en Mandchourie ne soit contrariée ni par la Société des nations ni par les puissances. Si le rapport de la commission d'enquête envoyée en Mandchourie révélait ce que le général Araki appelle « une mauvaise compréhension continue de la situation », le Japon non seulement se retirerait de la Société des nations, mais il interdirait à celle-ci d'intervenir en Extrême-Orient.

Les déclarations du ministre de la guerre nippon ont évidemment un caractère personnel n'engageant pas officiellement le gouvernement de Tokio. Mais, s'il ne faut pas prendre cette menace au tragique, il importe pourtant de réfléchir sérieusement à une éventualité que l'état actuel des esprits au Japon rend vraisemblable dans des circonstances déterminées. Si l'empire du Soleil-Levant, qui est la grande puissance dont l'influence est prépondérante en Extrême-Orient, venait à se retirer de la Société des nations et si tout le domaine de l'Orient lointain devait échapper désormais au contrôle de l'institution internationale de Genève, dont déjà la Russie soviétique et les Etats-Unis sont absents, le caractère universel de la Société des nations perdrait beaucoup de son importance. On ne veut pas supposer que le gouvernement de Tokio, qui a toujours fait preuve au sein du conseil et de l'assemblée de Genève du meilleur esprit de collaboration, puisse se résoudre à un geste de nature à compromettre l'autorité morale et à réduire le rôle de l'organisme créé pour assurer le développement de la vie internationale et la consolidation de la paix. De son côté la Société des nations, qui a été entraînée par les circonstances à intervenir dans le conflit sino-japonais dans des conditions particulièrement délicates et alors qu'elle ne dispose pas des moyens de faire exécuter ses décisions, doit veiller à ne pas fournir au Japon un prétexte pour se retirer du conseil de l'assemblée et pour reprendre son entière indépendance, ce qui aurait pour effet de le libérer, dans le domaine du lointain Orient, de toutes les obligations du pacte.


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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SPECIAL REPORT
 No.W.D. 1027.



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To the Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith
 Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No.W.D.
 1027, dated March 30, 1932.

WD/DBS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, March 30, 1932.

Serial No. W. D. 1027.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,
 Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: The Manchurian Situation as seen
 by Doctor Legendre

Continuing his series of articles on the Far Eastern situation (see notably Special Reports Nos. W. D. 1005 of February 6, 1932, and W. D. 1016 of February 29, 1932), Doctor Legendre discussed in FIGARO of March 28, 1932, the question: "Is Manchuria Chinese Territory?"

note
 893.0144

His reply is a categorical No. According to him, it is only the ignorance of Young China which allows claims to be advanced upon Manchuria as well as Mongolia and Thibet, which countries have not only never formed an integral part of China but have indeed frequently conquered or dominated China. He therefore compares these claims to the pretensions of the Kuomintang to place Indochina, Burmah, and even Java under its authority.

Casting a backward glance into history, Doctor Legendre recalls that the Manchus at the period when they dominated China were regarded as enemies rather than as

compatriots

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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compatriots and were always hated. As long as the Manchu Dynasty ruled in Peking, the Chinese were forbidden to migrate into Manchuria. This has been changed since the 1911 Revolution, the Chinese having invaded Manchuria pacifically in search of peace and food.

Doctor Legendre goes on to remark that the Japanese also came at the same period, having industrial aims and taking on police duties.

As for the claims of Japan, Doctor Legendre considers that they might be justified, the Japanese in remote times having frequently been in Manchuria. He adds:

"In connection with Manchuria, there is some question today of compelling respect by invoking the Treaty of Washington. But who respects that Treaty? Not even the Chinese. Have not political clans cut their country up in sections? Does such a thing exist as a compact and unified China in accordance with the postulate of the signatories of the Treaty of Washington who, taking little thought for realities, are today receiving a categorical denial from facts?

"On the other hand, we must not forget that European and American troops are occupying certain big centers in China. This country is consequently subjected to certain servitudes because of the chaos which reigns there. But the chaos would only be increased if this servitude were removed."

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see to
 893.91-Manchuria

In conclusion, Doctor Legendre denies that any pressure was needed from Japan to make Manchuria declare her independence. He himself was in Mukden at the end of 1928 when he learned without surprise that all the provincial Governors remained faithful to Chang Su Liang only because he protected Manchuria against the enterprise of Nanking. Chang Su Liang having forgotten his duty, the Governors declared their independence and, according to Doctor Legendre, they will never consent to be under the domination of Young China.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson,
 Special Assistant.

✓ Enclosure:

1. Excerpt from FIGARO,
 March 28, 1932.

In quintuplicate

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Incl. #1 to Special Report #WD 1087, March 30, 1932.

Excerpt from FIGARO, March 23, 1932.

From American Embassy, Paris.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

La Mandchourie est-elle une terre chinoise?

Par le Docteur A. LEGENDRE

Le Kouo Ming Tang, cette poignée de politiciens qui, grâce à l'étranger, ont réussi à s'emparer du pouvoir en Chine, revendiquent la Mandchourie comme terre chinoise, de même la Mongolie et le Thibet. Mais si la Jeune-Chine était moins ignorante, connaissait quelque peu l'histoire de son pays, elle saurait que les grands territoires ci-dessus n'ont jamais fait partie intégrante de la Chine et l'ont souvent conquise, dominée. Mais est-ce que le Kouo Ming Tang, qui compte à peine deux provinces sur dix-huit sous son autorité, ne revendique pas aussi l'Indochine, la Birmanie et même Java? Il est vrai qu'il y a vingt ans à peine le Chinois considérait encore, comme ses tributaires, toutes les nations du monde. « Tien hia » « sous le Ciel », il y avait lui, le « grand civilisé », le « pur », et tout le reste de l'humanité n'était que « Mantze », « barbares » méprisables.

Mais j'en reviens à la Mandchourie. Je passe sous silence la Mongolie où domine aujourd'hui le Bolchevik sans que la faction de Nankin ait jamais songé à protester, pas plus d'ailleurs que la S. D. N. ou les Etats-Unis, aujourd'hui si soucieux de défendre la Mandchourie. Mais le territoire mandchou, qu'est-il exactement?

Si l'on se reporte à l'histoire ancienne, cette contrée a été le berceau originel, non du Chinois, ce peuple hybride ethniquement, si mal caractérisé, mais de tribus nomades turco-mongoles, très guerrières, qui, au cours des siècles, n'ont cessé de se ruer périodiquement sur la Chine et de lui imposer leur loi, leurs dynasties. La dernière de ces tribus conquérantes fut celle qui, au dix-septième siècle de notre ère, établit à Pékin le règne des Ts'inn renversés en 1911.

Ce qu'il importe de faire ressortir, c'est que

Le Chinois n'a jamais reconnu à aucune époque les Mandchous comme étant des frères de race : au contraire, il les tenait en profond dédain, les traitant de « Mantze », ni plus ni moins que l'Européen. Je parle d'expérience : j'ai en effet vécu des années dans la capitale du Setchouen, à Tchen-Tou où existait un camp d'officiers et de soldats mandchous avec leurs familles. Or, ces maîtres de la Chine étaient considérés par le peuple plutôt en *ennemis* qu'en compatriotes. Et si vous aviez à vous venger d'un Chinois importun, il suffisait de le qualifier de « lou tsai », ou « esclave de Mandchou », pour qu'il décampât aussitôt, vexé à fond. Lors de la révolution de 1911, tous les Mandchous isolés dans l'intérieur furent massacrés par les Chinois, hommes, femmes et enfants.

Bref, le Mandchou n'a jamais été considéré par le Chinois comme faisant partie de sa famille : il a toujours été pour lui l'étranger haï. Le Mandchou, d'ailleurs, le lui rendait bien : ainsi la dynastie impériale des Ts'inn, originaire de Mandchourie, interdisait sa terre natale à tout sujet chinois. Et c'est seulement depuis la disparition de cette dynastie en 1911, que le Chinois a émigré en Mandchourie, émigration qui a pris un grand développement depuis que l'anarchie, sous le Kouo Ming Tang, avec ses massacres et ses ruines, a provoqué l'exode d'énormes masses de paysans. Ces masses hésitaient d'autant moins qu'elles savaient devoir trouver la sécurité sous la protection japonaise.

Mais c'est par un retour sur le passé qu'on se rend mieux compte de la vraie situation et du rôle historique de la Mandchourie, de cet immense glacis où tant de races se sont heurtées au cours des siècles. De ces chocs, il résulte des refoulements, tant vers l'est que vers l'ouest et le sud. Aucun doute qu'un certain quantum de la population japonaise primitive ne soit venu du Continent, de la Mandchourie et de la Corée. Si l'histoire n'était là pour nous l'enseigner, l'anthropologie à elle seule y suffirait. C'est surtout dans le nord du Hondo, sur la mer du Japon, qu'on rencontre ce type ethnique.

L'Aïnu, d'ailleurs, homme de race blanche, premier envahisseur du Hondo, est certainement venu du Continent. D'autres vagues de conquérants ont suivi : ceux du clan Yamato, les plus connus, puisque tout Japonais déclare descendre de ces fameux guerriers.

Bref, la Mandchourie n'est pas une terre chinoise ; elle a été, à une époque ancienne qui se compte par siècles, le champ de manœuvre de tribus nomades très guerrières qui ont, un jour, ou pénétré en Chine, en Corée et au Japon, ou bien entrepris une longue, très lointaine chevauchée, comme celle des Turcs qui, partis de Mongolie, finirent par se stabiliser en Europe après avoir enlevé Byzance à la chrétienté.

Ces dernières années, la Mandchourie a été

envahie pacifiquement par les Chinois du nord pour y trouver la paix et le millet quotidien. Le Japonais est venu lui aussi, sous l'aspect de l'industriel surtout et, de plus, heureusement, sous celui de *gardien de la paix*. Un intrus, a-t-on dit, ce Japonais : nullement, il *réoccupe* une place, des lieux que parcoururent autrefois ses ancêtres, soit pour paître leurs troupeaux, soit pour rompre des lances contre une tribu voisine. Pour le Chinois, la Mandchourie était la terre maudite d'où lui venaient tous ses malheurs au cours de tant de siècles. *Jamais il ne put la soumettre, fut toujours conquis par elle.*

L'émigrant chinois doit choisir : ou collaborer avec le Japonais, ou subir la loi de Moscou autrement tyrannique.

A propos de cette Mandchourie, il est question aujourd'hui de faire respecter l'intégrité de la Chine en invoquant le traité de Washington. Mais qui donc respecte ce traité ? Pas même les Chinois. Est-ce que les clans politiques n'ont pas dépecé leur pays ? Est-ce qu'il existe une Chine compacte, unifiée, suivant le postulat des signataires du traité de Washington qui, faisant foin des réalités, reçoivent aujourd'hui le démenti des faits ?

D'un autre côté, il ne faut pas oublier que des troupes européennes et américaines occupent certains grands centres de la Chine. Ce pays, en raison du chaos qui y règne, subit donc certaines servitudes : y toucher serait accroître ce chaos.

Pour en finir avec cette question de Mandchourie, je ferai observer que le fait d'avoir été conquise par le Mandchou n'autorise pas la Chine à réclamer le territoire de celui-ci. Une Allemagne annexée par la France serait-elle en droit de déclarer la France terre allemande du fait de cette union ?

Il faut aussi se rappeler l'existence de la *Grande Muraille* : elle fut construite par le Chinois, dans quel but ? Mais pour s'isoler de la Mandchourie, pour se protéger contre ses hordes. Donc, la Mandchourie, terre ennemie pour la Chine !

Aujourd'hui ce territoire se déclare indépendant : sous la pression japonaise, dit-on. On exagère : me trouvant à Moukden fin 1928, j'appris, sans étonnement, que tous les gouverneurs de provinces ne resteraient fidèles à Tchang Sué Liang qu'autant qu'il préserverait la Mandchourie de toute emprise de la part de Nankin. Tchang Sué Liang ayant oublié ses devoirs, les gouverneurs se sont déclarés indépendants et n'accepteront jamais la tutelle de la Jeune-Chine.

C'est là la *tradition*, la réalité. Et tous les augures de la S. D. N. n'y changeront rien. Au lieu de s'hypnotiser sur des textes juridiques, ils feraient mieux d'acquiescer la pleine connaissance des faits géographiques et historiques.

D^r A. Legendre.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Hankow/56 FOR #110(#86 to Leg'n.)
FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED Feb. 15, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese difficulties. Review of Japanese military
action in China proper.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

This emergency removal of the capital, although it is considered here to be a temporary, emergency measure, served to relieve to some extent the fears, so far as the immediate future was concerned, of Wuhan. It was felt that the location of the National capital at Loyang would render it essential to the Government that the Lunghai and Ping-Han railways connecting Loyang and Wuhan be kept in operation and that order be maintained in Wuhan.

7925 (d) Undeclared Sino-Japanese War. The inevitable Japanese military action in China proper, anticipated in this Consulate General's political report covering October, 1931, began at Shanghai on the evening of January 28, 1932. The first effect in Wuhan of the news of fighting at Shanghai was nervous uncertainty amongst officials and citizens. The Japanese authorities hurriedly began strengthening the barricades and other defenses of the Japanese Concession at Hankow. More stringent measures were taken by the Chinese authorities to prevent the occurrence of any incident that might precipitate hostilities here. At that time the whole desire of the Chinese authorities and responsible citizenry

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citizenry seemed to be to avoid any demonstration or other move that might give an excuse to the Japanese to begin hostilities here.

Shortly thereafter, however, there appeared a change in the attitude of the Chinese military officials and of merchants and bankers at Wuhan. With news that the Japanese had thrown shells from naval vessels into Nanking on the night of February 1, there was a decided stiffening in the attitude of the Chinese towards the Japanese. Responsible Chinese began to say openly that the only course left was to make the best resistance possible to any offensive move that the Japanese might undertake here.

The Japanese authorities with the limited force at their disposal in Hankow were, however, apparently sincerely desirous of maintaining tranquillity.

While Hankow's importance was increased and its status somewhat changed by the emergency removal of the National capital from Nanking to Loyang, the feeling here is that the Japanese will not willingly attempt any military activity in this area before the Shanghai situation is cleared up and tranquillized and before the water level rises sufficiently to enable the Japanese to bring adequate reinforcements and supplies to Hankow via the Yangtse. Even then the Japanese would, before they could attempt military action at Hankow, be compelled to answer to their own satisfaction in the affirmative, the question of whether or not they could

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NOTE

SEE 760f.00/24 FOR desp. #706

FROM Czechoslovakia (Hibbard) DATED March 30, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Conflict between China and Japan. Discussion
of in report made by the Foreign Minister of
Czechoslovakia before the Chamber of Deputies
and the Senate.

fc

793.94/5037

3075

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Regarding the conflict between China and Japan, and the rôle played by the League of Nations in the matter, he pointed out that this was the first occasion on which the League since its inception had been called upon to decide upon peace or war in a conflict between a Great Power and the numerically strongest and most extensive state of Asia. It was a very serious dispute, and in its consequences a very reaching one. All who were interested in the maintenance of world peace, and all who realized what it would mean for the post-War policy of Europe if this conflict could be settled and the League of Nations thus strengthened in its great mission, were called upon to interest themselves in the dispute. Dr. Beneš proceeded to give a dispassionate account of the essence of the conflict from the Chinese and Japanese points of view, and then referred to the results of the intervention of the League, which had been in touch with both parties since September last. The League had secured, first and foremost, at least the cessation of direct hostilities and battle on the front. It had further obtained

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the consent of both sides to participate in negotiations for an armistice, and the consent of Japan to commence the gradual evacuation of the area round Shanghai. This evacuation had already begun. Finally the League had the intention of getting the whole complicated matter studied by a special commission which would also occupy itself with the conflict in Manchuria in order to submit in due time suggestions for a definitive solution of the conflict between the two States. It was emphasized during the discussions in the League that should Japan fail in her obligations the League would proceed to make use of appropriate sanctions. Without anticipating the outcome of the trouble, or contending that everything had gone according to the wish of Geneva, Dr. Beneš said the great significance of the actual, even if only partial, success of the League and the decisive manner in which the League had stepped in to preserve peace, were not to be overlooked. He added that he was not exaggerating when he declared not only the minor States but also the Great Powers of Europe were surprised at the great moral force and impulse which international diplomacy had demonstrated at Geneva and at the significant rôle which the institutions of Geneva were likely after all to play in the case of a similar conflict in Europe. The Far East conflict was one between big Powers, it was remote from Geneva in an area where the interests of the contending parties touched also those of two of the greatest countries of the world, America and Soviet Russia, which were not themselves members of the League, and were often indeed opposed to its policy. Regarded from this aspect the Geneva meeting was a significant international event which, despite the scepticism evinced in Europe of Today, was of vast importance for the development of the League of Nations, and for belief in the possibility of maintaining international peace through Geneva. Of great importance was also the collaboration of the United States in the work of the League, and the appreciation of its efforts by the American Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson.

By

By far the most important section of the speech and the one which has created the liveliest comment in the press is that devoted to the proposed Danubian Federation and the attitude of Czechoslovakia on the question. As Czechoslovakia will occupy a key position in any such plan her conditions must be of great interest to France and Germany. No doubt these have been discussed with Tardieu and Sir John Simon though many express surprise at the open way in which Beneš has stated that Czechoslovakia will enter into no organization, union or federation which does not have the approval of Italy and Germany or which does not include the other members of the Little Entente.

The four principal points laid down by Dr. Beneš were:

1. The Government was ready in conjunction with the other Central European States namely, Austria, Hungary, Roumania and Jugoslavia, to explore means for closer economic and commercial cooperation between them. It was also prepared to take part in conferences of the five States and to accept as a basis the idea of a preferential system outlined in M. Tardieu's Memorandum.
2. In these endeavors any political action, constitutional reorganization, or discussion of a confederation must not play any part. The Czechoslovak Government also excluded any negotiations for a customs union between the five countries concerned. He had communicated to Sir John Simon, who originally had been in favor of a customs union, his political and economic objections to the plan.
3. The Czechoslovak Government would not enter any negotiations without Jugoslavia and Roumania. Complete accord between these three countries was an essential premise to Czechoslovak action.
4. The Czechoslovak Government believed that negotiations could be successful only if the Great Powers gave their consent and accepted the French initiative. In the event of Rome or Berlin withholding its approval from the plan, Czechoslovakia would not

take

1080

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

take part in any negotiations unless there was some hope for success. It was true that it would be better if immediate action could be taken, for several of the Central European countries were in such a bad financial condition that they could not afford to wait long. Assistance was very urgently needed.

After referring in detail to the French, German, and Italian memoranda, Dr. Beneš said that he would not countenance any policy aiming at political antagonism between Austria and Germany. The procedure likely to be adopted would be that the four Great Powers concerned would invite the five small States to a conference, probably in Switzerland; if an agreement were reached, then negotiations between the five and the Great Powers would ensue, and if these were successful, the next step would be to provide financial assistance to Austria and Hungary.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Shanghai/44 FOR Despatch # 8159.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED March 8, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Shanghai situation.
 Japanese began their first aerial bombing of
 Chapei in the morning of the 29th of January.
 Principal damage done was at the Shanghai
 North Station.
 Arrival of American Marines at Shanghai on
 February 3rd, 1932.

hs

793.94/5038

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ARRIVAL OF AMERICAN FORCES:

The U.S.S. HOUSTON, carrying Admiral Taylor and a contingent of some three hundred marines, arrived on February 3rd. Eight United States destroyers arrived the following day, bringing the total number up to twelve. The 31st Infantry arrived on board the U.S.T. CHAUMONT and disembarked the following day. The second battalion went into position along Soochow Creek on February 9th and the remainder took over about half of the front line held by the Shanghai Volunteer Corps on February 10th.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-15-

BRIEF OUTLINE OF MILITARY EVENTS:

On January 29th, early in the morning, the Japanese began their first aerial bombing of Chapel, which was repeated innumerable times during the following month. The principal damage done on that day was at the Shanghai North Station, which was directly hit by a bomb and completely gutted by fire, and at the Commercial Press building, the largest printing press of its kind in China, which was also destroyed. About noon on January 29th the Japanese resumed their offensive, using armored cars, but they were repulsed by the Chinese. The next day, January 30th, notwithstanding the fact that a truce was supposedly in effect, there was a great deal of sniping. In attempting to stop the fighting the Japanese, in the afternoon, set fire to a group of buildings adjoining the Odéon Theatre, just outside the Settlement boundary, on North Szechuen Road. No firemen were allowed to approach the buildings, which were reduced to ruins.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O. N. I. AND M. I. D.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated April 13, 1932

Rec'd 3:45 a. m.

FROM

DIRECTOR OF
 EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

APR 13 1932

Secretary of State,

Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 13 1932

Department of State

430, April 13, 9 a. m.

Following from Harbin:

"April 12, 10 a. m.

One. Russian Communists are suspected of serious but unsuccessful attempt to blow up Sungari bridge on southern line of Chinese Eastern Railway during the night of April 9th.

Two. Conditions in region along the east of railway still continue deplorable. From Imienpo eastward Chinese and Russian inhabitants are being plundered and maltreated by Chinese soldiers and brigands and Communists and Kuomintang agitators.

Three. Despite these shocking conditions, Japanese military are withdrawing their troops from that region to Harbin, Generals Tamon and Amano already having arrived here. It is suspected that Japanese wish to impress League Commission and others that new Kirin troops are unable to maintain order and that presence of Japanese troops is necessary.

Four.

F/DEW

793.94/5039

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FILED
 APR 14 1932

108

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gusigoff NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #430, from Peiping, Apr. 13, 9a.m.

Four. Soviet railway officials have returned from Siberia some Chinese Eastern Railway freight cars but firmly refuse to return 64 allegedly misappropriated locomotives despite sixteen demands of Chinese railway directors that they do so. Situation thus caused there is serious and may lead to far reaching consequences.

Five. Doihara informed me he has been made brigadier general and will go to Japan to assume command of a brigade and that in case of war between Russia and Japan the latter will win."

For the Minister

PERKINS

WSB

KLP

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT TO

Department of State

Washington,
April 13, 1932.

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

AMERICAN EMBASSY

APR 13 32

PARIS (FRANCE).

147 CONFIDENTIAL. FOR SECRETARY STIMSON'S INFORMATION.

One. Hanson telegraphs from Harbin April 12 that

793.94/5039 conditions in region along the eastern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway still continue deplorable, that despite the disordered conditions Japanese military are withdrawing their troops from that region to Harbin, and that it is suspected that Japanese wish to impress League Commission and others that new Kirin troops are unable to maintain order and that presence of Japanese troops is necessary.

Two. Hanson adds that Doihara, the Special Agent in Manchuria of the Japanese General Staff, informed Hanson that he "has been made brigadier general and will go to Japan to assume command of a brigade and that in case of war between Russia and Japan the latter will win".

FE:RSM:EJL

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. .

SHANGHAI

Dated April 13, 1932

Rec'd 6:20 a.m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

April 13, 6 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

At a meeting today British Minister and I, Italian Charge d' Affairs and representative of French Minister, discussed necessity of retaining large forces at Shanghai. British Minister informed me that he was informing his Commander-in-Chief that he saw no objection from a political point of view to reducing British forces here by one battalion. British Minister stated that he was making this statement in reply to an inquiry from the Admiral. I understood that British forces will probably be reduced by this number shortly.

I have informed Admiral Taylor of the above.

JOHNSON

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APR 13 1932
HPD

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM Geneva

Dated April 13, 1932

713.94
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500.C.H.

Secretary of State
Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 15 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

11:15 a.m.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 13 1932
Department of State

80, April 13, 4 p.m.

Yen told me this morning that he had requested a meet-
ing of the nineteen which will/hold on Saturday in order to
present the Chinese point of view on the Shanghai negotia-
tions. He said that China could not accept the proposal of
Sir Miles Lampson even in its modified form as it contained
"conditions" for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and
thus was contrary to the Assembly resolution. For example,
withdrawal was not to take effect for six months and then
only if order in Shanghai and the surrounding district jus-
tified such withdrawal.

WSB-KLP

WILSON

F/DEW

793.94/5041

APR 15 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N.R.

Dated April 13, 1932

Rec'd 1:30 Division of

Secretary of State

Washington:

COPIES SENT TO
 U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 13 1932

Department of State

April 13, 9 a.m.

The British Minister has just received a message from the local office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the effect that Quo learns from Nanking that the Chinese Government has telegraphed to the Chinese delegate at Geneva to ask for an elucidation of the question of the time limit. Pending a reply from Geneva on this point, the Chinese Government desires the next meeting of the conference be postponed for a few days.

WSB-RR

JOHNSON

F/DEW

793.94/5042

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GRAY

F/DEM

793.94/5043

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 13 1932
Department of State

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2--from Shanghai via N.R.,
April 13, 8 p.m.

(three) - Representatives of participating friendly powers feel that Japanese are protected in this connection by Article one which provides for cessation of hostilities around Shanghai including all and every form of hostilities, and they feel that Japanese should not press this point which should be capable of adjustment if main difficulty can be overcome.

(four) - Main difficulty is that Chinese insist on a clearly defined time limit within which Japanese withdrawal into the International Settlement and the Extra Settlement Roads of the Hongkew district should be completed in accordance with first sentence of Article No. three. Japanese have made it abundantly clear in the course of the negotiations that they are not prepared to fix any such time limit maintaining that the reduction of their troops to such numbers as appears absolutely necessary in Settlement, et cetera, must depend on restoration of normal conditions of security. Foreign representatives understand however that Japanese would be willing to make a declaration to the effect that 'As soon as local condition

in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-from Shanghai via N.R.,
April 13, 8 p.m.

in and around Shanghai return to normal - and they hope that conditions will have so returned within six months or sooner - the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and the Extra Settlement Roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932.'

(five) - Foreign representatives feel that they have done all they can to bring the two sides together and that if any agreement is to be reached China should either accept the above declaration or else sign the agreement as it stands relying upon definite undertaking in regard to withdrawal contained in the first sentence of Article No. three.

(six) - The foreign representatives submit that the Assembly might help towards a speedy conclusion of the agreement as already drafted if the Assembly would record a pronouncement that they have noted the results so far of China negotiations carried on in accepting the resolution of March 4 and that they interpret the first sentence

of

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109
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-from Shanghai via N.R.,
April 13, 8 p.m.

of Article three as clearly meaning that the Japanese
Government thereby undertake to complete at an early date
the withdrawal of the Japanese troops".

JOHNSON

WSS-HPD

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State

Washington,

April 13, 1932.

APR 13 32

AMERICAN EMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE).

793.94/5043

146

FOR SECRETARY STIMSON'S INFORMATION -- SHANGHAI
 NEGOTIATIONS.

One. Referring to the Department's No. 145 of
 April 13, 1932, the Department has since received
 from Johnson under date of April 13, 8 p.m., copy of
 the following identic message which is being sent by
 the representatives of the United States, Great
 Britain, France and Italy to their respective govern-
 ments:

QUOTE

(Telegraph Room: Quote text of message
 contained in Shanghai's telegram of
 April 13, 8 p.m., copy attached.)

UNQUOTE

Two. The QUOTE first sentence of Article three
 UNQUOTE referred to in the foregoing message reads as
 follows:

QUOTE In accordance with the program regulating
 withdrawal as shown in annex two to this agreement the

Enciphered by _____

Japanese

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5043

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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OR
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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

Japanese troops will withdraw to the International
Settlement and the Extra-Settlement Roads in the Hongkew
district as before the incident of January 28th UNQUOTE.

Carl
Leitz

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator M., 19_____, _____

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.51 Manchuria/1 FOR Tei 411-11am

FROM China (Perkins) DATED April 6, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 oxx

REGARDING:

The Mitsu and Mitsubishi interests will loan to the new State of Manchuria 20 million yen and another additional 20 million yen will be loaned to the state through the Bank of Chosen.

ek

793.94/5044

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated April 6, 1932

Rec'd 2:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

411, April 6, 11 a. m.

Following from Renzo News Agency, Tokyo, April 4th:

note 793.941

"At first the South Manchuria Railway Company was to accommodate the desired loan of twenty million yen to the State of Manchuria, but now that the Mitsu and Mitsubishi interest having come out with the offer of taking up the loan money will be advanced by them. The loan bars interest and uncovered, to be redeemed in five years.

893.51 Manchuria/1

It is further leased the Mitsu and Mitsubishi concerns will put up ten million yen each, which will be loaned to the State of Manchuria through the Bank of Chosen. As the Kwangtun army was originally approached for the loan, matter will be referred to General Honjo, and on his approval, the question will be decided upon at today's Cabinet meeting."

For the Minister
PERKINS

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Tel.#435 from China (Perkins) of Apr.14, 1932,
11am, and Tel.#59 to Geneva for Stimson of Apr.15,
1932, 5pm, are

FILED IN THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE

793.94/5045

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

435, April 14, 11 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"April 13, noon.

One. At 10:30 p. m. April 12 a Japanese military train carrying a motor car detachment and ammunition and consisting of locomotive, one passenger and several converted freight cars when passing over a bridge ten miles (#) on its way to Harbin over the Eastern Line the Chinese railway ran into explosives placed on the tracks, according to the version of Soviet railway officials, or derailed due to the previous removal of bolts from rails, according to the Japanese version. The locomotive and four cars toppled down the embankment, the passenger, four freight and eleven flat cars were destroyed, one officer and ten privates perished in the flames, about fifty privates were severely injured and eleven automobiles destroyed. Railway officials state that this is the most serious catastrophe on the line

COPIES SENT TO
GRAY (U.S.I. AND M.I.D.)

Peiping via N. R.

Dated April 14, 1932

Re: 12:30 a. m.
Division of



F/DEW

793.94/5045

APR 14 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #435, from Peiping, Apr. 14, 11a.m.,

line in Japanese history. Identity of guilty still unknown.

Two. Three sticks of dynamite with dry battery attached were discovered last night on same Eastern Line two miles from old Harbin."

"April 13, 3 p. m.

One. In an interview with the press yesterday General Tamon stated that Japanese troops would not take part in operations to clear the east line of the railway of undesirable elements but if the new Kirin troops prove unequal to the task the Japanese command would take action, that Japanese efforts to clear the district near the Siberian-Korean frontier were hampered by the unwillingness of the railway to place at the disposal of the Japanese military the necessary number of echelons for moving troops to the Eastern frontier, and that in order to eliminate banditry in Manchuria large numbers of troops and two or three years time are required.

Two. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the Japanese military will have more difficulty than they anticipated in clearing North Manchuria of Chinese irregular soldiers and bandits."

For the Minister
PERKINS

KLP - WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT REU-1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

April 15, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

APP 15 32

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

One. The American Legation at Peiping telegraphed
793.94-Commission/170
 under date of April 14, 3 p. m., that it was reliably
 informed that Koo had privately been warned by Yoshida,
 the Japanese assessor, that it might not be safe for
 Koo to accompany the Commission to Manchuria.

Two. The Legation at Peiping on April 15/127 transmitted
893.01-Manchuria
 a telegram from the Consul General at Mukden dated April 14
 reporting that Ohashi, ex-Japanese Consul General at Harbin,
 and Kawasaki, until recently a Japanese Foreign Office
 official attached to the Harbin consulate, are attached to
 the Changchun Foreign Office and are busily engaged in
 preparing documents to be given the League Commission by the
 Manchuria administration; that it is believed that objection
 to Koo emanates from this quarter; and that Japanese appear
 to be the only active members of the Changchun administration.

Three. The Legation on April 14/793.94/5045 transmitted a telegram
 from Hanson dated April 13, to the effect that it was becoming

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/5045

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

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Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

increasingly apparent that the Japanese military would have more difficulty than they anticipated in clearing North Manchuria of Chinese irregular soldiers and bandits, and that General Tamon, in an interview with the press on April 12, stated that large numbers of troops and two or three years time were required to eliminate banditry in Manchuria.

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Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Charge to
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This cable was sent in [redacted]
It should be [redacted] before
being [redacted] to [redacted]

Department of State

Washington,
April 13, 1932.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

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CONFIDENTIAL FOR SECRETARY STIMSON'S INFORMATION. --
SHANGHAI NEGOTIATIONS.

793.94/A
note
893.102-S
793.94119

One. According to reports received from Minister Johnson since your departure, it appears that the negotiations at Shanghai have reached a deadlock. The Chinese insist that a definite time limit be set within which the Japanese troops will withdraw into the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement road area as before the incident of January 28. This the Japanese refuse. On April 12 the Chinese representative informed Johnson that he had telegraphed Yen at Geneva for advice and that he hoped to have instructions within a fortnight. Johnson states that for the moment interest lies in attitude of League; that negotiations at Shanghai are indefinitely postponed; that Minister Lampson has booked passage to return to Peiping leaving Shanghai on April 16; but that he, Johnson, proposes to remain at Shanghai until satisfied there is definitely no further need for him to remain.

Two. In commenting, Johnson states that it seems fairly clear to him that the Japanese have been using the

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/5045A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department

OR

Charge to

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

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TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

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PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

negotiations for the purpose of obtaining time to consolidate their military position at Shanghai; that they intend to hold an area between the International Settlement and Woosung as a pledge to force the Chinese to accept terms in connection with boycott, anti-Japanese activities and other questions, possibly even questions relating to Manchuria; and that they expect such political questions to be brought before a round table conference. Johnson further states on Chinese authority that Chinese military refuse to sign any agreement that does not set a time limit for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and that Chinese political elements are endeavoring to capitalize the situation, which places Nanking in a delicate position.

It would seem that Johnson and Lampson have patiently and resourcefully pressed for an agreement, making many suggestions but without success.

Three. In the opinion of the Far Eastern Division the situation is this: (a) the Japanese, having engaged in military operations at Shanghai with certain objectives, refuse to agree to withdraw their troops unless and until they are satisfied that their objectives have been to a sufficient extent attained; (b) the Chinese, confronted with the presence of an invading military force which is there

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0105

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 PREPARING OFFICE
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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

- 3 -

Washington,

for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear upon them, decline to enter into an agreement which in effect would commit them to an assent to the presence of that force, unless, as a part of the agreement, they can obtain in return a pledge which would preclude the continuance for an indefinite period of the presence and pressure of the invading armed force. The two positions are scarcely reconcilable; to achieve an agreement one side or the other would have to yield; there is little if any room for compromise; the likelihood is that the situation will remain in statu quo indefinitely unless (a) one or the other of the disputants makes new military moves or (b) outside pressure contributes to its liquidation.

Four. For Johnson's guidance, the Department on April 11 telegraphed as follows: QUOTE The Department appreciates the difficulties which confront you in the negotiations; approves the attitude which you have taken; hopes that it may still be found possible to persuade the Chinese and Japanese to reach an accord; and awaits your further reports on the matter UNQUOTE.

Enciphered by FE:SKH/ZMF

Sent by operator M., 1982

Index Bu.—No. 50.

Carl
 Apr. 18, 1982. P.M.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P.R./228 FOR deap. #3704

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED March 28, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict.

Debate in the House of Commons on -
summary of given.

793.94 / 5046

fo

0107

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The House of Commons on March 22nd was the scene of an extended and important debate on the Far Eastern situation. Mr. Lansbury, leader of the Opposition, contrasted the reliance which China had placed upon the League for the settlement of the conflict with the determination of Japan to settle the matter without regard to its treaty obligations. He believed that the League had finally, though belatedly, taken a firm stand in defense of its principles, a large part of the credit for which he was glad to attribute to Sir John Simon. Mr. Lansbury then turned to Manchuria where, he said, Japan had set up a puppet government which was attempting to seize control of the Chinese maritime customs and thus prejudicing the rights of other interested powers.

Sir Austen Chamberlain replied with a defense of the League and of British policy towards the League in the matter of the present dispute. He said that Great Britain maintained an attitude of friendship towards both the parties to the dispute and that it was necessary for Great Britain to preserve an attitude of impartiality for the present. He believed that in the circumstances the League had done remarkably well by showing consideration towards both sides;

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

any other course of action, in his opinion, would have involved the application of sanctions, which would have brought to an end any possibility of the League remaining as a moral force.

Sir John Simon, replying for the Government, said that Britain is prepared to assume all its obligations as a member of the League. He conceived it to be essential, however, that a clear distinction should be made between the powers of the League as a mediatory organ and its coercive powers, as he did not believe that threat of coercion would promote the efforts which the League was making to mediate between the two disputants. With respect to Manchuria, he said that the rule which the British Government is following in general is to reserve any decision as to what it might do until the Far Eastern Commission of the League had rendered its report. So far as recognition of the new Manchurian regime is concerned, he said that Great Britain, being one of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty, would not countenance any violation of China's administrative or territorial integrity. At the same time he did not rule out the possibility that there might be a subdivision of China. In the same way, Great Britain would not tolerate any interference with the Chinese maritime customs in Manchuria, which would prejudice British and other foreign interests; but so far as he knew, the Manchurian regime proposed to do no more in this respect than

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

had been done by other independent regimes set up at
various times in other parts of China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS. Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94-Commission/160 FOR Tel.#104, 5pm

~~FROM~~ for (Blakeslee) DATED Apr. 12, 1932
TO China NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Department's plan for a solution of the Manchurian problem. Certain officers of the Department have drawn up an outline ~~of a plan~~ of a plan for the solution of the Manchurian problem, which contemplates the reestablishment of a Chinese administration in Manchuria and the negotiation of a new and comprehensive treaty. Plan is being mailed.

dew

793.94/5047

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM SENT

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

April 12, 1932, 5 p.m.

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA)

104

Your 425, April 9, 9 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR BLAKESLEE.

One. Officers of the Department have been giving serious thought to finding some helpful suggestions toward a practical solution of the problem relating to Manchuria to which question you will presumably sooner or later have to give consideration. Assuming that any such solution must, as far as possible, take into consideration the interests and views of the Chinese and Japanese Governments and the principles agreed upon in the Covenant of the League of Nations, in the Nine Power Treaty and in the Kellogg Pact, there has been prepared by certain officers an outline of a plan which, although perhaps not entirely comprehensive, includes certain features which might have suggestion value.

Two. The project contemplates as an initial step the conclusion of a preliminary agreement between China and Japan

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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2- #104, to Peiping, April 12, 1932

Japan to enter into direct negotiations relating, first, to the reestablishment of a temporary Chinese administration in Manchuria; second, to the reestablishment of a permanent Chinese administration in Manchuria, together with questions of security and protection of foreign rights and interests; and third, to the negotiation of a new comprehensive treaty.

Three. The Department is sending you by pouch in care of the Legation at Peiping a copy of this outline plan for such use as you may care to make of it, in whole or in part, as upon your own initiative and responsibility. The plan should reach you about June first, but if in the interim you should find it urgently desirable to have it before that date the Department will consider cabling a summary.

CASTLE

FE:JEJ:VDM

ACTING

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

W F/E

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Shanghai via R. R.

FROM

Dated April 15, 1932

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

Division of

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D. APR 15 1932

Department of State

April 15, 4 p. m.

Chinese have apparently moved a regiment of 3000 troops into the vicinity of Hungjao, southwest of International Settlement, and strong patrols of that body of troops have been seen moving northward in the direction of south bank of Soochow Creek. This will bring them into contact with left flank of Shirakawa patrol zone. I understand the Japanese consider this a threat to the left flank of their main position.

JOHNSON

WWC

HPD

F/DEW

793.94/5048

FILED

APR 15 1932

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893.23*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R/35 FOR # 138

FROM Siam (Kaufman) DATED March 9, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese dispute holds the interest of Siam but the only disturbances that have been caused has been the result of the foreign element.

ek

793.94/5049

793.94

0111
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE.

The Sino-Japanese dispute continues to hold the center of interests in the limited foreign news which reaches Bangkok. It is reported that during February a number of threatening letters were received by the Japanese Legation stating that serious consequences would result if the Japanese do not leave Siam immediately. It is believed that these letters were written by individual Chinese and do not represent the feeling of the majority as most of these are trades-people with their chief interest in life centered in their trade; these trades-people have considerable business with the Japanese and they would do nothing that would interfere with their business. It is reported that there has been one attack by Chinese upon a Japanese storekeeper with the intent of destroying

of destroying the store but this was frustrated by the police who have arrested the rioters. On the same night, misled by the false rumor of a brilliant Chinese victory, several thousand Chinese attempted to celebrate in violation of the police regulations which require that permission for such celebrations must be obtained in advance. Upon the intervention of the police a riot ensued in which the police were stoned by the rioters, who were dispersed only by the use of a fire hose. The affair ended with the arrest of about 120 rioters and the injury to a number of policemen. All but ten of these have been released and these, it is understood, will be deported.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten initials]

April 14 1932

No. 1850

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,

American Minister,

Berne.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your information copies, as listed below, of certain telegrams received by the Department in connection with developments in Manchuria for the period April 5 to April 13, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your communicating to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, the information contained in the enclosures to this instruction. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in these messages.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State.

Enclosures:

Telegrams from Peiping:

- 406, April 5,
- 409, April 6,
- 410, April 6,
- 416, April 7,
- 419, April 7,
- 422, April 8,
- 424, April 9,
- 430, April 13. (Extract)

Apr. 14, 1932.

FE:EGC

[Handwritten signature]
FE-m.m.h.

793.94/5049A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via NR

Dated April 16, 1932.

Recd 3:42 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

April 16, noon.


My April 15, 4 p.m.

Military Attache learns that Chinese Government
has ordered local commander to withdraw his strong patrols
to their original positions and to use only small patrols
if necessary. This seems to satisfy the Japanese.

Please inform War Department of the above and
my April 15, 4 p.m.

JOHNSON.

CIB JS



F/HS

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FILED

APR 18 1932

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893.23

0118
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5051

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.1111 Baker, Charles/63 FOR Tel#- 11am
FROM Shanghai (Johnson) DATED April 14, 1932
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 o p o

793.94/5051

REGARDING:

Unwise for Johnson to proceed to Nanking saying that he was going there in connection with the Baker kidnapping case.

ek

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Towite,
V₂

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 18 1932

April 18, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Minister Johnson is referring to paragraphs five and six of his telegram of April 13, 8 p.m., which, edited to show what has been decided upon in Geneva, are as follows:

"Five. Foreign representatives feel that they have done all they can to bring the two sides together and that if any agreement is to be reached China should....sign the agreement as it stands relying upon definite undertaking in regard to withdrawal contained in the first sentence of Article III (which reads: 'In accordance with the program regulating withdrawal as shown in Annex Two to this agreement the Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement Roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th.').".

Note: The difficulty in regard to the time limit question arises out of a provision found in the second sentence of Article III which permits Japanese troops to remain temporarily but indefinitely in certain localities outside of the Settlement and its roads.

"Six.the Assembly would record a pronouncement that they have noted the results so far of the negotiations carried on in accepting the resolution of March 4 and that they interpret the first sentence of Article III as clearly meaning that the Japanese Government thereby undertake to complete at an early date the withdrawal of the Japanese troops."

JEJ:EMU

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REF

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

April 18, noon.

My April 13, 8 p. m., and April 18, 11 a. m.

One. Lampson and I have just been informed that Quo is returning from Nanking tomorrow expecting to resume negotiations with the Japanese. (END GRAY)


Two. With reference to my telegram of April 13, 8 p. m., Lampson has information from his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the effect that committee of nineteen at Geneva will adopt second alternative mentioned in paragraph five thereof and will probably pass a resolution following lines suggested in paragraph six thereof.

Three. I propose to return to Shanghai on April 20th as Lampson and I consider that the time is probably ripe for bringing local negotiations to a conclusion.

JOHNSON

CIB

WSR



SHANGHAI

Dated April 18, 1932

Rec'd 5:12 a.m.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE

GENERAL,
Mukden, China, March 29, 1932.

LEGAL ADVISER
APR 29 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APR 16 32

SUBJECT: Some Sidelights on the Japanese Occupation.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 563 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated March 29, 1932, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 563
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW

F/LS

793.94/5053

FILED

APR 29 1932

4 Carbon Copies
Received

JM

1122

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 563

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, March 29, 1932.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Some Sidelights on the Japanese
Occupation.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report a few incidents which throw some sidelight on Japanese methods in Manchuria as well as show the lengths to which the Japanese will go in the furtherance of their schemes.

In the local branch of one of China's leading banks, some of the prominent officials of the former government had personal funds on deposit on September 18, 1931, since when these funds have been impounded by the Japanese in control. There is also on deposit in this bank \$2,500,000 belonging to the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. Recently the Japanese military demanded that these deposits be handed over, the spokesman being a lieutenant. The demand was refused and subsequently a higher officer appeared at the bank to offer an apology for the mistake that had been made. It is thought that the plan had been concocted in hope of securing the money by overawing
the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the manager and that when it miscarried the apology was offered. It is understood that the Japanese have given the bank permission to pay these personal funds to the individuals themselves upon their personal application or upon the application of their qualified representatives. They cannot, however, be transferred to other branches of the bank. This appears to be a clever move to induce some of these officials to return to Mukden, the Japanese desiring, no doubt, to induce them to accept positions in the new Government. In this connection it may be stated that Hsing Shih-lien (邢士廉), who was closely associated with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, is mentioned as the future Chief of Police at Chengchun and that Kao Chi-yi (高紀毅), former Director of the Peking-Liaoning Railway, and several others are ready to return.

Another interesting report has been heard that the private funds of Chang Hsueh-liang in the Bank of Chosen and Yokohama Specie Bank amounting to about Yen 15,000,000 have for the most part disappeared. These deposits were subject to withdrawal by checks bearing the personal chop of Chang Hsueh-liang which had been in the possession of Lu Yu-t'ing (鲁穆庭), the former director of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces. Wu En-p'ei (吴恩培), the present director of the bank, is in possession of this chop and according to my information has drawn large checks on these deposits. Colonel Doihara, who was recently promoted, received Yen 3,000,000 for the Tientsin affair

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

affair, during which Henry P'u Yi was spirited away on a Japanese destroyer to Newchwang. Mr. Wu, it may be added, is a close personal friend of Mr. Sudo, the Japanese adviser and actual director of the Three Eastern Provinces Bank. A large cancelled check drawn on these deposits has been seen by the informant. The above two reports have emanated from a reliable source and are believed to be reliable.

Some weeks ago a member of the Chinese staff of the local Post Office was arrested and detained by Japanese gendarmes for six hours for having written a letter in which responsibility for recent developments in Manchuria was attributed to the Japanese. While under detention he was forced to sign a statement to the effect that he would never criticize the Japanese again. Recently he was re-arrested because a report of his former arrest appeared in a Chinese newspaper in Tientsin for which he was not responsible. This second detention lasted twenty-four hours, during which he was closely examined and subjected to torture. He was badly beaten on the body, slapped on the face many times and threatened with being shot. He was forced to give the names of all persons in the local Chinese Post Office who are anti-Japanese and to sign a document promising that he would not divulge what had occurred during his detention. This man who is quiet and unassuming has had a serious nervous shock as a result of this brutal treatment.

About ten days ago, several experts of the

International

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
International Money Order and Union Departments, Tokyo, arrived in Mukden for the purpose of investigating postal conditions with a view, it is believed in responsible quarters, of making recommendations concerning the taking over by the Japanese Postal Administration of the Chinese post offices in Manchuria. A higher Japanese postal official, a Mr. Shimizu, arrived yesterday, in connection with the same question. It has been heard that Japanese Headquarters is urging the immediate taking over of the Chinese post offices while the investigators have advised delay and that Mr. Shimizu has been sent here to submit his views on this question. According to available information, the local Government so far has taken no part in this movement for taking over the Chinese post offices.

Yours respectfully,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.

800.
MSM:MHP



0126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

APRIL 15, 1932

APR 15 32

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (Switzerland)

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Department's 145, April 13, 4 p.m. and 146, April 13,
 5 p.m. to Paris for you.

On April 14, the Japanese Ambassador handed to the
 Under Secretary ~~who made no comment or commitment~~ an
 undated and unsigned paper bearing a single paragraph,
 the text of which is identical with that quoted in the
 fourth paragraph of Minister Johnson's telegram of
 April 13, 8 p.m. communicated to you in paragraph one
 of the Department's 146, April 13, 5 p.m. to Paris.

The Japanese Ambassador, in handing this paper to
 the Under Secretary, gave the impression but did not
 state that his Government hoped that pressure would be
 brought to bear on the Chinese to accept this formula
 in lieu of an agreed upon date for withdrawal of Japanese
 troops. *The Under Secretary made no comment*

Reference to previous telegrams discloses that
 Ministers Johnson and Lampson on April 9 suggested that
 paragraph as an alternative proposal on the question of

Enciphered by _____

the

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

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Washington,

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the withdrawal of Japanese troops and that it was submitted by the Chinese and Japanese negotiators to their respective Governments. It was to have been discussed at a subsequent meeting of the negotiators on April 11 but this meeting was not held as the Chinese referred the matter to Yen at Geneva and further meetings were adjourned sine die.

It is the surmise of the Department that the Japanese may endeavor at Geneva to enlist support of their position on the basis of this formula; and that you may be solicited in that connection. It is believed that the following points should be considered: (a) this formula is very indefinite and would give the Chinese no assurance; (b) it provides only that at a time to be decided upon by them the Japanese troops will be drawn back within a certain line; (c) it carries no promise whatever regarding withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese soil; (d) the Chinese negotiators apparently do not dare sign an agreement which makes no repeat no provision for withdrawal of Japanese troops within a fixed time limit. To the Department it seems doubtful whether in these premises it would be advisable for the

Enciphered by

American

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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 Charge to
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Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

American Government to bring to bear any new pressure.

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FE:SKH:JEJ/VDM

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5054

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.77/2853 FOR #454

FROM Mukden (Meyers) DATED March 24, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

The policy of the Japanese to unify control of all railroads in Manchuria
under the South Manchuria Railway Company.

793.94/5054

ek

0 1 3 (

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL
Mukden, China, March 24, 1932.

SUBJECT: Railway Situation in Manchuria.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to my despatches Nos. 425 and 432 of January 7 and 23, 1932, respectively, in regard to the railway situation in Manchuria, I have the honor to submit further information on this subject.

It has been learned from a reliable source that on or about March 4, 1932 the South Manchuria Railway Company signed a contract with K'ian To (關 鐸), Director of the Tsupiaokai-Taonan Railway (concurrently Director of the Fengtien-Shenhaiikuan Railway), for the operation of that line for a period of fifty years. The details of the agreement are unknown although it is possible that the agreement was the outcome of negotiations relative to the indebtedness of the Tsupiaokai-Taonan Railway to the South Manchuria Railway Company amounting to nearly Yen 50,000,000. This agreement is believed to be the first of a series providing for the operation of the Chinese lines in Manchuria by the South Manchuria Railway Company. According to my informant the negotiations which are now taking place relate to the lines which were built

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

by the Chinese with Chinese funds only, such as the Fenchien-Heilung, Kirin-Heilung and Hulun-Heilun Railways, as well as to the Japanese financed lines. Of the so-called Chinese lines, the Fenchien-Chen-haikuan Railway appears to be the only one not desired at present by the South Manchuria Railway Company for its comprehensive system of railways for Manchuria. Its interests, however, are well taken care of by the thirty Japanese in the General Offices of that line - the station masters are also Japanese - not to mention the presence of ex-members of the South Manchuria Railway Company's staff in the Communications Commission. Such agreements seem to be in complete accord with the Japanese policy of establishing a unified control over the railways of Manchuria under the direction of the South Manchuria Railway Company. This office is endeavoring to obtain further information on this subject and will report any details that it may obtain.

According to reliable information construction work on the projected Changchun-Tsai Railway will be started by the South Manchuria Railway Company as soon as the weather permits. The line will pass through Nungan (農安) and Fuyü (扶餘) and will tap a rich agricultural area. There are no difficult construction problems to be surmounted and as the line is only about one hundred miles long, its completion within the year is said to be contemplated. Large stocks of steel rails are stored along the

Kirin

013

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Qirin-Changchun tracks at Changchun, of which line
it will be an extension.

As was mentioned in my despatch of January
7, 1938, above mentioned, reports indicate that
work on the extension of the Qirin-Yunhua Railway
(Yunhua-Dairen line) to the Korean border will also
be started next month.

This office is endeavoring to follow develop-
ments in this connection and will keep the Depart-
ment currently informed.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Myers,
American Consul General.

Original and four copies to Department.
Two copies to Legation, Peking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Harbin
Copy to Consulate, Dairen.

377
MMB:cl

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5055

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.711/76 FOR Despatch # -

FROM Mukden (Myers) DATED March 29, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Censorship of mails being carried on by armed
Japanese gendarmes and not by agents of the
so-called independent government.

793.94/5055

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 APR 16 1932 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 15, 1932.

Mr. Castle:

793.94
 memo
 793.1025
 793.94119

Herewith a copy of Minister Johnson's telegram of April 9, 10 p.m., which shows that Ministers Johnson and Lampson suggested the alternative proposal which the Japanese Ambassador handed to you yesterday. This alternative proposal was referred by the Chinese and Japanese representatives to their Governments at Nanking and Tokyo and was to have been discussed at a subsequent meeting on April 11, 1932. However, as you will see from Minister Johnson's telegram of April 12, 9 a.m., this meeting did not take place as the Chinese representative stated he had no instructions from Nanking. As the Chinese Government referred the question to the League, no further meetings have been held.

File

I suggest telegram as per attached draft. (Draft 60, Apr 15, 6 pm)
SKH
See 793.94/5053a
General

JES/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Handed to the Under Secretary by the
Japanese Ambassador

IV - 14 - 32 DCH

Draft

File
Jah

F/DEW

793.94/5056

The Japanese Government take this
opportunity to declare that, as soon as
local conditions in and around Shanghai
return to normal -- and they hope that
conditions will have so returned within
six months or sooner -- the Japanese
troops will be further withdrawn to the
International Settlement and the Extra-
Settlement roads in the Hongkew district
as before the incident of January 28th,
1932.

0 1 3 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5057

SEE 761.94/495 FOR Tel.#441-lpm

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Apr.16,1932
TO NAME 1-1137 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese dispute.
Plans to stage fresh provocation calculated to cause a grave conflict between Soviets and Manchurian authorities were attributed to certain Japanese military circles in Harbin, according to reports from Harborovik published by Tass News Agency which is the official Soviet Agency.

tfr

0 1 3 7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated April 16, 1932

Rec'd 3:42 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

441, April 16, 1 p. m.

Following from Reuter, Moscow, April 15th:

"Plans to stage fresh provocation calculated to cause a grave conflict between the Soviet and the Manchurian authorities were attributed to certain Japanese military circles in Harbin according to reports from Harborovik published by the Tass News Agency which is the official Soviet agency.

These military circles are reported to have insisted that the Chinese authorities in Harbin should search the Soviet Consulate General at Harbin on the pretext that the Consulate is alleged to have arranged terrorist outrages and sabotage on the Chinese Eastern Railway whereas according to the Tass Agency these outrages have been provoked by the work of white guards and Chinese and Japanese, according to the Harborovik message the Chinese Chief of Police, General Wan Jui Hua, refused to comply with the

request

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #441, from Peiping, Apr. 16, 1p.m.

request of the Japanese military circles to search the Consulate unless he was decidedly ordered to do so by the Manchukuo Government at Changchun. Moreover it is alleged that the Japanese made it an indispensable condition that the search was to be carried out entirely by the Chief Police and under no circumstances was General Wan Jui Hua to reveal that it was inspired by the Japanese."

For the Minister

PERKINS


JS

CIB

0135

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM GRAY

Peiping

Dated April 19, 1932

Rec'd 1:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



444, April 19, 10 a. m.

The following telegram has been received from
American Consul General at Harbin:

"April 18, 11 a. m. General Tamon and his troops
are soon to be replaced at Harbin by General Hirose and
his Division."

For the Minister.

PERKINS

JS

F/LS 793.94/5058

APR 22 1932

FILED

793.94 WP
893-20146
894-23

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
500.2
893.1028
793.94119

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

A portion of this telegram FROM
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 22 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Geneva
Dated April 18,
Rec'd 11:48 a. m. 19th.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 22 1932
Department of State

✓ FEE
W-E

Secretary of State,
Washington.

81, April 18, 11 p. m.

A meeting of the committee of nineteen was held on
Saturday at which it was decided tentatively that the
committee would give an interpretation to Article 3 of the
draft armistice terms to the effect that this was under-
stood to mean an obligation on Japan for evacuation at the
earliest possible moment. The joint or mixed committee
set up under Article 4 of the draft had been requested to
furnish reports periodically on the state of affairs
including evacuation. Hymans was charged to ascertain
the views of the ^{Japanese} ~~Japanese~~ and the Chinese on such a
decision.

A further meeting was called for this afternoon
in the meantime a rump committee of the smaller states
met and prepared an alternate draft.

Regarding the meeting this afternoon Sweetser

reports

F/LS 793.94/5059

FILED

APR 22 1932

0 1 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 81 from Geneva

reports as follows:

"Hymas reported that Yen expressed disagreement on the ground that no adequate guarantee of withdrawal would be afforded. Not having confidence in the Mixed Commission's authority to give this guarantee he wanted a neutral authority either the four powers or an agency of the League. He also insisted on a public meeting which Hymas told him was assured.

Hymas stated that Japanese seemed ready to accept this solution on condition; that the Japanese did not wish to come to a meeting of the nineteen if there were to be a bitter debate with the Chinese. Benes, Madariaga and Motta expressed concern over such an attitude on the part of the Japanese. Drummond then stated that according to his interpretation the Japanese were ready to appear before the committee of nineteen to answer questions or to decide if the armistice arrangement were in conformity with the Assembly resolution but did not wish to be hailed before the committee by the Chinese for a controversial debate.

With regard to public meetings Motta felt that the time had come to speak straight out to the Japanese as the

two

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 - No. 81 from Geneva

two private meetings had created an unfortunate impression. Benes and Hymans likewise felt a public meeting with the two parties present was essential.

After Hymans had explained the text which he had circulated on Sunday Benes introduced an alternative text drafted in a private meeting held just previously by some of the members of the committee the purport of which was to give more definite guarantee of evacuation, the principle change being that the Mixed Commission should be invested with power to fix, either by majority, or of the exclusion of the two parties and at the request of either a time for the second and last step of evacuation.

Simon observed that this changed the function of the Mixed Commission and would give it the responsibility of acting as a tribunal. He questioned whether the committee would assume this responsibility particularly as one member was an American. He was not sure that the United States would accept the responsibility of participating in saying at what date withdrawal should take place.

A long debate ensued on this subject Ramel and Colban feeling the original resolution was not strong enough.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 - No. 81 from Geneva

enough. Lester suggested that the Mixed Commission should not itself fix a date but state when conditions justified withdrawal leaving the final decision to be made in Geneva. Motta felt that the Mixed Commission must have the definite power of reporting whether evacuation were justified. Boncour pointed out that since the Assembly would not fix a date and would not leave it to the parties concerned to fix a date there must be some outside authority which should at least be able to say when evacuation was possible. Simon again raised the question of American Government's possible attitude and inquired whether ^{the} ~~the~~ Commission should fix a day in advance by which evacuation should be completed or whether it would simply say that at a definite moment conditions had been established which justified evacuation. The Committee seemed unanimously of the view that the second alternative was the proper one.

Although the Committee came to a clear decision as to what it wanted done it was found difficult to express this in exact phraseology. Briefly the Commission was to be given authority to state by unanimity if possible that conditions had been established justifying evacuation

714
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 - No 81 from Geneva

evacuation but providing also that in case either party created difficulties the committee could report to the Assembly which would have its full authority unimpaired.

A small drafting committee was then created to find the legal phraseology for this idea and will report tomorrow.

WILSON

JS-CIB

0145

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huebner NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
note
500
793.94/111

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 22 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FE
WE

FROM

MET

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Dated April 18, 1932

Rec'd 11:40 p.m.

FILE

Secretary of State,

Washington

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 18 1932
Department of State

rel to Geneva

793.94/5060

82, April 18, midnight.

I repeat for your information telegram dated April 18,

11 p.m. sent to Johnson, Shanghai by the Secretary.

793.94/505-7

See my No. 81, April 18, 11 p.m.

April 18, 11 p.m. For the Minister from the Secretary.

"I am informed that the committee of 19 at a meeting
Saturday considered adopting in a resolution which will
contain an interpretation of article three of draft of
armistice agreement under which the committee of 19 declares
that it understands this to mean that Japan must evacuate
at the earliest possible moment. It also considered request-
ing the joint commission provided for in article four of
the draft agreement to report from time to time the progress
of withdrawal.

APR 22 1932

FILED

Committee of 19 this afternoon considered draft pro-
posal to give effect to ideas outlined at former meeting.

It

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Queffelec NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#82 from Geneva, April 18, mid-
night.

It has not yet reached final decision but it is seeking solution on lines that joint commission provided for in draft agreement should be empowered at the request of one of the parties to say whether the second and final stage of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops could reasonably be affected. In order that joint commission should not be prevented from making this pronouncement by the opposition of one of the parties it was proposed that if difficulty arose of this account the joint commission should make a report to the Assembly committee. This report could not be in the nature of a decision but any decision taken by the Assembly or its committee would doubtless be influenced by the report.

The committee of 19 is considering this procedure because it seems to be of the opinion that the declaration suggested by the Japanese and set out in paragraph four of your cable to the Department April 13, ⁵⁰⁴³ 8 p.m., did not give any assurance whatever of sufficiently prompt evacuation by the Japanese.

In

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#82 from Geneva, April 18, mid-
night.

In this opinion, judging from cables which I have received from the Department, the Department seems to concur. In this situation I should like to know whether you see objection to the course proposed by the committee of 19.

Your colleagues are being requested by their respective Governments for their opinion and a joint reply is being suggested to them.

I wish you to advise me directly of your own individual opinion but you are authorized to join in an identic reply provided this does not involve a compromise of your own opinion".

WILSON

WSB-KLP

0148

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,
April 19, 1932.

793.94
12/3 9634

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

48

793.94/5066

Your 82, April 18, midnight.

1pm

Johnson, under Department's instruction, went to
Nanking yesterday on urgent business, Baker case. He
will return to Shanghai tomorrow.

793.94/5060

Carl
ang

FE:SKH/ZMF

Rsk
FE
644

APR 19 1932
3
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
APR 19 1932

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1-138

0145

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
note

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N.R.

Dated April 19, 1932

Rec'd 7:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

214, April 19, 10 a.m.

The resumption of normal business is proceeding very slowly in ~~Shanghai~~ ^{Chapei} and other territory formerly Chinese controlled but now either actually or constructively under Japanese military occupation. Aside from actual destruction American business in such territory with the business of other nationals has suffered in various ways as illustrated by the following instances, each instance being typical of other similar cases.

(1) - Robert Dollar Company has several hundred thousand tael's worth of lumber on consignment at Chinese lumber yards in Chapei. The Japanese military are putting all manner of difficulties in the way of the sale of this lumber by the yards and its removal for places of ordinary commercial consumption. Both oral and written representations by this office to the Japanese Consulate General

on

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 21 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

file
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 19 1932
Department of State

F/G 793.94/5061
APR 25 1932

MAILED
MAY 6 - 1932

0151

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#314 from Shanghai via N.R.,
April 19, 10 a.m.

on behalf of the Dollar Company's interest in lumber have so far failed. Other American concerns are experiencing similar difficulties in moving stocks of goods and machinery from Chapei. A Chinese unofficial organization was set up there about April 1st with the consent of Japanese military. This organization levied a contribution on all goods moved. It was nominally closed by Japanese on April 11th but it is expected that similar organizations will take its place.

(2) - Andersen Meyer have received orders from Wingon Textile Company a Chinese firm for repairs to plant and machinery in their cotton mill at Woosung which was damaged by shell fire to extent of about three million taels. Andersen Meyer have also been appointed managers of the mill but I am not inclined to give official support to their requests made purely in this capacity. However, their orders for machinery are undoubtedly bona fide and I am told will mean the placing of orders for considerable amounts of American machinery. Japanese troops formerly billeted at Japanese cotton mill nearby moved to Wingon Cotton Mill March 8th and remain in occupation. Andersen Meyer

0151

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#214 from Shanghai via N.R.,
April 19, 10 a.m.

Mayer state it will be impossible to commence repairs until they evacuate and Andersen Meyer as managers ask me to demand this evacuation. I have written informally to Japanese Consul General laying the case before him and expressing hope that the American firm may be permitted to repair the plant and machinery without hindrance. This is as far as I believe I can go at present.

(3) - No Chinese police are permitted by Japanese to function in Chapei or surrounding Chinese territory and Japanese military authorities appear to be making no systematic effort to police that area or in fact any area behind their front lines. The result is that Chinese bad characters have almost unchecked freedom of action in Chapei. There are several American owned factories located in Chinese territory near the Settlement boundary and in at least one case their employees have been intimidated and held up. This factory owner has appealed to me to try to obtain International Settlement police protection extended to his plant and surrounding roads. I have advised him to hire his own watchmen but this will not solve the problem of
the

015

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-#214 from Shanghai via N.R.,
April 19, 10 a.m.

the hold up of employees outside his plant. He did not wish to ask for Japanese military protection except as a last resort fearing a strike by his Chinese employees if he should do so. In my opinion since Japanese are in actual control of this area this Consulate General must look to them for police protection for American property while at the same time making representations to the Chinese municipal authorities although the latter have at present no actual lands.

493.11 Shanghai/14

Two. With reference to the Department's telegram 61, February 29, 5 p.m., I request that in making representations to Japanese authorities both regarding American losses and the protection of American property a clause regarding claims similar to that suggested in my telegram 100, February 23, 3 p.m., be inserted.

493.11 Shanghai/12

Three. I desire that this Consulate General should extend all legitimate assistance to American business and in connection therewith request instructions regarding what degree of recognition should properly be given to Japan's de facto authority in certain sections here. Despatch is going

015
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

5-#214 from Shanghai via N.R.,
April 19, 10 a.m.

going forward giving more details regarding cases.

Repeated to the Legation, copy to Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB-RR

0 1 5 4

17. 吳 益 公司董事會決議通過(2010年12月31日), 公開發售股份: 1,000,000 1-138

793.94/5061

0155

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-128 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

- 2 -

ment of your recommendations on this subject.

With regard to Paragraph Two of Shanghai's telegram under reference, Department believes that in making representations to Japanese authorities regarding American losses and protection of American property, the rights of such American interests are in no way prejudiced by failure to include a clause similar to that suggested in Shanghai's 100, February 23, 3 p.m. If, however, you and the Consul General feel that ~~in certain cases~~ the addition of such a clause would assist in bringing about a settlement, you are granted discretion in the use thereof.

With regard to Paragraph Three of Shanghai's telegram under reference, Department is of the opinion that the technical question of QUOTE recognition UNQUOTE of QUOTE Japan's de facto authority UNQUOTE is not involved. Department desires that whenever legitimate American interests suffer injury the fact of such injury and a request for prompt and effective remedial action be made known to the responsible authorities. The procedure mentioned in the first paragraph of this instruction may be followed whenever appropriate.

Please inform the Consul General and repeat to Legation.

Enciphered by FE:RCM:KC/clis

Sent by operator M.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

APR 25 1932.
 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1931 1-128

0158

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated April 19, 1932

Rec'd 3:33 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



APR 20 1932

83, April 19, 7 p. m.

Following telegram has been sent to Shanghai:


April 19, 7 p. m.

FOR ENGERT FROM THE SECRETARY.

Your April 19, 3 p. m. Please inform me at once whether Mr. Johnson agreed on behalf of the American Government to the proposed identic reply contained in your cable. I desired his personal opinion on the situation presented and if he has not been consulted kindly inform me at once. Kindly also inform him that I desire his opinion as promptly as possible.

WSB - RR

WILSON



F/H/S

793.94/5062

APR 25 1932

FILED

0157

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington, *Gray*

April 22, 1932. *5pm*

WILSON,
BERGUES,
GENEVA (Switzerland).

54 PERSONAL FOR KLOTS FROM HORNBECK.

Is there some reason why the Department should not
have the text of Shanghai's April 19, 3 p.m. to the
Secretary at Geneva for which we made request in the
Department's 50, April 20, 4 p.m.?

Carth
Acting.

793.94/5062

793.94/5062

V
Apr. 22, 1932. PM

FE
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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

0158

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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or

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

April 20, 1932.

WILSON,

APR 20 32

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

Your 83, April 19, 7 p.m.

Please send Department text of Shanghai's April 19,
 3 p.m., to the Secretary, Geneva.

Department is now requesting Shanghai henceforth
 to repeat to Department telegrams sent to Geneva.

Call
 aing

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

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793.94/5062

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Please send me this despatch -
H.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

✓ DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

~~NY:~~

Despatch No. 2455 of April 6, 1932 -
Subject: "Japan and the League of Nations".

Encloses translation of article appearing in ECHO DE PARIS, entitled "Will Japan Retire from the League of Nations?"

In an article from LE TEMPS, giving an interview with M. Nagaoka, it is stated that M. Nagaoka is reported to have been in Paris in 1907 at conclusion of Franco-Japanese arrangement, by which the two countries recognize and guarantee to one another their possessions in the Far East.

File No. 793.94/5063.

H. Snyder.
Room 409.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Paris
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

4.22.32

WE

Would you care to inform the Embassy, with reference to the last paragraph of this despatch (No. 2455- of April 6, 1932) that the text of the Franco-Japanese agreement of 1907 may be found in MacNerray's Treaties, Vol. 1, p. 640?

R.H.

0161



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, April 6, 1932.

No. 2455

Subject: Japan and the League of Nations.



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation of an article by Pertinax, entitled "Will Japan Retire from the League of Nations?", which appeared in the ECHO DE PARIS of April 1st last.

It will be noted that the article contains a distinct implication that Japan is seriously considering her withdrawal from the League if the latter attempts to apply Article 15 of the Covenant to Manchuria.

In a talk which Mr. Pell of the Embassy staff recently had with Pertinax, the latter assured Mr. Pell that the article

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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article in question was based on an interview with the newly appointed Japanese Ambassador to France, M. Nagaoka, and coincided as closely as possible with the actual wording used by the Ambassador regarding the policy of Japan. For this reason, I feel sure that it will be of particular interest to the Department.

In this same connection, I am enclosing a translation of an article from LE TEMPS of March 20th, giving an interview which their correspondent had with M. Nagaoka shortly after his arrival. It will be noted that in this article M. Nagaoka is reported to have been in Paris in 1907 at the time of the conclusion of the Franco-Japanese "arrangement" by which the two countries "recognize and guarantee to one another their possessions in the Far East". 7518.942/3

The Department may recall (see Mr. Warrington Dawson's special report, Serial No. W.D.1023 of March 18, 1932,) that the TEMPS of March 16th published a long article by its Far Eastern Editor, M. André Duboscq, on the treaty between Japan and Indochina, in which M. Duboscq made a passing reference to this arrangement, the text of which the Embassy understands was made available to the Department at the time of the Washington Conference 1921-22. In the event, however, that the Department is not in possession of a copy of the text, I shall be glad to see what can be done about procuring a copy from the Foreign Office.

Respectfully yours,

Walter E. Edge
 Walter E. Edge.

List of Enclosures:

1. Trans. of article
 ECHO DE PARIS, April 1, 1932.
2. Translation of Article
 LE TEMPS, March 20, 1932.

IN TRIPLICATE.

COPY TO E.I.C.

NA/FP

note
 7518.942

See Enclosure
 Treas. 1
 Vol 3, p. 640

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to document 2155
 of 11 1982
 from the Embassy at Bern.

Translation.

WILL JAPAN RETIRE FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS?

* * * * *

The Disarmament Conference will reconvene at Geneva on April 11. Shortly after, the Council and the Extraordinary Assembly of the League of Nations will also resume their activities, the delegates to both being already on the spot as members of the Conference. The Sino-Japanese conflict is the only question inscribed on the order of the day of the Extraordinary Assembly, and it is the important question pending before the Council. Once more, we shall see the Japanese in conflict with the Chinese representatives, and the patience of the Tokyo Government appears to be exhausted. Since the Council dealt with the controversy September last, the Japanese Ministers have tried their best to be conciliatory. In the near future, if the Assembly does not confine itself to a prudent and limited action it is very probable that they will use their option as members of the League (article 1 of the Covenant) of resigning on two years notice. Two years notice: a figure of speed. The withdrawal would be immediate and, without further delay, by the active resistance of one of the parties, the Geneva institution would be ~~immediately~~ denied jurisdiction in the question which has occupied it for the last six months.

Let

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Let us try to define the present Japan policy after many modifications. It is a well-known fact that the Sino-Japanese conflict is taking place at two principal theatres: Manchuria and Shanghai. The Manchurian problem was dealt with by the Council last Fall and on the 10th of December a temporary solution was found. According to the terms of the resolution of that date, the Japanese troops were to retire to the railway zone (where according to treaties they have a right to keep a garrison) as soon as public order was restored, as soon as individuals and property were ^{no} longer endangered. In the meantime, the Japanese army was left free to carry out any police operation which it considered necessary. Besides, a committee of inquiry, presided over by Lord Lytton, was commissioned to study the situation from the standpoints of law and substance insofar as relations between Japan and China were concerned. This settlement was reached by virtue of the procedure of conciliation indicated in Article 11 of the Covenant, that is to say with the consent of both Japan and China. Japan has reserved for itself the right to treat directly with the adversary. This is of vital interest to her. She will not allow this decision to be jeopardized. Japan has always opposed the application of article 15 of the Covenant which authorizes the Council (or the Assembly) to come to a settlement without consulting the interested parties, to recommend and to apply economic and military sanctions to the State which opens hostilities without having observed the delay

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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delay stated in Article 12.

In Shanghai it is different. Here the Tokyo Government believes that the Japanese cause is merged with that of the other powers. It has engaged in a far-reaching enterprise but without previous consideration on the initiative of its sailors and its soldiers who did not, at the beginning, foresee all the obstacles. Japan believes that, having repulsed the 19th Chinese army it has defended civilization and that it is the duty of the powers holding possessions in the Far-East to prevent the tumultuous invasion of Shanghai by the nationalist hords.

Doubtless Japan will not abandon willingly the territory conquered by its soldiers. But it is not certain that it will consent to assume for a long period the protection of this territory. It has tried and will try to persuade the powers the powers that they ought to guarantee the integrity of the neutral zone and fight the boycott for the good of their own establishments. If the powers refuse to assume this responsibility, Japan will perhaps put a stop to the conflict.

But will the Assembly maintain the distinction between the two problems: Manchuria and Shanghai? Will it not try to invoke Article 15 to settle the Manchurian question, to arrive at a compromise to which the two parties would be invited to conform? The session held on the 17th of March by the "committee of 19" revealed a strong drift in this

direction ...

0165

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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direction. Besides, what will the conclusions of the Lytton Commission be, what attitude will it take towards the new Mukden Government which, to quote M. de Cadariaga, is but a puppet show? This is the dangerous point. If the Assembly or the Commission try to reopen the arrangement of December 10, a rupture will be imminent.

If it becomes definite, the League of Nations will have lost the last vestige of its universality. The United States, Russia, Japan - three major states will be absent. Geneva will have to confine itself to Europe. Apart from the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact will have suffered in the adventure, since it is a simple matter to predict that, in spite of the American note of January 7 addressed to Tokyo, Japan will succeed in having her Manchurian possessions recognized by certain nations provided it does not jeopardize the policy of the open door - see the studies published in FOREIGN AFFAIRS by Mr. Lowell and, in the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, by Sir John Fisher Williams.

It is possible that the League of Nations is resigned to yield, to opt for the lesser evil. But many will claim that in reality the lesser evil resides in a rupture. Dire perplexity for the true believers!

(PERTINAX).

og/cg.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 2455 of
April 6, 1932, from Embassy at Paris.

TRANSLATION

Extract from LE TEMPS of March 20, 1932.

A CONVERSATION WITH Mr. H. NAGAOKA, JAPANESE AMBASSADOR.

We were received this morning by M. H. Nagaoka, the new Ambassador from Japan who arrived yesterday in Paris, where he succeeds M. Yoshizawa, now Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. Nagaoka expresses to us his pleasure over his return to Paris, where he came for the first time in 1907 when on his way to the Second Hague Conference. From that year dates the Franco-Japanese agreement, by which the two countries recognize and guarantee to one another their possessions in the Far East. Japan was then hoping to sign a tariff agreement with Indo-China; unfortunately the negotiations entered into were not concluded.

"On the eve of my recent departure from Tokio," continued the Ambassador, "I learned with pleasure that pourparlers had again been opened with respect to this subject, and it my most ardent desire to sign at the earliest moment an agreement. The relations between France and Japan are excellent. While the impartial tone of the French press during the course of present events was not surprising to us, it none the less touched us; I rejoice for my part to find on my arrival in France such a favorable atmosphere. From 1917 to 1921, I was Counselor of Embassy here. I collaborated with the French during . . .

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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during the terrible days of the war, at the triumph of justice and right; my ambition is to renew my collaboration with them."

As concerns the negotiations for the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict, M. Nagaoka informed us of the hope of Japan, not only to arrive at an accord, but to maintain with China the relations of good neighbors and to realize with her an lasting and fruitful entente.

"What do you think," we asked of the Ambassador, "of the rumors circulating regarding the information in the more or less near future of a government of national union in Tokio?"

"Already," he replied to us, "before the formation of the present cabinet, such rumors were circulating. It is possible, under the pressure of external events, that they will again be heard, and that public opinion will lean towards a government of coalition. But you know that I do not come direct from Tokio and that I had a short stay in Berlin, where I was Ambassador until 1930. I heard nothing to that effect upon my departure from Tokio."


We left the Ambassador, who once again expressed to us his great satisfaction at representing his country in France.

WGS/dc

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

VP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY
GenevaDated APR 19 1932
FROM Rec'd 9:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

84, April 19, 9 p. m.



I quote herewith paragraphs 11 and 14 of the draft resolution referred to in my number 85, 5065 April 19, 10 p. m. The full resolution when adopted will be telegraphed.

"(11) Is of opinion that the powers as defined in annex four of the draft agreement, of the commission which is to watch the carrying out of articles one two and three of that agreement, include the competence to declare at the request of one of the parties that the moment has come when the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops can reasonably be effected.

(14) Requests the governments of the powers having special interests in the Shanghai settlements to transmit to the League of Nations the information which will be in the possession of the mixed commission in virtue of its functions and will be furnished to those governments by their respective representatives on the commission."

WILSON

FW



F/LS

793.94/5064

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 \$ 5064

Department of State

Washington,

April 20, 1932.

APR 20 32

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (China).

For the Minister.

Reference Geneva's telegram of April 18, 11 p. m.

Under date April 19 Geneva telegraphs that at the

private meeting of the Committee of Nineteen on that
 afternoon, the draft resolution was unanimously adopted
 and the text was handed to the Chinese and Japanese
 representatives to submit to their Governments for agree-
 ment. As soon as replies are received it is planned to
 hold a public session of the Committee.

The pertinent portions of the draft resolution as
 adopted at the private meeting of the Committee are contained
 in paragraphs eleven and fourteen which read as follows:

QUOTE (11) Is of opinion that the powers as defined
 in annex four of the draft agreement, of the commission
 which is to watch the carrying out of articles one two and
 three of that agreement, include the competence to declare
 at the request of one of the parties that the moment has
 come when the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops
 can reasonably be effected.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

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793.94/5064

793.94/5064
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 793.94/119
 893.102-5/14

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

(14) Requests the governments of the powers having special interests in the Shanghai settlements to transmit to the League of Nations the information which will be in the possession of the mixed commission in virtue of its functions and will be furnished to those governments by their respective representatives on the commission UNQUOTE.

Geneva states that the full text of the resolution when ~~was~~
^{finally} adopted will be telegraphed the Department.

Coste, Acting

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SKH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
 500.0111
 793.94119
 893.1025

WP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Dated

Rec'd 8:07 p.m.

Secretary of State, APR 20 1932
 Washington, DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

85, April 19, 10 p. m.

Concerning the private meeting of the Committee of Nineteen this afternoon, Sweetser states that the draft resolution was unanimously adopted (pertinent portions cabled in my number 84/5064 April 19, 9 p. m.) The text has been handed to the Chinese and Japanese representatives to submit to the respective governments for agreement. A public session will be held as soon as replies are received. Benes for the smaller powers stated that new text met their desires.

Drummond summoned me after meeting and informed me in strict confidence that Mugaoka had informed both him and Hymans separately today that his Government, he thought, would be prepared to accept an interpretation of the duties of the Mixed Commission as empowering them to declare at the request of one of the parties when the moment had come that complete withdrawal the Japanese troops

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 APR 20 1932
 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 20 1932
 Department of State

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F/L

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 85 from Geneva

troops could reasonably be effected. If Nagacka is speaking with the authority of his Government this is a very hopeful sign.

WILSON

FW-OX

0173

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

April 20, 1932.

APR 20 32

793.94/5065
WILSON,

BERGUES,

51 GENEVA (Switzerland).

Your 84/5064, April 19, 9 p.m., and 85/5065, April 19, 10 p.m.

Department is repeating to Minister Johnson at Shanghai
the substantive portions of your telegrams under reference.

Department will assume that telegrams to Department
which do not carry indication of being repeated to
Minister Johnson have not repeat not been so repeated.

793.94/5065

FE:MMH:EMU

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SKH
Apr. 20 1932. 12

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.52/280 FOR Tel 442 11am

FROM China (Perkins) DATED April 18, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 o r o

REGARDING:

Mortgaging of Chinese property. The effect of the Mukden Settlement Bureau's notification that all pledges of immovable property made after the 18th of September, 1931 would be invalid. The attempt of the Tientsin Trust Company Incorporated to contravene this regulation concerning the- and register with the American Consulate such instruments.

ek

793.94/5066

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 234

Riga, APR 8 1932

Subject: Comment in the Russian Press on Sec-
retary of State Stimson's Letter to
Senator Borah.



F/LS

793.94/5067

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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In U. S. A	<input type="checkbox"/>		
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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Moscow
IZVESTIYA, of February 27, No. 57, carried a sum-
mary of the letter written on February 24 by Sec-
retary of State Stimson to Senator Borah, under
the headline: "U.S.A. Demands that the 'Open
Door' Principle Be Respected in China -- Threat
to

MAY 2 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to Increase Naval Forces in the Pacific -- Full Contents of Stimson's Program Letter." The summary contained many fully translated excerpts and the correspondent's or Moscow editor's statement, underlined, that "throughout the entire letter Stimson reveals his present anxiety concerning the position of other powers, particularly England." This the Russian commentator confirms by citing the references to Lord Salisbury in support of the "open door," Balfour's announcement at the Washington Conference against "spheres of influence," as well as the Secretary's mention of the fact that the other powers did not support the American position set forth in the Note of the United States dated January 7, 1932.

The same issue carried comments on the letter from the NEW YORK TIMES quoting that paper as stating that the declaration was specially directed against the English Conservatives and also mentioning Simon and MacDonald; the NEW YORK HERALD-TRIBUNE, that the State Department is worried because the other powers did not support the note of January 7; the Scripps-Howard papers, that "the State Department had information that certain English and French circles would welcome an American-Japanese war, and that the United States, if the other powers will support it, is preparing to defend peace by more effective means than words;" the
Baltimore

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Baltimore SUN, that the purpose of the letter was to inform British public opinion of the close relation between the Nine-Power Treaty and American naval limitation." "The State Department," the TASS telegram concluded, "does not hide its disappointment that England and France did not support the United States."

The PRAVDA of the same day used the headlines: "Strained Relations between Japan and America," "The Beginning of a Change in American Policy," and also printed a Geneva TASS telegram captioned: "Uproar in the League of Nations," referring to the coming to life of American Far Eastern policy, the possibility of bringing one or more non-members (United States and/or Russia) into the pending extraordinary session or one of its committees.

On the 28th the IZVESTIYA, in a Washington despatch, under the headlines: "Anti-Japanese Campaign in the United States - Growing War Spirit," stated that "although the Department of State does not show approval of the legal preparations for a boycott or ban on munitions exports, it is clear that it regards the agitation for a boycott favorably in the belief that the agitation reveals the public reaction and builds up support for the Department in case energetic measures should have to be taken." The same issue quoted London papers to the effect that the letter was meant to be

read

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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read in England. The same day's PRAVDA printed TASS excerpts from Japanese papers as "Sharp Criticism of Stimson's Letter in Japan." TASS, in the same paper on the following day, stated that the letter had been approved by Borah before it was published and used the headline: "Borah's Influence Stronger."

The Washington correspondent of the TASS agency wired to the IZVESTIYA on March 1 that "the press is printing inspired news which points out that the United States is opposed to a boycott of Japan at the present moment and deems it more advisable to prevent the partition of China than to stop Japan at once." The same day's PRAVDA, in a Shanghai TASS despatch, quoted Chinese opinion to the effect that the United States had taken up the Japanese challenge. The PRAVDA of March 4th printed a long TASS telegram dated New York, March 2nd, summarizing a NEW YORK TIMES Washington correspondent's despatch which, it was claimed, was clearly "inspired" and proved that "Stimson's letter was directed more at France and England than at Japan."

The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the Red Army daily, used the references to the Scripps-Howard papers, already mentioned, probably because of the supposed statement therein that there had not been such a serious international crisis since the World War.

In

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In a review of the political events of the preceding 10 days, headed "The U.S.S.R. Surrounded by Capitalism," the same paper emphasized that the Stimson letter and the declarations of many American politicians that the American Navy must be increased, are to be taken as a warning to Japan not to ignore American capitalistic interests in plundering China.

Despite the lively comment of the first days there was nothing in the Russian press in direct reference to the "letter" since the last date mentioned above, until the appearance of a long article in the ZA INDUSTRIALIZATSIYU, No. 64, of March 17, 1932, entitled "The Japanese-American Conflict," translation of which is enclosed. The substance of this article is: the United States has a tremendous stake in the future markets of the Orient. Japan has always stood directly in America's path to those markets and intends to stay there. Secretary Stimson's letter is a direct threat to Japan which, for the moment, however, is not being carried further than general support of Nanking and unofficial agitation for an anti-Japanese boycott because there are at the moment three powerful brakes on American Imperialism: first, Japan can be useful to the United States against Russia, "the country building socialism"; second,

it

0 1 8

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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it is profitable for America to sell munitions to Japan; and third, America would have difficulty in waging war against Japan without an ally. England is distinctly meant by this latter and is pictured as unwilling and France is mentioned as probably having a secret agreement with Japan.

The article ends with a comparison of the present situation with that "on the eve of the war of 1914" and a repetition of the idea that "a compromise between the Japanese and American imperialists on the ground of an intervention against the Soviets is perfectly possible." The author, however, does not attempt to reconcile this statement with his reference earlier in the article to the antagonism that existed between the American and Japanese military when the United States and Japan were engaged in "an intervention against the Soviets" in Siberia in 1919 and 1920. The Russian writer seems to have overshot his mark. He states that "the United States has always opposed Japan's claims to Manchuria very energetically" and indicates that America was not pleased at the Japanese presence and policy in Siberia and yet tries to make it out that now Washington might agree with Tokyo to let Japan "intervene" toward Irkutsk. One of the privileges of Soviet publicists is to have things both ways.

On

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On March 29, 1932, in its No. 88, the IZ-VESTIYA,^a in a long article by P. Lapinski,^b drew up a balance of the results attained to that date by the League of Nations, and by the title of the article "Who Holds the Reins" and in the last paragraph, attempted to make out either that the League (England and France) were being driven by Secretary Stimson, or he was being driven by them. The idea of the Soviet publicist being of course, that the United States would like to go farther than it has in restraining Japan but is being held back by the two powers mentioned or that England and France (the League) have been dragged by the United States.xxxxx farther than they want to go. The Russian line of reasoning is that "there have been differences of opinion between England and America since the very beginning of the Shanghai conflict. The clearest exemplification of these differences was that England, despite Washington's

^a which was forwarded to the Department on April 7, 1932.

^b Lapinski, Paul, born 1879, Polish Communist leader, took part in the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences in Switzerland, in 1915-1916, with Lenin. Writes in Russian, Polish, and other Communist publications, on international political and economic problems. Author of pamphlet "The Kellogg Pact and the Pact Against Kellogg" (published in Moscow in 1928).

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Washington's insistence, did not support the American Note of January 7. ...It would seem at first glance that recently there has been a radical change, which would be an important matter. The decision passed on March 12 by the League of Nations, a decision, primarily influenced by England, indicates a certain approach to the American point of view." But the Soviet author questions this.

The author points out that "in the January 7 Note the United States formally brought to the notice of Japan and China that it would not recognize any 'situation, treaty, or agreement'^a which these governments might accept (that is, Japan and China) in violation of previous treaties....."

After a lengthy analysis of the Stimson letter, with references to the Yoshizawa article in the NEW YORK TIMES of February 22 and references to statements by the Japanese Ambassador to China, Sigemitsu, the author states that "America strove above all to have included in the decision of the League its own decisive formula,^b which is

^a underlined in the original.

^b underlined in the original. By "decisive" is meant "basic."

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is the basis both of the January 7 Note and the Stimson Letter. This decisive formula is a protest against any 'situation, treaty, or agreement'^a which would violate existing treaties or obligations growing out of the Covenant of the League. The Kellogg Pact is mentioned in the decision as it was in the Stimson letter. The words of the American formula are picked up very carefully."

The paragraphs intervening before the conclusion refer to declarations of English statesmen, editorials, and correspondents' articles largely concerning the alleged American desire to treat Shanghai and Manchuria as identical questions, and to the English and French reluctance to do so.

In his concluding paragraphs the Soviet writer points out that the League decision, while "repeating the exact words of the formula in the American Note of January 7, nevertheless altered it to a certain extent. The American Note declares that the United States 'will not recognize'^a such 'situations, treaties, or agreements.' The decision of the League of Nations is satisfied with less: it only points out that a duty 'lies' on the members of the League of Nations (a sort of

^a underlined in the original.

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of 'moral obligation' as the correspondent of
the TIMES interprets it) not^{to}/recognize that
sort of 'situations, treaties, or agreements'..."

Thus, claims the Soviet publicist, the
British and French console themselves because
the American position is above all an "abstract
one," one based on "principles," a "'moral'" one,
and he remarks that since Wilson and his famous
Fourteen Points the "Western European imperial-
istic powers have learned to perfection the art
of getting around Trans-Atlantic 'moral principles'
in one way or another and how to introduce their
own 'corrections' into them."

"For all these reasons the question as to
who holds the reins - Stimson (the United States)
driving the League (England and France) or the
United States being driven by England and France -
is a question that is far from settled. Only
the future can answer it and perhaps even the
very near future."

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole

Felix Cole,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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Enclosure: ✓

- 1/ The Japanese-American Conflict.
(Moscow ZA INDUSTRIALIZATSIYU,
No. 64, March 17, 1932, Page 2.)

(In quintuplicate.)

Copy sent to E.I.C., Paris.

Copy sent to E.I.C., Paris for Tokyo.

Copy sent to E.I.C., Paris for Peiping.

710 (U.S. - Japan.)

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 234 of APR 8 1932
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow ZA INDUSTRI-
ALIZATSIYU,
No. 64,
March 17, 1932,
Page 2.

THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONFLICT.

By M. Tanin.

(Translation.)

Every day brings us new and contradictory facts, and ambiguous information, concerning the attitude taken by the United States in regard to Far Eastern events. Stimson's letter to Senator Borah, and the concentration of the American Navy in the Pacific, seem to indicate that a decided anti-Japanese tendency has taken the upper hand, but even after this the political line of conduct of the United States continues to pursue a zig-zag course.

Which are the hidden causes of that lack of determination, strange at first glance, that distinguishes the policy of powerful American imperialism in regard to its rival who is in the act of seizing positions coveted from of old by American capitalism? The explanation must be sought in the circumstance that, apart from the fundamental fact of American-Japanese antagonism, there are also other factors at work, which dampen the activity of the
United

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United States, and prevent the existing conflict of interests from developing even now into a violent clash.

This, however, does not change the nature of the antagonism which, as shown by Stimson's letter and the comments of the Japanese press, is continuously growing on the whole more acute as Japanese predatory activities in China extend.

The interest of the United States in China from an economic point of view is very great. True, just now, American investments in China do not constitute a particularly large sum (approximately 175 million dollars); trade with China also constitutes an insignificant proportion in the total commercial turnover of the United States. But China cannot be conceived as something separate from the Far East, and the whole of Asia, which latter is of a tremendous potential significance to American imperialism. The trade of the United States with Asiatic countries, which in 1910-1914 amounted to 15 per cent of the total trade of the United States, had increased to 28 per cent in 1930. American imperialism, finding itself in the throes of an unprecedented economic crisis, views the Asiatic continent, inhabited by one-half of all mankind, as a huge market, as a field for investment of capital and for the exploitation of vast masses of cheap labor.

The

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The beginning of the expansion of the United States in the Pacific Basin dates as far back as that period when young American capitalism had greater possibilities in the home market. It will suffice to recapitulate the principal stages of American expansion in the direction of the Pacific: the struggle, which lasted decades, for the right to build the Panama Canal; the seizure of the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines (1898); the proclamation of the "open door" policy in China (1899); participation in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion (1901); the well-known declaration, partaking of the character of a program, of President Roosevelt at San Francisco to the effect that "the United States is a great Asiatic Power," and that "its geographic situation on the Pacific Coast assures for the future America's peaceful (?) rule over its waves," (1903); participation in the intervention in Siberia (1918); the initiative of American bankers in the formation of the second financial consortium for the exploitation of China (1920); the anti-Japanese pressure upon the Washington conference (1922); the active struggle against the Chinese revolution^{ary}/movement (1925-1927); the political tutelage exercised over

^a question mark of the author. M. Tanin.

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over the Nanking Government - such are the principal links in the chain of aggression of American imperialism in the Far East.

On this road, the United States has always encountered Japan, the rapid expansion of which found its expression in predatory onslaughts upon China and Korea, in her war against Tsarist Russia, and her extremely persistent economic penetration of the seized territories and spheres of influence.

Manchuria, now seized by Japan, has always been a hotbed of conflicts between the two rivals. The United States has always opposed Japan's claims to Manchuria very energetically. And even at a time when both antagonists joined the united front of the imperialists against the "Bolshevik danger," the mutual relations between the military headquarters of the expeditionary forces both of the United States and Japan in Siberia, had become so strained in connection with Japan's predatory appetites in Manchuria and in the Far East, that more than once matters were on the verge of an armed clash (see the most interesting memoirs of General William Graves, at that time commander of the American forces. - "America's Siberian Adventure").

In a word, the struggle of the two imperialistic Powers for the possibility of exploiting Manchuria, China, and, generally speaking, the countries of the Pacific Basin, has a history of several score of years to look back upon, and just now, in connection with
the

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the world economic crisis and the attack made by Japanese imperialism, it acquires increased acuteness and tension.

The System of Brakes.

Why, then, is America passive? The principal restraint in this matter is the desire of American imperialism to turn Japan's aggressiveness to account against the country, hateful to American imperialism, that is building up socialism. Inasmuch as that aggressiveness is directed against the U.S.S.R., it meets with the inward sympathies of American imperialism. The Tokyo diplomats speculate on that sympathy. Very characteristic in this respect are the writings of the American, Bronson-Reigh, a well-known mercenary in the pay of the Japanese, who publishes the FAR EASTERN REVIEW in Tokyo, with money from certain secret funds.

Recalling the intervention in Siberia, Bronson-Reigh writes:

"If the original plan of the Supreme Council of the Allies (regarding the compensation of Japan at the expense of Siberia) had been carried into effect, Japan would now be in Irkutsk or in Chita, constituting a bulwark against the Sovietization of Mongolia and a large part of China, and the pressure upon India would have been relaxed."

This

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This playing on the "Bolshevik danger" and the menace of the revolutionary movement in India has an effect. And sundry influential groups of American financial capital, and more especially banking groups, having an equal fear of the Chinese revolution, believe that Japan's services as policeman, to watch China, might be very useful to American imperialism. Reflecting the views and tendencies of these circles, a certain American financial newspaper writes that "Japan's activities in Manchuria open up a territory that has hitherto been inaccessible - to normal business intercourse." In conformity therewith, a New York financial group engaged in negotiations concerning the granting of a loan to Japan; these negotiations, however, yielded no results (just as the efforts of Lamont for a large loan to the South Manchurian Railway in 1927 had no positive result) just at the moment when the Japanese Prime Minister, Tanaka, proclaimed his "positive," or more plainly speaking, aggressive-predatory policy in Manchuria.

Closely connected with this tendency is the formula, "Japanese brains - American money," coined by the head of the American steel trust, Gary. This means that American capitalism is in a position to take very profitable advantage of Japanese initiative, Japanese connections, etc. Of interest in this respect is an article which appeared in one of the latest issues of the organ of the
steel

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steel industry of the United States, the IRON AGE (February 18). The article enlarges in quiet language on the broad prospects for the development of heavy industry in Manchuria under the Japanese protectorate, and points out that "its further industrialization, for satisfying the needs of Manchuria with her population of 29 million, and of Japan with a considerably larger population, will ultimately be to the benefit of all countries concerned." These words reflect the hope that creating a new industry in Manchuria will result in big orders for the American steel industry and machine-building industry whose output now, as a result of the crisis, has dropped to an unprecedented^{ed} low level. In the conditions under the severity of the crisis, today's interests override to a certain extent the interests and worries of tomorrow, on which tomorrow Japanese heavy industry, from its Manchurian base, is likely to enter into competition with the United States.

The strong effect of the orders placed by the Japanese Ministry of War is being felt. There was very good reason for the cold reception given by industrial circles to the proclamation advocating an anti-Japanese boycott, issued by a number of political personages and bourgeois economists. A prominent Republican senator, member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Moses,

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Mr. Moses, expressed himself as follows on this point:

"There are too many businessmen who adhere to the somewhat selfish point of view: let them fight, and we'll sell them merchandise. Morally this is very base, but nevertheless, such is the opinion of many of our business people."

The American "business people" make no small profits on the orders placed by Japan as well as by China. Tokyo has given large orders for munitions of war, cotton, oil, copper. Nanking also buys war stores, aeroplanes, etc. The shops of the Remington Arms Company have recently resumed work to their full capacity. In its reports the Department of Commerce emphasizes the comparative growth of export trade to Japan and China (which is also due to the anti-Japanese boycott in China). (In 1931, American exports to Japan amounted to 155 million dollars, and exports to China, 98 million dollars). The NEW YORK TIMES writes that the appearance of Mars (the god of war) at the stock-exchange is in favor of the "bulls," that is, the jobbers speculating on a rise of stocks.

It should be noted, however, that the magnates of guns and machine guns, of armor plates, aeroplanes, and poisonous gases, are still more interested in the uninterrupted increase of American armaments, in the event of a war with

Japan,

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Japan, provided, of course, there are chances of success.

The American imperialists, however, are fully aware of the tremendous difficulties of a war with Japan, if the United States has no allies. The well-known English naval expert, Hector S. Bywater, the author of the much talked-of book predicting "The Great Pacific War," although believing that the United States will ultimately be victorious, prophesies that Japan will seize the Philippines and the Island of Guam, that the Japanese Navy will attack California, that America will block the Panama Canal by sinking some of its own ships there, - and the United States will have other temporary reverses. Other authors (Admiral Bubnov and General Golovin, in the book, "The Strategy of the American-Japanese War," published abroad, and republished in our country) hold that without allies the United States cannot defeat Japan.

But without war, Japan will not let Manchuria go. This has been firmly resolved in Tokyo. This is well known also in Washington. The United States needs allies. But France supports Japan openly, probably having a secret agreement with her, while England, to judge by Stimson's recent energetic declaration deprecating anti-Japanese economic reprisals, is not minded to give to the United States even as much as diplomatic support. Moreover, the latest telegrams mention the efforts made to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This fact too

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too plays an important part in the network of causes which restrain the United States from taking decided steps against Japan.

Will These Brakes Hold?

This complex mechanism of brakes retards to a certain extent the progress of Japanese-American antagonism. But if we follow up the trend of events during the half-year since Japan's war against China started we see that for all the zig-zags of the Washington line of policy, it is visibly becoming more aggressive. That Stimson's letter to Senator Borah was made public is very significant in this respect.

Stimson further points out that in connection with the Manchurian and Shanghai events "a situation has come about which cannot be made to appear in keeping" with the nine-Power agreement for equal trading opportunities for all Powers in China, and with the Kellogg Pact; Stimson repeats and emphasizes the thesis of the note of January 7 to the effect that the United States "does not recognize any situation based upon any treaty or agreement between the Government of Japan and China, concluded contrary to the obligations stipulated in the above-mentioned documents (the Nine-Power Agreement, and the Kellogg Pact), and violating the rights of our Government or its citizens in China."

And

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And by way of drawing "practical conclusions," Stimson declares: "The possibility of changing the provisions of the Nine-Power Agreement cannot be discussed without at the same time taking into consideration the premises on which it is based."

The meaning of this twisted diplomatic formula and of the allusion to the "premises" mentioned in another part of the letter, is that if Japan violates the Nine-Power treaty, the United States regains its freedom to increase its naval armaments to fortify the Philippines and the Island of Guam, which are a menace to Japan.

This is a bit stronger than the correspondence addressed to the Geneva stock brokers' exchange:

But nevertheless the threats of the United States had no effect. The representative of the Japanese War Department declared that Stimson's reference to the Philippines and the Island of Guam was an "attempt at intimidation, but that Japan is prepared, and not afraid."

By the way, this is the point of view not only of [Japanese] military circles. One of the most prominent Japanese diplomats, Marquis Ishii, states point-blank in his recently published "Diplomatic Notes," practically declining persistently the demand of the United States for the "open door" in China: "Even the annulment of the Lansing-Ishii agreement leaves Japan's
special

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special interests in China as they were... Neither Europe nor America can try to deprive us of this, or to alter the existing situation."

The more the Japanese military operations and the accompanying measures of economic coercion in Manchuria develop, the more acute will this irreconcilable conflict of interests grow. The Japanese seizure of Chinese enterprises, customs houses, banks, vast stretches of land, etc., - all this is apt to disillusion those American business circles which had hoped for profitable collaboration with the Japanese. Manchuria is a huge drill ground for further aggression against the remainder of China. The conditions of "peace," offered by the Japanese headquarters before Shanghai, the bombardment of other ports, the preparations for a second edition of the Shanghai events in Tientsin, the activity of the Japanese gunboats in the inland stretches of the Yangtze River - all this shows that, while the Japanese imperialists are eating, their appetite continuously grows more ravenous (for it would be erroneous to think that the purpose of these operations is only to get hold of some trump cards for the coming negotiations with China and the Powers; no, the purpose is to seize new footholds in China proper).

American imperialism, which proclaimed that "the United States is a Great Asiatic Power," through Roosevelt's mouth, or, as Stimson renders this idea, "one of the leading Powers in the Pacific," cannot
remain

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remain a disinterested observer while its present and future markets are seized. American imperialism ^{is} will not remain passive even if it/left without allies.

But what concrete measures can the United States adopt? The minimum program is, on the one hand, aid to the Nanking Government by supplying munitions of war, and perhaps also money; and on the other hand, anti-Japanese boycott. At the present moment, the idea of a boycott does not meet the approval of the leading business and political circles. But it may be presumed that later on, as Chinese events develop, the sentiment in the United States in favor of a boycott will increase. Even now the organs of financial capital, while so far expressing themselves against boycott, are raising an alarm because of Japanese predatory tendencies. The WALL STREET JOURNAL (of February 10), in an article under the heading, "The Closing of the Open Door," points out with apprehension that: "Japan intends to seize the whole foreign trade of China, as it is already rapidly doing in Manchuria."

It is only a short step from this indignation at the "practical and cynical boldness" on the part of Japan to the adoption of reprisals. True, boycott is a double-edged sword. But while exports to the United States are a matter of vital importance to Japan (constituting 40

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per cent of her whole exports), exports to Japan from the United States are insignificant (3 or 4 per cent). The United States can also bring financial pressure to bear upon Japan, and this is being done already to an insignificant extent.

The huge financial advantages of the United States may also be turned to account in the matter of naval armaments. The Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee of the American Senate, Hale, in reading the figures which characterize Japanese naval armaments, stated that "Great Britain does not appear so much as a great naval power as does Japan." Moving a vast counter-program providing for 112 fighting units, Hale added modestly that this would have a "stabilizing effect upon the affairs of the world." (!) [Exclamation mark in the text.]

The character of this "stabilization" is elucidated by an article in the organ of the Japanese imperialists, the NIKHON, which in connection with American armaments, and more particularly the grandiose maneuvers in the Pacific, writes as follows: "The United States first expressed itself verbally against Japan. Now the United States confirms its words by maneuvers. Whether we like it or not we are on the eve of a war in the basin of the Pacific."

And from the other side of the Pacific comes the echo: "If Japan subjugates China, the inevitable result

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result will be war between Japan and the United States," (the Washington correspondent of the ASSOCIATED PRESS, February 20).

These are not mere words. These are signs. We also perceived such signs on the eve of the war of 1914...

True, since that time the world situation has radically changed inasmuch as all imperialistic Powers taken together are confronted with a common mortally hated foe - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. And, as already pointed out, this historical fact, one of cardinal importance, is largely instrumental in restraining the forces making for a Japanese-American war. A compromise between the Japanese and the American imperialists on the ground of an intervention against the Soviets is perfectly possible. But it would be a rotten and unstable compromise. Though it may sound paradoxical, joint participation of Japanese as well as American imperialism in an anti-Soviet intervention would not strengthen the imperialistic front in the end, but weaken it. We have seen this already by the example of the Siberian intervention in 1918. The seizure of Manchuria by Japan increases still more the difficulties in the way of the solidary activity of the two rival imperialistic Powers:

"The campaign of Western European counter-revolution, meant to buttress the Russian counter-revolution,

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revolution, was frustrated through disagreement between the camps of the counter-revolutionaries of the West and the East, between the camps of the Eastern and the Western exploiters, between the camps of Japan and America." (Lenin.)

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American Legation,
Riga, April 6, 1932.

Abstract of despatch No. 234, of APR 8 1932

Soviet press comment on the "Stimson Letter" to Senator Borah was lively during a short period. It revolved mainly around an interpretation of the letter as an effort to form a united front of England, France, and the United States against Japan. Historically and economically (i.e., imperialistically) Japan and the United States are rivals - neither will surrender - there is danger of war - but desire to sell arms to Japan, hope that Japan will attack the land of socialism, and lack of allies, are holding America back.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

FROM

GPAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated April 20, 1932

Rec'd 5 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 20 1932

Department of State

F/LS 793.94/5068

Secretary of State,
Washington.

April 20, noon.

The following telegram has been sent to American Consul
at Geneva:

"April 20, 11 a. m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

Your April 18, 11 p. m. I concur in colleagues' views
as set forth in Shanghai's April 19, 3 p. m., to Geneva."

JOHNSON

KIP



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Chinese situation

APR 21 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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RECEIVED
APR 20 1932 FROM
DIVISION OF
RELATIONS, APR 20

GRAY
Shanghai via N. R.
Dated April 20, 1932
Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 20 1932
Department of State

April 20, 3 p. m.

Quo returned from Nanking last night and informs me
that he is still expecting news from Geneva and does not
expect there will be any meetings here for days. Sub-
Committee is meeting this afternoon.

For the Minister
ENGERT

HED
RR

F/LS 793.94/5069

FILED
APR 25 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated April 20, 1932

Rec'd 8:10 a.m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

82, April 20, 5 p.m.

American Minister will leave Nanking tomorrow by
airplane, arriving Shanghai April 21, 10 a.m.

PECK

RR

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 237

Riga, APR 8 1932

Subject: Russian Press Comment on "the Stimson Letter."

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DIVISION OF
 EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 APR 20 1932
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 APR 28 1932

F/LS 793.94/5071

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

APR 30 1932

I have the honor to report that in the early days of the Chinese-Japanese conflict the Soviet press mentioned an advance of French colonial troops from northeastern Indo-China into the southwestern provinces of China. These allegations were publicly denied and Moscow for some time dropped the subject presumably in the press of more exciting and vivid events in the Far East. Recently, however, the Russian press has emphasized

alleged

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 MAY 9 - 1932

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1/ alleged Franco-Japanese relations and has now returned to the attack in a reasoned article in the SNABZHENIE, KOOPERATSIA, TORGOVLYA which has a certain amount of documentation, according to Russian standards. The article, from the March 21, 1932, issue, No. 66, a translation of which is enclosed, seems out of place, both in style and content, in the journal - a periodical not expected to be read abroad and which appeals to a very special class of readers.

The article begins by pointing out that, on the surface, Japanese action in China would not seem to favor French interests. Nevertheless, French press comment has approved the course of Japanese policy in Manchuria and China in the last seven months. The article badly asserts that this is due to Japanese bribery of the Paris press.

French loans to Japan are discussed. The French banking interests which are alleged to have backed these loans are analyzed and the author asserts that the money trails lead back to a French bank representing the Schneider-Creuzot munitions works. The writer says:

What is really the Franco-Japanese Bank? The Chairman of its board of directors is Charles Dumont who was the French Minister of the Navy when Japanese activities in China began ...

It is asserted that French military journals discussed Japanese actions in the Far East before
the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Niponese troops began to move. THE NEW YORK NATION is quoted and the article ends by recalling alleged French fears of Communism in Indo-China and pointing out that Japan and France are united by their common antagonism to Soviet Russia.

Respectfully yours,



Felix Cole,
Chargé d'Affaires a. i.

Enclosure:

1. France and Japan in the Far East.
(Moscow SNABZHENIE, KOOPERATSIA, TORGOVLYA
/Supply, Cooperatives, Trade/, No. 66,
March 21, 1932.)

(In quintuplicate.)

Copy sent to E.I.C., Paris.

Copy sent to E.I.C., Paris for Tokyo.

Copy sent to E.I.C., Paris for Peiping.

710 R(Japan - China.)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 237 of APR 8 1932
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow SNABZHENIE,
KOOOPERATSIA,
TORGOVLIYA
(Supply, Cooperatives,
Trade),
No. 66,
March 21, 1932.
Page 2.

FRANCE AND JAPAN IN THE FAR EAST.

By S. Brand.

(Translation.)

The attitude of French imperialism in regard to the Japanese adventure in China has been perfectly clear from the very first days of the seizure of Manchuria. The press organs of the French Government and heavy industry have unhesitatingly sided with Japan from the very beginning of the events in the Far East. The bandmaster in this harmonious concert is undoubtedly the TEMPS, a newspaper whose shares, together with the whole editorial staff, were taken over two years ago by the Comité des Forges, and which still is the recognized semi-official mouthpiece of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

It is true that, in the first days after the occupation of Mukden and Tsitsihar by Japanese troops, some newspapers raised mild objections against the Japanese military, and even hoped that the League of Nations would put a stop to the occupation. But this brave talk soon ceased

almost

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almost entirely as if by a magic wand. Now, after the revelations of the Geneva TRAVAIL, we know that this was not so much due to the magic wand as to the ten million francs distributed among the Paris editors by the Franco-Japanese Bank.

But even this does not explain exhaustively why French imperialism decided to assume the part of Japan's ally in the Far East. Indeed, the Japanese seizure of Manchuria, the attack on Shanghai and upon other economic centers of Inner China, is a menace to French capital just as it is to the interests of the bourgeoisie of the other countries.

There is no exact calculation of French capital invested in China. According to data adduced by the New York professor Roemer, 181 French enterprises were registered in China in 1929 (574 American and 682 English.) In addition, French capital, together with English and American capital, has been invested in the large Chinese banks ("Central Bank of China," the "Bank of China," etc.) It would seem that under such a state of affairs the French bourgeoisie ought not to be interested at all in supporting Japanese armed intervention which paralyzes the entire economic life of China.

Therefore the feeling of alarm with which the weekly EUROPE NOUVELLE, one of the few bourgeois organs which in this matter have retained a certain independence of opinion, addresses the French

Government,

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Government, appears perfectly natural: "Less than any other country is France justified in closing her eyes to the danger threatening her. First of all because French interests, French capital invested in China, exceed the interests and the capital of any other country, except Japan. Next, because Japanese exports to China compete emphatically with French exports and those of her colonies while at the same time French and Japanese commercial relations are insignificant and even tend to decrease. It is easy to imagine what will become of French interests if China is turned into a Japanese vassal. And, lastly, all these interests are subordinate to the economic and the political protection of Indo-China."

These apprehensions, however, are openly shared only by very few bourgeois organs (the liberal OEUVRE, the conservative JOURNAL DES DEBATS.) The remainder of the French press is either silent, or stands up, frothing at the mouth, for Japan's "lawful right to self-defense."

The German press and the American press endeavor to solve the riddle of this conflict between the direct interests of French capital and the official policy of the French Government by presuming that there is a secret Franco-Japanese agreement.

"The attitude of France," writes the Paris correspondent of the American weekly, NATION, "cannot be comprehended without the hypothesis of a Franco-Japanese

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Japanese agreement."

This "hypothesis" is borne out by a considerable number of facts and authoritative statements which show that a Franco-Japanese agreement - whether laid down in some document, or not - does exist, and not since yesterday.

The statement has been made more than once in the international press that as far back as the summer of 1931 Japan obtained a loan from France of 500 million francs. This loan was not placed as usual through banks, but the money was taken from the "Loans and Consignments Fund," which is a special institute attached to the Ministry for Finance for the management of the funds intended for social insurance. The money was paid-through the medium of the Franco-Japanese Bank. Moreover, Japan received 250 million francs through private banks - the "Banque de Pays du Nord," the "Banque de l'Union Parisienne," and the "Union Européenne Industrielle et Financière."

We have written out in full the designations of these banks, because their participation in the Japanese loans gives the whole transaction a very particular character.

What is really the Franco-Japanese Bank? The chairman of its board of directors is Charles Dumont who was the French Minister of the Navy, when Japanese activities in China began - also official delegate

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delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. But probably the best characterization of the Japanese loan transaction is that the Franco-Japanese Bank is practically controlled by the not unknown Schneider-Creuzot, the head of the largest world trust of war industries, and the chairman of the French Mine Owners' Committee.

Among the other leading persons of the Franco-Japanese Bank Schneider's son-in-law^a should be mentioned next. Count Saint Sauveur, and our old friend, Maurice Paleologue, the former French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, one of the inspirers of the intervention against the U.S.S.R., and the "high protector" of the Paris White refugees. The last-named of the banks mentioned, the "Union Européenne," was founded by Schneider especially to finance the numerous war industry trusts connected with his concern in one way or another (such as the Skoda trust in Czechoslovakia, the war industry concerns in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.)

Why did Japan get the money from France? The fact, generally known now, that from the beginning of August, 1931, six weeks before the sudden attack of the Japanese militarists upon Mukden, the Kreuzot works were working at full capacity on urgent orders for war stores for Japan, will answer this question.

The

^a the word may also mean brother-in-law. Translator's note.

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The German press also mentions another characteristic event. On September 1, 1931, that is, two and one-half weeks before the seizure of Mukden, the official journal of the French Ministry for War, the REVUE MILITAIRE FRANCAISE, printed a long article dealing with the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops from a military-technical point of view.

These facts are sufficient fully to convince anyone of the existence of a Franco-Japanese understanding in regard to the Far East. In the given case it is immaterial whether a treaty to that effect has been signed, of which the French Government categorically denies the existence, or whether the governments of the two imperialistic Powers have done without a formal document. One thing is evident: Japan made sure of the Political and material support of the French Government long before her Manchurian adventure.

In the chain of these facts there is only one circumstance that so far has not been clarified, namely: what was the price the French bourgeoisie received acquiesce in exchange for the losses sustained through the bombardment of Shanghai and the long paralysis of Chinese foreign trade?

On this point the German and the American press agree exactly.

"It is said, writes the usually well-informed Berlin liberal weekly, WELTBUEHNE, "that France has
granted

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granted Japan a free hand in Manchuria in exchange for the emphatic support of the Japanese delegate at the Hague International Tribunal as far back as the question of the Austro-German customs union ... There are also statements to the effect that Japan has promised France her support at the disarmament conference."

The above-mentioned New York NATION writes: "In Paris it is stated that Japan has promised to support the French at the disarmament conference. But this explanation, continues the said periodical, seems to us to be insufficient. It is much more probable that France is prepared to recognize Japanese supremacy in China, in order to prevent Soviet influence on China. And if Japan's activities lead to war between Japan and the U.S.S.R., and, consequently, to a suspension of the Five-Year Plan, this circumstance will probably not cause much regret in Paris."

This "surmise" of the American bourgeois publicist is the only plausible explanation of the solidarity between Japanese and French imperialism in the Far East. The Paris industrialists and bankers long ago began to be alarmed at the beginning of the revolutionary ferment in Indo-China. The French Government sends punitive expeditions to Annam, Cambodja, Chochin-China, and Tonkin; it has covered all Indo-China with a network of jails and gallows; but notwithstanding the large sacrifices

in

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in human life and gold, it cannot stop the prodigious growth of the movement against imperialistic oppression. The French colonizers know very well that the movement in Indo-China is closely connected with the revolutionary movement in the south of China (the French colony Tonkin borders directly on Hunan) and their hatred of the Chinese revolution and of the U.S.S.R. has naturally lead them to a rapprochement with the Japanese military. It was not for nothing that as far back as the beginning of the Manchurian campaign the Chief of the French General Staff, the notorious General Weygand, uttered the sentence which has since been picked up by the entire press: "This step will strengthen civilization in the East against Bolshevism."

What is practically an alliance between the French and the Japanese imperialists is the natural outcome of their common political aims. Japan, armed with Schneider guns, and supplied with French taxpayers' gold, is to act in the Far East as the same gendarme in regard to the U.S.S.R. as the center of the world revolution, French capitalism, arrogates to itself in Europe.

S. BRAND.

js/hs

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, April 8, 1932.

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SPECIAL REPORT
No. W. D. 1030.



To the Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith
Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W.D.
1030, dated April 8, 1932.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 8, 1932.

Serial No. W. D. 1030.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: The Manchurian Question as seen by
the Catholic Organ LA CROIX

LA CROIX published on April 2, 1932, an editorial entitled "The Importance of Manchuria in the Far East," signed by J. Caret, declaring that because of the Manchurian question in particular, the situation in the Far East remains very serious even though the fighting has stopped. The problems which precipitated a clash between Japan and China remain and an attempt at a forcible solution is therefore still possible.

Manchuria is considered as being the key to the situation.

Subsequent to the Russo-Japanese war and the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan expected to find in Manchuria wide spaces needed for the overflow of its population. The cold climate did not prove favorable to the Japanese race, however, and that was why the Chinese supplied the necessary labor. There are now some twenty-seven million

Chinese

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Chinese out of the thirty million inhabitants of Manchuria, whereas the Japanese there do not number more than two hundred thousand who are however the ruling class.

In the future, the key to power on the Asiatic Continent will belong to whoever controls Manchuria. Japan wishes to fill this part and at one time she was able to agree with the other interested Powers for separating the country into two zones of influence, Russia to the North and Japan to the South. But the European nations and the United States wished to have their share in the wealth of Manchuria where they had demanded the open-door policy.

The conclusion reached by LA CROIX is that, Japan now finding itself in conflict with the other Powers having extensive interests in the Pacific, Manchuria is now the scene of a struggle whose gravity cannot be denied.

If particular attention is called to the above article, it is because the Far Eastern matter dealt with either editorially or in the news columns of LA CROIX emanates to a large extent from the French missionaries in the Far East and is therefore often both direct and also exclusive in nature.

Very

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

Enclosure:

1. Excerpt from LA GROIX,
April 2, 1932.

In quintuplicate

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Encl. #1 to Special Report #WD 1030, April 8, 1932.

Excerpt from LA CROIX, April 2, 1932.

From The American Embassy, Paris.

L'importance de la Mandchourie en Extrême-Orient

L'attention du monde se porte de nouveau sur la Mandchourie. L'accord conclu le 29 mars entre délégués japonais et délégués chinois au sujet de la cessation complète des hostilités à Changhaï permet d'espérer un prompt accord concernant le reste des questions à régler. Mais les Japonais s'opposent catégoriquement à ce que l'affaire de Mandchourie soit évoquée à la suite de l'affaire de Changhaï. Ils estiment que cette affaire a été résolue par la proclamation de l'indépendance du nouvel Etat mandchou; ils déniaient à la Société des Nations comme aux puissances le droit de la rouvrir, et le ministre de la Guerre japonais a été jusqu'à déclarer que son pays se retirerait de l'aréopage de Genève si la publication du rapport que doit remettre la Commission d'enquête de la S. D. N. en Extrême-Orient provoquait une nouvelle intervention de celle-ci dans la question mandchoue.

La Chine, de son côté, se refuse énergiquement à accepter le fait accompli. Elle persiste à considérer la Mandchourie comme une partie intégrante du territoire de la République, bien que ce territoire, situé, comme la Mongolie et le Thibet, en dehors de la Grande Muraille, ait joui au cours des siècles d'une certaine indépendance politique et administrative. Il serait vain de se le dissimuler : la situation reste grave en Extrême-Orient. On ne se bat plus, mais les problèmes qui amenèrent l'emploi de la force n'ont pas disparu; toute tentative de solution par la violence reste donc possible.

L'enjeu est de taille. Un vaste

ritime. Ce furent donc les Chinois qui fournirent la main-d'œuvre indispensable à l'exploitation du territoire; ils sont maintenant 27 millions environ sur la trentaine de millions qui peuplent la Mandchourie, tandis que le nombre des Japonais ne dépasse pas 200 000. Ces derniers constituent donc les cadres de la colonisation, la classe dirigeante. Ils se sont, du reste, admirablement acquittés de leur rôle : l'exploitation est menée selon les méthodes les plus modernes, l'industrie agricole prospère, les services ferroviaires ne le cèdent en rien à ceux d'Europe ou d'Amérique. Les villes du Liao-Toung sont des modèles d'urbanisme; l'hygiène et l'instruction publique, notamment, y font l'admiration des visiteurs européens.

Depuis la conclusion du traité de Portsmouth, Russes et Nippons se sont fort bien entendus pour se partager le pays en deux zones d'influence : l'une au Nord, l'autre au Sud. Mais les nations européennes et les Etats-Unis tiennent à appliquer à la Mandchourie le principe de la « porte ouverte ». Elles veulent leur part des richesses mandchoues, et surtout elles redoutent l'augmentation de puissance qu'acquerraient le ou les détenteurs de ce pays, dont on a pu comparer la position, aux portes de l'Extrême-Orient, à celle de Suez ou de Panama.

Le centre du trafic mondial s'est, au cours des siècles, déplacé constamment de l'Est à l'Ouest; du bassin de la Méditerranée, il est passé dans l'Atlantique. On peut prédire que, dans la deuxième moitié du xx^e siècle, l'importance économique du Pacifique sera prépondérante. La clé de la puissance sera entre les mains de la nation qui possédera la Mandchourie. Le Japon voudrait bien être cette nation. Mais il trouvera devant lui l'opposition des autres nations qui ont de grands intérêts dans le Pacifique.

La gravité de la partie serrée qui se joue actuellement en Mandchourie n'échappera à personne.

J. CARET.





L'ancien empereur de Chine Pou-Yi
devenu président de la République
mandchoue.

territoire peuplé d'une trentaine de millions d'habitants, dont le sol et le sous-sol offrent de grandes richesses qu'on commence seulement à exploiter: telle est la Mandchourie. Ajoutons que la position stratégique du pays, traversé par le dernier tronçon du Transsibérien, est de toute première importance, puisqu'il commande le point d'aboutissement de la grande ligne ferrée qui relie l'Europe à l'Extrême-Orient.

L'ouverture de la Mandchourie à la colonisation remonte à la fin du XIX^e siècle. Ce furent les Russes qui établirent la première ligne ferrée, celle dont nous venons de parler. La colonisation suivit le rail, comme dans le Far-West américain. Céréales, haricots *soya*, bois des forêts septentrionales s'acheminèrent vers Vladivostok, puis vers Port-Arthur également, lorsque fut construit, au Sud, l'embranchement de Kharbine à la péninsule du Liao-Toung...

Le Japon ne pouvait tolérer que le colosse russe s'établît ainsi à ses portes, sur le Pacifique. A la suite de la guerre victorieuse qu'il mena contre la Russie, les droits acquis en Mandchourie par ce dernier pays lui furent transférés en vertu du traité de Portsmouth. L'Empire du Soleil Levant prenait donc la possession des chemins de fer du sud du pays et devenait détenteur du bail à ferme de la péninsule du Liao-Toung, ainsi que du droit d'exploiter les richesses agricoles dans toute la Mandchourie.

Tokio pensait trouver dans les plaines mandchoues les espaces nécessaires pour y répandre le trop-plein de sa population, qui est à l'étroit dans ses îles. Mais le climat du pays, très chaud en été, glacial en hiver, n'est pas favorable aux Nippons, habitués à la douceur de leur climat ma-

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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NOTE

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FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED April 20, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Derogatory article concerning the Imperial House of Japan. Newspaper incident has been amicably settled.

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W. R. Castle, Jr.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 25 1982

No. 298

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,
American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation I had on April 14th with the Japanese Ambassador concerning the withdrawal of troops in the negotiations at Shanghai.

Very truly yours,


W. R. Castle, Jr.
Acting Secretary of State.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
April 14.

U VC/AB

APR 20 1982 PM
MULT



793.94/5074

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 25 1932.

No. 742

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation I had on April 14th with the Japanese Ambassador concerning the withdrawal of troops in the negotiations at Shanghai.

Very truly yours,

W. A. Castle, Jr.,
 Acting Secretary of State.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum
 of April 14.

U VO/AB

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 m.m.h.

APR 20 1932 PM
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022
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY


April 14, 1932.

Memorandum of conversation with the Japanese
Ambassador, April 14, 1932.

The Japanese Ambassador referred to a report in the newspapers that the Fleet was to remain in the Pacific at the request of the Department of State and asked me whether it would be possible for me to say whether or not this report was true. I said that we had no idea where the report came from and that I could assure him that there had been no official communication on the subject between the two Departments.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

U WRC/AB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/138 FOR Tel. # 454, 2 pm

FROM China (Perkins) DATED April 20, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Strike of the employees of the Chinese Eastern
 Railway will prevent the transportation of
 General Tamon's Division, which was due to
 leave for the South.

793.94/5076

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hs

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cib

PLAIN

~ Peiping via NR

Dated April 20, 1932

Recd3:55 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

454, April 20, 2 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Harbin, April 19th:

"Indignant over the arrest of Chinese Eastern Railway employees in connection with the dynamiting of the Japanese troop train on April 12th, all the employees of the C E R are going out on a general strike tomorrow, suspending all the services on the whole line. They will thus incidentally prevent the transportation of General Tamon's Division, which was due to leave for the South tomorrow."

From Dairen, April 19th:

"Count Uchida has decided to retain the presidency of the South Manchurian Railway temporarily because of the visit of the League Commission of Inquiry to Manchuria."

From Changchun, April 19th:

"Complete anarchy reigns around the Imienpo Pogranichnaya sector of the C E R and the damage wrought by

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- # 454, from Peiping, April 20, 1932.

by irregulars and guerillas is estimated by the Japanese
at two hundred million dollars.

Japanese residents at Suifenho are crossing the
border into Russian territory for safety with Soviet
permission.

Japanese residents at Taheiho in a similar manner
are crossing the Amur to Blagoveschensk."

For the Minister,
PERKINS

JS CIB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

✓ FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
893.102
793.94119
893.0146
1239634

REF

This telegram must
be closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated to
anyone.

FROM

SHANGHAI

Dated April 21, 1932

Rec'd 5:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RECEIVED
APR 21 1932

URGENT

DIVISION OF

April 21, 2 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 21 1932
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/5077

One. British Minister tells me he (#) confidentially
from Geneva that the Committee was induced to adopt
paragraph eleven of the resolution by the fact that the
Japanese delegate had informed President Hymans in confi-
dence that the Japanese Government would be willing to
interpret annex four as giving the Joint Commission power
to declare by majority vote when it considered time for
withdrawal of Japanese forces had arrived.

Two. Neither Sir Miles nor I have been able to
gather from recent conversations with the Japanese Minister
that his Government had expressed itself in that sense
although admitted that he was not as yet fully informed of
all that had passed between Tokyo and Geneva.

Three. Sir Miles requests me to ascertain whether,
the event that the Japanese Government should accept this
interpretation of annex four, the American Government felt
that

FILED

APR 25 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REI

2- from Shanghai, Apr. 21, 2p.m.

that the Joint Commission should be asked to assume the responsibility of stating when the time for Japanese withdrawal had come.

Four. Minister Johnson returns tomorrow.

Repeated to Geneva.

For the Minister

ENGERT

CIB

WSB

(#) Apparent omission.



23
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REI

2- from Shanghai, Apr. 21, 2p.m.

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Four. Minister Johnson returns tomorrow.

Repeated to Geneva.

For the Minister

ENGERT

CIB

WSB

(#) Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 OR
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

April 22, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China)

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER.

Your April 21, 2 p.m., paragraph three.

With regard to the inquiry raised, the view of the
 Secretary of State, ~~communicated~~ ^{telegraphed} to the Department from
 under date April 21
 Geneva, is as follows:

QUOTE I feel very strongly that if the resolution is
 adopted by the Committee of Nineteen there should be no
 reluctance expressed on the part of our Minister and the
 other Ministers to accept the responsibility which it
 involves. First it seems to be the only effective way of
 solving the deadlock in the evacuation. I have never been
 satisfied with the previous recommendations of the Ministers
 at Shanghai which seem to me weak. This paragraph of the
 resolution does not permit the Mixed Commission to set a
 date for completing the evacuation in advance but merely
 to state when in their opinion a time has actually arrived
 in which the Japanese troops can be safely withdrawn. This
 is a mere finding of fact peculiarly of a nature appropriate
 for the jurisdiction of such a commission and I think they

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____,

793.945077

793.945077

149

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
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- 2 -

Washington,

would be unduly timid to refuse to accept such a responsibility UNQUOTE.

In this connection, Geneva has supplied Department with the text of Article ten of the draft resolution, which reads:

QUOTE Notes with satisfaction that the said Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles one, two and three, of which the last named provides for the complete withdrawal of Japanese forces as before the incident of January 28 UNQUOTE.

Castle
 Acting.

V
 Apr. 22 1962.14

SKH
 FE:JEJ/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator M., 19_____, _____

0236

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 257 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
 Geneva, Switzerland, April 5, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 APR 23 1932
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

APR 19 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
 SECTION OF NATIONS SECTION
 APR 21 1932
flaming only
 1 COPY RETAINED *EDH*

SUBJECT: Transmitting Sino-Japanese Documents for
 Period March 12 to March 31 inclusive.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

In U. S. WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's despatch
 No. 250 Political of March 15, 1932, transmitting documents
 relating to the appeal of the Chinese Government under the
 Covenant of the League of Nations.

In continuation of the procedure which has been follow-
 ed in this matter I am forwarding under separate cover as an
 accompaniment to this despatch further documents which were
 issued during the period March 12 to March 31 inclusive.
 Under the same cover as these documents there is also being
 sent a set of the printed minutes for the Extraordinary
 Session of the Assembly held in Geneva from March 3 to March
 11 inclusive. The latter had not yet been published when the
 despatch referred to above transmitting the provisional
 minutes for this Session was prepared.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
 Prentiss B. Gilbert.
 American Consul.

Original and Five copies to Department of State.
 One copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

F/LS
 793.94/5078

FILED

APR 26 1932

Ends

1237

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

forwarded under separate cover as an accompaniment to
Geneva Consulate's Despatch No.257 Political, of April 5,1932.

Miscellaneous Documents:

C.M. 201 1932 VII
A.(Exr.) 49 to 92.

Printed Minutes for Plenary Sessions of the Assembly:

First Meeting	March 3, 1932	11	a.m.
Second Meeting	March 3, 1932	4.30	p.m.
Third Meeting	March 4, 1932	7.45	p.m.
Fourth Meeting	March 11, 1932	6	p.m.

Printed Minutes for Meetings of the General Commission
of the Assembly:

First Meeting	March 4, 1932	4	p.m.
Second Meeting	March 5, 1932	10.30	a.m.
Third Meeting	March 5, 1932	3.30	p.m.
Fourth Meeting	March 7, 1932	3.30	p.m.
Fifth Meeting	March 8, 1932	3.30	p.m.
Sixth Meeting	March 11, 1932	10.30	a.m.
Seventh Meeting	March 11, 1932	5	p.m.

7 2 3 8
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Accompaniment to Geneva Consulate
Despatch No.257 Political, of
April 5, 1932, entitled: "Transmitting
Sino-Japanese Documents for Period
March 12 to March 31 inclusive."

123:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.332.M.201.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 29th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication, dated March 26th, which he has received from the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the Council in its resolution of December 10th, 1931.

Shanghai, 26.3.1932.

Commission of Enquiry arrived in Japan February 29th and left March 11th remaining most of time Tokyo. In spite of short stay Commission of Enquiry was able through interview with Foreign Minister, War Minister, Minister for Navy, and with leading personalities in business circles and circles specially interested relations between Japan and League of Nations to ascertain views prevailing as to main points its enquiry. During its visit to Osaka Commission of Enquiry was also able to discuss with leaders of business activities.

Commission of Enquiry arrived at Shanghai March 14th and is leaving for Nanking March 26th. During stay Shanghai, Commission of Enquiry was able to hear views of many representatives of political, educational, religious, business circles, both Chinese and foreign, on main aspects question relations China and Japan. Commission of Enquiry also started official contact with representatives of National Government of Republic of China and held interview with Vice-Chairman Executive Yuan and with Vice-Foreign Minister.

Commission of Enquiry intends to stay four days Nanking, arrive Peking end of first week in April and arrive Manchuria beginning of third week in April.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE
 GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

APR 7 1932

Communicated to the
 Assembly, the Council and
 the Members of the League.
 POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

A.(Extr.)92.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 29th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated March 29th.

Ref./A.13.

March 29th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to transmit to you the following telegram, dated Shanghai, March 28th, which I have just received from the Honourable T. V. Soong, Vice-President of the Executive Yuan (Council) and concurrently Minister of Finance, and shall be most obliged if you will have it circulated among the Members of the Assembly:

"Mr. F. W. Maze, the Inspector-General of Customs, reported to me the following:

"(1) The Commissioner of Customs at Antung telegraphs: 'I am informed that the Superintendent of Customs introduced his Japanese adviser to the Manager of the Bank of China to-day (March 26th?), when the adviser handed to the Manager the written circular instructions from Manchukuo (puppet government) that all revenues in the hands of the Bank of China on the 26th of March and all collection from that date should be paid to Tung San Sheng Kuang Yin Hsiao (Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces). The Manager replied that he could do nothing without instructions from the Maritime Customs. So far I have not been approached on the matter, but the Bank of China requests instructions, which I now solicit from you. Question is also raised of the present agreement with the Bank of Chosen.'

"(2) The Commissioner of Customs at Newchwang telegraphs: 'The Japanese adviser to the Superintendent of Customs and the Manager of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces called this morning (March 26th?) on the Manager of the Bank of China with a despatch, dated the 24th of March from the Finance Ministry of Manchukuo (puppet government) to him, instructing him to hand over immediately all the customs revenue held by the Bank of China on the 26th of March and all future collection to the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces. They thereupon demanded the immediate handing over of the funds to them. The Manager of the Bank of China refused saying that he should consult me (the Commissioner of Customs at Newchwang) and would inform them on their return this afternoon that the Commissioner of Customs has wired the Inspector-General for instructions.'

"Dr. F. A. Cleveland, Associate Chief Inspector of Salt Revenue, has received the following telegram from the district inspectors at Liaoning (Mukden): 'We learn from reliable sources that the Salt Commissioner has received order from the Finance Minister of the puppet government to take over by force our office and sub-offices including revenue balance, files and everything on the 28th of March.'

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

APR 7 1932

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council and
the Members of the League.
POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

A.(Extr.)92.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 29th, 1932.

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(Signed) W. W. YEN.

124

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
MAR 31 1932
POLITICAL SECTION

A(Entr.)91.1932.VII

Geneva, March 29th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated March 29th, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref.A.12.

To the Secretary-General.

March 29, 1932.

I have the honour to communicate to you the following summary of telegrams received from Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, with regard to the armistice negotiations held in Shanghai during the last few days, and to request that you will be good enough to bring the attention of the President and members of the Assembly to the same:

The discussions on March 25 revealed unmistakably Japan's intention to ignore the provisions of the original Draft Agreement and also the Assembly's Resolution regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops. The morning session was wasted over bickerings as to the accommodation of sick Japanese soldiers and horses in areas to be evacuated. During the afternoon's meeting, the military sub-committee, consisting of military representatives of both sides, assisted by the military attachés of the participating friendly powers, brought in a report revealing that Japan was willing only to withdraw to what they called the second line, running straight from the Szetseling Forts to Yanghangchen, Tatsand and Chenju. It was obvious that Japan's idea of withdrawal meant the maintenance of the army of occupation in the so-called adjacent areas between the Settlement limits and the above-mentioned line. The Japanese representatives also declared that the time-limit required for the withdrawal to the above indicated line would be six weeks. Asked as to when the withdrawal into the International Settlement would begin, the Japanese stated that it was uncertain, depending upon conditions. It seemed impossible to continue discussions so long as Japan ignored the principle provided in the Assembly's Resolution and the original Draft Agreement, providing for withdrawal into the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district within a fixed period. However, both sides were urged strongly by the British and American Ministers to China to continue the discussions.

The discussions on March 26 centred mainly upon Article 3 of the Draft Agreement, regarding the constitution and functions of the Joint Commission to certify to the withdrawal. The Article itself and the Annex thereto were accepted by both sides with the additional provision, which was suggested by Sir Miles Lampson as a compromise to the Japanese demand for aerial reconnoitring. The additional provision reads "The Commission may, in accordance with its decision, invoke the assistance of representatives of the participating friendly powers in arranging reconnaissance by aeroplane over such points as may be considered necessary in order to watch the performance of the provisions for the cessation of hostilities." The Japanese agreed to consider the above provision.

The military sub-committee this morning reported that the Japanese were prepared to abandon the Szetseling-Chenju line, but proposed holding the Woosung, Yinghsianghsien, Kiangwan and Chapei districts. It was reported this evening the Japanese military were prepared to abandon Paoshan, Woosung, Kiangwan and Chapei, but wanted Yinghsianghsien for accomodating their troops. The participating foreign military attachés pointed out the difficulty confronting Japan's immediately withdrawing fifty thousand troops and five thousand horses.

In the meeting on March 28 the discussions practically reached a deadlock, as a result of Japan's refusal to declare complete withdrawal within a fixed period, on which the Chinese insisted and which the Japanese were equally determined to refuse.

Another difficult problem lies in the definition and meaning of the phrase "adjacent territory" which the Japanese military declared must include the Woosung district, except the forts, and also Kiangwan, Chapei, and the north-eastern district adjoining Yangtsepoo. From all indications, it was clear that the Japanese were adamant in refusing to withdraw completely and insisting on occupying part of the territory under their control. In view of such an attitude on the part of the Japanese, it was futile to continue the discussions.

In communicating to you the above summary of telegrams for the information of the Assembly, I have the honour to point out that the Japanese seem bent on ignoring the original Draft Agreement as well as the Assembly Resolution concerning the armistice which cannot but bring in its train uncertainties in and around the Shanghai area for which the Japanese must be held responsible.

(s.) W.W. YEN.

124
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

MAR 31 1932

POLITICAL SECTION

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League

A. (Extr.) 90.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 29th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Situation in the Shanghai District

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the eighteenth report of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The seventeenth report was circulated in document A.(Extr.).86.1932.VII.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER IN CHINA.

Despatched Shanghai, 13h.45, March 29th

Received Geneva, 9h.30, March 29th

Situation Report No.18, March 29th.

Numerous reports from neutral observers along Chinese front confirm impression incidents are occurring between two sides more especially region Taitsung. A recent incident puts beyond reasonable doubt that strong Japanese patrol made attack on small Chinese escort accompanying neutral observer in vicinity Wunglichiao near Taitsung.

Japanese aerial reconnaissances now intensified over Chinese lines.

Japanese staff have today issued orders with view prevent recurrence incidents reported paragraph one.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, to the
Council and to the
Members of the League.

A.(Extr.)32.1332.VII.

Geneva, March 25th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly
the following communication dated March 25th.

Translation

Geneva, March 25th, 1932.

74/L.32.

Sir,

Document A.(Extr.).Com.Spec.1 reproduced a letter
dated March 15th from the Chinese representative communicating
the contents of a telegram from Li. Boong, Vice-President of
the Council of Ministers, protesting against a prolonged
stay by the Commission of Enquiry at Shanghai. I have the
honour to point out to you that, according to information I
have received from the Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai,
the Chinese newspapers of March 24th having mentioned this
protest by the Chinese delegation, Li. Kuo Taichi publicly
announced on March 25th that the Chinese Government had not
given the Chinese delegation at Geneva any instructions in
that sense. The communiqué adds that the Commission of
Enquiry is at present being fettered at Shanghai by the authori-
ties and the various corporations; that the situation in the
three eastern provinces is clearly causing anxiety to the
Chinese Government, but that if it were true that the Chinese
delegation has made such a communication to the League of
Nations it must have been due to some telegraphic error.

(31-12) N. SATO

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, to the
Council and to the
members of the League.

A.(Extr.)SS.1932.VII
Geneva, March 25th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly
the following communication dated March 25th.

Translation.

Geneva, March 25th, 1932.

73/1932.

Sir,

With reference to the statement made by the Chinese
delegate at the meeting of the Special Committee on March 11th,
1932, to the effect that there had been no question of observing
secrecy in regard to the negotiations for the cessation of
hostilities at Shanghai (A.(Extr.) Com.Spec.P.V.1, page 4 of
French), I have the honour to inform you that M. Kuo Taichi,
the Chinese delegate, expressed to the Japanese Minister in
China his regrets that the agreement reached regarding the
non-publication of the proceedings had not been observed, as
M. Kuo had unfortunately delayed in informing the Chinese
delegation at Geneva.

(Signed) N. SATO.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, to the
Council and to the
Members of the League.

A. (Extr.) 87.1932.VII
Geneva, March 25th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly
the following communication dated March 25th.

Translation
72/1932

Geneva, March 25th, 1932.

Sir,

With reference to my communication of March 23rd,
NC.70/1932, I have the honour to inform you that the official
negotiations for the cessation of hostilities began on March
24th. Two meetings were held in the course of that day.
The negotiations are being continued to-day.

The Japanese delegates are: General Ueda, M.
Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister in China, M. T. Shiro, Chief of
the General Staff of the Army, and M. Shimada, Chief of the
General Staff of the Navy. The Chinese delegates are:
General Taichi, General Wong and M. Kuo Taichi. The British
and United States Ministers and the Italian Chargé d'Affaires
are present at the negotiations; the French Minister, being
indisposed, is represented by a secretary.

(Signed) N. SATO

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

A. (Extr.) 36.1932.VII
Geneva, March 2nd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Situation in the Shanghai District.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the sixteenth and seventeenth reports of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai settlement. The previous report was communicated in Document A. (Extr.) 34.1932.VII.

Telegrams from His Majesty's Minister in China.

Enclaire.

Tel. No. 67 Sir L. Lampson.

Despatched Shanghai, 19h.12, March 25th.
Received Geneva 2h.00, March 26th

Situation Report No. 16.

March 25th. No change.

Enclaire

Tel. No. 68 Sir L. Lampson

Despatched Shanghai, 16h.23, March 26th.
Received Geneva 3h.00 March 26th

Situation Report No. 17.

March 26th. No important developments to report.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A. (Extr.) 85.1932.VII.
Geneva, March 26th. 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated March, 25th.

Ref. A.12.

March 25, 1932.

To the Secretary-General,

I have the honour to communicate to you the following telegram concerning the proceedings of the Armistice Conference held yesterday (Thursday) at Shanghai. The telegram sent by our representative at the Conference, Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"Two meetings were held to-day (Thursday, 24th.), but the result was disappointing due principally to the fact that the Japanese representatives were continually insisting of the discussion of irrelevant questions. I declared at the morning session that I would dissociate myself from the discussion, if the Japanese should continue to bring up questions outside the scope of the agreed draft agenda. General Uyeda is the Chief Delegate of Japan, with Minister Shigemitsu as assistant. Discussion will be resumed on Friday (March 25th)."

I shall be obliged to you to circulate the above information to the Members of the Assembly.

(sgd.) W.W.YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)84.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 24th. 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Situation in the Shanghai District

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the fifteenth report of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The fourteenth report was communicated in document A.(Extr.)75.1932.VII.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER IN CHINA

Despatched Shanghai, 20 h. 45, March 24th.

Received Geneva, 14 h. 00, March 24th.

Situation report 15. March 24th.

No change.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A. (Extr.) 83.1932. VII.

Geneva, March 24th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated March 24th, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation:

Rf. /A.(10).

March 23rd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to enclose copy of a memorandum entitled "OBSERVATIONS ON THE EXPLANATORY NOTE COMMUNICATED BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ON MARCH 2nd, 1932," prepared by this Delegation, with the request that you will be kind enough to circulate it among the Members of the Assembly.

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE EXPLANATORY NOTE COMMUNICATED
BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ON
MARCH 2, 1932.

This document, as the letter which transmitted it indicates, evidently does not constitute the statement required to be filed in compliance with the second paragraph of Article XV of the Covenant. It is designated as "simply an explanation of what has occurred at Shanghai." It does, however, present certain considerations of a general nature which perhaps should not be passed over in silence pending receipt of the final statement of the Japanese case on the whole controversy. We therefore venture to comment briefly at this time upon some of the matters referred to.

1. It is stated that the Chinese people and their Government have long pursued a persistent anti-foreign policy. This charge is sought to be enforced rather by mischievous insinuation and more or less deliberate distortion of fact, than by direct proof. In this way attempt has been made to portray a purely legitimate nationalistic spirit as something viciously anti-foreign.

When, not quite a century ago, China was thrown open to the world, she confronted a civilization which had wide divergencies - social, cultural, political and economic - from her own. China's ancient and illustrious culture is too well known to call for detailed analysis; the point is that its distinguishing characteristics quite naturally have necessitated a process of accommodation of Chinese ideas and habits to those of western civilization.

1) See document A. (Extr.) 6.1932.VII.

-2-

The people of China have had to adapt themselves to an entirely new system of relations with the outside world, with which they were totally unfamiliar. For example, they knew little or nothing about foreign trade and the manner in which it must be carried on. Everybody recognizes that the original treaty structure which grew out of this extraordinary situation possessed exceptional features which plainly were not destined to last forever. Limitations upon sovereign rights were imposed by treaty. Foreign settlements and concessions were established in China. Jurisdiction over foreigners who violated the law was turned over to Consular representatives of their own nationality. Duties were laid on all imports at a flat rate of five per cent, whatever the nature of the goods, whether diamonds or watches or necessities of life. Such arrangements as these were made nearly one hundred years ago.

As the country became adjusted to new conditions, and reforms of a social, material and judicial character took place, many of the abnormal and exceptional features of Sino-Foreign relationship have been eliminated with the sympathetic approval of the Governments concerned. Great Britain, the United States and other Powers have co-operated and exhibited a conciliatory and friendly attitude in this respect. Various concessions and settlements have been restored by Great Britain and Belgium. The former has turned back the leased territory of Weihaiwai, and pourparlers have been engaged with regard to similar matters. Gradually, China has taken her place as a responsible member of international society. To designate this natural and logical development as implying anything anti-foreign is a flagrant misrepresentation of the facts. The trend is all toward a more friendly and intimate relationship between China and the rest of the world.

2. The intimation that the teachings and philosophy of Dr. Sun Yat Sen (namely, San Min Chu Yi) were in any respect anti-foreign is a gross libel. It is true that Dr. Sun Yat Sen advocated the abolition of the so-called "unequal treaties". That proposal has been recognised as a perfectly proper one and it carries no sinister implication whatever. The fundamental tenets of Dr. Sun's teachings were the promotion of universal peace and harmony and the creation of the international mind. The cardinal principle of equality of races and altruism among nations may be said to be one which, in fact, originated in Japan. Probably there is no better way to explain the true Japanese attitude toward Dr. Sun Yat Sen than by quoting the words of Mr. Inukai, the Prime Minister of Japan:

"Ten years ago under the reign of Mutso Hito I was already tied by friendship with Sun Yat Sen. The number of his partisans was then very small. The partisans of the Tsing Dynasty were the rough adversaries of Sun Yat Sen. In spite of all these obstacles he never receded a step and it was he who finally overturned the Tsing Dynasty. One can say that this Master lived and died for the Chinese Revolution. Without this Master China would not have made the progress which she has attained to-day.

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The idea and action of this Master make of him one of the greatest figures of ancient and modern history of the world. His death is not only a loss to the Kuomintang but also for China and the entire world."

3. In spite of the fact that China even to-day has to tolerate much that would be considered humiliating in any other country, such as Consular jurisdiction, concessions, etc: it is indisputable that foreign visitors and residents have always found the Chinese a friendly and amiable race of men, who respond readily when they are treated with the respect and consideration due to a fellow man. There is no ground whatever for the assertion that there is any inherent animosity. Hundreds of thousands of foreigners living and working in China can testify to this.

The development of a national self-consciousness in China, as elsewhere in the world in these times, is inevitable and laudable. Its natural result is a legitimate aspiration to assume a position of equality in the family of nations. This is being done step by step. Notable progress in this direction was made when China's tariff autonomy was restored in 1928. This objective, with the others which have been mentioned, was attained by mutual agreement amicably made with the Powers concerned. China's claim for equal treatment was publicly approved by the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1930 as in full accord with the spirit of the Covenant.

4. The insinuation that repudiation of her foreign debts is a settled policy of China is equally unjustified. Nearly every Government in the world has been obliged, in the midst of this unprecedented depression, to resort to moratoria and other expedients, and temporary defaults have not been uncommon. China is no exception. Nevertheless, in the face of calamity which has been accentuated in her case, she did at the end of 1931 meet fully all her foreign loan obligations secured by maritime customs receipts. As to other loans not so well secured, efforts have been and are being made, not without some success, to meet the interest and capital charges. Time may be required to effect a full settlement, but there never has been any question of repudiation.

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In this connection it should be noted by way of illustration that the Chinese Government has regularly provided throughout the period of the 1895 Five Per Cent. Gold Loan, until and including the final date of maturity thereof on July 1, 1931, funds sufficient to pay all bonds and coupons properly due which have been presented. The only question remaining open is as to provision for bonds which were not presented when due, and as to these there are bona-fide legal controversies with the banks chargeable with the service of the Loan, arising partly over questions of accounting and questions of responsibility for fluctuations in exchange. During the past three years China has paid out for the benefit of bondholders under this Loan more than \$12,000,000.

It may also be noted that the interest on the Four Per Cent. Gold Loan of 1912 is being met. The last deposit on this account was made on March 17, 1932 in the amount of \$-114,890. 8. 5, to meet the coupon falling due April 1, 1932.

5. History shows that the rise of a national self-consciousness is always accompanied by a certain amount of internal agitation. Not so very long ago Japan passed through the same trying phase of its development which China is now experiencing. Every authentic account of Japanese contemporary history tells of disturbances during the Restoration period, which assumed a more definitely anti-foreign aspect than those found in China to-day. The Japanese themselves have always characterized these outbursts as merely incidental to the growth of the national spirit. In China such manifestations have oftener than not been directed against the Government; and no fair analysis of the psychology of the Chinese people can justify the conclusion that there is any real bias against foreigners on the part either of the people or of their Government. There is, of course, much more to be said on this subject if occasion requires; but it must be clear that an indictment of this nature, if it is to be considered at all, must be founded on something more than vague assertion.

6. Complaint is made that the text-books used in Chinese schools inculcate an anti-foreign sentiment. Here again the charge is not accompanied by the slightest proof and is most emphatically denied. Until recent years education in China was mainly restricted to the study of the ancient classics and literature. The new system was largely borrowed from Japan and the Western world; and modern history has, of course, taken its place in the school curriculum. It is hardly China's fault that a faithful account of her foreign relations during the past hundred years does not always make pleasant reading for Japan's subjects. That Chinese educational policy is quite the reverse of that contended for by Japan is incontestable. Probably no nation in the past sixty years has sent so large a proportion of its students abroad in quest of knowledge. They have gone, and are still going, in increasing numbers to America, to Europe and especially to Japan.

7. The allegation that "movements for the boycotting of Japanese goods have been increasing during the past fifteen years" will not stand the test of examination. For

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the period mentioned the figures show that Japan was rapidly capturing the Chinese market. Her exports to China increased by leaps and bounds at the expense of those of other countries, particularly of England. Almost everyone of those fifteen years was a record year for Japanese exports to China. Of all the foreign nations carrying on business with China, Japan enjoyed far the greatest volume of trade. Her commercial supremacy in this field seemed undisputed until she deliberately forfeited this dominant position by waging an undeclared war upon her best customer. From the beginning to end of the Explanatory Note there is no mention whatever of Manchuria and of the attack which was launched on the 18th of September last. The note merely states that "toward the end of September the anti-Japanese campaign extended over practically the whole of China and was highly effective." Can there be anything surprising about the diminution of Japanese exports to China in these circumstances? Armed invasion, with all the atrocities of war, is per se destructive of commercial relations. That the ~~aggressor~~ aggressor should complain of loss of trade through the unwillingness of a harassed population to buy his goods at the point of the gun, is one of the mysteries of this case which we cannot attempt to solve. The only wonder is that in the actual conditions the Chinese people and their Government have been able to exercise so much self-restraint and to keep the situation so well under control. The usual comment of European observers has been that in similar circumstances other countries would have found it impossible to protect the lives of Japanese nationals unless they were all placed in internment camps for safety.

8. The Explanatory Note is characteristically careless and misleading in its treatment of the events at Shanghai. The incidents which furnished the immediate pretext for the Shanghai expedition were clearly of a petty nature. The death of a Japanese monk in a street brawl for which the Chinese authorities were in no way to blame, the publication of an alleged offensive article in an uncontrolled newspaper which has since been suppressed - these are things not unlikely to happen anywhere in conditions of strained relations such as those brought about by Japan's acts in Manchuria. Japanese hoodlums in Shanghai were themselves principally responsible. Take the incident of January 20th:

"About fifty members of Japanese Youth Protection Society with knives and clubs proceeded to Sanye Towel Factory, set the building on fire and on the way home clashed with Settlement Municipal police. Three Chinese police were seriously wounded, one of them dying from wounds, three Japanese were shot by the police, one dying from wounds."

These are the words of the Shanghai Committee. Evidently Japanese lawless elements took matters into their own hands and in broad daylight perpetrated a peculiarly serious crime in the heart of that great commercial metropolis.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It seems to have been an organized affair conducted by members of the so-called Japanese Youth Protection Society.

9. The invasion of Shanghai cannot be said to be in the remotest manner connected with the necessity for guarding the International Settlement. Until the Japanese naval forces appeared on the scene the Settlement was not in the slightest danger. It has always been one of the safest places in the world to live. Never before in its history has it been exposed to such perils. Even when the Japanese forces were using the Settlement as a base, the Chinese military authorities, at considerable military disadvantage, took scrupulous care not to take any measures calculated to endanger life or property in that area. These facts are beyond any dispute.

The most reliable and impartial accounts of what took place at Shanghai are, of course, found in the reports of the Committee set up by the Secretary-General of the League. This Committee's first report summarizing the events of January 28th is conclusive on the attitude of the Japanese military and naval authorities with respect to the International Settlement:

"On January 28th early afternoon, Mayor of Great Shanghai transmitted to Japanese Consul reply accepting entirely Japanese demands.

"At 4 p.m. of the same day, Japanese Consul informed Consular body of receipt this reply which said entirely satisfactory. In spite of this change in the diplomatic situation there was a popular belief that Japanese naval authorities were determined to take direct action AT ANY EVENT. Japanese, however, made no attempt to occupy extra-Settlement section when the state of Emergency came into force in the Settlement in the daytime at 4 p.m.

"At 11 p.m. (that is seven hours after the emergency came into force, and the British and Americans have occupied their sections seven hours ago) Japanese Admiral issued two proclamations copies of which were served on the Mayor who declared he has received them at 11.15.

"At midnight, at a given signal, all the dropping parties of Japanese marines and armed civilians (who are mobilized before midnight) at entrances to alley-ways ADVANCED Westwards and Northwards in the direction of the Railway, - - - the Railway is under the absolute jurisdiction of China and outside both of the Settlement and of the Extra Roads Areas of the Settlement. It should be observed that the final party of 100 marines, accompanied by ARMED CARS, attempted to pass through gates dividing Settlement from Chinese territory at the end of Honan Road, but were prevented by Shanghai volunteer corps in whose section gate situated. Japanese marines and armed civilians met with resistance on the part of Chinese regular troops in the district under absolute Chinese jurisdiction."

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A.(Extr.)82.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 24th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated March 24th.

Ref./A.11.

March 24, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that the Armistice meeting which was to have been held in Shanghai yesterday between the Chinese and Japanese representatives did not take place for the following reason:

As originally understood the Chief Commanders of the two forces, namely, Generals Chiang Kwang-nai and Shirakawa, were to participate in the negotiations yesterday, but at the last moment the Japanese appointed Lieutenant-general Uyeda instead, so that General Chiang was obliged to stay away also from the meeting. It is now agreed that the formal Armistice meeting will take place to-day (Thursday), and the Chinese Government has appointed General Tai Chi as its military delegate.

(Signed)

W. W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of the
League.

A.(Extr.)81.1932.VII.
Geneva, March 24th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE JAPANESE DELEGATION.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation,
the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Assembly the following communication, dated March 23rd.

March 23rd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

With reference to the communication from the
Chinese delegation A.(Extr.)74.1932.VII, to the effect
that Japanese aeroplanes had attacked with machine -
guns the Hangchow railway station on the 20th instant,
I am in a position categorically to deny this
allegation.

Aeroplane reconnaissances took place on
March 21st in the district of Soochow and Hangchow
in order to survey the new earthworks thrown up by
Chinese troops in the Soochow district and on the
northern bank of the Whanpoo. The Japanese aero-
planes received strict orders not to open fire.

(Signed) N. SATO.

Japanese Representative on the
Council of the League of Nations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of the
League.

A.Extr.(80).1932.VII

Geneva, March 24th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly
the following communication dated March 23rd.

Geneva, March 25rd, 1932.

(Translation)

To the Secretary-General

In my letter of March 22nd, No.68/1932, I had the
honour to inform you that an official meeting of the Japanese,
Chinese and foreign military, naval and civilian representa-
tives had been arranged for 10 o'clock this morning. I have
just received a telegram informing me that at 9 o'clock this
morning M. Kuo requested the Japanese Minister in China to
postpone the meeting provisionally, as General Chang,
Commander-in-Chief of the 19th Army, had not agreed to attend.

(Signed) N. SATO

Representative of Japan on the Council
of the League of Nations.

()

A. (Extr.) 79.1932.VII.

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Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated March 23rd.

Summary of official telegrams received by the
Japanese Delegation on March 23rd.

1. *What is the main purpose of the study?*
 2. *What are the research objectives?*
 3. *What is the research methodology?*
 4. *What are the findings of the study?*
 5. *What are the conclusions and recommendations?*

1. On March 20th at about 10 a.m. the Medical Corps of the 11th Division, which was proceeding to Shanghai, where it was to embark, was attacked north of Tazang Chen by Chinese plain-clothes soldiers, who threw grenades. Three soldiers were wounded, one very seriously.

2. On March 21st, about midday, three Japanese artillerymen were attacked by Chinese plain-clothes soldiers at Kiangwan, outside the University. The members of the Lytton Commission were in the vicinity when this incident occurred.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)78.1932.VII.

GENEVA, March 23rd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated March 23rd, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./A.9

March 23rd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate to you the following telegram, dated Shanghai the 23rd of March, from the President of the Chamber of Commerce, with the request that you circulate the same among the Members of the Assembly:

"During the past few months Japan has on repeated occasions denied any intention of aggressive action in China, but has almost immediately after taken steps, which contradict directly such declarations. The Chinese Government has now incontestable evidence foreshadowing Japan's intention to deprive China of control of Chinese Maritime Customs in Manchuria, although in order to disarm foreign criticism, Japan may continue remittance of foreign loan quotas from the Customs revenue. Such measures, if permitted, would be direct infringement of China's sovereign rights, would seriously undermine the position of Chinese national finance, and would destroy the integrity of Chinese Maritime Customs. The Chinese Customs Service, which is the result of international co-operation extending over many years, has long been the backbone of Chinese national finance and has remained intact even through most difficult periods of China's history. In addition, Japanese control of the Customs tariff of Manchuria would certainly result in discrimination against all foreign trade other than Japanese, and would thus constitute a serious threat to the policy of the Open Door in Manchuria. The Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai appeals, therefore, to the League of Nations to take immediate and appropriate steps to prevent Japan from presenting again to the world a fait accompli, which might prove the first step to the disintegration of China.

(Signed) Wang Shao-lay, Chairman."

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)77.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 23rd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, which was transmitted to him on March 23rd.

Observations of the Japanese Delegation
on the Third Report (supplementary observations)
and the Fourth Report of the Shanghai Committee.

(Translation).

Third Report. (A.(Extr.)3.1932.VII).

It is regrettable that, when giving the Chinese reply to the Japanese demands, the report only mentioned the contents of those demands (subject to the previous observations with regard to this matter), and did not state the reasons therefor which were given in the text handed to the Chinese authorities. The presence of the 19th Army in the neighbourhood of the Settlement constituted an increasingly grave danger for the Japanese nationals and for the International Settlement itself. It was absolutely necessary that the army be moved further away. The object of the Japanese Command in asking for the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to a distance of twenty kilometres was to remove this menace, while avoiding further bloodshed.

Fourth Report. (A.(Extr.)15.1932.VII).

1. The report states that at about 4.0 p.m. on March 1st the Chinese military authorities issued orders for a general withdrawal. The Report appears to be based on the Chinese version, according to which the 19th Army had withdrawn without any fighting, in the absence of support from the Nanking forces. It should be observed, however, that on the morning of the following day, March 2nd, the 19th Army was still vigorously defending the positions before Tazang and that our troops only reached that place at 12.30 p.m., March 2nd, after serious losses.

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2. The announcement issued on March 3rd by the Japanese Military Commander stated that the threat to the safety of the Japanese nationals and to the International Settlement had apparently been removed owing to the withdrawal of the Chinese forces out of the area designated on February 16th, and accordingly ordered the cessation of hostilities.

3. The Japanese delegation has already corrected statements with regard to the relations of the Japanese naval authorities and the authorities of the Municipal Council of the International Settlement in its observations on the Committee's second report. The statement in the last paragraph of the fourth report that "interference by the Japanese with the police and other municipal functionaries reported in our second telegram continued and formed the subject of repeated protests to the Japanese authorities" does not represent the matter in the correct light. The protests related only to unimportant cases, such as acts of Japanese sentries in the discharge of their duties as municipal police officers. The very special state of affairs which existed during the first few days of the Shanghai incidents has undergone a complete change and increasingly harmonious co-operation has been established between the naval and the municipal authorities. For example, a first agreement was soon reached for the purpose of putting a stop to the activities of soldiers in civilian clothes within the International Settlement; this was followed by a second agreement in accordance with which the municipal police and the marines were to work together in searching for soldiers in civilian clothes, except in urgent cases; persons guilty of offences against the military laws were to be handed over to the gendarmerie. This agreement entered into force on February 26th. (The handing over of General Wong Kang to the Japanese gendarmerie by the superintendent of the municipal police at Hongkew is an example of this co-operation)(1).

The Japanese sentries have been gradually withdrawn from March 2nd. On the 3rd their number had been decreased by half, and on the 6th by two thirds. Their number was at that moment reduced to about a hundred, and when the fourth report was transmitted, it was hoped that normal conditions would soon be re-established. There were then no longer any Japanese sentries in the Hongkew district concession and on the roads of the Extension.

(1)

A person whose manner aroused suspicion was observed about 11.30 p.m. on February 27th near the side door of the Japanese Consulate General. The marines/accordingly asked the Japanese municipal police to question him. The man fled, pursued by the police and took refuge in Astor House. The Russian hotel superintendents turned him out and handed him over to the police. After questioning him, the head of the Hongkew station handed him over to the Japanese gendarmerie. As his identity was known he was treated with consideration and was liberated on March 1st.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

MAR 24 1932

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A (Extr.) 76. 1932. VII.

Geneva, March 23rd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated March 22nd.

68/1932.

March 22nd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

Referring to my communication of March 19th (No. 65/1932)* I have the honour to inform you that as a result of the negotiations which took place on March 21st a meeting has been arranged for the morning of the 23rd at which military, naval, and civilian representatives of Japan and China, and of the four Powers, will be present.

(Signed) N. SATO.

Representative of Japan on the
Council of the League of Nations.

* See Document A (Extr.) 69.1932.VII.

AMERICAN CONSUL
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

MAR 24 1932

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council and the
Members of the League.

A.(Extr.) 75.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 23rd.1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Situation in the Shanghai District .

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Assembly the fourteenth report of the representatives of the four
Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement.
The thirteenth report was communicated in document A.(Extr.)
71.1932.VII.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER IN CHINA.

Despatched Shanghai, 15.02, March 23rd.
Received Geneva, 2.30 " "

Situation Report 14 .

No change.

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

Communiqué à
l'Assemblée, au Conseil
et aux Membres de la
Société.

A.(Extr.) 75.1932.VII.

Genève, le 23 mars 1932.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS.

Situation dans la région de Changhaï.

Note du Secrétaire général.

Le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de transmettre à
l'Assemblée le quatorzième rapport des représentants des quatre
Puissances ayant des intérêts spéciaux dans la Concession de
Changhaï. Le treizième rapport a été communiqué dans le document
A.(Extr.)71.1932.VII

TELEGRAMME DU MINISTRE DE SA MAJESTE BRITANNIQUE EN CHINE.

Remis Changhaï 15h.02, le 23 mars 1932.

Reçu Genève 9h.30, le 23 mars.

Rapport numéro 14 sur la situation.

Aucun changement.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
MAR 24 1932
POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A.(Extr.)74.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 23rd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Assembly the following communication, dated March
22nd, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

March 22, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate to you the
following telegram of the 21st of March, which I
have just received from my Government, and shall be
obliged if you will have it circulated among the
Members of the Assembly:

"The Magistrate of the Soochow District
reported that Japanese aeroplanes were still
reconnoitring the city of Soochow daily.

"According to a report of the Chekiang
Provincial Government, Japanese aeroplanes
attacked with machine-guns the Hangchow Railway
Station on the 20th instant."

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

MAR 24 1932

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

POLITICAL SECTION
Commune Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)73, 1932. VII.

Geneva, March 23rd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated March 22nd, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./A.7

March 22nd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

At the request of the provincials of the Three Eastern Provinces now resident at Nanking, I have the honour to transmit to you the following telegram, dated March 21st, and shall be grateful if you will bring the same to the attention of the Members of the Assembly:

"It is no less than half a year that the Three Eastern Provinces of China have been groaning under the iron heels of the Japanese militarists. In utter disregard of the resolutions of the Council and of the Assembly, which enjoined the parties concerned not to aggravate the situation, the Japanese, however, have proceeded without the least hesitation to complete their aggressive plan for the annexation of the Three Eastern Provinces, as they did to Korea, by instigating and compelling the outlaws, captives and rebel elements to set up the so-called Manchukuo Government (the puppet government). The allegation that the government is established at the will of the people of Manchuria is but a fabrication to fool the world.

"The Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations will be due soon on the spot. We trust they will report to you the truth and unmask the intrigues of the Japanese, and we earnestly request that the League of Nations will, in pursuance of its sole purpose for the maintenance of world peace, do justice to China by denouncing the puppet government, to which the Chinese people are bitterly opposed, and restoring to China her sovereign rights, recognized by the world."

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

APR 7 1932

Communicated to the Assembly
the Council and the Members of
POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

A.(Extr.)73.1932.VII

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated March 22nd, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref.A.6.

March 22nd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate herewith the following telegram, dated March 21, from Messrs. T.V. Soong and Quo Tai-chi, Minister of Finance and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs respectively, and to request you to be good enough to circulate the same among the Members of the Assembly:

"Despite the injunction of the Assembly's Resolution for the cessation of further aggravation of the situation, Mr. F.W.Maze, Inspector-General of the Customs, reports that through the puppet government in Manchuria, the Japanese have been proceeding to seize the customs revenue in Manchuria, appointing Japanese advisers, and asking that the customs revenue be turned over to the puppet government. They also insist that all appointments to the customs staff in Manchuria and all tariff changes are to be submitted to the puppet government for decisions. It is threatened that any refusal to comply will be met by outright seizure of the customs service. Thus, the only remaining link of the Three Eastern Provinces with the rest of China is being broken, with the following consequences: (1) while there is pretence at offering the payment of the Boxer Indemnity and foreign loan quotas, there will be no payment allowed for meeting domestic loans charged on the customs; (2) the control of the customs service will have the effect of closing the open door in Manchuria not only to foreign trade but also domestic trade with the rest of China; (3) we have definite knowledge that the Japanese are arranging a customs union of the Three Eastern Provinces with Japan, thus completely severing Manchuria from China and attaching it to Japan."

In requesting you to draw the attention of the Assembly and of the Committee of Nineteen to the telegram and having in view the repeated Japanese obligation to recognise the political and territorial integrity of China, I am instructed by my Government to protest in the most solemn manner against the threatened proceedings and to declare that my Government will refuse to recognise the legality of such proceedings should they be carried out.

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated
to the Assembly,
the Council and the
Members of the League.

A.(Extr.)71. 1932.VII

Geneva, March 22nd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Situation in the Shanghai District

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the thirteenth report of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The twelfth report was communicated in document A.(Extr.)70.1932.VII.

Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Minister in China.

Despatched Shanghai, 13h.27 March 22nd.

Received Geneva 9h.00 " "

Situation report 13.

Embarkation eleventh division continues as schedule.
Withdrawal certain naval units also in progress.

No other important developments.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Extr.) 70.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 21st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Situation in the Shanghai District.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the twelfth report of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The eleventh report was communicated in Document A.(Extr.).67.1932.VII.

Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Minister in China.

Despatched Shanghai, 12h44, March 21st

Received Geneva, 9h00 " "

Situation Report 12, March 21st.

Embarkation 11th Division for Japan begins today.
Movement expected be completed March 22nd.

On complete departure of Division there will
still be approximately 37000 Japanese troops remaining.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Entr.) 69.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 21st, 1932.

APEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated March 19th, which he has received from the Japanese Delegation.

Geneva, March 19th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General
of the League of Nations.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that in the course of the negotiations for the cessation of hostilities which took place to-day at Shanghai, the Japanese and Chinese representatives reached a general agreement, which has just been submitted to their respective Governments.

A further meeting will be held on March 21st, at 10 a.m., at which the final decisions, on matters of detail, will be taken. It has been decided not to publish any records of the negotiations until they have been approved by the Governments.

I beg you to bring the above to the notice of the Members of the Council and of the League, and have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) S. SATO.

Japanese representative on
the Council.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Translation

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Extr.) 68.1932.VII
Geneva, March 21st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated March 20th, which he has received from the Japanese delegation.

March 20th, 1932

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that orders have been given today to the Third Naval Division, the First Destroyer Flotilla, the First Aircraft Carrier Flotilla, and the Cruiser "Oi", belonging to the Third Squadron now at Shanghai, to leave Chinese waters and return to Japan. The naval forces remaining at Shanghai will be only very slightly in excess of those which were there before the present incidents.

Requesting you to communicate the foregoing to the Members of the Council and of the League,

I have the honour, etc.,

(Sgd) S. SATO.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of the
League.

A.(Extr.)67. 1932.VII.

Geneva, March 19th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Situation in the Shanghai District.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the eleventh report of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The tenth report was communicated in Document A.(Extr.) 65.1932.VII.

Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Minister
in China.

March 19th, 1932.

Despatched Shanghai, 13h05.
Received Geneva, 9h00 a.m.

Situation report No.11.

March 19th.

Embarkation one Japanese mixed Brigade for Japan
continues.

Commander 19th route army protests to neutral
observers against continued flights Japanese aircraft
beyond Shirakawa patrol zone. Reports from Chinese
sources civilians injured owing fire from aeroplanes not
been verified.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

Communiqué à l'Assemblée,
au Conseil et aux Membres
de la Société.

A (Extr.) 66.1932.VII.

Genève, le 19 mars 1932.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS.

Communication de la Délégation japonaise.

Note du Secrétaire général.

Le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de transmettre à l'Assemblée la Communication suivante, en date du 18 mars, qu'il a reçue de la Délégation japonaise :

Monsieur le Secrétaire général ;

Me référant à la communication que j'ai eu l'honneur de faire au Comité des Dix-neuf concernant les pourparlers en vue de la cessation des hostilités à Shanghai, je m'empresse de porter à votre connaissance que le ministre du Japon à Shanghai vient de me faire savoir qu'une réunion officielle aura lieu le 19 à 10 heures du matin.

En vous priant de bien vouloir informer de ce qui précède les membres du Conseil et de la Société, je vous prie d'agréer..... etc.....

(s.) S. SATO,
Représentant du Japon au Conseil
de la Société des Nations.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

A (Extr.) 66.193 .VII.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

Geneva, March 19th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated March 18th, which he has received from the Japanese Delegation.

Sir,

With reference to the communication I had the honour to make to the Committee of Nineteen regarding the negotiations for the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, I have the honour to inform you that the Japanese Minister at Shanghai has just notified me that an official meeting will take place on the 19th at 10 a.m.

Requesting you to communicate the foregoing to the Members of the Council of the League,
I have the honour, etc.

(Sgd.) S. SATO
Japanese Representative on the Council
of the League of Nations.

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

Communiqué à l'Assemblée,
au Conseil et aux Membres
de la Société

A. (Extr.) 65.132.VII

Genève, le 18 mars 1932.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS
Situation dans la Région de Shanghai.

Note du Secrétaire général.

Le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de transmettre à l'Assemblée le dixième rapport des représentants des quatre Puissances ayant des intérêts spéciaux dans la Concession de Shanghai. Le neuvième rapport a été communiqué dans le document A. (Extr.) 63.1932.VII.

TELEGRAMME DU MINISTRE DE SA MAJESTE EN CHINE.

Remis à 13 h.30 le 18 mars

Reçu à 3 heures le 18 mars.

Rapport commun No. 10 sur la situation, 18 mars.

Aucune activité au cours des dernières vingt-quatre heures sinon que les Japonais poursuivent leurs reconnaissances aériennes au-dessus des positions chinoises. Les Japonais se proposent également d'utiliser un ballon d'observation et ont publié une déclaration disant que l'emploi de cet engin n'implique aucune action offensive.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Extr.) 65.1932. VII

Geneva, March 18th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.
Situation in the Shanghai District.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the tenth report of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The ninth report was communicated in Document A. (Extr.) 63.1932. VII.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTER IN CHINA.

D. 1.30 p.m. March 18th.

R. 9.00 a.m. March 18th.

Joint Situation Report No. 10, March 18th.

No activity during past twenty-four hours except continued Japanese air reconnaissances over Chinese positions. Japanese also propose employ observation balloon and have issued statement that its use does not imply offensive action.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

APR 7 1932

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the ~~POLITICAL SECTION~~ the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)64.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 18th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate herewith for the information of the Assembly, the following correspondence dated March 18th, 1932:

- I Letter addressed to the Representatives of China and Japan.
 - II Letter addressed to the Acting President of the Council.
 - III Reply addressed on behalf of the Acting President of the Council to the President of the Assembly.
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I.

Letter addressed to the Representatives of China and Japan.

March 18th, 1932.

At a meeting held on March 17th, the Special Committee which was set up by the Assembly at its meeting of March 11th decided, in execution of the functions entrusted to it by the Assembly, to invite the Governments of China and Japan to inform it of the measures which they have taken, or expect to take in the near future, in order to carry into effect the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and December 10th, 1931.

I am accordingly instructed by the Committee to request you to take steps to ensure that the information in question is communicated at the earliest possible moment to me for transmission to the Committee.

(Signed) Eric DRUMMOND.
Secretary General.

II.

Letter addressed to the Acting President of the Council.

March 18th, 1932.

In execution of the mandate given to him at its meeting of March 17th, the President of the Special Committee of the Assembly has instructed me to inform you that, referring to the penultimate paragraph of the Assembly's resolution of March 11th, the Committee would attach great importance to receiving at the earliest moment which the Council may find possible any reports which may reach the Council from the Commission appointed by its resolution of December 10th, 1931. In particular, the Committee desires to receive information as soon as may be possible in regard to the general situation in Manchuria. The Committee would be most grateful to you if, in your capacity as President of the Council, you would consider what steps may be taken in order to give effect so far as is possible to the wishes which it has expressed.

(Signed) Eric DRUMMOND.
Secretary-General.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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III

Reply addressed on behalf of the Acting President of the
Council to the President of the Assembly.

March 18th, 1932.

I have the honour, on behalf of the President of the Council of the League of Nations, to acknowledge receipt of the letter dated March 18th which you addressed to him through my intermediary on behalf of the Special Committee of the Assembly. The President of the Council is communicating this letter without delay to the Members of the Council and also to the Commission of Enquiry which was appointed by the Council by its resolution of December 10th, 1931.

(Signed) Eric DREHMONT.

Secretary-General.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A.(Extr.) 63.1932.VII
Geneva, March 17th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Situation in the Shanghai District.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the ninth report of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The eighth report was communicated in document A.(Extr.) 58.1932.VII.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTER IN CHINA.

D. 1.18 p.m. 17th March, 1932.

R. 9.00 a.m. 17th March, 1932.

Joint Situation Report No.2.

Quiet along both fronts. Contrary to press reports there have been no important changes troop dispositions either side. Beginning tomorrow Japanese commence re-embarkation one mixed brigade.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

APR 7 1932

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)62.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 17th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated March 17th.

MEMORANDUM.

In view of the coming recess of the Disarmament Conference and the departure from Geneva of members of the special Committee set up under the Assembly Resolution of March 11th, necessitating perhaps the adjournment of the Committee itself until April, I respectfully venture to suggest the following points for consideration.

According to the Assembly Resolution of March 11th the Committee has certain functions with regard to the execution of (a) the Assembly Resolution of March 4th and (b) the Council Resolutions of September 30th and December 10th.

1. As regards (a) its task is "to report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the said cessation and shall regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in conformity with the Assembly resolution of March 4th, 1932." At the time of the passing of the March 4th resolution it was made quite clear by the Assembly that the resolution ruled out the attaching of any conditions to the withdrawal of Japanese troops as being incompatible with the ~~Covenant and that the withdrawal must be complete. It was on these~~

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Covenant and that the withdrawal must be complete. It was on these two understandings that the Chinese Government accepted the resolution, and these two understandings were subsequently endorsed by the U.S. Government. Yet it is clear from a recent telegram that the Japanese Government are attempting to do precisely what the Assembly and U.S.A. have condemned, namely to impose political conditions as the price of Japanese withdrawal. Indeed, they are trying under cover of the Assembly's resolution to force the Chinese Government to accept a Japanese ultimatum.

It would in the circumstances appear imperative for the Committee to inform the representatives of the powers at Shanghai and the Chinese and Japanese Governments what is meant by the Assembly Resolution of March 4th.

2. As regards (b) the Committee is to follow the execution of the Council resolutions of September 30th and December 10th. The former resolution imposes the obligation on the Japanese Government to "continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, which had already begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured", and on the Chinese Government to "assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are re-established."

The December 10th resolution re-affirmed the September 30th resolution and called upon "the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution, so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution." The resolution went on to state explicitly that the appointment of the Commission of Enquiry was without prejudice to carrying out these measures. These two resolutions

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and the discussion in the Council on October 23rd (See the extracts quoted on pp. 12 - 16 of A(Extr.)1) together with the Assembly's condemnation of the idea of a settlement under military pressure, makes it clear that the withdrawal of Japanese troops is the essential preliminary to a settlement based on the Covenant.

It would appear to follow that the first task of the Committee is to implement this part of the Assembly's resolution by requesting the parties to supply information on what steps they have already taken or proposed to execute their obligations under the September 30th and December 10th resolutions, and what they are prepared to do to carry out those obligations in full. The parties might be asked to supply this information in time for the first meeting of the Committee after the Easter recess.

3. Since the danger of military pressure has been removed by securing Japanese evacuation the Committee is instructed "to endeavour to prepare the settlement of the dispute in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, and to submit a statement"

This no doubt will be a lengthy and complex task, to be carried out only in the light of the data received from the Commission of Enquiry on the spot. But it would appear appropriate and consonant with League precedents if the Committee were to give instructions to the Secretariat forthwith to prepare for its consideration a draft programme or agenda, indicating for instance the types of question with which it might expect to deal, the available sources of information, the ways in which and the issues on which League machinery, such as the Court and the technical organizations, could most appropriately be used, etc.

4. According to the 7th paragraph referring to the Committee's functions, it has to submit a first progress report to the Assembly as soon as possible and at the latest on May 1st, 1932.

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The Committee's report will, it is believed, take into account reports from the Commission of Enquiry, as well as from other committees or agents acting on behalf of the League. It may therefore be suggested that the Commission of Enquiry be instructed to make a first report on conditions in Manchuria in time for the next meeting. In view of the statement made by the President of the Council on December 10th when officially interpreting the resolution of that date, that "If the undertakings given by the two Parties according to the resolution of September 30th have not been carried out by the time of the arrival of the Commission (of Enquiry), the Commission should as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation," this first report would presumably deal with the extent to which Japan has carried out her obligations under the September 30th and December 10th Resolutions and what she is prepared to do to complete their execution.

5. My Government feels great anxiety at the present tense situation in Shanghai and Manchuria, and feels that the best check on Japanese aggressive activities is the sense of vigilant and constant League supervision. I have no doubt the President fully appreciates this aspect of the matter and intends to take appropriate measures to keep in touch with events and to have the Committee and if necessary the Assembly itself summoned at short notice should unexpected developments occur. But it would relieve my Government's anxiety to have information as to such measures, I therefore respectfully suggest that the arrangements contemplated under this head should be publicly announced as soon as possible.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
 the Council and the Members
 of the League.

A.(Extr.)61.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 17th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated March 16th.

The Japanese Delegation has already drawn attention on several occasions to the inaccuracy of certain official Chinese communications. In accordance with information obtained from the local authorities, it desires to submit the following corrections.

1. Bombardments from the air mentioned in documents A.(Extr.) 14 and 19, paragraph 1.

There has been no bombardment from the air since the cessation of hostilities was proclaimed on March 3rd.

On March 4th aeroplanes reconnoitering in the Kuangsan and Soochow area having been fired at, replied with machine gun fire.

On March 5th aeroplanes set out to reconnoitre in the Kwangtu area, but did not fire.

2. Establishment of a Japanese police administration at Chapei (document A.(Extr.) 19, paragraph 2).

There is no truth whatever in the statement that the Japanese forces intend to set up a police organisation at Chapei.

3. Burning of the Hsingtan village by Japanese troops (document A.(Extr.) 46).

Untrue.

4. Construction of an aerodrome at Liuho (documents A.(Extr.) 45 and 46).

Untrue.

5. Civilian population compelled to hoist Japanese flags and farm-houses burned wherever resistance was offered. (idem).

Untrue.

The Japanese troops have sometimes given the inhabitants papers bearing the Rising Sun to certify that no soldiers in civilian clothes were concealed in their houses. The occupants of these houses have often placed the certificates on their doors. These are probably the facts which have been misrepresented in the Chinese official reports.

6. The Japanese troops have strict orders not to cross the surveillance line indicated in the commander-in-chief's communiqué of March 8th. This line is as follows: starting from the north, Lobenkao, Fojaochen, Yowongtse, Ywaikangchen, Antingchen, Peikangchen, then towards the east; from this village up to the international Settlement along the Soochow river.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Official telegram received by the Japanese Delegation. Tokyo, March 16th. The order was given on March 14th to the 11th division, the 24th mixed brigade and certain special detachments at present in Shanghai, to return to Japan.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the POLITICAL SECTION Members
of the League.

A.(Extr.)60.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 17th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated March 16th.

March 16th, 1932.

Sir,

Referring to the communication of the Chinese delegation (document A.(Extr.)39.VII) concerning a telegram from M. T.V. Soong, Finance Minister, with regard to the Customs at Antung, I have the honour to inform you that our Consul in that town informed Mr R.M. Talbot, Customs Commissioner, of the contents of the Chinese communication, and that the latter has replied to the following effect:

1. That he has been officially informed by the Superintendent of the arrival of a Japanese Adviser;
2. That paragraph 1 of the Chinese communication is incorrect;
3. That the last part of paragraph 2 concerning the declarations of the Consul is also incorrect;
4. That he (Mr Talbot) in his telegram to Inspector-General Maze, had expressed a personal opinion and had reported current rumours, but that he had certainly not attributed to the Japanese Consul the statements which M. Soong's telegram alleged him to have made. He (Mr Talbot) had sent a telegram to M. Maze contradicting this information and asking him to rectify it.

(Signed) S. SATO.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

APR 7 1932

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

POLITICAL SECTION

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)59.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 17th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following telegram dated March 16th.

TELEGRAM FROM MESSRS. T.V.SOONG, WELLINGTON KOO AND QUO TAI-CHI.

On Monday (the 14th inst.), Mr. Quo, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, attended a tea-party given by Sir Miles Lampson, H.B.M.'s Minister, Mr. Johnson, the American Minister, Mr. Wilden, the French Minister, and Mr. Ciano, the Italian Consul-General, and met Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister. The following draft Agenda for the Armistice meeting was drawn up, subject to the approval of the Chinese and Japanese Governments:

"1. Chinese troops are to remain in their present positions, pending a later settlement.

"2. Japanese troops are to withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident, viz, January 28th. It is understood, however, that in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas.

"3. A joint Commission with neutral members is to certify to the mutual withdrawal.

"Note: It is understood that no other questions of principle will be raised.

- 2 -

"Separate Note (subject to the approval of the Chinese Government): The following understanding is agreed upon: Provided a definite agreement is reached on the basis of the above points, the Chinese side will voluntarily give an independent undertaking that Mayor Wu's letter of January 28th stands."

Yesterday Minister Shigemitsu visited Sir Miles Lampson, making the following change to paragraph 3 of the original draft:

"A joint Commission with neutral Members is to certify to the carrying out of the Agreement under paragraphs 1 and 2, and watch and observe the general conditions in the evacuated area until a later settlement".

A formal meeting was arranged for this afternoon (16th instant) to adopt the draft agenda, but is postponed upon the request of Minister Shigemitsu on the ground that no instruction has been received from Tokyo. The above information has been communicated to the Lytton Commission of Enquiry.

The Chinese Government considers the proposed amendments by the Japanese Minister as unacceptable. In the opinion of the Chinese Government the Separate Note as mentioned above should not be raised at the Armistice negotiations, because it is tantamount to a political condition for the evacuation of the Japanese forces.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.) 58 1932.VII
Geneva, March 16th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Situation in the Shanghai District.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the eighth report of the representatives of the Four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The seventh report was communicated in document A.(Extr.).56.1932.VII.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTER IN CHINA.

D. 1.31 p.m. 16th March, 1932.

R. 9.00 a.m. 16th March, 1932.

JOINT SITUATION REPORT No. 8.

No change.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Extr.) 57.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 16th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communications dated March 10th and 14th.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation.

March 10th, 1932.

1. Since the departure of the Chinese troops from Chapei the Japanese marines have co-operated with the Municipal Council of the International Settlement in repairing the roads in the extension of the Settlement. These roads have been cleared and are beginning to resume their normal aspect. The police of the Municipal Council is maintaining order in certain of the Chinese quarters by arrangement with the Japanese forces.

2. The Municipal Council has already issued more than 11,000 passes to Chinese desirous of removing their goods from this zone. The Japanese troops are helping to repair the light and gas. This work is progressing slowly, and consequently only a few Chinese have so far been able to return to their homes.

3. Access to the quarters of Chapei west of the Railway line is only allowed to holders of passes, until the shells, grenades, mines, etc., abandoned by the Chinese troops, have been removed and order has been re-established. Rumours having been circulated to the effect that the Japanese were going to set fire to this part of Chapei as a reprisal, a large number of Chinese fled with their possessions. Many cases of looting have been reported.

4. The work of removing dangerous objects from the Woosung zone is practically completed, and with the restoration of order a large number of Chinese and foreigners are returning to this district.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

March 14th, 1932.

1. The Municipal Council of the International Settlement, in agreement with the Japanese military authorities and the Chinese authorities, decided to take sanitary measures in the quarters of Chapei near the Settlement. After referring the matter to the meeting of the Consular Corps on March 10th, the first measures were taken on the 14th and are being actively pursued.

- 2 -

2. Many refugees have been evacuated from Charei with the help of the Japanese marines, who have distributed provisions to the inhabitants of this district. Since March 4th the naval authorities have organized medical rounds of inspection twice daily, and assistance is given to all sick and wounded who apply to the posts of marines. The sanitary units of the Red Cross and Catholic missions made an inspection at Charei on March 7th, but they considered it unnecessary to continue these rounds in view of the activity already displayed by the Japanese sanitary units.

March 14th, 1932.

Since the proclamation of the cessation of hostilities on March 3rd the following hostile acts have been committed against our troops by the Chinese troops:

1. On March 8th, near Liuho, the Chinese fired on a Japanese patrol.
2. On March 8th and 9th, at Hating, our sentinels were attacked by soldiers in civilian clothes.
3. On the 9th, at Nanziang, shots were fired at the general commanding the brigade; in the course of the evening our troops were twice attacked by Chinese soldiers in civilian clothes near Nanziang station.
4. On the 10th a group of officers was attacked by a detachment of Chinese soldiers armed with machine-guns, who had crossed the Soochow river at about 6 km. from Nanziang. One Japanese officer was wounded. In the afternoon of the same day shots were fired at the colonel commanding one of the first-line regiments near Nanziang station. During the night sentinels were attacked by soldiers in civilian clothes west of Nanziang station. One soldier was wounded.
5. On the 11th several shots were fired at a motor-boat between Nanziang and Hating; a patrol was also attacked on the same day south of Hating. During the night some thirty Chinese horsemen launched an attack in this neighbourhood (see previous communication).

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A.(Extr).56.1932.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

GENEVA, March 15th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

SITUATION IN THE SHANGHAI DISTRICT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the seventh report of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The sixth report was communicated in document A.(Extr)53.1932.VII.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTER IN CHINA.

D. 1.22 p.m. 15th March, 1932.

A. 9.00 a.m. 15th March 1932.

Joint Situation Report No.7

Reports regarding clashes between opposing forces becoming less frequent. Information from liaison officers on Chinese side suggests Chinese intend remain on defensive.

2. Orders for return to Japan 11th Division and 24th mixed brigade have been received Japanese army headquarters Shanghai.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Extr.) 55.1932, VII.

Geneva, March 15th, 1932

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated March 14th, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref. 4.2.

March 14th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate the following summary of telegrams received during the last few days from Nanking by the Chinese Delegation and to request that you will be good enough to communicate the same to the Assembly:

1. According to telegraphic reports from Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, since the inauguration of the puppet government in Manchuria, the trains running between Mukden and Shanhaikwan have been flying the flag of the illegal government. The Japanese authorities have been forcing the village elders of Chinohow, Hsien, Hsin-chen and Suichung (districts in the western part of Liaoning Province) to sign documents to the effect that the stationing of Japanese troops in the said localities was requested on their initiative for the protection of the people. As to the puppet government the Japanese also allege that it was formed by the will of the people.

2. According to telegraphic reports from our Legation in Tokyo, it was learned that the Japanese Cabinet decided not to accord for the present official recognition to the puppet government, but was prepared to negotiate directly with the said government on questions which relate to Japan's national policy or to the finances of Manchuria.

As to increasing the strength of permanent Japanese military effectives in Manchuria, investments and otherwise economically developing Manchuria, it was decided to leave them to be considered by the proper authorities concerned. When important matters relating thereto should come up, they would be considered by the Cabinet.

3. According to reports of the Shanghai Commissioner of Customs, nine Japanese war vessels entered the harbour on the 13th March, loaded with aeroplanes and war materials.

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.) 54. 1932.VII
Geneva, March 14th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated March 14th.

INCIDENTS AT SHANGHAI

Summary of an official telegram received on
March 14th by the Japanese Delegation.

On March 11th, about 9.30 p.m., a detachment of about 30 Chinese cavalry appeared at Loutang, 6 kilometres inside the control zone. Under cover of the darkness they attacked our posts, which succeeded in repulsing them at about 10.25 p.m.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A.(Extr.) 53.1932.VII.
Geneva, March 14th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Situation in the Shanghai District.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the sixth report of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The fifth report was communicated in document A.(Extr.)51.1932.VII.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTER IN CHINA.

D. 12.38 p.m. 14th March, 1932.

R. 9.00 a.m. 14th March, 1932.

Situation Report No. 6.

Noon March 14th. Nothing important occurred during past forty-eight hours. Headquarters recently arrived Japanese 14th division is now in line.

2. Japanese headquarters state Tokyo War Office is actively considering withdrawal portion troops now in Shanghai but no order yet been received.

3. Reports from foreign liaison officer on Chinese front indicate situation gradually becoming stabilized. Very little activity at front beyond minor clashes with Japanese cavalry patrols.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

APR 7 1932

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
~~the Council and the Members~~
of the League.

A.(Extr.)52.1932.VII.

Geneva, March 14th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated March 12th, addressed by the Chinese Representative to the President of the Assembly.

Rf./A(1).

March 12, 1932.

To the President of the Assembly.

In accordance with instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Chinese Government accepts the Resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on the 11th instant. As I anticipated in my explanation to the Assembly for my abstention, the acceptance of the Resolution has been delayed because of the time required for telegraphic communication between Geneva and Nanking, and for no other reason.

My Government is gratified that practically all the principles of importance, for which it has contended since the very inception of the Sino-Japanese dispute, have been incorporated in the Resolution of March 11th. My Government desires to refer in particular to three of these principles:

1. That the settlement of the dispute should not be sought under the stress of military coercion, which it takes to mean that the evacuation of Japanese troops must precede negotiation.
2. That it is the obligation of members of the League to submit any dispute which may arise among them to procedures for peaceful settlement, which absolves the Republic of China from all responsibility for the present terrible state of affairs in Manchuria, Shanghai and other parts of China, and
3. That it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, etc., brought about contrary to the Covenant of the League or the Pact of Paris. The word "situation" must, of course, cover the present state of things created in Manchuria through Japanese manipulation, instigation and military support, - in particular to the puppet government in Manchuria.

I shall be deeply obliged to you to bring the above to the knowledge of the Assembly.

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)51.1932.VII.
Geneva, March 14th, 1932

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Situation in the Shanghai District.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the fourth and fifth reports of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The previous report was communicated in document A.(Extr.)44.1932.VII.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTER IN CHINA.

D. 12.38 p.m. 11th March, 1932.

R. 9.00 a.m. 11th March, 1932.

Joint Situation Report No. 4.

No change.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTER IN CHINA.

D. 2.00 p.m. 12th March, 1932.

R. 9.00 a.m. 12th March, 1932.

Joint Situation Report No. 5.

Generally all quiet.

2. Japanese headquarters staff report attack 9.30 p.m. yesterday by 30 mounted Chinese on an outpost company at Lutanz. After an hour's fighting Chinese were repulsed with loss. No Japanese casualties.

3. All fighting portion 14th Division and attached units have now been disembarked.

4. Japanese continue daily air reconnaissances towards Soochow and Hangchow.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly
to the Council and the Members
of the League.

A.(Extr).50.1932.VII.
GENEVA. March 14th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Assembly the following communication dated
March 12th, which he has received from the United
States Minister at Berne, in reply to his letter
of March 11th.

March 12th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter⁽¹⁾ of March
11th, enclosing for the information of the American Government the
text of a Resolution⁽²⁾ relative to the Sino-Japanese dispute which
was adopted yesterday afternoon by the Assembly of the League of
Nations.

I am instructed by my Government to express to you
its gratification at the action taken by the Assembly of the League
of Nations. My Government is especially gratified that the nations
of the world are united on a policy not to recognise the validity
of results attained in violation of the treaties in question. This
is a distinct contribution to international law and offers a con-
structive basis for peace.

You suggest that I note particularly Part II of the
Resolution. In this the Assembly recalls several resolutions, and
cites especially its own resolution of March 4th, 1932, adopted in
agreement with the parties with a view to the definitive cessation
of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. My Govern-
ment as one of the Powers which have special interests in the
Shanghai Settlement has already authorized its representatives at
Shanghai to assist in cooperation with the representatives of other
Powers similarly situated toward the consummation of those objectives.

(Signed) HUGH R. WILSON.

March 11th, 1932.

To the Minister of the United States at Berne.

I beg to enclose herewith, for the information of your Government,
the text of a resolution relative to the Sino-Japanese dispute, which
was adopted this afternoon by the Assembly of the League of Nations.

In view of the collaboration which has on several occasions in
the course of recent events been effected between the Government of
the United States and the Governments of other Powers having special
interests in the Shanghai Settlements, perhaps you will allow me to
draw your particular attention to Part II of the Assembly resolution,
in which the Assembly addresses a request to the Powers Members of
the League of Nations which have such special interests.

(signed) ERIC DRUMMOND.

- (1) The text of the letter in question is appended.
(2) See document A.(Extr.) 48.1932.VII.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.) 49.1932.VII
Geneva, March 12th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the United States Delegation to the
General Disarmament Conference.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate for the
information of the Assembly the following communication he has just
received from the United States Delegation to the General Disarma-
ment Conference.

To the Secretary-General.

March 12, 1932.

I take pleasure in handing you a copy of a statement which
the Secretary of State made on the evening of the 11th instant
regarding the Resolution of the Assembly of the same day.

"The nations of the League at Geneva have united
in a common attitude and purpose towards the perilous
disturbances in the Far East. The action of the
Assembly expresses the purpose for peace which is found
both in the Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League
of Nations. In this expression all the nations of the
world can speak with the same voice. This action will
go far toward developing into terms of international
law the principles of order and justice which underlie
those treaties and the Government of the United States
has been glad to cooperate earnestly in this effort."

(Signed) Hugh R. WILSON.

3
LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.) 49.1932.VII
Geneva, March 12th, 1932.

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law the principles of order and justice which underlie
those treaties and the Government of the United States
has been glad to cooperate earnestly in this effort."

(Signed) Hugh R. WILSON.

VERBATIM RECORD

OF THE

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

FRIDAY, MARCH 11TH, 1932, AT 6 P.M.

CONTENTS :

15. ADOPTION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED
BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

President : M. HYMANS

15. — ADOPTION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE GENERAL COM-
MISSION.

The President :

Translation : I will read the following draft resolution,¹ adopted by the General Commission of the Assembly and put it to the vote. The vote will be taken by roll-call.

" I.

" The Assembly,
" Considering that the provisions of the Covenant are entirely applicable to the present dispute, more particularly as regards :

" (1) The principle of a scrupulous respect for treaties ;

" (2) The undertaking entered into by Members of the League of Nations to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the Members of the League ;

" (3) Their obligation to submit any dispute which may arise between them to procedures for peaceful settlement ;

" Adopting the principles laid down by the acting President of the Council, M. Briand, in his declaration of December 10th, 1931 ;

¹ Document A. (Extr.)/C. G.I. (1).

" Recalling the fact that twelve Members of the Council again invoked those principles in their appeal to the Japanese Government on February 16th, 1932, when they declared ' that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought about in disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by Members of the League of Nations ' ;

" Considering that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between Members of the League above referred to are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris, which is one of the cornerstones of the peace organisation of the world and under Article 2 of which ' the High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature and whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means ' ;

" Pending the steps which it may ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute which has been referred to it ;

" Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.

" II.

" The Assembly,

" Affirming that it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be sought under the stress of military pressure on the part of either Party :

— 2 —

"Recalls the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and on December 10th, 1931, in agreement with the Parties ;

"Recalls also its own resolution of March 4th, 1932, adopted in agreement with the Parties, with a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces ; notes that the Powers Members of the League of Nations having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements are prepared to give every assistance to this end, and requests those Powers, if necessary, to co-operate in maintaining order in the evacuated zone.

III.

"The Assembly,

"In view of the request formulated on January 29th by the Chinese Government invoking the application to the dispute of the procedure provided for in Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations ;

"In view of the request formulated on February 12th by the Chinese Government that the dispute should be referred to the Assembly in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 9, of the Covenant and in view of the Council's decision of February 19th ;

"Considering that the whole of the dispute which forms the subject of the Chinese Government's request is referred to it and that it is under an obligation to apply the procedure of conciliation provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant and, if necessary, the procedure in regard to recommendations provided for in paragraph 4 of the same article ;

"Decides to set up a Committee of nineteen members — namely, the President of the Assembly, who will act as Chairman of the Committee, the Members of the Council other than the Parties to the dispute and six other Members to be elected by secret ballot.

"This Committee, exercising its functions on behalf of and under the supervision of the Assembly, shall be instructed ;

"(1) To report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the said cessation and shall regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in conformity with the Assembly resolution of March 4th, 1932 ;

"(2) To follow the execution of the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and December 10th, 1931 ;

"(3) To endeavour to prepare the settlement of the dispute in agreement with the Parties, in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, and to submit a statement to the Assembly ;

"(4) To propose, if necessary, that the Assembly submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice a request for an advisory opinion ;

"(5) To prepare, if need be, the draft of the report provided for in Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant ;

"(6) To propose any urgent measure which may appear necessary ;

"(7) To submit a first progress report to the Assembly as soon as possible and at latest on May 1st, 1932.

"The Assembly requests the Council to communicate to the Committee, together with any observations it may have to make, any documentation that it may think fit to transmit to the Assembly.

"The Assembly shall remain in session and its President may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary."

The following States voted in favour of the motion :

Albania	Greece	Persia
Australia	Guatemala	Peru
Austria	Hungary	Poland
Belgium	India	Portugal
Bulgaria	Irish Free State	Roumania
Canada	Italy	Salvador
Chile	Latvia	Siam
Colombia	Lithuania	Union of
Cuba	Luxemburg	South Africa
Czechoslovakia	United States	Spain
Denmark	of Mexico	Sweden
Estonia	Netherlands	Switzerland
Finland	New Zealand	Uruguay
France	Norway	Venezuela
Germany	Panama	Yugoslavia
British Empire		

The following States abstained : China and Japan.

The President :

Translation : As regards the abstention of China and Japan, we must apply paragraph 5 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, which reads as follows :

"For the purposes of this rule, representatives who abstain from voting shall be considered as not present."

I therefore declare the resolution to be unanimously adopted.

The draft resolution was adopted.

M. Yen (China). — Mr President, ladies and gentlemen — It is with no little regret that for lack of definite instructions from my Government up to the present moment, I was not in a position to vote on this resolution which was before us. But I want to assure you that my abstention from voting is not to be taken as a sign of opposition to the resolution. In view of the distance which separates us here in Geneva from my country, and in view of the time which is required to get in touch with my Government by telegraph, I might have asked this morning for a postponement of this afternoon's session to a later date. However, as you, Mr President, said that it was desirable, both in view of public opinion and the dignity of the Assembly that we should terminate the first part of our work after ten days of frank discussions by the adoption to-day of the resolution. I was quite willing to forgo this request.

In conclusion, I have the honour to say that as soon as I receive a reply from my Government, I shall not delay to inform the Assembly of its contents.

I thank you, sir, and, through you, all the members of the Assembly, for the extremely just and sympathetic attitude which you have adopted in dealing with the tragic events which have overtaken my country.

— 3 —

The President :

Translation : We will now take the first measure in execution of the resolution which has just been unanimously adopted.

The Assembly has decided to set up a Committee of nineteen Members — namely, the President of the Assembly, who will act as Chairman of the Committee, the Members of the Council other than the Parties to the dispute and six other Members to be elected by secret ballot.

The ballot will now be taken, but I must first give you a few explanations regarding procedure.

We should, I think, apply in this case the provisions of the Rule 22 (a) of our Rules of Procedure, concerning the election of non-permanent Members of the Council. The other provisions of the Rules of Procedure which concern voting refer to the election of individuals, whereas what we have to do to-day is to elect six States. I think then that we should apply the provisions to which I have just referred. They are as follows :

"Where several seats are to be filled, the election shall be made by voting a list of names. Any ballot-paper containing more names than there are seats to be filled shall be null and void. "No Member shall be elected at the first or at the second ballot unless it has obtained at least the absolute majority of the votes. If, after two ballots, there still remain seats to be filled, a third ballot shall be held upon a list consisting of the candidates which obtained most votes at the second ballot, up to a number double that of the seats still to be filled, and those Members shall be elected which obtain the greatest number of votes.

"If two or more Members obtain the same number of votes and there is not a seat available for each, a special ballot shall be held between them ; if they again obtain an equal number of votes, the President shall decide between them by drawing lots."

Those are the provisions of the Rules of Procedure applicable to the election of non-permanent Members of the Council, and it is those provisions, I think, that we should apply for the election of States.

As regards the method of calculating the absolute majority, I would remind you of the Assembly resolution of September 15th, 1926, concerning rules dealing with the election of non-permanent Members of the Council : the number of votes cast is determined by the total number of voting papers, blank or spoilt papers not being counted. That is the general rule for the Assembly and is obviously the rule we should follow in the present case. I trust the Assembly will agree with me and share my view that this is the rule to follow.

I wish to stress the point that to be valid a voting paper must bear the names of States and not of representatives of States, and that no paper containing more than six names will be valid.

A secret ballot will now be taken by roll-call. I would ask M. Matos, delegate of Guatemala, and Mr. Lester, delegate of the Irish Free State, to be good enough to come to the platform and act as tellers.

(The votes were taken in turn by secret ballot.)

The President :

Translation : The result of the ballot is as follows :

Number of States voting	46
Voting papers valid	46
Absolute majority	24

The analysis of the voting is as follows :

	Votes
Switzerland	38
Czechoslovakia	35
Colombia	31
Portugal	26
Hungary	24
Sweden	24

The special Committee set up under the Assembly resolution of to-day's date consists then of the President of the Assembly, the twelve Members of the Council other than the Parties to the dispute, and the following six States elected by the Assembly : Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Portugal, Hungary, Sweden.

The Assembly has just completed the first stage of its duties, and has set up a Committee which will endeavour to carry out its task in the full consciousness of its responsibilities. It is a difficult task and, primarily, one of conciliation and appeasement. I earnestly appeal to the two States Parties to the dispute to help us. They are two great States, two great peoples sprung from a very ancient civilisation. An agreement between them would consolidate the East. We have but one thought : to establish peace and respect for law. That thought, which forms the basis of the League of Nations, the Assembly has just unanimously reaffirmed in its resolution. I adjure the two Governments concerned to make a real effort, in fulfilment of the hopes of the Assembly and of the world.

The Assembly will now adjourn until convened again, and early next week I shall convene a meeting of the Committee which has just been set up.

(The Assembly rose at 7 p.m.)

VERBATIM RECORD
OF THE
Special Session of the Assembly
OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

THIRD PLENARY MEETING

FRIDAY, MARCH 4TH, 1932, AT 7.45 P.M.

CONTENTS :

14. DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

President : M. HYMANS.

14. — DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

The President :

Translation : The President of the General Commission has just communicated to me a draft resolution which the General Commission now submits to the Assembly for approval. The draft resolution reads as follows :

" The Assembly,

" Recalling the suggestions made by the Council on February 29th and without prejudice to the other measures therein envisaged :

" (1) Calls upon the Governments of China and Japan to take immediately the necessary measures to ensure that the orders which, as it has been informed, have been issued by the military commanders on both sides for the cessation of hostilities, shall be made effective ;

" (2) Requests the other Powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to inform the Assembly of the manner in which the invitation set out in the previous paragraph is executed ;

" (3) Recommends that negotiations be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the Powers mentioned above, for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The Assembly will be glad to be kept

informed by the Powers mentioned above of the development of these negotiations."

M. Yen, delegate of China, will address the Assembly.

M. Yen (China). — During the discussion in the General Commission I did not speak further because I did not desire to stand in the way of other Members of the Assembly who desired to speak. At this point, however, I think it is imperative that I should make the following statement :

As I read the resolution, and as I understand the President to interpret it, the negotiations mentioned in paragraph 3 refer to armistice negotiations rather than to the so-called Shanghai Conference, which is to follow the armistice negotiations. We accept the resolution on that understanding ; and also with the understanding, which has been so splendidly emphasised by M. Motta and M. Beneš, that no condition should be imposed upon the withdrawal of troops occupying the territory of an invaded country. We consider that Members of the League cannot be expected or asked to pay a price for the enforcement of the right of being protected against foreign aggression, which is a right guaranteed to every Member of the League by the Covenant.

The President :

Translation : As no delegate wishes to speak, we will now vote, and the voting, as requested, will be by roll-call.

(A vote was taken by roll-call.)

The draft resolution was unanimously adopted.

The President :

Translation : I welcome this unanimous vote with the utmost satisfaction. It augurs well for our future proceedings.

The Assembly rose at 8 p.m.

VERBATIM RECORD
AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
MAR 23 1932
OF THE
Special Session of the Assembly
OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
SECOND PLENARY MEETING
THURSDAY, MARCH 3RD, 1932, AT 4.30 P.M.

CONTENTS :

10. PROGRAMME OF WORK : COMMUNICATION BY THE PRESIDENT ON BEHALF OF THE BUREAU.
11. CONSTITUTION OF A GENERAL COMMISSION : PROPOSAL BY THE BUREAU.
12. STATEMENT BY THE CHINESE DELEGATION.
13. STATEMENT BY THE JAPANESE DELEGATION.

President : M. HYMANS

10. — PROGRAMME OF WORK : COMMUNICATION BY THE PRESIDENT ON BEHALF OF THE BUREAU.

The President :

Translation : The Bureau of the Assembly met to examine certain preliminary questions of procedure. It decided that this afternoon the Assembly should first hear the statement of the Chinese delegation, at whose request the present extraordinary session was convened, and then the statement of the Japanese delegation.

After we have heard the representatives of the two States parties to the dispute, I shall call upon other delegates who may wish to speak, in the order in which they give in their names. But the representatives of the States parties to the dispute and the President and members of the Council may speak out of turn for the purpose of giving any explanations they think necessary.

11. — CONSTITUTION OF A GENERAL COMMISSION : PROPOSAL BY THE BUREAU.

The President :

Translation : The Bureau proposes that the Assembly should set up a General Commission on which all the States would be represented. The

whole question on the Assembly's agenda will be referred to that Commission, which will report to the Assembly. This proposal I have the honour to submit to you on behalf of the Bureau before opening the discussion. If there is no objection, I shall consider it adopted.

The proposal was adopted.

12. — STATEMENT BY THE CHINESE DELEGATION.

The President :

Translation : M. W. W. Yen, first delegate of China, will address the Assembly.

M. Yen (China). — I regret that I must begin by announcing that the negotiations at Shanghai for an armistice have broken down, as my Government reported to the League of Nations this morning.

Those negotiations, as you will perhaps recall, commenced on February 28th on the British flagship *Kent*, and resulted in certain proposals based on the principle of simultaneous and mutual evacuation. They were accepted by my Government the next day.

The Japanese Government gave no reply, but, on the contrary, landed heavy reinforcements in the International Settlement and elsewhere and launched a big offensive on March 1st. This offensive led to our troops retreating in good order to our second line of defence, partly to prevent them being encircled and pressed back on the International Settlement by the reinforced Japanese troops and partly because we believed that the basis for an armistice agreed on between the parties, with the help of Admiral Kelly, and reported to the Council by the British representative, would be accepted by the Japanese Government as it had been by us. Instead, the Japanese Government, on the evening of March 2nd, communicated to Admiral Kelly

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terms that were a flat rejection of the principle on which the agreed proposals were based. I will read these terms to you :¹

"1. Should China give assurance for withdrawal of her troops to a certain distance from Shanghai (distance to be determined by Japanese and Chinese authorities), Japan will agree to cessation of hostilities for a certain period (to be agreed upon between Japanese and Chinese authorities), and, pending subsequent arrangements, Japanese and Chinese forces shall hold their respective positions. Details relating to cessation of hostilities shall be arranged by the Japanese and Chinese military authorities.

"2. During the period of cessation of hostilities, a round table conference between Japan and China shall be held at Shanghai in which representatives of the principal Powers interested shall discuss with a view to reaching an agreement upon methods for withdrawal of both the Chinese and Japanese forces on such terms as are set out in the following paragraph, together with measures for the restoration and maintenance of peace and order in and around Shanghai and for the safeguarding of the International Settlement and the French Concession in Shanghai and foreign lives, property and interests therein.

The next paragraph is the important one :

"3. The withdrawal of troops shall be commenced by Chinese troops (including plain-clothes gunmen) to a specified distance, and, upon ascertaining the withdrawal of the Chinese forces, the Japanese forces will withdraw to the Shanghai and Woosung areas (both of which are Chinese territory).

"4. Should either of the parties infringe any of the terms of the cessation of hostilities, the other party shall have freedom of action. Both parties have the same freedom of action upon the expiration of the period agreed upon under paragraph 1."

In other words, if any alien *provocateur* should fire a shot, the armistice would immediately come to an end.

As you see, these are the terms of a conqueror to a vanquished country. My Government could do nothing but reject them, for my country will never agree to terms that are tantamount to surrender. Nor can any Member of the League, and least of all the League's supreme authority, the Assembly, condone proposals that do not provide for the withdrawal of the forces of an invader.

Permit me here to read to you another telegram which has just come to hand from the Vice-President of our Council of Ministers, dated Shanghai, March 3rd, 9 p.m. :

"Contrary to understanding reached on board *Kent*, Japanese forces instead of withdrawing from their original lines to Settlement and extra-Settlement roads have invaded Chapei and pushed forward to Chenju and beyond. This is another proof Japanese deliberate aggression although Japanese have announced intention to cease hostilities. We demand they should evacuate areas they have occupied by taking undue advantage Chinese withdrawal and withdraw to Settlement and extra-Settlement roads. Until this done we cannot enter negotiations or join any Conference in face military coercion. Advance of Japanese forces and their occupation

of area evacuated by Chinese again invites clashes between the two forces because of their proximity. — T. V. SOONG."

The Japanese delegation have circulated a statement to the effect that the Japanese forces have received orders to advance no further, and it is being explained that, as they have now achieved their objective, they will this time really cease advancing, at least for the present, and unless they consider an advance necessary in self-defence.

Unhappily, the latest news received by me reports further fighting and further Japanese advances, even beyond the limit at which we were assured the Japanese forces would stop.

Here are the telegrams :

"A portion of the garrison at the Woosung Forts has been ordered to hold out to the last minute, although the main body has been ordered to withdraw to the second line of defence. Woosung is now completely surrounded and the Japanese are fiercely bombarding it on all sides. Fate of the remaining garrison is sealed as all the guns have been put out of action. Severe fighting is in progress near Nanshiang (a city on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, about one mile west of Shanghai). Our rearguards are staging frequent counter-attacks to cover the retirement. Japanese troops are planning to press beyond the 20-kilometre line. Several Red Cross units, proceeding from the Settlement to bring in the wounded soldiers, were fired upon by Japanese troops and were forced to turn back."

Here is another telegram from Shanghai dated March 3rd :

"The Mixed Brigade placed under the orders of General Shimoto has occupied Nanshiang at 8 o'clock this morning [that is, to-day]. The 11th Division advances towards the city of Kading. Chinese forces have evacuated Chenju."

So I say that the armistice negotiations have therefore broken down, thereby nullifying the Council's proposal of February 29th based on the acceptance and carrying out of an armistice. Hostilities continue.

I therefore have the honour to request the Assembly, as its most urgent task under Article 15 of the Covenant, to endeavour to establish an armistice between the parties on the basis of the principle resulting from the discussion on the British flagship *Kent* reported by the British representative to the Council and in conformity with the provisions of the Covenant.

I come before you in the name of a great people at one of the most tragic and critical moments in its long history. China is here staking her national existence on the justice and the wisdom of some fifty-five nations represented in this unique Assembly.

Not unmindful of my own high duty and grave responsibility, I shall try to tell you in simple and direct language what China's position is and why she has appealed to the League of Nations. At the very inception of the conflict which is taking place on her territory, China put her case in the hands of the League of Nations and agreed to accept whatever measures the Council might take for a peaceful settlement with Japan. This fact is expressly emphasised by the Members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute in their appeal addressed to the Japanese Government on February 17th, 1932.

I should not be true to my own feelings and those of my countrymen if I failed at the very outset to pay a sincere tribute to the earnest

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and conscientious attention which the Members of the Council have given to this problem during the past five and a-half months. They have been untiring in their devotion to the task, and my predecessor, M. Sze, and I have at all times received the utmost consideration at their hands.

The proceedings were, in the first instance, based upon Article 11 of the Covenant. As time passed, and the situation developed through successive phases of steadily increasing gravity, China was constrained to invoke in addition Articles 10 and 15. This step, taken on January 29th, not only strengthened the hands of the Council but also led naturally and more or less inevitably to the reference to this Assembly. You will have observed that Article 15 prescribes a limit of fourteen days for such action by a party to the dispute. Since it became more and more apparent that the issues involved are so momentous and so vitally concern every party to the Covenant, and not merely those Governments represented on the Council, the necessity for bringing the maximum authority of the League of Nations to bear could not be ignored. China, therefore, on February 12th, requested that the Assembly be convened, indicating at the same time her willingness to withdraw her request, if the Council itself intended to act in that sense. For China to permit this right secured to her by the Covenant to lapse did not seem consistent either with the urgency of her own situation or with due regard for the obviously vital interest which other nations have in the maintenance of the principles underlying the whole controversy.

In presenting China's case, I shall endeavour to repress my own emotional reactions to what is actually going on in my country. This is no time for bitterness and recrimination. My purpose is to lay before you, as objectively as I can, the fundamental considerations and facts, as to which there can be no real dispute. Many pertinent details which I cannot stress in this oral statement will be found in the written statement filed by me and in the records at your disposal.

Nor can I hope here to deal adequately with the historical background which is so necessary to a proper understanding of the scope and significance of the present Japanese aggression. That, too, is described — I fear all too hastily and incompletely — in the written statement.

Let us proceed at once to the essentials. Both China and Japan have been Members of the League since it was founded, the only difference being that Japan has a permanent seat on the Council, while China has not. China was, however, elected to the Council as late as September 1931. Until the recent events, these two nations had been at peace with each other. That does not mean that there had not been differences, but the point is that when Japan, without any declaration of war or other warning, launched her attack on the night of September 18th, 1931, there was a state of profound peace between them.

Since then Japanese forces have been operating continuously on Chinese territory. Provinces comprising 200,000 square miles in area have been violently subjected to military occupation, Nanking, the capital of China, has been bombarded and the city of Shanghai, the most important seaport and commercial centre of China and of the Far East has been made the scene of armed conflict on a scale not experienced since the world-war.

On the night of September 18th, 1931, then, Japan announced that a section of the South Manchurian Railway, altogether two metres in length, had been destroyed by Chinese soldiers. Of course, it was only a disingenuous pretext. One does not on such trivial grounds suddenly move

armies with all the indications of premeditation and long preparation. Regular Japanese soldiers immediately opened rifle and artillery fire upon the Chinese soldiers at or near the city of Mukden, bombarded the arsenal and barracks, set fire to the ammunition depot, disarmed the Chinese troops in Changchun, Kwanchengtse and other places, and later took military possession of the cities of Mukden and Antung, and other places, and of the public buildings therein. All this took place smoothly and swiftly in an incredibly short space of time, manifestly pursuant to a carefully planned scheme of invasion of Chinese territory. Within forty-eight hours, Japanese troops had taken possession and were in effective control of an area as large as the British Isles.

To these acts of violence, the Chinese soldiers, acting under instructions from the Chinese Government, made no resistance and refrained from conduct which might in any way aggravate the situation. On the contrary, not oblivious of its obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Chinese Government, on September 21st last, brought the matter to the attention of the Council and requested that, in pursuance of authority given to it by Article 11 of the Covenant, the Council take immediate steps to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations; to re-establish the *status quo ante*; and to determine the amount and character of such reparations as might be found due to the Republic of China. The Chinese Government also stated that it was fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it might receive from the Council and to abide by whatever decisions the League of Nations might take on the premises.

After many days' earnest deliberation, the Council, on September 30th, unanimously adopted its first resolution.

This resolution on its face noted the specific assurances of Japan that she had no territorial designs in Manchuria; that the withdrawal of her troops within the railway zone, which had already begun, would continue as rapidly as possible, consistent with the safety of Japanese nationals; and that Japan would take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or aggravate the situation. This was all based upon written and oral statements by the Japanese representative. On September 24th, he addressed to the Council the following communication :

"The Japanese Government desires to state that it has withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the railway zone and that they are concentrated there. Outside that zone, only a few troops are, as a precautionary measure, quartered in the town of Mukden and at Kirin, and a small number of soldiers have been placed at certain points, these measures not constituting any military occupation.

"The Japanese forces are being withdrawn to the fullest extent which is at present allowed by the maintenance of the safety of Japanese nationals and the protection of the railway. The Japanese Government, which intends to withdraw its troops to the railway zone in proportion as the situation improves, feel confident that the Council will, in this matter, trust the sincerity of its attitude."

On September 29th, the President of the Council reported to the Assembly (then in session) as follows :

"I only wish to allude to several essential points: firstly, the affirmation of the Japanese

¹ See document A. (Extr.) 8.1932.VII.

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Government and by its representative that it never had or will have any intention of occupying Manchuria militarily; secondly, the fact that the Japanese Government has on several occasions insisted before the Council on its intention to withdraw as soon as possible the Japanese forces to within the railway zone gradually as the safety of its nationals and their property is effectively guaranteed; thirdly, the fact that this intention has, according to the declaration made yesterday to the Council by the Japanese representative, been, during the last two days, translated into definite action, and that outside the railway zone Japanese troops are only stationed in a few localities."

The assurances given by the Japanese Government were far from corresponding to the actions of the Japanese militarists before or following the adoption of the resolution of September 30th. On September 24th, Japanese military planes went to Chinchow and dropped four bombs; to Koupangtze, on the Peiping-Mukden line, and dropped two bombs; to Tungliao and dropped two bombs, destroying the electric-light plant. On the same day, Taonanfu, a city north-west of Changchun, was occupied by Japanese troops. On September 27th, six trainloads of Japanese soldiers arrived at Kirin. This is proof that the Japanese were not withdrawing at all.

After the adoption of the resolution, the record is as follows:

On October 8th, twelve Japanese planes circled over Chinchow and dropped thirty-six bombs. They also dropped leaflets calling upon the population to submit to Japanese rule on the threat of ruthless destruction of the city. Chinchow is about 130 miles south-west of Mukden. On October 14th, five trainloads of Japanese troops proceeded from Hsinmin towards Chinchow. On October 15th, more bombs were dropped at Chinchow. On October 17th, Japanese armoured trains arrived at Tungliao.

It is impracticable to list all these items for the period in question. Incidents of like nature were of almost hourly occurrence throughout Manchuria. The Japanese planes were especially active in reconnoitring and dropping bombs, with the evident purpose of terrorising the population and preparing the way for the extension of the occupation. Instead of withdrawing their troops to the railway areas as speedily as possible, the Council was informed by the Chinese delegate on October 20th that the Japanese army was feverishly consolidating its hold on all the principal towns of Manchuria, outside the railway zone, northward including Kirin, and Taonan, from Korea on the east to Mongolia on the west. They were trying to induce the Mongolian princes to sign away their rights and to set up an independent Government under Japanese protection. At all centres, the Japanese army was rooting out the Chinese civil authorities, who were offering no resistance, and was forcing unwilling Chinese individuals to organise puppet governments in all the main areas. The Japanese soldiers openly refused to recognise the Chinese national and local authorities in Manchuria. They seized the reserves and deposits of the larger Chinese bankers, the records of corporations and large quantities of both military and industrial supplies. They hastily extended their telegraph and power plants, cutting out the Chinese service. They seized the Chinese short-wave and other radio plant and the Chinese telegraph and telephone systems; they opened mail in the Chinese post offices, including private letters of Europeans. On October 13th, they seized the Peiping-Mukden Railway outside the Great Wall. On October 14th, they seized the

Chinese mining administration, throwing 15,000 men out of employment.

In view of these developments, which were diametrically opposed to what the resolution of September 30th enjoined, the Council met again on October 13th, one day earlier than was scheduled on account of the gravity of the situation. The outcome of its deliberations was its draft resolution of October 24th. This draft resolution reminded both the Chinese and Japanese Governments of the undertakings given to the Council by them, as contained in the resolution of September 30th, repeated the Japanese statement that Japan had no territorial designs in Manchuria, and called upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and proceed progressively to the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone. The total withdrawal was to be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council — namely, November 16th. It called upon the Chinese Government for the execution of its general pledge to assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of all Japanese subjects resident in Manchuria, and to make such arrangements for taking over the territory evacuated as would ensure the safety of the lives and property of the Japanese subjects there. The resolution also recommended that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all measures relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory, so that they might proceed smoothly and without delay; and that, as soon as the evacuation was completed, the two Governments should begin direct negotiations on questions outstanding between them, for which purpose the Council suggested that the two parties should set up a conciliatory committee or some such permanent machinery.

This draft resolution was "adopted unanimously, minus one vote", with the representatives of the British Empire, China, France, Germany, Guatemala, the Irish Free State, Italy, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Spain and Yugoslavia assenting, and Japan alone dissenting. The draft resolution of October 24th may have only a moral force because of the lack of unanimity; but, from the juridical standpoint, as expressed by M. Briand in his reply of October 29th to the Japanese note, "we still have before us . . . a valid resolution — namely, that which was unanimously adopted on September 30th, and which retains its full executive force".

Meanwhile, the Japanese army was steadily extending and consolidating its illegal occupation. The disruption of the Chinese administrative officers was followed by the setting up of puppet governments under Japanese control; Japanese advisers and controllers were installed in banks, commercial enterprises, municipal administrations and private and public institutions of every kind; the salt revenues were seized by Japanese soldiers and made over to these puppet governments, thus affecting the international loans secured thereon; Chinese-owned coal-mines were occupied and the land registers and title-deeds found in the archives of the provincial capitals were falsified or destroyed on a large scale so as to make over the land to Japanese subjects. The opening of the November Council meeting practically coincided with the taking of Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang, the northernmost of the north-eastern provinces north of the Chinese Eastern Railway and hundreds of miles from the nearest point on the South Manchuria line. This was done despite the pledges which the Japanese Government gave to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France, that Tsitsihar would not be attacked.

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In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council met again on November 16th, as scheduled in the resolution of October 24th. The resolution of December 10th, to which both China and Japan gave their concurrence, reaffirmed the resolution of September 30th, 1931, and called upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone might be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution. By virtue of the resolution of December 10th, a Commission of five members, to be assisted by one Chinese and one Japanese assessor, was appointed to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threatened to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depended. This programme in its letter as well as in its spirit provided, as M. Briand, the President, said, for action on two separate lines; first, to put an end to the immediate threat to peace; second, to facilitate the final solution of the dispute.

As to the extent to which Japan abided by the resolution just adopted, the subsequent events speak for themselves. Japanese troops were not only not progressively withdrawn; they progressively advanced. Despite the assurances given to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France that Japan would not go to Chinchow, the provisional seat of the Mukden Government, that city was nevertheless taken on January 2nd, and thus, in the words of Mr. Stimson, the American Secretary of State, "the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed." The American Government was thereupon constrained to declare that "it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto* nor does it intend to recognise any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments or agents thereof which may impair treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the "Open-Door Policy"; and that it does not intend to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan as well as the United States are parties."

To this note, the Chinese Government immediately replied that "basing its position on its sovereignty and independence and on the principles of territorial and administrative integrity, it has absolutely no intention of concluding any treaties or agreements of the categories described" in the American note.

The Council in its turn supported the Chinese and American point of view in the declaration read by the President on January 29th, 1932, in the name of all the Governments Members of the Council except the parties, that "a settlement of the difficulties between the two Governments, Members of the League, must not be sought in arrangements inconsistent with international obligations, more especially those arising out of Article 10 of the Covenant, by which they have undertaken to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of all Members of the League." The statement concluded by saying that "it would be impossible for the League to endorse a settlement secured by methods at variance with the obligations above referred to".

The Chinese Government understands this declaration to mean that the Members of the Council consider it would be a violation of Article 20, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, to recognise any arrangement which violates Article 10 of the Covenant or Article 1 of the Nine Power Treaty. Article 20, paragraph 1, reads as follows:

"1. The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof."

The crowning act in the Japanese invasion of Chinese territory was the attack and bombardment by the Japanese Army and Navy of the Chinese city of Shanghai and of Nanking, the capital of China, on the eve of the Disarmament Conference, amid circumstances of barbarity and horror too well remembered to need repetition. At Shanghai, as at Mukden, the immediate pretext was a comparatively small incident. A Japanese monk was killed in a street brawl. Regrettable, of course, but hardly a justification for sending 40 warships and 60,000 men to subdue a city of 2,000,000 inhabitants — the commercial metropolis of the Orient. This final act of aggression reinforced the idea of the Chinese Government that it was necessary, in addition to Article 11, to invoke Articles 10 and 15 of the Covenant.

By the powers vested in it under Article 15, the Council immediately authorised its Secretary-General to make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration of the problem. A Committee of Enquiry was forthwith appointed, composed of the representatives at Shanghai of some of its Members, to report on the circumstances and nature of the Japanese attack. The Committee has since made several reports, which are before you. That the situation was extremely grave may be gauged from the words of Mr. Thomas, the British representative, at the Council Meeting on February 2nd, when he said:

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel it to be impossible that the present situation in the Far East should be allowed to continue. Every day brings news of some fresh incident of the utmost gravity. Fighting over a wide area is practically continuous. Shanghai is the scene of a series of conflicts in which rifles and machine-guns, artillery and aeroplanes are taking part. War in everything but name is in progress."

He went on to state that the British and American Governments, with which the French, Italian and German Governments associated themselves, were presenting to China and Japan a formal request, to wit:

"(1) That all acts of violence and preparations for hostilities shall be brought to an end;

"(2) That, in the Shanghai area, both sides shall withdraw their troops and that, as a further protection to the International Settlement, a neutral zone shall be arranged, and,

"(3) That negotiations shall then be immediately begun to settle outstanding differences in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the Council resolution of December 9th last."

China forthwith accepted these proposals *in toto*. Japan rejected them in all their essential features.

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According to the second report of the Shanghai Committee:

"Since February 3rd, a state of open war exists, any pretence truce being abandoned. Firing continues intermittently, both in the Chapei and Woosung area, with the use of artillery and, on the side of the Japanese, by aerial bombardment. Offensive is entirely in the hands of Japanese whose declared object is to capture the Woosung forts and drive all Chinese troops considerable distance from Shanghai."

Thereupon, the Members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute were moved on February 17th, 1932:

"... to make a pressing appeal to the Government of Japan to recognise the very special responsibilities for forbearance and restraint which devolves upon it in the present conflict, in virtue of the position of Japan as a Member of the League of Nations and a Permanent Member of its Council. ... Japan has an incalculable responsibility before the public opinion of the world to be just and restrained in her relations with China. She has already acknowledged this responsibility in most solemn terms by becoming one of the signatories to the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 whereby the contracting Powers expressly agreed to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. The twelve Members of the Council appeal to Japan's high sense of honour to recognise the obligations of her special position and of the confidence which the nations have placed in her as a partner in the organisation and maintenance of peace."

Japan answered this earnest appeal on the part of the twelve Members of the Council with an ultimatum to the Chinese authorities, which was delivered on the very next day at 9 p.m. (February 18th), demanding the complete evacuation of Chinese troops by 7 a.m., February 20th, from their first lines, and the complete evacuation by 5 p.m. the same day to a depth of twenty kilometres beyond the boundaries of the International Settlement; the permanent dismantling of the Woosung forts and all the other fortifications and military works in the evacuated areas; failing which the Japanese commander would take the necessary action.

On the eve of the battle, February 19th, the Council met to consider the Japanese ultimatum and made a last-minute appeal to the Japanese Government in the following stirring words of M. Paul-Boncour, the President:

"You (the Japanese representative) have told us that as soon as the Japanese have, by the operations now impending, ensured the security of their nationals, there will be no question of their remaining on the ground won by their troops. That being so, I ask, and with a sincerity and emotion which you will certainly find in my words, whether there is not an appalling inconsistency between your freedom from territorial interests and the fact that a battle is about to be joined and that the field will be strewn with dead, whereas, whatever the outcome, it follows from your quite unambiguous statement, that the Japanese will evacuate the field as soon as they have achieved their object."

"You pointed out, briefly, but perfectly clearly, the method by which hostilities could

be prevented. You said that as soon as the fighting was over, neutral forces could easily guarantee order in the neutral zones between the two parties, thus assuring the safety of both."

"In these circumstances I wonder whether, in order to avert the impending struggle, it would not be possible to agree at once upon a solution which would be put into effect later."

"If you could prevent the ultimatum expiring within a few hours, what an example you would have given, what a service you would have rendered to the League! In the simplest possible words, I beg you to do so with a conviction which you certainly cannot fail to realise."

This appeal also fell on deaf ears. In the words of the third report of the Shanghai Committee:

"During the night, February 19th-20th, Japanese reinforcements were moved from their base in the International Settlement to the Japanese lines, and after preliminary aerial reconnaissance which satisfied Japanese that Chinese had not evacuated their lines in conformity with demand, Japanese opened attack February 20th at 7.30 a.m. in the Kiangwan and Woosung areas. Hostilities continued whole day."

This was the situation in Shanghai up to February 20th. The war continued with increasing severity, and the havoc which the Japanese Army and Navy has wrought to the Chinese towns and villages in its path surpasses description. In these conditions, China in defence of her people and her territory has been compelled to adopt measures of resistance. The fight which our soldiers have put up, and the courage and bravery with which they have set out to meet invaders with vastly superior armaments must command our admiration. Failing to break through the Chinese lines, the Japanese called for reinforcements which, when they arrived, put the total of Japanese forces to somewhere around one hundred thousand strong in Shanghai alone. In this connection, I cannot help mentioning the fact that, notwithstanding the vigorous protests of the neutral Powers, since January 28th the Japanese have continuously made use of the International Settlement as a base for the landing of troops and operations against the Chinese forces, thereby placing our troops in an extremely disadvantageous position, for we cannot very well attack the invaders without at the same time endangering to a certain extent the safety of the Settlement. I cannot but solemnly declare therefore that, should the safety of the Settlement be affected, the Chinese Government cannot be held responsible.

In Manchuria also, the developments of the past few days cannot fail to instil the gravest apprehension. The Japanese have now penetrated as far northward as Harbin, where the interests of another great Power are involved, thus complicating an already delicate situation. The independence movement, or what M. Sato, the representative of Japan on the Council, described as the "Manchuria for the Manchus" movement, has made itself felt in the proclamation of a Republic which, as the Japanese representative said, has the support of the Japanese Government. This again is contrary to the oft-repeated territorial disinterestedness of the Japanese Government: and to the assurances given by it to our Minister in Tokio last October that the Japanese Government had strictly forbidden Japanese nationals to lead, encourage or participate in any plan for an independent Government movement on the part of the Chinese. The Chinese Government was obliged to declare on February 22nd that:

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"Any usurpation or interference with the administration therein constitutes direct impairment of China's territorial and administrative integrity... that it will not recognise the secession or independence of the Three Eastern Provinces or any part thereof or any administration which may be organised therein without its authority and consent."

The foregoing recital of events is founded upon the official records in the proceedings before the Council. Whatever may be said of some of the minor details, the fundamental features of the situation are incontrovertible. Let me recapitulate:

1. The defiance of the Council by Japan is plain. That the resolutions of September 30th and December 10th joined in by the Japanese Government have been absolutely nullified by Japan's military forces appears with axiomatic certainty.

2. Nor is there any room for doubt that the Covenant has been violated. If the forcible seizure of 200,000 square miles of territory and the despatch of an army of 100,000 men to Shanghai do not constitute external aggression, where are the limits to action which can be called non-aggressive under the Covenant? Why did the twelve Members of the Council in their appeal to Japan bring to her particular attention Article 10, if they did not consider that it applied?

Let me read to you Article 10.

"The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

Does the undertaking to submit all disputes to arbitration or judicial settlement, as provided in the Covenant, have any meaning? Paragraph 1 of Article 12 reads:

"The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council."

In the very early days of the controversy before the Council, China placed upon the records of the League a written offer to settle all her disputes with Japan by arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with the terms of the Covenant. When the question was again raised orally by me at the Council meeting of January 29th, my Japanese colleague replied as follows:

"He (the Chinese delegate) has stated that Japan has never submitted the present dispute between her and China to arbitration or pacific settlement according to the obligation defined in Article 12. That is quite correct. But it is common knowledge that Japan is not prepared to accept arbitration with everyone."

Here is a direct defiance of the Covenant by a formal refusal to arbitrate.

In the appeal of the twelve Members of the Council it was said:

"They (the twelve Members) cannot but regret, however, that she (Japan) has not found it possible to make full use of the methods of peaceful settlement provided in the Covenant and recall once again the solemn undertaking of the Pact of Paris that the solution of international disputes shall never be sought by other than peaceful means. They cannot but recognise that, from the beginning of the conflict which is taking place in her territory, China has put her case in the hands of the League and agreed to accept its proposals for a peaceful settlement."

3. That Japan by refusing to arbitrate, and by resorting to war, has violated the Pact of Paris goes without saying. The Pact says:

"Article I. — The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."

"Article II. — The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

4. The violation of the Nine Power Treaty cannot be a matter of indifference to the League, which in the Preamble to its Covenant has bound its Members to "a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations" in their dealings with one another. I venture to remind you of the provisions of that treaty, which Japan signed. Article 1 of the Nine Power Treaty provides that the contracting parties other than China agreed:

"(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

"(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

"(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

"(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

The American Secretary of State, in his letter to Senator Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, dated February 25th, said:

"...It must be remembered also that this treaty was one of several treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference by the various Powers concerned, all of which were interrelated and interdependent. No one of these treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety."

"The Washington Conference was essentially a Disarmament Conference aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the world, not only through

the cessation of competition in naval armaments, but also by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the world, particularly in the Far East. These problems were all interrelated. The willingness of the American Government to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its position at Guam and in the Philippines without further fortification was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine Power Treaty, which assured the nations of the world not only of equal opportunity for their Eastern trade but also against the military aggrandisement of any other Power at the expense of China. One cannot discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating those provisions of the Nine Power Treaty without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent."

This, in brief, is my country's case before the Assembly. At this very moment of our deliberations, a Chinese territory as large as France and Germany combined is under the iron heel of the invader. Nanking, the capital of my country, has been bombarded for no reason whatsoever. Shanghai, the metropolis of the Far East, has been under the incessant shower of the enemy's bombs and shells. Places where stood busy thoroughfares and magnificent buildings have been demolished by the Japanese artillery and aerial raids, and reduced to a heap of ruins. Villages and towns have been subjected to the most violent bombings from the air, as witness the latest Japanese expeditions to Soochow and Hangchow upon which tons of explosives were dropped, taking a toll of over seven thousand civilian lives, which cannot but shock the conscience of the civilised world. In truth, the Japanese have been making an undeclared war against China, exploiting all the advantages of war without assuming any of its obligations.

I am coming to the end of my discourse. Where do we stand? We should be closing our eyes to the realities if we did not frankly admit that until now collective mediation has failed. The Council has pleaded in vain for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the invading forces. It has accepted promises and seen them broken, one after another. It has appealed to Japan's sense of national honour. It has joined the United States in declaring that any situation *de facto* brought about by means contrary to the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty cannot gain legal recognition. None of these measures has had the slightest effect. Japan's attitude is precisely as intransigent as it was in the beginning. Her official declaration, delivered only a few days ago in reply to the appeal of the twelve Members of the Council, embodies a flat refusal to brook any interference on their part. She there announced that she was under no legal promise to do what the Council asked; and that morally she believed she was "naturally and necessarily in a far better position to appreciate the facts than any distant Power can possibly be."

Let us look at the other side of the shield. China places herself unreservedly in the hands of the League; Japan refuses. China offers to adopt any method of peaceful adjustment, including arbitration and judicial settlement, which the League may suggest; Japan refuses. China offers to take full responsibility for the protection of Japanese subjects and interests in Manchuria, with international assistance, after the withdrawal of Japanese troops; Japan refuses to withdraw the troops. Four Members of the League acting in co-operation with the United States Government

proposed a series of measures looking to cessation of hostilities, and the settlement by negotiation of outstanding differences in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and of the Council's resolution of December 10th last; China accepted the proposals *in toto*; Japan rejected them in all their essential features. The neutral Committee of Enquiry set up by your Secretary-General at Shanghai has reported "that a state of war exists and that the offensive is entirely in the hands of the Japanese."

Again, where do we stand:

1. We urge this Extraordinary Assembly which is now seized of the whole dispute between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan to explore and exhaust the possibilities of effecting a settlement in conformity with the provisions of our Covenant.

2. China asks you to do everything in your power, first to bring about the cessation of all hostile action on her territory and the withdrawal of the invading forces; and second, the peaceful settlement of the entire Sino-Japanese controversy within the scope of the Council's resolutions and the spirit of the Covenant. Naturally, no measure, taken in relation either to Shanghai or to Manchuria, which encroaches upon China's sovereignty rights or is contrary to the general principles of international law or her existing treaty obligations to third parties, can be regarded as a settlement.

3. We ask you to recognise that the Covenant has been broken.

4. We ask you solemnly to declare that for the present terrible state of affairs, which prevails in Manchuria, Shanghai and other parts of China, my country bears no shadow of responsibility. When the Assembly has made this declaration, it will have begun to mobilise those moral forces by which, we still believe, this conflict may be solved and ended.

As a victim of unjustified and unprovoked invasion, and even in this very hour of battle, I say to you that we cherish no natural animosity against the Japanese people; we should indeed work for our common welfare and for the happiness of all mankind. It is for this reason that we ask for peace with justice which our Covenant prescribes.

13. — STATEMENT BY THE JAPANESE DELEGATION.

The President:

Translation: M. Tsunéo Matsudaira, first delegate of Japan, will address the Assembly.

M. Matsudaira (Japan). — Before starting my speech, may I be allowed to announce to the Assembly the contents of the telegrams I have received this morning from Shanghai. General Shirakawa, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in the Shanghai area, published a declaration to-day at 2 p.m. (Shanghai time), to the effect that the Japanese troops had been ordered to halt for the present at the position they were actually occupying and to cease all fighting, provided the Chinese took no further hostile action.

Admiral Nomura, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Fleet in the Shanghai area, also made a similar declaration of the cessation of hostilities.

1. As a Member of the League of Nations and its Council, Japan participates in this Extraordinary Session of the Assembly with sincere regret, since it has been convened on account of her trouble with a fellow Member of this organisation. This meeting is uncalled for in our opinion, because the question that has brought us together here has arisen from the fact that

Japan was compelled by the exigencies of the situation in Shanghai to take measures of self-defence against an impending and appalling danger to her nationals and to the International Settlement, a portion of which it is Japan's duty to defend. The moment, therefore, a sure means could be devised for the removal of the danger, the affair will of itself come to an end. I am, however, as a representative of Japan, glad, in a sense, to have this opportunity of laying before you, and through you before the world, the facts of the case and the position of Japan regarding it, so that the affair may be correctly understood by all.

2. While reserving our right to make on other occasions our remarks on some of the accusations against Japan mentioned in the Chinese delegate's speech, I may now be permitted to make a statement regarding the Shanghai incident, as to its origin, its development, its present situation and the attitude of my Government regarding the matter.

3. Since the revolution in China in 1911, the movement of nationalism in that country, often styled the "restoration of national rights" movement, has become signally intensified. It aimed at the termination of treaties considered prejudicial to the interests and the prestige of China, such as treaties of extraterritoriality and of Customs tariffs, and at the restoration of the leases and concessions held by foreign Powers. The movement is in its conception quite just and natural, and has found many supporters amongst the Japanese, and no doubt also amongst the nationals of other Powers. To attain this purpose, it was necessary for China to concentrate her energy on the improvement of her political and social conditions, on the perfection of her juridical and judicial systems, and on the adequate assurance of safety and justice to foreign residents within her territory. In point of fact, however, that was not the case. She adopted, or could not but adopt, the subversive policy of unilateral repudiation of her external obligations, without accomplishing such necessary preparations.

In 1921, at the Washington Conference, the late Lord Balfour said that China was not "a fully organised and stable State". Unfortunately, she has not yet succeeded in organising and stabilising her country. For many years, the Powers interested have had the right on a contractual basis to station garrisons to guard railways and other interests in Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanghaiwan. Especially in Tientsin through an agreement reached soon after the Boxer trouble in 1900, Chinese soldiers are not allowed to come any nearer than 20 Chinese li (about 6 $\frac{1}{3}$ miles) to where foreign garrisons are stationed. In Shanghai, land forces or marines of Great Britain, the United States, France and Italy, are stationed now to the strength of something like 18,000 all told. They are there not on any treaty basis, but on account of the necessity arising from the actual situation prevailing in the area. It is again from the point of view of actual necessity that warships of various countries are on the Yangtse River. It is a condition seldom found in any other country, and, in fact, those military and naval forces had on various occasions been obliged to fight the Chinese in their attempt to safeguard the interests of their respective nationals.

In recent years, there have appeared in China many military dictators who constantly vied with one another for political supremacy with the object of ministering to their own greed for power and wealth. The ideal of nationalism has not been pursued in its true and genuine aspect. Governments have been built and destroyed by contending

warlords in a rapid succession, and China has come to find herself in a chronic state of civil war.

In course of time, nationalism has come to take the shape of "anti-foreignism". By taking a wanton attitude of opposition towards foreigners, it was expected to cause popular feelings to run high to the benefit of those who aspired to political ascendancy. The victims of the cult have been numerous, including men and women of all nationalities. Of recent years, their anti-foreign activities have been directed more towards the Japanese. Treaty rights have been violated, anti-Japanese boycotts have been organised, violence has been perpetrated, and insidious propaganda has been carried on. That passages inculcating hatred of Japan and the Japanese should be freely inserted in text-books for the rising generation has shocked all right-thinking men because of its far-reaching effects.

We of Japan, for our part, are in sincere sympathy with the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese people to achieve national reconstruction and pacification, and fully appreciate the difficulties attendant upon that tremendous task. It is the natural mental attitude of a friendly neighbour. The Japanese Government and people, more than anyone else, have wished for and awaited, exercising forbearance and patience, the advent of a stable government in China, and the general establishment of good order in that country. It is greatly to be regretted that our attitude of moderation has been requited by the unbridled play of arrogance and contempt on the part of the Chinese people.

The activities of the anti-Japanese movement in the Yangtse River region, in which Shanghai is situated, have been quite pronounced for many years past. Boycott is only one of the various manifestations of the Chinese "anti-foreignism". The boycott in China is quite unique in its character. It has often been contended that it is impossible to stop people from not purchasing things which they do not like. That is not the case with Chinese boycotting. Private boycott organisations are formed with the connivance, or even with the assistance, of the Kuomintang Party, which is closely identified with the Chinese Government itself, and those organisations will, to attain their object, illegally and inhumanly coerce and punish their nationals who would not follow their orders.

That is exactly what has happened in Shanghai, as well as in other places, on an alarmingly large scale in the course of the past few months. The means of duress used have been the imposition of fines, forfeiture of goods, incarceration in cages on the public thoroughfare, perambulation through the town dressed in humiliating clothes, and what not. Under threat and intimidation, Chinese employees of Japanese firms have been obliged to resign, and the handling of Japanese cargoes has been forbidden to Chinese coolies. Chinese financial organisations have ceased business with Japanese merchants; lighters loaded with Japanese cargoes have been seized and plundered — all with a view to crippling Japanese business, and to mortifying the Japanese residents. They do not scruple in the least about disregarding the dictates of humanity: schoolchildren have been stoned, women have been molested, and, on occasion, peaceful Japanese residents have been denied their daily necessities such as charcoal, rice, milk and other foodstuffs, on account of the refusal by Chinese merchants to sell such goods.

In an atmosphere of extreme tension among the Japanese residents in Shanghai, because of such affronts, attacks and atrocities on the part of the Chinese, on January 9th last, a Chinese newspaper published an article which was a flagrant insult to the honour of our Sovereign. It exceedingly

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infuriated the Japanese people, whose loyalty to the imperial throne is well known. Shortly afterwards, on the 18th of the same month, a party of Japanese Buddhist priests and their companions, five persons in all, were attacked by a band of Chinese in a suburb of Shanghai. One of them was killed and two were severely wounded. The shock of these events naturally inflamed the long pent-up indignation of the Japanese residents and filled their minds with an intense sense of fear and excitement. The tension of the atmosphere became appalling.

Noting the situation, the Japanese Consul-General sent to the Chinese Mayor of Greater Shanghai, on January 21st, certain demands with a view to a local solution of the Buddhist priest question. A week later, on January 28th, the Mayor returned a reply acceding to the demands of the Consul-General.

In the meantime, Chinese soldiers belonging to the 19th Army who were being concentrated in the vicinity of Shanghai had been making hostile preparations against the Japanese entirely regard, less of the Mayor's acceptance of our terms. Further, Chinese plain-clothes soldiery and various lawless elements came secretly into the International Settlement. It has become in recent years the common tactics in China to use such disguised soldiers in civil warfare by way of ruse, very often to inflict a surprise attack upon the enemy. In the present incident at Shanghai, plain-clothes soldiers, entirely indistinguishable in appearance from ordinary citizens but carrying weapons concealed on their persons, wantonly attacked Japanese civilians and forces. On several occasions, they threw bombs at Japanese buildings. Such acts of terrorism on their part added tremendously to the gravity of the situation. Alarming rumours came into circulation, and not only the Japanese but all the foreign population in Shanghai were plunged into a state of panic.

Even after the acceptance by the Chinese Mayor of the demand of the Japanese Consul-General with regard to the attack upon the Buddhist priests, this situation did not improve but appeared to be going from bad to worse. On February 28th, therefore, an hour after the Mayor's reply, the authorities of the International Settlement proclaimed a state of emergency, and the armed forces of the various Powers in Shanghai were ordered out to duty in accordance with a plan that had been previously agreed upon by the International Defence Committee. The section assigned for the Japanese forces to guard was a part of the district of Hongkew, projecting into the Chinese area like a promontory, where the jurisdiction was partly Chinese and partly international in a very complicated manner. In that district there run one or two roads, the property of the International Settlement and regarded as its extension, and, even in ordinary times, Settlement police and Chinese police were in constant danger of coming to loggerheads. Along these extension roads and in their vicinity, there reside about 10,000 Japanese nationals, one-third of the total Japanese population in the Shanghai area, which numbers about 30,000. The western boundary of the Japanese defence line lies outside these roads along the railway line, which is in the Chinese district. Such being the circumstances, our marines detailed from our warships had to cross the Chinese district in order to proceed to their posts to the west of the road. A previous notice of the movements of our marines was, therefore, given by the Japanese Commander to the Chinese authorities with a view to avoiding a possible clash between Chinese and Japanese soldiers. In disregard, however, of this notice, Chinese soldiers fired at our marines when they were actually going to take up their assigned

posts. The fire had to be returned and the clash occurred.

From these facts, it will be quite clear that it was entirely contrary to every intention of ours that a collision should have come to pass, and it is to be specially noted that it occurred from a cause entirely independent of the incident of the Buddhist priests, which had been closed by the Mayor's acceptance of our demands.

4. Upon receipt of the news of this collision, the British and American Consuls-General offered their good offices, and the Japanese authorities being anxious to effect a cessation of hostilities, an agreement for a truce was reached between the Japanese and Chinese forces on January 29th. But, before daybreak on the 30th, the Chinese soldiers started firing with field-guns in violation of the truce agreement. In order to avoid aggravating the situation, the Japanese forces temporarily retired to the rear and requested the British and American Consuls-General to admonish the Chinese authorities. But the Chinese firing did not cease, some of the shells falling within the Settlement itself.

On January 31st, it was agreed between the opposing forces that they should cease from all hostile actions during the progress of negotiations for the establishment of a neutral zone; but again the Chinese, breaking their pledge, resumed the offensive, in a manner far more vehement than on the previous day. Moreover, the concentration of Chinese troops in the vicinity of Shanghai continued. An armoured train had been taken into the North Station of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, and it was apparent that the Chinese were making preparations for an aggressive assault upon the Japanese. The main strength of the Chinese forces was the 19th Army. It had come from Canton and its nucleus, the 61st Division, was responsible for the "Nanking incident" of 1927, when the Japanese, British and American Consulates were attacked and plundered without the slightest provocation, and foreigners, including women and children, were killed or maltreated. The danger to which the Japanese residents and forces was thus exposed was so great and imminent that we decided to return fire on February 2nd last. In such circumstances, the Japanese residents became excited and terrified and the alarming atmosphere in the International Settlement became increasingly intensified.

Our marines sent to the sector assigned for Japanese protection were not regular marines, but were only detailed sailors from our men-of-war, not properly trained for land warfare, and their number at that time was less than 3,000, though later increased to about 4,000; while the Chinese forces of the 19th Army were estimated to be 30,000 soldiers, outnumbering our forces by ten to one, and were equipped with field-guns, trench-mortars and armoured trains. Our marines were placed, therefore, in a very difficult position. To cope with the situation, they had no adequate means but to resort to bombing from the air. They did so, however, under strict instructions to limit their action to firing upon military objectives, such as bodies of soldiers, artillery and armoured trains. It is a matter for regret that, through inefficiency of mechanism and mistakes in recognising the objects of attack, unnecessary losses to civilian lives and property resulted on a few occasions. But had not the Chinese forces brought heavy and powerful weapons of war into the urban district, such calamities would never have happened.

Early in February, there occurred an episode in Nanking. On the 1st of that month, three shots were fired from the Chinese fort of Shihtzutai near that city, and Chinese soldiers sniped at a Japanese hulk to which was moored a Japanese

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steamer where the Japanese Consul and the entire Japanese colony had taken refuge.

Two Japanese cruisers anchored nearby fired ten shots in about 15 minutes to stop the Chinese attack, taking special care that their shells should not fall in the city. The matter was immediately made the subject of negotiation between the Japanese Consul and the Nanking Government and was soon settled by the 6th in a most amicable manner, the Chinese consenting to pay due reparations.

As the days went by, in Shanghai, our marines, attempting to hold their position against formidable odds in the performance of their duty of protecting the Japanese residents along the extension roads, became exhausted and, there being naturally a limit to the number of naval units that could be landed, it was considered necessary that we should send land forces from Japan by way of reinforcement. On February 7th, the Japanese Government gave out a statement to the effect that it had been decided that an expeditionary force would be sent to Shanghai with the object of discharging its duty of "safeguarding a large number of Japanese nationals and Japanese property worth many hundreds of millions of yen involved in the affair", and that such forces would be "limited to a strength absolutely required for the above purposes". It was further declared in the statement that the Japanese Government cherished "no political ambitions in the region of Shanghai nor any thought of encroaching there upon rights and interests of any other Powers".

When the first contingent of our expeditionary forces arrived at the scene of conflict in the middle of February, an attempt to bring about a cessation of hostilities was made by the Japanese Government. It was proposed to the Chinese forces that the Japanese would stop fighting if the Chinese forces would retire to a distance beyond the range of the Chinese guns, so that the imminent danger to the Japanese residents could be removed. Through the good offices of the British Minister in China, an interchange of views for the purpose of such an arrangement took place between the Japanese and Chinese authorities. It fell through, however, and the Chinese offensive became daily more active.

On account of the geographical and topographical conditions around Shanghai, the Japanese forces experienced hardships in their operations. Fighting continued and they were gaining ground slowly. In the meantime, the Chinese circulated propaganda to the effect that they were victorious, gave out false reports intended to injure the honour and prestige of the Japanese forces, and thus were trying to inflame their people in their warlike sentiments.

In the latter part of February, Admiral Kelly, the commanding officer of the British naval contingent, offered his good offices to the Japanese and Chinese forces with a view to the cessation of hostilities. The Japanese forces, in consonance with the policy of the Japanese Government to cause hostilities to cease at the earliest moment with an assurance regarding the removal of the danger to Japanese nationals, readily acceded to his proposal. On the 28th, an informal meeting of the Japanese and Chinese authorities for the purpose of stopping fighting took place on the Admiral's flagship in his presence. As the result of the discussions, a tentative programme was referred to the Japanese and Chinese Governments for their approval. The first programme did not meet with their approval, but negotiations were continued.

I wish to make it clear that this meeting was a *pourparler* of a most informal nature, entirely non-committal on the part of both Governments. It was clearly understood from the beginning that

any tentative plan considered in it could not become effective without the approval of the Governments. The accusation made by the Chinese delegate in this connection is therefore by no means warranted.

In the meantime, the fighting continued and on March 2nd — namely, yesterday — it was reported that the Chinese forces, who had been fighting fiercely, began their retreat. The Japanese forces have been ordered to-day to cease hostilities provided that the Chinese will not take any hostile action against them. As I announced before I started my speech, I have received a report that a fresh meeting of the military authorities of Japan and China for the cessation of hostilities was set for to-day at 1 p.m. (Shanghai time), but that it was postponed until to-morrow morning at the request of the Chinese authorities. We sincerely hope that a definite result will be obtained at the coming meeting.

5. I wish at this Assembly to declare most clearly the attitude of the Japanese Government in the Shanghai affair. It is this:

(1) If the danger to the Japanese residents and the International Settlement, a portion of which is entrusted to the Japanese forces for protection, could be removed, the Japanese forces are prepared to cease hostilities immediately. According as the situation in the Shanghai area becomes pacified, the Japanese expeditionary land forces will be withdrawn from Chinese territory.

(2) The Japanese Government is prepared to hold a round table conference with the representatives of the Powers intimately interested in Shanghai to deliberate upon the means of safeguarding in the future the rights and interests of the Powers concerned.

(3) The Japanese Government has no intention whatever to promote any political or territorial ambition in the Shanghai region, availing itself of the present situation. We have no desire to establish a Japanese Settlement in Shanghai or, in any other way, to advance the exclusive interests of the Japanese.

Such being our guiding principles in the present incident, the proposal offered by the President of the Council of the League of Nations on February 29th with a view to the cessation of hostilities subject to local arrangement was readily accepted by the Japanese Government.

When large forces are actually facing each other in hostilities at close quarters, it is impossible to stop fighting unless the military authorities on both sides on the spot come to an agreement. It was for this reason, I understand, that the actual cessation of hostilities was left to local arrangement in the Council's plan above referred to. An earnest attempt to do so was made by the military authorities in the Shanghai area, as stated before, but, before it was successful, the Chinese troops were forced to retreat.

6. As regards the Manchurian affair, it is, in the opinion of the Japanese Government, not a matter to be discussed at this Assembly. But since our Chinese colleague has referred at length to the situation in Manchuria in his remarks, I shall quote from the speech made by M. Yoshizawa, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Diet on January 21st last, the part relating to this question. He said:

"China, being our neighbour, always stands, both economically and politically, in intimate relationship with this country. In regard to Manchuria, in particular, for historical and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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geographical reasons political considerations must become of preponderant interest. It is, of course, beyond argument that the welfare of Manchuria is of the greatest consequence to Japan. There are more than a million Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria, and we possess in that region, in connection with the leased territory, railways, mines, etc., numerous rights and interests of vital importance, secured either by treaty or by contract.

"In recent years, the Chinese authorities, ignoring the historical fact that the present development of Manchuria is entirely due to Japanese efforts, and taking advantage of our complaisance, have pursued a policy of oppression towards our countrymen and have again and again set at naught their treaty rights and interests. The protests and warnings of our Government, despatched from time to time, were of little avail. Thus the situation became politically more and more disquieting, and the menace to our position increasingly grave. The patience of our people was tried to breaking-point, when there suddenly exploded the railway bombing incident of September 18th, 1931, precipitating a collision between Japanese and Chinese soldiers, the later developments of which occurrence are well known to all.

"Manchuria holds the key to peace in the Far East. That was true before the Russo-Japanese War: it is even more true at the present time. In the past, the Japanese Government have always done everything in their power to prevent the civil commotions of China from spreading into Manchuria because we possess there important rights and interests rendering the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria a matter of absolute necessity to Japan. Thanks to these untiring efforts, Manchuria has been kept free from the constant turmoil of China proper, and has been turned into a land of peace and prosperity. But for the Chinese disregard of treaty and contractual obligations, I believe that the incident of September 18th would never have resulted in the present complications. At any rate, as we have been chiefly responsible in the past for the maintenance of peace in Manchuria, so will our responsibilities in this respect be enhanced rather than lessened in the future.

"I desire to add a word in this connection to make it clear that Japan harbours no

territorial designs in Manchuria and that she will uphold the principles of the open door and equal opportunity as well as all existing treaties relating to that territory. What Japan desires is only to secure peace and order for Manchuria, and to make that region safe both for Chinese and foreigners and open to all for economic development."

The Manchurian affair has already been taken up by the League of Nations, and, through the decision of its Council on December 10th last, a Commission of Enquiry is now on its way to the spot. We are awaiting the outcome of their labours, which will afford valuable material for the final solution of the question between Japan and China. It would be unwise to reopen discussions at this Assembly on a matter which is being fully looked after and in which no danger of rupture is in sight. Such a course would only cause confusion and would be harmful to its settlement, which we all earnestly desire.

7. The Sino-Japanese controversy is the result of cumulative unfortunate circumstances in the past, and it is our sincere hope and, I am sure, that of the League of Nations and the many friendly Powers that have shown concern about the matter, that the present difficulties will be amicably composed at an early date and the dark clouds that are now hanging over Eastern Asia will be dispelled for all time to come.

The President :

Translation : I believe that the Chinese delegation does not wish to reply during this general discussion in plenary session, but that it reserves the right to submit further observations in the Commission which we have just decided to set up. In that case, if no other delegate desires to speak during the present discussion, we might decide to refer the whole problem to the Commission and, if you approve, the Commission could be convened for to-morrow afternoon. We have heard important statements to-day and should, I think, reflect upon them, so that it would be better if the Commission were to meet in the afternoon rather than in the morning.

If there is no objection, we will refer the examination of the problem to the Commission and convene a meeting of that body for to-morrow at 3.30 p.m.

Agreed.

The Assembly rose at 8.15 p.m.

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS

AND

VERBATIM RECORD

OF THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING

THURSDAY, MARCH 3RD. 1932, AT 11 A.M.

ABYSSINIA

His Excellency Count Lagarde, Duc d'Entotto
(Minister Plenipotentiary, Diplomatic Abyssinian Representative accredited to the League of Nations, High Counsellor).

Special Delegation.

His Excellency the Badjironde Zelleka Aguedeou (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Great Britain and France).

ALBANIA

M. Lec Kurti (Resident Minister, Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations).

AUSTRALIA

Major-General the Honourable Sir Granville de Laune Ryrie, K.C.M.G., C.B., V.D.
(High Commissioner in London).

Secretary :

Major O. C. W. Fuhrman, O.B.E.

AUSTRIA

His Excellency M. Emerich Pflügl (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,

AUSTRIA (cont.)

Permanent Representative accredited to the League of Nations).

Secretary :

M. Franz Matsch (Doctor of Law, Secretary of Legation).

BELGIUM

His Excellency M. Paul Hymans (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Viscount P. Pouillet (Minister of State, Member of the Chamber of Representatives).

Count Carton de Wiart (Minister of State, Member of the Chamber of Representatives).

M. Paul E. Janson¹ (Minister of State, Member of the Chamber of Representatives).

Substitutes :

M. J. Melot (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of the Belgian League of Nations Office).

M. Bourquin (Substitute Belgian Delegate at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments).

Secretary :

M. Nicaise.

¹ During M. Hymans' stay at Geneva, M. Janson will act as substitute delegate.

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BOLIVIA

His Excellency M. Adolfe Costa du Rels
(Minister Plenipotentiary, former Minister
for Finance).

His Excellency M. Alberto Ostria-Gutierrez
(Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-
potentiary in Peru and Ecuador).

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Right Honourable Sir John Simon,
G.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., O.B.E., K.C., M.P.
(Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).

The Most Honourable the Marquess of London-
derry, K.G., M.V.O. (Secretary of State for
Air).

Secretary-General:

The Honourable Alexander Cadogan, C.M.G.

Foreign Office:

Sir Arthur Willert, K.B.E.

Mr. R. L. Craigie, C.B., C.M.G.

Sir John Thomas Pratt, K.B.E., C.M.G.

Mr. A. W. A. Leeper, C.B.E.

Mr. E. H. Carr, C.B.E.

Mr. H. Ashley Clarke.

Dominions Office:

Mr. C. R. Price.

Private Secretaries:

Sir Walford Selby, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.V.O.
(Private Secretary to Sir John Simon).

Mr. L. G. S. Reynolds (Private Secretary to
the Marquess of Londonderry).

BULGARIA

His Excellency M. Constantin Batoloff (Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
in Paris).

M. Dimitri Mikoff (Chargé d'Affaires in Swit-
zerland, Permanent Representative acce-
dited to the League of Nations).

CANADA

The Right Honourable Sir George H. Perley,
K.C.M.G., M.P. (Member of the Canadian
Government without Portfolio).

The Honourable Maurice Dupré, K.C., LL.L.,
M.P. (Member of the Canadian Government,
Solicitor-General).

Substitute:

Mr. W. A. Riddell, M.A., Ph.D. (Dominion of
Canada Advisory Officer accredited to the
League of Nations).

Technical Advisers:

Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., LL.D. (Chief of the Canadian
General Staff).

Mr. L. B. Pearson (First Secretary, Department
of External Affairs).

Secretary-General:

Mr. P. E. Renaud, Ph.D., LL.D.

CHILE

His Excellency M. Jorge Valdés-Mendeville
(Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-
potentiary in Belgium and Switzerland).

Substitute:

M. Jorge Saavedra-Aguero (Counsellor of
Embassy, Chargé d'Affaires *par interim* at
Berne).

Substitute and Secretary:

M. Enrique Gajardo (Secretary of Embassy,
Secretary of the Permanent Delegation
accredited to the League of Nations).

CHINA

His Excellency M. W. W. Yen (Envoy Extraor-
dinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at
Washington, former Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs).

His Excellency M. T. Y. Lo (Envoy Extraor-
dinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at
Copenhagen).

M. Lingoh Wang (Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid).

Principal Advisers:

His Excellency M. Liou Von Tao (Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
at Berlin).

His Excellency M. Wang Chia Chen (Former
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Secretary-General:

Doctor Hoo Chi Tsai (Director of the Perma-
nent Office of the Chinese Delegation acce-
dited to the League of Nations).

Assistant Secretaries-General:

M. William Hsieh (Chargé d'Affaires in Paris).

M. Lone Liang (Counsellor at the Legation in
Berlin).

Secretaries:

Dr. Hsia Ching Lin (First Secretary at the
Legation in London).

M. Chen Ting (First Secretary of Legation).

M. Che Ngan Lou (Second Secretary of
Legation).

M. R. Fang (Third Secretary of Legation).

Dr. K. S. Weigh (Third Secretary at the
Legation in Washington).

M. Tsou Ming Chiu (Third Secretary at the
Legation in London).

M. Twsen Ling Tsui (Third Secretary at the
Legation in Berne).

M. R. Ouang (Attaché at the Legation in
Berne).

M. H. C. Sung (Attaché of Legation).

M. Woo Kwang Han (Assistant Secretary of
Legation).

COLOMBIA

His Excellency Dr. Antonio José Restrepo
(Permanent Delegate accredited to the
League of Nations).

Dr. Eduardo Santos (Former Minister for
Foreign Affairs).

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CUBA

His Excellency M. Aristides de Agüero y
Bethancourt (Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary at Berlin and
Vienna).

His Excellency M. Guillermo de Blanck
(Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-
potentiary, Permanent Delegate accredited
to the League of Nations).

His Excellency M. Carlos de Armenteros
(Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-
potentiary at Berne).

Secretary:

M. J. de la Luz Leon (Consul at Geneva).

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

His Excellency M. Eduard Beneš (Minister
for Foreign Affairs).

Substitute:

M. Zdeněk Fierlinger (Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne,
Permanent Delegate accredited to the League
of Nations).

Private Secretary to M. Beneš:

Dr. Vladimír Kučera ("Chef du Cabinet" to
the Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Secretary-General:

M. Arnošt Heidrich (Head of the Czechoslovak
League of Nations Office at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs).

Secretary:

M. Karel Trpák (Secretary of the Legation
at Berne).

DENMARK

Dr. Peter Munch (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Dr. L. Moltesen (Former Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Member of the Chamber of Deputies).

M. Peter Christian Schou (Envoy Extraordi-
nary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Ankara).

Substitutes:

M. Alsing Emmanuel Andersen (Member of the
Chamber of Deputies, Secretary-General of
the Social-Democratic Party).

M. Jens Andreas Hansen (Member of the
Chamber of Deputies, "Rédacteur").

M. Victor Pürschel (Member of the Chamber
of Deputies, Advocate-General of the Military
Forces).

M. Jesper Simonsen (Member of the Chamber
of Deputies, Judge at the Court of Appeal).

M. William Borberg (Permanent Delegate
accredited to the League of Nations).

Secretary:

M. Frants Hvass (Secretary at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs).

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

ESTONIA

His Excellency M. Jean Tõnisson (Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Member of the Chamber of
Deputies).

General Johan L. Laidoner (former Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Estonian Army
during the War of Independence).

M. August Schmidt (Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary at Rome and
Berne, Permanent Delegate accredited to
the League of Nations).

Secretary:

M. Johannes Kodar (Secretary of the Perma-
nent Delegation accredited to the League
of Nations).

FINLAND

His Excellency Baron A. S. Yrjö-Koskinen
(Minister for Foreign Affairs).

His Excellency Dr. Rafael Erich (Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
at Stockholm, former Prime Minister).

His Excellency Dr. Rudolf Holsti (Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,
Permanent Delegate accredited to the League
of Nations, former Minister for Foreign
Affairs).

Substitutes:

M. Reinhold Swentorzetski (Member of the
Chamber of Deputies).

Dr. Ensio Hiitonen (Head of the League of
Nations Office at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs).

Secretary-General:

M. Evald Gyllenbög (Counsellor of Legation
at the Permanent Delegation accredited to
the League of Nations).

Secretary:

M. Paul Hjelt (Secretary of Legation at the
Permanent Delegation accredited to the
League of Nations).

FRANCE

His Excellency M. Paul-Boncour (Senator,
former Minister).

Substitutes:

M. René Massigli (Minister Plenipotentiary,
Head of the French League of Nations
Office).

M. Basdevant (Legal Adviser at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs).

GERMANY

Dr. Brüning (Chancellor of the Reich).

Baron von Weizsäcker (Minister Pleni-
potentiary).

Experts:

Baron von Schoen (Assistant Director at the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

M. von Kamphövener (Head of the League of
Nations Department at the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs).

M. Blankenhorn (Attaché).

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GREECE

His Excellency M. Nicolas Politis (Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Paris).

M. R. Raphaël (Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations).

Secretaries :

M. A. Contounas (Secretary of the Permanent Delegation accredited to the League of Nations).

M. P. Pipinelis (Secretary of the Permanent Delegation accredited to the League of Nations).

GUATEMALA

His Excellency M. José Matos (former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations).

HAITI

His Excellency M. Constantin Mayard (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris).

HUNGARY

His Excellency Count Albert Apponyi (former Minister).

His Excellency General Gabriel Tanczos (former Minister).

INDIA

His Highness the Aga Khan, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O.

Sir Henry Wheeler, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E. (Member of the Council of India).

IRISH FREE STATE

Mr. Sean Lester (Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations).

Mr. J. J. Hearne (Legal Adviser at the Department for Foreign Affairs).

ITALY

His Excellency M. Dino Grandi (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

His Excellency M. Vittorio Scialoja (Minister of State, Senator).

Substitutes :

His Excellency M. Massimo Pilotti (First President of the Court of Appeal).

M. Augusto Rosso (Minister Plenipotentiary, Assistant Delegate to the Council of the League of Nations).

Secretary-General :

M. Francesco Jacomoni (First Secretary of Legation).

JAPAN

His Excellency M. Tsunéo Matsudaira (Ambassador in London).

His Excellency M. Naotaké Sato (Ambassador in Brussels).

His Excellency M. Shigeru Yoshida (Ambassador in Rome).

JAPAN (cont.)

Substitutes :

His Excellency Viscount Kintomo Mushakoji (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Stockholm, Copenhagen, Helsinki and Oslo).

His Excellency M. Shichitaro Yada (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne).

His Excellency M. Setsuzo Sawada (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of the Japanese League of Nations Office).

M. Hiroshi Saito (Counsellor of Embassy).

Secretary-General :

His Excellency M. Setsuzo Sawada (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of the Japanese League of Nations Office).

Secretaries :

M. Masayuki Yokoyama (Consul-General).

M. Tamao Sakamoto (Secretary of Embassy).

M. Shun-ichi Matsumoto (Secretary of Embassy).

M. Masatoshi Akiyama (Secretary of Embassy).

M. Taro Terasaki (Consul).

M. Shin-ichi Shibusawa (Secretary of Embassy).

Viscount Seiichi Motono (Consul).

M. Yuzo Issono (Attaché).

LATVIA

His Excellency M. Jules Feldmans (Minister Plenipotentiary, Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations).

General Alexandre Kaleys (Chief of the General Staff).

LIBERIA

His Excellency Dr. Antoine Sottile (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations).

LITHUANIA

His Excellency Dr. Dovas Zaunius (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

His Excellency M. Vaclovas Sidzikauskas (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London).

LUXEMBURG

His Excellency M. Joseph Bech (Minister of State, Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Substitutes :

M. Charles Vermaire (Consul at Geneva).

M. Albert Wehrer (Doctor of Law, Governmental Adviser).

MEXICO

His Excellency Dr. Romeo Ortega (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Sweden).

Secretary :

Dr. Salvador Martinez de Alva (Director of the Mexican Office at Geneva).

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NETHERLANDS

His Excellency Jonkheer F. Beelaerts van Blokland (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

M. J. P. A. François (Head of the League of Nations Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Extraordinary Professor at the School for Higher Commercial Studies at Rotterdam).

Secretary :

Jonkheer O. Reuchlin (Attaché of Legation).

NEW ZEALAND

Sir Thomas Mason Wilford, K.C.M.G., K.C. (High Commissioner in London).

NICARAGUA

NORWAY

His Excellency M. Birger Braadland (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

M. Erik Colban (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary).

M. Rolf Andvord (Head of the League of Nations Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

Secretary :

M. Henning Sollied (Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

PANAMA

His Excellency Dr. Narciso Garay (former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister Plenipotentiary in France and Great Britain).

PARAGUAY

PERSIA

His Excellency Anouchirevan Khan Sépahbodi (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne, Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations).

PERU

His Excellency M. Ventura García Calderón (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Permanent Office accredited to the League of Nations).

POLAND

His Excellency M. Auguste Zaleski (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

His Excellency M. Jean de Modzelewski (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne).

POLAND (cont.)

Substitutes :

His Excellency M. Marjan Szumlakowski (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, "Chef du Cabinet" to the Minister for Foreign Affairs).

M. Edouard Raczyński (Head of the League of Nations Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

M. Thadée Gwiazdowski (Counsellor of Legation at the Permanent Delegation accredited to the League of Nations).

M. Titus Komarnicki (Doctor of Law, Counsellor of Legation, Secretary-General of the Delegation to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments).

Expert :

M. Ladislas Kulski (Doctor of Law, "Rapporteur" at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

PORTUGAL

His Excellency Commandant Fernando Augusto Branco (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

His Excellency Dr. Augusto de Vasconcellos (Former Prime Minister, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister Plenipotentiary, Director-General of the Portuguese League of Nations Office).

His Excellency Dr. Vasco de Quevedo (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne and accredited to the League of Nations).

Substitute :

Dr. José Lobo d'Avila Lima (Universities of Coimbra and Lisbon, Legal Adviser at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

Secretaries :

M. Arthur Tavares de Melo ("Chef du Cabinet" to M. Branco).

Dr. Joao de Mendonça (Third Secretary of Legation, Private Secretary to M. Branco).

Dr. Luiz Norton de Matos (Third Secretary of Legation).

ROUMANIA

His Excellency M. Nicolas Titulesco (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London, Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations, former Minister for Foreign Affairs).

His Excellency M. Constantin Antoniadé (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to the League of Nations).

M. I. Petrovici (University Professor, Member of the Chamber of Deputies, former Minister).

Special Delegate :

The General Samsonovici (Chief of the Central Staff of the Army).

SALVADOR

His Excellency Dr. Joaquin Paredes (Chargé d'Affaires in Paris).

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SIAM

His Serene Highness Prince Pridi Debyabongs Devakula (Major-General, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berlin).

Secretary :

Luang Bhadravadi (Attaché at the Legation in London).

SPAIN

His Excellency M. Luis de Zulueta Escolano (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

M. Salvador de Madariaga (Ambassador).

M. Luis Araguistain y Quevedo (Member of the Cortes).

Secretary-General :

M. Julio Lopez Olivan (Minister Plenipotentiary).

SWEDEN

His Excellency Baron S. G. F. T. Ramel (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

M. J. E. Löfgren (Member of the First Chamber of the Riksdag, former Minister for Foreign Affairs).

M. K. H. L. de Hammarskjöld (Member of the First Chamber of the Riksdag, former Prime Minister).

Substitutes :

M. R. J. Sandler¹ (Director-General of the Central Statistical Office, Member of the First Chamber of the Riksdag, former Prime Minister).

M. K. I. Westman (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne).

M. E. C. Boheman (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Ankara and at Sofia).

SWITZERLAND

His Excellency M. Giuseppe Motta (President of the Confederation).

M. Max Huber (former President of the Permanent Court of International Justice, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross).

M. William Rappard (Director of the Institute for Higher International Studies).

Substitute and Expert :

M. Camille Gorgé (Head of Section at the Political Department — first class).

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. C. T. te Water (High Commissioner in London).

Substitutes :

Major-General A. J. Brink, D.T.D., D.S.O. (Secretary for Defence, Chief of the General Staff).

Major F. F. Pienaar, D.T.D., O.B.E. (Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations).

¹ In the absence of Baron Ramel, M. Sandler will act as full delegate.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA (cont.)

Secretaries :

Mr. W. C. Naudé.

Miss M. F. Burnside.

URUGUAY

His Excellency M. Pedro Cosío (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Germany).

His Excellency Dr. Enrique Buero (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Belgium and the Netherlands).

His Excellency Dr. Alfredo de Castro (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Switzerland).

Substitutes :

Dr. Paulina Luisi (Delegate of the Government of Uruguay on the Advisory Commission for the Protection and Welfare of Children and Young People).

M. Oscar Deffeminis (Consul-General at Geneva).

VENEZUELA

His Excellency Dr. Diógenes Escalante (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Great Britain).

Dr. L. G. Chacín Itriago (Chargé d'Affaires at Berne).

Dr. Luis F. Calvani (Consul-General in Switzerland).

YUGOSLAVIA

His Excellency Dr. Voislav Marinkovitch (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

His Excellency Dr. Zelimir Mazuranic (Senator, former Minister).

His Excellency Dr. Ilija Choumenkovitch (Member of the Chamber of Deputies, former Minister).

Substitute :

His Excellency M. Constantin Fotitch (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

Secretary-General and Expert :

Dr. Ivan Perne (Counsellor, Head of Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

Expert :

Dr. Ivo Andritch (Chargé d'Affaires at the Permanent Delegation accredited to the League of Nations).

Secretary :

M. Slavko Raikovitch (Attaché at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

Private Secretary to M. Marinkovitch :

M. Kosta Pavlovitch (Attaché at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

FIRST PLENARY MEETING

THURSDAY, MARCH 3RD, 1932, AT 11 A.M.

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2. ELECTION OF THE COMMITTEE TO REPORT ON THE CREDENTIALS OF DELEGATES.
3. SPEECH BY M. PAUL-BONCOUR, PRESIDENT IN OFFICE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
4. CREDENTIALS OF THE DELEGATES : REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CREDENTIALS.
5. ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.
6. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.
7. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
8. FIXING OF THE NUMBER OF VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY.
9. ELECTION OF THE EIGHT VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY.

1. — OPENING OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR, delegate of France and President in Office of the Council, took the chair.

The Chairman :

Translation : Ladies and gentlemen, — In my capacity as President in Office of the Council of the League of Nations, I have the honour to declare open the Special Assembly of the League of Nations.

2. — ELECTION OF THE COMMITTEE TO REPORT ON THE CREDENTIALS OF DELEGATES.

The Chairman :

Translation : The first item on the agenda is the constitution of the Committee on Credentials.

According to the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, this Committee should be elected by secret ballot. There have, however, been frequent departures from this rule at previous sessions. Accordingly, with the permission of the Assembly, and subject to any objections it may put forward, and in accordance with established precedent, I feel I shall only be forestalling the wishes of the delegations and expediting our work in submitting a list consisting of eight names, as follows :

His Excellency M. DE AGÜERO Y BETHANCOURT (Cuba) ;

His Excellency M. SCHOU (Denmark) ;

His Excellency M. FELDMANS (Latvia) ;

His Excellency Dr. ORTEGA (Mexico) ;

The Honourable Maurice DUPRÉ (Canada) ;

M. J. P. A. FRANÇOIS (Netherlands) ;

His Highness Prince Pridi Debyabongs DEVAKULA (Siam).

As no objection to the list has been raised. I think I may conclude that the Assembly has decided that the Committee on Credentials shall consist of the delegates whose names I have just read.

The list proposed by the Chairman was adopted.

The Chairman :

Translation : In proposing to the Assembly to constitute the Committee on Credentials immediately, it was my intention to hasten the procedure and to allow the Committee to carry out the important work it has to do in the best possible conditions.

The members of the Committee on Credentials which has just been elected by the Assembly will hold themselves in readiness to meet, as soon as they are notified, in the room placed at their disposal so as to be able to submit their report at the earliest possible moment.

3. — SPEECH BY M. PAUL-BONCOUR, PRESIDENT IN OFFICE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The Chairman :

Translation : This is only the second time since its foundation that the Assembly has met in extraordinary session.

The circumstances which led to these two meetings were widely different. The first special Assembly, convened for the purpose of welcoming a great European nation which had previously remained outside the League, was full of hope ; but temporary obstacles arose — a fact that only proves how, in this great and difficult task to which we have set our hand, the path of hope itself may sometimes be beset with difficulties. Those temporary difficulties were surmounted, and for years now the nation we had been preparing to welcome has been according the Assembly and the Council its invaluable collaboration, which I better than anyone can appreciate, convinced as I am that only on an international plane and under the aegis of the Covenant can we hope to eliminate for ever conflicts which have drenched our history in blood.

To-day's Assembly was convened in painful — nay, tragic — circumstances. For months a certain quarter of the globe had been rent by a great conflict between two nations which are Members of the League and of the Council ; and, long as is the list of conflicts which the League has already had to settle — in retrospect they will perhaps appear of minor importance, but they might have assumed more alarming proportions but for the League's existence — it may fairly be said that this conflict, by reason of its dimensions, was the first big dispute the League has had to cope with. Fate willed that it should also be the most complex, and that for several reasons — the distance at which the events occurred ; the internal upheavals which inevitably follow big social changes such as those with which one of the nations concerned had to contend ; the peculiar situation of that country, resulting from a body of treaties, contracts and customs. This regime, based on convention and custom, empowering certain nations to maintain armed forces on

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its soil, tended to a certain extent to invalidate for this particular problem the initial military data which we are in the habit of examining. To all these difficulties were added those caused by distance and by geographical factors: for, as you are aware, no really effectual step can be taken in that part of the world without the great American Republic which is not represented here among us. And, having touched upon that difficulty, may I venture, with all due discretion, to express the hope that the Government of the United States will continue to lend us its friendly assistance?

The situation I have just described was not calculated to make it easy for us to settle the conflict. Would the difficulties — overrated difficulties — we encountered reveal our institution as powerless? People talk glibly enough of the League's failure. When a storm bursts it is so easy to cry out; whether the cries are cries of distress or of hope it is not always easy to say.

I do not intend to disguise any of our own difficulties, or any of our temporary setbacks. I should despise myself if, at this juncture, I indulged in the polite formulas to which our sense of mutual courtesy inclines us, but which are ill-suited to the tragic circumstances that have brought us together. I now propose to give you an entirely objective account of what has happened.

On one of those evenings we passed together, when the Council's discussions dragged on until a late hour, I said that both the greatness and the tragedy of the League was that it had aimed at the universal. But even though this was the aim, its foundations had not been built upon a mere Utopian dream: the League is no mere fantastic conception lost in the clouds, like a night mist rising from the lake. On the contrary, it was formed in an atmosphere of reality. Its founders possessed a sense of reality; and we, whose duty it is to carry on their work, must possess that sense of reality too. Trade facilities, improved communications, our common need, despite any temporary barriers that may be raised — for economic resources other than our own, war upheavals and the *rapprochements* which have been the outcome of them — all have created in the world such a state of interdependence that a gun fired on the shores of the Pacific may convulse Europe, just as that revolver shot fired at Sarajevo set the nations of the world at one another's throats. If, however, aiming at the universal, the League is to keep the terms of the Covenant clear-cut and effective, they must be made more elastic, must be varied and adapted to meet the diverse needs of geographical, economic and political circumstances.

The Council realised that need, and throughout the first stage of its task — when the procedure was on the basis of Article 11 — it had as its guide, in that necessary process of adaptation, a man who can assuredly be said to be the personification of adaptability in action allied with sure breadth of vision — M. Aristide Briand.

The criticisms which, you will agree, have been so freely launched against us in the last few months all alike ignore the fact that in October, November and December, and up to the end of January, our procedure was based exclusively on Article 11. That article is concerned solely with prevention and conciliation, and is so framed that the Council may take a valid decision only with the agreement of the parties themselves. That means proceeding step by step, advancing only by gradual stages. How, then, could delay be avoided?

But, despite this delay, despite this succession of hopes and setbacks which might well have made us doubt ourselves, we may feel sure in our inmost hearts that, had there been no League, or had the League washed its hands of the conflict because it

was taking place far away on the shores of the Pacific, that conflict would undoubtedly have developed far more rapidly and have assumed far greater proportions.

And now let me tell you of a personal experience of mine. On one of those evenings when our eyes were fixed on the clock and its moving hands, that awakened in the minds of some of us a memory of zero hour — and those who fought in the last war on either side of the trenches know all the anguish of that hour — I told myself that, had the League Council been in existence before, had the States on the eve of a conflict had an opportunity of stating their views in public as they have just done now, some of the catastrophes which have overthrown our world might perhaps have been averted.

To return to the examination of the facts, I must point out that, in this difficult question — in which I do not shut my eyes to any of our miscalculations — tangible results have been achieved. Faced as it is with the first large-scale conflict it has been called upon to solve, your Council has not allowed any of the procedure laid down in the Covenant to be contested.

The other day, the representative of the young Spanish Republic, which in its new youthful vigour is continuing to accord us the invaluable support which Spain has granted us since the League was founded, said that the important thing was to maintain and develop the League's procedure and never to tire of weaving and drawing closer the net which it is our purpose to throw over the world in order to prevent war, even if war temporarily tears the net in the process.

Both in the first and in the second phase of the procedure results have already been obtained. Is it nothing that the first phase has finally terminated in the acceptance by both parties of a Commission of which M. Briand, the President of the Council, could say in his Declaration on December 9th, the terms of which were negotiated with the parties:

"Subject to its purely advisory character, the terms of reference of the Commission are wide. In principle, no question which it feels called upon to study will be excluded, provided that the question relates to any circumstances which affect international relations. The Commission will have full discretion to determine the questions upon which it will report to the Council, and will have power to make interim reports when desirable. If the undertakings given by the two parties, according to the resolution of September 30th, have not been carried out by the time of the arrival of the Commission, the Commission should as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation."

I know there may be blame for slowness: the slowness with which the Commission was constituted and its slowness in setting out on its journey. I know all that; but I should like to explain the reasons. Article 11 requires, whether for the taking of decisions or for the application and execution of decisions, the agreement of all the Members of the Council, including the parties to the dispute. But that is not all. From the outset, the Council has — inevitably — realised that, at every moment of its procedure, it should, if any tangible result was to be achieved, act in concert with the great American Republic which is not represented at its table. Consequently — and this also makes for slowness of action — the Council had to obtain the agreement of America: and I may add that America has never grudged that to us, but she was not represented at our proceedings. This necessity inevitably resulted in an aggravation of those delays

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of which I have myself complained at the Council table.

Nevertheless, the League has succeeded, on the basis of Article 11, in setting up a body the practical value of which will soon be apparent. That is something done, and it should be placed to the Council's credit.

Then came a day when the guns were heard at Shanghai, and an application was submitted by the Chinese Government; and the Council was faced with a graver task, imposing fresh duties on it — that of applying Article 15. We entered upon a phase which could no longer be called the prevention of the dispute, but its settlement, and for this purpose the Council had to procure all the necessary information with all possible speed.

The terms of Article 15 are quite categorical. The first paragraph provides that the Secretary-General shall, even in the absence of the Council, as soon as an application has been submitted to him in virtue of Article 15, proceed to make arrangements for a full investigation and consideration of the dispute. That is to say, even before the Council is called upon to decide whether the application is receivable or not, an investigation and consideration must take place. This question, the first with which the Council was faced, could not give rise to dispute.

As you will fully realise, this is our common guarantee. "*Hodie mihi, cras tibi.*" If it depended on sympathies, on community of interests or on friendships whether the Council could exercise discretion as to whether one of the essential articles of the Covenant should be set in motion, the common guarantee of the League of Nations would have ceased to exist.

A second and more difficult point was raised — namely, whether, as the dispute had originally been dealt with on the basis of Article 11, it was possible to proceed with its consideration on the basis of Article 15.

There, again, though we had a more detailed discussion on the point, the Council considered that, in view of the letter and spirit of the Covenant, no inconsistency of any kind could be established between Articles 11 and 15, since in fact and in most cases they represent different phases and different means of carrying out the same procedure. Moreover, we had an actual precedent, which was cited, and the opinion of a committee of jurists presided over by so high an authority as M. Adatci, now President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. We therefore considered that this second question should also be answered in the affirmative. We stated that the appeal to Article 15 and the procedure which was about to be carried out did not absolve the Council from the duty of continuing its efforts on the basis of Article 11. For that purpose we had not only the indications given in the Covenant but also the 1927 report on the most effective means of preventing war, which the Assembly had described as a valuable guide for the use of the Council.

In causing the investigation and consideration provided for in Article 15, paragraph 1, to be carried out, the Council — and we were careful to emphasise this point — in no way binds itself to continue the procedure on the basis of that article. On the contrary, it remains free to abandon it if it becomes convinced that that procedure was wrongly resorted to. The responsibility then falls on the party who submitted the matter to the Council on the basis of that article without adequate reasons.

In short, we replied in the affirmative on the three points I have just mentioned, and it seems to us that both legally and politically the Council's decision is such as to merit your approval.

When the procedure was opened, the Council adhered strictly to the terms of the Covenant. Article 15 laid upon it the special duty of acting with dispatch. Neither the Council nor the Secretary-General failed to observe that duty, and twenty-four hours after the procedure was opened under Article 15 a Commission directly representing the League was functioning at Shanghai — a commission composed of the representatives of the Powers, which had all responded to the appeal addressed to them.

The delay in the dispatch of its first — provisional — report was due solely to the fact that the United States representative had to ask his Government for authority before affixing his signature to the report. This report was followed by two others which form part of your documentation and which it will be for you to consider.

At the same time, according to the second paragraph of Article 15, the parties to the dispute were invited to communicate their explanations and statements of their cases. It will be for the Assembly, convened at the Chinese Government's request, to hear those statements.

Again, throughout the procedure before the Council, we never lost sight of one other extremely important article of the Covenant, which embodies the principle of the independence of States and respect for that principle by Members of the League: I refer to Article 10.

Among its various procedures with a view to eradicating the causes of war, the Covenant seems to have been designed to bring out this principle in particular, the underlying idea being that the League's first duty is to safeguard that supreme asset described as the territorial integrity of Members of the League and the political independence of those Members. The Council repeatedly recalled the fact that no final settlement of the dispute which failed to respect that principle could be approved by it, and it was glad to receive, on October 13th, October 24th and January 25th (the very eve of the day when Article 15 was to be invoked), and more recently still, specific declarations, the sincerity of which we have no reason to doubt, to the effect that, despite the regrettable events which have occurred, no attack would be made on the territorial integrity or independence of the country in question.

By insisting on our procedure being respected — an essential duty of the Council — by invoking and applying texts which both in the Covenant and in the treaties are simply the juridical expression of our plighted word, by stipulating that the future shall not be pledged on terms at variance with Article 10 of the Covenant, and by allowing no exception to be entered against any of the procedure laid down in that instrument, we have meticulously performed our duty, and have avoided allowing a precedent to be created which would have seriously hampered the League's future action. But it is manifest that our procedures — which are slow, and indeed, cannot be otherwise, depending as they must on accurate information collected by the League itself — can exhibit their full efficacy only if, while they are in process, hostilities break out and if, while we are deliberating, force intervenes and imposes its unlawful rule.

On this point it is easy for those who are closely watching to see whether the tempest will destroy our poor, fragile plant once and for all; it is easy for them to point to the disparity between our appeals, our recommendations and the clash of arms which has too often been the only response. To gauge the possibilities of criticism that lay open to such people, we need only consult our own feelings, our own distress; yet we did not falter, nor shall we falter now. The League must emerge,

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strengthened and confident of its destiny, from this recent trial, and I may say without exaggeration, without indulging in an optimism which facts might belie, that events justify us in believing that our tenacity is about to be rewarded.

No, we did not falter, and only a day or two ago we knew that it might perhaps be possible to bring about the adoption of a proposal which had hitherto been refused.

Last Saturday, the representative of the British Empire, Sir John Simon — and let me pay tribute publicly to him and to his Government and to Admiral Kelly for their unflagging efforts — Sir John Simon, when informing me of the negotiations then proceeding between the Chinese and Japanese commands, on board the British flagship off Shanghai, told me — and my Government confirmed it — that the United States was prepared to associate itself, not only with the measures taken by the great Powers possessing special interests in Shanghai, but also with a decision of the Council itself; so that the negotiations will now possess the moral force of the great international community represented by this Assembly.

The Council accordingly met on February 29th. Sir John Simon publicly confirmed the fact that armistice negotiations were proceeding, and also reaffirmed his Government's intentions and the assurance which the United States Government had given him. I then proposed a plan which was unanimously adopted by the members of the Council representing the Powers not directly interested in the conflict, and obtained a promise from the parties to the dispute that they would warmly recommend their respective Governments to adopt it.

I will simply indicate the main lines of that plan. You are acquainted with it; it forms a sound basis for our hopes to-day. It is that a Conference should meet at once at Shanghai consisting of representatives of the parties and representatives of the great Powers having special interests at Shanghai. The bases for the Conference would be as follows: on the part of Japan, respect for territorial integrity and the *status quo*, without any claim to special privileges; on the part of China, respect for the International Settlements and for the French Concession — all obviously subject to the cessation of hostilities, though the Council, in view of the factor of distance and the military situation, could not undertake to make suggestions in regard to details and has left such details to be settled on the spot.

The next day the representative of Japan communicated to the President in Office of the Council his Government's acceptance. Last night the representative of China informed me that his Government was prepared to accept the plan we had proposed, subject to the cessation of hostilities and an armistice on the lines discussed on board the British flagship.

You see exactly what the situation is. A ray of light appears on the horizon: the acceptance by both parties of the plan proposed by the Council, the support of that plan by the great American Republic — that opens up perspectives which had not appeared since this long and painful conflict first broke out. The execution of the plan is obviously conditional on the cessation of hostilities, and there still exists between the two parties, as regards the terms of the cessation of hostilities, a difference of opinion which has not yet been reconciled. At the same time, though hostilities have not ceased, at least in the legal sense of an armistice, I was notified this morning of the cessation of the Japanese offensive. Moreover, the mere fact that armistice negotiations are continuing and that both parties have explicitly

accepted a plan which is itself conditional on the cessation of hostilities means that our present deliberations are opening under auspices which I shall refrain from describing as more favourable, lest I be accused of exaggeration, but which are certainly less unfavourable than we feared at the tragic moment when this Assembly was convened.

And now it is for you to take up the discussion. The League took a very serious step when for the first time it decided to convene a special Assembly in virtue of a procedure laid down in Article 15 of the Covenant.

Public attention in every country is focused on us, and the masses look to us with hope and confidence. A different feeling may perhaps prevail in certain circles, and their attention may perhaps be more in the nature of the curiosity of an audience following the movements of the lion-tamer in the secret hope that he may be devoured.

Your resolute determination, your calm deliberations will enable you to cheat such mischievous hopes and ensure the achievement of the task which devolves upon you, a task the success of which will determine the League's future.

The Council, from whom the Assembly has taken over that task, has given you a full account of its efforts, its failures and its hopes. It is, in any case, conscious of having preserved for itself, for you and for the League, one thing which ranks above all others, for institutions and individuals alike — its honour.

4. — CREDENTIALS OF THE DELEGATES: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CREDENTIALS.

The Chairman:

Translation: The next item on the agenda is the report of the Committee on Credentials.

I call upon the Chairman of that Committee, His Excellency M. de Agüero y Bethancourt, delegate of Cuba, to read his report.

M. de Agüero y Bethancourt (Cuba), Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Credentials:

Translation: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, — The Committee appointed by the Assembly to report on the credentials of delegates met on March 3rd, 1932, at 11.15 a.m., in the office of the President of the Assembly. I was elected Chairman and was entrusted with the duty of drawing up the report.

The Committee examined the documents transmitted to it by the Secretary-General and found that the following States Members are represented by delegates who are in possession either of letters of credentials from heads of States or Ministers for Foreign Affairs, or of letters or telegrams from Ministers for Foreign Affairs, or of letters from permanent representatives accredited to the League of Nations:

Abyssinia, Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, India, Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Persia, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Salvador, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of South Africa, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

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The Committee considers that the representatives of these States Members are duly accredited.

The following States Members have not yet submitted documents accrediting delegates to the Assembly:

The Argentine Republic, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay.

The Chairman:

Translation: I beg to thank the Chairman of the Committee on Credentials for the assistance he has rendered us and the rapidity with which he has helped us to constitute the Assembly.

Has anyone any observations to make on the conclusions of the report?

The conclusions of the report were adopted.

5. — ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

The Chairman:

Translation: The next item on the agenda is the election of the President of the present special session of the Assembly.

In conformity with the Rules of Procedure, voting will be by secret ballot.

May I call upon M. Motta, delegate of Switzerland, and M. Titulesco, delegate of Roumania, as former Presidents of the Assembly, to be good enough to act as tellers?

(The votes of the delegates were taken in turn by secret ballot.)

The Chairman:

Translation: In the first place, I wish to thank the tellers for their kind assistance.

The result of the voting is as follows:

Number of States voting	47
Blank voting papers	0
Number of votes cast	47
Absolute majority	24

M. Hymans, first delegate of Belgium, has obtained 45 votes.

I have the honour, therefore, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to announce that His Excellency M. HYMANS, delegate of Belgium, is elected President of the Assembly.

May I say that, if my task has been a heavy one, it now brings me the very great pleasure of welcoming M. Hymans' election, which I consider to be symbolic of the spirit in which the Assembly intends to conduct its work?

I ventured just now to point out to the Assembly how closely the world was watching it and what a far echo its decisions would awaken. It has at the outset taken the wisest and best possible step by choosing, for the task of directing its work, one of our colleagues who, since the foundation of the League, has unfailingly placed at its service, sometimes in face of great difficulties, the invaluable assistance of his own personality and abilities and that of the noble country he represents. I am therefore glad to welcome him, and I now invite him to take the presidential chair.

(M. Hymans took the presidential chair.)

6. — PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.

M. Hymans (Belgium), President of the Assembly:

Translation: Ladies and gentlemen, — You have just done my country a great honour, and have given myself a token of confidence which I greatly value, in calling upon me to preside over an Assembly on whom devolves the arduous task — a task as great as it is fraught with responsibility — of seeking to restore peaceful understanding between two States Members of the League who have been divided by a long and cruel conflict. I thank you, and I thank in particular my distinguished friend, M. Paul-Boncour, President of the Council, for the much too flattering terms in which he welcomed me in this office — for I can only attribute his words to his friendship for me.

In taking this chair, my memory inevitably goes back, as you will well understand, to the First Assembly of the League in 1920, over which I had the honour to preside. At that time we were setting forth, with high hopes and in face of scepticism, upon a bold and noble enterprise — the organisation of an association of States for the purpose (to quote the actual terms of the Preamble to the Covenant) of maintaining justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of peoples with one another.

And now, after twelve years, after long toil, an Assembly of the League is called upon for the first time, in virtue of the obligation imposed upon it by Article 15 of the Covenant, to settle a complex dispute, fraught with danger, which has broken out between two great nations of the East and has unhappily led to bloodshed.

There is one gleam of hope which lightens the crisis. The Council of the League, as its President reminded us just now in his admirable and eloquent statement, adopted a proposal, a plan for settlement and negotiation, which might terminate the worst episode in this vast conflict. The acts of violence which have taken place have deeply moved the hearts of all, and the whole world earnestly hopes that the opening of negotiations will be rendered possible by a cessation of hostilities.

Both as President of this Assembly and as representative of a State which holds respect for treaties to be the essential principle in international life, I shall, like the rest of you, devote myself wholeheartedly and sincerely to see king any means and any methods likely to restore concord through justice and to strengthen the authority of the League.

7. — STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

The President:

Translation: We have to settle certain questions of procedure this morning, but before we come to them I should like to make a general observation on the application of the Rules of Procedure.

This session is of a special nature, and in the course of our discussions it is possible that we may not be able to apply in their entirety the provisions of our Rules of Procedure, which were drawn up and adopted for the purposes of our ordinary annual Assemblies. Of course, if any departures have to be made from the general rules, I shall always consult the Bureau beforehand, and in any case the final decision will rest with the Assembly.

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8. — FIXING OF THE NUMBER OF VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY.

The President :

Translation : We have this morning to elect the Vice-Presidents. I want to draw your attention now to the desirability of a decision which I think the Assembly should take forthwith and which involves a departure from the letter of the Rules of Procedure. According to the Rules, the Assembly must elect six Vice-Presidents. This has always been done at our previous Assemblies. I thought it might be desirable, in the present circumstances, for the Bureau to have a larger number of Vice-Presidents, and for the number to be increased accordingly for the present session from six to eight. The Bureau will have to take important decisions and to assume heavy responsibilities.

The President's proposal was adopted.

The President :

Translation : If we subsequently find it necessary to appoint one or more committees, the chairman of those committees will *ex officio* become members of the Bureau, in accordance with the usage we have always followed.

9. — ELECTION OF THE EIGHT VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY.

The President :

Translation : The Chinese and Japanese delegations have both spontaneously expressed their desire not to put forward candidates for election as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. I feel sure the Assembly will realise the motives of delicacy underlying this decision of the two delegations in the special circumstances in which we are placed.

The ballot will now be taken for the election of the eight Vice-Presidents. I will ask M. Pflügl, delegate of Austria, and M. Mayard, delegate of the Republic of Haiti, to be good enough to act as tellers.

I have a final observation to make. As you know, the vote is taken by secret ballot, the name of each country being read out, and I would remind delegates that voting papers must contain the names of eight persons but not names of countries.

(The votes of the delegates were taken in turn by secret ballot.)

The President :

Translation : The result of the ballot is as follows :

Number of votes	47
Number of votes cast	47
Absolute majority.....	24

The analysis of the voting is as follows :

M. Paul-Boncour (France)	45
M. Motta (Switzerland)	44
Baron Ramel (Sweden)	43
Sir John Simon (British Empire)....	43
M. Grandi (Italy)	40
M. Ortega (Mexico)	39
M. Brüning (Germany)	37
M. Sépahbodi (Persia)	36

In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, therefore, I have the honour to declare the following delegates Vice-Presidents of the Assembly : M. PAUL-BONCOUR, M. MOTTA, Baron RAMEL, Sir John SIMON, M. GRANDI, M. ORTEGA, M. BRÜNING and M. SÉPAHBODI.

(The Assembly rose at 1.30 p.m.)

A. [Exrt.]/G.C./P.V. 7.

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

GENERAL COMMISSION

MINUTES OF THE SEVENTH MEETING

TUESDAY, MARCH 11TH, 1932, AT 5 P.M.

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President: M. HYMANS.

18. — ACTION TAKEN BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IN PURSUANCE OF THE ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF MARCH 4th: COMMUNICATION BY M. SATO.

M. Sato (Japan):

Translation: I should like to make a communication with regard to my Government's action in pursuance of the resolution of March 4th.¹

You will have seen in the Press that the action to which I referred at the Commission's last meeting has been taken at Shanghai. The Japanese Minister handed a note to Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister, informing him that the Japanese authorities were prepared to enter into negotiations with the Chinese authorities in accordance with the terms of that resolution. This note added that there was some reason for apprehension with regard to the situation at the front, and that consequently it was urgent to reach a definitive agreement for the complete cessation of hostilities as soon as possible, and then to discuss and fix the arrangements for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The Japanese authorities had always supposed that the Chinese authorities fully understood their attitude in this connection; but, as they had received no communication from the Chinese authorities since the League adopted its resolution,

they desired to make it absolutely clear that they were prepared to negotiate in accordance with the terms of the resolution.

Sir Miles Lampson handed this note to the Chinese authorities and informed us that they also had signified their intention to enter into negotiations.

We hoped it would be possible to hold the first meeting this morning at the British Consulate-General, but it had to be postponed, owing to delay in the receipt of detailed instructions.

My Government authorises me to state that the Japanese forces will withdraw from their present positions, to the neighbourhood of Shanghai and Woosung, when the cessation of hostilities is finally assured in accordance with the first paragraph of the resolution and when, as provided in paragraph 2, appropriate measures have been agreed upon to prevent the Chinese forces from advancing or taking the offensive, and to ensure supervision over the zone evacuated by the Japanese forces. Our forces will then re-embark, as quiet is restored. Our authorities on the spot have already received general instructions to that effect. We have therefore good reason to hope that the situation will be rapidly regulated.

The President:

Translation: I thank the Japanese delegate for his interesting communication.

19. — DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE: CONCLUSION OF DISCUSSION AND ADOPTION.

The President:

Translation: Does M. Sato wish to make any communication with regard to the Japanese Government's intentions in connection with the resolution in the form resulting from the discussions of the General Commission?

¹ Document A. (Extr.) 12.1932.VII.

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M. Sato (Japan) :

Translation : I have just received instructions from my Government, and, now that the General Commission is about to reach a decision with regard to the draft resolution, I wish briefly to explain the Japanese Government's attitude and the reasons for the Japanese delegation's vote.

The Japanese Government is entirely in agreement with the fundamental principles set forth in the resolution, and, as it has stated on many occasions, its conduct will be guided by those principles.

As a Member of the League and a signatory of the Paris Pact, Japan is convinced that she has faithfully observed the provisions of these instruments, which are indispensable in the international order, and she is resolutely determined always to act in accordance with their principles. She particularly regrets the allegation that the action she was compelled to take in China was an attack upon the present political independence or territorial integrity of another country, or was an attempt to exercise military pressure for the pursuit of any object whatsoever.

As the Japanese Government has stated on several occasions since September last, Japan has no territorial designs in China. The force of circumstances compelled her to take military measures in China, solely in order to protect herself against serious and imminent danger to the life and property of her nationals.

I wish to proclaim once again that the Japanese Government is sincerely desirous of achieving rapidly a friendly settlement of the present situation.

With regard to the text of the draft resolution, the Japanese Government is particularly glad that attention has been called to the principle of scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations. The Japanese Government attaches the greatest importance to that principle. One of the most important factors in the present situation in the Far East is undoubtedly the systematic attacks on legitimate rights and interests guaranteed by treaty, and China's policy of unilaterally denouncing the most solemn undertakings. The Japanese delegation therefore desires to express its great satisfaction that the duty scrupulously to respect existing treaties is again proclaimed.

Another factor in the present state of affairs is the anti-foreign agitation and the boycott, an economic and political weapon, to which China has resorted in pursuit of her national aims. These practices constitute a real threat to peace, and do great harm to that good understanding between the nations upon which peace depends. The Japanese

delegation wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to this point.

The Japanese Government also notes with satisfaction that the draft resolution mentions the Council resolutions of September 30th and December 10th. Since the present incidents began, Japan has followed the Council's procedure with goodwill. She has furnished full explanations. She has shown that patience and conciliatory spirit which she has exhibited for many years, in spite of innumerable provocations by China, and sincerely desires to maintain with her friendly and fruitful relations. In virtue of Article 11, she proposed that a commission of enquiry should be sent to the Far East to obtain the necessary information for settling the whole matter. This procedure is still in progress : the Commission is still at work. You will remember that, at the Council's last meetings on January 29th and 30th, the Japanese delegation raised objections to the application of Article 15 to the whole Sino-Japanese conflict, in view of the proceedings to which I have just referred.

The Japanese Government's attitude is, I hope, now clear. It has itself stated its views in its reply to the appeal of the twelve Members of the Council. As I have just said, Japan took part in this Assembly, subject to certain reservations with regard to the applicability of Article 15. In view of this fact, we cannot vote in favour of the draft resolution. In these circumstances, the Japanese delegation will simply refrain from voting, in order not to oppose the adoption of the resolution.

I should like to say how much the Japanese delegation appreciates the efforts of its colleagues and of the Secretariat since the beginning of the Assembly in dealing with the question before us. It also sincerely thanks the Bureau and the Drafting Committee for their very difficult and important work.

The President :

Translation : As no one desires to speak, a vote will be taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted.

The President :

Translation : The draft resolution which the General Commission has just adopted will be submitted to the Plenary Assembly, which I shall convene for 5.30 p.m. to-day.¹

¹ See Records of the fourth plenary meeting of the Assembly.

A. [Extr.]/C.G./P.V. 6.

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

GENERAL COMMISSION

MINUTES OF THE SIXTH MEETING

FRIDAY, MARCH 11TH, 1932, AT 10.30 A.M.

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16. — DEATH OF M. BRIAND : REPLY FROM
M. TARDIEU TO THE PRESIDENT'S
MESSAGE.

The President :

Translation : Let me first read you the telegram which I have received, in reply to mine, from M. Tardieu, President of the French Council of Ministers. It is as follows :

" I am deeply touched by the condolences you have been good enough to offer me on behalf of the Assembly of the League of Nations upon the death of the illustrious statesman whose passing is so grievous a loss to the Government of the Republic and whose name stood for the pacific ideal of France and her faith in the civilising mission of the League. On behalf of the French Government, I beg you to receive and to convey to the Assembly my thanks for the messages you were good enough to transmit to me. — André TARDIEU."

17. — DISCUSSION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE DRAFTING COM-
MITTEE.

The President :

Translation : At the Commission's last meeting we decided to instruct the Bureau to prepare a draft resolution expressing the ideas put forward during the general discussion. It was understood

that any delegations wishing to formulate proposals would send them to the Bureau and that the authors of such proposals would discuss the wording of the resolution in conjunction with the members of the Bureau. We received proposals from the delegations of the British Empire, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Norway, Salvador, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The Drafting Committee, consisting of the members of the Bureau and the authors of the proposals, agreed on a final text, which was distributed to you yesterday. You are in possession of the draft resolution, but it will, I think, be necessary for me to read it to you before opening the discussion. It is as follows :

" 1.

" The Assembly,

" Considering that the provisions of the Covenant are entirely applicable to the present dispute, more particularly as regards :

" (1) The principle of a scrupulous respect for treaties ;

" (2) The undertaking entered into by Members of the League of Nations to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the Members of the League ;

" (3) Their obligation to submit any dispute which may arise between them to procedures for peaceful settlement ;

" Adopting the principles laid down by the President-in Office of the Council, M. Briand, in his declaration of December 10th, 1931 :

" Recalling the fact that twelve Members of the Council again invoked those principles in their appeal to the Japanese Government on February 16th, 1932, when they declared ' that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any

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Member of the League, brought about in disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by Members of the League of Nations;

"Considering that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between Members of the League above referred to are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris, which is one of the corner-stones of the peace organisation of the world and under Article 2 of which 'the High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature and whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means';

"Pending the decisions which it may ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute which has been referred to it:

"Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations.

" II.

"The Assembly,

"Affirming that it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be sought under the stress of military pressure on the part of either party:

"Recalls the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and on December 10th, 1931, in agreement with the parties;

"Recalls also its own resolution of March 4th, 1932, adopted in agreement with the parties with a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and notes that the Powers Members of the League of Nations having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements are prepared to give every assistance to this end, and requests those Powers, if necessary, to co-operate in maintaining order in the evacuated zone.

" III.

"The Assembly,

"In view of the request formulated on January 29th by the Chinese Government invoking the application to the dispute of the procedure provided for in Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

"In view of the request formulated on February 12th by the Chinese Government that the dispute should be referred to the Assembly in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 9, of the Covenant, and in view of the Council's decision of February 19th;

"Considering that the whole of the dispute which forms the subject of the Chinese Government's request is referred to it and that it is under an obligation to apply the procedure of conciliation provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant and, if necessary, the procedure in regard to recommendations provided for in paragraph 4 of that same article:

"Decides to set up a Committee of nineteen members — namely, the President of the Assembly, who will act as Chairman of the Committee, the Members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute and the representatives of six other Members to be elected by secret ballot.

"This Committee, exercising its function on behalf of and under the supervision of the Assembly, shall be instructed:

"(1) To report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the said cessation and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in conformity with the Assembly resolution of March 4th, 1932;

"(2) To follow the execution of the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and December 10th, 1931;

"(3) To prepare the draft of an agreement to be submitted to the Assembly, for the purpose of facilitating, in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, the settlement of the dispute;

"(4) To propose, if necessary, that the Assembly submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice a request for an advisory opinion;

"(5) To prepare, if need be, the draft report provided for in Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant;

"(6) To propose any urgent measure which may appear necessary;

"(7) To submit a first report to the Assembly as soon as possible and at latest on May 1st, 1932.

"The Assembly requests the Council to communicate to the Committee, together with any observations it may have to make, any documentation that it may think fit to transmit to the Assembly.

"The Assembly shall remain in session and its President may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary."

We will now open the discussion on the resolution as a whole, but I think it would probably be more practical to take each of the three chapters separately. If the Assembly agrees, therefore, I will open the debate on the first part of the draft resolution and will ask any Members who wish to do so to propose amendments.

Sir John Simon (British Empire). — There is one addition to the last paragraph of the first chapter of the draft resolution which I think might well be considered and which I should be prepared to propose with a view to widening and strengthening the declaration which it contains.

The General Commission will see in the first chapter that there is a paragraph beginning: "Considering that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between Members of the League above referred to are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris..." But though in that *considerant* we refer to the Pact of Paris, there is not in this draft any reference to the Pact of Paris in the final and effective paragraph. The final paragraph "proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions . . . and declares that it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations".

My colleagues may remember that when this proposition was suggested, I think by myself, in the speech which I made from the platform, I

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included the Pact of Paris in what I then proposed, and I would submit that it would make the statement stronger and more world-wide if we included a reference to the Pact of Paris as well as to the Covenant of the League in this, the effective paragraph of the first chapter.

I think the reason why the Drafting Committee did not include the words was a technical one; it was, I think, because there may be one or two States who are Members of the League who have not themselves signed and ratified the Pact of Paris, and therefore it would be technically incorrect for us to say that it was incumbent upon all the Members of the League to do something which is contained in the Pact of Paris. But, though that is technically a perfectly just criticism, I still think that words might be included, to the general approval of us all, which would bring a reference to the Pact of Paris into the final paragraph as well as a reference to the Covenant; and having consulted one or two of my friends here who, I know, take the same view, I would venture to suggest that we should add the following words at the end of the final paragraph of Chapter I: "or contrary to the Pact of Paris, in the case of signatories to that Pact".

I would only point out further that this first chapter opens with a "*considerant*" which begins by emphasising the principle of a scrupulous respect for treaties: it is therefore, I think, very just and proper that the Assembly, in making this solemn assertion in the first chapter, should not confine itself to a reference to the obligations which are to be deduced from the Covenant of the League of Nations, but should also include — for all the States to which it is applicable — the addition which I have suggested: "or contrary to the Pact of Paris, in the case of signatories to that Pact". If, therefore, my colleagues are in general agreement with that addition, which would strengthen the document, it appears to me that it might be entirely consistent with our real purpose and, as I have already said, would make world-wide the declaration with which this first chapter concludes.

The President:

Translation: There are four countries which have not ratified the Pact of Paris, but all States have signed it. I would therefore propose a slight change. The last paragraph might end with the words "or the Pact of Paris in the case of States parties to that Pact".

I think we are all in agreement as to the substance. We might alternatively say, "in the case of those States which are bound by that Pact". I do not think that the actual idea can be objected to, but this formula would perhaps be neater.

M. Politis (Greece):

Translation: I entirely agree with Sir John Simon that it would be desirable to mention the Pact of Paris in this part of the resolution, not only because this would bring the effective part of the resolution into line with the introduction, but because it would assuredly add to the value and force of the resolution. I merely wonder whether it is really necessary to say, "in the case of the States which are bound by that Pact". That would not be a very neat formula. In this Assembly, we can only speak on behalf of the Members of the League. The Members of the League enunciate what is stated in this paragraph. They agree that a certain situation can at once be regarded as contrary to the principles of the Covenant. We wish to add that that situation is also contrary to the principles of the Pact of Paris, and here we are faced with a difficulty in the case

of those countries which have signed the League Covenant along with us, but which are not bound by the Pact of Paris. Only I am not sure that we really need labour this point, because the States Members of the League which are not yet bound by the Pact of Paris — happily there are very few of them — would not be running any risk of contracting an additional obligation if they accepted the wording proposed by Sir John Simon, which points out that a situation such as that defined would be contrary both to the Covenant and to the Pact of Paris, since the Covenant contains the maximum obligation in this sense. It follows that even the Members of the League who are not bound by the Pact of Paris could, I think, agree without any disadvantage to the addition pure and simple of this reference to the Pact of Paris.

I think, then, that it would be neater and better to keep to a quite simple addition, such as "or to the Pact of Paris".

The President:

Translation: May I make one observation? The earlier paragraphs enunciate an entirely concrete and general proclamation as to the binding nature of the provisions of the Pact of Paris. The introduction says: "Considering that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between Members of the League above referred to are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris, which is one of the corner-stones of the peace organisation of the world, and under Article 2 of which . . ."

The paragraph to which Sir John Simon has proposed an addition begins with the words: "Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above". The Pact of Paris is, therefore, included in that sentence. I think, then, that we could very well say, "which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris".

The final provision of Part I of the resolution would thus be in keeping with the introduction. I do not regard the point as of any great importance, but that would be better from the standpoint of what M. Politis calls neatness and simplicity.

Sir John Simon (British Empire). — I should be the first to be content with this suggestion, for it will bring us back to exactly the proposal which I made in the first instance. I have always thought that we should add the words "or the Pact of Paris" and leave it at that. It was solely because certain difficulty was felt in some quarters that the words were deleted. For my part, I want them put back, and I accept M. Politis's proposal gratefully and, if I may say so, that would be entirely the simplest, the neatest and the most logical way of making the addition which we all desire.

The President:

Translation: If no one has anything else to say, I suggest that the last paragraph in Part I should end with the words "or to the Pact of Paris".

M. Restrepo (Colombia):

Translation: I entirely agree with Sir John Simon and M. Politis with regard to the addition to be made to this article. I would merely like to remind you that the Drafting Committee first inserted these words and then struck them out in order to make allowance for the position of the countries which have not ratified the Pact of Paris. Sir John Simon's and M. Politis's explanations have made the position quite clear, and I support the wording now proposed.

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The President :

Translation : What M. Restrepo has said is an interpretation and explanation of his attitude and of that of certain other countries. His statement will appear in the Minutes. I take note with much satisfaction of M. Restrepo's assent to the proposed wording.

The amendment proposed by Sir John Simon was adopted.

M. Yen (China). — I wish to point out that the French text in this last paragraph does not coincide accurately with the English, and I do not know exactly whether the French text was drawn up first and the English is a translation or whether the English is the original text and the French the translation, because the French text contains the words: "... les Membres de la Société des Nations sont tenus ...", whereas the English text reads: "... it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations ...". I was wondering whether it is possible to make the two texts coincide a little more, because I do not know whether "sont tenus" means exactly "it is incumbent". The Members of the League are "bound", as someone said the other day, and it is better that the two texts should coincide as much as possible to prevent any misunderstanding.

The President :

Translation : As the matter is one of language, I will ask the Secretary-General to speak.

The Secretary-General. — We have given this particular question very deep thought, and I think, if you consider it very carefully, you will see that probably the best translation of "it is incumbent" would be "sont tenus". I do not think you could find anything much better.

The President :

Translation : As we are agreed upon the meaning and our agreement will be recorded in the Minutes, we can now proceed.

Sir John Simon (British Empire). — There is a very small verbal change which has occurred to me and which appears both in the English and French text. It is in the previous paragraph to the one we have been examining. In the French text it begins: "En attendant les décisions". I am not, as some are, an authority on both these languages, but it seems to me that the word "decisions" in English ("décisions" in French) is perhaps not quite broad enough to cover all that we contemplate. Supposing that there is a happy agreement reached by negotiation between the parties and they become of one accord: I should not myself have described that in English as a decision of the Assembly. I would have thought a rather broader word, such as in French — if I might suggest it — "en attendant les mesures" and, in English, "pending the steps" which you may take, would cover both the case of seeking to conclude by negotiation and agreement, and, in the event of agreement not being reached, paragraph 4 of the Article being applied. It is purely a question of words: "décisions" seems to be rather too narrow a word, sounding like something that is imposed upon others and not therefore covering the case, which we hope may arise, of agreement between the parties.

The President :

Translation : Obviously the Assembly might find it necessary to take steps for the settlement

of the dispute which might not be decisions in the strict sense of the term. If there is no objection, the resolution will be amended in the manner suggested by Sir John Simon.

The amendment proposed by Sir John Simon was adopted.

The President :

Translation : Has anyone else anything to say on Part I as a whole?

Part I of the draft resolution, as amended, was adopted.

The President :

Translation : We will now take Part II of the draft resolution. Does anyone wish to speak?

Part II of the draft resolution was adopted.

The President :

Translation : We will now consider Part III of the draft resolution.

M. Beneš (Czechoslovakia). — In the Drafting Committee we agreed that No. 3 should read:

"(3) To prepare the drafts of an agreement to be submitted to the Assembly, for the purpose of facilitating, in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3 of the Covenant, the settlement of the dispute."

Certain delegations have just drawn my attention to the fact that it would certainly be advisable to alter the wording so as to make it clearer and make it correspond exactly with Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. I accordingly propose, in agreement with the delegations mentioned, a slight amendment which will make the text clearer but will not change the substance. The new text would read:

"(3) To endeavour to prepare the settlement of the dispute in agreement with the parties, in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, and to submit a statement to the Assembly."

Those are the actual words used in the Covenant.

The President :

Translation : The effect of M. Beneš's proposal is to introduce into No. 3 practically the whole wording of Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, which reads:

"The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate."

M. Beneš's proposal reads:

"(3) To endeavour to prepare the settlement of the dispute in agreement with the parties, in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, and to submit a statement to the Assembly."

This is based on Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. I do not suppose there will be any objections.

M. Motta (Switzerland) :

Translation : On behalf of my delegation I agree entirely with M. Beneš's proposal. It makes no change in the idea but merely clarifies it. It expresses in particular a notion which is, in my view, self-evident but which gains by being expressed — namely, that mediation necessarily presupposes the assent of the two parties.

The President :

Translation : In point of fact, we can hardly imagine an agreement without the assent of the two parties. If there is no further objection to this proposal I shall regard it as adopted.

M. Beneš's proposal was adopted.

The President :

Translation : Are there any other observations on Part III of the draft resolution?

M. Yen (China). — Before I point out another discrepancy between the French and English texts, I wish to say that what I am saying to-day concerns only the wording, because I have not received any instructions from my Government with regard to the substance.

In Part III, No. 2, of the French text the wording is as follows:

"De suivre l'exécution des résolutions adoptées par le Conseil le 30 septembre et le 10 décembre 1931; ..."

In the English text, the words "de suivre" are translated "to follow", and I am not sure that this is correct. Perhaps a better English word might be "pursue" or even "effect": but this might be too great a change.

The President :

Translation : I am not an authority in this matter and I should hardly like to propose to set up a committee of linguists.

The Secretary-General. — The advice I have from the experts here is that "follow" means "suivre" in French, and that the word "pursue" would have to be translated "poursuivre". I think "suivre" can only be interpreted "follow".

M. Yen (China). — Perhaps it is not "follow" but "follow up".

Sir John Simon (British Empire). — We are all anxious to have this document quite clear, and I should like to ask a question regarding interpretation.

In Part III, No. 1, the words "to report" are used. In No. 3, as amended, the word "statement" is used. In No. 5, we pass to the second procedure provided for under a later paragraph of the article, and the word "report" appears. In No. 7, about which I wish to have the interpretation, there is a reference to "a first report". It is not very clear, as the resolution is drawn up at present, what is the "first report" here referred to. Does it mean that, while we provided in No. 1 that there should be a report as soon as possible, we later provide in No. 7 that the first report of progress is, in any case, to be made by May 1st? Would it not be well to use the words "progress report"? The use of some such words would make it clear that the reference in No. 7 to a "first report" is not the report referred to under No. 5. One way of doing this would obviously be to insert in No. 1 the words

"to report as soon as possible, and, in any event, by May 1st, on the cessation of hostilities".

The President :

Translation : The difficulties Sir John Simon has mentioned are not, I think, so serious if you consider the French text, but it might perhaps be desirable to have a little more precision. There is no possible doubt as to the character of the report mentioned in No. 1. Whether it is called a report or whether some other term is used, it is plain what its nature is, and I think that, in French, the word "rapport" is the most suitable. Nor can there be any doubt with regard to No. 5. If there is any doubt as to the wording of No. 7, we might say, "to submit a first report on the situation to the Assembly as soon as possible". What the drafters of the resolution plainly had in mind was that a report on the position or situation should be submitted to the Assembly.

M. Beelaerts van Blokland (Netherlands) :

Translation : The wording proposed by the Secretariat is, I think, entirely correct. Would the words "report on the situation" express exactly the same idea? I do not think so. There is no reason why a report on the situation should be made at the latest on May 1st. It could equally well be made next week, because there is always a situation. It would, I think, be better to say, "on the progress of its work", or to use some equivalent phrase.

The President :

Translation : There is no divergence between us on the substance. Clearly, the report to be presented not later than May 1st will inform the Assembly as to the existing state of affairs and the Committee's work. That is, I think, self-evident, but, if further precision were required, we could say, in accordance with M. Beelaerts van Blokland's suggestion, "a first report on its activity".

I must, however, ask the Netherlands delegate's permission to point out that, if the Committee merely reported on its activity, the report would be incomplete, because it must also deal with the general situation. That is what the Assembly wants. Obviously, one of the main factors in the situation consists of the steps taken by the Committee and their results.

In other words, if the Committee presents a report on the situation, the report will have to contain a summary account of its activity, and if it reports on its activity, the report will have to contain a statement on the situation.

M. Motta (Switzerland) :

Translation : In No. 5, the word "report" is obviously essential, because that is the term used in the Covenant itself. We cannot therefore substitute another word.

In No. 1, it is quite clear what is meant. The only question is that in No. 7. The suggestion originally made by the President is, I think, the best. The idea of progress is implicit in the term "first report on the situation", which implies that there will be a second and a third report. That meets the doubts that have been expressed. I therefore urge the acceptance of the President's formula.

The President :

Translation : The exchange of explanations meets M. Beelaerts van Blokland's point, as the idea has been made quite clear.

It was decided to add the word "progress" before the word "report" in No. 7.

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Sir George Perley (Canada). — I hesitate to make any suggestions regarding the translation, because the members of the Secretariat are doing most excellently and they know a great deal more about it than I do.

I am going to make a suggestion with regard to No. 1. The clause reads, "which shall render definitive the said cessation and regulate the withdrawal" The English text would be plainer if the word "shall" were put in between the words "and" and "regulate", because it is possible in this English sentence to construe it that "regulate" refers back to the word "to", and therefore it might be held that the Assembly or the Committee under this clause undertook to regulate the withdrawal of the forces.

The French text is absolutely plain: "*ainsi qu'à régler le retrait des forces japonaises*", which refers entirely to the previous part of the sentence. Therefore, I would suggest that the word "shall" should be put between the words "and" and "regulate" in No. 1.

The Secretary-General. — I quite agree: the translation proposed is much better.

Part III of the draft resolution, as amended, was adopted.

The President:

Translation: We have examined the three parts of the draft resolution in turn, and I think that, after the exchange of observations which has taken place and the adoption of certain amendments, which after all are purely matters of form, we are practically unanimous on the resolution as a whole.

As, however, we have examined the various parts of the draft, I will now open the discussion on the whole — that is to say, I will grant permission to speak to any member who wishes to put forward any ideas or observations on the substance of the matter and on the general character of the draft resolution.

Count Apponyi (Hungary):

Translation: Our silence, I am sure, is more convincing than anything else could be. I think, however, we have a duty to fulfil with regard to our Drafting Committee. From my long parliamentary experience I realise the magnitude of the difficulty with which the Committee was faced, and

we owe it our thanks for the masterly way in which it has prepared a draft that combines the spirit of conciliation and the firmness necessary to enable the Assembly to perform its duty in this very serious situation. I therefore propose that the Assembly should express its gratitude to the Drafting Committee.

The President:

Translation: The members of the Drafting Committee are grateful to Count Apponyi for the kindly way in which he has referred to their work. The applause with which you greeted his words shows, I think, that you all approve them.

I had the honour just now of a conversation with M. Sato, the Japanese delegate. M. Sato told me that he was not at the moment in possession of his Government's instructions. He was forced to telegraph yesterday afternoon. Tokio is a long way away, and he is not at this moment in a position to acquaint us with the Japanese Government's views, but he hopes to obtain instructions which he has asked for in time to give us a reply this afternoon. That being so, I propose to hold a second meeting this afternoon, and I will ask the Chinese delegate to do his best so as to be able to inform us of his Government's opinion this afternoon. We might then hold a meeting at five o'clock in order to give M. Yen and also M. Sato and M. Matsudaira more time. We could then come to a decision and, after adjourning, hold a plenary meeting of the Assembly in the same room, as we did the other day. It would, I think, be a great advantage, both for public opinion and for the dignity of the League and its Assembly, if, after some ten days' very frank and wide-ranging discussion, we could terminate this first phase of our work to-day; otherwise we should have to adjourn, because to-morrow we must attend M. Briand's funeral, after which comes Sunday, and as far as I am concerned it will be extremely difficult for me to be here on Monday. There would then be an interruption, and it would be better, in the interest of everyone, in that of the League, and in that of the settlement of the conflict, if we could finish to-day. I venture to make a very pressing appeal to the Chinese and the Japanese delegations to try and enable us to conclude the first part of our task to-day.

The President's proposal was adopted.

A. [Exrt.]/G.C./P.V. 5.

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

GENERAL COMMISSION

MINUTES OF THE FIFTH MEETING

TUESDAY, MARCH 8TH, 1932, AT 3.30 P.M.

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10. — DEATH OF M. BRIAND.

The President:

Translation: I should perhaps read the telegram I sent yesterday to M. Tardieu, President of the French Council of Ministers and French Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is as follows:

"The Assembly of the League of Nations has been deeply moved by the sudden passing of M. Aristide Briand, and on its behalf I offer Your Excellency my deepest condolences on the loss which has been sustained by the Government of the Republic and the whole of France. The Assembly shares your grief and will faithfully and gratefully cherish the memory of the illustrious statesman who was so passionately devoted to the cause of peace and gave to it all his strength, his heart and his great eloquence."

M. de Zulueta (Spain):

Translation: I should like to make a proposal to the Commission. The funeral of the great statesman whose loss we all mourn will take place in Paris on Saturday. M. Briand showed by his example that, while serving our own countries, we can serve all mankind. All countries of the world should kneel before his tomb, on the soil of France. The League cannot be unrepresented at such a ceremony, and I venture to propose that

it should send a delegation. I suggest that the Assembly should appoint our President, M. Hymans, and the Secretary-General as its delegates.

The President:

Translation: M. de Zulueta's proposal is certainly in accordance with your feelings, as it is with mine. Both heart and spirit bid us join next Saturday in the tribute which France will pay to the memory of the great statesman who is the abiding symbol of our principles and our hopes. The Secretary-General (I am authorised to say) and myself will represent the League and the Assembly at M. Briand's funeral next Saturday.

M. Politis (Greece):

Translation: I concur wholeheartedly in the Spanish delegate's proposal; but I should like to suggest at the same time, although this is not a matter within this Commission's purview, that the Council itself should be represented at this ceremony by its President-in-office. We cannot forget that the great man who has left us was a particularly distinguished President of that organ of the League.

The Secretary-General. — Mr. President. — I think I ought to inform you that the Council is already considering the point raised by M. Politis, and I understand it is the intention of the members to invite their President to represent them on the sad occasion on Saturday.

11. — COMMUNICATION BY THE BRITISH DELEGATION OF A MESSAGE REGARDING REPORTS ON THE SITUATION AT SHANGHAI.

Sir John Simon (British Empire). — Mr. President. — With reference to the request transmitted from the Assembly to Shanghai for an official report as regards the cessation of hostilities, I have to-day received a message to the following effect from the British

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Minister to China, and, as you will see, this message is in effect a message from the representatives of the four States who have special interests in Shanghai. This is the message:

"American, British, French and Italian representatives and their commanders-in-chief met on March 7th and decided to send the following joint message to their respective representatives at Geneva:

"With reference to recent request from Geneva for information regarding cessation or otherwise of hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese forces in the neighbourhood of Shanghai, it is difficult, owing to comparative remoteness from the Shanghai Settlement of the present front, to secure such information from naval sources alone. Foreign representatives have arranged, in consultation with their four commanders-in-chief, to co-ordinate their enquiries, and, utilising reports of legations, military attachés, and such other information as may be available to foreign commanders-in-chief from naval, military or other sources, to send to Geneva daily a joint report which will be transmitted by the British Minister, as senior representative concerned, to the head of his delegation for textual communication to the heads of the French and Italian delegations and to the United States Minister at Berne for such action *vis-à-vis* the League of Nations as he may think fit. These daily telegraphic reports will be numbered serially, beginning to-day with Situation Report No. 1. It is hoped that these arrangements will meet with approval.

"This telegram has been drafted in concert with American, British, French and Italian heads of missions."

That is the message which I am authorised to transmit, and which, as you see, is a message from the American, British, French and Italian heads of missions. I may add that I have also received and have communicated to the French and Italian delegations and to the United States Minister at Berne the first of these reports, and, of course, subject to their own view, I am perfectly prepared to hand it to the President so that it may be read in due course.

The President:

Translation: The Commission will certainly desire to thank Sir John Simon for his communication. I am very glad that the representatives and the commanders-in-chief of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy have agreed to send us a report daily. We shall receive their reports with the greatest interest. They will be most helpful in the delicate task we have to perform.

M. Paul-Boncour (France):

Translation: I wish merely to comply with Sir John Simon's request to the Powers with special interests at Shanghai, and to say that, not only have we no objection to his proposal, but that it is entirely in keeping with the desire shared by all, that the Assembly and the General Commission should be supplied with the necessary information. I am extremely glad that the military attachés on the spot have agreed that they will be able to send joint reports; these reports will afford the League very valuable information. The consuls' reports have been extremely useful during the stage of hostilities in the strict sense of the term. When

operations have reached a particular line it is not easy for the consuls to visit the front. There is therefore obviously a gap. To put it briefly, the League is proving that, with the necessary experience, it is little by little forging the instruments it needs.

M. Rosso (Italy):

Translation: I entirely agree with Sir John Simon. I should be very glad that all information collected should be communicated to the Assembly.

Sir John Simon (British Empire):—Mr. President.—I have reason to think that the United States representative is equally willing. Perhaps as a formality the Secretary-General would wish to communicate with him.

The Secretary-General.—I will obtain the information as soon as possible.

12. — GENERAL DISCUSSION (continuation).

The President:

Translation: Before we resume the general discussion, I should like to say that I have still ten speakers on my list. If you think of the work we still have to accomplish, you will all agree that it is most desirable that we should finish the general discussion to-day. As we have only two or three days left this week, it is very important that the first stage in our work should be finished by the end of the week without our being forced to postpone until next week the important questions we are discussing, and on which we must not spend too much time. I should like to draw the attention of members who intend to speak to-day to the position, and I shall ask the Assembly to sit late if need be, so that we can finish the general discussion to-day.

Mr. Lester (Irish Free State).—Mr. President.—

It seemed well to me that, at the opening stages of this discussion, the field should be left clear as far as possible for those Members of the League who are not also Members of the Council to express their views on the principles underlying the tragic situation which has arisen in the Far East. I am sure that every one of my colleagues on the Council with me will have welcomed the very frank expression of views to which we have listened during the past two or three days.

I need scarcely say that the Irish people have nothing but the most friendly feelings towards the two peoples involved in this dispute, and I am happy to think that the relations between our delegations at innumerable Conferences in Geneva have always been most cordial. My country may be said to have no direct material interest in the Far East; but, like all other nations, we are deeply concerned in the maintenance of world peace, and, above all, in the maintenance and development of the organisation whose object is to replace in international affairs right for might, and the reign of law for the comparative lawlessness of the past.

The fateful issue which is before this Assembly therefore imposes a duty and a grave responsibility upon every Member of the League, whether representing a small or a large State. In the words of the Spanish Foreign Minister, the issue may well be whether or not the basic principle of our new international relations will continue to exist. The Council, which is your executive organ and upon which my country has the honour to be one of your elected representatives, has spent nearly six months in endeavouring to secure a peaceful settlement of the dispute, mainly under the provisions, it must be remembered, of Article 11. If we have not

achieved as full a measure of success as we sought, and fervently hoped for, it is not because your Council has lacked diligence in the discharge of its grave responsibilities, or been wanting in patience in its conduct of the affair. Very many efforts have been made to put an end to the bloodshed, sometimes by private appeals from the Council, and sometimes by using on behalf of the Council the local influence and the diplomatic machinery of the great Powers. The initiative taken on those occasions by the great Powers invariably received the full support of the Members of the Council, and I believe that the smaller nations which are Members of the Council, and which may perhaps be said to represent in a special way the general body of the Assembly, have correctly interpreted your views, and indeed have done their plain duty in lending their full support to every initiative which offered some possibility of successful mediation.

Permit me to recall one of the notable declarations of the Council. I refer to the resolution of December 10th, in which the Japanese representative joined with his colleagues in reaffirming the recognition by Japan of her obligation to withdraw her troops in Manchuria to the railway zone as speedily as was compatible with the safety of the lives and property of the Japanese subjects. On that occasion, a declaration was made by our distinguished President, M. Briand—whose death is a personal loss to every lover of peace. M. Briand made it quite clear that that withdrawal was not dependent upon and not to be delayed on account of the enquiry which the Lytton Commission had been asked to make. The attitude of your Council upon this point admits of no doubt.

The matter is of great importance, because of the fact that the dispute of which the Assembly is now seized is the whole dispute between China and Japan, not the incidents of that dispute, whether they are taking place, or have taken place, in Manchuria or Shanghai, but the trouble itself of which those incidents are the unhappy symptoms.

Certain considerations of principle seem to stand out from the mass of facts before the Assembly. Firstly, there is a duty clearly imposed upon every party to the Covenant to avail itself fully of the machinery of the League for the settlement of all disputes. The obligations of the Covenant in this respect are powerfully reinforced by the provisions of the Pact of Paris.

Secondly, the territorial integrity and political independence of every Member of the League are guaranteed in the plainest possible terms by Article 10 of the Covenant. This Assembly has to consider whether the conduct of either of the Parties to the dispute constitutes a violation of this all-important article.

Should it be found that the Covenant has, in fact, been violated, it would become our clear duty to declare again the solemn principles upon which the public law of the world is now based and to require of the party concerned a definite rectification of the situation.

In this relation, it may not be out of place to direct your attention once more to the note sent to Japan on February 16th by all the Members of the Council, exclusive of the two Parties to the dispute, and in regard to which the honourable delegate of Sweden has made a useful suggestion.

It is clear that the duty of the Assembly is not only to settle the dispute between two Members of the League, but also and above all to uphold the sanctity of the Covenant.

The first step is therefore to restore a situation compatible with the Covenant, not only by the cessation of hostilities, but by the restoration of the *status quo ante*.

The final settlement, which may take a long time to reach, can only take place on the basis of respect for international agreements, the Covenant, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Peace Pact of Paris. We must not only settle this dispute: we must settle it right.

It is a hard task, the hardest and the most responsible which the League has ever been called upon to undertake. But it is a task that is a direct expression of the League's fundamental purpose, of its very reason for existence.

I do not believe that the League will fail in this task, and I believe that, in the difficult and delicate negotiations ahead of us, we shall have the fullest co-operation and goodwill of both our Chinese and Japanese friends, and on their part they may be assured that they will get from the Assembly nothing but friendly and utterly impartial consideration of their respective cases.

13. — COMMUNICATION OF SITUATION REPORT No. 1.

The Secretary-General.—I have to inform you that I have been in communication with the representative of the United States Government, and he agrees that the information obtained be communicated to the Committee.

The President:

Translation: The Secretary-General is referring to the communication announced by Sir John Simon earlier in the meeting. It is the first report from the four representatives of the Powers principally interested in Shanghai.

The telegram reads as follows:

"Morning March 6th Japanese had occupied points along the line running roughly from north-west of Liuhoo on Yangtse via Lutung one mile west of Kiating to Huangtu on Shanghai-Nanking railway west of Nanshiang thence bending east covering Chenju along Soochow creek with a few patrols south of creek.

"Skirmishes then taking place such as are involved in case of troops occupying new front. Japanese report occasional skirmishes between patrols but no casualties March 7th.

"Japanese reinforcements disembarking Woonung railway wharves morning March 7th.

"Received no information of any change in situation since but both sides charge other with responsibility for fighting north-west of Liuhoo.

"We are taking steps to verify facts in this connection.

"Owing to geographical difficulties resulting from Chinese withdrawal we are at present only able to secure first-hand information from Japanese side of front but are endeavouring to make arrangements for maintaining contact with Chinese side also."

14. — GENERAL DISCUSSION (continuation).

M. Paredes (Salvador):

Translation: My country is among those which have co-operated in the work of the League from the very outset. It could not therefore omit to join in the united proclamation by the nations of the great principle of international solidarity, of which the League Covenant is the supreme embodiment.

Situated in the centre of America, Salvador has always identified itself with the noble principles governing the new international organisation, the

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aim of which is to establish the reign of law in place of the reign of force.

I need not say that Salvador has always maintained the best relations with the two great disputant Powers, who represent very ancient civilisations. It is as a Member of the League and as a small country devoted to the great principles of equity and justice that Salvador is taking part in this Assembly. We hope that the principles of territorial inviolability and non-intervention and other principles which I will mention later will at this session be acknowledged once again.

The Guatemalan representative on the Council, M. Matos, made an admirable statement of the principles cherished by the weaker nations on December 10th last, during the Council's sixty-fifth session. I merely wish to remind you that one of our sister republics in Central America has already upheld the cause of justice in the Council.

The Covenant, which is the League's supreme law, sums up in its preamble the legal doctrine which is to be taken as the basis of the new organisation.

Paragraph 3 sets forth the principle of the firm establishment of the understandings of law, and paragraph 4 proclaims the need for the maintenance of justice and the scrupulous observance of all treaty obligations. Article 10 requires of the Members of the League that they should respect the territorial integrity and political independence of States. It follows that armed intervention is excluded from modern international relations.

The Covenant is so wide in scope that, if it were strictly observed, it would provide an equitable solution for all conflicts. There are, however, certain cases in which special arrangements have to be made.

I should like to draw the Commission's attention to one very important point: Article 10 of the 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes gives the following definition of aggression:

"Every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol"

I think the words "force and violence" should be substituted for the word "war".

If it is the general idea underlying the Covenant and the Protocol that force and violence as well as to be condemned, it would be desirable, in order to avoid misinterpretations, to insert these words, the importance of which cannot be overlooked. That would prevent the recurrence of the very regrettable case of two Powers committing acts which by their nature really constitute war while declaring, in order to evade the responsibility that might result from such acts, that they have not resorted to war.

Unless the word "war" is replaced by the phrase "force and violence", a strong nation might take possession of the entire territory of another and then declare it had not had resort to war.

Article 10 of the Covenant, which guarantees territorial integrity, would in that case be difficult to apply, because we should be faced with a *fait accompli* due to the violation of the principle, a sufficiently grave and quite inadmissible act.

During the discussion of the report by the Fifth Sub-Committee to the First Committee on the Draft Protocol, M. Guerrero, delegate of Salvador and now Vice-President of the Permanent Court of International Justice, enunciated this opinion, which I desire to take up again and develop here.

It would be desirable that the League should enunciate once again the principles upon which it is founded. They may be summarised as follows:

(1) Respect for treaties, without which international life is impossible:

(2) Inviolability of a State's territory, and, as a logical corollary, a declaration of the principle of non-intervention, whether for the recovery of debts or for the protection of the lives and interests of nationals of the invading country, or for any other reason — except, of course, in the case of interventions recognised by the Covenant;

(3) Absolute prohibition of States taking the execution of justice into their own hands.

I fervently hope that the conflict engaging our attention may be settled in conformity with the principles of justice, and that the League will secure respect for the Covenant, and the whole Covenant, for it is the fundamental charter of the new international organisation.

My country ardently trusts that the Assembly's resolution may give the world an assurance that the League really represents an effectual force in the cause of justice, civilisation and humanity.

Count Apponyi (Hungary):

Translation: The year 1932 is undoubtedly a fateful year in the annals of the League of Nations. The League is faced simultaneously by two major problems, both of which present difficulties which differ widely but which are most certainly among the most important that any body could have to solve.

In his remarks yesterday, the French representative referred to the connecting link between these two apparently quite different classes of work. He observed that the success or failure of the present Assembly's proceedings might, and even inevitably would, have an effect on what was happening in the Conference. I entirely share his opinion. I would merely add that this influence is reciprocal. The proceedings in the other assembly will also have their effects and consequences, whether good or evil, on the joint action we are pursuing here. In both bodies we must always keep this consideration in mind.

The problem with which we are engaged for the moment is the conflict between China and Japan, and although the country I represent has no direct interest in the development of that conflict — we entertain nevertheless the same feelings of respect and sympathy for both the nations so unhappily divided — I will venture, perhaps for that very reason, but also from a feeling of duty, to occupy your attention for a few moments.

I am speaking, I have said, from a sense of duty. Let me explain what I mean, since my words might be held to imply too much. The Assembly, it might be considered, could very well dispense with the feeble help which I can give it in this matter.

The discussions in the League Assembly in these latter years contain, however, certain precedents, certain controversies have arisen in the course of its debates, and I have sometimes found it necessary to examine the League's decisions in a critical spirit; for these reasons, silence on my part might be taken to mean abstention, lack of interest or a refusal to take part in an act which it is intended shall promote the realisation of the League's ideal. I should be sorry if any such misconception arose. It is because I follow the path mapped out by the lofty ideal underlying the Covenant, because I adhere to the methods enjoined in it and in the other conventions devised to serve the same purpose, that I desire to state that we will loyally and unreservedly co-operate in this Assembly and in any decisions it may take.

Nevertheless, we must realise, I will not say the difficulty, for that is evident, but the probable effect which the success or failure of our

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proceedings will have on the League's credit. The League's detractors will have a reply ready to hand. They will say: "The conflict has been lasting for months; hostilities have actually been engaged between two great peoples, both of them Members of the League; the Council has met several times but has not succeeded in restoring order". This class of detractor probably enjoys the feeling of triumph generally experienced by the small-minded when events seem to them to justify their inability to rise to a higher level of view. We do not appeal to the League's detractors of that type, because they are not competent to judge whether we are deserving of praise or blame. We appeal to a very different and, fortunately, a far more numerous category of world opinion, because we consider that it has the right to criticise us. It includes all those who in good faith aspire to the same ends, who in good faith cherish, or, if they found it possible, would cherish the same ideals as ours, and who, when they are sceptical, regret with sorrow that they cannot hope for the revival of confidence in the League. It is to these men of good faith, be they optimists or pessimists, that I appeal. On their judgment depends what we term the enhancement or the decline of the League's credit.

From this standpoint, the League's credit would be enormously increased if in this difficult matter we could obtain a real result, and, first of all, the cessation of hostilities, for which, in my opinion, we have had to wait rather long. I shall therefore wholeheartedly support any proposals made with a view to ensuring that our influence is speedily felt at this preliminary stage. I shall in particular support Sir John Simon's suggestion that we should take special resolutions with this end in view. I hope to see his proposal in writing and I shall give it my enthusiastic adherence.

Such confidence as we can inspire would be materially enhanced if we could achieve this object, not only a pacific solution of the present emergency, but, following on that solution, a prospect of unravelling by pacific agreement — and that will probably require work uninterrupted by episodes like this — the tangled skein of major interests that is bound up with the Sino-Japanese question.

A result of that kind, brought about with the assent of the two great peoples directly concerned and, in a manner, in keeping with the legitimate interests and rights based on previous treaties, would be an immense success.

If we continue in the spirit in which the discussion has, to my great satisfaction, gone forward — for we have heard several delegations that have often been opposed to one another come forward and proclaim identical principles with the same warm and sincere devotion — if we continue on this path, I have strong hopes of our success.

No human institution can ever enjoy absolute certainty that it will always be successful. Just as there are certain diseases that defy science and all the efforts of the greatest physician without detracting from the physician's credit, so the League may be faced with an explosion of organic forces with which, in the present position of affairs, it will be unable to cope. That does not mean that we should not proceed in the hope that mankind will develop in a manner that will render feasible what appears impossible to-day. That will not reflect discredit on the League, because, while we cannot absolutely expect complete success for all human endeavour, we can at least demand that human endeavour, whether individual or collective, shall discharge its duty to the full and make every exertion to secure success.

Notwithstanding the difficulties of the problem on which it is now engaged, the League must

always remain itself. That is a simple axiom, but it contains, I think, the whole truth.

The League of course cannot, and should not, be the instrument of the individual policy of any single Power or group of Powers. It should be exclusively an organ devised to foster the high ideal expressed in the introduction to the Covenant, and to do so by the methods prescribed in the articles of the Covenant.

That is the straight road before us. If we keep to and continue along it, while making all due allowance for the legitimate pride of the two great nations concerned in the conflict, but at the same time loyally and firmly resolved to go to the uttermost limit, then, whatever happens, the League's credit can only be enhanced in the eyes of all those whose opinion matters.

I say that merely to complete the picture, but let me repeat, if we can keep to this straight road on which we have set out, if we can obtain, at all stages of our proceedings, the unanimity that has been shown in this Commission, we shall then have endowed the League with an incalculable moral force which, supported by that of the United States of America, will really and truly represent the conscience of all mankind. No one, I think, could resist the pressure of so great a moral force.

It is from a sense of duty, a sense of humanity, a real loathing of war and bloodshed, a feeling of devotion to the League, that, in agreement with all the small nations that have spoken in the same terms, I offer you my loyal and unqualified support.

M. Mayard (Haiti):

Translation: The Haitian delegation has been deeply moved by the speeches delivered from this platform by various distinguished statesmen on behalf of the peoples, strong and weak, that belong to the different continents. One and all have condemned the use of force in an international dispute. One and all have shown that peace between two nations, however remote, is an essential need for all the countries of the world and that wars between individual States have become a world-wide disaster, that the conception of the unity of the world has to-day found almost complete expression in the commonwealth of all mankind, that in a conflict such as this every State puts itself, not as was formerly the case, in the place of the oppressor, deriving glory and advantage from his oppression, but rather in that of the oppressed, and recognises the need for impartial international justice and consequently for an international force to dispense such justice without favour.

Everyone must have been impressed at the Commission's second meeting, when the President-in-office of the Council, M. Paul-Boncour, observed that the information required to arrive at a sound opinion would have been less contradictory, less passionate, more trustworthy and more deserving of consideration had it come from an impartial force belonging to the League and occupying a neutral zone between the armies of the two disputants. You will all remember the cogent and able statement made by the same brilliant orator on the afternoon of the day before, when he reminded the first meeting of this special session of the countless difficulties involved in the delicate task before the Council, explained the reasons for the slowness and hesitation with which it had acted and attempted to justify the imperfections of the measures and the inefficacy of the action taken by our executive organ and — to put things bluntly — its powerlessness, notwithstanding its conscientious endeavours, which we should acknowledge, and all the trouble it has taken within the unduly limited scope of our powers of action. Everyone must have held in his innermost conscience that, in the last

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 By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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six months, many men would have been saved from death, many homes preserved from ruin, had the League had at its disposal a force under its own orders, not merely for purposes of information but to give tangible and prompt effect to its work of pacification.

Japan and China, who, since the past autumn, have been fighting without being at war, would each have gained far more by saving the lives that have been lost and the property that has been destroyed than by taking up arms to uphold an alleged national prestige or to preserve interests which must in many respects seem questionable to a third party less directly concerned in the dispute.

That is the firm belief of the Haitian delegation. It is a belief we hold both in a general way and when we have in mind the protection of our own political independence and our own territorial integrity. We hold it in particular in regard to the Japanese and Chinese peoples, for whom the people I represent cherishes feelings of sincere and cordial friendship. Of that friendship we have given proof, for we have afforded hospitality to numbers of Chinese emigrants, who for many years have led their sober and industrious life in the midst of our population, which has gladly welcomed them.

Moreover, in more than one case, we have testified, not only to our friendship, but also to our enthusiastic admiration for the Japanese. We desire that they should steadily grow in power, because their extraordinarily rapid development, their amazing adaptation to western civilisation, their success in all branches of human activity and the bold and entirely legitimate course they took twelve years ago in demanding that the Covenant should proclaim the equality of the human races, have always been regarded by my compatriots as a tangible and decisive argument in favour of our own cause.

And on account of our esteem for the people of the country of the Rising Sun and its august Emperor, and of the special importance we attach for our own sake to its high position among the great Powers of the world, we expect from this people — and surely its presence in these precincts and the many statements it has made show how fully it intends to do so — that it should repudiate the old barbarous conception of national prestige based on conquest by violence, and that it should acquire the highest prestige in the eyes of mankind and the highest moral authority by submitting to the verdict of world opinion, which claims that it should respect the right of the weaker and thereby uphold our institution; for our institution would never survive a setback in the present disquieting situation.

From the lofty standpoint which it deliberately takes up, the Haitian delegation considers that the General Commission of the League and the League itself have another important objective linked up to that of the immediate cessation of bloodshed between the Chinese and Japanese; we must eliminate the conflict and its causes by setting between the disputants a precise and clear judgment on the substance of the Manchurian question, as well as the sanguinary episode at Shanghai. The Parties themselves would give more effective assistance to that end than all of us could give, because they would first evacuate the territories that have been wrongfully occupied and forgo their national claims and resentment.

The Parties will emerge ennobled by a judgment of that kind if it be based on the principles contained in the Preamble to the Covenant rather than on the arguments and counter arguments that controversies can adduce from its articles; while the

arbitrator itself, the League, will emerge both ennobled and more powerful, for no one will hesitate any longer to arm it with a suitable force to enable it "to deal with any matter within the sphere of the League or affecting the peace of the world". Then, and only then, will it be in a position to "ensure respect for, and the preservation as against external aggression of, the territorial integrity and political independence of all States".

We ardently hope that, to deal with the conflict in Asia, the General Commission will propose that the plenary Assembly adopt a decision so drafted as to revive in the minds of the peoples a vigorous and active confidence in the fundamental idea which gave birth to the League. We trust that the decision will do away, so far as the activities of the League and its terminology are concerned, with all those subtle discriminations which are concealed by such disquieting euphemisms as "unorganised States", "States with limited interests", "regional understandings", "special situation of a continent" and so on. All these are phrases which ordinarily are employed only to justify in advance the misuse of force and are applied to facts which represent a denial of the principles of justice, equality and mutual assistance, the very foundations and substance of the Covenant.

The Haitian delegation unreservedly associates itself with the categorical and precise opinions expressed by the delegates of Mexico, Uruguay, Panama and Salvador. We associate ourselves still more categorically and enthusiastically with the declaration of the Colombian delegate, M. Restrepo; and, like him, we ask the General Commission to recommend the Special Assembly to embody in the judgments and resolutions which it will ultimately pass with regard to the dispute brought before it the following four points which were formulated by M. Gonzalez-Prada, the Peruvian representative on the Council, on December 10th:

"(1) No State has the right to effect the military occupation of the territory of another in order to ensure the execution of certain treaties;

"(2) No State is entitled to oblige another — having invaded its territory — to enter upon direct negotiations on the bearing and legal value of treaties previously existing between the two States;

"(3) The exercise of the right possessed by each State to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its nationals must be limited by respect for the sovereignty of the other State; no State being entitled, in order to provide such protection, to authorise its military forces to penetrate into the territory of the other for the purpose of carrying out police operations;

"(4) The fact that a State has certain rights, claims, economic concessions, etc., in regard to another State does not entitle the former to effect the military occupation of the territory or to seize the property of the debtor State. Any recovery of debts by compulsion is illicit, in accordance with the principles accepted by the Second Peace Conference (The Hague 1907)."

If these four points, which apply to the question now before us as well as to innumerable cases in which the law has been broken by force, were to take their place in the League's jurisprudence and become embodied in its charter, the League would be assured of surviving as the safeguard of small States. It would have no need to fear disavowal by the peoples. It would cease to be confronted with the tragic dilemma pointed out by the head of the Spanish delegation when he said that the

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question for the League was: To be or not to be. To be, if it proclaims the law and condemns the arbitrary use of force; not to be, if in the present or in any other similar conflict, it makes the hazardous attempt, stigmatised in America by a terrible word, to "whitewash" a powerful country which has been found in fault.

Sir George Perley (Canada). — It is hardly necessary for me to say how much the Government and the people of Canada deplore the unfortunate events that have taken place recently in the Far East. The Dominion of Canada faces, across the Pacific, the two countries which now unfortunately find themselves opposed. With both those countries our relations have been and will, we hope, continue to be most friendly; with both of them our contacts are increasing in importance and in intimacy every year. It is not, however, on these grounds alone that we earnestly hope that a solution may be found for the present difficulties, but also because we regret exceedingly the fact that two countries, which are not only Member States of the League of Nations but also Members of the Council and signatories of the Paris Pact, have not been able to adjust their difficulties by pacific means, but have found it necessary to resort to force.

For some months the Council has been considering the question which has now been submitted to the Assembly. That question involved a problem of a most difficult and delicate character to the solution of which the Council has worked most faithfully. The Canadian delegation would like to pay tribute to that work.

Far more, however, than the solution of a single problem is at stake in our deliberations. During the last twelve years the world has been endeavouring to build up, through the League, a system of outlawing war and settling disputes by reason rather than by force. The way in which this Assembly deals with the question before it will go far to show how successful we have been in this effort. Certainly, if the Assembly meets satisfactorily the test which now confronts it, it will mean a long step forward in the realisation of the League ideal.

To the Canadian delegation it seems that the work of the Assembly must be based primarily upon the following considerations:

(1) We should stop further bloodshed and bring about a real and effective armistice;

(2) We should distinguish between the rights of a case and the manner in which those rights are realised and enforced;

(3) We should affirm as solemnly as possible the fundamental truth that no infringement of the territorial integrity, and no change in the political independence, of any Member of the League of Nations which is brought about by force in disregard of the undertakings of Article 10 of the Covenant can be recognised as valid and effective by the other Members of the League.

We believe that this Assembly, the instrument through which the common concern of mankind for the maintenance of peace can find expression and make itself felt, should proceed in its work with the above considerations always in view. We hope that by so doing it will arrive at a solution of the difficulties before it, which will be just, peaceful and permanent.

M. Batoloff (Bulgaria):

Translation: The President of the Council, M. Paul-Boncour, in his opening speech this session,

set before us the complexity of the problem we have to examine very objectively, and explained the great difficulties the Council's conciliatory efforts had encountered.

We do not intend to dwell on the details, or to examine the fundamental causes of the conflict in which two great countries in the Far East are so unfortunately engaged.

The problem concerns not only the States Parties to the dispute: its moral and legal effects are of vital importance to all States Members of the League. It raises questions of principle of the utmost importance. We must consolidate and safeguard the development of the new era in international relations inaugurated after the world war. That is to say, we must replace force by law. The solution of all conflicts must be sought by pacific means. Under the Covenant and the Pact of Paris justice must not be sought through violence. In the same way, no *fait accompli* policy could be acceptable to public opinion.

One of the fundamental articles of the Covenant, Article 10, guarantees the territorial integrity and political independence of all Members of the League. In the present conflict, therefore, the principle of the inviolability of the national territory must be safeguarded. It is important, in the interests of peace, that the Covenant and the Pact of Paris alike should be respected by all the signatories.

The League is now creating a precedent which is of great importance to the future, for the issue is the maintenance unimpaired of the confidence the nations have placed in the League, and the strengthening of its authority and prestige.

Bulgaria will support the common efforts of all Members of the League to ensure the strict application of the Covenant and the Pact of Paris.

M. Mazuranic (Yugoslavia):

Translation: I am glad to note from the speeches made from this platform that this time those who were pessimistic about the League will most certainly be disappointed. Almost all the speeches we have heard contain various fundamental features which are identical.

One point of the utmost importance in particular has been — as it deserved to be — brought out plainly: the conviction that the serious conflict, or if you prefer legal terminology, the difficult problem in the Far East, in spite of the tremendous distance geographically between the scene in which the events are — or we hope were — taking place, is of vital importance to the whole League.

The solution of the problem before us is as important to us as though the events in question had occurred within this very town, in which, fortunately, the atmosphere is peaceful.

My country wishes to speak during the present discussion, not in order to bring forward new opinions or to open out new horizons, but to state its profound conviction that Article 11 of the Covenant embodies not merely a method of procedure but a pure truth. The article stipulates: "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League." We also desire to join those who have emphasised that this time the League, in seeking an adequate solution of the problem, must exhaust every effort and, above all, must avoid anything which might disguise the real nature of the question. What the Council, in spite of its good intentions, has been unable to do will in no case constitute a precedent. But, now the problem is before the Assembly, it has entered into its final phase. We are discussing the matter under Article 15 of the Covenant. Any decisions we take will constitute a

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precedent, and will be of considerable importance. They may perhaps influence a whole historical era. I would go further, and would say that, in any event, our decision must not be an *ad hoc* decision, but must be universal and binding upon all Members of the League.

I would go even further and say that the representatives of the States directly concerned in the problem must be sure that our decision is universal and binding upon all. I need not, I think, dwell further upon the importance of our decision.

The sudden vicissitudes of modern history, the torrent of political events, demonstrate very clearly that the maxim *hodie mihi cras tibi* — though we should say *hodie tibi cras mihi* — is still true in international life.

I warmly support the Czechoslovak representative's statement, particularly his observation that the examination of the problem now before us will perhaps disclose certain weak spots in our organisation.

May I venture to draw attention to one of them? Is it not regrettable that the League is dependent, for the necessary information, upon the goodwill of the States which happen to be in a position to furnish it? However friendly and willing those States may be, I think it essential that the League should be able to obtain the necessary information through its own organisation.

The problem is very complex, and as the late M. Briand — then President of the Council — said on December 10th last: "this problem . . . is of a very special character, because of the exceptional nature of the treaty or customary relations existing in normal times between the two countries".

The problem is so difficult and complicated that it may be beyond the League's power to find an adequate solution. That should not discourage us, but should, on the contrary, incite us to improve our organisation; for the latter is so essential to all the Members of the League.

The League has been called upon to settle a serious question, to fulfil its most important duty. It has begun to do so, and Yugoslavia will warmly support any proposals in accord with what I have just said. We shall, of course, support the proposal of Sir John Simon, the British representative.

Mr. de Water (South Africa). — The Government of China has appealed to the Assembly of the League of Nations against the actions of Japan, which, they declare, constitute a violation of China's national integrity and, as such, a breach of the Covenant of the League, to which Japan is a signatory nation.

It therefore behoves every signatory nation to the Covenant to form its judgment on the facts of the case as they have been presented to us by the Parties to the dispute. It is for this reason that I speak briefly and, I hope, without circumlocution.

But let me say this at once, that it is not possible for my delegation to form a just judgment on the facts at the present moment, in the sense that it is at this moment not able to allocate the blame to one Party or the other to this dispute, for all the facts of the dispute between China and Japan are not yet known; although this I am able to say bluntly, that we have no other name for the state of affairs in China to-day than that of war, and the following facts at any rate appear to be clear to us.

Powerful Japanese forces, equipped with all the modern weapons of war, have been transported into Chinese territory. These armies have been actively and destructively used against Chinese forces and have taken possession of a considerable portion of Chinese territory. It appears to us equally clear

that Japan has not sought to use the pacific means at its disposal under the Covenant, to which it is signatory. Nor, in the absence of any further explanation by Japan, does it appear to us that in this dispute she has remembered her declarations under the Pact of Paris. Equally it seems to my delegation an undisputed fact that China has placed its case in the hands of the League and has been prepared at every stage of the enquiry by the Council of the League to act on its advice and instructions. As emphatically has Japan refused to show the same confidence in the fairmindedness of a body of which it has been for many years so active and important a Member.

As far as these facts are concerned, it is to be stated unhesitatingly, in our opinion, that a *prima facie* case has been made out that Japan has acted in contradiction to what we believe to be the obligations to which, equally with all of us, she is bound.

Yet so far, and no further, is it possible for me to form a clear opinion.

I, for one, would urge the distinguished representatives of Japan to state to this Commission of the Assembly, in the clearest terms, its full case on these points to which I have drawn attention. Japan may have the most profound reasons why she has not been able to use the machinery of the League, or why she has not been able to follow its advice. I can only urge again that we be given these reasons, for it seems to me to be the simple duty of this Assembly to ascertain the validity of those reasons.

Let me say this. My country stands back to no nation in its deep regret at the unhappy relations which exist between these two great Eastern peoples to-day. An unsettled Asia has, and has had, the most far-reaching economic repercussions in the world.

It has always seemed to us a tragic and fateful fact that China has now for many years been unable to compose her own internal differences. Such a composition, were it to come in the near future, would bring in its train reactions which, it will be agreed by every thinking man, must ultimately spell the greatest benefit to herself as well as to the nations of the world. But that wealthy country's weakness has never seemed to us to be a good reason why advantage should be taken of her weakness by any one of the great Powers of the world.

As for Japan, I am one of those who have always had, and still have, the utmost admiration for those great qualities of virility, intellectuality, courage and patriotism which characterise her people in their national life. It is because of the abundance of those qualities possessed by Japan's distinguished representatives at this Conference that I appeal to them, on behalf of my country, to use their great prestige to persuade the Government of their country to turn from measures of war to pacific means to compose this dangerous dispute. It is because Japan possesses those qualities in such abundance that it seems to me unthinkable that she will not pause and take stock. It seems to me unthinkable that, by the course she chooses to pursue, she will finally decide to cast on one side the friendship and admiration of so many nations, and the good opinion of the world.

Thus far I have spoken briefly of the actions and responsibilities that rest upon the two parties to the dispute. But what of ourselves? How far are we prepared to recognise the grave responsibilities and duties which a crisis such as this places upon every State Member of the League?

I had occasion at another time and in another place to remark that it appeared to me just and

seemly that the voice of a nation should be heard at these Conference tables in the advocacy of a policy, in proportion to its share in the sacrifice such policy may entail.

For that reason, the smaller nations at a conference such as this should look to the Great Powers for a lead. For theirs must be the chief sacrifice.

We, at this great crisis in our affairs, are looking for wise leadership from the Great Powers and, above all, for strong leadership — leadership which can be interpreted in terms of action and not in terms of words.

Are the Great Powers satisfied that they have pointed the way?

The Aga Khan (India). — It has already been said that the universality of the League of Nations is at once its weakness and its strength. We might equally say that its universality creates problems as well as solves them, because the League comprises a diversity which is hard for any individual mind to grasp. That diversity is even more marked in Asia than in Western countries; but the fundamental laws of justice and fair play, forbearance and goodwill apply in the East just as much as in the West. Our need in approaching the grave task before us is, above all, patience and understanding. I come from a country which, like other countries whose representatives have spoken here, has a tradition of friendship with both the Parties to the case that is before the Assembly; but much more than that, China is our good neighbour in the north and in the east, and with her province of Turkestan we have had, since time immemorial, friendly cultural and economic relations. India has behind her a long history of intimate association with China and Japan. The mutual influence of the three countries in religion, in art and in literature has endured since time immemorial. There is a town in my country which I know well and which contains one of the most sacred shrines of Buddhism. There you will find Buddhist pilgrims, not only from Burma, where that great and ancient religion holds firm sway, but from the more distant homes of the Buddhist both in China and Japan, side by side in common worship.

So too in art and thought, in literature and creative work, we find the living traces of that mutual influence. Just as the Indian Buddha has influenced Chinese and Japanese thought, so the great Confucius has left his living and eternal mark on India. Equally we have been drawn together by the ties of commerce that have grown stronger and more complex with the march of modern civilisation. Memories are long in the East, and India will have memories of all she has given and received in interchange with Further Asia, and cannot now be backward in pressing earnestly the cause of reconciliation in the spirit of the thought which has inspired the three countries alike.

The facts of history give me a platform from which I can rightly and earnestly appeal alike to my friends of China and Japan to seek the road to peace, reconciliation, adjustment and friendship, and to economic and intellectual co-operation in the permanent interests of both. The leaders of China and Japan must realise that, without this friendship and co-operation, the future can never be as happy and as peaceful for either of those great countries. We are here to help them by undertaking the work of mediation and to help to lay the foundation of a surer conciliation for the future.

Mediation is the first duty laid upon this Assembly by the terms of the Covenant. It is true that the Covenant prescribes other courses of action to be followed as circumstances develop, but, if we are faithfully to perform our first duty of friendly mediation, we must not let ourselves be deflected

by thoughts of any other duties that may later devolve upon us.

If we do not concentrate with a single mind upon mediation, we shall not only be prejudging the issues; we shall fall into a far greater error. No mediator can hope to succeed unless he sets himself to win and hold the confidence of both parties. He may too easily forfeit their confidence if he allows himself to be influenced by the knowledge that he may later have to form other conclusions. Yet if once the parties lose confidence in him, he will not only have failed completely in his first duty, but will have raised formidable obstacles in the path of further progress.

Therefore I would urge the Assembly, not only to concentrate on its first and vital immediate task of mediation, but to hold fast to the principles which alone can guarantee its success.

Is it too much to ask that the two Parties on their side should co-operate by placing themselves freely in the hands of the mediators, confident that the mediation will be carried out in a spirit of complete fairness and impartiality for the permanent peace and friendship of the Far East?

India hopes earnestly that mediation will be but the first step towards true friendship between China and Japan. To achieve its aim, mediation must be based, not on methods of expediency, but on clear guiding principles. Where else are we to seek these principles but in the Covenant itself, which is the mainspring of all our efforts here? All the signatories have fully weighed and understood the obligations which it lays on them; but that fact is perhaps not sufficiently appreciated. Let us make it clear beyond dispute to the world as well as to ourselves. I gladly support the suggestion made by the representative of Great Britain that we should seize the opportunity to reaffirm in all their bearings the fundamental principles that underlie the Covenant. If that suggestion can win united support, we shall lay a sure foundation on which an edifice of lasting peace, friendship and co-operation in the Far East can be constructed.

M. Feldmans (Latvia) :

Translation : I shall only detain the General Commission for a few moments.

The Latvian nation has followed with great anxiety the development of the events we are discussing. Even if we admit the extreme complexity of the problem and of the causes underlying the dispute, we must nevertheless also admit that the events have extended dangerously beyond the limits which the international undertakings, the Covenant and the Pact of Paris lay down with regard to the reciprocal relations of the nations.

We have seen an economic boycott, the failure of one of the Parties to execute treaties, hostile propaganda, and, finally, resort to force, the refusal to submit the question to pacific procedure. In a word, in this dispute, all the ills we believed had been finally banished from international life have reappeared.

The Latvian nation, which has very small material forces and has based its future on respect for international undertakings and faith in the vital power of the principles of justice and equity, of which the League is the guardian, views this with serious disquietude.

At this grave moment, the Latvian delegation strongly urges the two great disputant nations to lend us their aid in establishing peace, and assuaging the anxiety of the nations.

It is our duty to restore and strengthen their confidence in the League.

The Latvian delegation does not consider it desirable, at this moment, to examine the root causes of the dispute or to pronounce a hasty

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judgment against either Party. In our opinion, the League Assembly is chiefly a political instrument, whose primary duty is to restore and organise peace.

We are glad hostilities have ceased; but the nations expect more of us than that. We must convince them that this special Assembly has won a victory for the fundamental laws of our charter. We must be able to tell them that both nations, equally desirous of serving the cause of peace, have freely accepted solemn undertakings which will absolutely prevent any recurrence of the recent unhappy events.

The League must not give up the question until it is finally settled.

In this way, we believe, we shall best serve both the interests of the two countries and the cause of the League.

M. Costa du Rels (Bolivia):

Translation: Almost all the delegates have dutifully responded to the President's appeal to state their views here. My delegation also wishes to fulfil its duty. I shall be clear and brief.

Those who are competent to speak and whose feelings for the two nations which are unhappily in conflict are equally cordial have reminded us of the principles of the fundamental charter which govern the relations of States, their rights and their duties. It is therefore necessary to see what the position is.

The delegates of Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Salvador have generously, forcefully and enthusiastically reminded us of the principles which Latin America has always been the first to champion. Formerly, these principles existed only in the universal conscience. They are now embodied in the Covenant. All we ask is their strict observance, because therein resides the guarantee of our own future and existence. That alone will enable us, the younger, smaller, weaker countries to achieve our real destiny, as other nations have achieved theirs before us. Only we will not, cannot, and must not employ those methods by means of which, in the past, many nations were able to expand. Times have changed.

To-day, no nation can impose its will by force: the international community would acknowledge no advantage obtained in that way. The occupation of a territory over which another State has inalienable historic rights, through violence or cunning penetration, advantage being taken of geographical conditions, confers no authority and creates no right. To accept the converse would be to accept a curious *uti possidetis de facto* which at bottom was only the old time-worn mask of covetousness.

Sudden coercion or gradual penetration give a momentary illusion of possession, but sooner or later that illusion will vanish in the light of law and justice.

I said just now that the League Covenant offered us as a means certain texts which should provide remedies. The very complex problem now referred to the Assembly was already looming in the distance. M. Motta, with his customary tact and foresight, has analysed the texts and shown their logical connection and concordance. He very forcefully emphasised the great importance of Article 10. He then pointed, with unusual impartiality, to the various means provided in Articles 12 and 15, and indicated very strikingly their bearing on Article 16. After his eloquent and authoritative words, any further comments would be superfluous. We therefore all support his friendly and pressing exhortation to the representatives of the two Parties to the dispute. The Chinese and Japanese delegates can hardly forget that every voice raised here,

however humble, however weak, is speaking on behalf of the universal conscience and the brotherhood of mankind. The magnificent demonstration of fellowship from this platform, therefore, has made of it a living centre of spiritual force and truth.

But it is not enough to lay down the principles. We must apply them. On whom shall this heavy burden be placed?

The Covenant confers benefits, and it also imposes duties. For their accomplishment, certain material means which some of us have and of which others are deprived are necessary. It is this distinction which weakens the texts and renders the methods inoperative. Just as in modern States the system of taxation is graduated in proportion to means, in international life the responsibility for a conflict logically tends to fall upon the more powerful. It is an accepted fact, in civic matters, that the law should impose burdens upon the individual according to his capacity. In international life that is a privilege which has its magnificent aspect: certain nations, owing to their longstanding reputation and the successful development of their capacities, have become leaders of mankind. Obviously, despite the moral equality of States, their material capacity is graduated. There is a close connection between this fact and the principles of the League.

This discussion, which has given the smaller States an opportunity of expressing their views impartially, was necessary and useful. It has created an atmosphere making for wise counsels which we must be careful to embody in a resolution expressing the views put forward here.

The discussion is now closed. Public opinion urges the two States and the League to assuage their anxiety.

M. Yen (China). — I need hardly say how much the Chinese delegation is gratified at the noble and spontaneous response that so many distinguished speakers in the debate have made to our invitation to express themselves on the momentous issues of the Sino-Japanese dispute, issues which concern the very existence of the League of Nations.

I believe it is a fair deduction from the course of the debate to say that every speaker has supported the proposition that the League must stand by its Covenant at all events. As M. Beneš said the other day, the principles of the Covenant must be respected in all cases without condition. In the words of Sir John Simon, the situation before us involves something more even than the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Far East.

In my opening statement before the Assembly, I had the honour to ask you to do certain things, and to-day I beg to repeat the request.

The question has been raised during the debate by some speakers as to the procedure to be adopted by the Assembly. It has been pointed out with good reason that Article 15 provides, in the first instance, the procedure of mediation before proceeding to any other method. That is correct, although I should like to say that the procedure of mediation has been employed by the Council for the past five months, and we know with what success. However, if mediation is tried once more, this time by the Assembly, and fails, it is expected by my Government that the Assembly will exhaust all other possibilities under Article 15 and other articles.

The other point of procedure — and I am not sure whether one is justified in using that word in this connection — which has also been called to our attention is that, after the eventual adoption of a declaration, nothing more should be done at present. The contents of this declaration, I gather, will be similar to those of the Stimson Note sent

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by the American Government on January 8th to the Chinese and Japanese Governments. It is said that, if further action should now be taken by the Assembly in the dispute before we have heard from the Lytton Commission still on its way to Manchuria, it would be to prejudice the case.

Here it seems to me that there is a grave confusion of thought. Never for a moment has the Chinese Government asked or expected the Assembly to take an action that would be tantamount to prejudging the whole dispute. We asked you, for instance, to recognise that the Covenant has been broken; and on what ground? Because more than 200,000 square miles of Chinese territory is under Japanese military occupation, and some 30,000,000 Chinese citizens are under a foreign yoke — a flagrant violation of Article 10 of the Covenant. Because, contrary to the provisions of Article 12, Japan has publicly and formally stated that she would not submit the dispute to arbitration.

These are facts absolutely and perfectly obvious, which certainly require no special commission to report before we can believe them. We have before us the case of a nation which has sent its armed forces on to another's territory without any shadow of right. If the terms of the Covenant mean anything at all, the broad fact of the matter does not require, as I have said, any investigation by any commission or otherwise. Japan herself admitted it, and pleads provocation and excuse. In these circumstances it seems to me that the League in effect must say to Japan: "All you say as to provocation and excuse may or may not be true — that is something to be looked into. What concerns us is that you have gone about the settlement of the dispute with China in the wrong way. There are peaceful methods which you have agreed to for the settlement of all such differences. In sending your armies on to Chinese territory you have broken your contract with us. Bring them back to where they belong and then let us help you to settle this dispute with China by methods to which we are all committed." Such a declaration, that the Covenant has been and is being violated, does not have the slightest tendency to prejudice the merits of the dispute. That an army of invasion shall be undisturbed, and even allowed to extend its unlawful occupation, as the case is, pending peaceful investigation and adjustment of the dispute which that army was sent to settle by force, would be to connive at the very things which the Covenant forbids.

Moreover, the very resolution that created the Lytton Commission made the very natural and logical distinction between the preliminary and immediate matter of stopping hostilities and liquidating the military occupation of Manchuria, and on the other hand the task of adjusting the dispute itself. It was expressly stipulated therein that "the appointment and deliberations of the Commission should not prejudice in any way the understanding given by the Japanese Government in the resolution of September 30th as regards the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone." The Commission, it is clear, was intended to contribute towards a final and fundamental solution: it was not designed to perpetuate the foreign occupation of Chinese territory. That was the view and intention of the Council itself. China, therefore, asks that the decision of the Council be put into execution by and through the supreme authority of the Assembly, so that the Japanese troops now unlawfully on Chinese territory commence to withdraw.

The matter is rendered the more urgent by the fact that Japan has openly expressed approval of and supported the so-called "Manchuria for the Manchus" movement — in reality a puppet

Government. As soon as the Japanese troops withdraw, this so-called "Government" will collapse like a house of cards. I should like to call your attention in this matter to the declaration of my Government of February 22nd, published as Appendix VIII of our printed statement.

To sum up: The debate which has taken place in this Assembly has, I may be permitted to say, justified every one of the requests that I had the honour to present to you. In the name of peace and justice, for the sake of the honour and authority of the League of Nations, with a view to maintaining the sanctity of the Covenant and treaties and, finally, with the firm purpose of upholding international law in general, I again appeal to you to take the necessary action.

M. Sato (Japan):

Translation: Japan's attitude in this regrettable conflict has been amply explained both in the speech of my colleague, M. Matsudaira, to the Assembly, and in the Japanese Government's explanatory note distributed to the Members of the Assembly through the Secretariat, as well as in various documents and statements made in the Council since September last.

After the speeches we have heard in the General Commission, however, I should like to make a few brief remarks setting forth the principles on which our attitude is based.

I would first emphasise that Japan deplores the present events more than any other country. As a Member of the League and a signatory of the Pact of Paris, Japan is anxious that these important international instruments should be applied.

If Japan had to take military measures, it was in fact owing to the imminence of danger; the importance of her responsibility in the very special conditions prevailing in China made it impossible for her to act otherwise. She did not seek to settle the dispute by force. She had no intention of infringing Chinese political independence or administrative integrity. My country, faced by a pressing danger, was bound to take temporary and provisional measures of self-defence. You will recall cases in which other Powers have been compelled to take similar measures.

The very special *de jure* and *de facto* situation in China exists nowhere else, and I must say plainly that there can be no analogy between that situation and the situation in European countries or on the American continent. Where else will you find a foreign policy based on anti-foreign feeling and the unilateral denunciation of the most solemn undertakings?

Japan's attitude, the origin of the conflict, and the circumstances which produced it, have been explained to the plenary Assembly by my colleague, M. Matsudaira, and I shall not refer to them now.

I merely desire to stress the fact that we have no intention of exercising military pressure upon China in order to obtain privileges or terms of any kind whatsoever. We hope the situation in Shanghai will be rapidly reduced to order with the help of the Great Powers and in the spirit of the Covenant. For that reason, we were glad to accept the resolution of March 4th, and we urge that the negotiations contemplated be opened without delay. Only to-day our authorities at Shanghai took urgent steps in this connection with regard to the foreign authorities.

From the very beginning, Japan, as has been emphasised during the Commission's meetings, has contributed wholeheartedly to the League's work in the firm conviction that it was providing an essential contribution towards the establishment

of a new order, a new era of justice and security, in international relations.

To day we have the same faith in the League's work, and we expect the same results. We have the same desire to see its authority firmly established and its influence extended.

We accepted the Covenant in its entirety, and we wish to see it applied without derogation or exception, but with that due regard for facts which was in the minds of its framers and was embodied in the texts themselves.

Since the beginning of this painful dispute, the Council has endeavoured earnestly and patiently to find an equitable solution for the serious problem before us. In referring to the Council's work throughout these long months, I should like to say how much the Japanese Government has appreciated its efforts, and more particularly the action taken by the Council and by the Governments of the countries represented on it to relieve the present situation in Shanghai. I wish also to express my gratitude to the United States Government and its representative at Shanghai, who have joined their efforts to those of the Members of the League. Unfortunately the chair of him to whom I should wish to pay a respectful and sincere tribute, he whose latest efforts were devoted to the settlement of this affair and to the maintenance of world peace, for which his name will always be remembered, is empty. I refer to M. Aristide Briand.

15. — CONSTITUTION OF A DRAFTING COMMITTEE.

M. Beneš (Czechoslovakia) :

Translation : As the discussion is now at an end, I venture to suggest that the General Commission should appoint a drafting committee composed of the members of the Assembly's Bureau and the authors of the draft resolutions already submitted or to be submitted.

All draft resolutions should reach the drafting committee by midday to-morrow. The committee could then meet in the afternoon to examine these proposals and submit the final conclusions to be drawn from the General Commission's discussion.

The President :

Translation : M. Beneš feels that this discussion should close with the adoption of a resolution expressing the ideas developed during the general discussion. He suggests that any member of the Assembly who wishes to submit proposals should send them to the Bureau to-morrow morning, in order that they might be examined by the Bureau together with their proposers. This examination will take place to-morrow afternoon, and the Bureau will submit an agreed text to the General Commission.

M. Politis (Greece) :

Translation : I support the principle of M. Beneš' proposal, but I had hoped that the procedure would be speedier. I see no real use in inviting the delegations to submit draft resolutions within a given time-limit. It will complicate matters, and it seems contrary to the League's usual practice, as well as unlikely to facilitate the drafting committee's work. I think it would be simpler to keep to the Assembly's usual rule after an important discussion such as that which has just taken place, during which various ideas have been developed. The draft resolution should bring out the essential points. This work could easily and speedily be done by a drafting committee.

I therefore suggest that the Assembly should immediately set up a drafting committee to bring out the principles expressed during the discussion and to submit a draft resolution to the Commission as soon as possible.

M. Colban (Norway) :

Translation : I think this matter is of sufficient importance to require thorough examination by the drafting committee, after all the delegations have had an opportunity of sending in their comments. I therefore strongly support M. Beneš' proposal.

The President :

Translation : May I venture to express a personal view ? I think we should be wise to adopt M. Beneš' proposal. M. Politis' proposal is obviously simpler, and the procedure he suggests would be much quicker, though it might lead to some disappointment. We are under the impression, after our conversations and the speeches we have heard, that various proposals will be submitted. In these circumstances, I think it would be much more logical and practical to allow the members of the Commission time to prepare their proposals and also to give the Bureau, which will be assisted by the authors of the proposals, time to prepare a text on which, let us hope, unanimity will be reached.

I think, therefore, that M. Beneš' proposal is wiser in the present instance and is more likely to lead to the desired result.

Baron Ramel (Sweden) :

Translation : I strongly support M. Beneš' proposal, but I do not think it entirely rules out M. Politis' proposal. Something could be taken from both. The basis of the drafting committee's work must be not simply the draft resolutions submitted to us yesterday and those which may be submitted to-morrow, but also all the proposals and suggestions made by the various speakers during our discussion.

It seems to me essential, too, that our drafting committee should endeavour to lay down very precisely the fundamental principles on which the Assembly's work will continue for the solution of the problem as a whole.

The President :

Translation : I would venture to point out to M. Ramel that the drafting committee will certainly not confine itself to discussing the proposals submitted to it, but will also take into consideration the general ideas expressed during the discussion. If there are no objections to M. Beneš' proposal, I shall consider it adopted.

M. Beneš' proposal was adopted.

The President :

Translation : We shall therefore wait until midday to-morrow for any proposals that may be submitted. In the afternoon the Bureau will meet with the authors of the proposals, and we shall convene the General Commission as soon as we have reached conclusions. I hope we shall be able to convene it on Thursday morning or possibly Thursday afternoon. In any case it will be summoned in the usual way.

The meeting rose.

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

GENERAL COMMISSION

MINUTES OF THE FOURTH MEETING

HELD ON MONDAY, MARCH 7th, 1932, AT 3.30 P.M.

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President : M. HYMANS

6. — COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHINESE DELEGATION.

M. Yen (China) :

May I read the following communication, dated March 7th, which I intend to hand to the President of the Assembly immediately after I have read it ?

" Monsieur le President,

Yesterday I had the honour to inform you that General Chiang, Chief of the Army for the defence of the Shanghai region, had issued an order to the troops under his command that, in obedience to the resolution adopted by the Assembly, the cessation of hostilities should be made effective. This information was sent through Sir Eric Drummond, the Secretary-General of the League, by me.

" I have now the honour to inform you that I am in receipt of the following telegram from the Hon. T. V. Soong, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, to the following effect :

" Having accepted the resolution of the Assembly, we are ready to enter such negotiations for the armistice on the basis of the two understandings — namely, first, limited to matters pertaining only to cessation of hostilities and complete withdrawal of Japanese forces ; and, secondly, no condition to be attached to such withdrawal."

"The telegram adds that the negotiation for the armistice had not begun because the Powers who have been requested to give their assistance in the matter had not yet moved.

" (Signed) W. W. YEN."

I take it that perhaps the telegram means that the military, naval and civilian authorities of the Powers have not yet completely received their instructions. That may be the explanation for the Powers who have been requested to give their assistance not having made any movement yet.

The President :

Translation : The Commission will remember that our resolution of March 4th requested the Chinese and Japanese representatives and the four Powers with special interests in Shanghai to make arrangements with a view to rendering definite the cessation of hostilities. The Powers mentioned have, of course, instructed their military representatives at Shanghai to proceed in accordance with the Assembly's wishes. They have, however, sent us no particulars so far. I imagine they have received none.

7. — GENERAL DISCUSSION (continuation).

M. Titulesco (Roumania) :

Translation : China has appealed to the Assembly under Article 15 of the Covenant. The Assembly is therefore asked for a pronouncement on the grave dispute that has for six months divided two great countries, both of which are friends of us all, and both of which we esteem for their ancient civilisation, their history and, above all, the great part they play in the organisation of international life to-day.

Let it be remembered that Japan and China, who now come before us as disputants, are Members of the Council, and hence will be our judges in any

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conflicts that may arise between us in future. It follows that those views on points of principle which they in their inmost conscience regard as right in respect of their own interests naturally constitute, in their eyes, the law to which we should have to submit on some future occasion when our own interests were involved.

That demonstrates the gravity of the problem and the difficulty of our task.

But there is more. By reason of the circumstances in which this dispute comes before the Assembly to-day, notwithstanding the Council's efforts, which cannot be appreciated too highly, and in consequence of certain acts known to all of us, the conflict between China and Japan is bound up with a still more baffling problem — that of the functions and efficacy of the League as an instrument for the maintenance and development of peace between nations. That is the only standpoint which I shall adopt, since the merits of the problem have not yet been sufficiently studied to enable us to decide without bias in favour of one or other of the disputants.

At the stage we have now reached, it may be frankly said, the question asked by international public opinion, without whose help the League could not fulfil its mission, the question which takes precedence over all others, is whether the League exists or not.

To the problem thus raised, it is the duty of each Member of the League to give a clear and definite reply at this Assembly.

In doing so, we shall be accomplishing, not an act of courage, but rather an act of prudence. The States which are not directly interested in the conflict, but are striving for organised peace as something standing alone, are very like officers of the law called on to take in due time measures to safeguard future interests, private interests perhaps but nevertheless interests which, in their aggregate, compose the general interest of the world, in which is merged the interest of the League.

To the question put in this way, from the strict standpoint of the League's interest, I, in my capacity of a former President of two League Assemblies, am compelled to reply without any hesitation.

If the League exhausts all the possibilities offered by the Covenant without achieving the desired result, it will not only afford proof that it exists but will also show a vitality which will necessitate an expansion of its constitutional charter, since only the defects of that charter have prevented its success as a peacemaker.

If, on the contrary, the League fumbles, if it fails unequivocally to proclaim the great principles on which its Covenant and modern international life are founded, not only will the League have ceased to exist, but its arduous activity in the past will seem a delusion to those who believed in it.

Nothing could be unfairer to those who from the outset have co-operated with patient and passionate faith in this new organisation of peace, which they hoped would take the place of the system of water-tight sovereignties that led to so many disasters. The institution itself, on the other hand, will have met with the fate it deserves.

Is it so difficult for us to do our duty under the Covenant? Must we, in order to do so, wound the susceptibilities of either of the disputants? I do not, I cannot, think so. I prefer to believe until all hope has vanished that the disputants will give their wholehearted assistance in the application of the Covenant.

I have read with care the documents distributed by the Secretariat. I have listened with the closest attention to the statements we have heard from the representatives of China and Japan. The basic impression I have gathered is this:

To me it is inconceivable that the Japanese Empire, which is known for its loyalty and for the sense of honour on which the private and the public life of its people is founded, for the firmly established tradition of its observance of international undertakings, should have entered upon a course like that to which our attention has been drawn by the appeal from China, unless it conscientiously entertained serious, nay very serious, reasons for taking action.

It is, however, equally inconceivable to me that, however legitimate a country's interest, it should be impossible to find, in the pacific methods placed at the disposal of us all by the Covenant and by the various undertakings by which we are bound, a means of defending its interests and securing their triumph.

The Assembly cannot, of course, consider the merits of the question without a preliminary objective study, and probably this will have to be done by a small body which will be appointed by the Assembly itself, and whose work, unless the breach is healed in the meantime, will have to be considered by the Assembly itself, which will then have to draw its conclusions in accordance with Article 15.

The Assembly is, however, even at this stage, in a position to take certain decisions; it is in a position to proclaim, and, in my opinion, it is its duty to proclaim, the principles which should guide any future solution.

There are six of these principles. They are these:

(1) The immediate and final cessation of all hostilities. A decision to this effect the Assembly has already taken in its resolution of March 4th. I should merely like to point out that, in the case before us, it is not a question of the execution of orders which, according to the information we have received, have been given in this matter. The Chinese and Japanese representatives formally told us on March 4th that their Governments had already given the necessary orders for the termination of hostilities.

The question here, therefore, is the execution of a veritable contract between the Parties, solemnly entered into in the presence of the League Assembly.

(2) The need for concluding, as soon as possible, a military armistice, unaccompanied by political conditions, so as to ensure that the cessation of hostilities will be permanent in order that the negotiations which are about to start will be conducted in an atmosphere of calm and in a spirit which will permit of their success.

(3) Necessity for the complete application of Article 10 of the Covenant. This article, which is the keystone of the League, contains two obligations — that of assisting any Member of the League against foreign aggression, and first and foremost that of respecting the existing territorial integrity of the Members of the League.

May I point out that the Pact of Paris, which forbids war as instrument of national policy and contains a pledge that resort will be had only to pacific means to settle international disputes, thereby entails, for those who have signed it, an obligation identical with that in Article 10 concerning the respect for the existing territorial integrity of each State?

Any weakening with regard to Article 10, any fumbling in its unqualified application, would be a death-blow to the League; whereas its solemn affirmation by the Assembly at the very moment of our setting out to examine the conflict that has been referred to us would be a salutary act that would immediately remove all the misconceptions

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which may have misled international public opinion and so have caused it to misjudge the League.

Furthermore, ever since the beginning of the conflict, Japan has stated that she is firmly resolved to respect the territorial integrity of China. The League's task now is to help the two Parties so that we may pass from words to deeds.

(4) Need for protecting Japanese property and subjects.

The League should seek for means to ensure such protection, and those of its Members who enjoy powers conferred on them by their great responsibilities in the political sphere should help the League to put these means into practice, so that the argument which has clouded our discussions may be eliminated once and for all.

(5) Need for basing future negotiations on scrupulous respect for treaties.

When I say respect for treaties, I mean, first, the treaties of peace; the opening articles of those treaties enunciate the rules under which we are meeting to-day. Next, the Pact of Paris under which war has been forbidden as an instrument of national policy; and, lastly, respect for all international pledges, the unilateral denunciation of which is incompatible with the spirit and letter of the Covenant and with the notion of conventions in general.

(6) Need for the League to affirm a doctrine uniformly applicable to all its Members irrespective of their geographical position.

It has been said that, by aiming at universality, the League has been over-ambitious. That may be so, but I would rather its action should fail because it had encountered, in some parts of the world, certain realities for which it was not created rather than it should fail because it had changed its law to suit special cases and circumstances.

In the former case, it would be the League's action that had failed in a particular circumstance and not the League itself, for it would have remained faithful to its doctrine as conceived and known by the majority of its Members. In the second case, that in which there would be multifarious doctrines to suit the exigencies of the moment, it would be the League itself that would founder.

What faith could the nations have in the judge appointed to apply the law if the law was not the law they knew, the law to which they spontaneously submitted, but a law which no one could define; one which chopped and changed according to circumstances that could not be foreseen and over which often there would be no control; a law which, instead of being the precise and clear text that binds us, I mean the Covenant, was, as it inevitably must be, the hybrid result of all the precedents that would have been set up in particular cases as the result of emergency measures?

I come to my conclusion. The general discussion cannot, I think, end in our simply establishing a method of work or in a resolution dealing with nothing but procedure. It should close with certain decisions, among others one containing the solemn affirmation of the principles that must guide any solution which the Assembly may ultimately be required to enunciate.

These guiding principles are merely the principles of the Covenant, and we shall not, I think, be making any undue demand in asking the disputants to join us in affirming them.

I therefore appeal to them, not so much for the sake of the respect they owe to the Covenant, but rather for the sake of the devotion they have shown to it: for we can never forget the invaluable assistance Japan has given us from the foundation of the League.

What I am hoping, what I am asking, is that, before the Assembly begins to study the dispute, action will be taken on lines which will eliminate any trace of doubt concerning the fact that we are all, without distinction, bound by the Covenant and the treaties, and that we are unanimous in our devotion to the cause of peace and the work of the League.

To reject such an appeal would be to eviscerate our faith in the League and to rob the countries that are not parties to this conflict of their most precious possession — the legitimate hope that, in case of war or threat of war, the contractual guarantees they enjoy will be converted into tangible realities.

8. — DEATH OF M. BRIAND.

The President:

Translation: I have a painful duty to perform. We have just learned some unexpected and overwhelming news which will cause you, as it has caused me, the deepest emotion. M. Briand has just died in Paris.

He was the splendid embodiment of the idea of peace and international *rapprochement*. He was one of the most powerful workers in the service of the League. His voice, his accents, still echo in our ears. We see him before us. We loved him. We admired him.

He was one of the glories of France. He was one of the most illustrious of orators. His name will ever be coupled with the loftiest of man's ideals, and it will live in history.

We offer the French delegation, whose unbounded grief we well understand, our deepest condolence.

I propose that, as a sign of mourning, the Assembly should adjourn for a quarter of an hour.

M. Paul-Boncour (France):

Translation: Mr. President, if anything could assuage the grief I feel both as delegate of France and as a personal friend and assistant of M. Briand's through so many years, and as myself, too, a devoted servant of the League he served so faithfully, it would undoubtedly be the words in which you have announced this irreparable loss, and the unanimity with which the entire Assembly has in silent communion associated itself with what you said.

It is a moving and tragic coincidence that this grievous news should reach us during a meeting of the Assembly itself, the supreme symbol of the League, whose undying love he carries with him to the tomb: and the Assembly has met to settle a conflict to which, I may justly say, he gave the last months of his active life, the last breath that was in his body.

He has gone without witnessing the achievement of his desires, either in this particular matter or in the organisation of peace in general.

The best testimony we can render to his memory, the tribute which he would have welcomed most, is that we should be firmly resolved to persevere in the work to which he set his hand. I wish to assure you, by the grave that has been dug all too soon, that that resolve is held by the French delegation.

I shall not fail to inform the representatives of my country's Government and the silent masses of the French people, who loved him because he loved peace, of the immense effect produced throughout the world by the announcement of this irreparable loss.

(The meeting was adjourned at 4.45 p.m. and resumed at 5 p.m.)

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9. — GENERAL DISCUSSION (continuation).

M. Zaleski (Poland):

Translation: As many speakers have preceded me and have so ably dealt with the important problem before us, I will merely make a short statement.

The conditions accompanying the grave events in the Far East are certainly of a special character, as was pointed out on several occasions during the discussions of the Council on the conflict with which this Assembly has been called upon to deal.

This fact cannot, however, be regarded as absolving the League from the duty of doing all in its power to safeguard peace, in accordance with its most sacred duty under the Covenant. The Covenant imposes upon all Members of the League the duty of respecting the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.

I may perhaps be allowed at the same time to remind you of the passage in the Preamble to the Covenant in which the reasons which led to the establishment of the League are enumerated and, *inter alia*, the "firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another".

Poland, who, although she has no direct political interests in the Far East, is, in virtue of her geographical position, especially interested in the maintenance of peace in that part of the world, ardently desires to see the two great nations, with which she entertains relations of cordial friendship and who are now unhappily in serious conflict with one another, return to relations of concord and confidence. She also desires the reaffirmation of the principle of the maintenance of treaties in their entirety, which is the pivot of all relations between civilised peoples.

Consequently, it is with feelings of satisfaction that we have heard the statement of the Japanese delegate to the effect that his country has no intention of infringing the fundamental obligations arising out of the Covenant.

I hope that our efforts and the goodwill of both parties will enable us to achieve the result which we all desire — namely, that the present difficulties between China and Japan will shortly be settled and that the black clouds which darken the skies of Eastern Asia will be dispersed for ever.

I consider it my duty, however, to point out at this moment, which is so fraught with grave possibilities for the future of the League, that the action of the Council and the Assembly will inevitably meet with serious difficulties so long as the legal rules governing our League are not sufficiently clear and complete.

I need hardly repeat at this stage that my country has always been numbered among the most convinced supporters of the proposals for strengthening the powers at the disposal of the League for the maintenance of peace and the ensuring of respect for the rights of its Members. Poland has warmly supported the plan for mutual assistance and has never ceased to advocate a return to the Geneva Protocol and, during the discussions of the League on the Convention on the Means of Preventing War, she defended the view that there can exist no intermediate state between peace and war. The remarks made on that last occasion, at the beginning of September 1931, by the representative of the Polish Government on the third Committee of the Assembly are, I think, worthy of attention by my colleagues at the present time. On that occasion, Poland was almost alone in defending that view.

It is perhaps natural that an institution of such

recent origin as the League of Nations — for, after all, we are only at the beginning of our task, which is the organisation of the greatest political institution the world has ever seen — should not yet have succeeded in establishing machinery enabling us adequately to settle the relations between the States Members.

As I have already said, I have every hope that, thanks to the goodwill shown by both parties to the dispute, we shall succeed in bringing the problem before us to a satisfactory issue. We should, however, let the grave difficulties with which we are faced to-day act as a warning for tomorrow, and impel us to undertake without delay or hesitation the necessary work of perfecting our organisation. By making good the gaps in the Covenant and further perfecting its machinery, we shall be working for the organisation of peace and avoiding the possibility of our ever again finding ourselves in such a serious and difficult position.

Sir John Simon (British Empire):

I have listened with intense interest to the speeches which have been made from this tribune on Saturday and to-day, speeches made by many Members of the League representing widely scattered States situated in different continents of the world, and all inspired by a common purpose in which Great Britain most fully shares.

These declarations have revealed in the most striking fashion the passionate attachment which we all feel for the League of Nations as the expression of our aspirations for world peace, and as the embodiment of a new conception of society. And, my colleagues, I would add this: we are deeply conscious that the situation which we have before us involves something more even than the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Far East. It involves nothing less than the utility, in the case of a major dispute, of the League of Nations. And one strong impression which I have derived from the course of this debate only fortifies my own conviction that the League is an indispensable instrument for influencing international relations, and the preservation of its useful, authoritative influence is the best hope for the future of the world. Not one of us would be willing to contemplate a future world from which the active influence of the League was eliminated.

Our meeting together here and the course of this discussion are a demonstration that we all of us are of one mind in recognising the importance and desiring the maintenance of the fundamental principles of the League.

So much, Mr. President, by way of preface, for it is in that spirit that I, on behalf of my Government, desire to make a few remarks on the practical procedure which seems appropriate for the immediate purpose of our general discussion.

I begin by recalling and emphasising an observation of His Excellency M. Motta, who pointed out on Saturday that the first duty which is cast upon this Assembly in relation to the dispute that is before it is the duty of mediation. Article 15, in its third paragraph, expressly provides for this, and it is of the first importance that we should all keep the contemplated procedure strictly in mind, as M. Motta has expounded it.

Let me point out that the duty of mediation does not disappear because, unhappily, fighting has broken out and military operations on a vast and formidable scale have been in progress. These tragic developments serve rather to enforce the urgency and the importance of the duty of mediation.

The third paragraph of Article 15 provides that, when the dispute has been referred to the Council, "the Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement

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of the dispute". The ninth paragraph of the article confers upon either party to the dispute the right to refer it to the Assembly, and the honourable representative of China was entirely within his right when he took that course. In that event, by virtue of the tenth and final paragraph of Article 15, the whole of the provisions of the article relating to the action and powers of the Council apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, and it therefore follows inevitably that this Assembly, which first took up this matter four days ago, has as its first and foremost obligation the solemn obligation to do its utmost to effect a settlement of the dispute. We should be abandoning our first duty if we did not persist in pursuing this procedure of conciliation by every means in our power; and I associate myself most warmly with those who have preceded me — M. Motta and other speakers — in expressing my ardent hope that that procedure, which we must not abandon or regard in these first few days of our work as already exhausted, may be pursued to a successful issue by such appropriate procedure as the Assembly may see fit to adopt.

Let me add one more word on this point. Difficult as the task is, anxious as is the outlook for mediation, we have the advantage — and it is a great advantage — of having actually present here in this Assembly the authorised representative of both Parties. We look to them both as colleagues of our own, with whom we maintain relations of equal and undiminished friendship, to take full advantage of our efforts to bring about a reconciliation.

Again, those Members of the League who, owing to their special association with the Shanghai settlements, have facilities for promoting local negotiations or for reporting on disputed facts, have, one and all, put their officials on the spot unreservedly at the service of the League. Moreover, the Government of the United States of America has informed the Secretary-General of its willingness to co-operate at Shanghai in these respects.

And, lastly, on this point allow me to make this observation: after all, the League of Nations is an association of Member States with the special function of seeking, with the goodwill of the disputants and in a spirit of fraternity, the best way of reaching a reconciliation between them. A reconciliation may be difficult to effect, it may take long to reach; but, in endeavouring to discharge our duty, we must never forget that this is the first of the objects prescribed for us under Article 15 of the Covenant.

But there is a second aspect of our present duty to which I wish to direct particular attention, and which I think might very well be expressed in a declaration which every Member of the League here present should be willing to endorse without delay. I do not, of course, mean that we can pronounce a judgment on matters which are in controversy. It would be contrary to the first principles of justice that, at a time when an investigation is proceeding with the help of a Commission appointed by the League which has only just reached the Far East, when we have not received, as I understand, the full statement of the case of both parties, when each side unfortunately makes allegations against the other which are in dispute, it would, I say, be contrary to the first principles of justice to do anything of the kind. But, none the less, there is a very important declaration which, without waiting for the full ascertainment of matters in controversy, the Assembly might, if it so willed — and, as it seems to me, properly should — make forthwith, and I will venture to indicate for the consideration of my colleagues the general nature of the declaration I have in mind.

I have spoken of the distinction between pronouncing a premature judgment on matters in controversy and of a declaration of another sort which may fitly be made now. No one has put that distinction with more clearness than M. Beneš in his speech on Saturday — M. Beneš, whose constant interest and long experience in the work of the League is known to us all — and M. Titulesco, who spoke with his great authority and long connection with the League, made a very similar statement this afternoon. Let me quote two sentences from the speech of M. Beneš. He said on Saturday, in respect of the information secured on the substance of the dispute between China and Japan, that he did not claim to know it all; that he did not claim to be able to judge between the parties or to be able to accept beforehand the arguments *pro* or *contra*. M. Beneš rightly emphasised the complexity of the Far-Eastern situation and the difficulty, without exact information and close study, of appreciating what he quite rightly called the special situation existing in the Far East. With all that I agree; but the pronouncement which the Assembly might make now would not, I think, be in conflict with M. Beneš' reservation. What I have in mind is not a pronouncement as to the merits of the controversy between these two Members of the League, but as to the measures by which the solution of that controversy should be sought — for, mark you, this is the first time that the Assembly has been concerned with an appeal addressed to it under Article 15, and it is therefore of the first importance, having regard to the future, that we should not prejudice the opinion of the Assembly in future cases by prejudging the merits of a controversy which is under investigation, but that we should reaffirm what the proper methods of dealing with such a controversy are. Natural justice, the *jus naturale* of Roman law which has become the common inheritance of all who seek to do justice in any controversy, no doubt requires us to hold our judgment on the merits in suspense during the investigation which is taking place. But I would appeal to everyone here. I would appeal to our honourable colleague the representative of China, to our honourable colleague, the representative of Japan, I would appeal to the representatives of other States, whether small or great. Should not we take this opportunity now solemnly to reaffirm the fundamental principles on which the League is based, and by which every signatory represented in this room is bound? Should we not declare afresh that the Covenant does not authorise a State, however well founded its grievances against another State, to seek redress by methods other than the pacific methods set forth in Article 12 of the Covenant? Should we not make reference afresh to the Pact of Paris which, together with the Covenant, is one of the pillars of the peace organisation of the world? It provides, as M. Titulesco, pointed out an hour ago, under Article 2, that "the High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them should never be sought save by pacific means".

Should not we make reference therefore to Article 10 of the Covenant? By it all Members of the League have undertaken to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. These propositions, therefore, are propositions which every Member of the League is bound to accept without regard to the merits of the controversy and to all those complicated matters. Changes brought about not as the result of methods of conciliation and peaceful

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adjustment but by means contrary to the Covenant and the Pact of Paris manifestly could not receive the approval of Members of the assembly of nations, which exists for the very purpose of observing these obligations and these principles. Such are the general lines of the declaration which I would invite my colleagues here to join in formulating. It would not be the complete discharge of our duty, but it would be a step we can take now. It would be a step, I venture to think, we ought to take now at the end of our general discussion.

There have been indications from some previous speakers to-day and on Saturday that their thought has travelled along the same road, and indeed I am glad of it; and if I were fortunate enough to find that what I have said here to-day commanded a sufficient measure of support in this Assembly, I should indeed be happy to co-operate with others of you in submitting to the President, in due course, suggestions to carry it out.

Now what should such a declaration accomplish? Well, it would reassert the conditions under which every Member of the League is pledged to conduct relations with every other Member in a way which would, I trust, receive the adherence of every State here represented. It would direct the attention of the world once more — the fresh and specific attention of the world — to the proper means of solving disputes. It would be a proclamation not only of the interest but of the duty of us all to stand by the League in this hour of its severest trial. I agree with what was said from this tribune a short time ago by a previous speaker. It would be far better for the League to proclaim its principles, even though it failed to get them observed, than to forsake those principles by meaningless compromise. And, lastly, this declaration that I suggest would be a recognition that the ultimate progress of the world cannot be secured by any other means than the means which the League has been formed to organise and supply — the means of peace and of justice.

The President:

Translation: I have just received from M. Restrepo, the first delegate of the Republic of Colombia, who, owing to indisposition, is unable to be here to-day, the text of a draft resolution which is, he says, drawn up on the basis of considerations put forward by him from this platform on March 5th.

The draft resolution reads as follows:

"The Assembly,

"Adopting the principles followed by the Council in respect of the dispute between China and Japan;

"Declaring that cessation of hostilities and of all military pressure by one of the parties on the other is an essential and previous condition to further efforts by the League to obtain a peaceful settlement of the dispute between China and Japan;

"Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and December 10th and the draft resolution adopted by thirteen of its members on October 24th;

"Recalling that the two parties have recently in accordance with the Assembly's resolution of the 4th of this month, agreed to take all measures necessary to prevent the continuation of hostilities;

"(1) Requests the Chinese Government to provide all guarantees for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese nationals, both at Shanghai and in Manchuria, with the colla-

boration of impartial observers nominated by the League.

"(2) Requests the Japanese Government to withdraw its troops from Shanghai and to commence the evacuation of Manchuria in accordance with the Council's resolution of September 30th.

"(3) The Assembly recommends that the evacuation of Chinese territory should be completed within a time-limit to be fixed, account being taken of technical requirements by a Commission appointed by the Assembly."

M. Rosso (Italy):

Translation: I have just received a telegram from Shanghai, which does not contain any detailed information or anything very new, but which I think should be communicated to you. It is dated March 6th on board the cruiser *Trento* and reads as follows:

"The Japanese troops have halted about 20 kilometres from Shanghai. They are not in contact with the Chinese forces. Two vessels transporting Japanese troops have arrived at Shanghai."

This telegram is signed by Admiral Cavagnari, Commander-in-Chief of the Italian troops in the Far East.

I have come to this platform because the Italian delegation has no intention of evading the moral obligation which loyalty to the League imposes on each of its Members in deciding such grave questions as that which is now before us: I mean the duty of clearly stating its views and publicly shouldering its responsibilities.

It was right and natural that the representatives of the countries which are not Members of the Council should be heard first, as it was of importance to know whether or not they approved the action which the Council has been taking during the last few months on behalf of the whole League. They have spoken during this debate with an unmistakable clearness and firmness which have borne witness to the vitality of our institution and the moral force which, whatever may be said, it possesses.

As the representative of a State Member of the Council, the Members of which are jointly and severally responsible for its acts, I heard with satisfaction the judgment pronounced by other members of the Assembly on the work of the Council as explained and commented upon by its President, M. Paul-Boncour, in the able speech which he made on the day when the Assembly began its deliberations.

A number of the speakers whom we have heard in this hall have prefaced their statements by an assurance of their complete impartiality in regard to the conflict between China and Japan. Italy is one of the countries which are acknowledged to have special interests in China, but it is, I think, hardly necessary for me to say that, in spite of its special interests, my Government has always regarded, and will continue to regard, the problem before us with the strictest objectivity and the most scrupulous impartiality. Its only object is to co-operate in finding a just solution to the conflict, and its one ardent desire is that arms may be laid down and that the fundamental principles of the Covenant may come out of this ordeal strengthened.

The speaker who preceded me on this platform, Sir John Simon, suggested a solemn declaration by the Assembly confirming the staunch adherence of all Members of the League to the fundamental

principles of the Covenant. I hasten to say that I fully appreciate the value and importance of such a declaration.

Having said this, I should now like to lay before you the views of the Italian delegation with regard to the practical duty that devolves upon this Assembly. I say practical duty, because I think we are all agreed — we cannot but agree — upon the object to be pursued. It only remains for us to agree on the methods to be employed to achieve this object.

On this point I can only repeat what the Greek delegate, M. Politis, said last Saturday when he told us that we must keep in mind not only principles but also practical realities; he said that if we overlook the real facts of the situation, we may empty law of its substance and reduce it to nil, and that may bring both disappointment and disaster in its train.

What must the Assembly do to take account of the realities of the position? In the opinion of the Italian delegation, it must, in the first place, employ all means to effect the settlement of the dispute in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 15. It seems to us that, despite all, the Assembly will be giving proof of political wisdom if it does not evade its duty of carrying out, with all the authority at its disposal, the conciliatory and mediatory action provided for in Article 15, paragraph 3.

This action comprises successive stages. The first stage has already been indicated by the resolution adopted by the Assembly at its third meeting, on March 4th, when it set itself to solve without delay the most urgent problem — namely, how to render possible an arrangement entailing the final cessation of hostilities.

The second stage may be marked by the execution of a plan submitted to the Council by its President at the meeting of February 29th, with a view to the re-establishment of peace in the district of Shanghai. This plan entails the calling of a conference at Shanghai to act on behalf of the League. Such a conference would have the advantage of acting on the spot, and consequently being better able to judge of the situation and to find the most practicable and equitable solutions.

Finally, we must not, I think, forget that a Commission appointed by the Council on the basis of Article 11 of the Covenant is already on the spot, and has been instructed to study the substance of the question and to suggest the means best calculated to eliminate the underlying causes of the difficulties which have brought about the present state of affairs.

This is a programme of action which, in my opinion, offers a very good chance of bringing about a settlement of the dispute. By adopting it and supervising its execution by the most suitable means, the Assembly would in no way be forgoing its right to apply any other measures subsequently in the event of the execution of this programme encountering obstacles — a contingency which we ought not to expect in face of the loyal co-operation of the Parties to the dispute.

If I am not mistaken, this was the view expressed by M. Politis when he advocated the appointment of a commission to follow all the negotiations at Shanghai and to report to the Assembly. The Italian delegation highly appreciated the value of this suggestion and would, for its part, be ready to subscribe to it.

In conclusion, I will sum up the views of the Italian delegation by saying that it regards the duty of the Assembly as clearly indicated in the procedure laid down successively in the paragraphs of Article 15 of the Covenant. It is the right and duty of the Assembly to follow this procedure by taking, without precipitation but with firmness,

all the measures involved and at each stage utilising to the full the various means at its disposal. The Italian delegation considers that the three prerequisites of success are: firmness in its words, calmness in its decisions and consistency in the application of those decisions.

M. von Weizsäcker (Germany):

Translation: During the last six months the Powers represented on the Council have had an opportunity of expressing their views in the Council. I shall therefore be very brief. I should like, however, to stress the statements made during these last months by the German representatives and the steps that have been taken in regard to Japan and China. We have repeatedly urged the need to bring hostilities to an end at the earliest possible moment and to find a peaceful solution for the dispute. When the very first incidents occurred in September last, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs recommended at Geneva the immediate suspension of hostilities. The Council of the League endeavoured to bring this about, and its efforts were supported by the Powers particularly qualified owing to their position in the Far East. The news that reaches us justifies the hope that a decisive step has been taken in that direction. We may venture to hope that, once hostilities have ceased, we shall find it easier to arrive at a basis for further negotiations for settling the dispute. I fully realise the obstacles which stand in the way of what we are unanimously desirous of doing; but I realise, too, that those difficulties exist only to be overcome, as they surely will be overcome, by the exercise of firmness and circumspection.

From the discussions in this Commission one general idea seems to emerge. The dispute between China and Japan has lasted too long and has assumed proportions such that it has ceased to be a purely local conflict.

The incidents that have taken place in China have brought the League face to face with its main problem — the problem of the solution of international disputes by peaceful means. The task devolving upon the League was to ensure the execution of the provisions of the Covenant for safeguarding peace, and I need not emphasise the fundamental importance of this present test.

The League was created to maintain and ensure peace. The very reason for its existence would disappear were it to fail in the performance of the imperative duty laid upon it. My country, which was one of the first to accede to the Kellogg Pact and which opened the way to disarmament through a very considerable reduction in its armaments, is greatly concerned in ensuring the triumph of the principle of the just and equitable solution of international disputes by pacific methods. That is the principle which should be maintained and asserted in any decision, in any measure and in any resolution that may be decided upon by this Assembly.

Discussion, which has not been lacking in criticism, seems, moreover, to have served a very useful purpose. Over and above the problem now before us, it has provided us with information of a general character for the future. It has, above all, shown us the necessity of possessing means of preventing international conflicts — a principle which, as you are aware, the German representatives have continually urged during the last few years: "Prevention is better than cure". Nothing is more difficult than to try to settle incidents in a depressing atmosphere of suspicion and uneasiness.

I should also like to bring out one characteristic fact in the exchanges of views that has just taken

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place, and that is the frankness of the discussion to which we have been listening. A few weeks ago we heard the delegates to the Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments proclaiming that it was the duty of the Conference to achieve positive results. The Special Assembly is in precisely the same position as the Conference convened by the League: it must succeed. It is not enough to entertain a systematic optimism, a failing with which we have often — and rightly — been reproached. It is best to be frank and not to entertain illusions, but to face the facts as they are and deduce the logical consequences. That is the proper way to work: that is the method which should prevail in any collective activity, in any international organization.

Having stressed that point, I desire now strongly to support the proposals put forward by the British representative, to the effect that the general discussion should be brought to a close by the adoption of a declaration on the general principles of the Covenant and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. Should circumstances place any obstacle in the way of the full realization of those principles, I think, like certain other speakers who have preceded me here, and in conformity with statements made by the German representative on the Council, that it would be better frankly to recognise a setback than to content ourselves once again with a purely formal solution.

M. Paul-Boncour (France):

Translation: I have already claimed the attention of the Assembly too long, and I will not take up the time of the General Commission for more than a very brief statement. It was only right that the Powers Members of the Council, who have borne the responsibility for decisions in the last few months, should give an opportunity for speech to the other nations, which did not take part in our work and which have come from all quarters of the globe to assist us, if possible, in settling this painful and tragic conflict. The speeches we have heard from their representatives have evinced, in their great variety and ample range, a determination and wisdom which I feel must dispel the doubts sometimes expressed as to the political sense of the great democracy represented by the League of Nations.

But at the present stage in the discussion it is the duty of the Members of the Council to express their views in their turn.

As representative of France, I should like to say that my country is prepared to associate itself with any resolutions or any measures that the Assembly may deem most suitable for the settlement of the present conflict and to maintain and ensure respect for the provisions of the Covenant. My country has placed all its trust in the Covenant. It has based the whole of its foreign policy on respect for the terms of the Covenant. The actual proposals which my country has drawn up and is defending in discussions elsewhere — the success of which is largely determined by the ultimate success of our efforts here — are based on respect for the terms of the Covenant and on their reinforcement. You will then realise with what satisfaction France has heard so many nations, great and small, proclaim the confidence they place in the Covenant as regards their security and their territorial integrity. France feels she may interpret these declarations as a recognition, at least implicit, of the necessity — I repeat what the Greek representative said, in terms which were both elegant and precise — of perfecting the equipment and machinery of the League. As representative of France, therefore, I may say that I rejoice to find that so many of the declarations that were

made expressed my own views and those of my country. As President of the Council — for, do what I will, I cannot wholly dissociate that capacity from the other — I rejoice to find, in these discussions, a judgment of the Council's efforts which seemed to me friendly and appreciative. I am not, I think, mistaken in deducing, though there were shades of difference, and indeed diversity, in the modes of expression — and these form the actual value and interest of the discussions we have just held — that the nations represented here have approved the Council's work. Nor did I hear any suggestions made other than those on which the Council has hitherto based its action. This agreement cannot but strengthen the Council's hands very appreciably.

Just before the Assembly met, the Council had reached a positive result which, though still inadequate, was at least appreciable. It had secured the acceptance by both Parties — subject to a reservation to which I shall refer — of a cessation of hostilities in the Shanghai region. The Shanghai Conference, which constituted the essential point of what has been called the Council's plan, was made expressly conditional on the cessation of hostilities. The necessary solutions and the various details had obviously to be decided by the Conference, but the Council has already laid down the main lines. They are these: respect by Japan for the territorial integrity of China, and recognition by China of the maintenance of the International Settlement and the French Concession. That plan, which was conditional on the cessation of hostilities, was accepted by both parties, subject to the express and very natural reservation on the part of China that the Conference could not be held until hostilities had actually ceased. It was in these circumstances that the Assembly opened; and despite the conflicting reports which necessarily arise when, on a long and broken battle-front, where orders cannot get through everywhere at the same time, skirmishes and individual actions continue, it was clear to us that the main battle which had been raging for several days around Shanghai had ended. The Assembly — I say the Assembly because, at the judicious suggestion of the President, the decision adopted by the General Commission was immediately converted into a decision of the Assembly — intended to second the Council's decision, and has done so by inviting the two Governments, in a recommendation of March 4th, to ensure the effective execution of the orders given for the cessation of hostilities.

Our unanimous feeling is surely that the Assembly's first effort, its most immediate duty, must be to bring about an armistice to safeguard us against a resumption of hostilities, which will remain imminent so long as the actual and material cessation of hostilities has not been made permanent, so long as no armistice has been concluded laying down the conditions and time-limits for evacuation. Until the armistice has been concluded, we shall not have the pacification we need.

I quite realise that this only settles the Shanghai question; I note, like Sir John Simon, from the Council's previous resolutions, and particularly that of December 10th, which was accepted by both Parties, that it is materially impossible for us to pronounce on the part of the dispute relating to Manchuria until we have information which can only be given us by the Commission sent to the spot. I think, however — again in agreement with Sir John Simon — that, though our procedure in this respect hinges upon the receipt of information which we have not yet got, there is, on the other hand, nothing to prevent us now from making a declaration recapitulating the principles

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underlying the League's action. I am thinking more particularly of respect for Article 10, which my colleague and friend, M. Titulesco, rightly described as one of the cornerstones of the Covenant.

The confirmation of the Council's action, on the one hand, and the affirmation of the League's principles, on the other, are the bases on which, in my view, a resolution can be drawn up which could be adopted by the Assembly. A committee might be set up, as has been suggested, to follow events. But I do not think it is the view of anyone, and particularly of those who initiated the proposal, that the Assembly's authority can be manifested simply by the creation of a committee. The Assembly must adopt fundamental resolutions; the committee will outlast the Assembly, will remain in being when the Assembly is not actually present, but will be based on principles which the Assembly will lay down in a declaration — a precise categorical affirmation of the view of the Assembly, which is the highest emanation of the League.

M. Garay (Panama):

Translation: As representative of the Republic of Panama on the Council of the League, I had occasion in Paris, in connection with the voting on the resolution of December 10th last, to make certain declarations of principle to which M. Restrepo, the Colombian delegate, referred in his speech on Saturday morning. This circumstance, added to the fact that I am a delegate to the Special Assembly of the League, convened in virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant at the request of China, makes it more or less incumbent upon me to speak.

The little State that raised its voice in the Council when the fundamental principles on which its existence depends were at stake, could not, without forfeiting some of its moral force, keep silent in this Commission of the Assembly.

In his opening speech, the President of the Council, M. Paul-Boncour, outlined in masterly fashion a striking portrayal of the sequence of events in which the resolutions adopted by the Council in application both of Article 11 and of Article 15 of the Covenant are admirably summarised and commented upon.

I only propose at present to mention the Paris resolution of December 10th, in connection with which I felt bound, as I have said, to make certain statements. The Paris resolutions allowed one of the Parties to the dispute to take steps of a military nature in the foreign territory occupied by it, with a view to ensuring the protection of the lives and property of its nationals against the attacks of local bandits. That was the condition imposed for the acceptance of this resolution, which would have had no legal value if it had not been adopted unanimously. It was a purely practical expedient not intended to create a precedent; for the Covenant, our paramount law, does not recognise the doctrine of qualifying circumstances on which our resolution was inevitably based. That is the origin of all the reservations and declarations made thereafter.

For my part, I desired to safeguard the following three principles:

1. The principle of non-intervention, without, however, affecting the intervention of the League between States Members signatories of the Covenant, or interventions defined by treaties *inter partes*.

2. The principle of the territorial sovereignty of the State as a limit or barrier imposed on the exercise of the right of nations to protect their nationals in other countries.

3. The principle of the peaceful settlement of all international disputes which the Covenant makes obligatory for all Members of the League (Article 12).

After hearing this declaration and the much more important declarations which had preceded it, the then representative of China, Dr. Sze, pointed out that the application of the treaties and principles recognised by international law could not totally disappear at the frontiers of Manchuria. We never claimed that they should. But we did earnestly desire the immediate restoration of peace in the Far East, and the Council resolution as proposed seemed to us to be the sole way of securing this result. This hope was not fulfilled, but that was not due to any failure to act or any lack of a spirit of conciliation on our part.

There can be no doubt that neither party is a colony, protectorate or mandated territory, and that both are absolutely entitled to the protection of international law. Not only do we admit this fact, but we add — thereby signifying our agreement with some of our colleagues in the Assembly — that the Covenant recognises no varying degrees of sovereignty and independence as among Members of the League.

Since the New Year, the conflict has become so extended and events to complicated that, if this state of affairs had continued, not only China and Japan but the whole continent of Asia and all the continents of the world would have been affected. As a matter of fact, the battles at Shanghai and their possible consequences were already causing the greatest anxiety throughout the world. But we have now, fortunately, reached a period of temporary calm which we hope will be succeeded by a series of steps leading to the restoration of peace.

The Council has been solely concerned with the procedure of conciliation. On the eve of the meeting of our Special Assembly, negotiations were being conducted on board the British flagship *Kent* with a view to the cessation of hostilities and the evacuation of the foreign territory occupied. The excellent idea of initiating these negotiations is due to the British Government and particularly to Sir John Simon, His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The work of our Assembly has also begun with this same object of conciliation in view. At the time when the Council appealed to Japan not to give effect to her Shanghai ultimatum, I renewed at Geneva, at the public meeting of February 19th, the reservations I had made at Paris, and these reservations will be maintained as long as the situation in the Far East continues to be in flagrant contradiction with the doctrines of the Covenant and the prevailing principles of law. In so doing, I am not animated by the slightest partiality towards either of the Parties, but solely by a great hope in the future of the League, which might ultimately — we must remember — become the actual victim of the deplorable events that have brought us together here in Geneva.

Violence in international relations does far more harm to the world nowadays than was formerly the case. Formerly, it was no-one's concern but the country whose rights and interests were directly involved and which defended itself as best it could. But since the League has come into existence, the situation is no longer the same; such acts directly concern the League, which was created for the very purpose of preventing and punishing them.

Very distinguished speakers have expressed on this platform the hope that the Assembly will not take any action outside the domain of conciliation

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and mediation, in order that the procedure may be carried on exclusively within the limits of Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. Other speakers are of opinion that one of the Parties had a better right than the other to invoke the principle of legitimate defence, to which both Parties have appealed. But there has been an almost unanimous regret that one of the Parties did not lay its complaints before the League, seeing that the other Party agreed, from the very outset of hostilities, to submit the whole question, first to the Council and then to the Assembly. In addition, the principle that no new law can be created by force, or recognised by the League, has been referred to by many speakers. Naturally, my delegation entirely shares this opinion; but

it has no desire to prejudge in certain directions the conclusions of any future report, if any report there is to be.

Whether the Assembly deals with all or only with part of the dispute between China and Japan, it will have a heavy and onerous task before it. The League has never before been faced with so dangerous a situation, involving so grave a responsibility. Great evils call, however, for heroic remedies; and we hope that the Assembly will draw from the very weakness of its means of action the necessary force to save and consolidate this organisation, which is based on law and justice, and which it is our duty to protect.

A. [Extr.]/C.G./P.V. 3.

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
 AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

GENERAL COMMISSION

MINUTES OF THE THIRD MEETING

SATURDAY, MARCH 5TH, 1932, AT 3.30 P.M.

CONTENTS.

5. GENERAL DISCUSSION (*continuation*).

President: M. HYMANS.

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M. Munch (Denmark).

Translation: During the last few months, and more especially the last few weeks, you have all, no doubt, heard people impatiently ask why the League tolerates terrible events such as those which have been happening in China. The question, to tell the truth, is entirely natural. It is obviously hard for people to realise the League's true position under the Covenant and as a result of the perplexing circumstances in which it has existed during its first twelve years. Nor is it easy to realise immediately the special difficulties of the conflict which brought about the convening of this Special Assembly. Here in Europe at all events it will always be difficult to grasp the true nature of conflicts in Asia. The President of the Council, M. Paul Boncour, very rightly emphasised this point in his opening speech. We are faced with a conflict between two great countries whose total population exceeds a quarter of the aggregate population of all the States Members of the League. One of them is one of the great Powers which exercised a decisive influence in the framing of the Covenant. This country, which is a permanent Member of the Council, possesses a very powerful military organisation. The other country involved in the conflict is, by the extent of its territory and the number of its inhabitants, one of the biggest States in the world. The home of a very ancient civilisation, it has played an extremely important part in the history of mankind. It, too, possesses a very large number of military effectives. The events of these latter months show very clearly that, as long as powerful armies and navies exist,

coupled with the spirit that is bound up with them, the League will always have a very difficult task in imposing a settlement in the case of a serious conflict between any of the larger States. It is still difficult to establish the "League's peace", just as at one time it was difficult to establish the king's peace so long as the strongholds of the great feudal lords and great cities with walls and fortifications existed. This truth must be faced. It is sufficient explanation of the Council's patience in endeavouring to solve the present conflict by negotiations between the two countries involved, with the help of other States concerned. Such, moreover, is the procedure laid down in the Covenant. The latter expressly prescribes that conversations of this nature form the first stage in the League's work of conciliation. The Council has complied strictly with the provisions of the Covenant and the Assembly will doubtless do likewise.

It would most certainly be wise for the Assembly, too, to employ this method first. We must carry on the efforts initiated by the Council to bring about an agreement between the two parties by persuasion, by strengthening the Council's authority with that of the Assembly and appealing to the interests of the entire international commonwealth.

In conjunction with the two parties, we must consider in what forms direct conversations between them would be feasible — those, I mean, which would be most likely to facilitate a solution of the dispute.

These forms must probably differ for each of the two principal problems, that of Shanghai and that of Manchuria; but it is plain that there can be hardly any prospect of success for any attempt at mediation unless hostilities are suspended. In this respect, the position is not yet quite clear.

We must hope that the outcome of the resolution adopted by the Assembly yesterday evening will be the final cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese troops.

If, however, that hope is not fulfilled; if there are further operations and fighting on a large scale: if

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We must hope that the outcome of the resolution adopted by the Assembly yesterday evening will be the final cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese troops.

If, however, that hope is not fulfilled; if there are further operations and fighting on a large scale; if

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serious hostilities and fighting recommence; if they cannot be terminated by conversations, I see no other way than to apply the system laid down in the Convention we adopted in September 1931 with a view to strengthening the means for preventing war. Under that system, the Council or the Assembly would be entitled to prescribe a series of measures likely to bring about the cessation of hostilities, and the violation of such measures would involve a presumption that the State violating them was the aggressor.

That Convention, I know, has not been ratified, but it was the outcome of lengthy discussions; it was adopted by the Assembly and its ratification is, I believe, only a question of time.

If, finally, after further efforts at mediation, the conflict were to continue and there was still a danger of war, the League would be obliged to enforce the procedure laid down in Articles 13 and 15 of the Covenant.

Part of the problems connected with the dispute are, I think, of such a nature that they might suitably be submitted for settlement by a court of law or by arbitration, provided it were found impossible to solve them at a round table conference on the spot. I refer to some, at any rate, of the problems connected with Manchuria; in their case, the question is that of the interpretation and validity of certain conventions. The political problems, on the other hand, should be handled in accordance with the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 15.

If mediation were a complete failure, recourse would inevitably have to be had to a recommendation prescribing a solution in accordance with the third and fourth paragraphs of the article, and the consequences would have to be taken. In this matter, the Covenant is quite clear. It would be impossible not to apply it.

I may add that throughout the conversations we have in mind it will be absolutely essential to uphold two principles which are already laid down in the appeal made by the twelve members of the Council on February 16th.

The first thing to place on record is that a State will not be acting in conformity with the Covenant and the Pact of Paris merely because it avoids declaring war. We should, of course, be wise to recognise that not every frontier incident constitutes war, and that war may sometimes be avoided notwithstanding certain acts of violence. Where, however, you have military expeditions abroad and great battles between regular armies operating under orders from their Governments, there can be no explanation or statement of reasons which will convince the nations that these are legitimate acts of a pacific character.

What the Covenant and the Pact forbid is not merely a declaration of war, but likewise any act of aggression, any recourse to other than pacific methods as an instrument of national policy.

The second need is a clear affirmation of the principle that, after the establishment of the League as a great international organisation based on law and the adoption of the Pact of Paris, no new right can be created by force, no agreement secured by force can be registered by the Secretariat under Article 18 of the Covenant. That is a *sine qua non* for the validity of any agreement concluded between Members of the League.

In the view of many Members of the League, the guarantee contained in the Covenant against the creation of new rights by force is undoubtedly one of the most important achievements accomplished through the foundation of the League.

We must, however, hope that there will be no need for recourse to a recommendation under

Article 15, and that a solution will be brought about by direct conversations and mediation.

Neither of the opposing States will have failed to realise the very serious consequences which the continuation of the conflict might have for the international organisation of Geneva. No one can predict the economic, social and political effects which a great war in the East might have throughout the entire world.

If the efforts at mediation fail, and if the Council and the Assembly are compelled to use every means at their disposal to bring about the cessation of hostilities and to find a settlement for these burning questions, they may rightly feel sure that an immense majority of the inhabitants of all countries will watch their endeavours with the utmost sympathy.

If we are successful in our efforts, we shall have taken an immense stride towards the organisation of peace, which is the great aim of the League.

M. Motta (Switzerland):

Translation: Anyone who has listened closely and with an unbiased mind to the speeches made this morning and again this afternoon must have been struck principally by the concordance which marks the opinions that have been advanced. That concordance is particularly noteworthy because it is spontaneous — that is to say, it is not due to any previous understanding. I am not surprised at that; indeed, I should have been surprised if the reverse were the case.

This Special Assembly has been convened at the request of China in virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant. When the matter was before the Council, China involved other articles as well.

China is asking for the application of Article 15 in conditions which are, if I may say so, somewhat remarkable, because events have already, to a very large extent, outstripped the fundamental hypothesis contained in Article 15. Article 15 says: "If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement" It is plain, then, that, once the voice of guns and rifles has been heard, the hypothesis in Article 15 has been left far behind. I am glad, however, that we are still able to remain within the system of that article and that we are not required to think of entering upon another system laid down in other articles.

Article 15 prescribes two procedures which, to my mind, are fundamental. In the first procedure, the Assembly or the Council acts in the capacity of mediator. It is obvious that, with this procedure, the arrangement which it is hoped to achieve can only be brought about with the concurrence of the parties themselves. I most warmly hope that this first procedure will make it unnecessary to employ the second.

Should the conciliation procedure fail, Article 15 prescribes a procedure by way of recommendations, and, if that procedure results in a recommendation duly voted — that is to say, unanimously in the case of the Council, and in that of the Assembly with a specified majority which must, however, include all the Members of the Council — it has certain very important consequences which are described in Article 15, paragraph 6: war may not be made against a State which accepts the recommendation. This sentence, in appearance so simple, is full of the deepest significance. In it, Article 15 foreshadows the application of Article 16.

To my mind, the preliminary condition for the application of the procedure in Article 15 is that hostilities, should they have unfortunately broken out, must cease: the cannon must be muzzled. It would, I think, however, be a very great mistake

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to suppose that the cessation of hostilities means the solution of the conflict. It is, of course, a very important object, but a secondary one, which will, we hope, be achieved, along with others, by the resolution we adopted yesterday evening unanimously, including the parties to the dispute — a fact which we all welcomed with great satisfaction.

Our principal aim, however, is the maintenance — and, in the special circumstances we are considering, it would be better to say the restoration — of peace between the opposing countries.

Next, let me remind you of a few fundamental principles; and I must apologise for saying less well certain things which have been said with great eloquence and wisdom, and in some cases also very incisively, by earlier speakers.

First and foremost, we must always bear in mind Article 12, which contains a very strict obligation — that of having recourse to arbitration or judicial settlement, or, if this is impossible, to investigation and consideration by the Council.

Until this procedure in Article 12 has been accomplished, and hence until recourse has been had to the Council, all military acts and all acts of war — and the distinction is a rather subtle one — are prohibited. Now, I am afraid that, in this case, Article 12 has not been observed.

Article 15 is the complement of Article 12. It, too, necessarily implies the idea that a country cannot seek justice for itself. The results of the use of force cannot be acknowledged by the League, for the League is based, first and foremost, on the idea of right and on the idea of justice.

True, the Covenant does, in certain cases, contemplate the possibility of the use even of force; but, as all the countries gathered together here have accepted the Pact of Paris as well as the Covenant of the League, they are prevented from using force even in the case contemplated in the Covenant, because the Pact of Paris forbids all war, all exercise of force, as an instrument of national policy.

I do not propose here to deal with certain views, very natural views, regarding the notion of legitimate defence. That notion has, I know, been alluded to, but we cannot, I think, take shelter behind it until all the pacific and conservatory procedures in the Covenant have been exhausted.

I have no intention of examining the merits of the dispute at the present moment. We must, I think, give it the most unbiased and effective consideration we can.

We are not, in the strict sense of the term, a court of law. It would, I think, be an exaggeration to say that we have any real mission of arbitration. Our duty is to pave the way for a friendly settlement, if possible, and to seek for other solutions when friendly methods have failed. The General Commission will, I imagine, appoint a sub-committee of its members to make a special study of all the factors of the dispute. The sub-committee will then be asked to submit concrete proposals to the General Commission, which will forward them to the Assembly. I can, however, I think, rightly affirm that the conservatory and pacific procedures of the Covenant will have no great value, nor any very great effect, if they are robbed of all meaning as a result of *faits accomplis*.

Peace is the interest of all. The League is the new juridical symbol of that great idea. If, however, peace is the interest of all, I shall not be going too far if I say that that interest is vital in the case of small countries. Owing to their smaller territory and their inferior economic, military and other resources, the small countries are far more vulnerable than the great Powers, which can in some cases rely on force. Were the small countries to lose their confidence in the procedures laid down in the

Covenant, they would be obliged to seek for other methods to ensure the essential and fundamental bases of their security.

I should be sorry if the few remarks I have made had the effect of complicating in any way the Assembly's and the Council's task. We are all anxious to bring to the examination and solution of the conflict a very large measure of goodwill, and, above all, that feeling of friendship which is likewise a fundamental feeling in the League.

I am not sure whether, at some time or other, we shall not have to examine as well the question of the respective spheres of competence of the Council and the Assembly. Their action is to a certain extent concerted, because the Council has not completely divested itself of the question. It is only divested of it in what I may call a partial manner. We shall, during our discussion, consider this very interesting side of the question.

Next, let me say that, in my opinion — and this is a remark of very great importance — it does not seem that the conflict has been localised at Shanghai. The conflict has been brought before the League in its entirety. The great Powers have a great part to play, a great task to fulfil. The main thing that we, the small Powers, can do is to mobilise moral forces. We must demonstrate the ties that unite us all. The great Powers have other means at their disposal, and I hope there will be no need to use them. Let me, however, say that only by harmonising our aims, by ensuring that any action we take is concordant and united, can we safeguard what I will call, not the prestige, because I hate the word, but the legal and moral authority of the League.

M. de Zulueta (Spain):

Translation: Only the other day, when I was speaking at Geneva on behalf of Spain, I hastened to offer the most enthusiastic co-operation in the cause of peace of an old country which is actuated to-day by a new spirit and whose interests were, as I said then, worldwide but immaterial.

These latter words are peculiarly pertinent to the present case. Spain has no special ties with either of the two parties to the present dispute. Towards both, as towards all countries, she has the same feelings of sympathy and sincere friendship.

Our interests in this matter are the immaterial and worldwide interests to which I referred, the interests of peace and of the international legal order embodied in the League; those are interests regarding which all countries should be at one. My country's desire in the case before us now is exactly the same as it would be in all other similar cases. We are all entitled to demand that conflicts between States should be settled, not by the blind violence of arms, but by enlightened and pacific methods; not by isolated action on the part of the two nations directly concerned, but with the co-operation, in due form, of all the other nations who are entitled to claim, *Nihil humani a me alienum puto*. It is the countries which have the smallest interests involved that are the best qualified to represent justice.

In brief, the question for the League is, To be, or not to be? We are anxious that the League should act, and we hope that it will do so in the full measure prescribed by the Covenant and with the energy expected by the world.

We have listened with the closest attention to the statements made on different occasions by the Japanese delegate concerning the difficulties with which that country has been faced; but, without prejudging in any way the merits of the problem before us, we consider that the cause of Japan would undoubtedly have gained by being raised from the level of a local conflict in which

two isolated countries are at grips with one another to that of an objective problem submitted to friendly discussion before the League of all the nations.

Let us, then, lay down the three following principles:

First of all, we consider that it is the Assembly's duty to itself to proclaim that the Covenant demands that evacuation should precede negotiation. When two countries are in conflict, and if, unhappily, territory has been occupied, it would obviously be incompatible with the Covenant for the occupying country to require that the merits of the dispute should be discussed before its troops had withdrawn from the invaded territory. Hence, both in Manchuria and at Shanghai, it is, in our view, indispensable that, if there are to be negotiations with regard to evacuation, the questions affecting the merits of the dispute must be held over *in toto* until evacuation has been completed, or at the least until the principle of evacuation has been agreed upon and a date for its completion formally determined and accepted by both States.

Secondly, we hold that Article 10 is the Magna Charta of the League. Consequently, Spain reaffirms in this Assembly the axiom, enunciated by twelve Members of the Council (including Spain) in an appeal recently sent to the Government of Japan, to the effect that the Members of the League cannot recognise any political or administrative changes brought about by force or in disregard of the principles of the Covenant or the Pact of Paris. Spain believes that the Assembly would be acting wisely if all Members composing it were to express themselves explicitly on this point.

Finally, we must enter a formal reservation with regard to the argument that the obligations of the Covenant may be weakened or relaxed in the case of countries that are inadequately organised. Without putting forward any opinion whatsoever concerning the question whether or no this argument applies to the case before us now, we feel it to be our duty to state as unequivocally as possible that it is principally in the case of the inadequately organised countries, those which are striving to set up a better organisation at home, that it is essential to maintain the international obligations in the Covenant in all their efficacy. The Covenant is particularly necessary owing to the internal weakness of certain countries and the strength of others. The League, which is the organ of the international community, owes it to itself to protect internationally the weak against the encroachments of the strong and the strong against the chaos of the weak. If, then, there be any conflict due to a lack of internal organisation in certain countries, such cases should, we hold, be considered at Geneva. We could not support the view that, in these instances, there is any right to exceptional or separate action on the part of any State.

Who could doubt in this Assembly of fifty nations, stirred by a distant conflict, the world effects of which are felt by us all notwithstanding their remoteness, that the fate of disarmament and of peace, the safety of millions of homes throughout the world, are bound up with the decisions we are about to take? For the League, I repeat, the question is: To be, or not to be? We want the League to be.

M. Tõnisson (Estonia):

Translation: I wish to associate myself with previous speakers who have alluded to the great gravity of the present moment. The conflict is not merely one between two Powers. The fundamental

principles of international organisation as fixed after the world war are imperilled.

It is not my intention, nor is it within my power, to examine here the underlying causes of the conflict by which, to our keen regret, two Members of the League are divided. My country has always maintained the best relations with both. What I regret is that it should have been thought possible to seek for the solution of this deplorable conflict by the despatch of armed forces and the occupation of a large area of another State. Such methods should no longer be permissible under the system of the Covenant and of the Pact.

It has, I know, been said that the despatch of troops and the occupation of foreign territory were merely measures of a legitimate defence. Speaking for myself, I cannot accept so wide an interpretation of the concept of legitimate defence. We very sincerely hope that the resolution adopted by the Assembly yesterday will contribute to the effective and final cessation of hostilities between the two parties. The dispute will then have to be settled by the methods laid down in the Covenant and as equitably as possible.

I entirely concur in the remarks which were made this morning by the Finnish and Swedish delegates. It is, we consider, of great importance that the lofty ideals on which the Covenant is based should be effectively observed and followed. This will enable all countries, great as well as small, to take up, with greater confidence and enthusiasm, the work for the construction of a better international order, which it must ever be our aim to improve more and more.

M. Beneš (Czechoslovakia):

Translation: Far be it from me in this serious dispute to take sides with either of the opposing parties. I should have no reason to do so, for I am entirely free from all sentimental predispositions or material interests. My country is a sincere friend both of Japan and of China. It has not forgotten the help afforded to it by those two countries at the difficult period of the world war and after the war. Czechoslovakia, in her policy, has maintained close and truly amicable relations with both Japan and China, particularly at Geneva.

It is, therefore, in a purely objective light and in the spirit of complete independence that I wish to submit to you, Mr. President, a few short observations concerning the conflict between Japan and China.

Czechoslovakia is concerned in this serious problem solely as a Member of the League of Nations. She is anxious regarding the results of our present action; she desires the League to fulfil all its obligations deriving, not only from the Covenant, but from the moral prestige it at present possesses throughout the world. It desires that the League, which, in spite of all, represents a new spirit and quite a new method in international relations, shall prove that it is useful and, indeed, indispensable to the maintenance of world peace. I am prompted to speak solely by my enthusiasm for this great ideal of which it is the bounden duty of us all to be the sincere and devoted representatives. M. Paul-Boncour, President of the Council, explained to us, in his eloquent opening speech, the complexity of the question, the peaceful settlement of which we have to consider, and he has emphasised the important fact that we should endeavour to understand the Council's action in the light of the quite special situation in the Far East. I agree with him. At the same time, I should like to emphasise two important points:

(1) China and Japan must be convinced that we are acting in principle towards them as we should act towards any other Power;

(2) That, while bearing in mind the special position from the standpoint of international law as regards certain political facts in China, certain principles of the Covenant must be respected in all cases and unconditionally.

Having said this, I will define my view as follows:

I. In spite of all the information we have received regarding the origins of the conflict between China and Japan, I cannot claim to know all the circumstances or to be able to judge and accept in advance the arguments for or against, or to be able to mete out blame to either party. Moreover, on looking at the present dispute, I think we cannot entirely disregard certain events, said to have occurred in China, which would seem to be directed against Japan. For instance, the boycott to which reference has been made, but of which no details have been given, would, if it were proved, constitute a hostile procedure which could be complained of to the League. I regret that Japan did not of her own volition lay this matter before the League, as was, and is, her right. Neither public opinion nor the Members of the League could have turned a deaf ear to her complaints.

II. On the other hand, though, under the Covenant, a country possesses the right to ensure its legitimate defence, it has not the right to take justice into its own hands except with the permission of the League. Failing such permission, and faced with action on a large scale and of great political importance undertaken by one of the parties to the dispute in the territory of the other, I cannot help recalling the provisions of Article 10, one of the fundamental articles of the Covenant which I think has been infringed.

III. As a Member of the League of Nations, my country believes it to be necessary that every signatory to the Pact should be obliged in all circumstances to resort to the pacific procedure laid down in Article 12 of the Covenant.

Without referring to other important international acts, this obligation under the Covenant is the one we regard as most precious, the one which, together with Article 10 of the Covenant, should be stressed above all others in connection with this dispute and discussion. If these two provisions of the Covenant are not upheld, the whole edifice of the new international order is threatened. That is why my country invokes this great principle, being convinced that, within the framework of pacific procedure, all the claims of Japan — for instance, that which concerns the execution of international agreements signed by China — could be met.

IV. The fourth point I wish to emphasise is a question of no less importance to the League. For the first time, the Assembly is considering a request submitted to it under Article 15. It is of the highest importance for the League that we should clearly understand that, by our decisions and the methods we employ, we shall be creating precedents. This is also a matter which is of deep interest to Czechoslovakia and which has led to my addressing this Commission. Finally, this precedent provides us with a lesson. For cases of this kind, the League should possess a perfected machinery and organs of action, its own commissioners and commissions of enquiry and, possibly,

its own police force. It is later, however, after the settlement of this serious dispute, that we shall have to deal with this question.

In short, I trust that the League will clearly mark its intention of being just both to Japan and China, that it will, in every case, fully respect the provisions of the Covenant and will remember that we are to-day establishing precedents of a primordial importance for the life and very existence of the League.

In so doing, the League will have well earned the gratitude of all nations.

M. Politis (Greece):

Translation: My sole aim in speaking is to work effectively, as we are directed to do in the first paragraph of Article 11 of our Covenant, to safeguard world peace.

I need not dwell upon my sympathy for the two nations parties to the dispute. I think I have given them both proofs of my sincere friendship which I feel sure they have not forgotten.

I, like those of my colleagues who have already spoken from this platform, am very anxious to safeguard more specially the two principles which appear to me to be directly involved in this discussion — namely, on the one hand, respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of the nations, and, on the other hand, respect for promises made in international acts. I consider that the international community has its very roots in these principles, so much so that to disregard them would really amount to repudiating the existence of any legal bond between the States and, so to speak, returning to barbarism pure and simple.

But I am equally concerned about actual facts: for to overlook facts may empty legal principles of all their substance, reduce them to nothing, and prepare the way, not only for disappointment, but for disaster. That is why I greatly appreciate the work of the League Council in this matter. It has displayed wisdom to which it would be unjust not to pay a public tribute.

As my friend, M. Paul-Boncour, very rightly said in noble and eloquent terms, the Council's great merit is that it immediately put into operation the procedure for which provision is made in the Covenant. Thus it safeguarded the fundamental principles of our organisation. If the Council was unable to do more, that was because it was beyond its power, as it is beyond the Assembly's power, to fill in the gaps in our organisation, to supplement the defects of the system established by the texts.

If the Council had had at its disposal a police force prepared to stand between the opposing armies, hostilities would most probably have been avoided. It is also extremely likely that, had we had a more perfect organisation, the dispute itself would never have taken the turn it did take.

I may perhaps be allowed, as one who looks back regretfully upon work begun but not finished, as one who nevertheless still hopes that one day that work will be finished, as one who, eight years ago, helped to draft the 1924 Agreement and Protocol, to say frankly and sincerely that, if instead of remaining a pious hope, a milestone on the road ahead of us, the Protocol had come into force, it is more than probable, I think, that, as far as matters in the Far East are concerned, we should not to-day stand where we are.

The Council did what it could in the circumstances. Bearing in mind all the facts, it endeavoured first to restore a peaceful environment in which it would then be able to discharge its duty under Article 15, paragraphs 3 and 4. It began by endeavouring to put an end to the hostilities. Its

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M. Branco (Portugal):

Translation: The Government of the Portuguese Republic does not intend now to discuss the Sino-Japanese conflict or to make proposals for its solution. It has for centuries been a friend of China and Japan, for the Portuguese were the first Europeans to reach the Far East, where Portugal has always had considerable material and moral interests. The Portuguese Government will simply make a short statement inspired by the two-fold duty of traditional friendship and firm loyalty.

Nothing could be more painful to my Government than the dispute which, owing to unforeseen complications, has brought two great and friendly nations to arms for the settlement of a dispute that, according to our constitutional laws, should have been settled by pacific means. We still hope

— and the earlier proceedings of this Assembly confirm this hope — that the League's intervention, the efforts of friendly Powers, and the wisdom and respect for treaties that I am sure both parties must feel, will eventually triumph over the fatal circumstances which led to the outbreak of hostilities. The Portuguese Government most ardently hopes that the chief aim of the League's efforts, the restoration of peace, will be achieved.

Our full co-operation in this noble task, both here and on the spot, we place with sincere goodwill at the Assembly's disposal. We believe that, by indefatigably applying the Covenant, the League will ensure that justice shall be done to the two nations, and in so doing will heighten its own prestige and promote the welfare of mankind.

(The Commission rose.)

A. [Extr.]/C.G./P.V. 2.

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

GENERAL COMMISSION

MINUTES OF THE SECOND MEETING

HELD ON SATURDAY, MARCH 5TH, 1932, AT 10.30 A.M.

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3. — COMMUNICATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY ON MARCH 4TH, AND REPLY OF THAT GOVERNMENT.

The Secretary-General:

In view of the fact that the resolution which the Assembly adopted last night made a reference to the "Powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlements", I thought it right to communicate a copy of that resolution to Mr. Hugh Wilson, the United States Minister at Berne, and I have now received from him a letter which you will perhaps allow me to read:

"With reference to the resolution of the Assembly adopted yesterday, of which you were good enough to transmit a copy to me last night, I at once notified the Secretary of State of the United States thereof, and am now in receipt of a reply from Mr. Stimson, by which I am instructed to inform you that the American military authorities at Shanghai have been requested by telegraph to co-operate."

The President:

Translation: Note has been taken of this communication.

4. — GENERAL DISCUSSION.

The President:

Translation: I will now open the general discussion of the problem as a whole which has been submitted to the Assembly and the Commission.

M. Sato (Japan):

Translation: I should first like to communicate to the General Commission a telegram which I received at a late hour yesterday evening:

"Since March 3rd the Japanese first-line forces have been stationed on the Liuho-Chen-Kating-Nanhsiang-Shenzu line and they have ceased hostilities. A detachment of our troops is stationed at the Woosung Fort.

"Detachments of Chinese troops facing our advance lines at Kating and Nanhsiang have erected new defence works. Several of our aircraft having been attacked, we were obliged to fire to stop the Chinese from firing. Apart from that incident, there has been no fighting."

Yesterday, at the commencement of the General Commission's meeting, the Chinese delegate made a communication in which he referred to a place named Kuansan. I was not able at the time to find this place on the map, and I therefore did not contradict his statement. This morning, however, on reading the text of his communication, I found it was not altogether correct. This town of Kuansan was stated to be on the Shanghai-Nanking line, some forty miles west of Shanghai. As I informed our President yesterday, our forces have remained at a distance of about twenty kilometres from the International Concession of Shanghai. The forty English miles would take us much farther away than the line on which our forces halted. Consequently, this "official" communication does not tally with the facts.

Moreover, M. Yen's communication mentions that some 35,000 Japanese have been landed near Kuansan. It is impossible to land troops at that

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work was cut short by a request from China to the Assembly. I personally have no complaint to make about that; on the contrary, I think it is a matter for congratulation, because, now the question is before the Assembly, our discussions can assume an amplitude which will bring out more clearly and thoroughly the whole truth and all its consequences.

Now that public opinion, cognisant of the statements made here and those to be made later in the Assembly itself — now, I say, that public opinion is becoming aware of the danger with which it is faced, it will, I am sure, bring its beneficial influence to bear.

I therefore congratulate the Chinese Government on having referred this question to the Assembly. Following upon the Council, the Assembly must, since the Council's work is to be approved, continue that work. Its first duty it endeavoured to fulfil yesterday, and we are all glad that the two parties collaborated. Yesterday, the Assembly prepared the pacific environment in which it can exercise a mediating influence.

If, as we hope, the two objects contemplated in yesterday's resolution — the conclusive cessation of hostilities and the evacuation of Chinese territory — are promptly achieved, the Assembly can then pass to the task assigned to it in Article 15, paragraph 3. It will have to endeavour to reconcile the parties, to make it possible for them — under the League's auspices — to reach a friendly settlement of the dispute. Only if the negotiations to be opened at the round table conference at Shanghai were to fail, and if subsequently the Assembly's further efforts were unsuccessful, then only would it be necessary to contemplate the application of Article 15, paragraph 4 — namely, to make a report containing recommendations to the parties. But I hope we shall not need paragraph 4; I hope the application of paragraph 3 will suffice to restore peace and concord between the two nations on the basis of a friendly agreement.

In any event, we must remember that, under Article 12, there is a time-limit to our action. If subsequently it became necessary under Article 15, paragraph 4, to draw up a report containing recommendations, that would have to be done within six months from the date on which the matter was referred to us — namely, if I am not mistaken, by September 3rd next. That fact must be kept in mind.

I think that, a part from the question whether the Council should or should not continue to deal with some part of the matter, the Assembly should continue to deal with the dispute until it is finally settled. As we cannot remain in session for six months, I think you will agree with me that a practical solution would be to appoint a committee to follow the negotiations to be opened at Shanghai, to report to the Assembly, and, should those negotiations unfortunately prove unsuccessful, to make the necessary preparations for the Assembly's future work.

But, I repeat, and on this note I wish to end, I greatly hope we shall not need Article 15, paragraph 4. I cannot imagine that, faced with the terrible responsibilities devolving upon both parties, they will not make the necessary efforts at Shanghai, once a pacific atmosphere is restored, to reach, by means of reciprocal concessions, a friendly agreement safeguarding the rights, interests and self-respect of the two countries. They both belong, like my own country, to a very old civilisation. That is why I venture to remind my Chinese and Japanese friends that the very wise precepts of our old civilisations contain many lessons which they would do well to remember. I am thinking, in particular, of one of the wisest

sayings in the divine works of Æschylus, in which he says that men, like nations, must bear in mind the mobility of rights. Rights, he says, have a tendency to change hands, for he who possesses them and does not use them with the necessary moderation may see them pass into the hands of his adversary.

I hope my Japanese and Chinese friends will bear this in mind in reaching the desired agreement.

Khan Sepahbodi (Persia):

Translation: This is not the time for oratorical displays, and we must, as far as possible, avoid words likely to aggravate the situation. I asked to be allowed to speak solely as the representative of an Asiatic country which maintains cordial relations with China and Japan, and is anxious that peace and goodwill should prevail in the continent to which it belongs.

We cannot ignore the fact that, unless the conflict between two neighbouring and fraternal countries in Manchuria and Shanghai — nerve centres of the world — is brought to an end immediately, and in such a way as to leave no bitterness in the minds of the two parties, it may assume dimensions prejudicial to world peace.

The Persian nation, which has always had intellectual and artistic links with the Far East, is naturally concerned at the bloodshed and the serious events which are occurring on the shores of the Pacific Ocean.

We earnestly hope that, before this Assembly closes, it will find the most rapid means of settling the dispute and putting an end once and for all to this fratricidal struggle between two States Members of the League. We must at all costs safeguard the prestige and effectiveness of our organisation.

The whole East saw in the creation of the League the advent of a new era, in which the nations would co-operate on a basis of justice and equality. That era was to end rivalry between the great States and to protect the weak against unjust attack, humiliation or mutilation by the strong.

The Eastern nations would be immensely disappointed if, now a serious dispute has been referred to it, the League proved ineffectual, merely a feeble voice crying in the wilderness.

As the representative of an original Member of the League, which has been associated in its work from the very beginning, I feel bound to repeat what the representatives of my country have often said. In acceding to the Covenant, Persia was — and still is — firmly convinced that for all the Members of the League the Covenant provides a fundamental law, guaranteeing the peace and security of the nations.

It is our duty to-day to make the fullest use of our fundamental charter, and not to weaken its force by opportunist interpretations. We must restore peace and proclaim to the whole world that the League is not useless.

M. Buero (Uruguay):

Translation: When you referred yesterday, Mr. President, with your usual foresight and your sure legal knowledge, to the important question raised by the addition proposed by the Japanese delegation to the Bureau's draft resolution, you put your finger on the very centre of the problem before us to-day — that is to say, Is it legitimate for foreign troops to occupy the territory of another country, both countries being Members of the League? In calling attention as you did, from the Presidential chair, to the danger we were about to incur in accepting H. E. M. Sato's proposal, you perhaps departed somewhat from your strict

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duty as President and became an active member of the Assembly when you courageously drew attention to the disadvantages of ambiguous sentences, and showed us the rightful path. I should like, first, Mr. President, to thank you for your attitude. You inspired us with the courage which we seemed to lack. In doing so, you were acting, not only as an excellent President, guiding and summarising our discussions; you were acting, above all, as an energetic and particularly competent member of this Commission. I recognised in your generous observations the mental outlook and the great virtues of the admirable Belgian nation, a peaceful and loyal nation called to a great future.

The problem we settled yesterday with the help of H. E. M. Sato, who was good enough to accept our views, was to some extent a parallel, on a smaller scale, of the greater problem to deal with which this Assembly was convened. Their similarity seems so obvious to me that I wonder whether this and yesterday morning's meeting were strictly necessary, for this morning we are simply enlarging upon the resolution we adopted yesterday. However that may be, I think it advisable in my turn to explain the views to which we attach great importance, although we are a remote country and have particularly small material forces.

Yesterday, we enthusiastically approved the Bureau's proposal calling for the withdrawal of the troops, but did not discuss the conditions which there was some idea of laying down prior to actual withdrawal. The President of the Swiss Confederation rightly pointed out that here there could be no compromise. The principle is absolutely clear, and there can be no question of hedging it round with conditions or even methods which might weaken or nullify its value.

I am not now expressing an improvised opinion. This morning you heard the competent representatives of two American nations, Mexico and Colombia, declare forcefully and courageously that the sovereignty of the nations must not be restricted as regards their territorial jurisdiction. I want, on behalf of a small country in South America, to proclaim that it supports the same principles. I am sure all the States on the other side of the Atlantic will support my contention.

There were lively debates at the Pan-American Conference at Havana in 1928 as to the scope of the principle of absolute non-intervention, a principle supported by the majority of that Conference.

I also attended the 1930 Conference on the Codification of International Law at The Hague, when the same question was raised in connection with the liability of States for damage to the property and person of foreigners. On that occasion, a large majority of States — among whom were all the Latin-American countries — consistently refused to agree to any limitation of the principle of non-intervention, though this was urged by certain great Powers who had in mind the internal situation in certain Far-Eastern countries.

As you see, these precedents point to an unbroken line of conduct, and the Uruguayan delegation cannot remain silent in this important debate.

We also proclaimed our views in the Council of the League in 1923, during a discussion on the same principle between two European countries. I had the honour to represent my country on the committee of jurists appointed to deal with that dispute, and I then expressed the point of view put forward this morning, in particular, by the Mexican and Colombian delegates.

I know we are dealing to-day with a very special situation, but I wonder whether encroachment upon

the sovereignty of a State Member of the League can reasonably be justified on the pretext that its internal organisation has not reached a sufficient stage of development. No, if there were any reservations to be made in this connection, they would have been made before that State was admitted to our community. My reply to the contention that disorganisation and anarchy revealed themselves after its admission to the League would be that the election of such a State to a seat on the Council would not have been justified. The latter circumstance proves the weakness of the argument, and, considering it more carefully, I wonder if anyone could pronounce an opinion with regard to a country's state of development without laying himself open to the charge that his judgment was warped by material interests. Are we sure that our own state of civilisation is the best? Who is the custodian of the standard of development and organisation for the various countries? And if their development could be measured impartially, would that not involve a right of supervision, a disguised right to intervene, as it were?

I can speak very freely because my country, I am proud to say, is one of the best organised countries in the world. Foreigners enjoy every possible guarantee. Latterly, our courts have made awards on very important questions. Our judges gave judgment in favour of certain foreign companies who were pleading against the Uruguayan Government; their judgment was based on law and equity. That proves that I am not concerned here with petty interests, but simply desire the maintenance of the Geneva organisation on the basis of respect and the strict observance of its fundamental principles. The solutions we are about to adopt must be examined carefully. It would be most unfortunate if we weakened our organisation by limiting the scope of the undertakings and guarantees embodied in the Covenant. That might cause the League's whole structure to collapse.

There would be no reason for the representatives of the smaller countries to be here, if material interests were to outweigh considerations of justice and legality and respect for the Covenant and the conventions we have signed. That, in my view, would be a step backward. It would imply a reversion to distrust, greed and evil passions, with their inevitable results — wars like those which have steeped the world in blood for the greater part of its history.

In 1923, the matter was taken out of our hands, because there was then another organisation, which also arose out of the Treaty of Versailles — the Conference of Ambassadors. To-day, we have no pretext for neglecting our duty or concealing our failures. We have perhaps neither the material force nor the ability to apply certain provisions of the Covenant; but that does not absolve us from telling the world exactly what we think about events in the Far East. In 1923, we had to handle our League carefully; it was then a small child, trying its first steps. Nine years have passed, the child has grown, and I think it can withstand the present crisis, even if its actions are not fully effective in practice.

We must give the world an example of firmness, courage and idealism, and not be too discouraged by practical difficulties. Such an act of faith would shield us from the severe criticisms that have already been levelled at us. If we show that we are determined to tell the truth, we shall strengthen the world's shaken confidence and shall create renewed energy. On such expectant and confident energy my hopes are based.

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M. Branco (Portugal):

Translation: The Government of the Portuguese Republic does not intend now to discuss the Sino-Japanese conflict or to make proposals for its solution. It has for centuries been a friend of China and Japan, for the Portuguese were the first Europeans to reach the Far East, where Portugal has always had considerable material and moral interests. The Portuguese Government will simply make a short statement inspired by the two-fold duty of traditional friendship and firm loyalty.

Nothing could be more painful to my Government than the dispute which, owing to unforeseen complications, has brought two great and friendly nations to arms for the settlement of a dispute that, according to our constitutional laws, should have been settled by pacific means. We still hope

— and the earlier proceedings of this Assembly confirm this hope — that the League's intervention, the efforts of friendly Powers, and the wisdom and respect for treaties that I am sure both parties must feel, will eventually triumph over the fatal circumstances which led to the outbreak of hostilities. The Portuguese Government most ardently hopes that the chief aim of the League's efforts, the restoration of peace, will be achieved.

Our full co-operation in this noble task, both here and on the spot, we place with sincere goodwill at the Assembly's disposal. We believe that, by indefatigably applying the Covenant, the League will ensure that justice shall be done to the two nations, and in so doing will heighten its own prestige and promote the welfare of mankind.

(The Commission rose.)

A. [Extr.]/C.G./P.V. 2.

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

GENERAL COMMISSION

MINUTES OF THE SECOND MEETING

HELD ON SATURDAY, MARCH 5TH, 1932, AT 10.30 A.M.

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3. — COMMUNICATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY ON MARCH 4th, AND REPLY OF THAT GOVERNMENT.

The Secretary-General:

In view of the fact that the resolution which the Assembly adopted last night made a reference to the "Powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlements", I thought it right to communicate a copy of that resolution to Mr. Hugh Wilson, the United States Minister at Berne, and I have now received from him a letter which you will perhaps allow me to read:

"With reference to the resolution of the Assembly adopted yesterday, of which you were good enough to transmit a copy to me last night, I at once notified the Secretary of State of the United States thereof, and am now in receipt of a reply from Mr. Stimson, by which I am instructed to inform you that the American military authorities at Shanghai have been requested by telegraph to co-operate."

The President:

Translation: Note has been taken of this communication.

4. — GENERAL DISCUSSION.

The President:

Translation: I will now open the general discussion of the problem as a whole which has been submitted to the Assembly and the Commission.

M. Sato (Japan):

Translation: I should first like to communicate to the General Commission a telegram which I received at a late hour yesterday evening:

"Since March 3rd the Japanese first-line forces have been stationed on the Liuho-Chen-Kating-Nanhsiang-Shenzu line and they have ceased hostilities. A detachment of our troops is stationed at the Woosung Fort.

"Detachments of Chinese troops facing our advance lines at Kating and Nanhsiang have erected new defence works. Several of our aircraft having been attacked, we were obliged to fire to stop the Chinese from firing. Apart from that incident, there has been no fighting."

Yesterday, at the commencement of the General Commission's meeting, the Chinese delegate made a communication in which he referred to a place named Kuansan. I was not able at the time to find this place on the map, and I therefore did not contradict his statement. This morning, however, on reading the text of his communication, I found it was not altogether correct. This town of Kuansan was stated to be on the Shanghai-Nanking line, some forty miles west of Shanghai. As I informed our President yesterday, our forces have remained at a distance of about twenty kilometres from the International Concession of Shanghai. The forty English miles would take us much farther away than the line on which our forces halted. Consequently, this "official" communication does not tally with the facts.

Moreover, M. Yen's communication mentions that some 35,000 Japanese have been landed near Kuansan. It is impossible to land troops at that

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place, which is situated inland at a considerable distance from the banks of the Yang-tse. Moreover, the figure of 35,000 is very much exaggerated. At the present time, the Japanese first-line forces do not exceed 40,000 men, and it would be impossible to land a further 35,000 men. In any case, I would repeat that this figure is very much exaggerated.

We have received from the Chinese delegate a further communication, dated March 4th, dealing with a telegram received by the Chinese delegation from the National Crisis Salvation Association. This telegram states that the Japanese forces are still continuing their brutal destruction of civilian lives and private property by bombing, bombardment and incendiarism, etc. I must emphatically deny the truth of that statement. It is a purely tendentious report. Besides, we do not know anything about this National Crisis Salvation Association and we have no idea whether it is a trustworthy association or not. The report that our forces destroyed the lives and property of civilians after the cessation of hostilities in no wise corresponds to the facts.

I should like to add one word more. Extremely tendentious reports are being circulated by the Chinese newspapers in Shanghai. As you are aware, Shanghai is a centre for the fabrication of all kinds of extraordinary rumours. For instance, it was stated in a telegram from Shanghai dated March 5th that the local newspapers had announced that the Chinese troops had won back Nanhhsiang. That is absolutely incorrect. The newspapers, in mentioning this victory, stated that a number of Japanese who had rushed into the trenches abandoned by the Chinese and previously mined had been killed by the explosion of the mines.

It is added that Chinese circles still credit certain rumours to the effect that 8,000 Japanese have been killed at Liou-Hi, that a Japanese cruiser has been sunk and that Admiral Nomura has died. There is no truth in these rumours either. Some time ago it was reported that Admiral Shiozawa, commanding the Japanese Fleet, had committed suicide. This report was equally incorrect. Moreover, I read in the Paris edition of the *New York Herald* this morning that the Japanese troops were marching in the direction of Peiping. That is absolutely untrue.

We are faced with an extremely important question, the settlement of which will be a very delicate matter. I would therefore urge the Assembly not to let itself be guided by false reports of this kind.

M. Yen (China):

I am sorry that my Japanese colleague did not quite understand the telegram I sent to the Secretariat, which I thought was fairly clear. We did not say that Japanese troops were being landed at Quinsan, which is a station on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway about forty miles from Shanghai. We know it is in the interior of the province, and that no troops could be landed there. What we said was that Japanese troops were being landed at Liuho (near Woosung) in order to outflank the Chinese position at Quinsan. The object of landing them was to attempt to outflank our position. As to whether the Japanese troops have advanced on Quinsan or not, we have said nothing; but just now I have received another telegram from M. T. V. Soong, Vice-Chairman of our Council of Ministers, saying that Japanese forces at Kating and Tachang are still attacking our troops between Liuho and Quinsan. Moreover, a fleet of enemy aeroplanes has bombarded Quinsan from the air and machine-gunned Soochow, which is two hours by train from Shanghai. So

we can see from this that the so-called "cessation of hostilities" is far from being the fact.

Anyway, I realise as much as M. Sato the tremendous difficulty which perhaps many members of this Assembly may experience in knowing exactly where these places are. So only this morning I have had the honour to request the Secretariat to have a map of the province prepared, which can be circulated among the members; so that whenever these names come up — and these names are pronounced differently by the Japanese and by the Chinese — perhaps this map will be of assistance to you.

As to the news which is alleged to have been circulated by us, I beg to say that Reuter's Agency, if anything, is English; it is certainly not Chinese. I wish we could say that we owned Reuter's Agency. As to details of atrocities that have been published (not by us) I had recently the great sorrow to read an article by a lady journalist published in the *Petit Parisien* describing the atrocities in Shanghai. That lady was certainly not a Chinese, and she was certainly not in the pay of our Government. We have also read many reports of barbarities and atrocities published in the London papers and in the *New York Herald*. I wish I owned the *New York Herald*, but unfortunately I do not. There are hundreds of other American papers publishing accounts of these atrocities with no help on our part and entirely on their own initiative. If China is backward, it is certainly backward in propaganda work. Compared with Japan we are not "in it" at all, when you think of the millions of yen that have been poured into Europe and America by Japan for propaganda work. I wish I were in a position to claim that we were such masters of propaganda work as we are alleged to be by my Japanese colleague: but the fact is there is an old saying that truth must come to light at some time or other, and murder will out, and it is not propaganda work that influences public opinion, but the real state of things — the massacre of women and children, the bombing of cities and towns and villages — unfortified places — from the air. Those are the things that are going to move public opinion, and settle the Manchurian question in the way of justice and truth.

The President:

Translation: M. Sato will now address the Commission. I hope, however, that this discussion will not be prolonged.

M. Sato (Japan):

Translation: The remarks which the Chinese representative has just made contain one observation which I cannot ignore.

In the first place, I would say that I do not hold China responsible for all the rumours emanating from Shanghai. I simply drew the Commission's attention to the fact that many reports coming from Shanghai are untrue and that consequently they cannot be relied on.

However, even the Chinese delegation's utterances contain statements which are incorrect. For instance, the Chinese delegation recently wrote to the Secretary-General quoting certain words attributed to M. Matsuoka, and I was obliged to write myself to the Secretary-General, emphatically denying that those words had ever been spoken by M. Matsuoka. If I am not mistaken, the Chinese delegation divided M. Matsuoka's utterances into eight points. The letter which I wrote to the Secretary-General on March 2nd¹ was couched in the following terms:

¹ See document C.294.M.181.1932.VII.

" Referring to the letter dated February 29th, 1932, from the Chinese delegation, I have the honour to state that the Consulate-General at Shanghai informs me that M. Matsuoka did not utter the words attributed to him in that communication.

" As regards the seventh point, M. Matsuoka did, it appears, express the opinion in private conversation that the efficacy of the Briand-Kellogg Pact would have been strengthened further if it had defined economic boycotts as acts of war."

The *Journal de Genève* published the Chinese delegation's communication, and I was obliged to send a denial, which appeared in this morning's issue.

The Chinese delegate has just said that the Japanese Government has spent several million yen on propaganda in America and Europe. That allegation is made on the responsibility of the Chinese delegation; but I would ask the latter whether this charge is in accordance with the facts and whether the Chinese delegation can furnish proofs; otherwise, I cannot accept such an accusation.

M. Paul-Boncour (France):

Translation: I had not asked to speak, but I assume that the President's invitation refers to the telegram which I had the honour to communicate to the Commission just now, and to the telegram which Sir John Simon has shown me.

It seems to me — and I should like to put this as discreetly as possible — that if the Parties exchange and communicate all the contradictory reports they may receive, the whole time of the Assembly may be taken up with the discussion of these various reports. After such severe hostilities over such an extensive line of battle, which, however, is not absolutely continuous and on which orders may be received at different times, and the nervous strain of contact felt on both sides making skirmishes likely, there is bound to be a certain amount of truth in the contradictory information from the two Parties; and I am inclined to think that, until there is a zone, however narrow, between them occupied by international forces, the same contradictions and the same difficulties will continue.

In view, however, of the request, addressed yesterday on behalf of the Commission, and subsequently of the Assembly, to the Powers represented at Shanghai and having special interests there, to supplement the particulars furnished by the Shanghai Commission which was set up by the League Council, and which has already sent several successive reports, we may be able to obtain precise information.

We ourselves had not expected this invitation, and two days ago I sent a telegram to our representative and to our military attaché in China asking them to make enquiries on the spot. Yesterday evening I received a telegram laconic but very clear. I will read it to you, subject to the reservation proper to a piece of information which is not of a collective character and does not emanate from an organ of the League, but which is nevertheless a piece of information:

" Hostilities actually ceased yesterday at 2 o'clock on both sides."

Sir John Simon (British Empire):

I also have in my hand a communication which has been received from Shanghai by the British authorities, furnishing information as to the actual situation on the ground. The General Commission

will have in mind that Shanghai time is seven hours in advance of the time here, and the message which I have before me was sent off from Shanghai at half-past twelve (Shanghai time) — that is, about five o'clock this morning here. I have a second message received about an hour later. The British Commander-in-Chief replies to the message which I had sent last night at our President's request for information which the Assembly might have before it. It is of a provisional character, and I do not put it forward as a final report, but I am sure my colleagues will be glad to know what is the report furnished by the British Commander-in-Chief to our President in answer to his invitation of yesterday. He says that he has seen his Italian and French colleagues this (Saturday) morning. His colleagues had not then received instructions — doubtless the telegram which M. Paul-Boncour told us had been sent to the French Commander-in-Chief was still on its way. The British Commander-in-Chief says that details are not available, owing to the length of the front line and the distance to be covered, but he supplied the following as his preliminary report, adding that the Japanese military and naval authorities confirm it officially.

The Eleventh Division has been completed by the disembarkation of one more regiment at Liaoho. The Fourteenth Division, which will probably land at Woosung, is now on the way. All main operations have ceased, but there has been occasional firing, a few rounds of artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire chiefly in the region of Nanhoiang, to which place the military attaché is proceeding this afternoon. A military Staff Officer is also proceeding to Kiangwan, and their reports will be communicated in due course.

I put this information at once at the disposal of the General Commission purely as a provisional matter, because it is plain that we must still wait for some hours before we have a complete and a definitely verified statement. In the meantime, I venture to associate myself with M. Paul-Boncour and suggest that there should be a temporary "cessation of hostilities" between our two friends here, for it is very difficult for us to proceed with our work, which is to produce, I hope, an effective *apaisement* if there is occasional "firing" after the official cessation of hostilities has been proclaimed.

The President:

Translation: The news which the representatives of the British Empire and France have just communicated to us, and which they have obtained from their military authorities on the spot, is calculated to allay our anxieties to a certain extent. We cannot continue a discussion interspersed with geographical questions and contradictory information regarding occurrences which have taken place at an enormous distance from Geneva. We cannot continue to discuss the news contained in articles published at Shanghai, in Europe or elsewhere.

The resolution we adopted yesterday should result in an impartial ascertainment of the facts for our full and complete information. Until we are in receipt of these details, which we are anxiously awaiting, any debate on this point is useless, and I propose that we should pass on to the general discussion of the problem as a whole.

M. Braadland (Norway):

Translation: The statement which the acting President of the Council, M. Paul-Boncour, made with such eloquence yesterday to the Assembly proves how complex, difficult and delicate is the problem now before us. But the very complexity

of the situation makes it all the more necessary to bear in mind the essence of the problem. I think, therefore, that we should not expend too much of our time on questions of detail, which certainly, taken as a whole, qualify the situation, but which, if we attempt to examine them separately, will make it difficult for us to obtain that general view which is absolutely necessary if we are to form a right opinion of the problem.

The many special circumstances of the present conflict, which it is not easy for European Powers to estimate at their proper value, increase the difficulties we are experiencing in our attempt to discover a solution acceptable to all parties. But even if we recognise all the difficulties lying in the path of an unimpeachable juridical decision, this conflict raises certain questions of principle which I think are sufficiently clear, and regarding which the League of Nations can and should express an opinion without delay.

The Assembly should constantly bear in mind the fact that these are principles the violation of which might produce incalculable effects on the future of the League. The very authority of the League is at stake.

The dispute between China and Japan began in a way which, in the opinion of the Norwegian Government, made it natural to seek a practical solution by mediation between the two Parties, with a constant endeavour to prevent an aggravation of the conflict and the commencement of serious hostilities.

Consequently, as long as there still remained any hope of success, the Council was bound to endeavour to settle the conflict by the conciliatory action which it must undertake under Article 11, paragraph 1, and also under Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. These are the provisions on which the Council naturally had to base its action while waiting for the information which the Secretary-General sought to obtain by taking immediately such steps as were necessary and by hearing the statements which the Parties were bound to make to it.

Unfortunately, the conciliatory action of the Council did not produce the desired results. This action has been continued until the last few days, and will, of course, be continued until the conflict has been finally settled. But the present situation is such that it has become necessary to resort to other methods. The Norwegian Government holds it to be of the highest importance that the main lines of the Council's policy should be approved by the Assembly. The Norwegian Government also feels that it would be desirable for the Assembly to adopt certain measures, or possibly to invite the Council to adopt measures, calculated to bring hostilities to a definite end and to prepare the settlement of the whole conflict.

My Government considers that, in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, the Parties to the dispute should have laid before them certain perfectly clear recommendations regarding the steps to be taken to avoid the continuance of warlike acts and to prepare, as I have said, the settlement of the whole dispute.

But I feel bound to say that the League's action should not be confined merely to submitting recommendations to the Parties. World public opinion expects it of the League that, if either of the Parties does not accept or respect these recommendations, the League should take appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant. I reserve the right, after following the discussion in our Committee, to submit, if necessary, a draft resolution on these lines.

Obviously, a situation like the present one must be looked at both from the political point of view

and from the standpoint of what is practicable, and not in the light of a theoretically legal question. But for this an objective opinion based on actual facts is not enough. It must be realised that the present conflict raises questions of principle which are of fundamental importance for the future of the League.

M. Restrepo (Colombia):

Translation: Before coming to the serious question which this Committee has to consider, I wish to mention the following facts. The relations of my country with the two States in conflict, although friendly and cordial, are only of very recent date. They are, however, more advanced as regards Japan, a Power with which Colombia concluded in 1908 a Treaty of Friendship and Establishment guaranteeing to Japanese nationals the right to establish themselves and carry on their trade and industry throughout the whole territory of the Republic. At that time, I had the honour to preside over the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Colombian Legislature, which proposed to the latter the adoption of the draft Treaty; I even, I believe, had some share in securing the approval of this draft. As regards China, no diplomatic or consular representation, no undertaking or agreement of a positive nature, unites us as yet with that distant Republic. In other words, our opinion cannot, in the present problem, be suspected of being tinged with even the slightest degree of partiality. If we are anxious to state our opinion here, it is because we are fully conscious of the moral responsibility borne by each of the Members of this association, and we know that any serious conflict in any part of the world, like any precedent at law — or contrary to the law — which might be created in international life, is destined to affect our own existence.

Possibly the time has not yet come for the League to designate the aggressor and decide whether the territory of a Member of the League has been violated contrary to the provisions of the Covenant in this armed conflict, which the Committee of the Council has already called a state of war. But we should be prepared to do so at any moment, and we must not give the peoples of the world the impression that we are afraid to speak out clearly when the time comes. The future of the League, and consequently of the peace of the world, depends on this.

Negotiations are at present proceeding under the auspices of the League, and with the direct intervention of several Powers, to put an end to hostilities. Let us await the result of these efforts, which do not seem to have failed, and let us thereupon act accordingly.

In the meantime, I wish to offer my fullest support to the statements made by the representatives of France, Spain, Guatemala, Peru and Panama at the meeting of the Council in Paris on December 10th, 1931, statements embodying more or less explicitly the principles which may be in danger and which form the basis of relations between civilised peoples. These principles are the very expression of the provisions of the Covenant — in particular, Article 10 — to which the twelve Members of the Council referred on February 16th, and which I should like to see invoked in all its force when the Manchuria question is dealt with. I would particularly stress, as expressing a necessary consequence of these principles, the passage in the appeal of the Twelve (which is of the same tenor as the very firm declaration made by the State Department at Washington) noting that "no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought about in disregard

of Article 10 ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by the Members of the League of Nations".

The four points formulated on December 10th by M. Gonzalez Prada, representative of Peru on the Council, define the scope of the principles which are in question. For my part, I beg to submit them here for the consideration of my colleagues, in the hope that they may be adopted by all for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of weaker nations, the respect for which undoubtedly enhances the rights of powerful States.

The four points are these:

"(1) No State has the right to effect the military occupation of the territory of another in order to ensure the execution of certain treaties;

"(2) No State is entitled to oblige another — having invaded its territory — to enter upon direct negotiations on the bearing and legal value of treaties previously existing between the two States;

"(3) The exercise of the right possessed by each State to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its nationals must be limited by respect for the sovereignty of the other State: no State being entitled, in order to provide such protection, to authorise its military forces to penetrate into the territory of the other for the purpose of carrying out police operations;

"(4) The fact that a State has certain rights, claims, economic concessions, etc., in regard to another State does not entitle the former to effect the military occupation of the territory or to seize the property of the debtor State. Any recovery of debts by compulsion is illicit, in accordance with the principles accepted by the Second Conference (The Hague, 1907)."

These points, which I have ventured to borrow from the representative of a neighbouring and sister Republic, clearly express the principles of international law and the clauses of our fundamental Covenant. They form, in the opinion of my Government, the rule which should in all cases apply to the decisions to be taken by this Assembly in the problem which has led to its convocation. I am, moreover, prepared, on behalf of my country, to agree to any decision the effect of which would be, while safeguarding the principles I have outlined, to ensure the peaceful solution of this conflict and maintain intact, in the present serious situation, the authority of the League of Nations.

M. Romeo Ortega (Mexico):

Translation: In expressing the views of the Mexican Government and people, and in accordance with my instructions, it is my duty to make the following statements:

Mexico, in becoming a Member of the League of Nations, regarded it as an absolute necessity that the just application of international law should, by means of frank and loyal co-operation between all countries, exert sufficient moral force to establish and maintain the reign of true international justice.

The foundations on which the League has been built up, and the ideas expressed by the eminent statesmen who, as representatives of their countries, have spoken on many occasions from this platform, are such that Mexico regards the League of Nations as morally capable of guaranteeing the application of principles of justice as against interests which might endeavour by

forcible means to ignore or violate them. Confidence in this moral guarantee was the chief reason which led Mexico to form part of this Assembly and to co-operate to the extent of its means in achieving that lofty aim.

In the face of the unfortunate events which have led to the meeting of this Assembly, Mexico regrets that, in spite of the praiseworthy efforts of the Council, hostilities have continued for so long.

Respect for State sovereignty, the inviolability of State territory, the refusal to condone anything in the nature of armed intervention — whatever name is given to it by legal, diplomatic and political artifice — are essential principles for the life of all nations.

Mexico asks that the League should demand entire respect for the provisions of the Covenant and that, apart from geographical and ethnological conditions, it should assert, not as a theory which may or may not be applied, but as an expression of the will of the whole world and as a definite truth, that attacks on sovereignty should not be condoned and that all aggressive intervention should be barred.

The League, in taking such action, will recognise that, in international law, as in private law, no one can take justice into his own hands.

This is of vital importance for the League if it is to gain the respect which is its due. The League is, in the widest sense of the word, the judge, chosen voluntarily and solemnly by the nations.

Mexico demands that, as a result of this meeting, the principles of sovereignty, humanity and justice may be sincerely and loyally established.

M. Löfgren (Sweden):

Translation: In his speech during the general discussion of the Disarmament Conference, Baron Ramel, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, drew attention to the growing anxiety with which, in Sweden as in many other countries, events in the Far East are being followed, involving, as they do, a serious threat to the results obtained in Geneva in the organisation of peace. On behalf of the Swedish Government, he expressed the most earnest hope that peace might be promptly restored by the energetic action of the League and the Powers principally concerned.

From that time until the last few days the position in the Far East has become worse, and although the news appears to be contradictory, no one can deny that what is taking place is war in everything but name. At this moment I will say nothing as to what has been done by the organs of the League to put an end to this deplorable conflict. I note, however, with satisfaction that, from the first phase of the conflict, the Council pointed out that it could not be solved satisfactorily without the withdrawal of the troops concerned. No one can deny, especially after the report by the Committee of the League at Shanghai dated February 3rd, that the military means employed in the conflict between China and Japan are not in conformity with existing treaties. Sweden, for her part, has maintained on several occasions during the League discussions that the provisions of the Covenant prohibiting the use of armed force retain their entire validity whether either of the Parties describes the use of armed force as war or not. Without wishing at this moment to give any opinion on the respective claims underlying the conflict, I wish to state that, in the opinion of the Swedish Government, the landing of troops and their use in military operations on the territory of another Power are contrary to the provisions of the Covenant and of the Pact of Paris. Any attempt to extend the conception of legitimate defence in

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the manner adopted in the present case would render it impossible to maintain any legal international order.

Consequently, my Government unhesitatingly gives its support to the note addressed to Japan by the twelve members of the Council on February 16th last, and, in my opinion, the Assembly should endorse this appeal. I realise the complicated nature of the conflict and the special conditions prevailing in the Far East. These special circumstances cannot, however, be invoked by one of the Parties as an excuse for evading the procedure of conciliation and arbitration laid down in the Covenant.

It is, however, evident that, at the present time, the first duty of the special Assembly is to obtain, not only the cessation of firing, but also the definite cessation of hostilities. The latter is an indispensable condition in order that the organs of the League may contribute to a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The cessation of hostilities should, however, take place in such a manner that the position of the Parties to the dispute may not, in view of the settlement of the dispute, be influenced by military pressure and that invasion of Chinese territory may be stopped. I welcome the appeal adopted yesterday by the Assembly as a first step towards this result.

I wish, however, to point out that, once hostilities have ceased, it will naturally be the essential duty of the League to ensure the peaceful settlement of the conflict in the spirit of the Covenant. In this connection I may recall the remarks contained in M. de Brouckere's report, which was adopted as a valuable guide by the 1927 Assembly.

At this moment a heavy responsibility weighs on the special Assembly of the League and on all the States taking part in it. As M. Hymans, the President of the Assembly, stated in his opening speech, we must conscientiously seek for ways and means of restoring concord through justice. It is true that small countries like ours have less possibility than the Great Powers of influencing the course of events; but our interest in the maintenance of legal international order is all the greater.

If the League does not succeed in present circumstances in establishing peace based upon justice, the proper and loyal application of its own constitution, there is a danger of the more or less complete collapse of those ramparts which we have built up together with so much patience and zeal in order to prevent force from supplanting justice.

M. Erich (Finland):

Translation: I wish first to say that the feelings of the Finnish people are equally cordial towards both Parties to this dispute. Finland has had sincerely friendly relations with both from the time when she was not yet a sovereign State, and these excellent relations have been intensified since she became independent. Because of our sympathy for and good relations with the two Parties, we are the more anxious to help bring the present conflict to an end, and we hope the dispute between China and Japan will be settled in accordance with the principles of justice and equity, with due regard to the legitimate interests of both.

Finally, we hope that the League will emerge from the conflict stronger and not weaker. I should like to say, therefore, that, if in my statement I mention points which touch certain susceptibilities, I do so with impartiality and for the common good.

The matter with which we are dealing raises more than one serious problem affecting the very basis of the League. Is the League really a live

force and does it constitute a real guarantee? Or, whenever a vital and universal question of security arises, when it is faced with a dispute between world Powers, is it no more than a debating body, passing formal resolutions, or at most a mediatory body, whose real authority and influence depend chiefly on the goodwill—I will not say the arbitrariness—of the parties concerned?

Shall personal interest and political opportunism be the ultimate principles on which the policy of certain Members of the League is based so that certain Powers, regardless of the engagements into which they have entered, feel justified in acting as they think fit in order to assert their rights, or even to promote their interests, and in resorting, for that purpose, to any means of enforcement and coercion, instead of referring the matter to organisations set up for the purpose of safeguarding peace and settling disputes or facilitating their settlement?

The practice observed by States prior to the League's existence was based on the unlimited power of a State to act as its own interests dictated. But that is not the system inaugurated by the Covenant. Unfortunately, the Covenant's effectiveness has too often been weakened by a practice based on the principle of following the line of least resistance.

There is, indeed, considerable disharmony between the system of the League, whose political action must be based on the Covenant, and the actual facts—disharmony between the texts, disharmony between the facts. We are sometimes tempted to hide this disharmony, and in exceptional cases a certain amount of illusion may even be useful; reality is sometimes too discouraging. As a general rule, however, it is better to bring out the truth. It is regrettable that the League's power to assert its will is limited: but it is better to recognise its inadequacy than to pretend to observe the Covenant when we are not in a position to do so. Without offending anyone, we might even go a little further and call attention to a method sometimes employed which consists in interpreting some basic provision of the Covenant in a manner which is more skilful than sincere. That is obviously the least satisfactory method of interpretation.

The smaller States know very well wherein resides the League's real motive power and which States are actually responsible for the official interpretation and the real application of the Covenant. It is not to the special interest only of the smaller States, however, it is also their duty, to insist on a just interpretation and a reasonable application of the important principles which have been laid down.

Whenever the League has discussed the various aspects of international security, Finland has always and on every possible occasion insisted on the following principles, and their importance in the matter with which we are dealing must not be overlooked:

1. A clear distinction must be drawn between a threat or even a danger of war, on the one hand, and actual aggression, with or without a declaration of war, on the other. Care must be taken not to confuse a threat with aggression; there has already been confusion of that kind in the League, *inter alia* in the earlier phases of the present affair.

2. A distinction must be drawn between the material causes of a dispute and the aggression to which a dispute may lead if the parties, or one of them, will not submit to a pacific settlement. Whatever may be the responsibility of either party in regard to the basis of the dispute, the Covenant does not recognise aggression as a direct means for the settlement of a dispute.

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3. As early as 1924, Finland put forward and strongly pressed a view which is beginning to be more widely accepted—namely, that the aggression prohibited by Article 10 of the Covenant may occur, without any declaration of war, in the form of hostile acts infringing the territorial integrity and political independence of a country.

Confusion in this matter in political affairs may not justify, but perhaps in some measure explains, recourse to coercion without a declaration of war.

We do not suppose that the integral application of the principles of the Covenant can be decided from one day to the next. The present situation is complicated by the events which are occurring and also by the methods which it has hitherto been attempted to employ. However that may be, the Assembly cannot remain passive spectator. It must act. It must do its best in a serious situation, which, however, there is no reason to consider desperate. The Assembly must endeavour, by all the means at its disposal, to bring about a settlement of this dispute. That is its undoubted duty: to ignore its duty would be to incur the gravest responsibility in the eyes of the whole world for the future of mankind itself.

M. Beelaerts van Blokland (Netherlands):

Translation: The events which have occurred in the Far East since September last have everywhere caused the profoundest emotion. After the world war—the war to end war—and the creation of the League we hoped that in future, at least among the Members of the League, we should be spared the horrors of armed conflict.

That has not been the case. Hostilities broke out in China which, by whatever legal term they may be called, have all the main features of war.

From the beginning of the dispute, the League, with the help of the United States of America, has endeavoured to bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The Council has been dealing with the matter for nearly six months, and the Twelfth Assembly also gave it close attention. Apart from the Parties to the dispute, the Powers were

unanimous. Nevertheless, their voice throughout this period has been the voice of one crying in the wilderness. That is perhaps the most disquieting aspect of this tragic affair.

We have been studying the possibility of setting up an international police force, but we must not forget that, even were military action possible, the moral force of the Council's decisions must always remain the pivot of the system, the strongest guarantee of peace, unless the whole organisation of the League is to crumble. In the present case, that moral influence has failed. That Party to the dispute which felt it was entitled to take military action continued to do so in spite of the Council's unanimous opinion.

The noise of the guns on the battle-fields in China was a shameful accompaniment to the discussions of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Need I say that events of this kind demonstrate the imperative necessity for doing away with armaments? In my opinion, we must recognise that no reduction of armaments will guarantee us against a repetition of such events. There is only one way of achieving the desired aim. The nations must become imbued with the idea that war is a crime, that it must be abandoned as a means of national policy, and that the settlement of disputes must never be sought except by pacific means.

I have no intention, at the present moment, of allocating between the two Parties the responsibility for what has occurred. The dispute has been referred to the Assembly, and in performing its task it will, I am sure, fully appreciate not only its duty to stop the bloodshed in the shortest possible time, but also the fatal effect the League's failure would have on the whole organisation of the international community. The Netherlands Government, which has for centuries had friendly relations with the two great nations concerned in the dispute, is absolutely confident that the discussions will open a way to an agreement between the Parties and to valuable co-operation in future. Only thus will it be possible to safeguard, in the Far East, that peace which is so deep-rooted in the Oriental soul.

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT

AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

GENERAL COMMISSION

MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING

FRIDAY, MARCH 4th, 1932, AT 4 P.M.

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1. — ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONSTITUTION OF THE BUREAU.

M. Hymans (President of the Assembly) :

Translation : The Commission's first duty is to appoint its President.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) :

Translation : I stated yesterday that, in appointing you President of the Assembly in the particularly difficult circumstances with which they have to deal, the delegates had given the best proof of the spirit in which they intend to approach the problem before them. The Assembly, moved by a happy impulse, chose you as President, as you are aware. As the Commission is composed of exactly the same delegations, it would, I think, be logical and desirable that it should have the same President.

M. Hymans was appointed president by acclamation.

The President :

Translation : I thank M. Paul-Boncour for his observations and for the confidence he has shown in me. I accept the duty you have entrusted to me. I propose that the Bureau of the Assembly should also act as the Bureau of the Commission.

Agreed.

2. — CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE SHANGHAI AREA : ADOPTION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE BUREAU.

The President :

Translation : I have a communication to make with regard to a letter from M. Yen, first delegate of China.

At the beginning of his speech yesterday, M. Matsudaira stated that the commanders of the Japanese army had been ordered to cease hostilities at 2 p.m. At that time, we had not received any confirmation of the fact from the Chinese delegation. In a letter I have received from M. Yen this morning,¹ he says that the Chinese commander proclaimed the cessation of hostilities at midnight.

From these two concordant statements it would appear that hostilities have actually ceased. The second paragraph of M. Yen's letter says, however :

"Despite Japanese assurances to cease hostilities two o'clock Thursday afternoon (March 3rd), the Japanese are still attacking us at Loutangcheng near Kating: severe fighting is still in progress."

This news naturally created an unfortunate impression. We are receiving contradictory information. This situation cannot continue: we must put an end to these contradictory statements which are disturbing and alarming public opinion and the Assembly.

I would therefore ask M. Matsudaira to be good enough to give us an explanation of the facts alleged by M. Yen.

(The Japanese delegation handed to the President an explanatory document.)

¹ Document A. (Extr.), 10.1932.VII.

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In reply to my request, I have just received a document¹ from the Japanese delegation, which I presume they desire me to communicate to the meeting. It is as follows:

"The Japanese army and navy has ceased hostilities on the orders given by their commanders on March 3rd. Japanese troops in the front line are still from time to time being fired upon by Chinese regular soldiers, or by soldiers in civilian clothes, and in these cases are returning their fire. In the night of March 3rd, disbanded Chinese soldiers who had fled from Woosung appeared in the district of Liu-hi and fired on our soldiers who retaliated.

"These are only chance skirmishes which even if they recurred from time to time would not modify the attitude of the Japanese forces as defined in the proclamations made by the commanding officer.

"The Japanese army has no intention of resuming hostilities, nor of advancing beyond the positions at present occupied unless the Chinese army undertakes a veritable offensive. You may formally deny any allegation which might be made by the Chinese regarding an attack by our forces despite the cessation of hostilities."

M. Yen (China). — Gentlemen, yesterday afternoon I had the honour to present a statement from my Government as to the general situation. This statement contained at its conclusion four formal requests. It is perfectly obvious that not all these can be discussed and action taken on them at once. Nevertheless, it is the hope and the expectation of my Government and of my people that the Assembly certainly will not adjourn until it has expressed itself on all four counts.

Our last news yesterday was that both the Chinese and the Japanese commanders had announced the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, and we all — including myself — really sincerely felt very much relieved. Unfortunately, the latest news which has just been read to us by our distinguished President seems to present quite a different story.

We do not perhaps expect you to believe the reports received by us unconfirmed, nor do you expect me to believe the story presented by the Japanese. In order, therefore, to settle in our minds whether hostilities have really ceased or not, it seems to me that the only way is for us to ascertain this through some neutral authority.

I have therefore the honour to suggest that this Assembly request the four admirals in Shanghai: the British, American, French and Italian, to ascertain for us whether hostilities have really ceased; and that it authorise them to see to it that these hostilities do cease and remain ceased for perhaps an indefinite period of time, during which the terms of the armistice may be concluded.

As to the armistice itself, I venture to suggest that the Assembly might send general instructions also through these four high officers as to the principles which are involved. This armistice, arranged in the presence of these four admirals, would naturally include the principle of evacuation. It seems to me that when the military part of these arrangements has been completed, then naturally the so-called "Shanghai Conference", which has been accepted by both China and Japan, will of course commence. This Conference, it seems to me, will have greater hopes of complete success in view of the atmosphere of relief and tranquillity which will no doubt prevail in Shanghai at that time.

¹ Document A. (Extr.). 13.1932.VII.

The Secretary-General. — Mr. President. — At the conclusion of the meeting of the Assembly yesterday afternoon, I thought it my duty to telegraph to the Committee which has been set up at Shanghai to ask them to furnish as soon as possible and practicable a report on the development which has taken place there since they made their last report, and to pay special attention to the aspect relating to the cessation of hostilities.

Of course, immediately that report has been received I shall submit it to the Assembly, but I think it is fairly clear that that Committee may not be in a position to furnish full information with regard to the actual cessation of hostilities which may be taking place at some considerable distance outside Shanghai, and it was my intention this afternoon to ask the Powers who have military, naval and civil authorities on the spot if they would furnish information on that particular question so that it might be submitted to this Commission. I really think, that that would give the information which the representative of China and which you all desire.

Sir John Simon (British Empire). — Mr. President. — On behalf of the British Government I am very glad at once to give the assurance that we will make every effort to secure for you, sir, and for this body the most recent and accurate reports of the actual situation. I have no doubt whatever that the representatives of the other Governments who are especially interested in Shanghai will co-operate for that purpose, and I shall take the earliest opportunity of communicating to you, sir, the information which I am able to receive.

May I be permitted just to make one observation in order that we may recognise that there is some progress being made? I heard M. Yen just now begin his speech by saying that last night the Assembly was informed that both sides had accepted the armistice. I am bound to say that is not my recollection of what occurred, and indeed it would be very remarkable if M. Yen could have told us so yesterday, because his announcement to-day is that the Chinese accepted the proposed cessation of hostilities at midnight, which would correspond to something like five o'clock in the afternoon here — and that was the very moment at which he was speaking. Let us recognise the fact that considerable additional satisfaction may be drawn from the fact that now — and I believe for the first time to our knowledge — both sides have declared that they intend hostilities to cease. That is a new fact of great importance. At the same time, that there should be these incidents in endeavouring to consolidate the cessation of hostilities is a matter of great importance and gravity on which M. Yen does quite right to dwell. I would only ask therefore, sir, that we may recognise the degree of progress that has been made, and the British Government will most willingly take immediate steps to secure wholly impartial and official information as to the state of affairs as regards the cessation of hostilities on the ground.

M. Paul-Boncour (France):

Translation: You were quite right, Mr. President, to draw attention to the importance of ascertaining whether the hostilities have in fact completely ceased.

I said yesterday, when I described the Council's efforts, that its plan, which the two parties accepted, would obviously be of no avail unless hostilities actually ceased. We must certainly remove this anxiety if we are to perform freely the work entrusted to us. The only way to do that is to

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obtain information on the spot, and we are grateful to the Secretary-General for approaching, yesterday evening, the important body which, as I emphasised in my statement yesterday, we constituted, twenty-four hours after we were asked to take action — namely, the committee which is acting on behalf of the League at Shanghai.

It is obvious, however, that, in verifying the facts — which we must do — there is one point which can only be ascertained on the spot, and from military experts. Anyone who has been in the line of battle, especially when it is not a continuous line, is well aware that, in spite of orders from headquarters, shots may be exchanged and skirmishes occur: and this, however regrettable, does not run counter to our desire, the cessation of hostilities.

I am able, therefore, not only to give the Commission the same assurance as the representative of the British Empire has just given it, but to add that, foreseeing what would certainly be the desire of the meeting on this particular point, I sent a telegram to my Government yesterday asking it to obtain from the military attachés on the spot the information which the Commission requires and which I hope will arrive at any moment.

M. Pilotti (Italy):

Translation: I associate myself with M. Paul-Boncour's thanks to the Secretary-General for the step he has taken to obtain information from Shanghai.

I can assure the Commission that the Italian delegation will communicate to you, Mr. President, and to the Commission any information it receives from Shanghai.

The President:

Translation: On behalf of the Commission, I wish to thank Sir John Simon, M. Paul-Boncour and M. Pilotti for their promise to obtain precise information concerning the position at Shanghai through their military attachés and to communicate that information to the Assembly. It will certainly be of very great help in investigating the position and judging the facts.

M. Sato (Japan):

Translation: With the President's permission I will speak in place of M. Matsudaira, our first delegate.

How, may I ask, can it be alleged that the Japanese forces have suspended hostilities but are nevertheless fighting again? That is impossible. It was we who first ceased fire on March 3rd. Had we intended to continue the action and so go beyond our original objective, we should not have suspended hostilities of our own accord. You may be quite certain that the Japanese forces will never resume fighting, which has been effectively suspended by the Japanese command.

True, there are contradictory reports in circulation. It is said that in the front line a few skirmishes are still continuing. They are, I hope, only skirmishes of the kind that occur at the end of a big battle and that they will soon cease, so that there may, as soon as possible, be a real and effective suspension of hostilities.

I learnt this morning with great satisfaction of the announcement by the Chinese forces of the suspension of hostilities. As the President has pointed out, that is a very happy conjuncture, which will further the termination of hostilities. I do not imagine that operations will be resumed.

It was the Japanese too who proposed a conference for the suspension of hostilities. As hostilities have been effectively suspended in consequence of the orders given by the two commands, the next object must be to find a way to separate the two armies which have been engaged. This point should, I think, be considered by the representatives of the two forces.

The Secretary-General has told us that he has taken the necessary steps to obtain impartial information concerning the present position with regard to the opposing forces. I have great satisfaction in supporting that proposal, which has already been approved in the statements we have heard from the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy.

There have for some days been conversations on Admiral Kelly's flagship for the purpose of determining the conditions for the cessation of hostilities. In so far as my delegation is concerned, I hope that the conversations are still continuing and that they will lead to a tangible result in the shortest possible time.

It would, we think, be entirely appropriate that other Powers, those having a direct concern in the maintenance of security at Shanghai, should take part in these conversations and follow our negotiations. The Japanese delegation would have no objection to a suggestion of that sort. We should even welcome it.

The Japanese delegation will go even further. In our opinion, the question of the maintenance of order in the zone evacuated by the two forces will have to be considered.

This question will arise, because we cannot leave one of the zones — ours, for instance — exposed to all kinds of disorders.

As to the very much wider question of security in the Shanghai district, my Government is prepared, as it has already stated, to examine this matter at a round table conference which might be held as soon as an agreement has been concluded for the cessation of hostilities. The Japanese Government has already approached China with reference to the arrangements to be made for such a conference. I trust that the Assembly shares our desire for the early meeting of a conference of that kind, which will put an end to the regrettable position existing at present and that it will recommend the convening of the conference.

As I have stated previously, the Japanese troops sent as reinforcements will leave Chinese territory as and when the conditions as to tranquillity have been regulated. The technical details relating to the withdrawal of our troops would also be considered by the Shanghai conference.

I hope that, after this declaration by the Japanese delegation, it will be easy to put an end to the conflict, terminate the dispute altogether and so restore order and peace in the neighbourhood of Shanghai.

M. Yen (China). — I am sorry that I have again to ask you to take your eyes away from the mirage which is being conjured up before you by the Japanese delegation. I am just in receipt of three telegrams giving the actual state of affairs. While we are talking about a cessation of hostilities, the Japanese army is going further and further. These three telegrams have been put in a letter which I will hand officially to the Secretary-General. They read as follows:

"Japanese transports are now pouring troops into the region beyond Liuho."

Liuho is near Woosung.

"Some 35,000 more with tanks and cavalry were landed to outflank our present positions

near Kuansan (a city on the Shanghai-Nanking railway, about 40 miles west of Shanghai)."

This is twice the distance which the Japanese demanded our troops should retreat.

"Eight more Japanese transports entered the Yangtze River this afternoon (March 4th). Severe fighting is in progress.

"Our regiments, who were defending Woosung, were killed to the last man, rather than surrender. Foreign eye-witnesses saw our peasants being forced by the Japanese at bayonet's point to throw the corpses of our soldiers into the river.

"Japanese troops were landed to-day (March 4th) at Pootung (on the eastern bank of the Whangpoo River, opposite to Shanghai) to strike at the Hangchow region. The Japanese military officers make no secret that they intend to take the entire region between Shanghai and Nanking."

This is my information, so I must insist, Mr. President, that you authorize the admirals, the high neutral military officers at Shanghai, to see to it that hostilities cease, and that this cessation remains until the terms of armistice can be arranged.

We have here two forces which have fought for three weeks in the most bitter way against each other, and they are placed within a short distance and may at any moment start fighting again. You must remember that the cessation of hostilities is not associated with any withdrawal of troops, and is in fact tied up with a condition which can come into operation again unilaterally.

Further, I beg to call your attention to the fact that this cessation of hostilities is unilateral. It is not guaranteed. The Japanese commander can at any moment declare that the cessation of hostilities has come to an end. How are we, then, to be protected against another form of aggression?

Finally, on general principles in accordance with the articles of our Covenant, we are unable to agree that, while foreign troops occupy our territory, we should enter into any conference, for that would be negotiations under military coercion. Why have we asked for this Assembly? If everything is to be left to be arranged between the two military forces, there is no reason why China should have asked for the convocation of this special session.

Under these circumstances, I must insist that the Assembly take suitable action to see to it that the cessation of hostilities is real and that the cessation of hostilities is maintained until formal terms of armistice have been arranged.

M. Sato (Japan):

Translation: May I reply to M. Yen's statement concerning new Japanese reinforcements?

Some days ago we announced that the extension of the hostilities compelled us to send certain reinforcements, which are arriving now, but with the removal of the necessity for these reinforcements the troops composing them will be sent home. I am not at present in a position to say how we shall act; all that will be determined on the spot. That is why we propose the convocation as soon as possible of a conference to investigate the question of the cessation of hostilities and likewise those of the evacuation of the forces and the return of our troops to Japan. That has no connection with the suspension of hostilities in the front line, since the return home of the reinforcements will have to be regulated at the proposed conference, which will be attended not only by the military representatives of the two parties but also by

those of the other Powers. Effective measures will have to be taken at the conference for the cessation of hostilities and for the settlement of all matters arising out of it.

The President:

Translation: The very disquieting news which M. Yen has just communicated to us accentuates the painful uncertainty in which this meeting opened.

If I may sum up the discussion from the beginning, I would say that the vital consideration with which we are concerned is the need for the cessation of hostilities. Further bloodshed must be prevented.

The time, I think, has come to give definite form to the ideas that have been expressed. I therefore propose that we adjourn and resume in say half-an-hour, when I shall read a draft resolution which will be prepared in the meantime by the Bureau: and if, as I hope, it conforms to your views, it will be taken as the basis of your discussions.

Needless to say, after settling this matter, we will continue the debate, which will deal with the whole of the problem laid before the Assembly.

(The meeting was suspended at 5.15 p.m. and resumed at 6.50 p.m.)

The President:

Translation: I have been asked by the Bureau to communicate a draft resolution to the Commission. If it is adopted, it will then have to be submitted to the Assembly.

The draft is as follows:

"The Assembly,

"Recalling the suggestions made by the Council on February 29th and without prejudice to the other measures thereunder envisaged;

"(1) Calls upon the Governments of China and Japan to take immediately the necessary measures to ensure that the orders which, as it has been informed, have been issued by the military commanders on both sides for the cessation of hostilities, shall be made effective;

"(2) Requests the other Powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to inform the Assembly of the manner in which the invitation set out in the previous paragraph has been executed;

"(3) Recommends that negotiations be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the Powers mentioned above for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The Assembly will be glad to be kept informed by the Powers mentioned above of the development of these negotiations."

I will now open the discussion on the draft resolution.

M. Sato (Japan):

Translation: The Japanese delegation accepts paragraphs 1 and 2. I wish, however, to propose the following addition to paragraph 3. The first part of the paragraph down to the words "*destinés à rendre définitive la cessation des hostilités et à régler*" would remain, but the text after that would continue: "*les conditions et les modalités du*

retrait des forces japonaises, ainsi que la situation future des forces chinoises". These words would be substituted for "*les modalités du retrait des forces japonaises*". The rest of the paragraph would remain as a present.

May I briefly explain the reasons for the addition we propose? The word "*conditions*" implies that we wish not only to bring about the meeting proposed in the first part of the paragraph and to regulate the technical arrangements (*modalités*) for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, but also to indicate the conditions upon which the withdrawal would be carried out.

Moreover, in his address yesterday, my colleague, M. Matsudaira, emphasised that we would be prepared to withdraw our forces as soon as security and calm had been restored in the vicinity of Shanghai. The object of the additional words we propose, "and the future situation of the Chinese forces", is to bring the resolution into line with that statement.

The President:

Translation: I do not know whether anyone else wishes to speak, but I should like to make one observation. There is a very marked difference of meaning between the word "*modalités*" and the word "*conditions*". A *condition* signifies a fact by which the withdrawal would be conditioned; that is M. Sato's idea. Those who drafted the resolution had no such idea in mind; they were thinking of the technical conditions governing the withdrawal of the forces, whereas the word "*conditions*" might include political conditions.

M. Sato (Japan):

Translation: All these points will be settled on the spot, where all the circumstances necessitating the establishment of *modalités* or *conditions* for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces will be taken into account. We are anxious to place no impediment in the way of the consideration of the present position. The technical arrangements (*modalités*) for withdrawal can be decided only by taking into consideration the position existing on the spot.

In our view, the withdrawal of the Japanese troops is conditioned by certain essential circumstances. If the word "*conditions*" is too strong, I am entirely prepared to accept any other term which will meet the same object, but the maintenance of security and the maintenance of order, which engenders the feeling of security, and the protection of the lives and property of Japanese nationals, are conditions on which we must insist before the withdrawal can be carried out.

The President:

Translation: There is, I think, a shade of difference between M. Sato's language and that used by myself. When we speak of *conditions* and *modalités*, the idea, I think, in the minds of those who drew up the draft resolution is that all questions relating to security form part of the arrangements which are to be negotiated on the spot, "arrangements which will render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces".

That is a problem with many complex facets; we cannot solve it here in all its aspects. Those who are on the spot and who are acquainted with the exact position will be specially qualified to settle it.

Sir John Simon (British Empire). — I would direct attention to the English text of this resolution. The English text is just as authoritative as the French text, and M. Sato, as I know, is well acquainted with both languages. If M. Sato will look at the English text he will find that it runs thus: "... which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces." Might it not be useful to enquire of the honourable representative of Japan if the English text does not meet his point of view. If so, and if it is thought to be a fair expression of the view of the *redacteurs*, it seems to me not impossible that we can compose this verbal difference.

M. Sato (Japan):

Translation: I must apologise for opening a discussion on the draft prepared by the Bureau, for whom I have the utmost deference. Unfortunately, even with the explanation of Sir John Simon, who has drawn my attention to the English text, I see no difference between the English and the French versions. The latter says "*d'arrangements destinés à rendre définitive la cessation des hostilités*". That corresponds exactly to the words used in the English version.

If I press this point, it is because the Japanese delegation cannot accept a resolution without due reflection. For many weeks, we have been witnessing the most deplorable events without any really clear and definite arrangement being proposed. We cannot lightly accept a resolution by the Assembly, as you, Mr. President, will fully realise, after all the recent incidents which have developed on so wide a scale. After witnessing all these events we must have a resolution, if that is the Assembly's view, which will afford us satisfaction up to a certain point. I do not mean that all our demands must be accepted by the Assembly, but I hope our desires will be met in this essential matter.

The meaning which, according to the President's explanation, is to be attached to the word "*arrangements*" implies certain methods or conditions for which I must strongly press, but even after his explanation — and I apologise for saying this — I must point out that the public both in Japan and elsewhere will have before them only the text of the resolution. The public will not find it easy to know what is the real meaning of the word "*arrangements*" if the President's explanation is not annexed to the resolution. The public therefore will have only the text of the resolution on which to form an opinion.

That being so, I am obliged to press once again for a little more precision in the text itself.

The President:

Translation: So far, in my capacity as President I have offered a few comments on the draft resolution; I have attempted to explain it. I think, however, that in a body like this and at the stage we have now reached, the Commission itself must speak. We have here representatives of fifty States. It would be desirable and helpful if the representatives of some of these States could make their views known to the Commission and public.

M. Motta (Switzerland):

Translation: The time is undoubtedly a grave one, and I will make a friendly and pressing appeal to M. Sato, whom I venture to call my friend, to accept the Bureau's proposal as it stands. There is hardly any difference between the English and French versions. If it is desired to adjust the French text to the English, we need merely say "*régler le retrait des forces japonaises*", leaving out the word "*modalités*". I do not, however, think that

— 6 —

that will change the substance or essence of the resolution.

The Bureau is proposing what I may term a provisional or preliminary application of certain provisions of Article 15 of the Covenant. Under Article 15, it is possible for the Assembly to pass valid resolutions, provided the States Members of the Council present at the Assembly are unanimous, and there is a majority of the other States. The votes of the two parties to the dispute are not counted. We can therefore take a valid decision even if either of the parties dissented. I hasten however to add that I very strongly hope we shall secure not only legal unanimity but complete moral unanimity in this Assembly, including Japan and China.

What the resolution expresses is as follows. The principle of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops must not be questioned. Japan has promised that withdrawal. China demands it as a natural right. If you substitute the word "*conditions*" for the word "*modalités*", or if you add the word "*conditions*" to the word "*modalités*", you will be reopening the question of principle. That is inadmissible. I ask you therefore to adopt the resolution as it stands.

M. Beneš (Czechoslovakia) :

Translation : M. Motta has given a correct explanation of the legal situation, and I will merely associate myself with his opinion, without underlining it further.

With regard to the second question, it would, I think, be highly dangerous to leave anything uncertain, unclear or ambiguous in a document of this kind. It is essential for us all, as well as for world public opinion and particularly public opinion in the Far East, to know exactly where we stand. I therefore share M. Motta's view with regard to the addition of any words that might change the meaning of the resolution. I accordingly second M. Motta's proposal.

M. Sato (Japan) :

Translation : I have listened to M. Motta's remarks with the utmost respect.

Upon the question of procedure I do not entirely agree with him. You know better than I what are the provisions of Article 15. We are attending this Assembly subject to certain reservations concerning Article 15, but we do not wish to mention them at this stage. Article 15 excludes the votes of the parties in certain cases, but in the case of a resolution based on paragraph 3 of that article, there is no rule as to a majority. Subject to this reservation, I have taken note of M. Motta's remarks.

We are anxious to have a clearer text, I will not say one which will give us entire satisfaction,

but one which will, at any rate, be more precise. We are satisfied with the interpretation which the President gave just now — it may perhaps have been a personal opinion — and with that interpretation we could accept the text as it stands and will make no objection to its adoption by the Assembly.

Sir John Simon (British Empire). — The silence of my colleagues here makes me hope that we can adopt this resolution without a dissentient voice.

It will be for the President to say whether it is desirable to bring the actual language of the French and English texts into exact accord, as has been pointed out by M. Motta; but I do feel that it would be indeed a most fortunate beginning for a very difficult matter if it is possible for us to-night to adopt this resolution with unanimity and to have it in turn adopted by the Assembly.

The President :

Translation : If I have understood him correctly, Sir John Simon's proposal, which is very close to the suggestion made by M. Motta, is to omit the words "*les modalités*" in the French text and to say simply : "*à régler le retrait des forces japonaises*". The French text will then be identical with the English text, which reads : "and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces". M. Motta has said that, in his view, the idea is exactly the same and that it is only a question of words.

If the Commission considers this change acceptable, we might then adopt the resolution as a whole and submit it to the Assembly.

M. Motta (Switzerland) :

Translation : I hope the vote will be taken in an explicit manner and not merely in silence.

The President :

Translation : I quite appreciate your wish, and I think we shall fall in with it, but we could do so in the Assembly.

I declare the draft resolution adopted.

M. Motta (Switzerland) :

Translation : We are agreed.

The President :

Translation : I propose now to close the meeting of the Commission and, as President of the Assembly of the League of Nations, I convene the Assembly for to-day in this room at 7.45 p.m.

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3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
August 10, 1972
S, Date 12-18-75

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.032/101 FOR #538

FROM Japan (Neville) DATED Apr. 9, 1932
~~XX~~ NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: convening of the Japanese Diet in order to obtain approval
 of financial measures in connection with the Manchurian campaign.

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793.94/5079

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 538

Subject: Proceedings of the Diet.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Sixty First Session of the Imperial Diet was convened on March 18, and closed on March 24. The Session was extraordinary and was called for the purpose of passing on emergency financial measures necessitated by the expenses of the military operations in China.

The circumstances which led to the calling of this Session are interesting and significant. The Diet session in January (See despatch No.471, January 29, 1932) was

dissolved

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

dissolved by an Imperial Edict before it had taken action on the Budget bills. To meet the extraordinary expenses occasioned by the Shanghai and Manchurian military actions, the Cabinet had obtained the sanction of the Emperor, after approval by the Privy Council, of two bond issues totaling Yen 54,910,000. These were approved as emergency measures under Article 70 of the Constitution which provides that in case of emergency the Government can undertake financial measures by obtaining Imperial consent. The third request for funds to be raised in this manner amounting to Yen 22,000,000 encountered opposition from the Privy Council. This body stated that there was no need for treating the bond issue as an emergency measure, pointing out that the measure could and should be placed before the Diet for approval in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. The elections, following dissolution of the Diet, had been held and the Diet could be convened at any time. The Privy Council did, however, eventually approve Yen 15,000,000 of the amount requested, which would cover expenditures incurred previous to the end of the fiscal year (March 31st), but refused to approve the remainder.

This attitude on the part of the Privy Council left the Government no recourse but to convene the Diet in order to obtain approval for its financial measures. Obviously the Government would prefer to obtain approval for its measures without having the annoyance and possible risk of facing the Diet. For acting in defence of parliamentary practice the Privy Council has received the commendation

of

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of the press.

The Diet met on March 18th for organization. The election of the speaker and assistant speaker of the Lower House caused the initial conflict. The opposition insisted that the two Seiyukai men elected, Messrs Akita and Uehara, resign from membership in their party in accordance with a resolution passed by the Lower House in 1925. Their protests received no attention beyond catcalls and hisses from the Government Party members.

The formal opening of the Diet was held on the 25th in the presence of the Emperor, in the House of Peers. The first business of the two Houses, after the Imperial Message had been answered, was to pass a resolution thanking the armed forces of the Empire for their efforts in China. Speeches were delivered by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yoshizawa, the Minister of War, Lieutenant General Araki, the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Osami, and the Minister of Finance, Mr. Takahashi. Translations of the two speeches first mentioned are appended hereto. I have taken up the measures of the Finance Minister in a separate despatch (See despatch No. 533 of March 26).

The Government, with its large majority in the Diet, anticipated and encountered little opposition to its measures during the short session. The Opposition Party was not inclined to take issue with the Government on the matter of war expenses, and the military budgets were accepted with no debate. Other Government bills met some opposition, but were all passed. The bills passed in this session are outlined in detail in the despatch mentioned above.

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As usual there was considerable excitement and disorder in the Lower House. As has been expected, the opposition centered its attack on the failure of the Government to resign following the Nakurada Mon attempt on the Emperor. The Home Ministry and the Ministry of War were criticized for lack of care in not preventing the incident. The Home Ministry received blame for the series of outrages that include the assassination of Mr. Inouye and Baron Dan. Interpellations in regard to the Cabinet's policy in Manchuria and China, and regarding alleged pressure on Japan from the League of Nations were made of the Foreign Minister. I am unable, so soon after the end of the Session, to estimate the value of these interpellations.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin L. Neville

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim


Enclosures:

Copy of Foreign Minister's
 speech before the Diet

Copy of War Minister's
 speech before the Diet

Embassy's File No. 800. Japan

WTT/SR



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
538

The Address of Mr. Yoshizawa, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, at the 61st Session
of the Imperial Diet.

March 22nd, 1932.

At the last session of the Diet I had occasion to discuss the more important of the foreign questions confronting this country. To-day I have the pleasure of reporting, and of stating my views, on the various phases that have since developed.

As regards the Anti-Japanese movement in China Proper, the Japanese Government seized every opportunity to urge upon the Chinese authorities the thorough-going suppression of the same. However, China failed to respond, and the movement continued with increasing intensity and persistence. In Shanghai, where the agitation was conducted with especial vigor, the Minkuo Jihpao, a vernacular journal of that city, published on January 9th an article highly abusive of our Imperial House, and on the 18th of the same month, ^a Japanese priest~~s~~ and ^{his} ~~their~~ companions were murdered or wounded by a Chinese mob. The two incidents were sufficient to inflame the Japanese residents, who had long endured the ceaseless Anti-Japanese movements and whose patience had been well-nigh exhausted under the trying conditions of more recent months. The situation thus came to assume a grave aspect.

The

- 2 -

The Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai, acting under the instructions of the Government, presented to the Mayor of Shanghai strong protests regarding these two incidents, and at the same time made various demands for the settlement of the affairs. The Mayor complied without much demur with our demands relating to the first incident, and after some delay and much conversation, in the end accepted our terms regarding the second. On receipt of the Mayor's reply, at 3 o'clock on the 28th, the Japanese authorities, anticipating that the situation would improve, adopted an attitude of watchfully awaiting the fulfilment of their promise on the part of the Chinese. In the meantime, the 19th Route Army, then concentrated in the vicinity of Shanghai, having assumed a disquieting attitude and making a display of warlike preparations, the Shanghai Municipal Council had decided to take due precautions against the possibility of disturbances being created within the Settlement by undisciplined Chinese soldiers, or by mobs and radical elements. Accordingly, the Council, meeting on the 28th, declared a state of siege, to commence that day at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. As a result, the garrisons of the Powers were assigned to duty at their respective sectors in accordance with a pre-arranged plan of common defense. It was while the Japanese marines were proceeding to take up their post in the Chapei district, their allotted sector, that the Chinese fired upon our forces, and compelled them

- 3 -

them to take measures of defense. Reports are sometimes circulated making it appear that it was the Japanese marines who commenced the fighting, in spite of the Chinese acceptance of our terms of settlement. But the facts of the case are precisely as I have just stated.

Moreover, we exerted every effort to prevent any aggravation of the situation, and upon two occasions we entered into agreements with the Chinese authorities for a truce. But each time the agreement was rendered nugatory by the action of the Chinese army. Our demand, presented on the 19th of February, that the Chinese army should withdraw to a certain distance, was rejected by the Chinese. Thereupon, on the 20th, our troops which had been dispatched as a reinforcement, acting in concert with the navy, undertook to compel the withdrawal of the Chinese forces outside the prescribed area, and completed the task on March 3rd.

As soon as the Shanghai Incident occurred, the Chinese Government proposed to the Council of the League of Nations to make application of Article 15 of the League Covenant to the Sino-Japanese conflict, and later, upon the request of China, the case was transferred to the Assembly of the League. The Japanese Government took the view that the Shanghai Incident was a merely local affair which was not of a nature likely to lead to a rupture, while as regards the Manchurian Incident, not only had there been no renewal

of

- 4 -

of hostilities, but the matter was already pending in the hands of the Council under Article 11 of the Covenant and, moreover, the commission of inquiry had indeed left for the purpose of conducting investigations on the spot into the actual conditions prevailing in China; there was therefore no legitimate ground for applying Article 15 to either of these cases. It was with an unequivocal reservation based on that view that our government participated in the deliberations of the Council and the Assembly. However, the Assembly passed a resolution on March 11th, which was in more than one respect unacceptable to our government. On account of this unacceptability, our representatives under the instructions of the Government, expounded the Japanese position, ~~declared a protest~~ ^{made a reservation} embodying our contention with regard to the application of Article 15 of the Covenant, and abstained from voting.

In Manchuria, by reason of the special position it occupies in relation to China Proper, and the inveterate antagonism of the Manchurian people towards the militarist rule to which they had been subjected, it appears that subsequently to the downfall of the erstwhile Manchurian authorities last autumn, the efforts of the local leaders for the maintenance of peace and order in their respective districts gradually assumed the form of a movement for autonomy. A declaration of independence was made a short
time

- 5 -

time ago by former provincial governors and other Manchurian leaders. Our government received a communication under date of March 12th from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the new government, announcing the establishment of a new independent State of Manchuria. As regards this communication, we have gone no further than unofficially to acknowledge its receipt. I am certain, however, that it will be in accordance with the best interests of the new state if its government will, as the announcement says will be the case, really respect existing treaties and the rights and interests of foreigners, and faithfully adhere to the principle of the Open Door.

As regards the various questions pending between Japan and the Soviet Union in connection with the fisheries in northern waters, the negotiations assiduously conducted at Moscow since the end of last year have so far failed to bear fruit. From the broad stand-point of friendly relations between the two countries it is most desirable that we should arrive at a fair and suitable settlement. In fact, the difference in the views of the two governments concerning the basis of settlement is gradually narrowing. It is the intention of this Government to continue their efforts towards carrying our points and so to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests secured to us by treaty.

I have now given an outline of the latest developments

in

- 6 -

in the foreign affairs of Japan. While the interests of this country in Manchuria are certainly of paramount importance from a political view-point, those in China Proper are in the main economic rather than political. Consequently, if the Nanking Government and the Nationalist Party abandon their Anti-Japanese policy and direct their energies towards achieving internal unity and peace, and economic prosperity and progress, there is no room for doubt as to the possibility of restoring complete friendship and concord between the two countries. I may add on this occasion a word about the atmosphere of Europe and America, which has not always been sympathetic to Japan since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, and especially since the Shanghai Affair. That atmosphere was created simply through misrepresentations of facts emanating from Chinese sources or through misunderstandings of various kinds. I am confident that in time the sentiment of the Western Powers will turn gradually in favor of Japan.

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The Japan Advertiser,

Tokyo, Wednesday, March 23, 1932.

CAMPAIGN OF ARMY REVIEWED BY ARAKI

War Minister, in Diet, Asks Co-
operation of Nation in Sup-
porting Military

VITAL TO DEFENSE, HE SAYS

General States That Japanese
Troops Are Still Needed to
Keep Peace in Manchuria

The Minister of War, Lieutenant-General Sadao Araki, delivered the following address before the session of the Lower House of the Diet yesterday afternoon:

"The anti-Japanese movement in China grew more bitter as a result of definite boycott operations, constituting a menace to peace in the Far East. The interests of Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia were trampled upon by the authorities in power and the oppression of Japanese nationals was redoubled in ferocity, the situation being climaxed by the murder of Japanese, in particular, the killing of a party of Japanese army officers.

"The situation was such that the Japanese residents and even the native population of Manchuria and Mongolia did not know a moment's security from murder and robbery. Conditions became worse, and finally in the autumn last year, Chinese troops blew up a section of the South Manchuria Railway at Peitaying, which made it necessary to send Japanese troops to the scene in order to protect the railway. Since that time, the Japanese troops had to face overwhelming odds in daily engagements, but it was largely through wholehearted support of the people of Japan that the spirit of our soldiers was sustained and the difficult situation met and overcome over a long period of time.

Big Odds Encountered

"For six months only 30,000 troops maintained peace and order in an area more than two and a half times as large as the Japanese Empire, protecting the lives and property of 1,000,000 Japanese nationals and ensuring the security of 30,000,000 Manchurians. During this time the army also covered the first line of national defense without trouble.

"At the beginning of the Manchurian incident, our troops stationed in Manchuria were composed of the 2nd Division and an independent garrison, the total strength amounting to only 14,400 men, including 4,000 in the Mukden area. The total Chinese force at the time was 220,000, with more than 14,000 of them around Mukden. In view of this difference in strength, a mixed brigade was dispatched to the scene from Korea immediately and re-enforcements were sent later from time to time from Korea as the situation warranted. With this small force, the Japanese swept before them many

dangerous forces and maintained a guard against bandits. The present peaceful situation in the area is entirely due to the efforts of the Japanese. The future, however, is far from bright, and it is necessary that we maintain constant vigilance.

"From the standpoint of the national defense of Japan, peace in Manchuria is essential. It is therefore necessary for us to maintain our present strength there and also to send re-enforcements if needed. This point is now being studied by our officials.

Precautions Taken

"Next, in regard to our expedition to Shanghai, here, the situation was entirely different from that in Manchuria. Accordingly, we took the greatest precautions and the affair was handled from the beginning with the greatest care.

"A brigade was sent from Kyushu to support the naval forces already on the spot, in accordance with a decision of the Supreme Military Council. This was followed by the dispatch of a division.

"The army has done its best to avoid bloodshed and has made repeated overtures toward reaching a permanent settlement of the conflict. Far from responding to these overtures in a peaceful manner, the Chinese replied with artillery fire and we were compelled to retaliate.

"Moreover, the Chinese 19th Route Army, all Cantonese, was re-enforced by the bodyguard of General Chiang Kai-shek. In all, six Chinese divisions faced the Japanese at Shanghai, and therefore, additional Japanese re-enforcements were sent to the scene. The situation finally became quiet after a general attack by our troops.

Troops Now Returning

"Now that our objectives have been gained, the Japanese are steadily returning by the shipload to Japan. In

brief, the foregoing is an outline of the recent activities of the army.

"When we consider the situation from the standpoint of national defense, the importance and depth of the question are such that it cannot be considered on the same terms as the Siberian expedition or the Tsinan incident. From one point of view, the situation is more serious than the Russo-Japanese war and it is natural that the officers and men of the Japanese forces felt their blood course through their veins as on no other occasion.

"Through the efforts and co-operation of the people of Japan we hope to bring the matter to a successful conclusion.

"The co-operation of the army and navy in the recent operations was such as has rarely been seen in our history and we can be proud of our record before the rest of the world.

"We hope that you will understand the mission of the army and give us your sympathetic co-operation."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State



Washington,

April 20, 1932.
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AMERICAN CONSUL, APR 20 32

SHANGHAI (China).

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Please repeat to Department *1 sec* telegrams
to Geneva subsequent to your April 19, 3 p.m. *(see...?)*

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

SHANGHAI

Dated April 21, 1932

Rec'd 11:17 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

RECEIVED
 APR 21 1932

DIVISION OF

April 21, 4 p. m.



CONFIDENTIAL.

I have been shown confidential memoranda dated April 17 and 20 prepared by Millard, adviser to the Chinese Government, which are summarized below as I am told that they are influencing the Chinese to some extent in the present negotiations.

One. There is no advantage for China in hastily ending the present situation in the Shanghai area for so long as Japan occupies territory here without China's consent, she is clearly the aggressor.

Two. As soon as any kind of agreement has been signed Japan's position becomes to a certain extent legalized and changes from armed invasion to occupation with a measure of Chinese consent.

Three. It is a matter of indifference to China how large a force Japan keeps in the Shanghai area or for how long unless China can obtain immediate complete withdrawal. Presence of Japanese troops serves to focus attention of powers on the situation and it is to China's interest that attention

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

2- from Shanghai, Apr. 21, 4 p.m.

attention of world opinion should be held.

Four. The more Japanese troops are immobilized in Shanghai the fewer will be available in Manchuria and the greater the cost to Japan. Their continued presence will also seriously affect Disarmament Conference and the military policy of the United States and Russia.

Five. If China accepts proposed neutral Joint Commission it should issue declaration that it does so solely in the interest of peace; that it does not admit that Japan's occupation is anything but armed invasion without justification in fact or in international law; that it does not delegate to any international body its sovereign functions in this area; and that if in its opinion Japanese military occupation is unduly prolonged it will declare arrangement terminated and resume liberty to take unilateral action.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

KLP

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 18 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 13, 1932.

THE FRENCH PRESS AND THE FAR EAST.

FE: ~~Mr. Miller~~
~~Mr. Hamilton~~
~~Mr. Hornbeck~~

The Embassy at Paris reports that LE TEMPS, of March 22, 1932, published an editorial on the Far East:

"The most salient point in the (Yoshizawa) speech was Japan's expressed consideration that her interests in Manchuria were of capital importance from a political point of view, while the interests she possessed in China were more economic than political, which explained the very different methods by which Japan intended to settle the Manchurian conflict and the Shanghai conflict. It will be necessary for China to admit this double point of view, concludes the editorial, and for certain powers, notably the United States, to yield to the settlement of the Manchurian conflict as conceived in Tokyo."

(Paris Embassy's Despatch No. 2408, March 24, 1932)

Other French newspaper comments concerning the Far Eastern situation, transmitted with the Paris Embassy's Despatch No. 2429, April 1, 1932, are also worth notice:

Bernard Fay, writing in FIGARO of March 16, 1932:

"The entire American fleet is now massed in the Pacific. Big military and naval manoeuvres are being held near the Hawaiian islands. Every day the newspapers discuss the attitude which the people and the country should take with respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict...The women's clubs are agitated. There is talk of war....

"If

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"If the Japanese are wise they will not prolong the battle of Shanghai indefinitely. It has lasted too long for their own prestige. It is getting on the nerves of the Americans. It is filling the Pacific with a dangerous disturbance.

"In time of economic crisis one should never offer one's neighbor the temptation to make a great gesture of relief, above all when that gesture might open to them an economic market."

J. C. Balet, writing in LA REPUBLIQUE of March 20, 1932:

"Putting aside all question of legality, the creation of Manchuria as an independent State supported by Japan appears to us as a rather fortunate event."

O. Rosenfeld, writing in LE POPULAIRE of March 22, 1932:

"'Independent' Manchuria will meet the fate of 'independent' Korea; it will soon be annexed to Japan."

François de Tessen, writing in ACTUALITES of March 24, 1932:

"What will the nations which have signed the treaties concerning the independence of China do? What will be the attitude of the U.S.S.R.? And of the United States? Here we come up against a problem which is much broader and more important than the Shanghai situation."

JFC:EMU

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1857

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,
 American Minister,
 Berne.

Sir:

There are enclosed for your information copies, as listed below, of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in the Shanghai area for the period April 15 to April 20, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your communicating to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, the information contained in the enclosures to this instruction. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in these messages.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary.

Enclosures:
 Telegrams from Shanghai:
 April 15, 4 p. m.
 April 16, noon.

Apr. 21 1932. 29C.
 FE:LC:VL:83

rm
 FEI
 m.w.

793.94/5081A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

This telegram must
be closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated to FROM
anyone.

GENEVA

Dated April 21, 1932

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.

Secretary of State, DIVISION OF
Washington.

85, April 21, 4 p. m.

FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY

Reference Shanghai's April 21, 2 p. m.

I feel very strongly that if the resolution
by the Committee of Nineteen there should be no rela
expressed on the part of our Minister and the other
Ministers to accept the responsibility which it involves.
First it seems to be the only effective way of solving the
deadlock in the evacuation. I have never been satisfied
with the previous recommendations of the Ministers at
Shanghai which seem to me weak. This paragraph of the
resolution does not permit the Mixed Commission to set a
date for completing the evacuation in advance but merely
to state when in their opinion a time has actually arrived
in which the Japanese troops can be safely withdrawn. This
is a mere finding of fact peculiarly of a nature appropriate
for the jurisdiction of such a commission and I think they
would be unduly timid to refuse to accede such a responsi-
bility.

If you agree please notify Johnson accordingly.


WSB - RR

WILSON

F/LS

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-158
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

April 21, 1932.

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

Urgent.
 Confidential for the Secretary of State.

Shanghai's telegram April 21, 2 p. m., to Department
 and repeated to Geneva, and your 85, April 21, 4 p. m.

One. Japanese Ambassador called on Under Secretary this morning and stated that Japan would not agree to paragraph eleven, that she could not permit herself to be dictated to on the insistence of small powers. He said that Japan was of course willing to give consideration to the views of large powers. He said that the views of the Mixed Commission might not be unanimous and that, with provision for a majority decision, the less important powers might outvote the more important.

Two. The Department feels that there would be no objection to the Mixed Commission assuming responsibility in regard to the time for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops if this responsibility is restricted to the question of withdrawal from the areas now occupied by Japanese in Chinese territory beyond the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement road areas. However, if this responsibility

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-728

793.94/5082

793.94
 500.0111
 793.94
 893.1025
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

relates to the question of QUOTE complete UNQUOTE withdrawal
 of Japanese troops from Chinese soil at Shanghai, ^{including the Settlement areas,} that
 question would seem to be one in relation to which none
 repeat none of the powers could reasonably assume responsibility
 for making to another suggestions for action by the latter
 only. This, if it be so intended, would seem to be a new
 question. Would it not, therefore, seem wise that the scope
 of the responsibility which it is proposed should be assumed
 by the Mixed Commission ~~should~~ be more exactly defined at
 Geneva before the question of a mandate for a Mixed Commission
 is put to the governments which would be represented on that
 Commission?

Perhaps this point is covered in paragraphs of the pro-
 posed resolution regarding which the Department has not been
 informed. We have only paragraphs eleven and ^{yet} fourteen.

Three. In view of the above, Department is ^{deferring} withholding
 communication to Johnson in relation to your '85, April 21,
 4 p.m., *pending further word from you!*

FE *[Signature]* VDM/CIS

FE *[Signature]*

Castle, Acting

[Signature]


Approved by Mr. Castle

Enciphered by *[Signature]*

Sent by operator *M.*, 19 *[Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION



*Press Conference
 April 14, 1932*

A correspondent referred to a report from China to the effect that the Japanese Minister had informed the Chinese delegation at Shanghai that, because they had submitted new peace proposals to the League of Nations, Japan felt they had a free hand and might take any military operations deemed necessary to safeguard the lives and property of Japanese citizens. The correspondent then referred to another report from Geneva to the effect that the Japanese delegate at Geneva had telegraphed his Government to the effect that Sir Eric Drummond had informed Dr. Yen that the League of Nations would not consider the Chinese request to go over the matter again. Mr. Castle said that the Department had no confirmation of the reports. The correspondent asked, for background, what it all might mean. Mr. Castle said he did not know, except, as

F/LS 793.94/5083

-2-

the correspondents knew, the Chinese referred the matter to Dr. Yen in Geneva for advice, he understood, and we have heard nothing from Geneva--whether the League did or did not give him advice. Mr. Castle said he took for granted that the matter, if it were referred to anyone, would be referred to the Assembly committee. A correspondent remarked that the real point at issue seemed to be that the Japanese refused to set a date on which they would withdraw their troops. Mr. Castle said, in reply, that the real point at issue was, obviously, that the Japanese had so far been unwilling to set any date and the Chinese say they cannot sign an agreement unless some date is set. Mr. Castle said he understood there had been various compromise proposals, but that they had not been accepted by either side.

In view of our note of January 7 and the letter from Secretary Stimson to Senator Borah, a correspondent asked, for background, where the United States stands in the matter and whether it had completed its work in the Chinese question. Mr. Castle replied that it was not fair to say "completed its work" because we do not know what is going to happen. The United States is just as much interested as it ever was and will, of course, follow the matter closely and, if the occasion arises, it will take further action. Obviously, on the other hand, the attitude of this Government was very clearly stated in both documents of which the correspondent spoke, particularly the letter to Senator Borah. Mr. Castle added that for the time being he would make no further comment than that we stand on that policy.

A correspondent recalled that sometime ago questions were asked at press conference regarding the situation of the American consuls operating under the new regime in Manchuria. Now we have the Japanese offering a military guard--Japanese soldiers--to guard General McCoy and the other members of the League of Nations Commission traveling in Manchuria. The

-3-

correspondent asked if that raised any question at all so far as this Government was concerned. Mr. Castle replied in the negative. He pointed out that the Japanese military guard has not been detailed to guard General McCoy, but to guard the League of Nations Commission. General McCoy does not represent this Government on that Commission. If the League of Nations is willing to accept such a guard, it is no business of ours. A correspondent asked if it was the purpose of the guard to prevent the League of Nations Commission from coming into too close contact with the people in Manchoukuo. Mr. Castle replied that he would leave that question for the correspondents to study.

ARMAMENTS

A correspondent asked if there was anything Mr. Castle could tell the press about the situation at Geneva as to our proposal for arms cuts and the alignment of the various delegations on the question. Mr. Castle replied in the negative and explained that all we had seen so far was what the papers said about it this morning and last night. We are waiting to see what will happen. Perhaps when the Secretary gets there Friday, or Saturday, since the boat is a day late, he will have something to say.

AMBASSADOR GREW

A correspondent asked whether Ambassador Grew's call at the White House was purely a courtesy call or whether he discussed the Far Eastern situation with the President. Mr. Castle replied that it was purely a courtesy call. The correspondent asked if any date had been fixed for Ambassador Grew's departure. Mr. Castle replied that, unless there is reason for him to hurry off sooner, the Ambassador will sail on the 20th of May. There is a good boat then and the Ambassador wants time to study as much as he can in the Department. He also plans to go to Boston for a few days to see his family.

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DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

A correspondent said that the rumor persists that Mr. Willys is returning to this country and enquired whether any mention had been made of his resignation. Mr. Castle replied in the negative and explained that Mr. Willys was returning on his leave for purely business reasons, as he understood it. Mr. Foote told the correspondents that a telegram had been received to the effect that Mr. Willys was sailing on the EUROPA for a vacation in this country.

BOLIVIA-PARAGUAY

A correspondent asked whether any advices had been received in the Department concerning the military situation in the Chaco. Mr. Castle replied in the negative. The correspondent asked if anything had been received clarifying the situation as to whether they were sending new troops in there presumably for protection or merely moving about the troops already stationed there. Mr. Castle replied that we had not received any recent reports on that situation.

LOANS

A correspondent said there were a lot of guesses being made about the men coming to the bondholders' conference and asked if there was anything Mr. Castle could say to enlighten the press on the subject. Mr. Castle replied in the negative. He explained that he did not wish to give out the list because it might be changed, the people might not be able to come or they might object to having their names made public. A correspondent asked what time the meeting would take place. Mr. Castle replied that it would take place tomorrow afternoon.

A correspondent asked if Mr. Castle could indicate what kind of bonds would be dealt with in particular. Mr. Castle replied in the negative and explained that no agenda had been agreed upon and the meeting is merely for information. A correspondent said a report was current to the effect that the

037

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

representative of Lee Higginson & Company would attend and that the question of Kreuger and Toll would be raised. Mr. Castle reiterated that there was no agenda of any kind for the meeting.

LIBERIA

A correspondent enquired whether the Liberian Ambassador had ever presented a reply to our last note to Liberia. Mr. Castle asked who the Liberian Ambassador was. The correspondent said that the Ambassador resided in Baltimore. Mr. Castle explained that the Liberian Consul resides in Baltimore, but that we have no diplomatic connection with Liberia through the Consul. He is merely the Consul and never delivers any diplomatic documents to the Department. The correspondent then asked if a reply to our note had ever been made through any channels. Mr. Castle asked to what note the correspondent referred. The correspondent explained that he meant the last note we sent, about three weeks ago, protesting against the mistreatment of some of the witnesses who testified. Mr. Castle replied that no answer had been received.

A correspondent asked if our Minister had established diplomatic relations in Monrovia. Mr. Castle replied in the negative and explained that he is simply there. In circumstances like that, one can always carry on if one is clever at it. It is always possible to write personal notes.

Walter A. Foote, Acting Chief.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01-Manchuria/147 FOR Tel. #458, noon

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Apr. 22, 1932
~~Box~~ NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: advance of Chinese soldiers along eastern line of Chinese Eastern Railway. Conditions in interior horrible. It is believed that Russia will support partisans in order to make Japanese operations in Manchuria unbearably costly.

dew

793.94/5084

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated April 22, 1932

Rec'd 2:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

458, April 22, noon.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"April 21, 1 p. m.

One. An American who has just returned from an extended trip along the border near Pogradichnia has stated that General Wang Te Lin's troops numbering 5,000 well equipped and behaved soldiers are advancing along the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, that conditions in the interior some distance away from the east line are horrible, and that all classes of Chinese there blame the Japanese indirectly for the unprecedented outrages to which they have been subjected.

Two. His report on the conditions is confirmed by reports received by Consuls, nationals of whom have suffered terribly physically and materially.

Three. Vice Consul Takigawa stated at a consular body meeting yesterday that Japanese military had not yet decided about sending their troops east but that the newly arrived General Hirose was desirous of protecting not only Japanese but other

037

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

2- #458, from Peiping, Apr. 22, noon.

but other foreign lives and property on eastern line and that he, Takigawa, was arranging program for League Commission's visit to Harbin.

Four. I am of the opinion that the Japanese military are desirous that the League Commission become aware of the fact that more Japanese troops are necessary to restore order in North Manchuria hence their inactivity, and that the Soviet officials desire unrest to embarrass the Japanese and to make fertile ground for Communism. Conditions will become worse. It is not believed that there will be war between Russia and Japan but that the former will support partisans in order to make Japanese operations in Manchuria unbearably costly."

For the Minister

PERKINS

CIE

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A15 A4/992 ^{Confidential File} FOR Tel. # 136, 2 pm

FROM General Disarmament (Gibson) DATED April 21, 1932
Conference, AMDEL

TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1137 ***

REGARDING:

Stimson's conversations in Geneva on the Far East have resulted in definite progress and have been effective in strengthening the British and French determination to cooperate with the U.S.

793.94/5085

Confidential File

CHARGE SLIP

File No. 793.94

[illegible]

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

REMARKS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 1 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE GENERAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
GENEVA

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 29 1932
Department of State

April 21, 1932.

MEMORANDUM of conversation,
(Mr. Wilson and Mr. Matsudaira).

793.94

Mr. Matsudaira stated that he hoped as soon as convenient to have a conversation about general matters with the Secretary, but that in the meantime there were some urgent details which he would like to discuss with me and have me bring to the attention of the Secretary.

He assumed that I was familiar with the Draft Resolution of the Committee of Nineteen. I assured him I was. He said that he had heard there was some misunderstanding as to Mr. Nagaoka having expressed the opinion that the Mixed Commission might be charged with the duty of declaring when conditions were such that the Japanese retreat might reasonably be expected. He asked me if I had heard this report. I told him that I had heard it but through third parties, as Mr. Nagaoka had not spoken to me. Mr. Matsudaira explained that what Mr. Nagaoka intended to suggest was that the Joint Commission could act on a majority vote, and not to charge it with the duty of making a declaration as to when retreat might reasonably be expected.

He continued by stating that the Japanese Government could not accept Article 11, or certainly the first paragraph thereof, for ...

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793.94/5085-1/2

JAN 5 1933

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-2-

thereof, for two reasons, --

(a) because the negotiators on the spot, including the four friendly Powers, who were most familiar with the whole situation, had not reached the conclusion that any such power in the hands of the Commission was necessary or advisable; there was no reason to feel that the Committee of 19 were better able to interpret necessities than the gentlemen in Shanghai;

(b) because constitutionally no Japanese Government could admit the right of anybody but the Emperor to give orders for the movement of troops; neither the civilian Government nor the Minister of War himself can issue such orders.

I replied that while there might be some basis for the contention under (a), I could see none whatever for the point he makes under (b). Nobody was suggesting that an outside force give orders to the Japanese troops; what was suggested was that the Commission merely declare that they themselves have reached the conclusion that the time has come when a retreat might reasonably be expected. I could see no grounds on which anybody could claim a legal infringement of the power of the Emperor by such a proposal.

Mr. Matsudaira stated that the organization of the Committee of Nineteen made negotiation very difficult, as certain small Powers which had no interest on the spot were active in forcing conclusions difficult of acceptance for the Japanese Government. I replied that these small Powers were undoubtedly more concerned about the application of the Covenant of the League and the precedent that might thereby be set, than they were with the actual state of affairs in the Far East, but that he must be under no illusion in regard to their point of view;

they were ...

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

they were vigorously determined on the integral carrying out of the Pact of the League, and just because they had nothing to risk they were going to be the vigorous force with which he had to contend in this matter. I said that my own opinion was that a request by the Japanese Government for the dropping purely and simply of the first paragraph of Article 11 would put the Japanese in a very embarrassing position, as I thought their request would not be acceded to. I then added that I had heard there was some discussion as to the possibility of the Japanese making a spontaneous and unilateral declaration to the effect that they wished for a declaration from the Joint Commission, or considered that the Joint Commission might declare when in their opinion the state of affairs justified withdrawal, and that the Japanese High Command would be guided by this advice. Mr. Matsudaira felt that this would be very difficult, but added that they were working on this thought. I again urged on him the advisability of not taking a purely negative attitude, but of searching every avenue to find a means of making a positive suggestion to take the place of the first paragraph of Article 11.

Mr. Matsudaira then adverted to the fact that certain newspaper men had asked him whether Mr. Stimson was in touch with Mr. Litvinoff in regard to the Far Eastern situation. I told him that this idea doubtless arose from a report published by the "Zirchar Zeitung" on the evening of the 22nd, in which
 the United Press ...

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

the United Press correspondent reports that the Foreign Office spokesman in Tokyo had suggested that Mr. Stimson was getting into touch with Mr. Litvinoff in Geneva. I told him that Mr. Stimson had not got into touch with Mr. Litvinoff, and gave him a note whereby he could find the article in question.

Mr. Matsudaira stated that he had heard that Mr. Nelson Johnson had reported to the Secretary of State that he (Mr. Johnson) thought that the Japanese demands relative to the entry of Chinese forces in the area south and east of Shanghai, were unjustified. Mr. Matsudaira pulled out a map and first talked of the strategic danger to Japanese forces of the entry of Chinese troops in this area. I said that I was not a soldier, but it hardly looked to me as if these fears were justified, since a direct attack on the Japanese forces would involve crossing the International Settlement, which would instantly involve the four friendly Powers; the only other method of attack would be across the river, to the west of Shanghai, to attack the Japanese from the rear, and such a movement surely the Japanese Navy, with its command of the water, could prevent. Mr. Matsudaira then approached the problem from another point of view, showing me on his map the various go-downs and factories of Japanese nationality in this southern area. I asked him who had been policing this territory during the disturbance. He replied that he did not know. I said I didn't know either, but that I ventured to suggest that it ...

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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suggest that it had been policed by the Chinese. If this were the case, and order had been maintained during the stress of heavy fighting, surely it was unduly anxious to feel that special provision for the maintenance of order had to be made in this area when fighting was no longer going on.

Mr. Matsudaira again urged me at the end of the meeting to arrange as soon as the Secretary could conveniently do so, for an interview in which he could discuss the broader aspects of the case

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

GENEVA

Dated April 22, 1932

Rec'd 9:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

87, April 22, 1 p. m.

FROM THE SECRETARY.

Your 52/⁵⁰⁸² April 21, 6 p. m.


The preoccupation which you express under Number two is I believe covered by Article ten of draft resolution, text of which follows:

"Notes with satisfaction that the said Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles one, two and three of which the last named provides for the complete withdrawal of Japanese forces as before the incident of January 28."

Committee of Nineteen is awaiting definitive word from the Japanese Government and plans to call a session only upon receipt of such answer.

WILSON

WSB - HPD



F/LS

793.94/5086

793.94
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 793.94119
 893.0146
 500.0112



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

April 22, 1932.

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

55 FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Your 87/⁵⁰⁸⁶, April 22, 1 p.m.

The Department is instructing Minister Johnson,
 as suggested in your 85/⁵⁰⁸², April 21, 4 p.m., repeating
 to him the first paragraph of that telegram and text
 of Article ten as communicated in your 87.

Cast.
 Acting.

793.94/5086

SKM

FE: JJJ/VDM

FE

APR 22, 1932

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE
 WASHINGTON

MAY 4 1932

FE



ack. + letter to the
 I v. of President
 EARL BARNETT
 MAY 3/32
 APR 22 1932
 Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/5087

My dear Mr. Castle:

Will you please be good enough to have appropriate acknowledgment made of the enclosed copy of "China Speaks" which was sent to the President by the Chinese Cultural Society, 743 Fifth Avenue, New York City, and then return the book to us, together with a copy of your reply?

Sincerely yours,

Lawrence Richey
 LAWRENCE RICHEY
 Secretary to the President.

Book attached
 4/22/32

Honorable William R. Castle, Jr.,
 Acting Secretary of State.

Enclosure.

MAY 6 - 1932

FILED

See letter 5/4/32 to MacMillan Co
 re use of map prepared by
 Dept.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 4 1962.

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/5087

The Chinese Cultural Society,
 743 Fifth Avenue,
 New York, New York.

Sirs:

At the request of the White House, the receipt
 is acknowledged with thanks of a complimentary copy
 of a volume, entitled "China Speaks" by Chih Meng,
 which you sent to the President.

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:

met
 Stanley K. Hornbeck,
 Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Book received 11/11/62
Book received 11/11/62
Book received 11/11/62
 May 3 1962
 FE:ALJ/VDM
 4/23/32

met
 At
 the original
 final

793.94/5087

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 4 1932.

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/5087

Dear Mr. Richey:

Referring to the request contained in your letter of April 21, 1932, I am returning herewith the copy of the volume, entitled "China Speaks", sent to the President by The Chinese Cultural Society, 743 Fifth Avenue, New York City, together with a copy of the Department's acknowledgment which has been sent to that Society.

This book contains a very good statement of the Chinese side of the present Sino-Japanese controversy and is worth reading for the purpose of obtaining an insight into the Chinese viewpoint.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures:

Book;
 Copy of Department's letter.

W. A. Castle, Jr.

The Honorable


Lawrence Richey,

Secretary to the President,

The White House.

FE:JED/VDM

FE 4/25/32



793.94/5087

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Commission/180 FOR Tel. #459 5pm

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Apr. 22, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

~~REMARKS~~ General McCoy believes that Chinese officials were well informed as to probable Japanese action in Manchuria.

793.94/5088

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

This telegram must
 be closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated to
 anyone.

PEIPING

Dated April 22, 1932

Rec'd 7:48 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

459, April 22, 5 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Following is brief summary of comment by General McCoy
 in the course of informal conversation.

One. Commission's visit to the Yangtze Valley and
 North China, giving opportunity for general observation as
 well as the examination of important witnesses, has proved
 extremely valuable as a background for further investigations.

Two. From various sources it appears that Chinese
 officials were well informed in advance as to probable
 Japanese action in Manchuria. Chinese Minister in Tokyo
 warned Foreign Office which in turn apprised Marshal Chang at
 that time in Peiping. To minimize possibility of warfare,
 Chang ordered that no resistance be made to Japanese movements.

Three. So-called secret protocol to Treaty of 1905
 regarding competing railways in Manchuria was examined both
 in Tokyo and Nanking. Japanese and Chinese texts are sub-
 stantially identical, but the documents appear to be simply
 minutes of the meetings of the Treaty Commissioners.

For the Minister
 PERKINS

KLF - HPD

039

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chaffin NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5089

SEE 110.72/61 FOR

FROM State Dept. Division of (Immigration) DATED April 22, 1952 Rec'd.
TO For Eastern Affairs NAME 1-117

REGARDING:

Lecture, CHINA IN 1931, delivered at The Army War College April 5, 1932, by Maxwell M. Hamilton discussing in particular the fundamental forces at work within the governmental structure of China, and Communist and Manchurian situations.

M

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

Peiping

FROM


Dated April 23, 1932

Rec'd 12:55 a. m.

WP



Secretary of State,
 Washington.



460, April 23, 10 a. m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo April twenty-second:

"Hands off Manchuria warned the Japanese War Minister to the League of Nations and to the Moscow Government when speaking at a meeting at Osaka organized by Kokuhinsha which is a patriotic society which forms the nucleus of the present nationalist movement throughout Japan declaring furthermore that Japan will resolutely resist any attempt to apply the Nine Power Treaty. The War Minister called attention to the threatening situation in North Manchuria due to the Soviet massing of troops along the frontier and strengthening their air forces in the Far East.

Asserting that Japan's mission is to make Manchuria a paradise on earth and a safe place for everyone the Minister of War declared that nothing the League of Nations or the Soviet or anyone else could do to make Japan deviate from her course.

He

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FILED

APR 23 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 460 from Peiping

He added: it is time the Japanese made up their minds to cooperate wholeheartedly with the new regime in Manchuria for the establishment of a great civilization in the Far East."


For the Minister.

PERKINS

CIB WP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 TO THE GENERAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
 GENEVA



April 25, 1932

MEMORANDUM for Mr. Klots,

93.94
 8626-01
 The Committee of Nineteen will hold a private meeting tomorrow. ^{afternoon} They have been incited thereto by another rump meeting of the small States, who feel that they are not getting sufficient information and are not satisfied with the long delay in action.

In the mean time, the Japanese appear to have authorized Sigimitsu to acquiesce in a formula whereby the Mixed Commission set up under Article IV of the Armistice Agreement will be empowered not only to take note of the progress of the carrying out of the Armistice Agreement, but also to take note of any failure to carry it out.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. I learn from a source which I will impart to you privately, that Yohizawa has stated that if an attempt is made to apply Article 15 of the Covenant to the Manchurian situation, Japan will withdraw, not from the League of Nations, but from the Assembly thereof. This curious action would enable them to contend that their right to sit on the Council was unimpaired and that action taken by the Council under Article 11 could be continued.

The action would

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

The action would also have the merit in Japanese eyes of not raising the question of the Pacific islands mandated to Japan.

Of course it is problematical what action the Assembly and the Council would take under such an unprecedented situation.

HRW

(HUGH WILSON)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Copies sent to
J. Edgar Hoover
4/22/32*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
APR 25 1932
THE UNDER SECRETARY
Division of MR. ROGERS
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS April 21, 1932.
APR 22 1932
Department of State

JE
AR

for DCA
RE (R/S/M)

Memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador,
April 21.

F/LS

793.94/5091

The Ambassador said that he had not very much to report, but that he wanted to speak of the action of the Assembly of the League in connection with the Shanghai affair.

He said the negotiations with the Chinese were going on well enough in Shanghai under the guidance of the four powers; that his Government had accepted the proposal of Sir Miles Lampson, which he understood had been concurred in by Mr. Johnson, that Japanese withdrawal should take place as soon as conditions permitted, it was hoped within six months; instead of playing the game with the four neutrals the Chinese referred the matter to the Assembly of the League of Nations. The Ambassador said that he felt that the great powers had more or less sympathy with Japan, an assertion which I promptly denied, and a far greater understanding of the situation in Shanghai, but that the little powers on the League had run away with the whole matter. He said that article 11 of the agreement worked out by the committee of nineteen, that Japan should withdraw its troops when notified

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

2

notified by the neutral commission in Shanghai that the time was right for withdrawal would be entirely unsatisfactory to his Government. He said that, in the first place, this notification did not apparently have to be unanimous and that his Government would not wish to be bound by any majority rule in a matter of this kind. He said, furthermore, that the withdrawal of Japanese troops could not be at the request of any commission, since under the Japanese Constitution troop movements were solely dictated by the Emperor. I told him that this was merely quibbling, since it stood to reason that the commission could not order the withdrawal of troops, but that it equally stood to reason that, if the Japanese Government agreed that the troops might be withdrawn when notification was given by the commission that they could be safely withdrawn, it was perfectly simple for the military authorities to ask the Emperor to bring about the withdrawal. It was perfectly obvious that the principal trouble in Japan was the feeling that in Geneva Japan was being dictated to by the small nations - he particularly mentioned Switzerland and Sweden, which countries he said knew little about the Chinese situation.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE UNDER SECRETARY

3

I told him that, of course, these nations were acting for themselves in that they did not wish a precedent to be created whereby a strong power could, with impunity, invade other countries and then withdraw only when and how it pleased. The Ambassador said that if the small powers were able to put across their ideas Japan would undoubtedly not withdraw from the League of Nations, but would withdraw its delegates from the meetings of the Assembly, this, of course, as a protest. He admitted, however, that there was strong feeling in Japan that it would be better to get out of the League altogether.

As to the general situation in Japan, the Ambassador seemed to feel that it was slightly but very slowly improving. He admitted that the military was still in the saddle and that the course of the military was unpredictable. He spoke of the Russian concentration north of the Manchurian border and said there was no doubt that this concentration was being planned. On the other hand, he did not seem to feel that this constituted any serious danger as he said the Soviet had not made any definite protest to Japan within the last two months. He admitted, however, that the


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

4

the concentration was probably due to irritation at the
Japanese advance into northern Manchuria.

W. R. Castle, Jr.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 25 1982

KE

No. 1864

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,

American Minister,

Berne.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation I had on April 21st with the Japanese Ambassador concerning the action of the Assembly of the League in connection with the Shanghai affair.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Chustefan NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 25 1932.

No. 299

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,
 American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation I had on April 21st with the Japanese Ambassador concerning the action of the Assembly of the League in connection with the Shanghai affair.

Very truly yours,

Acting Secretary of State.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum
 of April 21st.

U VC/AB

APR 28 1932.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 25 1932.

No. 744

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation I had on April 21st with the Japanese Ambassador concerning the action of the Assembly of the League in connection with the Shanghai affair.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum
 of April 21st.

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OE
 Apr. 25 1932.

793.94/5091

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Copy to Mr. Klots.)



April 22, 1932.

FE
D C R

MEMORANDUM of conversation between
the Secretary of State and M. Hymans (*inference, Switzerland*)

792-94
M. Hymans stated that he was expecting the visit this afternoon of Nagaoka, and that according to what Drummond had told him Nagaoka was going to reply to the President of the Assembly in reference to the Draft Resolution of the Committee of Nineteen in somewhat the following sense:

That Japan could not accept the first paragraph of Article Eleven of the Draft Resolution, but that in a desire to be conciliatory they suggest that the Joint Commission contemplated in Article Four of the Armistice Draft should declare when in its judgment the withdrawal of the Japanese troops might reasonably be expected. This declaration, however, should be made to the Japanese authorities. In the event that the Japanese authorities were in accord, well and good; if not, the matter could be referred to a military technical committee which would examine the question. In the event that the latter committee informed the Japanese authorities in the sense of the Joint Commission and Japan still was not in accord, the matter could be referred back to the Assembly for action.

Mr. Timson stated that he felt this was putting the cart before the horse; that in western countries at least the principle had long been prevalent that the civilian authorities had the ...

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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had the last and decisive word in any case, and that as far as he (Mr. Stimson) was concerned, he could not accept a project which had a military committee refusing findings in which the American Minister at Shanghai had concurred. In his thought, the matter should be arranged in the inverse order, namely, a military committee should examine and report to the interested civilian authorities on the Joint Commission, and the Joint Commission could then transmit its decision to the Japanese authorities; and if the Japanese were not in accord, the matter could be transmitted to the Assembly.

M. Hymans seemed to concur in Mr. Stimson's thought, and stated that he would call in Mr. Wilson to tell him of his conversation with Nagaoka as soon as he had seen the latter this afternoon.

M. Hymans then asked the secretary whether in these Shanghai negotiations he had any advice or thoughts which he would like to give him. The secretary analyzed the situation, pointing out that what was needed was continuous and everlasting patience, especially when it was a question of negotiation with orientals, but in the exercise of this patience firmness was also essential, since unquestionably the Japanese would have their hands out from time to time for certain gifts which would sweeten the process of withdrawal. Becoming more specific, the secretary called attention to the incident last winter of the "demilitarized zones" around the five Chinese cities, and ...

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

cities, and stated that he thought the Committee of Nineteen could have to pay particular attention to the Japanese request for an undertaking by the Chinese not to enter those regions adjacent to Shanghai south of the Soochow creek. The Secretary fears that this demand may presage a possible plan for the demilitarization of a zone around Shanghai, and he added that the neutral Ministers in Shanghai felt that Japan's demands in this connection were unjustified. The Secretary mentioned that Mr. Wilson had seen Matsudaira in the Secretary's absence yesterday, and sketched some of that conversation, relating to the areas south of the Soochow creek.

The Secretary spoke of the attitude of the business men of Shanghai

The Secretary repeated that infinite patience was necessary, as well as a firmness adopted in a series of unanimous decisions by the States of the world. The publication of the letter to Senator Borah (inspired ⁱⁿ ~~by~~ the ^{instance of the} first question of the "demilitarized zones") had caused Japan to back away, just as it would back away before any show of united determination, but the minute that determination seemed to weaken or relax, they would advance bit by bit.

The Secretary discussed the present conditions in Japan, and pointed out the disappearance from the scene of activities of such men as Wakatsuki, Hanaguchi, Baron Dan, Marquis Makino, Baron Shidehara, Mr. ^{over} ~~Inak~~, etc. All of these gentlemen of broad international outlook, believing in the sanctity of treaties and full of the endeavor to cooperate with other nations, had ...

-4-

nations, had either been assassinated by the militarists or were confined to their houses, afraid to go into the streets without armed guards. The Jekyll and Hyde story was apposite -- there was a Jekyll Japan and a Hyde Japan, and at present the Hyde Japan was in the ascendency. It was necessary never to use harsh words which would stir up public opinion and give strength to this side which seemed to be for the moment prevalent in Japan.

M. Hyman introduced the broader question of Manchuria, stating that he did not think a solution would be pressed for in the Assembly Committee on May first, nor did he think that such a solution ought to be accepted even if pressed for until the Lytton Committee had had time to make a report. The Secretary concurred, and mentioned the difficulties which the Lytton Committee was experiencing through the obstacles placed in its way by certain Japanese authorities within Manchuria. The Secretary went on to explain that thirty years ago Manchuria was open land, with very few people; that since that time the Chinese population had become thirty millions, and the Japanese two hundred thousands; that one could not escape the conviction that the Japanese were animated by a desire to bring about a state of things in which their interests were altered from economic interests in Manchuria, with which he had a sympathy, into political interests in Manchuria, being domination by this two-hundred-thousand people over the thirty million Chinese; this ...

-5-

million Chinese; this domination represented a conception of relations of states which we had hoped that we had all out-grown and which, if allowed to continue, would throw us back in the march of history. But of course the attempt to introduce such a system would bring about inevitable interior difficulties, and the Secretary said bluntly that insofar as he could do so he would by public reiteration in conformity with such reiteration on the part of the other states of the world, seek to keep ever before the Japanese people the difficulty of the task they had undertaken, through the non-recognition of what they had done and through the constant focusing of public attention on the violation of the treaty obligations involved. He added that if the United States called attention to a violation of the Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Treaty it would have a certain influence but would be speedily forgotten, whereas if the States of the world did this world public opinion could not fail to be affected *a proud nation like the Japanese*. The Secretary then took up the failure of the Japanese to colonize Manchuria when they had every opportunity for doing so. He pointed out that similar failures were shown in their inability to colonize Formosa and Makodate, to the south and north of them; they were not a colonizing people, and no amount of Government encouragement had been able to make them so. Thus what they had hoped to obtain in Manchuria by infiltration, the advance of commerce and the taking up of land, they were now endeavoring ...

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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now endeavoring to seek by armed force.

Finally, the Secretary expressed his very high appreciation of the manner in which M. Hymans had conducted the Assembly meetings, told him he was following the march of their progress with the utmost interest and with the most sincere desire to cooperate. He added that the systems in the western world and in Europe had so many contradictory points that it was difficult to see how they could be brought into the same system, but that the immediate problem was to find the means by which those two systems could efficaciously and harmoniously work together for the peace of the world.

M. Hymans gave hearty assent.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

copy for - Department of State

Voluntary Political
Report.

(For the American Minister, Ottawa.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
 PUBLICATIONS SECTION
 APR 23 1932

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 25 1932
 Department of State

TRANSMITTING CHINESE PROPAGANDA
PAMPHLET.

F/LS

793.94/5092


From: _____, American Consul General,
Wesley Frost,

Montreal, Canada. Date of Completion: April 19, 1932.

Date of Mailing: April 19, 1932.

There is transmitted herewith a pamphlet published by the Montreal Chinese Students Association entitled, "The Sino-Japanese Conflict." It is believed possible that this publication may be of interest to the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State.

The Chinese students at McGill University number not more than half a dozen, while at the University of Montreal no students of the Chinese race are enrolled. The Department will note that the Montreal Chinese Students Association has the cooperation of a sister organization/



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

organization at Kingston, Ontario, presumably comprised of students in attendance at Queen's University.

The Chinese Department at McGill University is however rather active, particularly since the appointment of Professor Kiang Kang Hu as director of Chinese studies a year ago. It may be recalled that the Library of McGill University is the depositary of the G. M. Gest Chinese Library, assembled through the benefactions of Mr. G. M. Gest of New York and Cincinnati, head of the well-known contracting firm which bears his name.

(The Gest Library is merely in the custody of McGill University at the present time; and it is understood that Mr. Gest may at a later time transfer it to an American university either in New York City or on the Pacific Coast.) This collection of Chinese volumes is said to be superior to any collection existing outside of China, and since the destruction wrought by recent military operations in the Far East may possibly be rated even higher.

Popular opinion in this city is probably on the whole favorable to China as against Japan at the present time; and Dr. Kiang Kang Hu, above mentioned, has spoken and written very vigorously on behalf of his country, and has earned much approval here. On the other hand, a majority of the prominent business men who have attended the conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations have pronounced themselves as feeling that Japan has much justification. The most prominent of these persons is Colonel G. W. Birks, recently president of the

Canadian/

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Canadian Manufacturers Association.

Confidential.

While the pamphlet contains an appeal for financial assistance, some presumption may exist that its publication has been subsidized from Chinese official sources. There is even a possibility that Mr. G. M. Gest may have made a contribution, as he is known to be sympathetic with the Chinese point of view. The amount of influence which the pamphlet will exert will be dependent upon the extent to which newspaper editors throughout Canada utilize it as a basis for editorials or articles. General sentiment in Canada, as the Department is doubtless aware, is very similar to that in the United States on this question.

WF/LPO
800

Enclosure: Pamphlet.
Original to the Legation, Ottawa.
Copy to the Department of State, Washington.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Enclosure to report entitled
 "Transmitting Chinese Propaganda
 Pamphlets," dated April 19, 1932, from
 Montreal, Canada.*

The SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

A Chronological Outline of the Sino-Japanese Conflict
 Sino-Japanese Relations up to the Present Crisis
 A Cultural Bond Between China and Japan
 Some Characteristics of the Chinese People
 Shanghai and Chinese Nationalism
 Japanese Occupation of Mukden
 The Twenty-One Demands
 Losses to Civilization
 World Opinion
 Etc.

*7
 12/15/75*

Published by
 The Montreal Chinese Students Association
 Montreal, Canada, April, 1932

041
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

♦

Edited by
S. KWAUK, B.Sc., Med. '32, McGill University

Assisted by
W. H. FONG, B. Eng.

♦

Published by
THE MONTREAL CHINESE STUDENTS ASSOCIATION
(with the co-operation of its sister organization in Kingston, Ont.)
MONTREAL, CANADA
April, 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FOREWORD

In preparing this little publication, we have experienced the traditional self-consciousness and uneasiness of one laboring for the cause of Nationalism and patriotism. But, perhaps the purpose of our undertaking can best be summarized by the statement of Dr. W. W. Yen, Chinese delegate to the League of Nations, while addressing the extraordinary session of the League; "I come before you in the name of a great people at one of the most critical moments in its long history. China is staking her national existence on the justice and wisdom of the 55 nations represented in this unique assembly".

In dealings between nations as in dealings between individuals, there exists a quality which we designate as right or wrong. The outcome of the present conflict may not and most likely will not follow the arbitration of this sense of justice; as the spirit and the will to live up to high principles are still lacking among the nations. Yet the existence of such a judgment is just as real as the stars in the cosmos in broad daylight. The elapse of the last five months has demonstrated beyond doubt to China and her people that no Western nation is insane enough to undertake a crusader's trip to the East. After all, a nation's stability depends upon her own worth and strength. Therefore, if this book contains any appeal at all, it is an appeal for a just judgment from a purely ethical point of view.

We have no sympathy for self-stultifying propaganda which in the final analysis is the opium of the people of whatever nation that indulges in it. The following pages present what we sincerely believe to be the facts of the situation, supplemented by opinions of different authorities and of the press, and views of Chinese students in different parts of Canada.

The Montreal Chinese Students Association is greatly indebted to its friends, both Canadian and Chinese, whose financial help has made the free distribution of this booklet possible.

Additional copies can be obtained by writing to S. Kwauk, 772 Sherbrooke Street, West, Montreal, Canada. As only a limited quantity has been printed, we shall be glad to receive assistance, irrespective of amount, that will enable us to put out a reprint.

WORLD OPINION

"I see great danger in a nation's claiming the right to stay in a territory in which it is not entitled to be, on the plea of insecurity", and "So far as open relations are concerned, I have to admit that I am greatly disappointed by the attitude of the Japanese Government".

Senor de Madariago at the League of Nations.

"Public opinion would find it difficult to admit that military occupation could be assigned to the category of pacific means".

M. Briand at the League of Nations.

"What the world can neither forget nor forgive is that a nation, a member of the League of Nations, a signatory to the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, has flagrantly and deliberately broken her word and intimated to the world that she regards these obligations as so many scraps of paper".

"Whatever the excuse of the so-called justification for the Manchurian War, there is absolutely none for Shanghai. Were the world not so taken with the ultra-serious condition of world finance, world trade, world depression, with German Nationalism, with reparations and war debts, with unemployment, I am afraid he would be a bold man who would dare to say a world war could or would be avoided" and "I rejoice as a man and as a soldier at the Chinese resistance" (referring to Shanghai).

Sir Arthur Currie, Former Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Expeditionary Force and Principal of McGill University.

"Even though Japan's reasons were ten times as truthful as it can be assumed they are, there is no justification for force in Manchuria".

Senator William T. Borah.

"Japan, a military depotism, has assimilated from the West principally the material of our development—industrial efficiency, modern military equipment—and is adopting these to serve its purpose of imperialistic expansion."

and

"Nor does Japan as yet fill a dominant place in Manchuria's trade. If she does so in the future it will probably be, as in Korea, by closing the door there to other countries. The "open door" in Manchuria is guaranteed by the nine-power treaty. But will that fact check her?"—*David Lloyd George, Former British Prime Minister.*

"The League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact are the foundations of a future edifice of peace, and if they fail, the whole edifice will collapse. Would it be possible for the nations, after witnessing the tragic failure of the League in this first great test, with all its dreadful consequence for the Orient, to gather calmly in Geneva next February and discuss disarmament? Should they not rather conclude that each must count in the future on its own army and on that alone?"

"It is clear that if the United States and the League, collaborating, cannot prevent this breach of peace, one of its first consequences will be the definite failure of all disarmament projects. With the idea of disarmament will disappear the hope of international security, and if the whole Orient is plunged into chaos, what chance have we to collaborate to solve the (world) economic and financial crisis which is constantly increasing?"

Dr. Alfred Sze to the League Council.

THE CULTURAL BOND BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN

An Investigation into Chinese Standard Histories

By Professor KIANG KANG-HU

[Prior to his appointment as Professor of Chinese Studies at McGill University, Montreal, Dr. Kiang was associated at different times with University of California, Berkeley, Calif., University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, and Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. While in China he had been head of several educational institutions. In the following article he presents a very exhaustive study of the cultural and racial relations between Japan and China, a study for which his position and knowledge are most qualified.—Ed.]

About half a year ago the Japanese military clique began a barbaric attack against China, with deliberate destruction of Chinese properties and wholesale slaughter of Chinese civilians, women and children, which has caused all Chinese patriots to vow a hateful revenge against Japan with stubborn resistance to Japanese aggressors and complete boycott of Japanese goods; and, since then, the outside world generally thinks that these two Oriental nations must have been incompatible in nature and age long enemies throughout their histories. A little review of the past will reveal the untruth of this conception; on the contrary, their racial and cultural bonds are so intimate and close that a friendly co-operation and even perfect harmony between them is not at all impossible if the international policies of both were well and wisely directed. I shall here mention only a few outstanding facts definitely recorded in our official standard dynastic histories and commonly accepted by the scholars of the two countries as silent but eloquent witnesses to my assertions. This will serve to show also how much Japan is indebted to China, body and soul, and it further illustrates the inexcusable gross crime which her military clique and party politicians have committed towards her historical fatherland in the recent events.

From the beginning of our written history Japan was known to China as the Three Fairy Mountains (San Shen Shan). Owing to the many mystic stories told by the early Taoist adepts, the First Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty frequently ordered official expeditions to the Eastern Sea for the searching of angels and seeking of "immortal doses." The largest group of three thousand boys and girls was led by Hsü Fu (also incorrectly known as Hsü Shih) and sailed in the year 219 B.C. They reached the south tip of the main island of Japan and never returned. This is the first recorded Chinese colonization there; many more followed and even preceded this date. The tombs of Hsü Fu and six other leaders of the expedition in Kumano are even today well preserved and highly worshipped by the Japanese. The 2,000th year's anniversary was celebrated three years ago by a joint effort of both the Chinese and the Japanese governmental officials and prominent citizens.

The aborigines of Japan, the Ainu, who belong to the Slavic family of the Caucasian race, had been gradually pushed back further north by the newcomers from Korea, China and the Malay Islands; these three elements combined and mixed with a small percentage of the aborigines to make up the

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modern Japanese. Of the three, the Koreans were probably the major and the Malays the minor, but since most of the Koreans were originally from China and all of them were Chinese citizens or subjects, at least three-fourths of the modern Japanese are of Chinese blood, chiefly of the Han race. Chinese surnames are not uncommon in Japan and many of the Japanese noble and scholarly clans are traceable to Chinese origins. On the other hand, even in modern times, we have General Cheng Ch'eng-kuang (known by the Japanese title as Koxinga), the great patriotic hero of the late Ming period, and Priest Man Shu, the revolutionary poet-philosopher of the late Ch'ing period, both by Japanese mothers.

As to the cultural relation, I dare say that everything in Japan, prior to its contact with the West and aside from its modern material accomplishment, is Chinese. In religions and philosophy, Confucianism is still the dominant teaching of Japanese individual, family and social life. Buddhism, with its various sects, was introduced from China and not from India. All Japanese Buddhist patriarchs were either disciples of Chinese priests or disciples of their disciples. During and after the T'ang dynasty, hundreds of Japanese government students enrolled in the Chinese Imperial University and thousands of Japanese Buddhist priests travelled as pilgrims and studied as disciples in Chinese monasteries throughout the Empire. Besides K'ung Hai of the T'ang mentioned below, Tiao Jan and Chi Chao of the Sung are the best known Japanese Buddhist scholars who stayed long in China. It was a common practice for Japan to appoint Buddhist priests as envoys to China, for Japanese Buddhists differed from Chinese Buddhists only in one thing, namely, the former were generally allowed to retain their secular relations as to family obligations and government services while the latter, except the Chu Shih or laymen, were obliged to sever all worldly connections and live away in temples or hermitages. This explains also the fact that Buddhist influence over politics in Japan has always been more direct and much greater than in China. This condition remains the same today. The only Japanese life lost in Shanghai last January, which served as the excuse for the Japanese bombardment of the Chinese residential sections of that city, was a Buddhist priest participating in a street riot. In the early Ch'ing period, Chu Chih-yü (better known as Chu Shun-shuei), a Chinese philosopher and member of the Ming royal family, who fled to Japan and spent his life in Edo, afterwards Tokyo, was the tutor and advisor of the Tokugawa Shogunate and had among his pupils many great Japanese scholars and statesmen. Even Shintoism, which is supposed to be a primitive native religion of Japan, was not in its present shape till the introduction of the Taoist religion from China, and its very name is of Chinese words. Many Chinese heroes, including Hsü Fu, are among the Shinto deities for national worship. In literature and art, the Japanese had no written language except that of the Chinese which was adopted since the beginning of our period of the Six Dynasties. A Japanese Buddhist, whose name was K'ung Hai in Chinese and Kibobo Daishi in Japanese, returned from his 25 years study in China during the T'ang dynasty, invented the kanas (Japanese pronunciation for Chinese words Chia Ming meaning "borrowed terms") from Chinese writing and used them as phonetic guides to Chinese characters—since then they have become the Japanese alphabet for modern and vernacular literature, but all important and substantial words are still Chinese. Chinese classics, prose and poetry, are standards of Japanese writers. All branches of literary and non-literary arts in Japan are imitations of Chinese schools. The historical temples of Nara and the Great Buddha of

Kumakura were done by Chinese workmen. In government and society we find all systems and regulations bearing the Chinese nature, letter and spirit. All great political movements in Japanese history were inspired or influenced by Chinese teachings. Most of the heroes in the Great Reform were followers of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy. Many of the present day Japanese costumes and manners are remnants of the T'ang dynasty or earlier. Japan has helped much to preserve old Chinese customs. In this respect the Japanese are decidedly more conservative than the Chinese. We often have to go to the interior of Japan to study and identify things and names recorded in our old literature which have long been lost in China and therefore the records have been rendered unintelligible to the modern Chinese.

In the Chinese Dynastic Histories, Japan has been recorded as a regular tributary to China since the year 108 B.C. after the re-conquest of Korea by Emperor Wu Ti of the Western Han dynasty. In 56 A.D. of the Eastern Han, a State Seal was granted to the ruler of Japan by Emperor Kuang-wu through the former's tribute-bearing envoy. Since that period every ten years or so we find records of Japan's official visit to the Chinese court. The tributes from Japan were usually clothes, pearls, precious stones, slave girls, etc., while the return gifts of China were in general silk, tapestries, mirrors and swords together with gold and silver money. Despite the change of many dynasties in China, even during the period of the Southern and Northern Empires when China was torn by foreign invasions, civil wars and revolutions, the Japanese tributes came frequently and uninterruptedly. In 421 the ruler of Japan was given the title Great General (Ta Chiang Chün) by a Sung Emperor of the Southern Empire and in 504 he was promoted to the rank Prince (Wang) by a Wei Emperor of the Northern Empire.

The original name for Japan was O or O Nu, so recorded in Chinese histories. It is but a Chinese pronunciation of the name of the aborigines in Japan, Ainu, but it has a bad meaning in Chinese characters which read "short slaves." In 607 the Japanese ruler first addressed himself to Emperor Yang Ti of the Sui dynasty as "King of the Rising Sun Country," which was considered by the latter as impolite. Not until 670 of the T'ang dynasty, the name Jih Pen was definitely chosen by Japan and officially sanctioned by China. It is made of two Chinese characters:—Jih meaning "Sun" and Pen meaning "Root." These Chinese words have been pronounced by the Japanese as Nippon and afterwards translated by the Westerners as Japan. This has since become the standard name for Japan and is commonly used in China, though the old name O or O Nu is still quoted by the Chinese and it is much resented by the Japanese. From the Chinese Dynastic Histories we learn that in paying the regular tribute, Japan was required to present through its envoy a formal petition acknowledging the supremacy of the Chinese emperor. Twice during the Sung dynasty Japanese tribute was rejected and an imperial audience was denied to its envoy on account of the irregularities of this petition. The position of the Japanese envoy or tribute-bearer in the imperial audience was always placed among those from Korea, Loochoo, Burma, Siam, Annam and other eastern tributaries. In 1509 of the Ming it had been permanently fixed at the seventh row of the western side of the palace directly facing the Korean envoy.

The international relations between China and Japan continued to be peaceful and harmonious until the Mongols conquered China. The Mongols were the most militaristic and imperialistic people of the Orient and their

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Kahns were ever longing for further conquest. Since Japan had been a tributary to the overthrown Chinese Sung dynasty and always friendly and sympathetic towards the Chinese people, she refused to pay homage to the new Mongol Yuan dynasty. In 1264 and in 1266 Kublai Kahn twice sent direct envoys to induce Japan to submit, and in 1267 and 1269 he ordered the Koreans to persuade the Japanese to follow their suit, but all in vain. In 1270 he dispatched once more an imperial commission which succeeded in bringing Japanese tribute-bearers for the following years. In 1275 Kublai Kahn declared war upon Japan for the first time. Despite the large fleet and superior firearms commanded by Mongol and Chinese generals in three successive expeditions, Japan was not beaten and the Japanese tribute never came again to the Mongol court. This punitive measure of the Mongols and its failure has since altered the international situation between China and Japan.

When the Yuan dynasty was ended by a Chinese revolution and the Ming dynasty was put in its place, the Japanese government again accepted China's supremacy and paid tribute from time to time. Unfortunately, just about this time the Chinese pirates along the sea coast became very active and Japanese pirates joined them in frequent pillage of Chinese ports. Beginning with the first year of the Ming in 1358 until 1592, when Korea was for the first time invaded and conquered by Japan (Korea was regained by China in 1589), Japanese official visits and Japanese pirate raids appeared alternately in China. During the periods of the Chia Ching (1522-1566) and Wan Li (1573-1619), the provinces of Chili, Shantung, Kiangnan, Chekiang, Kuangtung and Fukien suffered almost yearly from Japanese piracy. On many occasions the districts, cities and towns were seized, officials murdered, and hundreds of lives and public and private properties destroyed. In 1549, 1554, 1563, 1602-7, and 1613, the Japanese penetrated further inland in large numbers. Nearly all the rich cities in the lower Yangtse valley were subject to their invasion and temporary occupation. The area was even larger than that covered by the recent Japanese inroad from Shanghai. The Ming government imposed severe laws prohibiting any communication between China and Japan except by official orders. Famous Chinese generals, such as Chi' Chi-kuang, Hu Tsung-hsien, Wen Ju-chang and T'ang Shun-chih, fought many glorious wars in defence of their country. When the Manchus established themselves in China, the Japanese first attempted a sympathetic aid to the Ming dynasty, but finally accepted the supremacy of the Ch'ing dynasty. They have, nevertheless, been less friendly and more suspicious towards the Manchus than they were towards the Chinese, and their tributes came to the court very irregularly. An equal position with, and an aggressive action against China was, however, not manifested until after the Great Reform in Japan in 1868.

In spite of the racial resemblance and cultural similarity between China and Japan, there is an outstanding diversity in the histories of the two countries. China has, as a rule, been governed by the civilians, while Japan from the beginning by its military caste; since 221 B.C., during the reign of the first Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty, China has been rid of the feudal system, while Japan lived in it until the fourth year of Meiji, 1871. The reason why China has changed many dynasties and Japan remains under one and the same ruling house is simply because the so-called ruling house was merely a figure-head and its actual ruling power rested upon the Shogonate, which literally means inherited military dictatorship. This great diversity has shaped the two peoples in different dispositions and characteristics which in turn deter-

mined the histories of the two nations. The causes of this diversity are numerous and complicated. Geography might be its prime and fundamental one. It is nothing strange to find two peoples of the same origin developing along diverse lines, since brothers, sisters, and even twins often grow vastly apart. The Japanese government, since the Great Reform, though having gone through many changes of political parties and military cliques, has maintained its definite policy at least in two points: First, a wholesale and wholehearted adaptation of western civilization with all its related materialism, industrialism, imperialism, etc.; and second, the expansion of Japan, territorially, politically and economically, at the expense of the weakening and breaking down of China. Sometimes this policy has brought up strong reactions among the Japanese upon national and international issues, but, viewed as a whole, it has been a hereditary policy throughout modern Japanese history.

China is probably the only empire in the history of the world that has been built up not by conquest but by being conquered. Since the Huns, the Tartars, the Mongols, and the Manchus could conquer China with much smaller and inferior forces than those of the Japanese, and establish their dynasties in China in respective periods, why not also Japan? Since China could absorb all her former invaders and conquerors and make their descendants thoroughly Chinese, why not also the Japanese? The reasons for a negative answer to the above questions are three: First, China has been newly awakened with a national consciousness which is something strange and foreign to her but has been forced upon her by the modern imperialist powers, including Japan. It is growing and spreading and will finally make China a modern nation despite her past. Second, Japan has been too much westernized: she would make China her colony and not her home, Chinese her subjects and not her fellow citizens. She would come to China as an alien master and not as an adopted son. This could never be tolerated by the Chinese. It is the very thing that caused the Mongols to be driven out while the Manchus remained. Third, both China and Japan are at present members of a world family. They are no more isolated but interdependent not only between themselves but also with all other nations. The world has become so small and sensitive that any change of international conditions between two members will certainly affect the whole. Though other powers are much occupied with their respective troubles, they cannot, however, afford to allow Japan alone to dominate China; though all nations are selfish and no substantial help can be expected from a third party, but because of their selfishness therefore their interference and protest may be counted upon for the sake of their own interests.

Following the present international policy, Japan can hardly gain much from China and great harm is almost certain to both China and Japan and also other nations. Military resistance, economic boycott and national hatred have been increased and intensified in China against Japan. If another world war should result, whether China be driven into extreme nationalism or into radical communism, no benefit could be drawn either by Japan or by the world. In this brief review of the historical relations, especially the racial and cultural bonds existing between China and Japan, I am truly grieved for the recent actions of Japan in China. To right this great wrong is the duty of the Japanese people as well as of the Chinese.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHINESE

By BERTRAM SMYTH-PIGOTT, Ph.D.

[While we blush at the qualities attributed to us as a race and do not agree to such generalization as adopted here-under; the fact that such rather complimentary remarks are made by most of our Western friends who have travelled in China, disembarasses us to some extent in the publication of this article. Dr. Smyth-Pigott had been connected with the British Diplomatic Service in the East, Japan and China, for some three years.—Ed.]

Few are the foreigners who have lived in China or, like the writer of these lines, have travelled extensively in that vast country, who have not noted and marked several characteristics common to nearly all her nationals. Especially will they have marked their courtesy, the honesty of their merchants, their loyalty to their friends and their hatred of their enemies.

As regards their courtesy, it has been said that the most courteous white man on earth is the Spanish hidalgo, but that he is quite overshadowed in this virtue of the Chinese aristocrat. Travellers in China, especially those who have journeyed in the interior, know this to be true.

Chinese honesty has been proverbial among the merchants of London for generations and practically ever since the London merchant first started to trade in the East, he has been willing to deliver goods on credit to his Chinese customer—no paper passing between them—on his simple word which was and is considered as good as his bond. Here in Canada, one often hears complaints of the way some Chinese laundryman treat the laundry, but seldom if ever does one hear that they have cheated a customer.

The Chinese are a philosophical people, with a pleasant national philosophy that aspires to peace, placidity and enjoyment of the beauties of nature. In the main they are slow in making friendships and are aloof with strangers, but once they do make friends they are absolutely loyal; moreover, should anyone, no matter of what race or colour, befriend a Chinese who is in need, that Chinese's gratitude will be boundless and eternal. On the other hand the Chinese never forget or forgive an injury and they are stubborn and ruthless enemies. It is almost a point of honour with them not to allow themselves to be placated. It would seem, therefore, well-nigh incredible that the Japanese should have chosen to pursue the course they have followed during the last six months. It may be possible to terrorize a group of people, a city or a province, but to terrorize a population of 450 millions is entirely out of the question.

It is just possible that Japan may gain some temporary benefit, but that she has earned the stubborn and undying hatred of all China for generations to come is certain. That a virtual state of war will long exist is unlikely, but that the boycott on Japanese goods—which inflicts incalculable damage upon Japanese trade—will be maintained for a considerable period, perchance for years may be confidently expected.

A Chronological Outline of the Sino-Japanese Conflict up to March, 1932

By S. KWAUK

June 26. Captain Shintaro Nakamura of the Japanese army travelling on an educational passport disappeared in Inner Mongolia while on a mission described as a geographical and historical survey. The Japanese told the story that the captain was attacked by a group of Chinese soldiers, who robbed him of his possessions and then shot him as a spy. In Japan, opinion in regard to the source of information was divided. Some said that it came from a Chinese soldier discontented with his share of the loot and others claimed that it was told by a friendly Mongolian.

July 2. Ten Chinese peasants and two Chinese Mounted Police were killed by Japanese machine-gun fire in Wanpaoshan district of Changchun. Chinese peasants had repeatedly protested against the Korean immigrants who despite treaty stipulations had been digging irrigation ditches through Chinese farms, endangering the watering system of the latter. It was reported that at first the offending Koreans had agreed to suspend work. Then the Japanese Consul at Changchun dispatched Japanese troops to the scene, which stiffened the Korean attitude. The incident took place when the Chinese farmers aided by the police began to fill up the trenches.

July 4. Koreans, in Pingyang, Korea, instigated by the Japanese press, which, during the previous days had published fabricated stories of maltreatment of the Koreans by the Chinese in Manchuria, started serious riots against the Chinese. Law abiding Chinese, both men and women were attacked and promiscuously murdered in Seoul, Chemulp, Gensan, Pingyang, and other localities. A number of Chinese business houses was burnt.

July 5. As a result of the Anti-Chinese riots, the whole Chinese quarter in Pingyang was razed to the ground by the Koreans. Eighteen Chinese were killed. The Japanese police pronounced themselves helpless and refused to interfere. The damage caused was estimated at \$400,000.

Over 100 Japanese soldiers arrived at Wanpaoshan, occupying by force the farms of the Chinese peasants.

July 7. Chinese Foreign Minister made strong protests to the Japanese Foreign Office. At Tokyo, the Japanese Foreign Office verbally expressed its profound

regret of the unhappy occurrence to the Chinese Minister. This was taken by observers as mere shedding of crocodile tears. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government was flooded with telegrams from different parts of the country urging a firm stand in the negotiations.

Refugees from Korea arrived at different ports in Northern China.

July 8. The second secretary of the Japanese Legation called at the Chinese Foreign Office and expressed, on behalf of his government, regret at the anti-Chinese riots in Korea. The Chinese Government endeavoured to pacify the populace and urged the people to refrain from reprisals. Up to date, 119 Chinese were killed, 370 seriously injured and 82 missing.

July 13. Early in the morning, the 10th Division of the Japanese army stationed in Tientsin, held manoeuvres on the various roads around the city.

August & Sept. Newspapers in Japan published inflammatory versions of a series of incidents that occurred in Manchuria during the summer and urged upon the Government and the people to adopt a strong and "positive" policy in dealing with China and pronounced that over 300 questions at issue between Japan and China concerning Manchuria could be settled once for all.

Several Japanese military officers were reported to have openly addressed their subordinates on the subject of Sino-Japanese relations and intimated the possibility of serious development in Manchuria and Mongolia.

Investigations by the Chinese Government of the case of Captain Makamura were being carried on in Manchuria.

After repeated protests from the Chinese Government, the Japanese Government finally disclaimed the responsibility of the massacre of Chinese in Korea, and blamed the Chinese of having courted all these misfortunes themselves.

Sept. 8. At the Japanese Cabinet meeting, the War Minister urged a strong policy in dealing with the Chinese Government in the alleged murder of Captain Shintaro Nakamura by Chinese soldiers. It was resolved that the military and diplomatic authorities should act in concert in whatever action was to be taken in the case.

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Sept. 9. The Asahi, a leading Japanese newspaper, expressed the view that the War Office was pressing upon the Government "the security occupation of an important region in Manchuria or Mongolia."

Sept. 13. Mukden authorities were reported to have accepted a modified set of Japanese demands, including the payment of damage and punishment of the perpetrators of the outrage. (Case of Captain Nakamura)

Sept. 18. General Jung Chun, chief of the staff of the Manchurian Army, informed the Japanese Consul at Mukden, Mr. Morioka, that proof had been obtained that the Captain had been shot as a spy by Chinese soldiers in Inner Mongolia. He also stated that a detachment had been sent to arrest the responsible party. This was published in the newspaper in Tokyo in the morning.

At 10 p.m., Japanese soldiers stationed around Mukden opened fire upon the Chinese troops, shelling the Peitayang camp on the outskirts of the city. A collision occurred at the camp, but soon the camp was disarmed. The Mukden Arsenal and the Chinese city were also shelled. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang who was in Peiping sent an urgent telegram to Mukden ordering his soldiers not to resist. Few hours later, the camp was laid to ashes, the arsenal dismantled and the city taken with little casualty. All means of communication went into Japanese hands. The Japanese alleged that the Chinese troops had destroyed a part of the South Manchuria Railway previous to their military operations.

Sept. 19. Early in the morning, the Japanese Military headquarters in Kwantung were moved to Mukden. At 3.40 a.m. General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese army, left Dairen on a special train with 800 infantrymen for Mukden. Meanwhile, the Japanese troops proceeded to occupy different cities along the South Manchurian Railway and by 5 a.m. Changchun, 200 miles north of Mukden, the important junction of the South Manchurian Railway, the Chinese Eastern Railway and Kirin-Changchun Railway, was taken together with many lesser important cities within that distance. Order was given by the Commander-in-Chief to a division of Japanese troops in Korea to hold itself in readiness for special service in Manchuria.

The Japanese warships in Dairen were dispatched to different Chinese ports on the north Shantung coast.

A formal protest was lodged with Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister to China, by Dr. C. T. Wong, the Chinese Foreign Minister.

Following that day, feeling against Japanese action was very high in China. Mass

meetings and demonstrations took place everywhere. The Chinese Government adopted a moderate policy entrusting the whole matter to the League of Nations to which it had made appeals. It was strained to the utmost to calm the people who were urging a drastic policy upon the government.

Sept. 21. Sporadic fighting continued between the Japanese troops advancing toward Kirin and the Chinese troops stationed at various points. There was very little resistance as a whole and hardly any casualty on the Japanese side to speak of. Kirin was occupied.

Demonstrations continued in China in spite of the government's attempt to suppress them.

At the Japanese Cabinet meeting, General Minami's proposal of further military measures was not adopted. Reinforcements, however, was sent into Manchuria from Korea without government sanction. This consisted of a mixed brigade of 4,000, which brought the total Japanese force in Manchuria to 14,400.

Sept. 22. Japanese troops were deploying themselves towards Harbin, bombing aggregations of Chinese soldiers that they happened to encounter on the way.


At the Japanese Cabinet meeting, Baron Shidehara of the Foreign Office and General Minami took opposite views with regard to Japan's policy in Manchuria, the former advocating conciliatory measures.

In Nanking, a big mass meeting was held. The Chinese Government took special precautionary measures to protect the Japanese people in the city against possible danger.

Sept. 23. Japanese military operations made the usual advance, and a third protest was sent to Japan.

First message from Geneva, requesting the Chinese and Japanese Governments to withdraw their troops and to abstain from further acts of hostility was received in both Capitals. In Nanking, it produced some soothing effect, although a mass meeting was held and attended by all classes of people including thousands of students from Shanghai. War was demanded against Japan. Simultaneously, meetings were being held in all big cities in China.

Sept. 24. The Japanese representative, Mr. Yoshizawa at the League of Nations, assured the League that the Japanese harbored no territorial ambition in Manchuria; and informed them that the incident was purely "local" and demanded direct negotiation with China. China, on the other hand, refused to deal directly prior to evacuation of the invading troops.



In Manchuria, three passenger trains were fired upon from the top by Japanese airplanes. Over a score of Chinese refugees were killed and wounded.

Sept. 26. United States presented to Japan and China a note similar to that of the League of Nations.

Sept. 27. China answered the United States and expressed earnest hope that "the most effective means will be promptly taken for maintaining the dignity and inviolability of international treaties."

Sept. 28. Dr. C. T. Wang was attacked in the Foreign Office by a party of incensed students.

In Geneva, the Japanese representative stated that his Government intended to "continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops to the railway zone, in

proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals was effectively assured and that the Japanese Government hoped to be able to carry out this intention as fully as possible." China had also given assurance of safety of Japanese lives and property in Manchuria. Dr. Sze made it clear that if withdrawal was not completed and the status quo not restored by October 14, China would demand further action.

Tokyo reported independence movements in Manchuria.

Sept. 30. Over ten Chinese Middle School students in Kirin were arrested and shot by Japanese soldiers, while distributing handbills.

C. T. Wang resigned as Foreign Minister of China.

Rumors were circulating in the press to the effect that independence movements in Man-

churia were taking place with the Japanese behind the scene.

The League of Nations after receiving the assurance of the Governments adopted the resolution that Japan would evacuate Manchuria "as rapidly as possible" and that the Chinese Government would undertake to protect Japanese lives and properties during the process of withdrawing. The Council was adjourned until October 14, allowing two weeks for the completion of the evacuation.

Oct. 2. Chinese troops stationed along the Harbin-Mukden Railway were bombed by Japanese airplanes.

Oct. 4. Four Japanese destroyers were ordered to proceed to Shanghai from Tokyo.

Oct. 6. Japanese War tanks patrolled streets in Hongkew district, Shanghai.

Oct. 8. Over Chinchow, where a temporary Chinese Manchurian Government was established, twelve Japanese naval airplanes scattered leaflets, asserting that Marshal Chang had lost popular confidence and warning the people not to support him. This was followed by some 70 bombs, causing considerable damage both to life and property.

Oct. 9. Japanese Government explained the act in Chinchow as the airplanes being first fired by Chinese troops (with rifles).

Japanese Cabinet meeting concluded, in discussing the Chinchow incident, that Japan would not change her policy.

Oct. 10. Stimson, Secretary of the State of U.S.A., sent a note to the League of Nations declaring that the United States would endeavour to reinforce whatever the League might do. The note pointed out that "the covenants of the League of Nations provides permanent and already tested machinery for handling such issues," and that it was "most desirable that the League in no way relax its vigilance and in no way fail to assert all pressure and authority within its competence toward regulating the action of China and Japan in its premises." For the first time, the Paris Pact and the Nine Power Treaty were invoked.

China appealed to Alejandro Lerroux of Spain as president of the Council of the League of Nations to convene a special session to consider the new phases of the Manchurian problem created by the bombardment of Chinchow.

Oct. 11. Mr. Shigemitsu, presented a note from his government to the Chinese Government protesting against the anti-Japanese movements in China, including

boycott, and warning the Government that it must assume all responsibility for any possible consequences.

Oct. 13. With a large number of marines on board, four Japanese destroyers arrived at Tsingtao from Port Arthur.

League of Nations Council reconvened. The Council expressed delight at the United States' note. Japan, however, resented the reference to the League's using "all the pressure within its competence" and asserted that the League is not authorized to apply pressure upon its members.

In spite of Japan's opposition to the United States participation in whatever capacity in the League Council, Prentiss Gilbert, American Consul-General at Geneva, and four other members of the Consulate staff, attended the meeting.

Nanking replied to the Japanese note of the 11th: "While the Government had done its utmost to control the growing indignation against Japan, which had been increased by recent incidents, such as the bombing of Chinchow, it was impossible to prevent a refusal on the part of the Chinese traders to handle Japanese goods," and that it would continue to protect the lives and property of the Japanese in China.

Oct. 14. A meeting of all the members of the Council of the League of Nations except China and Japan to discuss the question of procedure of the United States participation was called by Briand. It was agreed that it was a question of procedure and not principle; decision on the latter would call for an unanimous vote. Japan had signified her agreement to the supply of information by the United States and it would not involve principle if the information was to be supplied orally instead of in written form.

500 Mongolian bandits, aided by Japanese airplanes, raided Changwu, but were beaten off by Chinese troops.

Oct. 15. United States participation passed at the meeting of the League of Nations Council with Mr. Yoshizawa casting the only objecting vote.

Oct. 16. Mr. Gilbert participated in the meeting on the basis of full equality.

Oct. 17. The decision to invoke the Pact of Paris, and dispatching of notes by all the signatories of the Pact, and of all members of the League to China and Japan, was adopted at the League of Nations Council meeting. (By October 20th, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Norway, Poland, and Germany had already complied with the decision of the League.)

Oct. 20. Japan presented five points as a basis for negotiation:

1. The two countries shall pledge themselves to commit no act of aggression against each other.
2. They will suppress hostile agitation, boycott, and hostile propaganda.
3. Japan will respect the territorial integrity of Manchuria.
4. China will protect Japanese residents in Manchuria.
5. China and Japan will make an agreement for co-operation and avoidance of ruinous competition between the South Manchurian and other Railroads in Manchuria and give effects to all existing treaty rights.

Briand approved the first four but suggested that the fifth was too complicated to admit acceptance and that a clause be substituted to the effect that China should respect all her treaty commitments.

Oct. 21. Chinese delegates outlined their proposals as follows:

1. No negotiation until Japanese troops are withdrawn.
2. A neutral investigation during and after withdrawal.
3. Reparation for damage committed.
4. Establishment of a permanent board of arbitration and conciliation between Japan and China.

Oct. 24. Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution by a vote of 13 to 1, Japan casting the dissenting vote, that Japan was to withdraw her troops to within the South Manchurian Railway zone by November 16, 1931. The Council adjourned till that date.

While these activities were going on in the League of Nations, the development in Manchuria during the fortnight could be summarized as:

1. Instalment of a puppet Government at Mukden by General Honjo.
2. Supplying of munition and arms by the Japanese to Mongolian bandits.
3. Instigation of a local general by the Japanese to attack Tsitsihar.
4. Preparation of the Japanese troops to occupy Mukden and other cities throughout the winter.

Oct. 30. A Reuter dispatch stated that thirteen trainloads of arms and ammunition and five carloads of supplies had recently been delivered by the Japanese to the troops of a local Chinese general whom the Japanese Military had instigated to rebel against the Chinese Government.

Nov. 5. After three days of fighting, the Japanese troops forced the Chinese troops at the Nonni River at Tsitsihar, over 500 miles north of Mukden, to withdraw leaving behind 200 killed.

Nov. 6. On a visit to Stimson, the Secretary of the State, Ambassador Debuchi of Japan said that the troops on the Nonni River would be withdrawn southward as soon as the work of repairing bridges was completed in a week or ten days.

Nov. 7. Extraordinary session of the Council of the League of Nations commenced.

Nov. 8. In the night, a group of plain-clothes gunmen emerged from the Japanese concessions in Tientsin and started an attack on the Chinese city. At the same time, thirty odd shells were fired into the city by the Japanese troops. They were, however, successfully repulsed and dispersed by the Chinese police force who somehow were informed of the attack beforehand.

Nov. 9. China complained to the League of Nations that Japanese military authorities had seized all the funds, amounting to \$2,600,000, of the Chinese Banks in Chanchun.

Nov. 11. Four additional Japanese destroyers were sent to Port Arthur. A fresh Japanese brigade of troops was dispatched to Manchuria.

Nov. 12. General Honjo, delivered an ultimatum to the defending General of Tsitsihar demanding his evacuation.

Nov. 18. Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang, was captured by the Japanese. Japan virtually controlled the whole of Manchuria.

Nov. 21. Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, issued a memorandum to Japan. While reiterating Soviet's policy of non-interference, it warned Japan against her military operations which had "far exceeded the limits of the original zone" and could "not fail to cause the Soviet Government serious anxiety."

Nov. 23. Dr. Wellington Koo appointed Foreign Minister of China.

Nov. 24. Japanese and Chinese forces engaged in a battle twenty mile southwest of Mukden.

Japan asked the League of Nations to obtain the withdrawal of the last of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang's troops from Manchuria within the Great Wall.

Students in Shanghai staged a demonstration. The policy of the Government was denounced.

Nov. 27. The city of Chinchow was again bombed by Japanese airplanes. A Japanese expeditionary army of 10,000 advanced southward along the Chinese owned Peiping-Mukden Railway.

The United Press reported that Secretary of State Stimson said he was "at a loss to understand the reported movement of General Honjo's troops toward Chinchow."

Nov. 28. Stimson's statement produced bitter resentment at the Japanese Foreign Office. The Foreign Office's statement noted, "If a man in Mr. Stimson's responsible position loses his head at such a critical moment, as the present, the consequences would be grave indeed."

Nov. 30. China accepted the League's programme of the appointment of an international commission of inquiry to study the whole question of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The programme overlooked Japan's demand for right to take military measures against "bandits," and also China's demand for a time limit for Japanese evacuation.

Dec. 3. Japan rejected the League's programme.

Dec. 6. General Honjo warned Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang to withdraw his troops from Chinchow.

Dec. 10. The Council of the League of Nations adopted the resolution of urging the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the South Manchurian Railway zone as speedily as possible, and providing for an international commission of five members to investigate on the spot. Both China and Japan accepted the resolution.

Dec. 11. The Japanese Cabinet resigned on account of purely internal reasons. Inukai became Premier.

Dec. 14. General Chiang Kai-Shek resigned as the President of China.

Dec. 16. Over 100 were killed by a Japanese aerial attack at Tungliao. Severe fighting near Ningnien Station on the Tsitsihar-Keshan Railway was reported.

Dec. 21. Japanese military drive on Chinchow began along the Peiping-Mukden Railway.

Dec. 23. With the temperature 30 degrees below zero, the Japanese and Chinese soldiers fought along the Kaopang-tze Yinkow Branch Line of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. Several towns were taken by the Japanese.

Dec. 26. 2,000 Japanese troops arrived at Tientsin from Tangku. This created panic in the city.

Dec. 28. Tawa was occupied by the Japanese after severe fighting.

Dec. 29. Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang ordered his troops to evacuate Chinchow in view of the rapid advance of the Japanese.

Jan. 2, 1932 Chinchow was occupied by the Japanese without bloodshed.

Jan. 3. Consul Culver B. Chamberlain of the United States was assaulted by two Japanese soldiers and a civilian interpreter on one of the main streets of Mukden. It was entirely unprovoked.

Jan. 4. Japanese Government apologized to the United States Consul General at Mukden.

Two Japanese destroyers were ordered to Foochow, South China.

United States Government protested to the Japanese Government in regard to the attack on its consul.

Jan. 5. Japanese troops advanced along the Peiping-Mukden Railway to occupy all cities south of Chinchow and outside of the Great Wall.

Japan expressed regret to the United States Government.

Jan. 6. The port of Hulutao, south of Chinchow, on the Gulf of Liaotung was captured by the Japanese without resistance.

Jan. 8. The United States sent identical notes to Japan and China declaring its inability to recognize any treaty or agreement entered between the two countries, that are not in accordance with the spirit of the "open door policy," the Paris Pact or the Pact of the Washington Conference.

Jan. 8. An attempt on the life of Emperor Hirohito was made.

Jan. 11. Both China and Japan approved the five nominees to form the International Commission. They were the Earl of Lytton, G.B., chairman; General Frank R. McCoy, U.S.A.; Count Aldovrandi, Italy; General Claudel, France; and Heinrich Schnee, Germany.

Jan. 16. Japanese Government answered the United States note signifying its intention to maintain the "open door policy" in Manchuria.

Jan. 21. Several Japanese naval officers warned the editor of a Chinese newspaper in the Shanghai International Settlement to apologize for the "insulting remarks" in an article before January 23rd.

Japanese Consular and Naval authorities in Shanghai demanded the Mayor of Shanghai the dissolution of "organizations supporting the anti-Japanese boycott and sponsoring movements directed against Japan," and protested against a recent attack on five Japanese priests by a group of Chinese. The protest was accompanied by an ultimatum.

Authorities of the Settlement asked the Japanese Admiral to state his intentions in Shanghai.

Jan. 23. A Japanese aircraft carrier and four destroyers arrived in Shanghai with 400 marines to reinforce the 1,200 already present. The Chinese troops around Shanghai began to adopt defensive measures against a possible occupation of the city by the Japanese.

Jan. 25. League of Nations Council met again. Dr. W. W. Yen, the Chinese representative demanded immediate action by the League and intimated the disappointment of the Chinese Government at the delay in starting of the International Commission.

Jan. 26. The total Japanese naval force in Shanghai was represented by four cruisers, seventeen destroyers and one gunboat, after the arrival of one cruiser and twelve destroyers from Japan.

Local Chinese authority in Shanghai accepted all Japanese demands except that for the dissolution of anti-Japanese societies.

In compliance to Japanese demand the Chinese newspaper referred to suspended publication indefinitely.

Jan. 27. League of Nations Council presented notes to both Governments to avoid activities that might aggravate the situation in Shanghai.

The Japanese Consul General assured the entire consular body at Shanghai that the Japanese would not use force in Shanghai.

At 8 p.m., a twenty-two hour ultimatum was sent to the Mayor of Shanghai. A state of emergency was declared in the Settlement. Foreign defence forces and volunteers were called out.

Jan. 28. At 2 p.m., in spite of agitation against his action, the Mayor of Shanghai replied to the Japanese, acquiescing in every one of their demands.

At 8.30 p.m., however, Admiral Shiosawa declared that he would occupy Chapei.

At midnight, five Japanese planes bombed the slumbering district of Chapei, while the 2,000 marines proceeded to occupy the strategic points. The buildings were soon on fire. The 19th Route army offered stubborn resistance.

Prior to the attack, the United States Government had asked the Japanese Government to state its intentions in Shanghai.

Jan. 29. Aerial bombing of the densely populated native district continued, when the marines, using the International Settlement as their base, failed to drive out the defenders. The Woosung Forts, eighteen miles from Shanghai were shelled by the Japanese warships which at the moment

numbered thirty-seven. Chapei was shelled simultaneously.

Late in the day, Japan consented to a truce.

At Geneva the League of Nations Council minus the Japanese and Chinese representatives, adopted a declaration that the League will not recognize "any Sino-Japanese agreement imposed by Japan's military invasion." The declaration was based upon Article X of the Covenant.

Jan. 30. Chapei was still in flames. The Shanghai North Station was bombed and laid to ashes. The Commercial Press and the Oriental Library were similarly destroyed.

Several bombs were dropped in the Settlement.

Thousands of refugees streamed into the Settlement, leaving behind bodies of women and children "riddled with bullets."

Dr. W. W. Yen invoked Articles X and XV of the League Covenant at Geneva.

All Chinese banks in Shanghai closed in protest to the Japanese aggression.

Jan. 31. Great Britain, United States, France and Portugal sent warships to Shanghai for possible development that might endanger their respective nationals.

In Tokyo, the Foreign Minister asked the British, United States, and French Ambassadors "to solicit the support of their governments to persuade the Chinese to abandon warlike operations at Shanghai."

Meanwhile hostility continued at Chapei. Ruthless bombing of the city seemed to be the main tactics of the Japanese, while sniping that of the Chinese. There was no change in position.

Severe fighting continued near Harbin when the Japanese tried to assume control of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Feb. 1. Sporadic fighting continued in Chapei.

In anticipation of possible Japanese attacks by battleships, the Chinese Government moved to Loyang 1,100 miles inland from Shanghai.

Feb. 2. Great Britain requested a special session of the League of Nations Council. Right Hon. J. H. Thomas of Great Britain said, "Britain feels it impossible to allow the situation in the Far East to continue." The League authorized a commission in Shanghai to investigate the affair.

France, Italy, Great Britain, and United States presented to Japan and China five proposals as a basis of peace negotiation:

1. Cessation of all acts of violence on both sides forthwith on the following terms:
2. No further mobilization or preparation whatever for further hostility between the two nations.

3. Withdrawal of both Japanese and Chinese combatants from all points of mutual contact in the Shanghai area.
4. Protection of the International Settlement by the establishment of neutral zones to divide the combatants; these zones to be policed by neutrals; the arrangements to be set up by the consular authorities.
5. Upon acceptance of these conditions prompt advances be made in negotiations to settle all outstanding controversies between the two nations in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the resolution of the League of Nations of December 9th without prior demand or reservation and with the aid of neutral observers or participants.

Fighting in Shanghai was limited to exchange of machine gun fire at the border of the Settlement.
A Japanese cruiser fired on the city of Nanking.

Feb. 3. The Forts at Woosung fired back at the attacking Japanese fleet.

Aerial bombing by the Japanese of Chapei failed to dislodge the defenders.
The International Commission of inquiry left Paris for the East.

China accepted the five proposals of the four powers, while Japan conditionally accepted the first four and rejected the fifth.

Feb. 4. In Shanghai and Woosung, furious battles resumed in which machine guns, artilleries and airplanes took part. There was no change of position.

Feb. 5. The Japanese troops in Manchuria occupied Harbin after a devastating bombardment of the city.

Japanese attacks in Chapei were successfully repulsed by the entrenched Chinese. A Japanese plane was shot down by the Chinese. The Japanese Cabinet decided to send a full division of troops to Shanghai.

Feb. 6. Japanese planes bombed Chapei again setting new fires. Fighting continued throughout the day. However, there was no change in position.

Fifty-one flood refugees in a camp directed by Sir John Hope-Simpson were killed by the Japanese aerial attack.

Feb. 7. Japan reported movement of soviet troops at Vladivostok.

Feb. 8. British and United States naval authorities in Shanghai labored to bring about peace, while fighting in Woosung and Chapei continued.

Japan proposed the creation of permanent neutral zones surrounding the principal commercial centres of China. The zones were to be fifteen to twenty miles wide and policed by foreign troops, etc. In Washington the plan

appeared little short of a "dismemberment of the country and its partition among foreign powers."

Japanese Cabinet approved an appropriation of 40,000,000 yens to cover the military expenses in Shanghai.

Feb. 9. Japanese troops landed at the International Settlement. They soon went into action. The Woosung Forts were battered by guns aboard the warships. The League's Commission arrived at New York.

Feb. 10. Japanese attacks by sea, land and air failed to dislodge the Chinese from their trenches.

Eight hundred students at the Imperial University, Tokyo, demonstrated against Japan's course in China. They urged to stop this "imperialistic war." Twenty-five of them were arrested.

Feb. 11. Two additional divisions of troops were dispatched from Japan to Shanghai.

Feb. 12. 3,000 marooned civilians were rescued from the battle-torn Chapei during a four hour truce. Hostility was resumed soon after.

Dr. W. W. Yen asked for a meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Feb. 13. Shells and bombs failed to drive the defenders out of the ruins of Chapei.

Feb. 14. The Japanese concentrated 25,000 troops with tanks, field guns and planes along the Woosung-Chapei battle front for a big offensive.

The League called on Japan to abide by Article 10 of the League Covenant.

Feb. 17. Artillery duel brought about heavy casualties, but no change of position.

A middle school operated by the American Episcopal Church in the Settlement was raided by the Japanese troops.

The League appealed to Japan's "supreme sense of honor" to terminate hostilities in Shanghai.

The new state of Manchuria, known as "Ankuo," "Land of Peace," was formed under Japanese military direction.

Feb. 18. Artillery duel with occasional closer engagements continued along the Chapei-Woosung front.

Feb. 19. Japanese military authority delivered an ultimatum to the Chinese, demanding their withdrawal beyond a twelve mile radius of Shanghai by 7 p.m., February 20th. It was rejected.

Feb. 20. Severe fighting ensued.

Feb. 21. Severe fighting continued with no change of position.

Feb. 21. Inukai was re-elected Japanese Premier.

Feb. 23. The Japanese Cabinet decided to send 25,000 more troops to Shanghai.

In Shanghai, the Chinese held the lines in spite of Japanese attacks.

Feb. 24. The Chinese in the Imienpo district "rebelled" against the new state of Manchuria. The Japanese military

authority negotiated with Russia for permission to use the Chinese Eastern Railway to transport an "expeditionary" force.

Feb. 25. Chinese defenders in Shanghai withstood another general attack.

The Japanese Cabinet approved another appropriation of 22,000,000 yens to meet military expenses in Shanghai.

Feb. 29. The International Commission arrived in Japan.

Fighting continued along the Chapei-Woosung front.

BRIEF FACTS ABOUT MANCHURIA

1. Manchuria covers an area of 363,610 square miles. It is known also as the three Eastern Provinces of China - - Liao-ning, Kirin and Heilungkiang.

2. Manchuria was settled by the Chinese as early as the 4th century B.C. It has been the homeland of at least two ruling houses of China.

3. Manchuria has a population of about 30,000,000 including 8,000,000 Koreans, 280,000 Japanese and 2,000,000 Russians. Since 1927, about 1,000,000 Chinese from inside of the Great Wall migrated into Manchuria annually.

4. Manchuria has the best railway system in China. Over 2,500 miles are owned by the Chinese, 1,078 jointly owned by the Russians and the Chinese (Chinese Eastern Railway) and 695 miles controlled by the Japanese (South Manchurian Railway).

5. Agriculture is the most important resource of Manchuria. Half the world's soya bean comes from Manchuria. Its virgin forest covers 45,500,000 acres.

6. Thirty-two different minerals are found in Manchuria. In 1925 about fifty-eight million dollars worth of mineral was mined. Half of China's gold production comes from Manchuria. Coal is found everywhere. The Fushun coal field alone is estimated to have 1,200,000,000 tons of bituminous coal. In 1928, 233,942 tons of pig-iron were produced.

7. Manchuria controls one-fourth of China's foreign trade. In 1928, direct foreign imports were valued at \$126,873,236 and exports at \$226,150,650.

WORLD OPINION

"If the Japanese General Staff get away with what they are doing in China, the Kellogg Pact is a dead letter, the League of Nations has lost its usefulness, the Nine Power Treaty is worthless and the world is back where it was in 1914, when might was right and nations put their trust only in heavy armaments."

William Philip Simms.

"Japan is pursuing the imperialistic policy which Western nations followed in China in the 19th century. I predict that next she would proclaim herself the defender of Eastern Asia against Bolshevism".

Charles Hodges, Professor of Politics at New York University.

JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF MUKDEN

Letter by DR. T. Z. KOO

[Dr. T. Z. Koo has been for many years connected with the Student Christian Movement in China, and is the vice-president of the World Federation of Student Christian Movement. In the West he is regarded as one of the few ablest interpreters of Chinese culture of Modern thought. The following letter was sent by him to his Christian friends in the West after his visit to Mukden from Oct. 8 to 13, 1931. As it presents a very vivid description of the scene following the occupation of the city and also a personal reflection of the situation undoubtedly shared by many, it is reproduced here in full. Ed.]

29 Li Lu Hutung,
West City, Peiping
October 20, 1931

Dear Friend:

My last letter was written just on the eve of the outbreak of the Japanese incident in Manchuria. Then, very few people realized the seriousness of the incident. Now the whole world is aware of the gravity of the situation. In order to get a personal impression of what is actually going on in Manchuria during these days, I made a brief visit to Mukden from October 8 to 13. In this letter I will give a brief account of the impressions gained on this trip together with some of my own reflections upon the situation.

The train from Mukden left Peiping at 8.25 p.m. on October 8. Travelling on the same train with me was Mr. Chester Rowell of California, publicity director of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The first evidence of the trouble in Manchuria met our eyes when our train reached Chinchow, an important city on the railway 246 miles west of Mukden, the center of Japanese occupation. Chinchow

was bombed by twelve Japanese military planes at 1.00 p.m. on October 8. Our train was the first train to reach Chinchow from the outside after the bombing. The objectives of bombing were the wireless station, the railroad station and yards, and the temporary offices of the civil government which were in the buildings of the Communications University. The bomb intended for the station missed its mark and hit a provision store just across the street, tearing a jagged hole in the roof and killing two of the inmates. Mr. Rowell visited the railroad yards where most of the casualties were reported. In all three bombs were dropped on the wireless station, about 15 on the railroad yards and about a dozen on the University.

We continued our journey towards Mukden after spending about two hours in Chinchow. When our train reached Chu Liu Ho just beyond Hsin Min Fu, we came upon the second evidence of the Japanese occupation. Two Japanese soldiers with fixed bayonets came into the car in which I was sitting. One of them pointed his bayonet at me while the other searched my person, presumably for hidden arms. This was done to every passenger in the car. A little later, two more soldiers came through to inspect our baggage. At 1.30 a.m. on October 10, we reached Huang Ku Tun, the station just before the Mukden city station. Our train could not actually go to Mukden because the Japanese have torn up a section of the Peiping Mukden Line between Huang Ku Tun and Mukden City. As it was not safe to go into the city after dark, Mr. Rowell and I spent the rest of the night in a service car placed at our disposal through the courtesy of some British members of the Railroad staff at Huang Ku Tun.

At 8.30 the next morning (10th) we entered Mukden. Fortunately for me, our car was not challenged by the

Japanese sentries and so we slipped in without attracting undue notice upon ourselves. The city looked like a Chinese city passing the first three days of the Chinese New Year. Most of the shops were closed and the streets looked deserted. A temporary force of Chinese policemen controlled by the Japanese were patrolling the streets. At every police station I passed on the way I saw Japanese soldiers quartered in it. The headquarters of the Japanese army of occupation is established in Mukden and the city government is in the hands of a Japanese Mayor assisted by the usual departments also administered by Japanese nationals.

In addition to these Japanese military and civil administrative organs, Mukden also boasts of a Chinese Committee called the Committee for the Preservation of Order. The Chairman of this committee is Mr. Yuan Chin Kai, an old-time gentry of the city. This committee is really a dummy committee formed at the instigation without the approval of the Japanese Mayor's office. One then begins to wonder why create such a committee? On closer scrutiny I found that the Committee serves two purposes for the Japanese. The first is that the Committee, being a Chinese body, provides a convenient peg upon which to hang the pseudo-independence movements in Manchuria. You will undoubtedly have to read in your papers reports of independence movements emanating from Tokio. Mr. Yuan Chin Kai's committee was saddled with one of these independence movements. A second purpose is the more subtle one of using the dummy committee as a cover for anything the Japanese want to take over or do in the city in which they do not want their own name to appear. So far this committee has tried to hold to its single purpose of preserving order in the city of Mukden and has resolutely refused to have anything to do with the independence

movements or the sequestration of Chinese properties. But its role is becoming increasingly difficult and several members were contemplating flight from the city when I was there.

Japanese military and civil authorities have made clean sweep of all Chinese governmental organs in Mukden. This is true not only in Mukden but also in the whole occupied area of over a million square miles bounded on the east by Antung and Kirin, north by Changchun, West by Ssuningkai and Hsin Min, and south by Yingkow. In this area, the Japanese have completely throttled the Chinese civil and military administrations, thereby destroying the only existing check against banditry and lawlessness in South Manchuria. Having created this state of affairs, they turn round coolly to the world and say they cannot withdraw their forces because of China's inability to protect the lives and property of their nationals.

Japanese tactics in Manchuria can be summed up under four categories. First, the occupation of strategic centres of military importance. The occupation of Ssuningkai and the seizure of Tunhua are examples. Ssuningkai is a Railroad junction northwest of Mukden with lines radiating to three points of the compass, namely north, west and south. Tunhua is the terminus of the Kirin Tunhua railway on the border of Korea. Since its occupation, the Japanese have been forcibly extending the line to connect with the Japanese railway system in Korea thus completing the strategic route from Korea into north Manchuria.

Second, the seizure of economic resources and the disruption of Chinese industries in the occupied area. The Chairman of the Pro. Government and the Commissioner of Industry are still prisoners in the hands of the Japanese and it is com-

monly reported in Mukden that pressure is being brought to bear upon these two men by the Japanese to compel them to sign away the economic resources of Manchuria and other valuable properties belonging to the Chinese government. In Mukden, the Japanese have appointed Japanese managers to operate Chinese mills. They are operating the Chinese railway from Kirin to Mukden. What they cannot use, the Japanese are dismantling or destroying. Even if this occupied territory is returned to China later, the loss and damage to us on this score alone will be incalculable and will take our people many tens of years to recoup.

Third, the creation of puppet committee or persons to declare the independence of Manchuria from China. This will bring Manchuria under the tutelage of Japan and reduce her to the same status as Korea before her annexation by the Island Empire. On the same train on which I returned to Peiping (October 13) I found the Mongol Prince Taherhan traveling in disguise with his family. I learned that he was escaping from Mukden because the Japanese have been importuning him to declare the independence of Mongolia. When the Japanese entered the city of Mukden on September 19, they placed a military guard over his residence and then sent emissaries to induce him to start a Mongolian independence movement. This he resolutely refused to do and the Japanese began to double and treble the guards. So finally he decided that Mukden was not a healthy place for him just then and he smuggled himself out disguised as a servant. The Japanese have been making frantic attempts to secure other puppets for these independence movements, including the ex-emperor Pu-yi, but so far without success.

Fourth, the bribing and arming of the Hunhutse (Manchuria bandits).

As far as the ordinary people in South Manchuria are concerned, this move is the most cruel one for them. These bandits are incited by the Japanese to rob trains, villages and cities. I myself very nearly became a victim of these bandits as the train I came back on to Peiping was bandited on the way. My heart aches for the peaceful farmers of Manchuria during the long winter months which will soon come upon them when they have to face the double hardship of Japanese military occupation and widespread banditry.

In the next paragraphs, I wish to share with you some of my personal reflections as I observed the situation in Manchuria on this trip. My first reaction is that in this Japanese *coup d'etat*, we see militarism gone mad. I have seen for some time that when nations go on piling up armaments indefinitely, a point will be reached when the itch to use these armaments becomes irresistible. I think this is what has happened with Japan. The Japanese people probably have no more desire for war than the people in China. But the military gunta in Japan, drunk with its own sword rattling, has precipitated the nation into a situation which has practically damned an otherwise admirable people as a pariah in the eyes of the whole world. To-day we see in Manchuria Japanese militarism, running amok with all its attendant evils of brutality, murder, rape and lies. Let all who still believe in big armaments for "defensive purposes only" take warning and realise what a dangerous plaything they have in their hands.

My second reflection is in the realm of the future. The status quo in Manchuria presents a picture of Russia in the north and Japan in the south with China sandwiched in between the two. If Japan is allowed to get away with her bluff this time in South Manchuria, she would have

brought herself face to face again with her traditional enemy, Russia. Once before when their territories were contiguous, it brought on the Russo-Japanese war. It requires no special foresight to see that with militant Japan facing directly in Manchuria a rejuvenated Russia still smarting under her last defeat, war is inevitable. Thus, unless the status quo is restored, a standing threat to the peace of the Far East will have perpetrated in Manchuria.

My third reaction comes to me because of my interest in the movement for the outlawry of war. Through Japan's action in South Manchuria, a situation is dramatised in such a way that the whole world sees a nation armed to the Nth degree invading another nation which is utterly unprepared militarily to resist the invasion. Under any other circumstance, war between China and Japan would have been unavoidable. But China's rulers adopted a policy of non-military resistance to Japan's act of war and appealed to the League of Nations for arbitration. This has placed before the League an unique opportunity to prove to the world once for all whether it has a right to its existence. If the League takes an effective stand in this trouble between China and Japan consonant with the growing sentiment in the world for peace and cooperation between nations and for the outlawry of war, the whole cause for world peace would be immeasurably advanced.

The entire world is asking "Can the League function effectively in such a situation?" My answer is emphatically yes. There are people who do not have faith in the League because they say the League has no military force to enforce its decisions. These people do not understand that for the League to use military force to enforce its decisions is to negate the very purpose for which the League is created, namely, to do away with

war. But the League has an instrument at its disposal far more effective than military force. India through Mr. Gandhi and now China has demonstrated to the world that armed force can be resisted without resorting to armed force. The use of the boycott method by all the signatory powers of the League Covenant against an offending nation will quickly bring that nation to her senses. This international boycott can be applied in three stages. The first stage is for all the member states of the League simultaneously to break off diplomatic relations with the offending nation. After an interval of a fortnight, if the nation is still bent on making war, then the member states will close their sea ports to the shipping of the offending nation. Perhaps a month should be allowed after this declaration for the offender to think over its own actions. If it proves to be still recalcitrant, then the final stage should be applied, that is, withdraw all financial credit from the offending nation. I feel sure that the use of this method by the League when it has a clear case of international aggression before it will put an effective stop to war.

I believe, as all fair-minded men believe to-day, that in this Sino-Japanese situation in Manchuria, the League has before it a clear case of international aggression, pure and simple. Our Government has counselled the people to remain calm under provocation and await action by the League reserving the use of military force for self-defence until every other means to settle the trouble is exhausted. Hence, much is being expected from the League by the Chinese people as indeed by all the world. I earnestly hope the League will not fail this time. If it fails not only its own existence is threatened but the whole cause of disarmament and world peace is doomed beyond recall.

Forgive me for devoting this whole letter to our trouble in Manchuria. In these days of suffering and death there, I have no place in my heart for anything else.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) T. Z. Koo.

A SWORN TESTIMONY OF AN AMERICAN EYEWITNESS

[Dr. Sherwood Eddy, a world-wide known Y.M.C.A. worker, lecturer, and author of "The Challenge of the East," "Suffering and the War," "With our Soldiers in France," "The Challenge of Russia," etc., was present at the capture of Mukden. The following is his affidavit, sworn before the American Consul-General at Tientsin.—Ed.]

Republic of China
Province of Chili
City of Tientsin
Consulate General of
United States of America.

Before me, George Atcheson, Jr., Consul of the United States of America in and for the consular district of Tientsin, China, duly commissioned and qualified personally came Sherwood Eddy, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I was present at the capture of Mukden on September 18 and 19 and witnessed the Japanese occupation of the city. I proceeded to Korea where the three stages of Japan's policy there were evident; first to declare her "independence" of China, second to announce a protectorate under Japan, third, annexation and absorption. When I read in the Japanese controlled press

in Korea that "independence" governments were being set up at Kirin and in the North-eastern provinces I returned to Mukden. In the "Manchuria Daily News" of October 3, 4 and 5, I read that a "Chinese self-government system" had been set up in Mukden. Names were announced of men serving on the local Administration Committee of Peace and Order Committee who were said to have consented "to inaugurate a Chinese autonomic government." Two of these men came to see me personally for two hours on October 15. They stated that they had repeatedly been approached by Japanese and urged for the last ten days to set up a puppet "independence" government in that province, but they had persistently refused to do so. They were leading citizens of Mukden. I do not wish to give their names for fear of danger to them. I found no foreigner whom I interviewed and no Chinese in Southern Manchuria who doubts that there is convincing evidence that the capture of Mukden and the strategic points of Manchuria were a premeditated, carefully prepared, offensive plan of the Japanese army which is developing in the setting up of puppet so-called "independence" governments in the Manchuria provinces. And further deponent saith not.

(Signed) SHERWOOD EDDY.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ninth day of October, A.D. 1931.

(Signed) GEO. ATCHISON, JR.
Consul of the United States of America at Tientsin, China.

Seal of American Consulate General, Tientsin.

WORLD OPINION

"I tell you seriously there is firm belief among us in England that the Japanese militarists have embarked on this almost incredible policy of expansion and conquest, and are entering upon it with the passive support of Soviet Russia and republican France'.

Commander L. M. Kenworthy
of the British Navy.

Also outlining the five phases of the Japanese plan of conquest, he said, "the first has been accomplished with the seizure of all Manchuria. Second, it is necessary for her to occupy the great Yangtze Valley in order to dominate Chinese trade and commerce, and to give her an entering wedge for the conquest of all China".

"Third, she will eventually seize Canton and South China, and advance westward toward French Indo-China and British possessions".

"Fourth, she will be in a position, militarily and economically, to seize Indo-China from the French. Finally, she will advance upon India—upon which she has had her eye for many years".

"—But more serious still is the fact that Japan, despite her obligation of the League of Nations, the Peace Pact of Paris and Nine Power Treaty, has set herself as the judge in her own cause and, despite her obligations to the contrary, has resorted to war-like measures in order to enforce her will upon a weaker nation".

Norman A. M. MacKenzie, Associate
Professor of Law,
University of Toronto.

"If America lines up with the League to present a strong front against Japan, Japan will back down and withdraw her troops from the non-treaty territory beyond the South Manchuria Railway Zone".

Bertrand Russell.

"I was present at the capture of Mukden. Evidence of many witnesses interviewed at the time and on spot points to premeditated, carefully prepared offensive plan of Japanese army without provocation of any Chinese attack, producing bitter resentment when China, suffering with flood disaster and world preoccupied. Japanese troops not withdrawn, but all strategic points in Southern Manchuria, still held by Japanese and Chinchow bombed. I testify to evidence of efforts to establish puppet independent government in Manchuria under Japanese military control. I have forwarded sworn statements of interviews Chinese leaders in Manchuria who testify to repeated pressure of Japanese to induce them to head independent government".

Dr. Sherwood Eddy. Veteran
American Y.M.C.A. worker, author
and an eyewitness in a cable published
in the New York Herald Tribune on
October 14, 1931.

"The Japanese intend to colonize Manchuria and inner Mongolia by means of a puppet government of subservient Chinese".

Upton Close.

Author and lecturer, authority on
Oriental affairs.

"Remember, if it suits the purpose of the Japanese to kill Americans, that's exactly what they will do, and the softer we are the more they will kill. They know we won't boycott them".

Smedley D. Butler, former commander of U.S. Marines in China.

"The speed and smoothness with which Japanese soldiers moved, showed careful advance planning.

Grover Clark.

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS UP TO THE PRESENT CRISIS

By S. KWAUK

All the authorities and even average observers have agreed that the present Manchurian situation cannot be studied as an isolated incident. One may, however, still encounter difficulty to refute the assertion that it is only a "local issue." To dislocate it from the series of events which earmark the history of Manchuria during the last half century will only distort the true picture. The destruction of a part of the South Manchurian Railway by the Chinese soldiers, as alleged by the Japanese, would not in itself bring about Japan's invasion and successive occupation of Manchurian cities. Further, it was very unlikely that the Chinese soldiers, long taught through bitter experiences, the belligerency and the superior quality of the Japanese military guarding the South Manchurian Railway would attempt such an adventure. Throughout the summer (1931) Japan's hunt for a presentable pretext to launch a big enterprise was too well known. The Chinese press had repeatedly warned the populace to avoid provocative acts, which, while seemingly trifle, were possible of the gravest consequences. Therefore, the cause cannot be found in any recent occurrences in Manchuria. As a matter of fact, it is not local in origin. It is deep rooted in Japan, in the Japanese Government and in the Japanese policy. The present imbroglio, engendered from such a policy, can be simplified if the history of Manchuria is briefly reviewed. In view of the recent complications of the situation, the writer takes the opportunity also to present the important Sino-Japanese questions in general.

HISTORY OF MANCHURIA

Manchuria has been the birth place of at least three dynasties in the Chinese history. The short-lived Liao Dynasty in the beginning of the 10th century ruled part of the Chihli Province. In 1115 and 1644, the Chin and the Manchu Dynasties respectively were established by peoples from Manchuria. The latter ended in 1911. During the last dynasty which lasted nearly 300 years, there had been a great deal of intermixing with other stocks of the Chinese race. Today no distinction is and can be made between a Manchu outside of the Great Wall and a Chinese inside of it; and Manchuria is settled by many times more Chinese from within the Great Wall than the natives themselves.

The first diplomatic contact of Manchuria with the outside world was with Russia in the 17th century. A treaty was established, followed by two more, defining the boundary between the Russian and Chinese Empires.

Japan's keen interest in Manchuria started in the last century, hardly fifty years ago. Between Russia, seeking an ice-free outlet to the sea, and Japan, dreaming of economic and military expansion, friction inevitably ensued. But the weakness of the common host must first be proved.

SINO-JAPANESE WAR

Ever since the Opium War of 1839-42, and the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, the Manchu Dynasty was beginning to show signs of corruption and decline. With the people daily threat-

ening its existence by way of rebellion and revolution, the Imperial Government was not prepared to meet the onslaught of foreign aggressions. Much against its own will, it went to war with Japan over the question of Korea, a Chinese protectorate, during 1894-95 (Sino-Japanese War). The Treaty of Shimonoseki concluded after the war, really sowed the seed of the trouble that was to follow. By the treaty, Korea was recognized as an independent state, China ceded the Island of Formosa and Pescadores Group of islands and paid 200,000,000 taels for indemnity, and also China was to cede Liaotung Peninsular.

The extent of the war did not justify such wholesale relinquishment of territory. To the failure of Chinese diplomacy, we must ascribe such disproportionate result. However, the cession of Liaotung Peninsular was detrimental to Russia's plan in Manchuria, for it was believed, then, that the ice-free port of Russia was to be built on the coast of this strip of land. With the help of Germany and France, Russia threatened Japan, who then had no idea of Russian strength, to retrocede the land to China. Japan was forced to comply. As a result, Japan received 30,000,000 taels from China as a compensation. In return for this apparent service to China, Russia was given the right in 1896 to extend the Trans-Siberian Railway through north Manchuria to Vladivostok. This extension is known as the Chinese Eastern Railway. Since then Manchuria became the cynosure of world's political speculation.

CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

According to an agreement reached in April 1896, the projected railway was to be owned and operated jointly by the two governments, Chinese and Russian, with the president named by the Chinese Government but paid by the railway. This partnership was to

last 80 years, at the end of which the line with all its appurtenances was to pass to the Chinese Government, which, moreover, was to have the right of purchasing the Russian shares and thus become the sole owner of the line at any time after the expiration of 36 years.

KIAOCHOW, PORT ARTHUR, DAIREN AND SOUTH MAN- CHURIAN RAILWAY

In 1897, Germany seized Kiaochow under the pretext of protecting Catholic missionaries against bandits, and held it as a compensation for her effort in the intervention two years previous. Russia, to carry her scheme a step further, occupied Port Arthur and Dairen with the request for permission to build a sideline from Harbin to these two ports. China, morally constrained by their favor two years ago and practically limited in her means of self-protection, granted all these demands. According to a convention signed March 27, 1898, the two ports were to be placed under lease for a term of 25 years (till 1923). The new line was given the name South Manchurian Railway.

At the beginning, Great Britain in her quest for trade and whatever other objective she might have had was included in the list of interested parties in the affairs of Manchuria. But to avoid friction with the then apparently more powerful influence, Russia, she came to an understanding with Russia in 1899, whereby she was to confine her exploitation along the Yangtze Valley.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

During the Boxer outbreak in 1900, 150,000 Russian troops marched into Kirin and Heilungkiang and occupied practically the whole of Manchuria, and Peking (Peiping)

was captured by the Powers. Terms for peace between China and the Powers including Russia were drawn up in 1902. Russian occupation of Manchuria was opposed by the Powers in general, whose aim was to keep Russia away from the water, and by Japan in particular, whose motto was to get Manchuria and that if she could not have it nobody else was to have it either. Consequently the terms finally reached, as far as Manchuria was concerned, were greatly in favor of China. Russian troops were to evacuate Manchuria by steps in eight months. Russia's dissatisfaction was soon evident. She refused to carry out the second stage of the evacuation, unless further demands designed to root a firmer Russian control of Manchuria were ceded. Japan, acting in her own interest, offered to respect the Russian claims on condition that this would be reciprocated by Russia's recognizing Japan's special position and control in Korea, which Japan had freed from Chinese protectorship seven years ago and whose independence was guarded by a treaty between the Powers. Russia refused to make any concession. The result was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, followed by the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905.

The battles were fought on Chinese soil. China, though admittedly neutral was made the principal loser. The treaty ratified Japan's free hand in Korea and resulted in the transference of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the railway south of Changchun (South Manchurian Railway) to Japan.

It is ridiculous to note that the treaty made the reservation of the right to the contracting parties, Russia and Japan, to maintain guards along their respective railways in Manchuria "at numbers not exceeding fifteen per kilometer".

MUKDEN ANTUNG RAILWAY

In the same year, Japan was given the right to build a line connecting Mukden with Antung in Korea, with the understanding that the railway including its future properties, was to be bought by China after 1923 at a period to be decided by "an expert" of a third nationality", and that the affairs of the railway was to be inspected by an officer appointed by the Chinese Government.

In regard to the station of guards, the Chinese Government repeatedly raised strong objections. On separate occasions each of the two powers, Russia and Japan, signified its willingness to withdraw provided the other would do the same simultaneously. So the matter rested up to the present.

Since then Port Arthur and Dairen have become the foothold of the Japanese economic and military encroachment. Port Arthur has also developed into a Japanese naval base. The South Manchurian Railway, with late additions as sidelines has metamorphosed into the greatest instrument of Japanese exploitation of Manchurian wealth. Thus the pendulum swung to the other side; Japan became the dominating factor in Manchuria.

FIRST BOYCOTT

In 1908, a Japanese vessel, loaded with contraband was detained by the Chinese Government. Japan protested and demanded apology, indemnity and punishment of officers responsible. The Manchu Government, with its last breath of existence again manifested its weakness by acceding to all the demands. However, the people, for the first time in its history showed a sign of nationalism by resorting to what later proved to be the most effective means of retaliation, the boycott. What Japan had gained in the deal

was far short of paying for the \$13,300,000 she had lost in trade in the following nine months.

In 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

The birth of the Chinese Republic in 1911 marked the end of an era of corruption in Chinese diplomatic relations, concomitant with a change of policy in China of most of the Powers. To be fair, one should not forget the circumstances under which any government, that claimed to represent and reconstruct China, had to labor. The Republic inherited a prestige which consisted of some fifty concessions and settlements in a score of important cities, foreign administration of maritime customs and salt gabelle; indemnities and loans, a ridiculously low fixed tariff, foreign postal rights, leasehold of Kiaochow, Kowloon, Kwangchowwan, Weihaiwei, Port Arthur and Dairen, permanent cession of Hongkong, foreign railways in Manchuria, extra-territorial jurisdiction, right of coastal and inland navigation by foreign vessels, and policing right through foreign military forces at Tientsin, Peking (Peiping), Shanghai, cities in Manchuria and many others. That these hinder the normal development of a new nation, cannot be denied. In fact, to them one should attribute the instability of the Chinese Government. Yet, the more unstable the government is, the greater the ground and chances for foreign intervention; and more intervention begets more instability. To break this vicious circle has been the added task of the Chinese Government. Contrary to popular predictions, the stunted child of the East during recent years showed signs of great vigor and strength. Through pacific channels, the following were regained; the return of Weihaiwei, concessions in Hankow and other cities from Great Britain, the withdrawal of

most foreign troops, retrocession of foreign postal rights, shortening of the joint control of the Chinese Eastern Railway by twenty years, the realization of tariff autonomy and the relinquishment of extra-territorial jurisdiction.

On the other hand, through these years of reconstruction, the relation with Japan, especially in regard to Manchuria, has not changed. Historians have the misfortune of recording a few more incidents, tell-tale of Japan's unchanged policy in China.

"TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS"

In 1914, Japan captured the German leased territory of Kiaochow. Both Japan and China were members of the Ally. However, as the world was preoccupied with more grave matters, Japan thought it a master stroke to carry out her coddled plan by means of the infamous Twenty-one Demands. The demands, written on papers water-marked with dreadnoughts, and machine guns, were presented to the President of China on January 18, 1915. The Twenty-one Demands were in brief a brazen confession of Japanese ambition and policy in China, especially Manchuria. (See page 38) Later as an answer was not forthcoming, the following ultimatum was handed to China:-

"The Imperial Government hereby again offers its advice and hopes that the Chinese Government will give a satisfactory reply not later than 6 o'clock p.m. of the 9th day of May. It is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the designated time, the Imperial Government will take any steps she may deem necessary."

The three years old Chinese Government was too self-conscious and was in no position to stage a scene. The President "at the point of the bayonet" signed most of the demands. But popular sentiment was expressed in the form of a nation-wide boycott.

The loss to Japanese trade was tremendous. At the end of six months Japan felt the effect keenly and demanded the Chinese Government its cessation. It did not quiet down until about a year later, when China was unable to secure enough manufactured goods from other countries. The estimated loss of Japanese trade was over 32% of her total with China.

In 1916, Japan and Russia came to a treaty agreement whereby each should respect the right and safeguard the special interest of the other in Manchuria.

After the Great War, in 1919, when China could again procure supplies from Western nations, the boycott resumed. This time it was directed against the occupation of Shantung by the Japanese. Since then the boycott has virtually continued to the present with occasional exacerbations. In 1919, imports from Japan was only 3% of China's total. In the following year, Japan's trade with China was 7.2% less than that of the previous year, which meant a loss of \$29,155,000. In 1921, Japan's export to China was again reduced by 9% of that of the previous year, while the total import from countries other than Japan leapt by thirty percent.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

From the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 however, China regained the leased territory of Kiaochow, railways in Shantung and other special rights, granted to the Germans in 1898 and acquired by Japan through her military occupation in 1914.

This unprecedented accomplishment in Chinese diplomatic relations was due to three things:-

1. a general change in the attitude of the Western nations towards China as demanded and warranted by the

awakening of Chinese nationalism.

2. the noble labor of the Chinese representatives morally backed by a formidable boycott at home, and

3. a temporary change in Japanese policy due to the presence of Baron Shidehara as foreign minister.

From that year to 1927, the year when Baron Tanaka came to power again, the sea of international relations was comparatively quiet. And it was during this brief period that the Chinese Nationalist Government, the champion of the people, was formed. Just as China was about to travel the road to prosperity, the worst of her enemies and illwishers came to the scene.

TANAKA

Tanaka's initial policy toward China can be summarized by a statement in a memorandum presented by a Japanese patriotic society to the Japanese Government; - - "By inciting Chinese malcontents and creating great commotion and disorder in China, Japan can easily intervene and adjust matters." This he pursued for some time.

In the figure of Chang Tso-ling, the war-lord of Manchuria, Japan found an easy pawn. In the event of a real political unification of China Japanese policy and Japanese illegitimate interests in Manchuria would be dealt a deadly blow. It is a recognized fact that Chang Tso-ling's evasive attitude and inveterate resistance to the Nationalist Government were under the direction of the Japanese who held the nominal ruler by the throat on account of their influence in the land. In any local affair in Manchuria, Japan refused to negotiate directly with the Central Government. The reason is obvious. Until recently, the status of Manchuria has been kept little known to the rest of the nation. We pondered over the conditions in Manchuria

in the same way as the world is pondering over that in Russia today. Information had only been a matter of speculation.

TANAKA'S MEMORIAL AND POLICY

Tanaka's real policy was outlined in his famous Memorial presented to the Japanese Emperor on July 25, 1927. It is referred to as the "Positive Policy" in contrast to the "Friendly Policy" of Baron Shidehara. It is surprising that Japan's subsequent behaviours coincide so well with the scheme laid down by the Memorial. (See page 41.)

4,300 Japanese troops landed at Tsinan in 1927 when the Nationalist forces were marching toward Peking along the Peking Pukow Railway. On May 3, 1928, the Japanese fired on the Chinese soldiers. The fighting that ensued resulted in the heavy loss of life and property. In the same year, General Kuo Sung-ling, who was carrying out the order of the Nationalist Government to exterminate its last enemy, Chang Tso-ling, was captured and executed by the Japanese.

While in Tsinan, the Japanese troops murdered the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, (described elsewhere). This was the cause of the last flare-up of the boycott. It cost Japan \$17,453,000 of trade in that year.

Late in 1928, Chang Tso-ling yielded to popular sentiment and paid his homage to the Nationalist Government. On his way back to Mukden, he was murdered by the Japanese.

Chang Hsueh-liang succeeded his father; but his attitude introduced a revolutionary change in the status of Manchuria. Through him the three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) were brought under the Nationalist Government. He showed no inclination to take orders from the Japanese. His project of constructing

a new port, Hulutao, south of Chinchow on the gulf of Liaotung, with the aim to compete with the Japanese port, Dairen, and his program of railway construction caused great apprehension in Japan. In 1928, a line connecting Hulan with Hailun was completed, and the following year saw another line extending from Mukden via Heilungchang to Kirin opened for traffic. The latter line was the object of Japanese protest for its being "parallel" to a section of the South Manchurian Railway.

As it has been rightly proclaimed that the whole question of Manchuria is a question of Railways, a little detail will not be out of place.

Of all the railways in Manchuria, Chinese interests owned the most mileage, 3,320.2 kilometers. Both Russia and Japan owned approximately 1,000 kilometers. The Russians had invested the most money while the Japanese reaped the most profit. The annual profit of the South Manchurian Railway with its subsidiary enterprises came close to \$40,000,000. Japan's interest and "special rights" were, according to the Japanese, protected by treaties entered with the local government, stipulations of the "Twenty-one Demands" and other agreements of equally dubious character. Of great bearing upon the present crisis is the introduction of a new communication policy in Manchuria by the Chinese Government. By the end of 1930 the following features of the new policy were attained:-

1. Construction of Hulutao Harbor intended to be the main gateway of Manchuria.

2. Transportation of mails and salt by the Chinese Railways. (The South Manchurian Railway netted \$2,000,000 annually in the previous years in salt transportation.)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quong NARS, Date 12-18-75

3. Reduction of 23% on passenger rate. People going to North Manchuria for immigration purposes pay 30% of the regular charge.
 4. Introduction of "through service" among the different Chinese Railways.
 5. Reduction of freight by 30% on goods destined for the Chinese ports.
 6. Construction of over 550 miles of railways and purchasing of 64 additional locomotives.
 Great decrease of traffic on the South Manchurian Railway was registered in 1931. The success of the new policy again was partly due to the general awakening of national consciousness among the Chinese. At the beginning of the year, Japan proposed a joint railway conference with China. But owing to the former's insistence to deal with the local authorities instead of the Central Government and her premature publication of demands upon China to recognize her "special rights" in Manchuria, the proposed conference turned out to be a mere bubble.

JAPANESE SETTLEMENT OF MANCHURIA

Japanese settlement of Manchuria has never been successful. In 1931, there were only 280,000 Japanese in Manchuria as compared to 27,000,000 of Chinese who have migrated there. The climatical conditions of Manchuria have repelled the Japanese settlers whom the wealth and fertility of the country have attracted. Thus Japanese investments in Manchuria, which amounted to over a billion dollars, had to depend largely upon Chinese labor for its successful result.

This, in brief, was the status of Manchuria just prior to the present

crisis. It took half a century to mature. Whatever the immediate incident that has created the crisis may be, the force that has turned Manchuria into the "Danger zone of the East" lies in the Japanese policy. In Japan everything was ready at the beginning of the year 1931 to realize those long cherished ambitions, disclosed in their naked form in Tanaka's Memorial. All that they needed was to discover a pretext. Several vain attempts were made during the summer of 1931. Thus, while the situation came as a distinct surprise to the world, China had long expected it. In the issue of July 15, 1931, the "Chinese Nation" started its editorial with the following ominous statement. "Conflicts between the Chinese and the Japanese in the three Eastern Provinces are so frequent and abundant that they almost appear popular. To the Japanese Military clique, they are distinctly popular, for the members feel that they count on every conflict be it real or created, as a dependable pretext whereby their imperialistic designs may be slightly improved or in other cases, the disputed holdings may be further secured. Fantastic claims may of course be framed also when occasion warrants and it may be said for that school of Japanese politicians in general that they seldom allow an opportunity to sail by without making the most of it." And referring to the Wanpaoshan incident it further said, "As for the necessary excuse to justify a military occupation of entire Manchuria, the Japanese troops there would have no difficulty in finding it, if they play the Koreans against the Chinese and make use of the former as pawns in the game."

SHANGHAI AND CHINESE NATIONALISM

By S. D. QUONG, Arts '33, McGill University

Two formidable forces are in conflict in the Far East—Japanese Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism. The former directed by an insignificant minority of political fanatics in Japan is fighting for territorial gains; while the latter is supported by 450 million people in China struggling for self-expression. The cosmopolitan city of Shanghai, where on account of its peculiar status, Imperialism stimulates Nationalism and Nationalism hurries Imperialism, was converted into a battle ground of the conflicting forces.

The city of Shanghai, in many respects, bears a close resemblance to the city of Montreal. In addition to its being a very cosmopolitan place; it is the financial and commercial centre of China and the sixth largest seaport in the world. The city is situated in Kiangsu province on the bank of Whampoo river and within a proximity of 200 miles from Nanking which is located farther up in the Yangtse Valley. The foundation of the native city is dated as far back as 2150 years when it was merely a little fishing village known as "Hu"; its rise to prominence in the world of commerce and finance is only a late attainment. In 1832 the British East India Co. despatched a mission to Shanghai in an attempt to establish a trading post there. But the "close door" policy of the Chinese was inflexible and the attempt was fruitless.

During the Opium War between China and Great Britain 1840-42, the British, in the midst of their triumph in Canton, decided to extend their military operation into the Yangtse valley. Accordingly, a detachment of 2000 men was sent from Canton for that purpose. Shanghai was captured by the invaders without much difficulty.

The Treaty of Nanking in 1842 speedily brought the War to an end and incidentally it ushered Shanghai into a new era—a first contact with the Western World. According to the provisions of the Treaty Shanghai was denominated as one of five "treaty ports" of China open to foreign trade and commerce. The British, with their commercial farsightedness, once gaining admittance into the city were not slow to exact additional privileges from the declining Chinese Imperial Government. Through diplomatic channels, they were able to reach an agreement with the Chinese Government whereby a section of the city was leased as a settlement for British Nationals with the privilege of extra-territorial right and consular jurisdiction. This same special privilege was extended to France and the United States in 1849 and 1854 respectively. In 1862 the American and British Settlements, for the purpose of solidarity, were amalgamated into the present International Settlement.

The advent of the Japanese into the Shanghai foreign settlement began in 1895 with the Treaty of Shimonoseki which terminated the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Through this treaty Japan obtained new commercial privileges in China, which included the recognition of Japanese settlement in 'treaty ports.' From that time on Japan's keen interest in Shanghai has been phenomenal and today she is one of the leading figures in the International Settlement with two members sitting at its council.

The process by which the International Settlement expanded to its present size can be described in one word: usurpation. Through illegitimate negotiations with the corrupt local authorities and more recently by the device of

building roads into Chinese section, then claiming the land enclosed by the new roads, the Settlement Authorities have successfully expanded the Settlement from the insignificant 150 acres to an enormous area of 5,584 acres. The French Concession has also been greatly expanded in a similar manner. Today it occupies an area of 2525 acres.

The Administration of the Settlement is in the hands of a Municipal Council which consists of 15 members: 6 British, 5 Chinese, 2 Americans, and 2 Japanese. It is to be noted that although the Chinese residents in the Settlement represented over 90% of the tax-payers, they had no participation in the Municipal Council till 1928. In 1928 after much protestation by the Chinese residents and much deliberation of the Settlement Authorities, 3 Chinese members were included in the Municipal Council. This number was increased to five in 1930.

Shanghai in a political sense is composed of three separate administrative units, namely: the French Concession with a population of 435,000 administered by a Council with Chinese representation since 1904 and whose final authority rests with the French Consul-General; the International Settlement with a population of 1,000,000 governed by its own council; lastly, the Municipality of Greater Shanghai composed of three large wards: Nantao, Poo-tung and Chapei with a population of 1,700,000 and of which the Mayor of Shanghai is held responsible to the National Government.

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria has aroused bitter public resentment throughout China. While the government was not prepared to resist the invaders by force, the spirit of patriotism of the Chinese people once more rose to meet the occasion. Voluntary anti-Japanese associations sprung up spontaneously; a nation-wide boycott against Japan was in the process of formation. Anti-Japanese feeling rose to the highest degree and this natural feeling was particularly acute in "treaty ports" where the Spirit of Nationalism has been spurred by the presence of foreign elements and the prevailing atmosphere of foreign domination. Shanghai was a fervent scene of anti-Japanese activities. These worked havoc on the Japanese industries in the city and paralyzed the Japanese foreign trade, 25% of which normally found its market in China.

To suppress this spontaneous feeling and its manifestations, the Japanese Imperialists unwisely resorted to brute force. On Jan. 21st the Japanese Consulate Authorities in Shanghai supported by an ultimatum issued by Admiral Shiosawa, demanded the local Chinese Authorities to effect an immediate cessation of all anti-Japanese activities and permanent dissolution of all anti-Japanese Societies. In other words they demanded the obliteration of Nationalism of the Chinese people, which ever since the establishment of the Republic had proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to Japan's Imperialistic designs in China. During the last 20 years of revolutionary transition, governments have risen and fallen but Nationalism has survived among China's teeming millions. It exists in all ranks of Chinese Society; from the humble labourer to the proud defender of the country, from the most radical young student to the highly conservative scholar. To suppress Nationalism in China simply means to suppress the free will of 450 millions souls! Can it be done?

It was reported by impartial observers that after the presentation of the Japanese demands, anti-Japanese feeling was somewhat subdued and anti-Japanese societies ceased to function. This, however, did not satisfy the Japanese authorities, whose ulterior motive is beyond the bound of human imagination.

On Jan. 22nd at 8 p.m., a 22 hours ultimatum was delivered to Mayor Wu Tec-chen of Great Shanghai. To avoid unnecessary sanguinary sacrifices, at 2 p.m. the next day, the Mayor replied the ultimatum with unconditional acceptance of its terms. He was later assured by the Japanese Consul that the reply was satisfactory. But in spite of this assurance Admiral Shiosawa, acting apparently on a premeditated plan, issued an order to attack Chapei. Using the International Settlement as the base of their operation so as to render counter-attack by the Chinese impossible without endangering the lives and properties of neutrals in the Settlement, the Japanese marines began their furious attack on the Chapei area.

In a few hours time the sinister work of their deadly weapons was quite apparent; the once crowded industrial section of the city was literally reduced to a "no man's land". Foreign correspondents present at the scene amply supplied the world with horrible descriptions of Japanese atrocities: the destruction of millions of dollars of property, the deliberate burning of the priceless library of the Commercial Press, and the murder of thousands of civilians including women and children are monumental of an international crime in the history of civilization.

Now Japan has employed brute force in her attempt to crash Chinese Nationalism, but has she succeeded? On the contrary, instead of suppressing it she is actually increasing its strength and momentum, and above all, her barbarous action has inspired among the Chinese people a unity against a common foe—a unity that is fatal to the Japanese Imperialism.

AN UNSETTLED ACCOUNT

After the Japanese bombardment and final occupation of Chapei, the loss and damage sustained by the Chinese are estimated by the Chinese Department of Statistics at Nanking as:—

Property loss, \$390,000,000;
Japanese occupied area, 150 square miles;
Families directly affected, 180,000;
Individuals directly affected, 824,000;
(45% of the Chinese population in Shanghai)
Persons killed, 8,080;
Known wounded, 21,000;
Missing, 10,400;
Revenue of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai reduced 45%;
Property losses in the Japanese occupied area, \$200,000,000;
Value of buildings destroyed, \$600,000,000;
Value of factories destroyed, \$14,000,000;
Persons thrown out of employment, 250,000;
Educational institutions in the occupied area which were closed:—10 universities and technical colleges; 30 middle schools and 192 primary schools;
Students thus prevented from continuing their studies, 39,000;
Teachers thrown out of employment, 3,000;
Educational institutions wrecked by Japanese bombardment or occupied by the Japanese military: colleges, 12; middle schools, 17; primary schools 49.
Cotton mill workers thrown out of employment, 80% of total;
Business losses to Chinese Banks, 85% of total;
Losses to Chinese railways in occupied area, 40% of total;
Damage to roads, \$300,000.

JAPAN'S AGGRESSION AND THE PEACE MACHINERY

By W. H. FONG

With the Manchurian question still unsettled and the obvious impotency of the League to curb Japan's ruthlessness, world opinion must not continue to be undermined by the voluminous Japanese propaganda. It is universally admitted that the invasion of Manchuria was premeditated and unprovoked. She had chosen the most opportune time to strike her blow when China was struggling to survive under the worst calamity in her history and the rest of the world were too preoccupied with their insurmountable national problems of depression, unemployment and financial paralysis. On top of all these, Japanese statesmen saw clearly that with the dreadful memories of the Great War still fresh no sane people would venture to risk another war.

This last consideration inevitably reflects the weakness of the League of Nations in settling disputes between a first class world power and a nation like China. The shrewd Japanese were not slow to take advantage of this, with the result that all the League's protests and resolutions only served to allow Japan further occupation, an act which means direct defiance to the world to balk her aggression. What then are the elements which dominate the League's position?

A careful study of the League and its failure to impede the Japanese invasion of China will show that aside from what unknown concealed documents or undercurrent understandings there may exist between nations one need little hesitation to say that the whole League procedure was one of dilly dallying. The proceedings were filled with unqualified hopes of settlement in words, but those hopes were only to be repeatedly dissipated without the backing of concrete action. Lack of cooperation and coordination between the U.S.A. and League Council was the chief set-back. The absence of cooperation and coordination was evident when the U.S.A. withdrew from the League after it received the first Japanese rebuttal and again when the U.S.A. and League sent separate protests under varying degrees of attitude and conception of the violation of the peace pacts all of which Japan has stubbornly treated as scraps of paper.

An outstanding example of the swaying attitude of the peace pact signatories is France which the leading government newspapers while at the outset of the invasion denounced Japan's war-like aggression suddenly changed their stand to defend Japan's actions; although later the startling revelations of Japanese atrocity and vandalism in Shanghai produced some slight reaction in some of the journals.

Besides the general impotency of the League of Nations the Sino-Japanese conflict has exposed the utter defectiveness of the Covenant when its invocation and successful application were fully relied upon by China in her plight. During the League Assembly in Paris the skilful interpretation of the Document by Sir John Simon reduced it to a scrap of paper as for instance: when Sir John held that under Art. 10 the Council was powerless to declare one of its members to be the aggressor without the consent of the

member in question. Another interpretation by the French Government concerning sanctions maintained that Art. 16 of the Covenant cannot be applied because a state of war did not exist, a consideration from which we may justly infer that any member may wage war upon another member with impunity so long as it does not formally declare war.

Art. 16 also laid down that the nation must not declare war to enable the council to act, for by so doing it would become the "aggressor." Another official statement from the Council stated that the League would be powerless to apply the Covenant should Japan withdraw its membership. Of what use then is the existence of the League when the Powers which solemnly affixed their signatures to stand behind the Covenant a decade ago that these same signatories should fail to apply its sanctions in the Far East situation where practically every form of warfare is being extensively carried into action save the declaration of the sinister word WAR? Should this be allowed to continue it is undeniably a dangerous precedent of unfathomable consequences for the future if even in the midst of this extreme gravity the Powers should stop to ponder over the Covenant analysing for vulnerable spots while Japan continues to challenge the whole structure of the peace machinery to consolidate her position in China. At the time of writing the League has accomplished nothing in the way of enlightening the situation.

It is hardly too pessimistic to say that the League has defeated its own purpose when pitted against a real problem. However, Japan's more recent atrocities in Shanghai and her unexpected military reverses have finally exposed to the world Japan's worth as a nation and as a power. It is these two factors more than anything else which contribute to check (temporarily at least) her aggressions in China. Little did she dream that the tide of world opinion could be turned against her so swiftly and systematically. Thus, we may say that it is the moral pressure of world opinion and not the enforcement of any peace document which extricates Japan from her dreams. If then we realize the impracticability of the peace documents we should immediately examine and reconsider them and readjust accordingly so as to render them more fool-proof, more decisive—incorporating the necessary moral and physical provisions using the present bitter experience as a basis to prevent future recurrence.

Japan may tell the world that she harbors no territorial designs in China. But the fact remains that she is steadily forging ahead according to her "positive policy" with the ultimate aim to be master of the Pacific and to defy the whole world. To follow her course she is employing the most vile measures in complete defiance of world-opinion, international laws and treaty stipulations. Her latest move is centred in Shanghai where she tyrannically displayed her impressive naval and military forces to uphold her super-salesmanship of "buy or die" policy. Her horrible savagery, wanton destruction of innocent Chinese life and property have at last failed to escape the foreign eye.

Undoubtedly Japan's headiness and defiance will deprive her for a long time to come of her hard-earned honor and respect. She has lost her military prestige in her recent engagements with the famous Chinese 19th Route Army and she is on the verge of a great financial crisis. Alas, what is there left to profit? Manchuria? Hardly. It is time for her to wake up and realize that however deadly her war machine is there is still a deadlier force

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of moral judgment, a force of reality which all her "Blood and Iron" could never overpower nor conquer.

On the other hand, while China has suffered and sacrificed beyond description she is steadily winning in principle. This struggle has tempered her national consciousness more than ever. It demonstrates that although she has been constantly divided into factions and laboring under unrest in her period of national transition as a republic, she is undoubtedly a unified country when it comes to defend herself against outside invasion.

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

The demands are divided into five groups dealing with:-

1. Japan's freedom to build railways and ports, open mines, etc., in Shanghai.
2. Extension to 99 years of lease on Fort Arthur, Dairen, the South Manchurian Railway, and the Antung-Mukden Railway; the management and control of the Kirin-Changchun Railway and other railways in Manchuria; and rights and special privileges of mining etc. in Manchuria.
3. The control of iron supply in Central China, and joint ownership of China's iron and steel works.
4. Restriction of China's right to lease territories and granting special privileges to countries other than Japan.
5. Employment of Japanese advisors in financial, political and military affairs.

Hioki, the Japanese Minister, said (Quoted by *Paul S. Reinsch* in American Diplomat in Peking) "The present crisis throughout the world virtually forces my government to take far-reaching action. When there is fire in a jeweler's shop, the neighbours cannot be expected to refrain from helping themselves".

"*L. Oppenheim*, in International Law, states: "Such treaties, concluded by Heads of States, or representatives authorized by these Heads, as violate constitutional restrictions, are not real treaties, and do not bind the State concerned, because its representatives have exceeded their power in concluding the treaties.

W. E. Hall, in A Treaty on International Law, writes: "Therefore, a treaty becomes voidable as soon as it is dangerous to the life of, or incompatible with the independence of the state."

WORLD OPINION

"Many of the best friends of Japan find it difficult to understand, and utterly impossible to defend, her action in Shanghai and the truculent attitude of her representative in Geneva".

Willis J. Abbott, Editor of the Christian Science Monitor.

"Every morning some nation issues Japan an ultimatum to quit fighting China, and every time she gets another ultimatum, she sends in another army".

Will Rogers.

LOSSES TO CIVILIZATION

[*Dr. Kiang's letter reproduced herein appeared in the Montreal Herald on February 16, 1932. Up to date Japan has not yet been able to explain her motive in the destruction of these two "treasures."*—Ed.]

To the Editor of The Herald.

Sir,—The recent Japanese attack on Chapei, the northern sector of the Greater Shanghai, aside from the wholesale destruction of Chinese private properties and the massacre of innocent civilians, women and children, has effected an even greater loss to China and to the world at large in the bombardment of the Commercial Press Company and the Oriental Library.

The Commercial Press Limited is a pure Chinese business concern and is known as the largest publishing house of the world today. It is the largest not in the sense of its capital which is less than ten million silver dollars, but in the size of its employment numbering fifteen thousand men and women and with an annual output of textbooks and other literary works of many million copies or volumes.

The Company has just celebrated its thirty-fifth year last Spring. All the shareholders, the chief officials, and the great majority of the workers are Chinese. The headquarters of its managing and editorial departments together with its main printing plant are on Paoshan Road, Chapei, while its sales department is in the foreign settlement in Shanghai Proper. The printing plant covers twenty acres of land in the most congested part of the city with its group of fourteen modern buildings. It consists of all working divisions related to the art of printing and bindery all done by up-to-date machinery imported chiefly from America and Germany. Along side with the Chinese more than one hundred foreign experts are employed including Japanese.

The Oriental Library was at first attached to the Commercial Press and was known as the Han Fen Lou Library. Ten years ago the Company, with the help of the local municipal government, provided a special fund, and erected a large modern building of six stories as its new home. The entire collection of the Han Fen Lou was then moved into its new premises and the Library was renamed with an elaborate opening ceremonial. Thenceforth the Library has been open to the public and has received many large donations of both official and private publications. It handles also the safe deposit of rare editions and manuscripts for the outsiders. This is the only fire-proof Library building in the whole of Shanghai and no doubt the largest public library in China under modern management. According to its last year's report, the Library has on its shelves, 360,000 volumes in Chinese, and 100,000 volumes in other languages. It contains 700 works of the early and rare Sung editions dating back to the tenth century and about 10,000 volumes of unpublished manuscripts.

Both these cultural centers were burnt down to the ground by the cannon fire of the first Japanese attack on Chapei. From news reports Chinese and English, we gather that the Commercial Press was ruthlessly destroyed first, on January 29th, and the Oriental Library, situated just across the street, was totally crushed the next morning, shortly before the Japanese were forced to retreat.

Being personally familiar with both these institutions, and knowing their

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cultural values, I, as a Chinese citizen and a College Professor, deeply lament this great, irreplaceable loss to China and to the world in the field of Chinese studies, and strongly protest against this act of barbaric vandalism especia-

ally from a nation which from the beginning of its history shares the glory of our civilization.

KIANG KANG-HU.
 Professor of Chinese Studies,
 McGill University, Montreal.

JAPAN'S AMBITION

By W. Y. WONG, Science '34, Queens University

To understand the recent crisis in Manchuria and Shanghai one must appreciate the historical relations between China and Japan of the past sixty years. Those relations give evidence to constant Japanese aggression, desire for territorial expansion, and the ultimate conquest of Asia and the Pacific.

Japan's Imperialistic policy inaugurated in 1868 brought her Formosa and control of Korea in 1895 as spoils of a war on China. Furthermore China was compelled to cede the Liaotung Peninsula in Southern Manchuria, to surrender Luichin and to pay a heavy war indemnity of more than one hundred million dollars. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 gave Japan all Russian concessions and rights in Southern Manchuria. Finally she annexed Korea in 1910.

During the following decade or so, China was busy with internal revolution and the overthrowing of the Manchu dynasty, the new republic being established in 1911. This developed a spirit of Nationalism among the Chinese, and Japan realized that as soon as the Chinese National spirit was well developed, her ambitious program would be thwarted. Therefore she acted quickly and at the psychological moment. China was in an unsettled condition, and the rest of the world was busy with the World War, and Japan presented to China her Twenty-One Demands with a powerful threat of military action should they be rejected. Yuan Shi Kai, then President of the New Chinese Republic, signed the treaty with Japan, but did so without the consent of the government. This caused the fall of his government. The Nationalist government, however, repudiated Yuan Shi Kai's action and refused to acknowledge the Twenty One Demands. If the terms of the treaty were to take effect Japan would virtually have complete control of China.

Japan's tactics following this were despicable and typical; she did her best to keep China's government unstable and the country in a chaotic condition by assisting first one faction then another to create dissension and internal warfare. Naturally as China became weaker Japan became relatively stronger and her aims were more likely of realization. She looked with greedy eyes on Manchuria and Mongolia, rich in timber and minerals and with vast agricultural potentialities. Here was a nearby source for raw materials. With such a base for supplies she could carry on her conquest. She realized that eventually she would have to resort to force to acquire this territory; so she proceeded to pave the way in order to make her final military conquest easier, and at the same time less startling to the World.

She attempted to colonize Manchuria with Japanese and Koreans. This soon proved to be a failure. The railways built by the Japanese were a means of connecting strategic military bases, and of procuring native products. They further hampered Chinese developments in Manchuria and Mongolia by gaining control of the currency system, through the establishment of the gold standard to defeat the Chinese silver basis. Finally the Japanese Government established a Colonial Department to look after their Manchurian and Mongolian projects, and expansion and development of Japanese interests.

Then comes Japan's master stroke of strategy, again at the most opportune moment; this time when the Western Nations are struggling under the most serious economic depression and China facing the greatest flood in her history. The Japanese claimed that some Chinese troops blew up a bridge on the South Manchurian Railway. Japan invaded Southern Manchuria supposedly to protect the lives and property of her nationals, on September 18, 1931. She occupied the principal commercial centres, but her pretext became evident to the rest of the world when her troops proceeded northward bombing and destroying Chinese industrial centres and slaughtering the Chinese civilians and stopped only when they had occupied the whole of Manchuria. Then under the military rule of Japan, a handful of Chinese who act as pawns in the game, set up a Republic. It is supposed to be an Independent Republic. That is, it is independent of China's wishes, but it will take a great deal to persuade the world to believe that it is independent of Japanese dominance. Korea was once an independent state too: now it is a part of the Japanese Empire. When will Manchuria be formally annexed? Having solidified her position in Manchuria, Japan will proceed to penetrate the remainder of the Chinese Republic, then the conquest of Asia and the Pacific, and finally the control of Europe and America. It sounds big, but Japan is in earnest and she always knows the psychological moment.

HIGH LIGHTS OF THE TANAKA MEMORIAL

[When Tanaka came to power in 1927, a memorial of over ten thousand words was presented to the Emperor of Japan, outlining his "positive" policy in Manchuria. Since then this memorial has been translated into different languages and distributed all over the world. The following is a synopsis published in the China Critic of Sept. 24, 1931.—Ed.]

1. For settling difficulties in Eastern Asia, Japan must adopt a policy of "Blood and Iron."
2. In order to conquer the world, Japan must conquer Europe and Asia; in order to conquer Europe and Asia Japan must conquer China, and in order to conquer China, Japan must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia, Japan expects to fulfil the above programme in ten years.
3. Japan regrets that she has signed the Nine-Power Treaty which was intended by England and America to crush her interests in Manchuria, for thereby she agrees that Manchuria and Mongolia are Chinese territory. This has greatly hampered the freedom of Japanese policy in Manchuria.
4. Japan believes wars in near future with U.S.A. and with Russia are inevitable, so in order to get militarily prepared, Japan must build the Kirin-Hweining and Changchun-Talai railways in Manchuria.

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5. The South Manchuria Railway Co., acts in Manchuria as the Governor-General in Korea. In order to blind the eyes of the world and forestall the disclosure of secrets at present, the Colonial office nominally controls affairs of Formosa, Korea, and Saghalian islands, only, while really it manages affairs of Manchuria.

6. Japan must take strong steps, on basis of Twenty-one demands, to secure priority for building railroads, right of timbering and exploiting 19 iron and coal mines in Fengtien.

7. Japan should spend yen 1,000,000 from "Secret Funds" of Army department in order to send 400 retired officers disguised as teachers and traders scientists, and Chinese citizens to Mongolia to influence the Mongolian princes to revolt against China.

8. Koreans should be utilized by Japan as vanguard for colonization of and as spearhead for penetration into Manchuria and Mongolia.

9. Taking advantage of the local disorder in Fengtien, Japan should manipulate the situation so that the Fengtien Bank notes will depreciate to zero, and the Yen will take its place.

10. Japan must enjoy monopoly of supplies of beans, bean cakes, timber, coal, iron, fur, wool and all other products of Manchuria and Mongolia and perfect control of transportation so that Chinese influence would be wiped out, and Europe and America, when in need of these supplies, would be at the mercy of Japan.

WORLD OPINION

"If the Japanese armies can, with complete success, defy the League or if there appears some demonstrable impotence of the Council of the League in dealing with such a situation, it is not only a setback to the League but a world calamity of the first order. It looks as if the general feeling of the nations of Europe indicated that our civilization has not got the will or vitality to maintain those great covenants of peace on which our very continuance depends".

Professor Gilbert Murray.

"China always loses in the field and conquers in the end. In its vastness and fecundity it swallows up the invader. The military adventurer, be he Manchu or Japanese, falls at least into the greatest melting pot the world has ever known. China has outlived all the Empires.

Heywood Brown, actor, columnist, and socialist.

"Every Christian nation on the face of the earth should once join hand and muskets to deliver China from the yoke of Japan".

J. J. Curran, friend of the late Theodore Roosevelt in a wire to president Hoover of the United States.

"The world is going back to its 1914 status. Japan has run amuck, has defied the public opinion of the world, violated treaty obligations and employed violence in a fashion more wanton than anything witnessed in the World War. And, most tragic of all, Japan has got away with it".

Stanley High, former Editor of the Christian Herald.

"Japan is holding a blackjack over China's head, while China is tottering".

Arthur Brisbane.

A FEW QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT

By S KWAK

- I. THE QUESTION OF OVERPOPULATION.
- II. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND CHINA.
- III. THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.
- IV. THE JAPANESE ARMY IN MANCHURIA.
- V. JAPANESE CONQUEST OF CHINA (?).
- VI. THE CHINESE BOYCOTT.
- VII. CHINA AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

1. THE QUESTION OF OVERPOPULATION

When it comes to figures and calculations, most of us are too prone to take things for granted and to pass the information unscrutinised to others. Unconsciously we mislead people as well as fool ourselves.

Overpopulation has been given by the Japanese and students of economics, perhaps quite sincerely, as the basic reason of Japan's aggressive policy. Some see the present situation as the outcome of the struggle for existence due to over population. The stiff immigration laws of both the United States and Canada have debarred the entrance of this prolific people, and Australia and the Philippine Islands do not welcome them. Yet they have to live, and everyone has the right to live. Manchuria, then, provides the only outlet for her 750,000 surplus babies every year.

The situation is really not so bad as it first appears or has been painted. The density of population in the Japanese Islands is 428 per square mile. It is high, so we are told. But what about the population of the British Isles, which is placed at 468 per square mile? It may be of interest also to note that the density of Belgium population is 674 per square mile. These figures are based upon statements given in the World Almanac of 1931. If figures mean anything at all, the world should not be misled any longer.

When we include Korea, Formosa, and Sakhalin in our calculation, the density in the Japanese Empire is 333 per square mile, which is over 10 and 13 less than that of Italy and Germany respectively. If this even distribution is attained, which we believe to be an easy matter under the astute Japanese Government, the Japanese Empire is not half as crowded as Belgium.

After over 40 years of unrestricted exploitation of Manchuria, where the Japanese can settle as freely as in their homeland, the Japanese population in Manchuria is still below the meagre number of 280,000, as compared to two millions of Russians and thirty-one millions of Chinese, who have migrated there during the same period of time. According to reliable authority, of all employed in the different Japanese enterprises in Manchuria, more than 93% of agricultural labor, more than 70% of fisherman, 96% of miners, and 88% of factory workers are Chinese. The Japanese, with the Russians and Koreans, comprise the remainder. In these places, the Japanese undoubtedly enjoy the greatest preference. Manchuria is 2½ times as big as Japan, yet to every Japanese in Manchuria there are 260 in Japan. Similar state of affairs exists in Korea. Japanese population there is barely 400,000, the density of population being 231 per square mile, considerably lower than that of Japan. If the

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annexation of Korea has not solved the problem, the annexation of Manchuria will afford no better solution, and we have to look for another reason for her imperialistic policy.

II. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND CHINA

To the Chinese people who know mournfully little about the League of Nations, and who are inclined to be more or less idealistic in their political vision, it is the attitude of the League and not that of the Japanese that is evasive. At first, it ordered evacuation on a set date. Long after the date was overdue, a note of milder tone was issued. No result was produced. Another note was delivered, and so on. Each time, not only Japan ignored her promise, but Geneva preferred to forget entirely its previous order.

At the very beginning, China entrusted the whole matter to the hands of the League. After so many months of deliberation without result, her people are fast losing faith in this organ of peace. With this the League loses the support of at least half of the population of the world, and the entire backing of the East; for from Japan, who knows too well how the League stands, and who have derisively demonstrated to the world how it can be bantered with impunity, little faith can be expected; from India, which has never enjoyed a tithe of its benefit, her support is naturally not forthcoming; and finally Russia, who never believed in its usefulness, can scarcely be counted on as its supporter.

On the other hand the failure of the League to provide a satisfactory solution for the present conflict will have a very far-reaching effect. What will become of the disarmament conference, chalked down as the great event of the year? No nation will cast a vote on any proposed program without first pausing for a moment on the prosperity, happiness, well-being and dignity that will attend a disarmed state of which China is a living example. Of course, there is no doubt that the congenial air and harmonious atmosphere of the meeting will not be disturbed. Pacts will be signed as cheerfully as during the Washington Conference. But what then? What will become of these solemn words of promise, say 10 or 15 years from now? Will every nation do what she has promised? In other words, can the League still command the respect and hold the faith of the nations—even that amount of respect and faith with which the Chinese delegates have lodged their protest at the beginning of the conflict?

The Chinese National Government throughout this crisis has braved the popular sentiments and wish by adhering to its original policy of only seeking the aid of the League. Its precarious position is comparable to that of a maiden who has trusted a wrong man. Its fate is evident. What practical lesson will this teach any serious-minded government that is seeking the welfare of its people?

III. THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The most ardent and perhaps the most sincere promoters of the disarmament conference are curiously the nations who are best armed. Whether the real motive is sportsmanship, whereby those who are lagging behind in war equipment are given a chance to catch up; or just the opposite, so that the oppressed of the moment will be more or less permanently incapacitated to contemplate rebellion, revolution or war; or still it has something to do with a state of mental cowardice, a fear to endure the sufferings that the recent acquisitions of scientific warfare may some day inflict upon them; is a question

only of academic import. But the fact is that peace is only a password and not the motive. Who can enjoy peace if he is unequally treated and unjustly handled? There is not a single person of average mentality that will not forsake his prosperity and if necessary, lay down his life to fight for the security of these two attributes which he possesses by natural right. After all to strike back and to defend oneself is human nature. It is agreed by all that the Great War would not have been half as horrible, both in its results and in its methods, had not the combatants been lured into the delusion that each was fighting for equality and justice. As long as equality and justice have to be fought for, talking about peace and disarmament is but a display of human inconsistency or even hypocrisy.

Unless all nations are placed upon or have attained the same footing and unless equality and justice have been accorded to all through channels other than war, the conference is bound to fail in spirit. When the unequal treaties are abrogated and all rights unjustly acquired are retroceded, we are convinced that the world possesses the will, the sincerity and the means to disarm.

On the other hand, how far will the conferences, the pacts, and the covenants bring us? The stronger nations have learned that they are cumbersome, and the weaker ones, useless. It stands to reason that a race or nation that does not respect the right of another can hardly be expected to respect her words and promises, solemnly uttered as they may be; and when a nation or race does respect the right of another, her words are not needed as a guarantee.

The problem before the world today is neither to see who is wrong and who is right—this is always, evident—nor to decide the appropriate punishment of the offending nation, but to inflict the punishment. If all nations are self-respecting and sincere enough as to back up the principles in which they have professed their faith in spite of everything else, war will soon be a thing of the past. No nation, no matter how strong, can stand the opposition of all the rest of the nations, be that opposition in the form of an open war, economic blockade or embargo. Who will dare to start a war?

We see no other way out of our present world situation. India is struggling for self government, China is embroiled with Japan and every other nation has her own fears and suspicions. War in one corner or another will sooner or later break out. Suppression may delay it but will never prevent it. To a people to whom the difference of justice and equality and their deprivation does not warrant a sacrifice in life and property, war of course is an impossibility. But how many such races or nations are in existence?

We do not advocate war for we agree whole-heartedly with the supporters of the disarmament movements that it is unjust and unequal. The triad—sincerity, justice and equality—upon which alone peace can be built, is still wanting. We are afraid that war can not be abolished during the present generation and that we, in keeping with the time, will not hesitate to march into line if by so doing we can be sure of equality and justice.

IV. THE JAPANESE ARMY IN MANCHURIA

The atrocities of the Japanese troops are well known. From the point of view of humanity alone, the Japanese self-imposed ministry in Manchuria and cities under Japanese Military influence, is replete with incidents of barbarism. Whatever alleged benefit the Japanese material exploitation may have brought to Manchuria, it fails to expiate a fraction of what their soldiers have committed.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In May 1928, China called the attention of the league of Nations to an outrage, the very brutality of which had appalled all and made many suspect its authenticity! Geneva turned a deaf ear to this. However, all the Chinese papers were unanimous in presenting a most terrifying picture.

A band of Japanese soldiers broke into the office of the Chinese Foreign Affairs Commissioner in Tsinan after the city was occupied by the Japanese under the usual pretext of protecting Japanese lives. The nose and ears of the Commissioner were mutilated before he was put to death with a score of his assistants. One of his servants escaped the fate and thus the story was told. Another band broke into the Red Cross Hospital and murdered all the defenceless, wounded and sick, sheltered within. The story was testified by observers of a third nationality, who found bandages on the bodies of the victims. A nation-wide boycott which lasted for months was the retaliation instituted by the Chinese, whose government was too weak to exert pressure on its protests and demands.

Shooting of innocent and defenceless farmers and violation of their wives and daughters are too common to excite much diplomatic concern. Scarcely a day goes by without adding to the list of their crimes. Everyone shot was a "bandit" and that dispensed them from the necessity of presenting an explanation to the local Chinese authority. We are told that one Chinese farmer was made to drink kerosene and allowed to die of its effect, to soothe the grievance of a Japanese soldier. The Wanpaochan incident is among the recent outrages that can be mentioned. The interference of the local Chinese soldiers and police who have, through thirty years of painful experiences learnt to be reticent, was out of the question. The Japanese were only too anxious to fight and the slightest provocation would precipitate a skirmish, the consequences of which the Chinese were not prepared to assume. They were too costly. With over 100,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria, just before the present crisis, each a despot among a people to whom they are attached neither by blood nor through common interest, the sufferings of the civilians can well be imagined.

The presence of a foreign army regardless of its mission, over which the local functions of justice have no jurisdiction, is highly undesirable and is bound to bring about unhappy occurrences. We do not doubt for a moment the high quality of the Japanese troops as far as their military training is concerned. It is graceful to say that this huge horde of soldiers who otherwise would go to increase the number of unemployed in Japan, is maintained with funds from Tokyo. We do not want to trouble ourselves to cast any shadow of reasoned doubt on this statement. Suffice to say in passing that the maintaining of over 10,000 troops for the sole purpose of protecting Japanese lives which never have exceeded 280,000 is hardly laudable, both financially and practically to the shrewd mind of the Japanese Cabinet. It should be borne in mind, on the other hand, that to keep an army for any length of time is not the same as to keep a herd of cattle. The soldiers have to be kept constantly in good humor, and this can only be done at the expense of the people among whom they are stationed. It is a recognized fact that an army bent on conquest, or during an imperialistic sojourn, will degenerate, if the stubborn, impetuous and militaristic passions give way to the better and finer feelings of humanity. That the culprits to whose misbehaviour only the Chinese are victims, should be dealt with the greatest possible indulgence, is a point of military necessity. After all, to the Japanese officials, who are the only authority in the practical sense, Tokyo has no instruction that lives and properties of the Chinese should be respected.

So, the situation in Manchuria, up to the present crisis, presents one of the gravest pictures of civilization—an ultra-militaristic army in the midst of a defenseless people. The power is abused. There is no restraint on their demeanor. The limit of their satisfaction in dealings with the civilian is the limit of their action. Resistance is worse than hopeless. Hurried by opposition, their passions might overstep the bounds of mere satisfaction. And what is worse! With the awakening of nationalism, the people in Manchuria as well as in the rest of China, begin to show less and less tolerance for injustice. The problem is more than a religious or pious abstraction; for why can it not be one of the reasons of the present conflict?

V. JAPANESE CONQUEST OF CHINA (?)

A prominent Chinese in Canada recently surprised us with a bold statement that 75 years after the conquest of China by Japan, China would conquer and absorb her conqueror. In the past, China was repeatedly invaded by the then outsiders, the Mongols, in 1277 and the Manchus in 1644, for instance. These races, in face of the advanced state of Chinese civilization, both materialistic and cultural, during these unfortunate periods, were regarded as semi-barbarous tribes, who had sporadically risen to power through sheer physical force. Instead of the Chinese taking after their fashion, they were one by one absorbed in the Great Civilization. Upon this fact the belief has been anachronously derived that history will repeat itself, as it has done so many times. We take exception to this view. In the first place, conquest of China in the near future by any nation is not a possibility. And in second place the state of Japan does not admit any comparison with that of those invading tribes. Japan is not behind China in civilization, though it is to the Chinese that they owe their cultural background. And we cannot, for a moment, conceal from ourselves the fact that Japan's material development and physical adaptation are next to none. In Korea, we see clearly what Japan can do to her vassal state. After over twenty years of Japanese yoke, the fate of Korea seems to be doomed forever, and the time of emancipation, at first sympathetically awaited, seems to be receding rather than approaching.

Up to some thirty years ago, the Emperor of the Celestial Empire was supposed to rule by divine right. From time immemorial, China was obsessed with the belief that she was the center of the world with four seas as her boundary. That there were other peoples beyond the seas was never allowed. During this self-contained and "closed door" stage, it was natural to assume that the world was for China only and that the fate of China was the fate of the world. Since then we have paid a great price to learn that this is not the case. Therefore, we deplore very much that such superannuated ideas and puerile delusion are still in evidence. One cannot blame those whose mental outlook is limited by their physical vision. But there is absolutely no virtue in clinging to an obsolete and false idea for no better reason than conceit. To knowingly take the road of self-destruction is bad enough, but to dissimulate at the same time that he is going to a paradise, is a worse crime than suicide.

We also dare not subscribe our faith to the fatalistic philosophy of looking into the dim future for consolation, which is separated by a dangerous distance of 75 years.

VI. THE CHINESE BOYCOTT

Armed resistance is no longer the only means of reprisal. India has found expression of her national consciousness in "civil disobedience." When

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China first resorted to boycott against Japan, she had located a vulnerable spot in the Japanese aggressive policy.

After over twenty-five years of experience, the Chinese have forged it into the most effective weapon of defence as well as offence. When the Japanese authority demanded the cessation of the boycott in Shanghai, Japan decided to face the bleak truth that the boycott had hit her hard and yet at the same time she could not deny the indisputable right of a people to buy what they pleased. After all a loss of few hundred million dollars in trade which entails a proportionate reduction in national revenue is not conducive to the successful outcome of an expedition to conquer China or even Manchuria. This the Japanese Government should have foreseen at the beginning.

In former years when occasional Chinese boycotts were only an expression of convulsive bursts of popular resentment against Japanese outrages, Japan's trade with China represented one-third of her total. Her exports to China consisted mostly of manufactured goods, while that to other countries were largely raw materials. To the Chinese, then, the Japanese owed part of the success of their industry. Now the boycott has been enlarged by ten times. It has deprived the Japanese of raw material, prevented travel and freight on Japanese vessels, forbidden banking transactions, employment of Japanese nationals, the purchase, sale, transportation and even consumption of Japanese goods, etc., etc. The closing down of several mills and factories in Japan in recent months should be wisely taken as a sign of warning. Japan ought to realize that the continuance of her policy in China will mean the permanent loss of 400,000,000 customers who for many years have been willing to accept her straw hats that are made of paper, pencils that carry only half an inch of lead, etc., and that it is cupidity that destroys the goose that lays the golden eggs.

China as a republic has just past its teens. Her own citizens are just beginning to guide her destiny. To them the big demonstrations, mass meetings, and the bonfires on the school campus fed with Japanese straw hats, umbrellas, etc., are treasured memories. The national humiliation days are also their constant reminders. And more recently, the Wanpaochan incident, the Korean massacre and the bombing of Chapei which is strewn with their dead nationals are events which the growing generation is not ready to relegate to the limbo of oblivion. To them, to boycott the Japanese will not be a burden of patriotism, but a sacred duty which they will obey to the letter.

VII. CHINA AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION

There is little doubt that Japan has broken the treaties and the League covenant. But has it ever occurred to any that other members of the League have also violated the Article XVI of the League covenant, which reads, "should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, etc. -"? Have these been carried out? That this has been invoked against Japan only is quite beyond any person who knows enough English to comprehend the meaning of the Article. No wonder "Japan fails to understand why the appeal was addressed to Japan alone".

After the bombardment of Shanghai, the *laissez faire* attitude of the Powers in the conflict was explicitly stated in their recent notes to Japan and China, which the high Government Officials of the United States preferred to call "simply the extension of good offices," rather than to be considered "in any sense a demand or threat." They did not ask for any regard for the lives of the defenceless. The International Settlements on which hinged the interest of the Powers in the East, was not to be touched and their respective nationals, not to be molested. It was solely a matter between Japan and China, if Japan resorted to the extreme of incendiarism and vandalism. She was virtually assured that no power would interfere with her schemes, as long as she did not overstep her recognized rights in the Settlement.

Once more it has become clear to the Chinese that the only source of justice comes from stubborn resistance which she can muster from the corners of her own country. This is the sad truth. Thus, while the Chinese representatives are laboring nobly for a just end and while the newspapers may give the best prominence to any statement of a third nation and magnify a friendly advice to a protest, a protest to a demand and a demand to a threat, these notes of whatever nature fail to excite the enthusiasm of that part of the Chinese public which has better sense and self-respect.

History has borne out the fact that as far as foreign protection or intervention is concerned, United States, Great Britain, Russia, or any other country is just as undesirable as Japan. Protection from any foreign country has one thing in common - it makes self-protection at first unnecessary and later impossible. Japan's interest in Manchuria had protected the latter from Russian invasion and vice versa. But what has become of Manchuria? A nation's own worth is its strength and upon that alone its existence depends. While foreign help may be necessary to tide over crisis, it is too apt, in the end, to defeat the very purpose for which it is asked.

PRESS OPINION

"Rather than see Japanese militarism trample on China, just when the most enlightened Chinese are striving hard to get their country on a sound basis, the United States and other Western countries should resolutely back their views by withdrawing their diplomatic representatives from Tokyo, perhaps ever declaring an economic boycott to reinforce the Chinese Boycott."—*Albany Knickerbocker Press*.

"They can, however, make things decidedly unpleasant diplomatically and commercially for Japan or any other nation wilfully bringing down upon itself the wrath of a world still bleeding with wounds of the last Great War."—*St. Louis Post Dispatch*.

"Japan's idea of how to break down sales resistance and make business good is to shoot the ultimate consumer."—*The New Yorker*.

"Japan asks the Powers to restrain the military impetuosity of the Chinese. Did anyone say the Japanese have no sense of humor?"—*Boston Globe*.

"That Tokio has signified its willingness to share the loot with other countries, does not make its projected crime any more justifiable or excusable. Clearly the Japanese have taken this attitude only because they have suddenly discovered that the Shanghai situation is more than they can handle alone."—*The Nation*.

SCRAPS OF PAPER?

[At different times Japan's attention has been called to the following paragraphs of the two peace pacts and of the Covenant of the League of Nations. She solemnly signed them. Now she has treated them as mere scraps of paper. Yet how many have violated them through acts of omission?—Ed.]

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ARTICLE 10. The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE 16. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

NINE POWER WASHINGTON TREATY

ARTICLE 1. The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:—(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

THE PACT OF PARIS

ARTICLE 1. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relation with one another.

ARTICLE 2. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be except by pacific means.

PRESS OPINION

"But in so far as this means that Japan violated her treaty obligations under the covenant of the League of Nations, it was of vital importance to this country that we should not connive at Japanese aggression, for peace is the first objective of British policy abroad, and the League of Nations, acting through the covenant, is the only hope to make a peace policy effective".

Manchester Guardian.

"Members of the Nine-Power Treaty group may request Japan please to make a solemn promise to stop breaking the solemn promise it made 10 years ago."

San Diego Union.

"The plain fact is that, if we accept the ordinary meaning of words, Japan has been at war with China for five months. The open statement of this fact may be particularly embarrassing just now, but it is the fact itself, with its new threat to the center of Chinese trade and of foreign interests in China, which is the real embarrassment."

The Bulletin.

"Whatever justification there may have been for Japanese action in Manchuria, there is no valid excuse for the length to which the situation has been carried at Shanghai. What the Japanese expects to gain is far from clear, unless they believe that punishing the Chinese will break up the anti-Japanese boycott. It is by no means certain that this result will follow, and the Japanese are slowly but surely forfeiting the confidence and sympathy of the rest of the world. If they are unaware of this fact now, they will find it out when the inevitable day of reckoning comes".

Philadelphia Ledger.

"The apparent helplessness of the outside Powers in the case of Manchuria encouraged Japan to undertake a most daring coup by striking at Shanghai. A little boldness on the part of America and Europe while Japan was testing their patience in Manchuria would probably have averted this Shanghai gesture. But the League did nothing but protest and the United States made the fatal mistake of "bluffing" and then withdrawing. So Japan felt safe in teaching the peaceful Chinese a lesson in their great trading center. The trouble now is, however, that the scholar has turned defiant. The Chinese, finding no help in the West, have decided to help themselves."

Montreal Star.

"When a hostile force lands in a foreign country, drops bombs from airplanes on a city crowded with civilians, sets fires and goes through the streets shooting rifles and machine guns, it is difficult for persons with civilized dispositions to keep their heads. Yet, discounting as far as we may the flara of indignation which behaviour of this kind is bound to arouse, our considered opinion is that Japan, by her acts in Manchuria, Shanghai, and other parts of China, is guilty of aggression, of violating solemn treaties and promises, in a sense far more clear and less likely to be revised by subsequent judgement of historians than was Germany when she invaded Belgium in 1914".

The New Republic.

"The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the Japanese Government is either overpowered by a war machine that is running amuck or deliberately pursuing a war policy of unparalleled audacity, with a curious inability to justify its course by any standard of right or law."

Washington Post.

"It is time Japan face facts and international responsibilities after four and one half month's militaristic spree. There has been enough diplomatic falsifying and splitting hairs. The Japanese armed force has dragged Japan into a wholly untenable position vis-a-vis China and has jeopardized the safety and rights of all Powers concerned. That's the fundamental fact of the present case. All the Japanese explanations in the world can't alter it."

Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury (American owned).

"We certainly do not want the war continued we want it stopped at once; but we nevertheless must recognize that a state of war exists and that Japan began the war."

The Nation.

"When the story of this crime against humanity is more fully told, it must surely shock the world. The greatest city in the Far East, hitherto described as the outstanding example of Western enterprise in China, has been turned into a horrible trap for defenceless people. As surely as the frightfulness at Shanghai is allowed to go on without arousing the civilized world to protest, it will be repeated over other cities—eventually over the cities on this side of the Pacific Ocean."

Ottawa Evening Citizen.

"There is no longer any virtue in clinging to confidence in either the motive or the good faith of Japan in her dealings with China. Contrary to the terms of treaties solemnly ratified during recent years and pledge given to organized world society during the last four months, Japan has made war upon a fellow member of the League of Nations, civilization must deal with her promptly and effectively or future generations be doomed to go through ordeals beside which the Great War was child's play." *Toronto Star.*

"What is now clear is the fact that Japan's diplomatic and military objectives are one and the same. The Empire is acting as a unit, in spite of the protestations of its representatives. Japan entered upon an adventure last September whose sequels no one can foresee, but with each act of aggression the resistance of Japan increases and consolidates. The Empire may have a secret ally, or perhaps two; but it courts disaster, nevertheless, by antagonising nations to which it has given its pledge to respect the territory and independence of China".

Washington Post.

"Since the days of Grotius no single nation has violated so many established principles to regulate international relationship as Japan has done in the past four months."

"While Japan is trespassing on Chinese territory and interfering with China's independence, she's daily establishing new principles of international law."

China Press. (American owned)

"Just as the United States Marines never fight against Nicaraguan patriots but only against Nicaraguan "bandits", so the Japanese militarists classify all Chinese who are not pro-Japanese as bandits and irregular."

The World Tomorrow.

"Powers again warn Japan to be careful," says a headline. The full text was probably, 'If you can't be good, be careful'."

Ottawa Evening Citizen.

"Japan knows all that and goes blithely ahead with her preparations to annex Manchuria, while the rest of the world is busy pitying itself".

The Standard, Montreal.

"The bombing of residential sections, the murder of helpless men, women and children puts Japan beyond the pale of civilized warfare."

Philadelphia Inquirer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 892.01 Manchuria/148 FOR Tel. # 461, 11 am

FROM China (Perkins) DATED April 23, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1137 ***

REGARDING: Many foreign and Chinese refugees from the
eastern line have reached Harbin in a pitiful
condition and with shocking reports.

hs

793.94/5093

3441

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WP

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated April 23, 1932

Rec'd 2:00 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

461, April 23, 11 a. m.

Following from American Consul General, Harbin:

"April 22, 10 a. m.

One. Train service on the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway stopped since yesterday because of break in line between Imienpo and Weishaho. Railway management is receiving no communications from points east of Imienpo which has caused the belief that fighting is occurring near this place between old Kirin troops and Japanese forces, two echolons of which left Harbin yesterday.

Two. Many foreign and Chinese refugees from the eastern line have reached Harbin in a pitiful condition and with shocking reports."

For the Minister.

PERKINS

OIB WP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Apr. 25, 1932.

~~SECRET~~

I see no need of any action on our part.

Lampson and Johnson are trying to persuade the Chinese and Japanese to accept another formula (to which I see no objection on our part) and if it is accepted, the way is clear for the signing of the agreement.


JEJ

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
 500.0111
 793.94111
 893.0146

MET

FROM Shanghai

A portion of this telegram
 must be closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone.

Dated April 23, 1932

Rec'd 7:27

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 24 1932

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington

April 23, 2 p.m. (GRAY)

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY. Department's
147, April 20, 6 p.m.; my April 21, 2 p.m. from Shanghai
 and Department's 149, April 22, 5 p.m. (END GRAY)

One. Identic message communicated to the Secretary
 from Shanghai, April 19, 3 p.m., in so far as it related
 to responsibility of Mixed Commission was in line with
 views of Lampson and myself though in conversation with
 him on Monday, April 18, prior to my departure for Nanking
 and before we knew that our opinion was to be asked, it
 had from the first been our intention to put our respective
 Consuls General upon this Commission as our personal repre-
 sentatives and we felt that in view of all of the conditions
 here we did not wish to impose upon them or their colleague
 serving on this Commission the responsibility of deciding
 which conditions at Shanghai would permit of the withdrawal
 of the Japanese forces. It was our feeling that the last

paragraph

F/LS 793.94/5094

FILED

APR 28 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Shanghai, April 23, 2 p.m.

paragraph of annex four of the draft agreement gives sufficient latitude and discretion to the Commission to enable it to do even that if it so desired but the Commission was free and could not be forced by the Chinese to accept such a responsibility.

Two. I have complete text of draft resolution in fourteen paragraphs as supplied to me by Lampson.

Three. I returned to Shanghai yesterday and saw Lampson at 4:30. He had just been to see the Japanese Minister. The latter informed Lampson that paragraph eleven was unacceptable to the Japanese Government as it objected to any third party being given even by implication the power to decide when Japanese troops should be evacuated from Shanghai. Objection was made specifically to the words "competence to declare". In the course of the conversation which ensued Lampson and Shigemitsu examined annex four of the draft agreement and Shigemitsu pointed out that the last paragraph appeared to authorize the Commission to perform the function which the League desired. Lampson then suggested adding the following

words

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MET

3-from Shanghai, April 23, 2 pm.

words to the second paragraph of annex four in order to clarify this matter: "and is authorized to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three articles mentioned above". Shigemitsu gave Lampson his word that he would support agreement conformable with his government if we could get the Chinese Government to accept it in lieu of the phraseology of paragraph eleven of the resolution.

Four. I suggested to Lampson that we get Quo in and put the matter before him. Quo came and after some discussion in the course of which we pointed out to him that the second paragraph of annex four of the draft agreement thus amended seemed to us to be just as satisfactory as the phraseology of paragraph eleven. The Japanese after all merely named the Commission to certify to certain facts but did not thereby impose any obligation on the Japanese Government to act in accordance with the facts so certified. He stated that he was prepared to urge its acceptance upon the Chinese Government. Quo and Lampson left last night by steamer for Nanking and will be there tomorrow morning. They plan to return to Shanghai on
Monday

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

4- from Shanghai

Monday April 25th, by air. While in Nanking they will endeavor to persuade Chinese to accept this amendment in lieu of paragraph eleven and if successful will notify me by telegraph and I promised to urge Shigemitsu to take the matter up with his Government.

Five. This has all been communicated to the British Foreign Secretary by Lampson with the additional suggestion that paragraph eleven of the draft resolution be amended by dropping all of the words beginning "competence to declare" to the end of the paragraph and substituting therefor "authority to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the articles mentioned above".

Six. Repeated to Geneva.

RR. WFD

JOHNSON

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 25 1932
 Department of State

FE

MET

A portion of this telegram ^{FROM}
 must be closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone.

Geneva

Dated April 23, 1932

Rec'd 11:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

88, April 23, 2 p.m.

(GRAY) FOR HORNBECK FROM KLOTZ.

Your 54, April 22, 5 p.m.

No reason at all. Thought text of Shanghai's April 19,
 3 p.m. had already been sent. Text is as follows:

"April 19, 3 p.m. FOR THE SECRETARY.

Your April 18, 11 p.m. At a meeting this noon of the
 representatives of the four interested powers it was agreed
 to send the following identic replies to the inquiries
 received from our respective Governments.

"We consider that there is no objection to provision
 that Joint Commission should follow progress of local con-
 ditions in the Shanghai area and that its neutral members
 should send reports thereon from time to time/or if either
 side prefers to our respective governments. Provision has
 already been agreed to (see last paragraph of annex 4 of

draft

793.94/5095

APR 27 1932

FILED

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#88 from Geneva, April 23, 2 pm.

draft agreement) that 'Commission will in accordance with its instructions watch in such manner as it deems best carrying out of Articles one, two and three of agreement'. We feel that Commission and its neutral members should not be asked to assume greater responsibility than the above. Such reports should supply sufficient indication of the views of the neutral members of the Joint Commission as to local conditions. Point might be met by addition to proposed resolution of words to the effect that the Committee of nineteen recommends that the Joint Commission to be established under the agreement should follow the progress of local conditions and that its members, representing the participating friendly powers, should accordingly send reports from time to time to Geneva or to their respective Governments.

(reply)

The above is our report to specific questions raised in your inquiry but seen from this end it will be wiser if not too late to adhere to our original proposal (see last paragraph of identic telegram of April 13).

Your

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#88 from Geneva, April 23, 2 pm.

Your April 18, 11 a.m., and this reply are being repeated to Mr. Johnson in Nanking. (END GRAY)

CONFIDENTIAL. Sir Miles stated that Shigemitsu intimated to him the Japanese would prefer it if any reports which the neutral members may have occasion to make were addressed to their respective governments rather than to the League.

(GRAY) Department has not (repeat not) been informed. For the Minister, Engert".

WILSON

KLP-HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 493.11 Shanghai/22 FOR Tel#462 noon

FROM China (Perkins) DATED April 23, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Claims. Legation assumes that Department will instruct Con-
sulate at Shanghai and Legation as to the presentation of --
Claims arising out of Japanese-Chinese hostilities at
Shanghai.

793.94/5096

0450
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

man

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated April 23, 1932

Rec'd 4:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

462, April 23, noon.

Referring to Consul General Cunningham's April 19, 10 a.m., to the Legation, copy of which was repeated to the Department by Shanghai concerning claims for destruction of American property at Shanghai, Legation assumes that Department will instruct Cunningham and requests that copy of instructions be forwarded the Legation.

For the Minister

CIB KLP

PERKINS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1446

Peiping, March 22, 1932.

Subject: Memorandum of conversation,
 Dr. Hsu Mo-Mr. Peck,
 March 9, 1932.



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

Referring to previous correspondence concerning
 1/ the Shanghai incident, I have the honor to enclose a
 a copy of a memorandum of a conversation Consul General
 Peck had at Nanking on March 7, 1932, with Dr. Hsu Mo,
 Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. As the Department
 will observe, during the conversation Dr. Hsu Mo re-
 requested Mr. Peck to communicate to the American Minis-
 ter, for the information of the Department, the hope of
 the Chinese Government that the United States will as-
 sist China against any attempt by Japan to enlarge the
 scope of the "negotiations" provided for in Article

III

F/LS 793.94/5097

MAY 12 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

III of the resolution passed by the Assembly of the League of Nations on March 4, or to exploit in any way the recent military operations in Shanghai.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Mahlon F. Perkins

MAHLON F. PERKINS,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum of conversation, March 9, 1932.

800

LHE/GL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Nanking, China,

March 9, 1932.

Dear Mr. Minister:

I beg leave to enclose herewith a memorandum of the conversation with Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Hsu Mo, held on March 7, 1932, which formed the basis of my telegram sent to you on the afternoon of that day. The telegram transmitted the request of the Chinese Government that the American Government assist the Chinese Government to withstand any attempt on the part of the Japanese Government to enlarge the scope of the "negotiations" set forth in Article 3 of the resolution passed by the Assembly of the League of Nations on March 4, or to exploit in any way the recent military operations in Shanghai.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
 Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure: Memorandum dated
 March 7, 1932.

Five copies to the American Minister.
 No copies to the American Legation or
 the Department of State.

Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Shanghai.

WRF/b

3 4 5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

March 7, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy
at Shanghai.

Dr. Hsu Mo, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Peck, Counselor of Legation.

Dr. Hsu Mo asked Mr. Peck to call on him at four o'clock.

Dr. Hsu Mo asked Mr. Peck whether he had any information in regard to the progress of events at Shanghai. Mr. Peck replied that he was kept currently informed in regard to hostilities, etc., but that the American Minister did not supply him with information in regard to such matters as negotiations.

Dr. Hsu Mo recalled that the Assembly of the League of Nations had passed a resolution, consisting of three articles, on March 4, 1932, and he asked whether Mr. Peck had seen the text of the resolutions. Mr. Peck said he had seen the text as published in the news service furnished by REUTERS. Dr. Hsu Mo said that this text was reliable and he recalled that REUTERS had also published the substance of two reservations made by the Chinese delegate, Dr. Yen, in accepting the resolution. These reservations were that the "negotiations" referred to in Article 3 of the resolution should be concerned only with an armistice or the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, excluding all other subjects, and that the withdrawal of the Japanese forces should not be made subject to any condition whatsoever. Dr. Hsu Mo said that the position thus taken by Dr. Yen was the position of the Chinese Government.

Dr.

1

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Dr. Hsu Mo said that it was clear to everyone that the Chinese troops were now actually far outside the radius of twenty kilometers from Shanghai which the Japanese had stipulated in their demands, whereas the Japanese forces had likewise passed beyond that line and were still pressing the Chinese troops. He said that thus there was actually no need of any negotiations as a preliminary to the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, but since Dr. Yen had agreed to negotiations between Chinese and Japanese representatives in the presence of representatives of the Powers interested, the Chinese Government would not object to the holding of such negotiations. However, Dr. Hsu Mo said, the Chinese Government was unshakable in its position that the negotiations should be confined strictly to the military subject of the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, for the Government would not consent to the discussion of any political subject while Japanese troops were still in invaded territory, as though China had been defeated and were negotiating with a conqueror. Moreover, as Dr. Yen had said, China would consent to no conditions for the withdrawal of Japanese forces.

Dr. Hsu Mo asked Mr. Peck what he thought the situation would be if the Japanese forces should remain in the area now occupied by them, and should refuse to withdraw. Mr. Peck was non-committal and Dr. Hsu Mo answered his own question by saying that such a situation would imperil the peace of the whole Yangtze Valley and that the interests of all foreign nations would suffer with those of China. Dr. Hsu Mo said that it seemed clear to the Chinese Government that Japan wished to exploit the result of the

military

- 3 -

military operations at Shanghai and the Government felt that Japan was trying to enlist the support of some other nation or nations in such a policy. Japan might not, for example, go so far as to demand a Japanese Settlement at Shanghai, but she might demand other things which, although ostensibly for the advantage of all nations, would in reality inure to the advantage, principally if not solely, of Japan.

Dr. Hsu Mo asked that Mr. Peck communicate to the American Minister for the information of the American Government the hope of the Chinese Government that the American Government would assist the Chinese Government to withstand any attempt by Japan to enlarge the scope of the "negotiations" stipulated in the Assembly's resolution or to exploit the recent incidents at Shanghai. Mr. Peck said that he would telegraph to the American Minister in Shanghai in the sense requested.

Dr. Hsu Mo then said that the Chinese Government regarded the controversy with Japan in Manchuria and Shanghai as being inseparable and if China were forced, in the "negotiations" he had been referring to, to discuss any subject other than that of the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, then the Chinese Government would demand that the subject of Japanese activities in Manchuria be taken up simultaneously.

Mr. Peck inquired whether Dr. Hsu Mo wished to define what he meant by the "withdrawal" of the Japanese forces. Dr. Hsu Mo answered that the five points embodied in the arrangement come to tentatively on the British Flag-ship KENT included simultaneous stages of withdrawal by the Japanese and Chinese forces. Since the Chinese forces had now, as a matter of fact, completed

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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completed all the stipulated stages of their withdrawal, the Japanese forces should logically embark at once, but he saw no particular objection to the inclusion in the "negotiations" of such subjects as the times within which the Japanese forces should withdraw into the Settlement and Extra Settlement areas, should embark, etc.

WRP/b

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. D-221


RECD
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China.

March 2, 1932.

APR 23 32

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy - Official
Statement of the Chinese Government.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.



Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. D-218
of February 25, 1932, with which I submitted the texts
of certain announcements made by the Chinese Govern-
ment in regard to the Sino-Japanese controversy.

In this connection I have the honor to enclose
herewith a copy of a statement issued by the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently, received by me
on March 2, 1932, in regard to a recent appeal of
twelve members of the Council of the League of Nations,
dealing with the same subject.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck
Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

As described.

In quintuplicate to the Department
In duplicate to the Legation at Peiping.

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WRP:MCL

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MAY 10 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch to the Department No. D-221 of
Willis R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking,
China, dated March 2, 1932, entitled "Sino-Japanese
Controversy - Official Statement of the Chinese
Government".

STATEMENT

An official spokesman of the Chinese Government
gave out yesterday the following statement commenting
on Japan's reply to the recent appeal of the twelve
members of the League Council.

"The reply of Japan to the appeal of the Council of
the League of Nations reveals but another fruitless attempt
on her part at justifying her policy of military aggression
by an extraordinary form of oblique reasoning from created
presumptions. We see Japan lay all the blame at the door of
China and paint for her self a picture of perfect innocence.
She tells the world that China is the attacking party while
poor helpless Japan has resorted to arms only in self-defence,
that Japan has never even entertained the thought of impair-
ing the territorial integrity and political independence
of China, that she cannot consider the Chinese people as
an organized people and China as having an organized
government, that she is not less disposed than China to
settle the present conflict by peaceful means, and that
the Chinese troops will most certainly occupy the Inter-
national Settlement the moment Japan lays down her arms.

Such preposterous statements are indeed beyond human
credulity. It is indisputable and well-known truth that

Japan

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Japan made an unprovoked attack on Mukden on September 18, 1931, that under various pretexts she has invaded and occupied practically the whole of Manchuria, that she now attempts to set up an independent government in the region under her domination, that on January 28, 1932, after having obtained satisfaction for her demands, she opened an unexpected attack on Shanghai and has since been waging a furious but undeclared war on China in this great metropolis. If these can be considered as measures of self-defence or marks of respect for China's political independence and territorial integrity, what is, indeed, an act of aggression? China has shown a remarkable degree of self-restraint and has only been compelled, as a last resort, to exercise her natural right of resisting in self-defence the merciless onslaught of the Japanese forces.

The National Government of the Republic of China is a government of four hundred million people inhabiting the same territory, speaking the same language and possessing the same civilization. It is a government with which the governments of all other countries including Japan herself, enter into full diplomatic relations. The difference between the Chinese and the Japanese Government is that the former represents a peace-loving and law-abiding people, while the latter owes its existence to organized militarism in the most perfect form. Judging by the standards of Japanese terrorizing militarism, not only China but most members of the Family of Nations do not constitute organized States. It is perhaps somewhat uncomfortable to Japan to learn that at no time have the

Chinese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Chinese people been more closely united and has the strength of the Chinese Government been better felt than at present when the country is faced with a crisis precipitated by Japanese aggression.

As regards Japan's professed willingness to resort to peaceful measures, it is sufficient to point out the fact that she has chosen to set at naught all her commitments regarding the solution of international disputes by pacific means, and that she has turned a deaf ear to all entreaties for peace, including the most recent appeal of the Council of the League of Nations and the joint proposals submitted by certain Powers at the beginning of February.

In carrying on her military campaign in Shanghai, Japan endeavors to make the world believe that she is not only protecting her own nationals but also safeguarding the interests of the International Settlement. She maintains that the inevitable result of the Japanese forces laying down their arms or withdrawing to Japan will be the occupation of the International Settlement by the Chinese troops. It is clear to all that the Chinese Government has not the least intention to occupy by force the International Settlement at Shanghai, although it has protested most vigorously against the use of the International Settlement by the Japanese forces as a base of military operations against China. Japan is simply manufacturing another pretext at the expense of China to advance her own ulterior motives.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 4, 1932.

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Consul General Peck transmits herewith, with his own comment, a memorandum of a conversation which he had on March 5 with Mr. Uyemura, Japanese Acting Consul General at Nanking.

The main point of interest is that the Chinese seem to have been double-crossing the Japanese by creating an impression that the Nanking Government was not supporting the 19th Route Army. This may have been the cause for the rumors to that effect. I suggest that you read Mr. Peck's comment in his despatch.



JEJ/VDM

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. D-223

REGD

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

American Consulate General,
 Hankow, China.

March 7, 1932.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum of observations made to me by Mr. Uyemura, Japanese Acting Consul General, during a conversation held on March 5, 1932.

The tenor of Mr. Uyemura's remarks warranted the inference that official representatives of the Chinese Government have throughout the Shanghai incident been conversing with him regularly in an intimate and even sympathetic way. There can be little doubt but that some of the officials of the Chinese Government have led him to believe that the Government has continuously deplored the fighting between Japanese and Chinese forces at Shanghai and that the so-called "Chiang Kai-shek troops" were sent to the conflict only in order to ward off criticism from the Chinese public. Conversation held by the undersigned with Chinese officials, however, by the writer of this despatch leave little doubt but that support was given by the Chinese government to the 19th Route Army at Shanghai in its resistance to the Japanese. Under these circumstances the conclusion must be that some, at least, of the Chinese authorities have


deliberately

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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deliberately deceived Mr. Uyemura on this point, in order to dissuade the Japanese from bringing pressure to bear directly on the Chinese Government by, for example, military action at Nanking.

Illustrating the tactics pursued by the Chinese I have the honor to state that on the morning of March 5, a Chinese Army officer told an officer of this Consulate General that Mr. Uyemura had protested to the Chinese Government against the presence of a body of Chinese troops in Pukow, across the Yangtze from Nanking, and had given the warning that if an attempt were made to transport these troops across the river to Nanking the Japanese warships would take forcible measures to prevent the crossing. The Chinese informant expressed amusement at the fact that the troops in question had been, in fact, ferried across the river during the night of March 4, under the very guns of the Japanese cruisers, but without being observed by the Japanese officers. This operation must have been carried out with the knowledge, and probably under the orders, of General Chen Yi, Vice Minister of War, who, as reported by Mr. Uyemura, has been assiduous in asserting that the Chinese Government is not in sympathy with the fight against the Japanese at Shanghai.

It is certainly true that the Chinese Government wishes to liquidate the Shanghai conflict as speedily as possible, for the Government knows that it is in no position at present to wage an actual war with Japan. Nevertheless, the public announcements of the Government are to the effect that it will continue to oppose with force of arms all forms of Japa-

nese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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nese aggression (see my despatch No. D-207, of
February 9, 1932, enclosure No. 3).

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

Memorandum dated March 5, 1932.

Five copies to the Department.
Two copies to the Legation.

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WRP/b

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation.

March 5, 1932.

Mr. Uyemura, Japanese Secretary of Legation and Acting
Consul General.

Mr. Peck.

Subject: Sino-Japanese hostilities
at Shanghai.

Mr. Uyemura called on Mr. Peck at 3 p.m. During
part of the conversation Mr. Henrik de Kauffmann, Danish
Minister, was present.

Among the observations made by Mr. Uyemura were the
following:

The Japanese 14th Division, which had been ordered
to proceed to Shanghai, had not sailed and probably would
not, since military operations at Shanghai seemed to be
over. At least a part of the 11th Division would go to
Shanghai, however, and would relieve some of the troops
which had seen hard duty there.

The Japanese troops had pursued the 19th Route Army
during its retreat on March 2 and bombed the Chinese
forces from airplanes. Japanese reports were to the
effect that the line of march of the retreating 19th
Route Army was strewn with dead, about one corpse per
metre.

A part of General Chiang Kai-shek's 88th Division
had been in the front line with the 19th Route Army.
These had been the first Chinese forces to begin a re-
treat. The remainder of the 88th Division and the 87th
Division, both part of General Chiang Kai-shek's forces,
had been stationed at Kashing, near Hangchow, and at
Soochow, to prevent the 19th Route Army from retreating

to

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to Hangchow and Nanking.

Every day some officer of the Chinese Foreign Office goes to visit Mr. Uyemura on his temporary residence, the S.S. YUN YANG MARU at Hsiakwan, to consult with him and exchange news.

Mr. Shen, Chief of the Asiatic Section of the Foreign Office, lived all during his childhood in Japan, was educated in Japanese schools, and on his return to China spoke Japanese much better than he did Chinese. He speaks Japanese perfectly. Most of the Chinese military leaders speak Japanese, having been educated in Japanese military schools and the Military Academy. General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of Military Administration, speaks Japanese, and also General Ku Chung-lun, Commander of the Nanking Garrison, and General Chen Yi, Vice Minister of Military Administration. General Chen Yi has conversations with Mr. Uyemura almost daily.

Mr. Uyemura thinks the Chinese Government is in a very difficult position. General Chiang Kai-shek was not anxious to send reinforcements to the assistance of the 19th Route Army, because he was quite aware that the Japanese Government would be able to match such reinforcements with greater ones, and there would be no end to such increases of the fighting forces, with the advantage always on the side of the Japanese. Nevertheless, General Chiang had to send reinforcements, after the fighting had assumed serious proportions, or meet with political attack in China which would have been fatal to him. The Chinese Government is very anxious to call a halt to the fighting, but on account of the Chinese political situation is unable to submit voluntarily to Japanese terms. The Japanese Govern-

ment

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
ment, also, having achieved its object of driving the Chinese troops twenty kilometers from Shanghai, is anxious to end the fighting, but it is aware that any terms it might propose would be refused by the Chinese Government and people, simply because such terms emanated from the Japanese Government. The Chinese Government would itself be glad, however, to agree to any reasonable terms.

Mr. Uyemura thinks that by far the best way out of the impasse would be for third parties to suggest terms of settlement. This would be logical, because Japan has been fighting not only in her own interests, but in the interests of the International Settlement, and of foreign interests generally. The menace of Chinese troops near the Settlement and the Extra Settlement areas must be removed.

Mr. Uyemura doubts whether it is possible to have one Government for the whole of China, unless China becomes merely a loose confederation of autonomous provinces.

WRP/b

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 4, 1932.

~~MMH.~~

Le: (Mr. Ward:

Consul General Peck transmits herewith a translation of the Martial Law which was proclaimed at Nanking recently. So far as my memory serves me this Martial Law is similar to other Chinese Martial Laws which have been promulgated in the past. It is to be noted, however, that in Article 9 a disclaimer of responsibility is made for reimbursement of losses resulting from nine various actions which Chinese commanding officers may take under authority of this Martial Law. Some of these might affect American nationals but I presume that similar provisions are found in our own Martial Law.

JEF/VDM

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MAY 17 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. D-226

REC'D

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General, Nanking, China.

March 12, 1932.

APR 23 32

LEGAL ADVISER

MAY 8 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Regulations Relating to Martial Law
in Nanking.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Sir:

On February 1, 1932, the Commander of the Nanking
Defence Force proclaimed martial law in Nanking in accordance
with the provisions of the "Regulations Relating to Martial
Law", promulgated at Canton, July 29, 1926. (See "JUDICIAL
REGULATIONS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT", revised edition of
February, 1931, Book II., page 1632).

A translation of these regulations, made in this
Consulate General, is enclosed herewith.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

One, as described.

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WRP/RW

Five copies to the Department
Three copies to the Legation
One copy to the American Minister, Shanghai.
One copy to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet.

One

F/LS

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MAY 17 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- One copy to the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol.
- One copy to the American Consulate General, Shanghai.
- One copy to the American Consulate General, Canton.
- One copy to the American Consulate General, Tientsin.
- One copy to the American Consulate General, Hankow.
- One copy to the American Consulate General, Mukden.
- One copy to the American Consulate General, Harbin.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch to the Department No. D-226 of
Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking,
China, dated March 12, 1926, entitled "Regulations
Relating to Martial Law in Nanking".

REGULATIONS RELATING TO MARTIAL LAW

Promulgated July 29, 1926.

Article 1. The National Government shall, during the period of use of armed forces, and in accordance with the provisions of these regulations, declare or cause the declaration of Martial Law through the Commander-in-Chief in order to ensure peace and order in the fighting Area and at interior places under its jurisdiction.

Article 2. Areas in which Martial Law is declared may be divided into two kinds, as follows:

- (1) Precautionary Areas - Areas which are defended by garrison forces and in which defense measures should be taken as a precaution to avoid the occurrence of incidents.
- (2) Fighting Areas - Areas in which fighting takes place or, in other words, in which the troops attack or resist attacks by the enemy.

The above two kinds of areas will be designated and proclaimed when necessary.

Article 3. During hostilities, the highest military authorities of the various fortifications, harbors, islands, bays and other important areas may, in accordance with local conditions, at any time declare Martial Law in order to prevent invasion by an enemy

or

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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or to cope with incidents. They should, however, promptly report the matter to the Commander-in-Chief for approval.

Article 4. During the period of Martial Law, the local highest military authorities shall at all times report promptly to the Commander-in-Chief for consideration the situation in areas where they are engaging the enemy or garrisoning, as well as the arrangements made.

Article 5. In the Precautionary Areas, only administrative and judicial affairs which are connected with military matters will come under the control of the local highest military authorities. Any dispute concerning the authority of civil and military officials shall be solved by the Commander-in-Chief. Under the above circumstances, the local administrative and judicial officials shall act under the directions of the local highest military authorities.

Article 6. In the Fighting Areas, the control of local administrative and judicial affairs is transferred to the local highest military authorities.

Article 7. In the Fighting Areas, civil and criminal cases which are connected with military matters shall be tried jointly by the Political Affairs Bureau and Military Court of the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters.

Article 8. If there is no court in the Fighting Area, or if communication is cut off between the Fighting Area and the court having jurisdiction, the Political

Affairs

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Affairs Bureau and Military Court of the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters will also try jointly civil and criminal cases, even if they have no connection with military matters.

Article 9. In areas where Martial law is declared, the commanding officers shall have authority to do the following, and no claim shall be made for the reimbursement of losses resulting from such actions:

- (1) Restriction of meetings, assembly, strike, suspension of business, newspapers, magazines or other printed matters which are considered affecting and injuring military secrets.
- (2) Forbidding the exportation of people's property which may be used as military supplies, when necessary.
- (3) Inspection of privately-owned guns, canon, cartridges, powder, weapons, fire-arms and other dangerous materials, and the sequestration and confiscation of these things when necessary.
- (4) Censorship of mail and telegrams.
- (5) Searching incoming and outgoing vessels and other things, or intercepting of land and water communications when necessary.
- (6) Supervision and direction of local militia and farmers corps, and disarming or disbandment of those corps which are found to have committed illegal acts.
- (7) Reasonable compassionate grants for unavoidable damages to immovable property of the people by

hostilities

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hostilities.

(8) Searching of houses, structures and vessels
in the Fighting Area when necessary, disregarding
day or night.

(9) Issuing instruction to people living in Fighting
Areas to evacuate for strategic reasons.

Article 10. When the Commander-in-Chief considers that
the Martial Law is no longer necessary, he shall
declare it abolished.

Article 11. The Regulations Relating to Martial Law
cease to take effect upon the declaration of
abolition.

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, Japan, April 8, 1932.

No. 565

Subject: Secretary Stimson's letter
to Senator Borah.



F/LS

793.94/5101

MAY 18 1932

FILED

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

793.94/4423
50pud
With reference to the Embassy's telegram No. 79 of February 24, 1932, 4 P. M., giving press comment on the Secretary's letter to Senator Borah, I have the honor to
1/. transmit herewith a copy in translation of an article on the same subject which was published in the Diplomatic Review (GAIKO JIHO) of March 15, 1932. The writer of this article feels that the letter reveals an implied threat to Japan and is the result of misunderstanding and a biased view, which is not only embarrassing to Japan

but

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but is also discreditable to America. Much of the article is a defence of Japanese action at Shanghai, but includes comment on the relation of the Nine-Power Treaty to other treaties which were concluded at the Washington Conference.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin L. Neville

Edwin L. Neville,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

Copy, in translation, of the
GAIKO JIHO's article above
referred to.

Embassy's File No. 800.-Japan.

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AN APPEAL TO THE AMERICAN SENSE OF SELF-RESPECT

A Japanese Scholar's View on Secretary

Stimson's letter.

(By Ujiro Oyama, Professor at Waseda University,
 published in the GAIKO JIHO (Diplomatic Re-
 view) of March 15, 1932.)

Secretary Stimson's letter to Senator Borah, though rendered in the form of a reply to the latter's interpellations regarding the validity of the Nine-Power Treaty as to whether or not there was the necessity of its amendment, was in reality meant as an informal declaration of his protest against Japan's military actions in China. Moreover, judging from its phraseology and tone the open letter may be interpreted as implying a threat to this country. The contents of the letter are, however, an exposure of extremely biased views and misunderstanding about Japan's allegation and standpoint, and it is the height of indiscretion that a man in such an exalted position as Secretary Stimson would have made such an imprudent utterance; particularly at this moment when international politics is faced with^a very delicate situation such an indiscriminate charge is not only embarrassing to Japan, but also is highly discreditable to America.

Secretary Stimson says that "the Nine-Power Treaty not only guarantees equal^{commercial} opportunity in China for the nations of the world but also provides an assurance that no country is allowed to carry out any such scheme as to make China victim of aggressive design," as if implying

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plying that Japan was taking an aggressive policy towards China and making an attempt at military expansion in breach of the avowed principle of equal commercial opportunity in China. Further, Secretary Stimson writes, "had the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Non-War Pact been faithfully observed the present state of affairs would no doubt not have happened," this being tantamount to saying that Japan was a traitor to those treaties and should be held responsible for what has occurred. This is, indeed, the height of calumny and false accusation, and we wonder what has made Secretary Stimson pass so rash a verdict on a matter of such grave nature and what has prompted him to make such inconsiderate and imprudent utterances against Japan without showing any facts or evidence to support the verdict. The outbreak of the Shanghai affair had its origin in the anarchic and uncontrolled conditions in China, and Japan was simply forced to take measures of self-defence to protect the lives and properties of Japanese residents against the constant raids and assaults of Chinese mobs, because the Chinese authorities lacked both power and sincerity to control the situation and suppress the mobs. Japan did not initiate any military action but was obliged to appeal to arms because challenged by the Chinese, and it is an indisputable fact that China is responsible for the outbreak of the regrettable warfare. The fact that the Powers have followed Japan's suit and despatched troops to Shanghai proves that they were similarly concerned about the situation there. A precedent of the kind was made by Britain when it sent a large contingent of troops 15,000 strong to Shanghai on the occasion of the outbreak of the

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anti-British agitation in 1927, when the American Government also despatched troops there, these facts being still fresh in our memory. In the present instance, too, America as well as other Powers despatched troops to Shanghai ahead of Japan. The only difference lies in the fact that Japanese troops received the attacks of the Chinese while the troops of the other Powers were not attacked. Of course, the Japanese troops could not remain unresisting as they are not mere ornaments but were forced to offer resistance to the unlawful offensive of the Chinese. The action taken by the Japanese army was thus nothing but defensive measures against the unlawful and wanton attack of the Chinese; in other words, it was the case of the rightful use of the right of self-defence that belongs to the state. Supposing the Chinese attacked the American troops, the latter would no doubt have taken the same step as the Japanese army did.

Nevertheless, Secretary Stimson declares this action of the Japanese army violates the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Non-War Pact. Presumably it is not his intention to refuse to recognize a State's right of self-defence, but perhaps he fails to recognize the action of the Japanese army as a case of self-defence. But supposing a similar affair occurs in the Panama Canal zone what attitude will the American garrison stationed there take? We cannot fathom the mind of Secretary Stimson who, without taking the trouble to investigate the true aspect of the situation and without thorough information, denounces the attitude of the Japanese army as the attitude of a tyrant. After all, either the American Government or the

League

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League of Nations, which accuses Japan of having taken military^{action} in disregard of obvious reasons justifying her attitude, must have been misguided by an unwarranted suspicion that Japan harbors some ambitious design against China. That Japan entertains no aggressive intention towards China is very clear as was explicitly declared in the statements repeatedly issued by the Japanese Government. In this connection, Mr. Simons, the British Foreign Secretary, speaking in Parliament recently, declared the British Government placed full trust in the declaration of the Japanese Government. We are anxious to know why the American Government cannot believe what the British Government did not hesitate to believe, and if the answer is that America does not believe Japanese pledges without any particular reason but on account of mere sentiment, that sentiment is surely what the American Government must seriously reconsider. Dwelling on the grave significance of the Nine-Power Treaty, Secretary Stimson says that "the treaty is a self-controlling pledge of the Powers to dispose of such aggressive policies as are liable to menace the development of China", and pointing out that the treaty had close bearing upon several other treaties concluded at the Washington Conference and all those treaties had been brought into existence as one complete set, he goes on to say that "because the American Government had abandoned her overwhelming supremacy in the construction of capital ships and pledged the maintenance of the status quo of the defence of Guam and the Philippines on the condition of Japan's pledge to respect the Nine-Power Treaty the American Government cannot tolerate

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tolerate any amendment or abrogation of the Treaty without taking into consideration those other treaties". This uncalled-for argument of the American Secretary of State, which is a quite useless expression having nothing to do with the Shanghai affair, was perhaps an outcome of his hasty conclusion that Japan had no intention to respect and observe the Nine-Power Treaty from a hurried perusal of the statement of the Japanese Government presented to the Council of the League of Nations, in which the Japanese Government pointed out that China was anything but a systematic state and accordingly it was practically impossible to deal with that country as a perfect state. If such be the case it is a great mistake on the part of Secretary Stimson, because there is found nowhere in that statement any paragraph implying or suggesting that Japan is inclined to disregard or disrespect the said treaty. According to the opinion of the Japanese Government, as we understand it, originally the Nine-Power Treaty did not recognize the existence in China of a state with perfectly unified sovereignty and administrative system, but, on the contrary, it was the object of the treaty to enable China to establish a stable unified administration. If China were a perfectly systematized and well ruled state there would have been no necessity of arranging such treaty. But now that ten years have elapsed since the conclusion of that treaty no systematized and stable state has come into existence in China and the country remains in an as uncontrolled and ungoverned a condition as ever. Such being the case, the Japanese Government believes it opportune to put an end to the principle of non-interference in China's internal

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ternal affairs, the principle observed by the Powers as their common policy towards China since the Washington Conference, and to replace it with a positive policy of lending a helping hand for a speedy attainment of a perfect national unity in that country. Nobody who knows what China is and what is her real aspect will raise any objection to that suggestion, and if Secretary Stimson thinks it implies an aggressive design on China he is seriously mistaken. Again, Secretary Stimson apparently attributes the successful issue of the Washington Conference to the sacrifices made by America alone, and also he opines that all treaties concluded at the Washington Conference form one complete set and are of inseparable significance and that the Nine-Power Treaty is a conditional pact of the Naval Reduction Treaty and the Pacific Defence Limitation Treaty. All these allegations of Secretary Stimson are, however, mistaken notions resulting from a lack of knowledge concerning the Washington Conference, as was pointed out in the report on the interview between the Foreign Office authorities and the representatives of the metropolitan press published in the vernacular press some time ago. What puzzles us the most is for what purpose and for what reason Secretary Stimson referred to naval affairs in discussing the Shanghai affair. Now that the relations between America and Japan present a somewhat gloomy aspect on account of the Chinese questions it is very inadvisable that a man in so exalted a position as Secretary Stimson is would make such an uncalled for utterance which sounds like a threat to this country. Certainly we are justified in declaring that his is a very imprudent utterance.

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Side by side with that inopportune utterance of Secretary Stimson, quite disagreeable is the attitude of Mr. Lowell, president of Harvard University, and other eminent American scholars including several university presidents, who are reported to have emphasized the necessity of taking recourse to an economic blockade against Japan and have memorialized President Hoover to that effect. Nothing is more surprising. An economic blockade is but one step toward a declaration of war. What is the idea of those eminent American scholars that they have hit upon such a scheme and have taken steps to stir up the American nation and have urged their Government to carry out such a drastic measure? Even supposing that Japan committed a very serious blunder or grave offence it is by no means proper to resort to such a high-handed measure as an economic blockade which is practically tantamount to declaring war on that country. We must question whether the object of the American peace advocates is to create war between America and Japan by declaring an economic blockade against Japan merely on account of a petty local affair confined to a corner of China and to bring about another world war through it. Granting that such is the object of the American peace-lovers, though we hardly believe it to be so, we must question whether such is consistent with the attitude of America which is second to no other country in advocating non-war principles for the sake of the world peace. Although there is not the least possibility of an economic blockade having any good effect, the fact that such an

opinion

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opinion prevails among the intelligent classes in America goes a long way in proving that the American Government and nation lack perfect understanding and fair judgment regarding the question at issue. However, we Japanese need not worry much about what America is going to do. We shall only have to wait for the lawful judgment of justice.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Yunnan/41 FOR Despatch # 103.

FROM Yunnanfu (Stevens) DATED March 9, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1187 ...

REGARDING: Diplomatic situation has become very tense
 since the fall of Mukden according to speech
 by General Lung Yun, the Provincial Chairman.
 Hope expressed the China will unite in an
 unanimous effort to check the foreign invasion.

793.94/5102

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Leaders of various public and private organizations have sent telegrams of praise and encouragement to the Chinese commanders at Shanghai. During January and February, such organizations were active in raising funds in support of the 19th Route Army. More than Yunnan \$500,000 is stated to have been collected for this purpose from all classes of the people. The Yunnan Government is encouraging the movement and has sanctioned the organization of a "National Salvation Fund Committee" for raising Mex.\$20,000,000 by taxing property and incomes on a graduated scale of from

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one to five per cent of the ascertained or estimated value. The campaign is to be concluded within three months.

On January 14th, the Yunnanfu Municipal Bureau of Party Affairs succeeded in obtaining the Government's approval of a resolution ordering all merchants to print anti-Japanese slogans on their letter paper, printed circulars, wrapping papers, crates and other containers.

On February 2nd, a great deal of excitement arose over the report of a Chinese victory at Shanghai. The streets were soon thronged with people who gave vent to their state of mind by shooting firecrackers and shouting anti-Japanese slogans. A large demonstration parade, principally of students, marched to the entrance of the French Consulate where they set off a large number of firecrackers and shouted and sang patriotic songs much to the irritation of the French consul and his staff.

The tendency in official circles is to credit the Nanking Government with whatever Chinese successes are achieved, but the people themselves confine their praise to the individual commanders who are actually doing the fighting. Great interest in China's foreign relations has awakened among the masses of the people since the outbreak of the Shanghai trouble. All seem to be determined that the Chinese generals shall not bow to the Japanese demands.

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DOCUMENT FILE
NOTE

793.94/5103

SEE 793.94 Commission/160 ^{Confidential File} FOR #740
~~FROM~~ China (Johnson) DATED Apr. 22, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: outline of a plan for a practical solution of the
problem relating to Manchuria.

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No.D-229

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
 American Consulate General,
 Nanking, China.

APR 25 32

March 14, 1932.

F/LS

793.94/5104

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State
 Washington.

Sir:



Referring to my despatch No.D-221, of March 2, 1932,
 with which I enclosed a copy of a statement issued by the
 Chinese Government in regard to the Sino-Japanese Controversy,
 I have the honor to enclose herewith copies of the following
 documents:

1. Statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Office on March 2, 1932, concerning a tentative arrangement come to between Japanese and Chinese representatives on H.M.S. KENT for cessation of hostilities.
2. Statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Office on March 11, 1932, summarizing correspondence with the Japanese Government concerning the independence movement in Manchuria.
3. Translation of a manifesto issued by the 19th Route Army and the 5th Army following their retreat before the Japanese forces, beginning March 1, 1932.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck
 Willys R. Peck,
 American Consul General.

Enclosures:
 Three, as described.

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Five copies to the Department of State.
 Two copies to the American Legation, Peiping.
 One copy to the American Minister, Shanghai.

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch to the Department No.D-229
 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Hanking,
 China, dated March 14, 1932, entitled "Sino-Japanese
 Controversy".

WAICHIAOFU STATEMENT ISSUED IN SHANGHAI MARCH 2, 1932.

In view of the arrival of two more divisions of Japanese troops as reinforcements and their new offensive at Liuho as well as at Woosung it is important to announce the fact that at the informal meeting between the Chinese and Japanese representatives on board the Hms Kent under the friendly offices of Admiral Sir Howard Kelly certain points to form the basis of an agreement for the immediate cessation of hostilities were discussed and an understanding reached as follows.

First mutual and simultaneous evacuation.

Second no question of permanent dismantling of Woosung or Lion Forts to be raised.

Third supervision of evacuation on both sides by a Sino-Japanese commission with neutral observers.

Fourth evacuated area to be administered by Chinese authorities and policed by Chinese police as heretofore.

Fifth Chinese to withdraw to Chenju and Japanese to withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-settlement roads after which Chinese to withdraw to Wanziang and Japanese to withdraw to their ships - this last point subject to further discussion at a subsequent meeting to be arranged ----.

It was agreed that if the respective governments should approve the tentative understanding a formal

meeting

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meeting of the accredited diplomatic and military representatives was to take place forthwith for the purpose of consummating the arrangement.

In the afternoon of Feb. 29th the Chinese representative informed Admiral Kelly of the approval of the Chinese government and requested him to notify the Japanese authorities of the same so that should the Japanese government likewise give its approval the proposed formal meeting of the accredited representatives might be arranged at once.

Up to the present however no word has been received from the Japanese side as to the decision of the Tokyo government meanwhile the Japanese military naval and air forces have been launching a new attack against the Chinese forces on all fronts and the Japanese Consul-General has notified the Chinese Mayor of the intention of the Japanese military forces to bomb the two Principal Railways connecting Shanghai with Nanking and Hangchow. Should these peace efforts entirely earnest on the part of China again fail responsibility for the failure must once more rest with Japan.

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Enclosure No. 2 to despatch to the Department No.D-229 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated March 14, 1932, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy".

WAICHIAO PU STATEMENT ISSUED ON MARCH 11, 1932.

Ministry Foreign Affairs released today series four documents concerning so-called independence movement in Three Eastern Provinces. First document is China's note to Japan dated February 24th, protesting against latter's action in promoting so-called independence movement and against Mr. Sato's open profession before League Council of sympathy with this movement. Text this note had been released in full previously.

Second document is Japan's reply dated February 28th in which it alleged that "so-called independence movement in Manchuria should be regarded as acts perpetrated by Chinese citizens who have been discontented with the local political conditions", that neither Japanese Government nor its officials had anything to do with this movement, and that Mr. Sato's declaration, if accurately reported, did not mean anything more than Japan's welcome to new condition peace and order which would naturally result from development local self-government in Three Eastern Provinces.

China's rejoinder to Japan's reply despatched yesterday constitutes third of four documents. In this latest note, Chinese Government showed conclusively that foreign as well as Chinese nationals had lived in peace order in Three Eastern Province prior to Japanese

invasion

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invasion and occupation, that so-called independence movement had been actually promoted by Japanese Government and its officials, that handful Chinese citizens who participated in movement had been doing so purely because of Japanese coercion, that the real power and authority of the puppet government were wielded by the large numbers of so-called Japanese advisers and counsellors appointed either by the Japanese Government or its officials, and that the kidnapping of Pu Yi by the Japanese from Tientsin first to Dairen then to Mukden and now installed as "Chief Executive" of the bogus government went to show that Japan's part in the so-called independence movement was not merely that of a sympathetic helper as alleged by Mr. Sato, but was really the initiator of the whole thing. The note concluded by declaring that the Japanese government should be fully responsible for the establishment of the so-called independent or autonomous government in Three Eastern Provinces during their continued occupation by Japanese troops.

Last document is long list of officials in various bogus government offices in Three Eastern Provinces showing that great percentage of them are Japanese citizens, who manage puppet show in capacity of advisers and counsellors. Nanking, March 11th.

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Enclosure No. 3 to despatch to the Department No. D-229,
of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking,
China, dated March 14, 1932, entitled "Sino-Japanese
Controversy."

Manifesto Issued by the 19th Route Army and 5th Army

(Trans. Hsi)

March 2, 1932.

Brutal Japan, having despatched troops to Liaoning, now invades the Southeast. Our 19th Route Army, which has been ordered to defend the territory, assumed emergency self-defence. It has engaged the invaders for more than a month. At first, it fought with the naval landing force and land forces for over 20 days. Deaths and wounds on the part of the enemy have been worse than ours, so that the enemy could not succeed. Upon the arrival of the reinforcement of land forces, 2 divisions of the 5th Army formerly stationed in Kiangsu and Chekiang participated in the fighting. Again we engaged the enemy for 10 days, and the enemy has suffered heavy reverses 6 or 7 times. The enemy once more failed. Finally, Shirakawa arrived with 2 additional army divisions. Our troops on the field have been only 5 divisions of less than 40,000 men. On the other hand, the strength of the enemy is doubled. The enemy on the one hand falsely held negotiations for cessation of hostilities, in order to deceive the League of Nations and, on the other, sent one division to the Shanghai front and another division to Liuho where it landed and attacked us from the rear. We have been attacked on both sides. In view of the difficulty in transportation and because reinforcements were unable to come, we gave up the first front line on the evening of March 1. We retreated for strategic reasons and are planning a counter-attack. This is what has happened during the past month when the 19th Route Army and the 5th Army engaged the enemy.

Since

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Since Brutal Japan has been attempting to subjugate China in accordance with its settled policy, we cannot achieve final success unless a general mobilization of the whole country is effected with decided efforts for widespread fighting. The 19th Route Army and the 5th Army, in fighting against the enemy alone, are not aiming at victory in one corner and for one day only, but desire to serve as pioneers for their fellow-countrymen by sacrificing our flesh and blood. Since the Government removed to Loyang, a long period resistance policy has been decided upon. The soldiers and civilians in the whole country should, in pursuance of this policy, unite and rise up and press forward as those in front of us fall. We must not care about the retreat in Shanghai, and must not be separated by the trick of the enemy. On the other hand, it is earnestly hoped that our fellow countrymen in the Northeast will at once send troops to restore the lost territory so that the strength of the enemy may be diminished. Our 19th Route Army and the 5th Army will continue their efforts to fight a final battle with the enemy in order that the latter be attacked on both sides. The Turks continually fought three years and thus finally defeated 150,000 Greek troops. With two hundred million square li of territory and four hundred million people, as in China, we do not believe that we cannot annihilate a small enemy like Japan. When Korea was made extinct, it still had scores of thousands of troops which were finally disbanded by Japanese. At present China has more than one million troops. We would rather make a glorious sacrifice before the extinction of the country than be disbanded by others at a later date.

The present instance when Shanghai was trampled down by Japanese, shells and bombs have destroyed many structures

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and killed many civilians, but the civilians all hate the enemy and not us. The territory is as it was, and the civilians are as they were. If China should be subjugated by Japan, how would the enemy treat our civilians. Fellow countrymen are requested not to forget Chapei and Kiangwan, and the military leaders throughout the country not to forget Korea and the present Manchuria.

Brutal Japan in its international propaganda accuses China of not being an organized nation. We must cooperate. If the 19th Route Army and the 5th Army fail to win the final victory, we will all sacrifice our lives rather than become homeless slaves.

Chiang Kwan-nai,
Field Commander

Tsai Ting-kai,
Army Commander

Tai Chi,
Division Commander

Chang Chih-chung,
Commander, 5th Army

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At a weekly meeting of members of the Yunnan Provincial Government on January 18, 1932, General Lung Yun, the Provincial Chairman, made a speech summarizing recent political events in China and expressing his opinions thereon in the following terms:

"Since the fall of Mukden, the diplomatic situation has become very tense. The great mass of the Chinese people sincerely hope that China will unite in an unanimous effort to check the foreign invasion. Indeed, when one thinks of the future of our country one must think of the survival or extinction of our race and of the calamities which have befallen us of late on all sides. No remedy could be more logical than a determined effort to stand united against foreign insults. For this reason, the Nanking Government has made every concession to the public weal and, as a result, General Chiang has retired without hesitation, hoping that by so doing unification and peace would result. Happily, his action produced a measure of good results. Our people feel greatly relieved at his action during these troublesome times. Unfortunately, however, among our colleagues who are working earnestly for national unification, there are some who still seek to advance their own power and selfish influence at the expense of the nation. So true is this that it grieves me deeply to speak of peaceful unification.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 Shanghai, March 23, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese relations and negotiations.



F/LS
 793.94/5105

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

In continuation of my despatch of March 12, 1932,
 I have the honor to transmit herewith a further set of
 1/15 fifteen memoranda of conversations I have had with va-
 rious persons in Shanghai regarding Sino-Japanese rela-
 tions and negotiations.

The Department will observe that all essential
 points contained therein have already been covered in
 my telegrams to the Department between March 1 and 20,
 1932.

Very respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosures:

1/15: Memoranda of conversations:
 Feb. 29, March 1, 7, 9,
 10, 11, 11, 12, 13, 14, 14,
 15, 16, 17, and 20.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, February 29, 1932.

Dr. H. H. Kung.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

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I called on Dr. Kung to-day, and while there Mrs. Kung came into the room. Dr. Kung was very emphatic in his statement that China could not make further concession to the Japanese. Mrs. Kung, who has always been a Power behind the throne in Chinese Nationalist Politics since the rise of Chiang Kai-shek to power, insisted that China's only recourse, if conditions were going on as they are, would be to accept Bolshevism and with Bolshevism the aid of Russia, if assistance was not forthcoming from any one else.

I tried to point out to Dr. Kung and Mrs. Kung that the word Bolshevism meant nothing under conditions such as these; that one did not save one's country by becoming bolshevistic. One accomplished this end by becoming nationalistic and fanning the fire of patriotic love of the soil and of the homes that were being attacked. I said that I was quite sure that it was not Bolshevism that she meant, but the birth of a new national spirit among the Chinese. They both admitted the truth of this, but argued that the commu-

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nist party of China was the only party that was organized and capable of uniting the country.

Dr. Kung argued that the United States should declare war upon Japan, inasmuch as the Japanese were trampling upon treaties and covenants which the United States have so strongly advocated and supported. I stated that there was little chance that the United States would engage in war with the Japanese. Our people did not want war; they wanted to see this situation in the Far East settled without war. Dr. Kung argued that the United States would not have to do any fighting; that if we supplied the money and arms there would be plenty of Chinese soldiers to fight for us.

M.T.G.

American Minister.

NTJ.EH
EA

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 1, 1932.

Conversation with Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Dr. Koo came to see me at 6:15 and stated that from Geneva they had been informed that Sir John Simon had made the following proposal to Dr. Yen in connection with cessation of hostilities at Shanghai:

1. Immediate cessation of hostilities to be arranged in consultation with neutral commanders.
2. Japan to disclaim any territorial ambitions or intention to seek political rights.
3. China to declare her respect for integrity of the Settlement and her willingness to protect it against danger.
4. Negotiations between Japan and China immediately to commence, participated in by interested powers. Negotiations to work out a solution of the Shanghai question.

N.I.J.

American Minister.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 7, 1932.

Conversation with Mr. Wilden.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

The French Minister told me today, when we met at the British Consulate, that Mr. Matsuoka had been to see him and in substance had told him that the Chinese and Japanese had reached such a pass that they could not talk, and he hoped that the neutral powers would mediate. He reported Matsuoka as saying that the Japanese would not ask for concession or for an extension of the Settlement.

K.T.J.
American Minister.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, March 9, 1932.

Sir Miles Lampson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese relations.

Sir Miles told me that Mr. Matsuoka had come to see him yesterday, March 8th, and had told him that the Japanese were ready and anxious to negotiate. They would welcome third power mediation, being anxious to extricate themselves from the present situation. Lampson spoke very frankly to Matsuoka saying that he had done with verbal understandings, and he asked Matsuoka to put the Japanese ideas into writing. Matsuoka promised to do this, and last night Shigemitsu gave to Lampson a slip of paper on which he had written the following:

"The Japanese authorities, both civil and military, at Shanghai, are prepared to enter into negotiations with the Chinese authorities in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. As there is reason to entertain some anxiety concerning the situation at the front, it is deemed a matter of urgent necessity to reach at an earliest possible date a definite agreement for the complete cessation of hostilities.

"The Japanese authorities have all the way presumed that the Japanese attitude on the matter has been understood by the Chinese authorities. However, failing to hear anything from the Chinese authorities since the aforesaid Resolution was passed by the Assembly of the League of Nations, they wish to make clear beyond all doubt their readiness to negotiate along the lines laid down in the Resolution."

Lampson told me that he read the document over and

noticed

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noticed that it made no reference to withdrawal of Japanese troops. He said that he kept the document, however, for study, and, noticing that the opening paragraph resembled textually paragraph 3 of the League Resolution of March 4th, he made a marginal note for insertion after the word authorities at the end of the first paragraph, as follows: "and to arrange for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces". This amended document was returned to Shigemitsu last evening, who promised to give it further consideration. Sir Miles informed me that today Shigemitsu returned the document with his amendment reading: "and then to discuss and determine arrangements for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces". British Minister pointed out to Shigemitsu that the word "then" which had been inserted would make the document unacceptable to the Chinese. The Japanese Minister stated that the discussion of Japanese withdrawal could only follow agreement of cessation of hostilities. Sir Miles stated that he was expecting to see Quo Tai-chi, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, to-night, and would show him the Japanese draft and endeavor to obtain a Chinese counter-draft.

N.T.J.

American Minister.

NTJ.EH
EA

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 10, 1932.

Conversation with Sir Miles Lampson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

British Minister informed me today that he handed to Quo Tai-chi last evening Japanese proposal. He said that Dr. Quo immediately hit upon the word "then" but nevertheless promised to telegraph Nanking and that today Dr. Quo gave to him the Chinese reply to the Japanese proposal which is as follows:

"The Chinese Government having accepted the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4, is prepared to enter into negotiations with the Japanese authorities in accordance with the terms of the said Resolution, and on the understanding, as stated by its chief delegate Dr. W. W. Yen, that (1) such negotiations are limited to matters pertaining only to the definite cessation of hostilities and the complete withdrawal of Japanese forces and (2) no condition is to be attached to such withdrawal.

"The Chinese Government has already announced through its chief delegate at Geneva its readiness to enter into negotiations for the purposes and on the understandings as above mentioned and has presumed that the Japanese authorities have been fully aware of this fact.

"The receipt through Sir Miles Lampson at 5:30 p.m. March 9, of the communication from the Japanese authorities makes it clear that they are equally ready to enter into the proposed negotiations. The Chinese Government considers therefore the way open for commencing such negotiations."

N. T. J.,
American Minister.

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 11, 1932.

Conversation with Sir Miles Lampson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Sir Miles informed me today that he has received a request from the Japanese Minister asking for certain explanations in regard to the letter from the Chinese dated March 10, 1932. The letter of the Japanese asking for this explanation reads as follows:

"I am in receipt of your note of today's date together with its enclosure, a copy of a statement from Mr. Kuo Tai-chih expressing preparedness to enter into negotiations with us.

"I should very much like to have our representatives meet you and other colleagues and the Chinese representatives at your office tomorrow as suggested. But I regret to say that as the Chinese have now brought forth, as the basis of negotiations, conditions which I understand were not embodied in the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations, I am unable to do so, unless I feel myself sure as to the exact meaning of these conditions. One refers to a reservation made by Dr. W. W. Yen, - I wonder what that "no condition" exactly means. I am wiring to Geneva to enquire about its meaning and as to how that ex parte reservation was treated.

"Another refers to the wording "complete withdrawal". Would you not be kind enough to make enquiry with the Chinese if they attach some particular meaning to the word "complete", - this word is not found in the Resolution.

"In the meanwhile, I wish to assure you, and through you the Chinese side, that we have been confining our stand within the wording of the League Resolution, no more no less."

W. F. J.
 American Minister.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 11, 1932.

Conversation with Mr. Wilden, French Minister.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

At meeting today Mr. Wilden, the French Minister, read a telegram from Count Martel, the French Ambassador to Tokyo, in which the latter quotes Yoshizawa as instructing Sato in Geneva in regard to a statement to be made there before the Assembly. I interpret this statement as indicating that the Japanese propose to remain at Shanghai indefinitely for they practically say that all assurances must be given of protection to Japanese interests and that there must be no fear that the Chinese will return when they withdraw.

ACJ
American Minister.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 12, 1932.

Conversation with Mr. Robert Lewis.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Mr. Robert Lewis, an American citizen formerly with the Y.M.C.A. and now employed as an adviser to the Chinese Government, called. He recited generally the various instances which had occurred and the several attitudes which the Chinese Government had assumed in connection with these instances. He said that it was the hope of many people, and I assume that he had included the Chinese among these, that there would be no change in regard to American forces stationed at Shanghai. Mr. Lewis' manner was one of mystery intended possibly to carry the implication that he was deep in the councils of the Chinese Government.

N.T.J.
American Minister.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 13, 1932.

Conversation with Mr. Quo Tai-chi.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi called upon me this afternoon and in the course of conversation stated that what was meant by the Chinese phrase "no condition" in his letter to Sir Miles the other day was "political condition". He asked rhetorically why it was that Japan was not willing to proceed with armistice negotiations. He stated that if the Japanese objected to the reservations made by Dr. W. W. Yen it could very well be urged that after all, the negotiations upon which they were about to enter, were really concerned merely with the liquidation of a military situation and involved no questions of a political nature.

Dr. Quo stated that the Chinese would not advance while Japanese were retiring, but that Chinese could not at this moment consider question of non-occupation after Japanese withdrawal, as this was a political question. He said that the Chinese Government would be willing to give an undertaking that the policing of the area so evacuated will be taken care of in a manner satisfactory to all. I gathered that he had in mind the use of a Gendarmerie, possibly under foreign officers. He stated that the Chinese would not accept any proposals for neutralization or demilitarization of the zone about Shanghai.

N.T.J.
American Minister.

Conversation.

Shanghai, March 14, 1932.

British, French and Japanese Ministers,
Italian Charge d'Affaires, and Chinese
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

This evening, in the drawing-room of the home of the British Consul General, there met in the presence of the American Minister (Mr. Johnson) the British Minister (Sir Miles Lampson), the French Minister (Mr. Wilden), the Italian Charge d'Affaires (Count Ciano), Mr. Quo Tai Chi (Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs), and the Japanese Minister (Mr. Shigemitsu), for the purpose of exploring the possibilities of negotiations for the cessation of hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese at Shanghai. The discussion lasted from 4.30 until 7.15 p.m. After considerable discussion it was apparent that there were certain points upon which both sides could agree, and I suggested that before we left these points should be put down on paper, and accepted by both sides as a basis for more formal negotiations at a later date. As a result the following agenda of three points was agreed to:

1. The Chinese troops to remain in their present positions pending a later settlement.

2. The Japanese troops to withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of 28th January. It is however understood that in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-

mentioned

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mentioned areas.

3. A joint Commission with neutral members to certify the mutual withdrawal.

Added to the above was a note to the following effect: "It is understood that no other questions of principle will be raised", and a separate note was added: "(Subject to the approval of the Chinese Government) the following understanding is agreed upon: Provided a definite agreement is reached on the basis of the above points, the Chinese side will voluntarily give an independent undertaking that Mayor Wu's letter of 28th January stands."

The note relative to Mayor Wu's letter was the voluntary suggestion of the Chinese after considerable discussion, in the course of which it was apparent that the Japanese were going to insist upon some kind of satisfaction in regard to the Mayor's undertaking to suppress boycotts before they would agree to withdraw their troops. The Japanese Minister returned again and again to this point and finally Dr. Quo, quite voluntarily and evidently for the purpose of making it possible for negotiations to proceed, made the statement that the Chinese would be quite willing to re-affirm, if this were possible, Mayor Wu's letter of January 28th. He insisted that the letter had never been withdrawn, that the Chinese would be willing to live up to what they had already promised, but made it quite clear that he did not consent to this being made a condition to negotiations for Japanese troop withdrawal, and that this was a political matter which must be left to subsequent negotiations.

The French Minister offered the suggestion that if

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at any moment either side found itself unable to sign or agree to some undertaking, such an undertaking should be reduced to the form of a declaration to the four chiefs of Mission present and thus made less formal but just as binding.

In the course of discussion Mr. Shigemitsu pointed out that Japanese forces now in the neighborhood of Shanghai were so numerous that it would be impossible to quarter all of them within the area of the Settlement, and that it would be necessary to retire them to points adjacent to the Whangpoo River outside the Settlement where they could await embarkation and departure.

It was agreed that we should all meet more formally at 4 p.m. on the 16th, at which time it was hoped that we would be able to adopt the agenda now tentatively agreed upon with a view to making it the basis of formal negotiations.

N.T.J.
American Minister.

NTJ.EH
EA

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 14, 1932.

British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson.
French Minister, M. Wilden.
Italian Charge D'Affaires, Count Ciano.
American Minister, Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

After some discussion of letters exchanged between Sir Miles and Mr. Shigemitsu and Mr. Quo Tai-chi, it was agreed among us that the time had come when we should try to bring Mr. Quo Tai-chi and Mr. Shigemitsu together, informally, for the purpose of exploring the possibilities of negotiating for a cessation of hostilities as provided for in the League's Resolution of March 4. We have, therefore, invited Mr. Shigemitsu and Mr. Quo to meet in our presence this evening, at the British Consulate, and they have accepted.

N.T.J.
American Minister.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 15, 1932.

British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson.
French Minister, M. Wilden.
Italian Charge d'Affaires, Count Ciano,
American Minister, Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Lord Lytton, Chairman of the League Commission was present today at our meeting. The steps leading up to last night's meeting were explained to him. Lord Lytton stated that while the Commission was in Japan the Japanese had asked them to assist her at Shanghai. He said that the Chinese here had asked them to help and he was now anxious to know if there was anything that the Commission could do to assist. We told him that we would be better able to know how he might assist after the meeting which was scheduled to take place tomorrow.

N. T. J.
American Minister.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 16, 1932.

Conversation with Mr. Quo Tai-chi.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs came to see me this morning. He asked me what I thought of the Japanese amendments to the agenda. He had reference to the Japanese Minister's Note to the British Minister of last evening offering the following as a substitute for paragraph three of the original draft: "3. The Joint Commission with neutral members to certify the carrying out of the agreement under paragraphs one and two and to watch and observe the general conditions in the evacuated area until a later settlement."

I told Mr. Quo that I was not in a position to advise him in this matter, that I gathered from this suggestion an indication that the Japanese desired to control this question until the so-called Round-Table Conference may take place, and that in order to do this they would ask that the neutral Commission, which we were to appoint, would continue in control or in Charge until that time. Mr. Quo stated that the Chinese would not be willing to accept this amendment.

He also referred to the separate note under which he had promised that China would re-affirm the Mayor's letter of January 28th. He said that the Chinese Government would not be

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able to do this. This was a political question and therefore beyond the scope of these negotiations. The League Resolution did not call for the discussion of such questions. I informed Dr. Quo that I was not in a position to discuss the question of the anti-Japanese boycott or other activities, and that I did not feel that I was in a position to advise him on the subject.

NOTE: Subsequently, at a dinner which the four Chiefs of Mission gave to the League Commission I had occasion to discuss the above questions with Dr. Wellington Koo, Dr. Quo, and General Wu Tieh-cheng. With reference to the duties of the neutral Commission, as suggested by the Japanese, I pointed out to Dr. Quo that it was my understanding that the Japanese had offered this amendment in paragraph two of the League Resolution of March 11, 1932, which Resolution called for cooperation of the Powers "in maintaining order in evacuated zone" and had been acquiesced in by the Chinese delegation.

I suggested to Wellington Koo and also to Mayor Wu that the question of the re-affirmation of the Mayor's letter of January 28th was a stumbling block which the Japanese would insist upon before they would agree to a cessation of hostilities

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and while disclaiming any interest in the question in so far as I was concerned, I expressed the thought that a way out would be for the Mayor to have some newspaper man ask him about the validity of his letter of January 28th whereupon he could state publicly that it was still valid. I remarked that the sooner this was done the better, as no one now would connect his statement with negotiations with the Japanese. I suggested that this would help matters in that the next time the Japanese brought this question up all that was necessary would be for the Chinese to point to the Mayor's public statement. Mayor Wu did not seem to take kindly to this suggestion, saying that he hoped that the Japanese could be persuaded not to bring this matter up. Dr. Koo, however, thought that it was worth a good deal of consideration and promised to consider it.

N.T.S.

American Minister.

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By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 17, 1932.

British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson.
French Minister, M. Wilden.
Italian Charge d'Affaires, Count Ciano.
American Minister, Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

There being no further news from Mr. Shigemitsu in regard to the proposed meeting, it was agreed that we could do nothing but wait. It was our belief that Mr. Shigemitsu was having difficulty with his Government over the tentative agenda. In the meantime Sir Miles offered us, for consideration, the attached draft covering the proposition of the joint Commission provided for by paragraph three of the agenda. He suggested that we might consider this draft as one that might be offered at a convenient time.

N.T.J.,
American Minister.

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The joint Commission will be composed of 12 members, namely, one civil and one military representative of each of the following; the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian Heads of Mission in China being the representatives of the neutral Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from amongst its neutral members.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Shanghai, March 20, 1932.

Conversation with Colonel Drysdale.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Colonel Drysdale informed me today that Japanese Military Attaché, in discussing Japanese plans with foreign Military Attachés, stated that Japanese will propose at the forthcoming meeting, between Chinese and Japanese delegates, that Japanese forces will withdraw to a line running roughly from Paoshan, near Woosung, through Yanghang, Taitsang, to the northwest corner of the Settlement, that such a line will be necessary to accommodate a Japanese force of 37,000 men. Colonel Drysdale says that the argument of the Japanese is that the area behind this line will be necessary to enable such a force to maneuver. Colonel Drysdale pointed out that such a line held by such a force will be stronger as a defensive line than the one which they now hold, and did hold, with 45,000 men.

It is our belief that Japan will not show any willingness to withdraw these forces. We believe that they intend to use this force for the purpose of causing the Powers in China to accept the Round-Table Conference.

N.T.U.
American Minister.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/150 FOR # 555

FROM Japan (Neville) DATED April 6, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Japanese plans with respect to Manchuria. Apparent lack of- but there is an indication that Tokyo is using Manchuria as an attempt to divert the Japanese Military from a course which might bring it into conflict with the Nine-Power Treaty.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Tokyo, Japan, April 6, 1938.

No. 555

Subject: Japanese plans respecting Manchuria.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Japanese seem to be at a loss as to what to do with the new state which they appear to have on their hands in Manchuria. Practically all information obtainable in Tokyo leads one to the conclusion that any plans which the Japanese may have respecting the new state are neither complete nor comprehensive. There is no indication here that the Tokyo Government has a plan other than to attempt to divert the Japanese military from a course which might bring a charge by a foreign government of infringement of the Nine-Power Treaty. On the other

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hand, having succeeded in its ambition of a Manchuria compliant to dictation, the Japanese military is apparently becoming aware of the need of something more than military prowess in administering the new state so that it will bring economic benefit to Japan.

In its despatch No. 518, of March 10, 1938, the Embassy commented on the seeming inadequacy of the plans of the military. It is probable that the military would like to develop Manchuria by continued control of the Chinese puppets now in office there. In this connection there are reports indicating that a nationalist feeling is becoming evident among these officials which might eventually be adverse to Japanese interests, their recent insistence that the Official Gazette of the new state be no longer published in Japanese being cited in support of this view. From a Japanese source which is believed to be reliable I have heard that Tsang Hsih-yi of Mukden is regarded as more capable than any Japanese in Manchuria and likely to submit to Japanese direction only so long as submission may be profitable. He is said to be even more able than Lieutenant-Colonel Ishikawa who is reputed to be the officer most influential in Japanese activities in Manchuria. In the press other aims of the Japanese military are mentioned, such as demilitarization of the new state - the Chinese military to be replaced by a police force or a constabulary for the suppression of banditry - .

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banditry - , the settlement of Japanese emigrants on a large scale, the development of Manchurian resources by Japanese concerns. No comprehensive plan is, however, apparent, and the aims above mentioned all require money.

It is said by Japanese civilians that the military seems to have no idea that the raising of money for the fulfillment of its ambitions is a difficult problem. Recently, however, there has been a new development which seems to show that the military is giving serious consideration to this aspect of the matter. An agreement has been reached by which the leading financial interests of Japan - the Mitsui and the Mitsubishi - will lend money to the Manchurian Government. According to the press the first loan is Yen 20,000,000 for five years at five per cent, the loan being made through the Bank of Chosen, a surplus of the salt tax being the security. From a conversation I had with a leader of one of these interests, it would seem that the capitalists concerned are granting this loan with considerable misgiving. They may feel, however, that should the loan itself not be sound there will be indirect gain through commerce which such loans may promote. Or they may perhaps be motivated by fear, considering the recent assassination of the Managing Director of Mitsui, Baron Iwano, and plots against the lives of other capitalists on the part of reactionaries who had some as yet undefined connection with military officers." Even if such fear does not exist, the capitalists may believe it wise to

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placate the military, a large element of which is known regard capitalists with disfavor.

The fact that the military, despite its dislike of capitalists and its previous intention to restrain their activities in the new state, has agreed to this loan appears to be significant. It seems to mark the beginning of disillusionment of the military with regard to their hopes in Manchuria. If disillusionment is as yet too strong a term, at least the agreement indicates a compromise with fact on the part of the military. For example, I have been reliably informed that Lieutenant-Colonel Ishiwara has heretofore been strongly opposed to the entry of capitalists into Manchuria. The ideas of Ishiwara and of the military group associated with him appear to be a curious mixture of imperialistic nationalism and socialism. The recent renaissance of feudal spirit, as illustrated by the activities of the Japanese military, is distinctly colored by socialism. The spread of radical ideas in Japan during the past two or three decades has affected the classes from which the military is drawn and in a measure fused two points of view that are usually regarded as antithetical. The Embassy has recently had occasion to report the convergence of views of the military, reactionary bodies, and parts of the proletarian parties. The dislike of the military for capitalists is one indication of this. The military's reasons for compromise with the capitalists may be explained by reference to a conversation with Colonel Ishiwara of which I recently heard. He is said to have frankly admitted that he has no plan for the future of the new state. If as there is

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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reason to believe, he is the strongest Japanese in Manchuria, this admission, together with the report that he is one of those officers who planned for years the action that began on September 18, 1931, and the report that he is - for an army officer - surprisingly open to conviction, may explain this change in attitude. Apparently the military has been persuaded that the Japanese Government cannot undertake to support the Manchurian adventure indefinitely.


Respectfully yours,

Edwin L. Neville

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Embassy's File No. 900.-Manchuria.

ENC/AA



0528
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5107

SEE 811B.01/169 FOR despatch #567

FROM Japan (Neville) DATED April 9, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Political relations between China and Japan.

Refers to letter from Secretary of State Stimson to a friend in which he stated that Philippine Independence would probably start a movement to disturb the whole world emanating from the Far East, and that the Philippines would eventually fall under the rule of either China or Japan. Article taken from Tokyo newspaper states that Japan has no territorial ambition in China proper and elsewhere.

mc

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Tokyo, April 9, 1932.

No. 567.

Subject: Philippine Independence.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies in
1,2/. translation of editorial articles appearing in two
influential newspapers of Tokyo in regard to the Hare
Bill and the question of Philippine independence. Both
articles consist largely of reviews of the situation and
express no decided opinion in regard to the granting of
independence. Both give as their opinion that the move-
ment in America to grant independence grows out of economic
self-interest and has little of an altruistic nature.

Any

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Any feeling that the writers of these articles exhibit is that of umbrage over the suggestion that Japan would seize the Philippines in the event independence were granted. The ASAHI denies, with some heat, that Japan entertains territorial ambitions toward China or other parts of the Orient, and resents the imputation of such ambitions.

Other than these articles, the question of Philippine independence has received recently but little attention in the Japanese press. That comment appears is largely expressive of resentment over the allegation that Japan would seize the Philippines if American rule were withdrawn. Several of the news reports contain a few lines of comment, of which the following, from the Tokyo ASAHI, is typical:


This letter ^{allegedly} (from the Secretary to Senator Bingham) demonstrates in an astonishingly frank manner, the fundamental motive back of the Hoover Government, namely that of retaining the Philippine Islands. Moreover, it demonstrates plainly the profound belief that Japan will seize the Philippines, and that this belief has become more fixed since the Manchurian affair".

Respectfully yours,

Enclosures:

Copy in translation
 editorial Tokyo ASAHI
 " " translation
 Tokyo NICHU NICHU
 Embassy's File No. 105.
 ETT/CR

Edwin L. Neville,
 Chargé d'Affaires ad interim



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE
OF THE PHILIPPINES.

(Editorial)
 Tokyo SAHI, April 6, 1932.

On April 4, the House of Representatives of the United States passed a bill providing independence for the Philippines by an overwhelming majority of 306 votes to 47. By this bill, which was sponsored by Representative Outler B. Hare, a Democrat, American sovereignty would be withdrawn from the Philippines eight years after the inauguration of a constitutional government. The measure authorizes the retention by the United States of strategic areas in the Philippines. During the period which must elapse before American rule is withdrawn, a gradual limitation would be imposed on the entry of Filipinos into the United States. Philippine imports into the United States would also be subjected to duties during the transition period. The question is whether the Filipino people would agree to withdrawal of American rule under such conditions as those provided for in the Hare bill. The majority of Filipinos demand immediate independence. It is easy to see that Filipinos would object to any provision which opens the way for the United States to interfere in the matter of determining a constitution. The United States interfered with Cuba for the adoption of a constitution. Who can guarantee that the United States would let the Filipino people have their own constitution? The retention by the United States of strategic areas in the Philippines would also be opposed by Filipinos. Be that

-2-

as it may, the action of the House of Representatives this time cannot fail to be appreciated by Filipinos generally.

There are several reasons why the Hare bill was passed by the large majority in the House of Representatives as above stated. The House of Representatives is controlled by the Democrats who have been in favor of independence for the Philippines since the Islands passed under the rule of the United States thirty four years ago. In the United States, a movement has recently been started by merchants and manufacturers against the free importation into the United States of Philippine products. Those in favor of this movement urge the wisdom of granting independence to the Philippines and thereby imposing duties on Philippine imports. The opposition to the free entry of Filipinos into the Pacific coast of the United States was also a factor in favor of the Hare bill.

Whether the bill will receive as heavy support in the Senate as was given by the House of Representatives remains to be seen. In view of the fact that the administrative committee in the Senate has drafted a bill providing freedom for the Philippines after the lapse of certain years, the atmosphere in the Senate may be regarded as favorable.

Whether President Hoover will approve the measure just passed by the House of Representatives is a question. Another point worthy of attention is whether an agreement will be reached between the House of Representatives and the Senate regarding the period of granting independence to the Philippines. Especially noteworthy is the fact that Secretary of War Hurley and

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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and Secretary of State Stimson are antagonistic to the independence of the Philippines.

Secretary of State Stimson recently addressed a letter to a friend, in which he stated that the withdrawal of American rule from the Philippines would result in the disturbance of the balance of power in the Far East. Mr. Stimson further stated therein that if American rule be withdrawn at a time like the present when an historical movement to disturb the whole world is likely to be started from the Far East, the Philippines would ultimately come under the rule of either Japan or China. We wish to call attention of Secretary of State Stimson to the fact that Japan has no territorial ambition in China proper and elsewhere and that Japan's actions in Manchuria are nothing but the guarding of her legitimate rights and interests. With any historical movement to disturb the whole world from the Far East, Japan has nothing to do. Whenever the independence question of the Philippines is discussed, Japan is always made the objective of doubts and suspicions. We hope that those who discuss the above question will be very careful in their utterances. By the way, we call attention of the Japanese Government and people to the fact that Japan is often misunderstood by other nations as was the case with the statement above alluded to.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE
OF THE PHILIPPINES.

(Editorial)

Tokyo NICHU NICHU,
 April 7, 1935.

A bill providing for independence for the Philippines was passed by the House of Representatives of the United States on April 4 by an overwhelming majority of 403 to 47 votes. The full significance of this bill is not yet known to us in the absence of detailed information about the contents of the proposition in question. But one thing is certain and that is that the passage of the bill with such a sweeping majority deserves a special record in the annals of the independence movement for the Philippines. In view of the fact that Secretary of War Hurley and Secretary of State Stimson are opposed to independence for the Philippines, the passage of the bill shows that the public opinion of the United States is in favor of granting independence to the Philippines.

The recognition of independence for the Philippines is nothing but what the United States is bound to do from her repeated public pledges given in the past. The question is whether the United States is going to grant independence to the Philippines solely and entirely out of her sense of altruism. One of the factors giving a particular impetus to the American plan of granting independence to the Filipino people is America's intention of restricting Filipinos from entrance into the United States. The constant and easy influx of Filipinos into

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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into the United States is proving a serious menace to American labor. Anti-Filipino agitation in the Pacific coast of the United States has assumed such a serious dimension that last year the authorities were obliged to take suppressive measures against the agitators. This agitation is now rationally conducted in the United States. The Labor League in California recently passed a resolution opposing the entrance of Filipinos to the United States. The American Labor Union, at its conference called at Boston some time ago, unanimously passed a resolution proposing to grant immediate independence to the Philippines as an effective means of checking the entry of Filipinos into the United States.

The declaration issued by the United States at the time of the occupation of the Philippines indicates that the United States has no territorial ambition and that she merely desires the prosperity and happiness of Filipinos. In the Jones Bill which was passed by Congress in 1916, it is stated that American rule would be withdrawn from the Philippines and that the United States will grant independence to the Philippines when a stable government shall have been established in the Islands. From this, it may be inferred that the recognition by the United States of the independence of the Philippines seems to be a question of time. However, the announcements made by Secretary of State Stimson last year and this year indicate that such a recognition is out of the question. From a letter sent by Mr. Stimson to the chairman of a committee in the Senate, we can easily see how international politics are conducted

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so as to suit one's own convenience.

Secretary of State Stimson, while announcing that under American rule the Filipino people are enjoying prosperity and happiness, emphasizes the importance of the occupation by the United States of the Philippines under any circumstances in so far as the international position of the United States is concerned. Mr. Stimson further announces that in future the United States will have greater interests in the Pacific question, and that if American rule be withdrawn from the Philippines it is apparent that the Islands will pass into the hands of either China or Japan.

By such an announcement, the granting of independence to the Philippines becomes an impossibility. The public pledges given by the United States are nothing but a scrap of paper. There is no moral reason for justifying the American occupation of the Philippines at present as well as in the past. But the United States wants to justify her occupation of the Islands on the ground that such occupation is not only essential to the American national existence in the Pacific but conducive to the promotion of prosperity and happiness of Filipinos.

We do not want to criticize the theory of the United States regarding the Philippines. What we want to call the attention of the United States to is the glaring inconsistency to which Secretary of State Stimson commits himself by denying to other countries the theory which he applies to his own case. The announcement of Mr. Stimson that Japan will take possession of the Philippines when American

rule

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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rule would be withdrawn shows that he ignores international courtesy. We greatly censure Mr. Timson for his impropriety and at the same time we are dumbfounded at his arbitrary announcement.

...

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 5365



CHINA, March 30, 1932

HE UNDER SECRETARY

APR 26 1932
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: JAPANESE CONSUL GENERAL OHASHI LEAVES HARBIN

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON



SIR:

793.94
793.9493

I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2345, of even 1/ date, sent to the Legation on the subject of the departure from Harbin of C. Ohashi, Japanese Consul General here.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

1 enclosure as indicated

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2346

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, March 30, 1932

SUBJECT: JAPANESE CONSUL GENERAL AT HARBIN

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson

American Minister,

Peiping, China

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the local Japanese Consul General, C. Ohashi, who had been absent a month in Tokyo returned to Harbin on March 18th and requested me to lunch with him on that day. I found Mr. Ohashi depressed mentally and physically and was quite surprised at his appearance of illhealth. He informed me that his visit to Tokyo had not been very satisfactory, and that he had been ill most of the time while in that city. A few days later he told me that he had been ordered back to Tokyo. On March 25th he called on me to say good bye. When pressed in regard to his reason to return to Tokyo he stated that he was not to take up a new post in the foreign service of Japan but that he intended to resign from the service and accept a position with the new government of Manchoukuo at Changchun. He stated that by so doing he was sacrificing his pension, which he ordinarily would receive after a year and a half more service, and that his salary with the new government would be only one half of that he is now receiving as Consul General. He emphasized the fact that he was acting on his own initiative and that his acceptance of the new position was entirely voluntary. He added that Chang Ching Kai, whom he had helped to retain his position

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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as Civil Administrator of the Special Area, had urged him to enter the service of the new government. He requested that I treat the information he had given me in regard to his accepting a new position as confidential.

However, Chinese officials who knew of Mr. Ohashi's plans divulged them and they were no longer to be considered secret. Mr. Ohashi will be in charge of general affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Changchun. In this new position he will practically conduct the foreign affairs of the new government. Mr. Hsieh Chieh Shi is not considered by Chinese to be a very capable official and while temporarily at Harbin a few months ago ostensibly in charge of foreign affairs here he unsuccessfully intrigued to secure the position as Civil Administrator of the Special Area. Mr. Ohashi left Harbin on March 26th for Changchun, where it is expected he will remain to greet the Commission of the League of Nations now visiting the Far East.

It is my opinion that Mr. Ohashi expected that upon his arrival at Tokyo he would receive an appointment similar to that received by Consul General Hayashi at Mukden, who was made Japanese Ambassador to Brazil. Instead of this he was instructed to take up the position with the Foreign Office of the new government at Changchun. I believe that despite his remarks he had no desire to take up this new work. This would explain the depressed condition in which he was when returning to Harbin.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

Copies have been sent to
the Department.

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GCH/TLL

the original.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM GRAY

Shanghai

Dated April 26, 1932

Rec'd 2:50 a. m.

WP



Secretary of State,
 Washington.

PRIORITY.

April 26, noon.

My April 23, 2 p. m. High Commission heard from British Minister who is returning from Nanking today that Chinese Government is prepared to accept suggested amendment to paragraph 11 of new draft resolution. That he has so informed his Secretary for Foreign Affairs at Geneva and has told him that Wang Ching Wei and the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs have made it plain that this represents China's last word and limit of her concessions.

/ Not repeated to Geneva.

JOHNSON

CIB JS

F/DEW

793.94/E109



APR 28 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Department of State

Washington,
 April 26, 1932.

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Minister Johnson's ⁵¹⁰⁹ ~~in his~~ April 26, noon, from
 Shanghai, in reference to his April 23, ⁵⁰⁹⁴ 2 p.m., repeated
 to you ~~at Geneva~~, reports as follows:

QUOTE ~~By April 23, 2 p.m.~~ High Commission heard
 from British Minister who is returning from Nanking
 today that Chinese Government is prepared to accept
 suggested amendment to paragraph 11 of new draft
 resolution. That he has so informed his Secretary for
 Foreign Affairs at Geneva and has told him that Wang Ching
 Wei and the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs have
 made it plain that this represents China's last
 word and limit of her concessions. UNQUOTE.

✓
 Apr. 26. 1932 RV

Castle, Acting

SKM

FE:JEJ/VDM FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

793.94/5109

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11899 FOR #227

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED March 12, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1137 ...

REGARDING:

Chinese desire for a lasting peace with Japan. Memorandum of conversation with Chinese newspaper man and Consul Paul Meyer in which the Chinese stated that the-

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5110

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Nanking, China.

March 12, 1932.

Subject: Forwarding Memorandum on the
Chinese Political Situation.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose with this despatch a memorandum of a conversation between Consul Paul W. Meyer and a local Chinese newspaper man whom this office has found to be generally reliable and who is in close touch with current Chinese politics. The conversation took place at a small dinner given by an American missionary in Nanking. There were three other Americans present. The memorandum gives very briefly most of the subjects discussed, the Chinese himself leading the conversation. The conversation covered many subjects and no attempt has been made to classify or evaluate them in the memorandum.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peek,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
Memorandum, as described.

In quintuplicate to the Department
In duplicate to the Legation
Copy to the American Minister at Shanghai.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum to be given to the Department No. 5-221 of
Willys R. Peak, American Consul General at Nanking,
China, dated March 12, 1938, entitled "Forwarding
Memorandum on the Chinese Political Situation".

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Nanking, March 9, 1938.

Subject: Political Situation

Chinese Resident of Nanking

Consul Paul W. Meyer

The following statements were made by the Chinese
informant during the course of the evening:

1. The Second Plenary Session was held only for
the purpose of reelecting Chiang Kai-shek to
his former posts.
2. All the important military authorities and
most of the civil authorities are now back
in Nanking, and they are here to stay. They
do not now fear military action by the Japanese
at Nanking and they give the impression that
peace negotiations are sufficiently advanced
for them to return to Nanking permanently. All
want peace with Japan, not just a truce. Chiang
Kai-shek advocates peace now rather than after
a defeat, even though they have to accept the
same terms as those which would be imposed after
a big defeat. He considers it a senseless waste

of

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of effort to continue the war since China could not win anyway.

3. Chiang Kai-shek has sent 2 divisions of troops to Hangchow, and there are already two Divisions of his troops at Chinkiang. (The impression was given that these troops are there for purposes other than opposing Japan.
4. There were no troops at Liuhc when the Japanese landed there. Chiang Kai-shek was supposed to have sent two divisions to hold the Liuhc front, but they never arrived.
5. Japanese decided to land troops at Liuhc after they had captured General Wang Ken in the Astor House Hotel in Shanghai and learned from him that there were no Chinese troops in that area. They previously supposed that there were many Chinese troops there and that a landing would therefore be very costly. General Wang Ken had all the Chinese military plans with him when he was captured. He was quizzed at the Japanese military headquarters for two days before the Japanese released him, and he told everything.
6. The Military Affairs Committee reported to the Second Plenary Session at Loyang that the greatest menace to China today were the communists and the bandits, and not the Japanese.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7. There are now five Red armies in Hupeh, and they are confident they can capture Hankow. They can take Kiangsi and Anhwei easily and are already talking about the advance eastward (to attack Nanking).
8. T. V. Soong is probably already negotiating with the Japanese for peace terms.
9. Sun Fo made approximately 3 million dollars during the short time he was in office in Nanking. He sold short his government bonds, then after he came to Nanking he proposed a moratorium on these bonds which caused them to drop. He bought them back at a greatly reduced price and then said nothing more about a moratorium.
10. T. V. Soong bought Wang Ching-wei's loyalty for \$2,000,000., when Wang was sick in Shanghai Soong visited him in the hospital. He remarked that Wang needed to get out of the hospital and into a house. Wang said that a house would be too expensive. Soong said: "Never mind, I have one that you may have". Wang said that he was not sure whether he would take it or not. Wang's wife said that if he did not take it, she would. Later money is said to have changed hands also. At the time Wang was very much in debt, as he has been financing himself and his programs during the past two or three years by loans from friends.
11. The Victory Celebration of March 4 was well planned

but

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

but no one knows by whom. It appears that a certain Chinese military headquarters at Shanghai gave out the first news of the "Victory". This was broadcasted over Millington's radio station at Shanghai early Friday morning. Almost simultaneously posters appeared in Shanghai telling about the victory. This was followed by mosquito papers, and "extras" by the more reliable Chinese newspapers in Shanghai. In Nanking the Central Party Headquarters was responsible for spreading the rumor of the victory. All reports quoted Reuters. Chiang Kai-shek was much displeased with the affair.

12. Chiang Kai-shek is finished.

a. He made a bid for Party leadership and failed.

b. He made a bid for political leadership and failed.

c. He has recently made a bid to regain his military leadership and has failed;

1. He ordered General Chen Tiao-yuan to go to Shanghai. Chen replied that his troops were needed in Anhwei and that he could therefore not go to Shanghai.

2. He ordered Liang Kwan-yin to go to Shanghai. Liang stated that Haichow was a very vulnerable spot in the event of a Japanese attack and that his troops were needed there.

3. He ordered Han Fu-chu to go to Shanghai. Han stated that if he did that the Japanese would certainly attack Shantung.

4. He ordered a General in Kiangsi to proceed to Shanghai, but this General stated that he could not go on account of the communist menace.

General

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War and chief subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek, issued similar orders to other Generals "but nobody in the army pays any attention to orders from Ho Ying-chin". Chiang still has a certain amount of control over a few divisions but he no longer has troops under his direct command.

13. The Kuomintang is also finished. This is freely admitted by high party leaders in Nanking.
14. The present military regime in China is finished. There will be a period of readjustment and chaos, followed by a regime of a more radical type, something like the communists. There is no moderate party in China to take the place of the Kuomintang.
15. The German military advisers laid out the plans for the defense of Shanghai. They maintained that the Woosung forts were impregnable. Part of their plan was to block the river channel by sinking old Chinese war ship, so that Japanese ships could not come up the Whangpoo or the Yangtze; to defend the Liuhe area; and to sink all Japanese warships on the Yangtze. Chiang disapproved of the plan as it would mean war with Japan.
16. T. V. Soong is under the influence of Dr. Rajehman, the League of Nations representative in China.

Soong

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Soong is convinced that China should rely entirely on the League and has consistently followed this course. Dr. Rajchman had to be recalled by the League once because he was too aggressive in his work in China. Some Chinese are advocating a League of Nations mandate for China.

17. The economic effects of the flood are soon to be felt. The American wheat shipments will soon be exhausted and the Chinese government can buy no more wheat. The refugees will be a problem. Also the effect of the flood upon business generally will be felt very soon.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./52 FOR #1457

FROM China (Perkins) DATED March 30, 1932
TO NAME I-1157

REGARDING:

Exchange of Notes with the United States concerning the Sino-Japanese situation.

ek

793.94/E111

E111

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3. Exchange of Notes with the United States Concern-
the Sino-Japanese Situation.

On the 7th of January the American Secretary of State addressed an identical note to the Governments of China and Japan. On January 13th the Chinese Government, replying to this note, stated inter alia that

"from the time that the present events in the Northeast began on September 18, 1931, and up to the present day (the Chinese Government) has in every respect fulfilled its duties as prescribed in the Pact against War and has taken no steps of any nature whatever calculated to aggravate the situation."

It accused the Japanese, on the other hand, of having extended the field of their invasions; of having seized Chinchow; of having occupied Suichung and Channaiquan; and of having increased their forces at Chingwantao, Tientsin and other places. It declared that the Japanese must bear full responsibility for the events involved in these violations of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact against War. In conclusion, the reply assured the American Government that:

"with reference to the notification of Your Excellency's Government that in this matter it does not recognize as legal any situation de facto, I have the honor to state that the Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged with the Japanese Government the gravest protests against the various invasions and lawless acts perpetrated by the Japanese since September 18, 1931, and has made it known internationally that the

Chinese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- / -

The concluding paragraph specifically appealed to the United States as the sponsor of the Nine Power Treaty:

"With Shanghai in such a critical situation, the other places of China can be placed in great peril at any moment. Japan's violation of the Nine Power Treaty is impairing the sovereignty and independence as well as the territorial and administrative integrity of China. As Your Excellency's Government is the sponsor of the said Treaty, I have the honor to urgently request that you will cable Your Excellency's Government to observe their solemn pledges and obligations of the said treaty by adopting prompt and effective measures in order to prevent further Japanese military actions within Chinese territory and all other such acts on her part as are in violation of the said treaty so that its sanctity may be preserved and peace in the Far East maintained."

On January 31, as a result of the continued crisis at Shanghai, the Foreign Office addressed a second note to the American Minister. The Foreign Office said that

"after the State of Emergency had been declared in Shanghai, the Japanese troops had been assigned to defend the Chapel area, east of the Shanghai-Woosung Railroad, and that, on the afternoon of January 30, the Japanese troops suddenly replaced the British troops in the International Settlement area south of Soochow Creek and west of P'i-lin-hu."

It observed that the Chapel area was purely Chinese-controlled, and if the Japanese were really assigned to that area, it was quite evidently an act which violated China's sovereignty. In conclusion, it requested the American Minister to

"at once issue telegraphic instructions to the American Consul at Shanghai and to the officer in command of the American forces to put a stop at once to the military operations of the Japanese in Chapel and no longer to permit the Japanese forces to utilize the territory of the International Settlement for attacks on Chinese controlled areas."

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Chinese Government accords them no recognition whatsoever.

With regard to the treaties or agreements referred to in the note under reply, I have the honor to state that the Chinese Government, basing its position on its sovereignty and independence and on the principle of territorial and administrative integrity has absolutely no intention of concluding any treaties or agreements of the categories described."

There was a further exchange of notes after the outbreak of hostilities at Shanghai. On January 30, the Chinese Government formally accused the Japanese of pursuing an aggressive and positive military policy which had led to the invasion of Shanghai. It reviewed the events there in the following manner:

"On January 28 at 1:45 p.m., the reply of Mr. Wu Tieh-cheng, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, in reference to the four demands of Japan, was accepted by the Japanese Consul General with satisfaction; but at midnight on the same day, Admiral Shiosawa delivered an ultimatum to the Shanghai Municipality demanding that immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops for the occupation of the Japanese forces; at the same time the Japanese military forces took the initiative and attacked the Chinese troops with machine guns, and since then have been directing their attack continuously up to the twenty-ninth. Over twenty Japanese planes bombarded incessantly and indiscriminately along Chapei, the thickly populated district of Shanghai causing the said district in a state of conflagration resulting in the killing of countless civilians."

It stated that the Commercial Press and other cultural organizations had been destroyed, and continued

"Such actions not only place the lives and properties of all nationals residing in Shanghai in great danger but also constitute a direct menace to the very foundation of humanity and civilization. It is obvious that Japan should bear the entire responsibility

The Chinese authorities are compelled to take necessary measures as self defense and for the upholding of her sovereign rights"

The

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 25 1932.

No. 1860

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,
 American Minister,
 Berne.

Sir:

There are enclosed for your information copies and a paraphrase, as listed below, of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in Manchuria for the period April 14 to April 20, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your communicating to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, the information contained in the enclosures to this instruction. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in these messages.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.,

Acting Secretary.

Enclosures:

Telegrams from Peiping:

435, April 14, 793.94/5045
 438, April 15, (Paraphrase) 793.01.1127
 444, April 19, 793.94/5058
 445, April 19, 793.51.1105

895.
 PR:EC:VL:SS

KRM
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 m.m.h.

793.94/5111A

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In a telegram dated April 15, 1932, from Peiping, the Counselor of the Legation quotes a telegram dated April 14, from the American Consul General at Mukden which is substantially as follows:

It is understood on good authority that T. Kawasaki (until recently a Japanese Foreign Office official attached to the Consulate at Harbin) and Ohashi, Japanese Ex-Consul General at Harbin, are attached to the Foreign Office of the Manchuria régime at Changchun and are working busily to prepare documents to be given by the Manchuria régime to the League Commission of Inquiry. It is thought that the objection to the entry of Dr. Wellington Koo into Manchuria comes from the two men mentioned above. It seems that Japanese are the only active members of the Government at Changchun.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.11/1524 FOR #D231

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Mar. 17, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: evacuation of Americans from Nanking in February, 1932.

793.94/5112

5112

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. D-231

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China.

March 17, 1932.

Subject: Evacuation of Americans from
Nanking February, 1932.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose with this despatch
copies, in quintuplicate, of my despatch No. L-195
dated March 17, 1932, to the Legation at Peiping
entitled "Evacuation of Americans from Nanking
February, 1932".

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

As stated.

In quintuplicate

300

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1-195

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China.

March 17, 1932.

Subject: Evacuation of Americans from
Nanking February, 1932.

Honorable Nelson Truett Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 32, dated February 6, 10 p.m., to the Department of State, concerning the evacuation of American women and children from Nanking, and to enclose with this despatch, for the Legation's information, a copy of letter dated March 15, 1932, addressed by this office to a local American resident, describing the attitude of this Consulate General toward the subject of the suggested return of the evacuated Americans at this time.

Although there has been no active fighting between large bodies of Chinese and Japanese troops during the past two weeks, the Consulate General feels that the situation with respect to the safety of Americans at Nanking has not sufficiently cleared up to warrant the Consulate General modifying its original advice. It is possible, however, that the present state of affairs will

last

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last for some time to come, in which case this Consulate General may have to state that the present emergency is no longer a temporary state of affairs, and announce that Americans should either remain away from Hankin indefinitely, or, if they return, it should be on the distinct understanding that the situation has not changed, that the Consulate General does not yet consider it safe for Americans to reside here, and, that those who elect to live in Hankin, in these conditions must take cognizance of these facts and be prepared to evacuate on short notice.

Respectfully yours,

Willard H. Peck,
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of letter dated March 15, 1932, from the
 American Consulate General to a local American
 resident.

In duplicate to the Legation
 In quintuplicate to the Department
 Copy to American Minister at Shanghai.

SCU
 PAM:MCL

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch to the Legation No. L-196 of
 Willys R. Peak, American Consul General at Nanking,
 China, dated March 17, 1932, entitled "Evacuation
 of Americans from Nanking February, 1932".

In reply refer to
 File No. 30 WRP:MOI.

American Consulate General,
 Nanking, China.

March 16, 1932.

Mr. C. Stanley Smith,
 Nanking Theological Seminary,
 Nanking.

Sir:

Permit me to confirm the conversation held by you
 with the officers of the Consulate General this after-
 noon, in the course of which you inquired whether, in
 the opinion of this office conditions are such that the
 advice against the presence of American women and children
 in Nanking, as set forth in a letter dated February 5,
 1932, may now be modified.

You will recall that the opinion expressed by the
 officers of the Consulate General was that the danger of
 disorders in and around Nanking has not disappeared, the
 reasons for this view being that as yet no agreement has
 been come to between the Japanese and Chinese forces
 near Shanghai for a cessation of hostilities, the Japanese
 and Chinese troops are still facing one another in constant
 readiness for a resumption of fighting, and the excitement
 aroused by the recent events at Shanghai has not been
 appreciably allayed. The presence of a large number of
 Chinese troops in the Nanking-Shanghai area must be
 recognized as another potential source of disorder.

Very respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peak,
 American Consul General.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Commission/183 FOR #101

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED Mar. 30, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: copies of book issued by Peiping-Liaoning Railway concerning
 Japanese occupation of Manchuria, and prepared for the use of
 the Manchurian Commission of Inquiry.

793.94/5113

5113

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00/383 FOR Report # - .

FROM Nagasaki (Hitchcock) DATED April 7, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Publication of an editorial entitled "Japan's
 Future Diplomacy and Its Slogan" following
 a succession of triumphal returns of various
 military and naval units from the Shanghai
 scene.

793.94/5114

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 8179

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

DEPART. Shanghai, China, March 24, 1932.

MAY 6 1932

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Sanitary Conditions in Chapei.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

Copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 26 1932
Department of State

I have the honor to refer to my telegrams No. 174, dated March 9, 4:00 p.m., and No. 181, dated March 11, 5:00 p.m., with regard to the insanitary condition of those portions of Chapei adjoining the International Settlement and the steps taken by the authorities of the International Settlement to remove the menace to health caused by this condition.

1/ I now enclose herewith a copy of Senior Consul's Circular No. 133, circulated on March 9, 1932, containing the text of the communication which the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council addressed to the Senior Consul on that date, enclosing a copy of his letter to the Mayor of the same date.

2/ There is also enclosed a copy of a report made by Dr. John H. Jordan, Commissioner of Public Health of the International Settlement, concerning a survey made by him of the sanitary conditions in various areas

contiguous

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MAY 7 - 1932

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contiguous to the Settlement.

3/ Likewise enclosed is a copy of Senior Consul's Circular No. 138, circulated on March 21, 1932, containing the minutes of the Consular Body meeting of March 11 at which the subject of cleaning up the Chapei area was discussed. At this meeting the Secretary General of the Shanghai Municipal Council, Mr. Stirling Fessenden, was present and stated that the Council felt that unless some measures were taken at once to ameliorate the insanitary conditions, the Settlement was threatened with a grave menace to public health. The Consular Body gave its approval to the sanitary measures to be taken by the Shanghai Municipal Council. In my remarks at the Consular Body meeting, and in my discussions with the Settlement authorities, I took occasion to point out that the action of the Shanghai Municipal Council in engaging in activities outside the limits of the Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads must be considered purely as an emergency measure. I was assured that the Settlement authorities had no other motive than consideration for the health of the Settlement; that they would engage in no activities except those of sanitation; and that no political or other ulterior motive was behind their desire to clean up these Chinese areas.

I was informed that about March 16, with the consent of the Japanese authorities, and without objection from the Chinese authorities, the Shanghai Municipal Council


Public

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Public Works Department commenced cleaning up these sections of Chapei and that the work is still in progress.

Respectfully yours,


Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosures:

- 1/- Copy of Senior Consul's Circular
No. 133, of March 9, 1932.
- 2/- Copy of Report of Commissioner of
Public Health, Shanghai Municipal
Council, dated March 9, 1932.
- 3/- Copy of Senior Consul's Circular
No. 138, dated March 21, 1932.

PRJ:NLH
800/810.1

In quintuplicate
In duplicate to Legation
Copy to Minister at Shanghai

056

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8129 of E.S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 24, 1932, on the subject: "Sanitary Conditions in Chapei."

(CIRCULAR NO. 133-M-XIII.)

SUBJECT: SANITARY CONDITION IN CHAPEI

THE SENIOR CONSUL PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS HONORABLE COLLEAGUES AND HAS THE HONOR TO CIRCULATE THE FOLLOWING FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

(From the Chairman of Shanghai Municipal Council to the Senior Consul)

March 8, 1932.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter addressed to the Mayor of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai on the subject of the grave menace to the health of the Settlement arising from the derelict and insanitary condition of those portions of Chapei immediately contiguous to the Settlement.

I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(sd) E. S. Cunningham,
Chairman.

E. S. Cunningham, Esq.,
American Consul General & Senior Consul,
Shanghai.

Enclosure: March 8, 1932.
General Ma Teh-chen,
Mayor of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai.

Sir:

I have the honour to invite your attention to the grave danger arising from the disorganised and insanitary state of those portions of Chapei which, as the result of the recent conflict, have been left without any sanitary or other essentials of public service. In particular I would emphasize that in those portions of Chapei abutting on the Settlement, and in the area adjoining North Szechuan and Dixwell roads, any further delay in restoring sanitary conditions constitutes a grave menace to the health of the Settlement and of the whole of Shanghai. The Settlement has recently been threatened with a very severe smallpox epidemic which was largely due to imported cases, and it is feared that with the complete paralysing of the normal conservancy and sanitary arrangements in the Chapei area, the health of the whole community will be endangered.

In so far as its assistance has been requested in sending the Municipal Fire Brigade and obtaining a water supply to check the spreading conflagrations, the Council carried out what was obviously a public duty. As it has already indicated to officials of your Municipality, the Council would further welcome the immediate initiation by you of sanitary work in the areas concerned, and would gladly cooperate in whatever way it could be of assistance.

Whilst

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Whilst the Council assures you that it has no desire to function even temporarily outside the limits of its own administration, it feels, however, that if nothing is done immediately to remove the menace to health in the contiguous areas it will be compelled by necessity to make a survey of the problem and take steps to render such sanitary supervision and service as may be required under the circumstances.

As you are already aware of the position I hardly need assure you further that the Council is solely actuated by the desire to assist and cooperate with you in a matter of public duty which, in the interest of humanity, must be undertaken by some organised body.

I have the honour to be,
 Sir,
 Your obedient servant,
 A. B. MacNIGHTEN,
 Chairman.

 Circulated March 9, 1932.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 8179 of E.S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated
March 24, 1932, on the subject "Sanitary Conditions in
Chapei."
C O P Y

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Shanghai, March 9, 1932.

The Secretary.

SANITATION CONDITIONS OF THE AREAS
ADJOINING THE SETTLEMENT

In accordance with instructions received at the
Council Meeting on March 7th, I proceeded to investigate
this subject.

To expedite matters the areas to be reviewed were
sub-divided into five sub-districts, of which three were
inspected by myself accompanied by a Senior Official, and
two were inspected by Senior Chief Health Inspectors.

The districts were: -

- (1) the area to the North of Chaoufoong and Kungping Roads,
bounded to the South by the Settlement borders, to the West
by the Sawgin Creek, and the East & North by new roads known
as the Tsangpang Road, and a road leading off Yochow to the
North, the name of which I was unable to ascertain.
- (2) the area bounded on the East by Sawgin Creek, to the
West by Dixwell Road, and extending Northwards towards the
Chinese Y.M.C.A. Recreation Ground.
- (3) the triangle formed by Dixwell, North Szechuen and
Range Roads.
- (4) the area between North Szechuen and its extension and
the Railway.
- (5) the Chapei area proper.

It would seem that the worst and most dangerous
area is that above Chaoufoong Road, which has always been
somewhat suspect by the department, and which at the present
time is in what can only be described as a deplorable state.
Were it not for the cold weather, I am of opinion
it would be an active danger to the Settlement, and
moreover that a warm spell would at once make this
danger a real one.

It is essential in my opinion, that the
ordure and house refuse be removed, and that certain
of the small creeks blocked with faeces be attended to.
A full survey is being made of this area.

The second area, North of Sawgin Creek and West
of Dixwell Road, is reported to be in a most insanitary
condition, and immediate sanitary measures are necessary
in order to prevent the spreading of disease, more especially
as the warm weather is now approaching.

The

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The third area - that between Dixwell Road and North Szechuen Road, though a very difficult one to survey, owing to absence of side roads or through alleyways, seemed to me to be not at all bad, though there were certain insanitary areas. It would therefore be a comparatively simple matter to remedy such defects as were found.

The fourth area, according to the report from Mr. Heathcote, C.H.I., does not appear to be exceptionally bad, though a good deal of house refuse requires removal, but conditions are not so urgent, and I understand this area would be pretty dangerous to tackle at the present time owing to the presence of hand grenades and other explosives.

Finally in regard to the Chapel area, I have first to draw attention to the fact that I am not personally as well acquainted with the roads of this area as I could wish, and in addition the area being as large as the Western district, to make a satisfactory survey would take several days, and though I have to express my gratitude to the Japanese authorities who afforded me the fullest possible assistance, nevertheless, owing to Military exigencies, and to the blocking of certain roads by trenches and other obstructions, I was not able to make as satisfactory a survey as I could have wished. At the same time certain areas contiguous to the Settlement were surveyed with reasonable care and conditions are decidedly better than I had reason to anticipate.

The main roads are extremely clean and there is a distinct absence of ordure, as far as my observations, which were naturally somewhat hasty, went. There was however, in many alleyways, a very large accumulation of house refuse, and the sooner this is removed, the better. I do not doubt that more careful survey would reveal certain insanitary areas which were not noted owing to the necessarily rapid tour, and my lack of familiarity with the minor roads.

Nevertheless, I think it may be stated that taking the areas as a whole, the problem is not nearly as urgent as in certain other areas, but at the same time it is one which should not be neglected since it is not easy for military authorities, however efficient, to undertake certain civilian duties, such as removal of house refuse, and to make arrangements with ordure contractors. The Japanese Military authorities informed me that they were doing a certain very excellent work in regard to the sick and in regard to feeding certain of the inhabitants. I think, however, in regard to this area, it is desirable to make arrangements for general cleansing in conjunction with the Japanese authorities. I therefore propose to outline the measures which would be desirable should it prove impossible to cooperate with the Chinese authorities, to assist them to maintain their own areas.

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I would suggest the establishment of certain new temporary districts attached to those areas contiguous to the Settlement. For example, area No. 1 could temporarily be attached to Nos. 4 & 5 Sanitation Districts of this Department, and be described as No. 6, Temporary Eastern District. The boundaries of this District could be Dixwell Road in the West, Settlement boundary in the South, and in the N. & E. the open country, which would result in an irregularly shaped district which could readily be maintained by one Inspector.

The area between the railway to the West, Range Road to the South, and Dixwell to the East, could be combined as a temporary measure with the 3 Northern district, though additional assistance might be necessary.

In regard to the Chapel areas, it is my opinion they could be worked from our Markham Road Office, and our 4 Northern Office, as a temporary measure.

Should it become necessary for the Council to undertake these measures and provided the necessary arrangements could be made, the method I would suggest from the sanitary standpoint would be a gradual penetration into the areas above mentioned, with a gradual expansion of districts, and possibly the creation of special districts.

Should however, it become a matter of cooperating with the Chinese authorities, there is no doubt that this department, and particularly the P.W.D., could give valuable assistance.

I might conclude by drawing attention to the fact that whilst the matter is primarily one of interest from the sanitation standpoint, the P.W.D. are more experienced in regard to much of the actual work than this department, and their assistance would be entirely necessary before any definite fixed plan could be adopted.

To undertake this work it will be necessary to augment the staff of this department somewhat, but the cost of such measures need not necessarily be high, nor do I consider that the cost of general cleansing work would attain an exorbitantly high figure, though this is a matter upon which the Commissioner of Public Works is more competent to comment on.

I note that a proclamation appears in the Press to the effect that the Chinese Authorities will undertake this work, and have to express pleasure that this should be so since undoubtedly this department, and probably others, have their hands full and are not in the least desirous of adding to their responsibilities, but I beg to reiterate that the matter may prove urgent, and that delay in translating the intention into action might produce disastrous consequences. I am glad however, to be able to report that owing to the cold weather being unfavourable to the production of epidemics of intestinal disorders, I could note no evidence of severe epidemics, and the Japanese Authorities who are in close touch with the state of health in areas guarded by themselves, informed me that on the whole, conditions were satisfactory.

J. H. Jorand,
Commissioner of Public Health.

Copied by NLH #4
Compared with MB8

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 8179 of E.S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 24,
 1932, on the subject "Sanitary Conditions in Chapei."

(CIRCULAR NO. 138-G-V.)

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF CONSULAR BODY MEETING, MARCH 11, 1932.

THE SENIOR CONSUL PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS HONORABLE
 COLLEAGUES AND HAS THE HONOR TO CIRCULATE THE MINUTES OF A
 CONSULAR BODY SPECIAL MEETING HELD AT THE AMERICAN CONSULATE
 GENERAL AT 2:00 P.M. MARCH 11, 1932.

 Present:

Consul General for U.S.A. & S. C.	-E. S. Cunningham, Esquire,
Consul General for Norway	-N. Aall, Esquire,
Consul General for Belgium	-J. Van Haute, Esquire,
Consul General for Netherlands	-F. E. H. Groenman, Esquire,
Consul General for Great Britain	-J. F. Brennan, Esquire, C.B.C.,
Consul General for Denmark	-Ove Lunn, Esquire,
Consul General for Japan	-K. Murai, Esquire,
Consul General for Spain	-E. V. Ferrer, Esquire,
Consul General for Portugal	-Dr. J.B. Ferreira da Silva,
Consul General for Switzerland	-E. Lardy, Esquire,
Consul General for France	-J. Heyrier, Esquire,
Vice Consul for Italy	-Count G. del Bono,

and by invitation
 Secretary General, Shanghai
 Municipal Council

-S. Fessenden, Esquire.

The Senior Consul said he had asked his interested
 colleagues to convene in order that the subject of the
 alleged insanitary conditions in Chapei, mentioned in the
 Council's letter of March 8 to Mayor Wu (Circular No. 133)
 might be discussed. Mr. Fessenden had kindly accepted his
 invitation to attend the meeting in order to express the
 Council's attitude in the matter. Mr. Fessenden said the
 Council was very much concerned over the insanitary condi-
 tions in Chapei. With the consent of the Japanese author-
 ities the Council had sent its Commissioner of Public
 Health to make an investigation of that area, and as the
 result of his report, the Council believed serious threat
 to public health in the Settlement existed and that the
 Council should take immediate steps to remove or mitigate
 the menace. The Council felt that it alone possessed the
 organization and equipment to cope immediately with the
 menace, and accordingly he and the Chairman of the Council
 had called on Mayor Wu of the Shanghai (Chinese) Municipal
 ity that morning, at 11 a.m., had represented the hygienic
 dangers of the situation to him, had expressed the desire
 of the Council to remove, through Shanghai Municipal
 Council Public Health and Public Works Departments, the
 threat in the Chapei district to public health in the
 Shanghai areas and had asked the Mayor if he had any
 objection to the Council undertaking this work at once.
 The Mayor had replied that he agreed in principle, but
wanted

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 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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wanted to be informed in detail concerning the proposed work, in pursuance of which he suggested that his Commissioner of Public Health call on the Shanghai Municipal Council. The work would be done entirely at the expense of the Council. The Council understood the Japanese authorities would not oppose the work (and if the consent of those concerned could be obtained the Council proposed to commence operations on Sunday (March 13) or Monday (March 14). The Council's representatives had also told the Mayor that the Council was willing to turn this sanitary work in Chapei over to the local Chinese authorities immediately those authorities announced that they were in a position to undertake it. The Council realized that in carrying out health measures in Chapei it was, strictly speaking, going outside its province, but felt its action was justified in the interests of the public health of all the Shanghai areas. Accordingly the Council wanted the Consular Body to support it in its action, or at least to say that it did not disapprove of its projected course. The Council expected to exchange official written communications with the Mayor on the subject of its proposed sanitary work in Chapei, which communications would be made available to the Consular Body. In proposing to go into Chapei the Council was motivated entirely by considerations of health and not by any political or other motives which might be described as ulterior.

The Senior Consul referring to a letter which had been sent by Mayor Wu to the Japanese Consul General regarding the resumption of Chinese administrative functions in Chapei, remarked that letters from the Mayor on the subject had also been sent to other consulates. He enquired if his Japanese Colleague was willing to inform the meeting what he proposed to do in the matter.

The Consul General for Japan replied that he had received a letter from Mayor Wu and had consulted with his military authorities concerning it. No answer to the Mayor had been sent as yet but he thought the Japanese authorities would allow the Chinese to engage in sanitary work in Chapei and also resume public utility services.

The Consul General for the Netherlands remarked that he presumed the necessity for "cleaning up" Chapei was a very urgent one and Mr. Fessenden indicated on the map that the region west of the Hongkew Creek was in the worst state, hygienically speaking, next in order came the Hongkew salient and finally the area known as Chapei proper (including the North Station) was "not so bad".

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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will. The Consul General for the Netherlands expressed the wish that the assent of the Chinese Authorities be obtained to the proposed activities of the Shanghai Municipal Council in the ~~Shanghai~~ areas.

The Consul General for Great Britain thought that the Consular Body should record its hearty approval of the Council's proposals and the meeting generally accepted this view, the Consul General for the Netherlands adding that he felt sure the Consular Body greatly appreciated the Council's proposal to remove a menace to Settlement health.

The Senior Consul thanked Mr. Fessenden for coming to the meeting and for his exposition of the subject being considered.

THEN THE MEETING TERMINATED

Circulated March 21, 1962.

0575
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 4, 1932.

MEM:
RCM:
SKH:

U: If you have time.
SKH

Shanghai transmits herewith copies of three memoranda concerning events immediately prior to the opening of hostilities at Shanghai on the night of January 28 which would tend to indicate that the Japanese were determined to press the Shanghai affair from the beginning. I suggest particularly that you read the first memorandum which was prepared by Vice Consul Ringwalt who was in the Hongkew area at the time fighting broke out on the evening of January 28. I have marked some passages in his memorandum.

[Handwritten signature]

JEJ/VDM

0578

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 8181

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.


95C/A

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,


Shanghai, China, March 31, 1932.

793.94
127 Ringwalt

AM RECD



[Handwritten signatures and initials]



[Handwritten initials]

SUBJECT: Statements Regarding the Opening of Sino-Japanese Hostilities.

F/LS

793.94/5116

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith for the
1/ Department's information copy of a memorandum dated
March 17, 1932, by Vice Consul A. R. Ringwalt,
transmitting a statement from Brigadier Fleming,
Commander of the British Forces in the Shanghai Area
and senior officer of the Defense Committee, dated
February 5, 1932, concerning the events immediately
prior to the opening of hostilities on the night of
January 28.

FILED

MAY 1 4 1932

It will be noted also that Vice Consul Ringwalt
was himself an eye-witness to some of the events of the
Japanese attempted occupation of Chapei on that night.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

RAF:hf
800

Enclosure:
1/- Copy of memorandum with enclosure in two parts.
In Quintuplicate.
In Duplicate to the Legation.

1-1221
...

(Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 8181 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 31, 1932, subject: Statements Regarding the Opening of Sino-Japanese Hostilities.)

INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

March 17, 1932, p. m. 5:00.

Subject: Opening of Sino-Japanese Hostilities.

The attached statement and report were furnished me by Colonel Thoms, S. V. C. In my opinion they are of great interest and shed very considerable light on an otherwise obscure situation, particularly with reference to the opening of hostilities on the night of the 28th of January.

It seems quite plain that both Chinese and Japanese were prepared for the outbreak of hostilities. For example, the Chinese had a secret telephone wire leading down from a breastworks on Raoshing Road to a point overlooking the Japanese Public School so that troop movements of the Japanese in this neighborhood could be reported direct to this post.

The Inspector in charge of Hongkew Police Station has informed me that there was no indication that Chinese police evacuated Chapei until they were driven out by the Japanese forces and any claim to the contrary on the part of the Japanese was patently false. To his own personal knowledge there were some eighty or ninety Chinese police functioning east of Szechuen Road extension the night of the Japanese occupation, who were caught by the Japanese advance and were unable to make their escape. He believes that they retired to private houses and changed clothes, and that these men furnished the nucleus of the plain clothes brigade in this particular district. To the best of his knowledge all Japanese residents of Chapei were withdrawn before the night of the occupation, with the possible exception of a few Japanese concentration camps in the immediate vicinity of their military headquarters, which could be readily defended.

In so far as the movements of the Chinese members of the Shanghai Municipal Police were concerned, they were withdrawn from all areas within the Japanese sector as of 4:30 on January 28 when the State of Emergency went into effect.

I have conversed informally with Major Gerrard regarding the operations of the Japanese troops and it appears to be his unofficial opinion that the Japanese never intended to stop from the first. This opinion would seem to be borne out by the attached report regarding

the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the efforts of the Japanese military to attack the Chinese troops through West Nanon Road Gate.

I was an eye witness to a good deal of what went on during the first night of the occupation and happened to view the assembling of the Japanese troops near the Public School about 11:15 p. m. prior to their being dispatched into Chapei. My impressions were that the whole affair was being treated in the light of a picnic by the Japanese, with speeches, flashlight photographs and general gaiety. It was quite obvious that the occupation had been worked out a long time in advance as anyone could testify who saw the troops landed at the various jetties on the Bund and Broadway and from this point loaded on busses which fell into line with almost the same precision as a parade of wooden soldiers.

At about a quarter to twelve the troops left the assembly point at the Public School for various streets leading into Chapei, where they met with considerably more opposition than they had anticipated. Apparently they immediately called for reinforcements. As the firing was getting rather promiscuous at this time, I decided that discretion was the better part of valor and decamped. On the way back, I was able to view the mopping up methods of the Japanese troops. A squad of some fourteen or fifteen with rifles and machine guns would approach a street corner and on turning the corner would sweep the street, sidewalk and shops with machine gun bullets. I noticed considerable sniping, which handicapped the movements of the mopping up squads very considerably. I passed a number of wounded and dead civilians. Some had been shot and others bayoneted.

From this point I returned to the office of the United Press and from this window saw Japanese reinforcements being landed at the Customs Jetty, at which point they were bundled on to trucks and dispatched to Chapei.

Someone has said that the explanation for the Shanghai venture is that the Japanese Navy was jealous of the highly successful Manchurian expedition in which the Japanese army participated. The Navy hoped to duplicate this success in Shanghai.

ARTHUR R. KINGWALT.

hf

Copied by HF *fi*

Compared with MB *B*

0519

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Part 1 of Enclosure to Memorandum of Vice Consul
A. N. Ringwalt dated March 17, 1932, on the subject:
Opening of Sino-Japanese Hostilities.)

H. B. M. Consul-General,
British Consulate,
23, The Bund,
Shanghai.

STATEMENT OF EVENTS PRIOR TO
OPENING OF HOSTILITIES.

1. At a meeting of the Defence Committee on 27th January, 1932, Captain Samejima, Commander of the Imperial Japanese Naval Landing Party, in reply to a question by me said that with regard to the threatened drastic action to be taken in the event of the Chinese not conceding to the demands contained in Rear Admiral Shiozawa's ultimatum, he would give as much notice as possible of such action.

He added that the Rear Admiral would issue a public statement twenty-four hours in advance of taking action.

Captain Samejima further stated that in the event of the Japanese having to take action, it was the wish of Rear Admiral Shiozawa that the Shanghai Municipal Council should declare a state of emergency.

2. At 0730 hours, 28th January, 1932, Mr. Toda, who carries out liaison between myself and Japanese Headquarters, called on me at my house and said that the Japanese would be taking action next day.

3. At 1800 hours, 28th January, 1932, Captain Samejima personally informed me that in view of the fact that the Chinese had agreed to the Japanese demands, the necessity for drastic action would only arise if the Chinese failed to carry out their promises. He added that in any case no action was likely that night.

4. At 2255 hours, 28th January, 1932, information was received from the Shanghai Volunteer Corps that a member of the Japanese Company had reported that the Landing Party were preparing something they were anxious to conceal. There were screens covering the activities of their lorries. It was anticipated that they would attack Chapei from the North and East. The first intention was to start at 2200 hours, but that that had been altered to midnight.

5. At 2310 hours, 28th January, 1932, my Brigade Major was informed by Mr. Givens of the Shanghai Municipal Police that according to an official news bulletin issued at 2115 hours, Rear Admiral Shiozawa had issued a proclamation at 2030 hours, announcing his

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

his decision to take the necessary military action in
 Chapei.

6. At 2330 hours, 28th January, Mr. Toda called on
 me to say that the Japanese were about to undertake a
 minor operation to extend the area occupied by them
 and erect barbed wire between Chapei and themselves and
 around Hongkew Park.

7. At 2330 hours, 28th January, 1932, it was evident
 from reports received that the Japanese Landing Party
 were drawn up ready to start operations.

8. I attach a statement by Lieutenant Tuxford, Shanghai
 Volunteer Corps, regarding subsequent events in the C. V.
 C. sector in North Honan Road.

(Sgd.) G. FLEMING, Brigadier,
 Commander, SHANGHAI AREA.

SHANGHAI,
 5th February, 1932.

Copied by HM *fr*

Compared with MB *B*

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Part 2 of Enclosure to Memorandum of Vice Consul
 A. R. Ringwalt dated March 17, 1933, on the subject:
 Opening of Sino-Japanese Hostilities.)

Report by C. C., "A" Company, S. V. C., on the Attempt
 of the Japanese Forces to Pass Through the Defence Gate
 at Blockhouse "B" on the Night of 28th/29th January, 1932.

At the time of the circumstances detailed below, "A"
 Co., S. V. C., was holding that portion of the boundary
 line between Blockhouse "B" and Gate No. 9 on Cunningham
 Road, inclusive.

On Thursday night, 28th/29th January, 1932, at about
 midnight one Japanese armoured car and about 100 or more
 Japanese Marines came along Range Road. The armoured
 car was leading and it was attended by two Japanese
 interpreters in civilian clothes. At the corner of
 Range Road and North Monan Road this force was seen by
 Lt. Moffat, M. C., and C. S. M. Smith of "A" Co., S. V.
 C. Mr. Moffat asked the Officer in charge through the
 interpreter what was happening and informed the Officer
 that he could not go through the steel gate leading
 out into Boundary Road. He further informed him that
 nothing could be done until permission from H. Q. was
 obtained.

The armoured car turned the corner out of Range
 Road into N. Monan Road and stopped facing the steel
 gate. The Japanese Marines halted in Range Road. Lt.
 Moffat reported to Group H. Q. in person.

Cpl. Dalton, M. C., of "A" Co. was in charge of
 Blockhouse "B" and was actually in the road when the
 Japanese column appeared. He went up to the armoured
 car and about fifteen men got out of the armoured car
 and advanced up to the gate in two columns in single
 file. Cpl. Dalton went up to the Japanese officer
 and informed him that the gate could not be opened.
 He then telephoned direct to S. V. C. H. Q. reporting
 the above and was told under no circumstances were the
 gates to be opened.

The Japanese wanted to come into the Blockhouse
 but were not allowed to do so. There were two sentries
 on duty at the gate, Ptes. Nicholson and Traerup of
 "A" Co.

A relief was actually taking place at the time and
 Ptes. Harvey and Fasciato were relieving the other
 sentries and all four men were in the road and witnessed
 the whole of the foregoing.

The

058

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The armoured car retired at about 0020, leaving about 15 Japanese Marines at the gate. The remainder of the Marines stayed in Range Road at Honan Road corner.

At about 0045 hrs. lorries arrived with sand bags and the Japanese started building shelters at the side of the road to cover the approach to the steel gate into Boundary Road.

At about 0245 hrs., another truck load of Japanese Marines arrived. This was witnessed by Lt. Tuxford and Sgt. Aiers of "A" Co. The Japanese officer intimated to Mr. Tuxford that he wished the steel gate to be opened. Mr. Tuxford refused and reported direct to H. Q. and was informed by Col. Thoms that the gates were not to be opened on any account.

The Japanese wanted to use the Blockhouse as an C. P. but this was refused.

At about 0600 hours, a sandbag barricade was completed across H. Honan Road about 10 yards behind the steel gate to a height of 4 or 5 feet. At about 0645 hours, the Japanese opened heavy rifle fire through the gate for about 5 minutes and desultory rifle fire for some time after.

A Japanese sniper got on the roof of the Blockhouse before dawn and remained there firing at intervals all day.

After daylight, Col. Thoms arrived and shortly afterwards the Japanese retired from the steel gate into Range Road.

(Sgd.) W. B. BROWN, Captain,
C. C., "A" Company, S. V. C.

(Sgd.) I. R. B. TUXFORD,
"A" Company, S. V. C.

Copied by MB *VA*

Compared with MB *B*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 439

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Tokyo, Japan, March 28, 1932.


SUBJECT: Transmitting APR 25 1932 Clipping from
The Japan Advertiser containing Resolution
by American Missionaries in Japan.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:



I have the honor to transmit herewith as of possible interest to the Department a clipping in quintuplicate from The Japan Advertiser, Tokyo, dated March 28, 1932, covering a resolution in the form of an open letter signed by some 135 American citizens, all of whom appear to be engaged in missionary efforts of one character or another in Japan.

The second paragraph of the statement is of particular interest. The Japan Times, Tokyo, of March 28, 1932, comments upon this statement editorially, stressing the point of the admitted American culpability in the past through non-adherence to a pacifist policy.

Respectfully yours,

Arthur Garrels
Arthur Garrels,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
Newspaper clipping.

File No. 800.
AG/yo.

F/LS 793.94/5117

FILED

APR 28 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 439, March 30, 1932, from the
 American Consulate General, Tokyo, Japan.

Clipping from The Japan Advertiser, Tokyo, Japan, March 28, 1932.

MISSIONARIES FAVOR METHODS OF PEACE

Statement Issued by Americans
 in Japan on Subject of
 Sino-Japanese Conflict

USE OF FORCE IS DEPLORED

Signers Opposed to Campaign
 in United States for Placing
 Economic Boycott

A statement concerning the Sino-Japanese situation, which is critical of both American and Japanese policies of the settlement of international problems by means of force and which is signed by 135 American missionaries resident in Japan, has been issued. The statement does not represent the unanimous opinion of American missionaries for it is understood a larger number declined, for one reason or another, to sign the statement than the number which signed it. The statement follows:

"The following statement has grown out of repeated conferences by a group of American missionaries in Tokyo, and has received the endorsement of the undersigned persons throughout the country. Although the swiftly moving events of the past few weeks might make certain changes in wording desirable, the statement is issued as embodying timeless principles which are the permanent convictions of the signers."

"Our first word must be one of confession. We are citizens of a country that has at times furthered its own national interests by force, and by disregard of the rights and feeling of other peoples. Having by formal treaty renounced war we are even now imperilling the new processes of peace by spending much more in preparation for future wars than any other nation; by the maneuvers of a great fleet in Pacific waters; by supplying munitions to other countries; and by widely published discussions in committees of the United States Senate looking toward vastly increased expenditures for the navy. We readily admit that the sins of our nation in the past render any protest we might make against the conduct of another one open to the charge of inconsistency, if not of hypocrisy.

Embargo Agitation Regretted

"We deeply regret any agitation in America for the independent application of an economic embargo against Japan. While we recognize that many of its advocates have been prompted only by a desire to promote peace, we are convinced that the agitation has already hindered peace and is being used effectively in Japan by the advocates of a strong military policy. We believe that such action by America alone, far from promoting peace, would almost certainly cause war. Without necessarily renouncing the use of economic pressure by all the nations against an aggressor as provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations, we believe in the present circumstances that the threat of an embargo against Japan, only serves more fully to unify Japanese public opinion in support of the military policies.

"We believe that Japan has a fair claim for peace and order in the pursuit of legitimate economic opportunities in Manchuria and of any proper commercial and industrial undertakings she may have in China. We plainly see, too, how difficult this has become under the present disordered conditions in that country. Thus far we are one with what we take to be the method by which these interests should be protected. The policy of attempting alone and by military means a solution of such delicate international problems is one from which we are compelled to dissociate ourselves. We view its adoption in any country with profound grief and apprehension.

Peaceful Steps Advocated

"There is a better way. Since the World War grim necessity has combined with Christian idealism in drawing the nations of the earth away from the old method of arms toward the new processes of conference and law. By slow, painful steps a technique for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means has been set up. It is still new and largely untried, but in principle, at least, the governments of the world are committed to it, and its universal adoption awaits only the growing pressure of public opinion in every country. Since we as Christians have a conviction of the righteousness of this method, we feel the inescapable responsibility of doing everything in our power to promote the public opinion to support it.

"Much as we deplore the recent adoption of the old policy of force by Japan, we regret still more the scarcity of constructive discussion and criticism with regard to it. The country is being denied the leadership of some of her most enlightened minds at this time when it is sorely needed. We are keenly conscious of the difficulties in which our fellow-Christians are placed as a minority group open to frequent misunderstandings from society at large, and we offer them our deepest sympathy. We are, however, eager to avoid repeating the bitter experience of the churches of the West, which, since they failed to raise the prophetic voice of judgment in the day of world conflict were later unable to find the word of reconciliation for the peoples of the world.


"As we face the long future in Asia, so fraught with possibilities of good or ill for the human race we renew our pledge of faith in what we believe to be the way of Jesus as the only wise policy in this present situation, and we call upon our fellow-Christians in Japan and everywhere to join in that testimony to our common faith in the power of good-will which alone shall lead the world toward a better day."

The statement is signed by:
 Rose Armbruster, Jessie Asbury, Ruth Barbour, Eugene Barnard, Helen Barnes, Annie Bickel, Mabel Bickel, Charles Bishop, Mrs. Chas. Bishop, G. W. Bouldin, H. G. Bovenkerk, Blanch Brittain, T. T. Brumbaugh, Annie Buzzell, Gertrude Byler, Alice Cary, Alice Cheney, Lucile

Clarke, Harvey Clarke, Freda Clause, E. S. Cobb, Mary Collins, Clara Converse, Charma Covell, J. H. Covell, Matsu Crawford, Vernon Crawford, W. D. Cunningham, Mrs. W. D. Cunningham, Edith Curtis, John de Maagd, Marian de Maagd, Annie Dowd, Darley Downs, Lucille Downs, Marlon Draper, Winifred Draper, Dora Eringa, Wm. Erskine, Mrs. W. Erskine, Elizabeth Evans, Annie Ewing, Katherine Fanning, Mary Finch, Alice Finlay, Emma Fisher, J. E. Fisher, Josephine Fisher, R. H. Fisher, John Foote, Margaret Foote, Dorothy Franklin, Sam Franklin, E. C. Fry, Fred Gealy, Martha Gibson, Clarence Gillett, Mrs. C. Gillett, Elizabeth Gillian, Alice E. Gwinn, Harriet Hall, Howard Hannaford, Ruth Hannaford, K. C. Hendricks, Esther Hibbard, Edith Husted, Chas. W. Iglehart, E. T. Iglehart, Florence Iglehart, Luella Iglehart.

Roderick Jackson, Lona Jorgensen, J. S. Kennard, Jr., May Kennard, Grace Gerr, W. W. Krider, Lois Lehman, Clara Loomis, Hazel Lynn, L. W. Mann, Mona Mann, R. E. McAlpine, Mrs. R. E. McAlpine, Clarence McCall, Cora McCall, R. D. McCoy, Wm. McKnight, J. J. Mickle, Jr., Herbert Nicholson, Madeline Nicholson, Geo. Noss, Marie G. Noss, Pearl Nugent, W. C. Nugent, N. S. Ogburn, Helen Palmer, Azalia Pett, Jennie Pieters, Susan Pratt, Mary Ransom, Esther Rhoads, Margaret Rogers, Gertrude Ryder, Harold Schenck, Annie Scott, F. N. Scott, Mary Searcy, Edith Sharpless, Harriet Smith, H. V. E. Stegeman, C. R. Stetson, Mrs. C. Stetson, Mary Stewart, Doane Stott, Harvey Thede, Mrs. H. Topping, Helen Topping, Henry Topping, Mary Tracy, Mozzelle Tumlin, Hazel Verry, Julia Vorles, Gladys Walser, T. D. Walser, Florence Walvoord, Paul Warner, Chas. Warren, Cora Warren, Lillian Wells, Helen Wilson, A. D. Woodsworth, Mrs. A. D. Woodsworth, Wm. P. Woodard, E. H. Zaugg and Mrs. E. H. Zaugg.


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 27, 1932



Resolution of American Missionaries in Japan.

FW 793.94/5117

The Tokyo Consulate General (despatch No. 439, March 30, 1932) transmits the above resolution as published in the JAPAN ADVERTISER. The resolution was signed by 125 missionaries, but does not represent the unanimous opinion of American missionaries, it being understood that a larger number declined to sign it.

The resolution contains the following ideas:

The United States is imperiling peace by heavy expenditure in armament; by large-scale maneuvers in the Pacific; by supplying munitions to other countries and by discussions in the Senate committees looking to vastly increased naval expenditure. It is admitted that our national sins in the past make any protest against the conduct of another nation hypocritical. The agitation for an embargo against Japan in America is deeply regretted for it has already hindered peace and is being used in Japan by advocates of a strong military policy. It is considered that the threat of an embargo against Japan only serves to unify Japanese opinion in support of a military policy. It is believed that Japan has a fair claim for economic opportunity in Manchuria and China but the solution of Japan's problems in China by military force is not approved.

The

F.W.793.94/5117

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The settlement of international disputes by the machinery for peace that has been created since the World War is vastly preferable. While the adoption of force by Japan is deplored, the scarcity of constructive criticism regarding it is still more greatly regretted. Japan is being denied the leadership of her most enlightened minds at this time when it is sorely needed.

FE:WRL:EJL
hll

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

439

Tokyo, Japan, March 30, 1932.

Transmitting Newspaper Clipping from
The Japan Advertiser containing Resolution
 by American Missionaries in Japan.

I have the honor to transmit herewith as of possible interest to the Department a clipping in quintuplicate from The Japan Advertiser, Tokyo, dated March 28, 1932, covering a resolution in the form of an open letter signed by some 135 American citizens, all of whom appear to be engaged in missionary efforts of one character or another in Japan.

The second paragraph of the statement is of particular interest. The Japan Times, Tokyo, of March 28, 1932, comments upon this statement editorially, stressing the point of the admitted American culpability in the past through non-adherence to a pacifist policy.

Respectfully yours,

Arthur Garrels,
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:
 Newspaper clipping.

File No. 800.
 AG/yo.

70

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 439, March 30, 1932, from the
 American Consulate General, Tokyo, Japan.

Clipping from The Japan Advertiser, Tokyo, Japan, March 28, 1932.

MISSIONARIES FAVOR METHODS OF PEACE

Statement Issued by Americans
 in Japan on Subject of
 Sino-Japanese Conflict

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 Economic Boycott

A statement concerning the Sino-Japanese situation, which is critical of both American and Japanese policies of the settlement of international problems by means of force and which is signed by 135 American missionaries resident in Japan, has been issued. The statement does not represent the unanimous opinion of American missionaries for it is understood a larger number declined, for one reason or another, to sign the statement than the number which signed it. The statement follows:

"The following statement has grown out of repeated conferences by a group of American missionaries in Tokyo, and has received the endorsement of the undersigned persons throughout the country. Although the swiftly moving events of the past few weeks might make certain changes in wording desirable, the statement is issued as embodying timeless principles which are the permanent convictions of the signers."

"Our first word must be one of confession. We are citizens of a country that has at times furthered its own national interests by force, and by disregard of the rights and feeling of other peoples. Having by formal treaty renounced war we are even now imperilling the new processes of peace by spending much more in preparation for future wars than any other nation; by the maneuvers of a great fleet in Pacific waters; by supplying munitions to other countries; and by widely published discussions in committees of the United States Senate looking toward vastly increased expenditures for the navy. We readily admit that the sins of our nation in the past render any protest we might make against the conduct of another one open to the charge of inconsistency, if not of hypocrisy.

Embargo Agitation Regretted

"We deeply regret any agitation in America for the independent application of an economic embargo against Japan. While we recognize that many of its advocates have been prompted only by a desire to promote peace, we are convinced that the agitation has already hindered peace and is being used effectively in Japan by the advocates of a strong military policy. We believe that such action by America alone, far from promoting peace, would almost certainly cause war. Without necessarily renouncing the use of economic pressure by all the nations against an aggressor as provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations, we believe in the present circumstances that the threat of an embargo against Japan, only serves more fully to unify Japanese public opinion in support of the military policies.

"We believe that Japan has a fair claim for peace and order in the pursuit of legitimate economic opportunities in Manchuria and of any proper commercial and industrial undertakings she may have in China. We plainly see, too, how difficult this has become under the present disordered conditions in that country. Thus far we are one with what we take to be the method by which these interests should be protected. The policy of attempting alone and by military means a solution of such delicate international problems is one from which we are compelled to dissociate ourselves. We view its adoption in any country with profound grief and apprehension.

Peaceful Steps Advocated

"There is a better way. Since the World War grim necessity has combined with Christian idealism in drawing the nations of the earth away from the old method of arms toward the new processes of conference and law. By slow, painful steps a technique for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means has been set up. It is still new and largely untried, but in principle, at least, the governments of the world are committed to it, and its universal adoption awaits only the growing pressure of public opinion in every country. Since we as Christians have a conviction of the righteousness of this method, we feel the inescapable responsibility of doing everything in our power to promote the public opinion to support it.

"Much as we deplore the recent adoption of the old policy of force by Japan, we regret still more the scarcity of constructive discussion and criticism with regard to it. The country is being denied the leadership of some of her most enlightened minds at this time when it is sorely needed. We are keenly conscious of the difficulties in which our fellow-Christians are placed as a minority group open to frequent misunderstandings from society at large, and we offer them our deepest sympathy. We are, however, eager to avoid repeating the bitter experience of the churches of the West, which, since they failed to raise the prophetic voice of judgment in the day of world conflict were later unable to find the word of reconciliation for the peoples of the world.

"As we face the long future in Asia, so fraught with possibilities of good or ill for the human race we renew our pledge of faith in what we believe to be the way of Jesus as the only wise policy in this present situation, and we call upon our fellow-Christians in Japan and everywhere to join in that testimony to our common faith in the power of good-will which alone shall lead the world toward a better day."

The statement is signed by:

Rose Armbruster, Jessie Asbury, Ruth Barbour, Eugene Barnard, Helen Barns, Annie Bickel, Mabel Bickel, Charles Bishop, Mrs. Chas. Bishop, G. W. Bouldin, H. G. Bovenkerk, Blanch Brittain, T. T. Brumbaugh, Annie Buzzell, Gertrude Byler, Alice Cary, Alice Cheney, Luella

Clarke, Harvey Clarke, Freda Clause, E. S. Cobb, Mary Collins, Clara Converse, Charma Covell, J. H. Covell, Matsu Crawford, Vernon Crawford, W. D. Cunningham, Mrs. W. D. Cunningham, Edith Curtis, John de Maagd, Marian de Maagd, Annie Dowd, Darley Downs, Lucille Downs, Marion Draper, Winifred Draper, Dora Eringa, Wm. Erskine, Mrs. W. Erskine, Elizabeth Evans, Annie Ewing, Katherine Fanning, Mary Finch, Alice Finlay, Emma Fisher, J. E. Fisher, Josephine Fisher, R. H. Fisher, John Foote, Margaret Foote, Dorothy Franklin, Sam Franklin, E. C. Fry, Fred Gealy, Martha Gibson, Clarence Gillett, Mrs. C. Gillett, Elizabeth Gillian, Alice E. Gwinn, Harriet Hall, Howard Hannaford, Ruth Hannaford, K. C. Hendricks, Esther Hibbard, Edith Husted, Chas. W. Iglehart, E. T. Iglehart, Florence Iglehart, Luella Iglehart.

Roderick Jackson, Lona Jorgensen, J. S. Kennard, Jr., May Kennard, Grace Gerr, W. W. Krider, Lois Lehman, Clara Loomis, Hazel Lynn, L. W. Mann, Mona Mann, R. E. McAlpine, Mrs. R. E. McAlpine, Clarence McCall, Cora McCall, R. D. McCoy, Wm. McKnight, J. J. Mickle, Jr., Herbert Nicholson, Madeline Nicholson, Geo. Noss, Marie G. Noss, Pearl Nugent, W. C. Nugent, N. S. Ogburn, Helen Palmer, Azalia Pett, Jennie Pieters, Susan Pratt, Mary Ransom, Esther Rhoads, Margaret Rogers, Gertrude Ryder, Harold Schenck, Annie Scott, F. N. Scott, Mary Searcy, Edith Sharpless, Harriet Smith, H. V. E. Stegeman, C. R. Stetson, Mrs. C. Stetson, Mary Stewart, Doane Stott, Harvey Thede, Mrs. H. Topping, Helen Topping, Henry Topping, Mary Tracy, Mozzelle Tumlin, Hazel Verry, Julia Vories, Gladys Walser, T. D. Walser, Florence Walvoord, Paul Warner, Chas. Warren, Cora Warren, Lillian Wells, Helen Wilson, A. D. Woodsworth, Mrs. A. D. Woodsworth, Wm. P. Woodard, E. H. Zaugg and Mrs. E. H. Zaugg.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 5, 1932.

~~MMH:~~
~~SKH:~~

U.

In the attached despatch, Consul General Peck transmits a memorandum of a conversation with Dr. Lo Wen-ken, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Dr. Lo expressed some misgivings in regard to a statement of Sir John Simon in the House of Commons on March 22, 1932, in regard to the dispute between China and Japan. Dr. Lo said that "he realized with a shock that Great Britain might be wavering in her attitude toward the principles embodied in the various international covenants". He further stated that if this should unfortunately be the case, "he sincerely hoped that it was not true of the United States."

JEJ/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECD

NO. 73.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Seoul, Chosen, March 14, 1932.

APR 25 32

SUBJECT: Anxiety of Government General of Chosen
Regarding Missionary Opinion as to
Military Developments at Shanghai.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to report, as of possible interest to the Department, that the Government General of Chosen is seemingly anxious regarding the general opinion of foreign missionaries in this peninsula concerning the politico-military developments at Shanghai, and especially as to the effect such opinion may have upon the church constituencies in the United States and in the British Empire.

On March 9, 1932, in the name of the Government General of Chosen, approximately twelve American and twelve British missionaries were invited to a conference at the Bankers Club, Seoul, the object of which was evidently to present to the guests the Japanese explanation of the Sino-Japanese conflict at Shanghai, and to endeavor to convert the missionaries to the Japanese point of view.


A number of the missionaries invited got together a day or so in advance in order that they might be prepared to follow a uniform and well considered policy, and thus prevent any ill advised comment or remark that might later cause embarrassment to their work. At this preliminary meeting the majority were of the opinion that the only safe course to follow would be

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

to listen politely to whatever might be said, but themselves to make no comments, and particularly none which might appear as criticisms of the Japanese course of action. One British missionary had written a long and carefully prepared statement criticising, from the standpoint of a Christian missionary, many of the things which had been done. He was persuaded, however, to give up any idea of reading this at the conference. After some general discussion it was decided to follow the policy desired by the majority, which has just been described.

At the conference on the 9th Mr. Hodzumi, Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Government General, made quite a full statement expounding the Japanese thesis concerning the happenings at Shanghai and their causes. Mr. Oda, English language secretary to the Government General, also spoke but less formally. In general the remarks of both gentlemen brought out nothing new and simply reiterated what has appeared in the Japanese press. The missionaries were invited to ask questions but those put were of a harmless nature. However, a few questions seemingly caused the hosts some embarrassment, such as, for example, "If the developments at Shanghai do not constitute war, what would constitute war"?

One interesting revelation was the anxiety displayed concerning public opinion in the United States. Mr. Oda stated that they were much disturbed by the very real anti-Japanese feeling that had developed and particularly to note that several persons who had long been regarded as special friends of Japan are now very critical of Japanese action in Shanghai. The hosts also said that the foreign missionaries in Chosen were doubtless receiving many inquiries from their

friends

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 3 -

friends at home concerning developments in the Far East, and expressed the hope that, now that they had been acquainted with the facts, the missionaries would kindly do what they could to explain things to their friends.

It is stated that the majority of the missionaries, when asked to express their opinions, confined themselves to statements that they did not feel in a position to comment on such distant happenings as those at Shanghai but that they were appreciative of the religious tolerance and the law and order found in Chosen. These expressions of appreciation for the treatment accorded missionaries in this peninsula seemingly very much gratified the hosts.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Embassy at Tokyo for its information.

Respectfully yours,



John K. Davis
American Consul General

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JKD-rc

To the Department in quintuplicate.
Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECD

NO. 75.




AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Seoul, Chosen, April 1, 1932.

APR 25 32

SUBJECT: Anxiety of Government General of Chosen
Regarding Missionary Opinion as to
Military Developments at Shanghai.

713.91
391
103

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.



F/LS 793.94/5119

SIR:

I have the honor, adverting to my despatch No. 73, of March 14, 1932, to report that Mr. Yasuma Oda, the English Language Secretary to the Government General, has just completed a tour of the mission stations in southern Chosen and at each station visited has conferred with the American and British missionaries. In several places he has held conferences similar in general to the one described in the despatch referred to above.

It is thus increasingly evident that the Government General is desirous that everything possible be done towards inducing the American and British missionaries to take a favorable view of the recent Japanese conflicts with the Chinese.

Mr. Oda, although he only enjoys the title of Secretary, is in actuality the officer through whom the Government General most often comes in contact with all foreigners. He was educated and has lived many years in the United States. Although most earnest in serving Japanese interests he is very fair minded and practical.

Respectfully yours,

John K. Davis
American Consul General.

800.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-235

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China.

March 26, 1932.

Subject: Statement of Sir John Simon in the House
of Commons, on March 22, 1932, in regard
to the Dispute between China and Japan.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 72 of
March 26, 11 a.m. transmitting a summary of comments
made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to
the statement of Sir John Simon, British Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons on March 22,
1932, concerning the dispute between China and Japan.
A full report of these comments is enclosed herewith,
in a memorandum dated March 25, 1932. The draft of
this memorandum was shown to Dr. Lo Wen-kan and approved
by him.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck
Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Memorandum, as described, dated March 25, 1932.

In Quintuplicate to the Department of State.
in duplicate to the American Legation, Peiping.
one copy to the American minister, Shanghai.
one copy (as requested) to the Chinese Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

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WRP:MCL

4 Carbon Copies

Received

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MAY 14 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch to the Department no. D-245 of
 Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking,
 China, dated March 26, 1932, entitled "Statement of
 Sir John Simon in the House of Commons, on March 22,
 1932, in regard to the Dispute between China and Japan".

Memorandum of Interview

March 25, 1932.

Confidential

Subject: Statement of Sir John Simon in the House of
 Commons, on March 22, 1932, in regard to the
 dispute between China and Japan.

Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
 Mr. Willys R. Peck, Counselor of the American Legation.

Dr. Lo said that he had been so troubled on read-
 ing the published summary of a statement made by Sir
 John Simon in the House of Commons on March 22 that he
 wanted to make some comments on that statement and ask
 that Mr. Peck transmit them to the American Minister
 and the Department of State. He said that he intended
 speaking to Mr. Ingram, British Counselor of Legation,
 on the same subject, but that he would speak more freely
 and with greater frankness to Mr. Peck than to Mr. Ingram,
 because he wanted to wait and see whether Sir John Simon's
 statement really meant all that it implied in regard to
 the British Government's position, or not, before he
 raised any question with the British.

To begin with, Dr. Lo said, the whole tenor of
 Sir John's statement seemed to imply that in the dispute

between

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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between China and Japan there was a substantial equality of right and wrong, as between the two parties. This position, when it became known in China was bound to create a great feeling of disappointment, because the Chinese felt that throughout this controversy Japan had been the aggressor and China the aggrieved party and the Chinese were under the impression that the League of Nations and the friendly Powers were attempting to establish international justice. Dr. Lo pointed out that China had not come to the world, and especially to the League, as a suppliant for charity. China had, in good faith, signed the Nine Power Treaty, the Covenant of the League and the Pact Against War, and when things started in Manchuria China had come frankly to the other signatories of those covenants with proof that Japan had violated her obligations under the covenants. China had been constantly under great provocation to retaliate, but had nevertheless been faithful to the principles of the Pact Against War and the other international treaties and to the resolutions of the League not to aggravate the situation. China had limited her actions strictly to defensive measures and had left it to the other signatories of the Nine Power Treaty, the Pact Against War, and the Covenant of the League of Nations, to enforce those instruments and to maintain international justice.

With particular reference to the observations of the British Foreign Secretary, as published, Dr. Lo

invited

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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invited attention to that part of the statement in which Sir John Simon said that it was most important that Great Britain should not encourage or countenance what might be disregard or violation of Chinese territorial integrity under the Nine Power Treaty. Dr. Lo said China did not suppose that any signatory to the Nine power Treaty would encourage or countenance violation of China's territorial integrity, but he confessed that he was dismayed by even a reference to this possibility, because China had supposed that the other signatories were prepared to condemn and prevent such violation.

Dr. Lo then referred to Sir John Simon's reported observation that there was doubt whether Japan had been instrumental in setting up the so-called "puppet government" in Manchuria. He said that he had supposed the evidence of this had been conclusive to everybody. He thought it was self-evident that the "P'u-yi" regime had been set up by outside forces and he said he was very anxious to know whether the League Commission would condone this act, or whether the various treaty stipulations guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China would be maintained in full vigour.

Dr. Lo laid great emphasis on what he pointed out was the fallacy in the following statement attributed to Sir John Simon:

"At the same time, there was no law or common-sense in saying that in no conceivable circumstances could there ever be a subdivision of an enormous area like China. As a matter of fact, the raising in this province or that of an administration claiming independence was now commonplace in Chinese history".

Dr. Lo

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Dr. Lo said it was surprising to find a British statesman intimating that in the sight of law or common-sense a large nation had less right to maintain its territorial integrity than a small nation. He inquired whether this principle would hold in the case of India or Canada, which were comparable to China in area? Dr. Lo admitted that regimes asserting independence had been set up by Chinese factions in the past, but he insisted that this did not confer any right on another Government to promote such rebellious movements and utilize them to deprive China of a part of her territory.

In conclusion Dr. Lo said that he admitted that the present Chinese Government was in its youth and had shown many of the imperfections of youth. Nevertheless, China has been trained to rely on international justice, from the time of Hay to the present. China had looked up to the principles enunciated by Wilson and after the European War, which she entered at the urging of the United States, China had set up a monument inscribed to "The Victory of Justice". The imperfections of a youth do not confer the right on other persons to despoil him of his possessions. China has continued up to the present confident that the justice which is her due will be awarded her by the nations of the world.

In his statement Sir John Simon laid stress on the mediatory function of the League and ignored its coequal functions of arbitration and enforcement of international engagements. This fact had disquieted

Dr. Lo

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Dr. Lo very much, and he had asked Mr. Peck to come to see him, and to telegraph some of his observations to Washington. Dr. Lo said it was clear that the only alternative China had to reliance on international justice was to fight on her own behalf and he thought it would come to that if the Chinese people were to be faced by the fact that justice had not been done to them. China might not be able to fight as effectively as a highly "organized state" like Japan, but still she could fight in her own way, as the Boers had done in the South African War, and he was convinced that China would so fight, if she awoke to find herself robbed of Manchuria by Japan. The prospect, he said, was very depressing, since it would involve turmoil and ruin for the interests of all nations in China.

On reading Sir John Simon's reported statement, Dr. Lo said, he realized with a shock that Great Britain might be wavering in her attitude toward the principles embodied in the various international covenants he had mentioned. If this should unfortunately be the case, he sincerely hoped that it was not true of the United States.

WRP:MCL

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quejfen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 84.01 P. 2/51 FOR Despatch # 1458

FROM China (re: China) DATED 22-06-1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Movement of Japanese forces during February 1932, at
Shanghai, in Manchuria and in other parts of China,

jr

793.94/5121

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

79394

In opinion of Consul General at Mukden, southern Manchuria suffered more severely from banditry during period from September 1932, to March 1932, than at any other time in recent years. He points out that Japanese occupation of southern Manchuria has been the direct cause of adding to ranks of bandits large numbers of armed soldiers and police, many other recruits having been furnished by deserters during hasty retreat of Fengtien troops. When depredations of the bandits bring about carrying off of all livestock and carrying off or destruction of all stocks of grain, many male inhabitants of raided areas have had to join ranks of bandits to gain a livelihood. Most refugees are women, the number at Mukden being estimated at 50,000. Japanese in operations against bandits, reliably reported to bayonet wounded. Bandit prisoners are summarily shot. Japanese began use of Chinese troops in February for suppression of bandits. Bandits clasified in two categories, namely; "friendly" and "hostile", by Japanese. Japanese have in past employed bandits along Korean border, to maintain condition of unrest. Opinion of competent observers that Japanese will not be able to suppress banditry in Manchuria, under existing conditions.

19394

It is interesting to note the change of attitude during the month of General Ma Chan-shan, who had become a national hero through his dogged resistance of the Japanese. He maintained a neutral attitude through the beginning of the trouble between the old and new Kirin troops, attempting to mediate and settle the dispute peaceably. Later, he made Generals Ting and Li, after their defeat, feel that they were unwelcome in Heilungkiang Province.

On February 14th General Ma gave a sumptuous feast in the banquet hall of the Railway Club at Harbin to the Japanese generals and their staffs, military mission, consular officers, and prominent merchants.

On

- 9 -

On February 16th General Ma, accompanied by Colonel Doihara, left Harbin by Japanese airplane for Mukden. He was there appointed Governor of Heilungkiang Province.

On February 17th General Ma, together with Chang Ching-hui, Tsang Shih-yi, and Hsi Chia, two representatives of Mongolia, and one of Jehol, met at the Governor's palace at Mukden and formed themselves into an Administrative Commission.

On February 19th General Ma was back in Harbin; on the 22nd he had left for Tsitsihar, and by the 24th he was installed by the Japanese at Tsitsihar as Governor of Heilungkiang.

The Administrative Commission issued a declaration on February 18th declaring the independence of the four northeastern provinces and the severance of relations with the Kuomintang Government at Nanking, and stating that the Commission would arrange all matters relating to the establishment of a new state; that they expected to establish a liberal government and to put down the old militarism entirely; to stop all anti-foreign activities and to adopt the principle of the open-door and equal property externally; and to reduce the burden of the people and improve the public welfare. On the same day a spokesman of the Foreign Office at Tokyo stated that Japan was not considering the recognition of an independent Manchuria unless it proved to have all the attributes of an independent state. The American Consul General at Muk-

den

X

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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den reports that all available evidence indicates that the Japanese had prepared everything in advance of the arrival at Mukden of this Commission, and that the conference of the members of the Commission was arranged merely in order to give the move the appearance of having been inaugurated by the Chinese.

The strong attitude adopted and threats made during the month at practically every place in China proper where there were Japanese troops or gunboats stationed, prompted, no doubt, by the tender susceptibilities of this proud and sensitive people, resulted in expressions of opinion noticeably restrained, compared with those formerly prevailing on the part of the Chinese vernacular and English press. However, and in the absence in Manchuria of any free press in which Chinese views could be made public, it is believed that the costly fireworks at Shanghai and the doubt and anxiety in regard to ultimate Japanese intentions there, would have tended, for the most part, to drive Manchurian developments from the front page of newspapers abroad.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

At the end of January, on the night of the 28th, the Japanese suddenly landed forces with the intention of occupying Chapei, for the avowed purpose of protecting Japanese residents there, and of protecting the Settlement. Encountering a stiff resistance, Japanese airplanes were sent up the following day to bomb Chapei from the air. Efforts to arrange a truce during the last three days of January were fruitless, since the Japanese Government was unwilling to withdraw its forces from the Hongkew salient. Beginning with February 1st, and continuing through February 29th, the Japanese endeavored to push the Chinese forces back, their efforts being supported by aerial bombing and machine-gunning, artillery, tanks, and naval support. By the end of the month there were over 45,000 Japanese troops in the Shanghai area; the Chinese troops numbered approximately 55,000, but were very poorly equipped as compared with the Japanese. The tenacity of the Chinese resistance and their ability to take punishment came as a surprise to foreign observers as well as to the Japanese. To the 19th Route (Cantonese) Army should undoubtedly go the laurels in the fighting in and around Shanghai. The Chinese all over the country were aroused to a pitch of patriotic enthusiasm which is rare indeed in China. All over the country and among the Chinese abroad collections were

made

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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made for the 19th Route Army and for the defense of Shanghai, and volunteers demanded to be sent to Shanghai.

Sun Fo, the deposed "Crown Prince", endeavored consistently to make political capital out of the situation, and from the safe distance of Shanghai yapped at the heels of Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei, and other Government leaders, declaring that the Cantonese 19th Army was receiving no support and was being betrayed.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1974

Removal of Chinese Government to Loyang (Ministry of Finance moved to Shanghai), due to Japanese threats. Brief exchange of firing at Nanking between Japanese naval forces and Chinese forts on Lion Hill.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Shanghai/45 FOR Despatch # 8195.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED March 4, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Negotiations for the cessation/ of hostilities
 begun on February 28th at an informal conference
 between Chinese and Japanese representatives
 who met on board H.M.S. KENT, the British flagship.

793.94/5122

5122

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00-P.R. Nanking/49 FOR #D-230

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Mar.15, 1932
~~XX~~ NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: the threat of Sino-Japanese hostilities at Nanking.

dew

793.94/5123

5123

-2-

2. LOC. 1 AFF. 188

(1) The threat of Sino-Japanese hostilities and
the evacuation of certain American citizens.

The presence of the Japanese warships in the harbor caused great concern lest they should open fire on the Chinese capital. Within the city the Chinese soldiers set to work to dig trenches near the walls, to erect machine-gun nests at street intersections, and to barricade the city entrance at the main gate. These measures were manifestly designed to resist any landing which the Japanese marines might attempt to make. Both the Japanese and the Chinese officials gave assurances that they would not begin hostilities, but each side affirmed that it would retaliate in case the other opened fire. In such an atmosphere, the slightest accident or misunderstanding might result in a bombardment.

At 11:10 p.m. February 1, the boom of the first Japanese gun was heard. The firing from the 3-inch guns continued for twenty five minutes but rifle and machine-gun fire lasted through most of the night. In explaining the incident, the Japanese asserted that the forts on Lion Hill had opened fire and alleged that a Chinese bomb had fatally wounded a sentry on duty at the N. K. K. hulk.

The

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The Chinese contended that the Japanese fired the opening shot, perhaps to prevent soldiers crossing the Yangtze from Pukow, or perhaps to create a general disturbance.

The next morning there was a general exodus of Chinese from their water-front homes. The American residents of Soony Hill, whose houses were dangerously exposed to shell fire, departed for Shanghai. The American group leaders assembled again and agreed with the Consulate General's opinion that a similar incident might occur again and that Nanking might become involved in the general hostilities. The Chinese population was in a state of panic, the banks were closed, business was at a standstill, the government leaders had gone to Loyang and the Chinese troops were roused because of the Chinese successes at Shanghai. Chinese military planes were at the air field here and Nanking was at the head of communication routes to Shanghai. It was not unreasonable to assume that Nanking might be the objective of the division of infantry whose departure from Japan had been announced.

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The threat of hostilities continued throughout the month. Military conferences of Chinese leaders were held in the nearby town of Fuchen, about three miles north of the Yangtze and, almost daily, Chinese reenforcements en route to Shanghai crossed the Yangtze, if local reports were to be believed. It was feared that they would draw fire from the Japanese warships. There was the added danger that a defeat of the Chinese army at Shanghai might result in a retreat towards Nanking or in a clash between the Chinese factions.

Local tension became somewhat relaxed as a result of the unexpected stand of the 19th Route Army, but on February 25, an event occurred which demonstrated the possibility that something might still happen. The Japanese Consul General addressed a letter to the Waichiaopu in which he asked for the abolition of the trenches and artillery positions constructed by the Chinese forces along the city wall facing the river and particularly the trenches constructed near the Standard Oil Hill, on the ground that the latter might expose to danger, in case of an emergency, the foreign residential quarter in that neighborhood. Four days later, the work on the trenches and on the gun positions

within

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within 200 yards of Socony Hill's residences was stopped and the mounds were levelled. The soldiers who were stationed there were removed but the trenches were not filled in. This incident in itself is trivial enough, but if either side should exhibit an unreasonable attitude, a similar incident might lead to more serious consequences.

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
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

February 24, 1944.

DCR
Mr. Geist:

I suggest that the sheaf
of letters here attached (which
is now red ink indexed) be
indexed for and placed in the
permanent files.



FE:SKH:LGH


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Mr Stimson.;Etc.;Etc.;
Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs of the
United States of America.

C/o Heybeliada,
Deniz Harp Mektebi,
Sea of Marmara,
ISTANBUL. TURKEY.

793.94
STRICTLY PERSONAL.



Dear Mr Stimson,

it is not necessary, even if we had time,
to enclose a lot of papers called "introductions". You can get on
the international 'phone and get mutual friends to introduce us; such
as Sir Percival Phillips, Mr G.B. Shaw, Douglas Crawford; etc.

4287
I am writing this on the inspiration of
(so we must excuse each other for lack of full ceremony/
the moment:..of a suddenly felt need:..your need). AS I have not time,
I am enclosing copies of letters to Sir, John Simon, Mr Mussolini, Mr
Douglas Crawford (head of Rothermere press), Sir Eric Drummond, (L.O.N.),
W. R. Hearst, and a scrap of my last letter to B.E.S. (This scrap is
relative to Japan).

793.94
I know that your poor head is tired and
tired, and it is therefore, as a man-friend, that I am sending these letters
to you. They contain the "essence" of things in Japan. I do not need to
tell YOU that these things are TRUE;...you are in a position to KNOW.

I regret that I cannot enclose the copies
of the letters to W.R.H and D. C. However, you can get a competent s
retary to type them out for you. I am enclosing my notes of the letters.
You and I may have the happy chance to have a quiet talk about these
bits later; but, at present, you have a stiff job; and I do not wish to
add to it here.

I would only suggest that you take this
correspondence home with you --it will really help you:--much more

793.94
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MAR 17 1932
P.S./L.N.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

His Ex, Mr St.2.

quickly than your advisors can help you, at this moment, it will be a sort of "aspirine".

I owe much to the courtesy and kindness of the generous-minded U.S.: in their lavish hospitality to me. I do not, therefore, send you such a cattish letter as the one I sent to Sir. J.S. The Foreign Office, in London, deserve such tigerish talk anyhow.

But, oh, how I wish--if only for the sake of the U.S., that my two big works, (a) Ne-Shinto. (b) "The Great Hallucination", were published now!

This is a sort of "F.S". (in the middle of a letter). Please tell Mr Forbes that I shall tell him something interesting about his arrival, and reception in Japan, as U.S. ambassador. Even his best men do not know this;... what the I.J.G.(:) M.P., wired all over the empire, while Mr Forbes was drinking champagne, and hearing toasts to the President. It is a gem.

If the enclosed correspondence is not enough for you:--at this moment--(and if you need prolonged help) please wire me, and I will run over to Washington. In case you want me, wire your Istanbul embassy to make all travelling arrangements (I am married). In the meanwhile, if you are deep stuck, for (inside) stuff on Japan, code your ambassador here (I have not met him, as I have but recently blown for a rest from Japan), and I shall help all I can.

All the best; good luck.

Sincerely,

(T.O'Conroy)

T.O'Conroy

Conroy
P.S. If you get my notes (to use them), please send me copies. T.O'C.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Sir John Simon.; Etc.;Etc.;
 H.M.Principal Secretary of
 State for Foreign Affairs.
 (Re Japan and F.East).

C/o Heybeliada,
 Deniz Harp Mektebi,
 Sea of Marmara,
 ISTANBUL.
 13/3/32.

PERSONAL TO Sir J.S.

Dear Sir John Simon,

as we are both pressed for time,I would respectfully,submit to you to read the correspondence I sent to Sir E. Drummond a few days ago. That correspondence,Sir John,contains facts;not diplomatic fantasies.

H.M. Ambassador to Japan is unable to furnish such acute information;so I feel it a sort of---what may we call it?---obligation!. So,in this moment of difficulty,I wish to help you out a bit.

If my works: (a) "The Psychology of Neo-Shinto". and " THE GREAT HALLUCINATION" were printed this letter would not be needed; but,as they are not yet out,it is needed,and d--d badly needed at that.

Since writing to Sir Eric Drummond,I have been able to get the recent report of Mr TOKUTOMI's private report to H.I.M,the Emperor. This talk was in private;between H.I.M and Mr T.(only chamberlain was present). I presume that H.M. Ambassador has not been in a position^{to} get the ESSENCE of that report^(and other things) and to send it to you.

The heads of the subjects,of which Mr T Spoke to the Emperor are these:....

- 1-The outline of the history of Japan with Korea.)
- 2- " " " " " " " /
- China.)

SIR: J. J. Z.

3-- The outline of the history of Japan with Manchuria.

4--The " " ^(trust policy) " Powers and their relations to Japan.

5--China- Jap War. Russo- Jap War.

6--The present need of Manchuria to Japan.

Mr. T. did not touch on the present conflict going on on Chinese soil. However, he touched on Japanese need of holding Korea; and of interests in China.

If you are not acquainted with the substance of this extremely important report, (Japanese "family affair") then let me know, and I shall be glad to give you the essence of it.

Mr. Tokutomi, as you know, is the "Press King" of Japan. He is the owner of the "Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun" and of the "Osaka Mainichi Shimbun". These two papers are the "IT" of pressism in Japan. This means that Mr. T. is the SUPREME controller of the Japanese Press.

It may seem strange to you, Sir John, and to the ambassador, that Mr. T's talk to the Emperor are so completely different to what he publishes in the daily press (published by him in English): for "foreign consumption".

Of course, if H.M. Foreign Office is already acquainted with the (inside) meaning of this report to the Emperor, then, I respectfully submit my apologies for taking up your time.

I might add, however, that it may be wise for H.M. ambassador to: (if he can) follow the influence of the House of Peers (and, especially of the activities carried on between the "GENRO", the Prince Saionji and the Emperor) on the present political mental motions.

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Sir J. S. J.

If you have not the report of the fore-mentioned conversation between the Emperor and Mr T, then you could(perhaps)-I don't think¹-get it from Mr Matoudaira.

Mr M's dictionary is somewhat limited, so, perhaps he may confuse you with many "yes's" and "No's. But it would be interesting to try him. But, as I said, I think it is "Love's Labour Lost".

All the best things to you in Geneva.

Respectfully and sincerely,

J. S. J.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

To,
 His Excellency,
 Signor Benito Mussolini.; Etc.
 Rome.

C/o Deniz Harp Mektebi,
 Heybeliada,
 ISTANBUL.
 20--2--32.

Your Excellency,

this letter is without introduction, but, as we have mutual friends, introductions may be arranged at any time. This letter contains NOTHING of selfish interest-as you will see- and, as I respect your precious time-I shall try to make it "multum in parvo"

The texts of two letters(one to William Randolph Hearst, the greatest newspaper magnate in the U.S; and one to Mr Douglas Crawford, Chief of the (Editorial) interests of the Rothermere [Lord] Press in England; London, are, herewith enclosed. These letters speak for themselves.

The Inspiration to write to you has just come to me, so I am obeying that inspiration. As labourer, and logician, I deeply admire both your labours and your logic(both of which I closely follow); and, as a proof of this, I am confiding these very serious matters for your diagnosis and analysis.

- 1....Recent happenings in our history have brought us face to face with a weighty, and very intricate, problem that demands the genius of our most competent men to handle, to examine and to analyse...and to act.
- 2....Those geniuses must have the rare, rare gift: of being able to see into our future. You, Mr Mussolini, have that gift, MORE THAN ANY OTHER MAN IN OUR PRESENT HISTORY. My friend, Mr G. Bernard Shaw also has it, but he does NOT use the gift:..in political application;- unfortunately.
- 3....There has sprung up a new force, within the last sixty years, this new force is affecting our destinies (in the West), more and more daily; and, especially at this very moment. And nobody understands this new force.

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B.M .2.
 Force.

The needs of states, and their advisors and ambassadors, seem helpless before this (new to them) incomprehensible influence. Yet, they are compelled to treat with this ^{mental} "terra incognita" on the same basis; of thought-as they treat with nations of their own race and culture. This, naturally, is impossible...as they are thinking, and using words in terms (of meaning and morality), of Shinto foundation. We use words and thought on a completely different basis; both morally and culture'ally. This 'terra incognita' is JAPAN.

The word:-JAPAN- carries no SPECIAL meaning to the mind. It is the ¹almighty root-force from which everything within the very marrow of the Japanese mind springs---SHINTO---(Neo-Shinto) that holds the essence of the great problem that YOU and I--and others--will be forced to thoroughly understand: before we can know HOW to adjust our mental radio, to catch the mind-waves given out by such a strange new atmosphere as Neo-Shinto, really, is. There is NO COMPLETE EXAMPLE in history that could carry to the mind the full signification of this quite "unique" state of mind: SHINTO. If you say (which I feel you will not) "après moi le deluge"--you are too courageous to say such a boy-thing--then, the value of this letter falls to the ground.....and it is lost.

Here is the HOPELESSNESS of hope in the matter of Shinto. Shinto cannot join in the altruism of the West; it is hopeless to even hope it can. It is even STUPID to venture to THINK it can. It is, therefore, utterly foolish of Western statesmen to even dream that it ever will. Such a thing is AUTOMATICALLY impossible. The very essence of Shinto policy, and existence, is A[P-a-r-t-n-e-ss;..(within-itself-ism). Statesmen must get this fact deep into their minds before even tapping on a door THAT CANNOT OPEN. A DOOR THAT CANNOT OPEN. That is exactly "IT". Why cannot the door open? Because if the door opens, the house will fall. This, again, is a perfect illustration. Therefore, the Japanese statesmen (even

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B.M.3.

(even if they did feel in their hearts that you are right, dare not even try to open the door:.....IT MEANS THEIR OWN SUICIDE AND THE SUICIDE OF THE RACE, AND THE RACE[CULT. It means GIVING THE LIE TO ALL THEIR GODS; ALL THEIR EMERSONS, AND ALL THAT IS SACRED TO THEIR VERY EXISTENCE. This is the cement that holds the race together. If that goes; ..all goes. It would mean the annihilation of the Japanese, as a nation and a race.

And, if you, Mr Mussolini, wish to try the effect, of an intellectual bomb (C.B.S. could do it) then, sweetly, ask the Japanese ambassador this: "Your excellency, you say that you admire our western culture and force of mind; would you, yourself, Your excellency, give up your Shinto race-cult, to join with me, Benito Mussolini, to help the world to be ONE in thought?". While you are asking this, put on your strongest magnifying glasses and fix his eyes and lips. Then, Your excellency, will be able to grasp this letter; and to say to me;--"Mr O'Conroy, I now understand your letter of the 20--2--32. This is an interesting idea.

Even you, yourself, Mr Mussolini, may have, at times, thought--when speaking to the Japanese ambassador--to Italy. "ha, ha, he grasps my thought". No, Mr Mussolini, he does not, he may not. (this "may" means, in English, "il ne le faut pas"). When those men (ambassadors etc) return home, they become more than ever Shinto'ists. Do you wish a couple of recent examples?. Mr Yoshizawa (France). General Kanaya (Vienna) General Kanaya is NOW the chief of the general staff (he is, principally responsible for the present conflict). Mr Yoshizawa is the foreign minister. They become even ultra- Shinto when they return to Japan. Strange, but true.

(spoke, and
 These very men drank champagne, with you, Mr Mussolini, and with Mr Briand, Mr Macdonald and Mr Hoover (minus champagne). And they said "I understand your ideas, Mr Mussolini, Mr Briand, Mr Macdonald, Mr Hoover". Those same men are now defining the thought and ideas of the

B.M.4.
the

very men(such as yourself) to whom they said "I understand you Mr M, Mr Mac, Mr B, Mr H". and they said, "I agree with you". Now, look at them Mr Mussolini,

And, now, those gentleman have hourly business, of the greatest import, with those same men, but, now, it is with the Shinto mind, and the Shinto voice. Those gentleman(Mr Mac, Mr H, etc) have NO IDEA of the Shinto mind, and the Shinto voice, when it speaks to them...therefore, they are lost.

You, Mr Mussolini, with your analytic logic, can see the absolute ridiculousness of such a situation between nations with such interwoven interests :as Japan and the Western states. Those interests are getting, daily, more interwoven with your own interests .

* Thinking(through Shinto thought) makes Japan all ost just as much a puzzle * to the other Oriental states and peoples as it does to the West.

The ignorance of the heads of Western states with such a vital thing as Shinto is amazing. When I spoke of Shinto to Mr Coolidge, at the White House, Washington, he did not even know what Shinto meant. Some heads of states even think it to be a "Something" of Buddhism. This is one of the(perhaps the greatest) greatest, but saddest, comedies of our age.

Only two(2) men--as far as I know-- thoroughly understand^{Neo-} Shinto...Mr Curtis, of Hong-Kong and I. But Mr Curtis, unfortunately, has not had the time to devote exclusively--as I have done--to the study of the very roots of Shinto. I have just finished a big "THESIS" on the "PSYCHOLOGY OF SHINTO" And the "PSYCHOLOGY of The CONFUCIAN FORMS(NEI) In Shinto". This work is for the expert professors of Oriental philosophies. It will, probably, be published by the Oxford University Press. I have also finished another (a vast work), in encyclopedic form, of nearly all things of Japan--since the dawn of Japanese history till today. This work is too big for publication, in its present form(it is over 300,000 words), so it must be cut down. This is why I have come to this quiet, lovely, spot .

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B.M.5.
 spot

London tells me that this work "will make a big noise in the world". I hope it does. It is considered as "The most thorough and deep analysis ever made of Japan". The Chinese governing group (the Kuo-Min-tang) sent delegates, to ask me to sell them the work...I, naturally, refused. (They had heard of my studies from a Chinese friend of mine). I am going to call the big work "The Great Hallucination". For, Mr Mussolini, that is exactly what the West is suffering from: ~~..the~~ Japan. Hallucination. My big work is so documented, day, date, person, authority, words said, etc; etc, that NO HUMAN, Japanese, or other, can come up against it...it would be even laughable to attempt to do so. It is impregnable, un-assailable, and t-r-u-e. It is, therefore, that I now appeal to your great mind. This hallucination must be broken. And only such men as you CAN break it. There is a saying in English: "Ignorance is bliss". John Dewey says "NO". "Ignorance is NOT bliss; it is unconsciousness...and s-l-a-v-e-r-y". John is right, Mr Mussolini.

It must be broken; because it is alien and anti (fiercely anti-) to everything in our creeds and cultures. And it is a far, far, lower basis of civilization than ours. But, there are things in it (the Forms: bowing, etc,) that fascinate the shallow Westerners; and they SING HYMNS to it. If it were higher than our concept then I, Mr Mussolini, would be the first to adapt it to my own mental motions. But, even, then, I could not share it: as it is a cult that only ONE race may have:---that is only the Japanese race, and no other.

This ignorance, and hallucination has already cost the Western states and peoples billions, in money; it has cost them head-aches and heart-aches. It will cost them more billions, and more head, and heart-aches, in the delicate future:--if they do not set themselves to analyse the roots of it all:..Shinto.

Every ambassador; to Japan, should have (before going to Japan) a thorough, and clear, explanation of what Shinto really means: as the ONE, supreme, controlling political philosophy of the Japanese mind

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Democ.
 mind

and government, race, people, throne and state. If Shinto is broken..then,
the whole Japanese system breaks with it. The leaders KNOW THIS well.
 So what?.. The Japanese, themselves, DARE NOT break the hallucination. When
 they break the hallucination...they break themselves;;;and every shred of
 history ever written about the god-ancestors: from the sacred of sacred
 AMATERASU-NO- O- MI-KAMI to the present Son OF Heaven; the offsprigⁿ of
 AMATERASU. So, therefore, Mr Mussolini, No SANE Westerner can expect
 that the whole Japanese nation could commit political suicide . So we
 MUST BREAK the hallucination, for the sake of our own people, and culture.

You are a busy man--terribly busy--so I can
 give but a faint shadow of the deep signification of this letter. But all
 my knowledge is at your service, any moment you may need it. I have no
 arrières pensées, I am merely a thinking machine. Mr Shaw is the same. We
 are men without a narrow sphere. H. C. Wells is also of the same type.
 But you can feel the future, so can I, so can G.B.S. and H.G.W. You and I,
 Mr Mussolini, wish to help to save our culture (it is the best we have, at
 present). We must begin NOW. Wise farmers prepare early ~~for~~ winter.

I wish you all THE BEST that life can give
 you. You belong not only to Italy, you belong to all of us. You are
 the property of the world:..the world's Mussolini.

Deeply and sincerely,

(T.O'Conroy)

P.S. May I suggest that these letters require reading over several times,
 so that the brain may absorb their essential and logical values . T.O'C.

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D.B. G. 16-2-32 (Douglas Braggford)
 on Ehu has worked out to the letter -
 and now, dear, to the Super-S party is in
 power -- they are a ^{dishonest} fearful group of men
 and behind the old man - Inukai - P. M.
 is the sinister power of the dark Toyama.
 political the ^{disruption} of Japan - Does our foreign office
 know the name of Toyama? Of course not
 dear D.B. They will find that out - as per
 usual - some years after they should have
 found out P.M. Now, yourself have seen him in India.
 Inukai is the protector of the refugee Ind-
 ians (the oriental comber) the leader the Indian Bose

D.B. G. is the "pet" of the press P.M.
 and behind all - almost invisible - is the
 Super Chinkist Toyama, lank, lean,
 black bearded, fanatical. implacable and
 naturally - - - narrow. Ask our Amb
 in Tokyo if he knows the uncanny power
 of Toyama! - ^{Shin} If he does not, perhaps know - how can he know?
 name, yet every male in Japan from
 the school boy to the dotard know that
 dynamic name. His Magat know it well,
 (perhaps to his regret) - too well.

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

D. C. 3 Oh D. C. our diplom and espel
 The Consul Service give me a pacin. a
 rarely observant (educated) man Mr Carter - now
 in Hong Kong - (42 years using his keen brain in
 Japan & China) was almost requested to leave
 the for off a few years ago when he told
 them things that would have saved them
 hundreds of pains and millions of money.
 (They will lose many more million if they don't learn)
 Sir Harold Parlett, Counselor of Embassy for
 umpteen years in Tokyo, author of the Parlett

D. C. 4 dictionary conferred to me
 That he "does not know Shinto". I
 have his letter now. I sent him my
~~expert~~ ^{name} work on Shinto (for experts). I
 thought that he should be an expert.
 I shall not ask you to keep this a secret
 (at this — time) I am impregnable
 D. C. and Nobody in existence can
 come up against me on this matter.
 There is a letter locked up in the safe of

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P.S. Perhaps I never told you that I have (purchased) several all-ages, or gaps, ~~on Japan~~. Words (apart from an encyclopedia) over 200, ~~and~~ words (apart from the expert work on Shinto). This big work is unobtainable in U.S. documented, day, date, ~~and~~, vocabulary hour. I would even be laughable for any man, Japan or other to try to come against such an impenetrable wall. And now "white man" has ever had the unique Channel of information that I had, C.H. I know my Japan.

And, & b. There is no liberal voice in Japan now. (The few grains that were are locked up and the ~~three~~ ^{three} ~~liberal~~ ^{liberal} ~~men~~ ^{men} of the former government was assassinated by liberal ~~men~~ ^{men}). The Gen Shoji (Gen Kameyama) and Gen Hongo (Gen Murakami). But have the ~~men~~ ^{men} — and Toyama drinks — the people.

2. J. - Chargée here & her 1st of Dec. wanted me to leave. The
all thought the night
a pumped me - more for advice than anything else -
feels that I know, but he has not even a gram of idea

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 By Milton D. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75

I have to get knowledge
 that is the finest money for
 me. Perhaps I am wrong,
 in this; but it does not
 trouble me one quarter
 of the old "Tinker's Curse".
 I am a short man, as
 5 ft 6 in of earth is coming
 and in that institution each
 each dollar count.

* Leonard P. Moore, 222 Strand
~~that~~ (from "Old man (artist) that"
 in ^{in drift} should go far to prove this.

I could write for years. I could
 write an article every day of my
 life - every article from a fresh
 angle ^{near} of on all that is within the
 very marrow of the Japanese mind;
 and Japanese political mental
 motions. I don't think of money.*

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No ambassador should go to Japan without a course in the Political Philosophy of Shinto.

This letter to Mr. Hearst speaks for itself, it ^{shows} ~~shows~~ Creed & Culture: the culture of the Saxon-Celts

This letter is a mere bit-bit.

I am ready to go to London & ~~start~~ ^{start} doing a daily article, I can give up my post here at any moment. I shall gladly do so to help the world to grasp once & for all, a problem that will torment them more if it is not made clear now, and there is no other man in Eng who can write them.

9.9.75. I shall give the good and the bad both of the job - a personal, and a personal to the "Judgement"

0630

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

To Sir Eric Drummond.; Etc.; Etc.;
Secretary-General, League, Nations.
Geneva.

Heybeliada,
C/o Deniz Harp Mektebi,
ISTANBUL. 26-2-'32.

Purely Private to Sir, E.D.

Dear Sir Eric Drummond,

(a) this letter contains the best intentions:
help, from one Englishman to another. (b) It is AUTHENTIC, authoritative:
it is pure knowledge. (c) It demands no recompense.

I am too far away to enclose introductions,
but those may be had by 'phoning Mr Shaw (G.B.S) 4 Whitehall Court, W.W.
Sir Percival Phillips, "Thatched House Club", or Douglas Crawford, Chief,
"D.M", Northcliffe House....and several others whom you, probably, know.

You will, soon, have to envisage things of the
Far East; things of which you, and your advisors, cannot have pure know-
ledge:-facts. Mr S.,^{ug} probably, knows these things, but, you nat-
urally, cannot expect him to tell you them. If he did, he could never ag-
ain venture to meet his own people. And, psychiatrically, most im-
portant, Mr S., also, has, within him, the spirit:..the "thing-in-itself"
that is, automatically, ^{against} your-and your assembly's- FUNDAMENTAL culture.
This is within comprehending; and within pardoning; but, it does not help
you, on the eve of your most historic assembly. But what can really
help is this;..... Do

Do you know Neo-Shinto, Sir Eric? You know
that the Japanese race hold the belief that they spring from the divine
"Sun-goddess": the most sacred of all goddesses (or gods in creation); the
Shinto goddess, AMATERASU|-NO-O-MI-KAMI. This belief holds the centre;

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Sir.E.D.2.

of the stage of thought among the Japanese. This is the thought that killed Buddhism in one day and by one rescript(Imperial),1871. Promulgation of the new;(Shinto Constitution).

On top of this,we have the NEW (logical) development of Shinto;--Neo-Shinto. This new Shinto has become a political philosophy; and , it has a new " thing-in-itself "thing added to it . The new name of this Neo-Shinto" Thing-in-itself "thing is "NIHON-NO-Tamashi". Even very small children in Japan know this word: it supplies the electricity,fanaticism-or hysteria, that gives the driving-force TO ALL JAPANESE ACTIVITIES TODAY.

The "dynamo"tenders and engineers are composed of Messrs TOYAMA,Mitsu , Uchida and Sasaki. TOYAMA is the (political) Rasputin of Japan. These men control super-hyper patriotic clubs in every hole and corner of the Japanese empire,Manchuria and China. Those "secret clubs" are stung;prodded,into fanatic activity by the "SOSHI" and "GOROTaki" the---may I say---bullies,in the one case,and,"dervishes" in the other, of the NI-HON-NO-Tamashi. Dear Sir Eric, Sir John Simon has never had such valuable information ^{for} H.M.Ambassadors to H.I.M of Japan. Ask him!

Official form is given to all this combination by the present group of men(sworn members of the Toyama Co clique)the present government^{4 cabinet} of Japan. And,Sir Eric,they are among the most dangerous groups of men ,assembled in one cabinet,that the world has ever seen: ...dishonest...heartless...conscience-less...fanatic and corrupt .

And,now, Sir Eric, let us have the LOGICAL ANALYSIS. This is essential.

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Sir E.D.3.

1-- These men+machines driven by the living dynamos and backed by the howling slaves: the masses- (with exception of a few isolated, small, farmers) have, dynamo'ed into their brains, the Neo-Shinto idea: that "DAI-NIPPON" (Great Japan) is un-conquerable. This Neo-Shinto concept has been growing ever ^{stronger} (especially), since the Chin-Jap and Russ-Jap wars. This feeling is-today-at high fever point.

2----- This, of course, to any peyoniatriist, (as I wrote Mr M) is hallucination. But, Sir Eric, hallucination has two sides:....
 (1) ~~the~~ would-be hallucinators (Neo-Shintoists): Japanese people, Gov, Etc.
 (2) These people also hallucinate themselves. They, naturally, hallucinate you. But No 2. Fact may help you much: if you can grip its essence.
 ----- Why is this Neo- Shinto dangerous to the world? -----

3----- Because heads of states, their ambassadors and advisors do not know the ROOT-essence and origin of this TERRIFIC force acting DIRECTLY and UNHINDERED on the minds of nearly the whole people.

4----- The population believe (as per Shinto) that they ^{and,} ONLY are, (or) can be, the children of gods. You, and I, Sir Eric, are (this is true) "Ketto":- (barbarians). Every child in Japan knows this word, they hear it from their parents. All, outside of Shinto are barbarians.

5----- They think it is their HIGH destiny to crush all "ketto"s..and they think that they can do it. This is hallucination and ignorance, Sir Eric, yes; but it is....DANGEROUS.

6----- Shinto is a race-cult (the only race-cult in the

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Sir E.D.4.

world today) and ONLY A MEMBER OF THE RACE may be a member; naturally. And, that race is bound together in one DESTINY. Yes, they may assassinate, and they may terrify men; in whom they (the Shinto clique) may think the "Japanese Gheist" to be a bit shaky; such as Hidehara, Inouye, Wakatsuki (all ex-cabinet). This but lends strength to the cult; as they think it is the will of the divine Amaterasu-no-O-Mi-Kami (first of Imperial line) that all weak spirits be done away with. This is often done in Japan-very often- but the world does not hear of it: ...you hear only of men of cabinet positions.

7-----In Shinto there is (a) No MORAL law. (b) NO restriction: against Shinto action (I could prove this, in many cases, name, date, case, etc). (c) NO commandments that can act as a counter-force to the Neo-Shinto force. So, now, you see, Sir Eric, how UNLIMITED and UNHINDERED is this fierce u-n-d-e-r-g-r-o-u-n-d force. Now, you can see WHY Buddhism was killed in a single day!

8-----8-And they think that only in all this fanatical activity lies the safety, strength and continuation of the imperial line.....because the emperor is the living shinto god, direct seed of the first divine ancestress, A-n-O-m, k. If She falls, Shinto falls; if Shinto falls.....THE WHOLE JAPANESE RACE FALLS WITH SHINTO. Now, Sir Eric, you can clearly see to what lengths that spirit may force a fanatic multitude.

Yes, this all takes a lot ~~xxx~~ of absorbing.

And, then, there are so many other offshoots of it; So many that it has taken me 300,000 words, and a special "expert" Thesis besides; to try to carry it ~~into the minds of the Western peoples; and to try to help them in their attempt:~~ *into the minds of the Western peoples; and to try to help them in their attempt:* of

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Sir.E.D.5.

(in) envisage'ing Japanese mental motions. This is but an attempt to give you the "embryonic"essence; if it helps you,I am deeply happy. The letters to Mr M. and Mr D.C.(I am sorry the other is not enclosed) will help you to envisage things,from other angles not mentioned here. The time is TOO short to write the Letter to Mr W.R.H.(from my notes),and your assembly will meet(I hear) on the 3-3.

Good luck,

Sincerely,

(T.O'Conroy)

P.S. If you find that you may need me,a wire will bring me to Geneva. This letter is STRICTLY a "you & me"letter. However,if I feel the necessity to write to Sir John Simon,and of sending him a copy...you will understand.

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H

Aim writing without letter of introduction. If the Subject interests you introductions can easily be arranged, as I know friends of yours. There is no element of money, favour ... or anything that smells of self-interest, neither now nor hereafter.

The subject is, primarily, — 2nd It relat to the future of the UN S. 3rd It rel to the B. group. of Nats. — and, then, the ^{future} inter-reality of — and the Western peoples. I shall try to give you just an essence, in a small space.

[It has fallen to my fate to have been drawn into a deep and long study of G. — ^{(12 yrs) analytic} This is not credit to me, I was pushed into it. just as if a man — who was pushed off the Brooklyn bridge — analysed every sensation of his fall ^{and of the air & water} and feelings! Northcliffe first pushed me into this dizzy sphere. I have just finished a long, detailed, ^{documented} analysis. It is in the form of an encyclopaedia. Competent authority say that it is ^{by far} the most thorough research ever made of Japan. Besides this I have also finished a work (for a part

[illegible]

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2/ County, receive, and file, of Crooks a
 for guest. you draw in the "imagination"
 Revolt, more ~~harmless~~. I know those
 of Crooks m.H. I have them "tagged" on their
 true tribal names and true thought -
 which is far far far from what ^{the} hears &
 confiding M. S. Hunt. I have seen the
 words they use to ~~appear~~ and the words
 they use when they ~~revel~~ ^{bring} for
 to connect in any ^{normal} court. But such Crooks
 cannot be punished by courts, it must be

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& Simple Amer ^{+ bless their simple souls} sees the J's bowing low to each other. He, simple soul, writes poetry + sings a hymn to the "gracious", etc, etc Courtesans of the J's. If he were observant he would follow the fellows who bowed so low. He would then learn something. He would soon see the "gracious" gentleman milk and push a woman with the "inevitable child" strapped on ~~the~~ her back. E.g., Mr. Hearst: if Courtesans is bobbing up + down then the grasshopper - - -

Those Simple Amer always remind me of Mark Twain's "Innocents Abroad".
 Dumb, as a J entertains is famous. But as they are, almost all, incapable of giving intellectual entertainment, banqueting, Jemba is the only way left (Jemba were originally organized for this purpose)

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3/peers in other ways. Let this battle
 must cease :- your sample ^{sample} ~~profile~~ &
 our committee must get an effective
 medical agent. ignore. Your J. Law
 Says that "ignore" not there, it is unclear
 & unclear. I think that John is right.
 or, at least, he ^{seems} to be right. There is no doubt.
 He remains?)

now that's that. The psychiatric side
 Now let's have a peek at the beer side

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one could write here of the "Open door" policy. But, ^{if one had space} no least, a little hole in the door, sure, does not mean that the door is OPEN. Try it, Mr. Hearst. Ask your agents to forward something, anything, (put bricks into boxes) on the Manchurian (G) railroads. Time your boxes. ~~Flow~~ with those sent (same weight, size etc) by a G. coach which --- merchandise --- will arrive first a long long time ahead of the other. Try to send messages with mails; can you or your agents hammer through the G. Post Office Service in Manchuria, you cannot. But you say that it is "Against international law and sovereignty" ^{to have ~~the~~ ~~post~~ ~~services~~} ~~this~~ does not think of such things Mr. H. But this is only a flea bite

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4/ Your needs have been rather dependent
 on Giff-Silk. But now, we are making
 the staves of silk. They buy machinery,
 autos etc. But even if you cease to be
 halting this unstable thing. You are looking
 at a fundamen. to feed a worm is in your
 stone just because ^{the creator} it makes you hang
 in you? So the matter of being, we had better
 will not make such a hole in the side →
 Well. All this is not put in it is like this

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5th degree stuff. It comes straight from the head,
 where the mental machinery is. Alternative
 ed. by benefit notes in the long run. It is
 like the big "dole" - I had enemies
 and was a real phoolster.

Up a Leprechaun Head, more a child proof
 who only could think of the nose the
 under his nose, was the (innocent)
 mean of giving of the greatest

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as your Benderlips and thousands like them.

But they do it for money - they know their price & they get it - H.K. is responsible for most of the Manchurian prop & of Rea for China. There are many others R. Kennedy. Of "Benders" was the former heavy weight: for Japan proper.

7. It is the poor (deeply hallucinated boob)
foreigner who goes all over the world and
does the hallucinating & free (he even spends
his own money) for the Jig. When I had the pleasure to be hospitably
entertained by the Amer people I made
it a point to ask every Thomas, Richard
and Harry, "where did you get to
know those things of J." The ans

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It was amazing, even to me.

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I was my dear Mr H (always), "I read
 L.H. The G. gov should build
 him a monument - - - but they don't.
 Instead they paint him, and the joke,
 they call him by his naturalized name all
 through the G. Emp: Kozumit^{yakumy} taken
 they send his works abroad they call
 him L.H. He works both ways - - -
 and now, his Gop wife has to sell her
 little garden, bit by bit. What a sense

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Yet many of your and our books are ever
 ready to sell their cheap little souls
 to those people for a bit of a polished
 tin can. The Thutkent order of the
 Sacred Rat. Well Mr. H. Cotton can fetch
 cotton prices. It is the logical (mathematical) of
 things. Their secrets are ingetatable, their language (the sign)
 their secrets are ingetatable, they themselves are their own automatic
 in-getatable, how can a man, with, fair hair, blue
 human face, now can a man, with, fair hair, blue
 eyes, and a long nose, hope to get inside anything on
 a night, intellect? ~~He can do anything in the world~~
 yet the same man could find out
 the secret of "grey" matter, it is an accident of
 race, religion, and --- in-get-at-ability. A Rat
 in his hole knows that you can't get at him so
 he sits calmly & looks at you. But who wishes
 to boost & flatter the Presidency of the U.S.?

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9/29 gratitude!!

Now is perhaps the gist of
 their success. It is not Cleverness (I could
 give you enough stuff to fill a book, in)
 on the occasions when they get hopelessly
 "balled up". No, it is that They Know
that you don't, and cannot know.
their strength ^{there is no to their strength}
^{That is not due to any}

Now, these little bits fit much as for the
 present, so let us have a look at the
 future: ours. one thing is sure:...

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Then "get ups", books, propaganda, A foreigner is
always behind (but his name must not come to
the front). You have in your office, well got up
I stuff - for ex - "Glimpses of the Far East" N. V. R.
It is got up by an American, Mr. Kline. But who
ever heard his name? The world says "look how
the f are clever!". I only mention there to illustrate
the f are clever!
+ prove Subject I mention.

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1 Q. If you, and men like you, such as
 Prothermere, Bearbrooke, Puddell and,
 (perhaps, Canrose do not break the
 bubble of hallucination, well... Continue
 to be hallucinated... ~~and be it~~ ^{It will serve you}
~~right~~ ^{to the bunch of you!} you will, henceforth,
 have only yourselves to blame.

You, and I, know that the test of ages
 has shown that the type of fence that
 comes from the "White Man's" train.

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may all the gods have mercy ^{and on our cheeks} ~~on us~~ ^{we}
~~ever~~ Come under the rule of of a people to
 whom I as the sole essence of being,
 existence. from → on next
 page

Deeply rooted Conviction from a life of unceasing
 travel and unceasing analysis: Oriental have
 ever been too far from the heart of the universe to
 follow its beats and diagnose its needs, therefore,
 they are totally incompetent to prescribe its remedies.
 They have (especially recently: China, Manchuria,
 Round Table etc) been, what is it? "None were
 Tethered up (h)orsemen — true in the balance — and
 found wanting".

factory is the product best adapted to
 grasp, weigh and understand
~~the~~ (most) needs of our human motion.
 whether that motion be, ^{in fact} psychic, machine,
 economic, or physiologic. This is my own
 Then, if this is so, surely, for leading
 thinkers of that type, it is well worth
 while to try to secure to them & to
 their sons, the leadership of the world's
 future destiny. Because their minds

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with a sense of justice in their bones.
 (balanced) (loophole)

← from next page(s) here

the inter-balanced (up & down,
 North & South, East and West, in and
 out balanced) they are the better fitted
 to take charge - it does not matter
 what name you give them "Lords on Teatons
 or Gans". They are the best we have, ^{history has taught them to balance} so
 we should let our dope go + them.

→ Northcliffe told me to "observe" ^{and "watch" it. I did so.} & I never
 dreamed that it was going to lead me into
 such an intense microscopic analysis of almost
 everything within the very "marrow" of the G. mind.

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If he had known ~~the~~ what ~~an~~ ^{amplified} force
 it is he, probably, would have ~~spared~~
 nothing to reveal it to the world.
 Shinto is young: (resurrected). It has
 crushed everything in its way. It crushed
 Buddhism in a day (by one simple
 Imperial decree: 1871) It is the only ^{real} race
 cult on the face of our earth. And, in
 it, it is Supreme. No Creed, Caste, or
 outside influence is allowed to come near it.
 It has its own special ministers, its own
 sacred texts, its own special ^{state} ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~state~~
 of it ~~cannot~~ ^{cannot} be modified by outside
 criticism, as it has no written gospel & no
 and only, ~~and only~~ ^{and only} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~8~~ ⁸ ~~race~~ ^{race} ~~may~~ ^{may} ~~as~~ ^{as} ~~its~~ ^{its} ~~members~~ ^{members}:
 perfect barrier to all other influences.

My profession (and the ^{and peculiar} ~~unique~~ channels I was
 able to use). I was, for a long time, "grata," and
 a sort of honorary advisor. When gov depts asked
 me things they revealed their own weaknesses.
 Northcliffe felt, in his bones, that the race-
 cult (Shinto) was at the bottom. He was
 right (although he knew nothing of how Shinto
 works). If ~~every~~ ^{every} foreign Ambassador to I had
 a thorough course in the political philosophy
 of it then we would be saved much and be
 clearer. Mr Shaw (S.P.S.) was the only man who seemed
 to grasp it ^{to grasp it} ~~exactly~~ ^{exactly}.
 I could make this letter into another 300,000,000
 words.

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It is, therefore, that I do not hate those people. A doctor does not hate a patient just because he (truly) diagnoses the existence of a fearful disease in him.

But, if this tiny scrap interests you then my labour is not in vain. All my knowledge is at your disposal. ^{212000 Review} But the means by which I got ^{some} that knowledge would make hair stand straight. It covers Japan from the 1st day to this, and from the lowest "down & outer" to the Prince. But, then Mr Stewart, I have my reward, 'I only live only to obtain knowledge (real fundan know) ^{knowledge} that is the best bank. Cheque 2. ^{in the bank} Perhaps I am wrong. Who knows!

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Do you can now see Mr. Hearst, she
 they have hallucinated themselves,
 If they can " " it
 is then easy to ^{imagine} others. We
 have seen such cases in history of
 of fanaticism.

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By Bernard Shaw

It strongly looks as if Germany will "win the war" again, for the 4th time. Yes, Dear Mr Shaw, it was'nt for nothing that HEGEL existed....metaphysics mix wonderfully with political philosophy.

Are you doing any new work now?. I could not write you while wandering about. Am thinking of settling down somewhere in Spain or Portugal...fruits and vitamins....and....economy. I am tired of the East. The East is bad, infinitely worse than the West could ever be. In China we have the constant fear of bandits..murder..robbery..cruelty. But there is something about all those terrible things in China. The Japanese "bandits" work underground, and the more they smile the more you must get your sensory nerves 'cooked up'. This is the d...d old Confucius and his "KEI"(FORMS) taken from the "ANALECTS" and d-o-v-e-t-a-i-l-e-d into SHINTO. Billy Shapspear said something about the "smiling vill". He smiled and smiled, but still he was a vill . I wonder if he ever

G.B.S. 2
if he ever

(William I mean) lived in Japan. I have a very ancient writing before me now, it is by ARNALDUS MONTANUS: "A Memorable Embassy to the Emperor of Japan". This ancient piece of psychological analysis reminds me of the Lord's Prayer: "...As it was in the beginning so it is now and ever shall be". I shall give it to you:--if only to give a little extra proof to what I had the pleasure of telling you at our first glorious meeting. This is it:---

(This may be a bit interesting, in view of today)

"Amongst other seeming Vertues, one especial ability they have, their Looks and Gestures still denote them to be the only practisers of Piety and pure Zeal, when their bosoms swell with projects of all manner of mischief; and where they bear the greatest, and most inveterate malice, resolving to be severely reveng'd, there they Smile and Fawn, and in their speech, Pace and Gesture, express nothing but their dear respects, love, and honour that they bear them: This is so common amongst them that whosoever deals plain and honestly, speaks as he thinks, and performs what he promises, becomes a mocking stock, and their onely May-game". Yes, Arnoldus "got" them O.K.

Yes, Dear Mr Shaw, "the longer we learn the more we live"

There is no reason why it should not be this way; most English proverbs would be better if turned about face; ..and this is more a la Shaw anyhow. Now this is where we get serious; about the smiling villain. Our dear charming diplomats (the poor simps) sit (in the finest cafe on the Ginza) the Piccadilly of Tokyo. (There is only one such building, so it cannot be mistaken.) They watch the gentle gracious maids of Nippon in fairy kimonos serving cocktails and 'fary'ing around. The dear Diplomatic simps write home on fairy postcards (of mount Fuji) about the "ever smiling Japanese. They send, to prove it, periodicals (in Japanese) etc; etc. Little do the simps know that they are drinking their cocktails over the supreme headquarters of the General Staff of the Female Flesh Industry of half (or more) of Far East Asia. And that it is in this very building, and by the smiling mf

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G.B.S.5.
 (his slaves)
 himself; that the girls are stolen (few are paid for). And when they send
 the charming periodicals to the G.P.O, still less (as they can't read the
 characters) that in that very periodical the General Sakurai is calling
 on the fanatic population to "take no notice of the simple League of
 Nations and other "barbarians"(whites)", but to go ahead with the Japanese
 glorious conquest of China". The foreign office simp orders another cock-
 tail from the 'Fairy' and writes another postcard home to Lady Simp, about
 and the smiling demon, the host smiles wider, below them
 the charms of dear Nippon. They do not hear the pleadings of the "market"
 of women (mostly Koreans, young girls, taken from under the railway arches
 the many bridges
 of the long overhead line over Kobe and around the city of Tokyo)
and the army of Great Nippon march off to teach civilization a la
 Japonaise to the bandits of China. and, in Lon-
 don the Prime Minister of Great Britain "dines with the (Excellent) amb-
 assador of the noble nation of Great Nippon. The military attache Gen, X
 is there. And soon Gen X goes back to carry on the good work of Gen S
 (mentioned here). And His Ex The Ambassador presents the compliments
 of H.M the Emperor to H.M King George the Fifth. Great stuff, Mr Shaw.
 It sounds un-real...but it is as true as truth itself, My Dear Mr Shaw.

My big encyclopedia, on Japan is too big, the publish-
 ers wish to buy it, but I must cut it down; it is now over 300,000 words.
 "Love's labour (is a little) lost" But it will be done. Were it out now it
 would make a "noise". I know my Japan, Mr Shaw...oh, how I know it!! alas!

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

man

GRAY

FROM

GENEVA

Dated April 26, 1932

Rec'd 6:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

89, April 26, 9 p.m.

Sweetser reports that at a private meeting of the Nineteen this afternoon British representative Londonderry stated that Lampson reported that the Japanese Minister was ready to accept a formula in the armistice agreement reading as follows:

Second paragraph, article four:

"The Commission will, in accordance with its decision watch in such manner as it deems best, the carrying out the provisions of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this agreement and is authorized to call its attention to any neglect in the carrying out of any of the provisions of the three articles mentioned above".

Lampson proceeded to Nanking and reported to Johnson in Shanghai that the Chinese accept the phraseology with the addition, after "attention" of the words "in accordance with

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 27 1932
 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 APR 29 1932
 DIVISION OF
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

F/LS
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APR 29 1932

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man

2- #89 from Geneva

with its decisions taken in such manner as provided in the said annex".

At the same time the whole of Article 11 in the draft resolution of the Committee of Nineteen would be eliminated and would be replaced by an identic paragraph to the one referred to above, this at the instance of the Chinese Government.

Shigemitsu is endeavoring to obtain the consent of his Government and is expected to report tomorrow.

Because of this information the Committee of Nineteen decided to take no immediate action waiting further reports.

WILSON

FW OX

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By Milton C. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-233



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

APR 23 32

March 23, 1932.

Subject: Visit of Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds to the Scene of the Sino-Japanese Conflict near Soochow.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Any material which will throw additional light on the hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese forces in the Shanghai area between January 28, 1932, and March 3, 1932, is likely to be of interest to the Department of State, and I have little hesitation, therefore, in inviting the Department's attention to the enclosed report written by Vice Consul Reynolds of this office, who made a short trip to the Chinese military positions recently in company with Lieutenant W. G. Wyman, U.S.A., who was proceeding on a mission of investigation and observation assigned to him by the American minister. Mr. Reynolds was careful to avoid covering subjects which naturally fell within the scope of inquiry of Mr. Wyman and a very interesting portion of his report consists of memoranda of conversations with Chinese officers who took active

part

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part in the fighting near Shanghai.

in this connection, I have the honor to invite particular attention to the following enclosures to Mr. Reynolds' report:

Nos. 2, 5, and 6, interviews with General Tsai Ting-kai, Commander of the 19th Route Army.

No. 3, interview with Major Wu, whose troops defended the North Station.

No. 4, interview with General Weng, whose troops defended Woosung fort.


No. 7, interview with the Chief of Staff to General Tsai.

No. 8, interview with the District Magistrate of Taitung.

No. 10, interview with Dr. Hsu, representative of the Chinese Foreign Office.

Enclosures Nos. 9 and 13 are omitted, since they deal almost solely with the matter of the evacuation of American citizens.

Respectfully yours,


Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

Report, as described.

In quadruplicate to the Department of State
In duplicate to the American Legation, Peiping
One copy to the American Minister, Shanghai
One copy to the American Consul General, Shanghai.

800

WRP:MCL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China, March 22, 1932.

Subject: Visit of Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds
to the Scene of Sino-Japanese Conflict.

Willys R. Peck, Esquire
American Consul General,
Nanking.

Sir:

In accordance with the instructions contained in your letter to me of March 12, 1932, I accompanied Lieutenant W. O. Wyman, U.S.A., on a part of his inspection tour of the present scene of the Sino-Japanese conflict, near Soochow. I left Nanking on the morning of March 12.

During my absence from Nanking I visited Soochow, Cheni, Weiting, Kunshan, Taitsang, and interrupted my return journey by remaining in Chinkiang for one night to confer with the senior American naval officer present and various Americans there concerning plans for the evacuation of Americans in and near Chinkiang in case of serious disorders in that area.

All important conversations to which I was a party during my absence from Nanking are covered by the enclosed memoranda. To supplement the information contained in the memoranda, the following remarks

briefly

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briefly describe my journey.

Lieutenant Wyman and I arrived in Soochow late on the afternoon of March 12, and after making arrangements with Mr. David W. Roston, an American missionary residing there, to relay to you any messages sent to him by either Lieutenant Wyman or myself, we proceeded eastward a few miles further along the railway to the General Headquarters of the 19th Route Army where we were introduced to General Tsai Ting-kai, co-commander with General Chiang Kwang-nai, of the 19th Route Army. After an interview lasting about an hour, General Tsai informed us that arrangements would be made to conduct us on an inspection tour of the Chinese outposts during the following morning.

That evening Lieutenant Wyman and I were called on by a number of subordinate officers of the 19th Route Army, who had much to tell of the fighting which had taken place in the Shanghai, and who made many predictions concerning action which would be taken by the Chinese forces in the event of another outbreak of hostilities.

Early the following day, March 13, Lieutenant Wyman and I were escorted by General Tsai and several of his officers to Chinese outposts on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway line a few miles east of Kunshan. There was little activity to be seen during this and subsequent inspections. The train in which we were conveyed from the General Headquarters to Kunshan was forced to halt at Kunshan, as a railway bridge over the

Taiyangkong

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Tsinyangkong canal, a half-mile east of Kunshan, was impassable to heavy traffic owing to damage done, allegedly, by Japanese aerial bombs on March 2, 1932. A railway inspector accompanying the inspection party estimated that from two to three weeks would be required to effect repairs to the bridge, and that the repairs would cost approximately silver \$10,000. A second damaged bridge was crossed about two miles east of the first. At the time of the journey, the furthestmost Chinese outpost was situated on the west abutment of the second bridge. The railway inspector stated that two weeks would be required to effect repairs to the second bridge, and that the cost would be approximately silver \$5,000. The east approaches and abutments of both bridges were badly damaged, and two girders on each bridge were badly twisted, one on the first bridge being almost out in two. The rails and ties had been removed from both bridges. In several places between the two bridges, also, rails and ties had been removed. This, according to the railway inspector, was done by the Chinese forces during their withdrawal from Shanghai as a protection against pursuing Japanese forces.

The inspection party proceeded to Taitsang on the afternoon of March 13, going there in two motor launches along the Tsinyangkong canal.

The Taitsang District Magistrate, Mr. Chao En-chu, and the Taitsang Chief of Police, with a military guard, took the inspection party for a tour of the city, showing them en route the ruins of three business buildings

which

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which allegedly had been struck by Japanese aerial bombs on March 2, 1932. After being shown these ruins, the party was conducted to the ruins of what had once been a small kindergarten in which, according to Magistrate Chao, eight small children lost their lives when a Japanese aerial bomb was dropped on the building on March 2. After a brief inspection of Chinese fortifications at the East Gate of the city, the party was conducted to the village's only hotel where tea and cakes were served. Following this, the party returned to Kunshan by motor launch.

While proceeding along the canal to Taitsang, I was very much surprised to note on the west bank of the Tsinyangkong canal, about half way between Kunshan and Taitsang, a small village of modern foreign-style houses over which the American flag was flying. One of the Chinese officers in the party told me that this was the Eastern Agricultural Development Company, (振東農村) an organization composed mainly of American-born Cantonese who had returned from San Francisco.

On the morning of March 14 I was taken to the Soochow military airdrome by an army officer and the Railway Station Master of Soochow. The commander of the airdrome, Colonel Chao, showed me the wreckage of the airplane in which Mr. Robert M. Short, an American aviator, was shot down while in combat with six Japanese airplanes on the morning of February 22, 1932.

I

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I arrived in Chinkiang late in the evening of March 14, and spent the night on board the U.S.S. TRUXTON, conferring with Lieutenant-Commander S. G. Moore, U.S.N., senior American Naval officer present, concerning plans for the evacuation of Americans in and near Chinkiang in case of serious disorders. On the morning of the following day, March 15, I had conversations with two American missionaries in Chinkiang concerning the same subject.

I returned to Nanking in the afternoon of March 15.

I was very surprised during the inspection of the Chinese lines to note Chinese farmers busily engaged in cultivating the land between the Chinese and Japanese front lines. Along some sectors, the distance between the two lines was less than a mile, yet the Chinese farmers nonchalantly went about their work. Several of the Chinese officers stated that these farmers were very valuable to the Chinese army as a source of information concerning Japanese military movements.

Just prior to the departure of the inspection party from Kunshan to Taitsang, a group of fifty student-volunteers from Tientsin, including three or four young girls, arrived at Kunshan, each member bearing a pick or shovel. The volunteers were lined up in review before General Tsai, who spoke to them at length upon the dangers which they were voluntarily facing, and complimented them upon their display of patriotism. The leader of the volunteers informed General Tsai that over one hundred and fifty additional volunteers were on their

way

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way from Tientsin to the front lines, where they expected to assist the soldiers in digging trenches and erecting other fortifications.

The Chinese officers and soldiers with whom I came in contact during my trip displayed a spirit of patriotism which I had never before witnessed in China. Every officer with whom I spoke was optimistic in regard to the outlook over the situation as it existed at the time of my visit. The soldiers appeared to be well provided for, and displayed indications of being quite content with their duties.

The officers I met were, with one or two exceptions, Cantonese, and Cantonese appeared to be the universal dialect among them. The majority of the officers were graduates of the Imperial Japanese Military Academy in Tokyo, and each one of them took every occasion to make known his bitter hatred of the Japanese, mainly because, each said, of the "high-handed and egotistical methods used in Japanese military schools", and the Japanese "superior and conceited attitude when dealing with the Chinese students in Japan".

I was especially impressed with General Tsai Ting-kai. He told me that he was forty-one years old, and that he had risen from the ranks through his efforts in assisting in the suppression of numerous revolts in the vicinity of Canton, and in various bandit and communist suppression campaigns in Kiangsi Province. It was extremely difficult, on first meeting him, to induce

him

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him to talk freely, but after our first conversation he appeared to be willing to discuss any subject I mentioned, and was very frank in his conversations.

It appeared to be generally believed among General Tsai's officers that Sino-Japanese hostilities had by no means been brought to an end. The officers, to the last man expressed strong suspicions of the ulterior motives which they were certain the Japanese have in their present overtures for peace. On asking General Tsai on three different occasions, and in three different ways, his estimate of Japanese plans, he replied each time that it was his definite opinion that the Japanese have no intention to end hostilities, and that they are firmly determined to occupy the area along the south bank of the Yangtze River extending from Hangchow to Hankow. He insisted that he had unquestionable information which supported his contention, but in reply to questions concerning the nature and source of that information, he only smiled.

Renewal of hostilities on a large scale would, I believe, involve the destruction of a part of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway line in the rear of the Chinese forces. This would obstruct, at least temporarily, the movement of reinforcements and supplies from Nanking to the war zone. A railway tunnel about five hundred yards east of the Chinkiang railway station appears to be the most logical point at which destruction would be begun.

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I am very grateful for the opportunity to make the trip herein described, and I hope that the information I have obtained may be useful.

Very respectfully yours,

Lincoln C. Reynolds,
 American Vice Consul.

Enclosures:-

Memoranda of conversations:

- 1/ With David G. Poston, March 12, 1932.
- 2/ With General Tsai Ting-kai, March 12, 1932.
- 3/ With Major Wu Lu-hsun, March 12, 1932.
- 4/ With General Weng Chao-yuan, March 12, 1932.
- 5/ With General Tsai Ting-kai, March 13, 1932.
- 6/ With General Tsai Ting-kai, March 13, 1932.
- 7/ With Chief-of-Staff to General Tsai Ting-kai, March 13, 1932.
- 8/ With Mr. Chao En-hu, March 13, 1932.
- 9/ With Colonel Chao, March 14, 1932.
- 10/ With Dr. K. C. Hsu, March 14, 1932.
- 11/ With Dr. James B. Woods, March 15, 1932.
- 12/ With Miss Charlotte A. Dunlap, March 15, 1932.
- 13/ Memorandum of Plans for Evacuation of Americans in and Near Chinkiang, March 19, 1932.

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Enclosure No.1 in letter of March 22, 1932, from
Lincoln C. Reynolds to Willy R. Peck.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Soochow Railway Station,
Soochow,
March 12, 1932.

Mr. David G. Poston, Soochow Academy (Missionary),
Soochow.
Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds.

In accordance with an arrangement made by telephone,
Mr. Poston met Lieutenant W. G. Wyman, U.S.A. and Vice
Consul Reynolds at the railway station in Soochow on the
afternoon of March 12, for the purpose of devising a
system of transmitting messages from Lieutenant Wyman and
Vice Consul Reynolds to the American Consul General in
Nanking.

During the course of the conversation, Mr. Poston
stated that there were about thirty American residents
in Soochow at that time. All of these, he said, were
missionaries, and a large part of them were women and
children. In reply to Mr. Reynolds' question of whether
or not these people were not apprehensive in remaining
in Soochow in view of the proximity of the Sino-Japanese
front lines, Mr. Poston stated that it was generally
believed by the foreign residents of Soochow that the
peace of the city would eventually be disturbed by the

Sino-Japanese

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Sino-Japanese conflict or by mutiny and looting of Chinese troops stationed within the city. He said, however, that it was the intention of the American residents to remain in Soochow and rely upon the grace of God and good fortune to assist them to evacuate in case of serious disorders. Mr. Reynolds pointed out the probability of the railway between Soochow and Nanking being cut in case of a sudden outbreak of hostilities, and the interruption of all traffic along the canals in the vicinity of Soochow. Mr. Poston said that the Americans in Soochow were fully aware of these possibilities, but in spite of them they were determined to remain at their posts to protect their homes and other mission property as long as possible.

Mr. Poston said that advice had been received from the American Consul General in Shanghai, within whose consular district Soochow is situated, to evacuate from Soochow. He complained that the advice had not been transmitted by the Consul General in Shanghai through the missionary in Soochow previously designated, and that in view of this fact many of the Americans in Soochow were disinclined to accept the advice as official and definite.

Mr. Poston stated that no Japanese airplanes had flown over Soochow since March 8, and that despite the threat of disorder, all was very quiet in Soochow at that time. He said that the Chinese soldiers and civilian population were extremely friendly.

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Enclosure No. 2 in letter of March 22, 1932, from
Lincoln C. Reynolds to Willys R. Peck.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Chinese Field Headquarters,
Near Soochow,
March 12, 1932.

General Tsai Ting-kai, Commander 19th Route Army.
Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds.
Lieutenant W. G. Wyman, U.S.A.

(Note: Reports submitted by Mr. Reynolds will
not include material which form the
subject of Lieutenant Wyman's mission.)

General Tsai said that the troops under his command
at present occupy positions extending from a point a
short distance south of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway
line and east of Soochow, northward to a point beyond
Taitsang.

The General stated that his troops had not come
into contact with Japanese troops since the afternoon
of March 8, on which date the Chinese troops in one of
the outposts found it necessary to fire on a Japanese
cavalry patrol which approached too near the Chinese
lines. So far as the General was able to ascertain, no
casualties resulted from this minor encounter. General
Tsai said that no Japanese airplanes have flown over,
or behind, the Chinese lines since March 8. On that
date, however, a patrol of several Japanese planes flew
over Kunsan, Cheni, Soochow, and their environs. No

bombs

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bombs were dropped by the planes. General Tsai expressed the opinion that the presence of neutral observers, of which the Japanese are aware, in the Chinese lines, was responsible for the present inactivity of the Japanese troops facing his lines.

There are two Japanese divisions facing his troops at the present time, General Tsai stated.

General Tsai told Lt. Wyman that he had not been informed of the establishment of a "Shirakawa Patrol Zone".

General Tsai Ting-kai said that the 19th Route Army would be reenforced to normal strength by March 19, as a large number of recruits were arriving daily to replace the regular soldiers who were lost in the fighting at Chapei, Kiangwan, and Woosung. The General stated that, even though these recruits have had no previous military experience, yet judging from the results obtained from the use of student volunteers at Shanghai, the recruits will prove very effective in case of further hostilities. The General said that during the fighting in the Shanghai area, he was continuously besieged by large numbers of students demanding places in the Chinese front lines. Despite his repeated protests he was forced to accept the student volunteers in view of their threat to enter the front lines unarmed. The volunteers were issued hand grenades. General Tsai said that although he was very apprehensive at the outset, the students later proved to be one of his most effective units. The General credited the students mainly with

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the successful repulsion of Japanese tank advances.

General Tsai Ting-kai stated that he was convinced beyond doubt that the Japanese intend to extend a line from Hangchow, in Chekiang Province, to Hankow, in Hupeh Province, and to endeavor to drive northward all Chinese troops between that line and the Yangtze River. General Tsai expressed the opinion that, in view of information in his possession, the only reason for the failure of the Japanese to begin the immediate execution of this plan is the attitude of the United States.

The General stated that he realized that it is necessary now, more than ever, for the Chinese to present a united front, and that he would pledge himself and the troops under his command never to engage again in civil warfare.

At the close of the interview, Mr. Reynolds stated that it was not only a pleasure, but also a great honor to have met the General. General Tsai replied that he was grateful for the compliment, but that his troops alone were responsible for the courageous stand made by the Chinese at Shanghai in the face of "a determined aggressor using superior equipment." The General stated that he and his troops are more determined than they have ever been to defend China's territory to the last man.

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Enclosure No. 3 in letter of March 22, 1932, from Vice
 Consul Reynolds to Consul General Willlys R. Peck.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Near Chinese Military Headquarters,
 waiting,
 March 12, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

Major Wu Lu-hsun, Commander 3rd Battalion, 6th Regiment,
 of the 156th Brigade, of the 78th
 Division, 19th Route Army.
 Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds.

Major Wu, an English-speaking Cantonese, and a
 graduate of the Japanese Imperial Military Academy in
 Tokyo, commanded the unit of Chinese troops which first
 came into contact with Japanese forces in Chapel on the
 night of January 28, 1932. His troops later defended
 the North Station in Shanghai until the day of the
 general withdrawal of Chinese troops from the Shanghai
 area.

Major Wu said that the Commander of the Shanghai-
 Nanking Garrison, on learning late in January of the
 intention of the Japanese to initiate hostilities in
 Shanghai, despatched the 3rd Battalion to Shanghai as
 a defense precaution. He said that his was the only
 large Chinese military unit in Shanghai at the out-
 break of hostilities. On their arrival in Shanghai his
 troops numbered three hundred and fifty, of whom only

fifty

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fifty survived the severe fighting in Chapel.

Major Wu asserted that on the night of January 28, Japanese armored cars entered his defense areas, and, without previous warning, opened fire on his troops with machine-guns. The Chinese troops immediately returned the fire with rifles and machine-guns, and in a short time retired to their positions in and around the North Station. According to the Major, the Japanese armored cars were followed into Chapel by a large body of Japanese marines and plain-clothes-men on foot and in motor vehicles. The plain-clothes-men, he commented, were good fighters, as all or most of them had regularly received military training for a short period each year.

During the first few hours of their encounter with the Japanese forces, the Major said, his troops suffered severely from an inferiority complex which, he was inclined to think, was the result of years of over-rating of the spirit and ability of Japanese soldiers.

Major Wu said that, following the retreat of his men from the North Station during the early stage of the fighting, he was compelled to place reliable soldiers with machine-guns at the rear of his troops in order to force them to recapture the lost position. After recapturing the North Station with comparative ease, his soldiers suddenly became aware that they were not only superior to the Japanese soldiers in spirit, but also possessed the same, if not greater, ability as their foe. Thereafter, he said, his greatest task was that of

preventing

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preventing his men from taking unnecessary risks in their almost uncontrollable determination to annihilate the Japanese forces facing them.

Despite the repeated Japanese bombardment of the station from the air and land, Major Wu said, his men remained very courageous and determined to hold their position to the last, if necessary. They lived for days on nothing but rice and tea, and relied on neighboring shops to supply even these. Their supplies of ammunition were not entirely dependable during any time of the siege, yet in spite of these obstacles, the fifty men who remained from the original three hundred and fifty, were very reluctant to withdraw from their position when the order to retire was received. Major Wu stated that he considered himself thoroughly justified in commenting on the new spirit of patriotism which first pervaded the Chinese forces during the fighting at Shanghai, and which has since grown to inestimable proportions.

During his discussion of the fighting in the Shanghai area, Major Wu, as did his superior officer, General Tsai Ting-kai, paid especial tribute to the student volunteers who entered the conflict in Chapei, Kiangwan, Wocsung and Liuho with no previous military experience and with no weapons save hand-grenades. He asserted that, had it not been for the courageous conduct of these inexperienced youngsters, the Chinese losses from Japanese tank attacks would have been even more appalling than they actually were. Following the

first

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first attack of Japanese tanks, he said, the Chinese were completely at a loss to discover a successful defense against their onslaught. To those students goes the full credit for evolving the satisfactory method finally used to repulse the tank attacks, he stated.

He said that, under cover of darkness, small parties of student volunteers went out into the streets of Chapei, Kiangwan, and Woosung, taking with them a good supply of trench-mortar shells and hand-grenades. They dug shallow ditches across each important thoroughfare, and in these placed charges consisting of trench-mortar shells to which a hand-grenade had been bound. A long piece of strong cord was tied to the firing "ring" of each grenade and the entire charge then buried with an inconspicuous covering of dirt. Holding the other end of the cord, the student concealed himself in debris nearby and there awaited the approaching dawn, and with it the arrival of the first Japanese tank. When the ill-fated tank arrived over the powder-laden ditch, the student pulled the cord which exploded the charge, then in the confusion of the terrific explosion which followed, he leaped, with a whoop of triumph, from his place of concealment and -- "sometimes" -- escaped from the murderous machine-gun fire directed at him by the startled and very indignant Japanese soldiers. They Major stated emphatically that he had witnessed the destruction of no less than

thirteen

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thirteen Japanese tanks by this method, and that he had heard reports of others destroyed in the same manner. He also said that on a number of occasions he had witnessed small bands of these fearless youngsters, in the face of heavy Japanese machine-gun and rifle fire, brazenly endeavoring to put into commission again Japanese tanks which had been only partially destroyed. He did not, however, note any recommissioned tanks in use by the Chinese forces.

Major Wu stated that all Chinese heavy artillery was removed from the Shanghai area three days prior to the withdrawal from there of the Chinese troops. This was necessary, he stated, as there were only three roads leading out of Shanghai which could bear the weight of heavy guns. During part of the time these guns were being removed, Japanese planes circled overhead and bombed and swept with machine-gun fire the crews hauling them away to new positions. As practically all of the moving was done during the night, the casualties to the gun crews on this occasion were light.

Major Wu contended that the Japanese forces were thoroughly demoralized by the Chinese in the fighting in the Shanghai area, and stated that his contention in this respect was borne out by the fact that the Japanese did not move into the evacuated area in Chapei and Kiangwan until eight hours after the Chinese forces had withdrawn, and that the Japanese waited twenty-four hours before occupying the evacuated territory in the Woosung area. He thought that the Japanese, "clever militarists", were fearful of a ruse of some sort.

Major

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Major Wu said that he was a graduate of the Japanese Imperial Military Academy at Tokyo, and that after graduation he had spent six months with a Japanese regiment in Hokkaido. He said that during his residence in Japan, he made a particular point of closely observing the Japanese military and that by virtue of his observations he could speak with some degree of authority in this respect. He said that, on the basis of four-and-a-half years of close association with Japanese soldiers, he had come to the definite conclusion that the "so-called 'expression of grim determination on the face of every military son of the Mikado' has long been grossly misinterpreted because it is, in fact, merely a manifestation of utter stupidity!" Mr. Reynolds commented that, on the basis of the Major's remarks, he was led to believe that the Major was undoubtedly quite fond of the Japanese. A grunt of unconcealed disgust was the only response.

Major Wu said that the Japanese prisoners who had been captured by Chinese forces had repeatedly expressed their surprise at the considerate treatment accorded them by the Chinese. He said that of a large number whom he had questioned, all were of the opinion that they would be executed or starved to death. The prisoners admitted, according to Major Wu, that their officers had warned them to expect such treatment if captured by the Chinese.

When questioned with regard to the disposition of persons caught spying, Major Wu stated that all Chinese

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discovered conveying or collecting information for the Japanese are court-martialed and executed immediately, but that all Japanese so apprehended are sent to the rear where they will be kept imprisoned until the cessation of the present hostilities.

Mr. Reynolds asked Major Wu whether, according to the joint telegram of Sun Fo and Eugene Chen to the National Government, it was true that the 19th Route Army was compelled to withdraw from the Shanghai area through the failure of the National Government to send assistance. Major Wu replied that there was no basis for this statement; that the National Government had sent re-enforcements and other assistance; that ammunition had been regularly supplied to the forces in the Shanghai area by the National Government's arsenals in Nanking and Shanghai; and that, had it been necessary, the 19th Route Army could have remained indefinitely in the Shanghai area. Mr. Reynolds mentioned that the landing of Japanese troops at Liuhoo might have made continued occupation of the Shanghai area rather difficult for the Chinese troops. Major Wu stated that, had it been advisable from a military point of view, the Japanese troops could have been prevented from landing at Liuhoo or at least delayed long enough to have permitted the Chinese forces to utilize their entire strength in a decisive drive on the Japanese in the Shanghai area. He said that in order to execute this move, however, it would have been necessary for the Chinese forces to violate their obligation to the

International

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international Settlement, the one thing the Chinese were determined not to do.

Major Wu stated that Eugene Chen and Sun Fo are merely actors, and for that reason are highly unpopular with all intelligent Chinese. Mr. Reynolds inquired whether, according to a rumor he had heard, it was true that Eugene Chen and Sun Fo exercised influence over the 19th Route Army. Major Wu replied that these two gentlemen not only had no influence over the Army, but, on the other hand, were extremely unpopular with the officers and enlisted personnel of the 19th Route Army. The unpopularity of Eugene Chen and Sun Fo with the enlisted men of the Army may be accounted for, he stated, by the fact that the enlisted men of the Army have been kept currently informed of developments in all phases of the present conflict, and being so informed, are intelligent enough to be aware of the grave necessity of preserving National unity, and of disregarding any persons who are desirous of promoting discord.

Mr. Reynolds said that he had heard the opinion expressed on a number of occasions that had General Chiang Kai-shek been in the Shanghai area during the fighting there, the outcome of the fighting would have been different. The Major replied at once that General Chiang's presence at Shanghai would have had no effect on the outcome, and that he "was of a passing age". Mr. Reynolds told Major Wu that he had heard it said that General Chiang Kai-shek was primarily a military man,

and

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and not an administrator. Mr. Reynolds then asked Major Wu what, if that were the case, General Chiang Kai-shek would do in the future. The Major replied that he expected that General Chiang would retire and "travel abroad", but that he would remain at Nanking until the present Sino-Japanese question was settled. When asked what would become of General Chiang's army in the event of his retirement, Major Wu stated that there was no longer a "General Chiang's Army", that all Chinese troops would henceforward be under the control of the National Military Advisory Council. As evidence of the amalgamation of the Chinese forces, Major Wu stated that the battalion under his command was composed of thirty per cent Cantonese and about seventy per cent Shanghaiese. Major Wu jestingly commented that this was an ideal combination, as three Cantonese could show seven Chinese from any other part of the Country how to fight! He stated that he was very much inclined to believe it true, as printed in Japanese military text books, that Cantonese are not Chinese, but are, instead, a mixture of Japanese and a white race. Mr. Reynolds said that this statement was scarcely compatible with the Major's previous contentions that China was progressing rapidly in establishing National unity. The Major replied that he had not been serious in expressing his latter contention.

Major Wu asserted that the Japanese forces now facing the Chinese lines near Sooshow are deriving their

living

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living from the land; that in addition to obtaining their food supplies locally they are impressing Chinese farmers into their transport units and labor corps. He said that, according to information received at the Headquarters of the 19th Route Army, the Japanese are shooting without previous trial any Chinese suspected of espionage. He thought that, as the Japanese were not paying for the food supplies commandeered locally, the cost of their present campaign was not, contrary to general belief, great.

When questioned concerning the prospects of peace in the near future, the Major replied that he was convinced that, in the event of the failure of peace negotiations to be instituted, or in the event that the Japanese forces are not withdrawn from their present positions in the near future, the Chinese forces will take the initiative and endeavor to force them out. In reply to Mr. Reynolds' question concerning the ability of the Chinese troops to accomplish so serious a task, Major Wu stated that there was no doubt that the Chinese troops could drive the Japanese from their present positions.

Mr. Reynolds asked Major Wu whether or not the belief was true that the 19th Route Army would never again engage in civil war. The Major stated that both he and any of the officers of the 19th Route Army, would gladly pledge themselves to such a policy. He said that the present conflict had taught the

Chinese

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Chinese a lesson which, if learned years ago, would have resulted in China's being one of the stronger nations of the world at the present time.

Major Wu estimated the Chinese casualties to date at 10,000, and the Japanese losses at 9,000 killed and wounded.

The Major stated that the number of men in his battalion at present was greater than before it entered Shanghai, as new recruits had been received regularly since the withdrawal from Shanghai.

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Enclosure No. 4 in letter of March 22, 1932, from Vice
Consul Reynolds to Consul General Willlys R. Peck.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Near Chinese Military Headquarters,
Weiting,
March 12, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

General Weng Chao-yuan (翁昭垣), Commander 156th
Brigade of the 78th Division, of the 19th Route
Army.
Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds.

General Weng, who commanded the Chinese forces
which defended the fort at Woosung during the recent
siege of Japanese naval and land forces, is an extremely
youthful appearing thirty-six-year-old Cantonese, a
graduate of the Japanese Imperial Military Academy in
Tokyo, and a graduate of the French Army Air Corps
school.

In commenting on the siege, the General said that,
following the destruction of the large guns in the
Woosung fort, by the Japanese naval and aerial bombard-
ment, the Chinese occupants of the stronghold had less
than 25 machine-guns, and only 700 rifles with which to
reply to the Japanese fire. Courage, alone, he said was
responsible for the prolonged stand made by his men
in the face of an almost incessant bombardment from
Japanese men-of-war and airplanes. In addition to

receiving

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receiving "hundreds of shells from three sides", the fort was also the target for over 1,200 aerial bombs.

To protect themselves from so heavy a fire, he said, his men were compelled to live in subterranean passage-ways during most of the siege, and many casualties resulted from the numerous direct hits made by Japanese bombers and gunners who were able, during the early stages of the fighting to spot the location of the various passage-ways by the smoke issuing from their flues every time the soldiers cooked food. In a short time, however, his men discovered that if they used charcoal as fuel, little or no smoke was visible. Accordingly all local supplies of charcoal were requisitioned, and all went well until the men began to suffer, in their narrowly confined quarters, from the carbon-monoxide fumes given off by the braziers. For a time, he said, there was an incessant debate among his men concerning the relative disagreeableness of the fumes and the fire from Japanese men-of-war. The General said something to the effect that if all the head-aches contracted by his men during the siege of Woosung could have been placed end-to-end, the result would easily have outclassed the "morning after" the most convivial of Bacchus' nights-out!

Mr. Reynolds mentioned a report, issued during the early stages of the fighting at Woosung, of an attempted Japanese landing which was repulsed by the Chinese occupants of the fort. The General replied that, following a Japanese bombardment lasting all of one

morning.

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morning, he issued orders to the large guns in the fort to cease firing, and the Japanese, assuming that the Chinese guns were destroyed and that the Chinese forces had evacuated the fort, sent two motor launches loaded with marines to occupy the stronghold. The Chinese soldiers who had previously been stationed in trenches along the Whangpoo River bank, awaited in complete silence the approach of the Japanese marines. As the Japanese launches approached the shore, and at a given signal, the Chinese soldiers clambered out of their trenches and swept the launches with machine-gun fire, hand-grenades and a heavy fusillade of rifle fire. The launches hove-to and returned to the Japanese men-of-war with all haste, bearing their gruesome cargo. The General estimated that, out of the sixty or eighty marines in the two launches, not more than twenty escaped with their lives. Thereafter, the General said, the Japanese never again attempted to occupy the fort as long as they suspected the presence of Chinese troops within. Proof of their great caution was given, he thought, by their not attempting to occupy the fort until twenty-four hours after the Chinese forces finally evacuated it.

The General said that the Japanese forces could have captured Woosung Village and the fort during the early part of the fighting had they realized that the Chinese force occupying these two areas was so small. The Chinese were fortunate, he commented, in successfully anticipating which sectors of their lines were

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about to be attacked by the Japanese, and in each case Chinese soldiers were withdrawn from a quiet sector and despatched to support the sector which was eventually attacked. All Japanese attacks were repulsed in this manner, and the Japanese were led to believe that there were many times the number of Chinese forces in those two areas which there actually was.

When asked whether his troops had succeeded in shooting down any Japanese airplanes, General Weng stated that, although his troops had not shot down any Japanese airplanes, he had seen three Japanese planes destroyed by Chinese ground fire during the fighting in the Woosung area and in the vicinity of Chenju. He stated that the planes were brought down with machine-guns or rifles.

The General confirmed General Tsai Ting-kai's statement that no Japanese-owned property had been occupied by Chinese forces during the fighting in the Shanghai area. He said that, unless the Japanese-owned cotton mills in that area have been molested since the withdrawal of Chinese forces, they will all be found in an undamaged condition, as the Chinese forces strictly obeyed orders issued to them to refrain from molesting foreign-owned property.

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Enclosure No. 5 in letter of March 22, 1932, from Vice
 Consul Reynolds to Consul General Willys R. Peck.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

On Route to and from Chinese Outposts,
 Near Soochow,
 March 13, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

General Tsai Ting-kai, Commander 19th Route Army,
 Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds.
 Interpreters.

Mr. Reynolds inquired of General Tsai whether,
 according to a joint telegram sent by Sun Fo and Eugene
 Chen to the National Government, it was true that the
 19th Route Army had been compelled to evacuate the
 Shanghai area through the failure of the National Govern-
 ment to send it re-enforcements. The General replied
 at once that the withdrawal of his army was purely a
 strategical move, made advisable by the incessant
 severe punishment it was undergoing from Japanese heavy
 artillery and airplanes. He said that his army could
 have remained in the Shanghai area considerably longer,
 had he considered it advantageous to keep it there.

Mr. Reynolds mentioned to the General a rumor heard
 in Hankow to the effect that the 19th Route Army had,
 during part of the time it was fighting in the Shanghai
 area, been supported by Sun Fo from his personal funds.
 General Tsai emphatically denied this rumor, and said that

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the only basis which could exist for such an erroneous report would be the fact that Sun Fo had transmitted, on one or two occasions, funds received by him which had been subscribed for the 19th Route Army by Chinese residents abroad. General Tsai then said that, in order to efface any false impressions such rumors may create, he wished that it be definitely understood that neither he nor his troops were obligated to any person or cause, save that of upholding the honor of China, and maintaining China's territorial integrity, "as represented by the National Government at Hanking". (Note: This is the only occasion on which General Tsai indicated any connection between the troops under his command and the Central Government. LCR)

Mr. Reynolds inquired of General Tsai his opinion of the attitude of the United States during the present Sino-Japanese conflict. General Tsai said that he was aware of the numerous problems with which the United States Government is faced at the present time, and that its repeated endeavors to re-establish peace in the Far East were highly commendable. General Tsai, by way of additional comment, recalled having studied in school the recently established policy of the United States toward China. General Tsai said that the recent notes of the United States Government indicated clearly the intention of the United States to uphold the "Hay Policy".

Upon receiving the General's assurance that his opinion in this respect was similar to general Chinese

opinion.

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opinion, Mr. Reynolds inquired of General Tsai what he thought was the basis of a rumor current in Nanking to the effect that the United States had sold US\$180,000,000 worth of arms and ammunition to the Japanese Government during 1931. The General stated that he, also, had heard that rumor, but knew that it was entirely untrue. He expressed the opinion that the rumor "bore many of the characteristics of the Japanese propaganda mill". Mr. Reynolds mentioned that the Consulate General had been informed by the State Department that the United States had exported only US\$12,000 worth of arms and ammunition to Japan during 1931.

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Enclosure No. 6 in letter of March 22, 1932, from Vice
Consul Reynolds to Consul General Willys R. Peck.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

En Route to and from Chinese Outposts,
Near Soochow,
March 13, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

General Tsai Ting-kai, Commander 19th Route Army.
Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds.

In reply to Mr. Reynolds' inquiry concerning the Chinese losses during the fighting in the Shanghai area, General Tsai estimated that the Chinese casualties totalled 12,000. He said that he believed that the Japanese suffered from 9,000 to 10,000 casualties during that fighting. The General said that about twenty per cent of the Chinese casualties suffered were caused by Japanese artillery and airplanes. He stated that his estimates did not include the large number of innocent civilians who were wounded and killed during the conflict.

When asked whether or not he had lost many soldiers through desertion during the fighting in the Shanghai area, the General said that the number of deserters during that time "could be counted on the fingers of one hand." General Tsai said that from the outset of the fighting in the Shanghai area, he had made a particular

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point of keeping his officers currently informed of developments in all phases of the Sino-Japanese controversy, and that those officers in turn had kept the men under their command fully informed. Thus, he stated, his men understand fully the causes for which they are fighting. The General invited Mr. Reynolds to pick at random any soldier from the Chinese front lines, and to question him concerning even the non-military aspects of the present conflict. General Tsai affirmed his willingness to wager that an intelligent reply would be received from the soldier. In addition to being kept currently informed of the causes for which they are fighting, the General stated, his men are well fed, well clothed, and are regularly given plenty of spending money. These facts, he said, account for the extremely high morale of all his troops. General Tsai said that he had never, in all his military career, commanded such a courageous and loyal body of troops.

Several of the soldiers who were surreptitiously questioned the day before by a British military observer, replied that they "receive meat every day, now, have plenty of money, and are very happy."

General Tsai especially commended the student volunteers who came from the Fu Tan and Fung Yung Universities, saying that they demanded positions in the Chinese front lines in the Shanghai area, realizing that almost certain death awaited them. Of the small number

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of these students who volunteered, over 150 were killed by the Japanese, according to the General's Chief-of-Staff.

When questioned with regard to the prospects of peace in the near future, General Tsai referred to his previous statement that he was convinced that the Japanese have military plans which contemplate the occupation of the south bank of the Yangtze River to as far west as Hankow, and said that he can not yet believe that the Japanese are prepared to cease their fighting and return to Japan. He expressed the opinion that the question of "face", alone, demands that the Japanese remain in China at least for the time being. He said that the Chinese Government could under no circumstances accept terms of peace which would be sufficient to recover for Japan the prestige lost by the Japanese forces in the campaign in and around Shanghai. Alluding to Admiral Shiozawa's prediction that the Japanese forces would be in complete control of Chapei within three hours after the landing of Japanese forces, and without firing a single shot, General Tsai stated "that even a Japanese mind can conceive the great difference between three hours and thirty days!" General Tsai expressed the opinion that the Chinese, generally, look hopefully to the United States and the League of Nations to evolve a solution to the present highly complicated situation, yet intelligent Chinese realize that such a task is almost

beyond

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beyond human accomplishment, without resorting to the use of economic measures or military force. When asked whether, in his opinion, the Chinese, generally, expected foreign nations to intervene with economic sanctions or force, the General opined that, in the absence of the "only two factors which would induce such intervention, namely, sufficient economic interests in China, or a great enough desire to make the necessary sacrifice in order to re-establish peace in the Far East, intelligent Chinese do not expect military or economic assistance from abroad".

Mr. Reynolds stated that he had heard a rumor that the Chinese were planning to take the offensive in military action in the event that peace negotiations are not instituted soon, or in case the Japanese forces are not withdrawn from Chinese territory. The General said that it is still the intention of the Chinese to maintain their attitude of self-defense. He quoted, never-the-less a Chinese proverb: "Never chase a dog into a blind alley, for when he reaches the end he is certain to turn and bite."

The General turned the conversation again to the fighting which took place in the Shanghai area, and said that had it not been for his ever-mindful obligation to protect foreign lives and property in the International Settlement at Shanghai, his forces "could easily have driven the Japanese marines into the Whangpoo River" during the earlier stages of the fighting. He offered as proof of his contention, the statement that

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his troops outnumbered the Japanese forces five to one prior to the arrival from Japan of Japanese re-enforcements. The General stated that, as further proof of his respect for foreign lives and property in the International Settlement at Shanghai, he had issued orders to his soldiers, at the outbreak of hostilities, not to occupy foreign property in the Chapel, Kiangwan, and Woosung areas. All Japanese and other foreign nationals within the territory occupied by his troops at that time were asked to leave, and many were escorted unharmed to places where they could evacuate in greater safety. He cited especially the case of Japanese-owned cotton mills in the Woosung area which were within the Chinese lines for several days, and expressed the hope that neutral observers would be sent to make a close inspection of the property.

The General stated that, should the Japanese resume hostilities, they would find the Chinese fully prepared to continue the fighting indefinitely. He said that he had every reason to believe that his troops could defeat the Japanese, and pointed out that, in addition to being situated in territory particularly suited to Chinese military tactics, the Japanese artillery would not be so effective, as the canals and soft ground of the rice paddies in the area occupied at present would prevent the movement of heavy guns. He also stated that, as his troops would be extended over a wider area, the Japanese aerial bombardment which proved so harmful

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to the concentration of troops necessary in the fighting at Shanghai, would no longer be a serious menace.

The General pointed out that, if necessary, sufficient supplies of arms and ammunition may be obtained from Canton, Hanking, and Shanghai. Even in the midst of the present conflict, he said, the Chinese are striving to build up an efficient air force. Airplanes are being purchased abroad with funds liberally subscribed by overseas Chinese, and plans are under way for the training of good aviators.

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Enclosure No. 7 in letter of March 22, 1932, from Vice
Consul Reynolds to Consul General Willlys R. Peck.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

En Route to and from Chinese Outposts
Near Soochow, and En Route to and from
Taitsang. March 13, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief-of-Staff to General Tsai Ting-kai.
Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds.

The Chief-of-staff started the conversation by saying that he believed it to be the confident expectation of every Chinese that the American people would continue to maintain their present friendly attitude toward China. Mr. Reynolds replied that there appeared to be no reason for believing that Americans have any greater wish than their present desire to assist in the restoration of peace in the Far East.

In reply to the Chief-of-staff's question of what, aside from the present complicated Sino-Japanese problem, was the greatest issue facing China, Mr. Reynolds affirmed his inability to answer so important a question, but said that he had often heard the opinion expressed that the preservation of national unity is one of the paramount issues with which China is faced at present. The Chief-of-staff concurred in this belief and stated that the unification of China

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is nearer completion at the present time than at any time since the establishment of the Republic.

Mr. Reynolds said that it was to be deeply regretted that civil wars for the preservation of the Republic, or for other causes, had been fought almost incessantly during the past twenty years. The Chief-of-staff said that civil warfare alone was responsible for the predicament in which China finds herself at present, for, he stated, had it not been for this warfare, China would have been powerful enough, previous to the present trouble, to have discouraged "Japan's apparent designs on Chinese territory." The Chief-of-staff opined that the present conflict will serve at least one purpose, if only one, as it will have demonstrated to the Chinese people the vital necessity of subordinating personal ambitions to consideration of the Nation's welfare, if the peace of the Country is to be secured.

The Chief-of-staff denied that Feng Yu-hsiang's troops, as previously reported, were in the present war area. In reply to Mr. Reynolds' question, he stated that so far as he knew there were no Feng Yu-hsiang troops south of the Yangtze River. Concerning Mr. Reynolds' question regarding the whereabouts of General Chang Fah-kwei and his famous "Ironsides" Division, the Chief-of-staff stated that they are at present stationed on the Kiangsi Provincial Border awaiting orders from the National Government. (Note: Mr. Reynolds failed to remember the section of the border mentioned by the Chief-of-staff, but is under

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the impression that it is in the vicinity of the junction of the Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi borders). The Chief-of-staff stated that about one month would be required to transport the "Ironsides" Division from their present location to the war area in Kiangsu Province.

The Chief-of-staff stated that new recruits are being received daily, and that these are being trained as rapidly as they arrive. When asked whether or not these could be depended upon to defend themselves in case of further hostilities, the Chief-of-staff stated emphatically that they could, and that their lack of knowledge with regard to active military service would be compensated for by their extremely high morale and desire to serve their Country.

The Chief-of-staff said that he is fully confident that, in view of the favorable position now occupied by Chinese troops, they would be able to withstand indefinitely any attack which the Japanese might endeavor to make. He pointed out, as did General Tsai Ting-kai, that the terrain of the area now occupied by the Chinese and Japanese forces is entirely unsuited for the use of heavy artillery owing to the numerous canals and the prevalence of rice paddies which are too soft to permit the passage of heavy guns or tanks. He also mentioned that the wide extension of Chinese troops in their present positions would make the use of airplanes impractical for other than observation purposes.

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The Chief-of-staff also estimated the Chinese losses during the fighting in Chapei, Kiangwan and Woosung at 12,000, but was unable to give the relative percent of these casualties of killed and wounded.

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Enclosure No. 8 in letter of March 22, 1932, from Vice
Consul Reynolds to Consul General Willys R. Peck.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Taitsang,
March 13, 1932.

Mr. Chao En-hu, Taitsang District Magistrate.
Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds.

Magistrate Chao stated that Taitsang, an attractive Chinese town of 30,000 inhabitants, situated on the west bank of the Tsinyanghong canal about half way between Kunshan and Liuho, was visited on four occasions on March 2, 1932 by Japanese airplanes which dropped twenty-four bombs in and on the outskirts of the city.

The noise of the exploding bombs caused the frightened people to flee from their houses and shops into the streets, whereupon the Japanese planes swooped low over the city and swept the crowded thoroughfares from one end to the other with machine-gun fire. Magistrate Chao said that more than twenty innocent civilians were killed by the bombs and machine-gun fire, and a larger number wounded.

The party which Mr. Reynolds accompanied was shown the ruins of three business buildings in the heart of the city, and was later taken to view the ruins of a

primary

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primary school in which eight small children were killed when the building was struck by a Japanese bomb.

Magistrate Chao stated positively that there were no Chinese soldiers in the city at the time of the bombing, but that since March 2, a number of soldiers had been moved into the city in anticipation of attacks from Japanese forces entrenched a short distance to the eastward of the city.

Mr. Chao said that no Japanese airplanes had flown over the city since March 2, but that patrols of Japanese cavalry were reported to have approached to within a short distance of the town on two or three occasions since the date of the bombing.

Magistrate Chao said that all business in the town had been at a standstill ever since the attack of the Japanese planes, and that most of the inhabitants leave the town each morning and remain in the surrounding fields until nightfall, in terror of a repeated attack from the planes. Only a small number of shops were open on the occasion of Mr. Reynolds' visit, and only a small number of people were seen on the streets of the city.

Note: Magistrate Chao An-hu is a graduate of Northwestern University of Chicago, and completed an advance course in Municipal Government under Professor William B. Munro, of Harvard University.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

En Route from Soochow to Chinkiang,
March 14, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. K. C. Hsu, Department of International Relations,
National Government Foreign Office,
Nanking.
Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds.

Dr. Hsu said that the Department of International
Relations of the National Government Foreign Office had
received, since the outbreak of the present Sino-
Japanese hostilities, "several millions of dollars"
from overseas Chinese for transmission to the 19th
Route Army. When asked the approximate amount of
these contributions, Dr. Hsu politely replied that
he was not at liberty to disclose the information,
but said that the amount was "stupenduous".

He stated that the small Chinese community in
Sumatra, alone, had contributed US\$200,000, and that
one wealthy Chinese merchant there had, on separate
occasions, sent two contributions of US\$30,000 each.
The Chinese in New York and San Francisco also had
contributed liberally, he said.

Dr. Hsu mentioned having returned from Europe via
Siberia during the Autumn of 1930, and said that

while

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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while stopping over in Moscow for a week en route, he met the oldest son of Mr. Eugene Chen. This son, he stated, is the chief editor of one of Moscow's most radical papers, an English-language daily. Dr. Hsu commented unfavorably on the fact that all of Mr. Chen's children are at present receiving their education in Russia.

LOR:MCL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 11 in letter of March 22, 1932, from Vice
Consul Reynolds to Consul General Willys R. Peck.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Aboard U. S. S. TRUXTON,
Chinkiang,
March 15, 1932.

Dr. James B. Woods, Goldsby King Memorial Hospital,
Southern Presbyterian Mission, Chinkiang.
Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds.

Dr. Woods stated that Chinkiang was very peaceful,
and that the Chinese population of the city was un-
usually friendly toward all foreigners save the Japanese.
As there were no Japanese residing in the city at that
time, he said, the attitude of the Chinese with respect
to the Japanese made little difference with regard to
the local situation. Dr. Woods said that all Japanese
formerly residing in Chinkiang had been evacuated to
the Japanese destroyer in the harbor shortly after the
outbreak of hostilities in Shanghai.

In reply to Mr. Reynolds question as to whether or
not the Southern Presbyterian Mission had experienced
difficulty because of attempted occupation of its
property by Chinese soldiers, Dr. Woods replied that,
on the contrary, the soldiers showed more respect for
foreign property at the present time than they had at
any previous time. He said that the local military

headquarters.

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headquarters, fearing this difficulty had, some weeks before, sent to the various foreigners in Chinkiang printed military orders, sealed with the official chop, with instructions that the orders were to be posted on all foreign property. The orders, according to Dr. Woods, instructed all Chinese soldiers to refrain from occupation of the premises on the penalty of severe punishment.

Dr. Woods stated that the local military headquarters had concluded an arrangement with his hospital for the care of wounded soldiers. According to the terms of the arrangement, the hospital would receive fifty cents silver per day for each soldier accepted for treatment. This, Dr. Woods stated, was voluntarily offered by the Chinese, and was highly acceptable to the hospital authorities who had previously feared a deluge of wounded soldiers with no funds to pay for their expenses. To date, however, no soldiers had been sent to the hospital for treatment.

Dr. Woods stated that the American missionaries of Chinkiang had learned a costly lesson during the disorders of 1927, and that at the first sign of trouble in the future, the Consul General in Hanking would find no difficulty in persuading the Americans to evacuate Chinkiang.

LOR:MCL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 12 in letter of March 22, 1932, from Vice
Consul Reynolds to Consul General Willlys R. Peck.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Chinkiang,
March 15, 1932.

Miss Charlotte A. Dunlap, American Presbyterian
Mission, Chinkiang.
Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds.

Miss Dunlap, for many years a resident of Chinkiang,
informed Mr. Reynolds that conditions in Chinkiang were
more suitable to continued foreign residence than at
any previous time in her knowledge of the city. She
stated that the Chinese were extremely friendly toward
all foreigners save Japanese, and that as there were no
Japanese in Chinkiang at present, this feeling was
negligible in so far as it affected the local situation.

Miss Dunlap said that, although she felt perfectly
safe in Chinkiang, she would be guided by any advice
conveyed to her by the Consul General in Nanking in the
event that there was any change in the local situation.
Mr. Reynolds explained to her that the Consul General's
advice to Americans in Chinkiang would have to be based
to a great extent upon information which he might re-
ceive from them, and that he would appreciate receiving
any reports concerning changes affecting the safety of
Americans in that section. Miss Dunlap stated that the

Consul

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Consul General would be sent any information received in regard to this.

Miss Dunlap stated that close contact was being maintained by Americans in Chinkiang with the American destroyer in the harbor. Mr. Reynolds stated that, in the event of disorders, the Consul General in Nanking would probably issue his advice to the Americans in Chinkiang through the Naval vessel there.

LCR:MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 13 in letter of March 22, 1932, from Vice Consul Reynolds to Consul General Willys R. Peck.

MEMORANDUM

Nanking,
March 19, 1932.

In accordance with instructions issued to him on March 12, 1932, by Consul General Willys R. Peck, Vice Consul Lincoln C. Reynolds interrupted his journey at Chinkiang on his return trip from Soochow on March 15, for the purpose of obtaining information concerning plans for the evacuation of Americans in that vicinity in case of disorder.

Vice Consul Reynolds called on the senior American Naval officer present, Lt.-Comdr. S. G. Moore, Commanding the U. S. S. TRUXTON. Commander Moore showed Mr. Reynolds a plan prepared by the officers of the U. S. S. BARKER, the vessel which was relieved at Chinkiang by the U. S. S. TRUXTON. According to the plan, the American residents of Chinkiang, numbering seven on the date of the interview, will proceed to the Standard Oil Company or Asiatic Petroleum Company installations on the Bund, and from there will be transported to the American gunboat in a motor launch. In addition to the regular boat crew, the launch will also be manned by a machine-gun crew.

Commander Moore stated that arrangements had been

made

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made to cooperate with British naval authorities in the evacuation of American and British missionaries residing in Yangchow and along the Grand Canal between that city and the Yangtze River. These people will, in the event of trouble, be removed to the men-of-war at Chinkiang in Naval launches protected by machine-gun crews.

With regard to the evacuation of the Americans residing in the Seventh Day Adventists' Mission at Chiao Tou Djen, about twenty miles west of Chinkiang near the Shanghai-Nanking Railway line, Commander Moore stated that definite plans had not yet been arranged to evacuate these people in the event of disorder, but that he intended to arrange immediately for them to proceed, in case of necessity, to the bank of the Yangtze River opposite the mission compound, and in the event of failure of a naval launch to arrive there to evacuate them, they would be instructed to proceed down river to Chinkiang on board a junk. There were approximately seven Americans in Chiao Tou Djen on March 15. Commander Moore stated that the consulate general in Nanking would be notified immediately of arrangements to evacuate these people, as soon as the arrangements were completed.

Commander Moore stated that the U. S. S. TRUXTON had arrived in Chinkiang only two days before, but that he had already successfully made contacts with Americans ashore, and that he believed the situation at Chinkiang to be unusually quiet.

LCR:KGL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD

No.D-236

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China.

APR 26 1932

March 29, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy: China's
Policy toward the League, Japan
and the United States.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

On September 28, 1931, Dr. C. T. Wang resigned from the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, following an attack made on him by students, and on November 28, 1931, Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo was appointed Minister. In the interim the Ministry was in the charge of Dr. Frank Lee, Vice Minister. China's foreign relations, however, as distinguished from the affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were under the control of a Special Committee on Foreign Relations, headed by Dr. Tai Chi-tao. When the Commission wound up its affairs on November 28, 1931, it compiled a memorandum summarizing the conclusions it had reached in regard to the Sino-Japanese controversy. A translation of this memorandum, made in the Foreign Office, has just come to the Consulate General, and is enclosed herewith. A promise has been given that the translation

will



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
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will on no account be published. It may receive publicity through other sources, but in order to obtain a translation I was obliged to give this undertaking.

While the document is now rather old, nevertheless it repays a reading. I am informed that the principles set forth were readopted by the Government when General Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Wang Ching-wei came to power at the end of January last. The following passages relate especially to the United States: page 3, item 4; the opinion is expressed that when the appropriate time comes, the United States can be counted on to enforce the Nine Power Treaty and oppose the aggressive policy of Japan (apparently "champion" should be "contest"); page 4, item 6; reliance on the League is a means to an end, i.e. that of gaining support when the time comes to invoke the Nine Power Treaty and a means, also, of enlisting the sympathy of the United States. Attention is also invited to page 3, item 5; the second sentence points out the necessity of consolidating the strength of the Chinese people and of instilling in them a feeling of confidence in their Government.

Respectfully yours,


Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

1/ Translation of memorandum, as stated.

In duplicate to the Department of State
Single copy to the American Legation, Peiping
Single copy to the American Minister, Shanghai
Single copy to the American Member of the League
Commission of Inquiry.

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WRP:MCL

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch to the Department
 No.D-236 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul
 General at Nanking, China, dated March 29, 1932,
 entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy: China's Policy
 toward the League, Japan and the United States".

REPORT TO THE CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL SUBMITTED BY THE

CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN

AFFAIRS, MR. TAI CHI-TAG.

The Special Committee on Foreign Affairs, in its efforts to formulate a definite policy for the present Japanese question, has arrived at the following conclusions:-

1. That Japan's military aim is the complete occupation of the Northeastern provinces. In the early days of the present incident, her military authorities and those in control of Japan's foreign relations did not entirely agree upon any definite line of action. Since October 24th, when the Council of the League passed its second resolution, however, it has become abundantly clear that Japan's foreign policy has come under the domination of the militarists until today Japan's Foreign Office merely carries out the instructions of the military party. We must therefore carefully consider the military aspect of the present situation in order to arrive at any conclusions of our own.

2. That Japan, in addition to the military occupation of the Northeastern provinces, considers the elimination of China's existing civil and military control over those provinces as of primary importance. When the Chinese authorities withdrew from Chanyang (Mukden) to establish the provincial administration at Chinchow, it was an indication both to our own people and to the foreign countries that China is determined to claim back what she has lost for the time being. After the occupation of Tsitsihar, Japan's military forces have therefore been concentrating their energy on the expulsion from Chinchow of China's civil and military forces established there and of the last outpost of her authority in the Northeastern Provinces.

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The deliberate creation of extensive disturbance in the Peiping-Tientsin area, in the Wuhan area and in the Nanking-Shanghai area was all calculated to help in the realization of this fundamental aim. Tientsin was twice threatened with disorder. It is perfectly clear that the disorder was fomented by the Japanese in order to render the Chinese authorities in the Peiping-Tientsin area unpotent and ineffectual. If, as a result of this disturbance, the Central Government should begin mobilization of its troops, the Japanese would immediately, either through military means or through the irresponsible action of their residents in China, cause the normal life all along the Yangtze to be seriously upset. There would thus be a financial panic of enormous magnitude and the capital would be placed under military pressure similar to the situation during the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842.

3. That the League of Nations from the very outset is fully cognizant of Japan's policy as outlined in the foregoing paragraphs and has been doing all it can to prevent it from being carried out. Both England and France are in agreement with this aim. Suspensions about their intention are not justified, although what policy they will follow in the future no one is able to tell. But, up to the present, we think our interpretation is correct. The countries represented in the Council of the League will not, however, at present declare war on Japan because their own plans have not been fully developed and harmonised. This is the reason why the League has hesitated resorting to the application of sanctions as provided for in its Covenant. There are signs, it is true, that the League's efforts are being exhausted, but there is no danger of its collapse in spite of what Japanese militarism may compel it to do, because the League is after all a specific product of the Great War; and as the only

international

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international organization, it is not destined for a complete rupture unless the equilibrium throughout the world is entirely disturbed.

4. That America even up to now is sedulously consistent in being non-committal. Its attitude is seemingly one of supreme indifference. But when the time comes to invoke the articles of the Nine-Power Treaty and to champion the right of Japan thus to launch upon a needlessly aggressive policy, we can count upon her to do it. At present America is becoming more peaceful in its attitude every day and asks China to be as conciliatory as possible. All this, however, is meant to prepare for what she intends to carry out in the future.

5. That, in the long run, China will win victory over Japan and confidence among the nations of the world. What is needed at present is to consolidate the strength of the people and to foster a spirit of trust and abiding confidence of the people in the Government. In our relationship with foreign Powers, we must, in the first place, under no circumstances, assume the initiative of declaring war on Japan. Secondly, we must do our best to cultivate friendly feeling with the rest of the world. And thirdly, we must fully understand the realities of the situation. When, however, a moment comes to offer military sacrifice in compliance with the demands of the people, we must muster all our energy without compunction, provided that the sacrifice is fully rewarded by something substantial. If, therefore, the Japanese should attempt to seize Chinchow by military force, all that remains for us to do is to offer resistance at any cost. Only in this way is it possible to maintain the confidence of the people in the Government and to strengthen their will. Only, in this way, is it possible to prevent a general collapse of the nation and to establish

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establish a respectable position in the family of nations. In Tientsin, also we must preserve the inviolability of the provincial government in order to strengthen the trust of the people in the Government and to show to the world that China is determined to fight for her sovereignty.

6. That the Chinese Government must continue to believe in the efficacy of the efforts of the League and in no wise minimise its confidence. The League must, however, be made to understand that the situation is growing worse owing to the inability of the League to assume the fullest responsibility and to its refusal to resort to the application of sanctions. Japanese militarism has consequently become more alarmingly aggressive and the authority of the League more questionable. When this question of responsibility is made clear, it should, in the first place, weaken the critical attitude of the people for the Government. In the second place, the unbroken confidence in the League helps to maintain the friendly feelings with the Powers. And thirdly, when the day comes to make use of the Nine-Power Treaty, our efforts to enlist American sympathy should be productive of greater results. For after all the Powers which signed the Nine-Power Treaty are the Powers which have the most say in the League. If we fail therefore to do all we can to foster friendliness with the League, we shall win scanty support when we change our policy in the future.

7. That the forces in Japan which are endeavouring to overthrow the hegemony of the military clique are not weak and are furthermore identified with various influential groups. For the present, these forces have no opportunity to assert themselves as the domination by the military clique is well-nigh complete. But the day is bound to come when militarism will have spent its energy and then the forces of opposition will have their full sway and assume the reins of government.

It is

- 5 -

It is then that the relationship between China and Japan will be conducted along purely diplomatic lines.

In a general way, the forces opposing the military groups in Japan are those which have little sympathy with the occupation of Mongolia and the Northeastern Provinces either because of a difference in policy or because there is conflict of interest. Among the people to stand up against the military clique is firstly the group around Prince Maonji and 牧野. The second group consists of the Naval people around Yamamoto and 欠才部. The third is the financial group. The fourth group consists of merchants having commercial interests with the middle and southern portions of China. The fifth group includes merchants having extensive commercial interests with Europe and America. These five groups are all against the policy of military occupation of the Northeastern Provinces because it entirely conflicts with their interests and because the prosecution of such a policy is bound to be followed by financial bankruptcy. We must admit that active opposition by these groups will not appear for sometime, but we firmly believe that there will be a new era in the diplomatic intercourse between China and Japan. Nor is the confidence of our own people in the Government particularly firm. The time therefore to effect a radical change of atmosphere has not arrived. Even in ordinary conversation one must show circumspection in dealing with this subject, as a little carelessness may lead to misunderstanding and offer serious obstacles. However, there is no danger in laying the foundations now for the new period that is sure to appear. On the other hand, if the present exigencies require all the powers of resistance that we have, we must be willing to bear that sacrifice. The people at the same time may continue their active opposition to

Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Japanese aggression. These three kinds of efforts may be exerted simultaneously with no harm to any one of them.

The above paragraphs embody the results of the deliberations of the Special Committee on Foreign Relations since its inception two months ago. What it has done and what it plans to do are all based upon the observations and the conclusions which have been described above.

The Central Government has, however, full power in the formulation of its foreign policy, and, more especially, the President and the Vice-Commander as the supreme civil and military leaders of the country, must decide what is embodied in this report. The second, third and fifth items are especially important as the whole policy is really established on them.

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Received by the American Consul General
on March 26, 1932; probably written
before November 23, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

SHANGHAI

Dated April 27, 1932

Rec'd 5:12 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

April 27, 1 p. m.

(GRAY) Your 153, April 25, 5 p. m., to Shanghai

One. I am preparing a letter to my Japanese colleague protesting against obstacles placed in the way of, or damage done to, American business interests located in Chapei and other areas now under temporary control of Japanese military where specific information is available.

Two. With reference to police protection of American property located in Chapei and adjacent Chinese territory, (END GRAY) I have discussed matter with Cunningham and we find question one of great delicacy particularly in view of the fact that negotiations now progressing contemplate withdrawal of Japanese military into Settlement area and municipal and Extra Settlement roads adjacent to Hongkew and returning previously occupied area to jurisdiction of Chinese police. We agree that it would be dangerous for us to request the Japanese to afford police protection to American interests in areas mentioned lest such a request be used by the Japanese as justification for continued stationing of Japanese military in those areas.

(GRAY) Three.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 27 1932

F/DEW

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

2- from Shanghai, Apr. 27, 1p.m.

(GRAY) Three. We believe that question should be limited somewhat along the following lines. I will communicate with Japanese Minister calling attention to the fact that American interests have considerable funds invested in property and business in certain designated areas (without mentioning control there) and stating that these interests have complained to us that the activities of the Japanese military in those areas have prevented functioning of the Chinese police administration hitherto affording protection against bad characters and that we must therefore hold the Japanese Government responsible for any damage that may be done to American property in those areas due to the interference by the Japanese military with the functioning of the Chinese police. This attitude would seem to be consistent with our policy in regard to the whole question and places on record our understanding that appropriate and legitimate authority in those areas are in Chinese hands and that we are holding the Japanese responsible for damage and obstruction due to the fact that they have interrupted that authority.

Four. Referring to the third paragraph of the Department's 153, April 25, 5 p. m., the Consul General and I are of the opinion that it would be desirable to include the clause suggested in Cunningham's telegram 100 of February 493. 11-Shanghai/23, 3 p. m..

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REI

3- from Shanghai, April 27, 1 p.m.

23, 3 p. m.

Five. I discussed with my British colleague the question of responsibility for damages and he informs me that he has referred the matter to his Government and has asked that the legal department of the Foreign Office advise him as to the general policy which should guide him in determining what claims should be presented and to whom. I think it would be helpful if the Department could give me instructions along similar lines for my guidance in answering questions here.

JOHNSON

HID

KIF

072
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.102-S/1124 FOR letter

FROM Jerome D. Greene) DATED Feb. 19, 1932
~~XXX~~ NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: background of situation at Shanghai caused by Sino-
Japanese hostilities.

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793.94/5128

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0728
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/167 FOR Tel. # 474, 10 am

FROM China (Perkins) DATED April 27, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Spokesman from Japanese headquarters announced
that Yoda brigade left Changchun for Harbin.

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793.94/5129

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated April 27, 1932

Rec'd 2:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

474, April 27, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"April 26, 9 p. m.

Spokesman of Japanese headquarters announced that Yoda Brigade left Changchun this morning for Harbin. This brigade was transferred from Chinchow via Tungleurstu Pingkai and left detachments en route. Yoda Brigade was replaced at Chinchow by the Hiroasaki brigade."

For the Minister

PERKINS

WWC-KLP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11908 FOR Tel. #477. 1pm

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Apr. 27, 1932
~~XXX~~ NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: a memorandum made public by Sun Fo in which he stated that
the nation should resist Japan to the last.

dew

793.94/5130

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated April 27, 1932

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

477, April 27, 1 p. m.

Following from Kuo Wen, Shanghai, April 24:

"Sun Fo today made public a memorandum which he addressed to Mr. Wang Ching Wei, Mr. Hu Han Min and General Chiang Kai Shek last night in connection with the present policy diplomatic situation in China. The important features of the document are as follows:

First, the National Government should make immediate preparedness for the introduction of constitutional government. The third plenary session of the Kuomintang committee should be held next June for the discussion of fundamental principles of political and party reform.

Secondary, the Legislative Yuan should be entrusted with task of drafting a permanent constitution. This constitution is to be brought up for discussion and approval at a national citizens conference to be called by the Government next April. The constitution should regulate local self-government.

Thirdly, the people should be allowed to organize political parties so long as those parties advocate principles

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REI

2- #477, from Peiping, Apr. 27, 1p.m.

principles which are not contrary to the three peoples principles of Dr. Sun Yat Sen but military men in active service should not be allowed to exercise the right of suffrage.

Fourthly, representation at the peoples conference should be based on population as well as occupation and the electoral law in this connection should be drafted by the Legislative Yuan.

The memorandum further says that the nation should resist Japan to the last; which, in the opinion of Mr. Sun, offers the only way for the salvation of the Kuomintang and China. In order to facilitate the accomplishment of this object the Government should join hands with all those countries whose interests are in conflict with those of Japan.

Concerning the affairs of the Kuomintang, Mr. Sun says that party expenses should be borne by the members themselves instead of being defrayed by the National Government as has been the case hitherto. The Central Kuomintang should be maintained but branch party offices should curtail their activities. Party workers should be encouraged to enter useful professions.

In making public the statement today Mr. Sun denied that he is rejoining the National Government as Minister of Railways or that he has been offered the post of Chinese

Minister

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3- #477, from Peiping, Apr. 27, 1p.m.

Minister to the United States. He further said that he has not the slightest intentions to assume the post of Chairman of the Legislative Yuan to which he was appointed last January when the Government was reorganized."

For the Minister

PERKINS


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WWC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 264 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
Geneva, Switzerland, April 18, 1932.



SUBJECT: Transmitting Sino-Japanese Documents
Period April 1 - April 15, inclusive.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's Despatch No. 257 Political, of April 5, 1932, and previous despatches transmitting documents relating to the appeal of the Chinese Government under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In pursuance of the practice which has been followed in this matter, I am forwarding under separate cover as an accompaniment to this despatch further documents which were issued during the period April 1 to April 15 inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert,

American Consul

MAY 2 - 1932

FILED

Original and 5 copies to Department of State.
1 copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Shulman NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS TRANSMITTED AS ACCOMPANIMENT TO GENEVA
CONSULATE DESPATCH No. 264 Political,
of April 18, 1932.

O.359.1932.VII.

C.M.206. 5-2-32

C.M.208.

C.M.213.

C.M.216.

A (Extr.) 93 to 103.

A (Extr.) Com.Spec./1 - 6.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Geneva, Switzerland.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS TRANSMITTED AS ACCOMPANIMENT TO GENEVA
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O. 359. 1932.VII.

C.M.205.

C.M.208.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

APR 10 1932

Translation

Communicated to the POLITICAL SECTION
Members of the Council

0.359.1932.VIII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

GENEVA, April 9th, 1932

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Commission of Enquiry.

The Secretary-General has the honour to inform the members of the Council that he has received the following message from Lord Lytton, the President of the Commission of Enquiry:

"At the Council meeting held on November 21st, 1931, the Italian representative stated on behalf of his Government that it would place at the disposal of the Commission all the facilities it possessed on the spot and that all the Italians on the spot would contribute towards the enquiry. The Commission has no doubt that all the other members of the Council with representatives here will desire similarly to facilitate the accomplishment of the Commission's task and that they will, if necessary, send instructions to this effect to their Legations at Peking and their Consulates in Manchuria."

The Secretary-General has informed Lord Lytton that the above message is being brought to the knowledge of the Council.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.363.M.216.1932.VII.
Geneva, April 15th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated April 15th.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of official telegram received on April 15th
by the Japanese Delegation.

82/1932.

Shanghai, April 14th, 1932.

Japanese nationals continue to be the object of violence on the part of the Chinese population even in the International Settlement, although the municipal police there are endeavouring to ensure their protection. On April 13th a Japanese employee (29 years of age), on going to the French Settlement at about 10 a.m., was assaulted by five Chinese, probably students. He was seriously injured, particularly in the head. On April 14th, at about 10 a.m., a Japanese barber (34 years of age) was assaulted in the International Settlement, in the Sinche Road, by numerous Chinese. His condition is desperate.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and
Members of the League.

C.382.M.215.1932.VII.

Geneva, April 13th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate the following communication, dated April 14th, which he has received from the Japanese Delegation.

April 14th, 1932.

Sir,

In continuation of the previous communications concerning the Shanghai negotiations, I have the honour to transmit to you the following summary of the discussions:

1. The majority of the difficulties which had arisen during the discussions have been settled in co-operation with the representatives of the four friendly Powers. One of the points remaining in suspense - the determination of the places in which the Japanese troops would be accommodated - was settled at the Technical Commission's meeting on the afternoon of April 11th. This Commission was also on the point of settling the question of the position of the Chinese forces. Unfortunately, the Conference having been suspended since April 11th at the Chinese delegation's request, as will be explained below, the Technical Commission also suspended its proceedings on April 14th.

2. The only difficulty which still subsists is the question of the date of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the Settlement and extra-Settlement Roads.

The Japanese view on this subject is that, owing to the reasons which necessitated the despatch of Japanese troops to Shanghai and the present state of affairs in China, the responsible Japanese authorities cannot determine in advance a definite date for this withdrawal. The Chinese, on the other hand, demand that such a date should be fixed. After long discussions, the British Minister in China proposed, at the meeting of April 7th, that one of the three draft declarations which he had drawn up in this connection should be selected.

These drafts were far from agreeing with the above-mentioned views of the Japanese Government, and it was extremely difficult for the latter to accept them. Wishing,

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however, to make some response to the great efforts of the British Minister, supported by the representatives of the friendly Powers, and to reach as quickly as possible an agreement with regard to the final cessation of hostilities, the Japanese Government decided to accept the British draft No. I, which reads as follows:

"The Japanese Government takes this opportunity to declare that, as soon as local conditions in and around Shanghai so improve as to afford a sense of security to Japanese nationals as regards protection of lives and property and lawful pursuits (and it hopes that conditions will have so improved within six months or sooner), the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and extra-Settlement Roads in the Hongkew District, as before the incident of January 28th, 1932."

At the meeting of April 9th, the Japanese delegates announced the acceptance of this draft.

On the Chinese side, no mention was made of drafts II and III, but objections were raised with regard to draft I on the ground that no date for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces was clearly mentioned and that the period of six months was too long. The Chinese delegation therefore proposed that the text of the declaration should be amended so as to stipulate that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops should be completed within a period of four months or sooner, by which time normal conditions would have been restored in and around Shanghai.

The Japanese delegation was extremely surprised at this proposal, for it had been understood that one of the three texts proposed by Sir Miles Lampson should be chosen and that there would be no question of introducing amendments.

After a fresh exchange of views, Sir Miles Lampson, in a last effort at conciliation, prepared a new text modifying his first draft so as to include certain points of the Chinese proposals. This text stated that Japan would withdraw her troops to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement Roads as soon as local conditions in and around Shanghai had returned to normal - the Japanese Government hoping that conditions would have so returned within six months or sooner.

This text, while maintaining the period of six months, took into account the Chinese desiderata, notably by replacing the reference to "a sense of security" by the expression "return to normal conditions". It was decided that the two parties would apply to their Governments for final instructions and would make known their replies at the meeting arranged for April 11th. The Japanese Government, wishing to give evidence once more of its good will, decided to accept it, and the Japanese delegates notified the British Minister accordingly. On April 11th, however, the Chinese delegation asked for a postponement of the meeting arranged for that date, the instructions asked by Nanking from the President of the Administrative Yuen at Loyang not yet having been received.

In these conditions, it has not yet been possible to fix the date of the next meeting.

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3. In spite of these circumstances, the Japanese Government still entertains the firm hope that an agreement will shortly be reached at Shanghai, in view of the efforts of the representatives of the friendly Powers and the fact that such questions can only be settled in practice by negotiations on the spot.

Requesting you to communicate the foregoing to the Members of the Council and the League,

I have the honour to be, etc.

(s.) H. NAGAOI.

Japanese representative on the Council
of the League of Nations.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Committee
of Nineteen, the Council and
the Members of the League.

C.372.M.213.1932.VII.

A.(Extr.) Com.spec./5.1932.

Geneva, April 13th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Assembly the following communication, dated April 13th,
which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./A.22.

April 13, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter¹⁾ of March 18th and to communicate herewith a Memorandum
submitted in compliance with the decision of the Special Com-
mittee at its meeting on March 17th, to invite the Governments
of China and Japan to inform it of the measures which they have
taken or expect to take in the near future, in order to carry
into effect the Resolutions adopted by the Council on Septem-
ber 30th and December 10th, 1931.

From this Memorandum it must be evident to the
Committee that the measures which the Chinese Government
have taken or expect to take in order to faithfully carry
out the said Council Resolutions have all been frustrated
by the Japanese Government, which must, therefore, be respon-
sible for the abnormal state of things now prevailing in the
Three Eastern Provinces as a consequence of the non-execution
of the said Council Resolutions on the part of Japan.

(s.) W. W. YEN.

¹⁾ See document A.(Extr.) 64.1932.VII.

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MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE
 CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
 OF SEPTEMBER 30 AND DECEMBER 10, 1931.

The following memorandum has been compiled in response to the request of the Committee of Nineteen at its meeting on March 17, for information at the earliest possible moment on the measures which the Chinese Government has taken or expects to take in the near future in order to carry into effect the Resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30 and December 10, 1931.

Obligations assumed under the September 30 Resolution.

Under the September 30 Resolution of the Council the parties undertake to furnish the Council with full information as to the development of the situation and to take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation. The former obligation is, so to speak, non-controversial and has been constantly and faithfully carried out. The latter obligation has been complied with in full by the Chinese Government but not by the Japanese. All the Chinese military measures have been strictly limited to self-defence, and nothing has been done to aggravate the situation.

The principal obligations accepted respectively by the two parties are contained in the following paragraphs of the Resolution:

"Notes the Japanese representative's statement that his Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as possible.

"Notes the Chinese representative's statement that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are re-established."

(Official Journal, December 1931,
 p.2007.)

Steps taken by China to carry out the Resolution.

The Chinese Government took immediate steps to carry out its part of the contract:-

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On October 5 the following despatch from the Chinese Government was transmitted to the Council:

"General Chiang Kai-shek, the President of the National Government and concurrently the Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Naval and Air forces of the Republic of China ordered yesterday Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang to appoint high military officers who have been commanding the military forces of the Three Eastern Provinces to take over the places to be evacuated by the Japanese troops and to be strictly responsible for the restoration of order in those places which had been disturbed by the Japanese soldiers."

(C.665.M.273.1931)
(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2471.)

The next day the Council was informed that action had duly been taken in conformity with this despatch in the following cable message from the Chinese Government:

"Acting under the instruction of General Chiang Kai-shek, the President of the National Government, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang has appointed Generals Chang Tso-hsiang and Wang Shu-chang to take over the places to be evacuated by the Japanese troops and to be strictly responsible for the restoration of order therein."

(C.666.M.277.1931.)
(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2471)

The Chinese Government took immediate steps to notify the Japanese Government of the action it had taken and duly informed the Council of this action in a despatch, dated October 9, reading as follows :

"Chinese Minister in Tokio notified Japanese Government on October 6 that Chang Tso-Hsiang and Wang Shu-Chang have been appointed representatives to take over places to be evacuated by Japanese military forces and asked for telegraphic instructions to be sent to Japanese military commanders to begin handing over. No reply received up to date. Chinese Minister is instructed to deliver second note as follows: 'Fulfilment of Council resolution September 30 requires immediate transfer to Chinese authorities of localities occupied by Japanese troops since September 18. Chinese Government having pledged itself to assume responsibility for safety of lives and property of Japanese nationals during process of withdrawal of Japanese troops and re-establishment local Chinese authorities and police forces, notified Japanese Government October 6 of appointment of its representatives and asked it to make immediate arrangements to enable Chinese troops effectively to take possession evacuated localities and thus to protect lives and property of residents in conformity with its undertaking given at Council. As no reply received and matter extremely urgent I am instructed to request : Firstly, that Japanese Government indicate localities to be taken over this week; secondly, that in the course of the day instructions be telegraphed to military commanders so that re-occupation can be begun to-morrow.'"

(C.688.M.294.1931.)
(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2474.)

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The Japanese Attitude.

The Japanese Government, in a reply, a copy of which was communicated to the Council (C.691.7.297.1931.), reiterated its assertion that Japanese action in Manchuria had been undertaken only to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects, and proceeded to define its attitude as follows :

- "1. Military occupations undertaken by Japanese army along South Manchurian railway line since incident of night of September 18 between Chinese and Japanese troops near Lukien were designed solely to avert by preventive action the potential menace constituted by presence in those districts of Chinese armies in crushingly superior numbers. Japanese troops have in fact suffered considerable losses of men in spite of proclamation of non-resistance of Chinese troops.
- "2. Chinese Government proposes to appoint Generals Chang Tse-hsiang and Tang Shu-Chang to arrange with Japanese military authorities for suitable means of maintaining order in belt in localities in railway zone after withdrawal of Japanese troops. The present concentration in these localities of armed Chinese soldiers to cope with any eventuality, although maintenance of order is sole object in view, would very probably under present circumstances as at time of incident have regrettable effect of reviving troops' feeling of serious impending menace. In view of extreme tension of national feeling on both sides danger of conflict between troops of both parties is probably greater than at any moment hitherto."
- "3. Japanese Government considers most urgent task of moment is collaboration of our two Governments, with a view to calming excited national feelings by rapidly establishing through direct negotiation fundamental points capable of constituting a basis allowing of resumption of normal relations. Once national feelings are allayed by direct negotiation, Japanese troops might without overmuch apprehension return entirely to railway zone, thus facilitating assertion of authority and maintenance of order in localities in question.
- "4. Japanese Government is ready to negotiate immediately with responsible representatives of Chinese Government in order to establish fundamental points referred to."

(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2483)

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The issue of direct negotiations on unspecified "fundamental points" governing the relations between the two countries as a preliminary to Japanese withdrawal was thus for the first time raised and has ever since proved an insuperable stumbling-block to the execution of the Council resolutions.

China's Reply.

On October 12 the Chinese Government communicated to the Council a copy of its reply to the Japanese note. The following passages may be quoted:

"In defiance of international law and in violation of Covenant League Nations as well as Peace Pact of Paris and Nine Power Treaty signed at Washington, Japan has suddenly and without provocation invaded and occupied portions of the Chinese provinces of Liaoning and Kirin, overturned lawful provincial and district administrations, and in course of invasion committed many acts of war, and others not permitted by international law even in war, such as killing of innocent civilians, bombardment of unfortified towns, bombarding of passenger trains, and removal and seizure of public and private property, etc.....

"China and Japan being both bound by above-mentioned international agreements imposing on their signatories obligations to seek for peaceful settlement of all disputes, China at once appealed to Council of League of Nations. Council called upon Japanese Government to give orders for immediate withdrawal of their troops from areas occupied since September 18 and decided to accept solemn pledge, given by Japan to comply with its request, fixing its further meeting for October fourteenth, should by that time that pledge remain unfulfilled.

"Chinese Government refrained from very beginning from any and every act of hostility, going to length of strictly ordering all military forces not to offer resistance in whatever form to continuous advance of Japanese troops, and in spite of provocative actions increasing every day in intensity and embracing ever wider areas.

"At same time strictest discipline was imposed on the nation for protection in every way of lives and property of Japanese residents within Chinese territory under Chinese administration and the fact that no untoward incident has occurred anywhere in the vast area under Chinese jurisdiction proves conclusively that the undertaking given by the Chinese

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Government to Council of League of Nations is being observed most scrupulously. Repeated Government orders and proclamations have confined righteous indignation of our people within legal bounds, and mandate of the Chinese Government issued on October 7, ordering all local authorities 'to give full protection to foreign nationals and to prevent undesirable elements from taking advantage of situation in inciting any unlawful actions' further strengthened Government injunctions just at the time when it became only too obvious that Japanese Government was not fulfilling its pledge of withdrawal.

"Acting upon resolution of Council of League of Nations, Chinese Government has appointed two high officers to take over places to be evacuated and duly notified Japanese Government and Council to that effect, but Japanese Government has not yet carried out its declared intention to hand over places under their occupation to Chinese authorities. As is shown by the report of a neutral observer, such places as Shenyang, Kirin, Tunhuo, Chuliuh, Siumin, Tienchangtsi, etc. are still under control of Japanese troops. Meanwhile these troops keep on killing and wounding innocent citizens and destroying property without slightest justification.

"It must therefore be a matter of surprise to the world that popular indignation in China has limited itself to mere refusal to purchase Japanese goods. Freedom to choose one's purchases is an individual right with which no Government interferes, and, while it is the duty of every Government to protect foreign nationals, it is bound neither by any recognised standard of governance nor by any principle of international law to prohibit or punish exercise of an elementary right of citizenship. If there be responsibility at all in the matter, it lies entirely with Japanese Government which has, by many acts of unfriendliness since Wangpaichan incidents, created this general prejudice against Japanese merchandise."

(C.708.H.514.1931, Official Journal, December 1931, p.2491.)

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The View of all the Members of the Council except Japan.

The next development was the adoption by all the Members of the Council except Japan of the so-called October 22 resolution. This document not only retains its full moral force as pointed out subsequently by M. Briand, the President of the Council, but is of the highest political value, since it represents the considered view of all the governments Members of the Council, except Japan, on how to implement the Council resolution of September 30. Paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 of this resolution may be quoted:

"1. Recalls the undertakings given to the Council by the Governments of China and Japan in that resolution (of September 30), and in particular the statement of the Japanese representative that the Japanese Government would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and the statement of the Chinese representative that his Government will assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone - a pledge which implies the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

"4. Being convinced that the fulfilment of these assurances and undertakings is essential for the restoration of normal relations between the two Parties:

"(a) Calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council;

"(b) Calls upon the Chinese Government, in execution of its general pledge to assume the responsibility for the safety and lives of all Japanese subjects resident in Manchuria, to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of

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Japanese subjects there, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other Powers, in order that such representatives may follow in the execution of the arrangements.

"5. Recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory, so that they may proceed smoothly and without delay;

"6. Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments, as soon as the evacuation is completed, to begin negotiations on questions outstanding between them, and in particular those arising out of recent incidents as well as those relating to existing difficulties due to the railway situation in Manchuria. For this purpose, the Council suggests that the two Parties should set up a conciliation committee or some such permanent machinery."

(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2327).

This resolution crystallized the views of the President and various Members of the Council regarding the issue of direct negotiations on the basis of Japanese military occupation. These views, which are a complete vindication of the attitude the Chinese Government has adopted on this issue from the outset of the conflict and are impregnable based on the plain meaning of the Covenant and the Paris Pact, are recorded on pp. 13-18 of China's statement of her case under Article XV of the Covenant (A.Extr.1.1932).

China's Acceptance and Japan's Rejection.

The Chinese delegate in the Council meeting of October 23 expressed the entire readiness of the Chinese Government to accept all the obligations laid upon it by the Council resolutions,

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and to go further and to cooperate with the League in devising any supplementary arrangements that the Council might think desirable, in the following terms:

"In the view of the Chinese Government, the heart of the proposal is contained in the provision that the Council should meet again on November 16th, that it calls upon the Japanese Government to begin its withdrawal immediately, to proceed progressively with that withdrawal, and to complete it before the above date, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated to make arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated and ensuring the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, representatives of other Powers, in order that such representatives may follow the execution of these arrangements.

"..... the Chinese Government accepts this proposal and declares its readiness to carry out to the full all the obligations it lays upon China. Not only does my Government accept, it is willing to go further and to do everything possible to dissipate the apprehensions of the Japanese representative with regard to the safety of Japanese lives and property in the areas re-occupied by the Chinese authorities. I believe these apprehensions to be entirely unfounded. In the view of the Chinese Government, the insecurity and disorder that have arisen within the area occupied by the Japanese troops have their origin precisely in the Japanese occupation, will grow the longer the occupation continues, and will disappear with its termination. But I wish to state that I owe it to courtesy to declare that I am convinced the Japanese Government's anxiety is genuine, and I would ask my Japanese colleague in return to believe that the Chinese Government is sincerely desirous to remove any possible apprehension on this score.

"So strong is this desire, indeed, that not only do I accept the proposal in the resolution to invite neutral officers, but I am prepared to go further and to assure the Japanese representative and other members of the Council that the Chinese Government is willing to examine in the most conciliatory spirit here and now any proposals for extending the system of neutral officers or, with the help of the League, devising any other arrangements on the spot to guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property in the re-occupied territory, in order to dispel any apprehensions the Japanese Government may entertain as to the danger to its subjects that might result from compliance with the Council's resolution."

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"The terms "evacuation" and "taking over of evacuated territory" in the resolution I understand to include all Japanese forces of a military or quasi-military character, such as gendarmerie, police and aeroplanes of all kinds, the restoration to Chinese possession of all property, real and personal, public and private, which has been seized by the Japanese since the night of September 18th, and the release from all forms of restraint of Chinese authorities and citizens, and banking or other commercial or industrial establishments. In short, that, so far as possible, the status quo ante shall be re-established.

"I have the honour herewith to request the members of the Council and the representative of the United States to be good enough to signify their readiness to accept an invitation from the Chinese Government, which will be forthcoming without delay, to designate representatives to be associated with the Chinese authorities, under paragraph 4(b) of the Council's resolution."

(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2345.)

The Japanese Government refused to accept the resolution and re-affirmed its position as regards direct negotiations on the "fundamental principles" as a condition precedent to Japanese evacuation.

The President of the Council's Intervention.

Following upon the condemnation of this attitude in the Council on October 23rd, the President of the Council, in a communication to the Japanese Government (C.576.1.351.1931, Official Journal, December 1931, p.2345), pointed out that in the September 30th Resolution the Japanese Government had undertaken to:

"Continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops which has already begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be."

"No indication whatever was given at that time by the Japanese representative that matters such as an agreement as to the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria were in any way connected with the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals."

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The President then went on to argue that the various pledges given by the Chinese Government fully covered the "fundamental principles" as formulated by the Japanese Government itself in its counter-proposals to the Council resolution, and concluded:

"In these circumstances I feel confident that the Japanese Government, being desirous of fulfilling the undertaking which it solemnly contracted under the terms of the resolution of September 30 and which, moreover, it repeatedly confirmed by its declaration during the last session of the Council, at the meetings of October 22nd, 23rd and 24th, will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone and that it will thus be able to carry out that intention to the full in the shortest possible time.

"In view of the extreme importance which your Government attaches to the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the territories evacuated by its troops, I venture to call Your Excellency's attention to paragraph 5 of the resolution submitted to the Council on October 24th, which recommends the two Governments 'to appoint immediately representatives to settle the details relating to the carrying out of the evacuation and to the taking over of the evacuated territories, in order that these operations may be carried out in a regular manner and without delay'."

(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2516).

Chinese Action and Japanese Recalcitrance.

The Chinese Government on October 25th communicated a note to the Japanese Government, informing it of the appointment of a Chinese Commission to settle the details of evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territories, in accordance with paragraph 5 of the October 24th resolution, and asking it to appoint the Japanese representatives. The Japanese Government reiterated its original position as regards direct negotiations, thus once more flouting the authority of the Council and of its President.

In the circumstances it was clear that there was no further use in China attempting to carry out her part of the bargain since the Japanese Government was pursuing a deliberate and defiant policy of ignoring the authority of the League and

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extending and consolidating its illegal occupation of China's north-eastern provinces. However, in order to make its position perfectly clear the Chinese Government communicated to the Council, in a letter dated November 18th, a summary of the arrangements it had made for taking over the occupied areas in Manchuria in compliance with the obligations it had assumed under the Council resolutions. The following extracts from this letter may be quoted:

"In pursuance of the Resolution of October 24th of the Council of the League of Nations, the Chinese Government has taken necessary steps for taking over different places in Manchuria now under the occupation of Japanese troops as well as for making such arrangements as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects in evacuated territory.

"On November first, the Chinese Government announced the appointment of a commission for the re-occupation of evacuated territory in the North East Provinces, which is composed of seven members, namely, Mr. Wellington Koo, Chairman; General Chang Tso-hsiang, Mr. Chang Chun, Mr. Wu Tieh-Chen, Mr. Lo Wen-Kan, Mr. Tang Kr-Ho and Mr. Liu Chih. This Commission will be entrusted with the work of arranging with the representatives to be designated by the Japanese Government necessary details regarding the evacuation and re-occupation as well as the actual taking over and rehabilitation of evacuated places.

"In executing their task, the members of the Commission will request the representatives appointed by the different Powers to associate with them as closely as possible. It is expected that these representatives will observe the workings of the Commission in relation to re-occupation, accompanying its members to the places for actual re-occupation and remain in such places until they are sure that peace and order are effectively maintained. All necessary facilities will be accorded to these foreign representatives and all information regarding evacuation and taking over of the evacuated territory will be given to them without delay.

"The best disciplined soldiers, gendarmes and police will be, upon selection by the Commission, despatched by the Chinese Government to places to be actually taken over. For the effective maintenance of peace and order after evacuation and re-occupation of each place, the Chinese Government will authorize the Re-occupation Commission to proclaim martial law when it is deemed necessary, and enforce it for a short period of time, during which any disturbance of peace or any act of violence against the life and property of residents will be severely dealt with according to martial law."

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"Special precautions will be taken for ensuring the safety of all Japanese nationals. In view, however, of the many dangerous acts incompatible with the maintenance of peace recently committed by Japanese subjects in various parts of China, especially in Manchuria, the Japanese Government is expected to warn Japanese subjects in evacuated territory against taking any unnecessary course of action so as to ensure the successful execution of measures of protection by the Chinese Government."

(C.841.M.421.1931. Official Journal,
December 1931, p.2647).

The Assembly Committee has asked the Chinese Government what steps it proposes to take in the future to secure the execution of the September 30th and December 10th resolutions. The Chinese Government states herewith that the arrangements mentioned in the above letter still stand, and that it is, as throughout the conflict, ready at any moment to enter into discussions for implementing these arrangements and for co-operating with the League in devising whatever supplementary arrangements on the spot as may be regarded as desirable.

Conclusion.

It is clear from the above summary of events that the principal obstacle to an agreement has been the different interpretations put by each party upon what constitutes effectively assuring "the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals" in Chinese territory outside the railway zone. The Chinese Government's interpretation, which was explicitly endorsed by several members of the Council in the discussions on October 23rd and 24th referred to above, was, as the President, M. Eriand, put it, that the conditions of security which should be established should "make it certain that Japanese nationals and their property will not be subject to reprisals" after the troops had left. "Troops are about to leave a territory which they have administered, in which they have organised municipal services, police and various administrative departments. These various bodies have to be replaced. But that can be settled after a few hours or at most a few days' discussion." Such discussions, he pointed out, concerned police measures, administrative measures, possibly military measures - all questions which can rapidly be settled.

That is, the Chinese Government submits, the natural interpretation of safety for lives and property. Unfortunately, the Japanese Government persists in regarding into this phrase a programme for a political and economic protectorate of Manchuria, which the Chinese Government is to be compelled to accept in direct negotiation under the pressure of Japanese military occupation.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Members of the Council
and of the League.

C.364.M.803.1932.VII.

Geneva, April 11th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Commission of Enquiry with
regard to the admission of the Chinese Assessor
to Manchuria.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to
the Members of the Council the following information which
he has received from Lord Lytton, Chairman of the Commission
of Enquiry:

The Commission has seen a statement in the
Press to the effect that its Chinese assessor,
Dr. Wellington Koo, would not be authorised to
enter Manchuria. The Commission has discussed
this eventuality and has thought it well to
inform its two assessors that, should this
information be confirmed, a serious situation
would, in its opinion, arise, inasmuch as the
Commission cannot allow its composition to be
called in question. Any objection to its
Chinese assessor would be regarded by the
Commission as directed against itself, and it
would immediately inform the League of Nations.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and the Members of the League.

C.357.M.208.1932.VII

Geneva, April 9th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate the following communication, dated April 8th, 1932 which he has received from the Japanese Delegation.

79/1932.

April 8th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

The Japanese Government, pursuant to the resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations of September 30th and December 10th, 1931, has duly kept the Council informed of the events which have occurred with reference to the Sino-Japanese conflict during the last few months.

Acting on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to forward herewith a further communication arising out of the two above-mentioned resolutions, concerning the general situation.

(signed) N. SATO

Japanese representative on the Council
of the League of Nations.

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE GENERAL SITUATION.

1) The policy laid down in the Council's resolutions of September 30th and December 10th, 1931, was in perfect agreement with the line of conduct which the Japanese Government proposed to follow in Manchuria. The latter therefore willingly accepted these resolutions and has always sincerely hoped that it would be able to put them into operation, particularly as regards the withdrawal of the Japanese troops as rapidly as possible within the railway zone as soon as the protection of the lives and property of Japanese nationals was effectively provided for.

2) Following upon the incident of September 18th of last year, the majority of the officials of the North Eastern Government had fled, its troops were disorganised and disorder soon began to prevail throughout Manchuria.

To remedy this situation and restore order, two methods might have been followed on the Chinese side. The first was to send officials to Manchuria to re-organise and rally the Chinese troops and thus restore tranquillity and security to the

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country. The second was the re-establishment and maintenance of order by local organizations and by the population itself.

3) As regards the first of these methods, the Japanese Government could not but recognize the great danger which would have been presented by a reassembling of the Chinese forces, even with a view to the simple maintenance of order, in consequence of the excited state of feeling both on the Chinese and Japanese side. The presence face to face of Japanese and Chinese forces in the atmosphere of tension following upon the collisions which had occurred between them, was indeed particularly dangerous. In order that this first method could be effectively followed, it was necessary to relieve the tension between the two nations by means of co-operative action. The Japanese Government regarded it as necessary as a first step in this direction to initiate direct negotiations between the two countries. On several occasions it stated its ideas on this point both to China and to public opinion in general.

From the outset of the incidents in question, the Japanese Government pronounced itself in this sense (See reply from the Japanese Minister in China to M. Soeny concerning the proposal for a mixed Sino-Japanese Committee - Doc.C.876.M.432. 1931.VII.Official Journal Twelfth Year, No.12. page 2582 - and the Japanese Government's declaration of September 24th, C.809. M.845.1931. VII, Official Journal do page 2477). It repeated these views in its note of October 9th, 1931 (Doc.C.691.M.507. 1931.VII) in reply to the Chinese Government's note of October 5th and stated:

"Japanese Government considers most urgent task of moment is collaboration of our two Governments with a view to calming excited national feelings by rapidly establishing through direct negotiation fundamental points capable of constituting a basis allowing of resumption of normal relations. Once national feelings are allayed by direct negotiation, Japanese troops might

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without overmuch apprehension return entirely to railway zone, thus facilitating assertion of authority and maintenance of order in localities in question".

In its reply of October 12th to the appeal of the President of the Council, dated October 9th, 1931 (C.706.M.312.1931.VII. Official Journal doc. page 2484) the Japanese Government further said:

"The Japanese Government considers that in the existing circumstances the most pressing necessity is to relieve the tension between the Japanese and Chinese peoples by mutual co-operation. To this end it is essential to agree upon certain main principles to form a foundation for the maintenance of normal relations between the two countries. Once these principles have been laid down, the state of tension between the two nations will undoubtedly relax and the Japanese forces will be able to retire without apprehension within the South Manchurian railway zone. The Japanese Government is prepared to open negotiations with the responsible representatives of China on these fundamental points".

On October 28th, the Japanese Government stated (Doc. C.764.M.362.1931.VII) that with the future welfare of both nations in mind it felt that:

"Urgent need at present moment is arrive at solution of problem by co-operation of two countries and thus seek path of common happiness and prosperity. Their willingness remains unaltered and unabated to open negotiations with Chinese Government on subject of basic principles, above formulated, relating to normal relations between Japan China and on subject of withdrawal Japanese troops to South Manchurian".

In its notes to the Chinese Government dated October 31st and November 16th, the Japanese Government reverted once more to these ideas (Doc. C.794.M.386.1931.VII. page 2566; Doc. C.873.M.449.1931.VII. page 2579).

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The second method mentioned above was soon put into application. Chinese notables set up local bodies for the maintenance of order at Mukden, Kirin and other localities. The Japanese Government, as it stated in its note to the Chinese Government dated October 1st, 1931 (see Annex I), while forbidding "its military and civil officials to give any encouragement or assistance whatever to the political movements of the Chinese with a view to the constitution of a new Government" and "preventing Japanese nationals from participating in movements of this kind" could only "regard with favour the constitution of local bodies for the maintenance of order". In view of the state of disorder caused by the activities of brigands and other disorderly elements, the constitution of such bodies, in its opinion, "helped to restore order, ensure the safety of Chinese and foreign inhabitants and facilitate the return of the Japanese forces within the railway zone"⁽¹⁾.

(1) See the instructions given by the Japanese Government to its Consuls in Manchuria (Document C.676.M.283.1931.VII. C.J.XII. 12. page 2481) and the Japanese Government's reply of October 1st, 1931, to the Chinese Note of September 29th, 1931, Annex I.

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4. Nevertheless there was no proof of a sincere desire on the Chinese side to bring about an improvement in the situation. Not only did the Chinese Government not reply to the Japanese proposals for direct negotiations, but it took up an attitude tending towards a deliberate aggravation of the situation.

On September 23rd, Chang Hsuehliang set up the Chinchow Government and endeavored to foment disturbances along the South Manchurian railway line and in the districts inhabited by Japanese and Koreans. At this Government's instigation, elements of disorder - brigands, irregulars and disbanded soldiers - attacked and imperilled the lives and property of our nationals. The Japanese forces were thus obliged to combat these elements of disorder in different parts of Manchuria.⁽¹⁾

5. The Japanese Government had hoped that order would soon be restored and maintained as a result of the operations mentioned above, and particularly of those on a considerable scale carried out to the west of the Liao towards the end of last year, taken in conjunction with the increasingly effective assertion of authority by the local autonomous bodies. The latter were gradually assuming the character of local governments, were rallying the disbanded or disaffected troops, were setting up new police formations and were succeeding to some extent in suppressing disorder even in the districts of the interior.

Their authority is nevertheless not as great as the situation requires. On the other hand the

(1) See various communications to the Council of the League of Nations and Annex II below.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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endeavours of the Chinese Government and of Chang Hsuehliang's Government to stir up disorder in Manchuria are continuing. In these circumstances, general disturbances caused by the activities of disorderly elements or fresh dangers to the lives and property of our nationals are still to be feared. In such an eventuality, some action on the part of the Japanese forces would be inevitable and, indeed, essential. (1)

6. Manchuria has always been distinct from China proper, both by its customs and from the historical, economic and political points of view. Some years ago Marshal Chang Tsolin set up a government which was independent in name and in fact from that of China proper. Its freedom of action was such that the agreement between the Central Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. signed in May 1924 could not be applied as regards Manchuria until a new agreement had been concluded in September of the same year between the U.S.S.R. and Marshal Chang. Even after Chang Tsolin had submitted to the Nanking Government, he nevertheless retained his independence in practice. These facts show the special situation which exists in Manchuria.

Meanwhile strong opposition had grown up in Manchuria against the repeated abuses of the military dictatorship exercised by Chang Tsolin and his son. A movement in favour of a civil government had gained strength among the population. The local bodies mentioned above were set up in this atmosphere and

(1) As regards the restoration of order and the subversive activities in Manchuria see Annex III below.

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their efforts for the maintenance of order seem to have become naturally transformed, under the direction of the Governors of the Provinces, into a movement for the independence of Manchuria.

These elements have recently set up a new government hostile to the exercise of authority over Manchuria by the Nationalist Government or any other political faction of China proper.

In view of the importance of its rights and interests in this area, the Japanese Government cannot but follow with profound interest the development of the political situation in Manchuria. Apart from the effects it might have from the point of view of the Japanese forces and of our nationals, it must be recognised that the first method mentioned above of restoring order in Manchuria has become impracticable as a result of the political changes which have occurred recently. The newly constituted Government shows itself definitely hostile to the governmental authority of China proper; and the disorganised Chinese forces have also been re-formed by the new Government.

In these circumstances the Japanese Government greatly hopes that a situation in which order will be effectively restored throughout Manchuria will as soon as possible be brought about under the direction of the new Government. The Japanese forces are at present providing the forces of this Government in a friendly spirit with such assistance as they may need to restore and maintain order and tranquillity.

7. No doubt is possible as to the part played by the Nationalist Government in the direction and organisation of anti-Japanese agitation in China proper.

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The Japanese Government considers that this is not only a violation of the Council's resolutions concerning the non-aggravation of the situation and the non-extension of the conflict, but that these activities constitute acts of hostility by the use of means other than force. It has repeatedly drawn the serious attention of the Nationalist Government and of the local Chinese authorities, as well as that of the League of Nations, to this state of affairs. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government is not only doing nothing to repress the anti-Japanese agitation but is inclined to favour it and this movement is growing in violence.

These facts have been described in detail in the Japanese Government's explanatory note concerning the Shanghai incidents (A.Extr.6.1932.VII). Explanations regarding these incidents were also given in the same note.

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ANNEX I.

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S REPLY DATED OCTOBER 1st
TO THE CHINESE NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 29th, 1931.

As a measure of defence the Japanese forces had temporarily occupied certain points outside the Japanese railway zone in Manchuria but they are withdrawing ^{gradually} as the local bodies set up by the Chinese for the maintenance of order establish their authority. The Japanese forces have never set up any military administration in this district. The Japanese Government has also strictly forbidden its military and civil officials to give any encouragement or assistance whatever to the political movements of the Chinese with a view to the constitution of a new Government and has taken all possible measures to prevent Japanese nationals from participating in movements of this kind. Consequently the Japanese Government cannot assume any responsibility for such movements on the part of the Chinese.

As regards the constitution of local bodies for the maintenance of order, the Japanese Government, in view of the present state of disorder caused by the activities of bandits and other disturbing elements, can only regard this with favour since it may help to restore order, ensure the safety of Chinese and foreign inhabitants and facilitate the return of the Japanese forces within the railway zone.

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ANNEX II.

DISORDER IN MANCHURIA CAUSED BY BANDITS
AND IRREGULAR ELEMENTS.

1. At the very outset of the present conflict the Japanese delegation drew the attention of the League Council to the situation created by the "undisciplined bands" who even in peace-time infest Manchuria (C.594.M.337. 1931.VII, September 22nd, 1931, Official Journal XII, No. 12, page 2477) but for whom events were to provide an opportunity to cause considerable damage. To the activities of these bandits were added those of fugitive soldiers, then of groups of irregulars and other disorderly elements supported by Marshal Chang Hsuehliang. In a communication dated October 17th, 1931 (Doc. C.724.M.330. 1931.VII) the Japanese delegation drew the Council's attention to the "serious danger which has been caused for some time past by the growing activity of large bodies of mounted bandits and the presence of groups of disbanded soldiers"; it also communicated a map showing the distribution of the principal bands and groups of soldiers on November 30th, 1931.

From the month of November onwards the activities of these disorderly elements increased still further and in December it was necessary to carry out punitive expeditions on a large scale. An outline of the situation and of the task devolving upon the Japanese forces and local authorities (1) was given in communications dated December 23rd and 29th (Doc. C.1007.L.959.1931.VII and C.1012.L.964.1931.VII).

(1) See list of the principal communications on this matter at the end of this Annex.

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2. The importance of the ravages caused by disorderly elements may be gauged by the following figures:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of raids.</u>	<u>Killed and wounded.</u>	<u>Hostages.</u>
Oct. 1st to 10th	4199	+253(3) ⁽¹⁾	+218(18)
11th - 20th	4212	+ 36 (3)	+204 (183)
21st - 31st	437	+118 (4)	+43 (3)
Nov. 1st-10th	278	+63 (8)	+107 (6)
11th -20th	341	+72 (6)	+364 (2)
21st-30th	348	+24 (1)	+116
Dec. 1st - 10th	472	20	173
11th - 20th	372	30	90
21st - 31st	616	30	224
Jan. 1st - 10th	686	9	70
11th - 20th	825		
21st - 31st	769	22	371
Feb. 1st - 10th	572	12	208
11th - 20th	536	5	263
21st - 29th	493	13	230

(1) The figures in brackets show the number of victims of Japanese nationality. They are not yet available from the month of December onwards and will be supplied later.

The figures preceded by a cross refer to the whole of Manchuria with the exception of Chientao, the others to districts near the South-Manchuria Railway.

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It should be noted that a large number of foreigners other than Japanese have been the victims of bandits and Chinese. (See, for instance, documents C.659.M.250.1931.VII.(p.2479) (29-IX), C.879.M.455.1931.VII.(p.2584) (19.XI), C.951.M.534.1931.VII of 12.XII.1931.)

We would also recall the fact that from October to the end of December the Japanese forces were compelled to carry out more than 100 punitive operations (October: 33, November: 48, December: 20). These figures do not include local alarms, movements of armoured trains and air expeditions. From September 13th to November 15th, the Japanese police carried out 36 expeditions, the Chinese forces 3, and the Chinese police 55 (Document C.879.M.455.1931.VII).

The number of Japanese nationals (Koreans included) who were obliged to abandon their homes in Manchuria amounted on November 25th, 1931, to 10,125; on January 7th, 11,125 Koreans were compelled to flee from the districts near the South Manchurian Railway and ^{the} Peiping-Mukden line.

3. The figures relating to the disturbances in Manchuria for the month of March have not yet been compiled. It should be noted that there was a recrudescence of activity on the part of the elements supported by Chang Hsuehliang.

On the 21st, the railway was destroyed by an explosion between Tatum and Mengchiatung, near Ssupingkai. On the 22nd, a band of 200 brigands plundered the neighbourhood of Tochiatun station, and about 100 soldiers were sent from Kungjuling to repulse them. 5 Japanese officers and soldiers were killed.

Serious incidents took place in the Puyo district, where a band of some 3,000 men under the orders of Li Haichang attacked the environs of Fengan on March 28th. The Japanese women and children were sent to Changchun, and the other members of the Japanese colony took refuge on March 30th along the Chinese Eastern Railway.

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Communications concerning brigandage in Manchuria.

(Specially important communications are underlined.)

C.594.M.235. 22.IX.1931. O.J.XII.12.p.2475
C.659.M.270. 29.IX. " " " " 2478
C.675.M.282. 6.X. " " " " 2479
(Acts of violence by soldiers and bandits - Attack (app.3
on Newchang; expedition to Yingpan and Tiencuantai). (no.9.
C.678.M.285. 8.X. 1931. O.J.XII.12. p.2481
(Position of disbanding soldiers on October 5th)
C.700.M.311. 13.X. 1931. " " " " 2505
(Massacres of Koreans and ravages)
C.725.M.330. 15.X. 1931 " " " " 2508
(Distribution of bandits and soldiers)
C.732.M.337. 15.X. 1931 " " " " 2510
(No.2" - Attack on the Okura farm
No.31 (Interruption of traffic on the Chenchiatung-Tsungliao line)
No.32 (
C.836.M.416. 10.XI.1931. O.J.XII.12.p.2569
(Ravages of bandits and distribution at the beginning of November)
C.858.M.436. 13.XI.1931. O.J.XII.12.p.2574
(Punitive expedition in the district of Anshan, Tienling, Kungjuling
and Kaifeng - distribution of groups of bandits)
C.869.M.455. 19.XI.1931. O.J.XII.12.p.2584
(Figures concerning brigandage)
C.890.M.464. 24.XI.1931
C.900.M.474. 26.XI.1931 " " " " 2587
(Expedition to the environs of Anshan, Tangkanetsu and Nantai)
C.930.M.495. 28.XI.1931. O.J.XII.12.p.2588
(Ravages of brigands and soldiers)
After December 10th, 1931:
C.971.M.534. 12.XII.1931
(Activities of bandits, attack on the Peiping train)
C.997.M.553. 12.XII.1931
(Brigandage, expedition to Hanchiaotze and to the west of Chenchiatun)
C.1007.M.559. 23.XII.1931
(Brigandage)
C.1012.M.564. (Maintenance of order) 29.XII.1931
C.1013.M.565. (Attacks by brigands, punitive expeditions) 29.XII.1931
C.1016.M.568. (Attacks by brigands) 30.XII.1931
C.I.M.1. (Acts of brigandage) 2. 1. 1932
C.26.M.14 (Acts of brigandage) 6. 1. 1932
C.62.M.34 (Acts of brigandage) 16. 1. 1932
C.141.M.58 (Acts of brigandage) 29. 1. 1932.

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79/1932.

ANNEX III.

PRESENT POSITION IN REGARD TO THE MAINTENANCE OF
ORDER IN MANCHURIA.

Since the incidents of September 1931 the Chinese forces belonging to the North Eastern Government, which had remained in Manchuria, have been abandoning the North Eastern Government little by little in favour of the new authorities.

(a) The present forces of the Mukden Provincial Government are approximately as follows. Some 6,000 men under the orders of General Ow Shishan are posted along the Mukden-Hailung railway. Some 9,000 men under the orders of General Chang Hai-peng are posted along the Taonan-Angangchi railway. Some 2,000 men under the orders of General Wang Tierchung are posted along the railway from Mukden to Shanghaiwan and in the region to the west of the Liao. There are also small local forces

It is obvious that the above armed forces are not adequate to maintain order completely; but they are successful up to a point in checking the activities of bandits and irregulars.

Chang Hsuehliang is continuing his efforts to create disorder in order to regain power, by organising "voluntary armies". Of these voluntary armies mention may be made of "The Anti-Japanese Voluntary Army of the North-East for the Salvation of the Country" under the orders of General Hu Yukun, which operates in the Liao basin and in particular to the south of Chinchow. It is composed of some fifty

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groups of from 200 to 1,000 men. These forces have been particularly active in the region of Suichung and along the Takushan-Tungliao railway. Behind this "army" in the region of Shanhaikwan is the "Anti-Japanese and Patriotic Army of the People of the North-East", consisting of some twenty groups under Chin Tseming. These troops are said to be preparing an advance in Manchuria.

In Manchuria itself the "Voluntary Army of the People of the North-East" under the orders of Wu Chiahsing continues its clandestine activities. At the beginning of March it endeavoured to create disorder in the neighbourhood of Mukden. In the North-East of Mukden province the association of the "Great Sword" (Ta-Tac-Hui) is operating. The adherents of this association recently advanced in the neighbourhood of the Mukden-Antung railway. In the region west of Hsinmin the association of the "Red Lance" (Hung-Chiang-Hui) is busily at work.

b) In the Kirin province a government was set up by Hsi-Hsia who had fairly considerable forces at his disposal. But the forces opposed to him were not inconsiderable, and the new government was compelled to reckon with the customary tendency of Chinese soldiers to transfer their allegiance. In the early part of January the Kirin Government sent some 10,000 men to fight the hostile forces of Chang Tsochow, Tan Shanhai and Li Tu which were concentrated in the region of Yushu Pihhsien Shangchen. The movements of these troops gave rise to disturbances in the region of Harbin where Japanese and Koreans were assassinated by soldiers of the party opposed to the Kirin Government at the end of January. Japanese forces had to be rushed to the spot.

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The forces opposed to the Kirin Government (approximately 13,000 men) including the forces under General Ting Chao, head of the Railway Guards of the Chinese Eastern Railway, withdrew from Fongcheng to Ilac; but about February 20th they took Wuchiho, Inienpa and Weiho on the Eastern Railway line and looted the neighbourhood. As there were numerous Japanese nationals in the district to the east of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Japanese forces were sent on March 3rd from Harbin to Hailin and Ninguta. Negotiations are now proceeding between the opposing Chinese forces: but the situation is far from being established.

In the Chientao, General Wang Tehling attacked the Kirin Government at the beginning of February with his troops and looted the whole of the neighbourhood. On February 16th, some of these troops destroyed the Kirin-Tunhua railway line between Lafaotan and Tachiacho and between Weihuling and Huangnihotzu. A detachment of Japanese forces was sent on the 17th from Changchun to Kuchia where it was attacked by Chinese forces on February 20th. The anti-governmental Chinese forces are at present ravaging the Ninguta district and the regions further to the south.

On March 20th, the district to the south of Tunhua was looted by bandits and a small Japanese detachment was sent to deal with them.

c) The armed forces in the Heilung~~kiang~~ Province (approximately 12,000 men) have come to the support of the new Government. The attitude of Su Pingwen,

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who has some 6,000 men under him in the Manchuli district, is alone still uncertain. Occasional disturbances have taken place.

On March 10th a revolt occurred at Heiho and Japanese nationals were compelled to take refuge at Blagoveschensk.

On the 12th further disorders took place at Manchuli, in the course of which a Japanese was killed. On the 15th, the women and children of the Japanese nationals (75 persons) fled for refuge to Tsitsihar and Harbin.

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- 17 -

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

APR 5 1932

C.338.M.205.1932.VII

Geneva, April 4th, 1932.

POLITICAL SECTION
APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Council the following communication, dated
April 1st, which he has received from the Commission of
Enquiry appointed by the Council in its resolution of
December 10th, 1931.

Shanghai, 1.4.1932.

Lytton Commission desiring to be in touch with as many
circles as possible in China within limited time at its
disposal leaves to-day for Hankow where will pass two
days, arriving Tientsin April 9th morning, Peking same
day evening.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of the
League.

A.(Extr.).103. 1932.

Geneva, April 9th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated April 8th.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Official telegram received from the Japanese Delegation.

Shanghai April 8th.

On April 7th at 2.50 p.m. a group of some 60 Chinese soldiers crossed the Suchow river to the North of Chi Wang Mia and advancing in the direction of Nanziang opened fire on the Japanese troops near Fu Chia Pin. Another group of about the same number of men which was on the north bank of the Suchow river joined them in firing on our forces which were able to repulse the assailants.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Extr.) 102.1932.VII.

Geneva, April 6th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated April 6th, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./A.19.

April 6th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate herewith a telegram, dated April 5th, containing quotations from the speeches of Lord Lytton and Messrs. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Council, and Lin Sen, President of the National Government, upon the occasion of Lord Lytton's visit to Nanking in March, as follows:

Replying to Mr. Wang Ching-wei's speech of welcome on March 28th, Lord Lytton said:

"We recognise that China has shown great fortitude under trials that must have stirred the deepest emotions of her people. Your Government too has shown courage in placing your case unreservedly in the hands of the League. We are certain that the League wishes to prove to you that your confidence is not misplaced; and I can assure you that we will do everything in our power to bring about that result. When you say that the Chinese people have only one aspiration - the maintenance of their territorial and administrative integrity - I can assure you at once that that would necessarily be a condition of any settlement effected by the League. The League could not recommend to its Members any course which was inconsistent with their treaty obligations."

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Mr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a speech on the same evening declared that China is trying "to adapt herself to the political and social conceptions of modern times" and desires to continue her efforts in that direction "without external dangers and with the sympathy and friendly support of all nations, particularly those whose territories are adjacent to ours."

Lord Lytton replied:

"We appreciate the special difficulties which China is encountering in this period of transition from the old order to the new. The obstacles you speak of in the way of her progress towards unity under the Republic are inevitable. They are facts which must be borne in mind in any settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute. If they are faced with courage and resolution by the National Government, they can be overcome and the League will endeavour to secure for you the condition of external peace necessary for the accomplishment of that object."

Following a visit to the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, Lord Lytton, at the Central Party Committee reception, said:

"I think this monument does credit to the architect who designed it and to the builder who constructed it. But the real monument to Dr. Sun is to be found not merely on this hill, which we have visited, but in the whole of China herself. In the China of to-morrow is to be found the real monument of Dr. Sun. It is there that ~~his~~ his principles are being carried out, and that his great constructive work is being put into execution, and I am glad to learn that international peace and co-operation are amongst the foremost of those principles which he bequeathed to this country."

Lord Lytton was also entertained by Mr. Lin Sen and General Chiang Kai-Shek, Commander-in-chief, and complimentary speeches were made. Replying to Mr. Lin Sen, Lord Lytton said:

"You have spoken to us with the dignity which is in keeping with the high office you hold, and with an eloquence that I cannot hope to rival. In admirably chosen words you have described our mission as an agency for maintaining the peace of the world. You have also stated with moderation and fairness the hopes and aspirations of the Chinese people."

I shall be glad if you will be good enough to circulate the above to the Members of the Assembly.

(s) W.W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A(Extr.)101.1932.VII.
Geneva, April 6th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Assembly the following communication dated April 6th:

BRIGANDAGE IN MANCHURIA

Official telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation.

Attacks by brigands from January 1st to end of
February 1932, in the neighbourhood of the South-
Manchurian Railway zone.

Ref.78/1932.

	January			February		
	1 - 10	11 - 20	21-31	1 - 10	11 - 20	21-29
<u>Number of attacks:</u>	686	825	769	572	536	493
<u>" " " by groups of:</u>						
50 to 200 men	288	353	221	168	149	111
200 to 500 "	60	124	169	73	106	89
500 to 1000 "	48	49	65	35	47	44
over 1000 "	20	19	31	16	15	28
<u>Districts:</u>						
Mukden-Fushun	107	96	103	82	95	113
Liaoyang-Anshan Yingkow	109	82	75	71	53	40
Antung line	245	395	325	324	180	158
Tiehling-Kaiyuan- Ssupingkai	163	185	197	149	139	85
Hostages	79		371	208	263	230
Killed and wounded:	9		22	12	5	13

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

A.(Extr.)100.1932.VII.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

Geneva,

April 6th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Assembly the following communication dated April 6th.

Ref./A.18.

April 6th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that I have just
received a telegram from my Government, dated Nanking the 5th
instant, to the following effect:

The Mayor of Shanghai reported on the 4th instant
that the Japanese have appointed a Chinese, Hoo Li-fu by name,
former manager of a bathhouse in Nanking Road, Shanghai, and
another Chinese, Wang Tu by name, employee of the Bank of
Japan, as Director and Co-director respectively of the so-
called Political Bureau of Chapei. Wang Tu has also organised
a "Local Preservation Association", issued a proclamation and
appointed a Police Commissioner, a Traffic Manager, a Chief
Detective and a Director of Public Safety. To date already
150 policemen and 50 detectives have been enlisted.

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

A. (Extr.) 99.1932.VII.

Geneva,

April 6th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated April 5th, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref.A.16.

April 5th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

At the request of various public bodies in the Province of Chahar, I have the honour to transmit to you the following translation of a telegram, which I have just received from them, and shall be most obliged if you be good enough to circulate it among the Members of the Assembly:

"Since their forcible occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces from the 18th of September last, the Japanese, in utter disregard of our territorial and administrative integrity, have instigated a few outlaws to set up an illegal government to prepare the way for their future annexation of the Three Provinces. A month ago, Pu Yi, the deposed Emperor of China, under the Japanese duress, was taken to Manchuria to assume the presidency of the puppet government. In name, he is the head of the government, but, in fact, the Japanese themselves are the actual ruler. To crown it all the Japanese have now advised the puppet government to ask for international recognition.

"For the sake of world peace as well as the preservation of our territorial and administrative integrity, we, the people of the Chahar Province, oppose to our last breath the legality of this organization and earnestly request that the League of Nations will do justice to China by restoring to her the sovereign rights which rightly belong to her, so as to maintain world tranquillity and to uphold the sanctity of the Covenant of the League as well as other international instruments of peace."

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

A.(Extr.)98.1932.VII.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

Geneva,

April 6th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated April 5th, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./A.17.

April 5th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that I have received the following telegram from my Government, dated Nanking, April 2nd, and shall be obliged if you will be good enough to have the same circulated among the Members of the Assembly:

"The Kiangsu Provincial Government reported that Japanese planes bombed Anting (a town on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, about 30 miles west of Shanghai) on the 23rd of March. Over one hundred Japanese soldiers searched Huangtu (about 5 miles south-east of Anting), destroyed the property of the Middle and Normal Schools and the Chungshan Hall, and seized merchandise. Japanese troops stationed at Huangtu were increased by four thousand."

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

Communiqué à l'Assemblée,
au Conseil et aux Membres
de la Société.

A.(Extr.).3.1932.VII.
Erratum.

Genève, le 5 avril 1932.

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS.

Rapports de la Commission d'Enquête constituée à Chang-Hai
en exécution de l'Article 15, paragraphe premier, du Pacte.

Le Secrétaire de la Commission ci-dessus a fait parvenir
le texte de la correction suivante, à apporter au second rapport de
la Commission, en date du 12 février 1932:-

A la page 6, ligne 12, au lieu de:

"état de guerre existe ouvertement",

lire: "il existe un état de guerre patent",

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Reports of the Committee of Enquiry set up at Shanghai
under Article 15, Paragraph 1, of the Covenant.

The following correction has been received from the
Secretary of the above Committee to the Second Report of the
Committee dated February 12th, 1932:-

On page 6 (line 12) instead of

"state of open war",

read "state of open warfare",

Série de Publications de la Société des Nations

VII. QUESTIONS POLITIQUES
1932. VII. 4.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of the
League.

A.(Extr.)97.1932.VII
Geneva, April 5th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated April 4th.

Rf./A.(13).

April 4, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

Referring to the communication of the Japanese Delegation of the 2nd instant (A.(Extra)94.1932.VII.), wherein it was stated that as the result of an aerial reconnaissance Japanese observers saw a lively fusillade was taking place between Chinese soldiers at the northwest edge of Tazang and a force of several hundred Chinese soldiers coming from a northerly direction, I have the honour to inform you that the news as communicated is contrary to facts.

According to the report of General Chiang Kwang-nai the loud reports of firing on the night of March 31st near Tazang were due to the fact that Japanese plainclothes soldiers attacked the Chinese positions northeast of Tazang. He vigorously denies that there was any firing between Chinese soldiers, as alleged by the Japanese communication.

(Sgd) W.W. YEN.

0 7 8 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

APR 7 1932

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
~~POLITICAL SECTION~~
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)96.1932.VII.

Geneva, April 4th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated April 2nd.

Ref. 77/1932

1A/31367/31334
(8) 24/3

April 2nd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

With reference to the communication from the Chinese Delegation dated March 22nd (A.Extr.72.1932.VII.), I have the honour to inform you that it is entirely untrue that the Japanese authorities have taken measures to seize the customs revenue in Manchuria or taken steps with a view to this revenue being transferred to the Government of the State of Manchuria.

It is also untrue that the Japanese authorities are insisting on appointments to the customs staff and all tariff changes being submitted for the decision of that Government.

All these questions are within the competence of the Government of Manchuria and not of the Japanese authorities, the Japanese Government being in the position of a third party with regard to the maritime customs of Manchuria. The news of a proposed customs union between Japan and Manchuria is also inaccurate.

The Japanese Government is not aware of the intentions of the Government of Manchuria with regard to the payment of the service of foreign loans and other subjects mentioned in the Chinese communication. It has, however, noted the assurances given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of that Government in his telegram of March 12th last addressed to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Japan and other Powers, to the effect that the Government of Manchuria has decided to respect international undertakings and, in particular, the maintenance of the open door.

(Signed) N. SATO

Representative of Japan on the
Council of the League of Nations.

3 7-8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of the League.

A.(Extr.) 95.1932.VII.
Geneva, April 2nd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Situation in the Shanghai District.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the 19th, 20th and 21st reports of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The previous report was circulated in document A.(Extr.).90.1932.VII.

TELEGRAMS FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER IN CHINA.

Despatched: Shanghai, 12h. 19. March 30th.
Received: Geneva. 9h.00. " "

Situation Report 19. No change.

Despatched: Shanghai, 11h.27. March 31st.
Received: Geneva, 9h.00. " "

Situation Report 20. No important change in military situation.

Despatched: Shanghai, 19h.01, April 1st.
Received: Geneva, 14h.00. " "

Situation Report 21.

Minor engagements along limits of SHRI..... patrol zone reported in preceding messages have been officially brought to attention of respective military staffs, who are now considering appropriate remedial measures. Both armies continue to strengthen their respective positions.

1784
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Extr.) 94.1932.VII.

Geneva, April 2nd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Assembly the following communication dated April 1st.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of an official telegram received by
the Japanese Delegation.

76/1932.

Shanghai, April 1st.

On the night of March 31st, loud reports of gun
and rifle fire were heard in the direction of Tazang. The
Chinese newspapers of April 1st stated that the Japanese
forces had been attacking this place since the night of March
30th and had occupied it on the 31st; the Japanese Command
accordingly had an aerial reconnaissance carried out on the
morning of April 1st. The observers saw that a lively fusillade
was taking place at the north-west edge of Tazang between the
Chinese soldiers occupying this place and a force of several
hundred Chinese soldiers coming from a northerly direction.
There were no troops in the parts of the town facing the
Japanese lines.

The causes of this engagement between Chinese forces
are not yet known.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Extr) 93.1932.VII.

GENEVA, April 1st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Legation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Legation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated March 31st.

Ref.No.75.1932.

To the Secretary-General.

Following on my previous communications concerning the Shanghai conference, I have the honour to inform you that negotiations have been proceeding since March 24th on the bases of the preliminary agreement and of the League resolution of March 4th. The Chinese Legation contested several points proposed by the Japanese Legation, but thanks more particularly to the conciliatory efforts of representatives of the friendly Powers, agreement has been reached on the majority of the articles. Certain difficulties are still outstanding. It is hoped, however, that they will be settled at the next plenary meeting, which is to be held at 10 a.m. on April 2nd. The Military Sub-Commission is continuing its work.

The above-mentioned difficulties refer more particularly to the delimitation of the quarters required for the Japanese forces and to the date of their complete withdrawal within the Settlement. The Japanese Legation is endeavouring to reach an agreement as rapidly as possible, in the spirit of the Assembly resolution.

Wide propaganda is at present being carried on in China in favour of the continuation of hostilities against Japan. It must be noted that such propaganda is bound to make it more difficult to re-establish a normal situation at Shanghai which shall ensure the security of Japanese nationals. The Japanese Minister has duly directed the Chinese Legation's attention to this fact.

(Signed) N. SATO.

Japanese Representative on the Council
of the League of Nations.

Confidential

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to
the Committee of
Nineteen and the
Chinese Delegation.

A. (Extr.) Con. Sec. /6.
Geneva, April 10th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate for the confidential information of the Committee of Nineteen, the text of the draft agreement for the cessation of hostilities, resulting from the work of the Shanghai Conference up to the time when its work was interrupted.

SHANGHAI MILITARY CONFERENCE

Draft Agreement

Article I. - The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered to cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from..... The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease all and every form of hostile acts. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities in this respect will be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly Powers (agreed at the 8th meeting of the Conference - March 29th).

Article II. - The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the area dealt with by the Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement. (agreed at the 9th meeting - March 31st).

Article III. - In accordance with the programme regulating withdrawal as shown in Annex 2 to this Agreement, the Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the Extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932. It is however understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas.

- 2 -

The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex 3 to this Agreement (final agreement pending accord on Annex 2).

Article IV. - A Joint Commission including members representing participating friendly Powers will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw.

The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as defined in Annex 4 to this Agreement (agreed at the 7th meeting - March 28th).

Article V. - The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present Agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese, English text shall be authoritative.

Done at Shanghai on.....

Signatures

In the presence of

Signatures

Representatives of the friendly Powers assisting the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th.

(Agreed at the 7th meeting - March 28th).

A N N E X I.

The following are the positions of the Chinese troops as provided in Article II of this Agreement (here insert definition of the Chinese positions (1)). In the event of doubt arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will upon the request of the Joint Commission be ascertained by the representatives of participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission (agreed at the 10th meeting, April 2nd).

(1) These positions were discussed by the Sub-Commission and an agreement nearly reached at the last meeting, April 13th. The work of the Sub-Commission was interrupted due to the postponement of the Conference, asked by the Chinese delegation.

- 3 -

ANNEX 2.*

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated in Annex 3 will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the Agreement and will be completed four weeks after the commencement of the withdrawal.

The Joint Commission to be established under Article IV will make any necessary arrangement for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals which cannot withdraw at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

(Agreed at the 6th meeting on March 26th.)

ANNEX 3.

The following are the localities as provided in Article III of this Agreement.

(here insert definition of the localities in which the Japanese troops are to be temporarily stationed)**

In the event of doubt in regard thereto, the localities in question will upon the request of the Joint Commission be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission.

(Agreed at the 10th meeting on April 2nd).

* The question of a time-limit for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the settlement and Extension Roads was discussed at length and the British Minister drafted several proposals of declarations to be made in view of settling this matter.

The final suggestion made by Sir Miles Lampson at the 14th meeting, on April 9th, was as follows:

Draft declaration by the Japanese Government.

The Japanese Government take this opportunity to declare that, as soon as local conditions in and around Shanghai return to normal - and they hope that conditions will have so returned within six months or sooner - the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and the Extra-Settlement roads in the Honkew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932.

The Japanese Government accepted this proposal. The Chinese delegation asked the postponement of the Conference, stating that no instructions had been received from their Government.

** Final agreement reached at the sitting of the Sub-Commission on April 11th.

- 4 -

ANNEX 4.

The Joint Commission will be composed of 12 members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian Heads of Missions in China being representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such number of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

(Above was agreed at the 8th meeting on March 26th).

The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of the provisions of Articles I, II and III of the Agreement.

(Agreed at the 10th meeting on April 2nd).

"Separate Voluntary Declaration by the Chinese Government which may be issued either prior to or simultaneously with the conclusion of the Agreement, but not be annexed thereto."

In order to ease the general situation and secure the prompt re-establishment of stability and normal conditions in the affected areas, the Chinese Government hereby intimate their intention immediately to establish on their own initiative for the maintenance of peace and order in the evacuated area in the vicinity of the Shanghai Settlements, a force of special constabulary, for which they contemplate the employment of experts as officers and instructors.

It is understood that the incoming Chinese police referred to in the penultimate sentence of Article IV of the Agreement for of will be drawn from the above special constabulary.

(Agreed at the meeting of March 21st).

Verbal Note taken by Minister Shigenitsu and the interested foreign Ministers on March 21st, 1932.

In discussing this phrase, Mr. Kuo intimated that the Chinese Government contemplated the employment of foreigners amongst the experts in question.

0 7 9 .

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Committee
of Nineteen, the Council and
the Members of the League.

C.372.M.213.1932.VII.

A.(Extr.) Com.spec./5.1932.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

APR 19 1932

Geneva, April 13th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM POLITICAL SECTION GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Assembly the following communication, dated April 13th,
which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./A.22.

April 13, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter¹⁾ of March 18th and to communicate herewith a Memorandum
submitted in compliance with the decision of the Special Com-
mittee at its meeting on March 17th, to invite the Governments
of China and Japan to inform it of the measures which they have
taken or expect to take in the near future, in order to carry
into effect the Resolutions adopted by the Council on Septem-
ber 30th and December 10th, 1931.

From this Memorandum it must be evident to the
Committee that the measures which the Chinese Government
have taken or expect to take in order to faithfully carry
out the said Council Resolutions have all been frustrated
by the Japanese Government, which must, therefore, be respon-
sible for the abnormal state of things now prevailing in the
Three Eastern Provinces as a consequence of the non-execution
of the said Council Resolutions on the part of Japan.

(s.) W. W. YEN.

¹⁾ See document A.(Extr.) 64.1932.VII.

-2-

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
OF SEPTEMBER 30 AND DECEMBER 10, 1931.

The following memorandum has been compiled in response to the request of the Committee of Nineteen at its meeting on March 17, for information at the earliest possible moment on the measures which the Chinese Government has taken or expects to take in the near future in order to carry into effect the Resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30 and December 10, 1931.

Obligations assumed under the September 30 Resolution.

Under the September 30 Resolution of the Council the parties undertake to furnish the Council with full information as to the development of the situation and to take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation. The former obligation is, so to speak, non-controversial and has been constantly and faithfully carried out. The latter obligation has been complied with in full by the Chinese Government but not by the Japanese. All the Chinese military measures have been strictly limited to self-defence, and nothing has been done to aggravate the situation.

The principal obligations accepted respectively by the two parties are contained in the following paragraphs of the Resolution:

"Notes the Japanese representative's statement that his Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as possible.

"Notes the Chinese representative's statement that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are re-established."

(Official Journal, December 1931,
p.2507.)

Steps taken by China to carry out the Resolution.

The Chinese Government took immediate steps to carry out its part of the contract:-

- 3 -

On October 5 the following despatch from the Chinese Government was transmitted to the Council:

"General Chiang Kai-shek, the President of the National Government and concurrently the Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Naval and Air forces of the Republic of China ordered yesterday Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang to appoint high military officers who have been commanding the military forces of the Three Eastern Provinces to take over the places to be evacuated by the Japanese troops and to be strictly responsible for the restoration of order in those places which had been disturbed by the Japanese soldiers."

(C.665.M.273.1931)
(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2471.)

The next day the Council was informed that action had duly been taken in conformity with this despatch in the following cable message from the Chinese Government:

"Acting under the instruction of General Chiang Kai-shek, the President of the National Government, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang has appointed Generals Chang Tso-hsiang and Wang Shu-chang to take over the places to be evacuated by the Japanese troops and to be strictly responsible for the restoration of order therein."

(C.663.M.277.1931)
(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2471)

The Chinese Government took immediate steps to notify the Japanese Government of the action it had taken and duly informed the Council of this action in a despatch, dated October 9, reading as follows :

"Chinese Minister in Tokio notified Japanese Government on October 6 that Chang Tso-Hsiang and Wang Shu-Chang have been appointed representatives to take over places to be evacuated by Japanese military forces and asked for telegraphic instructions to be sent to Japanese military commanders to begin handing over. No reply received up to date. Chinese Minister is instructed to deliver second note as follows: 'Fulfilment of Council resolution September 30 requires immediate transfer to Chinese authorities of localities occupied by Japanese troops since September 18. Chinese Government having pledged itself to assume responsibility for safety of lives and property of Japanese nationals during process of withdrawal of Japanese troops and re-establishment local Chinese authorities and police forces, notified Japanese Government October 6 of appointment of its representatives and asked it to make immediate arrangements to enable Chinese troops effectively to take possession evacuated localities and thus to protect lives and property of residents in conformity with its undertaking given at Council. As no reply received and matter extremely urgent I am instructed to request : Firstly, that Japanese Government indicate localities to be taken over this week; secondly, that in the course of the day instructions be telegraphed to military commanders so that re-occupation can be begun to-morrow.'"

(C.688.M.294.1931)
(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2474.)

The Japanese Attitude.

The Japanese Government, in a reply, a copy of which was communicated to the Council (S.691.1.20, 1931.), reiterated its assertion that Japanese action in Manchuria had been undertaken only to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects, and proceeded to define its attitude as follows :

- "1. Military occupations undertaken by Japanese army along South Manchurian railway line since incident of night of September 18 between Chinese and Japanese troops near Mukden were designed solely to avert by preventive action the potential menace constituted by presence in these districts of Chinese armies in crushingly superior numbers. Japanese troops have in fact suffered considerable losses of men in spite of proclamation of non-resistance of Chinese troops.
- "2. Chinese Government proposes appoint Generals Chang Tse-Hsiang and Wang Shu-Chang to arrange with Japanese military authorities for suitable means of maintaining order in belt in localities in railway zone after withdrawal of Japanese troops. The present concentration in these localities of armed Chinese soldiers to cope with any eventuality, although maintenance of order is sole object in view, would very probably under present circumstances as at time of incident have regrettable effect of reviving troops' feeling of serious impending menace. In view of extreme tension of national feeling on both sides danger of conflict between troops of both parties is probably greater than at any moment hitherto."
- "3. Japanese Government considers most urgent task of moment is collaboration of our two Governments, with a view to calming excited national feelings by rapidly establishing through direct negotiation fundamental points capable of constituting a basis allowing of resumption of normal relations. Once national feelings are allayed by direct negotiation, Japanese troops might without overmuch apprehension return entirely to railway zone, thus facilitating assertion of authority and maintenance of order in localities in question.
- "4. Japanese Government is ready to negotiate immediately with responsible representatives of Chinese Government in order to establish fundamental points referred to."

(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2483)

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The issue of direct negotiations on unspecified "fundamental points" governing the relations between the two countries as a preliminary to Japanese withdrawal was thus for the first time raised and has ever since proved an insuperable stumbling-block to the execution of the Council resolutions.

China's Reply.

On October 12 the Chinese Government communicated to the Council a copy of its reply to the Japanese note. The following passages may be quoted:

"In defiance of international law and in violation of Covenant League Nations as well as Peace Pact of Paris and Nine Power Treaty signed at Washington, Japan has suddenly and without provocation invaded and occupied portions of the Chinese provinces of Liaoning and Kirin, overturned lawful provincial and district administrations, and in course of invasion committed many acts of war, and others not permitted by international law even in war, such as killing of innocent civilians, bombardment of unfortified towns, bombarding of passenger trains, and removal and seizure of public and private property, etc.....

"China and Japan being both bound by above-mentioned international agreements imposing on their signatories obligations to seek for peaceful settlement of all disputes, China at once appealed to Council of League of Nations. Council called upon Japanese Government to give orders for immediate withdrawal of their troops from areas occupied since September 18 and decided to accept solemn pledge, given by Japan to comply with its request, fixing its further meeting for October fourteenth, should by that time that pledge remain unfulfilled.

"Chinese Government refrained from very beginning from any and every act of hostility, going to length of strictly ordering all military forces not to offer resistance in whatever form to continuous advance of Japanese troops, and in spite of provocative actions increasing every day in intensity and embracing ever wider areas.

"At same time strictest discipline was imposed on the nation for protection in every way of lives and property of Japanese residents within Chinese territory under Chinese administration and the fact that no untoward incident has occurred anywhere in the vast area under Chinese jurisdiction proves conclusively that the undertaking given by the Chinese

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Government to Council of League of Nations is being observed most scrupulously. Repeated Government orders and proclamations have confined righteous indignation of our people within legal bounds, and mandate of the Chinese Government issued on October 7, ordering all local authorities 'to give full protection to foreign nationals and to prevent undesirable elements from taking advantage of situation in inciting any unlawful actions' further strengthened Government injunctions just at the time when it became only too obvious that Japanese Government was not fulfilling its pledge of withdrawal.

"Acting upon resolution of Council of League of Nations, Chinese Government has appointed two high officers to take over places to be evacuated and duly notified Japanese Government and Council to that effect, but Japanese Government has not yet carried out its declared intention to hand over places under their occupation to Chinese authorities. As is shown by the report of a neutral observer, such places as Shenyang, Kirin, Tsinhsue, Chuliuh, Sinmin, Tienchangtai, etc. are still under control of Japanese troops. Meanwhile these troops keep on killing and wounding innocent citizens and destroying property without slightest justification.

"It must therefore be a matter of surprise to the world that popular indignation in China has limited itself to mere refusal to purchase Japanese goods. Freedom to choose one's purchases is an individual right with which no Government interferes, and, while it is the duty of every Government to protect foreign nationals, it is bound neither by any recognised standard of governance nor by any principle of international law to prohibit or punish exercise of an elementary right of citizenship. If there be responsibility at all in the matter, it lies entirely with Japanese Government which has, by many acts of unfriendliness since Wanhsien incidents, created this general prejudice against Japanese merchandise."

(C.708.V.314.1931, Official Journal, December 1931, p.2491.)

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The View of all the Members of the Council except Japan.

The next development was the adoption by all the Members of the Council except Japan of the so-called October 22 resolution. This document not only retains its full moral force as pointed out subsequently by M. Briand, the President of the Council, but is of the highest political value, since it represents the considered view of all the governments Members of the Council, except Japan, on how to implement the Council resolution of September 30. Paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 of this resolution may be quoted:

"1. Recalls the undertakings given to the Council by the Governments of China and Japan in that resolution (of September 30), and in particular the statement of the Japanese representative that the Japanese Government would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and the statement of the Chinese representative that his Government will assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone - a pledge which implies the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

"4. Being convinced that the fulfilment of these assurances and undertakings is essential for the restoration of normal relations between the two Parties:

"(a) Calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council;

"(b) Calls upon the Chinese Government, in execution of its general pledge to assume the responsibility for the safety and lives of all Japanese subjects resident in Manchuria, to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of

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Japanese subjects there, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other Powers, in order that such representatives may follow in the execution of the arrangements.

"5. Recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory, so that they may proceed smoothly and without delay;

"6. Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments, as soon as the evacuation is completed, to begin negotiations on questions outstanding between them, and in particular those arising out of recent incidents as well as those relating to existing difficulties due to the railway situation in Manchuria. For this purpose, the Council suggests that the two Parties should set up a conciliation committee or some such permanent machinery."

(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2327).

This resolution crystallized the views of the President and various Members of the Council regarding the issue of direct negotiations on the basis of Japanese military occupation. These views, which are a complete vindication of the attitude the Chinese Government has adopted on this issue from the outset of the conflict and are impregnable based on the plain meaning of the Covenant and the Paris Pact, are recorded on pp. 13-18 of China's statement of her case under Article XV of the Covenant (A.Extr.1.1932).

China's Acceptance and Japan's Rejection.

The Chinese delegate in the Council meeting of October 23 expressed the entire readiness of the Chinese Government to accept all the obligations laid upon it by the Council resolutions,

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and to go further and to cooperate with the League in devising any supplementary arrangements that the Council might think desirable, in the following terms:

"In the view of the Chinese Government, the heart of the proposal is contained in the provision that the Council should meet again on November 16th, that it calls upon the Japanese Government to begin its withdrawal immediately, to proceed progressively with that withdrawal, and to complete it before the above date, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated to make arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated and ensuring the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, representatives of other Powers, in order that such representatives may follow the execution of these arrangements.

"..... the Chinese Government accepts this proposal and declares its readiness to carry out to the full all the obligations it lays upon China. Not only does my Government accept, it is willing to go further and to do everything possible to dissipate the apprehensions of the Japanese representative with regard to the safety of Japanese lives and property in the areas re-occupied by the Chinese authorities. I believe these apprehensions to be entirely unfounded. In the view of the Chinese Government, the insecurity and disorder that have arisen within the area occupied by the Japanese troops have their origin precisely in the Japanese occupation, will grow the longer the occupation continues, and will disappear with its termination. But I wish to state that I owe it to courtesy to declare that I am convinced the Japanese Government's anxiety is genuine, and I would ask my Japanese colleague in return to believe that the Chinese Government is sincerely desirous to remove any possible apprehension on this score.

"So strong is this desire, indeed, that not only do I accept the proposal in the resolution to invite neutral officers, but I am prepared to go further and to assure the Japanese representative and other members of the Council that the Chinese Government is willing to examine in the most conciliatory spirit here and now any proposals for extending the system of neutral officers or, with the help of the League, devising any other arrangements on the spot to guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property in the re-occupied territory, in order to dispel any apprehensions the Japanese Government may entertain as to the danger to its subjects that might result from compliance with the Council's resolution."

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"The terms "evacuation" and "taking over of evacuated territory" in the resolution I understand to include all Japanese forces of a military or quasi-military character, such as gendarmerie, police and aeroplanes of all kinds, the restoration to Chinese possession of all property, real and personal, public and private, which has been seized by the Japanese since the night of September 18th, and the release from all forms of restraint of Chinese authorities and citizens, and banking or other commercial or industrial establishments. In short, that, so far as possible, the status quo ante shall be re-established.

"I have the honour herewith to request the members of the Council and the representative of the United States to be good enough to signify their readiness to accept an invitation from the Chinese Government, which will be forthcoming without delay, to designate representatives to be associated with the Chinese authorities, under paragraph 4(b) of the Council's resolution."

(Official Journal, December 1931, p.2345.)

The Japanese Government refused to accept the resolution and re-affirmed its position as regards direct negotiations on the "fundamental principles" as a condition precedent to Japanese evacuation.

The President of the Council's Intervention.

Following upon the condemnation of this attitude in the Council on October 23rd, the President of the Council, in a communication to the Japanese Government (C.576.L.351.1931, Official Journal, December 1931, p.2325), pointed out that in the September 30th resolution the Japanese Government had undertaken to:

"Continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops which has already begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be."

"No indication whatever was given at that time by the Japanese representative that matters such as an agreement as to the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria were in any way connected with the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals."

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The President then went on to argue that the various pledges given by the Chinese Government fully covered the "fundamental principles" as formulated by the Japanese Government itself in its counter-proposals to the Council resolution, and concluded:

"In these circumstances I feel confident that the Japanese Government, being desirous of fulfilling the undertaking which it solemnly contracted under the terms of the resolution of September 30 and which, moreover, it repeatedly confirmed by its declaration during the last session of the Council, at the meetings of October 22nd, 23rd and 24th, will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone and that it will thus be able to carry out that intention to the full in the shortest possible time.

"In view of the extreme importance which your Government attaches to the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the territories evacuated by its troops, I venture to call Your Excellency's attention to paragraph 5 of the resolution submitted to the Council on October 24th, which recommends the two Governments 'to appoint immediately representatives to settle the details relating to the carrying out of the evacuation and to the taking over of the evacuated territories, in order that these operations may be carried out in a regular manner and without delay'."

(Official Journal, December 1931,
p.2516).

Chinese Action and Japanese Recalcitrance.

The Chinese Government on October 27th communicated a note to the Japanese Government, informing it of the appointment of a Chinese Commission to settle the details of evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territories, in accordance with paragraph 5 of the October 24th resolution, and asking it to appoint the Japanese representatives. The Japanese Government reiterated its original position as regards direct negotiations, thus once more flouting the authority of the Council and of its President.

In the circumstances it was clear that there was no further use in China attempting to carry out her part of the bargain since the Japanese Government was pursuing a deliberate and defiant policy of ignoring the authority of the League and

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extending and consolidating its illegal occupation of China's north-eastern provinces. However, in order to make its position perfectly clear the Chinese Government communicated to the Council, in a letter dated November 12th, a summary of the arrangements it had made for taking over the occupied areas in Manchuria in compliance with the obligations it had assumed under the Council resolutions. The following extracts from this letter may be quoted:

"In pursuance of the Resolution of October 24th of the Council of the League of Nations, the Chinese Government has taken necessary steps for taking over different places in Manchuria now under the occupation of Japanese troops as well as for making such arrangements as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects in evacuated territory.

"On November first, the Chinese Government announced the appointment of a commission for the re-occupation of evacuated territory in the North East Provinces, which is composed of seven members, namely, Mr. Wellington Koo, Chairman; General Chang Tso-hsiang, Mr. Chang Chun, Mr. Wu Tieh-Chen, Mr. Lo Wen-Kan, Mr. Tang Hr-Ho and Mr. Liu Chih. This Commission will be entrusted with the work of arranging with the representatives to be designated by the Japanese Government necessary details regarding the evacuation and re-occupation as well as the actual taking over and rehabilitation of evacuated places.

"In executing their task, the members of the Commission will request the representatives appointed by the different Powers to associate with them as closely as possible. It is expected that these representatives will observe the workings of the Commission in relation to re-occupation, accompanying its members to the places for actual re-occupation and remain in such places until they are sure that peace and order are effectively maintained. All necessary facilities will be accorded to these foreign representatives and all information regarding evacuation and taking over of the evacuated territory will be given to them without delay.

"The best disciplined soldiers, gendarmes and police will be, upon selection by the Commission, despatched by the Chinese Government to places to be actually taken over. For the effective maintenance of peace and order after evacuation and re-occupation of each place, the Chinese Government will authorize the Re-occupation Commission to proclaim martial law when it is deemed necessary, and enforce it for a short period of time, during which any disturbance of peace or any act of violence against the life and property of residents will be severely dealt with according to martial law."

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"Special precautions will be taken for ensuring the safety of all Japanese nationals. In view, however, of the many dangerous acts incompatible with the maintenance of peace recently committed by Japanese subjects in various parts of China, especially in Manchuria, the Japanese Government is expected to warn Japanese subjects in evacuated territory against taking any undesirable course of action so as to ensure the successful execution of measures of protection by the Chinese Government."

(C.841.M.421.1931. Official Journal,
December 1931, p.2547).

The Assembly Committee has asked the Chinese Government what steps it proposes to take in the future to secure the execution of the September 30th and December 10th resolutions. The Chinese Government states herewith that the arrangements mentioned in the above letter still stand, and that it is, as throughout the conflict, ready at any moment to enter into discussions for implementing these arrangements and for co-operating with the League in devising whatever supplementary arrangements on the spot as may be regarded as desirable.

Conclusion.

It is clear from the above summary of events that the principal obstacle to an agreement has been the different interpretations put by each party upon what constitutes effectively assuring "the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals" in Chinese territory outside the railway zone. The Chinese Government's interpretation, which was explicitly endorsed by several members of the Council in the discussions on October 23rd and 24th referred to above, was, as the President, M. Eriand, put it, that the conditions of security which should be established should "make it certain that Japanese nationals and their property will not be subject to reprisals" after the troops had left. "Troops are about to leave a territory which they have administered, in which they have organised municipal services, police and various administrative departments. These various bodies have to be replaced. But that can be settled after a few hours or at most a few days' discussion." Such discussions, he pointed out, concerned police measures, administrative measures, possibly military measures - all questions which can rapidly be settled.

That is, the Chinese Government submits, the natural interpretation of safety for lives and property. Unfortunately, the Japanese Government persists in reading into this phrase a programme for a political and economic protectorate of Manchuria, which the Chinese Government is to be compelled to accept in direct negotiation under the pressure of Japanese military occupation.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

1
Communicated to the Committee
of Nineteen and the
Japanese Delegation.

A. (Extr.) Com.spec./4 1932

Geneva, April 14th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the "National Salvation
Federation of Chinese Bodies" of Shanghai.

Note by the Secretary General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Special Committee the following telegram addressed to
the said Committee through the intermediary of Dr.W.W.Yen.

Rf./A.23.

Your attention called to fact parley in shanghai is troops
stationing instead of withdrawal conference with japanese
firmly demanding surrender of wocsung and other places
for stationing troops without time limit deliberately
failing comply league decision lampson mediation sug-
gestions also inconsistent with true withdrawal shanghai
three millions people oppose this hope you put into prac-
tice responsibility vested in you and effect japanese un-
conditional complete immediate withdrawal as decided by
league = Shanghai national salvation federation of chinese
public bodies.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Committee
of Nineteen and the
Japanese Delegation.

A. (Extr.) Com. spec./3
1932.

Geneva, April 12th, 1932

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Committee of Nineteen the following communication
dated April 11th which he has received from the Chinese
Delegation.

Rf./A.(20).

April 11th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General:

I have the honour to inform you that I have received
a telegram from my Government to the effect that the
armistice negotiations at Shanghai have again reached a
critical stage, where agreement between the Chinese and
Japanese Governments is very unlikely.

Under the circumstances I am instructed by my Govern-
ment to present the latest phase of the negotiations to the
Members of the Special Committee, and to request for a meet-
ing of the same.

I shall be deeply obliged if you will kindly transmit
the request to His Exc. Mr. Hymans, President of the Special
Committee, so that a meeting of the Special Committee may
be arranged at an early date.

(Signed) W. W. Yen

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Committee
of Nineteen and the Japanese
Delegation.

A.(Extr.)Com.Spec./2.1932.

Geneva, April 13th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Committee of Nineteen the following communication
dated April 12th which he has received from the Chinese
Delegation.

April 12th, 1932.

Ref./A.21.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of
a Memorandum, together with a Summary of the proceedings,
on the Shanghai armistice negotiations, which have been
going on since the 14th of March. As the contents of
the Summary have been sent here by telegraph, it must be
obvious that they cannot be complete, but they give a faith-
ful account of what has happened at the negotiations.

I shall be obliged to you to circulate the Memorandum
and its annex, the Summary, among the Members of the Special
Committee.

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

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MEMORANDUM.

On March 4th, the day after it opened in extraordinary session the Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon the Governments of China and Japan to take immediately the necessary measures to ensure the effective cessation of hostilities and recommending that negotiations be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the powers which have special interests in the Shanghai settlements, for the conclusion of arrangements which should render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.

This resolution further refers to the plan of pacification announced by H. Paul-Boncour, the President of the Council, in the Council meeting of February 29. On this occasion M. Paul-Boncour had submitted a plan for the cessation of hostilities and holding of a Conference to restore peaceful conditions in the Shanghai area. The plan further indicated the basis on which the Conference should be held and added that the meeting of the Conference was of course subject to the making of local arrangements for a cessation of hostilities.

When the Special Committee of the Assembly met on March 17 it took note of the fact that hostilities had virtually ceased and that the discussion for rendering this cessation definite and regulating the withdrawal of the Japanese forces had begun. It considered a communication from the Chinese Government stating that the armistice discussions at Shanghai had practically reached a deadlock

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because of the submission by the Japanese representative of a separate note and a request for an amendment to the agenda of the armistice conference. On this occasion the President stated that if the separate note were being put forward as a condition for the armistice it would constitute making a political condition, which was incompatible with the Assembly Resolution of March 4th for the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Shanghai area. The President further interpreted the proposed amendment to the agenda. Both the ruling of the separate note and the interpretation were concurred in by several members of the Committee, including the Japanese representative. The Minutes record the following observations of the Swiss delegate, M. Motta:

"The Chairman's interpretation, which had been accepted by the Japanese representative, definitely ruled out any political condition to the signature of an armistice. The Chinese representative could accordingly reassure his Government on this point, and M. Motta was glad to observe that opinion was unanimous in this respect."

The President expressed his satisfaction that his interpretation of the amendment had been accepted by M. Sato, and that with reference to the separate note the Japanese representative had stated that it was merely a proposal to China and not an armistice condition. The President requested the Chinese and Japanese representatives to inform their Governments with regard to the statements made at the meeting of the Committee, and this information was duly sent by the Chinese representative.

More than three weeks have passed since the March 17th meeting and the armistice negotiations have reached no definite conclusion. It is true that for the time being fighting has

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virtually ceased and no blood is being shed. This is indeed a precious result and one for which the Chinese Government wishes herewith to express the profound gratitude of the Chinese people to the Assembly and its President.

But it is clear that the present situation is precarious and that so long as agreement has not been reached, peace, which has never ceased to be troubled by occasional skirmishing and aeroplane raids, is at the mercy daily, almost hourly, of an incident. All the meetings and laborious discussions of the last three weeks have failed to achieve agreement on arrangements rendering definite the cessation of hostilities and regulating the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in accordance with the terms of the Assembly resolution of March 4th, and so have postponed the carrying out of the plan submitted by M. Paul-Boncour for the holding of a Round Table Conference at Shanghai.

The principal obstacle to the fulfilment of the Assembly resolution accepted by both China and Japan is in the view of the Chinese Government the steady insistence of the Japanese Government that the withdrawal of its forces to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads must be subordinated to Japanese views as to when 'conditions' in and around Shanghai have sufficiently improved to warrant a sense of security by Japanese subjects. X Meanwhile the Japanese Government is pressing for the opening of the Shanghai Conference before Japanese troops have withdrawn.

X Now worded as "return to normal". See Summary p.7.

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In the circumstances the urgent need of the situation appears to be, in the view of the Chinese Government, to dissipate the confusion and to adopt a clear cut plan of procedure which should make it possible to bring the armistice discussions to a successful conclusion and so pave the way for holding the Shanghai Conference. It would seem urgently necessary to define clearly the nature and the mutual relations of the several negotiations now in progress or due to take place in Shanghai, in the light of the Assembly resolutions of March 4 and 11, of the Council plan of February 29 and of the discussions in the Council and Assembly when the plan and resolutions were adopted and of the Special Committee of the Assembly when the Shanghai situation was discussed on March 17.

The Chinese Government for its part ventures to submit the following proposals and conclusions which in its view emerge from a careful consideration of the resolutions, plan and discussions referred to above:

1. An armistice must be concluded and must provide, in conformity with paragraph 3 of the Assembly resolution of March 4, for arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of Japanese troops. The details of this armistice are to be negotiated on the spot with the help of the ministers of the powers having special interests in the Shanghai settlements. A Mixed Commission with neutral members should be constituted to follow and report on the withdrawal of troops.

2. The second task before the Chinese and Japanese Governments and the specially interested powers, is to prepare and hold the Round Table Conference at Shanghai. This Conference, as the President of the Council, M. Paul-Boncour, pointed out on February 29 has as its object the restoration of peaceful

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conditions in the Shanghai area. The basis for the deliberations of this conference was likewise indicated at the same meeting of the Council. The Chinese Government for its part, it may be recalled, accepted the Council plan in a letter to the President of the Council dated March 2nd (A.Extr.7.1932), on the understanding that the Conference should be held when the armistice had been accepted and carried out, that the Conference was concerned only with the restoration of peace in Shanghai and all questions arising out of the Sino-Japanese conflict in any part of China should be settled in accordance with the procedure invoked by China before the League, and that participation in the Conference was of course subject to agreement between the participating governments as to its agenda.

3. In this connection the Chinese Government, in pursuance of its policy of complete frankness and loyalty vis-à-vis the League, wishes to put on record for the consideration of the Assembly Committee its views on the following point :

The complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from territory under Chinese jurisdiction at Shanghai should take place by a date fixed as part of the armistice arrangements and cannot be subordinated to any political condition, including the acceptance of any proposal as regards the agenda or competence of the Round Table Conference, for to do so would be contrary to the resolutions of the Assembly as interpreted by the President.

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SUMMARY OF THE SHANGHAI ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, met Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister to China, at a tea party given at Shanghai on Monday, March 14th, by Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister, Mr. Nelson Johnson, the American Minister, Mr. Ilden, The French Minister, and Mr. Ciano, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires. As a result of the discussions the following draft agenda for an armistice meeting was drawn up subject to the approval of the Chinese and Japanese Governments:

1. The Chinese troops were to remain in their present positions, pending a later settlement.
2. The Japanese troops were to withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th. It was, however, understood that in view of the numbers of the Japanese troops to be accommodated, some would have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas.
3. There was to be a Joint Commission with neutral members to certify to the mutual withdrawal.

Note.

It was understood that no other questions of principle would be raised.

Separate
Note.

Provided a definite agreement should be reached on the basis of the above points, the Chinese side would voluntarily give an undertaking that Mayor Wu's letter of January 28th stood. This undertaking was subject to the approval of the Chinese Government.

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On March 15th, Mr Shigemitsu visited Sir Miles Lampson and made the following change to paragraph 3 of the original draft: "A Joint Commission with neutral members to certify to the carrying out of the agreement under paragraphs 1 and 2 and to watch and observe the general conditions in the evacuated area until a later settlement."

A formal meeting was arranged for the afternoon of March 16th to adopt the draft agenda, but it was postponed upon Mr Shigemitsu's request on the ground that he had not received instructions from his Government.

Meanwhile the Chinese Government made it known that Mr Shigemitsu's proposed amendments were unacceptable and that the Separate Note should not be raised at the armistice negotiations as it was tantamount to a political condition.

Two meetings were held on March 19th, as a result of which an agreement was reached. This draft agreement, which was still subject to the approval of the two Governments, was to the following effect:

1. The Chinese troops would remain in their present positions pending later arrangements. The Chinese authorities would define the said positions. In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question would be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly powers.
2. The Japanese troops would withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932. It was, however, understood that in view of the number of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some would have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas. The Japanese authorities would define the

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said localities. In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question would be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly powers.

3. A Joint Commission including members representing the participating friendly powers would be established to certify to the mutual withdrawal. This Commission would also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police. The constitution and procedure of the Commission would be defined in the attached Annex.

Annex.

"The Joint Commission would be composed of twelve members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments and the American, British, French and Italian heads of mission in China being the representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission from the Members representing the participating friendly powers."

The following was a separate voluntary declaration by the Chinese Government: "In order to ease the general situation and to secure the prompt re-establishment of stability and normal conditions in the affected areas, the Chinese Government hereby intimate their intention immediately to establish on their own initiative for the maintenance of peace and order in the evacuated area in the vicinity of the Shanghai Settlements a force of

- 10 -

special constabulary for which they contemplate the employment of foreign officers and instructors. It is understood that the incoming Chinese police referred to in the penultimate sentence of paragraph 3 of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities will be drawn from the above special constabulary."

In the discussions on the constabulary it was suggested that the Pao-an-tui (Gendarmerie) be immediately despatched from Peiping for service in the evacuated areas.

Subsequently the following phrase was added to the beginning of paragraph two of the draft agreement reached on March 19th: "In accordance with the definite programme regulating the withdrawal as shown in Annex ... of this Agreement." In the voluntary declaration to be made by the Chinese Government the words "experts as" were substituted for the word "foreign," while the following verbal note was taken at the meeting: "In discussing this phrase, Mr Quo Tai-chi intimated that the Chinese Government contemplated the employment of foreigners among experts in question."

The meeting for Wednesday, the 23rd March, did not take place, because the Japanese appointed General Uyeda as military representative instead of General Shirikawa, the Chief Commander as originally understood. For this reason General Chiang, Chinese Chief Commander, declined to attend the meeting. The Chinese Government appointed, thereupon, General Tai Chi, Commander of the Shanghai-Woosung Garrison, in the place of General Chiang.

Two meetings were held on March 24th, but the results were disappointing, as the Japanese representatives insisted continually on the discussion of irrelevant questions.

- 11 -

Mr. Quo declared at the morning session that he would dissociate himself with the discussion, if the Japanese continued their efforts to lead the negotiations to questions outside the scope of the agreed draft agenda. In passing it may be noted that General Uyeda became the Chief Japanese Delegate with Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister, as assistant, which was contrary to the understanding that the Japanese Minister should be the Chief Delegate. Mr. Quo insisted that the discussions should follow strictly the agreed agenda, which the Japanese seemed anxious to overthrow.

At the following meeting, which took place on Friday, the 25th of March, the discussions showed unmistakably the intention of Japan to ignore the provisions of the original draft agreement and also of the Assembly's resolution regarding withdrawal. The morning session was wasted over bickerings over the accommodation of Japanese sick soldiers and horses in the areas to be evacuated. During the afternoon meeting, the military sub-Committee, consisting of military representatives of both sides assisted by the Military Attachés of the participating friendly Powers, brought in a report, which revealed that Japan was willing to withdraw only to what she called the "second line", running from Szetseling Forts (Woosung) to Yanghangche, Tatsung and Chenju (on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway). In other words, Japan's idea of withdrawal meant the maintenance of her army of occupation in areas between the Settlement limits and the above-mentioned line. The Japanese representatives declared further that the withdrawal to the above-indicated line would require a time limit of six weeks. When the Japanese were asked as to the time when they would withdraw to the International

- 12 -

Settlement, the reply was that it was uncertain, - all depending on the conditions. Under the circumstances a rupture of the negotiations was prevented only by the mediation of the British and American Ministers.

The discussions on the 26th of March centered upon the constitution and functions of the Joint Commission, which is to certify to the mutual withdrawal. The Article itself with Annex thereto was accepted by both sides. In the place of the Japanese demand for aerial reconnoitring, provision was made for neutral aerial observation. The military sub-Committee reported that the Japanese were still insisting on having Ying-hsiang-hsien for accommodating their troops.

On March 28th the negotiations practically reached a deadlock as Japan refused to declare complete withdrawal within a fixed period. Japan's definition of "adjacent territory" also included the Woosung area, Kiangwan, Chapei and the north-eastern district adjoining Yangtzepoo of the International Settlement.

The deadlock continued at the meeting of the 29th of March, as the Japanese flatly refused to give a date for complete withdrawal.

On March 30th the Japanese named four localities as minimum for quartering their troops: 1. the Woosung district, including Chang Jah Pang and Wen Chao Pang; 2. the Chapei district; 3. the Yin Hang Chen district, north-east of Kiangwan Race course and 4. the Ying Hsiang Hsien district, north-east of Yangtzepoo, thus embracing a total territory of 50 square li.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 13 -

At the meeting on April 4th, the Japanese again declared that they would not set a time limit to complete withdrawal, but offered a separate declaration stating that withdrawal to the Settlement would take place when conditions improved, so as to afford a sense of security to Japanese lives and interests. This declaration without time limit was considered unsatisfactory by the Chinese Delegate.

The latest meeting took place on the 9th of April, and a formula setting a time limit for complete withdrawal to the International Settlement of the Japanese troops was suggested by the British Minister, reading as follows:

"The Japanese Government takes this opportunity to declare that as soon as local conditions in and around Shanghai so improve as to afford a sense of security to Japanese nationals as regards protection of lives and property and lawful pursuits (and it hopes that conditions will have so improved within six months or sooner) the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and extra-Settlement Roads in Hongkew District as before the incident of January 28th."

After discussion the formula was amended to read:

"The Japanese Government takes this opportunity to declare that as soon as local conditions in and around Shanghai return to normal - and it hopes that conditions will have so returned within six months or sooner - the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement Roads in the Hongkew District as before the incident of January 28th."

The amended formula has been forwarded by the Chinese and Japanese Delegates to their respective Governments. The Chinese Government considers the formula, even as amended, as unsatisfactory.

0821

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Communicated to the Committee of Nineteen and the Japanese Delegation.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
APR 19 1932

A.(Extr.)Com.spec./1.

Geneva, March 21st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.
POLITICAL SECTION

Committee of Nineteen appointed by the Assembly.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Committee of Nineteen the following letter, dated March 19th, which he has received from the Chinese Representative, together with his reply, dated March 21st.

March 19th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General:

I have the honour to inform you that I have just received a telegram from the Hon. T. V. Soong, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, to the effect that it is possible that the Commission of Enquiry will prolong its stay in Shanghai for the purpose of participating in the discussions of the so-called Shanghai problem. He continues by saying that the Chinese Government is not at all in favour of such a change of plans on the part of the Commission, as in the first place its principal duty is to study and report on the situation in Manchuria, and in the second place as the Chinese Government understands that this Commission has been asked through the Council to submit as soon as possible a report to the Special Committee of Nineteen on the general situation in Manchuria. It is evident a prolonged stay in Shanghai would be contrary to what is expected by all parties concerned of the duties of the Commission of Enquiry.

The Chinese Government expresses, therefore, a strong desire that the Commission of Enquiry proceed as early as possible to Manchuria as originally planned as far back as the end of last year.

I shall be obliged to you to bring the above to the knowledge of H.E. Mr. Hymans, President of the Special Committee, and through him to the Members of the same.

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

March 21st, 1932.

To the Chinese Representative:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. A(5) of March 19th, with reference to the programme of work of the Commission appointed by the Council on December 10th.

I presume that your Government has taken the necessary steps to communicate its views direct to the Commission, either through the Chinese assessor, or otherwise.

With reference to the statement in your letter that the Chinese Government understands that this Commission has been asked through the Council to submit as soon as possible a report to the Special Committee of Nineteen on the general situation in Manchuria, I venture to draw your attention to the contents of document A.(Extr.) 64.1932, which was communicated on March 18th to the Assembly, and which makes clear the action which has been taken. I need hardly add that no change has been made in the terms of reference of the Commission as set out in the Resolution of the Council of December 10th.

I am communicating your letter and this reply to the members of the Assembly Committee and also to the Japanese Representative.

(Signed) Eric DRUMMOND, Secretary-General.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated April 28, 1932

Rec'd 1:12 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 28 1932

Department of State

APR 30 1932

Secretary of State,
Washington.

April 28, 9 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE.

My April 23, 2 p. m., and April 26, noon.

One. At meeting of four colleagues this morning
British Minister read to us a telegram from Geneva dated
April 27th which contained the following:

"In order to bring matters to a conclusion amendment
to draft armistice suggested by you must first be agreed to
by both parties. Draft armistice will then come before
Committee of 19 with the following words added at the end
of annex 4: 'and is authorized to call attention to any
neglect in the carrying out of provisions of the three
articles mentioned above'. Committee will then pass a
resolution in article 11 of which they will take note of
agreement thus reached by parties."

Two. He also read to us a telegram from Geneva dated
April 28th stating that text of article 11 of resolution
which it was now proposed that Committee would adopt would
be as follows: "Eleven. Takes note of fact that powers
as defined

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MAY 8 - 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- from Shanghai, Apr. 28, 9p.m.

as defined in annex 4 of draft agreement of Commission which is to watch carrying out of article No. one, article No. two and Article No. three of that agreement, include authority to call attention in accordance with Commission's decisions, taken in such manner as is provided in said annex to any neglect in carrying out and of provisions of articles mentioned above."

Three. The above indicated that Committee of 19 at Geneva was waiting upon negotiators here formally to accept proposed amendment as part of draft agreement before adopting resolution. Lampson and I therefore called upon Quo at noon today and got him to agree to meet with Shigemitsu at 3 this afternoon for the purpose of accepting formally amendment to annex four.

Four. Accordingly at 3 p. m. Shigemitsu and Quo met in the presence of representatives of four friendly powers and accepted formally the amendments suggested above. This information is being conveyed to Geneva by Lampson.

Five. In the course of one meeting today Quo suggested that the first 15 words of the first sentence of article No. three of draft agreement (see my telegram March 28, 9p.m.) "in accordance with the program regulating withdrawal as shown in annex 2 of this agreement" be dropped. Shigemitsu consented to this and it was then agreed that annex 2 should be added

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- from Shanghai, Apr. 28, 9p.m.

be added to annex 3 with no change except substitution of the word "above" for the words "in annex 3" in the first sentence of annex 2. Annexes 3 and 4 will then be re-numbered 2 and 3, respectively.

Six. Quo objected to the words "referred to in the penultimate sentence of article four of the agreement occurring at the end of the separate voluntary declaration by the Chinese Government (see my March 28, 9 p. m.) on the ground that declaration was separate and not connected with the agreement; that such was understood and that therefore reference to specific article was objectionable to the Chinese. Shigemitsu at first demurred but finally consented to refer to his Government the following words: "who take over from the evacuating Japanese forces in accordance with the arrangements for a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai" in substitution for objectionable passage.

Seven. Phraseology of agreement has now been entirely accepted by Shigemitsu and Quo, except for passage just quoted which should give no trouble.

Section two follows by cable.

JOHNSON

WSB

KLP

082
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REI

A portion of
this telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

FROM

SHANGHAI *fh*

Dated April 28, 1932

Rec'd 10:55 p.m.

892.0146
893.236
Secretary of State,
Washington.



April 28, 9 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Eight. There remains but one outstanding question
now unagreed to and that is the positions of Chinese troops
south of Soochow Creek and on the Pootung side of the
Whangpoo River. The Japanese continue to demand that
Chinese designate positions of their troops in those areas.
(END GRAY) CONFIDENTIAL. Purpose of course is to fix
Chinese troops in positions so indicated and Chinese have
consistently refused to comply for they realize that agree-
ment will fix troops at points designated for an indefinite
period. Lampson and I have supported Quo in his position.
We have maintained that in the beginning all discussion
concerned itself with troops actually engaged in hostilities
and that negotiations were for the purpose of separating
these troops and bringing about a cessation of hostilities.
We have supported Quo in the claims that to discuss their
troops to the south of Soochow Creek and on the Pootung
side of the Whangpoo is to introduce new matter into the
discussion. It is our hope that with text agreed to and
League

F/LS 793.94/5132

(Section Two)

FILED
MAY 2 - 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

2 ~~FROM~~ Shanghai, Apr. 28, 9p.m.

League Resolution passed we will be able to persuade Japanese to drop this question so that it should be possible to sign the agreement early next week.

Nine. It is my purpose to designate the Consul General as my civilian representative on the Mixed Commission and to ask one of the military language officers in Peiping to serve as my military representative. I wish to keep Drysdale free for use in Manchuria should that seem necessary.

Ten. I hope that with the signature of this agreement the Department will approve my return with staff to Peiping.

(END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

WSB

0827

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
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PM REC TELEGRAM SENT



Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

VIA NAVAL RADIO

Washington,
 April 29, 1932.

30 4 R

AMERICAN CONSUL
 APR 30 32
 SHANGHAI (China)

162

FOR THE MINISTER.

Your April 28, 9 p.m.

One. Your purpose, as indicated in paragraph nine of your April 28, 9 p.m., has the Department's approval provided the representatives of the other participating friendly powers make similar designations.

Two. When informed that the agreement has been signed, the Department will give consideration to the question of your return to Peiping mentioned in paragraph ten of your telegram.

Castle
 ACTING

793.94/5132

CR
 Apr. 30, 1932.

FE:JES/VDM

m.m.h.
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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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0828

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

MAY 4 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Dated April 28, 1932

Rec'd 3:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

90, April 28, 8 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Committee of 19 met in secret session this afternoon.

I am informed that information was furnished that both the Chinese and Japanese have accepted the Lampson proposal as to the duties of the Mixed Commission. The Japanese are still making some difficulty as to detail concerning the position of the Chinese troops.

The Committee is summoning the Assembly for Saturday morning at which time the draft resolution containing article 11 as last reported to you will be submitted. It is not known definitely what action the Japanese will pursue but it is expected that they will either vote for or abstain and it is not anticipated that they will raise objections.

WILSON

WSB

RR

F/LS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM

Shanghai

Dated April 29, 1932

Rec'd 4:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

April 29, 1 P. M.

At about eleven thirty this morning during military review for Japanese Emperor's birthday an unknown Oriental approached reviewing stand in Hongkew Park and threw a bomb onto the speakers stand. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister, and Shirakawa, Japanese Commander in Chief, were severely wounded. Other Japanese officials also wounded. Condition of Shigemitsu and Shirakawa not yet known. Colonel Drysdale Military Attache standing nearby witnessed incident.

JOHNSON

CIB WP

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 29 1932

Department of State

F/LS

793.94/5134

FILED

MAY 2 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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AM REC
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington, *May*

APR 29 52 April 30, 1932.

793.94/5134
AMERICAN CONSULATE,
SHANGHAI, (China).

158 For the Minister.

Your telegram April 29, 1 p.m. */5134*

If you have not already done so, you are authorized
to express ^{*approximately*} to ~~appropriate~~ Japanese ^{*authorities*} ~~authorities~~ the sym-
pathy of this Government with the unfortunate victims.

793.94/5134

Castle
using

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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AM REC'D
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Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

April 26, 1932.

APR 29 32

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan)

96 Department has been informed by American Minister to China of severe injuries inflicted on his Japanese colleague and other Japanese officials, civil and military, by bombing at Shanghai. Please express to Japanese Foreign Office in appropriate terms and without referring to the authorship of the outrage the sympathy of this Government with the unfortunate victims.

793.94/5134

Call
 Airing

DP:JP:MSD

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APR. 29. 1932. 17

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

0832

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated April 29, 1932

Rec'd 11:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

DOUBLE PRIORITY

216, April 29, 5 p. m.



Supplementing minister's April 29, 1 p. m., I learn on

793-94
702-9493
12-00

good authority that Shigemitsu Japanese Minister very serious-
ly but not dangerously wounded and that one of his legs was
broken. Murai Japanese Consul General was less seriously
wounded. General Shirakawa was wounded in the face and
possibly had his jaw broken. Admiral Nomura naval commander
will probably lose the sight of one eye. Kawabata chairman
of the Japanese Residents Association was the most seriously
injured and will probably die. The Secretary of the Japanese
Residents Association was also seriously injured. Several
arrests have been made but name and nationality of perpetra-
tor or perpetrators not yet known.

Repeated to the Legation, copy to Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

RR

F/DEW

793.94/5135

FILED

MAY 4 - 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DÉLÉGATION DU JAPON
À LA
CONFÉRENCE GÉNÉRALE
DU
DÉSARMEMENT

GENÈVE, LE April 29, 1932



793.94

F/HS

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Immediately after our recent conversation on the speech of General Araki, War Minister, which appeared in the Chicago Daily Tribune of April 23, I took steps to inquire whether the report of his alleged remarks on the Nine-Power Treaty was founded on facts.

In reply, I have just received a telegram from the Foreign Office, which informs me that General Araki did not make any statement, in his speech in Osaka, that Japan should resolutely oppose the application of the Nine-Power Treaty. I understand

The Honourable H.L. Stimson,
Secretary of State,
Hôtel des Bergues,
Geneva.

793.94/5135-1/2

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U.S. DEPT. OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

that no exact text of his speech was published but only passages were reported at random by different correspondents. The chances are that misrepresentation and exaggeration of facts have been telegraphed abroad.

Hoping that the above information will interest you,

Very sincerely yours,

T. Katsurana

P.S. May I enclose herewith for your information a copy of report on recent plots of exploding bridges & railways, alleged to have been done by Russian communists in north Manchuria, which we have received from Foreign Office.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Geneva, Switzerland

May 1, 1982

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I thank you deeply for your letter of April 29, informing me that General Araki did not make the statement reported in the Chicago Tribune. I deeply appreciate the steps you have taken to avoid any misunderstanding on this subject. It has been a great pleasure to see you here and I am only sorry that the necessity of my return to the United States has shortened the pleasure of my conferences with you.

Very sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson

His Excellency,
Mr. Tsuneo Matsudaira,
Japanese Delegation,
Hotel Metropole,
Geneva.

S HLS.GAM

793.94/5135-1/2

Confidential

(1) ARREST OF RUSSIAN IN POSSESSION OF EXPLOSIVES
IN RAILWAY STATION AT HARBIN.

This Russian has been found to be an employee of the printing-office of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company. 131 pieces of explosive and several secret letters were discovered in a valise carried by him. At the enquiry made by the Control Bureau of the Special Police, the prisoner stated that these explosives had been brought by train coming from the direction of Vladivostok, and that a group of 19 accomplices was working with him. These 19 have been arrested. Enquiry shows that these persons received Communist instruction last year at Khabarovsk and had become Communist agents.

(2) PLAN FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF RAILWAY-BRIDGE
OVER THE SUNGARI RIVER.

Explosives were found at and near the bridge in several places to the extent of 304 pieces of small size and 243 of large size, of a total weight of 34 or 35 kan. A duplicate copy of a contract for repairing the bridge was also discovered on the spot, and it is supposed that this contract was used for the purpose of gaining access to the bridge. (The railway-guard stationed at the bridge was shot and killed. We have reason to believe that the copy of the contract was taken from the Control Bureau of the Chinese Eastern Railway by Mr. Ovchinikov, Chief of the 3rd Department of the Company. The latter resigned from his post about that time on very favorable conditions, and at present his whereabouts are unknown.) There were also found on the spot a shotgun, 8 cans of provisions, some bread coming from Harbin, and 2 maps of North Manchuria. The attempt to blow up the bridge had been planned beforehand, and we suppose that the criminals intended to escape into China disguised as hunters.

(3) ATTEMPT TO BLOW UP THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY.

This attempt was conceived for the purpose of injuring the 2nd Division returning from Harbin. Three "yellow" explosives (weighing about 1½ kilograms) were discovered by
Chinese

- 2 -

Chinese workers under the railway tracks about 345 kilometres east of Harbin. These explosives were fitted with an electric wire, at one end of which was attached a mechanism for setting off the explosion, and at the other end a switch (of German manufacture). Nearby was found a small battery. The charges were so arranged as to explode under the coaches after the passage of the locomotive. From these facts, it appears that the authors of the attempt were well versed in the use of explosives.


(4) DERAILMENT AND OVERTURN OF MILITARY TRAIN.

This accident took place not far from the spot mentioned above. Large spikes had been removed from the rails so that the weight of the locomotive would cause them to be thrown out of place. (It is rumoured that explosives had also been placed under the tracks, but this has not been confirmed.) As a result of the derailment and overturn of the train, the gasoline contained in the automobiles being transported in the cars caught fire and caused much damage. These are the methods usually employed by Communists, several train-accidents of a similar character having taken place in the same region during the Russo-Chinese conflict.

(5) CONCLUSION.

We believe that this act of destruction was the work of Communists, and our belief is strengthened by the fact that the explosives used in the 2nd and 3rd cases are the same as those discovered in the possession of the Russian arrested at the Harbin Railway Station. Although the labels had been removed, we believe the explosives to be of Soviet manufacture. This tends to confirm our suspicion that the act was committed by Communists. The Control Bureau of ^{the} Special Police is pursuing its investigations with the collaboration of a Japanese Adviser and in cooperation with the gendarmerie and the police of the Consulate, but no precisions can yet be made as to the guilty persons.

The number of suspects of Soviet nationality arrested in connection with this affair by the Control Bureau since April 7th totals about 60. The majority ^{of these} are employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
WE

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

793.94
793.102
793.94119
500.0111

RECEIVED
APR 30 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Geneva

FROM

Dated April 30, 1932

Rec'd 5:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 2 1932
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 30 1932
Department of State

22. to Geneva
+ Shanghai
Apr. 30/32
MAY 1 1932

F/LS
793.94/5136

91, April 30, 11 a.m.

Sir John Simons sends me a letter dated April 29th suggesting that it might be desirable for the four Ministers at Shanghai to resume joint reports to Committee of 19 at suitable intervals briefly narrating any developments such as military movement, progress of negotiations, et cetera.

I have consulted with the Secretary and he states that he desires this submitted to you but for his part sees no objection to procedure suggested.

WILSON

WSB

1932
MAY 1 1932
RECEIVED

0839

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

VIA NAVAL RADIO
Washington,
April 30, 1932.

3 R

AMERICAN CONSUL
SHANGHAI (China)

793.94/5136

161

FOR THE MINISTER.

One. With regard to the Shanghai situation, a telegram No. 91, April 30, 11 a.m., has been received from Wilson at Geneva, as follows:

QUOTE Sir John Simon sends me a letter dated April 29th suggesting that it might be desirable for the four Ministers at Shanghai to resume joint reports to Committee of 19 at suitable intervals briefly narrating any developments such as military movement, progress of negotiations, et cetera.

I have consulted with the Secretary and he states that he desires this submitted to you but for his part sees no objection to procedure suggested. UNQUOTE

Two. The Department concurs in the view of the Secretary of State and desires that you telegraph to the Department the texts of any joint reports that may be submitted.

793.94/5136

Cast
Aving

FE:JEJ/VDM
Enciphered by SKH
Sent by operator M., 19 APR. 30 1932

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

0840


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State



1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,
 April 30, 1932.

28

WILSON

APR 30 32

BERGUES

GENEVA (Switzerland)

62

/5136

The text of your 91, April 30, 11 a.m. has been telegraphed to Minister Johnson at Shanghai with the statement that the Department concurs in the view of the Secretary and with instructions that the Minister telegraph to the Department the texts of any joint reports that ^{may} be submitted.

Caell
 aring

FE:JEJ/VDM

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/5136

793.94/5136
 note
 893/102-S
 793/94119
 500/C112
 500/C111


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

F A
D P

793.94
793.94119
893.10~S

REI

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM Dept. of State dated April 30, 1932

Rec'd 4:44 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



26. to Geneva
Apr. 30/32
File

118, April 30, 10 a. m.

Department's telegram 96, April 29, 5 p. m.

I have carried out instructions in a note to the Foreign Office.

I saw the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, War and Navy last night at dinner and expressed regret and sympathy orally. They said that they had no reason to connect the bombing at Shanghai with the negotiations and that it would make no difference in their attitude so far as they could see at present. The Foreign Minister seemed to be of the opinion that the Shanghai negotiations would necessarily be considerably delayed as both Shigemitsu and Murai, the Consul General, were so injured that they would not be able to carry on. (It is too early to expect definite information as to the Japanese personnel replacing these two men.)

There seems to be very little public excitement although the Minister of War told me that both the Manchurian and Shanghai situations were very troublesome, the former more so than the latter on account of the large numbers of lawless elements in Manchuria.

NEVILLE

RIF-WSB

F/DEW

793.94/5137

FILED

MAY 3 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

PM REC'D
 TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Grey and Confidential

Washington,

April 30, 1932.

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

[FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.]

Upon receipt of telegraphic report of April 29 from
 Minister/Johnson at Shanghai in regard to the bombing of
 high Japanese officials at Shanghai, the Department
 instructed the Minister to express appropriately the
 sympathy of this Government. ~~The Department sent a similar~~
 instruction to the Embassy at Tokyo. In a telegram dated
 April 30 the Embassy reported that it had carried out the
 Department's instructions and further reported as follows:

QUOTE I saw the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, War and
 Navy last night at dinner ~~and expressed regret and sympathy~~
~~orally~~. They said that they had no reason to connect the
 bombing at Shanghai with the negotiations and that it would
 make no difference in their attitude so far as they could
 see at present. The Foreign Minister seemed to be of the
 opinion that the Shanghai negotiations would necessarily
 be considerably delayed as both Shigemitsu and Murai, the
 Consul General, were so injured that they would not be able

Enciphered by OK

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/5137

793.94/5137 63

5134

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
 It should be treated as such and not be
 being communicated to anyone.

APR 30 32

SP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State
Washington,

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

- 2 -

to carry on.

There seems to be very little public excitement although
the Minister of War told me that both the Manchurian and
Shanghai situations were very troublesome..... UNQUOTE

Carthe, Acting
5/4

793.94/5137
M.D.
FE:MMH:REK/clb FE

Enciphered by CR

Sent by operator M., 19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Bluestein NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
 793.94117
 812.122C

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

rh

FROM

A portion of this telegram
 must be closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone.

SHANGHAI

Dated May 1, 1932

Rec'd. 6.43 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 1, 4 pm

(GRAY) First Secretary of the Japanese Legation

called on the British Minister this morning and on me
 this afternoon and gave us the following message from
 the Japanese Government:

"The Japanese Government desire to proceed with the
 negotiation of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities
 notwithstanding the Hongkew Park incident. But they re-
 serve their liberty as to the measures which they may
 take as the result of the investigation into the incident.
 (END GRAY) Commenting upon it the Secretary said,
 confidentially that he personally felt we need not take the
 second sentence too seriously. It had been added merely
 because rumors had been reported to Tokyo that the incident
 was due to investigation of 19th Route Army.

(GRAY)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 MAY 2 1932
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 2-1932
 Department of State

F/LS
 793.94/5138

MAY 5-1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

RH #2 of May 1, 4 pm from Shanghai

(GRAY) Your 261, April 30, 3 pm. The representatives
of the four participating powers will meet tomorrow noon.

JOHNSON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

rh

GRAY

GENEVA

FROM

Dated April 30, 1932

Rec'd 12.45 pm

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 2 1932
Department of State

RECEIVED
MAY 30 1932
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

165, April 30, 1 pm

The Assembly in plenary session this morning passed
unanimously (Japan abstaining) the following resolution
submitted to it by the Committee of 19:

"The Assembly

One. Considering that its resolutions of March
4 and 11 recommended that negotiations should be entered
into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives with the
assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities
of the powers having special interests in the Shanghai
Settlements for the conclusion of arrangements which shall
render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate
the withdrawal of the Japanese forces;

Two. Considering that while it is not for its committee
to take the place of the negotiators - since the arrangements
contemplated

793.94
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F/LS
793.94/5139

MAY 5 1932

FILED

MAY 2 - 1932

Del. to Shanghai
May 2/32

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

2-#165, from Geneva, Apr. 30, 1p.m.

contemplated in the Assembly resolutions of March 4 and 11 can only be concluded on the spot - every power represented in these negotiations is entitled, should serious difficulty be encountered in the course of the negotiations or (to notify the Committee "which exercises its functions on in the carrying out of the above mentioned arrangements, on behalf of and under supervision of the Assembly" of those difficulties;

Three. Considering that the negotiations should be pursued in accordance with the above mentioned resolutions, no one of the parties being entitled to insist on conditions which would be incompatible with the said resolutions;

Four. Having noted the articles of the draft armistice which have been communicated to the committee of the Assembly and have been accepted by the two parties.

Five. Considers that these articles conform to the spirit of the said resolutions;

Six. Notes in particular that under article three of the said draft, the Japanese Government undertakes to carry out the withdrawal of its forces in the International Settlement and the roads outside the Settlement in the Hongkew District as before the incident of January 28, 1932.

Seven. Declares that it is in accordance with the spirit of the resolutions of March 4 and 11 that this withdrawal should take place in the near future.

Eight. Declares that the resolution of March 4 will only

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

3-#165, from Geneva, Apr. 30, 1 p.m.

only have been fully complied with when Japanese forces have been entirely withdrawn.

Nine. Notes that the draft agreement provides for the establishment of a joint commission including neutral members to certify the mutual withdrawal and to collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw.

Ten. Notes with satisfaction that the said commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of articles 1, 2 and 3 of which the last named provides for the complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces as before the incident of January 28th.

Eleven. Is of the opinion that the powers, as defined in annex 4 (now annex 3) to the draft agreement, of the Commission which is to watch the carrying out of articles 1, 2 and 3 of that agreement, include authority to call attention, in accordance with its decisions taken in such a manner as it provided in the said annex, to any neglect in carrying out any of the provisions of the articles mentioned above.

Twelve. Earnestly recommends the parties in question to continue the negotiations with a view to reaching their rapid conclusion, and requests the governments having special

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

4-#165, from Geneva, Apr. 30, 1p.m.,

special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to continue to lend their good offices for this purpose.

Thirteen. Expressly points out that unless a conclusion is reached as laid down in the resolution March 4 and 11, the question will necessarily come up again before the Assembly.

Fourteen. Requests the Governments of the powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to transmit to the League of Nations the information which will be in the possession of the Mixed Commission in virtue of its functions, and will be furnished to those governments by their respective representatives of the commission."

The resolution quoted above was adopted practically without discussion, the Japanese and Chinese representatives limiting themselves to an explanation of the position of their respective governments with regard thereto. Yen emphasized the repeated concessions which China has made in an endeavor to bring to a successful conclusion and declared that his government in accepting the resolution is acting solely in the interest of peace without, however, abandoning government rights under the covenant with respect to China's territorial integrity. The Japanese representative declared that his government is prepared to sign the
 draft

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

5-#165, from Geneva, Apr. 30, 1p.m.

draft agreement formulated by the Committee at Shanghai and explained that his abstention from voting was based on the reservation which Japan has felt bound to observe with regard to the application of article 15 to the Sino-Japanese dispute.

On the conclusion of these remarks the President declared the Assembly adjourned until further notice. The Committee of 19 also submitted today a report to the Assembly in execution of paragraph one, part 3 of the Assembly's resolution of March 11, 1932 (in passing this resolution explains that a further report in compliance with paragraph seven of the same resolution will be circulated shortly).

The report submitted today, comprising some 25,000 words, first gives a brief resume of the present situation at Shanghai with respect to the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of troops; then follows a statement setting forth in chronological order a history of the armistice negotiations at Shanghai and explaining the efforts of the Assembly Committee to facilitate an agreement, culminating in the adoption by the Committee of the text as quoted above of article 11 of the resolution. Inasmuch as this report appears to contain no elements which are not already known to the Department, the Consulate will not (repeat not) cable the text unless instructed, but will forward it by mail. The Assembly this morning took no formal action on this report. "

GILBERT

WSB

0851

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$ 5139

793.94/5139
 note
 793.94/119
 893/1025
 5/10 p.c.m.

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China) MAY 232

163
 FOR THE MINISTER

One. In a telegram ~~No. 165, April 30, 1 p.m.~~ from Geneva, the Department is informed that the League Assembly in plenary session on ~~the morning of~~ April 30 passed unanimously (Japan abstaining) the resolution submitted to the Assembly by the Committee of Nineteen. The resolution consists of fourteen paragraphs, ~~the text of which the~~ Department assumes ^{text} is already available to you ~~in Shanghai~~; if not, Department will telegraph text upon request.

Two. Geneva commented on the adoption of this resolution, as follows:

QUOTE The resolution quoted above was adopted practically without discussion, the Japanese and Chinese representatives limiting themselves to an explanation of the position of their respective governments with regard thereto. Yen emphasized the repeated concessions which China has made in an endeavor to bring to a successful conclusion and

Enciphered by _____

declared

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____,

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1938 1-138

REC'D
 TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

VIA NAVAL RADIO
 Washington,
 May 2, 1932.

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

793.94/5139

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

declared that his government in accepting the resolution is acting solely in the interest of peace without, however, abandoning government rights under the covenant with respect to China's territorial integrity. The Japanese representative declared that his government is prepared to sign the draft agreement formulated by the Committee at Shanghai and explained that his abstention from voting was based on the reservation which Japan has felt bound to observe with regard to the application of article fifteen to the Sino-Japanese dispute.

On the conclusion of these remarks the President declared the Assembly adjourned until further notice. The Committee of Nineteen also submitted today a report to the Assembly in execution of paragraph one, part three of the Assembly's resolution of March 11, 1932 (in passing this resolution explains that a further report in compliance with paragraph seven of the same resolution will be circulated shortly).

The report submitted today, comprising some 25,000 words, first gives a brief resume of the present situation at Shanghai with respect to the cessation of hostilities

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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Charge Department
OR
Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 3 -

and the withdrawal of troops; then follows a statement
setting forth in chronological order a history of the
armistice negotiations at Shanghai and explaining the
efforts of the Assembly Committee to facilitate an
agreement, culminating in the adoption by the Committee
of the text as quoted above of article eleven of the
resolution. ~~Inasmuch as this report appears to contain
no elements which are not already known to the Department,
the Consulate will not repeat not cable the text unless
instructed, but will forward it by mail.~~ The Assembly
this morning took no formal action on this report. UNQUOTE

SKH

Castle, Acting

SKH

793.94/
FE:JEL/VDM

M.M.H.
FE

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

0854

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM


Secretary of State
Washington.

92, April 30, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR CASTLE AND FAR EASTERN DIVISION
FROM THE SECRETARY.

My 162, April 29, 9 p. m.

In addition to reported resumption of General Disarmament Conference, I have during the past week had further most satisfactory interviews in respect to the Sino-Japanese situation. My talk with Hailsham proved unexpectedly satisfactory. Not only is he strong conservative and Minister of War but he has personal knowledge of Far East through representing Britain in the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1929. He is keenly alive to the present situation and sympathetic with our viewpoint. My talk with him was so satisfactory that it seemed to me to eliminate the necessity of my going to London to confer with Baldwin or other conservatives. I have had further talks with MacDonald and Simon together in which we covered the pending situation in Manchuria in every detail. Simon has told me that he is giving directions to the Foreign Office that all decisions respecting



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

2-#92, from Geneva, April 30, noon.

843.51 Salt F. 1-10

respecting the Manchurian state must be brought to him personally so as to avoid danger of their being decided merely by departmental routine. He has told me of a new issue caused by a demand of the Manchurian state for salt revenues which he thinks makes a better test issue upon which America and Britain can base their public (?) to Japan and to the world. When this proposal comes to the Department I think we should consider it with the utmost care. On his statement I was inclined to agree with his position that a protest on it would be less open to defense from Japan. I have also talked at length with Drummond so that he would be familiar with our position; also with various members of the small powers represented on the Committee of 19 who are the most effective supporters of our policy against Japan in Geneva. This includes Benes of Czechoslovakia, Ramel of Sweden, Hymans of Belgium, and others. I have also had two talks with Matsudaira and one with Yen. The leaders of the League are fully alive to the seriousness of the challenge which Japan's attitude has made to the efficiency of their organization. They look forward to a possible crisis in May when the Assembly reconvenes or an almost certain one in September after the Lytton report. They are most anxious to be given all information which we can properly give them saying that

our

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-#92, from Geneva, Apr. 30, noon.

8620.01
our information is better and clearer than any other. I have promised to give them all I properly can. Our position on the mandated islands is thoroughly understood and recognized as one of the possible key points in the controversy. If I had done nothing in regard to the Disarmament Conference I should feel that my conversations in regard to Japan and China had made the trip worth while.

WILSON

WSB

085
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.51 Salt Funds/106 FOR Tel. # 93, 3 pm

FROM Switzerland (Wilson) DATED May 1, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: News concerning the salt gabelle according to
Simon indicates a very real threat to the
integrity of the administration.

793.94/5141

hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 ELDER, WHITMAN, WEYBURN & CROCKER
 PEMBERTON BUILDING, BOSTON
 TELEPHONE
 MAY 2 1932
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

CABLE ADDRESS
 "BURNWEY"

FE
 F/LS 793.94/5142

Mr. William R. Castle,
 State Department,
 Washington, D. C.



My dear Mr. Castle:

I have been handed a pamphlet entitled
 "Japanese Scheme of World Conquest" by the late
 Premier Tanaka of Japan in 1927, purporting to be
 reprinted from the China Critic, Vol. IV, #39, which
 seems a very extraordinary document.

May I inquire whether the State Department
 has any information whether this document is genuine?

Very truly yours,

W/HA.

Emund A. Whitman

MAY 12 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/5142

In reply refer to
FE - 793.94/5142.

May 12 1932.

Mr. Edmund A. Whitman,
Femberton Building,
Boston, Massachusetts.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of April 30, 1932, inquiring with regard to the authenticity of a document published in the CHINA CRITIC in September, 1931, purporting to be a Secret Memorial submitted by General Tanaka to the Japanese Emperor in 1927.

Inasmuch as the document to which you refer was published in a foreign country under foreign auspices and has become a subject of controversy, the Department does not desire to comment with regard to its authenticity.

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:

M.H.
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

ENCLOSURE
120
121

CR

12-18-1932

898.
FE: 793
V-11-32

FE 32
m.m.f.

793.94/5142

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D

No. 47.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Amoy, China, April 1, 1932.

SUBJECT: Publications in "Press Releases".

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to "Press Releases" from the Department of State, dated February 6th, 1932, in which telegrams are printed from the American Consul at Swatow and from the American Vice Consul at Foochow regarding conditions in their districts and none are printed from Amoy. In view of this fact I beg that the Department be good enough to inform me, for my information and guidance, why, for instance, my telegram of February first, 2 p. m. was not mentioned therein, inasmuch as it treated of identically the same tense situation as the telegrams that were published from the neighboring Consular offices.

I am only prompted in requesting this information, by a question in mind as to whether my telegrams were as efficient as the occasion demanded they should be.

Respectfully yours,

Lynn W. Franklin
Lynn W. Franklin,
American Consul.

In triplicate to Department.
800
LWF/O

F/LS

793.94/5143

FILED

MAY 25 1932



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 47.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Amoy, China, April 1, 1932.

Subject: Publications in "Press Releases".

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to "Press Releases" from the Department of State, dated February 6th, 1932, in which telegrams are printed from the American Consul at Swatow and from the American Vice Consul at Foochow regarding conditions in their districts and none are printed from Amoy. In view of this fact I beg that the Department be good enough to inform me, for my information and guidance, why, for instance, my telegram of February first, 2 p. m. was not mentioned therein, inasmuch as it treated of identically the same tense situation as the telegrams that were published from the neighboring Consular offices.

I am only prompted in requesting this information, by a question in mind as to whether my telegrams were as efficient as the occasion demanded they should be.

Respectfully yours,

Lynn W. Franklin,
American Consul.

In triplicate to Department.

800

LWF/O

A true copy of
the signed original
inal. *L. W. Franklin*

0867

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

12-18-75

Lynn W. Franklin, Esquire,
American Consul,
Amoy, China.

Sir:

In reply to the inquiry contained in your despatch No. 47 of April 1, 1932, as to why your telegram of February 1, 2 p. m., was not released by the Department, although telegrams from the American Consuls at Swatow and Foochow were released, you are informed that in passing upon the question of what material embodied in the reports received by the Department shall be given out to the press, a number of factors necessarily require consideration, such as the timeliness of the information, the present or possible interest of the public in such information, the authoritativeness of the information (whether it is a rumor, a conjecture, an expression of opinion), whether the information should be kept confidential for reasons of policy or for other reasons, et cetera. In examining again your telegram of February 1, 2 p. m., to which you refer, the Department is of the opinion that, in so far as the subject matter of the telegram is concerned, certain of the information contained therein might advisably have been released to the press. However, it must be remembered that the Department, during February, was receiving daily a large number of telegrams from the Far East and that this fact may

793.94/5143

12-18-75

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

may have resulted in the Department not releasing certain information which under more normal conditions would have been made public. The fact that no part of your telegram of February 1, 2 p. m., was given to the press is in no way indicative that the Department considered that your telegram was inadequate or failed to meet the requirements of the Department.

As you will have noted from other issues of the Department's "Press Releases", the information contained in no small number of your telegrams has been released to the press.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GRAY

Shanghai

Dated May 3, 1932

Rec'd 3:00 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

May 3, noon.

Quo Tai Chi, chief delegate on Chinese side
assaulted by Chinese students at his house at about
nine thirty this morning. Slightly wounded on forehead.
It is not believed that his condition is such as to
delay proceedings.

JOHNSON

JS

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RECEIVED
MAY 3 1932
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 3 1932
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/5144

MAY 6 - 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Canton/53 FOR Despatch / 115 to Legation.

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED April 5, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Intensity of public feeling against Japan
 might easily lead to another rupture with
 Nanking should the Central Government reach
 any settlement with Japan which would be con-
 sidered derogatory to the prestige of the
 nation.

hs

793.94/5145

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Attitude Towards a Settlement with Japan.

The intensity of public feeling against Japan coupled
with

-9-

with the uneasiness which prevails lest the Nanking authorities betray the country might easily lead to another rupture with Nanking should the Central Government reach any settlement with Japan which would be considered derogatory to the prestige of the nation. This feeling of distrust of Nanking is largely the result of the anti-Chiang Kai-shek propaganda which has been deliberately spread during the past three months for the purpose of creating an atmosphere favorable to the launching of another independence movement at the opportune time. As an example of this sort of propaganda may be cited the address at the Weekly Memorial Meeting on March 14 of Mr. Liu Lu-yin, formerly director of the Publicity Department at Nanking. He declared that "the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

State Department

Dear Sir:

If possible I would like to know the exact status between China and Japan now. Also I would like to know what tentative advances have been made toward a peace treaty between the two nations.

Can you advise me regarding these conditions or give me references pertaining to the subject?

Yours truly,
 Wayne Routh.

406 South 8 St.

Richmond, Indiana.



MAY - 3 32

F/LS 793.94/5146

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MAY 1 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
FE - 793.94/5146.

May 14 1932

Mr. Wayne Routh,
406 South Eighth Street,
Richmond, Indiana.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May 1, 1932, requesting that you be informed with regard to the status of relations between China and Japan and with regard to advances which have been made towards a peace treaty between the two countries.

It is assumed that you refer to the present difficulties existing between China and Japan. In this connection there is enclosed for your information a copy of Senate Document No. 55, entitled CONDITIONS IN MANCHURIA, on page 11 of which is a resolution adopted on September 30, 1931, by the Council of the League of Nations in regard to the situation in the Far East. There are enclosed, also, copies, as given to the press, of resolutions passed by the League Council on December 10, 1931, and by the League Assembly on March 11, 1932,

and

793.94/5146

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and of an agreement signed at Shanghai on May 5, 1932.
It may be stated in this connection that the Commission
of Inquiry appointed by the League of Nations in accordance
with Paragraph 5 of the resolution adopted on December
10, 1931, is now in Manchuria making investigations
in behalf of the League.

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:

M.H.
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.


Enclosures:

Senate Document No. 55;
Press statements of December 10, 1931,
March 11 and May 9, 1932.

egc.
FE:RSC

FE

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OK ✓

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1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 26, 1932.

SHANGHAI SITUATION

THE UNDER SECRETARY

Subject: Negotiation of an Agreement.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Minister Johnson in his April 26, noon, reports that, according to the British Minister who is returning from Nanking today (April 26), the Chinese Government is prepared to accept the amendment to Paragraph (11) of the League's proposed Resolution which was suggested by Ministers Johnson and Lampson on April 22 as reported in the Minister's April 23, 2 p.m.

Paragraph (11) of the proposed League Resolution amended in the light of the above is as follows:

"Is of the opinion that the powers as defined in Annex four of the draft Agreement, of the commission which is to watch the carrying out of Articles one, two and three of that Agreement, include the authority to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the articles mentioned above."

*The underlined clause is in substitution for the last clause of the original paragraph (11) as follows:

"competence

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

"competence to declare at the request of one of the parties that the moment has come when the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops can reasonably be effected."

JEJ/VDM



7
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
AE

JS
The portion of this telegram FROM
in confidential code must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

SHANGHAI

Dated May 4, 1932

Rec'd 2:43 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

May 4, 2 p.m.

Your 163, May 2, 7 p.m.

One. We hope to have a meeting of both sides
tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock for the purpose of
effecting signature to agreement (end gray).

Two. At the last moment Chinese have raised
question of a title for the agreement and I am going
to try to see Quo this afternoon to persuade him to
let the question of title drop as the Japanese object.

(Gray) Three. Plan is to have those who can
attend sign, and then agreement will be taken by
Drafting Committee to bedside of Shigemitsu, Uyeda
and Quo Tai Chi for their signatures.

JOHNSON


JS

F/LS 793.94/5148

FILED

MAY 9 - 1932

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793, 94/119



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

fw

A portion of this telegram
 must be closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone.

FROM

Shanghai,

Dated May 4, 1932.

Recd 4.12 pm.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

May 4, 2 am.

My May 1, 4 pm. (Gray)

One. This evening late, Okazaki, Secretary of
 Japanese Legation came to Sir Miles to say that the
 Japanese delegation had received instructions to make
 a statement in following terms at moment of signing of
 agreement:

"The Chinese delegate states in his note addressed
 to the representatives of the participating friendly
 powers that the Chinese side reserve the right to des-
 patch troops when necessary for the maintenance of
 order. I understand that such despatch of troops is
 to be carried on after the approval of the Joint Com-
 mission will have been obtained. It is desired that
 this understanding be placed on record in the minutes."

(End gray). Two.



F/LS

793.94/5149

MAY 9 - 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page two, May 4, 2 am from Shanghai.

Two. Okazaki asked Sir Miles whether he thought this statement would be acceptable to the Chinese Government. Sir Miles stated that he thought it would blow up the whole arrangement as such had not been the understanding.

Three. Sir Miles offered the following as an alternative for the last two sent (sentences?) : (Begin gray)

"In the event of any such troop movement, as contemplated above, appearing to the Japanese side as having hostile intentions, the Japanese authorities understand that they have the right to call attention of the representatives of the participating friendly powers members of the Joint Commission thereto under article one." (End gray).

Four. Sir Miles has repeated all of the above to the British Ambassador in Tokyo asking him to go to Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and try to persuade him to have proposal dropped and his alternative used, if any.

(Gray) Five. I hope that the Department can find it possible to instruct Tokyo to ask British Ambassador to show it his telegram from Lampson and to join British Ambassador in representations at the Foreign Office. Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON.

FW OX

0875

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
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 \$

5149

PM REC'D
 TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

May 3, 1932.

AMEMBASSY,

MAY 3 32

TOKYO (Japan).

99 Urgent.

Reference Johnson's telegram, repeated to you, regarding statement by Okazaki to Lampson and Lampson's communication to British Ambassador, Tokyo.

You are authorized to confer with British Ambassador and, in case he and you feel that useful purpose would be served by your doing so, to cooperate in appropriate representations to Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Inform Johnson and Department of action taken.

Castle
 Aetig

FE: SKH: CLS

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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793.94/5149

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REI

FROM

PLAIN

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 4, 1932

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

May 4, 1 p. m.

Following is situation report number 22, May 2nd:

"Since date of report number 21 there have been no important military developments. Japanese ground patrols have frequently reconnoitered to the south of Hoochow Creek eastward of Nanziang and Japanese military aircraft have continued flight westward and southward of Shirakaga patrol zone. Chinese report states that at noon April 25th a Japanese aircraft dropped a bomb near the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway which destroyed a house. This report is denied by the Japanese who state they have since some time back ordered bomb racks removed from their airplanes."

JOHNSON

KLF

WSB

F/LS 793.94/5150

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MAY 9 - 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

APRIL 29, 1932.



REMARKS

by

STANLEY K. HORNBECK

at meeting of

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Washington, D. C.

Afternoon, April 29, 1932.

As Presiding Officer, my sole appropriate function is to preside.

However, I wish, and I think it eminently appropriate, on this day when we are discussing treaties in relation to the Far East, to make mention of and pay tribute to one who has contributed much to the making and interpretation of international law in connection with Far Eastern matters during the past four decades. I refer to Mr. Ransford S. Miller, Foreign Service Officer of Class One, whose career came to an abrupt close day before yesterday.

Mr. Miller entered the service of his Government 38 years ago. From then until the hour of his death he devoted his life to questions and problems of the relations of his country to countries of the Far East. He spent some 15 years in the aggregate on duty in the American Embassy in Tokyo and an almost equal period in Korea. The rest of his service was in the Department of State where he was during four periods on duty and was during two periods Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. He rendered eminent service both in the field and at headquarters. He made friends everywhere. He contributed constantly to the maintenance of amicable relations and the solution of difficult problems. In his passing those of us who were most closely associated with him have lost a beloved friend and an esteemed colleague. In law and in diplomacy we have lost an indefatigable, conscientious and effective craftsman. In the Foreign Service of the United States we have lost a distinguished officer who, because of his unusual qualities in combination, can never be exactly replaced.

Mr. Miller contributed substantially to the giving of information and suggestions in connection with the determination of the course of action followed by the American Government in meeting the problems which have arisen out of the situations which have developed in the Far East during the past few months. Because of that fact, and because the Chairman of the Program Committee has insisted that I not only preside at this session but "say something", I feel disposed to undertake to state in outline what seem to me to be the underlying principles which have guided the action of the American Government. I would not have the temerity, nor do I think I would find it possible, to

FILED

MAY 4 - 1932

793.94/5151

- 2 -

attempt to give an account of the events of these months past or to describe in detail the action taken. All that I can venture to do is to indicate the basis in thought upon which the Government's course has rested.

"SOME PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS

UNDERLYING AMERICAN POLICY IN RELA-

TION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE

FAR EAST"

The policy of the United States with regard to this whole situation is nothing more nor less than a particular application of the general principles of American foreign policy.

These general principles include: (a) in general, respect for the legal and moral rights of other states and peoples -- with expectation of respect by them for the legal and moral rights of the United States; (b) in regard to commerce, equality of opportunity and treatment -- on the basis of most-favored-nation practice; (c) in regard to political methods, abstention from alliances and from aggression; (d) in the field of diplomatic approach, persuasion rather than coercion; (e) in regard to action, cooperation with other powers wherever cooperation is found practicably possible.

In formulating its attitude and course of action with regard to the current Manchuria and Shanghai situations, the American Government has kept before it certain broad considerations of law, of policy and of interest which may be outlined as follows:

The United States has no legal standing in the organization of the League of Nations, and although the American Government can cooperate with the League -- as it has been doing for a number of years past -- it cannot involve this country in the legal machinery of the League as such;

The United States holds no special mandate to apply, interpret or enforce the obligations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Pact itself does not prescribe or authorize any procedure for its own observance or enforcement. It is an instrument of renunciation, not a constitution of mechanism for enforcing peace. It must rely, for efficacy, upon the sanction of public opinion.

The general policy of the United States with regard to China is expressed in the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty. The American Government emphasizes that Treaty, not only because of the desirability that agreements should be respected, but because the provisions of that Treaty envisage and express the practical interest, not alone of China, but also of Japan, of the United States and of the other nations which are signatories. That Treaty expresses the historical policy toward China of the United States and the principles agreed upon since the beginning of this century by the other powers that have rights and interests in the Far East. It contributes toward maintenance of an equilibrium in the Far East, safeguarding the ultimate interests of all the signatory powers.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

It has seemed proper and desirable to maintain an attitude of impartiality as between the disputant countries.

It has seemed advisable to act in cooperation or concert with other powers concerned. The United States and Japan are both powers on the Pacific Ocean. The Washington Conference powers all have interests in China. These facts suggest a line of action based firmly on the principle of respect for and solicitude in regard to the fundamental rights and interests of all of the powers concerned in relation to the political and economic development of the Far East.

The problem of maintaining peace is a common or world problem; it is the proper concern of the whole community of nations, not a right or an obligation peculiar to any one nation.

With these broad principles in mind, the American Government has followed and is continuing to follow in reference to the problems which have arisen out of these situations a policy of cooperating with every nation and every international agency which chooses to act in support of peace and of the agreements and machinery which have been created for its maintenance.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TOKYO

Dated May 4, 1932

Rec'd 9:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

122, May 4, 6 p. m. (GRAY)

Department's 99, May 3, 9 p. m.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Ambassador that the instructions to the Japanese delegates have been changed and that the statement would not be made. In view of this development I have not approached the Foreign Office. (END GRAY)

The Minister said further to the British Ambassador that the army was insisting upon a communication to the neutral delegates to the effect that the Japanese attach importance to the disposition and movements of Chinese troops in certain areas and particularly to a statement in this regard made by the Chinese in a committee meeting. I am unable to estimate the importance of this proposed communication (#) Chinese which is not for publication.

Repeated to Shanghai.

NEVILLE

KLF

WSB

(#) Apparent omission



F/LS

793.94/5152

FILED

MAY 9 - 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 872.00/11921 FOR Tel 492 3pm

FROM China (Perkins) DATED May 3rd, 1932
TO NAME 1-1187 ...

REGARDING:

Negotiations with Japan in regard to Manchuria will be opened by the National Government as soon as the Shanghai incident is settled. This will be undertaken along the Government's policy to resist Japanese aggression. Excerpt from newspaper interview by Wang Ching Wei.

ek

793.94/5153

793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 3, 1932

Rec'd 7:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1932, May 3, 3 p.m.

Legation's 177, April 27, 1 p.m.

Following from Kuo Wen, Nanking, April thirtieth:

"The National Government will open negotiations with Japan over Manchuria as soon as the Shanghai problem is settled, Mr. Wang Ching Wei, chairman of the Executive Yuan, declared in a press interview this afternoon. Mr. Wang explained that this will be undertaken in pursuance of the policy of the Government to resist Japan's aggression and carry on negotiations with Japan simultaneously.

Asked about the attitude of the Government toward Soviet Russia Mr. Wang declared that the Government is in favour of resuming diplomatic relations with Russia in principle but it is still considering the question as to when this should be effected.

Concerning the Communist bandit situation in Fukien

Mr.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#492 from Peiping via N.R.,
 May 3, 1932, 3 p.m.

Mr. Wang said that the Reds had taken Changchow but Amoy is still in the hands of the Government forces. He believed that with the arrival of General Ho Ying Ching in Kiangsi something effective will be done towards the suppression of the Reds. He expressed the opinion that the task of the Government in this connection has been greatly facilitated by the Communists leaving their mountain fastnesses and going to the sea coast.

Asked about Mr. Sun Fo's recent memorandum on political and party reform Mr. Wang replied that it will be examined by the third plenary session of the Kuomintang committees. Mr. Sun is right so far as principles are concerned but the question is still as to when constitutional Government should be introduced.

In conclusion Mr. Wang said that not only the people but the Government itself is interested in the early introduction of constitutional Government. What he fears is that any premature move in this connection may result in a return of the conditions which prevailed prior to 1924 when the northern militarists and politicians made a

mockery of

0 8 8 4

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#492 from Peiping via N.R.,
May 3, 1932, 3 p.m.

mockery of constitutional Government. The Kuomintang is easy to overthrow but who is to take charge of the Government after it is ousted? I hope that the more substantial elements in Chinese industry, banking and education will come forward and lay the foundations of a real constitutional Government. I will retire as soon as the situation is stabilized".

For the Minister,

WSB-KLP

PEPKINS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE
NOTE

SEE 893.01-Manchuria/180 FOR Tel. #495, 6pm
FROM China (Perkins) DATED May 3, 1932
~~xxx~~ NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: troop movements in Manchuria. Japanese troops are moving north.

dew

793.94/5154

5154

0886
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 3, 1932

Rec'd 7:22 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

495, May 3, 6 p.m.

Following telegram has been received from the Consul
General at Mukden:

"May 2, 3 p.m. Confidential information from a reliable
source is to the effect that there has been a considerable
movement of Japanese troops to the north. The Chosen divi-
sion at Chihnsien has been relieved by the Hirosaki division
and moved into Eastern Kirin into which reenforcements have
also gone from Northern Chosen. The situation in North Man-
churia is regarded as serious and other reenforcements have
been requested. Very little information is given out by
Japanese headquarters and specific information on these move-
ments is unobtainable".

For the Minister,

KLP_WSB

PERKINS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



MAY 4 32



May 3, 1932.

May 19 1932.
L. C. May 19/32

F/LS

793.94/6155

My dear Mr. Secretary:

You may be interested in the inclosed letter from
Mr. Mori, with his observations upon the mistranslation
of the American note. Kindly return this to me when you
are through with it.

Very sincerely yours,

Robert G. Marshall

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State.

RECEIVED
MAY 20 1932

✓
Inclosure.

0888

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:EJL

Hadzu Hospital,
Near Yokkaichi,
Ise Province,
Japan.
April 12, 1932.

Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur,
Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.,
U. S. A.

Dear Dr. Wilbur,

Since receiving your courteous acknowledgment of my New Year greetings some months ago, I have often thought of writing to thank you for your kind words of wise counsel in regard to the difficult times in which we all live. One cannot be too careful in what one says or does, confronted as we are with an unprecedented economic depression throughout the world and strained relations amongst certain countries, especially between Japan and China.

Although we must never lose sight of the great ideal of universal peace, we cannot afford to keep our eyes shut to what is actually taking place under our very nose. No one can help deploring what has happened in Manchuria and Shanghai, but the causes of these occurrences do not seem to have been so simple and easily avoidable as they might appear to a superficial onlooker. The Japanese military authorities regard Manchuria as their first line of national defence on the Asiatic continent, while our statesmen seem to consider it as the only outlet that remains open for our surplus population,

for

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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for the doors of America and Australia are alike practically sealed against our emigrants. The Chinese, on the other hand, have been over-zealous in their efforts to regain their national autonomy, and gone to the length of setting at naught their treaty obligations. Notwithstanding all these and other reasons on our side, the sympathies of the whole world are almost without exception with the Chinese. They are the weaker party, and one naturally sympathizes with the weak rather than with the strong. Doubtless, too, China has much to say on her own side, and personally I think there is a good deal in the utterances attributed to her representatives at Geneva and elsewhere. China accuses us of militarism, but the apologists of Japan also declare that China is over-ridden by military men. The Chinese charge the Japanese troops with cruelty and vandalism, but the Japanese newspaper correspondents write of unspeakable atrocities committed by the Chinese regular and irregular troops and bandit-soldiers in Manchuria. I suppose this sort of mutual recrimination is unavoidable in all wars, and can only hope such stories will be taken at a discount in America, from whichever side they may come.

Language difficulty is another fruitful source of international misunderstandings. This morning I was having read to me an article in a magazine ("The Rising Generation") in which the writer points out how the

mistranslation

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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mistranslation of the American note to Japan and China of January 7th was the cause of the feeling aroused in Japan. I am enclosing a copy of the original American note, and my re-translation of the press mistranslations (three leading newspapers of Tokyo published more or less identical mistranslations). You will see how different and how much more unconciliatory is the mistranslated version.

You might think, at a casual glance, that the writer in the "Rising Generation" is splitting hairs with English grammar, but he points out that it was largely owing to these mistranslations that so much feeling was shown in the editorial columns of those papers. The Japanese Foreign Office, probably perceiving the mischief wrought by these inaccurate versions, published a more faithful translation, but it had little effect in improving matters. First impressions are always very strong, especially on the public mind, which is easily controlled by the Press.

It is really very regrettable that such misunderstandings occur pretty frequently. I am afraid such things happen also on your side of the Pacific Ocean. It is most sincerely to be hoped that the situation in China will improve as the result of the work done by the League commission, and that a perfect understanding will be reached not only between China and Japan, but also between our

country

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

country and yours.

I trust you are in splendid health. I am sorry I cannot say that of myself, though I am in much better condition than I was a few years ago. I was very much grieved to hear of the death of Dr. Jordan. Such a one as he is very much needed at a time like the present.

With the best of wishes,

Sincerely yours,

M. G. MORI

P.S. - Pray forgive me for the excessive frankness of this letter. M.G.M.

COPY: EJJ

ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE AMERICAN NOTE.

With the recent military operations about Chin-chow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues to be confident the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan, but in view of the present situation and its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into by those Governments, or agents thereof, that may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty and independence or territorial integrity of the Republic of China or the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy, and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both Japan and China, as well as the United States, are parties.

Mistranslations.

- (1) Instead of the mild expression, "with the recent military operations," one paper writes "as the result of the military operations," while two other newspapers write "by the military operations".
- (2) Instead of saying that the administrative authority of China at Chin-chow has been destroyed, one paper says "Chin-chow has been destroyed."
- (3) Instead of saying that the work of the league commission will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties, all three leading papers say the commission will solve the difficulties, thus ignoring the softening effect of the word "facilitate" the solution.
- (4) Lastly, the most important error, one paper translates the latter portion by saying that "The U. S. Government cannot recognize any legality in any of the present de facto conditions". Another paper renders, "the American Government cannot recognize any legality in the existing de facto state of affairs." A third journal gives practically the same version. As the writer of the article criticizing these mistranslations points out, they entirely disregard the auxiliary verb "may" in the original, which clearly implies a contingency or possibility, and must not be taken as a direct protest against the existing state of affairs in Manchuria.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAY 18 1932

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/5155

My dear Dr. Wilbur:


I acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 3 enclosing a letter from Mr. Mori calling attention to and commenting on mistranslations in relation to the American Government's notes to Japan and China of January 7, 1932.

The matter is distinctly interesting. I appreciate your courtesy in sending me it, and I return herewith, as you request, Mr. Mori's letter.

Yours sincerely,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
From Mr. Mori to
Dr. Wilbur, dated
April 12, 1932.



The Honorable

Ray Lyman Wilbur,

Secretary of the Interior.

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

5/13/32

SKH

MAY 18 1932 PM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINESE LEGATION
WASHINGTON

MAY 4 1932

DIVISION OF

April 30th 1932. May 4 1932



Dear Dr. Hornbeck:

I am herewith enclosing for the information of
the State Department three copies of a cablegram received
to-day from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard
to the Shanghai bomb outrage.

Yours sincerely,

Hankling Yen

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure:

Copy of cablegram
as above.

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief of the Far Eastern Division,
Department of State.

DCR
file

F/LS

793.94/5156

089^L
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING. DESPATCHED APRIL 30,
1932.

Received by the Chinese Legation, Washington, D.C.
April 30, 1932.

With regard to the bomb outrage at the
Hongkew Park, Shanghai, we have received reliable
reports that the bomb-thrower was a Korean who
was already arrested by the Japanese troops, and
that the place where the outrage took place had
been guarded by Japanese troops where Chinese
could not enter.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 4 1932.

My dear Mr. Chargé d'Affaires:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your
 note of April 30, 1932, enclosing for the information
 of the Department copies of a cablegram received by
 the Chinese Legation on April 30 from the Ministry of
 Foreign Affairs in regard to the Shanghai bomb incident.

I am, my dear Dr. Yen,

Very sincerely yours,

Dr. Hawking Yen,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of China.

A true copy of
 the signed orig-
 inal.

May 4 1932.

FE:MMH:REK
 5/3/32


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM Gray
 SHANGHAI

Dated May 5, 1932 MAY 5 - 1932

Rec'd 3:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.



URGENT

May 5, 1 p.m.

One. Agreement signed at 12 noon today. I propose
 to leave for Nanking early Saturday morning by boat.
 I shall remain at Nanking three or four days with my staff.

Two. British Minister leaves same day by air
 proceeding to Peiping.

Three. Joint committee has been constituted as
 follows:

The Consuls General and Military Attaches of the
 United States, Great Britain and France, and the Chinese
 Secretary and Military Attache of the Italian Legation.
 Japanese Consul General and Acting Military Attache .
 Chinese members not yet announced.

JOHNSON

JS

F/LS 793.94/5157

FILED

MAY 6 - 1932

0898

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huselstein NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

PM REC'D
 TELEGRAM SENT



Department of State

VIA NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

May 5, 1932.

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN



AMERICAN CONSUL MAY 5 32

SHANGHAI (China)

FOR THE MINISTER.

Your May 5, 1 p.m.

One. Please radio text of agreement as signed.

Two. Department appreciates the difficulties

which have confronted you in the negotiations and heartily
 commends you for the efforts which you have put
 forth to bring them to a successful conclusion.

Casth
 Curry

793.94/5157

FE:JEJ/VDM

FE

CR
 May 5, 1932

Enciphered by PT

Sent by operator M., 1932

Index Bu.—No. 50. Noted on Efficiency Records

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

793.94/5157

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
MAY 2 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 2 - 1932
Department of State

4
FE
JLG

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ITALIAN
AMBASSADOR, APRIL 28, 1932.

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See
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The Italian Ambassador asked my personal judgment as to whether the Italian cruiser TRENTO should call at Japan on the way home from Shanghai. I intimated it might cause some comment but expressed no opinion. It strikes me the call would be unfortunate but not important. He asked me to consult the Navy and advise him. I see no reason for consulting the Navy and would be careful not to advise him by any outright expression. He said he had not been asked to approach our government but only to express his own judgment.

F/LS
793.94/5158

J.G.R.

JGR

FILED
MAY 3 1932

A-R JGR:HWC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Foochow/K1 FOR Despatch # 120.

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED April 4, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1137 ***

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese situation during March, 1932,
was very quiet.
Comments of local American missionaries and
Chinese on the results and effects of the
Sino-Japanese situation.

hs

793.94/5159

5159

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

where standing on the bridge with the salt air in his nostrils and binoculars in hand he scans the coastline of his beloved province.)

II - THE SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION.

1. General.

793.94
 With the exception of a few minor incidents, nothing of note occurred in the Sino-Japanese situation during March, 1932. The month under report was one of marked quiet.

Following the retreat of the Chinese forces at Shanghai certain of the local Japanese residents drove motor-cars into the city and distributed handbills in celebration of the victory of their troops at Shanghai. Upon the receipt of the news from Shanghai in March 8, 1932 that a Japanese General had been killed and that the Chinese forces had recaptured lost ground, the native populace expressed their unbounded joy by firing fire-crackers throughout the day. Later they learned that this news was false. In view of the minor incidents resulting from the two above-mentioned celebrations, it is reported that the Chinese and Japanese authorities reached an agreement that in the future neither side would take part in "celebrations."

An aide-de-camp of the Japanese Emperor visited Foochow on March 12, 1932. It is reported that the purpose of his visit was to inspect the Japanese naval vessels at Pagoda Anchorage.

In view of the quiet situation obtaining at Foochow Mr. T. Tamura, Consul General for Japan at

Foochow,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

-15-

A - SOME COMMENTS OF LOCAL AMERICAN
 MISSIONARIES AND CHINESE.

American: That the difficulties of all foreigners
 would have increased had the Chinese won
 from the Japanese at Shanghai.

Chinese: That as soon as the Sino-Japanese situation
 becomes easier the Chinese military will
 again turn their energies against each
 other.

American: That, while the Chinese in his (the
 American's) district would oppose Japanese
 rule from a patriotic standpoint, still
 in their hearts it would be welcomed as
 a relief from the present misrule of their
 so-called officials.

800

GLE/HCY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NATIONAL
 CONVENTION
 Minneapolis, Minn.




NATIONAL BOARD, YOUNG WOMENS
 CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS of the U.S.A.

600 Lexington Avenue, New York City

Telephone:
 PLaza 3-4700

Cable Address:
 Emissarius, N. Y.



April 28, 1932

Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck
 State Department
 Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Hornbeck:



The attached letter from
 Miss Kaufman may be of service to some-
 one in your office who is keeping in
 touch with all possible material from
 the Far East.

Very sincerely yours,

Sarah S. Lyon

Sarah S. Lyon
 Executive
 Foreign Division

SSL.EK

F/LS

793.94/5160

MAY 6 - 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Letter from Emma Kaufman, Japan
 March 10, 1932

Confidential and not for Newspapers

Rumors seem to grow both in number and variety at such a rate these days, that one is bewildered and finds it difficult to recognize even the shadow of truth that may be behind. Newspapers are looked upon as purely mediums of propaganda, but still one must read them, as some one said last night, to find out what isn't true.

Kato San and one of the other older members of our staff belong to a small club of liberal women who are definitely opposed to militarism, and who are exerting every effort to try to learn the truth of affairs and forming their own opinions. A current phrase that one hears repeatedly in conversations regarding Manchuria and Shanghai is "ninshiki-fusoku," which translated literally is lack of knowledge and cognition. Last night I invited three of the most outstanding of this group - all non-Christian - to the house for dinner, and with them several members of the Japanese staff whose work keeps them more closely tied to the Y.W.C.A. building, than we wish were necessary. It is indicative of the whole atmosphere of Japan at the present time that even in a private living room every one speaks with bated breath, and I had to draw up close with note book and pencil to get as much as possible of the conversation. I feel amply rewarded for the hours I have spent in the study of the Japanese language, but at times like these I realize how inadequate it is.

With the outlook for peace not very promising at Shanghai and the calling for more and more soldiers, and plans going ahead for the setting up of a republic in Manchuria, the division of opinion is becoming more marked; the militarists are more militaristic and the liberals and supporters of the League of Nations more and more concerned about the future and humiliated at the impotency of the government to cope with the situation. One of the women last night at first refused to come as she said she didn't want to face a foreigner.

Even in such organizations as the W.C.T.U. and the Women's Peace Society, the younger members are impatient with the older members whose attitudes, they assert, are too much tinged with nationalism. The leading women in the Women's Division of the League of Nations Association are older women who accept the views of government officials largely, and are considered quite without the pale as far as the younger women are concerned. Fortunately there is one W.C.T.U. worker whose experience at the conference in London, and many other international conferences has fitted her to be a good go-between and she is trying to make the younger women realize how far they have travelled beyond the older and is pleading for a bit more patience.

About a week before the League of Nations Commission arrived, the secretary of the League of Nations Tokyo Branch, which is to be distinguished from the League of Nations Association referred to above, called together a group of sixteen younger women to discuss what they might do in the way of educational work. There were two representatives each of the Women's Suffrage Association, the W.C.T.U. the Y.W.C.A. two newspaper women, and several engaged in educational work. An interview was secured for three or four of them with Lord Lytton, the head of the Commission, and they had the opportunity of expressing their views which they said represented that of many women. When they arrived at the Imperial Hotel a little before nine o'clock in the morning, a newspaper woman apparently had heard

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of the promised interview, and was ready to accompany them, but they made short shrift of her. Lord Lytton urged upon them the necessity for strengthening the League in times of peace, if it was to have any value at the time of crisis.

Yesterday one of the police from the Metropolitan Police Office called at the Women Suffrage Association office and said he had been ordered to confiscate their March magazine, but he couldn't give any information as to the articles that were to be suppressed. Everything is carefully censored before distribution, but apparently there are ways by which magazines can be sent to subscribers before the police have an opportunity to suppress, and 1400 of the suffrage magazine had already been mailed, 100 of these going to America. The organ of the proletariat group, called Hataraku Fujin, or working women, is sold in shops only and the whole issue was suppressed this month, because of the anti-war articles.

Mrs. Hani, whose magazine has probably the largest circulation of any women's magazine in Japan, wrote a strong anti-war article last month, and it escaped the censor, but letters came from the parents of some of the children protesting at Mrs. Hani's lack of patriotism and fearing the influence it would have upon the children.

One of the women in last night's group is a newspaper woman who lived for six years in China, speaks Mandarin and has many Chinese friends with whom she has kept in constant correspondence for several years. This hasn't been possible recently, but I am arranging for her to meet an English missionary who arrives on the Empress tomorrow on her way to China. I had a letter just yesterday from Miss Elliot of the Y.W.C.A. in Hongkong asking me to meet the steamer and make it possible for her friend, who is an ardent supporter of the League, to hear the opinions of some of the liberal thinkers in Japan. It is sometimes difficult to make people in China realize that such do exist.

Another Japanese woman who knows China and Chinese well, having gone to Peking to teach at the request of some of the first Chinese students to come to study in Japan during the reign of the Empress Dowager, and who later was instructor at the normal school in Mukden, has a dormitory for Chinese women students. Thirty of the forty have returned home, but the remaining ones are staying to finish their courses, and have met once or twice with a small group of Japanese women. Some of the questions asked were: What is the Peace Society doing? Ought not the Christians to make a united protest? What do the Japanese women desire of the Chinese women?

101 The assassination of Baron Dan has shocked the whole country, and many fear that the end is not yet. It is generally known that the Emperor is more sympathetic with modern means for the solution of difficult problems than with militaristic methods, but the aggressive military group attribute this to the influence of the advisers about him, and say that he himself isn't guilty of such weakness. It was rumored the other day that His Majesty's chamberlain was to be removed from office, and he with the Keeper of the Seal and one or two other Imperial Household officials are carefully guarded all the time. Another rumor is that the Chief of Staff for Manchuria and the War Minister had an interview with the Emperor during which the Staff officer expressed his opinion that the War Minister wasn't nearly aggressive enough in his policy, at which the Emperor became quite indignant. Direct appeals to the Emperor are also said to be talked of and even the replacing of the Emperor, on the score of ill health, by a regent who would be more amenable to the military.

0906

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The only remaining elder statesman Prince Saionji has come up to Tokyo to remain for a week or more and that is always a portent of some great political crisis. It is known that there is dissension in government circles, and another rumor is that government will not recognize the new republic of Manchuria, which is a republic created by the military. The fact that the Premier has expressed the opinion that Manchuria is a more complicated problem than Shanghai is said to indicate much dissension in the Cabinet.

Financial conditions become worse and worse, and yesterday I heard that there were several bank failures in three different provinces but that the news was being suppressed in the papers.

There is propaganda among the schools to raise money for airplanes, each child in the primary schools to bring a contribution of one sen, and those in high schools to bring ten sen. This is very recent, but so far I have heard of two schools that have refused to ask the children to make contributions, Miss Mawai's and the Tsuda College. No doubt others will follow.

Dr. Nitobe who is well known to many of you is also a marked man. About two weeks ago he was speaking out in the country and is reported to have said that Japan suffered from two evils, communism and militarism, and the latter was a worse evil than the first. This enraged the military who went to the hospital and insisted upon an interview with him to demand an apology, which he is said on good authority not to have done, although the papers reported him as having done so.

I trust that this will serve to give you an idea of the reasons that inhibit much liberal expression at the present time in Japan. I have heard the opinion expressed several times that unless some one is willing to pay the price of the extreme sacrifice, the power of the military will not be broken.

I must give you a bit of children's gossip that has come out of Mrs. Hani's school. The small daughter of one of our board members came home and said that a friend had told her that Prince Chichibu had put his han (seal) on some paper that his mother didn't approve of, and she had punished him by keeping him in his own house and not letting him go out.

Foreign Division
LH - 4:8:32

0907

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chusky NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 3, 1932.

My dear Miss Lyon:

Permit me to thank you for your letter of April 28, 1932, enclosing a letter dated March 10, 1932, from Miss Emma Kaufman, in Japan, dealing with popular sentiment and political conditions prevailing in that country at this time.

Miss Kaufman's letter was read with interest, and your courtesy in sending me a copy is very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,


Sarah S. Lyon

Miss Sarah S. Lyon,

Executive, Foreign Division,
National Board, Young Womens Christian
Associations of the U.S.A.,

600 Lexington Avenue,
New York, New York.

By Lyon
May 4, 1932.



FE: WRL: EJJL

m.m.A.
WRL

793.94/5160

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 5, 1932.

Dr. ~~Hornbeck~~:

Subject - Withdrawal of 31st
Infantry from Shanghai.

This is important.

The telegram came to FE about 4 p.m., since which time we have endeavored to have the file assembled (attached) and Mr. Jacobs and I have discussed the matter.

We assume that you will want to talk with Mr. Castle and with the War Department and ~~perhaps~~ also the Navy Department on this. I think there is a Cabinet meeting tomorrow and it is possible that Mr. Castle will wish to take the matter up there.

While Mr. Jacobs and I fear that with the lifting of the state of emergency and the consequent withdrawal of American and British forces from cooperative policing in the International Settlement, the Japanese may be more than ever inclined to

usurp

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

usurp Municipal police functions in Sectors other than their own, we consider it only logical on our part, once the state of emergency is lifted, for American forces at Shanghai to be reduced. Perhaps by tomorrow we shall receive definite word that the state of emergency has been lifted. Mr. Jacobs and I are rather inclined to the view that any withdrawal of American forces should await the lifting of the state of emergency, if it is to occur within the next few days, as Minister Johnson indicates.

You may wish to consult the British on the question of reducing American forces. ~~but as the British have already reduced their forces, without, so far as I know, prior consultation with us, it does not seem that we are necessarily called upon to discuss this with them.~~

MMH:CLS

M.M.H.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.P.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET
A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.

Shanghai
Dated May 5, 1932
Rec'd 1:20 p.m.
MAY 6 - 1932

Secretary of State,

RECEIVED

Washington

MAY 16 1932

May 5, 9 p.m.

SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 5 - 1932
Department of State

F/H/S

793.94/5161

793.94
no
893.102-S
811.30-aw
893.0146
811.23

One. Incident on Settlement border between Japanese
marines and International Settlement police involving 31st
Infantry illustrates danger inherent in the present situ-
ation. Commander-in-Chief has informed Defense Committee
that he perceives no further occasion for continuance of
state of emergency which is now being used simply to keep
Japanese out of Settlement and that American forces are
not here for that purpose. I approve of his action.

(GRAY) Two. Commander-in-Chief informed me that he
is now informed that emergency will probably be lifted
tomorrow.

Three. In view of this fact and the fact that Sino-
Japanese agreement has been signed and that Japanese evacu-
ation will begin tomorrow May 6th, (END GRAY) I recommend
that

Confidential File

0911
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Shanghai, May 5, 9 p.m.

that reconsideration be given to the matter of the retention of the 31st here at Shanghai and that that regiment be taken away. (GRAY) The British have already reduced their forces by a battalion. Commander-in-Chief approves.

Copy to Commander-in-Chief and Consul General Shanghai.
(END GRAY)

JOHNSON

KLP-HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DCR
copy

May 6, 1932.

TO: Commander Lammers.
FROM: S. K. Hornbeck.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND A.I.D.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PARAPHRASE

Shanghai

Dated May 5, 1932

Rec'd 1:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

May 5, 9 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

One. The occurrence between International Settlement police and Japanese marines which took place on the Settlement border and which involved the 31st Infantry is illustrative of dangers which inhere in the present situation. The Defense Committee has been informed by the Commander-in-Chief that so far as he can see there is no further need to continue the state of emergency which is being made use of now merely to keep the Japanese out of the International Settlement. The Commander-in-Chief informed the Defense Committee further that American forces are not present at Shanghai for that purpose. The Commander-in-Chief's action has my concurrence.

Two. Commander-in-Chief informs me that he is informed that emergency probably will be lifted tomorrow.

Three. In view of this fact and the further fact that Sino-Japanese agreement has been signed and that Japanese evacuation is to begin tomorrow May 6th, it is my recommendation that the question of retaining the 31st Infantry at

Shanghai

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Shanghai be reconsidered and that this regiment be removed.
The British have already reduced their forces by a battalion.
Commander-in-Chief approves.

Copy to Commander-in-Chief and Consul General Shanghai.

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 6, 1932.

Reply of the Department of State to Telegram from
Minister Johnson at Shanghai Recommending that
31st Infantry Be Taken Away.

In reply to the telegram of May 5, 9 p. m., from Minister Johnson at Shanghai, the Department of State has telegraphed the Minister that no report from official sources regarding the incident on the Settlement border to which the Minister refers has been received by the Department and that, judging the incident from newspaper reports, it would not seem advisable to the Department for the 31st Infantry to be removed immediately following that incident. The Department of State also informed the Minister that the Secretary of State was now en route to the United States; that the Department wished to discuss with him the question of the removal of the 31st Infantry and its relation to other questions; and that therefore it was probable that no action would be taken on the matter until after the arrival of the Secretary of State. The Minister was requested to inform the Commander-in-Chief of all of the foregoing.

The Department requested that the Minister make arrangements to have the Department informed immediately when the state of emergency at Shanghai is lifted and the Department asked that the Minister report how many British and American soldiers, marines, landable bluejackets and volunteers are now present at Shanghai.

0916

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER
 Collect
 Charge Department
 Charge to
 TELEGRAM SENT
 Department of State
 Washington
 May 6, 1932.
 AMERICAN CONSUL
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN
 Paraphrase
 COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.I.

SHANGHAI (CHINA).

Urgent. 170

Confidential for the Minister.

Your May 5, 9 p.m.

One. Department has had no report from official sources regarding incident on Settlement border to which you refer.

Two. On basis of newspaper reports, it would seem inadvisable to Department to remove 31st Infantry immediately on the heels of that incident.

Three. With regard to other factors ~~which lead you to recommend removal of 31st Infantry~~, the Secretary of State is now on his way home; ~~and~~ the Department desires ^{with him} to discuss this question ~~with him~~ and ~~in~~ its relation to other questions; ~~and~~ therefore probably ~~will take~~ no action until after his arrival. *Inform Commander in Chief of all of the above.*

Four. Can you inform Department how many (a) British and (b) American soldiers, marines, landable bluejackets and volunteers are now present at Shanghai.

Five. Department ~~assumes that it will be~~ informed immediately when state of emergency is lifted.

Enciphered by FE: SKH: EJJ FE
 793.94/5161
 Sent by operator M. 19.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/5161

Confidential File

0917

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

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PM REC
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED*
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

May 10, 1932

MAY 11 32

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI, (China)

793.94/5161
177 Department's 170, May 6, 11 a.m., for the Minister.

Can you give Department information requested in
paragraph four?

Carth, Acting
SKH

FE:SKH:KC

mmw
FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5161

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11927 FOR Tel. #497. 11am

FROM China (Perkins) DATED May 5, 1932
~~For~~ NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: friction developing between Canton and the National Government, which is chiefly on account of the Canton clique desiring the Central Government to adopt a stronger policy against Japan.

dew

793.94/5162

5162

0915

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JS

Plain

PEIPING

Dated May 5, 1932

Rec'd 1:20a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

497, May 5, 11 a.m.

Legation's 497, April 27, 1 p.m. Following from
Reuter, Peiping, May fifth:

"Chinese messages from the South carry rather alarming news concerning the international situation. They say that a political storm is brewing rapidly and that friction is developing between Canton and the Central Governments. In the absence of any official pronouncement on the matter it is difficult for neutral observers to judge how serious the situation is, or whether official reports are unnecessarily alarming.

It seems, however, that the Central Government regarded Mr. Sun Fo's recent manifesto on how to save the country an abuse of his position and consider that he should have expressed his views to (all government?) instead of broadcasting them to the Cantonese.

The trouble has chiefly arisen because the Canton clique consider that the Central Government should adopt a stronger policy vis a vis Japan, though this is considered by many merely an excuse to attack the leaders of the Government.

A number

0920
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- from Peiping, May 5p #497.

A number of prominent persons are working to smooth over the differences and it has been suggested that a conference between Mr. Sun Foo, Mr. Wang Ching Wei and General Chiang Kai Shek be held shortly at Hangchow for an exchange of views."

For the Minister.

PERKINS

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/5163

CANCELLED

SEE 393.9521/2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D. ~~W~~

EJ

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated May 6, 1932

Recd. 2.22 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

222. May 6, 5 p.m.

The Japanese are withdrawing today one

infantry battalion from each of the following localities
 to Woosung for embarkation to Dairen: Nanziang, Lotien,
 Liuhoh, Kiating. Total about 24,000 men of the third
 division. It is expected that the Nanziang Liuhoh
 Positions will be evacuated by May 9, when Chinese
 police force of 300 men now on the way from Nanking
 will take over the control of evacuated districts in
 accordance with the peace agreement concluded yesterday.
 Additional police are en route here from Peiping.

Please inform War Department.

Repeated to the Legation, copy to the Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

KLP



F/LS

793.94/5164

FILED

MAY 9 - 1932

793.94
 not
 893.102-5
 894.23
 793.94119
 893.6146

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

JS

Plain

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated May 7, 1932

FROM Rec'd 12:55a.m.



793.94
 893.102
 793.94119

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

507, May 7, 11 a.m.

Following from Nippon Demano, Tokyo, May 6th:

"The Privy Council threatens to make difficulty with the armistice agreement that was signed yesterday. Dissentient members of the Council point out that the agreement is signed not only by war delegates but also by foreign delegates together with representatives of the countries interested, viz., Britain, the United States, France and Italy. It further provides for not a few important questions including the formation of an international commission. The agreement is not therefore a mere armistice agreement but it is a sort of international treaty and therefore imperial sanction ought to be obtained before it is signed. The dissentients propose that they will demand an explanation of the government, holding it responsible for it."

For the Minister

PERKINS

JS

F/LS 793.94/5165

FILED

MAY 11 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

SS VULCANIA

May 5, 1932

WILSON,

RECEIVED from S
 MAR 2 1933
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND ELIGOR
 GENEVA (Switzerland)

793.94
 I should like Gibson and Davis to have copy of
 memorandum on Far Eastern talks and policy, which I left
 with you, before they go to London.

STIMSON

S ATK.GAM

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1916 1-138

793.94/5165A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 493.11 Shanghai/26 FOR Tel#169 6pm

FROM Shanghai () DATED May 5, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Claims. Department perceives no objections to the pre-senation of claims to both Chinese and Japanese authorities where the liability is in doubt. Necessary to obtain as complete a record of evidence as possible.

793.94/5166

5166

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

XFE

mam

TELEGRAM SENT

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

May 5, 1932, 6 p.m.

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI

169

For the Minister.

With reference to paragraph five of your April 27,
 1 p.m., Department offers the following comments:

One. In regard to the question of the merits of par-
 ticular cases see Department's 95 of March 12, 2 p.m., to
 Shanghai.

Two. In regard to the question of procedure to be
 followed in handling particular cases see Department's
 153 of April 25, 5 p.m., to Shanghai.

Three. In the presentation of claims to the Japanese
 or Chinese authorities, or both, it probably would be ad-
 visable to err on the side of presenting some doubtful
 claims rather than on the side of withholding any possibly
 good claims and there would appear to be no serious objec-
 tion to presenting to the authorities of both Governments
 claims in which the question is in doubt as to which Gov-
 ernment caused the wrong.

Four.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #169 to Shanghai

Four. Department fears that many of the claims may present difficult questions of law and may be resisted by both Governments. It is therefore highly desirable that claims be prepared as indicated in Department's 95 of March 12, 2 p.m., and in duplicate, one copy with original or certified evidence to be sent to the Department in order that if necessary the claims may be carefully studied collectively before the formation of a definite general policy with reference to the action necessary to effect settlement of claims not adjusted locally.

Five. If possible please advise substance of instructions received by your British colleague in regard to presentation of British claims.

Six. Department desires that as soon as practicable Cunningham submit to the Department a brief report giving the approximate number of American claims, the types of such claims, the dates upon which such claims arose, the amounts involved and the action taken in reference thereto.

CASTLE

ACTING

FE:ROM:EMU LE

793.94/5127

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.9521 Ahn Chang Hoang /1 FOR Tel. # 220, 1 pm

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED May 6, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Ahn Chang Hoang arrested because of suspicion
 in connection with the Hongkew Park bombing
 and the attempt on the life of Japanese Emperor.

hs

793.94/5167

5167

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EJ

GRAY

SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

Dated May 6, 1932

Recd. 7.50 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

220, May 6, 1 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Following telegram has been received from
 Los Angeles, May 4th, addressed to Cunningham.

"We are advised Korean educator Ahn ~~Seimko~~ *Chang Hoang*
 has been arrested in the French concession and
 delivered to Japanese that has for years endeavored
 (*) his capture as political prisoner. He has been
 long a Los Angeles resident; his wife and five
 American born children maintain residence here. He
 is organizer of our association chartered under
 California laws. We petition Your Excellency in the
 names of all Koreans in the United States and his
 family that you may personally extend all possible
 assistance in his behalf. Signed Earl K. Paikeep,
 President Korean National Association of America;
 S. K. Kim, President Young Korean Academy."

Two.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

220 from Shanghai

Two. An official from this Consulate General called on Japanese Consul in Charge and was informed that Ahn is being held by Japanese Consular police for investigation; that this investigation may take two or three weeks and it may be necessary to deport him to Korea. The officer could not say whether he was suspected of implication in Hongkew Park bombing but implied that this bombing and attempt on life of Japanese Emperor in January last were part of same plot. He said that Ahn would not be put to death and that he would (*) justice. It was emphasized that inquiry was unofficial.

Three. No reply is being made direct to Los Angeles and I request the Department to acknowledge telegram and give such of above information as it considers appropriate.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

RR

HPD

(*) Apparent omissions

0931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

mem

TELEGRAM RECEIVED PLAIN

PEIPING

FROM

Dated May 7, 1932

Rec'd 5:05 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 7 1932
 Department of State

508, May 7, noon.

111.20 A.P.D.
 73

Legation's mail despatch 1102, July 27, 1931.

Following from Kuo Wen, Peiping, May 6th.

"The Sino-Japanese armistice, which was signed at Shanghai on Thursday morning, is the subject of editorial comment in a number of Chinese papers here and Tientsin this morning.

The TA KUNG PAO, leading independent paper in North China, finds the opposition of the Chinese people to the agreement quite natural, since there is no fixed date in the agreement for the completion of the withdrawal of Japanese troops. From the standpoint of China the signing of the agreement is contrary to the wishes of the Chinese people, while from the standpoint of the powers, it may be regarded as an admission that they have reached the limit of their mediation.

The

793.94
 793.102
 793.94119

F/LS

793.94/5168

MAY 11 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #508 from Peiping

The paper further says that although hostilities have been ended by the armistice, the Shanghai question cannot be considered settled, inasmuch as Japanese troops have not yet been withdrawn.

The CHEN PAO says that while it can sympathize with the stand of the National Government that the agreement involves no loss of sovereign rights on the part of China, inasmuch as it makes provision for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops immediately after the signing of the agreement, it must be pointed out that the important question is not when the Japanese troops start withdrawal, but when such withdrawal can be completed. The paper fears that Japan will insist on the holding of a round table conference and will not withdraw her troops from Shanghai until this demand is accepted by China, though the National Government has already voiced its opinion to the proposed conference. If the conference is held, Japan will be sure to bring up her demand for a concession in Shanghai in the opinion of the CHEN PAO.

The SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO expresses keen disappointment at the failure of the agreement to set a definite date for the final

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#508 from Peiping, May 7, noon.

final withdrawal of Japanese troops from Shanghai and says that by agreeing to station special police to take over the districts to be evacuated by the Japanese troops, the National Government has tacitly accepted the demands of the Japanese military that these districts be converted into neutral zones. The paper assails the action of the government as a great diplomatic surrender to Japan.

The TIENTSIN YUNG PAO says that by signing the agreement the Chinese Government has gone back on its declaration that the Shanghai affair is an extension of the Manchuria controversy and should be settled simultaneously with the latter. The paper again recalls the recent statement of Mr. Quo Tai Chi that before signing the agreement, the government would publish its terms for the information of the public, yet this was not done until four hours after the agreement was signed on Thursday afternoon. In the light of these circumstances, the papers find it difficult for the government to explain away the criticism of the people that the agreement constitutes a diplomatic defeat for China".

KLP-WSB

For the Minister,
PERKINS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D. **FE**

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY



Shanghai via N.R.


Dated May 7, 1932

Rec'd 10:03 a.m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington

227, May 7, 1 p.m.



F/LS

793.94/5169

At meeting of Joint Commission today I was unanimously elected chairman. Japanese reported withdrawals of troops from certain areas to be effective before 9th. Chinese announced that Peiping police are due here about the 9th and will take over policing. .

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking.

GUNNINGHAM

WSB-HPD

FILED
MAY 12 1932

0935

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

PM REC'D
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,
May 7, 1932.

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (Switzerland)

MAY 9 32

68
One. May 7 Consul General Cunningham at Shanghai telegraphed that he had been unanimously elected Chairman of the Joint Commission, ~~that Japanese reported withdrawal of troops from certain areas to be effective before May 9; and that Chinese announced that Peiping police were due Shanghai about that date to take over policing.~~

~~Two. According to summaries of Chinese and Japanese press comment on the Shanghai agreement submitted by the Legation at Peiping, there is considerable criticism of the agreement.~~

~~Three. Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.~~

Cast
Avis

FE:DEJ/VDM

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1932 1-138

793.94/5169

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huebner NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY AND PLAIN

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 7, 1932

Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

226, May 7, noon.

(GRAY) Referring to Department's telegram No. 167,
May 5, noon, to the Minister.

One. Chinese members mixed commission are Okyui,
Secretary General Shanghai Chinese municipality; and
Wen Ying Hsing, Commissioner of Public Safety.

Two. Following is the full text of agreement signed
May five: (END GRAY)

"ARTICLE ONE. The Japanese and Chinese authorities
having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that
the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from
May 5, 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as
lies in their control cease around Shanghai all and every
form of hostile acts. In the event of doubts arising on
regard

793.94
893.102
793.94119

F/DEW

793.94/5170

MAY 11 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#326 from Shanghai via N.R.,
May 7, noon.

regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers.

ARTICLE TWO. The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this agreement. ~~The~~ The aforesaid positions are indicated in annex one to this agreement.

ARTICLE THREE. The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in annex two to this agreement.

ARTICLE FOUR. A joint commission, however, including members representing the participating friendly powers, will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer
from

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#126 from Shanghai via N.R.,
 May 7, noon.

from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this commission will be as defined in annex three to this agreement.

ARTICLE FIVE. The present agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

Done at Shanghai, this fifth day of May, nineteen hundred and thirty two. (Chinese and Japanese signatures)
 In the presence of (signatures of foreign heads of mission)

Representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March fourth, nineteen thirty. (*) Annex one. The following are the positions of the Chinese troops as provided in Article two of this agreement.

Reference

Omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-#126 from Shanghai via N.R.,
 May 7, noon.

Reference the attached postal map of the Shanghai district scale one stroke one fifty thousand.

From a point on the Soochow Creek due south of Anting village north along the west bank of a creek immediately east of Anting village to Wanghsienchiaio, thence north across a creek to a point four kilometers east of Shatow, and thence northwest up to and including Supeikou on the Yangtsee River.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will, upon the request of the joint commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers, members of the joint commission.

Annex two. The following are the localities as provided in Article Three of this agreement:

The aforesaid localities are outlined on the attached maps marked (a), (b), (c), and (d). They are referred to as areas one, two, three and four.

Area one is as shown on map (a). It is agreed (one) that this area excludes Woosung village; (two) that the

Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

5-#126 from Shanghai via N.R.,
May 7, noon.

Japanese will not interfere with the operation of the
Shanghai-Woosung Railway or its workshops.

Area two is shown on map (b). It is agreed that the
Chinese cemetery about one mile more or less to the north-
east of the international race track is excluded from the
area to be used by the Japanese troops.

Area three is shown on map (c). It is agreed that
this area excludes the Chinese village Tsao Chia Chai and
the Sanyu cloth factory.

Area four is shown on map (d). It is agreed that the
area to be used includes the Japanese cemetery and east-
ward approaches thereto.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the
localities in question will, upon the request of the joint
commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the
participating friendly powers, members of the joint com-
mission.

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the locali-
ties indicated above will be commenced within one week of
the coming into force of the agreement and will be
completed

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

6-#126 from Shanghai via N.R.,
May 7, noon.

completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal.

The joint commission to be established under Article Four will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

Annex three. The joint commission will be composed of twelve members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian heads of mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March fourth. The members of the joint commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions

094

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Qualefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

7-#126 from Shanghai via N.R.,
May 7, noon.

decisions of the commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the chairman having a casting vote. The chairman will be elected by the commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly powers.

The commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles one, two and three of this agreement, and is authorized to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of provisions of any of the three articles mentioned above".

Repeated to the Legation.


CUNNINGHAM

WSB

0943

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
*WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$



1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

MAY 7 32

May 7, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China)

URGENT. 171

Your 226 May 7, noon.

Has text of agreement been made public? May
Department release to press?

Castle, Acting


SKY

793.94/5170

FE:TEJ:EMU

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MAY 7 32



Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

PM RECD

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

0944

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF ACCOUNTS

MEMORANDUM

May 10, 1932.

FA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 12 1932
DIVISION OF FOREIGN
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

Authorization No. 130, fiscal year 1932,
for \$500. has been issued to cover the share
of the United States of expenses of local trans-
portation, secretary, stationery, postage, telegrams
and other expenses of the Joint Commission provided
under the Sino-Japanese agreement of May 5, 1932.

The Consul General at Shanghai should be
instructed to draw separate drafts and render
separate accounts.

man

BA/AIM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS - ADMINISTRATION
MAY 16 1932

MET

GRAY

A-C
FA

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 11 1932
Department of State

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 7, 1932

RECEIVED SECRETARY OF STATE
MAY 7 1932
MR. CARR

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

224, May 7, 10 a.m.

At a meeting of the heads of American, British, French and Italian missions in China it was decided to recommend that the expenses incident to the joint commission to certify to mutual withdrawal as provided in the Sino-Japanese agreement of May 5, 1932, should be borne one-sixth by each of the following powers in China: United States of America, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and China. It is requested that an initial special allotment of gold dollars 500 be authorized to meet the expenses of local transportation, secretary, stationery, postage, telegrams and other necessary expenses. It is hoped that the expenses will be nominal. Request is made for authorization to pay all expenses incident to American committeemen

See drafted
5-10-32
F/Ls
MAY 11 1932

793.94/5171

FILED

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#224 from Shanghai via N.R.,
May 7, 10 a.m.

committeemen and any assistants that they may employ
pending final payment from fund provided by the six
powers.

Repeated to the Legation, copy to the Minister.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB-KLP

0947

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department X
OR
Charge to
\$

PM REC'D
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington, *Ray*

MAY 11 52
MAY 11 32

May 10, 1932.

793.94/5171
note
125.8574
AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (CHINA)

178 Your 224/5171, May 7, 10 a.m.

\$500 granted for purposes indicated. Draw separate
drafts and render separate accounts indicating thereon
quote Authorization No. 130, 1932, unquote.

Casell

ACTING

(enc)

793.94/5171
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Reg

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M.H.
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A-C

OR
MAY 11. 1932

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1919 1-138

793.94/5171

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
12-EC
893.102S
793.94119

JS

FROM Plain
SHANGHAI

Dated May 8, 1932
Rec'd 12:40a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

URGENT

230, May 8, 11 a.m. 5170

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 8 1932
Department of State

Department's 71, May 7, 1 p.m. Text of agreement
was made public on date of signature.

CUNNINGHAM

JS

F/LS 793.94/5172


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MAY 12 1932

0945

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 8205

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Li

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
 Shanghai, China, April 9, 1932.



Subject: Publications Dealing with "Japan's
 Undeclared War in Shanghai."


THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

MAY 1 1932

Sir:



793.94
 note
 893.102-S

F/LS 793.94/5173

MAY 17 1932

FILED

1/ I have the honor to transmit, under separate cover, a copy of a publication recently issued by the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce entitled "Official Documents Relating to Japan's Undeclared War in Shanghai." This compilation is in no sense official and it is believed that all, or practically all, of the documents appearing therein had already been published in the local press. Moreover the texts of the documents cannot be considered as official or authoritative. However, the compilation may prove of some value to the Department. It will be noted on page 24, Chapter IV, that document No. 2, which is headed "Defence Forces Protest," is not an official protest but is merely an excerpt from one of the local newspapers regarding a reported protest by the Defense Commission to the British, American and Italian Consuls

General

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

General (see this office's telegram of February 3, 2 a.m.) ¹³⁹⁰⁵

There is also forwarded, under separate cover, a symposium of articles by various Chinese and one Japanese writers entitled "Symposium on Japan's Undeclared War in Shanghai." No particular comment is necessary in regard to this pamphlet. Particular attention is invited to the article by Dr. J. C. H. Wu on page 46, "The Boycott from the Standpoint of International Law, and the succeeding article by Mr. D. K. Lieu on War Losses and Damage in Shanghai."

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
 Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

✓
 Accompaniments:

- 1/- "Official Documents Relating to Japan's Undeclared War in Shanghai."
- 2/- "Symposium on Japan's Undeclared War in Shanghai."

PRJ MB
 800

In Quintuplicate.

In Duplicate to Legation.

1 of each ENCLOSURE FILED IN OVERFLOW FILES.
DATE FILED 5-14-32

Stop

1951

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 9, 1932

Rec'd 6:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

511, May 9, noon.

Following from Kuo Wen, Nanking, May sixth:

"Dr. Lo Wen Kan issued a statement this afternoon with regards to the Sino-Japanese peace agreement signed at Shanghai last Thursday.

Dr. Lo expressed his confidence that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn to their defense position as before January twenty-eight last, and that there will be no necessity for the mixed commission to exercise its function of reporting whether normal conditions have been reestablished in Shanghai or not.

The Foreign Minister defined the peace agreement in a press interview at ten o'clock tonight. He said that since the conference began, Japan had brought up many unreasonable demands, which were successfully resisted

by



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MAY 12 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-511

2-#511 from Peiping via N.R.,
 May 9, noon.

by the Chinese delegates. For example, the Japanese first proposed a round table conference to settle they suggested the establishment of a free port in Shanghai the Shanghai question. Then/ and the extension of the settlement. They also brought up the demand for the suppression of the anti-Japanese boycott. All these demands were eventually withdrawn as a result of the efforts of the Chinese delegates.

Referring to the question of Japanese withdrawal, Dr. Lo said that the Japanese originally demanded an extensive area for their troops to withdraw to, but as the result of a prolonged argument on the part of the Chinese delegates, they agreed to the area designated in the peace agreement. The Japanese also brought up the question of the stationing of Chinese troops along the southern bank of the Soochow Creek and at Pootung, but the demand was withdrawn upon the opposition of the Chinese. Dr. Lo added that although the present agreement fails to provide for the immediate withdrawal of all the Japanese troops from Shanghai, it represents the best bargain which China can get under the existing international situation as well as the circumstances prevailing in

China

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

No. 511 from Peiping

China today. With the Shanghai affair settled, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will turn its attention to the Manchurian question, which is the root of the Sino-Japanese controversy.

Concerning the Sino-Russian situation, Dr. Lo said that the Chinese Government had long been considering the question of resuming diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, but recent events such as the failure of the Soviet Government to accord adequate treatment to the Chinese delegation at the Sino-Russian conference, coupled with reports that the Soviet authorities were treating with the puppet government in Manchuria, are likely to hinder the speedy restoration of friendly relations between the two countries."

For the Minister

PERKINS

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, April 14, 1932.

No. 1478

Subject: Memorandum of conversation -
Dr. V.K. Ting and Mr. Perkins,
April 6, 1932.

F/L
793.94/5175



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.94

Sir:

1/

I have the honor to enclose herewith, in duplicate, a memorandum of a conversation between Dr. V.K. Ting, former Mayor of Greater Shanghai, and at present professor of geology in the National University, and Mr. Perkins, Counselor of the Legation, in which Dr. Ting expressed his views with regard to the policy which he believed China should adopt toward its present difficulties with Japan.

APR 21 1932

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Mahlon F. Perkins

Enclosure:

MAHLON F. PERKINS,
Counselor of Legation.

1. Memorandum of conversation.

800

MFP/GL

1478

MEMORANDUM

of

CONVERSATION BETWEEN DR. V. K. TING,
FORMER MAYOR OF GREATER SHANGHAI, AND
MR. PERKINS.

April 6, 1932.

Dr. Ting's remarks were to the following effect:

Intelligent Chinese have no illusions as to the difficulty of obtaining much help in the present emergency from either the League of Nations or the United States, since they fully appreciate the very great obstacles in the way of applying economic sanctions such as the boycott. If the Chinese can obtain any assistance, so much the better; but they are not counting upon it. Before the Shanghai incident, a large section of Chinese opinion favored negotiations with Japan, but now there is no support for such a policy. No Chinese government could last for even a few days which advocated such a course. In creating the Shanghai incident, the Japanese have gone too far, and the result of any negotiations would be simply to give them a bill of sale for Manchuria. They are now in de facto possession of that part of China and there can be no object in merely legalizing their position. Of course, no intelligent Chinese believe it possible at the present time for China to recover the lost territory by military operations, but the thing to do is for China to bide its time and take advantage of such opportunities as the course of future events may present.

If China does not consent to negotiate, it is possible that Japan may take further measures and occupy many of the ports. But China is too large for Japan to occupy entirely; and, in such a contingency, the Chinese must adopt

a policy

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

a policy of passive resistance. If the Japanese attack, the Chinese should make whatever resistance is practicable and endeavor to tire the Japanese out through political and economic non-cooperation.

Dr. Ting emphasized the fact that China is decentralized economically, is largely a self-contained country and can get along one way or the other without much foreign trade. Japan is, on the other hand, a highly organized, modern state and probably could not endure the dislocation of trade which would ensue. Although the military classes in Japan are in the saddle at the present time, there is always hope that the dissatisfaction of the commercial and manufacturing classes may eventually moderate the present Japanese policy. He added that, by reason of recent military expeditions, the Japanese national debt had already been increased about one-sixth. It would be impossible for Japan to make great profits out of Manchuria for many years. The whole of Manchuria's foreign trade was but a very small fraction of Japan's total foreign trade, and only about one-half of Manchuria's foreign trade was with Japan itself, for instance, a large portion of the coal from the Fushun mines was consumed in China. For these reasons, it was to be hoped that the Japanese would eventually find their present policy altogether unprofitable.

Dr. Ting said that the issues between China and Japan in regard to Manchuria could not be reconciled, since Japan actually purposes to obtain far more than it would be entitled to under the most favorable interpretation of the treaties. This explains why the Japanese did not seek negotiation at the outset in preference to forcible occupation.

He also

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

He also mentioned that there was always the possibility of Japan becoming involved with Soviet Russia, an eventuality which would, of course, be of advantage to China.

The fighting at Shanghai has shown that China was capable of obstructing Japan much more than had been formerly considered possible; and, even if Chiang Kai-shek wished to do so, his own under-officers and men would never consent to compromise with Japan.

MFP:MM

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