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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 19

1930-39

793.94/5176-5310
Apr.-June 1932



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

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The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

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Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

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In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 17, 1932.

~~MEM:~~
~~ROM:~~
~~SUM:~~

The Minister transmits herewith some very interesting digests of memoranda prepared by Mr. T. M. Millard for the Chinese Government in his capacity as an adviser.

All of these digests are interesting, but some particularly interesting passages are marked on pages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, and 11.

[Handwritten signature]

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Shanghai, April 5, 1932

Subject: Sino-Japanese conflict.

CONFIDENTIAL



MAY - 7 32

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the
1/ confidential information of the Department, a copy of
a memorandum dated March 30, 1932, prepared by Mr.
Thomas F. Millard, an adviser to the Chinese Govern-
ment, regarding the present Sino-Japanese conflict.

This document, which Mr. Millard styles "Supple-
mentary Digest from Memos. of T. F. M.", deals with
the alleged attitude of the League of Nations and of
the principal powers towards China and Japan and ap-
parently consists of a series of excerpts from pre-
vious memoranda submitted to the Chinese Government
between October 1931 and March 1932.

The Department's special attention is invited to
pages 3 and 4 ("Attitude of the American Government")
and pages 10 and 11 ("Summary of Position") from which
it would appear that in the opinion of Mr. Millard

the

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the United States is the most important factor in the present crisis because it is the only power which may ultimately be willing to go to war with Japan for the purpose of defending treaty rights.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosure: ✓

Copy of memorandum by Mr.
Millard, March 30, 1932.

CVHE.EA

4 Carbon Copies

Received *11/16*

1 copy in SCR for
note - loss.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential
By Thomas F. Millard

Shanghai March 30, 1932

SUPPLEMENTARY DIGEST FROM MEMOS.
OF T. F. M.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS VISAVIS CHINA AND JAPAN

Extract from memo. dated October 6, 1931

"In many previous reports and memos. this adviser has tried to impress that the League of Nations cannot function effectively to defend China in the event of aggressive acts of neighboring Powers. Nevertheless the League provides a good means of getting the attention of the world and of the governments of the principal Powers to such aggressions."

Extract from memo. dated December 1, 1931

"Anything done by or through the League of Nations will provide only an interim or 'breathing time'. The League and a large majority of the governments composing it have no genuine interest in Manchuria. They do not really care whether Manchuria is governed by Japan or China. The League's acts in this case have been, in the first place, to save the prevention-of-war functions it has created, and, lately, to 'save the face' of the League itself. . . . In the end the League's acts regarding the China-Japan situation will fizzle out in some resolutions that are devoid of practical application in the Far East."

Extract from memo. dated December 12, 1931

"The League of Nations' Commission of Inquiry into events and conditions in Manchuria is unlikely to effect any real change in the situation. The Japanese Government already has plainly indicated its purpose to refuse to be bound by the League's recommendations, and the League does not possess the means to make its resolutions effective. . . . It appears more and more that the League's attempts to treat this issue are seeking a formula to withdraw with a semblance of dignity from the controversy."

Extract from memo. dated January 9, 1932

"It is unlikely that investigations in China and Manchuria of a Commission of the League of Nations will add materially to the knowledge of the questions now possessed by the League and by the governments of the Powers. This being so the considerable time required to make the Commission's investigations and report will merely enable the League to stave off definite action, and meantime Japan will be able to extend and consolidate her position in Manchuria."

Further comments regarding the L. of N.

Events subsequent to the writing of the memos.

previously

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previously quoted indicate that the opinions expressed therein were correct. In the last month or two, and especially in utterances of members of the Commission of Inquiry since their arrival in China, there is a noticeable shift from emphasizing the mandatory character of the League's functions in situations like this one and to emphasize their purely mediatory character; in short, the League is seeking for itself a way out of the embroglio that will preserve something of its reputation and prestige. It has become plain that the League realizes its helplessness to solve this question on the basis of exact or even comparative international justice.

JAPAN AND THE LEAGUE

It is evident that the Japanese Government now knows that it need not fear any effective curb from the League. Moreover, late developments indicate that if the League continues an attitude of reproof and rebuke to Japan, the Japanese Government may withdraw from the League. Japan's withdrawal from the League in this instance will in no way change the real position, but it will further emphasize Japan's political and moral isolation. That may work to China's advantage later. Japan's suggestion of withdrawal from the League obviously is, at this time, intended to influence the League Commission, and also to curb anti-Japan criticism at Geneva. In one way for Japan to withdraw from the League, now or later, will improve the situation by clarifying it. So far, and now, the League is a kind of smoke-screen obscuring the realities of the situation.

Extract from letter to Mr. Eugene Chen, dated January 9, 1932

"By reading the digest of my memos. herewith you will see that from the time this Manchurian situation came up I have advised these things:

// "There is no short-cut to a solution of the situation. It is likely that you have to face a Japanese control of Manchuria for one or two years at the best.

// "Only action by the Powers under the terms of the Washington treaty can liquidate the situation in a way at all satisfactory to China.

"Time is required to build up public opinion in the United States and in other countries so that those governments will have popular support behind them. In the meantime appeals to the League and to the Kellogg-Briand Pact are preliminary gestures having a large propaganda value."

Extract

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Extract from memo. dated October 6, 1931

"The Independence Movement. It already is plain that the Japanese military party wishes to detach the three Eastern Provinces from the rest of China. The plan is to have some Chinese who are amenable to Japanese influence organize a sort of government in Manchuria and declare its 'independence'. The Japanese military then will recognize that government and will protect it with their power in case the Chinese Government should attempt to depose it, in order to 'preserve peace' in that region. Such a Chinese administration in Manchuria will be puppets of the Japanese."

NOTE : Since those comments were written events in Manchuria have taken the course predicted, except that the Japanese Government has not yet formally recognized the new state.

AD. NOTE : Since the above was written the Japanese Government has authorized a loan to the "Manchukuo" state, which is tantamount to recognition.

ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Extract from memo. dated October 6, 1931

"While there is disappointment in some quarters because the US Government has not, so far, moved more positively in this Manchuria crisis this writer thinks that its position is diplomatically correct and also wise. . . . For the American Government to take a cautious course now is likely to work to China's advantage later."

Extract from memo. dated December 1, 1931

"On the contrary, the US Government does care whether Japan or China controls Manchuria. For reasons of long-continued policy and considerations of national advantage and security the US Government wants China to retain Manchuria and it can be expected that it will at an appropriate time take any measures short of war to preserve and restore China's territorial integrity and political autonomy there. The US Government even may go to war on this issue of treaty sanctity if all peaceful measures fail and Japan's outlaw course can be stopped in no other way. But that outcome requires a good deal by way of preparing and developing public opinion in America."

Extract from memo. dated October 17, 1931

"Those who were present at Washington in 1921 and 1922 and who were enabled to see behind the scenes of that conference can recall some things that exerted a strong influence on its decisions and on the acts of the Japanese Government. . . . The pressure brought to bear on the Japanese Government is embraced in the following collocation:

"Japan was anxious to have the American and British governments to agree not to fortify and augment

their

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their naval forces and bases in the Far East. Having by then to face the loss of the alliance with Great Britain the Japanese discerned that the US and GB would thereafter be in combination against Japan on certain issues.

"Japan was anxious to put a stop to the American naval building program, which already had made the US navy superior to any in the world and which if continued would give it dominance in the Pacific. It was privately but firmly intimated to the Japanese delegation that non-fortification of certain bases and the 5/5/3 naval ratio depended on a satisfactory adjustment of Sino-Japan relations and the renouncement by Japan of designs visavis China that constituted a danger to peace in the Far East.

"Under that pressure Japan yielded on the China issues and signed the nine-powers treaty."

NOTE : Those comments of this adviser made last October, November and December are confirmed by subsequent events, notably the letter of Secretary of State Stimson to Senator Borah, in which the collocation and arguments of the previous memos. were repeated. Mr. Stimson's letter to Senator Borah obviously was an oblique method of getting the background of the US position visavis Manchuria, China and Japan before the American and British peoples; in short, it was educational propaganda designed to prepare public opinion for action to be taken later. The entire course and motivation of the American Government as it develops is almost exactly as was outlined in this advisers memo. dated November 24, 1931, on "RELATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE SINO-JAPAN CONFLICT IN MANCHURIA," which is on file at the Waichiaopu.

In this connection the stiff fight put up at Shanghai by the Chinese army has a distinct bearing on the possible action, hereafter, of the American Government. The conclusion foreign military observers deduce from those operations around Shanghai is that in the event of a war between Japan and the United States the Chinese can be of important assistance to America in bringing the war to a satisfactory conclusion by defeating Japan, and such evidence undoubtedly will have an effect on American policy and on the policy of other Powers.

ATTITUDE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

Extract from memo. dated November 16, 1931

"Left to itself and Europe the British Government most

likely

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likely would pursue its historical policy (where its vital interests are not immediately touched) of facing 'realities', and in due course will accept Japan's acts in Manchuria as a fait accompli. But the British Government cannot afford to ignore the attitude and policy and wishes of the American Government, for Britain's relations with America are more important than anything arising out of her relations with Japan and China. At Washington in 1921-22 it was well known to those behind the scenes of the conference that the British Government preferred to retain the alliance with Japan and gave it up only because the US Government insisted and made that a condition of US-British cooperation. . . . In the end the British Government will follow the lead of the US Government regarding the Sino-Japan issue."

Extract from memo. dated March 25, 1932

"The debate in Parliament on March 22 confirms the opinions of this adviser expressed in previous memos., vis, that the British Government is willing to regard Japan's acts and position in Manchuria as fait accompli. Phrases in Sir John Simon's speech intimate that Great Britain may at a later time recognize the 'independence' of Manchuria. It is still possible, however, for the American Government to draw the British Government into a line of action designed to restore Manchuria to China. . . . This debate again makes plain that the influence of the major European Powers, and Great Britain, in the League of Nations has for some time been and from now on will be used to create a plausible 'camouflage' for a do-nothing policy for the League visavis China and Japan. All the utterances at Shanghai of Lord Lytton indicate that policy. Lord Lytton's speeches, and Sir John Simon's, do not reflect the policy of the American Government or of the American members of the Commission."

The following press clipping is significant:

"London. March 30.--Japan obviously does not intend to abandon her position in Shanghai until her previous demands, especially the suppression of the trade boycott, have been conceded, says the Manchester 'Guardian.' Apart from the fact that hostilities have ceased, the position is just where it was, the paper continues. 'Japan would be as glad to withdraw from Shanghai as China and the Powers would be to see her go. The adventure only drags on because Japan is afraid she will lose prestige. Manchuria is another story. Japan insists it is separate from the Shanghai question, which means she will do just what she likes in Manchuria while admitting that parties other than China and Japan are concerned in Shanghai. The British Government unfortunately has created the impression it might accept the Japanese viewpoint in this matter, but the influence of the United States and probably the majority of League members is likely to be exerted in the opposite direction.'--Reuter."

ATTITUDE

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ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

Extract from memo. dated November 16, 1931

"Broadly the French Government is disinterested about whether China or Japan govern Manchuria, and in the event of a serious international crisis arising out of the question it will prefer to take the 'easiest way', which will be to permit Japan to 'get away with' her high-handed acts. But if it comes to a serious divergence between Japan and the United States, France will consider her good relations with America of more importance to her than the dubious 'friendship' of Japan. . . . The Chinese Government should not however ignore the evident intimations of a private understanding between the Japanese and French governments about Far Eastern questions. Comments of the French and Japan press reveal evidence of a kind of agreement that France will not actively oppose Japan's policy toward China."

NOTE : Since that memo. was written the French Government, alarmed by reactions of Japan's China policy in America, has on several occasions categorically denied the existence of any 'private' understanding with Japan and has reaffirmed France's adherence to the Washington treaty. The French Ambassador to the United States has made a number of addresses positively denying that France consents or approves Japan's late acts in China. This is evidence that the French Government will not go contrary to the American view of the matter, but does not disprove the opinion expressed in the memo. previously quoted, viz, that France is indifferent about Manchuria and is averse to positive action to curb Japan.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COMMISSION

Extracts from memo. to Dr. Wellington Koo, dated March 25, 1932

"During their stay in Shanghai I have had some contact with the American contingent of the Commission and have done what I could to put certain points before them, and, through them, I have learned something indicating the Commission's trend of thought.

SOME SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS

"The following questions, and my answers to them, indicate a definite trend and reveal, possibly, the line of the inquiry and some recommendations that may be made:

"QUESTION: Can China be called an 'organized State', and, if not, is Japan's action in the interest of world-stability?

"ANSWER: China is at present a disorganized State

due

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due to a shift from an archaic to a modern form of government, but it is not a disorganized State in the sense of a barbaric State or a State that never has been organized. On the contrary China was an organized State long before any of the present Western states attained that status and her history gives good ground for a belief that the present disorganization is temporary.

"It is pertinent that the temporary disorganization of China provided the principal reason for calling the Washington conference and for making the so-called nine-Powers treaty concerning China. Had China been an organized State there would be no reason for the nine-Powers treaty. That China was then and might for some years be a disorganized State was the major premise of the nine-Powers treaty, and Japan, in taking unilateral military action in China has expressly violated both the letter and intent of that treaty, as well as disregarded the Kellogg-Briand pact to which all signatories of the nine-Powers treaty have agreed.

"In contrast to China, Japan's late acts in China show that while Japan is an organized State now, she is not a civilized State in the modern acceptance of that term. Moreover there are many indications that the political regime in Japan is nearing a crisis and many observers think that a revolution is impending there. It may be that at a time when China is getting stabilized, Japan will be at the beginning of her revolution.

"QUESTION: Is it true that the Chinese at all times try to use foreign Powers to save themselves from the consequences of their political failures and delinquencies and to prevent external interference?

"ANSWER: Yes, it is true that in modern times, and now, the Chinese Government usually resorts to that method to stave off foreign encroachments. This is the only means available for a nation that is too weak in a military way to defend itself and which therefore is forced to depend for its security on treaties and 'peace pacts', or upon organizations like the League of Nations. This is China's position now. The effect on world-polity of the failure of those methods need not be depicted here, but the consequences of such failure are fairly apparent.

"QUESTION: What prospect is there that the Chinese Government or any responsible Chinese political leaders will give approval or consent to a plan, sponsored by the League of Nations, to put Manchuria for a period under a form of international control?

"ANSWER: It is unlikely that the Chinese Government or any important Chinese political leaders will approve such a plan at this time. Such a plan savors too much of a 'mandate', and in such a case it is certain that Japan will claim to be the logical and proper Power to exercise the mandate. . . .

Even

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Even if such a plan should commend itself to some Chinese leaders as an abstract proposal having certain presumed advantages it is unlikely that any of them will publicly approve it, for to do so will bring on them a storm of popular disapproval. . . . But it is most probable that the chief objector to such a plan will be Japan."

"COMMENT ON FOREGOING QUESTIONS: There is nothing surprising in these questions propounded by members of the Commission. All the queries have been fore-indicated by what has transpired at Geneva and by utterances of governments of some of the Powers. . . . The creation of an international 'buffer state' in Manchuria might have the temporary effect of blocking Japan's plans to annex that region and it can do no harm to have the Commission recommend it as a way out of the difficulty. To be effective such a plan requires the full support of the United States, and it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to get the consent of Congress to a plan putting the United States into a joint action with the League. The plan has so many practical objections that it hardly can be taken as feasible. But its advancement by the Commission may serve an oblique political purpose in hindering Japan's policy of annexation.

"QUESTION: To what extent has the Chinese Government instigated an economic boycott of Japan, and does not such a boycott, if persisted in, interpose an insuperable obstacle to peace between the two nations?

"ANSWER: There is slight tangible evidence that the responsible Chinese Government has directly instigated the boycott on Japanese products and trade, but there is no doubt that it is sympathetic to the movement. This particular boycott is a direct reflex of Japan's invasion of Manchuria and probably will end whenever the cause of it disappears.

"But even if the Chinese Government had openly declared and supported a boycott on Japan's trade in China it might be considered to be within its rights. 'Economic sanctions', which are a euphemism for boycott, are recognized by the Covenant of the League of Nations as a legitimate means to bring offensive governments to terms, and as a preferable alternative to war. Japan has been since last September, and still is, making actual war on China, against which China's only effective retaliation is a boycott, or 'economic sanctions'. In fact, the Chinese Government openly has asked the League of Nations to support it and join with China in applying to Japan the Article of the Covenant regarding economic sanctions, or to help China to make the boycott more effective by extending it to all members of the League. It is ridiculous to say that an economic boycott is the same as war. If that were true why should the League Covenant define, in effect, economic sanctions as a

means

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means to prevent war? A movement to have the American people boycott Japanese products, that is supported by many prominent Americans, is taking place in the United States and Canada, and this is done not as an act of war but in order to stop a war by bringing non-warlike pressure on an aggressor."

STATUS OF SHANGHAI

Extract from memo. dated March 25, 1932

"It has been evident for some time that the foreign 'diehard' elements at Shanghai intend to use the present situation, if possible, to obtain an extension of the Settlements area. The most favored scheme is to create a 'neutral zone' surrounding the Settlements. Much propaganda was brought to bear on the League Commission on this question."

In that connection the following press clipping from the North-China Daily News of March 31, 1932, is of interest:

"Under the heading of 'Shanghai Powers' Plan Exposed,' the following despatch from W. N. Ewer at Geneva, was published in the 'Daily Herald' of March 8:

The big Council Powers began to show their hands in the League Assembly to-day, and to-morrow should see something like a decisive fight.

They want to get rid of the Assembly after allowing it to pass a pious resolution. They want the settlement of the Shanghai affair to be handed over to the 'Shanghai Powers.'

They want the Manchurian question to be shelved until the Lytton Commission has reported.

And they want all this to be done without insisting on the prior withdrawal of the Japanese.

The suspicion is growing that the Shanghai Powers would like to use the presence of the Japanese as a lever to extract from China new privileges and new concessions for themselves, as well as for Japan.

The Council Powers have not succeeded in getting rid of the Assembly, nor have the actions of the Assembly been limited to the passage of pious resolutions, but the point which is of the utmost importance to Shanghai is that every care should be taken to prevent itself being misunderstood either in China itself, or at Geneva. It is becoming daily clearer that whatever natural hopes and plans there may be for the improvement of the status of Shanghai, and the establishment of precautions against the happenings of the past two months, they will fail to obtain adequate support abroad if any impression is gained that tactics employed could, by any stretch of

language

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language be described as predatory or justifying the suspicion to which Mr. Ewer refers."

The "Daily Herald" is the principal "labor" organ in London and the dispatch quoted is from its correspondent at Geneva. The Daily Herald's dispatch accurately reflects the motives of some of the principal Powers.

It is significant, also, that the British press in China, and the British political writers in general (vide Woodhead) have already adopted the term "Manchukuo" instead of Manchuria, thereby indicating a premonition of future recognition by Great Britain of the new state.

SUMMARY OF POSITION

JAPAN: Japan has, in effect, taken complete political control in Manchuria and evidently intends to remain there. No informed person has any doubt of her purpose, later, to convert the occupation into annexation. Rejects foreign interference or right to intervene.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: Ineffective except as a propaganda and 'moral force'. Regarded solely as an agency for propaganda the cost of China's appeals to the League are justified. Any dependence on the League to eject Japan from China are outside the realm of practical politics. A situation may develop later, however, when the League may offer even to Japan a way to "save face" by yielding to 'moral opinion' instead of a threat of force, even if a threat of force is the actual reason for Japan's action.

UNITED STATES: Has taken a position diametrically opposite to that of Japan. Will not recognize any status quo resulting from Japan's acts in Manchuria and China. Has virtually forced Great Britain, France, et al, to make similar declarations in principle, although contrary to their real wishes. Up to the present the direct issue between Japan and the United States on this question has not arisen, but it must arise in time. When that comes the American Government must decide these points:

1. Will it accept the status quo resulting from Japan's military action in China?
2. Or will it take steps to compel or induce Japan to withdraw from China and respect the nine-Powers treaty?

It is plain to experts that to take the second alternative will bring the United States very close to war against Japan. It will require the US to put strong pressure on Great Britain and other Powers to obtain their support, or at least their friendly neutrality. Joint representation, to be followed by joint action if not acceded to by Japan, by the United States and Great Britain, with or without the cooperation of France and Italy, has a good chance to make Japan yield without resorting to war, but the risk of war lies in any

action

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|| action on that line. This undoubtedly is understood
at Washington and London. The other Powers will wait
on the decisions and action of the American Government:
if the US does not move the other Powers will not.

— || The decisions of the American Government will BE MADE
AT WASHINGTON. The decisions will be influenced by
FACTS as reported by its officials in China, but not
necessarily by their opinions.

|| CHINA: It is high time for the Chinese Government to
recognize the practicalities of the situation and to
concentrate its diplomatic and other efforts where they
have results, viz, in the United States.

MILLARD

Copied by khw *[initials]*
Compared with mb *[initials]*


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LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Shanghai, April 11, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese peace negotiations.

MAY - 1 32



F/LS

793.94/5177

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for convenient reference and for the permanent records of the
1/13 Department, a set of Minutes prepared by me of the meetings between the Chinese and Japanese delegates who have been conferring in Shanghai, in the presence of the representatives of the four participating friendly powers (Great Britain, United States, France, and Italy), with a view to concluding a formal agreement for the cessation of hostilities.

The attached documents cover the meetings up to and including April 4, 1932, of which the first two (March 19th and 21st) were informal conversations. They were, however, the only ones M. Henry Wilden, the French Minister, was able to attend in person. Illness prevented his attending any of the subsequent meetings and he was represented at them by a Secretary or the
Counselor

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
Counselor of his Legation.

All essential points mentioned in the material submitted herewith having already been covered in my telegrams to the Department between March 19⁴⁸³⁰ and April 4⁴⁹⁵⁶, 1932, it will not be necessary for me to comment thereon in this despatch. As no stenographic reports were made of the meetings the records submitted herewith, although of course not verbatim reports, will I hope enable the Department to obtain a fairly good picture of the general tone and atmosphere of the proceedings.

The Minutes of the meetings since April 4, 1932, will be forwarded with a later despatch as soon as they have been written up.

Very respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


William H. Engert
First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosures: 4

- 1/2: Conversations, March 19th and 21st.
- 3/13: Minutes of 11 meetings, March 24th, 24th, 25th, 25th, 26th, 28th, 28th, 29th, 31st, April 2nd, and 4th.

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Conversation.

Shanghai, March 19, 1932.

Present: Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Wilden, French Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Chargé d'Affaires

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai -
Negotiations.

This morning the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Quo Tai-chi, and Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister, met in the presence of the above-mentioned representatives of friendly powers for the purpose of considering each Government's attitude toward the tentative agenda which had been adopted on March 14th. The meeting took place in a room at the British Consulate used by Sir Miles as an office. Sir Miles, being the senior Minister present, took informal charge of the proceedings. The meeting convened at 10 a.m.

Item 1.

Sir Miles suggested that we take up for consideration, first, Item 1 of the draft agenda which read:

"1. The Chinese troops to remain in their present positions pending a later settlement."

Mr. Quo Tai-chi raised the question of the meaning of the word "later". Mr. Shigemitsu contended that this question

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question of the positions of the Chinese troops was a matter that must be dealt with by the military people. Mr. Quo stated that the Chinese would be prepared to define their line and suggested that any doubt in regard to their positions might be resolved by neutral Military Attachés. Mr. Shigemitsu thought that the matter should be checked by the neutral Commission provided for in Item 3 of the agenda.

Mr. Quo again brought up the question of the meaning of the word "later", stating he thought that this implied conditions beyond the competence of the present negotiations, which he contended could in no way bind the Chinese politically, nor impose conditions upon the Chinese. At his suggestion the word "settlement" was changed to read "arrangements".

As a result of discussion it was agreed that Item 1 should be changed tentatively to read:

"1. The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements. The Chinese authorities will define said positions. In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly powers."

It was also suggested, and tentatively agreed to, that the following preamble be inserted just before Item 1:

"It

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"It is agreed that the cessation of Sino-Japanese hostilities in the Shanghai area shall be rendered definite and the withdrawal of Japanese forces shall be regulated in accordance with the following provisions:"

Item 2.

The discussion then proceeded to Item 2 of the tentative agenda which read:

"2. The Japanese troops to withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of 28th January. It is however understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas."

Mr. Shigemitsu stated that the last part of this item was very important to the Japanese because of the large number of Japanese troops to be accommodated. This large number with their numerous supplies would make it difficult for the troops to leave. It was therefore going to be necessary to quarter these troops along the Whangpoo River, and particularly at the village of Woosung. He mentioned a Japanese mill at Woosung where he said that troops might be quartered, and pointed out that this was adjacent to a place where they

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they could be conveniently reembarked upon ships.

Mr. Quo appealed to Mr. Shigemitsu urging that the Japanese make an extra effort to get their troops back into the Settlement and to the extra-Settlement roads adjacent to Hongkew, rather than occupy a large area outside the Settlement. He suggested that the Japanese define the places to which their troops would be retired, and that if any doubt should arise this should be cleared up by the Military Attachés of the four friendly powers.

Mr. Shigemitsu stated that he could not give any undertaking as to the time of withdrawal. He said that Japanese troops would be retired as soon as the situation became quiet. He mentioned undertaking of the Mayor in regard to anti-Japanese activities. (The Japanese Minister's remarks carried the implication that Japanese troops would remain until anti-Japanese activities had been brought to an end.)

Mr. Quo stated that Mayor Wu had never canceled his note. He suggested that the assistance of military, civil and naval authorities of the friendly powers be invited to determine the necessity of retaining large Japanese forces at places outside of the Settlement, - in other words, to see that Japanese carry out first part of Item 2 as soon as might be possible.

Mr. Shigemitsu would not state any time for withdrawal. He insisted that Japanese forces were prepared

to

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to leave as soon as conditions made that possible, but he could not mention a time. He asked whether Chinese would accept a proposal for a neutral Commission to investigate the number of Chinese troops up to and including Nanking. He said that the Japanese must reserve to themselves the right to determine the necessity for keeping troops at Shanghai; they could not admit outsiders to determine this question for them. He stated that he felt sure that withdrawal of Japanese forces would take place soon. He observed that the Chinese are fortifying themselves and mobilizing, and said that the Japanese did not wish to be bound in the face of such facts.

The following tentative draft of Item 2 was offered:

"2. The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932. It is, however, understood that in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas. The Japanese authorities will define the said localities. In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto the localities in question will be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly powers.
(The Japanese troops will be withdrawn as soon as possible

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possible from the localities adjacent to the Settlement to the areas specified in the first sentence of this paragraph. The good offices and assistance of representatives of the participating friendly powers may also if required be invoked to certify the physical necessity, owing to the lack of suitable accommodations, for the temporary stationing of portions of the Japanese troops outside the areas referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph.)"

The Japanese objected to the words within brackets, stating that they could not accept any stipulation as to time of withdrawal. Mr. Shigemitsu said that he was willing to express their sentiment in this connection orally outside of the discussion. He asked that we accept his word for this, that the Japanese would withdraw as soon as possible, and that the physical necessities were there. With this understanding Quo agreed that the words might be dropped.

Item 3.

Discussion then proceeded to Item 3 which read:

"3. A joint commission with neutral members to certify the mutual withdrawal."

Mr. Shigemitsu wanted to have some arrangements made for maintaining order in the area to be evacuated, stating that the Japanese feared looting upon the retirement

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tirement of their soldiers, and they wanted to make some arrangements whereby this might be prevented.

Mr. Quo stated that the Chinese side was prepared for this emergency. They proposed as a special arrangement to set up a body of special constabulary or "Pao An Tui" organized along the lines of those with which all foreigners were familiar at Peiping. This police would be brought from places distant from the scene of conflict and therefore untouched by the animosities current at Shanghai. The Chinese Government was prepared to guarantee peace within the evacuated area.

Mr. Shigemitsu stated that he raised the question because Japanese people outside the western districts could not leave their dwellings because of uneasiness. He suggested the use of patrols by neutral forces in areas adjacent to the Settlement for the purpose of giving confidence to Chinese and foreigners alike. He dwelt upon the fact that the Japanese were afraid and that it would take time to allay this feeling of uneasiness. The following redraft of Item 3 was tentatively put before the meeting:

"A joint Commission including members representing the participating friendly powers will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the

incoming

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incoming Chinese police. The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as defined in the attached annex."

Footnote: The footnote was understood as a matter which could be dropped.

Sir Miles raised the question of the necessity for a preamble which would set forth the reason for the negotiations, namely, to discuss cessation of hostilities. Mr. Shigemitsu expressed some doubt as to the necessity for setting down a preamble, saying that he thought that cessation of hostilities was a military question. He pointed out that when formal negotiations begin Japanese delegates will be military people and not civilians; that the question of cessation of hostilities is a matter for the military to decide; that they had examined the precedents and had discovered that the armistice which was agreed upon at the end of the Russo-Japanese War had been arranged between subordinate Japanese military officers. It had been their intention to use their chief of staff, General Tashiro, and he thought that he himself would not participate, but would leave the matter in the hands of his Consul General.

We all expressed some surprise at this and urged upon Mr. Shigemitsu the advisability of taking up with his Government the question of appointing him delegate

for

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for Japan, to negotiate for their side. Mr. Shigemitsu stated that this matter will have to be taken up with the Government at Tokyo. Mr. Quo stated that it was the intention of his Government to use him, as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and General Chiang Kuang Nai, to represent the Chinese.

Agreed Minute.

The discussion then proceeded to consider the agreed minute which read as follows:

"In order to ease the general situation and (in proof of their earnest desire) to secure the prompt reestablishment of stability and normal conditions in the affected areas, (and inspire confidence amongst the residents therein,) the Chinese Government hereby intimate their intention immediately to establish on their own initiative, for the maintenance of peace and order in the evacuated area in the vicinity of the Shanghai Settlements, a force of special constabulary for which they contemplate the ~~engagement~~ employment of foreign officers and instructors."

Mr. Quo objected to the words enclosed within the brackets. It was suggested that the following be added at the end of this text, in order to make it clear that this special constabulary was to be used at Shanghai in the areas evacuated by the Japanese:

"It

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"It is understood that the incoming Chinese police referred to in the penultimate sentence of Paragraph 3 of the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities of _____ will be drawn from the special constabulary."

In discussing this question of the agreed minute Mr. Shigemitsu again raised the question of neutral patrols in the interval between the departure of the Japanese and the arrival of the Chinese police. He also intimated that the Japanese wanted something more than just police in the area after the Chinese had taken over, in order to give confidence to his people.

(Wilden, Lampson, and I are of the opinion that it would be very undesirable for us to have our forces in this area at any time. We do not wish to have them interposed between the outgoing Japanese and the incoming Chinese in view of the high state of feeling which now exists in that area.)

Mr. Quo stated that it was his desire that this minute or declaration in regard to special constabulary should be taken in the same way as the Japanese Minister's statement in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops, and not made as a matter of formal record. He asked that we take note of his undertaking; said that they would be prepared to take over the area as soon as the Japanese withdrew. Mr. Shigemitsu insisted that as

Japanese

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Japanese are withdrawing it would be highly necessary for the Chinese to give some such undertaking as the above in order to restore confidence among the people in the affected areas. Mr. Quo Tai-chi wanted to make the establishment of constabulary a temporary measure; he did not wish to be bound to keep constabulary always here.

In view of Mr. Quo Tai-chi's statement, in the presence of representatives of the participating friendly powers, to the effect that Mayor Wu's letter had not been withdrawn, Mr. Shigemitsu assented to the matter of a voluntary statement on this subject being dropped.

The meeting adjourned until Monday, March 21st.

N.T.J.
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Conversation.

Shanghai, March 21, 1932.

Present: Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Wilden, French Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Chargé d'Affaires

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

The Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister met this morning and continued discussions which had been commenced on March 19th.

Item 2.

Mr. Quo Tai-Chi referred to the Assembly's Resolution of March 4th, stating that the Resolution called for negotiations for the purpose of regulating the withdrawal of Japanese forces. He pointed out that this Resolution, under which the present negotiations were being undertaken, implied a certain program of withdrawal and that the time element was most important. He suggested that the Japanese should indicate the time within which their forces would be withdrawn.

Mr. Shigemitsu thought it would be impossible for the Japanese to indicate a time for withdrawal. He said that these matters would have to be arranged by the military; that for this reason it was necessary that military people be participators in the negotiations. We

were

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were now discussing the basis of formal negotiations at which the military would have to arrange how they would withdraw their troops, and also discuss and make definite the cessation of hostilities. He stated that he himself did not understand military matters; that the ends mentioned by Mr. Quo must be worked toward by the military. It was his idea that any arrangement which might result from our negotiations should be signed by the military on both sides as the principal negotiators, while he and Mr. Quo might sign as witnesses along with the diplomatic representatives of the participating friendly powers.

Mr. Quo suggested that the words "in accordance with a definite program regulating withdrawal as shown in Annex _____ to this agreement" be inserted at the beginning of Paragraph 2. He suggested that this would leave the matter of detail to the military to work out when they met. Mr. Shigemitsu stated that he could appreciate Mr. Quo's point of view but could not see any reason for writing this clause into Paragraph 2. It was his opinion that these matters should be left to the military, who would have a plan to offer. Mr. Shigemitsu suggested that Mr. Quo might make a reservation along this line, and stated that he would do what he could to help with his military.

Reservation

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Reservation by Quo Tai-chi.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi stated that he accepted Paragraph 2 provided a definite program of withdrawal was drawn up.

Agreed Minute

Mr. Quo stated that he wanted to drop the clause regarding the employment of foreign officers and instructors, as it would be objectionable to the Chinese people. Sir Miles said he thought the statement as it stood would help very much. It was finally suggested that the word "foreign" be dropped and that the words "experts as" be substituted, so that the clause would read: "for which they contemplate the employment of experts as officers and instructors". Mr. Quo agreed that the diplomatic representatives of the participating friendly powers present should make a note of the following:

"In discussing these affairs Mr. Quo intimated that the Chinese Government contemplated the employment of foreigners amongst the experts in question."
Mr. Quo stated that he would accept this method of dealing with the subject provided Mr. Shigemitsu would accept his suggestion in regard to Item 2. Mr. Shigemitsu objected, but it was finally agreed that both sides should refer the matter to their respective governments.

With reference to the question of a preamble, Mr.

Shigemitsu

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Shigemitsu stated that he wished to leave this to the formal meetings. He thought that they would like to have an article dealing with cessation of hostilities rather than a preamble. He said that he accepted the three items as they now stood, with annexed documents, as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Shigemitsu stated that the Japanese military complained that the Chinese military are constantly moving, and again referred to the necessity of using the Woosung landing place. Mr. Quo referred to this and asked whether the Woosung landing place would be linked with the Settlement. Mr. Shigemitsu refused to answer.

It was decided that we were now ready for the first formal meeting, and agreed that this should take place on Wednesday, March 23rd, it being understood that the Japanese would have General Uyeda second in command (as General Shirakawa probably would not be here), General Tashiro, Chief of Staff, and perhaps a naval man, Admiral Shimada, with two interpreters. The Chinese stated that they would bring General Chiang Kuang Nai or General Tsai Ting Kai, and General Gaston Huang, and a Japanese interpreter.

NTJ
 Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

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1st Formal Meeting.

Shanghai, March 24, 1932.
10 a.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
General Uyeda
General Tashiro
Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister.
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Baudet (French Minister being ill)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

General Uyeda opened the proceedings by taking from
1/ his "furoshiki" the attached document.

(The presentation of this document by General Uyeda was interesting and significant because it indicated that the Japanese military intended to take charge of the negotiations and to dictate the course they should follow. We had had no warning that the Japanese would present a draft of their own. The draft basis for discussion which was formally before the negotiators by agreement between the Japanese Minister and the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs was the draft of March 19, 1932, which had been revised and adopted as
referendum,

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2/ referendum, a copy of which is hereto attached.)

After a pause, during which all present read the draft presented by the Japanese, with the draft agenda which had been adopted on March 19th and which was formally before the meeting, Mr. Quo stated that he preferred to use the draft of March 19th, as the new one introduced by the Japanese contained a great deal of new matter.

Shigemitsu. States that the Japanese side is willing to use the old draft as a basis, but wishes to cast the preamble in regard to the cessation of hostilities into the form of a first article.

Quo. Points out that hostilities have ceased; wants to follow League Resolution of March 4th. Prefers preamble to new article. Thinks it unnecessary to make any new declaration for the cessation of hostilities.

Shigemitsu. Admits cessation of hostilities, but now wishes to make it definite.

Quo. Prefers old draft with preamble as more in conformity with League Resolution.

Lampson. Suggests that negotiators take old preamble and turn it into an Article 1 if this will help. Such an article could recite the facts of the cessation of hostilities and then could follow text of preamble. Following text suggested:

"Article 1. The Japanese and Chinese author-
ities

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ities having already ordered the cease-fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from _____. The forces of the two sides will, so far as lies in their control, cease all hostile acts. In the events of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers."

Shigemitsu. Points out that there are two things to be accomplished according to the Resolution of the League:
 a) Cessation of hostilities; b) Withdrawal of troops.

Quo. Points out that as a matter of fact hostilities have ceased.

General Tai-Chi. Informs Uyeda that several days have been spent working on the fundamentals with the aid of representatives of the friendly powers. Hopes we can stick to the three points in the adopted agenda. Chinese forces being where they are, there is nothing further to do but to arrange for the withdrawal of the Japanese.

General Tashiro. Argues that we are here to arrange mutually for an armistice, and although it is true that orders have been given independently by each side to cease fire, there remains the necessity of this being formally agreed to and arranged. Situation is not peaceful. There is at present no real cessation of hostilities.

Quo.

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Quo. Points out that there seems to be no point in discussing the legality of cessation of hostilities. There was no declaration of war. The only question is to keep the two forces apart.

(Argument continues back and forth, Japanese maintaining that they have come here to make cessation of hostilities real and definite by an official understanding, Chinese stating merely that they are here to give information as to their positions, that they have ordered their troops to cease all fire. It becomes increasingly evident that the Japanese are stalling. It is clear that they want the negotiations to cover the boycott and anti-Japanese activities, but are debarred from mentioning these by name. By the word "hostilities" they have in mind all of these things, that is, boycott, anti-Japanese agitation, and employment of plain-clothes gunmen. By 11.30 they agree to discuss Article I. The Japanese insist that mention must be made of plain-clothes gunmen. The Chinese claim that hostilities are hostilities, and are to be delimited to the activities of uniformed soldiers; they deny any knowledge of plain-clothes gunmen and point out that question of agitations is political and beyond the scope of the negotiations.)

General Tai Chi. Denies any knowledge whatever of the activities of plain-clothes gunmen. They have made clear through statements published in the press their attitude

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attitude towards such persons. They have been running down and punishing such people behind their lines when found. States that if Japanese continue to raise this point then question of air raids and machine gunning of innocent persons must be taken into consideration.

(At ten minutes past twelve General Tai Chi accepts Lampson draft of Article I, it being understood that cessation of hostilities shall be complete. Japanese state that they understand hostilities in this connection to include plain-clothes gunmen.)

General Tai Chi. Argues that the peculiar nature of the hostilities makes it possible that there are among civilian population many who will take violent action against Japanese. It will serve no good purpose to go into the effects without considering the causes. He insists that he has come on the basis of the three points agreed to between Shigemitsu and Quo. He is prepared to indicate positions of Chinese troops and to arrange for withdrawal of Japanese. He has no authority to discuss political questions.

Generals Uyeda and Tashiro. Continue to advance arguments in favor of their draft of Article I, pointing out that it is very important from their point of view that something be done about the plain-clothes gunmen, as well as other agitations. Both argue that there was ample evidence of the fact that plain-clothes men were being

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being used by the Chinese in connection with their armies.

Quo. Objects to any discussion of matters of political importance. States that Chinese military deny any knowledge whatever of gunmen; they do not employ gunmen as a part of Chinese military forces. Points out that question of other activities borders on political and is therefore beyond the scope of these negotiations.

Shigemitsu. Plead with us to permit the military to continue their discussions uninterrupted, as he thought that they wished to clear up their own ideas on the subject.

The conference adjourned at 12.40, to meet again at 3 p.m.

N.T.J.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Draft Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities
between Japan and China.

The authorities of the Japanese and Chinese forces have agreed upon and concluded the following agreement:

Article I.

The Japanese and Chinese forces shall cease all hostile activities (including the activities of plain-clothes gunmen) from _____ a.m. (p.m.) on March _____ th, 1932.

During the cessation of hostilities both the Japanese and Chinese forces shall refrain from all such actions as may injure the honor of the other or agitate the public sentiment.

Article II

The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements.

The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I attached hereto.

Article III

The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932. It is however understood that, in view of the numbers

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numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be stationed temporarily in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas.

The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex II attached hereto.

Article IV

A Joint Commission including members representing participating friendly Powers will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal.

The aforesaid Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police.

The constitution and procedure of the aforesaid Commission will be as defined in the Annex IV attached hereto.

Article V

The Japanese and Chinese forces may carry on reconnaissance by aeroplanes over such points as may be considered necessary in order to watch the performance of the provisions for the cessation of hostilities.

The aeroplanes to be used in the aforesaid reconnaissance shall bear the following marks, namely:

The Japanese aeroplanes _____

The Chinese aeroplanes _____

Article VI.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Article VI

In the event of either of the Japanese or Chinese forces infringing any of the terms of the present agreement, the other shall have no obligation to comply with the same agreement.

Article VII

The present agreement shall come into force on the day of the signature thereof.

The present agreement is made in duplicate in both the Japanese and Chinese languages.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Annexes

(1) The withdrawal of Japanese troops to the localities indicated in Annex II will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the agreement.

Should there be any invalids or sick horses that cannot be withdrawn at the time of evacuation, they may be detained at their positions together with an ambulance corps (accompanied by some guards). The Chinese authorities shall give protection to the above.

(2) The Chinese authorities shall station in the areas evacuated by the Japanese troops a force of special constabulary stipulated in the second paragraph of Article IV of the agreement within _____ days of the signature thereof.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Annex

The Joint Commission will be composed of 12 members, namely one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian heads of Missions in China being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4, 1932.

The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Separate Declaration by the Chinese Government.

To be issued either prior to or simultaneously with the conclusion of the agreement, but not to be annexed to the agreement.

In order to ease the general situation and to secure the prompt re-establishment of stability and normal conditions in the affected areas, the Chinese Government hereby declare their intention immediately to establish on their own initiative, for the maintenance of peace and order in the evacuated area in the vicinity of the Shanghai Settlements, a force of special constabulary, for which they contemplate the employment of experts as officers and instructors.

It is understood that the incoming Chinese police referred to in the second paragraph of Article IV of the Agreement for (date) will be drawn from the above special constabulary.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Draft of March 19, 1932

As revised and adopted ad referendum.

It is agreed that the cessation of Sino-Japanese hostilities shall be rendered definite and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces shall be regulated in accordance with the following provisions.

1. The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements. The Chinese authorities will define the said positions. In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

2. The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932. It is however understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas. The Japanese authorities will define the said localities. In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question will be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

3. A Joint Commission with neutral members will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This

Commission

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police. The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as defined in the attached annex.

Footnote (not for publication)

It is understood that no other questions of principle will be raised.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ANNEX

The Joint Commission will be composed of 12 members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian heads of Mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Simultaneous but Separate Voluntary Declaration
by the Chinese Government.

In order to ease the general situation and to secure the prompt re-establishment of stability and normal conditions in the affected areas, the Chinese Government hereby intimate their intention immediately to establish on their own initiative, for the maintenance of peace and order in the evacuated area in the vicinity of the Shanghai Settlements, a force of special constabulary, for which they contemplate the employment of foreign officers and instructors. It is understood that the incoming Chinese police referred to in the penultimate sentence of Paragraph 3 of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities of March ____ will be drawn from the above constabulary.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2nd Formal Meeting.

Shanghai, March 24, 1932.
3.15 p.m.

Present: *g*

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
General Uyeda
General Tashiro
Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Baudet (French Minister being ill)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

Prior to meeting entire personnel of negotiations was photographed by movies in front of British Consulate. It was understood that no one should make any speeches, all talking being limited to introductions. Sir Miles introduced the various delegates and the representatives of the friendly powers present. At the end, Mr. Quo, in response to an invitation from the movie operator to finish the film, made a statement to the effect that he hoped the Japanese would meet the Chinese half way in the negotiations. This offended the Japanese very much.

General Tai Chi. The conference having opened,

General

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General Tai stated the Chinese wished to proceed on to Article II, that is: Article I of draft of March 19th, Article II of Japanese draft. He said that Article I as suggested by the Japanese contains political matter which he is not in a position to discuss. He is prepared to discuss only questions of Chinese lines and of Japanese withdrawal from the area.

General Tashiro. Stated that the article dealing with the cessation of hostilities must contain the items for which they are contending, namely: activities of plain-clothes gunmen, and questions injurious to the honor of the two nations or calculated to agitate public sentiment. These are necessary in order to make the article clear and specific.

General Tai Chi. Insists at some length that he does not know anything about the employment of plain-clothes gunmen; that he cannot accept any responsibility for them.

Tashiro. Argues existence of plain-clothes gunmen and their connection with Chinese army, from fact that Chinese received back some ten plain-clothes gunmen among 36 Chinese prisoners who were returned.

Tai Chi. Continues to deny any knowledge of plain-clothes gunmen, or any connection between plain-clothes gunmen and regular Chinese forces. States that Chinese army cannot be held responsible for activities of gunmen;

this

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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this is a police matter.

Sir Miles. Proposes that we go on to Paragraph 2 of draft of March 19th, as we seem to be unable to get anywhere on the subject of gunmen.

Shigemitsu. States that he thinks question of gunmen is very important and should be settled.

Uyeda. Suggests adjournment until both sides have had an opportunity to consider.

(They agree to continue and to proceed to Article II of Japanese draft, or Article I of draft of March 19. Japanese wish to place the clause regarding ascertainment of positions by participating friendly powers in an annex.)

Quo. Wants to have words "pending later arrangements" dropped.

(In discussion which followed it developed that if words were dropped as suggested by Quo sentence would read: "The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions", which would mean that they would remain in their present positions indefinitely, which is absurd. Quo's objection to the words is based on the fact that their use would be subject to interpretation as limiting the movements of Chinese troops on Chinese soil.)

Tashiro, Uyeda. Object to change, as such a change would involve a change in the fundamental basis for the discussions.

Quo.

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Quo. States precedent for change lies with Japanese suggestion. Chinese suggestion does not change spirit of article as it stands.

Uyeda. Wants to retain old wording; says phrase is backbone of whole matter.

Quo. Contends that if Japanese understand this phrase to be fundamental, then there can be no doubt that it carries implication of restriction upon the freedom of movement of Chinese troops and is, therefore, an infringement of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and contrary to League Resolution.

Lampson. Suggests using words "during cessation of hostilities and pending a final or eventual settlement".

Meeting adjourned at 6.15 p.m., to meet again at 10 a.m., March 25th.

NTJ.
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

3rd Formal Meeting.

Shanghai, March 25, 1932.
10 a.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
General Uyeda
General Tashiro
Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Baudet (French Minister being ill)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

As conference opened, Quo read a telegram from Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, reporting message from General Liu Ti-ping from Chekiang, complaining of airplane flights over Hangchow on March 21st, as also of airplane flights over Soochow. He also read a telegram from the 19th Route Army complaining of attacks upon Chinese patrols by Japanese patrols.

Uyeda. Asks for further postponement of consideration of Article I (Japanese draft).

Article II

(Article I of draft of March 19th)

Quo. Insists that words "pending later arrangements"

are

- 2 -

are objectionable to the Chinese.

Uyeda. States that if words in question are dropped the meaning of agreement will be stultified.

Quo. States that he is prepared to allow phrase to stand provided he can make reservation in following words:

"China accepts the phrase 'pending later arrangements' on the understanding that it does not imply any restriction upon the right of the Chinese Government to move its troops freely within Chinese territory upon the resumption of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this agreement."

Uyeda. Says reservation is unacceptable as it changes the meaning of the text.

Quo. Suggests that we pass over point for the present and proceed, leaving question for future consideration. Presents document setting forth Chinese positions as running from Anting eastward to Wanghsienchio, thence north to a point four kilometers east of Shatow, and northwest up to and including Hupok'au. (Reference Postal Map Shanghai District, scale 1/150,000)

General Tashiro and General Huang were appointed to represent the Japanese and Chinese sides respectively, to meet in the presence of the British, French, American, and Italian Military Attaches for the purpose of determining Chinese lines.

Article III.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ARTICLE III

(Article II of Draft of March 19)

Quo. Points out that on the 21st he offered the following words to be inserted at the beginning of the paragraph:

"In accordance with a definite program regulating withdrawal as shown in Annex ____ to this agreement." Recalls that Shigemitsu agreed to press the point with his military, and says that his acceptance of the clause was made contingent upon adoption of some program for withdrawal of Japanese forces.

(Japanese indicate a desire to discuss program and then take up question of drafting of Article III.)

Uyeda. Insists that Paragraph 3 of Japanese draft be adopted without change in view of wording used in Paragraph 2 of draft of March 19th.

Quo. Refuses, saying that he had just agreed with Shigemitsu that question of drafting be left for the moment. Goes on to say that it is important that normal conditions be restored at the earliest possible moment and to that end urges that the "adjacent areas" mentioned in draft Article II be made as small as possible, and that the occupation of these areas by Japanese forces be made as temporary as possible.

Uyeda. Points out that program for withdrawal will be contained in the Annex.

Quo.

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Quo. Argues that Japanese must begin to withdraw to Settlement and to positions occupied prior to January 28th. He asks Uyeda directly how soon the Japanese forces will withdraw,- what amount of time will be required to complete withdrawal, and, pending complete withdrawal, what will be the "adjacent areas".

Uyeda. Proposes to begin withdrawal to first line within a week; withdrawal from localities will depend upon local situation. Line will be fixed by Sub-Committee.

General Tai. Thinks a week too long.

Uyeda. It will take a considerable time to pack, to leave, and to prepare new billets. Japanese are prepared to begin within a week, in accordance with Annex attached to Japanese draft.

Tai. Opposes that withdrawal can be accomplished within less than a week. Chinese special constabulary will be ready to take over very shortly.

Uyeda. Says he understands that first paragraph of Japanese draft of Annex is acceptable to the Chinese. Expresses his willingness to begin withdrawal within a week.

Tai. Objects to Paragraph 2 of Annex. Considers that sick can be removed.

(Chinese object to the stationing of Japanese guards for Japanese sick; say that doctors and sick can be left under Chinese protection.

Quo.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Quo. Asks for definition of "adjacent areas".

General Tai Chi. Argues that presence of armed Japanese guards after withdrawal of main Japanese force would cause grave difficulties.

(At this point Sub-Committee returned and General Tashiro made statement that he doubted the power of the Chinese, General, Huang, to represent China, as the latter was unable to give any information regarding Chinese lines south of Soochow Creek.)

(Of course, the Chinese do not have to give lines south of Soochow Creek. They would appear to have complied with all requirements as long as they have given lines opposite to Japanese lines.)

The meeting adjourned at 12.45, to meet again at 3 p.m.

NTJ

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4th Formal Meeting

Shanghai, March 25, 1932.
3 p.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
General Uyeda
General Tashiro
Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.
General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Baudet (French Minister being ill)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

Japanese and Chinese delegates met at 3 o'clock and began a long and tedious discussion of care of sick mentioned in second paragraph of Japanese Annex to Paragraph 3 of Japanese draft.

Sir Miles. Suggested that matter of evacuation and protection of sick left behind by Japanese forces might be taken care of by joint Commission.

Uyeda. Believes such a suggestion if adopted would mean too many complications.

Lampson. Offers following redraft:

"The Joint Commission to be established under
Article _____ will make any necessary arrangements

for

- 2 -

for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above."

Program for Withdrawal.

Quo. Asks how long it is going to take to withdraw Japanese troops.

Uyeda. Two areas to be evacuated. Evacuation of first area will begin within one week. He thinks that it will take six weeks to withdraw Japanese forces to localities adjacent to the Settlement.

Quo and General Tai. Consider six weeks too long and unnecessary.

Uyeda. Contends that six weeks is an outside limit. It will take considerable time to provide quarters for so many men.

Quo. Argues that early evacuation is necessary to permit farmers to resume their occupations. Points out that the International Settlement and extra-Settlement Hongkew roads are ultimate destination of Japanese troops. Of course it will take time for Japanese to prepare quarters outside of the Settlement on Chinese soil.

Shigemitsu. There is not enough room on Settlement area for large number of Japanese troops. Japanese mills
are

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are now opening and there is no room in mills for troops.

Quo. How long will it take to withdraw to Settlement and to extra-Settlement roads?

Uyeda. I cannot tell.

Quo. This point is essential under the League Resolution of March 4th.

Shigemitsu. Future situation must determine when troops will return to Settlement. It was because of the large number of Japanese troops that formula covering quarters outside in adjacent areas was adopted.

Quo. Formula was based on considerations of a technical nature. No question was made of political conditions.

Shigemitsu. Quite so. We want to take the troops out as soon as possible, but until the general situation permits they must remain. Cannot give any time limit when situation will permit troops to go.

Quo. Points out that whole purpose of conference was to carry out League Resolution covering cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Japanese troops. Unless there can be some promise of early withdrawal there is no use to continue negotiations.

Shigemitsu. States it is impossible for Japanese to name any time. Japan has no desire to keep troops here longer than is absolutely necessary; does not desire to continue expensive occupation, but cannot name time when troops will be taken out.

Uyeda.

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Uyeda. Suggests that they proceed to some other question.

Quo. Says that this is hardly useful, as question of time for departure is fundamental, and unless it is settled there is little use for us to go on.

Shigemitsu. Suggests that we proceed to Paragraph 2 of Japanese draft of Annex, which reads:

"The Chinese authorities shall station in the areas evacuated by the Japanese troops a force of special constabulary stipulated in the second paragraph of Article IV of the Agreement within _____ days of the signature thereof."

Quo. Objects to this paragraph, as it is covered by Article III of draft of March 19th which provides as follows:

"This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police."
Says Japanese draft smacks of a condition.

Lampson. Suggests that point be covered by inserting in Paragraph 3 of March 19th draft, after words "incoming Chinese police", the words "who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw".

(At this point Military Sub-Committee returns, composed of General Tashiro and General Huang, and Military Attaches. They report that Chinese find line laid down

by

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by Japanese completely unacceptable to the Chinese.)

Quo. States that line laid down by Japanese is totally unacceptable to Chinese; indicates intention of Japanese to remain and not to withdraw; says that the only thing he can do is to refer whole matter to League and to his Government.

Shigemitsu. Urges that Sub-Committee be permitted to continue its meetings and further to discuss question of Japanese localities, in hope that some understanding can be reached. States that he feels Sub-Committee can help in the accomplishment of the task ahead. Wants to go on with the main discussion, leaving the question of fixing the localities and military lines to the military to handle, we going on with the fundamentals. Proposes that we continue as we have been doing to-day, leaving out points on which we cannot meet, and discussing those on which we can meet.

Lampson. Having referred the matter to his colleagues, says that he and his colleagues representing the participating friendly powers are prepared to sit as long as there is any chance of agreement.

Shigemitsu. Considers that there is basis of agreement here. The foundation is there; let us build upon it.

Quo. Feels the two sides are so far apart he sees no reason for going ahead.

Shigemitsu. Again urges that they proceed.

(At

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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(At this point Sir Miles Lampson, Count Ciano, Mr. Baudet (Secretary of French Legation and acting on behalf of French Minister),⁷ and I agree to urge Quo not to break, as it is evident that Japanese are anxious to go ahead. Lampson and I both appeal to Quo not to break now, but to go on without prejudice to his position, in the hope that we may yet find common ground for agreement.)

(It is agreed that we will adjourn until 10 o'clock to-morrow, March 26th, when we will have one meeting in the morning, and then adjourn over Easter Sunday, permitting both sides to consider their positions.)

NTJ.
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

5th Formal Meeting

Shanghai, March 26, 1932.
10 a.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
General Uyeda
General Tashiro
Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Lagarde, (French Minister being ill)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

Uyeda. Proposed that we continue discussions and take up Paragraph 3 of draft of March 19th. He announced that this would be acceptable to the Japanese side, provided the words suggested by Sir Miles Lampson: "who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw" were inserted at the end of the second sentence between the word "police" and the period.

Uyeda likewise proposed to discuss Article V of Japanese draft, which reads:

"The Japanese and Chinese forces may carry on reconnoissance by airplanes over such points as may be considered necessary in order to watch the per-

formance

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formance of the provisions for the cessation of hostilities. The airplanes to be used in the aforesaid reconnoissance shall bear the following marks:

The Japanese airplanes _____

The Chinese airplanes _____ . "

Quo. Opposed discussion of this question as it is matter unilaterally offered. Stated that he desired to limit discussion to draft of March 19th which was mutually accepted.

Uyeda. Stated that while Article V was not in the draft of March 19th, still it is necessary to put it into discussion, as it will aid in determining whether cessation of hostilities is complete or not.

Quo. Said point was covered by activities of joint Commission. Use of airplanes will cause misunderstanding. Chinese want to stick to draft of March 19th.

Uyeda. States that point is not contrary to the spirit of the draft of March 19th and that, although Quo states that matter is covered by joint Commission, joint Commission is not a permanent body and observation of lines after withdrawal takes place will be necessary.

(There then followed a spirited discussion between Shigemitsu and Quo, Quo arguing that Japanese points should have been brought in for consideration in connection with the mutually adopted draft of March 19th, rather than as a new draft unilaterally offered without previous warning by the Japanese side. Lampson intervened to make

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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a suggestion, which seemed acceptable to both sides, to the effect that airplane observation might be carried out, if necessary, by the Commission. Lampson's suggestion as a substitute for Article V of Japanese draft follows, to be inserted at the end of Annex to draft of March 19th covering constitution of joint Commission:

"The Commission may, in accordance with its decisions, invoke the assistance of the representatives of the participating friendly powers in arranging for reconnoissance by airplane over such points as may be considered necessary in order to watch the performance of the provisions for the cessation of hostilities." The question was reserved for future consideration.

Article VI of Japanese draft reads:

"In the event of either of the Japanese or Chinese forces infringing any of the terms of the present agreement, the other shall have no obligation to comply with the same agreement."

Quo. States that this article presents a fundamental question in that it seems to ignore completely the League Resolution and the question of the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. Says that the introduction of this article alters whole character of negotiations. Points out that League Resolution contemplates two things: first, cessation of hostilities; second, regulation of withdrawal of Japanese troops; and says that withdrawal

of

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of Japanese troops is all-important question now. Hostilities are ended; Chinese troops have gone. If there are any present hostilities it is merely because Japanese troops have pursued Chinese troops. It is now necessary to arrange for the withdrawal of Japanese troops, so that the two forces may be separated.

Shigemitsu. It is quite true that withdrawal of Japanese troops is important to Chinese. Question of withdrawal of Japanese troops is now under discussion; that is what we are here for. But, if after program is completed, there is a breach of this arrangement on either side, then where will we be?

Lampson. Suggests that article be left out, as it is unusual in an agreement.

Johnson. Suggests that article be dropped; either the two sides cease hostilities, or they do not. What is the necessity for arranging for the breaking of the agreement in the text of the agreement itself?

Uyeda. There was no other meaning in this article other than an expression of sincerity on both sides.

Quo. Again points out that the agreement has a two-fold object, and the more important of the two objects is the withdrawal of Japanese forces, upon which cessation of hostilities depends. Japanese appear to have lost sight of this phase of the discussion, as draft which they have submitted emphasizes even as to its title the question

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tion of cessation of hostilities.

Shigemitsu. If we fail to withdraw

Quo. If you fail, then cessation of hostilities cannot become a fact.

Shigemitsu. Is it your proposal that we delete this Article VI of Japanese draft?

Quo. Yes.

Uyeda. Says article has no special meaning; that it is merely intended to indicate sincerity. He thinks article not worth so much discussion.

Quo. Says he is not arguing about the article. States that on considering this article and title of the Japanese draft, which reads: "Draft Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities between Japan and China", one is led to suspect that Japanese conception of the present negotiations is quite different from Chinese conception under the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of March 4th. Japanese appear to be discussing cessation of hostilities. We, however, have come to discuss not only the cessation of hostilities, but also the withdrawal of the Japanese forces; and of the two points, the withdrawal of the Japanese forces is the more important, as hostilities have already ceased.

Uyeda. States he is prepared to consider question of withdrawal.

It was here suggested that in Article VII of the
Japanese

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Japanese draft the text be so amended as to indicate that in case of dispute the English text would become authority.

At this point also there was brought in the Lampson-Teichman suggestion for a substitution in regard to Article V of the Japanese draft which has been quoted above, and it was agreed that this should be taken away by the Japanese for further consideration.

It being Saturday, it was agreed that the meeting would adjourn until Monday, March 28th, at 10 a.m.

N.T. J.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

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 By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

6th Formal Meeting

Shanghai, March 28, 1932.
 10 a.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
 General Uyeda
 General Tashiro
 Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
 General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
 General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
 Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
 Mr. Johnson, American Minister
 Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
 Mr. Lagarde (French Minister being ill)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

Over the week-end a new draft had been prepared by
 1/ Mr. Teichman and labeled Draft B. It is attached hereto
 as an annex.

Article I of Draft B.

Uyeda. Considers that plain-clothes snipers are
 an invention of the Chinese army and should be regarded
 as one of the activities of the Chinese army. They have
 done their work both with the army and after the army
 has retired. He feels there is no doubt that they are
 part of the regular Chinese forces. For instance, it is
 a fact that of thirty odd prisoners returned to the Chi-
 nese ten were plain-clothes men. In accepting these ten

men

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men in plain clothes it is recognized by the Chinese that they were members of the Chinese army. Nevertheless, the Chinese deny the fact that they accepted these war prisoners as regular soldiers. Now, because plain-clothes gunmen are a specialty of the Chinese army, and because the Chinese deny the fact, we must all the more insist on making them a part of this article. We want to state clearly that the activities of these plain-clothes gunmen should be included in the hostile acts mentioned in this article.

Quo. This question was discussed for some five hours the other day, and the Chinese not only deny the existence of any connection with the plain-clothes gunmen, but they have themselves undertaken to repress such people. There was the case of the Ronin on the Japanese side. It was as the result of the deadlock then reached that Sir Miles had suggested this wording as a way of getting around the point. (Reference is to Article I of Draft B which reads:

"The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease-fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from _____, 1932. The forces of the two sides will, so far as lies in their control, cease all hostile acts. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers."

Uyeda. Of the 36 prisoners returned to the Chinese, ten were plain-clothes gunmen. What is the explanation?

General Tai. They were not soldiers. They were

the

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the laoposhing, i.e. peasantry. There were four civilians received in the lot by the Bureau of Public Safety at Shanghai. Denies that they accepted any plain-clothes men as soldiers.

Uyeda. Here introduces a paper in Chinese which appears to be an order about sending out plain-clothes spies. It is an order of a Chinese Division Commander. Uyeda intends that it be accepted as documentary evidence that Chinese use plain-clothes gunmen.

Quo. Says this order applies merely to information, the employment of spies in plain clothes. It refers to the sending out of soldiers in plain clothes, or the employment of villagers to collect information.

Uyeda. One of the villagers confessed that he was employed by the Chinese regular army. Introduces a paper of confession. Suggests an amendment to Article I of Draft B: the words "including activities of plain-clothes gunmen and all forms of provocative acts" to be inserted after the word "hostile acts" and the period, at the end of the second sentence in Article I.

Lampson: Suggested inserting "and every form of" between "all" and "hostile act" at end of second sentence of Article I, Draft B.

Uyeda. The Chinese seem to think that plain-clothes soldiers are not included in "hostile acts".

Quo. Says that of course, activities of gunmen are included, if there are such, but denies that there are any

gunmen

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gunmen connected with the Chinese armies.

Uyeda. Wishes to study Sir Miles' suggestion.

Quo. Wishes to stand on old wording.

Article II.

"The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this agreement."

Reservation by Chinese Side.

"It is understood that nothing in this agreement implies any permanent restriction on the movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory."

Uyeda. Considers Chinese reservation unnecessary.

Quo. Wants to get back to original text of reservation as he submitted it on the 25th:

"China accepts the phrase 'pending later arrangements' on the understanding that it does not imply any restriction upon the right of the Chinese Government to move its troops freely within Chinese territory upon a resumption of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this agreement."

Uyeda. What is the meaning of "resumption of normal conditions" in Chinese reservation?

Shigemitsu. Interrupted to say that Quo was bringing up a fundamental question. Japanese cannot accept Chinese interpretation of words "pending later arrangements". No other interpretation is acceptable to the Japanese. This agreement is temporary.

Quo. We cannot enter into any arrangement that will impair our sovereignty or political integrity.

Shigemitsu. We understand your difficulties. We
have

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have no intention to restrict permanently your sovereignty. This arrangement is temporary.

Quo. "Pending later arrangements" means limitation in the minds of his critics.

Lampson. Suggests that words "upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this agreement" be inserted after word "arrangements" in first sentence of Article II of Draft B.

Quo. Wants to consider question.

Shigemitsu. Is willing to accept the words to assist the Chinese, but thinks that sentence as it stands meets all points. Japanese object to any written interpretation.

(Insertion of phrase suggested by Lampson would mean of course that Chinese troops would remain in present position until released by subsequent arrangement.)

Annex II.

"The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated in Annex III will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the agreement, and will be completed as soon as possible within a maximum period of six weeks.

"A Joint Commission to be established under Article IV will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above."

Uyeda. Suggests following as a substitute for Paragraph I of Annex II:

"The

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"The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated in Annex III will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the agreement and will be completed in four weeks of the commencement of the withdrawal."

Quo. It is important for him to know whether this time mentioned refers to withdrawal to points mentioned in Article III.

Shigemitsu. No. It refers to withdrawal to localities adjacent to those mentioned in Article III.

Quo. Then this program is quite incomplete. Localities adjacent to those mentioned in Article III were for temporary accommodation of large number of Japanese troops.

Shigemitsu. You raise a fundamental question.

Quo. If it is fundamental with you, it is even more fundamental with us. If you are going to stop at those localities, then when are you going to complete the withdrawal to the Settlement and extra-Settlement roads? This is but the first part of the program; where is the second?

Shigemitsu. We cannot say anything about that.

Quo. That point must be covered.

Shigemitsu. You raise a fundamental point. We do not intend to stay there permanently; but how long we will stay we cannot say. We will withdraw altogether as soon as the situation improves.

Quo. That is not the point. What we want to know is when you can complete the withdrawal.

Shigemitsu.

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Shigemitsu. You raise again a fundamental point. The question of final withdrawal must be left to Japanese. We do not wish to leave our troops here any longer than is necessary.

Quo. I insist on a time limit; otherwise conditions in and about Shanghai will remain as they are.

Shigemitsu. Of course we would like to contribute to the betterment of conditions.

Lampson. At this point Sir Miles suggested the insertion of the following between the first and second paragraphs of Annex II:

"The further withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the areas mentioned in the first sentence of Article III will be completed as soon as local conditions (of local security) permit of such reductions in the numbers of the said troops as will enable them to be accommodated in the said areas."

Shigemitsu. Sir Miles' suggestion is unacceptable to the Japanese.

Quo. Sir Miles' suggestion is unacceptable to the Chinese. In the first place, Chinese forces are now retired; therefore, what is the necessity of such a large force of Japanese? Second, so long as a large force of Japanese remains outside the Settlement, just so long will conditions be bad. Conditions are disturbed by the fact that Japanese forces are apparently an army of occupation.

Shigemitsu. With reference to Mr. Quo's first point, Japanese wish to decrease their number as soon as
armistice

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armistice is signed. With reference to his second point, Japanese wish to assist in the restoration of normal conditions.

Quo. States that he feels line suggested by Japanese on Saturday, i.e., line from Chenju to Paoshan to which Japanese forces would retire, indicates that Japanese wish to keep here an army of occupation.

Shigemitsu. Of course, the suggestion of that line may have caused misunderstanding.

Quo. It was hardly a misunderstanding. It gave me a distinct shock, and I have not yet recovered.

Admiral Shimada. Conditions are such that we must stay. There is curfew in the Settlement.

Quo. Curfew is the effect, and not the cause of these conditions. If Japanese withdraw there will be no curfew; pre-curfew conditions will rapidly return. Mr. Shigemitsu said nothing about local conditions when we talked informally about the three points and agreed to them. Then only technical difficulties attendant upon the accommodation of such a large number of Japanese troops were considered.

Shigemitsu. It is true I said nothing about local conditions, but I did speak about the physical impossibilities of accommodating so many troops. But I never said anything about any time limit.

Quo. Physical limitations are easily ascertained.

Local

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Local conditions can never be agreed upon. We are concerned here with the physical conditions that had to be taken care of, and not with local conditions.

(Mr. Shigemitsu here indicated a desire to change the wording of Article III.)

Lampson. Have you an outside time limit to suggest?

Quo. My instructions were "within one month".

(Turning to Shigemitsu): You are attaching certain conditions to the League Resolution. When you accepted the League Resolution of March 4th you accepted it unconditionally.

The meeting adjourned, until 3 p.m.

N.T.J.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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DRAFT "B"

March 27, 1932.

Article I

The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from _____ 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease all hostile acts. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

Article II

The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement.

Reservation by Chinese Side.

It is understood that nothing in this agreement implies any permanent restriction on the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory. C

Article III

In accordance with the programme regulating withdrawal as shown in Annex II to this agreement, the Japanese

nese

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nese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex III to this Agreement.

Article IV.

A Joint Commission, including members representing the participating friendly Powers, will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as defined in Annex IV to this Agreement.

Article V

The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present Agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

Done

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Done at Shanghai, this _____ day of _____
nineteen hundred and thirty-two, corresponding to
_____.

(Chinese and Japanese signatures.)

In the presence of:

(Signatures of foreign heads of Mission)

Representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in
the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of
the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4, 1932.

Annex I

The following are the positions beyond which the
Chinese troops will not advance as provided in Article
II of this Agreement.

(Here insert definition of the Chinese positions.)

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto,
the positions in question will be ascertained by the
representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

Annex II

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the lo-
calities indicated in Annex III will be commenced with-
in one week of the coming into force of the agreement

and

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and will be completed as soon as possible within a maximum period of six weeks.

The Joint Commission to be established under Article IV will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

Annex III

The following are the localities in which the Japanese troops will be temporarily stationed as provided in Article III of this Agreement.

(Here insert definition of the localities in which the Japanese troops are to be temporarily stationed.)

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question will be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

Annex IV

The Joint Commission will be composed of 12 members, namely one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian heads of Mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in

accordance

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accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

The Commission may in accordance with its decisions invoke the assistance of its members, the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, in arranging for reconnaissance by the latter by air over such points as may be considered necessary in order to watch the carrying out of the provisions regulating the cessation of hostilities.

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Separate Voluntary Declaration by the Chinese Government

(To be issued either prior to or simultaneously
with the conclusion of the Agreement, but not
to be annexed thereto.)

In order to ease the general situation and to secure the prompt re-establishment of stability and normal conditions in the affected areas, the Chinese Government hereby intimate their intention immediately to establish on their own initiative, for the maintenance of peace and order in the evacuated area in the vicinity of the Shanghai Settlements, a force of special constabulary, for which they contemplate the employment of experts as officers and instructors. It is understood that the incoming Chinese police referred to in the penultimate sentence of Paragraph 3 of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities of _____ will be drawn from the above special constabulary.

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7th Formal Meeting.

Shanghai, March 28, 1932.
 3 p.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
 General Uyeda
 General Tashiro
 Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
 General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
 General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
 Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
 Mr. Johnson, American Minister
 Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
 Mr. Lagarde (French Minister being ill)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

When negotiations recommenced at 3 p.m., Mr. Quo announced that he wished to make an observation on behalf of General Chiang Kuang Nai. He then read a telegram to the effect that since both sides had ordered firing to cease the Japanese had been pressing the Chinese near Huangtu and Taizang.

Uyeda. Denied that there had been any advance by Japanese since the armistice.

Annex II.

Uyeda. Stated that the Japanese had no objection to Annex II.

Quo. Stated that might be so, but that there was
objection

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objection to Annex II as it now stood, from the Chinese point of view. Chinese were willing to take into consideration the physical conditions necessitating the keeping of large Japanese forces outside the Settlement, but they found it difficult to understand or to appreciate other reasons offered. He said that as long as Japanese troops remain outside of the Settlement area conditions in and about Shanghai cannot return to normal; and for the Japanese to use the abnormal situation thus caused as a reason for keeping troops here is to start a vicious circle.

Uyeda. Mr. Quo's argument is a repetition of his statement of yesterday. Our reply is the same. We wish to withdraw as soon as possible; as to the question of time, all that the Japanese can say is that they will be there "temporarily".

Quo. Asks for a definition of the word "temporarily".

Uyeda. States he has no words to define the situation he has in mind. It relates to conditions and would be interpreted by the Chinese as political.

Lampson. (To Quo): Do you not have a draft to offer?

Quo. Stated that he had, but held the old draft back as sent to him by his own Government, for it was more harsh in its terms than the one which we had agreed to use here in Shanghai.

Lampson. Inquired whether the matter did not turn

on

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the definition of the localities.

Quo. Yes, but even small localities might become very important if occupation should be permanent or indefinite.

Shigemitsu. The number of Japanese troops depends on conditions. "Temporary" is the only word acceptable to the Japanese.

Quo. Insists upon some kind of a time limit, for only then will negotiations succeed in making effective the first part of the undertaking in Article III of Draft B which reads:

"The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932."

Only then will it result that negotiations conform to the spirit of the Resolution of March 4th of the Assembly of the League. He suggests that we leave this question for the present.

Annex I.

Shigemitsu. Doubts the necessity of second paragraph of Draft B:

"In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers members of the joint Commission."

Suggests that this matter belongs of right to the joint Commission.

Article IV.

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Article IV.

"A joint Commission including members representing the participating friendly powers will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as defined in Annex IV to this Agreement."

This article was accepted.

Annexes I and III.

Shigemitsu. Wants second paragraphs of Annexes I and III omitted, in view of the first sentence of Article IV now accepted, which he says appears to cover the point.

(The point in question is the resolution of doubts in regard to the question of positions of Chinese and Japanese troops by members of the joint Commission representatives of the participating friendly powers.)

Quo. Wants these paragraphs to stay.

(Japanese are evidently trying to avoid inspection of their lines and troops by third parties.)

Shigemitsu. Argues that after all negotiations are merely to fix the positions, and there can be no doubt after they are fixed. He wants an opportunity to consider this question.

Article V.

"The present agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof. The present agreement is made (in duplicate) in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being

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being any doubts as to the meaning, or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative."

This article accepted, omitting the words in parentheses.

Annex I.

Shigemitsu. Wants last paragraph omitted:

"In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers, members of the joint Commission."

Quo. Favors retaining it, as it is an elaboration of the provisions of Article IV describing the joint Commission.

Uyeda. Says Chinese up to the present have argued for simplicity; therefore wishes to drop this paragraph in the interest of simplicity.

Quo. Thinks future doubts must be taken care of.

Shigemitsu. Feels that in case of future doubts the joint Commission would naturally come into play.

Uyeda. Points out that if this paragraph is retained, then it is the representatives of the participating friendly powers, independently of the Chinese or Japanese, who will make investigation.

Quo. Precisely; that is the point and that is why I think the paragraph should stand.

Uyeda. Representatives of the participating friendly powers are being consulted for the purpose of fixing

the

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the localities to begin with. Once the localities have been fixed, then they should be ascertained and certified by the joint Commission which includes both parties. Thinks it unnecessary to retain paragraph as it stands.

Quo. There may be doubts in the future, in which case we can appeal to the joint Commission to resolve the doubts.

Shigemitsu. Believes this is provided for in Article IV.

Quo. If there are doubts then let us refer them to third parties. This is quite fair.

(Quo passes a penciled note to Lampson explaining that Chinese do not want Japanese investigating their lines.)

Uyeda. To retain this paragraph would change the spirit of Article IV.

Lampson. Why not insert the words "upon the request of the joint Commission" after the word "ascertained" and before the word "by", and thus bring the joint Commission directly into play.

Shigemitsu. Japanese desire to give further study to the question.

Annex III.

Uyeda. Reserves for further study last paragraph of Annex III reading:

"In the event of doubts arising in regard
thereto,"

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thereto, the localities in question will be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly powers members of the joint Commission."

Shigemitsu. We want to omit words "in which the Japanese troops will be temporarily stationed" from Paragraph 1 of Annex III, which would then read:

"The following are the localities as provided in Article III of this agreement"

The Chinese accept this suggestion.

Annex IV.

"The Joint Commission will be composed of twelve members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments; and the American, British, French, and Italian heads of Missions in China, being the representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th.

"The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission.

"All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote.

"The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly powers.

"The Commission may, in accordance with its decision, invoke the assistance of its members, the representatives of the participating friendly powers, in arranging for reconnaissance by the latter by air over such points as may be considered necessary in order to watch the carrying out of the provisions regulating the cessation of hostilities."

Uyeda. Referring to reconnaissance by airplanes, suggests following reading to be substituted for that used in Draft B quoted above:

"The

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"The Japanese and/or Chinese members may be permitted, upon consultation with other members of the Commission, to arrange for reconnoissance by air over such points as may be considered necessary in order to watch the carrying out of the provisions regulating the cessation of hostilities."

Quo. Objects to Japanese suggestion. Points out that matter was discussed at some length before and feels that it must be left to friendly neutrals as suggested in Draft B. Japanese suggestion is unacceptable to the Chinese. It is too much like the original proposal made by the Japanese.

Uyeda. Of course the only time when airplanes are to be used will be when either side has doubt. The participation of the friendly powers goes without saying, but the party that has the doubt should go to see.

Quo. The Chinese will be happy to have neutral parties investigate, and are ready to accept the investigation of friendly neutrals.

Uyeda. Even when the participating friendly powers have a suspicion, a reconnoissance will be made much more practicable if carried out by the parties themselves.

Lampson. Suggests that words "be permitted upon consultation with other members" be dropped from Japanese suggestion, and that words "requests the" be substituted therefor.

Quo. Says he wants an amendment to the Annex, to the effect that all airplane flights will be with the permission of the Chinese Government. This might of course

merely

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merely involve the concurrence of the Chinese member of the Commission. He offers the following, for insertion at the end of last paragraph of Annex IV:

"It will be necessary for the Chinese member, on behalf of the Chinese Government, to signify his concurrence, which will not be unreasonably withheld."

This question was left over for further consideration.

At this point the Military Sub-Committee made its report.

Quo. Wants to refer question of withdrawal of Japanese troops to his Government. Feels that the negotiations have come to an impasse on this point.

(It becomes increasingly clear that Japanese intend to withdraw behind railway and hold this area indefinitely.)

The Military Sub-Committee takes recess until Wednesday morning, March 30th.

Negotiations adjourned until 10 a.m., Tuesday, March 29th.

N.T.J.
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

8th Formal Meeting.

Shanghai, March 29, 1932.
Tuesday, 10 a.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
General Uyeda
General Tashiro
Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Lagarde (French Minister being ill)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

Sir Miles. Makes an appeal to both sides to make
speed.

Johnson. Endorses Sir Miles' appeal.

Quo. Endorses Sir Miles' appeal. Points out that
we spent some five of the 21½ hours' negotiations thus
far used discussing plain-clothes gunmen only, and then
had it brought up again. Says Chinese are ready to go
ahead with the fundamentals, among which they admit the
most fundamental is the question of the withdrawal of
Japanese troops. Hostilities have now ceased, and the
only thing left is for the Japanese soldiers to with-
draw. Japanese should begin withdrawal at once.

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(It takes half an hour for Japanese and Chinese to explain why they have not been speedier.)

Uyeda. Thus far, he thinks, we have discussed and passed two articles. We are now engaged in discussing question of localities and of time. Although Chinese say we have wasted time, feels that time has not been wasted because of importance of questions discussed. Points to progress made by Military Sub-Committee. With reference to the time and localities, these are not independent questions. If Chinese force Japanese to narrow the localities, it will be very difficult for the Japanese to carry out withdrawal smoothly.

Shigemitsu. General Uyeda wants to leave matters of localities to the Sub-Committee, while negotiations go on for the agreement.

Article I.

"The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease-fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from _____ 1932. The forces of the two sides will, so far as lies in their control, cease all and every form of hostile act.

"In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers."

Quo. Was ready to accept the original version of this article, but Japanese wanted an amendment, and Sir Miles had suggested adding the words "and every form of" after the word "all" and before the word "hostile act".

Uyeda.

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Uyeda. This important article relates to plain-clothes gunmen. If Chinese had acknowledged the plain-clothes men then we could have got along very fast. Sir Miles offered an amendment; Japanese are prepared to accept article thus amended, provided it is understood that the article includes activities of plain-clothes gunmen.

Quo. We have never admitted the employment of plain-clothes gunmen. Chinese would have added activities of "Japanese ronin".

Lampson. Do you accept Article I with addition of words "all and every form of"?

Quo. We want original text.

Lampson. Let us get on.

Quo and Uyeda. Accepted.

Article II.

"The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements (upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this agreement). The aforesaid positions are indicated in Article I of this agreement."

Quo. I have referred to my Government at Nanking Article II with the additional words (enclosed in parentheses in the quotation above) suggested by Sir Miles, to take the place of a reservation by the Chinese side.

Shigemitsu. I want to make it quite clear that we cannot entertain any idea of vagueness in this understanding.

Article III.

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Article III.

"In accordance with the program regulating withdrawal as shown in Annex II to this Agreement, the Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932."

Quo. The vital point is time limit. The whole question of Japanese withdrawal must be considered in a light different from that hitherto cast upon it. The principal is set forth in the first sentence of this article. The second sentence deals with certain physical aspects. If the Japanese side is unwilling to give the Chinese a complete program based on a time table covering their withdrawal, then it seems difficult to know how we can go on.

Shigemitsu. I must go back to Article II (which has to do with the position of Chinese troops) and point out that we have not yet passed Annex I, which also relates to the designation of Chinese positions, a question on which the Sub-Committee is still working. I accepted Article III in the course of our informal discussions, on the basis that both sentences were to be considered on the same level of importance. The Japanese quite understand Mr. Quo's point of view, but the Japanese point of view also must be clearly understood. I feel that the Sub-Committee must be requested to work very hard. Then we could go ahead.

(Shigemitsu clearly implied, although this was not said, that Japanese are putting a great deal of weight

upon

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upon question of positions of Chinese troops. By this time it was known to all of us that the Japanese were insisting that the Chinese give to them in the Military Sub-Committee, in connection with Annex I, the location of Chinese troops south of Soochow Creek and east of the Whangpoo in the Pootung area.)

Quo. But the Military Sub-Committee is working only on the question of the "localities" (i.e., the localities to which the Japanese troops were to be withdrawn outside the Settlement areas stipulated for in Annex II); that is only one of the points involved. There still remains the question of a time limit, a schedule, a time table.

Shigemitsu. We attach great importance to Article III.

Lampson. Can you not accept the article?

Shigemitsu. We cannot accept the first phrase of fifteen words until Annex II has been accepted.

Uyeda. With reference to the questions of "time" and "localities", both are connected with matters now under consideration by the Sub-Committee. The question of time cannot be considered independently of the question of localities.

Annex I.

"The following are the positions of the Chinese troops as provided in Article II of this Agreement;

(Here insert definition of the Chinese positions)

"In

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"In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will be ascertained (upon the request of the joint Commission) by the representatives of the participating friendly powers members of the Commission."

Quo. Change suggested in last paragraph of Annex I put forward by Sir Miles is acceptable to the Chinese.

Uyeda. Considers entire paragraph unnecessary.

Quo. No reservation in regard to last paragraph was made on the Japanese side during preliminary discussions.

Shigemitsu. Said he did not make any reservation as he thought it was a mere matter of procedure: for instance, when a locality was fixed it was fixed, and nothing else need be done about it, - therefore, why keep this paragraph in the annex?

Quo. Considers paragraph and provisions for participating friendly powers useful. Wants paragraph kept, and feels that it will be helpful if they can call upon the participating friendly powers.

Uyeda. This concerns the first period of evacuation or withdrawal. The second stage is taken care of by the Commission. Therefore he considers paragraph unnecessary.

Quo. General Uyeda's point is met by Sir Miles' suggested reference to the Commission. Hopes that there will be no question in the future, but should such occur then they will wish to have mediation of the participating friendly powers available.

Uyeda.

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Uyeda. Provision for assuring questions with regard to withdrawal by the Joint Commission, if changed, would imply lack of confidence by the Joint Commission. Stated that he believed the paragraph should be omitted.

Quo. We have every confidence in the Commission.

Uyeda. The first stage is to be taken care of by the participating friendly powers. The second stage is covered by Article IV and therefore it is hardly necessary that we continue to use the participating friendly powers after this has been done.

Quo. The defining of the areas is the work of the Military Sub-Committee. We are providing for the future. The paragraph is acceptable to us.

Uyeda. Suggests that question be reserved for future consideration, as we are only repeating ourselves.

Annex II.

"The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated in Annex III will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the agreement, and will be completed (in four weeks of the commencement of the withdrawal). The Joint Commission to be established under Article IV will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above."

Uyeda. Says that period of four weeks (see words in parentheses in quoted annex above) suggested by Japanese yesterday was dependent upon withdrawal to points being

considered

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considered by Sub-Committee. He wants to reserve this question of the four-week period until the Sub-Committee's work is finished.

Quo. Phrase following amendment to the text of Annex II to be inserted between first and second paragraphs, to complete program of withdrawal:

"The withdrawal from the adjacent localities to the International Settlement and extra-Settlement roads as mentioned in Article III will be completed within _____ weeks from the signing of this agreement."

Uyeda. Intends to complete withdrawal as soon as possible, but cannot easily give a date of withdrawal. It is a matter of local conditions; Japanese cannot commit themselves to a date.

Quo. I regard this point as essential to the complete fulfilment of the Assembly's Resolution. Yesterday I mentioned a draft that I had received from Nanking which set a time limit of four weeks for such withdrawal, but I did not bring it before the meeting because of a desire to meet Japanese difficulties. This draft which I have offered in the light of my instructions makes quite a concession in point of time, but we want to be conciliatory. The longer the Japanese troops remain outside the area of the Settlement, the longer the situation in and around Shanghai will remain disturbed, the longer it will take to restore normal conditions, and the greater the tendency to perpetuate feelings of animosity among the people who have

suffered

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suffered most grievously during these recent days of conflict. The Chinese Government cannot find any way to surmount the difficulties unless a definite time is fixed.

Uyeda. Notwithstanding the fact that the Chinese delegates have more strict instructions from Nanking, it appears that they themselves have been more lenient than their instructions. This shows that the Chinese delegates understand the difficulty which faces the Japanese, who are not in a position to fix a date, for it is a question of local conditions.

Shigemitsu. Mr. Quo again raises the fundamental question of the withdrawal of troops. On this point I tried to make it clear from the beginning that we must be free to decide how many troops we need to protect our people here, and how physical conditions make it necessary for us to put our troops outside of the Settlement because of the numbers necessary to protect our people. We wish to contribute as much as we can to the restoration of normal conditions, but we cannot now determine when those normal conditions will return.

Quo. You have from the beginning raised the question of physical conditions.

Shigemitsu. We never intended to station our troops here permanently.

Lampson. The Chinese want a time limit. The Japanese

nese

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nese state that withdrawal is dependent upon conditions of local security. The idea of local security is not a new one; it was mooted at Geneva by the President of the Assembly during the discussion of the Resolution of March 4th. Perhaps the following text might help: (It is suggested that it be inserted as a new paragraph between Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annex II.)

"The further withdrawal of Japanese troops to the areas mentioned in the first sentence of Article III will be completed as soon as conditions of local security permit of such reductions in the numbers of the said troops as will enable them to be accommodated in the said areas. This will be effected as soon as possible in accordance with the spirit of the Resolution of March 4th and the discussion which preceded its adoption."

Suggested that this draft be carried away by both sides for consideration. We are faced with a deadlock: the Chinese say we must have a time limit; the Japanese say we can have no time limit. Why not carry this away for consideration?

Uyeda. Expresses appreciation for a suggestion which he is ready to study, but wants to make it clear that he cannot accept a time limit although he wishes to withdraw his troops as soon as it is possible.

Quo. So long as suggestion is compatible with our stand, we are always ready to consider any suggestion that may be helpful. We have given every proof of this.

Lampson. Both sides may take the suggestion and turn it in any way so as to make it acceptable.

It

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It was agreed to pass over Annex II for later consideration.

It was agreed to pass over Annex III for later consideration.

Annex IV.

Last paragraph of Annex IV quoted below came up for discussion:

"The Commission may, in accordance with its decisions, invoke the assistance of its members, the representatives of the participating friendly powers, in arranging for reconnaissance by the latter by air over such points as may be considered necessary in order to watch the carrying out of the provisions regulating the cessation of hostilities."

(The question was Chinese Government's approval of reconnaissance airplane flights over Chinese territory.)

Lampson. Chinese have membership on joint Commission, and that membership can represent the Chinese Government in giving permission to the Commission.

Quo. Feels that his suggestion is quite necessary.

Lampson. But China can delegate power to the Chinese members of the Commission.

Quo. Objects on ground that it is an impairment of China's sovereign rights over the air, and wants to return to the original text in Draft B. Says Annex IV as contained in Draft B has been referred to Nanking. He is prepared to accept text as given in Draft B. He does not

find

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find acceptable the redraft offered which reads:

"The joint Commission will

"The Japanese and/or Chinese members may request the Commission to arrange for and undertake in such manner as it deems best reconnoissance by air over such points as may be considered necessary in order to watch the carrying out of the provisions regulating the cessation of hostilities. The Chinese members on behalf of the Chinese Government will signify their concurrence."

He suggests that we go back to the text as it appears in Draft B, and that words in last paragraph: "the representatives of the participating friendly powers" be omitted, in order that the matter be undertaken by the Commission and thus the desires of the Japanese be met.

Lagarde. Suggests that all reference to reconnoissance by air be dropped, so that second paragraph of Annex IV would read:

"The Commission may in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of the provisions regulating the cessation of hostilities."

Quo. Suggests that amendment be made specific by referring to the carrying out of the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this agreement. Last paragraph would then read:

"The Commission may in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles I, II, and III of this agreement."

Quo. Indicated that he liked this idea.

It was agreed that Annex IV should be reserved for consideration by both sides.

Meeting adjourned until 10 a.m. on Thursday, March 31st.

N.T.J.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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9th Formal Meeting

Shanghai, March 31, 1932.
Thursday, 10 a.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
General Uyeda
General Tashiro
Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Lagarde (French Minister being ill)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

Meeting convened at 10 a.m.

Uyeda. Asks whether we should go into details of
withdrawal or discuss Article II.

Lampson. Suggests that we clear away small mat-
ters first, as ability to clean up small matters will
help much toward the clearing up of larger questions.

Uyeda. Assents.

Article II.

"The Chinese troops will remain in their
present positions pending later arrangements
(upon the restoration of normal conditions in
the areas dealt with by this agreement). The
aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I
to this agreement."

Quo.

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Quo. Wants to know the meaning of the word "upon" in the phrase in parentheses: "upon the reestablishment of normal conditions". Says that Nanking favors additional phrase plus reservation, or would prefer reservation without additional phrase. States that of course the Chinese take it for granted that, meeting as we are under the auspices of the League and with the participation of the friendly powers at the invitation of the League, there will be no infringements of Chinese sovereignty.

Shigemitsu. You propose to put in a reservation?

Quo. Yes. By instructions from Nanking.

Shigemitsu. You put back our discussions to the beginning, so I must state again our argument: "pending later arrangements" is not permanent, and we cannot accept any reservation.

Quo. Then I must make a reservation.

Shigemitsu. We referred the newly-drafted clause to our Government.

Quo. The new phraseology merely defines the word "later"; it does not really cover the original point that I raised.

Lampson. I put it to you, Mr. Quo, that the phrase "upon the reestablishment of normal conditions" really means the same thing as your reservation.

Johnson. If the Chinese reservation means the same as the phrase "upon the re-establishment of normal conditions",

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ditions", then what is the objection to their making it? If it merely amplifies what is already said, I, for one, can see no objection.

Lampson. Under Article I we discussed the question of plain-clothes gunmen. General Uyeda accepted our understanding that phraseology covered gunmen. Why cannot Chinese accept our understanding on this subject? You, Mr. Quo, can record your views with us just as General Uyeda did his. There can be no objection, because this (pointing to text of Chinese reservation which reads: "It is understood that nothing in this agreement implies any permanent restriction on the movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory") means the same as that (pointing to first sentence of Article II which reads: "The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this agreement").

Quo. I want to make an official declaration along the lines of my original text quoted in Draft B.

Shigemitsu. How will it then stand?

Lampson. It will stand as drafted; Paragraph I with the suggested addition; the second paragraph will then become an official declaration to the Conference. Thus:

"Article II. The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by the agreement. The aforesaid

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aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this agreement.

"Official declaration to Conference by Mr. Quo. It is understood that nothing in this agreement implies any permanent restriction of the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory."

Shigemitsu. This is acceptable to Japan.

Shigemitsu. The Military Sub-Committee is working on Article III (relative to withdrawal of Japanese troops).

Quo. The Military Sub-Committee is working on the question of localities.

Annex I.

(Question of examination of positions by neutral observers in case of doubts.)

Lampson. Can we not accept this text now?

Shigemitsu. In this connection we have certain legal difficulties which we have had to refer to Tokyo, and we have had no reply. The legal point is: Can we accept that our positions be ascertained by a third party without participation by our own people?

Quo. Your difficulty applies only to your side. The arrangement is acceptable to us.

Shigemitsu. We will have to ask that the matter be passed over.

It was agreed that Annexes I and III should be passed over.

Annex II

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Annex II

(Relative to withdrawal of Japanese troops.)

Quo. This brings up the most important point in this conference, so far as we are concerned. We want to see normal conditions restored as soon as possible, and if that object is to be attained it is important that none of the old sores be left open. The sooner we can make the people forget the unhappy events of recent days the better for every one. It is our opinion that the longer Japanese troops remain on Chinese soil, the longer will the sore remain open and the more difficult it will be to forget. Conditions are returning to normal. The curfew has been lifted by the French Concession and by the International Settlement. All of this indicates a relaxation of the nervous tension which has existed, and convinces us that the necessity of maintaining so large a Japanese force in and about Shanghai no longer exists; so we feel that the Japanese can voluntarily and of their own free will arrange a time table for their withdrawal. We have been conciliatory; we have left matters entirely in their hands; we have tried not to dictate the length of time that we desire fixed. I want to appeal to the Japanese side to meet the Chinese point of view in order to achieve our common object.

Uyeda. Mr. Quo's statement is well understood. We also recognize that Shanghai and its vicinity is re-
turning

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turning to normal, but we do not think that the time has come to withdraw our armies altogether. Of course we must try to get people to forget the trouble and anxiety through which they have gone; not only that, we must try to remove all the cause that has brought about this unfortunate affair. We are making progress in that direction but have not yet reached our goal; that is why we cannot state that we are ready to withdraw our army altogether.

Shigemitsu. I sincerely appreciate the sentiments of Dr. Quo in connection with Article II. He expressed the idea that normal and friendly relations between our two countries are to be reestablished; he said that normal conditions about Shanghai are coming back quickly, and I agree with him. We want normal conditions to be restored as soon as possible so that everyone can pursue his business in full prosperity. As a matter of fact, when we declared cessation of hostilities we sent back a large proportion of our troops and of our navy without any request from the Chinese. All of this we are doing and have done without being compelled by any agreement. We are very anxious to contribute to the restoration of normal conditions. I can say more: we wish to pursue this policy to the extreme. To put a definite time limit to the stay of our troops is an impossibility for us, but we are glad to express our policy, namely: we shall
be

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be glad to see the time come when we will need no troops, not even a sailor. As I said before, we cannot fix a date. (Producing a copy of the SHANGHAI TIMES of March 31, 1932, from among his papers) I do not bring newspaper reports to disturb sentiment, but to-day's newspaper (pointing to a Press Union report on Page 3 dated from Nanking March 31, 1932) puts it this way:

"In this matter all factions seem to be resolved to carry on war for a long period of time."

I do not offer this for the purpose of disturbing the friendly character of our conference, but I do want to say that such kind of statements cause disturbance to our people. This sort of thing is sometimes believed by our people. We have to do what we can to improve the situation; we want to contribute to that end.

Lampson. Where does this item come from?

Shigemitsu. Shows him the paper.

Quo. You have one way of looking at things. Our way is that nothing can have so wholesome an effect as for you to make a time table; nothing could so reassure the people as to have them know that the Japanese troops were leaving. According to the nationalistic mind, nothing stirs the people to resistance so deeply as the retention of foreign troops upon the national soil. The thing that you refer to is effect and not cause. We have respected the neutrality of the Settlement; we have respected its security during all of the recent troubles.

Shigemitsu.

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Shigemitsu. I do not wish to refer to the past, but we have to face the present. We have the troops here; we have to devise a scheme as to how to withdraw.

Lampson. Refers to the high level adopted by both sides in this conference, which gives us hope that agreement is near. The Chinese want a time table; the Japanese cannot give one, but want to get out as soon as they can. I suggested the following formula which I hoped would be acceptable to both sides:

"The further withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the areas mentioned in the first sentence of Article III will be completed as soon as conditions of local security permit of such reductions in the numbers of said troops as will enable them to be accommodated in the said areas. This will be effective as soon as possible in accordance with the spirit of the Resolution of March 4th and the discussions which preceded its adoption."

Quo. I also offered the following formula:

"The withdrawal from the adjacent localities to the International Settlement and extra-Settlement roads as mentioned in Article III will be completed within _____ weeks from the signing of this agreement."

Sir Miles. I appeal to both sides to find some way to turn this corner.

Quo. I have made myself clear.

Shigemitsu. I did not think there was such disagreement between us until we met in this formal meeting.

Quo. I agreed as to the physical aspects of the situation, but I made no commitment as to the psychological side which was not taken into consideration.

Shigemitsu.

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Shigemitsu. It is the one word "temporary" that stands in the way. You want to define this word.

Quo. Anything which falls short of a time table will be unsatisfactory according to my instructions. I cannot sign anything less.

Lampson. This brings us up against it. We want to reestablish normal conditions. You, Mr. Quo, want a time table. You, Mr. Shigemitsu, cannot give one. Is there, then, no way around? We are at your service if we can help.

Quo. This is the last point. Let us jump over it, as General Uyeda says. When this is settled the conference is settled.

Uyeda. The area of withdrawal is now being discussed by the Military Sub-Committee, and although the Chinese criticize the area as being too big, we have understood from the beginning that areas would be bigger than the ideas of the Chinese in regard to them. Areas are not too large when considering the number of troops to be taken care of.

Uyeda. Here complains that the discussions of the Sub-Committee were made public, thus causing suspicion among the public. Points out that although the Chinese side have insisted on knowing time of withdrawal, the Japanese side have from the beginning insisted that Japanese armies remaining here will be temporary.

General Tai Chi.

- 10 -

General Tai Chi. The word "adjacent" has no limit; the word "neighboring" is the way we understand it. Places where troops are to stay must be more clearly defined.

(While this discussion was going on Quo sent a penciled suggestion to Sir Miles to say he thought that ultimate solution might be by mutual declaration or by an agreed minute, but that this must be taken up as a last resort and "out of committee". Lampson suggests that we have Quo and Shigemitsu in to tea, and this we agreed to do. Quo suggests in regard to mutual declaration that suggestion for this should come from participating ministers and not be made too prematurely.)

It was decided to go on to the final paragraph of Annex IV.

Uyeda. The meaning of the term "adjacent" need not be discussed here. Let us leave it to the Subcommittee. I raised the point about the rousing of the suspicion of the public only because the Chinese spoke of suspicion. As regards time limit, we would like to ask the Chinese when conditions will be safe enough for us to withdraw all our forces.

Quo. We must ask you about that. Our opinion is that when you go conditions will return to normal on their own account. So far as the Chinese are concerned

we

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we have always respected the security of the Settlement;
we do not threaten it. We went out of our way to ar-
range for a special constabulary to make for security in
the future.

Annex IV. (Last Paragraph)

(Question was acceptance of Mr. Lagarde's sugges-
tion that paragraph read as follows:)

"The Commission will in accordance with its
decisions watch in such manner as it deems best
the carrying out of the provisions of Articles I,
II, and III of this agreement."

Quo. Says above wording is acceptable to the Chi-
nese side; that whenever anything is reasonable it is al-
ways acceptable to the Chinese side.

Uyeda. We think it good on general principles, but
we think it vague. Prefer Sir Miles' suggestion and
have asked instructions from Tokyo.

Meeting adjourned until 10 a.m. on April 2nd.

NTJ
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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10th Formal Meeting.

Shanghai, April 2, 1932.
Saturday, 10 a.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
General Uyeda
General Tashiro
Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Lagarde (French Minister being ill)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

Shigemitsu. Announces that last paragraph of Annex
I and last paragraph of Annex III, which are the same
and which read:

"In the event of doubts arising in regard
thereto the positions (localities) in question
will be ascertained, upon the request of the
joint Commission, by the representatives of the
participating friendly powers members of the
joint Commission."

are acceptable to Japan. Thus both sides accept.

Annex IV.

The negotiations then proceeded to the considera-
tion of the following draft of the last paragraph of
Annex IV:

"The

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"The Commission will, in accordance with its decisions, watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this agreement."

Uyeda. This draft does not include a reconnaissance by air by name, but the Japanese delegation wishes the conference to know that the Japanese will grant permission whenever requested by the Commission. The Japanese consider that the use of airplanes is quite necessary, and they believe that they will often be requested.

Clause reading thus is accepted by both sides.

Annex II.

Shigemitsu. States that we have now come to three questions: Chinese positions, the localities of Japanese troops, and the withdrawal of Japanese troops. Intimates that Japanese localities and question of withdrawal are dependent upon designation of Chinese positions.

Quo. The Chinese positions are practically all named.

Shigemitsu. The Military Sub-Committee is working with knowledge.

Quo. The all-important question is the consideration of the time limit, upon which Japanese localities are dependent.

Uyeda. Do the Chinese have a good idea as to a time limit?

Quo. Our idea has been stated over and over again.

The

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The primary purpose of the Conference is the accomplishment of peace. We should avoid any mention of anything that will defeat that aim.

Uyeda. As Mr. Quo says, we also are anxious to re-establish peace and prosperity at Shanghai. The withdrawal of Japanese troops at Shanghai is dependent upon the reestablishment of security there; we are prepared to withdraw when security is obtained. We want to ask the Chinese to name a date when security has been restored. It is just as difficult to name a date for the return of security as it is to name a date for the withdrawal of our troops. Mr. Quo referred to a precedent established at Tsinan where the Japanese accepted a time limit for the stationing of their troops there. The Tsinan situation cannot be accepted as a precedent, as conditions there differed greatly from those here.

Quo. The Chinese hold that conditions of security have already been restored; the curfew has been lifted in the International Settlement and in the French Concession; business men are returning; factories are reopening; business houses are resuming operations. The only factor which makes for distrust and uncertainty is the presence of Japanese troops. Chinese forces have shown no acts of hostility against the International Settlement.

Shigemitsu. That is your argument; we feel quite differently. Our people are not free to go into the Chi-

nese

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nese city, nor are they free to go into some places in the International Settlement. We feel that the presence of our troops here has a reassuring effect upon our own people.

Quo. The special constabulary which the Chinese are organizing should meet your point.

Shigemitsu. Well, that is one step, but it really gets us only a little way.

Quo. The newspapers quote General Araki as stating that perhaps the Japanese may never withdraw.

Shigemitsu. That headline was most misleading. What he said was: "We will withdraw when we can feel that security has come back."

Quo. If China protects foreign life and property we can be held responsible. Ever since the outbreak and not until recently were Japanese jeopardized by attacks. Japanese have been protected. But what did the Japanese do for Chinese nationals in Korea? Comparatively speaking, our Government has done its duty in protecting Japanese life under most trying circumstances.

Lampson. I offered a formula the other day. Would that be acceptable? It reads:

"The further withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the areas mentioned in the first sentence of Article III will be completed as soon as local conditions permit of such reductions in the numbers of the said troops as will enable them to be accommodated in the said area."

Quo.

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Quo. If improved by the addition of a time limit it would be satisfactory.

Shigemitsu. We are reducing our troops all the time. We want to continue sending them back, but we cannot fix a time limit. We are quite ready to withdraw them as soon as possible. We have to deal with the sentiment of our own people.

Quo. I think that your own people can be made to understand. By keeping so many soldiers here are you not defeating your own purpose? Is not Japan primarily interested in trade? The presence of Japanese merchants in Shanghai is useless without good will. A prerequisite to revival of trade and reestablishment of order is peace, and withdrawal of Japanese soldiers will contribute more than any other thing to that end.

Shigemitsu. We are prepared to do our part toward the reestablishment of peace.

Quo. The local feeling of uncertainty will continue as long as Japanese troops continue here.

Lampson. Can we not come back to our formula?

Quo. To a country with several thousand years of history, a hundred years may be considered as "temporary".

Shigemitsu. (Sotto voce) Yes; in a country which considered itself the middle country of the world
(aloud) We are studying the question.

Quo. Suggests the appointment of a Sub-Committee
to

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to study the matter, as we are at a deadlock.

Shigemitsu. I cannot answer at once; I have referred the matter to Tokyo.

Quo. Both sides have exhausted their views.

Shigemitsu. Can we not await the receipt of our instructions?

Lampson. Suppose we adjourn, and over the week-end we will make a redraft containing text as far as we have been able to agree?

It was agreed that the meeting should adjourn until Monday, April 4th, at 3 p.m.


Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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11th Formal Meeting.

Shanghai, April 4, 1932.
Monday, 3 p.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
General Uyeda
General Tashiro
Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Lagarde (French Minister being ill)

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

Lampson. Over the week-end we circulated a new
1/ draft which we called "Draft C" (hereto attached). Shall
we begin discussion on the basis of this draft?

Uyeda. Thanks, Sir Miles, for preparing a new
draft. It refers to period mentioned in first paragraph
of Annex II which reads:

"The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the
localities indicated in Annex III will be commenced
within one week of the coming into force of the
agreement and will be completed in four weeks from
the commencement of the withdrawal."

The period mentioned is closely connected with the lo-
calities which the Japanese have had in mind, and this
time is therefore provisional until we can be certain
as to the localities.

Quo.

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Quo. Words in question have not been passed anyway. We might want the period shorter.

Uyeda. The discussion of the agreement has advanced step by step, and there now remains only the question of the ascertainment of the Chinese positions and the localities to which the Japanese troops must move, and the question of time limit. We understand that there is a serious question in regard to Chinese positions south of Soochow Creek and on the Pootung side of the Whangpoo River. The Chinese side refuse to designate these positions as they had nothing to do with the recent fighting, but on the Japanese side we consider these matters as being very important. They form part of the fundamental agreement and we want a definite answer from the Chinese.

Quo. The question of Chinese positions south of Soochow Creek and across the Whangpoo River in Pootung is new and not expected by us. At the informal meeting which we had at tea the other afternoon the question was brought up but was recognized as a new question, not only by the Chinese but by the representatives of the participating friendly powers. The question involves a fundamental principle, namely, the right of the Chinese to move their troops at will on Chinese soil.

Uyeda. In the preliminary and informal discussions there was no specified limit in regard to the Chinese
positions

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positions; all areas were to be discussed. We were surprised to learn that there should be any discussion about this. We have been told that there are no Chinese troops in Pootung, but we want more definite information. As long as there is no definition of the Chinese positions we must think over our situation. Also from the point of view of the protection of our troops and Japanese residents we must look carefully into this question.

Quo. This involves a fundamental principle, namely, China's right to move her troops freely on Chinese soil. The Japanese side say that it was understood at our informal meetings that this was to be discussed, but it was not so understood by us or by the participating friendly powers. General Uyeda says that the Japanese have properties in Pootung and therefore have a right to know where Chinese troops are. If we accept such an argument then what about Japanese properties all over China? Must we furnish the Japanese with information as to the location of Chinese troops because the Japanese own property in several places in China? We cannot discuss this question as it is beyond the scope of the Conference.

Uyeda. The Chinese say that it was not discussed before. If you examine the record of the Sub-Committee you will find it is quite clear that the matter has been discussed; it has been brought up in the Sub-Committee. Mr. Quo mentions Japanese residents and properties in

other

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other parts of China, but it is quite clear in this discussion that only the area around Shanghai is under consideration. If we limit the discussions to the area between the opposing troops, then we fall short of our duty. If nothing is said about the area south of Soochow Creek and on the Pootung side of the Whangpoo River, then it will be easy for this agreement to be broken.

Quo. If the Sub-Committee has taken up this question then it has exceeded its authority. The Japanese say that their rear must be protected. Their fear is exaggerated. The Chinese have always been on the defensive; they have made no attacks; there is no likelihood that the Japanese flank or rear will be attacked. We cannot discuss this question, for it involves the right of China to move her troops freely on Chinese soil without being questioned by foreign powers. If we differ as to what was discussed in the informal meetings leading up to these negotiations, then we may refer our differences to the participating friendly powers.

Uyeda. Does not believe that the Chinese made no offensive action, either generally or locally from Pootung, during recent fighting. Even if they had made no offensive act, that could be no guarantee for the future. The distance is so short that Japanese troops and properties would come within range of big guns as well as rifles, so that it would be quite impossible for the

Japanese

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Japanese to withdraw; this question should therefore be included in the discussions. If the Chinese insist on refusing on principle, then there is a great difference between our standpoints. This question is closely connected with the question of the time of our withdrawal. Although we believe that a time limit of any kind cannot be given, we are prepared to make a declaration intended to meet the desires of the Chinese in this regard. The Chinese have suggested the setting up of a Sub-Committee for this question, but we think this unnecessary.

Quo. Asks General Uyeda what the purpose is of the Japanese troops. Are they to be temporarily there, outside the Settlement, or are they going to remain permanently, to protect their flank and rear?

Uyeda. We are going to withdraw to the designated localities in order that the opposing troops may be separated and further fighting avoided. But if we separate the troops and do not take care of our rear then the principal cannot be kept and although the Chinese side seems to have a fear that when we speak of the future we mean permanent, still we have all along said that we wanted to withdraw. There is no reason for the Chinese to believe that we want our time limit to be permanent.

Quo. The Chinese forces south of Soochow Creek and on the Pootung side of the Whangpoo River have never been involved in the local hostilities. Without sincerity

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in our hearts we cannot bring about a cessation of hostilities. We do not understand why military units never involved in the hostilities should be included in this discussion. Both on principle and on the facts, the discussion of our positions south of Soochow Creek and on the Pootung side of the Whangpoo is outside the scope of the Conference and cannot be accepted.

Lampson. I call attention to the last two sentences of Article I which read:

"The forces of the two sides will, so far as lies in their control, cease all and every form of hostile act. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers."

This should cover the point at issue.

Uyeda. The Whangpoo River is at our rear, but its width is not sufficient to prevent rifle fire reaching our positions. The Chinese speak of battleships protecting the Japanese; on the contrary, the warships may be the very cause of the danger; they have been repeatedly fired at. We have been told that there are no Chinese troops on the Pootung side, but we want to make it certain.

Lampson. May I once more call your attention to the last two sentences of Article I? If that means what it says, then it means that all hostilities will cease. It should cover the point.

Shigemitsu. That is a very good suggestion. We appreciate

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preciate the meaning of the first article. I think discussions between the two sides are not going very fast, but the point at issue, as I understand it, is whether those places mentioned by General Uyeda were included in the phrase "present positions". We left it to the Military Sub-Committee to decide whether "present positions" cover any positions on the Pootung side. If it is necessary from a military point of view, then if both sides can agree to some formula, that ought to be done in order to ease the military situation.

Lampson. (Turning to Quo) Were there any troops on the Pootung side?

Shigemitsu. In the Military Sub-Committee your people said there were no troops.

Quo. That was by courtesy. Unless there can be some limitation

Shigemitsu. If military people say we must be guarding our rear, then I think there must be something in it.

Quo. We must have some limit to the scope of our negotiations; otherwise there is no limit to the new areas and new units that you can drag into this discussion. Our scope is limited to such areas and such units as were involved in recent hostilities here.

Lampson. In the negotiations of the 19th of February the Japanese drew a line on the other side of the Whangpoo.

Quo.

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Quo. I cannot answer because of the principle involved.

Lampson. Could you not answer as a matter of courtesy and as a statement of fact, and merely say there are no troops there?

Quo. I cannot answer; there is a matter of principle involved. I do not know; I am not a military man. I have tried to make it quite clear as to the principle, and our position is that this question should not be raised.

Lampson. I think Article I is very definite, and accompanied by a courtesy statement of fact the fears of the Japanese should be allayed.

Lagarde. Suggests adding words "around Shanghai" between words "cease" and "all" in second sentence of Article I, and between word "hostilities" and the comma in third sentence of same article.

Quo. I cannot accept that; it smacks too much of a neutral zone. "Around Shanghai" sounds too much like a neutral zone. Forces that were not involved in the hostilities should not be involved in this discussion.

Lampson. But you do not intend to carry on hostilities after this agreement is signed?

Quo. Of course not.

Lampson. I think phrase all inclusive. The insertion of this phrase does not change the meaning.

Quo.

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Quo. You are taking into consideration new areas and new units; we are discussing only the troops involved.

Johnson. I would prefer sentence as it stands, as new words limit the meaning.

Quo. If it means no more than it says, then I am prepared to accept.

Uyeda. I think it a good idea to insert the two words in Article I because it makes the meaning clearer, but it does not displace my suggestion as to the necessity for designating Chinese troop positions in Pootung. I must study the question.

Quo. If by adding the two words we can end the discussion I shall not object to them. My stand is that we must not extend the scope of the Conference.

Uyeda. I am prepared to study the words but am not prepared to withdraw my proposal; I think the suggested amendment will not meet my views. I want to reserve the question of the two areas south of Soochow Creek and on the Pootung side of the Whangpoo for future study. I offer the following text of the declaration which I propose that the Japanese make, and I ask the consideration of the Chinese:

"The Japanese Government take this opportunity to declare that, as soon as the local conditions in and around Shanghai so improve as to afford a sense of security to the Japanese nationals as regards the protection of their lives, property and lawful pursuits, the Japanese troops will

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will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932."

Quo. (After reading draft) This does not make Article III any clearer.

Shigemitsu. As I have told you over and over, we cannot accept a time limit.

Quo. I think I have made myself very clear; at least I hope so. The remaining of Japanese troops in and around Shanghai will effectively retard the return of the sense of security to which you attach so much importance. Unless you give us a time table peaceful conditions cannot be restored.

Shigemitsu. I have looked the matter up and I find that we did not agree to a time limit at Tsinan; we wrote a note.

Quo. I shall be glad to have a note from you setting down a time limit.

Shigemitsu. We are ready to make a declaration of this kind; I think this better.

Quo. It does not complete the program mentioned in the first paragraph of Annex II; it contains no time limit.

Lampson. Does this not meet your ideas except for the question of time limit, Mr. Quo?

Quo. I must refer the matter to my Government. This declaration leaves the question entirely dependent

upon

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upon a matter of local conditions which we claim will not improve as long as the Japanese troops remain.

Shigemitsu. We should endeavor to meet one another's difficulties.

Quo. We have been very thoughtful; we have not attempted to dictate the length of time. We leave the fixing of a time limit entirely to the Japanese.

Shigemitsu. Could you not give this question a little consideration? I tell you we cannot make any time limit.

Quo. We are not dictating to you a time limit. It will be something that you decide for yourselves. You can say that it will be your intention to complete the withdrawal in such a such a time, but not later than such and such a date.

Shigemitsu. What would happen if we should fix a definite date and then could not meet it because the situation would not permit?

Quo. Of course we would not expect to hold you in the face of unforeseen difficulties. (Turning to Sir Miles) I suggest that we might save the situation in this way by adding the words: "which they expect will be completed in _____ or not later than _____" to the end of the Japanese declaration.

(Sir Miles passes formula to Shigemitsu who studies it and passes it back to Sir Miles, who hands it to Quo.

Silence.

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(Silence)

Admiral Shimada. Says that Japanese are of such a peculiar character that if six months should be stipulated Japanese might feel that they had to stay that long, although they might wish to get out sooner.

(Long silence)

Quo. (To Shigemitsu) Another formula for solving it would be for you to send me a confidential note defining the term "temporarily" in Article III as meaning

(Silence)

Lampson. Could you not consider Mr. Quo's wording?

(Long silence)

Lampson. Where are we?

Uyeda. We seem to be discussing number of months, but for my part we cannot name any time.

Quo. But we are only asking for a time within which you can make your withdrawal. There is plenty of latitude there.

Uyeda. As we have repeated time and time again, we want to withdraw as soon as possible. By this statement which I offered you here we make that more clear, but it must be understood that we cannot fix a time limit because the reestablishment of normal conditions cannot

be

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be fixed. If you are prepared to accept the sincerity of the Japanese you would not ask for such a statement.

Quo. The declaration which you offer is unsatisfactory both as to form and as to substance; it is still far from the desires of the Chinese. We have always expressed a desire for a time table. Now, the substance of this declaration which you offer is that your withdrawal depends upon the restoration of normal conditions, but I tell you that the presence of Japanese troops will effectively retard the restoration of normal conditions.

Uyeda. The Chinese side do not seem to be satisfied with this declaration, but on our side we thought the original word "temporary" was quite enough and therefore we thought that we had made quite a step forward when we made this statement. We cannot name a time limit.

Lampson. We have now had eleven meetings, and have talked for some thirty-four hours. Can we not go ahead?

Shigemitsu. We are sorry that it has taken so long; still we cannot go much faster. We honestly thought that we had made a big effort in presenting our declaration.

Lampson. Is it absolutely final that something cannot be put at the end to meet the Chinese point of view?

Shigemitsu. We do not wish to break this conference. We have not said the final word on any point; we want to do our best. Cannot Mr. Quo consider our proposal?

Quo.

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Quo. I can consider it with some addition, but I have made my position quite clear.

Shigemitsu. Such a declaration should help you. I am sure if you had your phrase it will be satisfactory.

Quo. When I suggested that phrase I was making every effort to meet you.

Shigemitsu. You should be able to go further.

Quo. I have gone the limit. My difficulties are greater than yours; my people have lost more than yours have. If you make a gesture you will go far toward improving relations between our two countries.

Shigemitsu. We can do it on our own account. You pay too much attention to public opinion.

Quo. I am asking you to do this by your own volition.

Lampson. It might help the Japanese to use the words "they expect to be able". That is an expression of hope; it does not tie you down by what might happen in the meantime. As a friendly gesture, why can you not refer your respective formulas to your Governments?

Uyeda. In view of the wide difference between our instructions and the point to which we have got so far, we doubt that we can get favorable consideration. However, we will put it before our Government.

Quo. I will refer the Japanese proposal to my Government, but I am certain of their reaction. They cannot accept it.

Sir Miles.

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Sir Miles. I plead for speed. We have had eleven meetings and have talked thirty-four hours.

The meeting adjourned, to meet at 10 a.m. on April 7th, it being agreed that the Chinese would refer the Japanese proposal to Nanking, and the Japanese would forward the Chinese suggestion to Tokyo.

N.T.J.
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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DRAFT "C"

April 3, 1932

Adopted

Article I

The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from _____ 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease all and every form of hostile act. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

Article II

Adopted

The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement.

Article III

In accordance with the programme regulating withdrawal as shown in Annex II to this Agreement, the Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district

trict

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strict as before the incident of January 28, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex III to this Agreement.

(Note: the first fifteen words of the first sentence are still outstanding.)

Article IV

Adopted

A Joint Commission, including members representing the participating friendly Powers, will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as defined in Annex IV to this Agreement.

Article V

Adopted

The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present Agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese and English

texts,

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texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

Done at Shanghai, this _____ day of _____
nineteen hundred and thirty-two, corresponding to
_____.

(Chinese and Japanese signatures.)

In the presence of:

(Signatures of foreign heads of Mission)

Representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the
negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the
Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4, 1932.

Annex I

Adopted (except for definition)

The following are the positions of the Chinese troops
as provided in Article II of this Agreement.

(Here insert definition of the Chinese positions.)

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto,
the positions in question will, upon the request of the
Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of
the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint
Commission.

Annex II

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the local-
ities

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ities indicated in Annex III will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the Agreement and will be completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal.

The further withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the areas mentioned in the first sentence of Article III will be completed as soon as conditions of local security permit of such reductions in the numbers of the said troops as will enable them to be accommodated in the said areas. This will be effected as soon as possible in accordance with the spirit of the Resolution of March 4th and the discussions which preceded its adoption.

The Joint Commission to be established under Article IV will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

(Note: The second paragraph of this annex is not yet agreed to by either side.)

Annex III

Adopted (Except for definitions)

The following are the localities as provided in Article III of this Agreement.

(Here insert definition of the localities in which

the

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the Japanese troops are to be temporarily stationed.)

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission.

Annex IV.

Adopted.

The Joint Commission will be composed of 12 members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian heads of Mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote. The Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Agreement.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Separate Voluntary Declaration by the Chinese Government

(To be issued either prior to or simultaneously
with the conclusion of the Agreement, but not
to be annexed thereto.)

In order to ease the general situation and to secure the prompt re-establishment of stability and normal conditions in the affected areas, the Chinese Government hereby intimate their intention immediately to establish on their own initiative, for the maintenance of peace and order in the evacuated area in the vicinity of the Shanghai Settlements, a force of special constabulary, for which they contemplate the employment of experts as officers and instructors. It is understood that the incoming Chinese police referred to in the penultimate sentence of Article IV of the Agreement (here insert reference and date) will be drawn from the above special constabulary.

314
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

PLAIN

PEIPING VIA N.R.

Dated May 9, 1932

Rcd. 5.25 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

514. May 9, 3 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Hong Kong, May eight:

"High Canton officials are critical against Nanking for the Shanghai peace truce, which they regard as contrary to the prolonged resistance put up by the Cantonese forces around Shanghai and as a concession to Japan. It is believed that Canton may express stronger opposition to Nanking.

General Chen Chi Tang is taking over the air force and the Navy as precautionary measures.

An important manifesto on the current situation will be released soon. It is reported that General Chang Huai Chang and Admiral Chen Tseh oppose General Chen Chi Tang's coup d'etat but the real situation is still rather obscure here."

For the Minister

WSB

PERKINS

F/DEW

793.94/5178

MAY 12 1932

793.94
note
893.00
893.102-S
93.94119



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D. *FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MF

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 9, 1932

Rec'd 4:15 a.m.

F/DEW 793.94/5179

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 9 1932
 Department of State

512, May 9, 1 p.m.

Following from Xuo Wen, Shanghai, May 6th:

"Mr. Eugene Chen, former Minister of Foreign Affairs,

issued a statement today, criticizing the Sino-Japanese
 truce agreement signed yesterday morning. A point which
 in the opinion of Mr. Chen shows that Japan has scored
 over China is the speech of Mr. Yoshizawa, in which he
 congratulates Mr. Yuo Tai Chion his moral and physical
 courage in signing the agreement. Mr. Chen says that when
 a man congratulates an opponent, it is safe to assume
 that the victory is on his side.

Launching into a detailed criticism of the terms of
 the agreement, Mr. Chen goes on to say that everybody
 knows that the political and territorial sovereignty of
 China is one and indivisible and that invasion of
 Manchuria means invasion of China. For this reason the
 Chinese people have been insisting on a simultaneous
 settlement of the Manchuria and Shanghai question. After
 recalling

MAY 12 1932

FILED

793.94
 note
 893.102-S
 793.94/119
 793.94-Commission
 893.01-Manchuria

3 1 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#512 From Peiping May 9, 1932

recalling a statement by Mr. Wang Cheng Wei to the same effect, Mr. Chen asks what is the result of the present agreement. 'The National Government at Nanking and its amateur diplomats may think that the agreement is a mere military arrangement and has nothing to do with political issues and therefore does not affect the territorial integrity of China, but as a matter of fact, this is not true when one country signs a truce with another country, which is in military occupation of one part of its territory, that country is destroying its own territorial integrity.'

*note
793.94-Commission
893.01-Manchuria*

Referring to the preliminary report of the Lytton Commission Mr. Chen declares that the statement that Manchuria is in a state of anarchy is the most damaging statement to Japan in the eyes of the world. Japan is at present determined to employ all its military strength to reestablish order in Manchuria. This explains Japan's anxiety to negotiate ~~a~~ settlement at Shanghai so that she can divert her fifty thousand troops to Manchuria. The agreement is, therefore, a victory for Japan, because it enables her to hold Shanghai with a smaller force, while the Chinese troops are prevented from recovering their lost territory.

'Someone may ask me if I am not in favor of the
evacuation

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

3-#512 from Peiping May 9, 1932

evacuation of Japanese troops from Shanghai. I have no hesitation in declaring that I am in favor of Japanese evacuation, but I maintain that Japanese troops not only should leave Shanghai but also Manchuria, otherwise we must resist Japan to the last,' Mr. Chen concludes."

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

WSB

014

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TOKYO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 11, 1932.

SWH: *U*


The Embassy (Tokyo's No. 592, April 23, 1932) transmits and comments on a Jiji editorial of April 10 on Mr. Stimson. After commenting on the favorable effect of Mr. Stimson's attendance at Geneva on the world peace movement, it criticizes him for his general imprudence in Far Eastern matters, in particular his interference in the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1929, his disclosure of Baron Shidehara's confidences regarding the Chinchow military situation, and his statement regarding Japan's possible territorial ambitions on the Philippine Islands.

WRL



FE:WRL:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 592

Subject: Secretary of State,
Henry L. Stimson.



F/LS

793.94/5180

793.94
2005
7/1/94

MAY 13 1932

FILED

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit, as of possible interest, a copy in translation of an editorial which appeared in the Tokyo JIJI of April 10, 1932, (one of the leading Japanese dailies), entitled: "Statements of Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson". After commenting on the favorable effects the Secretary's attendance at the Geneva Disarmament Conference will have and reviewing the efforts towards peace which the Government of the United States has

made

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

made in the past, the editorial goes on to criticize adversely what it characterizes as a lack of prudence on the part of the Secretary. In this connection it refers to the Secretary's attitude at the time of the Sino-Russian dispute over the Chinese Eastern Railway, his "unnecessarily alarming fuss over the Manchurian situation after the occurrence of the Chinchow affair", his disclosure of a confidential conversation between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Forbes, and his "imprudent statement that Japan has some ambition respecting the Philippines". The paper claims to regard the alleged imprudence as having "affected badly the friendly relations of the United States and Japan".

In commenting on the improvement of the relations of the two countries in recent years, the editorial refers to the immigration question, stating that "Even the immigration question, which once strained American-Japanese relations, is now regarded as destined to receive a most rational and satisfactory solution in the not distant future".

Respectfully yours,



Edwin L. Neville,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

Copy of an editorial which
appeared in the Tokyo Jiji
of April 10, 1932.

Embassy's File No. 500.

LIS/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.	1.
Dispatch No.	592.
From American Embassy Tokyo.	

Translation.

STATEMENTS OF SECRETARY OF STATE

HENRY L. STIMSON

(Editorial in the Tokyo JIJI of April 10, 1932.)

Mr. Stimson, Secretary of State, left New York on April 8th for Geneva with the intention of submitting a new proposal to the General Disarmament Conference now in session. The participation of so able and influential a statesman as Mr. Stimson will materially assist the Conference to attain its object. The United States of America occupies a very important position in world politics and her actions will at once affect other countries to a great extent. We are confident that under the leadership of the United States all other countries, large and small, desire that the sentiments of mutual trust be strengthened and that upon this foundation a permanent peace be established the world over. Through the competency and initiative of the successive Presidents and Secretaries of State of the United States, the two great milestones of peace have already been set up on the highway of the world in the form of the Washington Naval Agreement and the Kellogg Pact. These accomplishments are to be regarded as permanent and inestimable contributions toward the peaceful diplomacy of the world and have had the effect of enhancing the credit of the United States among all the nations. Mr. Hughes through the Washington Conference and Mr. Kellogg by the Kellogg Pact are respected

by

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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by the peoples of the world as enlightened statesmen among the successive Secretaries of State.

11/11/77
Stimson

We presume that Mr. Stimson feels the weight of responsibility of inheritance of the dual legacy of the Disarmament and the War Outlawry Pacts and the duty of the furtherance of ideals embodied in such a legacy. However, we sincerely regret that in the attitude of Mr. Stimson there seems to be something which does not always conform to the policy of prudence which his predecessors possessed. A few years ago when the Sino-Russian conflict occurred regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, Mr. Stimson made a hasty attempt to invoke the Kellogg Pact, only to be compelled to withdraw before a single stroke from Soviet Russia. This was far from elevating the credit of the United States. Surely it was not Japan alone that deplored the above failure of the Stimson diplomacy with Soviet Russia. To cite another significant instance: Mr. Stimson, who maintained a cool attitude in the early stages of the Manchurian incident made an unnecessarily alarming fuss over the Manchurian situation after the occurrence of the Chinchow affair. In a press interview, he went so far as to disclose some particulars of confidential conversations between Baron Shidehara, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Ambassador Forbes in Tokyo. We know not through what unfortunate turn of circumstances it was that such a disclosure was made, but if he did it in an attempt to restrain the Japanese authorities it was surely nothing but imprudence.

79394

Quite recently, when the bill providing for the independence of the Philippines was passed by the House of Representatives

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Representatives of the United States, Mr. Stimson made an imprudent statement that Japan has some ambition respecting the Philippines. The independence question of the Philippines is a question to be settled as the United States pleases. We are only confounded by Mr. Stimson's boldness in openly making such a statement. Such slips of the tongue so repeatedly made by Mr. Stimson are too serious to be regarded as a virtue of the American national character so traditionally known for innocence and straightforwardness. We do not believe that Mr. Stimson gave any direct support to the proposed economic blockade against Japan which gained ground among certain sections of the American people. The rise of such a thoughtless theory must be attributable to the imprudent attitude of the United States Government. We want to have discarded even more positively the boldness that disregards the international rules of courtesy. Mr. Stimson's imprudence may be said to have affected badly the friendly relations between the United States and Japan. In recent years, the relations between the two countries have improved considerably. Even the immigration question, which once strained America-Japan relations, is now regarded as destined to receive a most rational and satisfactory solution in the not distant future. At this juncture, the Manchurian incident occurred and the Japanese people are now endeavoring to protect Japan's legitimate rights and interests in Manchuria. Unfortunately, the Americans in official and private circles lack sufficient knowledge of actual conditions of the Far East. It is extremely regrettable that Mr.

Stimson

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Stimson by his imprudent attitude has fanned American nationals sentiments against Japan. We are afraid that such an attitude of the United States Government will greatly disappoint many Japanese who have hitherto employed all sacrificing efforts to promote American-Japanese relations by enhancing Japanese national reliance and confidence in the United States Government and people.


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 8224

~~FE~~
~~a-c/c~~

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, April 15, 1932.



Subject: Conditions in Chapei and
Surrounding Territory.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.



File

793.94
note
893.102-S
893.1052
893.1053
493.11-Shanghai

F/LS 793.94/5181

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 8179 of March 24, 1932, regarding sanitary conditions in Chapei, I have the honor to state that rehabilitation in that section of the city is proceeding very slowly. In addition to the actual destruction and damage there, which is considerable, other factors are tending to hamper a return to normal conditions. The most important of these factors is that the Japanese military are raising obstacles, both directly and indirectly, to the return of Chinese and foreign business men and the resumption of business. It is rumored that Japanese are in many instances offering to purchase damaged property at considerably reduced prices and the view is held in some quarters that by this method of penetration the Japanese are making an entering wedge for some ulterior purpose, possibly the establishment of a Japanese concession in that area. No schools have

reopened

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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reopened in Chapei, although some of the higher institutions of learning have rented premises in the International Settlement or French Concession in which to pursue educational work.

ESTABLISHMENT OF SHANGHAI NORTHERN DISTRICT CITIZENS'
MAINTENANCE ASSOCIATION:

note 893.1052

The police of the Public Safety Bureau of the Municipality of Shanghai have not up to the present time been permitted by the Japanese military to resume their functions in Chapei, and in fact none of the public services of the municipality have been resumed there. This absence of police protection led to the organization about April 1st of a committee known as the "Shanghai Northern District Citizens' Maintenance Association." The object of the organization as announced appeared to be altogether praiseworthy. It was said that it intended to re-establish police and sanitary functions in Chapei and to encourage the resumption of business. By the end of the first week in April the Association appeared to be fully organized with various chiefs of departments, including a chief of administration, a chief of police, a chief detective and traffic superintendent and a chief of the Social Affairs department. However, several of these persons were of unsavory reputation and at least two of them had police records in the International Settlement. A number of policemen without arms were employed and road cleaners, et cetera, were also hired. It soon developed, however,

note 893.1053

-3-

however, that the revenues of the association were to be provided by a system of taxation or "squeeze" on all property which was removed from Chapei. In a circular put out by the association it endeavored to explain its activities in the following manner:

The circular states that the Japanese have frequently announced that they do not intend to occupy Chinese territory, and acting on this assumption the committee approached them and received permission for the committee to maintain peace and order in the Northern District, provided there was no interference with the Imperial Japanese forces. The revenues of the committee were to be raised temporarily by a tax of three per cent on all goods removed amounting to over ten dollars in value. The committee hoped that the public would understand that they were acting as public benefactors and were in no sense a "government" such as had been established in Manchuria. The circular also contained this somewhat significant sentence:

"The Northern District can become a Settlement only when the National Government is willing to sign a treaty to that effect."

With the connivance of the Japanese military a levy of about three per cent was made on all goods removed from the Chapei region. Investigators were posted at the entrances to various streets and on Markham Road bridge for the purpose of checking up on persons entering Chapei or removing belongings or goods without special permits, which were apparently issued jointly by the Japanese and the association.

This

-4-

This Consulate General first became aware of the operations of this committee through an application made by the Robert Dollar Company for permission to move lumber placed on consignment in various Chinese

1/ lumber yards in Chapei. There is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum dated April 4, 1932, by an officer of this Consulate General, detailing some of the difficulties which he had in connection with this request.

2/ There is also attached a copy of a communication addressed to the Japanese Consul General under date of April 5th. Oral representations were made at the same time to the Japanese Consul, Mr. Iguchi, who stated that he had no information with regard to the Citizens' Committee but that his office could not interfere with the collection of levies by Chinese organizations. It was pointed out, however, that no Chinese officials were functioning in Chapei, that the Japanese military were in absolute actual control of this area, and that they were the ones to whom we must necessarily look for assistance. Finally the Japanese requested that the Chinese proprietors of the lumber yards visit the headquarters of the Japanese Naval Landing Party. This was done under date of April 11th, the Chinese merchants being accompanied by a representative of this office and one from the Dollar Company. Another long interview was held the chief outcome of which was that the Japanese naval officers disclaimed any connection with the Citizens' Committee and promised that they would, after due investigation, issue permits to the

Chinese

-5-

Chinese dealers in order that the lumber might be removed. Up to the present, however, this has not been done. In the evening of the same day, that is April 11th, the Japanese military closed the headquarters of the Citizens' Maintenance Association and a Japanese communique declared that this had been done because it had been found that its activities were in contravention of the public interest. It is reported from Chinese sources that the association has merely been moved to other premises and will reorganize and reappear shortly.

The Japanese are confronted with a very difficult problem in regard to the policing not only of Chapei but of all the area under their control. So far they appear to be making but little effort to protect property in districts other than those in which Japanese nationals reside.

*note
493.11-shanghai*

A complaint has been received from an American firm whose factory is located near the border of the Settlement to the east of Chapei, that Chinese ruffians and gangsters are becoming active in the vicinity of its factory; that the Chinese foreman of the factory was beaten by a crowd of ruffians in front of its plant on April 10th; that one of the firm's shroffs was stopped on April 12th by a Chinese gangster and ten dollars demanded from him. The American manager of the factory feared conditions might become worse daily unless the situation is controlled, and he requested that this office take steps to have police protection from the

Shanghai

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Shanghai Municipal Council extended to the area surrounding the factory. I have informed him that I am not in a position to comply with this request as the factory is not located in the Settlement or on an extra-Settlement road, but have suggested that he employ a sufficient number of watchmen to protect his property. However, this will not solve the difficulty entirely as malicious characters operate on the roads in that vicinity. This is not an isolated instance but has occurred frequently in various parts of the territory formerly under Chinese control. Fortunately, however, up to the present time very few American firms have suffered.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosures:

- 1/- Copy of Memorandum by
George V. Allen, dated
April 11, 1932.
- 2/- Copy of letter to Japanese
Consul General, dated April 5, 1932.

PRJ MB
800/350

In Quintuplicate.

In Triplicate to Legation.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8224 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April 14, 1932, on the subject: "Conditions in Chapei and Surrounding Territory."

COPY

MEMORANDUM

April 11, 1932.

Subject: Application of Robert Dollar Company
for assistance in Obtaining a Permit
for the Delivery of Lumber from
Chapei Yards.

Acting on a suggestion of Consul Iguchi made through Mr. Josselyn, the Dollar Company asked its Chinese dealers in Chapei to apply in person to the Japanese Naval headquarters on Hsin Min Road for permits to move Dollar Company lumber from their yards. At 2:30 this afternoon four of these dealers, together with Mr. Essa (of the Dollar Company) and myself went to the naval headquarters, accompanied by Mr. Ikeda of the Japanese Consulate, who acted as interpreter.

Throughout the early part of the interview I sat as an observer. The Japanese official to whom we talked was Lieutenant Commander Doi.

The Dollar Company representative was informed that the Japanese Naval officials had been engaged for the last two or three days in investigating the ownership of the lumber in the yards in Chapei. It was indicated that some of the statements which the Dollar Company had made had not been found to be true. However, the Japanese official stated that he had proceeded with his investigation far enough to be able to say that within two or three days he would be in a position to issue permits to the Chinese dealers, so that the Dollar Company lumber might be moved. He explained that the Chinese dealers must come to him for a permit each time it is desired to move any lumber but that when he is satisfied that the lumber belongs to the Dollar Company he will issue the permit freely. He asked Mr. Essa to supply him with photographs and specimen signatures of each of the Chinese lumber yard owners who handle Dollar Company lumber. Mr. Essa agreed to do this immediately.

During the course of the interview the Japanese official indicated at least wonder if not displeasure at the fact that foreigners were undertaking the matter of obtaining permits for Chinese dealers when the whole affair should be one merely between the Chinese and the Japanese authorities; therefore, before leaving I explained to Commander Doi that my presence at the interview was entirely in the interests of American property and that I was not there to represent Chinese interests

in

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in the least. I explained, however, that I had a legitimate right to represent the American property because on my previous visit I had been referred by the Japanese officials to a local Chinese organization (which the American Consulate did not recognize) which had demanded payment of a large sum of money before agreeing to allow the property to be moved.

I asked Commander Doi if there would be any necessity in the future of negotiating with the local Chinese organization to obtain the permits desired. He replied definitely that he had no connection with the Chinese organization whatsoever and that his permits would be issued without reference to them when he is satisfied that the lumber belongs to the Dollar Company, and he will satisfy himself in this regard by his own investigation. I asked him also if there would be any fees connected with the issuance of his permits. He replied (somewhat haughtily) that there would be none.

I took occasion also to say to Commander Doi that the U. S. Consulate would not recognize the right of any self-appointed citizen's organization in Chapei to levy a tax or contribution of any kind upon American property.

During the course of the interview Commander Doi stressed two or three times that the Japanese Navy had no relationships whatsoever to the local Chapei Citizens' organization. He appeared annoyed when I asked whether we might have to refer to this organization again. I pointed out to him, however, that I merely asked the question because we had been told on our previous visit that the Japanese Navy would not issue the desired permits without a statement from this organization that the property was American.

The Japanese gave the appearance of wishing to avoid any semblance of connection with the local Chinese Citizens' organization. I believe we have forced them to this position by our protests.

Commander Doi also stressed the fact that he had the greatest desire to influence the return of normal conditions and the growth of business in Chapei as soon as possible.

GVA

Copied by MB
Compared with 1977
[Handwritten initials]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 8224 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April 14,
 1932, on the subject: "Conditions in Chapei and Surrounding
 Territory."

COPY

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
 Shanghai, China, April 5, 1932.

Subject: Application of the Robert Dollar
 Company for Permits to Deliver
 Lumber from Chapei Lumber Yards.

K. Murai, Esquire,
 Consul General for Japan,
 Shanghai.



Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you that the Robert Dollar Company, an American firm, has stated that it has lumber stored on consignment in various Chinese lumber yards located in Chapei. (A list of these yards, with their locations, attached to original letter). The Robert Dollar Company states that in order to make delivery of this lumber from time to time to its customers it is necessary to get permits from the Japanese Naval Landing Party. Accordingly the company recently made application for such permits and on April 4th a representative of this Consulate General, in company with a representative of the Robert Dollar Company, called at the Japanese Naval Landing Party Headquarters at Hsin Min Road, Chapei, and requested that the required permits be given. After considerable discussion the officer in charge stated that permits would be issued by the Japanese Naval authorities only upon the recommendation of a certain unofficial Chinese organization called "The Citizens' Union for the Maintenance of Local Order, North Shanghai."

I feel sure that it is not the intention of the Japanese naval and military authorities to interfere in any way with the speedy resumption of normal business activities in Shanghai, and particularly with the business of an American firm, and that the refusal of the officer in charge to permit the delivery of the lumber above mentioned is due to a misunderstanding. I would therefore greatly appreciate it if an investigation could be made into this matter and permits issued for the delivery of this lumber.

I have the honor to be,
 Sir and dear Colleague,
 Your obedient servant,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

Copied by MB 
 Compared with KFH 

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

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 793.94119*

MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*RECEIVED
 MAY 9 1932*

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 9, 1932

Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 9 1932

Department of State

MAY 11 1932

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

232, May 9, 5 p.m.

One. Japanese delegate joint commission has in-
 formed me that complete unit Japanese troops have been
 withdrawn as from one o'clock today from Liuho,
 Kiating and Nanziang.

Two. That unit at Lotien will be withdrawn as
 from noon May 10th. Notifications of intention to
 withdraw was given to the Chinese on the 8th.

Three. Chinese delegates advised that yesterday
 400 special police left Nanking and are available today
 at Liuho, Kiating and Nanziang and tomorrow at Lotien.

Four. Chinese delegates have notified appoint-
 ments for civil administration at each of these places
 and state that competent interpreters accompany the
 officials entering upon their duties. The Chinese
 delegates no doubt had in mind the request of the
 Japanese for interpreters to accompany police and civil
 officials when about to take charge of evacuated areas.
 This request was made at the joint commission's meeting
 on the 7th.

Five.

F/LS

793.94/5182

MAY 13 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#232 From Shanghai May 9, 1932

Five. Instructions from the Department and the Legation are solicited as to amount of detail desired to be reported during the carrying into effect of paragraphs one, two and three of the Sino-Japanese agreement of the 5th.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

VIA NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

May 11, 1932.

MAY 11 52

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China)

Your 232, May 9, 5 p.m., paragraph five.

Report on important developments, giving the essential facts. In cases where you think they will be helpful, ^{add} ~~give~~ details.

Carthe, Acting
 SKH

FE:SKH:CLS

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____,

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5182

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
note
893.00

✓
✓
✓

EJ TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

CANTON VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated May 6, 1932

Recd. 9.55 a.m. 9th

Secretary of State
Washington



May 6, 10 p.m.

F/LS
793.94/5183

I have been confidentially informed by a high official that when the southwest political council is officially informed of the terms of the Shanghai agreement it will announce the dissent of this Government. He stated that this was not likely to lead to the reestablishment of an independent government but that naturally cooperation between Canton and Nanking would for the present be impossible. He further stated that no local opposition to the action of the council was anticipated.

FILED
MAY 12 1932

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking.

BALLANTINE

RR
WSB

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

GRAY

SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

Dated May 9, 1932

Recd. 9 a.m.

Secretary of State -

Washington

233. May 9, 6 p.m.

From Colonel Drysdale for War Department.

"Japanese completely evacuated Liuho, Kiating
and Nanziang today and Chinese resumed control without
incident. Lotien will be evacuated tomorrow against
which Japanese defense line will be Yang-mang-Taitsang-
Chenju. The 14th Division is ordered to Manchuria.
One additional regiment mountain artillery is return-
ing to Japan. Japanese state further withdrawal is
contingent on developments of situation.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

HPD

WSB


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FILED

MAY 12 1932

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


FROM



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


No. 8207



Handwritten initials and marks

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
 Shanghai, China, April 12, 1932.



Subject: Maintenance of Commerce and Shipping.

THE HONORABLE
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON, D. C.



F/LS
 793.94/5135

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's tele-
 gram of February 6, 8 p.m., in paragraph three of which
 the Department instructed that as broad commitments as
 possible should be obtained from both the Japanese and
 Chinese authorities with respect to their non-interference
 with the neutral trade and commerce of the port of Shanghai.
 After considering this matter it appeared to me that the
 most effective way to deal with it would be to obtain the
 cooperation and support of the Consular Body, and I accord-
 ingly suggested at a meeting of the Consular Body on Feb-
 ruary 17, 1932, that representations might be made to both
 the Chinese and Japanese authorities expressing the hope
 that there should be no interference with the commerce and
 shipping of the various countries of Europe and America
 during the existing emergency. My proposal met with
 unanimous acceptance and communications were accordingly
 addressed by the Senior Consul to the Mayor of Shanghai
 and to the Japanese Consul General under date of February

18, 1932.

Handwritten notes:
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-2-

- 1/ 18, 1932. A copy of Senior Consul's Circular No. 68, of February 17, 1932, containing the draft of the communications is transmitted herewith, and reference is made to my telegram No. 73, ^{79394/4462} dated February 18, 7 p.m. in which I reported the foregoing. A reply was received from the Japanese Consul General dated February 24, 1932, stating that it had been the policy of the Japanese Government to cooperate with the other Powers concerned in keeping the trade and shipping of the port of Shanghai free from interference, and that there was no alteration in this policy during the present crisis. A reply was also received from the Mayor of Shanghai dated the same day, February 24, 1932, stating that the Chinese authorities were in full sympathy with the maintenance of the commerce and shipping of the port of Shanghai; that they had spared no effort in this regard since the outbreak of local hostilities; that the Chinese authorities regretted that the utilization of the Settlement area by the Japanese troops as a base of attack on the Chinese forces had produced a most disastrous effect on the commerce and shipping of Shanghai. Copies of
- 2/3/ Senior Consul's circulars Nos. 86 and 93, containing the text of these replies are attached hereto, and reference is also made to my telegram No. ^{79394/4462} 122, dated February 27, 6 p.m. regarding them.

I consider that these representations had a good effect, particularly in keeping shipping free from interference. During the greater part of the hostilities American shipping entered the Whangpoo and came up to


Shanghai

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

Shanghai with only a minimum of inconvenience caused by the Japanese military operations against the Woosung Forts. At the end of February, it will be recalled that there was an attempt to blow up the Japanese flagship IDZUMA and the Japanese cruiser OI by what are believed to have been submarine mines in the Whangpoo. Following this incident the manager of the Dollar Steamship Company consulted me and I informed him that I considered it best for the Dollar vessels to anchor at Woosung on arrival instead of coming up the Whangpoo until conditions were more stable. Following this, three Dollar vessels anchored at Woosung on February 29, March 3 and March 4 respectively. Vessels arriving thereafter went to their regular berths at Shanghai.

Respectfully yours,


Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosures:

- 1/- Copy of Senior Consul's Circular No. 68
dated February 17, 1932.
- 2/- Copy of Senior Consul's Circular No. 86
dated February 24, 1932.
- 3/- Copy of Senior Consul's Circular No. 93
dated February 24, 1932.

In Quintuplicate
In Duplicate to Legation

800/610.2
PRJ/nlh:kw

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8207 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April 12, 1932, on the subject: Maintenance of Commerce and Shipping.

(CIRCULAR NO. 68-M-XIII.)

SUBJECT: THE MAINTENANCE OF TRADE & SHIPPING OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES.

THE SENIOR CONSUL PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS HONORABLE COLLEAGUES AND HAS THE HONOR TO CIRCULATE THE FOLLOWING DRAFT OF PROPOSED AND SELF-EXPLANATORY LETTERS TO MAYOR WU AND THE CONSUL-GENERAL FOR JAPAN (MUTATIS MUTANDIS) ON THE MATTER SUGGESTED BY HIM AT THIS MORNING'S MEETING OF THE CONSULAR BODY, FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION. FAILING THE RECEIPT OF ANY OBJECTION BY THURSDAY AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 18, 1932, A LETTER OF THIS WORDING WILL BE DESPATCHED.

(Tentative Draft of letters from the Senior Consul to Mayor and to Japanese Consul General.)

Sir:

In view of the immense importance of the port of Shanghai in world commerce, I have the honor to state that it is the earnest desire of my interested colleagues any myself to take all steps possible to maintain the trade and shipping of our respective countries during the present critical time. With this end in view, we trust that the responsible (Japanese) (Chinese) authorities will without qualification undertake not to interfere, either now or in the future, with the trade and shipping of the various countries of Europe and America at this port, and that you will see fit to make a declaration in this sense.

A similar communication is being addressed to the (Chinese) (Japanese) authorities concerned and the favor of a prompt reply is requested.

I have etc.,

Senior Consul.

Circulated February 17, 1932.

Copied by Engl.

Compared with Engl.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 8202 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April 12, 1932, on the subject: Maintenance of Commerce and Shipping.

CIRCULAR NO. 86-M-XIII.)

SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE OF TRADE AND SHIPPING

THE SENIOR CONSUL PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS HONORABLE COLLEAGUES AND WITH REFERENCE TO CIRCULAR NO. 68-M-XIII, HAS THE HONOR TO CIRCULATE THE FOLLOWING FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

(From the Consul General for Japan to the Senior Consul.)

February 24th, 1932.

Sir and dear Colleague,


I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant with regard to the maintenance of trade and shipping of various countries in the port of Shanghai, and to state in reply that it has been the policy of the Japanese Government to co-operate with other Powers concerned in keeping the trade and shipping in the port of Shanghai not interfered with, and that the present crisis causes no alteration in this policy of my Government.

I have the honour to be,
Sir and dear Colleague,
Your obedient servant,
(Sd) K. Murai,
Consul General

Edwin S. Cunningham, Esquire,
American Consul General,
and Senior Consul,
Shanghai.

Reference 68-M-XIII.
Circulated February 24, 1932.

Copied by
Compared with



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 8302 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April 12, 1932, on the subject: Maintenance of Commerce and Shipping.

(CIRCULAR NO. 93-M-XIII.)

SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE OF COMMERCE AND SHIPPING

THE SENIOR CONSUL PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS HONORABLE COLLEAGUES AND HAS THE HONOR TO CIRCULATE, WITH REFERENCE TO CIRCULAR NO. 68-M-XIII, THE FOLLOWING FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

(Translation of a letter from the Mayor of Shanghai Municipality to the Senior Consul.)

February 24, 1932.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dealing with the subject of the important relation which Shanghai bears to the trade of the world and requesting that the commercial and shipping interests of the various Powers be maintained during the present crisis.

So far as the necessity of devising ways and means to keep up the commerce and shipping of Shanghai is concerned, the interested Chinese authorities and myself are in sympathy with you and your colleagues. This is why China has spared no effort in the maintenance and protection of the commercial and shipping interests of Shanghai since the outbreak of local hostilities and it is presumed that you are aware of the exertion on her part. The Chinese authorities sincerely and deeply regret, however, that the utilization of the Settlement area by the Japanese troops as a base of attack on the Chinese forces and the carrying out of their aggressive policy have already produced a most disastrous effect upon the commerce and shipping of the Powers at Shanghai. It is a matter of record that I have definitely and repeatedly told you and the representatives of the other friendly Powers with whom the responsibility should rest.

In view of your letter under acknowledgment, besides communicating with the Chinese authorities concerned so that they may continue the effort to maintain and protect the commerce and shipping of Shanghai, I have to transmit this reply for your information.

(sd) Wu Te-chen,
Mayor.

Edwin S. Cunningham, Esquire,
American Consul General and
Senior Consul,
Shanghai.

Reference 68-M-XIII.
Circulated February 26, 1932.

Copied by dy
Compared with dy

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.77/2857 FOR # 586

FROM Japan (Neville) DATED May 7, 1932 (received)
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Dismissal of vice president Eguchi of the South Manchuria railroad. This has resulted in the resignation of the President Uchida and several directors and has incurred the displeasure of the military in their conduct of affairs in Manchuria.

793.94/5186

5186

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 586.

Subject: Vice President Eguchi of the South Manchuria
Railway dismissed.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that on April 7th the Vice President of the South Manchuria Railway, Mr. Sadaye Eguchi, was dismissed from office by the Government, which obtained an Imperial Ordinance for this purpose. As soon as the announcement of this dismissal was made, Count Kosei Uchida, President of the South Manchuria Railway, called a meeting of directors at Dairen and announced his own resignation. Several other directors also resigned.

Under existing laws governing the administration of the South Manchuria Railway the Government has the power of appointment.

-2-

1/. appointment and dismissal of the Directorate. In ordinary times the dismissal of a somewhat obscure official would have attracted little attention. But at this time, when the interest of the entire nation is centered on Manchuria, somewhat of a political furor has resulted. I append hereto a translation of an editorial article from the influential SHAN HAINICHI. This article is strong in its criticism of the Government's action in dismissing, for purely nepotistic reasons, an official who, though appointed by the previous Minseito Ministry, was apparently an able man trusted by his official superior, Count Uchida, and by the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria. The article charges that the Seiyukai desired to replace both the President, Count Uchida, and the Vice President, Mr. Eguchi, with deserving Seiyukai men, and that the dismissal of Eguchi was actually an indirect mode of ousting Count Uchida inasmuch as it was known that the latter would not tolerate any interference with his official subordinates.

This opinion seems to be held by the press in general. If the Government intended by dismissing Eguchi to oust Uchida without its strategy being recognized, the attempt was a failure. The press has given a surprisingly large amount of space to the alleged unseemly willingness of the Government to subordinate national welfare to partisan advantage. The consensus of newspaper opinion is that the Premier has no desire to lose the services of Count Uchida but that strong influences in his party forced him to consent to Eguchi's dismissal. Whether or not he foresaw Count Uchida's consequent resignation is problematical, but it is hardly likely that a politician of his experience

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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could have failed to consider that eventuality.

The action taken by the Government in dismissing Mr. Eguchi, with its result in Count Uchida's resignation, has brought forth severe criticism from sources other than the press. The Japanese military authorities of the Kwantung, with whom Count Uchida has worked in close cooperation, have protested against making any change in the existing directorate. General Araki, the Minister of War, and Admiral Ozumi, the Minister of the Navy, are reported as having called on the Premier, on separate occasions and indicated that they are strongly desirous of the retention of Count Uchida as President of the South Manchuria Railway. The tone of the press reports would indicate that the military authorities are so determined to prevent the replacement of Count Uchida that in case the Government takes any steps to replace him, a serious impasse might result.

The Government took no action on the resignation of Count Uchida until a few days ago, when it telegraphed requesting him to remain in office. It has probably been considerably perturbed by the unexpected outburst of protest against what it might consider a justifiable change of personnel in favor of men of the Government Party. The press reports that Mr. Jotaro Yamamoto, a prominent member of the Seiyukai Party and once President of the South Manchuria Railway, was selected to replace Count Uchida. Mr. Yamamoto, apparently disturbed by the Army's agitation, refused the proffered post.

It is said that the Army objects to Mr. Yamamoto, the Seiyukai's nominee for the post of President of the South Manchuria Railway, because of his capitalistic taint. Mr. Yamamoto was once a director of the Mitsui interests

and

-4-

and a man of wealth who may be expected to be sympathetic toward the capitalistic exploitation of Manchuria. There is said to be in the Army at present a curious antipathy toward capitalism as representing a force which would subordinate the military spirit to commercialism. It is rumored that General Araki is considering the post of President of the South Manchuria Railway for himself. Failing that, it is said that he has in mind General Ugaki, now Governor General of Chosen.

In deciding to make the change in the management of the South Manchuria Railway the Government, probably urged on by ambitious members of the Meiyukai, seems to have neglected to consider the intense public interest in Manchurian affairs as well as the attitude of the Military. The strong opposition to the Government's plan which has resulted, is indicative on one count of public indignation at making a political football out of an office of great importance to the Empire at this critical time. In another sense it indicates that the Military are determined to prevent possible interference with their own plans for Manchuria by changes in the management of the South Manchuria Railway dictated by Tokyo politicians. The final outcome of the dispute will be interesting, as a decision to retain Count Uchida would be further evidence of military dominance in political affairs.

General Araki is quoted as stating that he has no objection to Count Uchida retiring provided a suitable successor, who will carry on similar policies, may be found. This means, of course, cooperation with the Army. The Military is obviously strongly opposed to allowing party politics to affect their own program in Manchuria.

The

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The latest press reports indicate that Count Uchida has been persuaded by the Military authorities to withdraw his resignation. He had previously indicated his willingness to remain at his post until after the departure of the League Commission of Inquiry from Manchuria, and he has now agreed to remain until that time. In an interview with press representatives on the 19th, Count Uchida stated that as soon as the League Commission had departed, he intends to proceed to Tokyo. This is taken to mean that he still intends to resign.

Respectfully yours,


Edwin L. Neville

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:
Editorial from the
OSAKA MAINICHI

Embassy's File No. 800. Japan.

WTT/SE



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TYRANNY OF SEIYUKAI .

(Editorial)

OSAKA MAINICHI, April 14, 1932.

That the Government's action in forcing Mr. Eguchi, Vice-Governor, out of the South Manchuria Railway has been outrageous, is fully recognized by the public. The Government has weakly stated that the resignation of Mr. Eguchi was the result of the application of Imperial Order Number.... (something), but the Overseas Minister himself is positively refusing to give out the reason.

The Government is under no obligation to explain its actions on any readjustment of personnel, it is true; but when the post immediately involved is of national importance and the individual concerned is the cynosure of general attention, the Government, as a Party Ministry, should make all efforts to obtain a clear understanding of the nation.

To dispose of men of importance with an attitude implying that the Government can always impose its will and that whatever it does is absolute, is an action savoring of despotism or dictatorship, and should never be attempted by a party Ministry such as the Seiyukai, which has for many years been preaching..... a Party Ministry that stands upon the strength of popular support.

When the Government dismisses officials under its control, it may not find it necessary to explain why the dismissal has been carried out in the event the circumstances are known to the public. However, in such a case as that
of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of Mr. Eguchi when the public has been ignorant as to any wrongs on the part of Mr. Eguchi to merit the sudden dismissal (applying the heaviest punitive measure on one who is not an official but a director of the J.N.R.) without giving the reason, cannot be described as other than despotic.

If the forced retirement of Mr. Eguchi is solely due, as the public has suspected, to the fact of his having been appointed by the Minseito Ministry, it has its origin in party prejudice and demonstrates the 100 per cent ugly feature of partisan strife. The inability of the Government to offer a satisfactory reason for its action has its background in this unsavory motive. The nation knows it well; and well knowing it, the nation realizes the extent of this tyrannical action.

The Government is declaring that it has requested Governor Count Uchida to remain in his post, but this is mere camouflage. It is well aware that unless the Vice Governor is removed first, it cannot force out the Governor. It also knows that Count Uchida, "stiff necked" as he is, will never stay in with his assistant shoved out without his consent.

The Government's aim is simply to force both of them out and instal men of its own choice. It is already selecting the successor to Count Uchida. Making the South Manchuria Railway a fat pork barrel has long been an evil of partisan struggle in the past, and it is a serious loss to the nation to repeat the practice at this time when the newly born Manchurian Republic has just started on its national life.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Does the Seiyukai believe that the nation would be complacent after it has committed such a serious political crime? Does it think the nation is just an "easy mark" until it rises in mobs? It should be pointed out for the Seiyukai that the nation has been observing the action of the Seiyukai as the worst tyrant.

It is refreshing, at this juncture, to hear Lieutenant-General Araki, War Minister in the same Ministry, declaring against the ill-considered move of changing the heads of the South Manchuria Railway. Between the lines of the War Minister's statement, we notice his hatred of partisan arrogance. And what does this teach us?

It indicates the increasing disgust on the part of the nation against the political parties and party politics, and increasing confidence in the military circles. Where would this lead, then? It is plain: it would point to a leaning toward Fascism. The Seiyukai is digging its own grave and also the graves of popular politics and party politics. This steadily goes on while the Seiyukai turns a deaf ear to public opinion and indulges in its own smug self complacency.

....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01-Manchuria/194 FOR #1470

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Apr. 7, 1932
NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: pamphlet published by Dr. Chao Hsin-pao, President of the
Legislative Yuan of Manchukuo, giving motives behind the organization
of the independent state of Manchuria. This pamphlet, which is dis-
tributed through the Japanese Legation, is self-evidently Japanese
propaganda.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1470

Peiping, April 7, 1932.

Subject: Japanese Complexion of the
State of Manchukuo.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

- 1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith the English translation of a pamphlet published by Dr. Chao Hsin-pao, President of the Legislative Yuan of the newly organized State of Manchukuo and Mayor of Mukden, together with an editorial from "Le Journal de Pekin" of April 7, 1932, commenting upon this pamphlet and upon the Japanese complexion of the new state.
- 2/

As pointed out in the editorial, this pamphlet was distributed through the Japanese Legation to other foreign legations in Peiping, and the extra copies enclosed with this despatch were supplied upon an informal request to the Japanese Legation. That the pamphlet is in the nature of Japanese propaganda is self-evident.


Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Mahlon F. Perkins
 Counselor of Legation.

Enclosures:
 Two, as noted herein.
 800
 RLB:epg.

013
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



*In the name of the Mukden
New Regime, we, in capacity of
participants in the same, res-
pectfully inform the civilized
nations of the world the
motives of our organizing this
New Regime.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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By Dr. Chao, Hsin-Pao

In the name of the Mukden New Regime, we, in capacity of participants in the same, respectfully inform the civilized nations of the world the motives of our organizing this New Regime.

Gentlemen, now the new regime is organized, I am one of the participants concerned in this event. Beyond the boundries of S. H. K. and in the southern parts of China there are rumours circulating that we are under the Japanese Military dictatorship, so whatever we do is the motive of the Japanese. Perhaps, owing to that misleading propaganda work that the world does not concept the real idea of the state of affaires and believes the rumours as facts.

Today I, in the capacity of a participant of this new regime as well as a representative of those other participants, am going to announce in detail to the world about our motives, reasons and principals for organizing this new regime. In order to avoid any misunderstanding I sincerely

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hope that nations which take interest in the situation of the Orient and those concern the welfare of Manchuria, will listen to my statement with serene aspect and calmness.

There is a person who sleeps in the daytime and gets up at 3 or 4 p. m., with the habit of morphia injection; after being stimulated he begins to joy-seeking with girls or immerses himself in gambling; never in his life cares to listen to faithful advices. Daily practice of these evil doings from day to dawn then he goes to sleep whose temper is extraordinary cruel, once enraged murderous deeds frequently committed. Gentlemen, if you meet such a person what would you do with him? Will you employ him as your servant? Will you engage him as your secretary? Will you pay him high respect as your superior? I am afraid you will find yourself in great trouble for having him near you. Chang Hsueh-Liang is the man.

Ever since he is in power of the N. E. provinces he had been sucking the blood of the people for satisfying his selfish desire and boisterous pleasure. Issuing non-cashable bank-notes which to buy food products from the industrious farmers and then sold them to foreigners who paid him solid gold which is promptly converted into his own property. Imposing unbearable taxes on the people in order

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to obtain more money to purchase ammunitions, to feed hundreds of thousands of unpatriotic murderous soldiers; that is the way to increase his territorial influence. Adulterous deeds were perpetrated on wives and daughters of his subordinates.

His properties and military estimates were increased by leaps and bounds but the people were getting poorer and poorer every day, so they either fled to other places for safety or died of hunger, yet he showed no sign of grief or sympathy. Carrying with him flesh and blood of the people of the N. E. provinces into the other side of the Great Wall with the intent to realize his baseful ambition in spite of the sacrifice of the lives and safety of 30,000,000. people. Those who lead him to mischief are considered as his faithful followers and beneficial friends and those who give him good advices are considered as malicious and condemnable. Since his being chief of N. E. 4 provinces people either has suffered from bankruptcy or being home-wrecked. As the people are afraid of his devilish power and as there left no course to lodge complaint so it may be considered the people as in hell.

Gentlemen, if you were the natives of the N. E. 4 provinces, what would you do? Could you endure torture

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and death without resistance? Please think, is there any chance for such a person to remain still in power in this time of the century? If he were in England or America or France, could he live even for one day? Now there are only two ways for the people of the N. E. provinces; one is to suffer whatever torture inflicted on them and die with no complaint and the other is to rise and with no complaint and fight against him. But you must be aware of his possession of 100,000 tiger-like and wolfish soldiers, how can we fight him with our bare hands.

He used the same drastic method in dealing with the people of our neighbour country and that is the cause of this terrible event of September 18th. Therefore this terrible event was caused by Chang-Hsueh-Liang and his gang and as much as the sufferings and loss of the people are also inflicted upon by Chang Hsueh-Liang and his gang.

The military elements of our neighbour country do not hate our people but they do bear hatred against Chang Hsueh-Liang and his gang and so is our people bearing no grudge against the Japanese but they do abhor Chang Hsueh-Liang and his gang. Since the Japanese has driven out Chang Hsueh-Liang and his gang and has saved our

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people from the hands of those unscrupulous persons, the people of the N. E. Provinces, for this reason feel grateful to the Japanese military movements.

Chang Hsueh-Liang and his gang attack us by stating that we take this opportunity, after securing assistance from the Japanese military, to rise into political prominence. With this means of propagating their evil minds they try to oust us, who are laboring under good faith for the welfare of the people, to recover their fame losing grounds and power so as to again enslave the people. A man who seeks foreign assistance for procuring political prominence is a person of great greed.

Now, I wish to tell you something about my personal character and I hope that the patriots of the world will use their own judgment regarding my present situation as to whether I am a man who seeks foreign assistance for procuring political prominence. I was brought up in Chinese primary and high schools for education and afterwards I studied eleven years in Japan where I took up law study. Within that period of eleven years Chinese students, soon after graduation, returned to China in order to attain their aim for being an official, while others who learned the lucky ones began to admire for good luck and also returned to

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China in hurry. I was the only one who left behind to devote my time in study and lived my simple life, with a intent to be the only Chinese jurist from Japan. I was rewarded with the most difficult Degree of Honor and I am the only one who got this Degree up to present. If I were a man of greed for official grandeur I could not stay in a foreign country to study so long only for educational purposes.

With an idea to reform the judicial administration I accepted the offer from Chang Hsueh-Liang as a legal adviser of the N. E. Provinces. I have returned to China six years ago and I have never contemplated to be an official, this statement of truth could be proved by letters written to me by Chang Tso-Lin & Chang Hsueh-Liang. By boasting oneself is no glory but I do to show you that my enthusiasm in assisting to organize this new regime is to sacrifice my own interest for the welfare of the people so that they be able to proceed into the road of liberty. Since you know my personal character then you will understand our reasons to establish this administration as well as the purpose of the Japanese assistance.

Japan help us to erect this administration but they did not help Chang Hsueh-Liang and Tong Yu Ling. etc. that is because Japan believes us in capability of abolishing the

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customary evil habit of bribery and miscarriage of justice. And to carry out effectively a good administration so as to help the people to the road of prosperity.

The Governor of this Provincial Government now is H. E. Tsaong Sih-Yi. although he is not a scholar yet among the Chinese officials, he is politically clean and principally correct. Ever since he has been in politics more than ten years with lucrative positions still he has no more than thousand dollars in cash.

A jurist must be a person of serious mind. I am of little ambition and with no greedy desire. My criticism regarding to any person is very fair and accurate. I shall declare that H. E. Tsaong Sih-yi is a person whom I pay high respect so you may understand what kind of a man H. E. Tsaong is.

I think the patriots of the world are anxious to know the existing condition between the Japanese military and the Chinese people in Manchuria, so I shall proceed to tell you very clearly.

To organize this new regime is the will of the Chinese people and the Japanese have not interfered with but they do always nourish the hopes; that, we shall have a clean and straight administration; that we shall lessen

the burden of the people and help them to prosperity; that we shall build a theoretical happiest world and expect other nationals than Chinese to join us to enjoy our prosperity; those are the hopes entertained by the Japanese military as well as the civilians. Do you realize that you are began to head onto the land of happiness and our hearts are throbbing with ecstasy as soon our grievances are left behind.

Do you wish to know the relationship between the Japanese and we the Chinese? I shall tell you in general. The relationship between Japan and Manchuria is closely connected both parties received the same educational affections. If mutual help is arranged in economics the benefit is also mutual, otherwise both parties will suffer financial loss. Japanese people are very sentimental, honesty, friendly and chivalrous. With respect to modern civilization they persuade it enthusiastically and diligently. For this reason men with great ability are abundant. With a yearly increase of population, territorial tightness and productive exhaustion are keenly felt. Since there are so many capable men yet so limited in employment, an outlet must be found.

While Manchuria is a vast piece of uncultivated land with scanty population; to devolve Manchuria men and money are required so if we two nations help each other all

is well, otherwise the Japanese shall die of hunger and the Manchurians may die of poverty. Therefore Manchuria should accept the financial support and experts supply from Japan in order to cultivate the land and develop the industry. Then the Japanese shall survive and the Manchurians shall be rich, so the economical assistance of the Japanese is beneficial to China. The uncultivated lands and the unexploited mines, if left untouched, there will be not even one cent produced, if we, by the financial help and the skillful execution of the Japanese, allow the natural resources to be developed then we can easily enjoy at least half of the profit. For the sake of Manchuria's economical improvement we shall welcome the Japanese. We entertain this idea not because of the Japanese military presence but really for the cause of our national wealth. Anybody who possesses a clear mind will not reject this proposal.

Chang Hsueh-Liang never strike the thought of people's welfare into his head but only devotes his time to scheme how to enlarge his military force and territorial conquest. Gentlemen, please think how can you make the brave citizens of a geographically connected neighbour country to dwell in those three small islands with no means of life preservation,

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and yet we here lay in waste of such ensources. Is that kind of condition should be allowed to exist among sentimental human beings?

So now we determined to co-operate with the Japanese in enterprises of economical nature; mutual contrivance for life preservation; with an hand-in-hand spirit to attain mutual prosperity and perpetuity so as to show to the world a sample of friendship. We believe that Japan has the same spirit of co-operation and intention and absolutely refrain from the nesire of territorial conquest.

Our Sage, Manchins said in his teachings: "Man who possesses reliable property has a reliable heart and one who possesses no reliable property yet has a reliable heart is a patriot." Peace can only be secured by the satisfaction of the people therefore the only measure to secure peace in the Far East is to procure satisfaction for the people. With this spirit we are endeavoaing to preserve peace in the Far East. That is our policy.

What about our spirit, and the real idea of the Japanese? We humbly request the nations of the world to watch the result with calmness and wait patiently for one or two years. I strongly believe after one or two years that the nations of the world will applause the light and truth;

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honesty and grandeur of the Japanese and our far-sighted judgment in this case. I hope the nations before realizing any result of our contrivance that they would not mis-focus their point of view and raise any unfair criticism or not calle-for actions which would eventually hamper our procedure for preserving the peace of the Far East and hinder our progress of developing mutual care and Love.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Reference No. 2

Dispatch No. 1420

LE JOURNAL DE PEKIN

Thursday April 7 1932

Propaganda

While Nanking denounces Pu Yi and the pu-yicrats as renegades and threatens to launch a punitive crusade against them, Changchun denounces Chang Hsueh-liang and his former underlings, big and small.

In Mukden the newlycomes are busy confiscating the property of the so-called "rebel" Chang-ites.

All the residences of the former officialdom have been turned over to the partisans of Manchukuo.

All the money deposited by them in the local banks have been seized.

The Frontier Bank and the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces will be closed on April 15 and the sums deposited with them by the former officials will be transferred to a new central bank to be founded in Changchun.

It is taken for granted that the rightful owners will never see a cent of these sums.

We are become accustomed to the words Traitor, Renegade, False Brother, in Chinese politics in the last few years. Such epithets have been applied to every name which has risen above the political horizon, without a single exception.

But such words and the deeds of treachery, trickery, felony which justify their use have been exceptionally frequent during recent events in Manchuria.

The case of General Ma Chan-shan is so conspicuous an example that it jumps to everyone's mind without need of being reviewed. Ma's entrance into his duties as War Minister of the new Japanese pu-yicracy came so soon after his oath to die rather than surrender to the Japanese that the wide world gasped.

We say "the new Japanese state" deliberately and advisedly for the simple reason that Manchukou is precisely that. Any other adjective for it than "Japanese" would be inaccurate.

A pamphlet published by Dr. Chao Hsin-pao, president of the Legislative Yuan of the new state, mayor of Mukden, chief official to receive the Lytton Commission next month, is a striking demonstration of this truth.

The pamphlet makes no attempt to dissimulate Chao's hypocrisy and treason.

He admits that for the last six years he was legal adviser to Chang Hsueh-liang and that he deserted so as to join the Japanese.

His pamphlet tells us that he was in Japan during his student years, spent eleven years there, and that he is delighted at present to help the Japanese and to be protected by their bayonets.

This pamphlet, of which several thousands were printed, is distributed through the Japanese Legation—which is a very instructive fact.

The pamphlet devotes a lot of its energy to dynamiting Chang Hsueh-liang.

Dr. Chao Hsin-pao, having been his intimate adviser, chooses the intimate in the Young Marshal's life to dilate upon. Chang Hsueh-liang is seen as representing all imaginable vices and as responsible for all the disasters which have overtaken Manchuria. And all Chao's former colleagues are suddenly become "wolves" and "tigers".

While the Japanese.....they are "sentimental, honest, friendly and chivalrous".

They pursue modern civilization with enthusiasm and diligence.

They are very numerous, very energetic and many of them are men of great talent.

Therefore humanity must see to it that Japan expands its territory. Manchuria, (Dr. Chao speaking), is a vast uncultivated region, with a very scant population. If Manchuria and Japan help each other, all will be well.

But if the two did not make a team, Japan would die of food-hunger and Manchuria of silver-hunger.

Therefore Manchuria should accept Japan's financial help, experts and advice.

Thus the Japanese will survive and the Manchurians will become rich.

If we exploit Manchuria with the aid of Japan, we shall reap at least half of the profits.

We are delighted to co-operate with the Japanese military not for their sake but for the sake of the happiness which they will bring to our nation.

How can men of feeling bear to own such great resources while their neighbors have to live on three tiny islands incapable of preserving their national existence.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The above are typical of the Japanese Pearls to be found in the report of Chao Hsin-pao which is intended 'for all the civilized nations' and for the Lytton Commission. The aim of this remarkable pamphlet is to explain the intentions of the Free and Independent State of Manchukuo and the reasons for its devotion to Japan.

The pamphlet, which is edited, printed, distributed and shipped throughout the world by the Japanese propaganda agencies, closes by saying:

"I am certain that the nations of the world will applaud the results of Japan's honesty and grandeur of soul, of the Light and Truth of Japan."

These words, coming as they do from a good Chinese patriot, cannot but impress his readers. It is important to remember that the author, Chao, traitor to his former colleagues and to his nation, is the main personage commissioned with the reception and instruction of the Lytton commission during its study of the Manchurian question.

Meanwhile Henry Pu Yi Hsuan Tung whom Chao is devoted to now that he has de-devoted himself to his former chief, signalizes the opening of his reign by an act of loyalty quite different from those of his collaborator Chao.

Ex-emperor Henry has, according to the Yung Pao of Tientsin, called his most devoted servants, the palace eunuchs, to his side. They are ordered to rush to Changchun.

These eunuchs are a strikingly appropriate symbol of the emasculated political policy which Japan desires the ex-emperor and all the pu-yicrats to follow during the Lytton Commission's visit and forevermore.

A. N.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00/385 FOR Despatch # 588.

FROM Japan (Neville) DATED April 22, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Control of Manchuria and Mongolia by Japan
has long been the ambition of at least a
part of the reactionary societies and
since the beginning of the Manchurian affair
the reactionary societies have received nation-
wide attention.

hs

793.94/5188

5188

0 1 9 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

since their interests and aims are to a certain degree similar. The control of Manchuria and Mongolia by Japan has long been the ambition of at least a part of the reactionary societies. Ryohsei Uchida, mentioned above, recently informed a member of my staff that he had memorialized the Government to this effect in 1913. Another leader said a few days ago that the enforced return of the Liaotung Peninsula by Japan and its subsequent transfer to Russia has been the dominating factor in the development of reactionary societies. The importance of these societies has been enhanced since last September by the assistance which they have been able to render the military through propaganda, the silencing of opposition, and organization of support. Their potential danger has been realized throughout the country by the recent disclosures that followed the assassination of Baron Dan, reported in my despatch No. 561 of April 7th. It is probable that these societies will maintain their present position as long as the military remains in power.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11934 FOR # 1479

FROM China (Perkins) DATED April 14, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Admiral Tsai Ting-kan's conversation with Mr. Perkins in which the Admiral stated he thought the Shanghai disturbance was a mere blind to allow the Japanese time to gain control of Manchuria.

ek

793.94/5189

5189

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Admiral Tsai expressed the opinion that the disorders in Tientsin in the latter part of 1931 were instigated by the Japanese in order to intimidate the young ex-Emperor, Pu Yi, and to induce him to proceed for safety to Dairen, whence he could afterward be prevailed upon to govern Manchuria; that the fighting at Shanghai was brought about in order to divert attention from Manchuria until preparations had been made for the new government there. He also intimated that the Japanese had in mind to hold an area near Shanghai for use as a settlement of their own, lying between the International Settlement and Woosung.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.51/357 FOR # 590

FROM Japan (Neville) DATED April 23, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Supplementary budget has been approved by the cabinet for submission to the diet has included in it expenditures for the Manchurian and Shanghai affairs.

ek

793.94/5190

5190

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11933 FOR Tel#- 4pm

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED May 6, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

The recent consolidation of the air force with the army and the uniting of the Kwangtung naval forces under the head of the first group army headquarters is regarded as significant in connection with the pending Shanghai settlement as it is said that Canton will not sanction the acceptance of humiliating terms.

ek

793.94/5191

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0199

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to

REC'D
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

May 9, 1932.

793.94/A
225
93/102S
113
AMERICAN CONSUL,

MAY 9-32

SHANGHAI (China).

FOR THE CONSUL GENERAL AND THE MINISTER.

Department desires to be informed with regard to
Japanese invasion of American defense sector on May 3
and changes in defense plans and allocations made
subsequent thereto.

Castle
Acting.

793.94/5191A

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

MAY 9, 1932

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

FROM

Dated May 10, 1932

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 10 1932

Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

234, May 10, 4 p. m.

Your 170, May 6, 11 a. m. for the Minister was repeated
to Nanking.

One. Official report and protest from Shanghai Municipal
Council regarding incident involving 31st Infantry was
received yesterday and I expect further information today
after which I will telegraph full report.

Two. Regarding the lifting of state of emergency
I have no official information regarding when this will be
done and have left this matter entirely to the discretion
of Shanghai Municipal Council. From conversations with
Shanghai Municipal Council officials I understand they
believe that state of emergency should not be lifted until
withdrawal of Japanese troops contemplated in Article
and Annex 2 of Sino-Japanese agreement of May 5th has been
completed and incoming Chinese police functions have been
established.

Repeated to the Legation, copy to Commander-in-Chief.

CUNNINGHAM

WWC-WSB

F/LB

793.94/5192

FILED
JUN 13 1932

793.94
note
893.102
893.0146
811.23

793.94/5161
L.L. to Shanghai
May 11/32
H.L.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 10, 1932

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

235, May 10, 5 p.m.

Colonel Drysdale has personally observed Japanese evacuation and resumption of control of evacuated area by the Chinese to date. Lotien was evacuated today and entered by the Chinese police without incident in accordance with prearranged schedule. This completes first phase of the evacuation. The date of evacuation from Yanghing Tazang Chenju position, presumably the next area to be evacuated, has not been announced. The Japanese say that further evacuation depends on developments. Transmit to War Department. Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP-RPF



793.94/5193

FILED

793.94
693.10-3
894.23

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 110.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, April 7, 1932.

SUBJECT: Transmitting Mimeographed Pamphlet from Tientsin
Japanese Information Bureau concerning Dissemina-
tion of False Reports.

793.94

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
PUBLICATIONS SECTION
MAY 10 1932

WASHINGTON, of accompanying
documents stamped to be
forwarded to DCR

SIR:

MAY 9 1932

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy, in
quadruplicate, of my despatch No. 152 of this date, to
the Legation at Peiping, on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800

FPL/DA

Enclosure:
To Legation, April 7, 1932.

Original and 3 copies to Department.

Copy into
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 10 1932
Department of State

F/LS

793.94/5194

FILED

MAY 19 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.152

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Tientsin, China, April 7, 1932.

Subject: Transmitting Mimeographed Pamphlet
from Tientsin Japanese Information
Bureau concerning Dissemination of
False Rumors.

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, as of possible
interest, a copy of a mimeographed pamphlet issued recently
by the Japanese Information Bureau at Tientsin summarizing
a collection of alleged false reports said to have been
disseminated by the Chinese. The pamphlet explains itself.

There has been no corresponding pamphlet issued by
the Chinese.

Respectfully yours,


F. F. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
As stated.

800

FL/DA:w

Original and 1 copy to Legation.
In quadruplicate to the Department.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch
No. 110, Dated April 7/32,
From the American Consulate General
at Tientsin, China.

COLLECTION OF FALSE REPORTS SPREAD BY CHINESE

Japanese Information Bureau,
Tientsin.
(March 1932)

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

793.94/519
7615/76367

- I -

COLLECTION OF FALSE REPORTS SPREAD BY CHINESE

PREFACE.

A Chinese proverb says "KEEP THE PEOPLE IN IGNORANCE. LET THEM DEPEND UPON THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES. This is said to be a secret of the Chinese administration over the people since several centuries. And it is obvious that, even at the present time, when the organs of communication are developing, the Kuomintang party believing that propaganda is the most important method for unifying the whole country, is still following in the steps of the fore-mentioned proverb not to let the people know the real cause of events or what is actually happening in this country.

The Chinese authorities believe that propaganda means to deceive the people with false reports. If we look at a statement made by the Chinese delegate at Geneva, Dr. Alfred Sze, at a time when the Manchurian affair took place, it is easily understandable how the Chinese authorities are relying upon, not only periodical publications, but upon the Chinese for this sort of propaganda. Another example is given by Dr. W. W. Yen with regard to the Shanghai affair when he stated that the Japanese used "dum-dum" bullets and poisonous gas, which is absolutely groundless.

Especially, since the Shanghai incident, many crazy reports have appeared almost every day in the Chinese papers insisting upon their so-called "victories". This form of propaganda has now reached the climax in China. Thus, the Chinese try to instigate their own people to adopt insulting feelings towards Japan so as to enable them to maintain political power over their own nationals.

It is indeed a pity for the people of this country to be prevented and debarred from having reliable sources of information through the medium of this false and pernicious propaganda and so they are trying to estrange the two neighbouring countries.

Below is a collection of the false reports fabricated by the Chinese in order to make their readers understand what Chinese propaganda really is.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

CONTENTS.

- I. Extra edition of the Chinese papers claiming their victories.
2. Reports of an alleged riot among the Japanese troops.
3. Corpses of Japanese soldiers in coffins.
4. Complaints of the Japanese soldiers captured.
5. The power of the "Big Sword Corps".
6. Humain bullet-proof.
7. Fighting of Chinese aeroplanes.
8. Widows commit suicide and children cry.
9. False map.
10. Frequent celebrations of victories.
- II. National beer.
12. Japanese casualties.

- 3 -

I. EXTRA EDITION OF CHINESE PAPERS

One of the most striking examples of false reports appearing in the Chinese papers was given in Canton. On March 16 a report was spread that THE JAPANESE TROOPS WERE ENTIRELY ANNIHILATED, GENERAL UEDA WAS CAPTURED ALIVE, AND A REMAINING FORCES WERE DISARMED BY THE BRITISH TROOPS. An extra issue publishing this news caused the people to start "celebrating" and a large number of fire-crackers were let-off. A short time afterwards, however, when it became known that the report was not true, each Chinese paper published an excuse blaming the Publicity Bureau of the local government whom they held responsible.

Another false report also appeared in many Chinese papers published in North China, for example, the "Min Kuo Jih Pao" on February 18 said that GENERAL UEDA, WHO COMMANDED THE JAPANESE FORCES IN SHANGHAI, TOGETHER WITH 800 OF HIS BODYGUARDS WERE SURROUNDED BY THE CHINESE TROOPS ON FEB. 17 AT 7 P.M. AT KIANGWAN AND DISARMED. The above paper reported this as if it were true. We are truly sorry that such false news must have much embarrassed General Ueda.

Another ^{report} paper of a similar nature was published in Chinese papers stating that Admiral Hirozawa had committed "hara-kiri" two or three times and that Admiral Nomura was wounded. The cause of these false reports seem to have been based upon the fact that on the same day a Japanese officer, who was out scouting, went ahead when he was near Kiangwan when his party succeeded in routing a number of Chinese soldiers and safely returned to their original post. It happened that one of the Japanese officers belonging to the above scouting party was unexpectedly promoted to the rank of "general" according to the Chinese press version, so it would appear from the above.

Another Chinese paper reported on the same day the following foolish story under the heading of A STATEMENT MADE BY A CERTAIN JAPANESE WHO IS AGAINST "JAPANESE INVASION OF CHINA POLICY".

SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE HOSTILITIES AT SHANGHAI THE JAPANESE TROOPS HAVE LOST TOO MANY MEN, NUMBERING OVER 12,000 OF CASUALTY, WHICH CAUSED THE WHOLE OF THE TROOPS TO LOSE THEIR FIGHTING SPIRIT, AND THEY DO NOT WANT TO TAKE ADVANCE ANY MORE.

- 4 -

The Japanese marines numbered altogether only 2,700, but the Chinese papers have increased their number -- on "paper" -- to as large as 10,000 and again killed ALL OF THEM -- on paper. We really fail to understand how they dealt with so many dead bodies of the Japanese! It is indeed a shame that the general public should be "fed" with such false rumour and be compelled to read them.

Another report on the part of the Chinese said :

THE CHINESE TROOPS DESTROYED THE STRONGEST ARMY IN THE WORLD IN THE FIGHTING NEAR SHANGHAI. THE CHINESE TROOPS HAVE THEREFORE GAINED GREAT VICTORIES NEVER ACHIEVED IN THE HISTORY OF CHINA. WHEN THE JAPANESE TROOPS WERE DRIVEN AWAY, OUR TROOPS ENTERED THE FOREIGN SETTLEMENT AND KILLED ALL THE REMAINING JAPANESE. WE FINALLY WON THE FIGHTING LAST NIGHT. GENERAL UEDA SENT AN URGENT TELEGRAM LAST NIGHT TO TOKYO ASKING FOR REINFORCEMENTS. OUR BIG SWORD CORPS WAS THE MOST SUCCESSFUL FIGHTING UNIT.

This is another of many outrageous forms of propaganda which appeared in a Chinese paper under date of February 23. The above paper continued to relate as follows:

OUR TROOPS STARTED GENERAL ATTACK AGAINST THE JAPANESE TROOPS AT KAIKUAN, MIAOSHINCHENG AND CHAPEI, AND AT 2 P.M. THE ENEMY RETREATED SUSTAINING BETWEEN 2,000 and 3,000 CASUALTIES. OUR TROOPS UNDER THE COVER OF A BARRAGE OF OUR ARTILLERY ADVANCED AS FAR AS YUHANG ROAD AND CHAKOW MARKET, AND EXPECT TO DEAL WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE ENEMY BY THIS EVENING.

Furthermore, this same Chinese paper published the following heading: THE GLORY OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC -- THE WHOLE WORLD RECOGNIZES CHINA. But all these reports are contrary to actual facts. On that very day the Japanese troops advanced to a line connecting the north and south areas of Kiangwan, inflicting heavy losses on the Chinese troops.

Moreover, on the next day, the Japanese troops who were reported by the Chinese papers to have retreated to Kiangwan, they -- the Japanese -- occupied the Chinese front line at Miaoshinoheng, and the commander of the Chinese 88th division was wounded, one brigade commander and two regimental commanders were killed, together with 2,000 or 3,000 casualties on the Chinese side, which we greatly deplore. But still the Chinese papers continue to publish their "victories" which do not cause us indignation but rather make us to feel pity for them.

- 5 -

2. RIOT AMONG JAPANESE TROOPS.

It is a very common thing for the Chinese troops to start a riot or mutiny. It is rather natural for them, as they are merely "hired" soldiers, and therefore are in the habit of staging a riot or mutiny from time to time whenever they are short of money. Then, they either kill their superior officers or desert, carrying their arms away with them. But it does not require any comments as to the difference between Japanese and Chinese troops. The Chinese themselves know these facts quite well, but still they try to blind themselves to these facts. The "Min Kuo Jih Pao" and several other Chinese dailies published the following report on Feb. 28 when the Japanese troops started their free action: A PORTION OF THE JAPANESE TROOPS STARTED TO MUTINY, AS THEY DID NOT LIKE TO JOIN IN THE FIGHTING AND THEY WERE FINALLY THROWN INTO THE CREEK AND DROWNED.

Special Shanghai telegram dated Feb. 21 appeared in the "Min Kuo Jih Pao" reported that 600 Japanese soldiers out of a total number of 3,000 started a mutiny and finally they were disarmed in order to be sent back to Japan etc., seems to be rather common in nature, appearing sometimes in the Chinese papers, but the end of that paper said these bad disciplined soldiers instead of being sent back to Japan were all thrown into the creek and drowned, AS IT WAS FEARED THAT WHEN THEY RETURNED TO JAPAN THEY MIGHT TELL THE JAPANESE PEOPLE OF THE FAILURE OF THE JAPANESE TROOPS AND WOULD INSTIGATE THE JAPANESE SENTIMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THE JAPANESE MILITARY ETC. Such a report might be a common occurrence among the Chinese military under such circumstances. Therefore they tried to twist it round to read as if the Japanese were also guilty of such conduct. These Chinese are really their own accusers!

3. CORPSES OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS IN COFFINS.

The "I Shih Pao" published on Feb. 19, at a time when it seemed to have exhausted all other sources of propaganda, a very gruesome report to the following effect:

THE JAPANESE ARMY SENT MANY DEAD BODIES OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS KILLED DURING THE FIGHTING AT SHANGHAI IN 2,000 WOODEN BOXES TO TIENTSIN, AND THEY WERE SENT TO THE JAPANESE BARRACKS AT HAIKUAN SSU. THIS IS DUE TO

- 6 -

THE FEAR OF AN ANTI-MILITARY MOVEMENT IN JAPAN IF THE CORPSES OF THESE SOLDIERS WERE SENT BACK TO JAPAN. THESE CORPSES WILL BE BURNT IN TIENTSIN IN A FEW DAYS.

4. COMPLAINT OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS CAPTURED.

The "I Shih Pao" published a Shanghai telegram dated Feb. 22 saying that a Japanese soldier who was captured alive at Kiangwan said: 'I AM NOT SERIOUSLY WOUNDED SO IF I WISHED I COULD RUN AWAY FROM THE BATTLE-FIELD, BUT I AM AFRAID OF THAT MY SUPERIOR OFFICERS WILL FORCE ME TO GO BACK AND FIGHT. SO I WISH TO BE TAKEN PRISONER BY THE CHINESE, BECAUSE THE (TH AND 12TH DIVISIONS OF THE JAPANESE ARMY HAVE ALREADY LOST THEIR FIGHT) ING SPIRIT AND THEY DO NOT WISH TO CONTINUE FIGHTING FURTHER WITHOUT ANY PURPOSE, AND THEY ARE ONLY TAKING RESISTANCE AGAINST THE CHINESE BECAUSE THEY ARE COMPELLED TO DO SO.

The Japanese army, among whom there appeared many courageous soldiers such as , for instance, THE THREE HEROES who blew up themselves up by carrying explosive bombs and powder around their waists and succeeded in forcing an opening in the barbed wire defence. It is therefore impossible for the Japanese army to possess any soldiers who are cowards or to make any comparisons between the Japanese and Chinese soldiers. The acts of the Chinese soldiers are similar to those of beasts, for example, they exposed the head of a Japanese killed on the top of a spear, so how could it be possible that a Japanese soldier would prefer to surrender?

5. POWER OF BIG SWORD CORPS.

The "I Shih Pao" of Feb. 23 said that

ON THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 22 THE CHINESE TROOPS WHO CONTINUED TO BE STATIONED AT YUNTSIAOPIN ATTACKED THE JAPANESE TROOPS AND DURING THE FIGHTING THE COMMANDING OFFICER, GENERAL CHANG FA KWEI, DASHED INTO THE ENEMY'S LINE IN FRONT OF HIS OWN TROOPS. THE BIG SWORD CORPS ALSO FOLLOWED HIM AND HIS TROOPS. MOREOVER SIX AEROPLANES WHICH CAME FROM CANTON JOINED IN THE FIGHTING, BUT THE JAPANESE TROOPS LACK ANY REAL FIGHTING EXPERIENCE, AND THE MAJORITY OF MEN OF THE JAPANESE ARMY/^{WHO} DO NOT BELONG TO GOOD CLASS

- 7 -

PEOPLE ARE AFRAID OF DEATH. THIS IS BECAUSE THE JAPANESE SOLDIERS ARE VERY MUCH AFRAID OF THE BIG SWORD CORPS, AND WHEN THEY ARE CAPTURED BY THE CHINESE SOLDIERS THEY POINT, AS THEY DO NOT SPEAK CHINESE LANGUAGE, ONE FINGER TO THE CENTRE OF THEIR CHEST AND PLACE ONE HAND AT THE BACK OF THEIR NECK TO SIGNIFY THAT " IF YOU WANT TO KILL ME, SHOOT ME, BUT DO NOT CUT OFF MY HEAD".

General Chang Fa Kwei must have been at that time in the province of Hunan. It is true that there exists in China a Big Sword Corps which might be suitable for fighting in the mediaeval ages, but not during the present day modern war weapons. But there is no soldier in the Japanese army who is afraid of blunt swords like kitchen knife carried by the Chinese soldiers. It is rather surprising to learn that the Japanese soldiers asked the Chinese soldiers to shoot them but not cut off their heads.

6. HUMAN BULLET-PROOF.

Chinese also reported the following on Feb.23:

THE JAPANESE TROOPS TOOK OFF THE CLOTHES OF THE CHINESE, NUMBERING MORE THAN SIXTY, INCLUDING MOSTLY YOUNG SCHOOL BOYS OR SCHOOL GIRLS WHO WERE POWERLESS TO RESIST, AND HELD THEM UP IN FRONT OF THEM WHEN THEY ADVANCED. THE CHINESE TROOPS DID NOT ATTACK THE JAPANESE AT FIRST, BECAUSE THEY SYMPATHIZED WITH THEIR OWN PEOPLE. BUT AT LAST THEY WERE COMPELLED TO FIRE, IN THE INTERESTS OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY, AND THEY WERE COMPELLED TO FORGET THEIR OWN PERSONAL FEELINGS, EVEN IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO KILL THESE POOR INNOCENT VICTIMS. THE CHINESE TROOPS EXPERIENCED MORE THAN TEN TIMES SIMILAR CASES, AND A LARGE NUMBER OF THE CHINESE INNOCENT PEOPLE WHO WERE USED BY THE JAPANESE SOLDIERS AS HUMAN BULLET-PROOF WERE KILLED.

It is really wonderful how the Chinese manage to invent such horrible and disgusting stories. The Chinese authorities have always been in the habit of deceiving the people and now they are exciting the people against Japan by making use of such horrible propaganda. A crime of this nature, committed by these same Chinese authorities, is nothing but an outrage on humanity, which is to be condemned by the whole civilized world.

- 3 -

7. FIGHTING OF CHINESE AEROPLANES.

It is a well known fact that the Chinese aeroplanes which have been concentrated near Shanghai were composed of a large number, but only a few of them could actually fly. Many of these planes were finally shot down by the Japanese aeroplanes, and almost all the others which remained in the aerodromes were also destroyed by the Japanese bombing planes. But the Chinese papers continued to report as if all these Chinese aeroplanes bravely fought against the Japanese aeroplanes. Under the striking heading of SECOND AIR FIGHT -- ONE CHINESE AEROPLANE FIGHTS AGAINST FIVE JAPANESE PLANES AND SHOOT THEM DOWN, Chinese paper reported that on Feb. 10 at 10:30 a.m. five Japanese planes dropped bombs on the Chinese defence lines along Chapai, Yang Shu Poo and Chung Yun Chiao, but they flew away on being threatened by the Chinese anti-aircraft guns. Later on, these five planes again appeared over the Chinese positions, and therefore General Yang, commanding officer of the Chinese aviation corps, immediately piloted a large Chinese aeroplane and attacked the Japanese planes, single-handed. While the Japanese planes were flying rather low trying to drop bombs, the Chinese plane got its machine gun in position and fired down upon the Japanese planes. After twenty minutes of fighting the Japanese planes flew away in an easterly direction, but one of them crashed to the ground on the way with two pilots. One of them was killed instantly, but the other one, who was wounded in the leg, tried to resist the Chinese by taking out his pistol. He was finally shot dead by the Chinese. The other four planes flew away and landed on the Foreign Settlement but the Chinese plane did not pursue them as it might cause a damage upon the inhabitants in the Settlement.

All the above stories were so carefully written and worded as to give the Chinese readers the impression that it was the actual truth of what had really happened.

8. WOMEN COMMIT SUICIDE AND CHILDREN CRY.

THE MAJORITY OF THE JAPANESE RESIDENTS AT SHANGHAI WERE RECRUITED BY THEIR OWN ARMY AS PLAIN CLOTHES MEN, OR ORDINARY UNITS, BUT MOST OF THEM WERE EITHER KILLED OR WOUNDED DURING THE FIGHTING WITH OUR 19TH ROUTE

- 9 -

NEW. THE WIVES OF THESE JAPANESE ON BEING INFORMED OF THE DEATH OF THEIR HUSBANDS, NEARLY ALL COMMITTED SUICIDE AND THE CHILDREN WHO WERE LEFT BEHIND STARTED CRYING AND WAILING THAT THE DEATH WAS SO TERRIBLE THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO HEAR ONESELF SPEAK.

The above story was reported by the "I Shih Pao" and was published on Feb. 13. A somewhat similar story appeared in other Chinese papers which said: IT IS REPORTED THAT THE JAPANESE WOMEN RESIDENTS IN SHANGHAI WHO LOST THEIR HUSBANDS IN THE FIGHTING WENT HOME AND ORGANIZED THERE A "HUSBANDS' SEARCHING COMMITTEE" AND APPROACHED THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES AND DEMANDED THEIR HUSBANDS RETURN ALIVE, WHICH, NATURALLY, CONSIDERABLY EMBARRASSED AND ANNOYED THE JAPANESE OFFICIALS.

9. FALSE MAP.


The Chinese papers always report the "victories" of their own troops, but as all these reports were found to be untrue, it was not possible to publish any authentic map of the districts where the fighting took place, or where the alleged "victories" occurred. On the contrary, the truth is that the Chinese troops were gradually pushed back by the Japanese troops. But the "Yung Pao" published on Feb. 29 a map showing where the Chinese victories took place. As it was quite unexpected to see a map published in the Chinese papers, it was looked at very attentively, and it was then discovered that it was a "faked" map. For example, in that map Kiangwancheng was drawn on the east side of the railway, and Miaoshincheng, where the Japanese THREE HEROES who turned themselves into human torches lost their lives, appeared on the east side of the railway, which should be in reality, between Kiangwancheng and Tachangcheng.

10. SECOND CELEBRATION OF VICTORIES.


The "Ta Kung Pao" which is reported as one of the largest Chinese dailies in North China, published under the following heading: CHINESE TROOPS HAVE NOT YET TAKEN RESISTANCE AGAINST THE JAPANESE. WE HAVE SIMPLY CONTINUED TO HOLD OUR SECOND LINE OF DEFENCE. THE NEWS OF THE HOSTILITIES AT SHANGHAI WHICH WERE REPORTED IN NORTH CHINA ARE MIS-REPORTED ON SEVERAL POINTS.

Real Situation

Chinese Report



由上海到吳淞口我方陣線形勢圖



日本軍
 中國軍

- 10 -

The paper said:-

ACCORDING TO A TELEGRAM DATED MARCH 5 DESPATCHED FROM NANKING, WE ARE SORRY TO SAY THAT THE CHINESE VICTORIES AT SHANGHAI ARE NOT EXACTLY TRUE. THEY HAVE BEEN REPORTED BECAUSE THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT PARTY UNLIBERATELY CIRCULATED RUMOURS TO THIS EFFECT.

The above Chinese daily corrected in this way the news published in its paper, and then reported that the Japanese troops DO NOT STOP THEIR RESISTANCE, and so forth, which is entirely contrary to its former report which said as follows: A CERTAIN DIVISION OF THE CHINESE TROOPS RECOVERED MIU HO AND ANOTHER CHINESE DIVISION RE-OCUPIED CHENG JU. ONE OF THE JAPANESE WARSHIPS WAS SUNK, ANOTHER WAS DAMAGED AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF OUR ENEMY, GENERAL SHIRAKAWA, WAS KILLED. ALSO WOOSUNG AND CHAPEI WERE RECAPTURED BY THE CHINESE TROOPS.

A part of the Chinese general reading public, who did not know the truth, looking at these victories which appeared in the paper believed them to be true, and even at Tientsin, strange to say, celebrated these victories with the firing of fire-crackers. The reason why the fore-mentioned paper corrected the false statement might have been just because these reports were too evident and glaring against the actual truth, but, especially, they were very much afraid that these reports might have some effect on the Inquiry Commission of the League of Nations at such time when Dr. W.W. Yen, the Chinese delegate at Geneva, was advocating that Japan DOES NOT STOP FIGHTING AGAINST THE CHINESE TROOPS WHILE THE CHINESE TROOPS HAD CEASED TO TAKE ANY HOSTILE ACTION and the paper probably thought it advisable not to publish the news which was untrue, fearing that the League of Nations might blame the Chinese military for having started action against the Japanese troops. In the meantime, the Chinese government also took note of this unreasonable propaganda and tried to make the public believe that all these reports were circulated by the anti-Kuomintang parties, and that the Chinese troops had simply been holding their own defence lines. At any rate, it is typical Chinese propaganda, and without referring to any other Chinese reports but simply by reading this kind of news which required immediate correction nobody would place any confidence or trust in the Chinese papers.

- II -

II. NATIONAL BEER.

This does not directly concern the Chinese press, but it is a similar example of the Chinese character, which makes us laugh. The Kuomintang has been advocating since a long time the development of the Chinese national industries; and the boycotting the Japanese goods. Their slogan has been taken up by the Chinese people, and many articles are to be seen which have a label pasted on them to denote that they are "national" products of China, although many of them are not so.

While a Japanese military officer was on his way back from Shanhaikuan to Tientsin by express train with some of his friends, he ordered lunch in the Dining Car, and asked the dining room attendant to bring him a bottle of ^{Japanese} beer which he did not expect to have in the Chinese train under the present circumstances. The answer of the attendant was exactly what the Japanese officer was expecting, and the attendant brought him a bottle of Chinese beer with a "Five Star" label affixed on the bottle and some Chinese characters signifying that the contents were a "pure national product of China". When the bottle was opened the Japanese officer noticed that it did not appear to be a very fresh bottle; and therefore tried to find out whether it was really Chinese made or not. He then discovered that it was really Japanese "Kirin" beer, but with the Chinese label pasted over the original Japanese label and another bottle that was also brought him was the Japanese "Asahi beer". If asked, the Chinese might answer that this is the pure Chinese national product but simply in a bottle which was made in other country.

12. JAPANESE CASUALTIES.

According ~~came~~ to a Japanese official statement, the casualties among the Japanese troops at Shanghai up to March 3 were 141 killed among naval units and 431 wounded, together with 231 killed in the army and 1712 wounded. It was quite natural that the Japanese army and navy units may have sustained such large casualties, as the geographical condition of the country was very much against them, and also the Chinese troops, who knew the local situation well, utilized all adequate spots and positions. But if we compare the fighting at Shanghai with those at other places, the Japanese casualties were rather small.

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From this point of view we rather admire the courage of the Japanese troops. However, the majority of the Chinese press killed "on paper" 1,000 or 2,000 Japanese at each battle, and they also shot down many Japanese aeroplanes, or sunk Japanese warships, or killed Japanese commanding officers etc. all, of course, "on paper". Therefore, if we pick up all these reports of the fighting which appeared in the Chinese papers, the total number of the Japanese casualties would not only be most extraordinarily heavy, but they would be altogether out of proportion to the actual facts. A curiously inclined gentleman took the trouble to carefully analyze all these Chinese reports of killed and wounded etc., as the result of which he came to the following conclusions:

Total number of Japanese casualties.....	33,470
Japanese aeroplanes brought down by Chinese....	29
Number of Japanese war vessels sunk.....	6
Number of Japanese tanks destroyed or captured...	15
Number of rifles captured.....	1,540
Machine guns captured.....	18
Big guns captured.....	23

Some of the Chinese press might have reported figures larger than the above, so it is not wonderful to understand that the Chinese people have been accustomed, from generation to generation, to exaggerate and distort actual facts, e.g. in Chinese ancient history a fable is told to the effect that once upon a time there was a famous Chinese whose beard was 3,000 feet long! Also that the height of the dust from the Mongolian desert reaches 100,000 feet up in the sky. The Chinese will also exaggerate in the sense that if he is looking down at any place from a building, for instance, he will say that, from his place of looking, it was 10,000 feet downwards, and so on, ad lib.

If we take all these exaggerate figures as "adjective" we have no need to wonder. But according to the Japanese fashion to take clearly and accurately every figure or incident, such as one or two soldiers, or one of two guns, as the case may be, comparisons between the Japanese and Chinese methods of calculating figures, or other data, requires no comparisons. Isn't it the Chinese traditional way of delusion?

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 13 -

The members of the Inquiry Commission of the League of Nations are kindly requested to carefully note and observe all these false press reports on the part of the Chinese, and their love of exaggeration.

.....

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

TIENTSIN VIA N.R.

Dated May 10, 1932

Recd. 5.30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

May 10, 1 p.m.


The following has been sent to the Legation
today:

"May 10, noon.

Local Japanese officials state that press
reports of Japanese military activities at Shanhaikuan
are due to minor maneuvers and a request made to the
Chinese military that the latter investigate activities
of Chinese reported arrival in the vicinity.

According to reliable independent source Japanese
garrison of two hundred has not been increased and
has engaged in demonstrations probably with a view to
impressing the Chinese. From this source it is also
learned that the Japanese commander on May 4 asked
the Chinese commander to sign a statement admitting
inability to maintain peace and order and that
following his refusal one hundred Manchukuo civil

police



F/LS

793.94/5195

FILED

MAY 18 1932

793.94
note
893.102 Tientsin
894.23
893.01-Manchuria
EJ

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-From Tientsin May 10, 1932

police in uniform under a Japanese officer came inside the wall and occupied the railway station but withdrew twenty-four hours later due to the protests of British railway official on duty there.

Repeated to Department and Nanking."

ATCHESON

KLP

HPD

0221

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

May 12, 1932.

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

69 893.00 / 11940

One. May 10 the Consul General at Canton telegraphs
 that various semi-public bodies are agitating against the
 Shanghai agreement.

793.94 / 5195

Two. May 10 the Consul in charge at Tientsin
 telegraphs that he is reliably informed that the Japanese
 garrison ^{of two hundred} at Shanhaikuan has not repeat not been increased
 and that the garrison has engaged in demonstrations probably
 with a view to impressing the Chinese; that on May 4 the
 Japanese commander asked the Chinese commander to sign a
 statement admitting inability to maintain peace and order
 and that following his refusal one hundred civil police ~~in~~
~~uniform~~ of the new Manchuria régime under a Japanese officer
 came inside the Great Wall and occupied the railway station
 but withdrew twenty-four hours ^{later} due to protests of British
 railway official on duty there.

693.94 / 2259

Three. May 10 the Legation at Peiping reports that
 there are some indications that the Nanking authorities
 are adopting, at least for the present, a conciliatory

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5195

0222

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

- 2 -

attitude toward Japan.

793, 94/5193
Four. May 10 the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphs
that the American military attaché has observed the Japanese
evacuation and the resumption of control by the Chinese of
the area evacuated; that Lotien was evacuated May 10 and
entered by Chinese police without incidents in accordance
with prearranged schedule; that this completes the first
phase of the evacuation; ~~that the date of evacuation from~~
~~Yangking Tazang Chenju position, presumably the next area~~
~~to be evacuated, has not been announced, and that the~~
~~Japanese say that further evacuation depends on developments.~~ *Sign*

Five. Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

Castle, Acting

Sign

MAY 12 32

FE
FE:MMH:REK

May 12, 1952

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.--No. 50.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 12 1932

No. 1882

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,
 American Minister,
 Berne.

Sir:

There are enclosed for your information copies, as listed below, of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period May 5 to May 11, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your communicating to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, the information contained in the enclosures to this instruction. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in these messages.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State.

Enclosures:

Telegram (508), May 7, from Peiping; 793.94/15168
 Telegram (222), May 6, from Shanghai; 15164
 Telegram (232), May 9, from Shanghai, (Extract); 15182
 Telegram (235), May 10, from Shanghai; 15193
 Telegram, May 10, from Canton;
 Telegram, May 10, from Tientsin. 15195

May 12, 1932.

FE:EGC:LM

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5/12/32

May 12, 1932.

793.94/5195

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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JAPANESE INVASION OF SHANGHAI
(JANUARY 28—MARCH 7, 1932)

A RECORD OF FACTS

793.94
note
8/2/1025

F/LS 793.94/5196

RECEIVED
MAY 9 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 9- 1932
Department of State

the compliments of
Mr. Hawking Yen
Chargé d'Affaires

793.94/5196

FILED

MAY 11 1932

SECRETARIAT,
CITY GOVERNMENT OF
GREATER SHANGHAI.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAPANESE INVASION OF SHANGHAI

(JANUARY 28—MARCH 7, 1932)

A RECORD OF FACTS

SECRETARIAT,
CITY GOVERNMENT OF
GREATER SHANGHAI.

1 2 2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAPANESE INVASION OF SHANGHAI

(JANUARY 28—MARCH 7, 1932)

Since the occurrence of the Wanpaoshan affair in July, 1931, followed by the massacre of Chinese immigrants in Korea, a fire of deep resentment has swept the whole country. The unprovoked attack on Mukden on September 18 and the subsequent invasion and occupation of the principal cities in the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) served only to further intensify Chinese feelings. While Japan ignored the repeated attempts of the League of Nations to effect an amicable settlement of the dispute and persistently refused to withdraw her troops and cease military operations, the Chinese people resorted to patriotic movements and sought to retaliate by pacific resistance. Anti-Japanese boycott associations were organized and it was hoped that, by putting an effective check upon her trade, Japan might be made to realize that her prosperity must to a large extent depend upon China's goodwill.

The Japanese, however, instead of feeling a sense of repentance, became more bellicose. Repeated attempts were made by them to create troubles in the Hongkew district of Shanghai. They held mass meetings and passed resolutions demanding their government to take "direct action" against the Chinese. Japanese radicals, parading in Northern districts, smashed window panes and assaulted Chinese shopkeepers. In their encounter with the Municipal police, they attacked and wounded a British officer. The situation became so serious that the Settlement authorities found it necessary to call out the Shanghai Volunteer Corps and to detail special armed guards for the maintenance of order. In short, the feelings on both sides ran high.

On January 18, five Japanese monks ventured into some lonely spots on Mayushan Road and attracted public attention by playing Buddhist musical instruments. How they came into conflict with the Chinese is still unknown but they were reported as having been attacked by Chinese. While two of them were slightly wounded, three suffered serious injuries, one dying subsequently. As no policeman was present on the scene, no arrest was made until three days later when, as a result of a rigid investigation made under the order of Mayor Wu Te-chen of Greater Shanghai, three persons, suspected of being connected with the case, were apprehended and sent to the Shanghai District Court for trial and punishment according to law.

In the following morning (January 19) Mr. K. Murai, the Japanese Consul-General, called at the Mayor's office and lodged a verbal protest in connection with the assault on the Japanese monks. In the same afternoon, the Secretary-General of the City Government of Greater Shanghai, under instructions from the Mayor, visited the Japanese Consul-General and expressed regrets at the unfortunate incident, assuring him at the same time that strict orders had already been issued for the arrest of the culprits and for the protection of Japanese nationals residing in areas under the jurisdiction of the City Government. The Japanese Consul-General was further requested to warn his nationals against ill-advised adventures such as that undertaken by the Japanese monks at a time when the feelings between the two peoples were embittered.

On the same night, the Japanese people took the law in their own hands. Some fifty Japanese young men, armed with clubs and daggers, proceeded to the place where the monks were attacked and set fire to the San Yue Towel

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Factory, it being suspected that the assailants were workers of that institution. The factory was partially destroyed. On their way back, they were stopped by the Shanghai municipal police. Thereupon, they clubbed and stabbed the Chinese police constables. Three of them were wounded, one dying immediately afterwards. Three Japanese were shot by the police and one of them died.

On the following morning (January 20), the Japanese Consul-General called on the Mayor and handed him a note containing the following demands:

1. A formal apology by the Mayor.
2. The immediate arrest of the assailants.
3. Payment of solatium and hospital expenses.
4. Suppression of all anti-Japanese movements and immediate dissolution of all anti-Japanese boycott associations.

Mayor Wu informed the Japanese Consul-General that while he was willing to consider the first three demands, he found it difficult to comply with the fourth one. He pointed out that patriotic movements, if they were conducted within the limits of law, could not be suppressed by governmental orders. He stated that the current anti-Japanese movements were only the natural and spontaneous reaction on the part of the Chinese people against the series of unfortunate events in the Northeast for which the Japanese were responsible. He gave the assurance, however, that should the people's activities be found illegal, they would be suppressed according to law.

In connection with the incendiary crime committed by the Japanese on January 19, the Mayor also filed a protest with the Japanese Consul-General, enumerating the following demands:

1. A formal apology by the Japanese Consul-General.
2. Immediate arrest of the culprits.
3. Payment of indemnity.
4. An assurance by the Japanese Consul-General that similar incidents would not occur.

Then negotiations followed and on January 21, the Japanese naval commander, Admiral Shiosawa, issued a declaration to the effect that in the event of Mayor Wu's failure to give a satisfactory reply to the Japanese Consul-General and carry out the terms as demanded, the Admiral would take the necessary action to protect the rights and interests of the Japanese Empire.

Meanwhile, Japanese naval reinforcements arrived in Shanghai and the Japanese Consul-General informed the Mayor on January 24 that if no satisfactory reply were received within a reasonable time, the Japanese Government would take action to enforce the demands as contained in his note.

On the evening of January 27 Mr. K. Murai, the Japanese Consul-General, communicated with the Mayor, stating that a satisfactory reply must be given before 6 p.m. on the following day.

In the early afternoon of January 28, the Mayor sent his reply through his Secretary-General to the Japanese Consul, accepting in toto and unconditionally the Japanese demands referred to above. The Japanese Consul-General expressed his complete satisfaction with the reply. He told the Secretary-General that while he was pleased with the sincerity of the Mayor in attempting to bring about an amicable settlement of the matter, he hoped that in view of the tense situation the sand-bags and barbed wire barricades erected at the boundaries by the Chinese should be removed, saying that they were provocative to the Japanese people. In reply, the Secretary-General said that

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the sand-bags and barbed wire barricades were meant as a precaution against the unscrupulous elements and would be removed as soon as the circumstances calling for such a precaution no longer existed. He further pointed out that the tenseness of the situation was due not to the existence of sand-bags and barbed wire barricades but to the presence here of large numbers of Japanese warships and marines. The Secretary-General left the Consulate with the assurance from the Japanese Consul-General that "nothing would happen."

At 11.25 p.m. on the same day, the Mayor was in receipt of copies of proclamations issued by the Japanese naval commander at 11 p.m. and enclosed in an envelope bearing the title of the Japanese Consulate-General. The proclamation stated, *inter alia*, that in view of the large number of Japanese nationals residing in Chapei (Chinese territory), the Japanese naval commander deemed it necessary to send troops there for their protection. It further stated that the Japanese naval commander hoped that the Chinese troops stationed in the Chapei areas should be promptly withdrawn and all military establishments there removed.

About 30 minutes after the Mayor received the aforesaid proclamation, another report reached him that the Japanese marines had already launched a surprise attack on Chapei.

In the same night, Mayor Wu sent in a formal protest to Mr. Murai. Mr. Murai said that he did not know anything about the incident but would immediately get into touch with the Japanese naval authorities. On the following morning (January 29) at 9.30 o'clock, Mr. Shirai, the Japanese Vice-Consul, sought out the following four reasons for the Japanese military operations:

1. According to the defence scheme of the Municipal Council of the International Settlement, the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the area to the east of the railway has been entrusted to the Japanese. What the Japanese have done is to carry out the trust.

But the area assigned by the Shanghai Municipal Council to the Japanese could not have included the area to the east of the railway under absolute Chinese jurisdiction. Granting that it could for the sake of argument, then there was no justification for the Japanese marines to advance to the other side of the railway.

2. The Japanese navy had received reports that some plain-clothes Chinese would start some trouble in the area where many Japanese were living. Therefore it was necessary for the Japanese marines to take precautions.

3. Many Chinese policemen on duty in that area disappeared and therefore it was necessary for the Japanese marines to enter that area and accord protection to the Japanese.

These two allegations were entirely untrue and unfounded. We had strong police forces over there to maintain peace and order and were well able to accord adequate protection both to the Japanese and to all other residents.

4. The existence of barbed wire and sandbags in the Chinese area in close proximity gave the impression that China treated Japan as an enemy country and that provoked Japanese action.

The barbed wire and sandbags were put up for the sole purpose of defending that area against lawless elements. Both the Shanghai Municipal Council and Japanese have put them up on numerous occasions and these precautions never proved offensive either to the Japanese or to anyone else. The Japanese had at the time 10 warships in port and a landing party of 1,450 men, and the

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total number of Japanese warships in Shanghai and its vicinity, including cruisers, destroyers, and aeroplane carriers, was 34. Let us be open-minded and ask ourselves whether the imaginary plain-clothes Chinese and the barbed wire and sandbags, or the 34 warships and over a thousand landed marines, were more provocative?

The Japanese Vice-Consul also stated that if the Chinese troops would stop firing, the Japanese marines would remain on the east side of the Shanghai-Woosung railway. In reply, the Secretary-General said that the areas occupied by the Japanese marines were Chinese territory and that the only way to avoid further conflict would be for the Japanese forces to withdraw. In the same morning, Mayor Wu visited the American and British Consuls-General, calling their attention to the Japanese invasion of Chapei from the International Settlement, and expressing the hope that steps would be taken to restrain the Japanese. On the same evening, through the good offices of the American and British Consuls-General, a truce was arranged between the Chinese and Japanese forces to take effect at 8 p.m. No sooner had the truce been arranged than it was broken by the Japanese marines who continued their attack on the Chinese troops.

Early on January 29, at nine o'clock, one of the first incendiary Japanese bombs from a Japanese aircraft was thrown on the extensive buildings of The Commercial Press, the largest of its kind in China. It was established as early as 1896 and for the past 36 years had supplied 75% of China's textbooks. Its total assets amounted to \$25,000,000, of which \$15,000,000 were material property. Its library, the Oriental Library, contained 600,000 volumes including many invaluable editions of the Sung Dynasty (960-1276). The exact reason why the Japanese were so anxious to destroy first of all a cultural institution as The Commercial Press is still unknown.

When the Japanese commenced hostilities on the night of January 28, their marines started an advance from the International Settlement and attacked Chinese troops stationed in the adjacent Chinese territory. Later, when they withdrew, they went back to the International Settlement. It was there that they set up their headquarters. It was there that they fitted out their warlike expeditions. It was there that they landed their marines, soldiers, artillery and supplies. It was there that they recruited their reservists (armed plain-clothes Japanese and ronins). It was there that they carried on part of their fighting. In other words, the International Settlement which was supposed to be absolutely neutral was used by the Japanese as the base of their military, naval, and air operations, and also as a sanctuary where they could retire when repulsed and for recuperation and re-supply. Chinese troops defending China's territory against ruthless Japanese attacks were unable to reply effectively without endangering the lives and property of thousands of friendly neutral foreigners residing in the International Settlement and its vicinity, and were unable to pursue the Japanese attackers without risking conflict with friendly neutral foreign police and troops protecting the Settlement. On January 30, Mayor Wu lodged a strong protest with Brigadier-General Macnaughtan, Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council, and said that he was surprised "that not only has the Council failed to adopt any measures to prevent the Japanese from indulging in acts seriously affecting the neutral status of the Settlement, but it has never expressed any dissent." The Chinese members of the Shanghai Municipal Council also filed a letter of protest with the Shanghai Municipal Council calling attention to the circumstances accompanying the Japanese invasion of Chapei. An identic letter was sent to Mr. E. S. Cunningham, American Consul-General and Senior Consul. It said in part: "It is most regrettable that the Japanese in pursuing their hostile acts have made use of the district, the safety and good order of which they are under obligation to safeguard, as the base of their operations. Such action

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of the Japanese constitutes a grave violation of the neutral character of the Settlement and should therefore be immediately checked." At about the same time, the British representations to Japan expressed the hope that no action would be taken inside the International Settlement at Shanghai without prior consultation with the other governments concerned. The American State Department also made representations to the Japanese Government similar to those made by Great Britain, demanding that there should be no intervention by Japan in the International Settlement at Shanghai without the other Powers concerned being consulted. However, all what Japan did was to turn a deaf ear to these protests.

On January 31, at meetings held between the Japanese Consul-General, the Admiral commanding the Japanese naval forces, Mayor Wu of Greater Shanghai, and Division Commander Au Shou-nien of the Chinese 19th Route Army, in the presence of the American and British Consuls-General and commanders of the Settlement Defence Forces, at the British Consulate-General, it was agreed that the Japanese Consul-General should report to his Government a suggestion that Japanese troops should be withdrawn from the salient. If the reply was unfavorable, the Chinese would refer to their Government, and until a final reply was received, both sides agreed that they would not fire unless first fired upon. At that meeting, the Japanese Consul-General admitted that the Japanese marines went beyond the limit assigned to them under the Defence Scheme of the International Settlement and declared that the Japanese assumed full responsibility in this connection. On February 1, the truce was more or less observed, though there was again some desultory firing. On February 2, at about noon, general firing from both sides recommenced. At about 3 p.m., i.e., after the fighting had reopened, the Japanese Consul-General informed the Consular authorities that the Japanese Government had rejected the proposal for a neutral zone. On February 3, the Japanese Consulate-General informed the Consular authorities that 3 Japanese destroyers had been fired upon from the Woosung Forts (which was entirely unfounded), and that the Japanese therefore intended to occupy the Forts. The offensive was entirely in the hands of the Japanese, whose avowed object was to capture Woosung Forts and drive all Chinese troops a considerable distance from Shanghai.

After the reopening of hostilities, the Japanese naval authorities took complete control of the Hongkew district inside the Settlement, barricading streets, disarming police, and paralysing all other municipal activities of the Settlement authorities, including the fire brigade. Numerous excesses, including summary execution, were committed by Japanese marines, reservists, and roughs (ronins). A reign of terror resulted, and almost the entire non-Japanese population of the area ran away. The Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai and the Chief Japanese delegate at Geneva admitted that excesses had been committed by their nationals.

The Japanese premeditated plan is to destroy not only the Chinese army, fortifications, cultural institutions, but also Chinese industry. They burnt the San Yue Towel Factory on January 28, and on February 11, Japanese aeroplanes dropped two bombs and destroyed the Wing On Cotton Mill situated within the International Settlement, killing 6 and wounding 10. The bombing was later explained to be "accidental."

On February 16, the League of Nations Council at Geneva, other than the Chinese and Japanese representatives, addressed a note in the nature of an appeal to Japan, and pointed out that no permanent solution of the Sino-Japanese problems could be achieved by force, whether military or merely economic. They could not but recognize that, from the beginning of the conflict, China had put her case in the hands of the League and agreed to accept its proposals for a peaceful settlement, and that Japan had "incalculable

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responsibility before the public opinion of the world to be just and restrained in her relations with China."

In order to attain the end of the League Council, to obtain Japan's response to the League Council's appeal, and to bring hostilities speedily to an end, the British Minister to China, Sir Miles Lampson, arranged for a meeting of the Chinese and the Japanese military commanders with a view to discussing the basis of mutual evacuation. The meeting was held on February 18, and the Chinese and Japanese commanders were represented by their Chiefs of Staff. The Japanese representative presented exorbitant terms, which the Chinese representative found unacceptable. After two hours of fruitless discussion, the Japanese representative said that the Japanese side would send in a written communication of their terms before 9 p.m. and he hoped that the Chinese would send a reply as soon as possible.

At night, the new Japanese military commander, Lieutenant-General Uyeda, delivered an ultimatum to the 19th Route Army. It contained six articles:

1. Your forces will speedily cease all warlike operations, and complete the evacuation of your first line before 7 a.m. on February 20.

By 5 p.m. on February 20 you shall have completed the evacuation of the entire area to a depth of 20 kilometers north of the following lines, including the Szetselin Forts, namely, to the west of the Whangpoo River, draw a line from the northwest point of the International Settlement, through Tsaochiadoo and Chowchiachiao to Poosungchen, and to the east of the Whangpoo River a line from Lannidoo to Changchiachiao. All fortifications and military works to be completely removed in the evacuated area, and no new ones to be erected.

2. Japanese troops shall not attack or bomb or chase Chinese troops once they have begun evacuating. This, however, does not prevent aeroplanes from being sent out on observation duty.

Japanese troops shall, after the evacuation by Chinese troops, maintain only the Shanghai Municipal-roads area adjacent to Hongkew, including the Hongkew Park.

3. Japanese troops shall, after the evacuation of the first line by Chinese troops, send to the evacuated area investigators guarded and protected by Japanese soldiers. The said investigators shall carry Japanese national flags for the purpose of identification.

4. Chinese troops shall assume full responsibility for the safety of life and property of Japanese people outside of the evacuated area, failing which the Japanese shall take necessary steps.

With regard to plain-clothes men, they are to be effectively suppressed.

5. As regards protection for foreigners in the vicinity of Shanghai, including the evacuated area, the matter will be dealt with separately.

6. With reference to the boycott movement, the promise of Mayor Wu as declared on January 28 must be strictly enforced. Relating to this clause, the matter shall be dealt with by diplomatic negotiation between Japanese Foreign Office and Civil Administrative Official (Chinese) of Shanghai.

Lieutenant-General Uyeda concluded the ultimatum by saying that "unless the above articles are complied with, Japanese troops will be compelled to take free action in which event Chinese troops must be responsible for all the consequences resulting therefrom." The Japanese Consul-General also addressed a similar note to the Mayor on the same evening.

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On the following day, February 19, Mayor Wu replied to Mr. Murai that the grave situation in Shanghai was due to "the invasion of our territory and the brutal murder of our people by your troops in violation of all international treaties and international law..... Inasmuch as the measures called for in your letter have a direct bearing upon the general relations between China and Japan, they should be dealt with by the diplomatic authorities of the two countries concerned. I have, accordingly, transmitted your letter to my government for consideration and for reply to His Imperial Japanese Majesty's minister through our Ministry of Foreign Affairs." The Mayor also pointed out that "as acts of provocation by attack, bombing, and bombardment on the part of your troops continue unabated, the indignation of our people has daily been intensified. Under these circumstances, it is natural that the so-called anti-Japanese activities should fail to cease, and the responsibility in this connection must rest entirely with you."

On the same day, General Tsai Ting-kai replied that "the troops under my command are an integral part of the army of the National Government of the Republic of China, by whose orders alone all their activities are directed."

On February 24, Colonel Henry L. Stimson, the American Secretary of State, sent a reply to Senator William E. Borah, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, giving his opinion as to whether the "present conditions in China have in any way indicated that the so-called Nine-Power Treaty has become inapplicable or ineffective or rightly in need for modification," and what should be the policy of the American Government. He reaffirmed the determination of the United States Government to uphold the principles of the "Open Door" and equal opportunity with regard to China, and, alleged indirectly, that Japan, by her actions in Manchuria and in the Yangtze Valley, had violated both the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

On February 28, Chinese and Japanese representatives met informally on board the H.M.S. Kent, under the friendly auspices of Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, Commander of the British Asiatic Fleet. During the conversation certain points to form the basis of an agreement for the immediate cessation of hostilities were discussed and an understanding was reached as follows:—

1. Mutual and simultaneous withdrawal.

2. No question of permanent dismantling of Woosung or Lion Forts (Szetselin Forts) to be raised.

3. Supervision of withdrawal on both sides by a Sino-Japanese Commission with neutral observers.

4. Evacuated area to be administered by Chinese authorities and policed by Chinese police as heretofore.

5. Chinese to withdraw to Chenju and Japanese to withdraw to the International Settlement and the Extra-Settlement Roads; after which Chinese to withdraw to Nanzhang and Japanese to withdraw to their ships—the latter part subject to further discussion at a subsequent meeting to be arranged.

It was agreed that if the respective Governments should approve the tentative understanding, a formal meeting of the accredited diplomats and military representatives was to take place forthwith for the purpose of consummating the arrangement.

In the afternoon of February 29, the Chinese representative informed Admiral Kelly of the approval of the Chinese Government and requested him to notify the Japanese authorities that, should the Japanese Government likewise give its approval, the proposed formal meeting of the accredited representatives

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might be arranged at once. This showed how sincere the Chinese Government was in its desire to promptly cease hostilities and restore peace.

But the Japanese attitude was entirely different. Laying the tentative understanding aside, Mr. K. Murai, the Japanese Consul-General, sent the following note to Mayor Wu on the same day (February 29):—

"According to authentic reports from various quarters, your military authorities have recently caused military reinforcements from various points to be concentrated here in this city, and that these said reinforcements have been transported by trains. Such movements are sufficient further to aggravate the present situation. If the despatch of Chinese reinforcements to this city is further continued, Japan, in self-defence, shall be compelled to take the inevitable step, namely, it is planned, after March 2, to destroy military trains as well as those sections of the railways from Kashing to Shanghai and from Soochow to Shanghai, which sections being used for military purpose."

The reason why the Japanese could be reinforced, but not the Chinese, and why Chinese reinforcements would aggravate the situation, but not the Japanese reinforcements, has never been made known.

To this Mayor Wu sent the following reply:—

"In reply I should state that since the night of January 28 the Japanese forces have repeatedly invaded our territory and murdered our people; and their atrocities committed in violation of all international law and international treaties and against humanity have formed the subjects of my former protests to you. The action of the Chinese troops, on the other hand, have all been confined to self-defence. That the situation should have been aggravated has been due to the fact that your country has repeatedly sent reinforcements here, thereby adding to the catastrophe already endured.

If the Japanese forces should continue to attack our troops, the latter could not but be compelled to adopt appropriate measures for self-defence, and all responsibilities in this connection must rest entirely with you."

When the public meeting of the League of Nations Council opened at Geneva on the same day (February 29), attention was immediately directed towards the peace negotiations in Shanghai. M. Paul Boncour, the Chairman, in his introductory speech, proposed the immediate establishment of a conference of all the interested Powers in Shanghai, together with China and Japan, which would endeavor to arrange for the cessation of hostilities. The Shanghai Conference would be undertaken on the basis:

1. That Japan has no political or territorial designs and has no intention of establishing a Japanese settlement at Shanghai or otherwise advancing exclusive Japanese interests;
2. That China recognizes that the safety and integrity of the International Settlement and the French Concession must be preserved;
3. That the conference is conditional on the making of local arrangements for the cessation of hostilities which the Council trusted would be brought about very speedily with the utmost assistance from the principal Powers in Shanghai in consolidating the arrangements;
4. That the immediate re-establishment of peace is without prejudice or qualification to any position taken up by the League or any Power regarding Sino-Japanese affairs.

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While Mr. Murai was asking China not to despatch further reinforcements to Shanghai, two fresh divisions from Japan were at the time added to their fighting forces. On the other hand, the Chinese 19th Route Army issued an order on the evening of March 1 to withdraw all Chinese forces to their second line of defence, about 20 kilometers from Shanghai. On March 3, General Chiang Kwang-nai, Commander of all troops in the front, gave official orders to cease hostilities against the Japanese unless further attacked by Japanese forces.

Admiral Sir Howard Kelly handed to the Chinese representative the so-called Japanese basic conditions for immediate cessation of hostilities as follows:—

1. China shall give assurances that her troops will be withdrawn a certain distance to be determined by agreement between Chinese and Japanese authorities, whereupon Japan will agree to a cessation of hostilities for a certain period to be agreed upon by both parties. Pending subsequent arrangements, both forces will hold the positions which they now occupy.
2. During the armistice period a Round Table Conference shall be held at Shanghai, with representatives of the principal interested Powers participating, with a view to agreeing upon the methods by which withdrawal of both Chinese and Japanese armed forces shall be accomplished. This Conference also shall formulate methods for the maintenance of peace and order in the vicinity of Shanghai and the safeguarding of the International Settlement and the French Concession and the foreign lives and property therein.
3. All Chinese troops, including plain-clothes gunmen, shall be withdrawn to a specified distance. When the accomplishment of this withdrawal has been completed, Japanese troops shall withdraw to the Shanghai and Woosung areas.
4. In the event that either side infringes the terms of the armistice, the other party immediately regains the right to freedom of action.

These fresh Japanese conditions showed a radical departure from the understanding reached aboard H.M.S. Kent on February 28. They were tantamount to surrender, and as such they proved absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese Government.

The special meeting of the League of Nations Assembly was opened at Geneva by M. Paul Boncour at about 11 a.m. on March 3. Dr. W. W. Yen, the chief Chinese delegate, in a letter to the Secretary-General of the League, accepted the armistice proposals "based upon the principle of mutual and simultaneous evacuation" which were formulated on H.M.S. Kent. It stated that, notwithstanding that the Japanese had since launched an offensive on a larger scale, China was still prepared to accept the proposals, and, if they were carried out, China would accept the Secretary-General's proposal of February 29 to participate in a conference at Shanghai on the understanding that the conference was concerned only with the restoration of peace at Shanghai and that all questions which had arisen in the conflict between China and Japan would be settled in accordance with the procedure laid down by the League.

When the League of Nations Assembly met again on March 5, a resolution was unanimously adopted recommending the cessation of hostilities with a subsequent international conference at Shanghai to establish permanent peace and to settle the means of withdrawal of the Japanese forces. On behalf of China, Dr. W. W. Yen accepted the resolution on condition that the Japanese withdrawal would be unconditional. The Japanese delegates agreed to the resolution with some hesitation.

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On the one hand, Japan was discussing cessation of hostilities and the convocation of a Round Table Conference, on the other hand, the Japanese forces were advancing farther and farther into the interior beyond 20 kilometers from Shanghai, the reinforcements from Japan and from Manchuria were landing, and the Japanese aeroplanes were bombing Quinsan, Soochow, and other populous and unfortified cities along the Shanghai-Nanking Railway. It is reported that they will also bomb other cities along the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway. When asked why the Japanese were still sending reinforcements (35,000 fresh Japanese troops) to Shanghai after he had said that he could categorically affirm that the Japanese were the first to cease hostilities, namely, on March 1, Mr. Sato, the Chief Japanese delegate, explained that the Japanese reinforcements sent to Shanghai before the cessation of hostilities had to land at the pre-arranged point, but would obviously be sent back. This explanation aroused great laughter, and the Chairman, M. Hymans, had to call the meeting to order. On March 7, it was reported that the arrival of a division from Manchuria increased the number of Japanese soldiers in and around Shanghai to about 70,000, that there were 49 Japanese warships stationed between Nanking and Woosung, that there were over 200 Japanese aeroplanes in action in different places, and that the Japanese were rebuilding and refortifying the Woosung Forts which they had demanded that the Chinese should permanently dismantle.

What then was the Chinese attitude? On March 6, Gen. Chiang Kwang-nai, Commander-in-Chief of all Chinese forces near Shanghai, issued further orders to all Chinese troops to withhold fire in accordance with the request of the League of Nations then in session at Geneva. The orders stated: "The Assembly of the League of Nations at its special meeting now in progress has resolved to request Chinese and Japanese forces to cease hostilities. We are complying with the request. Unless Japanese troops attack our forces, we shall refrain from attacking the Japanese. If, however, the Japanese troops disregard the decision of the League of Nations and continue to attack our troops, we will then resist."

Numerous reports are coming in almost every minute that the Japanese are breaking their faith and are penetrating farther and farther toward the interior districts of China.

In connection with the fighting, the Japanese have unfortunately done a number of things which they should have deeply regretted. One of these was the deliberate bombing of the Chinese Flood Refugee Camp. It was situated on the Yiu Ying Road, two miles northwest of the North Railway Station and one mile from the nearest point on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, and so could not be described, as the Japanese did later, as adjacent to the Chinese position. It had on January 26 10,399 refugees, and a staff of 49 members. After the first Japanese bombardment of Chapei on January 29, about 2,000 of these refugees fled, but over 8,000 remained in the camp, and were, as usual, fed and sheltered. On February 2, a Japanese aviator flew low over the camp and waved his hand to the occupants, which included some 3,000 children. No one could have mistaken it for a military encampment. Three days later (February 5), the camp was bombed by Japanese planes at noon. A woman and a boy were killed on the spot, 4 persons were wounded, and some of the patients in the hospital died of fright. Most of the refugees fled, and there remained in the camp only a few hundred persons, the majority of whom were sick in hospital or aged people who found it difficult to get away. The camp was bombed again on February 6, and 48 persons, mostly patients in the hospital, were found dead. The occupants were removed with the exception of some 20 people. The camp was bombed again on February 7. It was then entirely evacuated, and, as the relieving party was about to leave the camp, the planes returned and dropped a bomb which damaged a house

beside the camp. This action on the part of the Japanese was both unnecessary and inhuman. What military advantage could have been gained by constant attacks like these on a camp occupied by homeless refugees from the flooded areas?

Another thing that the Japanese did during the hostilities was the use of dum-dum bullets. It is true that Admiral Shimada emphatically denied that Japanese forces were using such bullets and even charged that it was the Chinese who were guilty of using them. He even displayed specimens of alleged Chinese dum-dum bullets. Mere arguments avail nothing. Let us see what an expert had to say about the matter. Dr. G. P. Burne of the Chinese Red Cross General Hospital who gained experience in minor war surgery during the Great European War, sent a letter to Dr. F. C. Yen, Superintendent of the Red Cross Hospital, giving a detailed account of finding dum-dum bullets which he had extricated from wounds on a Chinese soldier and on a Chinese civilian, a woman. He definitely stated that those two instances were cases of dum-dum bullet shots.

A third thing was the numerous excesses that the Japanese marines, soldiers, and "reservists" committed during the hostilities. Thousands of innocent civilians, including helpless women and children and poor flood refugees, were ruthlessly attacked, imprisoned, tormented, and summarily butchered. Factories, houses, shops, schools, libraries, laboratories, hospitals, and churches were burnt at will. The populous, unfortified territories adjacent to the International Settlement was bombarded again and again from aeroplanes, artillery positions and warships. There was wanton destruction everywhere. Business and property losses alone amounted thus far to over 100 million dollars. The number of lives lost cannot yet be ascertained. The Japanese say they have not declared "war." But these excesses which are not permitted even in times of war have been committed by the Japanese in Shanghai. Could a declared war be any worse?

Lastly, the Japanese, by invading and occupying Chinese territory and encroaching upon China's sovereign rights without provocation, has deliberately regarded as "scraps of paper" the Hague Conventions, the League of Nations Covenant, the Washington Nine-Power Treaty, and the Kellogg-Briand Anti-War Pact. The loss to China will be comparatively small, and China is determined to resist the Japanese invasion to the end. But who are going to uphold the high ideals and lofty principles as embodied in the above-mentioned international engagements which have taken the best minds and the greatest statesmen of the world a quarter of a century to build up? Is the world fully prepared to sacrifice all these for the Japanese militarists and let them be trodden under foot for all time?

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Issued March 14th, 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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NOTE

SEE FOR

893.00 P.R. Tsingtao/49

#14

FROM (.....) DATED

46

Tsingtao

Bergin

April 6, 1932

REGARDING:

The rumor that the Japanese were preparing for a military occupation of Tsingtao has caused a flurry of excitement among the Chinese of the district.

ek

793.94/5197

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINESE EMIGRATION FROM BEIJING.

There was very considerable agitation during the first half of the month among the native population of Tsingtau due to reports that the Japanese were planning a military occupation of the port. It was first reported that this occupation would take place on March 15th and from about the tenth onward very considerable numbers of Chinese left Tsingtau by rail for Taiwan and other interior points. When no movement on the part of the Japanese took place on the 15th rumor set the date forward to the 18th but still nothing developed and the rumors apparently were dissipated. It was reported to this Consulate that many thousands of Chinese left the port between the tenth and the twentieth but it is presumed that many of them have now returned.

It is stated that the rumors were probably started by Japanese Consular Police who came to Tsingtau during the month and whose statements regarding the local situation were misunderstood by the natives. At any rate the developments serve to indicate that there was considerable nervousness and uncertainty on the part of the native population regarding the intentions of the Japanese.

The reports of the impending occupation of the port by the Japanese were fairly circumstantial and were.....

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 By Milton O. Quejido NARS, Date 12-18-75

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were to the effect that Japanese troops were coming to Tsingtao sometime between the 15th and the 18th. The Japanese Consul General here had, through the Japanese Consul at Tainan, asked General Han Yu-ch'ia for permission to land armed parties of sailors but his request had been refused. Japanese plain clothes men were coming to Tsingtao every day in large numbers and occupying themselves in local Japanese residences. Japanese mill owners and others here had made up lists of their employees and turned them in to the Japanese Consul General for the purpose of facilitating the issue of passes after the port had been occupied. Admiral Chen had left for Tainan by a special train accompanied by myself and others of the Consuls at Tsingtao for the purpose of meeting General Han and consulting with him regarding the maintenance of peace and order in Tsingtao. These and many other details were in circulation and were apparently believed by a considerable portion of the native population.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Tainan/47 FOR Despatch # 83.

FROM Tainan (Mainhardt) DATED April 7, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: No serious incidents involving the Japanese
have been allowed to occur in the Tainan
district owing to the carefulness and strict
precautions of the authorities.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAPANESE RELATIONS AND BOYCOTT.

793.94
Fortunately no serious incidents involving the Japanese have been allowed to occur in this district owing to the carefulness and strict precautions of the authorities. There have been a few minor ones, such as interferences by students with Japanese school children, but nothing of that sort has inflamed any of the hot-heads to make the situation worse. The hostilities at Shanghai drew the attention of everybody who was politically minded, while they lasted, and since then the news emanating from the peace negotiations has absorbed their attention. A statement made by Mr. Tan Chen, Vice

President

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~

May 13, 1932.

Summary of Consul Sturgeon's report on "Review of Politico-Economic Developments in Japan in Reference to Manchuria" (No. 105, April 17, 1932).

The establishment of the new Manchurian state is taken for granted in Japanese business circles and plans are being formulated to reap full benefit from the "vastly enlarged Japanese spheres of influence". The Japanese have a new conception of Manchuria: that they have greater and permanent rights and liberties there and that the way is now open for large-scale development enterprises.

Two schools of thought exist as to economic policy in Manchuria, one of a practical nature, looking to income from investment, and the other nationalistic, that development should be conducted with national funds for national benefit.

The attitude toward Manchuria has now assumed a colonial complexion, and European colonial policies are being studied. The more enlightened view is that, if peace is to reign, Manchuria should be developed in accordance with a liberal policy, the welfare of the Chinese population being duly considered. The other view is that Manchuria is useless

unless

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unless it can give food, clothing and houses to a large number of Japanese.

A plan envisaging emigration of 500,000 Japanese to Manchuria in ten years has been formulated by the Overseas Affairs Ministry. The cost of the enterprise will be 200,000,000 yen or 2,000 yen a family. They are to be under direct control of the South Manchuria Railway Company, Oriental Development Company, or other Government agencies. The enthusiasm for emigration is running high at the moment due to the enormous publicity given to Manchuria in recent months. There are numerous plans for mass emigration, but all show ignorance of the practical obstacles to carry them out. Chinese labor is abundant for all general and practical purposes, and unemployment is widespread among Japanese already in Manchuria.

Industrialists are indifferent to expansion in Manchuria, preferring to open factories in Japan. Their opposition to investment in Manchuria has repeatedly been shown when efforts have been made in the past to give preferential customs treatment to Manchurian products entering Japan. Moreover, industrialization in Manchuria would come into conflict with

Japan's

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Japan's five-year industrial plan. In addition, capital is lacking and it is admitted by such well-informed persons as one of the directors of the Mitsui house that south Manchuria is already well-developed industrially and that north Manchuria is only suited to agriculture and stock-raising.

The chambers of commerce of principal Japanese cities met in Mukden on March 17 to discuss ways and means of taking the fullest advantage of Japan's new position in Manchuria. Among the recommendations agreed upon by these organizations was that Japanese and foreigners should have equal economic opportunity, as a rule; that in customs matters the new Manchurian Government should fix tariff rates as low as possible and abolish export duties; and that an arrangement should be made with the new government to continue the Sino-Japanese reciprocal tariff agreement.

It is of interest to note that Koreans are flocking to settle in pacified areas in Manchuria and that the Korean Government general authorities are moving to control them.

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C o n f i d e n t i a l

Office of Economic Affairs
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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 11 1932
Department of State

Copy in FE

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No. 105

REVIEW OF POLITICO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
IN JAPAN IN REFERENCE TO MANCHURIA

From: American Consulate General, Tokyo, Japan.

Prepared by:

L. D. Sturgison
Leo D. Sturgison
American Consul

4 Carbon copies
Received JM

One copy detached
for note in D.C. R.
D.C.R.

Date of Completion: April 17, 1932.

Date of Mailing : April 23, 1932.

MAY 23 1932

RECEIVED

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Views of Business and Government
Leaders Regarding Manchurian Opportunities.

The recent views expressed by Japanese business and Government leaders in regard to the business and industrial possibilities in Manchuria give considerable indication of the probable trend of future economic activity in that region. It is assumed by most Japanese in position to share responsibility for developments in Manchuria that a condition of normal order will soon be secured. The establishment of the new state is taken in business circles at face value, and the formulation and revision of exploitation plans are being laid accordingly. It is, consequently, expected--as in fact has been done--official steps will be taken to make possible the reaping of tangible benefits from the vastly enlarged Japanese spheres of influence. There is indication, in the expressed views of semi-official publicists, that the changed status of Manchuria warrants a new conception of that region: and approach to the business and industrial problems there based on greater and more definite rights and liberties; and with all traces of the temporary element removed.

The establishment of a new government for Manchuria and Mongolia, and the apparent definite severance of these large areas from China has undoubtedly given Japanese enterprise a certain optimism of outlook. The practical certainty of continued hostility of the Chinese is seen by some; and the opportunity to work under a regime indebted to Japan for assistance and protection is preferred over the previous condition. It is not so much that Japan

has

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has acquired any new commercial rights or privileges as a result of recent events in Manchuria, but in the large amount of publicity given to its interests there a changed or progressive viewpoint is unmistakable.

Although there is a general groping for the right commercial policy to employ in reference to Manchuria, there is unity in the view that the way is now open for development enterprises on a large and permanent scale. There are various policies recommended for Manchuria; some political or patriotic in conception, while others are of a more practical and hence conservative nature. The difference between the two is not always distinguishable, but they may be divided roughly into those which take into consideration the status and future relationship of the inhabitants of the country, and the practical questions of income in relation to investment, etc., and another group that demands a following up of advantages acquired by military action, not necessarily with due regard for true economic practice, in a nationalistic way. According to the latter plan, which has already seen service, the national treasury should support the immediate development of such enterprises as are considered of value to the national welfare or defence.

To a greater degree than in the past, the attitude toward Manchuria and Mongolia is now based upon colonial theory, and in formulating a policy of development, the colonial policies of Great Britain, Spain, Holland, and other countries are given attention. There is nowhere the public expression of opinion that this region may be treated as a colony; it is the fact rather that colonial experience of Japan and other countries are consciously or unconsciously involved in the question of future development.

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ment. Reviewing the past, some see that development enterprises in Manchuria have not infrequently been against the best interests of the Chinese, and recognize that working toward mutual benefits would prove a sounder policy. The actual formulation of such a policy is probably one of the greatest of the Manchurian problems faced by Japan.

The more enlightened view of Manchuria is that it must be developed in accord with a liberal policy. Failing this a periodic recurrence of disturbances is expected. A great deal will depend, it is believed, on the manner in which Japanese settlers (emigrants) conduct themselves, or are treated by the Chinese population; and how much freedom of trade and business is afforded by the Manchurian Government. There is an ardent hope among some publicists that Japan may settle enough people in Manchuria to relieve population pressure at home. A former Japanese consular officer in Manchuria recently enumerated the following lack of qualifications of his people to reside there: uncongenial climate, difference in living conditions and customs, high living costs of Japanese compared with Chinese, and the greater adaptability of the Koreans as emigrants.

On the other hand, a former director of the South Manchuria Railway has stated in a published article that "If the Manchurian and Mongolian question cannot be solved so as to give a large number of Japanese people food, clothing, and houses, that territory has no meaning for Japan; the new state of Manchuria and Mongolia has no significance". The theory back of this, however, is that

Japan

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Japan should do its utmost to further industrialize by bringing raw materials to Japan for manufacture instead of developing industries in Manchuria. Capital would in this way be best employed to solve the social and economic problems of the country as a whole, as against any single group of interests. Should factories be established in Manchuria or Mongolia, cheap native labor would be employed, thus defeating the more important aims of Government leaders.

In Manchuria and Mongolia, according to the above quoted view, capital would find its main uses in the operation of mines, developing power projects, expansion of the gas industry, financing agricultural projects, and in the purchase of raw materials for use or fabrication in Japan. The materials that are generally considered of greatest value to industries in Japan are: iron ore, coal, magnesium, lumber and wood pulp, and vegetable oil products. Industries capable of development in Manchuria, as viewed from Japan, include sheep raising, agriculture, stock farming, and fruit growing. Experiments have also been conducted in sericulture, and the production of sugar beets. Various other enterprises are under consideration, but these serve to indicate the main fields of effort. It will not be attempted in this report to estimate the natural resources available; it is sufficient here to say that it is generally known that they are enormous. The present stage of development of Manchuria is also omitted from the scope of this report. (Comprehensive information on these subjects is to be found in The Manchuria Year Book for 1931). The purpose
of

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of this report is to show the reaction of the civilian interests of the country to the enlarged field for enterprise which many believe the recent military movements in Manchuria and Mongolia have opened up to the Japanese people.

It is also hoped to indicate some of the problems that Japan faces in its effort to encompass Manchuria, more completely than before, in its economic empire.

The highly complicated problem of securing gains from Manchurian investments and enterprises, following the period of disorder and interruption of business is to be recognized; as well as the attending poverty and commercial losses that the military operation has brought about. It is impossible to estimate at this time the eventual influence that such factors will have, especially since a complete change in political administration has taken place.

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EMIGRATION TO MANCHURIA

Plans To Stimulate Emigration

Military and Government leaders assert that the military stage of the Manchurian problem is virtually over except for the danger from banditry. In consequence they maintain that an opportunity is now apparent for Japanese colonization. The de facto situation is considered as propitious as may be expected in the immediate months to come.

Upon the expressed views of various military, Governmental and semi-official leaders, including representatives of the South Manchurian Company, the Oriental Development Company, and professors from the agricultural departments of the various imperial universities, a plan to assist immigration has been formulated by the Ministry of Overseas Affairs. This plan anticipates sending 500,000 Japanese to Manchuria and Mongolia within a decade. The cost of the enterprise is estimated at ¥200,000,000, distributed in amounts of ¥2,000 per family of five on an average. This is the first definite announcement of concrete Government plans to establish settlements in Manchuria looking toward massed colonization. In the development of this scheme the ideal community is considered 300 or more families. They are to be under the direct charge of the South Manchurian Railway Company, the Oriental Development Company, or the Japan Emigration Association. These associations will undertake to select the settlers and to see that they depart with the idea of remaining in Manchuria or

Mongolia

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Mongolia permanently.

The Kwantung army is interested in this plan and is expected to cooperate with the Government agencies in furthering it. A special department is to be established to take charge of Japanese and Korean immigrants to Manchuria, in cooperation with the South Manchurian Railway, the Consulate General at Mukden, and the Ministry of Overseas Affairs. Koreans appear to be in advance of the Japanese in entering Manchuria in recent weeks. The assistant Governor of Korea made a tour of this region for the purpose of studying the possibilities of the territory for Korean Emigrants. A large number appear to have entered the country following the termination of major military movements, necessitating control measures to cover the influx.

Concrete Plans To Dispatch Immigrants

Plans developed by various prefectural and social organizations to encourage and assist immigration to Manchuria are very numerous. A number of them are worthy of note, while others are of only minor consequence owing to a lack of substantial backing, principally the necessary financial means. Some of these are of interest as indicative of the general trend in this direction.

Movements to send settlers to Manchuria have sprung up throughout the Empire. In the main they are supported by Prefectural Governments, immigration

associations,

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associations, army reservist associations, and the like. The origin of the movement is perhaps to be found in the enormous publicity given to Manchuria in recent months, and the belief that with the new Manchurian Government in power, land lease and other disputes will be settled, thus permitting Japanese to acquire and develop land with greater freedom.

Among the local movements to send immigrants to Manchuria those in Aomori and Yamagata Prefectures are notable. A near famine occurred in the Prefecture of Aomori during the past year, and reports indicate that in one or two entire villages contemplate moving to Manchuria. A plan has been formulated in Yamagata prefecture to conduct lectures and training courses preparatory to sending some 500 emigrants annually. Another movement has been observed to send families of soldiers who have lost their lives in the recent military expedition. Many of these appear to have requested assistance needed to emigrate. Up to the present time the greater part of the immigrants who have gone to Manchuria were of the skilled or semi-skilled worker class, such as carpenters and masons. The educated unemployed are also showing interest in going to Manchuria. The army in Manchuria has given employment to members of all these classes to a limited extent, particularly skilled manual workers. Among the more local schemes to assist the emigration movement a number of groups are being recruited in the district of Osaka, and it has been reported that some

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of the residents of Saghalien have left that region for Manchuria. In general these groups are so organized as to constitute a kind of self-contained community, taking with them teachers and priests, with the intention of having their own schools and places of worship.

Drawbacks To Opportunity In Manchuria

It is quite clear that many of the plans to aid emigration to Manchuria are based upon a lack of understanding as to the immediate practical obstacles to be faced and also the hardships which would be encountered before the success of any venture could be expected. In addition to the fact that Manchuria is affected by the world depression, and that Chinese labor is abundant for all general and practical purposes, there is the added problem of reconstruction following recent military and civil disturbances. This latter incident has removed from all accounts, many fields of employment and perhaps postponed the time when industrial and commercial development may begin again. There are many drawbacks, therefore, with respect to the potential opportunities in Manchuria held to be awaiting the enterprise of emigrants.

The large Japanese firms which are counted upon to absorb industrial workers are not yet ready to make the expansion which would permit employment of much larger numbers. Industrial concerns are held in check by the obvious financial risks attending the unsettled conditions prevailing, and the fact that there are already available facilities to care for present business

needs.

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needs. The industrialists also have the general object in developing Manchuria to establish factories in Japan rather than in that region. Hence the indifference of these groups to mass emigration is noticeable. The development of certain industries outside of Japan would also prove harmful to vested industries within the country. This position has been revealed whenever attempts have been made to give preferred treatment to Manchurian products. In a larger way the emigration movement is handicapped by the lack of a concrete or definite policy, or means of gathering together the various interests under one program. There is a general confusion of views among Military, business, proletarianism, and critical circles, as to practical steps necessary to forward this movement and take advantage of the opportunities believed to be offered. There is further a conflict between plans to invest capital and aid in the development of Manchuria and the five-year plan which has recently been formulated for the further industrialization of Japan (this plan was advanced by a leading member of the present party in power - Mr. Jotaro Yamamoto, president of the South Manchuria Railway under the Tanaka Cabinet). The conflict here may in a sense be political or based upon political movements, but it may bring delay in the formulation of an unified program for Manchuria.

From the standpoint of the responsible authorities in Manchuria and Mongolia, there is also the problem of unemployment in those regions developing as the re-

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sult of an influx of laborers and other emigrants from Japan. Warnings have already been sent back to Japan to this effect. A leading news journal, the TOKYO NICHU NICHU, calls attention to the fact that emigrants are going into Manchuria with only vague anticipations of what they may expect. Although this testifies to the difficult living conditions in Japan at present, it is nevertheless important in reference to practical phases of the emigration problem. Although in the past it has been complained that the Japanese have shown little interest in moving to Manchuria because of uncongenial climate, and the difficulty of meeting Chinese competitive conditions, the promising opportunities held up recently appear to have overcome indifference. The Nichi-Nichi states that a number of those who have already gone are now suffering from lack of employment.

Expectations that the new State might absorb a large number of Japanese have not yet materialized. It is still in process of organization, is weak financially, and has not had adequate time to begin industrial and business activities requiring outside assistance. It is not apparent that the near future will see any such opportunity. It is a question again of available resources awaiting development but requiring perhaps a long period of time and a great deal of expenditure of capital. At present capital for new enterprise in Japan is secured only with difficulty, and moreover it is concentrated in relatively few quarters.

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The whole question of mass immigration, therefore, faces many difficulties and is likely to proceed but slowly - with results now much in doubt. In discussing the opportunity for Japanese in Manchuria the Oriental Economist comments in its February issue that one of the major problems in Manchuria is the inability of Japanese laborers engaged in farming, mining, and railroad construction, to compete with the Chinese laborers because of lower standards of living. Koreans, however, apparently have greater ability to compete with the Chinese laborers and to live under conditions more nearly approaching theirs. These factors of cheap labor and low producing costs among the Chinese are held to be almost insurmountable obstacles to the Japanese; severe competition may arise between nationals of the two countries in which Japan is likely to experience difficulty in maintaining both economic position and prestige. This journal fails to see in Manchuria a field for possible emigration on a scale that would materially assist in the solution of Japan's population problem.

A leading authority writing in the Chugai Economic review (a director of the Mitsui Company) states that south Manchuria is now well developed, and that the industries best adapted to North Manchuria are agriculture and stock raising. The latter industries, he observes, will require large amounts of capital, such as would be beyond the capacity of any but the largest financial interests, and out of the question for in-

dividual

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dividual enterprise. Government participation to a large extent would therefore be necessary for the development of these industries. The amount estimated as a minimum requirement is Yen 200,000,000 to Yen 300,000,000, and for a profitable return on investment, a period of ten years.

Activities Of Chambers Of Commerce And Other Trade Promotion Organizations

Owing to business interest in Manchuria manifested by various commercial centers, a meeting of representatives of fifteen Japanese Chambers of Commerce was recently held in Mukden. The delegates attending this conference were drawn from important commercial organizations. The purpose of the meeting was to establish an economic policy relative to Manchuria which would permit obtaining maximum benefits from the recently enlarged rights and privileges of the Japanese. A draft of the resolution which included adherence to the "open door" and protection of earned rights and privileges was adopted. The following gives in substance the results of the conference, as published in the Japan Chronicle of March 17, 1932:

" For three days, March 16th to 18th, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry is to hold a conference for study of problems in Mukden, and to discuss Japan's economic policy towards the new State of Manchuria and Mongolia.

The Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Kobe, Kyoto, Hakodate, Niigata and Hiroshima will send representatives to the Conference. From the Japanese Chambers of Commerce in Manchuria will be representatives of Mukden,

Dairen

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Dairen, Harbin, Changchun, Tiehling, Antung and Yingkow. The Korean and the Tsingtao Chambers will also be represented.

The agenda of the Conference is being prepared by the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in consultation with the Manchurian Chambers. The draft agenda drawn up by the Japan Chamber, and its recommendations, are as follows:--

1.--Consolidation of administrative organs in Manchuria, and their security.

(a) The Kwantung Government-General, the Headquarters of the Japanese Garrison in Kwantung province, the Consulate General and the South Manchuria Railway Company to be consolidated into one body to govern politics, army, diplomatic affairs, communications and industries. (b) To organize a supreme council of Government official and private parties so as to study economic problems and take suitable measures on a fixed national policy. (c) To consolidate all organs for investigation of resources and economic affairs into one unit and make it complete and authoritative.

2.--Open door and equal opportunity problem.

(a) To pay due respect to the principles of the open door and equal opportunity in Manchuria and Mongolia. (b) In economic activity Japanese and foreigners to have freedom and equality, as a rule.

3.--The South Manchuria Railway Company.

(a) The S.M.R. policy to be adjusted properly to cope with the administrative change in the new State. (b) To modify freight policy so as to assist the progress of Japanese economic activities in Mukden and Mongolia.

4.--Monetary policy.

(a) To reorganize all monetary organs and establish a central Japanese bank to keep in close contact with the currency system of the new State, and issue consolidated paper notes, concentrating its activity in Manchuria. (b) To establish a special banking organ to assist exploitation of various industries by means of low interest and long period loans.

5.--Tariff problem.

(a) To induce the new Manchurian Government to fix tariff rates as low as possible, and abolish export duties as quickly as possible. (b) To arrange with the Government for the retention of the Sino-Japan reciprocal tariff agreement. (c) To revise the existing treaty for the establishment of the Dairen Customs. (d) To apply preferential

tariffs

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tariffs to special products in Kwantung province.

6.--Industrial policy.

(a) Industrial exploitation in Manchuria and Mongolia to be made chiefly in key industries.
(b) Such industries as iron, soda, soya bean, oil and fats, pulp, coal oil, and magnesium to be encouraged. (c) A mining act to be incorporated so to protect vested rights, and promote new enterprises.
(d) Reform of forestry administration, and protection of Japanese investments. (e) Stocks-farming; attention to be paid to the improvement of sheep breeding, cattles, horses and pigs. Stock disease prevention. (f) To protect fishery rights and exploit salt making. (g) A special organ to be established for the encouragement and protection of farmers migrating to Manchuria and Mongolia. Protection of Korean farmers.

7.--Trade policy.

(a) A credit guarantee system to be provided for the promotion of exports from Japan to Manchuria. This system is keenly needed for wheat, machinery, dyestuffs, rayon and woollen goods. (b) An information bureau to be established. "

Municipal interest in the so-called Manchuria opportunity is seen in the action of the Commercial and Industrial Bureau of Tokyo which has appropriated a sum of money to aid the following projects (Nichi-Nichi March 8, 1932).

- "1. The centralization of institutions governing commerce and industry in Manchuria.
2. The open door policy and equal opportunity in Manchuria.
S.M.R.'s Business Policy
3. The reform of the South Manchurian Railway Company's business policy, especially the reduction of the freight tariff and the selling prices of coal.
4. The centralization of banking institutions in Manchuria and the establishment of a bank for financing the industrial development in Manchuria.
5. The establishment of the customs tariff policy.
6. The establishment of the industrial development policy. (The basic industries will be conducted in Manchuria).

7. The

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SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The principal material for this report has been obtained through translations from leading Japanese periodicals (Toyo Keizai, Chugai Shogyo, The Bankers Magazine, and Diamond); and conversations with business men and observers. Owing to the unsettled and rapidly changing conditions dealt with, the report is only quasi-analytical. Further observation and study will be necessary to estimate the effect upon Japan's economic life of developments in Manchuria.

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7. The foreign trade policy. The export indemnification system must be created in order to promote the export of products in the leased territory of Kwantung and Japan Proper to Manchuria. Institutions for making the market survey in Manchuria and promoting the trade between Japan and the new Republic must be established. "

The city of Osaka has decided to set up an investigation bureau at Harbin at a cost of ¥30,000, which is expected to function from July. At Kobe it has decided to utilize ¥10,000 of municipal funds in like manner. The city of Yokohama has dispatched a director of the Prefectural Industrial to Manchuria for the purpose of investigating industries and business matters of possible interest to circles in his district. The general effect of these varied activities upon Japan's future in Manchuria remains problematical.

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(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY MORNING, MAY 7, 1932

At the press conference this morning, Assistant Secretary Rogers announced the release of an exchange of telegrams between President Hoover and the President of Poland on the occasion of Poland's national holiday. The release of the Foreign Service changes made during the past week was also announced. A despatch from the American Consul General at Shanghai to the effect that the Japanese were withdrawing a substantial number of troops will also be made available to the press.

FRANCE

Mr. Rogers also announced the receipt of a telegram from Ambassador Edge, reporting the death of M. Doumer, President of France. Ambassador Edge also reported to the effect that, according to the plans being made, a conference will apparently be held on Thursday of next week.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

A correspondent referred to a despatch in one of this morning's newspapers, wherein the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office was said to have branded as high-handed the formulation by the American State Department of a policy affecting a multilateral treaty. Referring to a speech delivered by Acting Secretary Castle on May 4, 1932, the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman is said to have denied that the Manchurian situation should be involved in any discussion of the Kellogg Pact. The correspondent then asked if the Department had received anything from the Japanese Government indicating its attitude on this question



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question. Mr. Rogers replied in the negative. The correspondent then asked if that had not been the attitude of the Japanese Government for some time. Mr. Rogers declined to comment. Asked if he had any information to the effect that Japan might secede from the Kellogg Pact, Mr. Rogers replied in the negative. A correspondent then asked if there was any provision in the Kellogg Pact according to which a signatory might renounce the Pact. Mr. Rogers replied that there was no provision in the Pact covering the withdrawal of any of the signatories therefrom. The correspondent then inquired as to the attitude of the State Department on the modification or interpretation of the Kellogg Pact. He observed that the United States could not take any action alone and asked if the treaty could be interpreted by the various nations to suit themselves. FOR BACKGROUND ONLY, Mr. Rogers replied that it was obvious that a construction or interpretation of an instrument like the Kellogg Pact could be arrived at through the process of international action and the precedents created under it, but that so far as modifying the words and terms of the Pact, it was obvious that no one government could do it.

BONDS

Asked if there were any developments concerning the recent meeting of the Committee of Foreign Bondholders and if any further meetings had been scheduled, the Assistant Secretary replied that there had been no recent developments and, while the Department has received a number of inquiries concerning the matter, no further meetings have been scheduled.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SILVER

A correspondent said that Senator King announced yesterday that he and Representative Somers were introducing a joint resolution

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resolution calling for the convening of an international conference on silver and providing for the appropriation of \$100,000 to cover the expenses of such a conference. The correspondent then asked if the passing of such a joint resolution would make it mandatory upon the President to call the conference. In reply, Mr. Rogers said that he stated yesterday the position of the Administration concerning the calling of a conference on silver. The correspondent then asked what would be the attitude of the State Department with regard to Senator King's resolution. Mr. Rogers replied that he did not think it would be wise to comment on the subject.

M. J. McDERMOTT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

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CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION IN MORNING
PAPERS OF SATURDAY, MAY 7, WHICH DO NOT APPEAR
ON THE STREETS BEFORE 8.00 P.M. O'CLOCK, EASTERN
STANDARD TIME, FRIDAY, MAY 6, 1932. NOT TO BE
PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY
WAY.

ADDRESS OF HON. WILLIAM R. CASTLE, JR.,
ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE, TO THE
GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE METHODIST
EPISCOPAL CHURCH, IN ATLANTIC CITY ON
FRIDAY EVENING, MAY 6, 1932, AT EIGHT
O'CLOCK

It is a very healthful thing to have the people
of the United States take, as they are beginning to do,
a real interest in the foreign relations of our country.
Essentially our foreign relations are non-partisan and
should always be so maintained. There will always be,
of course, changes of emphasis on details as Republicans
or Democrats are in control, just as there will be
under different Presidents, whether or not of the same
party. Fundamentally it must always be true, if we

would

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would avoid disaster, that those who have the conduct of our foreign relations should remember, not that they are Democrats or Republicans, but that they are Americans who must carry on a high tradition of foreign policy.

This fact makes possible the discussion of foreign relations without any of the acrimony that all too often obscures the real issues when we are discussing domestic affairs. The danger, or better the difficulty, lies in the fact that when speaking of either foreign or domestic affairs most people do not see the picture as a whole. They have their pet theories, their panaceas which generally fail to take account of any of the issues surrounding the individual act or principle. They permit one bright light to dazzle them so that they fail to distinguish the rest of the picture which seems to them unimportant because it is, to them, in shadow.

In domestic affairs there are those who are so absorbed in the passage of bonus legislation that all other issues are forgotten. Others are convinced that the salvation of the country depends on the retention or the revision of the Eighteenth Amendment and become so absorbed in debating this question that they forget that other laws are equally important. Some people talk of the horrors of the "power trust" but nobody I have ever met can define it. So I might go on naming other issues, all of them important but no single one, in my opinion, so important as to make the others negligible; no single one so important that it alone, without regard to the others, can keep this country of ours on the path of righteousness and right living.

So, in foreign affairs, there are those who so earnestly desire to have the United States a member of the World Court that they see this step as the one road to peace. Yet the Court is only one milestone in the forward march of international understanding. Others pin their whole faith in treaties of arbitration and ignore the fact that conciliation may make arbitration, which is a legal act, unnecessary. Still others see in disarmament the only sure guarantee of world peace and they are so eager to have this accomplished instantly that they would almost fight a war to see it brought about. When there is a conference at which, perhaps, great strides are made in disarmament - as there were, for example, in the Washington and London Conferences - these people attack the Government for not doing more. Of that I shall speak later. The President, who can and must survey the whole ground, cannot champion one method to the exclusion of others, but rather must and does support all sane progress in the ways of understanding and peace. He stands ready to sponsor any measures, now here, now there,

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which carry forward his country and the world in the ways of peace.

One of the president's main preoccupations, because it is something in which visible progress should be made, has been in the cause of disarmament. When he took office he knew that in naval disarmament we had made a long step at the Washington Conference. But this Conference of necessity had left untouched large classes of fighting vessels. I say "of necessity" because the American negotiators recognized that it was better to take something than to lose all. The President, therefore, brought about the London Conference of two years ago which resulted in limitation on a proportional basis of all classes of fighting ships, at least among the three principal naval nations. I know that many people were bitterly disappointed that this Conference did not far more drastically reduce navies, but by securing a maximum beyond which no one could build we stopped competition and started an era of confidence in each other out of which will come eventually the real reduction toward which we all look. We tried for more than was accomplished since this country always strives for high ideals in such international matters, but the good people who wrote bitterly because we could not carry out our full program failed to realize, as so many fail in so many instances to realize, that it is better to record forward steps than to admit total lack of success. These people forget that other nations have other problems and fears and that what may seem to us only slight achievement may seem to them an amazing and almost terrifying result. We hope that long before the time, in three or four years, when the nations meet again to discuss naval matters, France and Italy will have adhered to the Treaty and that, limitation having been accepted by all the great naval powers, reduction may be the next step.

The reasons why the president is so keenly interested in disarmament are many. One is, of course, the utterly useless burden of expense on a world staggering under intolerable economic burdens. I have heard people say, sneeringly, that, after all, the idea that three hundreds of millions spent annually in armament which is essentially destructive, might better be put to constructive purposes is obviously fallacious reasoning since already the world's production is too great to be absorbed. I admit that production may be unbalanced, but I deny that in a world where so many suffer for want of the bare necessities of life there is too much production. But leaving aside the question of how this can be remedied - and toward this solution we are at present groping - I challenge the idea that production may be only in material things. How about spending some of this wasted money in building up education so that through a wider knowledge human life may be made happier and sweeter. How about opening up the forests and making the health giving countryside available to the little children who wither in the cities? How about building churches in which, with the help of an inspired clergy, the spiritual side

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of man's nature may be developed? All these things add nothing to the material production of the world, but they add infinitely to mental and moral and spiritual development, to the productivity of the spirit. That is why those who lay stress on the question of the material waste of excessive armament are really thinking of the higher good of the human race. And even if we look at it in the purely material sense, the mere question of dollars and cents, there is a high argument. Excessive taxation may seem to bear only on the rich, but actually it must affect the happiness of every family since indirectly, in one way or another, every person has to pay. Remove, then, the burden of unnecessary armament, more severe in many other countries than here, and the load on every family will be lighter, the pennies more abundant and the possibilities of a richer life the greater.

But the primary reason for armament reduction must always be in the cause of peace. We in the Government who try to look out over the world are convinced that competition in armament is almost certain to lead to war; that even if competition can be eliminated great armament with a correspondingly great military personnel definitely increases the danger of war. That danger, to be sure, would not be eliminated by total abolition of armament. In fact, I am not sure that it might not be increased since men can fight with clubs and stones and we know that, before the invention of gun powder, the strong did not hesitate to oppress the weak; that wars were fought even in the name of religion. The goal at which we should rather aim is reduction to a point where the army is primarily for police purposes and only such defensive forces are permitted as would make invasion difficult if not impossible.

That broadly speaking, is the aim of the American Delegation in Geneva. We have no cut and dried program to present, but have had and shall continue to have suggestions to make which we hope may be helpful. Under the President's direction the Delegation has already proposed the elimination of such offensive weapons of land warfare as tanks and mobile guns of heavy calibre. Take, for example, these heavy guns. Fixed in frontier fortifications they are defensive. If they can be moved from place to place their only real purpose is the destruction of these defensive fortifications. So, also, we have thrown out the suggestion that armies should be for police and defense purposes, that, therefore, numbers of soldiers beyond what must be estimated for the different countries for these two purposes should be cut off. The problem is not simple and we make no pretense that it is, but we believe it sound and believe also that, with good will, the goal at which it aims can be reached.

The United States believes, of course, that armament reduction should be proportional, but that when this thesis is granted, there may be extensive cuts without danger of imperilling national defense. If two equally strong countries face each other, each with an army of a million men, it seems obvious that they would be equally safe if each had an army of a hundred thousand men. If the theory of proportional reduction is accepted there is not a proposition which we are unwilling to discuss as touching any branch

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of the service. But we feel strongly that, as to land, air or sea forces the whole picture should be considered. Only in this way can relative strength be preserved. We hope for much more, but if Geneva accomplishes nothing but limitation the first great step in reduction will have been taken.

One other word only as to the Disarmament Conference. The President is determined that the American Delegation make every effort to abolish now and henceforth those aspects of war which result in the destruction of the civil population. We must get rid of lethal gases which spread over the countryside. We must outlaw forever the bombing of open cities which result only in the death of civilians, of women and children. If ever again the world must be subjected to the scourge of war, which people are beginning to realize is one of the worst as well as most inhuman methods of settling disputes, we must, at least so far as possible, exempt from danger the people who continue constructive work in the midst of works of destruction.

There are clouds over the Conference as there always are over every international conference. But we must not give way to despair of final results. I believe that, before the Conference is over, shafts of the sunshine of common sense and of idealism will break through the clouds. The Secretary of State, in his discussions in Geneva with the various leaders has, I am sure, given a strong impulse to this high thinking out of which high action must come. The world too desperately needs relief from the burden of excessive armament, too earnestly expects the individuals who represent different nations in Geneva to give proof that they believe in the common brotherhood of man to permit them to fold their tents and return to their homes empty-handed, to permit a break-up without result. Listen to the pessimists if you must, but let the only effect of their pessimism make you pray more earnestly for success. You may be sure that the American Delegation will leave not a stone unturned in the search for results.

Nobody believes more earnestly than I the importance, indeed the necessity of limitation and reduction of armament. Yet it never gives me particular satisfaction to discuss it. The reason is not the difficulties inherent in the problem. There is always tremendous satisfaction in tackling difficulties boldly and in seeking their solution whatever the odds may be. The real reason is that the subject inevitably puts too much emphasis on war, too little on peace. It is always better to speak of keeping the peace than of preventing war. Peace is the normal state of human society; war the abnormal. On any subject we keep a firmer, cleaner mental outlook if we hold ourselves to the normal. It is better, I am sure, to preach of the rewards and the satisfaction of sobriety than of the punishment and suf-

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fering of drunkenness. We have to clean up the dirt to make the world a fit habitation for mankind, but when the dirt is out of sight it should also be out of mind. Peace in the world is what we want, not mere absence of war, a peace which comes of tolerance and understanding of the ideas of every honest man, of faith in the good will of nations. We ought to have the courage to recognize honesty and to believe in the honesty of the average man even if his ideas differ from ours. In arguments on disarmament we are all too inclined to feel that the man who differs is dishonest and in so feeling we ignore the inheritance or the fears which may make him differ with passionate honesty.

When he negotiated the Pact of Paris Mr. Kellogg took as a basis his belief in the honesty of man, whatever his creed or color. He felt that if the world as a whole renounced war as a national policy, that if the nations of the world solemnly promised to seek the settlement of all their disputes through pacific means, this would constitute a tremendous advance toward a peaceful world. The criticisms of the Kellogg Pact have all revolved around the fact that it has no force behind it, that nothing except honor would prevent a nation from breaking its terms, that therefore it is useless until there is added some penalty for breaking its terms.

To employ a bold simile one might suggest that it is as silly to brand the Kellogg Pact as useless as it would be to brand the Ten Commandments as useless. Both have only the power of conscience to make them valid, but as no man would dare to say that the moral law, as transmitted to us by Moses, is useless, so no man has a right to say that this pledge of international peace is useless. It is true that legal punishment has been enacted for infringement of some of the moral laws of the Bible and that this, although it has not added one whit to their validity, has made men more fearful of transgression. So it may be that, granted the imperfection of human nature, there should be punishment for transgression of this international compact of peace.

No man in the world is more sincerely a lover of peace than President Hoover. This has nothing to do with party politics. It has nothing to do with whether you approve the man or not. But it is a demonstrable fact which history will record. When Mr. Hoover entered the White House the United States was a signatory of the Kellogg Pact. As a fellow member of the Cabinet he had assisted Mr. Kellogg in putting it through - and this enthusiastically. The Pact was a part of our national law and the President determined to make it a corner stone of our national policy. In the official statement of the conversation between the President and Mr. MacDonald occurs this highly significant phrase - "In signing the Paris Peace Pact fifty-six nations have declared that war shall not be used as an instrument of national policy. We have agreed that all disputes shall be settled by pacific means. Both our Governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge". Already the Kellogg Pact was growing in

power

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power and application. At the time of the London Naval Conference the President bade his delegates to keep the Pact always in mind, to base their policy on the Pact. In his instructions to the Delegates to Geneva he reiterated this thought.

But there were still those who complained that the Pact had no "teeth", who compared it, to its disadvantage with the Covenant of the League of Nations. The President deplored this tendency because it seemed to him that one great weakness of the Covenant was its threat of the use of force to keep the peace, of one kind of war to prevent another kind of war. It was in just this that the United States was and is far removed from the League. It is contrary to all our traditions to put in the hands of an alien body, even though we might have a vote in that body, the decision as to whether or not our young men should go out into the trenches to face death. There is no doubt that an aggressor should be restrained but who shall decide the aggressor? And even if a just decision shall be reached is the only possible way of restraint that we shall go out with guns to fight this aggressor? Even if a nation is guilty of theft of territory is this a reason for the sacrifice of innocent neutral lives? Do our courts send out citizens with guns to shoot armed burglars who have been convicted of theft, risking the lives of the innocent and making possible the physical victory of the criminals? This opposition to the use of force to prevent force, of war to prevent war has become, I think, almost the most potent argument in opposition to joining the League. This solution certainly will never be chosen to strengthen the Pact.

But we have not yet "put teeth into the Kellogg Pact". To do this there has been a tremendous drive, conducted, I may say, by many of my best personal friends, to have this country decide that it will declare a boycott on any nation which violates the Pact. You have yourselves recently seen the strength of this drive in favor of a boycott. The advocates of this form of coercion undoubtedly draw their inspiration also from the Covenant of the League.

The President is vigorously opposed to the official boycott because he recognizes it for what it is, practically an act of war. It might often override treaties and we like to consider ourselves as champions of the sanctity of treaties. An official boycott against a nation - and this means, of course, cessation of trade and communication for the sake of starving that nation financially and physically into submission to our will - would be futile unless universally applied. And who would be the first to suffer? Not the armies and the navies, but the civilian population. Not the soldiers and the sailors, but the workers, the women and children. There can be no doubt that a boycott, universally applied, would bring a nation to its knees, but at a cost that would be almost worse than war. Except in a country able to feed itself from its own resources it would mean starvation. Starvation means revolution and the collapse of all government. Before this happens, to be sure, there would probably -----

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be war. A boycott implies a blockade and I know of no measure more certain to lead to war than blockade.

The very statement that a boycott to be effective must be universal leads us back immediately to the idea of a body superior to national governments which must issue a fiat. Here, as before, we run counter to American tradition and practice. On matters of pure law I can well imagine that our country and others would submit to judicial decision. We do this all the time in various arbitration cases and the principle is one which we have accepted, might well accept more fully. But it is seldom that cases arise in which apparent violations of the Kellogg Pact are capable of purely judicial decision. As a rule the matters at issue are matters of opinion and of careful evaluation of facts rather than of legal points. In such a situation the United States should maintain the stand that the decision must be made here inasmuch as we cannot turn over to a foreign body a decision on any except justiciable matters.

All that I have said so far has been what we cannot do, but to take a merely negative stand is not at all the character of the President. He has been eagerly searching for some formula which would make the Kellogg Pact more effective without incurring the danger that this country would have to fight to preserve the peace. The formula finally reached was first expressed in the note of the Secretary of State to China and Japan on January 8th of this year. In that note, after discussing obligations arising from the Nine Power Treaty, the Secretary added this very significant phrase "that it (the American Government) does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties". This warning applied specifically, of course, to the situation in the Orient, but inasmuch as international law is built up by an accumulation of specific pledges of this kind it immediately assumed an importance extending far beyond the present situation. It seemed to the President that this attitude of the American Government ought to be made even more definite both because it was important in the present situation and because it added a new principle of law. In an open letter to Senator Borah the Secretary, therefore, after referring to the notes of January 8th to China and Japan, added that "If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation". This on the part of the Government of the United States clearly extended the principle enunciated with respect to China and Japan to similar issues which might arise in any part of the world. It was also an implied invitation to the other nations of the world to align themselves with the United States. The invitation, I am glad to say, was immediately accepted by the League of Nations. In their statement on March 11th they naturally

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
laid the emphasis on the principles of the Covenant of the League, but stated that "the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the League, ---- are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris which is one of the corner stones of the peace organization of the world. The League, therefore, proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations," which principles, as you will have noted, the League itself declared to be in harmony with the principles of the Kellogg Pact.

I believe that the world must recognize in this a splendid forward step in the maintenance of peace, a step fully in harmony with American tradition, one which, above all, does not envisage the use of force to restrain a predatory nation. As the President says, it is the strongest moral sanction the world has ever known. If all the nations of the world realize that the gains which have come to them through the use of force will not be recognized as valid by the world at large, they will understand that these gains are useless. The principle is one which can be applied promptly through joint notification in case trouble arises. There is no necessity of determining at the moment on the aggressor, but the world will have time to consider and decide which of the two nations is at fault. I have great confidence in the validity of the decisions which may be reached by the conscience of mankind, and I think there will be little chance in the future of any serious division in opinion as to the guilt which must be placed on the nation because it ignores its obligations under the Kellogg Pact. No such nation in the future will be permitted to enjoy the fruits of its dishonest attack on the peace structure of society.

Through this action the President has "put teeth in the Pact" and has done it in a way which avoids the use of force. He has added a bright, new, inspiring chapter in international law. His action has appealed to the conscience of the world and as time goes on may well change the whole attitude of the nations toward the use of force.

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MAY 9, 1932.

Sino-Japanese Conflict.

The following is the full text of the agreement signed at Shanghai on May 5, 1932:-

"ARTICLE 1. The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from May 5, 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease around Shanghai all and every form of hostile acts. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers.

"ARTICLE 2. The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in annex one to this agreement.

"ARTICLE 3. The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in annex two to this agreement.

"ARTICLE 4. A Joint Commission, however, including members representing the participating friendly powers, will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this commission will be as defined in annex 3 to this agreement.

"ARTICLE 5. The present agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

"The present agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

"Done at Shanghai, this fifth day of May, nineteen hundred and thirty-two.

(Chinese and Japanese signatures)

"In the presence of representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March fourth, nineteen hundred thirty-two:

(Signatures)

F/DEW

793.94/5202

FILED
 JUN 01 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

"Annex 1. The following are the positions of the Chinese troops as provided in Article 2 of this agreement.

"(Reference, the attached postal map of the Shanghai district scale one stroke one fifty thousand.)

"From a point on the Soochow Creek due south of Anting village north along the west bank of a creek immediately east of Anting village to Wanghsienchiaio, thence north across a creek to a point four kilometers east of Shatow, and thence northwest up to and including Supeikou on the Yangtze River.

"In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers, members of the Joint Commission.

"Annex 2. The following are the localities as provided in Article 3 of this agreement:

"The aforesaid localities are outlined on the attached maps marked (a), (b), (c), and (d). They are referred to as areas one, two, three and four.

"Area one is as shown on map (a). It is agreed (one) that this area excludes Woosung village; (two) that the Japanese will not interfere with the operation of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway or its workshops.

"Area two is shown on map (b). It is agreed that the Chinese cemetery about one mile more or less to the northeast of the international race track is excluded from the area to be used by the Japanese troops.

"Area three is shown on map (c). It is agreed that this area excludes the Chinese village Tsao Chia Chai and the Sanyu cloth factory.

"Area four is shown on map (d). It is agreed that the area to be used includes the Japanese cemetery and eastward approaches thereto.

"In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers, members of the Joint Commission.

"The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated above will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the agreement and will be completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal.

"The Joint Commission to be established under Article 4 will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

"Annex 3. The Joint Commission will be composed of twelve members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian heads of mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March fourth. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the chairman having a casting vote. The chairman will be elected by the commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly powers.

"The commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles one, two, and three of this agreement, and is authorized to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of provisions of any of the three articles mentioned above."

The Joint Commission provided for by Article 4 has been constituted as follows:-

United States:-

The American Consul General (Chairman).
 The American Military Attaché.

Japan:-

The Japanese Consul General.
 The Japanese Acting Military Attaché.

China:-

The Secretary General of the Shanghai Chinese Municipality.
 The Commissioner of Public Safety.

Great Britain:-

The British Consul General.
 The British Military Attaché.

France:-

The French Consul General.
 The French Military Attaché.

Italy:-

The Chinese Secretary of the Italian Legation.
 The Italian Military Attaché.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5203

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Tientsin/46 FOR Despatch # 103.

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED April 1, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127 oro

REGARDING: Anti-Japanese feeling which has been so pronounced
 at Tientsin appeared to have reached its peak
 in the course of March.

793.94/5203

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
 The only development of any considerable importance may be said to be that the anti-Japanese feeling which has been so pronounced at Tientsin since early last Autumn appeared to have reached its peak in the course of the month. That a more moderate attitude now prevails on the part of the Chinese towards the Japanese can scarcely be denied; a corresponding change on the part of the Japanese towards the Chinese is also generally admitted. It is difficult to determine the exact reason for this apparent change, but the turn of events in Shanghai early in the month may have been one of the main factors

793.94
 A further mark of a more cordial feeling between the Chinese and Japanese was observable on the occasion of a farewell tea party given by Lieutenant General Hashii, the retiring commandant of Japanese forces in North China, on March 15, at which time the Chairman of the Provincial Government, General Wang Chu-chang, the Mayor of Tientsin, Chow Lung-kuang, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Safety, Brigadier General Wang I-min, and many other Chinese officials were present. The presence of these officials at this function left the impression that much of the ill feeling

326

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5204

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 693.9412/259 FOR Tel. # 518, 5 p.m.

FROM China (Perkins) DATED May 10, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Press reports stated that instructions had been issued at Nanking instructing various principal municipalities to dissolve all anti-Japanese boycott associations. Inquiries made of local officials failed to confirm reports.

793.94 / 5204

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 10, 1932

Rec'd 5:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

518, May 10, 5 p. m.

On May 5th press reports stated that instructions had been issued at Nanking instructing the various principal municipalities to dissolve all anti-Japanese boycott associations and to refrain from inspecting Japanese goods. Inquiries made of local officials failed to confirm these reports and the Legation telegraphed the American Consul General at Nanking, who replied as follows:

"May 9, 3 p. m. Your May 6, 5 p. m. All I can ascertain is that secret instructions were issued probably about May 2 to authorities in the provinces to put a curb on anti-Japanese demonstrations. It does not seem likely that these instructions related directly or even indirectly to activities in pursuance of the boycott. In Nanking anti-Japanese boycott activities are again in progress after having been in abeyance during the Shanghai negotiations."

The foregoing suggests, however, that the authorities at Nanking are adopting, at least for the present, a conciliatory attitude toward Japan.

For the Minister

PERKINS

WSB-WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5205

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11940 FOR Tel. # - 9 pm

FROM Canton (Ballentine) DATED May 10, 1932.

TO NAME 1-1127 ooo

REGARDING:

League agreement.

Southwestern Kuomintang Executive Council
sent a telegram to the Central Government
criticising the - for failure to dispose
of the Manchurian question and for imposing
limitations on China's right freely to station
troops within its own territory.

793.94/5205

hs

3271
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

GRAY

Canton via N.R.

Dated May 10, 1932

Rec'd 9:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

May 10, 9 p. m.

With reference to my telegram of May 6, 4 p. m., various semi-public bodies have launched an agitation against the League agreement and denunciatory streamers have appeared on the streets.

Yesterday the Southwestern Kuomintang Executive Council despatched a telegram to the Central Government criticising the agreement among other things for failure to dispose of the Manchurian question and for imposing limitations on China's right freely to station troops within its own territory.

Repeated to the Legation and Nanking.

BALLANTINE

WSB-WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

FROM

Dated May 11, 1932

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

*2el. to Shanghai
 May 12/32
 2el.*
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 11 1932
 Department of State
may 12/32
 MAY 12 1932

236, May 11, 9 a. m.

My telegram No. 234, May 10, 4 p. m.

*793.94
 note
 893.102-S*

Incident evening May 3rd as reported by commanding officer 15th Infantry and municipal police was substantially as follows: Japanese sentries stationed on Wu Chen Road bridge alleged that stones had been thrown at them by Chinese coolies whereupon a Japanese patrol of about 60 men commanded by an officer crossed bridge to the southern side of Soochow Creek which is in the 31st Infantry sector. Chinese civilians were clubbed and bayoneted both on the street and in houses. Several Chinese were seized by the Japanese who endeavored to take them across the bridge. Assistance was requested from 31st Infantry and a detachment under command of Major Gerow proceeded there, also a number of senior European officered police. After much arguing the Japanese officer in charge of the detachment was persuaded to withdraw his men back across the creek. The Chinese who had been seized were released to the police. Altogether 10 Chinese received injuries.

Chamber of

F/DEW

793.94/5206

JUN 12 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #236, from Shanghai, May 11, 9a.m.

Tele.gram
 Chamber of the Council reporting incident to senior Consul May 9th states inter alia "Without going into the history of other instances of objectionable conduct on the part of Japanese marines in the Settlement, I feel constrained to represent to the Consular Body that this force has repeatedly interfered with and obstructed municipal administration without any reasonable justification whatever and has been, and still is, a source of much anxiety to the Council.

It is almost incredible that the responsible officers of the supposedly highly disciplined troops of modern first class power like Japan could seriously contend, as in the Wu Chen Road incident, that the throwing of stones and the shouting of objectionable epithets by a comparatively small number of the lower classes of Chinese affords a reasonable pretext for the forcible invasion of the Settlement by those troops and the indiscriminate bayonetting and wounding of Chinese pedestrians who were in no way responsible, to say nothing of the provocative threatening of the Municipal police and armed forces of a friendly foreign power who were engaged solely in trying to maintain peace and order in the Settlement.

At present there appears to be little prospect that the recently concluded Sino-Japanese agreement will result in the complete withdrawal from the Settlement of Japanese
 marines

027

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-#236, from Shanghai, May 11, 9 a.m.

marines and I, therefore, venture to express the hope that the Consular Body will exercise its utmost influence with the Japanese authorities to put a definite end to the interference of the Japanese forces with the Municipal administration of the Settlement."

Department's telegram of May 9, 5 p. m. Subsequent to this incident all troops have been withdrawn from Settlement border from Soochow Creek, Markham Road bridge around to North Honan Road, and the border guarded by police only. The troops are in billets and available in case of emergency.

Repeated to the Legation, copy to Commander-in-Chief.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

WWC

0275

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

May 11, 1932.

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (Switzerland)

One. May 11 Consul General at Shanghai reported that on evening May 3 about sixty members of a Japanese patrol, alleging that stones had been thrown at them by Chinese coolies, crossed the Wu Chen Road bridge to the southern side of Soochow Creek into the sector assigned to the 31st Infantry, United States Army; Chinese civilians were clubbed and bayoneted both on the streets and in houses, ten Chinese receiving injuries; that the Japanese endeavored to take several Chinese across the bridge; upon appeal to the 31st Infantry, a detachment thereof proceeded to the spot; and after argument the Japanese officer was persuaded to release the Chinese and to withdraw his men.

Two. In a report on May 9 to the Senior Consul regarding this incident, the Chairman of the Municipal Council stated in part as follows:

QUOTE Without going into the history of other instances of objectionable conduct on the part of Japanese marines in the Settlement, I feel constrained to represent to the

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

793.94/5206

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

Consular Body that this force has repeatedly interfered with and obstructed municipal administration without any reasonable justification whatever and has been, and still is, a source of much anxiety to the Council.

It is almost incredible that the responsible officers of the supposedly highly disciplined troops of modern first class power like Japan could seriously contend, as in the Wu Chen Road incident, that the throwing of stones and the shouting of objectionable epithets by a comparatively small number of the lower classes of Chinese affords a reasonable pretext for the forcible invasion of the Settlement by those troops and the indiscriminate bayonetting and wounding of Chinese pedestrians who were in no way responsible, to say nothing of the provocative threatening of the Municipal police and armed forces of a friendly foreign power who were engaged solely in trying to maintain peace and order in the Settlement.

At present there appears to be little prospect that the recently concluded Sino-Japanese agreement will result in the complete withdrawal from the Settlement of Japanese marines and I, therefore, venture to express the hope that the Consular Body will exercise its utmost influence with

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0277

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
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Department of State

Washington.

- 3 -

the Japanese authorities to put a definite end to the
 interference of the Japanese forces with the Municipal
 administration of the Settlement. UNQUOTE.


Three. Inform Drummond, confidential as to
 source.

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MAY 12 1932



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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

PM REC'D

1-138

0278

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

VIA NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

May 12, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL

MAY 12 32

SHANGHAI (China)

180
 Your 236, May 11, 9 a.m., in regard to the incident
 of May 3, concluding paragraph.

One. Department assumes that this refers only to
 American troops and that all these have been withdrawn
 to their billets. Is this correct? Have troops of any
 other nationality been similarly withdrawn? What
 nationalities and sectors?

Two. What foreign forces other than Japanese have
 been removed from Shanghai? Report nationalities and
 numbers.

Carter, Acting

SKH

793.94/5206

FE:MMH:JLJ/VDM

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1922 1-138

793.94/5206

415
 MAY 12 1932
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Warsaw, April 25, 1932.

No. 1468

Subject: Transmitting memorandum of conversation
with the Japanese Minister in Warsaw.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.



F/LS 793.94/5207

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK		Yes	No
to the field			
In U.S. A.			
1 copy	MID		
L.W.H. Jr.			

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose as of possible interest
to the Department a copy of a memorandum of my conversa-
tion with the Japanese Minister in Warsaw on the evening
of April 23.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph Flack

Joseph Flack,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum.

Copy to E. I. C. and
American Delegation, Geneva.

JF:BJD

4 Carbon Copies

Received *[Signature]*

028

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 140, American Embassy,
Warsaw, Poland.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE
JAPANESE MINISTER IN WARSAW.

In a private conversation with M. Kawai, the Japanese Minister, a few days ago, in answer to my question as to what news he had from the East, he expressed himself as follows:

In the beginning he said the Japanese were getting away from Shanghai and that the Russians were concentrating at strategic points but only in the event of massed concentration by the Russians would Japan resort to war. He said that Manchuria was very important from the Japanese point of view as they have large investments there and it was felt that Manchuria must be freed for many years to come from uncertain Chinese conditions. Japan had no desire to annex Manchuria but considered it essential to defend it from Russia. The Japanese felt that Manchuria should be an economic entity with the open door prevailing and under Japanese influence in a manner somewhat analogous to United States influence in the Philippines. He concluded by saying that perhaps no Japanese had made similar statements but it was his opinion that his statements represented the aims of his countrymen towards Manchuria. The Minister spoke freely and apparently with sincerity.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2526.

Paris, April 29, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict.

~~FE~~
~~WE~~

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAY 12 1932

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK Yes No
To the Field
In U. S. A.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 13 1932
Department of State

F/LS 793.94/5208

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's
instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I
have the honor to transmit herewith clip-
pings from the French press, on the subject
of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the
period from April 1 to April 28, 1932, in-
clusive.

MAY 13 1932

FILED

Respectfully yours,

Walter E. Edge

Walter E. Edge.

Enclosures.....

128
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Enclosures (single copy):

Clippings from the following newspapers:

April 1, 1932.

No. 1 - L'ECHO DE PARIS

April 8, 1932.

No. 2 - L'ERE NOUVELLE

April 17, 1932.

No. 3 - LE JOURNAL

4 - LE POPULAIRE

April 18, 1932.

No. 5 - LA REPUBLIQUE

April 19, 1932.

No. 6 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS

7 - LE PETIT PARISIEN

8 - LE POPULAIRE

9 - LE TEMPS

April 26, 1932.

No. 10 - L'ERE NOUVELLE

11 - LE MATIN

12 - LE PETIT PARISIEN

April 27, 1932.

No. 13 - L'ERE NOUVELLE

14 - LE POPULAIRE

In quintuplicate.

710.

RS/jdk

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, April 1, 1932.

LE JAPON se retirera-t-il de la Société des Nations?

La conférence du désarmement se rassemblera, à Genève, le 11 avril. Peu après, le Conseil et l'Assemblée extraordinaire de la *Société des Nations* reprendront, eux aussi, leur activité, les délégués qui les composent se trouvant déjà sur place puisque faisant partie de la conférence. Or, le conflit sino-japonais est la seule affaire inscrite à l'ordre du jour de l'Assemblée extraordinaire et elle est la grande affaire pendante devant le Conseil. Une fois de plus, nous verrons donc aux prises les représentants japonais et les représentants chinois.

Mais, pour le coup, le gouvernement de Tokio semble être à bout de patience. Depuis que le Conseil s'est saisi du litige, en septembre, les ministres nippons ont temporisé de leur mieux. Désormais, si l'Assemblée ne se confine pas dans une action prudente et limitée, il est très probable qu'ils useront de la faculté reconnue aux membres de la Société (article 1 du Covenant) de s'en retirer sur préavis de deux années. Préavis de deux années : c'est une façon de parler. La retraite serait immédiate et, sans autre délai, par la résistance active de l'une des parties, l'établissement genevois serait dessaisi du procès qui l'occupe depuis six mois.

Essayons de définir la politique japonaise telle qu'elle se présente aujourd'hui, après d'assez longues hésitations. On sait que le conflit sino-japonais se déroule sur deux scènes principales : la Mandchourie et Shanghai. Le problème mandchourien fut traité par le Conseil durant l'automne et il a reçu, le 10 décembre, une solution provisoire. Aux termes de la résolution, en date de ce jour, les troupes japonaises rentreront dans la zone du chemin de fer (où les traités leur reconnaissent droit de garnison) dès que l'ordre public sera rétabli, dès que les personnes et les biens ne seront plus en danger. Entre temps, l'armée japonaise demeure libre d'exécuter telle opération de police qu'elle estime nécessaire. De plus, une commission d'enquête, présidée par lord Lytton, est chargée d'étudier la situation de droit et de fait en ce qui concerne les rapports du Japon et de la Chine. Ce règlement a été obtenu en vertu de la procédure de conciliation formulée à l'article 11 du Covenant, c'est-à-dire avec l'assentiment du Japon aussi bien que de la Chine. Le Japon s'est réservé de traiter directement avec l'adversaire. Il s'agit, pour lui, d'un intérêt vital qu'il ne laissera pas périliter. Il s'est toujours opposé à l'application

de l'article 15 du Covenant qui permet au Conseil (ou à l'assemblée) d'établir un règlement en dehors des parties, de le leur recommander et de mettre en vigueur des sanctions économiques et militaires contre l'Etat qui, par exemple, commence les hostilités sans avoir observé les délais prévus à l'article 12.

A Shanghai, il en va différemment. Ici, le gouvernement de Tokio considère que la cause japonaise se confond avec celle des autres puissances. Il s'est jeté dans une entreprise de grande envergure. Mais ce fut un peu au hasard, sur l'initiative de ses marins et de ses soldats qui ne discernèrent point, au début, tous les obstacles. Le Japon estime qu'ayant repoussé au loin la 19^e armée chinoise, il a défendu la civilisation et qu'il incombe à toutes les puissances possessionnées en Extrême-Orient de prévenir le reflux tumultueux des hordes nationalistes vers Shanghai. Sans doute, le Japon n'abandonnera pas de gaieté de cœur le terrain conquis par ses soldats. Mais il n'est pas sûr qu'il consente à en assumer longtemps la protection à lui tout seul. Il n'élève pas de protestation contre le recours à l'article 15. Il a essayé et il essaiera de persuader aux puissances qu'elles doivent, pour le bien de leurs établissements, garantir l'intégrité d'une zone neutre et s'en prendre au boycottage des marchandises. Si les puissances déclinent toute responsabilité, le Japon arrêtera peut-être les frais.

Mais l'Assemblée acceptera-t-elle cette division du conflit en un compartiment de Mandchourie et en un compartiment de Shanghai ? Ne voudra-t-elle pas se servir de l'article 15 pour dénouer la question mandchourienne, pour mettre sur pied un compromis auquel les deux parties seraient ensuite invitées à se conformer ? La séance tenue, le 17 mars, par le « comité des 19 » a déjà révélé un mouvement violent dans ce sens. En outre, quelles seront les conclusions de la commission Lytton, quelle attitude prendra-t-elle envers le nouveau gouvernement de Moukden, dénoncé par M. de Madariaga comme un jeu de marionnettes ? Voilà le point dangereux. Si l'Assemblée ou la Commission font mine de rouvrir l'arrangement du 10 décembre, la rupture ne se fera pas attendre.

Quand elle sera consommée, la *Société des Nations* aura perdu les dernières apparences de l'universalité. Etats-Unis, Russie, Japon : trois Etats de premier rang seront absents. Genève devra se rabattre sur l'Europe. A côté du *Covenant*, le pacte Kellogg aura souffert dans l'aventure car il est aisé de prédire qu'en dépit de la lettre américaine adressée à Tokio, le 7 janvier, le Ja-

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pon réussira à faire reconnaître par certains ses positions mandchouriennes, pourvu qu'il ne touche pas à la porte ouverte — voir les études publiées dans *Foreign affairs* par Mr. Lowell et, dans le *Manchester Guardian* par sir John Fisher Williams.

Il est possible que la S. D. N. se résigne à filer doux, à opter pour le moindre mal. Mais beaucoup s'écrieront qu'à la vérité le moindre mal est dans la rupture. Dure perplexité pour les croyants.

PERTINAX.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enc. 8

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, April 8, 1932.

Et les bandits chinois ?

Pendant ce temps-là, les Japonais continuent tranquillement leurs petites opérations. Ils auraient bien tort de se gêner. Les Etats-Unis leur ont bien adressé des représentations, mais la France et l'Angleterre, comme le faisait remarquer Wickham Steed l'autre soir, ont refusé de joindre leur protestation à la leur.

Quant à la Société des nations, malgré les efforts de Briand, ces derniers efforts qui ont achevé de l'épuiser, la Société des nations s'est tenue coite. On a nommé des commissions, bien sûr, on a fait des enquêtes (sont-ils arrivés en Mandchourie, seulement, ces fameux envoyés de Genève ?), on a louvoyé, tergiversé, temporisé. On a écouté l'un et l'autre, on a refusé de prendre parti. Pourtant, il n'était pas besoin de tant d'enquêtes pour savoir que les Japonais ont occupé la Mandchourie, qu'ils ont brûlé la moitié de Changhaï, tué des milliers de Chinois, de femmes, d'enfants...

Où, mais, dit la Société des nations, le Japon n'a pas déclaré la guerre. Le Japon a tiré le canon, bien sûr, les mitrailleuses ont marché, et les baïonnettes, et les avions, il y avait des morts plein les tranchées. Mais c'était pour le bien de la Chine. Des incendies, du sang, des blessés, des morts, tant que vous voudrez, mais pas la guerre. Ce mot-là, c'est un mot qui fait peur. Mais la chose, de si loin... De Genève on n'entendait pas les cris des mourants dans les barbelés. A Genève, on n'a pas d'imagination.

Il fallait bien « rétablir » l'ordre, en Chine, vous pensez bien. Les « bandits » faisaient trop de dégâts, ils pillaient, ils volaient, ils tuaient à l'occasion. Le Japon a tenu à leur donner une leçon de civilisation ; il est venu montrer à domicile comme on tue m'eux, quand on est une nation policée.

En Amérique aussi il y a des « bandits », et de beaux. On ne fait pas mieux, en Chine, sûrement, que les « gangsters ». A quand une petite expédition punitive du Japon en Amérique ? Ce ne serait pas la « guerre », vous le pensez bien : une simple petite incursion civilisatrice. Et qu'est-ce que Genève aurait à dire après ce beau précédent ?

Tout de même, parler des bandits, en Chine, c'est vite dit. Savez-vous qu'en chinois le même mot sert à désigner un bandit et un soldat ? Ces gens-là sont des sauvages, ils ne distinguent pas entre les manières de tuer. Ils sont si arriérés qu'ils n'ont que mépris et horreur pour un homme qui tue un autre homme.

Mais comme cette circonstance linguistique est commode pour les Japonais ! Les Chinois à fusils, ce sont les bandits, tandis que les Japonais à fusils sont, eux, des soldats.

Ces bandits chinois, tout de même, leur ont prouvé, à Changhaï, qu'ils avaient appris à se battre presque aussi bien que les soldats civilisés. Le Japon a failli « perdre la face ». Il veut bien, maintenant, s'y montrer plus sage. Changhaï, d'ailleurs, n'était pour lui qu'une monnaie d'échange.

Ce qui intéresse les Japonais, c'est la Mandchourie. Ils ne quitteront pas la Mandchourie. Et pour laisser un peu de « face » aussi à la Société des nations, le Japon camoufle sa conquête, il invente cette réjouissante histoire d'Etat mandchou.

Dans un hôtel international de Tien-Tsin, le lamentable « Henry Pou-Yi », dernier héritier des empereurs mandchous, menait une terne existence au milieu de ses concubines. Sa pension avait été bien réduite par les éphémères gouvernements de Pékin, on oubliait même souvent de la lui payer. Henry Pou-Yi n'osait pas trop rappeler son existence à Tchang-Tso-Lin et aux autres terribles seigneurs de la guerre.

Habillé à l'européenne, des lunettes d'écaillé sur son petit nez rond, le dernier des Fils du ciel se consolait en jouant au tennis, en buvant des cocktails avec des petites femmes internationales.

C'est là que le Japon est venu chercher cet inoffensif dégénéré. Quelle aubaine pour lui ! Enfin, il va être commandité par des gens sérieux, enfin il a trouvé une carrière, il va pouvoir se donner un peu d'importance...

On n'attendait pas, bien sûr, de la Société des nations, qu'elle envoie des troupes en Chine pour chasser les Japonais — il faudrait qu'elle les eût, il faudrait que le projet de M. Tardieu fût réalisé.

Mais, en attendant, si elle avait solennellement condamné le Japon, quel prestige moral elle y eût gagné ? Elle eût ainsi fondé le droit international, germe de l'avenir.

Tant pis pour la Chine. Mais surtout tant pis pour la Société des nations, tant pis pour nous.

Simone TERY.

Jan 17

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, April 17, 1932.

LE JAPON SORTIRA-T-IL de la Société des Nations?

C'est le point d'interrogation
qui se pose à Genève
devant la nouvelle phase
de l'affaire sino-japonaise

La Société des nations se laissera-t-elle entraîner à mettre le Japon dans le cas de sortir de la ligue ? Voilà la question qui se pose aujourd'hui à Genève.

Le Japon a indiqué très clairement que deux circonstances pourraient lui imposer l'obligation de se retirer. La première serait l'intervention de l'assemblée dans l'affaire de Mandchourie. La seconde serait une tentative de transporter à Genève le règlement de l'incident de Changhaï.

En principe, rien ne paraît plus facile que d'éviter ces deux éventualités. L'affaire de Mandchourie a été soumise à une enquête. La commission Lytton est au travail. Il n'y a qu'à attendre le rapport qu'elle doit faire au conseil de la Société des nations, en vertu de l'article 11 du covenant. Quant à l'affaire de Changhaï, elle n'a pas évolué défavorablement, grâce à la sage résolution que M. Paul-Boncour a su faire adopter par le conseil avant l'entrée en scène de l'assemblée. Les hostilités ont pu être arrêtées. Sans attendre la conclusion d'un armistice en règle, le Japon a retiré une bonne partie de ses troupes. Les négociations d'un armistice ont abouti à l'établissement d'une formule qui n'a certes pas toute la clarté que l'on souhaiterait, mais qui peut être interprétée en ce sens que les troupes japonaises se retireraient dans un délai de six mois si, d'ici là, la Chine accordait les garanties qui sont réclamées pour l'exécution des traités et la sauvegarde de l'existence et des intérêts, non seulement des Japonais, mais de tous les colons étrangers.

La conclusion a été ajournée, parce que les Chinois ne veulent pas lier le règlement du litige au retrait définitif des troupes ; ils s'abritent derrière un texte ambigu, voté par l'assemblée, qui indique que la solution du litige ne saurait être imposée par la force. C'est dans ces conditions que le Comité des dix-neuf, qui représente l'assemblée jusqu'à la fin des vacances, est convoqué, sur l'initiative des Chinois, dont l'intention très claire est de se servir de la démagogie internationale pour esquiver le règlement du litige.

Le Comité des dix-neuf, qui demeure sous l'influence modératrice des éléments les plus avisés du conseil, de M. Paul-Boncour et du président Hymans, parviendra-t-il à conjurer l'éclat d'une sortie du Japon ? On peut l'espérer. Mais aura-t-il l'énergie de faire comprendre aux Chinois qu'il n'y a qu'à conclure l'armistice et qu'il faut aussi régler sérieusement le litige, en accordant aux étrangers des garanties sérieuses ? Ceci est plus douteux. — SAINT-BRICE.

Pop. 17

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, April 17, 1932.

La menace d'un conflit russo-japonais se précise

LORSQUE l'assemblée extraordinaire de la Société des Nations, convoquée à la demande de la Chine, s'est séparée, elle a laissé à un Comité spécial le soin de suivre le conflit sino-japonais. Ce comité composé de 19 membres, s'est réuni hier. Il a pris connaissance des négociations qui ont eu lieu à Changhaï et qui n'ont pas abouti à la conclusion de la paix.

On sait que la divergence porte principalement sur les délais dans lesquels les troupes japonaises évacueraient le territoire occupé. Tokio ne veut pas prendre, à ce sujet, un engagement ferme. Il veut se réserver toute liberté d'action.

On lira plus loin le compte rendu de la réunion du « Comité des 19 ». Fidèle à l'attitude passive dont la S.D.N. ne se départit pas depuis le commencement de la guerre en Extrême-Orient, le Comité a refusé d'intervenir. Il a simplement chargé son président de négocier avec les représentants des deux parties. Or, le Japon a fait savoir officiellement qu'il quitterait la S.D.N. si celle-ci se mêlait de « ses » affaires. Mais ce chantage nippon ne provoque pas, même dans les « milieux de la S.D.N. », la moindre réaction. On continue à traiter l'Empire du Soleil Levant avec les plus grands ménagements.

Cette attitude est d'autant plus dangereuse pour l'institution de Genève et pour la paix, que les membres de la S.D.N. n'ignorent certainement pas les préparatifs militaires du Japon contre l'U.R.S.S. Le danger que, pour ma part, je ne cesse de signaler depuis le 18 septembre dernier, devient une réalité. Les Japonais, maîtres de la Mandchourie, se préparent à envahir la région maritime appartenant à l'U.R.S.S., et à occuper Vladivostok. Une forte armée est concentrée dans le nord de la Mandchourie. Dès que l'état des routes le permettra, les forces nippones se porteront dans la direction de Vladivostok, d'une part, de Khabarovsk, de l'autre, et certainement aussi dans la direction du lac Baïkal.

Pour justifier son action militaire, le commandement japonais utilisera les bandes de contre-révolutionnaires russes groupées par ses soins à Kharbine, le long du chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois, aux frontières de l'U.R.S.S.

Le conflit sino-japonais, que la S.D.N. ne veut pas résoudre, menace de s'étendre « très prochainement » en un conflit sino-russo-japonais.

Pour ne pas avoir arrêté le Japon au début, quand il n'osait encore défier le monde entier, la S.D.N. se trouvera demain devant un conflit armé de la plus redoutable ampleur.

O. ROSENFELD.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Ref. 18

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, April 18, 1932.

Le Japon et la S.D.N.

Une grosse question se pose à Genève : le Japon sortira-t-il de la Société des Nations ? Il a déjà laissé entendre qu'il ne pouvait admettre que Genève intervint directement dans l'affaire de Mandchourie, ni dans l'affaire de Changhaï, et que s'il y avait intervention directe sur l'un de ces deux points, il sortirait de la Société.

Or, la Chine poursuit à fond sa politique qui est justement de se poser en victime et d'exiger une intervention directe de Genève, sinon en Mandchourie, où la commission Lytton est aujourd'hui au travail, tout au moins à Changhaï, où les hostilités sont suspendues sans que les Japonais se soient encore retirés.

On ne voit pas, d'ailleurs, pourquoi, en Mandchourie, on ne laisserait pas le temps à la commission d'étudier le problème et de faire son rapport. A Changhaï, nous sommes en présence d'une demi-solution qui revient à peu près à ceci : le Japon se retirera dans six mois si d'ici là la Chine a pris les mesures indispensables de protection des étrangers. Ajoutons qu'une partie des troupes japonaises a déjà été retirée. Et sans doute les Chinois veulent d'abord que se retirent les troupes avant que commencent les négociations, tandis que les Japonais veulent que se poursuivent et s'achèvent les négociations avant que les troupes se retirent, mais on peut, même sur ce point, arriver à un compromis. Le comité des Dix-Neuf s'y efforce. Sans

exploitant, dans centre important de la Bretagne, fonds de commerce d'entreprise générale d'électricité, recherche, pour augmenter fonds de roulement, commanditaire pour une somme de 10.000, remboursable en 5 ans, avec faculté d'anticip. Bail, 3-6-9. Loyer, 1.500. Marchand, en magasin, 40.000. Bon chiff. d'aff. Bénéf. prouvés. Un bon intérêt est offert. Garantie par nantis. premier rang. Voir pr renseignements, complémentaires : Caisse Hypothécaire, 97, rue Saint-Lazare, Paris. — T. 9.712.

ELECTRICIEN

de 20.000, pour une durée de 5 ans, est recherché par opticien-coutelier d'une localité de la vallée du Rhône. Maison existant depuis 50 ans. Bail et loyer intéressants. Marchand, en magasin, 106.000 fr. env. Chiff. d'aff. 82.000. Bénéf. intéressant. Le demandeur offre bon intérêt et donnera en garantie nantissement premier rang. Voir d'urgence pour renseignements complémentaires : Caisse Hypothécaire, 97, rue Saint-Lazare, Paris. — J. 9.763.

P R E T

ranche hypoth. en premier rang. Voir pour renseignements, complémentaires : Caisse Hypothécaire, 97, rue Saint-Lazare, Paris. — C. 9.609.

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, April 19, 1932.

Les sanctions économiques au pacte de Paris

La troisième résolution Capper au Congrès américain

M. le sénateur Capper a déposé au Sénat de Washington, le 6 avril dernier, un nouveau projet de résolution en vue d'attacher des sanctions économiques au Pacte de Paris.

Déjà le *Committee on Economic Sanctions* de New-York, dont les bienfaisantes activités se sont marquées en mainte occasion, avait publié, le 7 mars, dans toute la presse des Etats-Unis, un manifeste dans le même sens. Inquiet de constater l'inefficacité, aussi bien du Pacte que du Covenant de la S.D.N., pour mettre fin au conflit sino-japonais, le Comité avait demandé que, en cas d'une violation flagrante des engagements signés, les autres nations, signataires du Pacte, se missent aussitôt d'accord pour : « 1° cesser immédiatement toute expédition d'armes ou de munitions ou de toute autre contrebande de guerre reconnue comme telle, aux violateurs du Pacte; 2° prendre telles autres sanctions économiques et mesures concertées — hormis l'emploi de la force militaire — et qui pourraient paraître les plus appropriées et les plus efficaces dans les circonstances données ». Le manifeste était signé par M. Nicholas Murray Butler, président de l'Université Columbia, M. A. B. Houghton, ancien ambassadeur à Londres, M. S. H. Strawn, président de la Chambre de commerce des Etats-Unis, et de nombreuses personnalités appartenant à l'élite dirigeante des Etats-Unis.

Il semble que le sénateur Capper se soit inspiré de ce manifeste, et aussi bien qu'il ait voulu donner une voix officielle aux réclamations qu'il avait suscitées dans le public américain lorsqu'il déposa sa proposition.

On se rappelle que le même sénateur avait déjà fait deux tentatives, le 21 novembre 1927 et le 10 février 1929, l'une et l'autre ayant pour objet de « donner des dents » au Pacte. Ces deux tentatives s'étaient, à l'époque, heurtées à l'irréductible opposition du sénateur Borah, et les propositions avaient été rejetées.

Le troisième texte, déposé mercredi, diffère sensiblement des deux premiers en ce fait qu'il se conforme exactement à la politique essentielle des Etats-Unis, telle que l'a tout récemment définie M. Stimson. Il stipule que, en aucun cas, le gouvernement américain :

1) Ne devra accepter la situation *de facto* créée par une violation du pacte de Paris qui pourrait nuire aux droits des Etats-Unis ou de leurs nationaux, tels que fixés par un traité

dans n'importe quel pays affecté par cette violation; 2) ne devra reconnaître aucun traité ou accord obtenu par des moyens contraires au covenant du pacte de Paris et qui modifierait les obligations de ce pacte.

En outre, les précédents textes faisaient reposer sur le Président des Etats-Unis seul la responsabilité de « décider et déclarer par proclamation » qu'un pays avait violé le Pacte de Paris. La nouvelle résolution propose :

Au cas où d'autres nations, non parties dans un conflit, auront décidé dans une conférence publique qu'une nation quelconque a commis une violation du pacte de Paris en ayant recours à d'autres moyens que les pacifiques, et au cas où ces nations auront, de plus, décidé qu'elles se refuseront à aider ou encourager le violateur par des envois d'armes ou autres fournitures de guerre ou de lui donner aucune assistance financière; et au cas où le Président décidera et déclarera par proclamation qu'une violation du pacte de Paris a été commise en fait; il sera contraire à la loi, à moins qu'un acte du Congrès ou qu'une proclamation du Président n'en décide autrement, et jusqu'à ce qu'une proclamation du Président déclare qu'une telle violation a cessé d'exister, d'exporter à un pays, ayant violé son engagement, des armes, des munitions, des approvisionnements de guerre ou tous autres articles pour usage de guerre, ou de faire n'importe quel arrangement commercial ou financier avec le violateur ou ses nationaux et qui, à l'estimation du Président, pourrait servir à renforcer ou continuer la violation.

Ce qui importe le plus, dans les circonstances actuelles et en période électorale, n'est pas de savoir si le Congrès, dirigé par M. Borah et entêté dans son opposition à toute liaison avec la politique européenne, votera ou écartera la proposition Capper. Mais nous devons voir un encouragement dans la persistance des élites, aussi bien de la politique que du monde des affaires et du haut enseignement, à éclairer l'opinion américaine et à la persuader que son intérêt propre, non seulement n'est pas opposé, mais est indissolublement lié aujourd'hui et en toute occasion à celui des autres nations de l'Europe et du monde. C'est cette opinion, ainsi éclairée, qui, contre la première impression de son gouvernement et en dépit de l'opposition constante de M. Borah, a déjà réussi à imposer le Pacte de Paris au Congrès et au gouvernement américains. Il n'est nullement improbable que, dans un temps donné, sous les mêmes influences et les circonstances aidant, elle ne courbe une fois encore cette même opposition, elle ne se rallie à la proposition faite à Genève le 6 février par M. André Tardieu et qu'elle n'ajoute enfin la force des sanctions économiques à celle de la police internationale, afin de rendre un, au moins, des Pactes de paix opérant.

GEORGES LECHARTIER.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PP. 19

Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, April 19, 1932.

Les délibérations variées de Genève

Genève, 18 avril.

DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL

Après un dimanche particulièrement calme, délégués, experts et... journalistes se sont offert aujourd'hui des plaisirs variés. Commission générale du désarmement, commission des Dix-Neuf sur le conflit sino-japonais et comités de rédaction se sont, pour leur agrément, savamment entremêlés.

Ce matin, trois heures n'ont pas suffi à la première pour se prononcer définitivement sur le principe de la réduction des armements par étapes, qui seul, pourtant, est conforme à la lettre et à l'esprit du pacte et sur lequel, d'ailleurs, tout le monde est d'accord. Demain, il faudra y revenir pour adopter le texte élaboré dans ce sens au cours de la soirée par le comité Politis.

A ce train-là, si M. Henderson ne se décide pas enfin à présider, si, au lieu d'activer et d'éclairer le débat, il continue à solliciter les interventions et les amendements, on n'en finira jamais. Déjà, du fait de ce manque complet de direction et d'énergie, le découragement gagne les délégations.

Celles qui étaient venues ici avec de nombreux experts les renvoient peu à peu pour éviter des frais inutiles, tous se trouvant réduits à la plus complète inaction. Il est temps vraiment de réagir et, si l'on ne veut pas sombrer dans le ridicule, de mener la discussion des articles et l'adoption des textes avec plus de vigueur que ne l'a été jusqu'à présent la discussion générale.

L'affaire sino-japonaise

En ce qui concerne l'affaire sino-japonaise, dont l'examen a occupé cet après-midi la commission des Dix-Neuf on s'oriente vers une solution très voisine de celle que préconisait samedi M. Paul-Boncour. On se rappelle que le délégué de la France suggérerait de confier à la « commission mixte », qui sera constituée aussitôt après la signature de l'armistice pour en surveiller l'exécution et qui doit comprendre un représentant diplomatique et un représentant militaire de chacune des quatre grandes puissances et des deux parties, le soin de juger quand le rétablissement de l'ordre et de la sécurité sera tel à Changhaï que puissent être rapatriées les dernières troupes japonaises.

Certains délégués, sir John Simon notamment, se sont demandé s'il n'aurait pas là pour les représentants des puissances une grosse responsabilité à assumer. Comment se prononceraient-ils, à l'unanimité ou à la simple majorité ?

En supposant, ce qui est vraisemblable, que Chinois et Japonais ne soient pas d'accord sur le moment où les conditions normales seront rétablies dans le grand port du Yang-Tsé, l'appréciation en incomberait forcément aux seuls représentants français, britanniques, italiens et américains...

Or, si, au lendemain de la décision prise par eux et du départ des forces nippones, des troubles antijaponais venaient à éclater, leur responsabilité et, par conséquent, celle des gouvernements de Paris, Londres, Rome et Washington se trouveraient gravement engagées.

Une suggestion du délégué irlandais

Pour tourner la difficulté, le représentant de l'Irlande a émis une idée

ingénieuse : la commission mixte, a-t-il dit, ne devrait pas avoir à prendre de décisions et à imposer ses vues aux deux parties. Son rôle devrait se borner à constater que la situation à Changhaï est redevenue normale, c'est-à-dire que la présence des derniers contingents japonais ne lui paraît pas se justifier davantage. Si Japonais et Chinois sont d'accord, les derniers soldats nippons seront rapatriés et l'affaire sera réglée. S'ils ne le sont pas, l'avis émis à la majorité par la commission mixte sera transmis à Genève à la commission des Dix-Neuf, émanation de l'assemblée de la S.D.N., et c'est alors celle-ci qui statuera.

Cette suggestion, qu'a vivement appuyée M. Paul-Boncour, a finalement été adoptée après une longue discussion à laquelle ont pris part notamment MM. Benès et de Madariaga, et M. Hymans s'est vu chargé à nouveau de pressentir officiellement les représentants des deux parties sur l'accueil qu'ils lui réserveraient.

D'ores et déjà nous avons toute raison de penser qu'elle ne rencontrera pas d'objection sérieuse de la part du Japon, mais il y a les délégués chinois que certaines personnalités genevoises et même certains membres de la commission des Dix-Neuf, par leurs conseils et leur attitude, encouragent à la résistance... La carence de la S. D. N. ne s'est sans doute pas encore affirmée d'une façon assez éclatante au gré de ces singuliers défenseurs de la Ligue !

Les intentions de M. Stimson

Cette affaire sino-japonaise compte, paraît-il, parmi celles qui intéressent le plus particulièrement le secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. Stimson, que la grippe a contraint, hier soir, à s'aliter aussitôt après son entrevue avec le chancelier Brüning et qui n'a pas quitté la chambre aujourd'hui. Dans certains milieux d'ordinaire bien renseignés, on prête, en effet, au représentant du cabinet de Washington l'intention non seulement de gagner à sa théorie de « non-reconnaissance de situation de fait créée par la force » — lisez : « de la situation créée en Mandchourie par les Japonais » — les hommes de gouvernement qu'il est susceptible de rencontrer ici, mais de leur proposer d'en faire l'objet d'un article additionnel au pacte Briand-Kellogg.

On ajoute qu'il a, dans ce but, le plus vif désir de se rencontrer avec M. Litvinov, étant donné à la fois les intérêts russes en Mandchourie et le fait que les Soviets sont signataires du pacte contre la guerre.

Quant à la conversation d'hier soir entre le secrétaire d'Etat et le chancelier Brüning, il se confirme, malgré la discrétion observée par les deux intéressés, qu'elle a été d'ordre très général. Prise de contact et rapide tour d'horizon, nous a-t-on dit, au cours duquel on a principalement parlé de la situation en Allemagne au lendemain des élections présidentielles et à la veille des élections à la Diète de Prusse, et du désarmement. La question des réparations, en revanche, n'a, paraît-il, pas même été évoquée, mais d'autres rencontres entre les deux hommes d'Etat ont été envisagées qui leur permettraient d'élargir le cercle de leurs échanges de vues...

Albert JULIEN.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Pop 19

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, April 19, 1932.

La tension entre le Japon et l'U. R. S. S. s'accroît

Le « Comité des Dix-neuf » de la Société des Nations a reconnu, hier, la nécessité de fixer un délai à l'évacuation de Changhaï par les Japonais. Mais ayant exprimé une idée si héroïque, il n'a pas osé fixer le délai. Il veut charger la Commission mixte de Changhaï de prendre cette décision. Or, le Japon n'entend pas être privé de sa liberté d'action. Il ne prend pas d'engagement ferme. Et une fois encore, la S. D. N. laisse faire. Le « Comité des Dix-Neuf » continue les traditions du « Comité des Douze ». Il se réfugie dans la procédure, tout en sachant que l'impérialisme japonais seul peut bénéficier de tous ses atermoiements.

Il suffit d'ailleurs de lire les deux télégrammes ci-dessous, pour comprendre à quel point la situation s'aggrave en Mandchourie.

A Tokio on accuse ouvertement les Soviets de vouloir « provoquer » le Japon. A Moscou, par contre, on désigne le Japon comme le provocateur. Et des deux côtés on annonce l'imminence d'un conflit armé.

On connaît notre point de vue. Dès le premier jour de l'occupation de Moukden, nous avons prévenu l'opinion publique de la menace que cette action du Japon présente pour la paix en Extrême-Orient.

Dès la première heure nous avons désigné le Japon comme l'agresseur, qui vise à conquérir non seulement la Mandchourie, mais aussi les régions orientales de la Sibérie.

Il semble que l'heure n'est plus éloignée où le commandement japonais mettra à exécution la deuxième partie de son programme : il provoquera un conflit avec la Russie, soit directement, soit avec l'aide des bandes de contre-révolutionnaires russes.

La S. D. N., qui n'a pas voulu arrêter dès le début, l'agression japonaise contre la Chine ; l'U. R. S. S. qui n'a pas su, en s'adressant à la S. D. N. et à tous les signataires du pacte Kellogg, mobiliser l'opinion publique contre l'impérialisme japonais ; tous les gouvernements qui ont sciemment trompé les peuples, en leur cachant la gravité de la situation en Extrême-Orient, portent tous la responsabilité de la catastrophe qui a déclenché la nouvelle guerre russo-japonaise peut déterminer.

O. ROSENFELD.

Il y a là une allégation qui a déjà beaucoup

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEMP

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, April 19, 1932.

GENÈVE ET LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Du fait de la réunion du « comité des dix-neuf » chargé par l'assemblée extraordinaire de la Société des nations de suivre le développement du différend sino-japonais, l'attention se trouve ramenée sur le conflit qui trouble depuis de longs mois la situation en Extrême-Orient et qui a valu de si graves soucis au conseil de l'institution internationale de Genève. On peut même considérer que l'affaire entre dans une phase nouvelle à la suite de la décision prise samedi dernier. En effet, le « comité des dix-neuf », présidé par M. Hymans, ministre des affaires étrangères de Belgique et président de l'assemblée extraordinaire, examinant les grandes lignes du projet d'accord élaboré à la conférence de Shanghai en vue de la conclusion définitive d'un armistice, notamment la question des délais d'évacuation pour les troupes nippones, a estimé qu'il ne lui appartient pas de fixer ces délais. Dans ces conditions, M. Hymans a été chargé d'entamer des conversations avec les représentants de la Chine et du Japon pour les déterminer à reprendre les pourparlers et à mettre un terme aux difficultés qui ont empêché jusqu'ici la conférence de Shanghai d'aboutir.

Cette attitude est sage. Il serait difficile, en effet, pour le « comité des dix-neuf » d'intervenir directement dans les négociations de Shanghai en se prononçant sur les délais à fixer pour le retrait des troupes japonaises, alors qu'il y a sur place une conférence au sein de laquelle sont représentés, avec les délégués du Japon et de la Chine, les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie, conférence qui seule peut constater si la situation est redevenue suffisamment normale pour que les troupes nippones puissent être retirées sans inconvénients. Un télégramme de Tokio confirme que le gouvernement du mikado admet cette manière de voir, se réservant de contrôler si les conditions prévues pour le retrait de ses troupes sont effectivement remplies, mais on ne connaît pas jusqu'ici les instructions du cabinet de Nankin, lequel préférerait, dit-on, que la décision relative à l'évacuation soit prise à Genève. Ceci dépasserait, sans doute, la compétence du « comité des dix-neuf », dont le président, M. Hymans, a reconnu qu'il n'a ni les pouvoirs ni l'intention de diriger à distance les négociations de Shanghai, mais que son rôle consiste à apprécier si ces négociations se développent conformément à la résolution de l'assemblée. Il est à noter, au surplus, que le gouvernement de Tokio a donné l'ordre à ses représentants de ne pas prendre part à la réunion du « comité des dix-neuf ».

Le problème qui se pose devant l'assemblée extraordinaire et le comité qui émane d'elle subsiste dans toute sa complexité première. Comme nous n'avons cessé de le constater ici, des erreurs ont été commises dans la procédure par laquelle le conseil de la Société des nations d'abord et l'assemblée extraordinaire ensuite ont été saisis du conflit mandchou en vertu de l'article 11 du pacte et du conflit de Shanghai en vertu de l'article 15, alors qu'il s'agissait, au début, d'un différend de caractère local qu'il eût été possible de régler sur place par des pourparlers directs entre les autorités chinoises et les autorités japonaises. D'autre part, le Japon, fort des traités lui reconnaissant des intérêts spéciaux en Mandchourie, est peut-être allé au delà de ce qu'autorise le droit international en passant à l'action militaire en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien placée sous son contrôle. Le débat a été ainsi déplacé sur un terrain particulièrement délicat. Tandis que le Japon avait la légitime préoccupation de sauvegarder son prestige de grande puissance en face d'une masse inorganisée comme l'est la Chine en ne laissant pas porter atteinte aux droits qu'il tient des traités et des

accords, la Société des nations, de son côté, avait le devoir de maintenir toute son autorité morale en ne laissant pas porter atteinte aux stipulations du pacte.

La controverse a pris un caractère qui n'est pas sans danger pour l'ordre international. On n'ignore pas que dans certains milieux japonais influents un mouvement se dessine en faveur du retrait de l'empire du Soleil-Levant de la Société des nations. C'est une éventualité qu'on ne peut envisager de sang-froid, car elle aurait des conséquences graves pour la situation d'ensemble en Extrême-Orient, pour le Japon lui-même, et pour l'institution internationale de Genève qui perdrait en fait son caractère universel si, après les Etats-Unis et la Russie, le Japon devait être absent de l'assemblée et du conseil. Personne ne peut avoir intérêt à provoquer délibérément une telle crise. D'aucuns font remarquer que l'autorité morale de la Société des nations serait atteinte bien plus gravement encore si le conseil et l'assemblée devaient confesser publiquement leur impuissance à réagir efficacement contre une violation des clauses capitales du pacte. Est-ce réellement le cas? Du côté japonais on le conteste formellement. La thèse du Japon est que l'intervention nipponne en Chine est conforme aux dispositions du pacte, qu'elle ne comporte que des actes de légitime défense, qu'elle se résume, en fait, dans l'exercice d'un droit juridiquement admis et par le Covenant et par le pacte Briand-Kellogg. En d'autres termes, à tort ou à raison, les Japonais se défendent d'être des agresseurs à l'égard de la Chine, la présence permanente de troupes étrangères sur certaines parties du territoire chinois étant autorisée par les traités en raison de l'état de désordre et d'insécurité qui existe en Chine. Les garnisons nippones de Shanghai, de Pékin et de Tientsin ayant été l'objet de provocations et d'agressions qui furent le fait des troupes régulières chinoises, le Japon a dû agir pour protéger ses ressortissants.

Tels sont les arguments par lesquels les Japonais répliquent à l'accusation d'avoir violé le pacte. Il faut souhaiter que l'on fasse preuve à Genève de tout le sang-froid nécessaire pour éviter une crise qui dresserait l'empire du Soleil-Levant contre la Société des nations, au sein de laquelle cette puissance a constamment exercé jusqu'ici l'influence la plus heureuse. Les grandes nations qui suivent de près les événements d'Extrême-Orient, les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie, ont de même l'intérêt le plus évident à prévenir de nouvelles complications. Mais il faut bien constater que le problème sino-japonais tel qu'on a voulu le poser devant la Société des nations excite les passions au point d'influencer les esprits les plus clairs et les plus sûrs. C'est ainsi qu'on a vu avec surprise M. Wickham Steed invoquer dans le *Sunday Times* contre la thèse de M. Tardieu en matière de désarmement et d'organisation de la paix le fait que la France, à en croire l'éminent publiciste anglais, se serait montrée très peu empressée à soutenir et le Covenant et le pacte Briand-Kellogg lorsque le Japon a violé ceux-ci, selon lui, en Mandchourie et à Shanghai.

Il y a là une allégation qui a déjà beaucoup servi, mais qui se trouve démentie par les faits. La France s'est constamment associée en toute sincérité aux démarches des Etats-Unis, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie à Tokio et à Nankin pour faciliter la solution du conflit; elle a constamment agi à Genève en plein accord avec les autres membres du conseil, et on n'a pas le droit d'oublier que son ministre des affaires étrangères, qui était alors M. Briand, n'hésita pas à assumer la présidence du conseil de la Société des nations dans les circonstances les plus difficiles et les plus ingrates, parce qu'il entendait déployer son meilleur effort pour hâter un règlement satisfaisant. On peut se demander si le conflit sino-japonais en serait où on le voit encore aujourd'hui si tout le monde, à Genève et ailleurs, avait fait preuve du même esprit de compréhension et de conciliation, du même désintéressement politique dont la France n'a cessé de donner l'exemple.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

26

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, April 26, 1932.

LE FEU COUVE EN ORIENT...

par Louis LALOY

Le conflit entre la Chine et le Japon est assoupi, mais non pas terminé. Les troupes japonaises sont encore à Changhaï ; des renforts japonais sont envoyés en Mandchourie. Dans les deux cas, on allègue la nécessité de protéger l'existence et les biens des Japonais qui sont allés chercher fortune sur la terre étrangère. Mais les Chinois, en leur pays, n'ont-ils pas le droit de se protéger, eux aussi, quand on les extermine impunément ?

Le bureau de la statistique du gouvernement de Nankin vient de publier quelques chiffres à ce sujet. La zone occupée encore actuellement par les Japonais à Changhaï et dans la banlieue de la ville s'étend sur une surface de 160 kilomètres carrés, ou 16.000 hectares. La valeur des immeubles détruits, en cette zone et dans ses environs, est estimée à 1 milliard 500 millions de francs, représentant 85 % du total. Parmi ces immeubles, se trouve le célèbre établissement de la *Commercial press*, l'une des plus grandes entreprises d'édition du monde, avec ses collections de livres anciens et modernes, entièrement anéanties. Le bombardement de l'artillerie et de l'aviation japonaises a démolé aussi 12 collèges, 17 écoles secondaires et 49 écoles primaires. Un grand nombre d'usines ayant été touchées, 250.000 ouvriers et employés se trouvent, de ce fait, sans travail.

Le recensement de la population, fait en mars, accuse une diminution de 800.000 sur 2.400.000, pour les Chinois et de 9.000 sur 52.000, pour les étrangers : soit le tiers, d'une part, et de l'autre un peu moins du sixième. Le nombre des Chinois tués ou disparus est d'une vingtaine de mille. Les autres, sans abri, sans moyens d'existence, sont allés chercher du travail ailleurs. La plupart n'en trouveront pas. La misère en fera bientôt des mendiants faméliques, prêts à s'enroler, pour le riz quotidien, dans une de ces bandes de pillards qui suivent en Chine l'étendard communiste.

Le Japon, à Changhaï, ne peut se plaindre : il a obtenu des résultats. Mais il ne doit pas s'étonner si la Chine reste en alerte, aussi longtemps que son territoire ne sera pas entièrement libéré. Une autre question se posera bientôt : c'est celle des réparations pour tant de dommages. Le Japon tient sa réponse prête. Il accusera les Chinois de lui faire perdre des sommes plus considérables encore en refusant d'acheter ses cotonnades et sa quincaillerie. Mais si l'on admettait cette compensation, la France pourrait demander une indemnité aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique, qui ne veulent plus de ses vins, ou à l'Angleterre, qui refuse nos articles de mode et nos parfums. Le droit à une réparation n'est ouvert que par un acte de violence. On ne met pas un gouvernement à l'amende, parce qu'on a perdu la clientèle de son peuple. On s'efforce de la reconquérir. Le meilleur moyen, pour cela, n'est certes pas, comme semble penser le Japon, de détruire les clients.

En Mandchourie, la politique japonaise porte également ses fruits. Le motif de l'intervention était, comme on sait, la répression du brigandage. Depuis que cette province qui appartient à la Chine depuis plusieurs siècles a proclamé son indépendance, à l'instigation du Japon, le brigandage y a redoublé. Il n'y a presque pas de jours où les dépêches officielles de Tokio ne signalent quelque escarmouche entre les soldats japonais et des bandes armées. Mais ce ne sont pas toujours de simples escarmouches. Ces derniers jours, une brigade japonaise, ses communications coupées, se trouvait en fort mauvaise posture. Nous n'avons pas su, ni sans doute n'apprendrons de sitôt, ce qu'il en est advenu.

Il y a toujours eu des brigands en Mandchourie, parce que cet immense territoire, aux frontières de la Chine proprement dite, était d'une surveillance difficile et offrait un refuge aux repris de justice. Mais ces brigands, aujourd'hui, reçoivent un considérable appoint de soldats déserteurs ou débandés. Toutes les armées chinoises sont des armées de métier. Incapables, si l'armée est dissoute ou s'ils s'en trouvent séparés, de rentrer dans la vie civile, ces guerriers continuent la guerre, comme ils peuvent et où ils peuvent. Mal équipés, sans ravitaillement régulier en munitions ni en vivres, ils n'en sont pas moins redoutables, par leur courage intrépide, et aujourd'hui, ils commencent d'apprendre à manœuvrer. Ils attaquent le Japon, parce que c'est l'ennemi de la nation. Les brigands auxquels ils se joignent ne sont pas eux-mêmes insensibles à cette idée.

Le petit prince déchu qu'on a installé en Mandchourie croit-il se tirer de ces difficultés en les dérobant à la curiosité de la commission d'enquête envoyée par la Société des Nations ? Son gouvernement a commencé par refuser l'entrée du territoire à un éminent homme d'état chinois, M. Wellington Kou, membre de cette commission. Devant des protestations énergiques, il a fallu céder. Maintenant on interdit, sous peine de mort, aux enquêteurs de dépasser la zone du chemin de fer, c'est-à-dire de s'écarter à une distance de plus de vingt kilomètres de la voie ferrée. Ces mauvais procédés ne donnent certes pas une idée favorable ni de ce gouvernement ni de ceux qui le conseillent, ni surtout de la situation en Mandchourie.

Ce n'est pas le moment de perdre de vue l'Extrême-Orient. Le feu couve sous la cendre et peut, d'un jour à l'autre, devenir incendie.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Matin 26

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, April 26, 1932.

LA TENSION S'AGGRAVE ENTRE LES SOVIETS ET LE JAPON

M. Litvinoff a quitté hier Genève pour Moscou afin de s'y entretenir des événements de Mandchourie

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 25 avril. — Par téléphone. — M. Litvinoff est parti aujourd'hui pour Moscou. Officiellement, ce long voyage est justifié par les strictes exigences du protocole soviétique. M. Litvinoff doit se trouver à son poste pour accueillir, comme il se doit, Ismet pacha, président du conseil de Turquie, qui rend visite au gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S.

De l'avis général, ce prétexte arrive fort opportunément pour permettre au commissaire du peuple des affaires étrangères de prendre position avec ses camarades du gouvernement au sujet de la situation en Extrême-Orient.

Il est certain que depuis une huitaine de jours, elle se tend singulièrement et notamment sur le plan des relations russo-japonaises.

Entendons-nous : il ne s'agit pas de l'affaire de Changhaï où l'U.R.S.S. n'a rien à voir, mais de la Mandchourie, sagement mise hors de cause depuis des mois par les délibérations de Genève.

En ce qui concerne Changhaï, nous aurons demain après-midi à Genève une réunion, d'ailleurs privée — ce qui prouve que les choses ne sont point arrangées — du comité des 19.

Quant à la Mandchourie il semble bien que, désormais seuls, Moscou, Tokio et Nankin devront s'en occuper activement.

Cependant, à en croire les gens renseignés, cela « chauffe » depuis peu dans cette région mystérieuse.

Les raisons de cette hausse subite de température sont extrêmement complexes, car en dehors des tendances ou des soupçons des deux gouvernements organisés, le jeu se complique par l'intrusion ou la provocation d'éléments dont on ne connaît pas au juste les mobiles et les inspirateurs.

Un Japonais bien placé pour connaître les dernières nouvelles m'a dit aujourd'hui :

Nous en voyons là-bas de toutes les couleurs : rouges, blancs et jaunes... autrement dit des troupes soviétiques, des organisations de Russes contre-révolutionnaires, et enfin des irréguliers chinois.

Et pourtant il suffirait déjà des difficultés régulières, si l'on peut dire, entre Tokio et Moscou pour rendre la partie extrêmement délicate.

Depuis des semaines, l'interprétation du vieux traité de Portsmouth, quant à l'utilisation par le Japon de l'embranchement Kharbine-Changchoune du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois, a donné lieu à une suite de malentendus. Moscou a protesté à plusieurs reprises contre le transport sur cette ligne de formations armées. Tokio a justifié son bon droit en offrant de régler commercialement les frais de trans-

D'autre part, l'occupation de Kharbine et d'Imienpo par les troupes japonaises a vivement inquiété les soviets, sans qu'ils aient pu, d'ailleurs, s'y opposer ouvertement, car leur droit de regard dans cette zone porte exclusivement sur la ligne du chemin de fer.

En plus, un autre événement a donné encore, récemment, l'alarme à Moscou. Les Japonais avaient envoyé des troupes à Chientao, à la frontière soviétique, et à proximité de Vladivostok. Fort courtoisement, M. Hirota, ambassadeur du Japon à Moscou, a expliqué les raisons de cette mesure. La région était terrorisée par des bandes d'irréguliers chinois, et il était urgent d'assurer la protection des ressortissants japonais ou coréens établis comme agriculteurs dans le pays.

Diplomatiquement, ces divers incidents ont été plus ou moins réglés, mais il n'en reste pas moins que la presse soviétique, fort nerveuse, continue — par ordre, car elle ne saurait agir autrement — à attribuer de hautes visées politiques à ces expéditions de police.

Le Japon est soupçonné couramment de vouloir refouler l'U. R. S. S. de la côte, en lui coupant systématiquement toutes les voies d'accès.

Par ailleurs, en dépit des mises au point rassurantes de leur gouvernement, les Japonais s'inquiètent à la lecture des nouvelles — vraies ou fausses, l'on ne saurait se prononcer — selon lesquelles il y aurait concentration de troupes soviétiques à Vladivostok, où, de surcroît, l'on aurait créé récemment deux importantes usines de gaz toxiques.

Mais la tension entre les deux partenaires pourrait peut-être s'atténuer — le Japon a suffisamment à faire en Mandchourie et les soviets ne tiennent pas à se mesurer avec un adversaire qu'ils redoutent traditionnellement — sans des incidents de plus en plus fréquents, quotidiens même, dont on recherche vainement les responsables.

Lorsque récemment des Inconnus ont fait sauter un pont se trouvant sur la ligne soviétique, Moscou a accusé le Japon ; puis, devant les preuves formelles du contraire, il a reproché ce méfait à des organisations de Russes blancs soutenues par Tokio. Du côté japonais, l'on reste convaincu que ce forfait, qui ne pouvait servir en rien le haut commandement nippon, avait été l'œuvre ou bien de provocateurs rouges — car à son avis, il existe en Russie un parti désirant la guerre — ou bien encore le fait d'irréguliers chinois.

Il y a une semaine, en revanche, c'est le Japon qui eut à souffrir d'un attentat pareillement mystérieux. Un de ses convois, par suite d'un sabotage flagrant de la voie, a roulé dans un ravin. L'on ne sait encore exactement si le coupable fut rouge, blanc ou jaune.

« La faute est aux Russes blancs, assurent à Tokio les gens de Moscou : ces blancs auxquels vous offrez votre appui veulent vous entraîner dans une guerre à la faveur de laquelle ils espèrent abattre notre régime. »

Des Russes blancs ? Ils existent sans nul doute, mais aussi bien Moscou que Tokio seraient bien en peine de dire qui ils sont, quel est leur nombre, leurs chefs, et où ils se trouvent. L'étrange Mandchourie du Nord garde son secret. A 50 kilomètres des voies ferrées et des rares centres urbains, commence une région quasi inexplorée : le « territoire noir » — encore une couleur de plus — comme le nomment Russes et Japonais, et qui échappe à tout contrôle. Il s'y fomente, c'est certain, une grande conspiration ; mais le propre d'une conspiration est de ne livrer à la publicité ni le nombre de ses adhérents ni le nom de ses capitaines.

Il y a entre Hailun et la frontière soviétique un « vide » fertile et sauvage, où 300.000 hommes peuvent aisément vivre et disparaître pendant 10 ans. C'est un coin glacial en hiver, brûlant en été, qui vaut les plus beaux mystères de l'Afrique. Est-ce là que des conjurés contribuent de leur mieux à hâter une rencontre entre deux races, rencontre peut-être inévitable ? C'est bien possible.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Mais quelle qu'en soit la raison, Moscou manifeste aujourd'hui la plus vive inquiétude et rappelle M. Litvinoff de Genève, en dépit des représentations réitérées de l'ambassadeur japonais, M. Hirota, qui prêche imperturbablement le sang-froid.

Explains below the reason why it is so.
Below are the reasons for the.
Enclosure No. 11 to the letter No. 8888 of 1972.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PP. 26

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, April 26, 1932.

« Le Petit Parisien » au Japon

LE RESSENTIMENT GRANDIT AU JAPON CONTRE LA S. D. N.

(De notre envoyée spéciale
 André VIOLLIS.)

Tokio, 25 avril.
 Le ressentiment grandit ici chaque jour contre la Société des nations. Les journaux sont remplis de diatribes contre elle et chacun parle ouvertement, souvent avec regret d'ailleurs, d'une démission prochaine et nécessaire du Japon.

Dans une tournée d'inspection de deux ou trois jours, le général Sadao Araki, ministre de la Guerre, a assisté, dans la grande ville industrielle d'Osaka, à divers meetings de plusieurs milliers d'auditeurs, organisés par des associations nationalistes. Il a déclaré qu'il devenait impossible pour le Japon d'obéir aux injonctions de la Société des nations et il a de nouveau affirmé la détermination nipponne de mener en Mandchourie la campagne d'ordre et de paix qui lui convient, sans souci d'aucune intervention.

A son retour, le général Araki a réuni plusieurs grands chefs de l'armée pour envisager les mesures à prendre le cas échéant dans la Mandchourie du Nord, où la situation serait assez troublée. Ces chefs militaires ont également discuté la question de la Société des nations et se sont, paraît-il, trouvés d'accord pour conclure que, si la Société des nations ne modifiait pas son attitude à propos des négociations de Changhaï et du rappel des troupes nipponnes, le Japon se verrait obligé de donner sa démission.

— Est-ce exact ? ai-je été demander à un haut fonctionnaire des affaires étrangères.

— C'est du moins très possible, me répondit-il avec un regard dont la gravité contrastait étrangement avec l'éternel sourire figé sur les lèvres japonaises. Voyez-vous, le comité des Dix-Neuf à Genève, en donnant à la commission mixte de Changhaï le droit et le pouvoir de fixer la date de la retraite finale de nos troupes, porte atteinte à notre constitution même. Chez nous, le commandement suprême de l'armée et de la marine relevant uniquement de l'empereur, cette décision de rappel de nos troupes ne peut être prise que par le quartier général agissant d'après les instructions de l'empereur. Nous ne supporterons, sur ce point, aucune ingérence étrangère.

Le ton ferme était très différent de la vague et courtoise phraséologie dont les fonctionnaires japonais enveloppent d'ordinaire leur pensée.

En outre, reprit mon interlocuteur, nous nous étions donné beaucoup de peine au cours des négociations de Changhaï. Et avec l'aide de quatre ministres étrangers, nous étions sur le point d'aboutir à un accord quand la fâcheuse intervention de Genève a tout fait échouer. Car nous estimons que, forts de l'appui de la Société des nations, les Chinois ne voudront plus, maintenant, reprendre les négociations. Si donc l'assemblée plénière confirme les résolutions du comité des Dix-Neuf, peut-être nos délégués seront-ils obligés de quitter Genève. Notre décision finale dépendra de l'attitude de cette assemblée.

Les petits Etats parlent des questions de Mandchourie et de Changhaï comme s'ils parlaient de questions européennes. Ils ne se sont pas donné la peine de comprendre le point de vue et l'attitude japonais.

J'interroge :

— Ne croyez-vous pas que le Japon perdra quelque chose en quittant l'assemblée des grandes nations ?

— Sans doute, le Japon en éprouvera un grand regret, car la Société compte ici de nombreux amis. L'Association pour la Société des nations a plus de 20.000 membres, chiffre que seule dépasse l'Angleterre. De plus, nous avons conscience d'avoir rendu de grands services à Genève en aidant la Société à résoudre d'importants problèmes tels que ceux de la Haute-Silésie, de Mossoul, et les différends entre la Pologne et l'Allemagne, entre la Roumanie et la Hongrie. Le fait que le Japon envisage sa démission prouve à quelle profondeur son sentiment patriotique et sa dignité ont été blessés.

Je demande maintenant à mon interlocuteur si le Japon a l'intention de protéger le Dr Wellington Koo, assesseur chinois à la commission d'enquête de Mandchourie, que les autorités mandchoues ont l'intention d'arrêter s'il s'avise de quitter la zone japonaise du Chemin de Fer Sud-Mandchourien.

— Voilà de nouveau un difficile problème, répondit mon interlocuteur. Pour protéger efficacement le Dr Wellington Koo, il serait nécessaire d'employer la force. Or notre armée estime que l'usage de la force serait d'un fâcheux effet pour l'avenir du nouvel Etat mandchou et les relations amicales qui se sont établies entre le Japon et lui. Le gouvernement n'a pas le droit d'exiger que l'armée change de politique à son égard. Il est à regretter que la commission d'enquête se soit obstinée à ignorer l'Etat mandchou. Sans en reconnaître l'existence officielle, elle aurait pu, tout au moins, traiter ses représentants comme elle a traité les autres autorités locales dans les villes chinoises qu'elle a visitées. Pourquoi ajouter aux malentendus et blesser les amours-propres ?

J'ajoute que l'opinion suit, ici, avec une certaine nervosité les mouvements de la commission d'enquête. La rumeur court que l'union ne serait pas parfaite entre ses divers membres et que son président, lord Lytton, prêterait une oreille trop complaisante aux revendications chinoises. Faut-il voir dans ces bruits autre chose qu'une manifestation nouvelle de l'impatience japonaise devant l'ingérence de la Société des nations ?

— Quand en serons-nous débarrassés ? me disait hier un ami japonais. Qu'on nous laisse les mains libres et tous les problèmes entre les Chinois et nous serons bientôt résolus !

Où, mais comment ?

André VIOLLIS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enc 27

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, April 27, 1932.

Le Japon au ban des nations

Andrée Viollis a interviewé à Tokio le général Sadao Araki, ministre de la guerre.

Ce fier militaire a parlé avec une franchise toute martiale. Ces diplomates japonais sont si fins, si renseignés, — le corps diplomatique du Japon est un des plus remarquables du monde — usent de tant de sourires, de circonlocutions, de politesses, d'arguties, de révérences, qu'il est aussi difficile de les saisir qu'anguilles en rivière. Mais avec le général Sadao Araki, au moins, on sait à quoi s'en tenir. Enfin nous savons ce que le Japon cache au fond de son sac.

Pourquoi le général Sadao Araki mettrait-il des gants ? N'est-il pas tout puissant dans son pays ? Un ministre de la guerre, d'habitude, c'est un ministre comme les autres. Le ministre de la guerre, au Japon, c'est le chef de la caste militaire, il n'est pas responsable devant le Parlement, il ne doit compte de ses actes qu'à l'empereur, le généralissime.

Dans les conseils de ministres, lorsqu'après de longues discussions, on aboutit enfin à une décision, le général, qui n'a rien dit jusque là, se lève enfin et déclare à peu près :

— Messieurs, je ne suis pas du tout de votre avis. Je suis même de l'avis contraire.

Et on est bien obligé d'en passer par où il veut. Car si la Chine est le pays du monde où l'on a le plus de mépris pour le métier militaire — « bandit » et « soldat » c'est, en chinois, le même mot — le Japon au contraire est celui où l'on a le plus de respect, le plus de vénération pour le guerrier. La caste militaire prime toutes les autres.

Le pays des fleurs de cerisier, des érabes et des maisons en papier est aussi celui des samourais. Les officiers dans les autres pays portent un sabre : les samourais, eux, en portent deux. Ce n'est pas si loin, le temps des samourais au Japon.

L'esprit samourai y est plus vivant que jamais. Jamais on ne vit tant exalter l'art de massacrer son semblable. Le courage, le patriotisme, l'héroïsme sont, dans ce pays de toutes les vertus, les vertus mères.

Il faut voir, à Tokio, les foules défiler devant la maison sacrée du général Nogri (un prédécesseur du général Sadao Araki), l'homme des massacres de Port-Arthur, qui se fit nara-kiri pour couronner son héroïque carrière. On y amène les enfants des écoles.

Et le petit cimetière des trente héros qui ont attendu des années l'occasion de couper proprement la tête du shogun qui avait insulté leur seigneur ! Revenant au petit jour avec la tête de leur ennemi, ils sont arrêtés devant un pont par la police : elle leur demande des explications, ils les donnent le plus simplement du monde. Vous pensez que la police conduisit les assassins en prison ? Pas du tout : la police se mit à genoux dans la neige en signe de respect. Et les trente héros, le lendemain, ouvrirent le ventre en chœur, pour achever plus glorieusement leur exploit. Et maintenant, le peuple de Tokio s'en va dévotement brûler des bâtonnets d'encens sur leur trente tombes.

Le Japon est le pays le plus militariste du monde. Si le patriotisme n'existait pas, il l'aurait inventé. Et lorsque le général Araki déclare :

— Aux moments de crise nationale, les Japonais marchent comme un seul homme. On peut être assuré qu'il dit ce qu'il pense et qu'il ne se trompe pas.

Donc le général Sadao Araki n'a pas hésité à dire à Andrée Viollis :

— Nous ne pouvons vraiment accepter sans protestation l'opposition que certains petits Etats, ne possédant pas d'intérêts réels en Mandchourie ou à Changhaï, se permettent sur des problèmes...

Quel mépris magnifique ! Notez que ces « certains petits Etats », qui se permettent d'avoir une opinion sur le massacre de vingt mille Chinois à Changhaï, ce sont les Etats-Unis, l'Angleterre, la France...

De quel droit, je vous le demande, un pays qui n'a pas « d'intérêts » dans un pays se permet-il de vouloir défendre ce pays de l'avidité de son voisin ? Avez-vous jamais entendu un homme d'Etat avouer que toute sa politique est fondée sur l'intérêt avec une candeur aussi ingénue ?

Le reste, la justice, le respect des faibles, le droit des nations, le droit des gens, ce sont, comme s'exprime ce brave général, « discussions de caractère purement émotif et sentimental ». Pour lui, il n'est ni émotif ni sentimental ; pour lui, « le problème repose sur des données réalistes ».

Pourtant si, le général est sentimental, lui aussi. Sans craindre de se contredire, il affirme soudain, la main sur le cœur, cette chose énorme :

— Nous attribuons en outre à la Mandchourie une valeur sentimentale. C'est notre Alsace-Lorraine, à nous !

La Mandchourie, peuplée de millions de Chinois, où une poignée de Japonais se sont installés, une Alsace-Lorraine japonaise ! Mais le général donne la preuve de ce qu'il avance, et quelle preuve !

— En 1896, dit-il, nous l'avions prise à la Chine.

Et voilà ! Et le général conclut, impavide :

— Ni la Société des nations ni Moscou n'arrêteront notre œuvre. Nous ne dévierons jamais de notre route, et nous sommes prêts à écarter tous les obstacles.

Le plus triste, c'est que le Japon en est capable en effet. Si la Russie n'intervient pas, — et ce n'est pas nous qui souhaiterions jamais une guerre nouvelle, — qui pourrait l'en empêcher ?

Mais que la Société des nations ait au moins le courage de flétrir enfin le Japon, de le mettre au ban des nations.

Et voyez-vous maintenant à quoi elle pourrait servir, tout de même, l'armée internationale demandée par M. Tardieu ? Il faut bien une police pour les bandits.

Simone TERY.

Ref. 28

Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 2526 of April 29, 1932.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, April 27, 1932.

LA GUERRE EN EXTREME-ORIENT

Les opérations militaires dans la Mandchourie du Nord

Ainsi que le *Populaire* l'a fait entrevoir, la situation en Mandchourie devient critique.

Après avoir concentré, en secret, des troupes dans le nord de ce pays, le Japon vient de commencer une opération militaire d'envergure.

Il suffit de lire l'extrait du *Times*, que nous publions ci-dessous, pour se rendre compte de la gravité des événements qui se préparent.

Naturellement, la presse anglaise qui reçoit ses inspirations du Japon, essaye d'accuser la Russie. Mais elle laisse néanmoins deviner les intentions belliqueuses de Tokio.

Les lecteurs connaissent bien notre point de vue. Ils savent que, dès le premier jour de l'invasion de la Mandchourie par les troupes nippones, nous avons redouté l'extension du conflit. Nous n'avons cessé de demander à la S.D.N., à tous les gouvernements, y compris l'U.R.S.S., de prendre des mesures pour arrêter l'action militaire du Japon et pour l'obliger à renoncer à la conquête de la Mandchourie.

Ni l'U.R.S.S., ni les gouvernements capitalistes, ni la S.D.N. n'ont rien fait. Tous ils ont laissé le Japon poursuivre tranquillement la réalisation de ses plans de conquête.

A présent, maître de la Mandchourie, l'impérialisme nippon se prépare à envahir la région maritime et son port Vladivostok.

Et pourquoi se gênerait-il ?

N'apprenons-nous pas, en effet, que lord Lytton, président de la commission d'enquête de la Société des Nations envoyée en Mandchourie, a cru devoir informer officiellement le « gouvernement » mandchou de l'arrivée de la commission. Ainsi lord Lytton, mandataire de la S.D.N., reconnaît en fait la création d'un Etat prétendu « indépendant », mais qui n'est en réalité qu'une colonie du Japon. Ainsi, le président de la commission qui doit enquêter en Mandchourie reconnaît en fait le dépeçage de la Chine.

C'est une véritable honte !

Il est temps que la France se donne un gouvernement qui cesse de soutenir l'impérialisme japonais et prenne l'initiative d'une action internationale contre le brigandage nippon.

Sinon le feu qui couve dans l'Extrême-Orient, pourra rapidement prendre des proportions catastrophiques.

O. ROSENFELD

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rome, April 29, 1932.

No. 1396.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict and Soviet Mobilization.



F/LS 793.94/5209

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

FOR DISTRIBUTION - ☒ Yes ☐ No

To be
 In U. S. A.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 1323 of March 17, 1932, on the Sino-Japanese situation, I have the honor to inform the Department that the Italian press has followed with interest the recent developments in Soviet mobilization along the Manchurian border. In the articles sent by special correspondents or syndicated throughout the peninsula, although the magnitude and strength of the Russian preparation is greatly emphasized, it is confidently stated that the mobilization is purely one of precaution, a "big parade" whose object

may

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may be only "an attempt to fan the flame of patriotism" as a shield for Soviet domestic difficulties. All accounts seem agreed that war is unthinkable and that if it should occur Russia would lose the maritime provinces in the twinkling of an eye.

In one of the few editorials appearing on the subject, Luigi Barzini, editor of the Naples MA TTINO, states that Japan has for years watched, like a cat at a mousehole, an opportunity to seize the Manchurian mouse, and now that it has its claws safely around its prey, no bluff can make it let go. Russia's frontier army, the writer feels, is essentially a bluff, since in his opinion there is no means of supplying it with the sinews of war; finances and communications both are lacking. One combination alone, adds Signor Barzini, Russia backed by the resources of the United States, could defeat Japan at present, and this is manifestly impossible. He concludes with a warning that history may repeat itself should Russia become too involved in the present difficulties, since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 was the mortal stroke which eventually finished the Tsar's empire.

I may add in passing that the amelioration of the Shanghai situation has resulted in the recall of the Italian warships TRENTO and ESPERIA, both of which should shortly arrive in home waters.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Alexander Kirk
 Alexander Kirk,
 Counsellor of Embassy.

Enclosure: Clipping.

Copies to E.I.C. Paris.

SC/eh

710.

IL MATTINO, Naples.
April. 27. 1932.

page 1.

Despatch No. 1392.

Perchè il Giappone fa il comodo suo?

La Russia — ci dicono i telegrammi — concentra forze imponenti sulle frontiere della Manciuria. E' possibile.

Ma i giapponesi — dicono pure i telegrammi — non sembrano affatto impressionati da questi preparativi. Hanno in Manciuria due sole divisioni, ritenute sufficienti a continuare a battere i cinesi — il che sembra sia il modo più pratico per stabilire l'« indipendenza » in Cina.

L'indifferenza giapponese è un indice di tranquillità e di sicurezza. Se a Tokio si temesse un intervento russo, l'occupazione nipponica della Manciuria non continuerebbe ad essere affidata a meno di quarantamila soldati.

I figli del Sole Levante continuano a consolidare la loro posizione di comando sulla nuova repubblica mancese con una impassibilità inalterabile.

Per farli smettere e tornare indietro non bastano dimostrazioni militari russe, concentrazioni di flotte americane, commissioni d'inchiesta, conferenze internazionali, pressioni diplomatiche. Al punto in cui sono le cose, bisognerebbe andarli a cacciare a cannonate.

E questo, nel momento attuale, non può farlo la Russia, non può farlo l'America, non può farlo alcun paese del mondo. Perciò il Giappone seguita a svolgere i suoi piani, quietamente, metodicamente, sicuro del fatto suo.

I giapponesi hanno la pazienza del gatto, che rimane per un tempo infinito quieto, gli occhi socchiusi, immobile, attento, davanti ad un buco dal quale il topo dovrà pure uscire una volta. Il topo che il Giappone sa aspettare con una costanza mirabile si chiama « opportunità ». E l'ha sempre afferrata.

Sembra rassegnato, mansueto, docile, pacifico, adattabile, inerte, fa le fusa. Aspetta. Ad un tratto balza, tira fuori grinfie e zanne: il topo è comparso.

L'opportunità a cui il Giappone faceva la posta è arrivata quando la Russia si è impegnata a fondo nel « piano dei cinque anni » in cui si dissolvono le sue ultime forze; quando la crisi ha prostrato l'America — e il resto

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No. 1396.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict and Soviet Mobilization.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-12-77

-2-

may be only "an attempt to fan the flame of patriotism" as a shield for Soviet domestic difficulties. All accounts seem agreed that war is unthinkable and that if it should occur Russia would lose the maritime provinces in the twinkling of an eye.

In one of the few editorials appearing on the subject, Luigi Barzini, editor of the Naples MATINO, states that Japan has for years watched, like a cat at a mousehole, an opportunity to seize the Manchurian mouse, and now that it has its claws safely around its prey, no bluff can make it let go. Russia's frontier army, the writer feels, is essentially a bluff, since in his opinion there is no means of supplying it with the means of war; finances and communications both are lacking. One combination alone, adds Signor Barzini, Russia backed by the resources of the United States, could defeat Japan at present, and this is manifestly impossible. He concludes with a warning that history may repeat itself should Russia become too involved in the present difficulties, since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 was the mortal stroke which eventually finished the Tsar's empire.

I may add in passing that the amelioration of the Shanghai situation has resulted in the recall of the Italian warships TRENTE and ESMERALDA, both of which should shortly arrive in home waters.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Alexander Kirk,
 Counsellor of Embassy.

Enclosure: Clipping.

Copies to R.I.C. Paris.

SC/eh

710.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE
NOTE

793. 94/5210

SEE 500. A 15 a 4/1021 Sanitary Clig FOR Tel#165 2pm
FROM Great Britain (Mellon) DATED May 10, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING Telegram from Gibson in London regarding Baldwin's attitude toward Far Eastern situation.
Baldwin believes Japan will only be influenced by military force and England is not prepared to go that far. American general conception of moral joint pressure as means of upholding our rights and avoiding the necessity for using military force explained to him.

ja

5210

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE
NOTE

SEE 393.9521/4 FOR Tel. # 237.2 pm
FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED May 11, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Statement by Japanese consular officer that
bombing on April 29th and bomb plot against
Japanese Emperor in Tokyo in January last
crimes identical in execution and details.

hs

793.94/5211

5211

0309

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 11, 1932

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

237, May 11, 2 p.m.

My telegram No. 220 May 6, 1 p.m.

One. Subsequent thereto I have received several telegrams from Los Angeles regarding Ahn and other Koreans. Telegram from Women's International League for Peace and Freedom requests me initiate thorough investigation to insure absolutely fair trial. I am taking no action on this telegram.

Two. Telegram from Ahn's son Philip Ahn, claiming American citizenship, requests me investigate his father's physical condition. A consular officer saw Ahn Monday at Japanese (#) and latter stated that he is well treated and in good health. This was cabled to son.

Three. Confidential. Japanese Consular Officer stated that bombing here on April 29th and bomb plot against Japanese Emperor in Tokyo in January last crimes identical in execution and details.

Not

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#237 From Shanghai May 11, 1932

Not repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

HPD

KLP

(#) Apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11941 FOR Tel. # 520, 1 pm

FROM China (Perkins) DATED May 11, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese crisis in Manchuria.
 Special delegates despatched
 to Shanghai to interview Sun Fo
 with a view to consulting him on
 the Government's policies on im-
 portant internal and external prob-
 lems particularly China's policy
 toward Japan relating to the
 settlement of the - .

793.94/5212

5212

hs

0312
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WP

PLAIN

Peiping

Dated May 11, 1932

Rec'd 2:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

520, May 11, 1 p. m.

Following from Asiatic News Service:

One. From Nanking May ninth:

"Owing to the refusal of Mr. Sun Fo to proceed to Hangchow the proposed departure of General Chiang Kai Shek and Mr. Wang Ching Wei has therefore been postponed indefinitely. Special delegates have been despatched to Shanghai to interview Sun Fo with a view to consulting him on the Government's policies on important internal and external problems especially China's policy towards Japan relating to the settlement of the Sino Japanese crisis in Manchuria. Cooperation between all Kuomintang leaders in Nanking, Shanghai and Canton is hoped for, otherwise the days of the Kuomintang's policies and supremacy in China will be numbered. But up to present the Hun Han Min and Sun Fo factions within the Kuomintang are still not satisfied with the signing of the Shanghai peace pact leaving the three provinces of Manchuria to Japanese military domination. Sun Fo
and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 520 from Peiping

and Hun Han Min are of the opinion that all anti Japanese and anti Manchuria forces in Manchuria will be suppressed by the Japanese when the League of Nations Council take up the Manchurian question for solution in September since Japan can transfer the fifty thousand Japanese troops from Shanghai to North Manchuria now".

Two. From Canton May ninth: "General Chen Chi Tang has ordered Generals Hsiang Han Ping, Yu Han Mou and others to report at the military headquarters for a special conference to be held on the morning of the fifteenth instant when HunHan Min the veteran Kuomintang civilian leader is expected to participate in it. The result of the conference will show whether the Southwest will continue to cooperate with Nanking or sever relations with the Chiang Kai Shek, Wung Ching Wei combination. Generals Li Chung Jen and Pai Chung Hsi leaders of the Kwongsi party will also take part in the special conference. The fate of Kwangtung will be decided by majority vote on the fifteenth instant".

For the Minister.

PERKINS

JS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PLAIN

JS

PEIPING VIA N.R.

FROM Dated May 12, 1932

Rec'd 3:00a.m. *file to Tokyo*

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 12 1932
Department of State

F/LS
793.94/5213

*793.94
note
893.102-S
793.94119
894.23
893.0146*

524, May 12, 1 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Tokio, May 11th:

"A Foreign Office spokesman disclosed today
that the Japanese cabinet at yesterday's session
decided to withdraw the entire expeditionary force
from Shanghai within a month.

The Ninth Division is returning to the peace
station at Kanazawa.

The spokesman said: 'This decision is due to
the Japanese Government's desire to conform to world
opinion and to prove that Japan had no territorial or
other ulterior motives in dispatching troops to Shanghai'.

MAY 24 1932
RECEIVED

Although it had previously been intended to
maintain a semi-permanent garrison of at least a
division, the latest decision entails a return to
the conditions existing prior to the January outbreak
as far as Japanese strength at Shanghai is concerned:

Only a small force of bluejackets is remaining
to protect Japanese residents.

031

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-from Peiping May 12, #524.

All the other troops are returning to Japan (and some of them are being sent to Manchuria).

While hopeful that the Chinese will strictly observe the terms of the armistice and not permit Chinese troops to enter the twenty kilometer zone the spokesman said that Japan would hold the other powers and world opinion accountable if the Japanese withdrawal resulted in a menace to Shanghai.

He added 'The Japanese feel that they fought the battles of other nations as well as their own at Shanghai but they gained only world wide odium'."

JOHNSON

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 12, 1932

Rec'd 7:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

526, May 12, 6 p. m.

Legation's 524, May 12, 1 p. m.

Following from Reuter:

The Japanese residents of Shanghai are viewing with alarm Tokyo's decision to withdraw the troops from Shanghai, says the Chinese press, and arrangements are being immediately made for a meeting to discuss the situation. It is understood that Japanese business men are working by the decision and intend protesting vigorously to Tokyo asking that their troops may remain indefinitely.

The hope expressed by a Japanese Foreign Office spokesman yesterday that 'The Chinese Government would not permit Chinese troops to enter the twenty kilometer zone when the Japanese withdraw from Shanghai' has evoked vigorous denunciations in official circles and in the press here.

It is pointed out that nothing was mentioned in the armistice agreement forbidding Chinese troops to enter the zone. Furthermore, the Chinese delegate, when the armistice



FLS

793.94/5214

FILED

MAY 16 1932

793.94
 note
 893.102-S

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#526, from Peiping, May 12, 6p.m.,

the armistice was signed, declared before all the delegates that the agreement in no way bound the Chinese Government from full freedom of movement in the disposition of its troops and this was accepted without a debate. Therefore it is regarded here as very surprising that such a statement should have been made in Tokyo.

It is believed here that the Japanese troops in Shanghai are only withdrawing to strengthen the Japanese army in Manchuria which unofficial estimates give as already one hundred thousand strong."

JOHNSON

WSB

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

FROM

Dated May 12, 1932

2861 E I JWW

Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



F/LS 793.94/5215

239, May 12, Noon.

The Japanese Joint Commissioner has advised me of the following which I have transmitted to the Chinese Joint Commissioner:

"The Japanese naval landing party plans to withdraw its defense guards from Chapei, commencing on May 16th, with the area south of the railway. Beginning on May 14th Chinese authorities will be enabled to inspect the latter area.

To that end it is necessary that the Chinese delegates will make concrete arrangements with the Japanese delegates and the headquarters of the Japanese landing party. It is hoped that the former will confer with the latter on the transfer at an early date." /

In transmitting this information to Chinese delegates I have tendered any assistance which seems to be desirable as well as offered

each

793.94
 893.102-S

MAY 16 1932

FT ED

0316
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#239 From Shanghai May 12, 1932

each party the use of the committee room for conferences and carrying out the suggested arrangements.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

HPD

0321

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

Gray
1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
PLAIN

Washington,
May 13, 1932.

5215
71

WILSON,
BERGUES,
GENEVA (Switzerland).

1/5215

One. May 12, the Consul General at Shanghai
telegraphs as follows:

QUOTE The Japanese Joint Commissioner has advised me
of the following which I have transmitted to the Chinese
Joint Commissioner:

SUBQUOTE The Japanese naval landing party plans to
withdraw its defense guards from Chapei, commencing on
May 16th with the area south of the railway. Beginning on
May 14th Chinese authorities will be enabled to inspect the
latter area.

To that end it is necessary that the Chinese delegates
will make concrete arrangements with the Japanese delegates
and the headquarters of the Japanese landing party. It is
hoped that the former will confer with the latter on the
transfer at an early date END SUBQUOTE UNQUOTE.

Two. The Consul General adds that he has transmitted
to the Chinese delegates this information, with offer of
appropriate assistance.

793.94/5215

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -


Three. Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

Castle, Acting

SKH

FE:MMH:REK
m.m.h.

FE



Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

PM REC'D

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Geneva

Dated May 12, 1932

FROM

Rec'd 2:11 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

187, May 12, 5 p.m.

Consulate's 165, April 30, 1 p.m., pen-


ultimate paragraph.

The Secretary General has circulated the report of the committee of 19 required under paragraph seven of part three of the Assembly's resolution of March 11. The body of this report deals solely with the Manchurian question and bears as an annex the preliminary report of the Lytton commission (summarized in the Consulate's 167, May 3, noon.)

The present report merely summarizes briefly the steps taken by the committee in compliance with the resolution cited above and appears to contain no information which is not already in the Department's possession. It concludes as follows:

"It would therefore appear that the situation can be summarized as follows:

As



F/LS 793.94/5216

FILED

MAY 16 1932

793.94

500.2111

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#187 from Geneva May 12, 1932

As regards Shanghai the committee thinks it may say that the Assembly's resolutions, aimed at the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Japanese forces, are in process of being carried into effect. The agreement negotiated on the spot in accordance with the Assembly's recommendations seems likely to insure the complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces in a short time.

As regards the Manchurian question, the special committee did not feel called upon to open its examination until it had received from the Council a report by the Commission of Inquiry together with any observations the Council might desire to make." (see Consulate's 183, May 10, 2 p.m.)
793.94/Comm. 1/12

Note may be made that, in spite of ~~Esic?~~ Japanese army reservations in regard to the application of Article 15 of the Covenant to the Manchurian question, the committee of 19 is continuing the fulfillment of the Assembly's resolution of March 11 by including the whole dispute under its mandate.

GILBERT

WSB KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington, Naval Radio
 May ~~12~~, 1932.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

122 One. May 12, Geneva, reports as follows:

QUOTE The Secretary General has circulated the report of the committee of 19 required under paragraph seven of part three of the Assembly's resolution of March 11. The body of this report deals solely with the Manchurian question and bears as an annex the preliminary report of the Lytton commission.

The present report merely summarizes briefly the steps taken by the committee in compliance with the resolution cited above and appears to contain no information which is not already in the Department's possession. It concludes as follows:

SUBQUOTE It would therefore appear that the situation can be summarized as follows:

As regards Shanghai the committee thinks it may say that the Assembly's resolutions, aimed at the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Japanese forces, are in process of being carried into effect. The agreement negotiated on the spot in accordance with the

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

793.94/5216

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

Assembly's recommendations seems likely to insure the complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces in a short time.

As regards the Manchurian question, the special committee did not feel called upon to open its examination until it had received from the Council a report by the Commission of Inquiry together with any observations the Council might desire to make END SUBQUOTE.

Note may be made that, in spite of Japanese reservations in regard to the application of Article 15 of the Covenant to the Manchurian question, the committee of 19 is continuing the fulfillment of the Assembly's resolution of March 11 by including the whole dispute under its mandate UNQUOTE.

Two. Please repeat by mail to Tokyo.

Castle, Acting

SKH

FE
 FE:MMH:REK

FE
SKH

May 13 1932.
MMH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

032F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure # 4 to List No. 48 from Geneva, May 2, 1932

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONFERENCE

POUR LA

FOR THE

RÉDUCTION ET LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS

REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DE L'ASSEMBLÉE

SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY

JOURNAL

GENÈVE 1932

GENEVA 1932

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 13 1932

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAY 17 1932

RECEIVED

No 60. — DIMANCHE 1^{er} MAI 1932.

No. 60. — SUNDAY, MAY 1ST, 1932.

COMMUNICATIONS A LA RÉDACTION DU JOURNAL.

Les communiqués et informations à insérer dans le *Journal* doivent être adressés à M. John Palmer, rédacteur en chef, bureau 710, Bâtiment des Commissions.

Note: *Le Journal est publié pour la commodité de MM. les délégués et du public. On n'y trouvera pas un compte rendu complet et définitif des séances de la Conférence ou de l'Assemblée et de leurs Commissions; il ne doit donc pas être employé comme source de documentation. Au surplus, si l'on veut qu'il paraisse très exactement, il ne saurait donner autre chose qu'un résumé sommaire des discussions.*

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITOR OF THE JOURNAL.

Material to be included in the *Journal* should be addressed to the Editor, Mr. John Palmer, Room 710, Committee Building.

Note: *The Journal is issued for the convenience of the delegates and the public. It is not intended to serve as a complete permanent record of the discussions which take place at the Conference or the Assembly and their Committees, and it not therefore be used for purposes of reference. Moreover, it is to appear promptly, it cannot give more than a summary of the discussions.*

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 480 —

Conférence pour la Réduction et Limitation des Armements. Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

I. PROGRAMME DES SÉANCES.

Commission permanente consultative pour les questions militaires, navales et aériennes: Comité de rédaction.

Le Comité de rédaction de la Commission permanente consultative se réunira demain lundi 2 mai, à 15 h. 30, au Bâtiment des Commissions (salle G).

Commission aérienne: Sous-Comité.

Le Sous-Comité se réunira demain lundi 2 mai, à 15 h. 30, au Bâtiment des Commissions (salle L).

Commission navale.

La Commission navale se réunira mardi 3 mai, à 10 heures, au Bâtiment des Commissions (salle H).

Ordre du jour:

Suite de la discussion (voir document Conf. D./C.N./Agenda 8).

Commission terrestre: Comité d'experts.

Le Comité d'experts se réunira mardi 3 mai, à 10 heures, au Bâtiment des Commissions (salle G).

Ordre du jour:

Questionnaire proposé pour les experts par le Comité de rédaction (documents Conf. D./C.T./7 et Conf. D./C.T./C.E./2).

Commission des dépenses de défense nationale: Sous-Comité du Comité technique.

Le Sous-Comité du Comité technique se réunira mardi 3 mai, à 15 h. 30, au Bâtiment des Commissions (salle L).

Commission des dépenses de défense nationale: Comité technique.

Le Comité technique se réunira mardi 3 mai, à 16 heures, au Bâtiment des Commissions (salle L).

Ordre du jour:

1. Examen de l'aide-mémoire rédigé par le Sous-Comité (document Conf.D/C.D./C.T./32) et des questions de procédure s'y rattachant.

2. Rapport de MM. Kissling et Sandler sur la documentation reçue.

II. SIGNATURES ET RATIFICATIONS D'ACCORDS INTERNATIONAUX.

Son Excellence M. Tomás Francisco Medina, délégué permanent du Nicaragua auprès de la Société des Nations, a adhéré, au nom de son gouvernement, le 30 avril 1932, à la Convention pour la réglementation de la chasse à la baleine (Genève, 24 septembre 1931).

I. PROGRAMME OF MEETINGS.

Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions: Drafting Committee.

The Drafting Committee of the Permanent Advisory Commission will meet on Monday, May 2nd, at 3.30 p.m. in the Committee Building (Room G).

Air Commission: Sub-Committee.

The Sub-Committee of the Air Commission will meet on Monday, May 2nd, at 3.30 p.m. in the Committee Building (Room L).

Naval Commission.

The Naval Commission will meet on Tuesday, May 3rd, at 10 a.m. in the Committee Building (Room H).

Agenda:

Continuation of the discussion (see document Conf. D./C.N./Agenda 8).

Land Commission: Committee of Experts.

The Committee of Experts of the Land Commission will meet on Tuesday, May 3rd, at 10 a.m. in the Committee Building (Room G).

Agenda:

Questionnaire proposed for the experts by the Drafting Committee (documents Conf.D/C.T./7 and Conf.D/C.T./C.E./2).

National Defence Expenditure Commission: Sub-Committee of the Technical Committee.

The Sub-Committee of the Technical Committee will meet on Tuesday, May 3rd, at 3.30 p.m. in the Committee Building (Room L).

National Defence Expenditure Commission: Technical Committee.

The Technical Committee will meet on Tuesday, May 3rd, at 4 p.m. in the Committee Building (Room L).

Agenda:

1. Examination of the Memorandum proposed by the Sub-Committee (document Conf.D/C.D./C.T./32) and of questions of procedure relating thereto.

2. Report by M. Kissling and M. Sandler on the documentation received.

II. SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

His Excellency M. Tomás Francisco Medina, Permanent Delegate of Nicaragua accredited to the League of Nations acceded, on behalf of his Government, on April 30th, 1932, to the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Geneva, September 24th, 1931).

— 481 —

III. LISTE DES DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUÉS A LA CONFÉRENCE.

Journal de la Conférence (et l'Assemblée), No 59.

A la Commission navale:

Conf.D/C.N./23. Proposition de la délégation roumaine concernant la résolution de la Commission générale du 22 avril 1932 (Conf.D/C.G./28(2)).

III. LIST OF DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTED TO THE CONFERENCE.

Journal of the Conference (and Assembly), No. 59.

To the Naval Commission:

Conf.D/C.N./23. Proposal by the Roumanian delegation in regard to the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd, 1932 (Conf. D/C.G./28(2)).

Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée. Special Session of the Assembly.

CINQUIÈME SÉANCE PLÉNIÈRE

Tenue au Bâtiment des Commissions, le samedi 30 avril 1932, à 10 h. 30.

ADRESSE DE SYMPATHIE AU GOUVERNEMENT JAPONAIS.

Le PRÉSIDENT désire se faire l'interprète de l'émotion indignée que tous ont ressentie à la nouvelle de l'attentat commis à Chang-Hai et qui a cruellement frappé le ministre du Japon, deux généraux et un amiral japonais et le consul général du Japon. Il a déjà apporté, à M. Nagaoka, le témoignage de la réprobation et des profonds regrets de l'Assemblée; il le renouvelle ici publiquement en formant des vœux ardents pour la guérison des victimes de l'attentat. Il ajoute que M. Paul-Boncour, Président en « exercice du Conseil, rappelé en France, l'a prié d'associer ses sentiments à ceux de tous.

M. NAGAOKA (Japon) remercie le Président des paroles qu'il a prononcées tant au nom de la Société qu'en celui du Président du Conseil et en son nom personnel. Non seulement le Gouvernement japonais et les malheureuses victimes, mais encore le pays tout entier, seront très sensibles à cette manifestation de sympathie.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS.

Le PRÉSIDENT déclare que l'Assemblée a été convoquée en exécution de sa résolution du 11 mars. Le Comité qu'elle avait institué remplit son mandat en présentant un rapport qui décrit l'évolution des événements depuis l'Assemblée du 11 mars et un projet de résolution qui constitue en somme la conclusion de ce rapport. Un second rapport sur la situation générale sera distribué incessamment.

Le Président résume brièvement les faits et la situation actuelle.

Il faut d'abord constater avec satisfaction que, depuis plusieurs semaines, les hostilités ont cessé virtuellement, comme l'écrivait, le 12 avril, la délégation chinoise, en ajoutant que c'était là un résultat précieux pour lequel le Gouvernement chinois exprimait sa reconnaissance à l'Assemblée. D'autre part, le retrait des forces japonaises est en voie d'exécution. Conformément au vœu des Assemblées du 4 et du 11 mars, des négociations ont commencé le 14 mars à Chang-Hai entre les représentants de la Chine et du Japon, avec les représentants des quatre Puissances ayant des intérêts spéciaux.

Le Président expose brièvement les différentes phases des négociations qui eurent lieu à Chang-Hai et des délibérations du Comité des dix-neuf, qui s'était réuni dès le 17 mars. Le 16 avril, ce comité chargea le Président de l'Assemblée de se mettre en rapport avec les représentants de la Chine et du Japon. Des conversations fréquentes eurent lieu et le Comité se réunit de nouveau les 18, 19, 26, 28 et 29 avril.

FIFTH PLENARY MEETING.

Held in the Committee Building of the Secretariat on Saturday, April 30th, 1932, at 10.30 a.m.

ADDRESS OF SYMPATHY TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

The PRESIDENT felt sure he was interpreting the feeling of indignation which all must experience at the news of the outrage committed at Shanghai. The Minister for Japan, two Japanese Generals, a Japanese Admiral and the Consul-General of Japan had all been seriously injured. He had already expressed to M. Nagaoka the reprobation and profound regret of the Assembly. He desired publicly to renew that assurance and to express his ardent desire for the recovery of the victims of the attempt. He would add that M. Paul-Boncour, Acting President of the Council, who had been recalled to France, had asked to be associated with this address.

M. NAGAOKA (Japan) thanked the President for what he had said on behalf of the League of Nations and of the President of the Council and on his own behalf. Not only the Japanese Government and the unhappy victims of the outrage, but the whole country, would greatly appreciate that manifestation of sympathy.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

The PRESIDENT said that the Assembly has been convened in execution of its resolution of March 11th. The Special Committee which it had appointed had fulfilled its instructions by presenting a report which described the progress of events since March 11th, together with a draft resolution which constituted in effect the conclusion of that report. A second report on the general situation would be shortly distributed. The President briefly summarised the facts of the present situation.

It must first be noted with satisfaction that for several weeks hostilities had virtually ceased. The Chinese delegation had on April 12th written to that effect, adding that the Chinese Government desired to express its gratitude to the Assembly for so valuable a result. Moreover, the withdrawal of the Japanese forces was in progress. Negotiations had begun on March 14th at Shanghai, in conformity with the recommendation of the Assemblies of March 4th and March 11th, between the representatives of China and Japan assisted by the representative of the four Powers with special interests at Shanghai.

The President recounted briefly the various phases of the negotiations which had taken place at Shanghai and the discussions of the Committee of Nineteen, which had held meetings from March 17th onwards. On April 16th, the Committee had instructed the President of the Assembly to get into touch with the representatives of China and Japan. Frequent conversations had taken place and the Committee had met again on April 18th, 19th, 26th, 28th and 29th.

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Le 19 avril, le Comité, se considérant comme un organe de conciliation, rédigea un avant-projet de convention destiné à établir une entente entre la Chine et le Japon. Cet avant-projet fut discuté avec les deux délégations, mais il subsistait un dissentiment sur un point important. Sur ces entrefaites, un nouvel effort de conciliation s'accomplissait à Chang-Hai, sous l'inspiration du président du Comité des représentants des quatre Puissances spécialement intéressées. Le ministre de Grande-Bretagne, sir Miles Lampson, indiquait que les négociations se poursuivaient favorablement et enfin qu'un accord s'était virtuellement réalisé, grâce à une adjonction apportée au texte de l'annexe III, se rapportant à l'article IV du projet d'armistice.

Le rapport (document A.(extr.)108.1932.VII) donne tous les détails désirables et le Président ne veut attirer l'attention de l'Assemblée que sur quelques points.

Le projet d'armistice prévoit la constitution d'une commission mixte, composée de représentants de la Chine et du Japon et de représentants des quatre Puissances spécialement intéressées. Cette commission aura pour fonctions de certifier le retrait des troupes, de collaborer à l'organisation du transfert des zones évacuées à la police chinoise et de veiller à l'exécution des clauses de l'armistice, notamment de celle qui vise le retrait des forces japonaises. Elle sera, en outre, autorisée à signaler toute négligence dans l'exécution de ces clauses et, à défaut d'unanimité, pourra prendre ses décisions à la majorité. L'institution de cette commission, sa composition, ses fonctions, forment des éléments importants du projet d'accord dont on annonce la conclusion officielle et définitive ainsi que la signature pour un jour très prochain.

Le Président donne lecture du projet de résolution suivant:

« L'Assemblée,

« 1. Considérant que ses résolutions en date des 4 et 11 mars ont recommandé que des négociations soient engagées par les représentants chinois et japonais, avec le concours des autorités militaires, navales et civiles des Puissances ayant des intérêts spéciaux dans les concessions de Chang-Hai, en vue de la conclusion d'arrangements destinés à rendre définitive la cessation des hostilités et à régler le retrait des forces japonaises;

« 2. Considérant que s'il n'appartient pas à son Comité de se substituer aux négociateurs — les arrangements envisagés dans les résolutions de l'Assemblée des 4 et 11 mars ne pouvant être conclus que sur place — toute Puissance représentée aux négociations a le pouvoir, en cas de difficultés graves dans le progrès desdites négociations, ou dans l'exécution des arrangements susmentionnés, de signaler lesdites difficultés audit Comité « qui exerce ses fonctions au nom et sous le contrôle de l'Assemblée »;

« 3. Considérant que les négociations doivent être poursuivies conformément aux résolutions précitées, sans qu'aucune des parties puisse prétendre imposer des conditions incompatibles avec lesdites résolutions;

« 4. Ayant pris connaissance des articles du projet d'armistice qui ont été communiqués au Comité de l'Assemblée, et qui ont été acceptés par les deux parties;

« 5. Estime que ces articles sont conformes à l'esprit desdites résolutions;

« 6. Constate, notamment, que, par l'article III dudit projet, le Gouvernement japonais s'engage à opérer le retrait de ses forces dans le Settlement international et sur les routes extérieures du Settlement dans le district de Hong-Kéou, sur les positions où elles se trouvaient avant l'incident du 28 janvier 1932;

« 7. Déclare qu'il est conforme à l'esprit des résolutions des 4 et 11 mars que ce retrait ait lieu à bref délai;

« 8. Déclare que la résolution du 4 mars ne sera pleinement exécutée que par le retrait complet des forces japonaises;

« 9. Prend acte du fait que le projet d'accord prévoit l'institution d'une commission mixte, comprenant des membres neutres, chargée de certifier le retrait réciproque, ainsi que de collaborer à l'organisation du transfert des

On April 19th the Committee, considering itself to be an organ of conciliation, established a preliminary draft text intended to form the basis of an understanding between China and Japan. That preliminary draft had been discussed with the two delegations, but there had remained disagreement upon an important point. A new effort at conciliation had meanwhile been made at Shanghai as a result of the good offices of the President of the Committee of the representatives of the four Powers with special interests. Sir Miles Lampson, Minister for Great Britain, had indicated that the negotiations were progressing favourably and that an agreement had been virtually realised on the basis of an addition to the text of Annex III to Article IV of the draft Armistice Agreement.

The report before the Assembly (document A.(Extr.)108.1932.VII) gave all the necessary details and he was merely drawing the attention of the Assembly to certain points.

The draft Armistice contemplated the appointment of a Mixed Commission composed of representatives of China and Japan and of the four Powers with special interests. It would be the duty of that Commission to certify the withdrawal of the troops, to assist in the organisation of the transfer of the evacuated zones to Chinese police and to watch over the execution of the armistice clauses, particularly that which provided for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. It would further be authorised to draw attention to any negligence in the execution of those clauses and, failing unanimity, would take its decisions by a majority. The establishment of that Commission, its composition, and its duties, formed important elements in the draft Agreement, the final conclusion and signature of which was announced for an early date.

The President then read the draft resolution:

“ The Assembly,

“ 1. Considering that its resolutions of March 4th and 11th recommended that negotiations should be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai settlements, for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces;

“ 2. Considering that while it is not for its Committee to take the place of the negotiators—since the arrangements contemplated in the Assembly resolutions of March 4th and 11th can only be concluded on the spot—every Power represented in these negotiations is entitled, should serious difficulties be encountered in the course of the negotiations or in the carrying-out of the above-mentioned arrangements, to notify the Committee, which exercises its functions on behalf of and under supervision of the Assembly, of those difficulties;

“ 3. Considering that the negotiations should be pursued in accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions, no one of the parties being entitled to insist on conditions which would be incompatible with the said resolutions;

“ 4. Having noted the articles of the draft armistice which have been communicated to the Committee of the Assembly and have been accepted by the two parties;

“ 5. Considers that these articles conform to the spirit of the said resolutions;

“ 6. Notes in particular that under Article III of the said draft, the Japanese Government undertakes to carry out the withdrawal of its forces in the International Settlement and the roads outside the Settlement in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932;

“ 7. Declares that it is in accordance with the spirit of the resolutions of March 4th and 11th that this withdrawal should take place in the near future;

“ 8. Declares that the resolution of March 4th will only have been fully complied with when the Japanese forces have been entirely withdrawn;

“ 9. Notes that the draft Agreement provides for the establishment of a joint Commission, including neutral members, to certify, the mutual withdrawal and to collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating

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territoires évacués par les forces japonaises à la police chinoise, qui viendra prendre en charge lesdits territoires aussitôt que les forces japonaises se retireront;

« 10. Prend acte avec satisfaction du fait que ladite commission aura pour tâche de veiller, de la manière qu'elle jugera la mieux appropriée, conformément à ses décisions, à l'exécution des articles I, II et III, dont le dernier prévoit le retrait complet des forces japonaises sur les positions où elles se trouvaient avant l'incident du 28 janvier;

« 11. Estime qu'en vertu de ses pouvoirs, tels qu'ils sont définis à l'annexe III du projet d'accord, la commission chargée de veiller à l'exécution des articles I, II et III de l'Accord est autorisée à appeler l'attention, en prenant ses décisions de la manière stipulée à ladite annexe, sur toute négligence dans l'exécution d'une disposition quelconque des articles visés ci-dessus;

« 12. Insiste auprès des Parties en cause pour qu'elles poursuivent les négociations en vue d'une rapide conclusion, et prie les gouvernements ayant des intérêts spéciaux dans les concessions de Chang-Hai de continuer à prêter leur concours à ce sujet;

« 13. Relève expressément qu'à défaut d'une telle conclusion prévue dans les résolutions des 4 et 11 mars, la question reviendra nécessairement devant l'Assemblée;

« 14. Prie les gouvernements des Puissances ayant des intérêts spéciaux dans les concessions de Chang-Hai de transmettre à la Société des Nations les informations que possédent, en vertu de ses attributions, la commission mixte à constituer et qui leur seront fournies par leurs représentants respectifs dans ladite commission. »

M. YEN (Chine) dit que les membres du Comité spécial de l'Assemblée et les Puissances amies ont, surtout en ce qui concerne l'attaque et l'invasion de Chang-Hai par des forces japonaises, fait des efforts constants au cours des derniers mois pour persuader le Japon que les hostilités devaient prendre fin. La Chine a toujours prêté une oreille attentive aux représentations qui lui étaient faites et son gouvernement a immédiatement donné son assentiment lorsque les Puissances amies, au début de février, ont invité les deux parties à arrêter les hostilités à Chang-Hai et à engager des négociations en vue de régler les divergences qui subsistaient. Le Japon rejeta cette proposition et, un mois plus tard, il refusa de nouveau de sanctionner un arrangement qui devait servir de base à la conclusion d'un armistice extrêmement équitable pour les deux parties et qui était le fruit des bons offices de l'amiral Kelly.

Cet arrangement prévoyait le retrait des troupes chinoises à Chenzu et le retrait des troupes japonaises à l'intérieur de la concession internationale, comme première étape, et le retrait des troupes chinoises à Nanziang et le débarquement des troupes japonaises, comme deuxième étape. Les Japonais sont encore retranchés à Chenzu et à Nanziang et refusent de fixer la date à laquelle ils se retireront, même dans la concession internationale. Il existe une guerre d'agression non déclarée, et le fait qu'il est loisible à l'agresseur de profiter des avantages qu'il s'est procurés d'une manière aussi illicite constitue un précédent lamentable.

Le Comité spécial, lorsqu'il a procédé à l'examen des négociations de Chang-Hai, a décidé d'écarter la note séparée que le Japon annexait au projet d'accord en vue d'un armistice (voir *Journal* No 40, pages 323 et suivantes), en considérant qu'elle comportait une condition politique. La semaine dernière, le Comité spécial a adopté une résolution dont le paragraphe 11 écartait encore une condition politique, mais prescrivait la façon dont la date du retrait définitif des troupes japonaises dans la concession serait fixée. La Chine a accepté cette proposition, mais une fois de plus le Japon ne s'est pas rallié à la décision du Comité spécial.

Si le délégué de la Chine rappelle ces faits, c'est pour montrer que, chaque fois, c'est la Chine qui a accepté et le Japon qui a repoussé les termes proposés pour l'armistice et que, après chacune de ces impasses, les négociations n'ont repris que grâce à des concessions importantes consenties par le Gouvernement chinois.

La formule actuelle apporte au problème une certaine solution, mais une solution qui n'est pas équitable pour la Chine. Néanmoins, ce pays a décidé de l'accepter en tant que solution

Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw;

“ 10. Notes with satisfaction that the said Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles I, II, and III, of which the last-named provides for the complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces as before the incident of January 28th;

“ 11. Is of opinion that the powers, as defined in Annex 4 to the Draft Agreement, of the Commission which is to watch the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of that agreement, include authority to call attention, in accordance with its decisions taken in such manner as it provided in the said Annex, to any neglect in carrying out any of the provisions of the articles mentioned above.

“ 12. Earnestly recommends the parties in question to continue the negotiations with a view to reaching their rapid conclusion, and requests the Governments having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to continue to lend their good offices for this purposes;

“ 13. Expressly points out that unless a conclusion is reached as laid down in the resolutions of March 4th and 11th, the question will necessarily come up again before the Assembly;

“ 14. Requests the Governments of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to transmit to the League of Nations the information which will be in the possession of the Mixed Commission in virtue of its functions, and will be furnished to those Governments by their respective representatives on the Commission.”

M. YEN (China) said that the members of the Special Committee of the Assembly and the friendly Powers had, especially in connection with the attack and invasion of Shanghai by Japanese forces, been during the past few months unremitting in their efforts to induce Japan to agree that hostilities should cease. China had always lent a willing ear to the representations made to her and his Government had at once assented when the friendly Powers at the beginning of February had requested the two parties to end the hostilities at Shanghai and begin negotiations for the settlement of outstanding differences. Japan had rejected that proposal and had again refused a month later to accept an understanding reached for the basis of an armistice eminently fair to both parties as a result of the good offices of Admiral Kelly.

That agreement had provided for the withdrawal of the Chinese troops to Chenzu and the Japanese troops to within the Settlement as a first step, and of the Chinese troops to Nanhsiang and the Japanese troops to their ships as a second step. The Japanese were still entrenched in Chenzu and Nanhsiang and refused to settle a date for their withdrawal even to the Settlement. There existed an undeclared aggressive war and it was a lamentable precedent that the aggressor should be permitted to enjoy his illgotten advantages.

The Special Committee, in reviewing the negotiations at Shanghai, had ruled out the separate note annexed by Japan to the proposed agreement for an armistice (see *Journal* No. 40 p. 323 and seq.) since it embodied a political condition. The Special Committee had last week adopted a resolution wherein paragraph 11 again ruled out a political condition, but prescribed the manner in which the time of the final withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the Settlement should be decided. China had accepted that proposal, but Japan had again disapproved of the decision of the Special Committee.

He recounted these facts to show that in every case China had accepted, and Japan had rejected, the proposed terms of armistice and that, after every such *impasse*, the negotiations had been resumed only as a result of important concessions on the part of the Chinese Government.

The present formula furnished some kind of solution of the problem, but was not fair or just to China. China, however, had decided to accept it as a practical solution solely in the

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pratique et uniquement dans l'intérêt de la paix. La Chine ne s'est pas départie de la position qu'elle a jusqu'ici adoptée, à savoir que la présence de forces japonaises armées en territoire chinois constitue une violation de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine et ne saurait en aucun cas être justifiée. Le Gouvernement chinois réserve tous les droits qu'il possède en vertu du Pacte de la Société et du droit international en général.

Le Gouvernement chinois attache une extrême importance au paragraphe 6 de la résolution, qui enregistre l'engagement pris par le Japon de se retirer dans les limites de la concession internationale; au paragraphe 7, qui déclare que ce retrait doit avoir lieu à bref délai; au paragraphe 8, d'où il résulte que la résolution du 4 mars ne sera pleinement exécutée que lorsque les forces japonaises se seront entièrement retirées; au paragraphe 10, qui prend acte du fait qu'il appartiendra à la Commission mixte de veiller à l'exécution des articles I, II et III, ce dernier article stipulant le retrait définitif des forces japonaises; enfin, au paragraphe 13, qui dispose expressément que, en cas de rupture des négociations la question reviendra devant l'Assemblée.

Le Gouvernement chinois espère que le Comité spécial et l'Assemblée elle-même continueront, comme ils l'ont fait jusqu'ici, de déployer leurs efforts énergiques et vigilants pour veiller à l'exécution complète et immédiate des dispositions de la résolution actuelle et de toutes les précédentes.

M. NAGAOKA (Japon) déclare une fois de plus que le Gouvernement japonais a toujours eu le plus vif désir de voir couronnées de succès les négociations qui se poursuivaient à Chang-Hai sur la base de la résolution du 4 mars de l'Assemblée. Depuis le début de ces négociations, ce gouvernement n'a pas cessé de faire tous ses efforts dans ce but, en se conformant strictement à ladite résolution. Il éprouve donc la plus grande satisfaction de ce que le projet de résolution qui vient d'être lu constate que le projet d'accord élaboré à Chang-Hai est conforme à la résolution de l'Assemblée et que l'espoir y est exprimé de la prompte conclusion d'un accord.

En effet, à Chang-Hai, un comité de rédaction a réussi à coordonner les divers articles dont on avait pu convenir. Une réunion a eu lieu le 28 avril entre les délégués japonais et chinois, assistés par les ministres des Puissances amies qui ont pu constater ce résultat du comité de rédaction. Une réunion plénière est prévue pour le 2 mai et le Japon est prêt à signer le projet d'accord élaboré. Il va sans dire que le Gouvernement japonais exécutera fidèlement cet accord qui consacre de façon si heureuse la résolution du 4 mars de l'Assemblée.

Le délégué du Japon tient à exprimer à cette occasion sa plus vive reconnaissance à l'égard des représentants civils, militaires et navals de la Grande-Bretagne, des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, de la France et de l'Italie, qui, dès le début, ont pris part aux pourparlers et dont les bons offices ont apporté, à l'élaboration d'un projet d'accord, une contribution dont on ne saurait exagérer l'importance.

D'après les informations qui sont parvenues à M. Nagaoka, M. Johnson, ministre des Etats-Unis, d'abord, et sir Miles Lampson, ministre de Grande-Bretagne, ensuite, se sont rendus tout récemment de Chang-Hai à Nankin en vue de résoudre les difficultés qui avaient surgi. Les efforts de ce dernier ont réussi à obtenir l'acceptation par les deux parties du texte connu sous le nom de « projet Lampson ». A la réunion du 28 avril, mentionnée tout à l'heure, les délégués japonais et chinois ont exprimé leur assentiment formel audit projet, d'après lequel la commission mixte, chargée de veiller à l'exécution des articles I, II et III de l'Accord, est autorisée à appeler l'attention, en prenant ses décisions de la manière stipulée dans l'annexe, sur toute négligence dans l'exécution d'une disposition quelconque des articles visés.

La délégation japonaise ne se croit pas cependant en mesure de donner sa voix au projet de résolution soumis à l'Assemblée et se borne à s'abstenir dans le vote, étant donné que le Gouvernement du Japon maintient la position de réserve qu'il a toujours cru devoir observer relativement à l'application de l'article 15 du Pacte au conflit sino-japonais. Mais M. Nagaoka peut assurer l'Assemblée que cette attitude ne changera en rien la ferme volonté de son gouvernement de faire tout ce qui dépend de lui pour que les négociations en cours à Chang-Hai aboutissent dans le plus court délai.

Il est procédé au vote par appel nominal.

interests of peace. She had not receded from the position which she had hitherto maintained: that the presence of Japanese armed forces in Chinese territory was a violation of her territorial integrity and could not be justified. The Chinese Government reserved all its rights under the Covenant of the League and international law in general.

The Chinese Government placed great importance on paragraph 6 of the resolution, which noted the undertaking of Japan to withdraw to the International Settlement; paragraph 7, which declared that the withdrawal must take place in the near future; on paragraph 8, which was to the effect that the resolution of March 4th would only have been fully executed after a complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces; on paragraph 10, which noted that it would be the duty of the Joint Commission to watch the execution of Articles I, 2 and 3, the last of which provided for a final withdrawal of the Japanese forces; and, finally, of paragraph 13, which explicitly stipulated that in the event of the negotiations breaking down the question would again come before the Assembly.

His Government hoped that the Special Committee and the Assembly itself would continue, as before, their energetic and vigilant efforts to see that the provisions of the present and all previous resolutions were carried out with thoroughness and promptitude.

M. NAGAOKA (Japon) said that his Government had always keenly desired that the negotiations which had been in progress at Shanghai on the basis of the Assembly resolution of March 4th should be crowned with success. Since the beginning of those negotiations it had never ceased to exert all its efforts to achieve success in conformity with that resolution. He was, therefore, happy to note that the resolution which had just been read declared that the draft agreement framed at Shanghai was in conformity with the Assembly resolution and that it expressed a hope for the prompt conclusion of an agreement.

At Shanghai a drafting committee had succeeded in coordinating the various articles on which agreement had been possible. A meeting had taken place on April 28th between the Japanese and Chinese delegates, assisted by the Ministers of the friendly Powers, at which the result of the work of the drafting committee had been considered. A plenary meeting was contemplated for May 2nd and Japan was ready to sign the draft agreement which had been framed. His Government would, of course, loyally carry out that agreement, which was a happy sequel to the Assembly resolution of March 4th.

He desired to express his liveliest gratitude to the civil, military and naval representatives of Great Britain, the United States, France and Italy, who from the outset had participated in the negotiations and whose good offices in the framing of the draft agreement had been a factor of which it was impossible to exaggerate the importance.

According to the information in his possession, Mr. Johnson, Minister for the United States of America, and Sir Miles Lampson, Minister for Great Britain, had recently gone from Shanghai to Nankin with a view to settling the difficulties which had arisen. The efforts of Sir Miles Lampson had resulted in obtaining the acceptance by the two parties of a text which was now known as "the Lampson formula". At the meeting of April 28th, to which he had just referred, the Japanese and Chinese delegates had formally assented to that draft, under which the Mixed Commission appointed to supervise the execution of Articles I, II and III of the Agreement was authorised to call attention to any negligence in the execution of any provision of those articles, taking its decisions in the manner stipulated in the Annex.

The Japanese delegation did not, however, feel able to vote for the draft resolution before the Assembly and would therefore abstain in view of the fact that the Government of Japan maintained the position of reserve she had always felt bound to assume regarding the application of Article 15 of the Covenant to the Sino-Japanese dispute. He could assure the Assembly, however, that the attitude of the Japanese delegation did not in any way affect the firm intention of his Government to do all in its power to ensure that the negotiations in progress at Shanghai should reach a successful conclusion in the shortest possible time.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

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La résolution est adoptée à l'unanimité, la délégation japonaise s'abstenant de prendre part au vote.

Le PRÉSIDENT constate, comme conclusion de la discussion et du vote qui viennent d'avoir lieu, qu'il s'est produit un accord entre les deux gouvernements de la Chine et du Japon sur le projet d'armistice, qu'il sera loyalement exécuté et que l'accord sera signé incessamment.

Il tient à remercier les membres du Comité spécial, qui se sont acquittés de leur mandat avec une haute conscience, et sir Eric Drummond, qui au cours des négociations lui a prêté le plus précieux concours. Il remercie enfin les Puissances ayant des intérêts spéciaux à Chang-Hai et dont les représentants ont déployé là-bas l'action la plus vigilante et la plus utile. L'Assemblée espère qu'ils continueront à lui apporter leur concours.

Sir John SIMON (Royaume-Uni), au nom de l'Assemblée, exprime ses remerciements au Président pour la patience et l'habileté avec lesquelles il a accompli la lourde tâche qui lui incombait.

(L'Assemblée décide de s'ajourner jusqu'à nouvel avis.)

The resolution was unanimously adopted, the delegation of Japan abstaining from the vote.

The PRESIDENT noted, as a consequence of the discussion and of the vote which had taken place, that agreement had been reached between the two Governments of China and Japan concerning the armistice. That agreement would be faithfully executed and would be very shortly signed.

He desired to thank the members of the Special Committee who had carried out their instructions with conspicuous devotion, and Sir Eric Drummond, who during the negotiations had given valuable assistance. Finally, he would thank the Powers with special interests at Shanghai who had on the spot given the matter their vigilant and fruitful attention. It was to be hoped that they would continue to afford their co-operation.

Sir John SIMON (United Kingdom), on behalf of the Assembly, expressed his sincere thanks for the patience and skill with which the President had accomplished the heavy task which had been laid upon him.

(The Assembly adjourned until further notice.)

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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0331

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
893.0146
811.23
811.30
841.23
MP
Secretary of State
Washington

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 13, 1932

Rec'd 4:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



F/LS 793.94/5218

241, May 13, 1 p.m.

Department's 177, May 11, 7 p.m. and 170,

May 6, 11 a.m, paragraph four.

(A)-Present British forces ashore 3049
plus 200 marines and bluejackets immediately landable
if necessary.

3249

(B)-Present American forces ashore; 31st In-
fantry 1279, marines 1412, plus 200 American marines
and bluejackets immediately landable if necessary.

2891

Shanghai volunteer corps all nationalities 2239.

Grand total 8379.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

RR

JUN 13 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

FROM

Dated May 13, 1932

Rec'd 3:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

240, May 13, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Referring to my telegram No. 239, May

12, noon. At a meeting of the Chinese and Japanese delegations of the Joint Commission held yesterday afternoon at this Consulate General the Japanese delegation officially but orally informed the Chinese delegation that the entire Japanese army in Shanghai area would be withdrawn in about a month's time, at the latest about June 10th. The Commission stated that the Commission would be officially informed very shortly.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

HPD



F/LS

793.94/5219

MAY 18 1932

FILED

793.94/5219
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/5220

CANCELLED

SEE 793.94-SHANGHAI ROUND TABLE/2

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM GRAY
 PEIPING

Dated May 14, 1932

Rec'd 3:14a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.


532, May 14, 3 p.m.

Tientsin's May 10, noon. There appears to have
 been some Sino Japanese friction at Shanhaikwan but
 as yet nothing of importance.

Legation is investigating and will report further
 if there are any significant developments.

JOHNSON

JS



F/LS 793.94/5221

MAY 18 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1886

May 19, 1932.

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,
 American Minister,
 Borneo.

Sir:

There are enclosed for your information copies, as listed below, of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period May 12 to May 18, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your communicating to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, the information contained in the enclosures to this instruction. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in these messages.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.


Enclosures:

Telegram (527), May 13, from Peiping; 793.94/527
 Telegram (531), May 14, from Peiping; 893.01/531
 Telegram (532), May 14, from Peiping; 793.94/532
 Telegram (240), May 13, from Shanghai; 793.94/5219

FE:EGC

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CR
 May 19, 1932.



793.94/5221

0336

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 14, 1932

Rec'd 12:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

URGENT.

529 May 14, noon. /5213

Legation's 524, May 12, 6 p.m. Following from

Reuter:

"Nanking May twelfth. Chinese official sources state that there are no prospects of holding the round table conference in Shanghai until the Japanese troops have withdrawn from Manchuria into the railway zone.

Although the Japanese troops are being withdrawn from Shanghai and the cessation of hostilities in Shanghai is agreed on it is only a partial settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

So long as the Japanese troops occupy Chinese territory the Chinese Government cannot negotiate with Japan regarding any political issues".

"Shanghai May twelve. The withdrawal of the Japanese troops



F/LS 793.94/5222

OV-17 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#52 from Peiping via N.R.,
May 14, noon.

troops will commence about May twentieth and it is
expected to be completed before the end of the month.

General Shirakawa will be relieved of his post as
commander-in-chief of the expeditionary forces after
he reports to the Throne and completes all remaining
business while the force itself will be reorganized".

JOHNSON

JS

0338

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated May 14, 1932

Rec'd 3:14 a.m.

FROM
 SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
 MAY 16 1932
 MR. KLOTS

Secretary of State
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 14 1932
 Department of State

URGENT

530, May 14, 1 p. m.

Following from Rengo, Tokyo, May twelfth and thirteenth:

"In reference to the petition sent to the Government by Japanese residents at Shanghai, War Minister Araki remarks that the movement of the Imperial army is decided by Imperial authority. The order once issued for withdrawal cannot be countermanded.

General Araki assures the Japanese at Shanghai to be perfectly at ease for if the situation grows unquiet the army will not leave them to their fate.

The Supreme Military Council was held at the War Minister's room in the War Office at one p. m. on the twelfth which lasted until five thirty. It is understood that the fundamental policy of the War Office relating to the steps to be taken after the withdrawal of troops from Shanghai and measures for South Manchuria, North Manchuria, Soviet Russia and the League of Nations was deliberated upon. The Council will be in session every day for some time to come."

JOHNSON

JS

793.94
 893.102
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 894.23

F/LS

793.94/5223

REMO

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.102-S/1165 FOR memorandum

FROM State Department. (Hackworth) DATED Jan. 29, 1933
~~xxx~~ The Legal Adviser NAME 1-1127 app

REGARDING: blockade of Shanghai. While history of Shanghai affords evidence that right of blockade should not be exercised with respect to that port, the port has not attained a status in international law to render illegal the exercise of such right. While conclusion as to the port is also applicable to the International Settlement, status and history of Settlement afford stronger reasons for requesting and expecting that the Settlement be excepted from the operation of any blockade of the port.

dew

793.94/5224

5224

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11952 FOR Tel 528 4pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED May 13, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING:

Telegrams to Mr. Wei from Chinese Generals expressing satisfaction over the Shanghai settlement.

ek

793.94/5225

5225

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

PLAIN

.. Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 13, 1932

Rec'd 8:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

528, May 13, 4 p.m.

Legation's 525, May 12, 5 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Nanking, May 12:

It is announced that Mr. Wang Cheng Wei has received telegrams from Generals Chen Chi Tang, Li Tung Jen and Pai Chung Shi, the Kwangtung and Kwangsi leaders, expressing satisfaction with the settlement of the Shanghai dispute and pledging fullest and most loyal support to the Central Government. These telegrams, it is stated here, should dissipate all disquieting rumors concerning the situation in South China."

JOHNSON

KLP

WSB

0 3 4 2

[Signature]

MP

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 14, 1932

Rec'd 4:50 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 14 1932
Department of State

244, May 14, 2 p.m.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE
my 236, May 10, 9 a.m. has been guarded alternatively by British and American forces. Both these forces have been withdrawn to billets as previously stated. British forces in sector outside Settlement boundary have not been withdrawn from perimeter of the defense area apparently because Settlement police do not function there.

Two. One battalion of the British troops, approximately 700 men, left for Hong Kong about April 18th. Italians have just reduced their forces ashore by 100 and have now 100 men on shore.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WWC

HPD

F/LS 793.94/5226

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 By Milton D. Huestefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY ..

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 16, 1932

Rec'd 6:05 a.m.



Secretary of State,
 Washington.

245, May 16, noon.

Colonel Drysdale this morning personally witnessed
 the withdrawal of Japanese bluejackets from that part of
 Cha~~pe~~^{PEI} south of the railway and the resumption of control
 of the evacuated district without incident by 500 Chinese
 police from Peiping. Drysdale is leaving tomorrow morning
 for Peiping where upon Lieutenant Robert H. Soule replaces
 him as member of the joint commission in accordance with
 instructions of the American Minister. Transmit to War
 Department.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

RR

WSB

F/LS

793.94/5227

1932

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 813.0146
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

FROM

Dated May 16, 1932

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



Telegram to Geneva

F/LS

246, May 16, 5 p. m.

Referring to my telegram No. 245, May 16, noon,
and other telegrams regarding the evacuation by the
Japanese and resumption of control of the area by the
Chinese:

793.94/5228

One. The Japanese have informed the Chinese that
Tazang will be evacuated at one o'clock May 17th and
requested the Chinese to establish contact today.

Two. The personnel of the committee for the re-
establishment of control of the evacuated area has been
notified to the Japanese.

Three. The Chinese have requested the Japanese to
evacuate the railway lines concerned so that they may be
repaired and operation resumed.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

RR

WSB

0345

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department

OR
 Charge to
 \$

PM REC'D
 TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

May 16, 1932.

MAY 16 32

6P

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA.

12/5227
 May 16 the Consul General at Shanghai reports
 that that morning the American Military Attaché
 personally witnessed the withdrawal of Japanese
 bluejackets from that part of Chapei south of the
 railway and the resumption by 500 Chinese police
 from Peiping of control of the evacuated district
 without incident.

May 16/5228 the Consul General also reports that
 the Japanese have informed the Chinese that Tazang
 will be evacuated May 17 and the Japanese have
 requested that the Chinese establish contact today;
 that the personnel of the committee for the reestablish-
 ment of control of the evacuated area has been notified
 to the Japanese; and that the Chinese have requested
 that the Japanese evacuate the railway lines in order
 that the lines may be repaired and operation resumed.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

Enciphered by FE:MMH:LM
793.94/5228

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-138

793.94/5228

034F

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 462

REC'D

LEGAL ADVISER

COPIES SENT TO

O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of Economic Affairs

JUL 25 1932

AMERICAN CONSULATE

GENERAL

COM. & RE.

Mukden, China, April 18, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 14 32

SUBJECT:

Resume of Political Developments
 September 18, 1931 to March 31, 1932.

Office of Economic Affairs

MAY 24 1932

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

1/-

I have the honor to enclose herewith a brief resume of political developments in South Manchuria between September 18, 1931 and March 31, 1932. It is thought that a review of this kind might prove of interest to the Department and the Legation and its perusal might be helpful to General McCoy, the American member of the League Commission of Inquiry. The resume is based on material on file at this Consulate General and was prepared by Vice Consul Monroe Hall.

A few observations may be of interest in this connection. In the first place, the rapidity with which the occupation of Mukden was effected and the extension of military occupation immediately to other cities in the railway zone and within a few days to Kirin city despite the absence of a menace from that quarter and the guarantees of the local officials that they would adequately protect Japanese nationals afford overwhelming evidence that the Japanese army was completely prepared

F/LS 793.94/5229

MAY 13 1932

711300

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 16 1932
 Department of State

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

pared for this action and that the questions at issue were not merely local or transitory ones. Attention may also be drawn to the frequent military manoeuvres which the Japanese army staged in the environs of Mukden during the weeks preceding the occupation and to the presence of considerable artillery in Mukden at that time which unconfirmed reports stated had been brought from Korea and discharged during the dead of night only a few days prior to the outbreak. These circumstances may be adduced as evidence in support of the conclusion, reached at that time by close observers of political conditions in Manchuria, that Japan had decided to effect a settlement of the Manchurian problems and that the much emphasized railway incident, the Nakamura case and other recent incidents were exaggerated far beyond their proportions for the purpose of giving the Japanese military action an appearance of reasonableness and at the same time of cloaking its real purpose.

That the Chinese authorities had at least given the Japanese ample opportunity for resorting to drastic action for protecting their interests and treaty rights cannot be gainsaid. The Chinese obviously were blinded by the seeming success of their studied policy of procrastination and disregard of agreements and protests and in spite of ominous warnings persisted in these obstructive and aggravating tactics. The situation had reached such a pass according to a recent statement of a prominent Japanese official that Japan decided that it would have to move into Manchuria or
 withdraw

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

withdraw entirely.

It may be of interest to mention a few of the important events of the period covered by the resume which definitely mark the disclosure or unmasking of Japanese plans for accomplishing the domination of Manchuria. After the initial military occupation, the events that stand out are the airplane bombardment of Chin Hsien (Chinchow - old name) on October 8, the attack on the Heilungkiang forces on the Nonni river early in November and the subsequent occupation of Tsitsihar - these steps were not taken until Japanese propaganda had disclosed that Soviet Russia would not use military force for the protection of its sphere of influence -, the despatch of Japanese troops against Chin Hsien late in November which was so unexpectedly stopped and disavowed by the Japanese government, the long delayed expulsion of the Chinese troops from the Chin Hsien area and the elimination of Chinese rule in South Manchuria at the beginning of the year (Chin Hsien occupied on January 2, 1932) and the development of the movement for the creation of a new state which culminated on March 9, 1932, with the inauguration of P'u Yi (ex-Emperor Hsuan T'ung) as the Chief Executive of Manchoukuo at Changchun, the capital. It is worth while noting that Japanese interest in and connection with the independence movement which began to attract attention late in September has existed from the outset.

In the light of the developments outlined in the enclosure, the Japanese government's protestations that they have been in no way connected or concerned with the creation of the new state cannot be taken literally but

may


0345

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

may possibly be explained by the oriental complex for keeping the records clean for the sake of appearances. As a matter of fact, all reports of persons who have had any relations with the new government unanimously state that the government is Japanese, that is, that its Japanese members completely control and actuate every department and therefore it is obviously not Manchurian in the sense that the word denotes the native inhabitants of this land - a broader interpretation of the word to include Japanese and Koreans as well may explain the Japanese insistence upon its use.

Yours respectfully,


M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

✓ Enclosure: Resume of political developments in South Manchuria.

Original and four copies to Department.
Two copies to Legation

800
MSM:CC

4 Carbon copies
Received F.P.
copy in D.C.R.
for note - loc.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 462 of M. S. Myers, American Consul General at Mukden, China, dated April 18, 1932 to Department of State on the subject "Resume of Political Developments September 18, 1931 to March 31, 1932".

MEMORANDUM

SUMMARY OF SALIENT POINTS PERTAINING TO THE SITUATION IN SOUTH MANCHURIA FROM SEPTEMBER 1931 THROUGH MARCH 1932.

(Compiled from the files of the American)
 Consulate General, Mukden.

Date of Report. SUBJECT.

Sept. 10. REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH MANCHURIA DURING AUGUST, 1931.

1. Critical condition of Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria.

2. The relationship of Manchuria to the rest of China becoming more intimate. Opposition of Japan to this tendency.

3. Nakamura Case: Strained relations between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Army. Nakamura case merely a pretext. Opinion that the Japanese army desired the failure of the negotiations in this case as strongly as the Foreign Office desired a peaceful settlement because the army was eager for action in Manchuria and settlement of the Nakamura case would have removed a strong pretext.

4. Wanpaoshan Incident: Reasons for the negotiations reaching an impasse.

5. Decrease in the sale of Japanese goods due to unfavorable gold yen exchange. Little progress made in Mukden in the anti-Japanese boycott.

Sept. 13 NAKAMURA CASE.

Report that the Japanese Consul General had convinced the Mukden authorities that if this case was not settled satisfactorily there would be critical consequences. Chinese Chief of Police left Mukden to join the group of investigators who were sent out on September 6.

Sept. 19 OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.
 1 A.M.

Informed by the Japanese Consulate General that the S. M. R. was cut north of Mukden by 400 Chinese troops from the Pei Ta Ying garrison. 150 Japanese troops engaging the Chinese.

Informed by the Chinese Foreign Office that the Japanese had been requested unsuccessfully to cease firing.

see

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Sept.19. (see the other reports on the outbreak of hostilities).

Japanese army occupied the commercial settlement and the Chinese city, Mukden, during the night of September 18-19.

Proclamation posted in Mukden, signed by General Honjo, setting forth the Kwantung Army's explanation of the outbreak of hostilities, and reassurances and warnings to the Chinese civilian population. The substance is that the Chinese army damaged the S. M. R. and attacked the Japanese guards, and that these actions were part of a studied plan and policy.

Sept.20. JAPANESE MILITARY OCCUPATION.

1. Changchun, Newchwang, Yingkow, Antung, Kwang Chen-tze occupied by the Japanese military during the morning of September 19.

2. Chinese troops in and near Mukden offered no resistance.

3. Explanation of the incident by the Japanese Consulate General.

4. Belief that the Japanese Consulate General did not know the plans of the military.

5. Difficulty of believing the Japanese explanation of the incident.

6. Impression that the Japanese Consular Officials in Mukden did not believe the statement by the military authorities that the incident was caused by Chinese aggression.

7. Just before the incident negotiations concerning the Nakamura case were progressing satisfactorily due to the conciliatory attitude adopted by the Chinese.

Sept.21. Japanese authorities would not state conditions under which a return to status quo ante would be made.

Japanese military occupation extended to Kirin. Heavy movement of troops northward from Mukden. The main body of the Japanese troops were at Changchun. Practically all of the Chinese soldiers had been moved down the Peiping-Mukden Railway to Chinchow and Shan-haikwan.

Chinese banks closed by the Japanese. Provisional Municipal Administration by Chinese under a Japanese officer (Doihara) established in Mukden.

Sept.22. Difficulty of finding Chinese willing to participate in the provisional administration under

Doihara

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Sept. 22.

Doihara. Japanese plan to have similar municipal governments established in Antung, Newchwang, Changchun, Ssu-pingkai and Kirin.

Occupation of the city of Kirin completed September 21. Chientao area was being occupied.

All Chinese shops and banks in Mukden remained closed. Japanese military deny that the railway east of Kirin city was occupied.

Japanese military reported that only one division reinforced by five Korean battalions was in Manchuria.

The Japanese stated that the occupation was practically complete and that it extended over the entire S. M. R. zone, and Chengchiatun, Kirin City, Kuangcheng-tze which were occupied to protect resident Japanese.

Sept. 23.

CONSENSUS OF CHINESE AND LOCAL FOREIGNERS' OPINIONS CONCERNING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

1. Japanese for many nights prior to September 18 had held nightly machine gun practice.
2. On the night of September 18 unusually heavy machine gun fire started shortly after 9 p.m.
3. Explosion near north camp at about 10:30 p.m.
4. From that time on rifle fire continued all night.
5. Japanese artillery fire started about midnight.
6. Trench mortar arsenal attacked shortly afterwards with hand grenades. Workmen and guards killed in their sleeping quarters.
7. By 5 a.m. entire city occupied by the Japanese military.
8. Chinese maintain they had orders for several days not to fire on the Japanese under any circumstances.
9. Apparent that Chinese offered little if any resistance.
10. Japanese story of the attack is dubious.
11. Further details.

S.M.R. FOREIGN OFFICE REPORTED THE MOVEMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS TOWARD TUNHUA.

1. Other troop movements.

Japanese

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Sept.23. Japanese reinforcements from Korea went through Mukden on September 22 for Changchun where the chief concentration of Japanese troops was taking place.

Japanese planes flew over Hsinmin and Tahu-shan and, it is reported, dropped bombs on the barracks at the latter place.

Sept.24. JAPANESE ARMORED TRAIN AND TWO COMPANIES POSTED JUST EAST OF HSINMIN.

1. Position of other troops.

South bound train for Shanhaikwan loaded with refugees held up by bandits between Chuliuho and Hsinmin. Train reached Hsinmin without passengers. About 200 Japanese troops despatched to Hsinmin.

Banks in Mukden still closed and business at a standstill.

CONSUL VINCENT'S MEMORANDUM AFTER INSPECTING THE SCENE OF THE ALLEGED EXPLOSION WITH A JAPANESE ESCORT.

(See also Lieutenant Brown's report which includes a sketch of the scene and is from the military point of view).

1. Inspection of the scene was preceded by a summary of violations of Japan's treaty rights in Manchuria and of irritating incidents by Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto's version of the details of the clash.

3. Reasons for the firm opinion in which Consul Vincent, Lieutenant Brown and Lieutenant Cranford concurred, that the Japanese version of the clash was not trustworthy.

Sept.26 JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTH MANCHURIA.

(This despatch supplements previous reports)

1. Japanese battalion which occupied Tunhwa was withdrawn to Kirin.

2. Occupation by Japanese troops of Liaoyuan (Chengchiatun) Tungliao and Taonan.

3. Occupation of Tungliao terminated.

4. Japanese officers stated that 15,000 Japanese troops were in Manchuria. Some observers believe this figure to be too small.

5. Pretext for occupation was the alleged ex-

plosion

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plosion on the S. M. R.

6. Chinese and Japanese versions of the clash are entirely different.

7. Japanese were obviously prepared for a clash. Evidence of preparations.

8. The time selected by the Japanese for the settlement of Manchurian issues was opportune.

Sept. 29. Provisional government formed by Chinese officials in Kirin.

Japanese press reported a movement for the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia.

Letters from observers on the spot describing the Japanese occupation of Kirin.

Removal of \$800,000 from the provincial depositories in Kirin to the Japanese Consulate.

Japanese Consul General, Kirin, stated that the acts of the Military were beyond his knowledge.

Sept. 30. RECENT INCIDENTS ON THE PEIPING-MUKDEN RAILWAY.

Japanese machine gun fire from an airplane flying over a train, killed several Chinese.

Japanese explain that the fire was directed against Chinese soldiers.

Misleading interview given to the press by Major Watari concerning the Peiping-Mukden Railway.

THE SITUATION ON SEPTEMBER 29.

1. Military situation appeared to be stabilized temporarily, but the political situation, outwardly at least, was more complex.

2. Bank of China and Bank of Communications in Mukden resumed business on September 28. Most of the native shops remained closed.

3. Personnel of the Chinese Peace Maintenance Committee in Mukden.

4. Propaganda in the Japanese-controlled press for the establishment of a new government.

5. Belief that Chang Hsueh-liang will not be permitted to return to Mukden.

6. Sidelights on the Japanese occupation, including

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ing interference with commerce and with the actions of Chinese officials.

Oct. 1. Japanese authorities gave much prominence to the alleged Chinese movement to form an independent Manchurian government.

Japanese forces from Yingkow entered Newchwang-cheng which had been attacked by bandits at 2 a.m. October 1.

Oct. 2. INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AT MUKDEN.

1. The movement was instigated and forced by the Japanese. Yuan Chin-k'ai stated that he had been urged by the Japanese to organize an independent government, and that he had refused. He considered it probable that the Japanese had approached other Chinese.

2. Japanese strongly opposed to the return of Chang Hsueh-liang.

3. Attitude of the Japanese toward the local official banks.

4. Opinion that the longer the re-establishment of Chinese authority in Mukden is delayed the more chance there will be to establish a puppet government.

Oct. 3. Yuan Chin k'ai and K'an Chao-hsu denied newspaper reports stating that they were connected with the movement to form a new government.

Oct. 5. IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY OCCUPATION UPON AMERICAN INTERESTS.

1. Interference with personal liberty.

(a) Japanese soldiers with fixed bayonets patrolled the streets in front of the Consulate General.

(b) Labels or certificates of identity were required of Consular servants in order that they might pass through the streets unmolested by Japanese soldiers.

(c) Consular officials were stopped in the Chinese city by Japanese soldiers and made to identify themselves, (see also the Chamberlain incident of January 4.)

(d) Permission had to be obtained from the Japanese military for Americans to visit such places as the Mukden (Chinese) radio station, Chinese aviation field, arsenal, railway station, and other places.

The

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(e) The Japanese military had to be approached, through the Japanese Consulate General, concerning practically all matters which prior to September 19 came within the province of Chinese officials.

(f) No official notification was presented to the Consulate General of the establishment of control by the Japanese.

2. Interference with American companies and American trade.

(a) Requests from American firms for some form of identification for their Chinese employees in order to permit them to travel to and from their work without being molested by Japanese patrols.

(b) Letters from Andersen, Meyer & Company requesting the Consulate General to protect its interests in unpaid accounts in a number of Chinese government and semi-government concerns.

(c) Letter from Frazar Federal Incorporated concerning the company's substantial interest in the motor buses of a Chinese company which were seized by the Japanese, and requesting a protest to be made against the forced occupation of the company's office by Japanese soldiers, and the seizure without payment of gasoline on the company's premises.

(d) Interference with the Mukden Radio Station.

(e) Refusal by the Japanese of a request to inspect the American owned Waco airplane.

(f) Very adverse effect of the Japanese occupation on the business of the National City Bank of New York.

(g) Other cases of interference with the operations of American companies including the cases of the Standard Oil Company, and the Vacuum Oil Company.

3. Possibility that the Japanese banks will take over the remunerative task of financing South Manchuria and furnishing it with bank notes.

4. Effect of the general economic paralysation of South Manchuria on American business.

Oct. 6. Clash of Japanese detachment with Chinese near Ssupingkai.

Guerilla

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Oct. 6. Guerilla warfare in country districts north-east of Mukden.

Japanese reported outbreaks of anti-Korean feeling. 500 Korean farmers reported murdered. Troops sent to the northeast of Fushun to protect Koreans.

Oct. 7. At the time of the occupation of Mukden all Chinese government offices were seized and labelled "occupied by the Japanese Army".

Local foreign office kept open only for the handling of visa work, and each application for a visa reported to the Japanese gendarmery headquarters.

Japanese infantry numbering 300 men, plus field artillery left Mukden October 7, 2 a.m. for Hsinmin area to reinforce detachment there. Six airplanes departed at daybreak.

Japanese headquarters reported that Chinese forces straggling toward Chinchow were terrifying that district.

Oct. 8. The Peace Maintenance Committee issued a statement on October 7, denying that it had anything to do with setting up a new government, or with any move for independence.

TEN JAPANESE AIRPLANES BOMBED CHINCHOW AT NOON.

1. Thirty bombs were dropped, and there was machine gun fire from the planes. The Chinese did not fire at any time.

2. General Honjo's explanation of the bombing of Chinchow. His reasons appear flimsy and unconvincing.

3. Every act of the Japanese military revealed that their purpose was to overthrow Chang Hsueh-liang. Translation of leaflets dropped from the planes.

4. The bombing was a nullification of the Japanese protestation that their military actions were in self defence.

5. Casualties resulting from the bombing of Chinchow: 16 killed including one Russian.

Oct. 9. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION.

1. Situation at Mukden remained unchanged.

2. Outside of the railway zone and Chinese cities adjacent thereto, Japanese troops were at Hsinmin, Liao-yang and Kirin.

3. Japanese reported that there were only two recent

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Oct 9.
 recent military operations.

(a) Against "bandit troops" north of Mukden.

(b) Against "bandit troops" northeast of Fushun.

4. Japanese troops outside of the railway zone officially reported to Lieutenant Brown to be 4,800
 Distribution of these troops.

Japanese control of Mukden practically complete. The complete withdrawal of Japanese troops before the establishment of an effective Chinese municipal administration and police force would jeopardize lives and property.

Since the Japanese occupation banditry increased greatly. Many Chinese soldiers and police fled from their posts and turned into bandits.

(a) Details of bandit operations.

Japanese censors established in the Chinese post office. Chinese telegraph and wireless station at Mukden closed since September 19.

Oct. 10. POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH MANCHURIA.

1. The military actions undertaken by the Japanese were dictated by political considerations and had no relation to the railway incident.

2. General survey of the situation.

3. Japanese Consul General stated in private conversation that the independence movement could not succeed without Japanese support.

4. Japanese intrigues among the Mongols in the Liaoyuan and Taonan areas.

Oct. 12. Message from Mr. Chester Rowell which he requested Minister Johnson to transmit to President Hoover.

(a) Former Manchurian Government completely eradicated.

(b) Chinchow air raid was directed against Chang Hsueh-liang's government.

(c) Japanese army authorities were trying to form in Manchuria and inner Mongolia government under Japanese tutelage.

Oct. 14. Japanese airplanes in the neighborhood of
 Koupang-tze

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Koupang-tze reported fired on by a Chinese troop train and responded by dropping bombs.

Japanese detachments frequently sent to the interior to disperse bandits.

Large expedition against bandits sent from Mukden October 14, to Hsinglungtien (on P-M railway) to disperse 5,000 bandits. Expedition consisted of 2 battalions infantry, one battalion artillery, one squadron of cavalry, one squadron of airplanes.

This expedition returned to Mukden October 15 after dispersing the bandits.

Oct. 15. Customs station on the bridgehead at Antung closed by the Japanese.

(a) This action will cause a great loss of revenue.

(b) Statement of the Commissioner of Customs at Antung.

Oct. 16. Ta Lin Chan on Liaoyuan - Tungliao railway occupied by 2,000 Mongols on October 13, Tungliao occupied October 14. Japanese force moved west on this line to attack the Mongol bandits.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PEACE MAINTENANCE
 COMMITTEE AT MUKDEN.

1. Purpose and work of the Committee.
2. Personnel of the Committee was pressed by the Japanese to assume the functions of government.
3. Essentially the Committee is the unofficial spokesman of the Chinese in dealing with the Japanese.
4. Similar Committees formed at Fushun, Newchwang, Tiehling, Changchun and Ssupingkai.
5. Regulations of the Committee.

Oct. 17. The Chinese Post Office remained the only Chinese administration at Mukden which had neither been closed nor put under Japanese control.

Banditry was extremely serious especially west of the Liao.

Probability that banditry would be used as a pretext for further military action.

The

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Oct. 20. THE REOPENING UNDER JAPANESE SUPERVISION
 AND CONTROL OF THE BANK OF THE THREE
 EASTERN PROVINCES AND THE FRONTIER BANK
 IN MUKDEN ON OCTOBER 15.

1. General Honjo's instruction to the Peace Maintenance Committee giving the regulations under which the banks were permitted to reopen.
2. Deleterious effect on American business of the restrictions on the banks.
3. Japanese advisers in the banks.
4. Railways and public utilities put under Japanese control.
5. Evidence that the Japanese were laying foundations for the financial and economic domination of South Manchuria.
6. Provincial regulations governing the reopening of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank.

Oct. 21. SELF GOVERNING SOCIETIES FORMED AT FUSHUN,
 TIEHLING, LIAOYUAN, AND AT LEAST SIX OTHER
 PLACES.

1. The Executive Committees of the societies are provisionally functioning as administrators of their respective districts.
2. Japanese are reported to be advisers to the societies.

REORGANIZATION OF THE BUREAU OF FINANCE OF
 LIAONING PROVINCE.

1. Copy of the provisional regulations ostensibly by the Peace Maintenance Committee but the hand of the Japanese military is plainly visible.
2. Economic activities of the Japanese.
 - (a) Japanese control over the official banks.
 - (b) Probability that taxes formerly objected to by the Japanese will be dropped.
 - (c) Opinion that the regulations of the former government for preventing the expansion of Japanese interests will be withdrawn.

Oct. 22. PEACE MAINTENANCE COMMITTEE WAS GRADUALLY
 ASSUMING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PROVINCIAL
 GOVERNMENT.

1. Bureau of Industry opened.

Japanese

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Oct. 22. Japanese officially reported that a clash had occurred between 1,000 Chinese troops and two companies of railway guards about 8 miles south of Tiehling on October 21. Chinese retreated westward. Japanese cavalry despatched to cut them off.

Japanese planes scouting over the Taonan-Angangki Railway were fired on by Chinese troops and in reply dropped bombs, Japanese stated that two bridges on this railway were destroyed recently by the Chinese, and that the necessity of protecting their interest in the railway was the reason for the bombing.

Letter from Mr. Chao Hsin-po stating that he had been appointed Mayor of Mukden on October 20.

1. Summary of provisional regulations governing the municipal office.

2. Japanese advisers.

3. Bureau of Police Force.

Oct. 23. SUMMARY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

1. Further information concerning the administration of Mukden municipality.

2. Appointments made subject to the approval of the Japanese military.

3. Japanese advisers attached to every Chinese office.

4. Opinion that the Japanese military were seizing every opportunity to punish the Northeastern forces.

5. Joint committee for the maintenance of peace and order of the Mongolian border officially announced its formation on October 12, at Taonan.

6. BRIDGE OVER THE NONNI RIVER SOUTH OF ANGANGKI DESTROYED BY HEILUNGKIANG TROOPS.

(see also the Telegraphic report of October 22)

7. Bandit activities:

(a) West of Liao river.

(b) Mongolian bandits.

8. Additional information.

Oct. 24. Traffic on the Liaoyuan-Tungliao railway suspended due to activities of Mongolian bandits.

Activities of Japanese subjects for the
 restoration

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Oct. 24.

restoration of a monarchical government in Manchuria. The effect of these activities will be to give the Japanese a plausible pretext for prolonged military occupation and for reinforcing their troops.

Oct. 26.

Copies of telegrams sent by Consul General Hanson and Second Secretary Salisbury from October 6 to October 20 while on their tour of investigation. These telegrams present a review of the hostilities since September 18, reports of interviews with Chinese and Japanese, and the reflections of the investigators on the situation.

The general tenor of the telegrams is that the Japanese military action was unwarranted.

Oct. 27.

Chang Hai-p'eng, Tupan of the Mongolian border, reported to have been supplied with arms and ammunition by the Japanese for his expedition against the Heilungkiang government.

A Japanese military train was despatched from Liaoyuan to the Nonni river for the purpose of surveying the damage done to the railway.

Oct. 29.

Attempt of the Japanese military authorities to interfere with the business of the National City Bank, Mukden branch.

(a) Protest made to the Japanese Consul General.

(b) Memorandum by the Manager of the Bank.

(c) Incident settled by a reply from the Japanese Consul General interpreting the army's communication as merely an expression of desire.

Oct. 30.

Military movements around Liaoyuan.

(a) Bandit activities.

(b) Efforts of the Japanese to force a movement for independence, including efforts to effect a Manchu restoration.

Oct. 31.

According to reliable information a Japanese armed guard removed on October 31 \$670,000 of Salt Administration funds from the Bank of China, Newchwang, to the Provincial Bank at that place.

Nov. 2.

Additional unsuccessful efforts of the Japanese to induce Yuan Chin-k'ai to organize a provincial government at Mukden.

Serious fighting reported at Tailai between

Chang Hai-p'eng's

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Nov. 2.

Chang Hai-p'eng's forces and those of Ma Chan-shan.
 Reports that Japanese troops were assisting Chang.

Japanese troops were despatched north of
 Chengchiatun along the Ssu-tao railway on October 28
 to re-establish traffic.

Nov. 3.

Ultimatum by General Honjo to the Chinese
 troops at Tsitsihar and Taonan demanding their with-
 drawal to a point 10 kilometres from the Nonni river
 to prevent interference with the Japanese gangs who,
 under the protection of Japanese troops, will repair
 the destroyed railway bridges.

Nov. 5.

REPORT OF JAPANESE HEADQUARTERS CONCERN-
ING THE FIGHTING WITH MA CHAN SHAN'S
FORCES AT NONNI RIVER.

(a) Details of the engagement.

CLOSURE OF CHINESE ELECTRIC LIGHT AND
POWER PLANTS BY THE JAPANESE.

1. Chinese plant at Antung was closed by order
 of the Japanese military on September 22.

2. The Mukden Electric Light Company is com-
 pletely under the control of the Japanese.

3. Chinese plant at Changchun was closed by
 the Japanese.

4. The Newchwang plant is a Sino-Japanese
 enterprise and consequently has not been interfered with.

Additional information concerning the efforts
 of the Japanese to induce Yuan Chin-kai to organize a
 provincial government. Yuan reiterated his refusal.

Points submitted by the Peace Maintenance
 Committee to the Japanese military authorities for
 approval.

Nov. 7.

Severe engagement at the Nonni river was
 concluded by the occupation of the Chinese positions by
 the Japanese and the withdrawal in good order of the
 Chinese forces to a new position 15 kilometres south of
 Angangki.

The Japanese force numbering 2,000 was re-
 ported to be strengthening their positions, and rush-
 ing repairs to the bridge.

Reported that Chinese reinforcements of
 approximately 2,000 are proceeding to the scene over
 the C. E. R.

Nov. 8.

The Peace Maintenance Committee announced

that

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Nov. 8.

that it was functioning as the provincial government but that it was not concerned with past or future questions and that it had no connection with Nanking or Chang Hsueh-liang.

Nov. 10.

Japanese military reported an increase of banditry in regions adjacent to the S.M.R. due to the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the Nonni river area. Engagements with bandits occurred in the vicinity of Haicheng, Tiehling, Hsinmin and Ssuningkai.

Nov. 11.

Translation of a pamphlet issued by Japanese soldiers to the populace of Kirin.

1. "Duration of occupation to be two or three years in order to liberate the people of the Northeast".

2. "Anyone hostile to our soldiers shall be considered an enemy and conquered even if they are a league of many powers".

Nov. 12.

Rumor that an attempt will be made to make P'u Yi the sovereign of Manchuria.

The Japanese Consul General stated that the Japanese troops would not be withdrawn by November 16.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS WITH CONSUL
 GENERAL HAYASHI AND VICE CONSUL MIURA
 CONCERNING THE MANCHURIAN SITUATION.

Comment on the memorandum.

1. Two most salient points at that time in the Manchurian situation.

(a) Military activities in the northwest along the Tao-An Railway.

(b) The efforts to establish with Japanese assistance an independent government of Manchuria and Mongolia.

2. Opinion that the Japanese military have as their irreducible minimum object the reduction of Manchuria to the status of a protectorate of Japan in fact if not in name.

3. Consul General Hayashi had urged his government to have a committee of investigation visit Manchuria.

4. Situation in the Nonni river area.

Nov. 13.

KWANTUNG ARMY HEADQUARTERS REPORTED THAT THE
 SITUATION ON THE NONNI RIVER WAS BECOMING
 VERY DANGEROUS.

1. Troop movements.

Impressions

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Nov. 13. 2. Impressions of an American newspaper correspondent after his inspection of the Japanese position on the Nonni.

Nov. 15. Army headquarters which had reported quiet on the Nonni front during the past three days, broken only by minor outpost engagements was forced by newspapermen who had seen contrary despatches to admit that there had been Japanese attacks with heavy artillery since November 12.

Nov. 16. Policy of the Japanese military headquarters in reference to seized materials.

INTERVIEW WITH PRINCE KUNG.

1. He stated that the Japanese ronin had tried to persuade him to form a Manchurian Monarchy.

2. He refused; but he would like to see a Manchurian republic established.

3. He stated that the ronin were urging P'u Yi to become Emperor and he is afraid that P'u Yi, being weak, may succumb to the persuasion.

Nov. 17. Japanese demonstration at Mukden in opposition to the attitude of the League of Nations, and to manifest wholehearted support of a strong policy in Manchuria.

Nov. 18. KWANTUNG ARMY HEADQUARTERS ANNOUNCED THAT A JAPANESE OFFENSIVE COMMENCED ON THE NONNI FRONT AT DAWN ON NOVEMBER 18.

Japanese military reported that after the fighting near Tahsing, Ma Chan Shan concentrated strong forces at and around Angangki. He failed to reply to the Japanese proposals and advanced and pressed the Japanese right flank and rear, and in this way endangered the Nonni river bridges near Kiang Chou. Also, after the small front-line clashes of the preceding few days Ma undertook an enveloping offensive. Consequently the Japanese for self-defence launched an offensive.

Japanese press reported that a mixed brigade and planes ordered to Manchuria left Japan proper on the 14th and 16th respectively.

Japanese reservists were called to the colors for guard duty in the railway zone to replace troops which have been sent to the front.

The Japanese officials announced that Japanese troops after sharp fighting reached the C. E. R. on November 18 at 1 p.m.

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Nov. 18. THE JAPANESE FINALLY INDUCED THE PEACE
 MAINTENANCE COMMITTEE UNDER YUAN CHIN-
 K'AI TO ORGANIZE A PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT.

1. The Japanese met more difficulty than they had anticipated in establishing independent governments in Manchuria.

2. Activities of P'u Yi.

3. Additional information pertaining to the military and political situations.

Nov. 19. JAPANESE HEADQUARTERS OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED
 THAT TSITSIHAR STATION HAD BEEN OCCUPIED
 BY THE JAPANESE FORCES AT ABOUT NOON ON
 NOVEMBER 19.

1. The Chinese were retreating in disorder about 20 kilometres north of Tsitsihar.

2. Russia had taken no action as a result of the Tsitsihar engagement.

3. Reinforcements consisting of a mixed brigade, estimated strength 5,000 were scheduled to arrive in Mukden from Japan on November 20.

Nov. 21. JAPANESE HEADQUARTERS REPORTED:

1. Three trains of Chinese troops passed Shan-haikwan moving northward.

2. The main concentration of Chinese troops along the Peiping-Mukden Railway was reported to be at Koupangtze.

Japanese replacement brigade was detained in Mukden in readiness it is believed for an offensive towards Chinchow, the probable objective of the next Japanese attack.

Nov. 23. SEIZURE OF SALT ADMINISTRATION FUNDS.

The Banks and Salt Offices were informed by the Japanese military that no withdrawals of salt funds were to be made without the approval of the military authorities.

Transfer of the salt funds in the Bank of China, Newchwang, to the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces at the insistence of the Japanese.

Memorandum by the Special Deputy of the Chief Inspector of Salt Revenue, Shanghai, entitled, "The Salt Revenue of Manchuria".

Additional information.

Minor

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Nov. 24. Minor engagement 4 miles northeast of Ch'üliu-ho. Infantry company from Mukden sent as a reinforcement.

Nov. 25. REPORTED THAT A JAPANESE DRIVE AGAINST CHIN-CHOW WAS IMMINENT COULD BE INFERRED FROM EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE.

The purpose of the drive would be to end the influence of Chang Hsueh-liang and the National Government north of the wall. The eradication of their influence would greatly facilitate the endeavors of the Japanese toward establishing independent governments in Manchuria.

The independence movements have not been spontaneous.

The increased activity of bandits and the inability of the local governments to maintain order were advanced by the Japanese as the reasons for continuing their military occupation. But the local governments were kept weak by Japanese restrictions.

Nov. 27. KWANTUNG ARMY HEADQUARTERS COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 27.

"Due to the serious fighting in Tientsin the Kwantung army decided to take the necessary measures".

One hundred twenty cars loaded with Japanese troops and military equipment including tanks and artillery left Mukden early in the morning of November 27 over the Peiping-Mukden railway in the direction of Chinchow.

Lieutenant-Colonel McIlloy reported three battalions from Kirin and Ssupingkai, with one battalion from Changchun following, were enroute as reinforcements.

Four hundred reservists in Mukden called to the colors for local guard duty.

Many airplanes departed during the morning of November 27 from their Mukden base in a westerly direction.

Japanese headquarters reported that an armored train preceding Japanese forces over the Peiping-Mukden railway met and captured a Chinese train east of Tahushan.

Estimated strength of Japanese forces in the Chinchow drive, 13 battalions.

Nov. 30. Headquarters announced that the Japanese forces despatched toward Chinchow had been substantially withdrawn to the east of the Liao river.

Headquarters

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Nov. 30. Headquarters also reported that the Chinese forces east of Chinchow were being augmented.

The Peiping-Mukden railway and telegraph lines were cut in several places on November 29.

Headquarters reported that 3,000 Heilungkiang troops were marching on Tsitsihar. Because of the threat to the safety of the 500 Japanese troops still at Tsitsihar headquarters despatched two battalions of reinforcements from Mukden in the morning of December 1.

Dec. 2. SOME ASPECTS OF THE JAPANESE OCCUPATIONS.

1. Japanese public utility service was replacing the Chinese.

(a) Extension of the Japanese water, gas, and telephone services in Mukden.

2. The Fengtien Mining Administration (Chinese) was closed by the Japanese on or about November 11.

3. Fuchow-wan Coal Mines (Chinese) near the Leased Territory, were taken over by the Japanese.

4. Penhsihu Coal and Iron Mines, a Sino-Japanese enterprise, now controlled solely by the Japanese.

5. Japanese were taking advantage of conditions in Manchuria to advance their interests in derogation if not violation of the "open door".

Dec. 3. Japanese headquarters reported the continued activity of Chinese forces around Tsitsihar, and the continued movement of Chinese forces in the Chinchow area. Also that four bridges between Hsinmin and Tahu-shan on the Peiping-Mukden Railway had been blown up by the Chinese.

Peiping-Mukden Railway authorities were unable to confirm the heavy movement of Chinese troops north from Shanhaikwan which was reported by Japanese headquarters.

Dec. 5. The Japanese spokesman stated that the infiltration of Chinese troops into the Faku district continued.

(a) Reasons for believing that the purpose of the northeastward movement of the Chinese troops was not to undertake an offensive against the Japanese.

RECENT ACTIVITIES OF THE PEACE MAINTENANCE COMMITTEE.

1. Yuan Chin-k'ai had incurred the disfavor of the Japanese by his frank statements.

Circumstances

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Dec. 5. 2. Circumstances of an American news correspondent's interview with Yuan Chin-k'ai.

DISPOSITION AND NUMBER OF JAPANESE TROOPS IN MANCHURIA.

The military admitted having slightly less than 20,000 men in Manchuria.

Ssuningkai-Taonan and the Taonan-Angangki Railways were being operated as a unit under the S.M.R.

Dec. 6. Two detachments of troops were sent a short distance north from Hsinmin to the district west of the Liao where bandits were causing disturbances.

(a) Other troop movements.

INTERVIEW GRANTED BY GENERAL HONJO TO THE CORRESPONDENT OF THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE.

1. No intention of attacking Chinese troops at Chinchow unless offensive measures were undertaken by Chinese regulars, Chinese plain clothes soldiers, or bandits instigated by Chinese troops.

2. Necessity of protecting railway zone.

3. Discussion of proposed neutral zone.

4. Number and disposition of Japanese troops in Manchuria.

5. Japanese casualties since September 18.

Dec. 8. Japanese headquarters emphasized the increasing menace of the Chinese troops and irregulars west of the S.M.R. zone.

Headquarters attributed the increased activity of Chinese soldiers in Tungliao and Chengchiatun to the Chinese government.

Dec. 9. The local press reported that pending the complete organization of an independent government in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army would exercise supervisory control and protect the new state from Chinese aggression.

Dec. 10. UNOFFICIAL INDICATIONS OF THE DESIRES AND PLANS OF JAPANESE ARMY HEADQUARTERS CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.

1. Indications that the Manchuria-Mongolia independence movement was progressing rapidly from the theoretical to the practical state.

2. Self-government body established at Yingkow.

Opinion

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Dec. 10. 3. Opinion that the withdrawal of Japanese support would result in the collapse of the movement for independence.

4. Only Sino-Japanese negotiations or outside pressure would forestall the complete realization of the independence movement.

Dec. 11. JAPANESE ADVISERS IN CHINESE ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTH MANCHURIA.

1. Enumeration of the Chinese Government, public utility and commercial organizations in South Manchuria in which there were Japanese advisers, supervisors or managers.

2. Opinion that the Chinese in the present administration are neither representative nor able, and that they are dependent on the Japanese.

Dec. 12. Japanese headquarters reported increased bandit activity near Hsinmin and Yingkow; the concentration of aircraft and artillery at Chinchow; and the removal of the Chinese Third Cavalry Brigade to Tung-liao.

Under the name of Yuan Chin-kai invitations were sent to Chang Ching-hui at Harbin and Hsi Hsia at Kirin to come to Mukden on December 20 to confer on the establishment of a separate government for Manchuria.

Dec. 14. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING JAPANESE ADVISERS IN CHINESE ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTH MANCHURIA.

1. 160 Japanese advisers at present. But in addition officers of the Kwantung Army act in advisory capacities in certain local organs.

2. This group of Japanese may be said to form the de facto administration of Manchuria.

3. Explanation of the opinion that if the present system in Manchuria continues, Japan will secure a virtual monopoly of Manchuria's trade.

Dec. 15. Tsang Shih-yi, who had been under detention at Mukden since September 18, was released and installed as Governor of Fengtien on December 15. It was believed that this event foreshadowed an early attack on Chinchow.

Opinion that Tsang was forced into office and would be merely a mouthpiece.

INTERVIEW GRANTED BY GENERAL HONJO TO THE CORRESPONDENT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES.

(The questions were submitted in writing and written replies returned).

1. Military necessity would make it imperative that

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Dec. 15.

the Chinese troops evacuate the Chinchow area.

2. Until such time as the new Manchurian Regime had developed armed forces sufficient to quell the bandits and insure itself against attacks, the Japanese military forces would be willing to shoulder the burden of maintaining stability.

Dec. 17. Minor military activities against Chinese irregulars.

Dec. 18. Reliable information that Japanese airplanes bombed Tungliao, killing three Chinese. The city was in a panic.

Obvious preparations being made in Mukden for an early drive on Chinchow.

Dec. 19. POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN SOUTH MANCHURIA.

1. Memorandum containing a resume of a private conversation between Consul General Myers and Consul General Hayashi.

2. Uppermost questions in the minds of the Japanese:

(a) Organization of independent provincial government.

(b) Withdrawal of the Chinese forces from the Chinchow area.

3. Attempts of Japanese to influence Chinese leaders.

4. From the military and the political point of view the presence of Chinese forces in the Chinchow area were great drawbacks to the Japanese plans for the establishment of independent governments in Manchuria.

5. Statements made by Mr. Hayashi.

Dec. 21. Headquarters reported that the first railway battalion was sent on the morning of December 21 from Ssupingkai to clear out seven thousand bandits operating in the Changtu-Fakumen region.

Official reception in celebration of the new Provincial Government was held in Mukden on December 21.

Dec. 22. Military headquarters inquired about terminal and shifting facilities at the Tahushan junction. Considerable amounts of shrapnel were moved to the railway station in Mukden. These facts presaged an attack on Chinchow.

The

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Dec. 23. THE SPOKESMAN FOR JAPANESE HEADQUARTERS UNOFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THAT FAKUMEN WAS CAPTURED ON THE AFTERNOON OF DECEMBER 22.

He indicated that a westward drive against bandits was taking place on a wide front extending from about Changtu on the north to Yingkow on the south, and that the Yingkow units are moving northwards along the Liao.

Changtu, Kaiyuan, Tiehling, Mukden, Liaoyang and possibly Haicheng are the main points from which the drive was launched.

This operation, under General Tamon, was larger than any undertaken up to this time.

Dec. 24. EXPANSION OF JAPANESE MILITARY HEAD-QUARTERS AT MUKDEN.

1. Five departments added: Administration, Communications, Financial, Industrial and Foreign Intercourse.

2. Outline of the work of these departments as reported in the press.

Japanese headquarters reported that the mixed brigade which had been operating in the Faku area was withdrawn to Tiehling on December 24. Anti-bandit operations in that area are considered successfully terminated.

Dec. 25 Japanese headquarters reported fighting between two companies of Japanese and 1,000 Chinese northwest of Yingkow on December 23.

Additional information.

Dec. 26 Japanese headquarters reported heavy bandit attacks on Fenghuangcheng and nearby stations on the Mukden-Antung line. Two battalions from Antung and two companies from Liaoyuan were despatched for a bandit suppression campaign.

Newchwang and Tienchwangtai, northwest of Newchwang, were occupied by the Japanese forces without resistance on December 24.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST BANDITS WHO WERE SAID TO BE MANAGING THE S.M.R. ZONE.

1. Activities in the Faku area.
2. Japanese troops engaged.
3. Bandits were much fewer than the 7,000

originally

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Dec. 26.

originally announced by headquarters.

4. Movement reported of troops of the second division at Liaoyang to Yingkow in view of the menace at that point.

Dec. 27. A Japanese brigade with cavalry and artillery crossed the Liao at Yingkow early in the morning of the 27th and moved to Tienchwangtai. From there they were marching toward Panshan.

The troops despatched against bandits on December 23 returned to Liaoyuan and Yingkow on December 25.

Dec. 28. Japanese headquarters reported a clash between Japanese troops and 2,000 Chinese regulars and irregulars near Tienchwangtai in the morning of December 28, the Chinese fled toward Panshan.

Dec. 29. Four trains of 29 cars each, carrying Japanese troops and equipment left Mukden in the afternoon of December 29 over the Peiping-Mukden railway.

The Murai brigade arrived in Mukden from Dairen during the night of December 28.

The brigade commanded by General Tamon was reported to be moving westward along the Koupangtze-Yingkow line.

Reported that the Japanese army was completely controlling affairs in Manchuria and through advisers and other contacts was supervising the work of the independent governments of the Manchurian provinces.

Dec. 30. Reported that the Japanese forces, according to reliable information, captured Panshan on the afternoon of December 29 and that they were continuing their move toward Koupangtze.

Nine additional troop trains left Mukden over the Peiping-Mukden railway.

The four troop trains that left Mukden on December 29 were discharged at Hsinmin and returned to Mukden.

Japanese headquarters reported that the Tamon division had advanced to a point 8 miles northwest of Panshan.

Japanese troop advancing down the Peiping-Mukden railway reached a point one mile east of Koupangtze where they were held up pending the repair of a wrecked bridge.

six

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Dec. 30. Six additional trains of troops left Mukden over the Peiping-Mukden railway during the afternoon of December 30.

Dec. 31. Japanese headquarters announced that a junction of Japanese forces had been effected at Koupangtze.

Reported that Japanese forces composed of two mixed brigades and five infantry regiments were expected to move on Chinchow on January 1.

Jan. 1. General Miyake, General Honjo's Chief of Staff, stated that he expected Japanese cavalry to enter Chinchow on the night of January 1.

Jan. 2. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce, under Japanese pressure, secured the chops of Chinese stores in Mukden to a petition to General Honjo requesting that troops drive the Chinese troops out of Manchuria and suppress banditry.

Interview with the correspondent of the Herald Tribune who returned from Koupangtze on the night of January 1.

(a) Bombing by Japanese planes of railway and station at Koupangtze on December 30.

(b) Departure from Koupangtze on December 31 of six Chinese troop trains.

Jan. 3. Japanese headquarters announced that Chinchow was occupied by the Muro brigade at 10:40 a.m. January 3. The advance guard entered on the preceding day.

Jan. 4. Consul Chamberlain assaulted by Japanese soldiers in Mukden.

(a) Details of the incident.

Jan. 7. Reported that approximately 15,000 Japanese troops occupied the railway from Mukden to Shanhaikwan.

Other troop movements and additional information.

EFFECT OF THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION ON THE
 RAILWAY SITUATION IN MANCHURIA.

1. Review of the railway situation in Manchuria prior to September 18, 1931.

2. Importance of railway problem in Manchurian affairs.

3. The Chinese evaded Japanese protests and

made

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Jan. 7.

made every effort to divert traffic from the S.M.R. to their own lines. Since the Japanese occupation the situation has been completely reversed.

4. Mukden-Hailung-Kirin lines now feed only the S.M.R.

5. Peiping-Liaoning tracks under the S.M.R. near Mukden were destroyed by Japanese troops on the night of September 18 and have not been repaired.

6. Connections at Kirin between the Kirin-Hailung and Kirin-Tunhua lines, formerly opposed by the Japanese were made on October 16 with their approval.

7. The Ssu-Tao and Tao-An lines are now controlled by the S.M.R.

8. Present status of the lines, including the proposed Tunhua-Kainei, and Changchun-Talai lines.

9. The Chinese scheme of railway construction as prepared by the Communications Commission in Mukden in 1930 is dead.

10. Railways built with Japanese capital and now being operated as part of the S.M.R. will continue to be so operated.

11. Recently Chinese lines have been large purchasers of American equipment. The Japanese lines have bought very little American railway material.

12. Opinion that the "open door" may not be closed but indications are unmistakable that the market is no longer open.

Jan. 9. Fengtien Provincial Government announced its assumption of control of the Mukden-Shanhaikwan section of the Peiping-Liaoning railway.

Jan. 11. Japanese headquarters reported that a Japanese cavalry detachment was ambushed at Chihhsi, 30 miles southwest of Chinchow, on January 10. A punitive expedition consisting of one regiment and one battalion were sent from Chinchow and Kaochiao to Chihhsi.

Jan. 13. SOUTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY LAND QUESTIONS.

1. Extension of the railway settlement at Mukden.

2. According to Japanese press reports some railway zone questions of long standing had been settled to the satisfaction of the Japanese.

Jan. 16. Japanese headquarters reported that a

Japanese

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Jan. 16.

Japanese battalion occupied Tungliao on January 14 after ejecting 3,000 "Chinese partisans".

Jan. 19.

The press reported that the main points concerning the formation of the new government had been decided.

Jan. 21.

Preparations were being made to increase the Japanese forces in Tsitsihar.

(a) The commanding officer stated that the increase was necessary for the suppression of banditry.

(b) Through traffic was in operation from Tsitsihar to Mukden via Taonan. A mixed Sino-Japanese staff and equipment were being used. It is planned to use this line in competition with the C.E.R.

Jan. 22.

Press reports concerning the proposed new government for Manchuria and Mongolia.

(a) Comment on the press reports.

(b) Additional information.

Jan. 23.

THE RAILWAY SITUATION IN MANCHURIA.

Comments on an interesting article in the Osaka Mainichi entitled, "Japan is deeply concerned over Manchurian Railway Administration". A copy of the article is included.

(a) The correspondent, in common with Japanese generally, appears to see nothing inconsistent in an independent state and Japanese control of the essential functions and agencies.

STRUCTURE AND OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF
 THE FENGTIEN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT.

1. List of officials of the various government offices at Mukden giving the names of the Chinese chiefs and the Japanese advisers and counsellors.

2. The novel feature of the provincial government is the "Self Government Guiding Board".

(a) Principal provisions of the board's regulations.

(b) The section chiefs of the board are all Japanese.

(c) Only a few Chinese clerks and writers

are

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Jan. 23. are on this board but the Japanese employed
are said to number about 200.

(d) The chairman is to have a Japanese
adviser who is to act for him in his
absence.

(e) Work of the board.

(f) Most of the advisers were formerly
with the S.M.R., the Bank of Chosen or
the Yokohama Specie Bank. They were
assigned to their present positions by
the Kwantung army.

Jan. 28. Japanese headquarters officially announced
that one artillery battalion accompanied by several air-
planes left Changchun for Harbin on January 28 at 9 a.m.

Jan. 29. Japanese headquarters reported that the
anti-Hsi Chia forces at Harbin are strongly anti-
Japanese. During the night of January 28 they destroyed
the railway bridge across the Sungari near Laoshakow
on the Harbin-Changchun line.

According to reliable information the Japa-
nese seized C.E.R. rolling stock 3 kilometres north of
Changchun at 4:20 p.m. January 28, after which the
Japanese forces proceeded northward until their advance
was stopped by a damaged bridge. Acts of sabotage all
along the line have been reported.

Jan. 30. An association of Russians in Manchuria
and Mongolia was formed at Mukden.

(a) The object of the association was
to obtain full citizenship for "Russian
Manchurians".

(b) It is understood that the movement
has received encouragement from Japa-
nese sources.

(c) Recently the association was dis-
solved.

Jan. 31. Transfer of the second division headquarters
and one brigade from Liacyang to Changchun on January 29
was confirmed. They are expected to proceed to Harbin
when transportation is available.

Feb. 1. Japanese headquarters reported that troops
under General Hasebe reached Shuangcheng after repulsing
a Chinese attack. The advance on Harbin was proceeding
on foot.

THE MOVEMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
"NEW STATE" WAS MAKING RAPID PROGRESS.

1. The press gave much space to the movement.

The

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Feb. 1.

The Japanese advance on Harbin for the purpose of "protecting Japanese residents" there met with far more resistance than had been anticipated.

(a) Troop movements.

According to a reliable report the salt revenue has constituted practically the only revenue of the local government. But since the middle of January another sizable income has been available to the local government. This income is the cigarette tax paid by the British-American Tobacco Company on the output of their local factory. The company has receded from its former stand of refusing to pay the tax to the new government.

Feb. 3.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FENGTIEN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT.

1. Provisional regulations governing the organization of the office of the magistrate.

2. Regulations governing the election of the Self-Government Commission.

(a) Comment on the regulations.

Through the agency of the Self-Government Guiding Board which is to all intents and purposes a Japanese organ, and its Japanese representative in the district who is the head of the Guiding Commission, the Japanese are in a position to exercise as much control over the district governments as may be desired.

Feb. 10.

List obtained from headquarters of the designation of the Japanese troops in Manchuria.

Feb. 16.

It was announced that the long delayed conference on the establishment of the new state would be held on February 17 or 18.

Hsi Chia from Kirin and Chang Ching-hui from Harbin arrived in Mukden on February 15 to attend the conference. Ma Chan Shan was expected to arrive in Mukden on February 15.

The movement to establish the "new state" was being energetically pushed by the interested parties.

Feb. 17.

Opinion that because of the approaching visit of the League Commission and the disturbances in Shanghai, Japanese officials, with the tacit approval of high Japanese authorities, were trying to expedite the establishment of an independent Manchurian state.

The

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Feb. 17.

THE EXTENT OF BANDITRY AND RECENT BANDITRY
SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS IN SOUTH MANCHURIA.

1. The Japanese military occupation of South Manchuria was the direct cause of the great increase in banditry.
2. The regions west of the Liao which were recently occupied by Chinese troops have suffered most from bandit depredations.
3. Many former soldiers and police have become bandits.
4. During the hasty retreat westward of the Fengtien (Liaoning) troops many armed soldiers deserted and became bandits.
5. With the disappearance of the central provincial administration at Mukden, governmental authority in the interior was weakened and disorder rapidly increased.
6. South Manchuria during the past six months has suffered more severely from banditry than at any other time in recent history.
7. Japanese drives against bandits.
 - (a) Practically the only information in regard to these operations has emanated from Japanese sources.
 - (b) Examples of typical Japanese reports on banditry amounting to a summary of recent operations, and including Japanese statistics of participants and casualties.
 - (c) List of 73 cases of banditry during January as published in the Manchuria Daily News.
 - (d) Other reports of banditry.
 - (e) Conditions created in towns and villages by banditry.
 - (f) Evidence from Japanese reports showing that their anti-bandit operations were ruthless.
 - (g) The Japanese have started to use Chinese troops in their anti-bandit campaigns. This experiment has not been satisfactory.
 - (h) Districts in which there has been considerable banditry.

Efforts

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(i) Efforts being made to enlist the bandits for local defence purposes.

(j) Opinions of competent observers that the Japanese through Chinese puppet government will not be able to suppress banditry in Manchuria.

(k) Banditry is fundamentally an economic problem.

(l) Regulations governing the surrender of bandits.

(m) Additional information.

Feb. 18.

DECLARATION BY THE NEW ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION ANNOUNCING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FOUR NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES AND THE SEVERANCE OF ALL CONNECTION WITH "THE PARTY GOVERNMENT" (NANKING).

1. The declaration also states that the new administration commission will arrange all matters relating to the establishment of the new state and that it expects to attain the following:

(a) Internally, to establish a liberal administration and to put down the old militarists;

(b) Externally, to stop all anti-foreign acts and to adopt the principle of the open door and equal opportunity;

(c) To reduce the burdens of the people and improve the public welfare.

The administration commission consisted of Chang Ching-hui, chairman, Tsang Shih-yi, Ma Chan-shan, Hsi Chia; two Mongols, Chi Wang and Ling Sheng; and Tang Yu-Lin. (But there is no evidence that Tang Yu-Lin participated.

Ma Chan-shan was elected Governor of Heilungkiang, vice Chang Ching-hui resigned.

Feb. 19.

Statement of Chang Ching-hui to newspaper correspondents concerning the establishment of the "new state".

His Japanese adviser and interpreter replied to most of the questions.

Opinion that the actual formation of a "new state" depended on the amount of pressure the Japanese could apply.

Supplementary

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Feb. 24. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION CONCERNING
 BANDITRY.

1. Article from the Manchuria Daily News listing the bandit groups which have surrendered or offered to surrender to the Chinese or Japanese forces.

2. Comment on the article.

3. The main body of the Japanese 38th Brigade at Suiching and Hsingcheng, along the Peiping-Liaoning railway, was despatched on February 14 toward Chihnsi to suppress bandits in that vicinity.

4. Chang Hai-p'eng's troops expelled about 1,000 bandits from Ch'angwu, on the Tahushan-Tungliao railway on February 12.

5. According to a Japanese war office communique banditry in the Chientao region, along the Korean border, was rampant.

6. Reports of bandit activities in other regions.

Feb. 26. The following particulars regarding the new state were announced on February 25:

Name: Man Chou Kuo.
 Head: The Executive.
 Flag: Yellow field with bars of red, blue, white and black occupying the upper left quarter.
 Designation of the Executive's Tenure: Ta Tung.
 Capital: Changchun.

Feb. 27. A three day demonstration in support of the formation of the new state was being held in Mukden.

(a) The demonstration was organized by the municipal authorities under the direction of the Self-Government Guiding Board.

(b) No enthusiasm was noticeable.

(c) The object of the demonstration was to show that the Chinese were demanding the establishment of a new state.

(d) The absence of Chinese initiative and the total subjection of the Chinese to the Japanese clearly demonstrated the extrinsic nature of the new state.

(e) As a demonstration of popular sentiment at the birth of a nation there has probably never been in recent times a more abject failure.

Translations

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- Feb. 27. (f) Translations of handbills distributed during the demonstration.
- Feb. 29. At a meeting of delegates of all Manchuria a resolution was passed requesting early formation of a new state.
- (a) Large numbers of Japanese attended the meeting and participated in it.
- (b) No enthusiasm was shown.
- (c) Summary of the resolution.
- Mar. 1. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE "NEW STATE" WAS OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED ON MARCH 1 AT MUKDEN BY CHANG CHING-HUI, CHAIRMAN OF THE NORTH-EASTERN COMMISSION.
1. After painting a black picture of conditions in Manchuria and China since the establishment of the Republic, the proclamation announced the complete severance of relations with the Republic of China and the establishment of the state of Man Chou Kuo.
2. Copy of the proclamation in English which was handled to the foreign press correspondents.
3. The Chinese text states that, "all treaties and debt obligations pertaining to the territory of the new state which have been concluded by the Republic of China with Foreign Powers shall be recognized in conformity with international usage".
- Mar. 3. Translation of the Chinese text of "a draft of the General Principles governing the organization of the Government of the New State". This document was published in the Chinese newspapers in Dairen but it was not published in the Mukden newspapers.
1. Comments on the draft constitution.
2. Translation of the "Law for the Protection of the rights of the People of Manchuria". This document was published in the Japanese press.
- Mar. 4. Chao Hsin-po, Mayor of Mukden, announced that ex-Emperor Hsuan Tung (P'u Yi) would be requested for the third time "to resume his post".
- (a) Plans for the inaugural ceremony.
- Mar. 9. Bandit activities in and around Mukden.
- SETTLEMENT OF THE WANPAOSHAN CASE.
1. Brief review of the history of the case.
2. Results of the investigation of the Sino-Japanese

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Mar. 9.

Japanese Committee as reported by the Japanese Consulate General, Mukden.

(a) The Chinese contentions were reported to be groundless.

(b) Upon the completion of the investigation a new agreement, substantially the same as the disputed one of last year, was drawn up and the case is now considered settled.

(c) The Kirin government's approval of the agreement is to be obtained as a matter of form.

3. General question of the thousands of Koreans in South Manchuria who fled from their homes to various Japanese railway towns after the Japanese occupation in September.

(a) At a meeting of the Japanese Consuls in Manchuria it was decided to send these Koreans back to their farms and to finance them.

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF JAPANESE POLITICAL CONTROL IN MANCHURIA.

1. Further evidence that the Japanese are directing the governmental organs of Manchuria.

2. Plans for taking over the Chinese Post Office or of merging it with the Japanese postal administration.

3. The Japanese control all Chinese telegraph offices, between Mukden and Harbin and also control the Kirin office.

4. Additional information concerning the telegraph administration.

5. Thirty Japanese are now employed in the general office at Mukden of the Fengtien-Shanhaikwan railway which was ostensibly taken over by the Fengtien Provincial Government early in January.

6. The Self-Government Guiding Board which was formed under the direction of Japanese military headquarters ostensibly to institute self-government in the districts, actually has for its main functions the supervision and control of the administration of the districts; also it was active in promoting the new state movement.

7. The influence of the Japanese advisers of

the

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Mar. 9.
 the new government.

8. Very few prominent Chinese are associated with the provincial administrations. And there is a total absence in the government of Chinese leadership or organization of any kind capable of carrying out the extensive preparations made for the new state.

9. Except for the Chinese Maritime Customs and the Post Office, the status of Manchuria resembled rather a Japanese colony than even a protectorate.

10. With Japanese permeating all branches of the government and semi-government enterprises in Manchuria and by one means or another directing their activities, the existence of the independent state is fictitious.

Mar. 11. Reliable information was received that four Japanese advisers were assigned to the office of the customs superintendent at Newchwang on March 9. No interference the the Commissioner's office was reported.

Mar. 12. Smuggling at Antung increased greatly since the closing of the Customs station at the bridgehead on September 21 by the Japanese military authorities. Consequently it is estimated that the Customs' revenue suffered to the extent of about 1,000,000 Yen in 1931.

Mar. 15. Communication from the local provincial government stating that the chief executive of Man Chou Kuo formally assumed office on March 9.

Mar. 16. THE INSTALLATION OF P'U YI.

1. P'u Yi was heavily guarded by Japanese and Manchurian troops and police.

2. The streets were decorated with the flags of the new state and Japan.

3. The Chief Executive's proclamation was read by Premier Cheng Hsiao-hsu.

4. Translation of the proclamation.

5. Translation of Count Uchida's speech.

6. Translation of the "Regent's response".

7. The predominant role played by the representatives of Japan throughout the entire proceeding was quite obvious to the most casual observer.

8. Efforts to celebrate the installation at Mukden.

(a) The origin of the efforts was trace-
 able

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- Mar. 16. able to the Japanese either directly or indirectly through the Japanese controlled Chinese authorities.
- (b) There was no evidence of spontaneous enthusiasm on the part of the Chinese populace.
- (c) Reports stated that conditions were the same at other Manchurian cities.
- Mar. 17. T. Komai, civilian adviser to the Kwantung Army with the rank of Lieutenant-General, was appointed Director of the General Affairs department in the state Affairs Council of the new state. The Premier is the head of the State Affairs Council.
- Mar. 18. Communications from Hsieh Chieh-shih, Minister of Foreign Affairs informing the Consul General that the state of Manchuria had been established, and that he had sent a communication announcing the establishment of the new state to the Secretary of State.

(a) Copies of the communications.

THE GOVERNMENT OF MAN CHOU KUO.

1. List of the principal officials appointed by mandate of the chief executive on March 10.

(As far as possible the list shows the officials' connections with the former government)

2. The Self-Government Guiding Board was formally closed on March 15. The board is being re-organized as the Government Training Bureau which will be established at Changchun and will have its representatives (Japanese) in the magistrates' offices.

(a) The counterpart of most of the constitution of the new state is to be found in the Japanese constitution.

3. The General Affairs Department of which Mr. Komai is the director, will be staffed largely with Japanese and it will control as well as supervise the work of the executive branch of the government.

4. Japanese holding key positions will be found in every department of the new government.

5. Reasons for believing that Japan is committed to a policy which will end in annexation.

6. Similarity between the events of the past few weeks in Manchuria and those of a quarter of a century ago in Korea.

Additional

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Mar. 18. 7. Additional information concerning the permeation of the new government by Japanese.

8. Except for the propagandists who are endeavoring to mould foreign public opinion the Japanese seem to take it for granted that Manchuria is at least a Japanese appanage.

Mar. 22. ORGANIC LAWS OF MAN CHOU KUO.

1. Translation of the organic laws of the new state which were promulgated on March 11.

2. Plan showing the organization of the new government.

Mar. 24. According to reliable information the S.M.R. signed a contract with K'an To, Director of the Ssuning-kai-Taonan railway, for the operation of that line for a period of fifty years. This information has been confirmed. Japanese have superseded Chinese in important posts in the railway.

(a) The agreement is believed to be the first of a series providing for the operation of the Chinese lines in Manchuria by the S.M.R.

(b) Additional information concerning the railway situation.

Mar. 26. The Japanese press reported that it was decided at a cabinet meeting at Changchun on March 24:

(a) To retain for the present the existing Customs system of the Chinese Republic together with existing tariffs.

(b) To remit monthly to the Inspectorate General, Shanghai, the portion of the Customs receipts required for servicing foreign loans.

(c) To retain the surplus for the use of the new government.

Mar. 27. According to reliable information the Japanese Consul General at Harbin, Mr. Ohashi, resigned his post to become Chief of the General Affairs Division in the Foreign Ministry, Changchun. Mr. T. Kawasaki until recently a Japanese Foreign Office official attached to the Consulate General in Mukden, has been appointed to the Foreign Office of the new state in Changchun.

Mar. 29. Some sidelights on the Japanese occupation particularly in relation to banking transactions concerning the funds of former Chinese officials.

Reliable

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Mar. 29. Reliable information was received that the Salt Inspectorate at Newchwang was closed on March 28, and that its functions were taken over by the Salt Commissioner.

Mar. 30. The Japanese press reported that the new government had announced on March 28 that the Salt Administration was independent of Nanking and that all of its administrative functions would be taken over by the Changchun government. It was announced also that foreign obligations secured by the Salt Gabelle will not be repudiated and claims entered by the creditor Powers will be considered. Employees willing to sever connections with the Chinese Government will be retained.

793.94/5230

CANCELLED

SEE 793.94-SHANGHAI ROUND TABLE/4

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By Milton D. Chas. J. J. J. Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
note
893.0146
894.23
893.102

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FV

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

FROM

Dated May 17, 1932

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 17 1932
Department of State

File
del. to Geneva
May 17/32
MAY 17 1932

247, May 17, 5 p. m.

Lieutenant Soule today personally witnessed the withdrawal of one battalion of Japanese infantry from Tazang and immediate vicinity and the resumption of control of the evacuated district without incident by 150 Chinese police from Nanking. Repeat to War Department.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WWC

RR

F/LS 793.94/5231

RECEIVED
MAY 17 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
813.0146
894.23

REF

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 17, 1932

Rec'd 10:05 a.m.

Rel. to Bureau May 17/32

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 17 1932
Department of State

246, May 17, 7 p. m.

Referring to my telegram No. 246, May 16, 5 p. m.,
and other telegrams regarding evacuation: the Japanese
joint Commissioners have notified the Chinese joint
Commissioners that the Japanese defense units at Chenju
and Chenju station are scheduled to withdraw at one p. m.
on May 20. Notify War Department.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WWC

RR

F/LS 793.94/5232

2881 61 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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 Charge Department
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 Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

May 17, 1932.

MAY 17 32

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

73 May 17/5231 (a.)
 the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphs that
 an officer from the office of the American Military Attaché
 on that day witnessed in person the withdrawal of one
 battalion of Japanese infantry from Tazang and immediate
 vicinity and the resumption by one hundred fifty Chinese
 police from Nanking of control of the evacuated district
 without incident; (b-)

793.94/5232

May 17/5232
~~May 17 the Consul General reports also~~ that the
 Japanese Joint Commissioners have notified the Chinese
 Joint Commissioners that the Japanese defense units at
 Chenju and Chenju station are scheduled to withdraw on
 May 20.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

May 17. 1932. PM

793.94/5232

FE:MMH:REK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.0011/80 FOR # 117 to Legation.

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED April 19, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Article which appeared in the HSIN MIN PAO
 derogatory to the Japanese Imperial House.
 Japanese Government taking a weak attitude
 towards the matter probably because it does
 not wish to have its hands fuller than it
 now has of external political difficulties.

hs

793.94/5233

5233

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Canton, China

The article in question is a report on the activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Canton, China. It is reported that the CCP has been active in the area of the Pearl River Delta, and that it has been working to establish a base of operations in the region. The article also mentions that the CCP has been working to establish a base of operations in the region of the Pearl River Delta, and that it has been working to establish a base of operations in the region of the Pearl River Delta. The article also mentions that the CCP has been working to establish a base of operations in the region of the Pearl River Delta, and that it has been working to establish a base of operations in the region of the Pearl River Delta.

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END

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure:

1/- Memorandum of Conversation.

Copies sent:

2 to Legation
 2 to Department

100

J. B. 101

Handwritten initials

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1. The following information was obtained from a review of the files of the Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of the Director of Intelligence, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Security Affairs, regarding the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States during the period from 1945 to 1960.

2. The CIA was established in 1949 as a separate agency within the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. Its primary mission was to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information to the President and the Secretary of State.

3. During the period from 1945 to 1960, the CIA conducted a wide range of activities, including the collection of intelligence information from foreign sources, the analysis of that information, and the dissemination of that information to the President and the Secretary of State. The CIA also conducted a variety of covert operations, including the collection of intelligence information from foreign sources, the analysis of that information, and the dissemination of that information to the President and the Secretary of State.

4. The CIA's activities during this period were characterized by a high degree of secrecy and a strong emphasis on the collection and analysis of intelligence information. The CIA's activities were also characterized by a strong emphasis on the dissemination of that information to the President and the Secretary of State.

5. The CIA's activities during this period were also characterized by a strong emphasis on the collection and analysis of intelligence information. The CIA's activities were also characterized by a strong emphasis on the dissemination of that information to the President and the Secretary of State.

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10. The CIA's activities during this period were also characterized by a strong emphasis on the collection and analysis of intelligence information. The CIA's activities were also characterized by a strong emphasis on the dissemination of that information to the President and the Secretary of State.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/212 FOR Despatch # 5396.

FROM Harbin (Hanson) DATED April 23, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Reasons for the recall of General Dohihara, Chief
 of the local Japanese Military Mission, lay
 probably in the fact that he permitted many
 Chinese officials to manage Manchurian affairs.

hs

793.94/5234

5234

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 5306

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HANKIN CHINA, April 23, 1933.

SUBJECT: POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN NORTH MANCHURIA.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 2306, of to-day's date, addressed to the Legation at Peiping transmitting copies of memoranda with regard to the political situation in North Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 2306 to the Legation,
 with four sub-enclosures.

800
 TH/ta

True copy of
 the original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1566

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, April 23, 1933.

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTED MEMORANDA RE
 CONDITIONS IN NORTH MANCHURIA.

The Honorable

Nelson Franklin Johnson,
 American Legation,
 Peking, China.

Sir:

- I have the honor to enclose herewith copies in translation
- 1/ of memoranda, entitled: "Memoranda for the Recall of General
 - 2/ Pothman"; "The Idea Behind General Pothman's Latest Operations";
 - 3/ "The Lament Conflict"; "Extension of Network of Japanese
 - 4/ Operations in Manchuria," which were submitted to me by a reliable Russian and of which copies have been sent the office of the "Military" branch at the request of this Russian.

It has become evident that the work of General Pothman has been unsatisfactory from the Japanese Tokyo headquarters military standpoint, hence his recall. It is possibly true that Pothman placed too much emphasis in the theory that Chinese leaders could stay bright, but I doubt very much that the so-called Manchus have as much influence as suggested in enclosure No. 1. It should be noted that the author of these memoranda is close to a Russian who expects to receive much from Mr. Vassil, Russian representative of the South Manchuria Railway, when the influence of this railway on the Chinese Eastern Railway still more important.

- There -

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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There is reason to believe that the recent Japanese military expedition to Hainan was not so successful as mentioned in enclosure No. 2, but in the main this memorandum contains much that is true.

The claim mentioned in enclosure No. 3 is apparently both welcomed by the Japanese and Soviet leaders, the former because it furnishes a pretext to bring more troops into North Manchuria and to take over the guarding of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the latter because it affords the communists a chance "to fish in troubled waters."

The interesting viewpoint that war will break out between Soviet Russia and Manchukuo and not between the former and Japan is set forth in enclosure No. 4.

Respectfully yours,


G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
 American Consul General.

Copies have been sent to:

- the Department;
- the Embassy at Tokyo;
- the Legation at Peking (through the Department);
- the Consulate General at Mukden.

CGG
 GCH/th

True copy of
 the original


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-Translation-

2366

32

REMARKS FOR THE HRC LL BY GENERAL DOHIMARA

The unexpected recall of General Dohimara, Chief of the local Japanese Military Mission, who was in fact the Governor-General of Manchuria and who joined in his hands all the functions of government of the country, is explained by the following considerations.

While Dohimara was leaning upon important connections in Tokyo he was nevertheless on the whole a military person: for the military he was not military enough, not having for twenty years held a purely military position, while for the diplomats he was not diplomat enough because he belonged to the military caste.

In his capacity of adviser in relation to the old and young Marshals, he acquired Chinese habits, took a liking to Chinese antiquity and closed a number of firm relations with former important Chinese officials.

This was what made him follow the theory of utilizing Chinese officials of the former regime, such as Tchang Kai-si, Yuan Ching-kai, Chang Ching-kai, and others, in the affairs of the new government, which met with strong opposition on the part of the Manchurian groups who did not believe in the sincerity of high Chinese officials who expressed their willingness to work for the new movement.

The theory of Dohimara that all Chinese were to equal degree to be bought and that they were given incentive positions they could fill in the same measure to which they did not find confirmation in fact and was severely criticized by Manchurian leaders through to positions who are sworn enemies of the Chinese and who claim that they are leading the movement.

This Manchurian movement found support in Japanese circles. Usami, the Manchurian representative of the Japanese Government, being the first to stand on the side of the Manchus. Usami in cases connected with the Kwantung movement through one of the principal military members of the latter, Colonel Ishihara, brother of Usami's former assistant and chief of the transportation section of the local branch of the Japanese Government, now head of the Tientsin-Taipei Railway.

The Manchus who were dissatisfied with Dohimara criticized his theory of making use of former Chinese high officials also in Tokyo, for this purpose taking advantage of, among other things, the presence in Berlin of the private secretary of Premier Imamura, Mr. Kimura, and a number of representatives of the War Ministry who were recently were in Manchuria.

Thus the fall of Dohimara was affected by the efforts of the Manchus and those Japanese groups which were for Manchurian aspirations. To bring this about was so much easier as a number of high Chinese officials admitted by Dohimara to the management of Manchurian affairs in fact proved to maintain connections with Chang Kai-si in secret. More activity is to be expected from Dohimara's successor, who will give more support to Manchurian separatist movements.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-Translation-

THE ID. CHINESE TROOPS' CAUSE OF THE ID.

The recently completed operations of the Japanese troops appear strange to many and give the impression that it was an adventure which was but little successful and was not brought to a conclusion.

This is not so, however.

It was not included in the plans of General Tamon to settle the entire disorder on the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway; on the contrary, these disorders go so far still to the advantage of the Japanese because they offer an excuse for bringing new troops here, these troops being placed on shipboard in Japan on April 10th, 12th and 14th. Besides, these disorders are also useful for the League Commission about to arrive and also in order that the tortured population may ask for Japanese aid.

General Tamon's problem was not to quiet the disorders but to increase them by means of scattering the last remnants of the old Kirin troops of General Ting Chao and Li Ts. which threatened to establish some semblance of order beyond the limits of the zone occupied by Japanese troops. It was not advantageous to have order established outside of the zone occupied by their troops, and for this reason it was decided to destroy the last stronghold of the old power.

The old Kirin troops were completely defeated, while part of them (1st and 2nd brigades) were sent over to the new authority. The purpose was thus achieved, and the country deprived of the support of the former government troops and delivered up to the mercy of brigand and robber bands, strengthened by Soviet agitators and instructors.

Now the check outside of the zone of activity of the Japanese troops should increase until the Japanese find it possible to act. This depends upon the arrival of new reinforcements, which are expected in Harbin in about two weeks.

In Japanese military circles there is dissatisfaction with General Tamon; he is criticized with undue operations from a purely strategic point of view. It is stated that he was always inclined to make front attacks and was not able to surround the enemy forces and take them prisoners.

General Tamon all the time insisted on reinforcements, as he considered three brigades insufficient, as they have been bearing the entire brunt of operations ever since the month of September. The request of General Tamon has only now been granted.

General Tamon's brigades should this morning (?) have left for Tsitsihar (where it is not entirely quiet) by rail.

APR 27 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-Translation-

THE CHINA CHAOS

The growing chaos on the eastern line is so far not worrying the Japanese: they are certain that they can handle the situation any moment, but for this purpose the Japanese must be in firm possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the guarding of which, after the last incident, they have decided to take upon themselves, even as the entire control of navigation along the Amur river.

It is apparent that the transfer of the guard to Japanese hands is in all probability connected with the Manchurian-Soviet conflict, which will ensue just as soon as reinforcements have arrived from Japan, i. e. the 8th and 10th divisions, the brigades and a special technical detachment with air forces.

It is not the intention of the Japanese to enter Soviet territory a procedure which has been voted as undesirable (as well as expensive and risky) in view of the immensity of Siberian distances, and their only aim is entirely to uproot Soviet influence in Manchuria, including the leading officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway, inasmuch as they consider that the Soviets are becoming dangerous here and may bring chaos to Manchuria where it will be difficult to cope with the same.

To handle this chaos without Soviet support is easy for the Japanese. In a word, there is planned a repetition of the 1929 conflict, with the only difference, however, that this time the Manchus will have real force, Japanese, behind them, which will eliminate the possibility of bringing into the country regular Red Army troops.

Russia will have to be satisfied with a so-called "small war" or partisan war with wide use being made of interned Chinese Communist forces.

Russia, same as South China, is definitely counting on chaos in Manchuria, figuring as they do that by playing at the same time on the anti-Japanese feeling of the Chinese masses it will be possible here to develop such a mess that therein will drown both the new regime and all Japanese efforts to re-establish order.

Chaos is the favorite method of Communists: from the chaos of the October revolution in Russia they were able to bring about their well known regime. From the local chaos in the same manner there should arise, as phoenix from the ashes, a new Soviet Manchuria.

This chaos will be brought about by various explosions, acts of terrorism, removal of railway property, even as far as the removal of rails for entire sections of the road. It is possible that this reliance upon chaos is absurd, but the communists have no other ways in Manchuria; otherwise they will simply be politically moved out of here and will find themselves in a stupid and dishonorable situation.

That the Soviet side is not thinking of a serious Japanese-Soviet war but only of partisan and terrorist activities in Manchuria may be judged by the fact of dislocation of Soviet troops in the Far East. In Trans-Baikal and the Far District there are two divisions in each, while in the Maritime District there are four divisions.

From a strategic point of view this distribution of troops is below all criticism, because in the case of a serious war the Maritime District can easily be cut off and the Maritime Army will find itself in a bag. This means that plans are not being made for a regular war

-but-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-1-

but for partisan revolutionary activities, for which reason the main forces are kept at the point where the frontiers of Manchuria, Korea and the USSR come together, so that Korea and Manchuria may easily be swayed and strengthened by revolutionary attachments and partisans.

Let more than two weeks will have elapsed before the outbreak of a Manchurian-Soviet conflict, and those two weeks will be particularly uneasy and dangerous. The peaceful policy of Litvinoff, as carried on Harbin by Lavoutsky and Koshnetsov, has been infinitely set aside and red aggression has already begun its work for decided sovietization of Manchuria.

THE MANCHU NEWS.

THE MANCHU NEWS, which should have been issued today under the editorship of Alexander Ivanoff, is issued by special permission of Koshnetsov, who has in mind four candidates for the editorship: Mikhailoff, Spittin, Ivanoff and Koroboff. Mikhailoff it was decided to save for more important work, but Ivanoff is placed at his disposal as manager, and Ivanoff with this in view visited Mikhailoff prior to the issuance of the newspaper.

THE MANCHU NEWS will be the organ of Manchurian independence, and Ivanoff has been instructed to maintain the closest possible contact with the National Committee of Manchuria: the publisher of the newspaper - CHUNG KANG TI - is also a Manchua, who, after much effort, found it possible to change his Chinese inclination entertained by him during the past several years and to become closely connected with the Manchurian organization.

Within one week, on this Sunday, there will be issued the first number of an evening paper connected with the MANCHU NEWS, which will enter into a fight with the HUNAN. This newspaper will also be under the editorship of Ivanoff.

THE NEW MEMBER OF THE BOARD IS A MANCHU.

1. Hui Fang, newly appointed member of the Board of the M. N. S. is a full-blooded Manchua and was moved to this position by the Manchurian National Committee. He will play an important role, as the controller of the (Chungking) Government's policy in the highest railway organ.

APR 29 1982

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM

EXTENSION OF NETWORK OF JAPANESE CONSULATES IN
 MANCHURIA.

The places where new consulates will be established are kept in secret until decision has been passed with regard thereto by the Tokio Government. However, it has already been ascertained that the following places have been selected:

Consulates: at Ninguta, Taonan, Tunghua and Hailun.
Consulate agencies: at Imienpo, Mulin, Sansing, Linchang and Fuyu.

Consular police will function in 11 new places in Manchuria.

A credit of 10 million yen has been asked for in connection with the extension of the network of consular establishments.

EVALUATION OF FUTURE CONFLICT.

A conflict is unavoidable and it will break out in the nearest future. But it will take place not between Japan and the USSR, but between the latter and Manchuria, prior to which the new Government would have to win strength and take over all responsible posts, including those on the C.R.R.

In the intensive work which is being conducted in this direction the Japanese are trying by all means to show that this is none of their concern. The Japanese military circles are of the viewpoint that, for a more successful influencing of public opinion, war should first be declared by Manchuria, whereafter Japan, so to say, would be compelled to join the hostilities.

In order to avoid accidental excesses on the borders, which, in the present tense atmosphere, could lead to a Japanese-Soviet conflict, the Japanese are keeping their troops away from the Soviet borders, notwithstanding the fact that the occupation of Manchouli and Pogranichnaya stations would be but an easy matter for the Japanese.

For the same reason the Japanese are giving considerable consideration to Soviet interests and, in particular, display caution in question connected with changes on the Chinese Eastern Railway, though one could have expected from them a stronger attitude in regard to new appointments on the railway.

In particular, they are avoiding to irritate the Soviet officials by the appointment of new persons and so far content themselves with the re-appointment of persons formerly connected with the railway. But, even within these limits, there have been promoted to the leading posts on the railway such sturdy enemies of the

- Soviets -

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Soviets as Lui Jun-huan, Pang Chi-kuan and Yang Shou-ying, new chief of the General Office, who will be used for the conflict. After the rough work has been completed, posts in the Board will be occupied by Li Li-chun, Zhao Hsi-ku and other Manchus who are intended for "clean work" on the railway.

The "pacifism" of the Japanese with regard to the USSR is, therefore, nothing but a tactical manoeuvre to veil their true hostile feelings, the Japanese, from a strategical viewpoint, being thoroughly prepared for war which will take the form of support to the new State against the aggressive intentions of the USSR.

Consideration has been given to everything in this plan, even to the narrowing of the railway gauge between Harbin and Changchun for direct transfer of military trains of the South Manchuria Railway to Harbin. As estimated by the Japanese, the re-fastening of rails will take not more than 14 hours, all necessary technical preparations therefor having been made long ago.

Dismantled Japanese gun-boats are being shipped to the Sungari where they will engage in fighting with the Amur fleet of the Bolsheviks and will protect Manchuria from Soviet invasion by water.

A conflict between Manchoukuo and the USSR is imminent. The Japanese realize that the new Government, being supported by the Japanese, is unpopular in China, and it must, therefore, of necessity give "something" to the Manchurian population, and this "something" may be given only on the account of the USSR.

The new authority is first of all endeavoring to increase its influence on the Chinese Eastern Railway, and even entirely deprive the bolsheviks of this railway, while on the other hand it will also attempt to free the Mongols from bolshevik bondage, in which connection much activity is developed at the present time.

In the opinion of the Japanese, such policy will undoubtedly strengthen the prestige of the Manchoukuo regime, which is accused of disregard for and sale of China's interests, but it will be rehabilitated if it returns to Manchuria the Chinese Eastern Railway and part of Mongolia. Such success will be the more outstanding at the present time when there is complete disunion in China and decline in the prestige of the Nanking Government.

We are on the eve of the conflict, although it is impossible to foretell the exact moment when it will break out. The bolsheviks themselves are aiding in

- setting -

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

setting the stage for a conflict by their practice of removing property of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which in Manchurian-Japanese circles is classed as criminal activity.

Thus, while Manchoukuo will operate with political accusations (red propaganda) it will at the same time have to deal with criminal charges, which infinitely simplifies the staging of a conflict. The Japanese themselves, however we repeat, will remain aside, which explains the peaceful tone of the Japanese press with regard to the USSR which has been suggested also as the proper policy recently for the pages of the HARBINSKOE VREMYA.

APR 20 1982

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EE

MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

FROM

Dated May 18, 1932

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

713.94
note
893.102
613.0146

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 19 1932
Department of State

F/DEW

250, May 18, 4 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL. 12-06 (11 2)

793.94/5235

My telegram No. 236, May 12, 9 a.m., regard-
ing Japanese incident of May 3.

As senior consul I recently called on the
Japanese Consul in charge and showed him protest from
Municipal Council, a part of which was quoted in
that telegram. He admitted that Japanese military
had exceeded proper bounds and stated that he would
bring protest to their attention. I then stated
that it would be beneficial if an agreement could
be reached which would define the limitation and
objects of military activities within or on be-
half of the Settlement; that I had no definite plan
in mind but inquired whether he would be willing
to discuss the matter with me and the proper
officials of the International Settlement. He

MAY 21 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#250 From Shanghai May 18, 1932

seemed sympathetically inclined but as he is merely temporarily in charge of the Consulate General I do not know whether anything will eventuate. I have also spoken to the Secretary General of the Municipal Council and he is considering the matter.

Two. The foregoing is merely tentative
but before proceeding further I desire to know whether there is any objection to my initiating informal discussions which would have for their object the devising of a plan or agreement which would prevent the usurpation of the Council's authority in the International Settlement by military forces of any foreign power.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

RR

WWC

041C

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

May 19, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China)

CONFIDENTIAL

185
 5235
 Your 250, May 18, 4 p.m., paragraph two, in regard
 to devising a plan or agreement to prevent the usurpation
 of the Council's authority in the International Settlement
 by military forces of any foreign power.

In view of the existing general situation,
 Department believes that it would be inadvisable repeat
 inadvisable to initiate at this time discussion in
 regard to a difficult question of this nature.

Repeat to Legation.

Strinson
dy

MAY 19 1932 114

793.94/5233

FE:JES/VIDM

mm/4
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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5235

0411

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to

OR *Paraphrase sent*
to War, M.I. 8, and
ONI

Washington,

May 17, 1932.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

MAY 17 1932

127 The three Departments concerned now have under consideration the question of withdrawing the Thirty-first Infantry from Shanghai. This Department is informing the British Ambassador here informally and confidentially that we have in contemplation the withdrawal of the regiment by the next Army transport about one month hence. You should likewise inform British Minister.

This procedure will amount to advance notice, give opportunity for consultation if needed, and allow for change of plan if new developments call for such.

The Department desires that announcement of decision, if and when reached, shall emanate from Washington.

Inform Commander in Chief of ^{essentially} all of above.

Stimson

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by

FE

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

795.94/5235A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Copies to General Moseley,
 Commander Lemmers and
 Major Krone.*

A telegraphic instruction from the Department of State to the American Minister at Peiping, of date May 17, DCR 1932, reads substantially as follows:

Paraphrase

The question of the removal of the Thirty-first Infantry from Shanghai is now being considered by the State, War and Navy Departments. The British Ambassador is being informally and confidentially informed that this removal is in contemplation, with the probability that the next Army transport, which will call at Shanghai in about thirty days, will take the troops away. Please inform the British Minister informally and confidentially.

This information is being given (confidentially) in advance in order to allow for consultation if necessary, and, in the event of a change in conditions, for alteration of the present plan.

If and when a decision is reached, it is the desire of the Department that the announcement thereof be made in Washington.

Please inform the Commander-in-Chief of the content of this message.

793.94/5-235A

8.4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

713.94
 813.1023
 893.0100
 894.23

WP

GRAY

FROM Shanghai

Dated May 18, 1932

Rec'd 11:08 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
 COPIES SENT TO FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 U.N.I. AND M.I. MAY 19 1932
 Department of State

MAY 19 1932

249, May 18, 3 p. m.

One. Referring to my telegram No. 248, May 17, 7 p. m. The Japanese Commissioner has advised the Chinese Commissioner that the withdrawal of the Japanese defense units at Chenju and Chenju Station has been deferred until 11 a. m., on May 23rd.

Two. The Japanese Commissioner has also advised the Chinese Commissioner that the defence guard of Kiangwanchen, west of the railway line, is expecting to withdraw on May 19th at 11 a. m., and the naval landing force of Chapei on May 23rd at two p. m. He requested the Chinese delegates to make necessary arrangements with the Japanese naval landing party to take over control of the latter area. I understand that this includes all of Chapei with the exception of the area exempted under the agreement of May 5th.

Three. Referring to my telegram number 243, May 16, 5 p. m., paragraph 2. The Japanese Commissioner has notified

F/LS 793.94/5236

5228

0 4 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 248 from Shanghai

notified the Chinese Commissioner that the policing of Taziang was not taken over by the special repeat special police and he expresses the hope that in the future the functions will be undertaken by the special police.

Four. Referring to my telegram No. 246, May 16, 5 p. m., paragraph 3. The Japanese Commissioner has requested the Chinese Commissioner to present a complete program in regard to the railway lines so that the Japanese will be able to conform to the Chinese desires as much as possible.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

Js

0415

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
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PM REC
 TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,
 May 19, 1932.

MAY 19 32

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

74 May 18/5236 the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphs that
 the Japanese Commissioner has advised the Chinese Commissioner
 that the withdrawal of the Japanese defense units at Chenju
 and Chenju Station has been deferred until May 23 and that
 the defense guard of Kiangwanchen, west of the railway line,
 is expecting to withdraw on May 19 and the naval landing force
 of Chapei on May 23; and that the Japanese Commissioner
 requested that the Chinese delegates make with the Japanese
 naval landing party arrangements necessary to take over
 control of the latter area. The Consul General states that
 he understands that this includes all of Chapei except the
 area exempted under the May 5 agreement. The Consul General
 reports further that the Japanese Commissioner has notified
 the Chinese Commissioner that the policing of Tazang was not
 taken over by the special police and he expressed the hope
 that in the future these functions will be undertaken by
 special police; and that the Japanese Commissioner has

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5236

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

- 2 -

requested that the Chinese Commissioner present a complete program in regard to the railway lines so that the Japanese will be able to conform as much as possible to the Chinese desires.

214
 May 16/ the Consul General at Harbin telegraphs that on May 15 about one thousand of Ma Chan-shan's troops attacked Japanese positions just northeast of Sungpu; that fighting continued until the evening ~~of May 14~~; that on May 16 Japanese reinforcements were sent from Harbin; and that according to the Japanese military mission the Chinese troops are now retreating.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

Stinson

SKH

mmh
 FE:MMH:REK

FE

SKH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

713.94
 note
 #13.01-Manchuria
 751.92
 893.00

FE
 EE

JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIFING

Dated May 19, 1932
 FROM

Rec'd 4:10a.m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 19 1932
 Department of State

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
 U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

542, May 19, 2 p.m.

Following from Kuo Wen News Agency, Nanking, May
 17th:

"Keen regret that the Japanese military should
 bring pressure on the Chinese garrison authorities
 at Shanhaikwan while the ink on the Sino Japanese
 peace agreement at Shanghai has not yet dried up was
 expressed by Dr. Lo Wen Kan, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
 in a press interview today. He hoped that no untoward
 incidents would occur there to further aggravate the
 Sino Japanese situation.

Concerning the Manchurian situation Dr. Lo said that
 it would be to the interests of both China and Japan to
 negotiate a peaceful settlement. At the beginning of
 next month all the Japanese troops in Shanghai and
 Woosung will have completed their withdrawal to the
 areas designated in the agreement and if by that time
 circumstances are favorable the Chinese Government will
 proceed with negotiations over Manchuria on the basis of the
 principle that any settlement to be reached must not
 affect

F/LS

795.94/5237

MAY 21 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- from Peiping May 19, #542.

effect the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

Referring to the Sino Russian situation Dr. Lo said that the Government has been considering the question of resuming diplomatic relations with Russia for some time but no definite decision has been reached. Personally he had no sympathy with the argument of those who declare that if China should resume diplomatic relations with Russia it would amount to a toleration of the activities of the Communists in China. To refute this line of reasoning it is only necessary to point to countries where Communist activities are under ban although they are in diplomatic relations with Russia.

Dr. Lo further said that the question to be decided before resuming relations with Russia is whether the Moscow Government will agree to refrain from carrying on activities detrimental to the social and economic order of this country. If Russia can accept this term it will not be difficult for China to resume relations with Moscow. Mr. Mou Teh Hui, Chief Chinese delegate to the Sino Russian Conference at Moscow is at present in Paris but he will return to Moscow as soon as the Government has decided on its policy toward Russia."

JOHNSON

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Plain

PEIPING

FROM Dated May 19, 1932

Rec'd 2:30a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 19 1932
Department of State

546, May 19, 3 p.m.

Following from Kuo Wen, Nanking, May 17:

"Mr. Ariyoshi retired Japanese Ambassador who arrived here from Shanghai yesterday called on Mr. Wang Ching Wei, Chairman of the Executive Yuan this morning and had a two hour interview with him.

It is unofficially stated that the purpose of Mr. Ariyoshi's trip to Nanking was to sound the Chinese Government regarding the convocation of a round table conference at Shanghai for the discussion of political questions. Mr. Wang is reported to have told Mr. Ariyoshi that the Chinese Government cannot entertain his suggestion as it leaves the Sino Japanese question entirely in the hands of the League.

Mr. Ariyoshi returned to Shanghai this evening. He also called on Dr. Lo Wen^{Kan} before his departure. Mr. Ariyoshi was formerly Japanese Ambassador to Brazil."

JOHNSON

JS

F/LS

793.94/5238

793.94/5238
Shanghai Press
7/19/32

7/19/32

3426

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

93.14
 13.12
 893.0146
 894.23

WP

RECEIVED
 MAY 20 1932
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECEIPTS

GRAY

FROM Shanghai

Dated May 20, 1932

Rec'd 1:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

251, May 20, 9 a. m.

File *Placed War Dept* *MAY 20 1932*
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 20 1932
 Department of State
Rel. to Hansen
May 20/32

Lieutenant Soule yesterday morning personally witnessed the withdrawal of one battalion of Japanese infantry from Kiangwan and immediate vicinity, and the resumption of control of the evacuated district without incident by one hundred Peiping police. The Japanese military attache has informed Lieutenant Soule that the Japanese defense unit at Chenju will be discontinued on 23rd at 11 a. m., and the Japanese naval landing party will be withdrawn from Chapoi at two p. m., on the same day.

Repeat to War Department. Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

JS

F/LS 793.94/5239

MAY 24 1932

FILED

0421

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
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PM RECD
 TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

May 20, 1932.

WILSON,

MAY 20 32

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

75 15220
 May 20 the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphs that on the morning of May 19 an officer of the staff of the American Military Attaché personally witnessed the withdrawal of one battalion of Japanese infantry from Kiangwan and immediate vicinity and the resumption of control by one hundred Peiping police of the evacuated district without incident; and that the Japanese Military Attaché has informed the officer from the staff of the American Military Attaché that the Japanese defense unit at Chenju will be discontinued on May 23 and the Japanese naval landing party will be withdrawn from Chapei on May 23.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

Stinson
may

793.94/5239

FE:MMH:REK

FE
m.m.h.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5239

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00/393 FOR Tel 541.1pm

FROM China (Perkins) DATED May 19, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

The effect the death of Inukai will have on Japanese relations with Manchuria. The next coming weeks will show whether the military or the diplomats will speak the final word as to these relations.

ex

793.94/5240

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JS

PLAIN

PEIFING

Dated May 19, 1952

Rec'd 4:10a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

542, May 19, 2 p.m.

Following from Kuo Wen News Agency, Nanking, May
 17th:

"Keen regret that the Japanese military should
 bring pressure on the Chinese garrison authorities
 at Shanhaikwan while the ink on the Sino Japanese
 peace agreement at Shanghai has not yet dried up was
 expressed by Dr. Lo Wen Kan, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
 in a press interview today. He hoped that no untoward
 incidents would occur there to further aggravate the
 Sino Japanese situation.

Concerning the Manchurian situation Mr. Lo said that
 it would be to the interests of both China and Japan to
 negotiate a peaceful settlement. At the beginning of
 next month all the Japanese troops in Shanghai and
 Woosung will have completed their withdrawal to the
 areas designated in the agreement and if by that time
 circumstances are favorable the Chinese Government will
 proceed with negotiations over Manchuria on the basis of the
 principle that any settlement to be reached must not
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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- from Peiping May 19, #542.

affect the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

Referring to the Sino Russian situation Dr. Lo said that the Government has been considering the question of resuming diplomatic relations with Russia for some time but no definite decision has been reached. Personally he had no sympathy with the argument of those who declare that if China should resume diplomatic relations with Russia it would amount to a toleration of the activities of the Communists in China. To refute this line of reasoning it is only necessary to point to countries where Communist activities are under ban although they are in diplomatic relations with Russia.

Dr. Lo further said that the question to be decided before resuming relations with Russia is whether the Moscow Government will agree to refrain from carrying on activities detrimental to the social and economic order of this country. If Russia can accept this term it will not be difficult for China to resume relations with Moscow. Mr. Mou Teh Hui, Chief Chinese delegate to the Sino Russian Conference at Moscow is at present in Paris but he will return to Moscow as soon as the Government has decided on its policy toward Russia."

JOHNSON

JS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

FROM Peiping
 Dated May 20, 1932
 Rec'd 5:20 a. m.

7/13/94
 7/13/94 - Wang
 693.9412
 894.00

RECEIVED
 MAY 20 1932
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND PEPPERS

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 20 1932
 Department of State

543, May 20, 5 p. m. 15-238

Legation's 543, May 19, 3 p. m.

Following from Kuo Wen, Nanking, May 18th:

"During his call on me yesterday Mr. Ariyoshi made no reference to the round table conference in Shanghai, said Mr. Wang Ching Wei, Chairman of the Executive Yuan in a press interview today.

Mr. Wang added that the interview was confined to an exchange of views as to how the present Sino Japanese situation could be improved. Mr. Ariyoshi brought up the question of the anti Japanese boycott movement in China over which he expressed his regret. Mr. Wang pointed out that the boycott was the natural effect of the Japanese action in Manchuria. (END PART ONE).

JOHNSON

JS

F/LS 793.94/5241

MAY 24 1932


FILED

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

PLAIN



FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 20, 1932

Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

549, May 20, 5 p. m. (PART TWO)

and that it could only be removed by Japan reconsidering her policy in regard to Manchuria. Nothing of a political nature was discussed, Mr. Wang declared.

Mr. Wang described the assassination of Mr. Inukai as a very unfortunate incident and expressed the fear that if a military government were established in Japan the Sino-Japanese situation would be further aggravated. He hoped that the Chinese people and Government would bend their efforts toward internal reform.

Concerning the internal situation Mr. Wang said that General Chen Ming Shu, Minister of Communications, had seen Mr. Sun Fo in Shanghai and transmitted to him the views of the Government in regard to his recent memorandum on political and party reform. The Central Kuomintang was considering calling the third plenary session next month and he hoped that all the leaders of the Kuomintang would attend and discuss all the outstanding national issues."

(END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RR

*7/3/94
 note
 893.01. Manchuria*

Tientsin via N. R.

FROM Dated May 20, 1932.

Recd, 8:10 A. M.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 20 1932
 Department of State

May 20, 4 P. M.

The following has been sent to the Legation.

"May 20, 3 P. M. My May 20, noon, and May 20,
 1 P. M.

I have received confidential report dated May
 15 from reliable foreigner then at Shanghai kuan
 to the effect that tranquility prevails there, that
 Japanese night rifle practice had thrown the town into
 a panic which was increased next night by Chinese rifle
 practice, and that Manchukuo and Japanese police have
 disarmed many Chinese police in villages outside (outside)
 the Wall.

Reports would appear to have been not only
 exaggerated but in the main false.

Repeated to Department and Legation."

RR WWC

ATCHESON

F/LS 793.94/5242

FILED
 MAY 24 1932

0428

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





REC'D
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2556.

Paris, May 13, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict.

MAY 20 32



F/L S 793.94/5243

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from April 30 to May 7, 1932, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

Walter E. Edge
Walter E. Edge.

Enclosures.....

0429
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Enclosures (single copy):

Clippings from the following newspapers:

April 30, 1932.

No. 1 - LE JOURNAL
2 - LE QUOTIDIEN
3 - LA REPUBLIQUE
4 - LE TEMPS

May 2, 1932.

No. 5 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
6 - LE JOURNAL
7 - LE QUOTIDIEN

May 7, 1932.

No. 8 - LE TEMPS

In quintuplicate.
710.
RTP/jak

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

four. 30

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2556 of May 13, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, April 30, 1932.

CAUSES ET CONSÉQUENCES de l'attentat de Changhaï

Le crime qui démontre la gravité
 de l'agitation antijaponaise
 ne va-t-il pas compromettre
 la conclusion de l'armistice ?

L'attentat qui vient de se produire à Changhaï semble s'être appliqué à réunir tous les éléments de complication de l'affaire sino-japonaise. Une bombe atteint les trois têtes de l'état-major japonais, le chef de la diplomatie, le chef de l'armée et le chef de l'escadre — cela au milieu d'une cérémonie officielle où les plus grandes précautions avaient dû être prises. Il est bien difficile, dans ces conditions, de contester que les Japonais ne soient exposés à de sérieux risques.

On peut remarquer, par contre, que l'attentat se produit au cours d'une revue passée en l'honneur de l'empereur du Japon. Cette manifestation ne se serait évidemment pas produite s'il n'y avait pas eu de soldats japonais. Mais il n'y a pas que des soldats japonais à Changhaï ; il y a des garnisons permanentes — anglaise, française, italienne — toutes fort importantes, des garnisons jugées indispensables pour assurer la sauvegarde des étrangers. La question de l'occupation militaire dépasse de beaucoup la récente intervention nipponne. Où l'on retrouve le cas spécifiquement japonais, c'est dans le fait que l'auteur de l'attentat serait un Coréen. Ce n'est pas la première fois, assurément, que la réaction nationaliste au pays du « Matin calme » se manifeste en violence. La plus illustre des victimes a été le prince Ito.

Le nouvel attentat met en lumière le trouble profond qui se développe autour de la politique japonaise d'expansion en Corée et en Mandchourie. Cette agitation ne peut évidemment détourner les Japonais d'une politique de recherche de débouchés qui leur est absolument indispensable ; par contre, elle risque d'exaspérer les rudesses — ce qui ne facilite pas l'apaisement. On entrevoit de grosses complications d'avenir.

Mais l'intérêt immédiat l'emporte. L'attentat survient au moment même où les dernières difficultés de la conclusion de l'armistice semblaient écartées et où l'assemblée des nations va se réunir, soit pour prendre sa petite part du succès, soit pour préparer de nouvelles complications. Et voici qu'une occasion exceptionnelle est offerte aux agités irresponsables de faire du désordre. On peut craindre qu'ils ne soient tentés d'en abuser. — SAINT-BRICE.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Quot. 30

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2556 of May 13, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, April 30, 1932.

Pas de paix à Shanghai pour les hommes de bonne volonté

Que vont faire les Japonais, eux qui, pour venger le meurtre d'un officier, ont occupé la Mandchourie, et, pour le massacre de trois bonzes, ont débarqué à Shanghai et incendié Chapéi, en présence de cet attentat dont leurs plus illustres chefs militaires sont victimes, et M. Shigemitsu, qui devait aujourd'hui même signer avec la Chine une convention sur l'armistice?

Déjà les pourparlers sont rompus. La Société des Nations semble décidément trouver un adversaire qui la dépasse, dans le destin qui s'acharne sur la terre de Chine.

Elle s'était pourtant assouplie à toutes les circonstances, faite patiente, modeste, et longanime, devant les impatiences et les exigences sans cesse croissantes du Japon.

Celui-ci ayant laissé entendre qu'il ne s'inclinerait pas devant une décision venue de Genève, le comité des dix-neuf, issu de la S. D. N., s'était quelque peu dessaisi en faveur de la commission mixte, composée des ministres des puissances qui sont sur place, à Shanghai.

Cette commission aboutissait avant-hier à un compromis, où d'ailleurs le Japon ne s'engageait guère, et voici que la bombe d'un révolutionnaire emporte comme toile d'araignée son œuvre patiente.

L'auteur de l'attentat est un de ces partisans coréens, qui ne voient pour leur patrie une chance de recouvrir son indépendance que dans une conflagration, celle-ci dût-elle bouleverser un continent.

Il y a décidément trop de nations et trop de partis qui ont intérêt à ce que les choses ne s'apaisent pas si vite en Extrême-Asie.

Des nuages lourds de menaces s'accumulent à nouveau sur cette partie du monde, et les hommes de bonne volonté risquent de n'y pas trouver sur leur route la paix qui leur est promise.

— WITNESS.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF 30

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 2556 of May 13, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, April 30, 1932.

EN EXTREME-ORIENT

Le Japon fonde un Empire

Un Coréen vient de jeter une bombe à Changhaï dans un groupe de hauts dignitaires japonais : généraux, amiraux, ambassadeurs. Il y a eu des victimes ; ce sont les risques du métier d'impérialistes. Des Coréens n'ont pas encore accepté le protectorat japonais ; il est trop clair que le Japon trouvera demain les mêmes ennemis en Mandchourie. On ne fait pas d'omelettes sans casser d'œufs, dit le proverbe. Il y aura encore pas mal d'œufs cassés si le Japon continue sur la route qu'il s'est tracée, pas mal de Japonais petits et grands qui perdront leur vie dans l'affaire, mais le Japon, lui, comment en sortira-t-il ?

Le passé répond de l'avenir. Le Japon poursuivra probablement en Mandchourie la politique qu'il a toujours poursuivie en Corée, et il aura probablement en Mandchourie le succès qu'il a obtenu en Corée, avec cette différence que la Mandchourie étant plus grande et plus peuplée que la Corée, les efforts du Japon devront être beaucoup plus considérables. Mais il est patient.

Le tsarisme a essayé de l'arrêter jadis sur le Yalou. Le tsarisme a été battu et rossé. Les maîtres de Moscou se souviennent de l'aventure et ne tiennent pas à s'y jeter à nouveau. C'est ce qui explique que le chemin de fer, dit de l'Est chinois, ait été par eux si promptement abandonné. De ce côté, il faut bien avouer que le Japon n'a pas un adversaire très mordant : l'Union des Soviets de toute évidence ne veut pas se battre.

Bon, mais voyez le premier résultat de cette attitude pacifique : c'est que le Japon a mis la main sur toute la Mandchourie.

Le second ? C'est que la commission envoyée là-bas par la S. D. N. a reconnu l'Etat mandchou, et par conséquent la séparation des trois provinces qui le composent d'avec la Chine. On ne

saurait mieux faire le jeu du Japon qui tient à ce que soit bien proclamée « l'indépendance » de la Mandchourie au moment même où il l'occupe, ce qui est le rythme habituel suivi par les puissances protectrices à l'égard des pays qu'elles placent sous leur protectorat.

Le troisième résultat de l'attitude pacifique de Moscou ? C'est que le Japon songe à la Mongolie orientale, d'une part, à la Province Maritime, capitale Vladivostock, et à la partie russe de Sakhaline, d'autre part. En vérité, il faut se souvenir que la politique japonaise est une politique impérialiste, nous voulons dire qu'elle tend à la constitution d'un vaste Empire. Dans un premier temps, le Japon ayant battu la Chine s'installa en Corée et à Formose. Dans un second temps, ayant battu la Russie, il s'installa à Port Arthur en Mandchourie et dans la partie sud de Sakhaline. Dans un troisième temps, en 1915, il tenta d'organiser un véritable protectorat de la Chine et il échoua. Un peu plus tard, en 1919, il poussa jusqu'au lac Baïkal et dut en revenir. Mais il revint tout de même de la guerre avec un port dans le Chantoung et la troisième marine du monde, ce qui interdisait aux U.S.A. d'élever la voix.

Il vient de jouer le quatrième acte de la tragédie et de saisir toute la Mandchourie. Mais, comme nous disons, ce n'est pas fini. Le Japon veut sans doute plus que la Mandchourie, il veut tout le balcon sibérien sur le Pacifique peut-être. L'U. R. S. S. ferait bien de prendre garde. Ces sortes de politiques entraînent des guerres qui commencent à deux, puis un troisième larron intervient, un quatrième, et finalement le monde commence à saigner de toutes parts.

Nous avons déjà connu cela. Ce n'est pas gai.

Pierre DOMINIQUE.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEMPS 22

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 2556 of May 13, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, April 30, 1932.

LE JAPON ET L'ATTENTAT DE SHANGHAI

L'attentat commis hier à Shanghai ramène tragiquement l'attention sur le conflit sino-japonais et la situation toujours critique en Extrême-Orient. La bombe lancée par un révolutionnaire coréen à la cérémonie organisée dans le quartier japonais de la concession internationale à l'occasion de la fête du mikado ne peut manquer d'émouvoir vivement l'opinion nipponne. Le ministre du Japon en Chine, M. Shigemitsu, est gravement blessé; l'amiral Nomura, commandant de l'escadre japonaise à Shanghai, le général Shirakawa, commandant des troupes nippones, et le général Uyeda, sont grièvement atteints; M. Kawabata, président de l'association des résidents japonais, a succombé; d'autres personnalités ont été frappées par des éclats de l'engin. On ne saurait se dissimuler que les répercussions de cet attentat peuvent être sérieuses. Des précédents nous portent à méditer sur les conséquences directes et indirectes des crimes de caractère politique perpétrés dans des circonstances pouvant engager la responsabilité des autorités de deux pays dont les relations sont déjà très difficiles.

L'auteur de l'attentat est un Coréen appartenant, dit-on, à un comité révolutionnaire qui, sous l'étiquette de « Association nationale de Chine et Corée », a son centre à Shanghai. La fin tragique du marquis Ito a prouvé de quelles violences sont capables les agitateurs coréens engagés dans une lutte sans merci contre le pouvoir nippon. Ce qui caractérise l'attentat, c'est que celui-ci a été commis par un Coréen, donc un ressortissant japonais, dans le secteur des troupes nippones de la concession internationale, qui est placé sous le contrôle de la police japonaise; mais on est en droit de se demander s'il n'a pas été organisé en dehors de ce quartier. Où, par quels éléments, par quels moyens? C'est ce que l'enquête devra démontrer pour établir toutes les responsabilités dans cette affaire, qui a provoqué presque autant d'émotion à Nankin qu'à Tokio, car les dirigeants chinois comprennent certainement qu'elle pourrait avoir des conséquences politiques graves s'il était acquis que des Chinois ont joué un rôle dans cet abominable attentat. Il faut souhaiter que la pleine lumière se fasse le plus vite possible et que tout le monde garde son sang-froid en présence d'un événement qui peut donner lieu à de nouvelles complications. Que le représentant officiel du mikado en Chine, que le chef des forces navales et des forces militaires japonaises, qui assumaient la mission que l'on sait dans les négociations en vue de conclure un armistice, aient pu être victimes d'un attentat de cette nature, et dans de telles circonstances, cela est bien fait, on le conçoit, pour exaspérer l'opinion publique au Japon, déjà très excitée par les événements de Mandchourie et de Shanghai. Il ne faut pas oublier que l'influence des milieux militaires est actuellement prépondérante dans l'empire du Soleil-Levant, que le peuple nippon cède à quelque nervosité en présence des difficultés intérieures et extérieures avec lesquelles il se trouve aux prises, qu'il réagit avec force contre l'accueil réservé à Genève aux thèses du gouvernement de Tokio. C'est là un état d'esprit dont il faut tenir compte dans l'appréciation de la situation, et qui rend la tâche du cabinet Inukai particulièrement délicate.

La première question qui se pose est celle de savoir dans quelle mesure l'attentat de Shanghai peut faire obstacle à la signature de l'armistice que l'on considérerait comme virtuellement acquise. Même si le gouvernement de Tokio est disposé, comme on est porté à le

croire, à ne tirer aucune conclusion politique de l'attentat d'hier, il va de soi que les pourparlers à Shanghai devront être suspendus pendant plusieurs jours, puisque, du fait des blessures de M. Shigemitsu, de l'amiral Nomura et du général Shirakawa, la représentation japonaise à la conférence de Shanghai est effectivement désorganisée. Si, comme le laissent entendre les informations de Tokio, le Japon ne se propose pas de mettre en cause le gouvernement de Nankin, la signature de l'armistice serait simplement retardée de quelques jours, mais cette solution, d'une importance capitale dans l'état présent des choses, ne serait pas remise en question.

Tout le monde doit le désirer, car lorsqu'on la considère dans son ensemble la situation en Extrême-Orient a des aspects singulièrement inquiétants, et de nouvelles complications survénant entre Tokio et Nankin, à la suite de l'attentat d'hier, achèveraient de rendre impossible un règlement acceptable pour les parties en cause. Il est de l'intérêt politique bien compris du Japon de voir se liquider au plus tôt la crise de Shanghai, qui a pris un développement que n'avaient pas prévu les Nippons et qui a eu pour effet de transformer en véritable expédition militaire ce qui ne devait être au début qu'une simple opération de police. Les grands intérêts du Japon ne sont pas à Shanghai, où il ne réclame pas d'autres privilèges que ceux reconnus à l'ensemble des puissances qui disposent dans ce centre de forces pour assurer la protection de la vie et des biens de leurs nationaux, mais en Mandchourie, où il possède des droits résultant d'accords formels et où il a créé, dans la zone du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien, une œuvre immense qu'il ne saurait sacrifier en aucun cas. Or, on est bien obligé de constater que l'état des choses en Mandchourie crée de sérieuses préoccupations. Les Chinois et certains éléments russes s'efforcent de faire échec au gouvernement mandchou, qui n'a pu s'organiser, on le comprend très bien, que grâce à l'appui japonais. La lutte se poursuit dans des conditions qui obligent le Japon à maintenir des forces importantes dans le pays. D'autre part, l'Union

des républiques socialistes soviétiques masse des troupes à la frontière sibérienne, et l'éventualité d'une intervention des Soviets n'est pas écartée. Des informations de presse font craindre que les relations entre Tokio et Moscou ne soient assez tendues, et, à tort ou à raison, on est enclin à penser que certains milieux américains encouragent Moscou à susciter de ce côté des difficultés qui ne pourraient laisser le Japon indifférent.

Un conflit russo-japonais n'est pourtant pas une éventualité que l'on doive envisager pour l'avenir immédiat, car les Soviets seraient sans doute bien en peine d'entreprendre une lutte ouverte en Extrême-Orient contre un adversaire aussi redoutable que le Japon, lutte qui, au surplus, risquerait de provoquer l'effondrement du régime communiste en Russie même. Il n'en est pas moins vrai que tout cela contribue à faire peser sur la situation générale en Extrême-Orient un lourd malaise à l'heure même où le Japon doit veiller avec la plus grande attention au redressement de sa situation financière et économique et où il doit consacrer son meilleur effort à la consolidation des droits qu'il a acquis dans le sud de la Mandchourie. Il y a là un ensemble de faits dont on peut déduire que le gouvernement de Tokio s'emploiera à régler le plus vite possible et dans l'esprit le plus libéral la question de Shanghai.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enc. 2

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 2556 of May 13, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, May 2, 1932.

Le rêve panjaponais

par Arturo LABRIOLA

Il est de toute manière évident que dans ces discussions sur la « politique » du Japon en Extrême-Orient, on tombe dans une double erreur.

La première est celle de considérer les initiatives guerrières du Japon en Chine et dans la mer du Japon comme des problèmes qui regardent des puissances encore dans l'état social du XVII^e siècle. C'est l'avis d'un écrivain du *Foreign Affairs*. Grâce à cette prétendue « constatation » le mécanisme de Genève ne pourrait, ne devrait être appliqué aux conflits de l'Extrême-Orient. Cette thèse, qui favorise d'une façon admirable les intérêts de la conquête japonaise, est fausse à tous les points de vue. En tout cas elle semble ignorer le fait que si la conquête japonaise frappe un pays qui se trouve dans une situation spéciale, elle frappe aussi — d'une manière ou de l'autre — certaines puissances occidentales, qui ne sont pas, évidemment, dans « l'état social du XVII^e siècle ».

Séparer l'action japonaise en tant que dirigée contre la Chine, de cette même action en tant qu'intéressant certaines puissances occidentales, est évidemment artificiel et dangereux. On pourrait s'en apercevoir un jour, trop tard. Mais on dirait que même à Genève cette préoccupation ne joue qu'un rôle très effacé dans l'attitude des représentants des « grandes » puissances. On aimerait s'imaginer qu'on est encore en 1894, au temps de la première guerre sino-japonaise, ou en 1895, au temps du traité de Shimoneeki, lorsque les grandes puissances arrangèrent dans leur intérêt, et avec la salive de leurs diplomates, ce que les autres avaient réalisé avec le sang de leurs veines... Mais ce temps est passé.

La seconde et plus grande erreur dont on se rend coupable dans cette question, c'est de considérer la con-

quête japonaise dans sa valeur « actuelle », et de ne pas considérer les conséquences qu'elle entraîne. C'est un point de vue que la paresse ne réussit pas à justifier.

On a l'air de se dire: au fond, de quoi s'agit-il? D'une région inconnue qu'on appelle « Mandchourie » et sur laquelle aucune puissance « occidentale » n'a jamais pensé avoir des prétentions. Cela pourrait regarder les Soviétiques, mais si — ou en les obligeant à la résignation, ou en leur infligeant une bonne leçon — le Japon pouvait avoir raison d'eux, ne devrions-nous pas considérer comme très heureuse cette situation? Pour Changhaï la question est différente; mais Genève, d'une façon ou de l'autre, résoudra ce problème, et le Japon devra bien renoncer à y mettre les mains. Nous lui abandonnerons la Mandchourie et son âpre hiver, et nous reprendrons Changhaï... aux Japonais et aux Chinois aussi, s. v. p.!

Soit. Mais est-il permis, en l'état de la question, d'ignorer encore que la Mandchourie est pour le Japon une étape, et Changhaï un moyen de chantage? Maintenant personne ne conteste plus l'authenticité du mémorandum Tanaka. Or ce mémorandum est en train d'être réalisé. Il comporte de la part de la race nipponne une partie fantastique sur la conquête mondiale qui rappelle les anciens rêves pangermanistes des Gobineau, des Vacher de Laponge, des Penka, et d'Houston Chamberlain. Ces rêves ont sombré dans la défaite allemande de 1918, et dans la déchéance de l'Angleterre de son rôle de premier plan en tant que puissance économique. Les rêves panjaponais — qui survolent l'horizon même de l'Asie — sont destinés au même réveil.

Mais ce mémorandum comporte une partie actuelle, dont les termes sont: au nord le détroit de Behring et le lac

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Baïkal, à l'occident le Thibet, et au midi l'Australie et la Nouvelle Zélande, jusqu'à l'île de Chatam, et en passant par la mer des Alfours. Les Japonais ne se cachent pas que la Chine est une « monture » sur laquelle on entreprend le grand voyage. Ils s'imaginent que les divisions du monde occidental et la haine pour la Russie Soviétique pourront largement faciliter son jeu.

Depuis des dizaines de siècles les évolutions du Japon ont été les évolutions d'une caste nobiliaire, organisée sur la base des groupements locaux de famille, dans des formes purement militaires. Cette caste a créé le Shogunat, l'a remanié, l'a aboli, a rétabli le pouvoir de l'Empereur, toujours par un fait qui dépendait d'elle. Le constitutionnalisme fut la forme sous laquelle elle réalisa son unification. D'elle est sortie la grande bourgeoisie des affaires, et dans ses mains est l'empereur, la haute hiérarchie militaire, et la finance de l'Etat. Les autres classes ont été réduites à un rôle passif et subordonné. Le Japon est la propriété et le patrimoine moral des daïmios, des samourais et des clans (groupements locaux de famille) nobiliaires.

Une bourgeoisie non aristocratique, n'a pas d'existence morale dans ce pays. Des idéaux divergents de ceux des classes aristocratiques, et qui se résument dans la conquête militaire, ne sont et ne seraient pas tolérés. L'Etat c'est la caste militaire, c'est-à-dire la vieille aristocratie des daïmios (princes) et des samourais, qui a toujours mené le pays ; et c'est avec l'idéologie de cette caste qu'il faut compter et cette idéologie est la guerre.

Voilà pourquoi dans la politique du Japon il est absolument impossible de constater un simple *fait actuel*, destiné à rester fermé sur soi même. Ce fait est l'anneau d'une chaîne.

Et ce sont des actes et des événements que tout le monde connaît, mais qu'on dirait ignorés par certains hommes de Genève. S'en tirer en pensant à l'embêtement de la Russie, et aux difficultés de l'Etat Soviétique, c'est vraiment faire preuve d'un trop heureux d'état d'esprit, pour pouvoir le considérer comme politique.

Arturo LABRIOLA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2556 of May 13, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, May 2, 1932.

L'ACTION des Soviets dans les affaires d'Extrême-Orient

Est-il vrai que le chef du groupe de Coréens qui a monté l'attentat de Changhaï ait fait deux fois le voyage de Moscou ? Ce qui est certain, c'est qu'il existe à Moscou un institut destiné à la formation des agitateurs révolutionnaires asiatiques. Ce qui est non moins certain, c'est que la propagande soviétique exploite tous les éléments qui s'opposent à la politique du gouvernement japonais : les nationalismes coréen et chinois, l'activité des bandes d'irréguliers chinois en Mandchourie. La III^e Internationale a créé, à cette fin, une sorte d'*Intelligence Service*, qui s'appelle le *Razdiadupr*, dont les intrigues ne laissent parfois pas d'inquiéter les maîtres du Kremlin eux-mêmes. Les dirigeants bolcheviques prétendent semer le vent sans récolter la tempête ; ils se flattent d'exploiter l'anarchie chinoise et de ruiner l'impérialisme japonais en restant à l'abri des réactions. Ils ne voudraient pour rien au monde être entraînés dans une guerre ouverte qui aboutirait certainement à la débâcle de la bande des exploiters du prolétariat, soit par une défaite, soit par la suprématie des militaires victorieux. Les dirigeants de Moscou sont tout à fait convaincus que le gouvernement japonais fera tout le possible pour éviter une guerre ; ils ne peuvent se

dissimuler pourtant qu'à force de jouer avec le feu on risque d'allumer l'incendie.

Cette préoccupation s'est manifestée d'une manière caractéristique, au cours d'une réunion du Politbureau tenue à Moscou, le 10 avril dernier. Dans cette réunion, consacrée à l'examen des affaires d'Extrême-Orient, le commissaire du peuple à la guerre, M. Vorochiloff, a exposé les mesures prises pour mettre la Sibérie à l'abri d'une attaque japonaise. Les troupes régulières soviétiques concentrées en Extrême-Orient atteignent 150.000 hommes. Ces troupes, à l'exception de deux divisions, sont groupées autour des stations de chemins de fer de Tchita et de Kharziskaja. De plus, les Russes peuvent compter sur le concours de l'armée de la République de Mongolie extérieure, forte de 50.000 hommes, de quatre brigades de volontaires chinois (20.000 hommes) et des formations de francs-tireurs du district de l'Oussouri (40.000 hommes). L'aviation ne dispose pas de moins de 550 appareils, dont 300 sont concentrés dans les cinq aéroports du district de l'Oussouri et les trois aéroports du district de Tchita. D'après Vorochiloff, ces mesures sont largement suffisantes pour mettre la Russie à l'abri d'une attaque japonaise.

Le représentant de la III^e Internationale, Manouïlsky, et le président de l'Internationale des syndicats rouges, Lozovsky, ont protesté contre cette tactique purement passive, soutenant qu'il faut, au contraire, profiter des moyens militaires accumulés et de l'occasion pour adopter une tactique résolument offensive. Le premier a fait valoir que les Coréens formés à l'école de Moscou sont prêts à fomenter un soulèvement contre le Japon. Le second a signalé le développement des syndicats rouges, au Japon même, qui sont tout disposés à profiter du mécontentement causé par la crise économique.

Le président des commissaires du peuple, M. Molotoff, a soutenu la thèse de Vorochiloff. Il a indiqué qu'il fallait, à tout prix, éviter de provoquer un conflit avec le Japon. Il a signalé la crise d'approvisionnement, qui a pris une tournure très grave dans toutes les grandes villes de Russie. Il a attiré l'attention sur l'état critique des services de chemins de fer et sur le mécontentement des paysans, qui ne manqueraient pas de saisir l'occasion d'un conflit extérieur pour se mettre en révolte contre le gouvernement. Par ailleurs, un rapport du Guépéou montre que les partisans de Trotsky ont conservé de nombreux adeptes dans le parti communiste. Il faut donc être très prudent.

Molotoff a signalé en outre que, d'après les informations reçues au commissariat des affaires étrangères, le gouvernement japonais voudrait éviter un conflit avec Moscou, mais que cela lui serait impossible si les milieux militaires japonais recevaient des preuves que la III^e Internationale et l'Internationale des syndicats rouges préparent une révolution au Japon et en Corée, ou soutiennent les irréguliers chinois en Mandchourie.

« Cela exige de nous une prudence extraordinaire », a dit Molotoff ; il faut absolument s'abstenir de tous les actes qui pourraient irriter les militaires japonais. »



M. VOROCHILOFF
 En médaillon, M. MOLOTOFF.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Le principal danger, a souligné le président des commissaires du peuple, provient des agissements du *Razdiadupr* et des nombreux agents de la III^e Internationale en Mandchourie, en Chine, en Corée et au Japon. L'activité de ces agents n'est pas contrôlée. On peut redouter des actes de sabotage, des attentats, etc. (Retenez que ces mots ont été prononcés le 10 avril. L'attentat de Changhaï a eu lieu le 29 avril.)

« Nous pouvons être entraînés à la guerre sans la vouloir, conclut le président des commissaires du peuple. si nos camarades du *Komintern* et du *Razdiadupr* ne modèrent pas leur action. »

Cet avis a prévalu en fin de compte et la réunion du Politbureau s'est terminée par le vote d'une résolution recommandant à tous les intéressés de continuer les mesures préventives pour être prêts à toute éventualité, mais d'éviter en même temps ce qui pourrait aggraver le conflit.

Nous surprenons là, sur le vif, l'attitude des dirigeants des Soviets qui continuent de subir l'entraînement révolutionnaire et qui, pourtant, sont devenus assez conservateurs, au moins de leurs places, pour souhaiter des apaisements sans avoir le courage et peut-être les moyens de les réaliser. — S.-B.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Quot. 2

Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 2556 of May 13, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, May 2, 1932.

Les difficultés financières et politiques du gouvernement japonais

La modération relative dont le Japon a fait preuve après l'attentat de Shanghai a surpris l'opinion européenne. On croyait que les militaires nippons en prendraient prétexte pour prolonger l'occupation de la zone conquise par les armes et peut-être même pour exercer de nouvelles représailles. Au lieu de cela, Tokio a décidé de ne pas mettre en cause la Chine et de hâter la conclusion de l'accord sur les conditions de l'armistice.

D'après les dernières informations, les négociateurs japonais se bornent à demander pour la commission mixte le droit de surveiller les mouvements des troupes chinoises.

Il est vrai qu'en bonne logique l'explosion d'une bombe sur une tribune officielle où se trouvaient les chefs de l'armée et le ministre du Japon a prouvé que l'occupation militaire ne suffit pas pour garantir cette « sécurité » des citoyens japonais, au nom de laquelle fut entreprise toute l'opération de Shanghai. Mais la logique seule n'aurait pas suffi pour déterminer la décision du gouvernement du Mikado. Le communiqué officiel a annoncé qu'elle avait été prise sur le rapport des ministres de la Guerre, de la Marine et des Finances. Ce sont les arguments de ce dernier qui l'ont emporté. Depuis plusieurs semaines, déjà, il insistait sur la difficulté de trouver les trois milliards et demi de francs nécessaires pour couvrir les frais de l'expédition militaire dont l'état-major n'avait pas prévu la durée.

La situation politique intérieure n'est pas non plus sans nuages dans l'Empire du Soleil levant. Deux meurtres politiques, dont les victimes furent les représentants de deux consortiums financiers rivaux, gouvernemental et anti-gouvernemental, sont symptomatiques à cet égard. Ils continuent la série d'attentats commencée, il y a quelques années, par l'assassinat du premier ministre Hara.

En outre, les révolutionnaires coréens n'ont jamais cessé de faire valoir leurs revendications nationales à l'aide de la bombe et du poignard. Il n'y a pas longtemps, un Coréen avait attenté à la vie de l'empereur. La bombe de Shanghai a été aussi lancée par un patriote coréen. Le gouvernement de Tokio a donc été bien inspiré en considérant l'attentat du 29 avril comme une affaire intérieure. — WITNESS.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEMPS 7

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 2556 of May 13, 1932.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, May 7, 1932.

L'ARMISTICE SINO-JAPONAIS

L'armistice entre la Chine et le Japon a été signé hier à Shanghai dans des conditions particulièrement émouvantes. Le document — dont seul le texte anglais est officiellement acquis — a dû être porté à l'hôpital où le ministre du Japon, M. Shigemitsu, gravement blessé lors de l'attentat du 29 avril, y a apposé sa signature quelques instants avant que les chirurgiens procédassent à l'amputation de sa jambe droite. La convention d'armistice a été signée également par l'amiral Shimada et les généraux Uyeda, et Tashira pour le Japon, par les généraux Tsichi et Wang pour la Chine, enfin par les ministres de France, de Grande-Bretagne, des Etats-Unis et le chargé d'affaires d'Italie. C'est dire que l'accord a été conclu sous les auspices des quatre principales puissances, qui sont d'ailleurs représentées chacune par un délégué civil et un délégué militaire dans la commission mixte chargée de veiller à l'exécution des conditions de l'armistice.

L'acte a une importance capitale, puisqu'il règle en fait la situation à Shanghai et met le point final aux opérations entreprises par le Japon pour la protection de la vie et des biens de ses nationaux dans la région qui constitue le centre de la campagne de boycottage des produits japonais et de l'excitation contre toute influence nipponne. Il est entendu que les deux parties qui furent aux prises s'abstiendront désormais de toute forme d'hostilité, que les troupes chinoises resteront sur les positions qu'elles occupent actuellement à une vingtaine de kilomètres de Shanghai, et sur lesquelles, on s'en souvient, elles durent se replier au moment de la dernière offensive nipponne. Par contre, les troupes du mikado se retireront dans le délai d'une semaine dans les limites de la concession internationale, étant entendu, toutefois, qu'en raison de l'importance de leurs effectifs certains cantonnements leur seront assignés dans la zone chinoise entre Chapei et Woo-Sung. Enfin, la commission mixte de douze membres, six civils et six militaires, surveillera le transfert aux forces de police chinoise du contrôle des points évacués par les Japonais. L'accord tel qu'il est conclu témoigne d'un réel esprit de conciliation chez les parties en cause, les Chinois n'insistant pas sur leurs premières exigences, les Nippons s'abstenant de réclamer des garanties spéciales qui eussent pu être interprétées comme humiliantes pour la Chine. On s'étonne, en vérité, qu'il ait fallu tant de jours et de semaines pour faire admettre par les deux parties des conditions d'armistice aussi simples et logiques, sauvant la face pour le gouvernement de Tokio engagé dans des opérations militaires de grande envergure qu'il n'avait pas prévues et pour le gouvernement de Nankin obligé de soutenir une lutte dépassant de beaucoup les possibilités de ses ressources et de ses moyens militaires.

D'une manière générale, il faut se féliciter que l'affaire de Shanghai se trouve liquidée en fait par cet arrêt définitif des hostilités. La Société des nations, qui était saisie en vertu de l'article 15 du pacte et qui, par la résolution de l'assemblée extraordinaire, risquait de devoir ou bien confesser son impuissance ou bien heurter de front le Japon et déterminer par là même la retraite de cette puissance de l'institution internationale de Genève, est maintenant libérée d'une tâche ingrate et singulièrement dangereuse pour son autorité. Elle reste engagée, il est vrai, dans l'affaire de Mandchourie, dont le conseil a été imprudemment saisi, au mois de septembre de l'année dernière, en vertu de l'article 10 du pacte, mais le conflit de Shanghai constituait pour elle

l'épreuve la plus délicate. Quant au Japon, après les mécomptes que lui valut une opération de police trop rude entreprise au début avec des moyens insuffisants, on comprend fort bien qu'il se soit prêté avec beaucoup de bonne volonté à la conclusion d'un armistice sauvegardant son prestige militaire et laissant entière la question du règlement de tous les problèmes de caractère politique et économique se posant entre lui et la Chine. Il donne une preuve nouvelle de cette bonne volonté et de son désir d'en finir en procédant dès aujourd'hui au retrait de ses troupes sans utiliser le délai d'une semaine prévu à cet effet.

Le gouvernement de Tokio doit porter son attention sur des intérêts plus considérables et plus immédiats que ceux qu'il avait à défendre à Shanghai, où il n'a jamais songé à réclamer d'autres privilèges que ceux reconnus aux principales puissances, ce qui lui eût d'ailleurs été impossible à tenter sans provoquer des complications internationales qu'il ne saurait envisager de sang-froid. La situation intérieure au Japon est difficile en ce moment. La crise financière et économique y fait durement sentir ses effets. Le cabinet conservateur, présidé par M. Inukai, doit gouverner avec prudence et fermeté en raison des remous profonds qui peuvent se constater dans les masses nationales. D'autre part, le parti militaire demeure très puissant, et on n'ignore pas que certains milieux réagissent volontiers contre les méthodes parlementaires qui ne permettent guère de faire face par des moyens appropriés à ce que d'aucuns considèrent comme des nécessités impérieuses pour le développement de l'expansion nipponne. Mais la principale préoccupation du gouvernement du mikado est la situation qui existe en Mandchourie. Le Japon ne peut renoncer en aucun cas aux droits qu'il a acquis en Mandchourie, qu'il tient de traités et d'accords dont il n'admet pas que la validité puisse être contestée.

Il a engagé d'énormes capitaux dans l'organisation et la mise en valeur de la région du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien; il s'efforce de garantir la sécurité dans le voisinage de cette zone. C'est par là que s'explique l'action militaire qu'il a entreprise au mois de septembre dernier, à la suite des incidents de Moukden, et qui a abouti, en fait, sous prétexte de débarrasser la Mandchourie du sud des bandes d'irréguliers chinois, à détacher les provinces mandchoues de la Chine et à les constituer en un Etat indépendant.

Tout cela ne va pas sans choes ni heurts. La réaction chinoise est vive en Mandchourie. D'autre part, sans qu'on puisse prévoir une intervention de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, intervention qui signifierait la guerre, il est certain que la concentration de troupes russes à la frontière sibérienne doit retenir l'attention, d'autant plus que le caractère actuel des relations entre Moscou et Tokio n'est pas précisément cordial et conflant. Le Japon ne désire certainement pas la guerre, mais il n'hésiterait pas, sans doute, à la faire si ses intérêts vitaux en Mandchourie étaient menacés. Quant aux Soviets, ce serait un véritable acte de folie de la part des dirigeants de Moscou de s'engager délibérément dans une telle aventure. Il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'on a parfois l'impression que, dans quelques milieux internationaux, on cherche à dresser Moscou contre Tokio. Peut-être ne faut-il y voir qu'un effet de la politique qui porte tout naturellement certaines puissances à organiser la résistance à l'expansion nipponne sur le continent asiatique; mais il serait excessif de vouloir en conclure, dans l'état présent des choses, à la menace d'un conflit qui affecterait la situation politique dans le monde entier.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MAY 21 1932

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Gray

FROM
 SHANGHAI

Dated May 21, 1932

Rec'd 5:00 a.m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 21 1932

Department of State

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

2557, May 21, 3 p.m.

Referring to my telegram No. 251 May 20, 9 a.m.

Japanese Commissioner has notified Chinese Commissioner
 that Japanese army is planning to withdraw from Yangkahong
 (Yanghang) and Szetseling, May 24, 11 a.m.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

JS

F/LS 793.94/5244

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
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Washington,

May 21, 1932.

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WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

76
May 21/15244 the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphs
that the Japanese Commissioner has notified the Chinese
Commissioner that the Japanese Army is planning to
withdraw from Yangkahong (Yanghang) and Szetseling on
May 24.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1912 1-138

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

NO. 266 Political.



AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, May 4, 1932.

MAY 20 32

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAY 25 1932	

SUBJECT: Transmitting Sino-Japanese Documents for
 the Period April 16 - April 30, inclusive.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



SIR:

793.94 / 5131

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's despatch
 No. 264 Political, of April 18, 1932, and previous despatches
 transmitting documents relating to the appeal of the Chinese
 Government under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In conformity with the procedure which has been fol-
 lowed in this matter, I am forwarding under separate cover
 as an accompaniment to this despatch further documents
 which were issued during the period April 16 to April 30,
 inclusive.

Very respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
 Prentiss B. Gilbert,

American Consul.

MAY 26 1932

FILED

Original and 5 copies to Department of State.

1 copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

enclosure and accompaniments

F/LS

793.94/5245

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SENT AS AN ACCOMPANIMENT OF GENEVA
CONSULATE'S DESPATCH NO. 226 POLITICAL OF MAY 4, 1932.

A (Extr.) Comm. Spec. 1932. 7 to 12.

A(Extr.) 1932.VII. 104 to 110.

Minutes of the First Meeting (Public) of the Special

Committee held on March 17, 1932, at 3.30 p.m.

Verbatim Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Special

Session of the Assembly held on April 30, 1932,

at 10.30 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SENT AS AN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF GENEVA

COMMITTEE DEBATE NO. 230 POLITICAL OF MAY 4, 1932.

A (Extr.) Comm. Spec. 1932. 7 to 12. ✓

A(Extr.) 1932.VII. 104 to 110.

Minutes of the First Meeting (Public) of the Special

Committee held on March 17, 1932, at 3.30 p.m.

Verbatim Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Special

Session of the Assembly held on April 30, 1932,

at 10.30 a.m.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Committee of Nineteen and
the Chinese Delegation.

A.(Extr.) Com.Spec.7.1932.

Geneva, April 16th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the Secretary General has the honour to circulate the following communication dated April 15th.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE SHANGHAI NEGOTIATIONS.

I.

The resolution passed on March 4th by the Assembly of the League of Nations concerning the cessation of hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese forces in the Shanghai region, being in conformity with the line of conduct which the Japanese Government intended to pursue, the latter willingly accepted it. With the assistance of the representatives of the friendly Powers, it accordingly opened and carried on conversations with China.

Through the intermediary of the British Minister in China, the basis of the negotiations had been settled during the unofficial conversations which opened at Shanghai on March 14th. The Japanese Minister in China, the Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the representatives of Great Britain, the United States, France and Italy, had taken part in those preliminary conversations. Four meetings were held (on March 14th, 19th (morning and afternoon) and 21st). The result of these conversations was communicated by the Chinese delegation in its memorandum of April 12th (A.Extr.Com.Spec.7/1932), pages 8 and 9. (Add, however, in the Annex, page 2, after: "to the discretion of the Commission: "whose decision should be taken by majority vote, the chairman having a casting vote. The chairman will be elected by the commission from the members representing the participating friendly Powers".)

The official Conference held its first meeting on the morning of March 24th, taking as a basis for its discussion a draft framed by the Japanese delegation. That draft was based on the text drawn up by the preliminary Conference with the addition of the necessary technical details.

Fourteen meetings were held between March 24th and April 2th. Thanks to the efforts of the British Minister and of the representatives of the other friendly Powers, most of the questions were settled on March 28th and 29th, and various articles were approved (see below).

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A technical Commission consisting of the Japanese and Chinese experts and the military attachés of the friendly Powers had been constituted, and the only important question submitted to it which was still outstanding was the determination of the eventual positions of the Japanese and Chinese forces. The question of the date of the withdrawal of the Japanese forces within the Concession was again the attention of the plenary Conference.

The questions raised during the discussions will be explained below, article by article.

II.

Article 1.

This article was drawn up at the meeting of the Conference on March 29th. Its object is to render final the cessation of hostilities.

The Japanese delegation had asked that the prohibition to use plain clothes soldiers and irregulars should be expressly mentioned, but as the outcome of the discussion the term "all and every form of hostile acts" was adopted.

Article 2.

This article refers to the determination of the position of the Chinese forces. It was drawn up at the meeting on March 31st.

Article 3.

This article is closely connected with annexes 2 and 3. It determines the position and withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The interpretation of the term "temporarily" gave rise to the most serious difficulties. On the Chinese side it was asked that, without taking into account the circumstances of the moment, the date by which the Japanese forces were to withdraw to the settlement and Extension Roads, should be fixed. The Japanese delegation, for the reasons explained later and also in the note dated April 14th from the Japanese representative on the Council, could not agree to fix this date in advance.

Article 4.

This article deals with the constitution, etc., of the Joint Commission and the transfer to the Chinese police of the maintenance of order in the evacuated zone.

Article 5.

This article deals with the entry into force of the agreement and the text which is to be authoritative.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Annexe 1.

Position of the Chinese troops.

The positions of the Chinese troops formed the subject of discussion in the Technical Commission. No difficulty was raised as regards the troops to the north and northwest of Shanghai. On the other hand, the question of the positions of the Chinese forces south of the Socchow River and in the Fochung region (where there are big Japanese works and wharves) formed the subject of lengthy debate.

(a) As regards the region south of the Socchow River, the Chinese delegates indicated at the meeting of the Commission on March 26th, Kuatschuen, Hunjacchen, Lungtuachen, as being their most advanced positions. They stated that they did not desire to operate movements of troops east of these localities.

(b) At the meeting of the Commission on April 11th, the British Military Attaché proposed that the Chinese should inform the foreign military attachés of the localities beyond which their troops would not advance; the military attachés, in their turn, would inform the Japanese of the Chinese communication; these communications would be annexed to the general agreement.

The sittings of the Conference having been suspended after the 11th - although the work of the Sub-commission was continued on the 12th and 13th, it was suspended from the 14th until the resumption of the sittings of the Conference - the above-mentioned point could not be definitely settled.

Annexe 2.

1) The first paragraph of this Annexe refers to the commencement of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the vicinity of the Concession, and the period during which that withdrawal might be completed. The above-mentioned Chinese communication states that the period was fixed at six weeks. The Japanese agreed, however, at the meeting on March 28th, to reduce it to four weeks.

2) The second paragraph concerns the care of invalids or sick or injured animals which it might not have been possible to evacuate in time. The Chinese communication (page 11) would appear to insinuate that the mention of such a question reflected an intention on the part of Japan to ignore the provisions of the original draft agreement. It is obvious, however, that such a question is purely technical in character, and in no way at variance with the agreement previously concluded.

3) The Chinese delegation had asked that a clause should be inserted, fixing clearly the date of the withdrawal of the Japanese forces to the International Settlement and the Extension roads. This question was to form the main subject of the subsequent discussions.

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The Japanese Government has the liveliest and most sincere desire to withdraw its troops as rapidly as possible inside the Concession and, eventually, to bring them back to Japan. But it must not be forgotten that the reason for which these forces had to be sent to Shanghai was the need of protecting Japanese nationals. To fix a date for the withdrawal of these troops without the assurance that this protection will be secured would be to render the despatch of the troops itself senseless; and in the light of the state of affairs at present prevailing in China it is evident that the Japanese Government cannot at present make provision for any such date. (See in this connection part III below).

In presence of the repeated demands from the Chinese and by way of response to the efforts made by the representatives of the friendly powers to bring about agreement, the Japanese Government, in spite of the difficulties involved in the acceptance of a time limit, agreed, in the hope that such a proof of goodwill would help to hasten the conclusion of an agreement, to the compromise proposed by the Minister of the United Kingdom (see letter 81/1932 of April 14th from the Japanese representative on the Council).

The meeting of the Conference was proposed for April 11th, and the two delegations were to give the final replies of their Governments in regard to the last draft declaration proposed by Sir Miles Lampson. On the morning of the day fixed, the Chinese delegation stated that in the absence of instructions it would not be in a position to attend the Conference, and asked for the meeting to be postponed to a subsequent date.

Annex 3.

The Chinese communication appears to seek to give the impression that an effort is being made on the Japanese side to impose a solution in regard to the positions which the Japanese forces may take up. This is not correct. On April 6th the Technical Commission reached agreement in regard to the Japanese positions, viz. in Woosung, Kianwan, Shapai and the district on the east of the Concession. On the following day the members of the Commission (including the foreign military attachés) visited the districts in question, and on the 11th the agreement was confirmed.

The points in question are the following:

- a) district of Woosung: an area of about four square miles extending to the north of Woosung Creek along the bank of the Whangpoo, but not including Woosungchen and the land in the neighbourhood of the schools and hotels;

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- b) district of Chapei: area to the East of Hongkew Creek;
- c) neighbourhood of Kienwan: district to the East of the railway line Shanghai-Woosung;
- d) eastern part of the Concession: area of one mile radius on the bank of the Whangpoo.

Annex 4.

Paragraph 1 deals with the situation and procedure of the Joint Commission. No difficulty has been raised in this connection.

Paragraph 2 deals with the steps to be taken to supervise the observance of the agreement. The text agreed on provides for the Commission to have powers to take such steps as it considers most appropriate in execution of Articles 1, 2 and 3.

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Spontaneous Declaration by the Chinese Government.

This question had already been decided during the preliminary discussions.

The text of the declaration in which the Japanese Minister and the Foreign Ministers interested "take note" (March 1st) is reproduced at the end of the communication from the Japanese representative on the Council dated April 18th.

III.

The Chinese communication of April 18th states that the principal obstacle to the fulfilment of the Assembly legislation is the steady insistence of the Japanese Government that the withdrawal of its forces to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads must be subordinated to Japanese views as to when "Conditions" in and around Shanghai have sufficiently improved to warrant a sense of security by Japanese subjects; or again that the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from territory under Chinese jurisdiction at Shanghai cannot be subordinated to any political condition including the acceptance of any proposal as regards the agenda or competence of the Round-Table Conference. It thus endeavours to show that in the course of the three weeks during which the discussions of the military conference continued Japan raised the political conditions which had been discussed by the Assembly and the Special Committee. Such an allegation is completely unfounded.

Even in the preliminary negotiations it was definitely recognised that owing to the size of the Japanese forces some of them must be temporarily stationed outside the Settlement and the extension. The withdrawal of these troops into the Settlement would entail a considerable decrease in their strength, and it is plain that such a decrease could not be effected unless the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the Shanghai area were safeguarded and could not be endangered by this decrease in the forces sent to protect them. During the discussion at the first meeting of the General Commission of the Assembly, when the draft resolution was discussed, H. Hyman, President of the Committee, said:

"..... I think it is the idea of the authors of the draft resolution that all questions relating to security are part of the arrangements that will have to be negotiated on the spot for the purpose of making the cessation of hostilities definitive and settling the details of the withdrawal of the Japanese forces."

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The questions relating to security must necessarily be settled according to the circumstances themselves, and it goes without saying that the Japanese authorities are obliged to take into account the conditions prevailing upon the spot in regulating the withdrawal of their troops. To say that this constitutes a political condition is a flagrant error. (It should be noted that, at the meeting of March 28th of the Shanghai Military Conference, the British Minister, having quoted extracts from the minutes of the meeting of the General Commission of the Assembly with regard to the statements of M. Sato and M. Hymans, added that, in his opinion, a return to normal conditions /in which the safety of the Japanese was ensured/ was not a new political condition raised by Japan but had been stipulated by the authors of the resolution. Subsequently the Ministers of Great Britain and the United States again maintained this point of view.)

As regards the question of the Round Table Conference, Japan has no desire to exercise pressure on China by the presence of the Japanese forces in order to obtain conditions favourable to Japan in regard to "the programme or the competence of the Conference". The Japanese Government understands that according to the plan of the President of the League Council of February 29th, the Round Table Conference should begin as soon as the negotiations for the final cessation of hostilities have succeeded. It is therefore convinced that when that time comes China will be under the obligation to participate in this Conference and that should any efforts be made to circumvent the opening of the Conference, Japan would be entitled to demand, on the basis of the plan, that China should take part in the Conference.

Japan has in no way modified the attitude which she took up at the outset at the time of the adoption of the Assembly resolution of March 4th, and has not departed from this attitude during the Shanghai negotiations.

The representatives of the four friendly Powers who have taken part in these discussions have always endeavoured to promote their success in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the resolution of March 4th. Thanks to their efforts the Conference had nearly achieved its aim, and the Japanese Government had even taken the last step necessary to the success of the negotiations, as the Japanese representative explained in his letter of April 14th. The representatives of the Powers who thus took part in the negotiations evidently regarded as just and reasonable not only the clauses on which agreement had been reached, but also the last proposal which Japan decided, in spite of great difficulties, to accept.

IV.

1. The Japanese forces already withdrawn from the Shanghai area amount to about 38,000 men and are the following:

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Date of moving orders	Troops	Effectives.
March 14th	1 division	about 10,000
" 14th	1 mixed brigade	" 5,000
" 26th	heavy artillery and line of communications formations	" 8,000
April 11th	1 division (partially)	" 10,000
" 15th	air formations, heavy artillery and l. of c. troops	?

2) Forces remaining stationed at Shanghai: 2 divisions, about 20,000 men (not including other train and l. of c. formations).

Present number of horses: about 2,000 (there are difficulties in the way of bringing such a number of horses back inside the Concession).

There is also considerable material (aeroplanes, artillery, munitions, provisions, surgical dressings, miscellaneous stores, fodder, motor-cars, weapons, etc.).

3) The Japanese forces are on the line Lieukochon-Ketingchen-Tenzieng-Guanzu.

4) Japanese nationals continued to be subjected to violence on the part of the mob, even in the Concession where the municipal police endeavours to protect them (see communication of April 14th). The movements of Chinese troops continue (see communications of April 8th and 15th).

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CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL SECTION.
L. N. Political
Sino-Japanese
Conflict.
DRAFT AGREEMENT.
File - <u>PBM</u>

AL (Extr.) Com. Spec. 8.
 10 April 1932.

Article 1. The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from, 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease around Shanghai all and every form of hostile acts. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers.

Article 2. The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement. (1)

Article 3. In accordance with the programme regulating withdrawal as shown in Annex II to this Agreement, the Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932. It is however understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex III to this Agreement. (2)

- (1) At the time of the adoption of this Article, the Chinese Delegate made a declaration which was accepted by the Conference to the effect that nothing in this Agreement implies any permanent restriction on movements of the Chinese troops in Chinese territory.
- (2) It is obvious that unless a definite time limit is provided in Annex II, the introductory phrase to this Article will be useless.

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Article 4. A Joint Commission including members representing participating friendly Powers will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as defined in Annex IV to this Agreement.

Article 5. The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present Agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese, the English text shall be authoritative.

Done at Shanghai this day of, 1932,
 corresponding to

Chinese and Japanese signatures.

In the presence of

Signatures.

Representatives of the friendly
 Powers assisting the negotiations
 in accordance with the Resolution
 of the Assembly of the League of
 Nations of March 4th, 1932.

Annex I. The following are the positions of the Chinese troops as provided in Article 2 of this Agreement (here insert definition of the Chinese positions).

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto the positions in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers members of the Joint Commission.

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Annex II. The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated in Annex III will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the Agreement and will be completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal.

The Joint Commission to be established under Article IV will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

Annex III. The following are the localities as provided in Article III of this Agreement (here insert definition of the localities in which the Japanese troops are to be temporarily stationed).

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto the localities in question will upon the request of the Joint Commission be ascertained by the Representatives of the participating friendly Powers Members of the Commission.

Annex IV. The Joint Commission will be composed of twelve members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian heads of missions in China being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The Members of the Joint Commission will

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employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from the Members representing the participating friendly Powers. The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Agreement.

 Separate Voluntary Declaration by the Chinese Government which may be issued either prior to or simultaneously with the conclusion of the Agreement, but not to be annexed thereto.

In order to ease the general situation and secure the prompt re-establishment of stability and normal conditions in the affected areas, the Chinese Government hereby intimate their intention immediately to establish on their own initiative for the maintenance of peace and order in the evacuated area in the vicinity of the Shanghai Settlements, a force of special constabulary, for which they contemplate the employment of experts as officers and instructors.

It is understood that the incoming Chinese police referred to in the penultimate sentence of Article 4 of the Agreement for.....
of.....will be drawn from the above special constabulary.

 Verbal Note taken by Minister Shigemitsu and the interested foreign Ministers on March 21st, 1932.

In discussing this phrase, Mr. Kuo intimated that the Chinese Government contemplated the employment of foreigners amongst the experts in question.

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NOTES ON THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT
 CIRCULATED BY THE JAPANESE DELEGATION FOR THE
 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF COMMITTEE
 OF NINETEEN OF THE ASSEMBLY.

 TEXTUAL DISCREPANCIES:

Article I. The phrase "around Shanghai" is missing in the second sentence before the phrase "all and every form of hostile acts."

The phrase "the situation" is likewise missing, perhaps due to telegraphic mutilation, in the last sentence of this Article before the phrase "will be ascertained."

SUBSTANTIAL INACCURACIES:

Article II. It is to be noted that at the time of the adoption of this Article, the Chinese Delegate made a declaration which was accepted by the Conference, to the effect that nothing in this agreement should imply any permanent restriction on the movements of the Chinese troops in Chinese territory. This declaration is conspicuously absent in the text circulated by the Japanese Delegation.

Article III. It is obvious that unless a definite time limit is provided in Annex II, the introductory phrase to this article will be useless.

Annex I. The footnote which the Japanese Delegation attached to this Annex is quite misleading. It is quite true that an agreement was nearly reached with regard to this point, but it is to be noted that the work of the Sub-Commission was interrupted not so much due to the postponement of the Conference asked by the Chinese Delegates as to the introduction by the Japanese Delegates of the position of Chinese troops in the areas in Pootung and south of the Soochew Creek; the Japanese demand was tantamount to the demilitarization of these areas which involved China's sovereign rights and questions outside the scope of the Conference.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Committee of
Nineteen and the Japanese
Delegation.

A.(Extr.)Com.spec./9.1932.

Geneva, April 16th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate the following
communication dated April 17th.

Rf./A.25.

April 17th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.-

Referring to the communication from the Japanese Delegation
(A.Extr.Com.Spec./6), giving the text of the Draft Agreement
of the Shanghai Military Conference, I have the honour to point
out the inaccuracy of the 2nd footnote on page 3, of the English
version. In the original French version this footnote did not
appear, but has since been inserted through the circulation of
an erratum.

The footnote in question, referring to a note in parenthesis
which follows the first sentence of ANNEX 3, as to the localities
in which the Japanese troops are to be temporarily stationed,
declares that final agreement thereto was reached at the sitting
of the Sub-Commission on April 11th.

According to my information no agreement was reached in this
very important matter. Only maps showing the localities and defin-
ition of same were drafted by the Foreign Military Attachés for
initialling, but unfortunately the Sub-Commission broke up on the
14th instant due to the raising by the Japanese of fresh and
extraneous questions, - questions unrelated to that of withdrawal
of Japanese troops.

I shall be obliged if you will circulate the above information
to the Members of the Special Committee.

(s.) W.W. YEN.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Committee of Nineteen
and to the Chinese
Delegation.

A.(Extr.)Com.Spec./10.1932.

Geneva, April 20th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate as a confidential communication to members of the Committee of Nineteen the following note, xxxxxxxx dated April 18th, which he has received from the Japanese delegation.

Ref. 86/1932.

April 19th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

"With reference to the communication of the Chinese delegation A.Extr.Com.Spec. 9, I have the honour to state again xxxxxxxx that according to the information in the Japanese delegation's possession, the localities in which the Japanese troops are to be stationed were settled on April 11th in the Technical Commission, as explained in document A.Extr.Com.Spec. 7, page 4 (English text) Annex 3.

"The work of the Technical Commission was suspended on April 14th, owing to the suspension of the plenary meetings of the Conference, as I informed you in my letter of April 14th (C.582.N.213.1932.VII, paragraph 1) and for no other reasons".

(Signed) H. NAGAOKA.

Japanese representative on the
Council of the League of Nations.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Committee of Nineteen
and the Japanese
Delegation.

A.(Extr.) Com.Spéc./11.1932.
Geneva, April 25th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Members of the Special Committee the following communication, dated April 25th, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./ A.27.

April 25th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General:

Referring to my communication of the 11th instant (Ref./A.20), wherein I had the honour to request that a meeting of the Special Committee of the Assembly might be arranged so that the latest phase of the negotiations of the Shanghai armistice might be presented to it, I have the honour now to request that in view of the probable adjournment of the Disarmament Conference for a few weeks, the Members of the Special Committee will see to it that the Shanghai negotiations will be given the necessary directions before their departure from Geneva, so that the said negotiations will be promptly concluded in accordance with the letter and spirit of the resolutions of the Assembly as interpreted by the President.

(s.) W.W. YEN.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

A (Extr.) Com. Spec. 12 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Draft Resolution submitted by the Committee of Nineteen.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour
to communicate herewith the text of the
draft Resolution which is submitted for
its adoption by the Committee of Nineteen.

The Assembly,

1. Considering that its resolutions of March 4th and 11th recommending that negotiations should be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai settlements, for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces;
2. Considering that while it is not for its Committee to take the place of the negotiators - since the arrangements contemplated in the Assembly resolutions of March 4th and 11th can only be concluded on the spot -, every Power represented in those negotiations is entitled, should serious difficulties be encountered in the course of the negotiations or in the carrying-out of the above-mentioned arrangements, to notify the Committee, "which exercises its functions on behalf of and under supervision of the Assembly", of those difficulties;
3. Considering that the negotiations should be pursued in accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions, no one of the parties being entitled to insist on conditions which would be incompatible with the said resolutions;
4. Having noted the articles of the draft armistice which have been communicated to the Committee of the Assembly and have been accepted by the two parties;
5. Considers that these articles conform to the spirit of the said resolutions;
6. Notes in particular that under Article III of the said draft, the Japanese Government undertakes to carry out the withdrawal of its forces in the International Settlement and the roads outside the Settlement in the Hong Kew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932;

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7. Declares that it is in accordance with the spirit of the resolutions of March 4th and 11th that this withdrawal should take place in the near future;

8. Declares that the resolution of March 4th will only have been fully complied with when the Japanese forces have been entirely withdrawn;

9. Notes that the draft Agreement provides for the establishment of a joint Commission, including neutral members, to certify the mutual withdrawal and to collaborate in arrangements for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw;

10. Notes with satisfaction that the said Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles I, II and III, of which the last-named provides for the complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces as before the incident of January 28th; (how Annex 3)

11. Is of opinion that the powers, as defined in Annex 4 to the draft Agreement, of the Commission which is to watch the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of that agreement, include authority to call attention, in accordance with its decisions taken in such manner as it provided in the said Annex, to any neglect in carrying out any of the provisions of the articles mentioned above.

12. Earnestly recommends the parties in question to continue the negotiations with a view to reaching their rapid conclusion, and requests the Governments having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to continue to lend their good offices for this purpose;

13. Expressly points out that unless a conclusion is reached as laid down in the resolutions of March 4th and 11th, the question will necessarily come up again before the Assembly;

14. Requests the Governments of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to transmit to the League of Nations the information which will be in the possession of the Mixed Commission in virtue of its functions, and will be furnished to those Governments by their respective representatives on the Commission.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
 Council and the Assembly.

A.(Extr.).104.1932.VII.
 Geneva, April 16th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate the following communication dated April 15th.

SHANGHAI INCIDENTS.

Summary of Official Telegrams Received by the Japanese
 Delegation.

84/1932.

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According to reports published on April 14th in a Shanghai newspaper issued in English, Chinese soldiers of the 88th Division appeared in small bodies during the night of April 13th in the neighbourhood of the Hunjao aerodrome and the Soochow river. They are stated to have arrived in front of the Japanese positions. The newspaper adds that since the southern part of the Soochow river is of high strategic importance, it would seem that as soon as a larger force has been collected the Chinese soldiers will attempt to establish themselves there. Further, the Chinese forces in this area are fortifying their defensive positions in the rear. This advance has been noted by foreign military attachés. According to their statements the number of troops amounts to about one regiment. The attachés are to proceed to the spot on April 16th to ascertain the exact facts.

It is to be noted that at the meeting on March 26th, the Chinese mentioned Hwatsaochen, Hunjao and Lunghwa as their most advanced positions south of the Soochow river, and stated that they had no intention of going beyond those points. The present movements of the Chinese troops have brought them well beyond the line joining these three places. They might seriously threaten the flank of the Japanese army. It is needless to emphasize the serious character of such a movement of troops, in spite of the de facto cessation of hostilities and in the present state of negotiations. The military authorities attach great importance to the outcome of the investigations to be made by the foreign military attachés.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

A.(Extr.)105.1932.VII
Geneva, April 23rd, 1932.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated April 21st, 1932 :-

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF MANCHURIA.

I. Japanese ambitions in Manchuria.

It does not always happen that a State, when pursuing a national policy, which involves for its execution an invasion of the sovereign rights of another and friendly State, makes that policy clearly evident. This, however, has happened with regard to Japan's policy towards China, and especially as concerns Japan's desire and intention, when circumstances seem to permit, to bring under substantial political control that great part of China known as Manchuria, or the Three Eastern Provinces.

The actions of Japan since September 18th, 1931, are alone sufficient to demonstrate this, but, when these actions are placed in historical relation to earlier actions of Japan, the certainty of their significance becomes still more evident. It is appropriate, therefore, before referring specifically to certain of the features of Japan's military invasion of Manchuria, beginning with September 18th, that something should be said as to events prior to that date.

At no time since the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 has the Chinese Government doubted the purpose of Japan to seize Manchuria whenever an opportune occasion might arise.* Ten years before this Japan had demanded, by the Treaty of Shimoda which concluded the Sino-Japanese war, that China

* See Appendix V of "Statement communicated by the Chinese Delegation in conformity with Article XV, paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations", p.43, (A.Extr.1. 1932.VII).

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should cede to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula, but had been compelled, by the pressure of Russia, Germany and France, to forego this demand in exchange for an increased money indemnity from China. However, with the defeat of Russia in 1905, Russia was compelled to cede to Japan the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula (which, in the meantime, Russia had obtained from China) and Russian interests in the portion of the South Manchurian Railway south of Changchun. To these transfers China was not able to refuse her consent. From this date, as has been said, China has had no doubt as to the ultimate designs of Japan upon Manchuria.

In 1915 came the Twenty-One Demands to many of which China, in the face of a direct ultimatum from Japan which threatened immediate war, was compelled to accede*. By means of the Agreements, thus obtained under duress and with no quid pro quo, Japan was enabled to strengthen her economic interests and political influence in Manchuria. At this time, 1915, Japan, by the nature and scope of her Demands in their original form, came out boldly, and cynically into the open, and without disguise made known what her policies were to be with reference to Manchuria, and, indeed, with reference to the whole of China, which she would then have brought into political subjection herself, had she felt it wise, at that time, to insist upon a full compliance with her Demands as originally presented.

The next year, in 1916, in connection with a fracas between Chinese and Japanese soldiers occurring at Chengchia-tun, near the border of Mongolia, came again a clear revelation of what were Japan's desires with regard to Manchuria and Eastern Lower Mongolia. New demands upon the Chinese Government were then made by Japan which in addition to other requirements, asked that China should agree "to the stationing of Japanese police officers in places in South Manchuria and Eastern Lower Mongolia where their presence was considered (by Japan) necessary for the protection of Japanese subjects. China also to agree to the engagement by the officials of South Manchuria of Japanese police advisors". "In other words", says Willoughby in his treatise on FOREIGN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN CHINA (2nd ed. Vol. I, p. 206) "that Japan should be given an indefinite and therefore general right to participate in the policing of whatever portions of South Manchuria and Eastern Lower Mongolia she might think desirable".

* See appendix I, Chinese Statement, A. (Extra.) 1, 1932.VII.

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In addition to these demands certain "Desiderata" were also presented by Japan. * These demands and desiderata, as observed by Willoughby, were based upon facts as alleged by the Japanese, and not as determined by any thorough or bilateral examination as to who were in the wrong,

China, fortunately, found it possible not to yield to the demands in so far as they would have meant a recognition by herself of an extension of Japan's political rights in Manchuria and Eastern Lower Mongolia, but the fact that the demands were made, and strongly urged by Japan, indicated the extent of her desires with reference to the territories concerned.

In the diplomatic discussions between Japan, Great Britain, France and the United States, beginning in July, 1918, and terminating in January 1921, in the creation of a new banking Consortium, Japan made strenuous, but unsuccessful efforts to obtain the recognition by the other Powers with whom she was negotiating of her special rights to the economic exploitation of Manchuria. Here, again, Japan made plain her desires with reference to Manchuria.

At the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, Japan was prevailed upon to make certain concessions with regard to powers which she had been exercising in China, but, it is to be noted, so far as concerned her claims to rights, economic and political, in or relating to Manchuria, she refused to make any concessions, - not even as to the rights which she had obtained under such infamous circumstances in 1915**. Thus, once more, were demonstrated the policies which Japan intended to pursue with reference to Manchuria.

Since the Washington Conference Japan has, upon several conspicuous occasions asserted and exercised rights to control political conditions in or relating to Manchuria which have been without any justification under either international law or existing treaties. Thus, despite her engagement in the Sino-Russian Treaty of Portsmouth (Article IV) "not to obstruct any general measures, common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria"; and despite her and Russia's engagement in Article VII of the same treaty "to exploit their

* Generally, with regard to these Japanese demands and desiderata, see MacMurray TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA, Vol.II, pp.1347-1352.

** See appendices II, III, IV, Chinese Statement, A. (Extra) 1.1932.VII.

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respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes," Japan has continually, and, in a number of cases, successfully, prevented needed railway development by China in the provinces of Manchuria, and has made the South Manchuria Railway a powerful governmental agency for other than purely commercial or industrial purposes.

It is, however, to be noted and emphasized that, during these more than twenty five years, Japan has never denied that Manchuria constitutes an integral part of the territory of China. She has sought in every possible way to increase her economic and political influence and control in Manchuria, but, at the same time, has repeatedly, and in the most solemn and official manner, recognised the fact that China's territorial sovereignty extends over Manchuria. This formal recognition she has made no effort to withdraw up to the present time.

It is clear, then, that Japan has hoped and believed that, while conceding the formal or technical sovereign territorial jurisdiction of China over the Manchurian Provinces, she will be able so to increase her actual economic and political influence and control over these provinces as to give her the substance of power while leaving to China only a formal and wholly unsubstantial political authority. This, at any rate may certainly be regarded as Japan's policy up to, and until the events beginning with September 18th.

Since September 18th, 1931, it undoubtedly appears that, while not changing her main policy Japan has decided that the quickest and most effective way to realise it will be, first, to break down in every possible way the existing organs of control and administration of China in Manchuria, and then to take steps to have created, and to support with her armed forces when created, a new set of governmental agents in Manchuria who will declare their independence of China, and who and when formally recognised by Japan as the de jure government of Manchuria, will be disposed to grant to Japan such treaty rights as she may desire.

II. Chinese Representations to the League.

As soon as it was seen that the military forces of Japan which had invaded Manchuria in September last, were setting to themselves the task of ousting from authority all Chinese organs of political administration in Manchuria, the Chinese Government perceived the significance of this line of action and took pains to give notice to the Members of the League of Nations represented upon the Council that such acts upon the part of the Japanese forces were not only in violation of established principles of international law and justice, but were in violation of the specific undertakings of Japan, as given in the Nine Power Treaty

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resulting from the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 and of Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

It is to be observed that, in the first communication to the League in which China made appeals to the Council under Article XI of the Covenant, China asked not only that the Council should take immediate steps to prevent a development of the situation which Japan had created and which was endangering the peace of nations, but also to re-establish the status quo ante. Thus, when the Council adopted unanimously its Resolution of September 30, the Chinese representative, Dr. Sze, took pains to say that China expected the Council to see to it not only that the Japanese troops should be completely withdrawn from Manchuria or to within the South Manchurian Railway Zones, but that there should be a "full re-establishment of the status quo ante". He further said (Official Journal, December, 1931, p. 2308): "that by October 14th (the date to which the Council proposed to adjourn) the complete withdrawal and the re-establishment of the status quo ante had been effected, the measures at present being employed would prove adequate, but if ----- this happy result was not achieved by that date, the Council would, of course, have to examine what other measures might be required in the circumstances."

Again, when accepting the draft of the Resolution of October 24, 1931, which was adopted unanimously by the Council except for the single vote of Japan, the Chinese representative said (Official Journal, December 1931, p. 2345):

"The terms 'evacuation' and 'taking over of evacuated territory' in the Resolution I understand to include all Japanese forces of a military or quasi-military character, such as gendarmerie, police, and aeroplanes of all kinds, the restoration to Chinese possession of all property, real and personal, public and private, which has been seized by the Japanese since the night of September 18th, and the release from all forms of restraint of Chinese authorities and citizens, and banking or other commercial or industrial establishments. In short, that, so far as possible, the status quo ante shall be re-established".

On November 4, 1931 (C.793.M.387.1931.VII. Official Journal, December 1931, p. 2540) the Chinese Delegation in a communication to the Secretary-General of the League, with reference to information supplied therein, and to a Memorandum filed the previous day, said:

"It is now clear that the Japanese Army or Occupation are pursuing a deliberate policy of trying to substitute for the authority of the Chinese Government the rule of various groups and individuals set up and maintained by the Japanese themselves. Yesterday's memorandum predicted that a further step in this policy was imminent. It has now been taken; the Japanese military are confiscating the salt revenues and trying to divert them into the hands of the puppet authorities set up by themselves the situation is of the utmost gravity."

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Again, in a communication to the Secretary-General of November 7, 1931 (C.812.M.402.1931.VII. Official Journal, December 1931, pp.2543-4) the Chinese representative on the Council said: "This concrete example casts a vivid light on the proceedings of the Japanese military in Manchuria, and shows how, on the pretext of maintaining law and order, they are everywhere destroying the authority of the lawful Chinese Government, and, under the guise of 'committees for the maintenance of peace and order', or other aliases, are setting up and maintaining, at Mukden, Kirin, and other points under Japanese occupation, the arbitrary rule of persons and groups who are the puppets and creatures of the Japanese Army Command'.

Still again, on November 17, 1931 (C.868.M.446.1931.VII. Official Journal, December, 1931, p.2550) the Chinese representative called to the attention of the Council of the League the fact that it was reported that the Japanese authorities had taken ex-Emperor Puyi, of the former Manchu dynasty, from the Japanese Concession in Tientsin, where he had been sheltering himself, to Mukden (as later appeared for a part of the way upon a Japanese warship with a military escort), for the purpose of establishing there a bogus government with Puyi as its head. The following declaration was then made by the Chinese Government:

"The National Government (of China) has already declared to the League of Nations and to the Governments of friendly Powers that the Chinese Government and people will not recognise any illegitimate institutions established in subversion of China's administrative integrity in those places of the north-eastern provinces which remain under the occupation of Japanese troops. In the event that establishment of Puyi's government is confirmed, the National Government (of China) will regard such government as a seditious institution and at the same time as an auxiliary organ of the Japanese Government in disguise, while all acts of such government, which are necessarily illegal, will be repudiated by the National Government."

In his communication of November 13, 1931 (C.854.M.432.1931.VII. Official Journal, December 1931, pp.2571-72) the Japanese representative upon the Council, while asserting that his Government had forbidden its nationals "to mix themselves up in any way with local independence movements", nevertheless went on to assert that the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria had "had no alternative but to encourage the formation of the Chinese themselves of bodies, responsible for the maintenance of order."

We have also, the frank statement made by the Japanese representative, Mr. Sato, to the Council at its meeting on February 19, 1932, that the Japanese Government viewed with sympathy the independence movement in Manchuria.

At the time of the unanimously adopted Council resolution of December 10, the Chinese representative said (Official Journal, December, 1931, p.2377):

"China would regard any attempt by Japan to bring about complications of a political character affecting China's territorial or administrative integrity, such as promoting so-called independence movements or utilizing disorderly elements for such purpose, as an obvious violation of the undertaking to avoid any further aggravations of the situation."

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Finally, on February 22nd, 1932, the Chinese Government made the following formal statement with regard to the puppet governmental agencies which the Japanese authorities had been establishing and supporting with armed forces in Manchuria (see Appendix VIII of "Statement by Chinese Delegation in Conformity with Article XV, paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, p.47. - League Document, A.(Extr.) 1.1932.VII, dated February 29, 1932, see also, for the same document, C.266.M.156.1932.VII):

"The Three Eastern Provinces, also known as Manchuria, are always an integral part of China and any usurpation or interference with the administration therein constitutes direct impairment of China's territorial and administrative integrity. Article of the Organic Law of the National Government of October 4th, 1928, which was proclaimed in the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) as well as in other provinces of the Republic, provided that the National Government shall exercise all governing powers in the Chinese Republic. The Provisional Constitution of June 1st, 1931, expressly provides that the territory of the Chinese Republic consists of the various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, and that the Republic of China shall be a unified Republic for ever.

"The territorial, political and administrative integrity of the Chinese Republic, besides being an attribute of a sovereign State and of international law, is guaranteed by Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 1 of the Nine Power Treaty. Such guarantee has been implemented by Japan when she adhered to the League Council resolution of September 10th last, which reads partly as follows:

"The Council recognises the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria:...being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation....."

"In the resolution of October 24th last, the Council emphasised the importance of these assurances, saying that it "recalls the Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and of the Nine Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged 'to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China'."

"The Council further states in the resolution of December 10th last that, "considering that events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24th, notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life."

"This resolution was also accepted by Japan. The Chinese delegate who endorsed it declared: "China would regard any attempt by Japan to bring about complications of a political

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character affecting China's territorial or administrative integrity (such as promoting so-called independence movements of utilising disorderly elements for such purposes) as an obvious violation of the undertaking to avoid any further aggravation of the situation."

"Now, in defiance of all law and solemn obligations, the Japanese authorities who are in unlawful occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces are endeavouring to set up in these provinces a so-called independent government and are trying to compel Chinese citizens to participate in the puppet organisation. The National Government has repeatedly and emphatically protested against the illegal actions of the Japanese Government in this regard, and hereby again declares that it will not recognise the secession or independence of the Three Eastern Provinces or any part thereof, or any administration which may be organised therein without its authority and consent."

III. Japanese military support of puppet government.

As regards the amount of Japanese military support required to maintain in nominal existence the puppet government in Manchuria, we have a recent statement by the Japanese that they still have there some thirty-thousand troops. The information which the Chinese Government has is that a much larger number of Japanese troops are still in Manchuria possibly more than twice that number.

For specific instances, communicated to the Council of the League, in which the Japanese military forces were taking steps to break down Chinese civil authority and institutions in Manchuria and to replace them with authorities of their own establishment, reference may be made to the following documents:-

C.586.M.233.1931.VII.(Official Journal, December 1931, P.2457):
C.591.M.235.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2460):
C.604.M.242.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2464):
C.627.M.251.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2466):
C.660.M.271.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2469):
C.661.M.272.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2470):
C.692.M.302.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2474):
C.733.M.338.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2496-7):
C.863.M.441.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2526):
C.789.M.383.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2538):
C.793.M.387.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2540):
C.812.M.402.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2543-4):
C.838.M.418.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2546):
C.839.M.419.1931.VII.(" " " " " "):
C.868.M.446.1931.VII.(" " " " " 2550):

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IV. Attitude of the U.S.A. and the League.

It is thus clear, that, from the beginning, China has advised the League, and by so doing has given notice to the world, that she will not be satisfied with any outcome of the situations created in Manchuria by the acts of Japan since September eighteenth 1931, which brings into existence a situation that departs in any substantial manner from that which existed prior to that date; and that she conceives that, in pursuance of the obligations created by the Covenant of the League of Nations, it is incumbent upon the League to use, to the fullest extent necessary, its authority to prevent such a changed political situation from being created, or, if created de facto, from being recognized by the League or by its members as of a de jure character. Indeed, if brought into a de facto existence, in violation of the Covenant of the League (not to speak of the Washington Nine Powers Treaty or the Paris Peace Pact), it is the contention of the Chinese Government that the League should use its authority to break down that de facto situation in order that the political order existing prior to September eighteenth may be re-established.

The Chinese Government notes with satisfaction the official statement of the United States Government of January 7th 1932, communicated in identic terms to the Governments of China and Japan calling attention to the fact that with the recent military operations about Chinchow the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September eighteenth 1931, had been destroyed, and, in view of that fact, declaring:

"The American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese Government that it can not admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agencies

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thereof, which impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties".

The Chinese Government also notes with satisfaction that all the members of the League of Nations have, by the unanimously adopted Assembly Resolution of March 11, 1932, placed themselves upon substantially the same ground as the United States. In the Resolution it is declared:

"The Assembly adopting the principles laid down by President of the Council Briand in his declaration of December 10, 1931;

"Recalling the fact that twelve members of the Council again invoked these principles in their appeal to the Japanese Government February 16, when they declared, no infringement of territorial integrity and no change in political independence of any member of the League brought about in disregard of Article X of the Covenant ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by the members of the League of Nations

"Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above, and declares it incumbent upon members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nation

It is clear, then, that both the United States and all the members of the League of Nations have committed themselves to the proposition that any change in the political status of Manchuria brought about by means that are in violation, in the one case, of treaties to which the United States is a party, and, in the other case, of provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, will not, and properly cannot, be effective to bring about a situation which can claim to be of a de jure character, or even of such de facto character as to entitle it to recognition of any sort by other Powers.

That Japan, since September eighteenth, has been acting in Manchuria in violation of treaties and of the Covenant of the League of Nations is now denied by no one except herself. Equally certain is it that Japan has employed her armed forces in Manchuria with a deliberate intent to destroy the administrative integrity of China so far as Manchuria is concerned. She has sought to justify these acts by asserting that, by so doing, she has been able to obtain Chinese authorities more compliant to her will and thus - though the connection is not plain - to secure a greater degree of safety for her nationals and their property. Even if this were true (which the Government of China denies), no argument is needed to show that no principle of international law justified such actions by one country within the territory of another Power. As to this it is sufficient to refer to the statements of Lord Cecil at the second meeting of the Council of its sixty-fifth session, September 22, 1931 (Official Journal, December 1931, p. 2270); to the statement of M. Briand, as President of the Council at its October meeting 1925 (Official Journal, November, 1925, p. 1700); to the declaration at the same time of Sir (then Mr.) Austen Chamberlain - these declarations being approved by Viscount Ishii speaking for Japan; - and to the convincing argument of Senor Madariaga at the fifteenth meeting of the sixty-fifth session of the Council, October 24, 1931. (Official Journal, December 1931, pp. 2352, 2353).

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7. Japanese subversive acts in Manchuria.

But, whatever may be her attempted excuse or justification, Japan has not denied that she has ousted from office the administrative agents of the Chinese Government in Manchuria, and supported in office, in their place, agents who have derived no official status whatever from the Chinese Government. Thus, Japan sought to relieve herself from the odium of having seized and controlled the disposition of funds of the Chinese Salt Gabelle by asserting that she had turned these seized funds over to other Chinese persons whom she, Japan, had recognized as qualified to receive and use them. Japan has not denied that this transfer was in opposition to the protests of the agents of the Chinese Government who were authorized by the Government to receive them, nor has Japan denied that this transfer was accomplished with the direct aid of her armed forces. Thus, in an official communication of the Japanese Government transmitted to the Council of the League of Nations on November 13, 1931, we find declared :

"It has now become evident that Chang Hsueh-liang (Chinese official head of the Manchurian Government) is directing Chinese forces stationed in various parts of Manchuria and, with the help of bandits (an unsupported allegation) is striving by every means to attack the security of our troops and the interests of Japanese nationals in Manchuria. It is therefore perfectly comprehensible that, in these exceptional circumstances, the Japanese military authorities should have interfered with the dispatch of funds which were aimed at maintaining activities directed against themselves."

The Japanese communication continues :

"Furthermore, local organs have been established by the Chinese to maintain order in Manchuria. To place at the disposal of the Committee for the maintenance of order organized at Mukden, the resources which have hitherto gone to Chang Hsueh-liang amounts, in short, to reinforcing the action of the body which is, in fact, responsible for the maintenance of order until the restoration of normal conditions, and, to this extent, this action can only be regarded as highly desirable. Accordingly, the action of the military authorities (of Japan) in intervening to transfer the surplus revenues of the Chinese Salt-Tax Office to another Chinese body cannot be regarded as unjustifiable".

The "local organs", and the "Committee for the maintenance of Peace", referred to in the last paragraph that have been quoted from the Japanese communication, derived no official authority from the Government of China, and had, in fact, been brought into existence and maintained in power by the Japanese military authorities.

In the foregoing communication - and others might be quoted if it were necessary - we have the clear admission by the Japanese Government that, not only were its military forces operating to prevent the de jure Chinese officials in Manchuria from functioning, but that they were enabling other persons, deriving no official authority whatever from the Chinese Government, to function in their place.

Indeed, it is well known that the determination of the Japanese to take possession of the city of Chinchow was almost wholly, if not wholly, based upon the desire of the Japanese Government to oust from authority the last remnants of Chinese official administration and control in Manchuria. Certainly, there was no military need for the occupation of the city by the Japanese military forces, for neutral observers on the spot unanimously reported that Chinese

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forces were not concentrating there, and that those Chinese forces which were already there were not engaged in any operations that would indicate any offensive against the Japanese forces; not, at the time, were there in or near Chinchow any Japanese nationals to be protected.

The purpose had in view by the Japanese Government for the occupation of Chinchow was plainly declared in a printed hand-bill which the Japanese aeroplanes dropped in great numbers upon the city. This circular declared that the Imperial Japanese army would never recognise the government which Chang Hsueh-liang had established at Chinchow after the government at Mukden had been destroyed by the Japanese, and that the army would take 'drastic measures to suppress such government.' The people of Chinchow were extorted to submit to the kindness and power of the army of the Great Japanese Empire and to oppose and prevent the establishment of Chang Hsueh-liang's government, "otherwise", the hand-bill declared, "they will be regarded as decidedly opposing the army of the Great Japanese Empire, in which case the army will ruthlessly destroy Chinchow."

Given the conditions that have existed in Manchuria since September last, it is clear that there is overwhelming evidence to the effect that, as has been shown, from the very beginning, and at every subsequent stage of its development, the so-called State of Manchoukuo has been at the instigation of, and with the military assistance of, the Japanese military forces in Manchuria.*

VI. The Puppet Government and International Law.

International law is so clear that it is not necessary to present an array of authorities, that any aid given by an outside Power to the people of a portion of the territory of another friendly state who are taking steps to separate themselves and their territory from the sovereignty of that state is an act of the most unfriendly character and furnishes a just casus belli should that state decide so to regard it. As typical of the established view of all international law-writers may be quoted the statement of Thomas Baty, an eminent authority and one who has for years served as an adviser in matters of international law to the Imperial Japanese Government. In an article entitled 'The Relations of Invaders to Insurgents' (Yale Law Journal, May, 1927), he says: "At last we can approach the final and crucial group of cases; those that is, in which the invading enemy not only desires to avail himself of revolution, but actually inspires and foment it.

* If further evidence is needed as to the destruction of Chinese authority in Manchuria by the Japanese military, and its attempt to take full control of economic and commercial as well as of political affairs in Manchuria, reference might be made to the summary of these acts published in the Manchester Guardian of January 15, 1932 and in the Baltimore Sun (U.S.A.) of January 19 and 20.

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Here it would seem, there can exist no doubt. It is not open to an occupying enemy to do indirectly what he cannot do directly and force the local population into active hostility to their sovereign under cover of insurrection. If, during the war of 1812, the United States had occupied Lower Canada, and had availed themselves of local dissatisfaction to secure a proclamation of secession and alliance with themselves, the allegiance of the people of Quebec would not have been in the least degree affected."

Dr. Baty is here speaking of a situation of open war. A fortiori, his doctrine would apply to a party which has invaded the territory of a friendly Power and declared that its sole purpose and justification for doing so is, temporarily, to provide protection to its own nationals living in that territory.

As has been already shown; Japan would have been stopped by general principles of international law from giving an encouragement or aid to the people of Manchuria, had they spontaneously sought to assert their independence of China. How much stronger, then, was her legal and moral obligation to refrain from giving encouragement and aid in view of the specific treaties which she had freely and voluntarily entered into!

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

A. (Extr.) 106.1932.VII.

Geneva, April 27th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated 26th April.

Ref./A.28.

A MEMORANDUM ON THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION
OF MANCHURIA.

In the light of certain statements made in the Japanese Government's note (C.355.M.209.1932.) it seems desirable to supplement the communication of the Chinese Government dated April 18th (C.372.M.213) on the steps taken by the Chinese Government to put into effect the Council Resolutions of September 30th and December 10th. An account is given here of the main developments in Japanese policy in Manchuria since September 18th, with a view to casting light upon the relation between this policy and Japan's assurances to the League and treaty obligations. This account is based on the communications from the Chinese Government to the League since the beginning of the conflict and reference will be made in each case to the appropriate documents.

1. Extension of Japanese Occupation.

The trouble in Manchuria started, it will be remembered, owing to the alleged removal of one or two rails from the South Manchurian line by Chinese on the night of September 18th. No proof has ever been forthcoming of this assertion, which the Chinese Government denies in toto, and the Japanese Government refused the neutral investigation requested from the beginning by the Chinese Government. Neutral evidence shows that there was no interruption in traffic on the South Manchurian Railway on the night in question, and indeed Japanese troop trains were despatched to the spot before the time at which the alleged incident occurred (see documents C.591.1931, tel.10; C.627, 1931, tel.28; C.677, 1931, tel.45; C.723, 1931, tel.72).

The Japanese Government made a number of assurances to the Council of the League in the next few days. These assurances were summed up as follows by the President of the Council in a statement made to the Assembly on September 29th, after submission to the Japanese Delegate: "I only wish to allude to several essential points: first, the affirmation by the Japanese Government and by its representative that it never had or will have any intention of occupying Manchuria militarily; secondly, the fact that the Japanese Government has on several occasions insisted before the Council on its intention to withdraw as soon as possible the Japanese forces to within the railway zone

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gradually as the safety of its nationals and their property is effectively guaranteed; thirdly, the fact that this intention has, according to the declaration made yesterday to the Council by the Japanese representative, been during the last two days translated into definite action and that outside the railway zone Japanese troops are only stationed in a few localities."

Owing to the refusal of the Japanese Government to accept a League Commission of Enquiry as desired by the Chinese Government, it was difficult for some time to get reliable information from the spot. But the subsequent information obtained and transmitted to Geneva by the Chinese Government makes it clear that from the first day of the Japanese outbreak the plan of occupation proceeded swiftly and smoothly without any pause or hesitation, and in utter disregard of the statements made by the Japanese Government to the League.

The fact that Japan has militarily occupied practically the whole of Manchuria and that this occupation took place in flat defiance of Japan's obligations under the Covenant, the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, of her assurances quoted above and of the obligations she accepted in the Council Resolution of September 30th, to withdraw her troops and to take steps to prevent any aggravation or extension of the conflict, scarcely needs demonstration.

a. The Capture of Tsitsihar. But it may be recalled that certain supplementary pledges were likewise made and broken as incidents in the general policy of treaty-breaking which began on September 18th and continues to this day. Thus Japanese troops were sent northward to the Nonni River bridgehead on the ground that the bridge must be repaired. The repairing of bridges on Chinese territory hundreds of miles from the South Manchurian railway has, of course, nothing to do with the safety of Japanese lives and property. But the real motive of the move was plain from the beginning, for the Japanese troops were accompanied by irregular forces under a Japanese protégé, General Chang Hai-Peng, whom it was the desire of the Japanese to make the Governor of Heilungkiang Province, the northernmost of the Manchurian provinces and the only one which at that time retained its lawful Government, the others having been overthrown by Japanese forces and replaced by Japanese-controlled puppet authorities (for details see below). The lawful Governor had actually come to an arrangement with the Japanese Consul in Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang, by which he undertook to repair the bridge in question himself, thus making the Japanese pretext even more transparent. The subsequent events are recounted in Documents C.789, C.799, C.803, C.817, C.840, C.847, C.867 and C.869.

In C.800 the Japanese Government stated: "Despatch of Japanese troops to Chiang-chiao is due to the urgent necessity of repairing Nonni bridge, and the Commander of Kwantung army has received definite instructions to withdraw his troops upon completion of repair work and not to go further than bridge." Two days later, on November 8th, (Document C.813) the Japanese Government stated that: "According to report received by the Ministry of War, Japanese troops after occupying Tahsing at mid-day on 6th instant have ceased to advance northwards. Reinforcements which had not yet rejoined them have also stopped their northward march. Advance of Japanese troops towards Nonni river is due solely to necessity of protecting the work of repairing the bridge, which will last about a fortnight. The Government is firmly resolved, as it has already stated, to recall these troops as soon as the work is terminated."

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In a communication dated November 7th (C.812.M.402.1931) the Chinese Government summarised the situation as follows:

"The following information just received clearly reveals the fact that the Japanese military concentration at the Nonni River bridgehead is in pursuance of the deliberate policy of the Japanese Army Command of driving out the representatives of the lawful Chinese Government throughout Manchuria and substituting the rule of persons and groups maintained by the Japanese themselves.

"On November 6th Major Shideyoshi Hayashi, representing the Japanese Army Command in the Kwantung Peninsula, informed General Ma, the Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, that the Japanese troops will cease hostilities only if General Ma surrenders his post to Chang Hsi-Peng, who will set up a committee for the maintenance of order.

"This is a further step in the progress so clearly depicted in the information circulated to the Members of the Council during the last few days, and which I venture to recapitulate:

"(1) The Memorandum of November 3 ((C.782.p.5) states:

"The Chairman of the provincial government of Heilungkiang, the northernmost of the Manchurian provinces, was visited by a representative of General Honjo, with the demand that he repair the bridge over the Nonni River within a week, failing which it would be repaired by the Japanese with the help of troops. This move was undertaken in order to facilitate the crossing of the river by the Japanese protégé, Chang Hsi-Peng, who is preparing to attack Heilungkiang. Later, two Japanese representing General Honjo, called upon the Chairman of the Heilungkiang provincial government, and told him that Japan could not recognise his authority because he had been appointed by the Chinese Government, and ordered him to hand over his office to Chang Hsi-Peng, on pain of being turned out by force."

"(2) The Note of November 5 (C.798, pp. 1-2) states:

"For some time the Japanese military authorities have been supporting Chang Hsi-Peng against the lawful government of the Province of Heilungkiang. In pursuance of this policy the Japanese recently demanded that the bridge over the Nonni River on the northernmost section of the Taonan-Angangchi line should be repaired. The Chinese Provincial Government then came to an agreement with the Japanese Consul in Tsitsihar as to the immediate repair by the Chinese authorities of this bridge. But Major Hayashi, representing the Japanese Army Command in the Kwantung Peninsula, called on the Provincial Government on November 1st, and informed it that whether or not it was capable of repairing the bridge the South Manchurian Railway had decided to send men on November 4th to repair it under the protection of Japanese troops. He added that Japan was determined to change the political situation in Heilungkiang by force and regardless of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations. The Japanese Consul replied to the expostulations of the Chinese authorities that he could not check these activities.

"Japanese troops have accordingly been dispatched to the Nonni River bridge, with the ostensible object of assuring the reparation of the bridge, but actually in order to act as a screen for Chang Hsi-Peng's irregulars and to facilitate their advance into Heilungkiang. This has created a dangerous situation about the Nonni River bridgehead with the prospect of clashes between the troops of General Ma, representing the authority of the Provincial Government of Heilungkiang, and the irregular forces put into the field by the Japanese. Any such development would lead to an advance by Japanese troops to Tsitsihar and the cutting of the Chinese Eastern Railway".

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"(3) The note of November 5th (C.799) pointed out that armed clashes between the Japanese troops and their irregular allies on the one hand and the forces of General Ma on the other had actually begun and added:

"In the last few days six Japanese troop trains have arrived at the bridgehead, with the obvious purpose of affording support to the advance of Chang Hai-Peng and his irregulars into Heilungkiang, with the object of stirring up trouble in this province."

This summary of events makes it clear that the ostensible object of repairing the bridge is merely a pretext, for not only is it unusual to repair bridges with the aid of artillery, infantry and bombing planes, but the Japanese military authorities actually overrode an agreement between the Chinese provincial government and the Japanese consul in Tsitsihar and insisted upon repairing the bridge by these extraordinary and provocative means after General Ma had undertaken to do so himself. This concrete example casts a vivid light on the proceedings of the Japanese military in Manchuria and shows how on the pretext of maintaining law and order they are everywhere destroying the authority of the lawful Chinese Government and under the guise of "committees for the maintenance of peace and order" or other aliases are setting up and maintaining, at Mukden, Kirin and other points under Japanese occupation, the arbitrary rule of persons and groups who are the puppets and creatures of the Japanese Army Command.

This policy is creating and fomenting disorder in Manchuria. It is also a violation of Article X of the Covenant and Article 1 of the Washington Nine Power Treaty. It is a flat denial of the Council's injunctions and dishonours Japan's repeated and solemn promises before the Council to do nothing that would aggravate or extend the conflict.

On November 11th the Chinese Government told the Council that

"the Japanese military authorities have not abandoned their ambition to overthrow the Provincial Government of Heilungkiang and replace it by creatures of their own, as they have already done in Mukden and Kirin, and that the situation about the Nen River bridgehead remains grave.

"General Honjo, the Japanese Kwantung Army Commander, notified General Ma, the Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, on November 8th, that he should state what were his intentions before midnight, if he wanted to prevent Japanese troops from entering Tsitsihar.

"At noon of November 8th Major Shideyoshi Hayashi, representing General Honjo, notified the Heilungkiang Provincial Government that the only way to maintain order and to avoid further fighting was for General Ma to surrender his post to Chang Hai-Peng 'by peaceful means'."
(C.833.M.413.1931).

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On November 12th (C.842.M.422.1931) the Chinese Government further reported that the Heilungkiang Provincial Government had received an ultimatum at noon the same day from General Honjo, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, requesting General Ma, the Chairman of the Provincial Government, to resign and evacuate Tsitsihar immediately.

On the next day, November 13th, (C.846.M.427.1931) the Chinese Government gave further details of the continuing advance of the Japanese Army across the Nonni River bridge and their open declaration that they intended to occupy Tsitsihar and to seize the administration, and added

"In bringing the above to your attention I beg to point out the flagrant and bare-faced manner in which the Japanese military are violating the solemn undertaking repeatedly given to the Council by the Japanese Government to refrain from aggravating or extending the conflict and are revealing as worthless the assurances given to the President of the Council by the Japanese Government as recently as November 8th, only four days ago (C.813.M.403.1931.VII), to the effect that Japanese troops after occupying Tahsing at mid-day on November 6th had ceased to advance northwards and reinforcements on the way had also been stopped.

"The Japanese Government on the same occasion assured the President of the Council that the advance of Japanese troops towards the Nonni River was due solely to the necessity for protecting the work of repairing the bridge. This statement is impossible to reconcile with the proceedings of General Honjo and his emissaries as revealed in the above despatch and my previous note."

On November 15th (C.860.M.438.1931) the Japanese Government admitted what it was no longer possible to deny, namely that its troops were in fact engaged in a campaign to occupy Tsitsihar. The usual pleas of self-defence and preventing a conflict between Chinese and Japanese troops were advanced in extenuation of this action.

It may be recalled that the Japanese Government also gave pledges in Washington, London and Paris, not to take Tsitsihar and that nevertheless the town was occupied practically at the same moment as the Council met in November, and a puppet Government duly installed in this as in other occupied provinces.

b. The Fall of Chinchow. The second incident in the development of Japan's policy of treaty-breaking military occupation which involved the breaking of further specific pledges was the occupation of Chinchow. Chinchow in Southwest Manchuria was made the temporary capital by the lawful Government of Manchuria, which had been driven out from Mukden; the destruction of this Government and the driving out of its head, Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang, was the real though unavowed object of the Japanese occupation. As early as October 8th, therefore, Japanese aeroplanes dropped the following proclamation on Chinchow and followed up this gesture by the bombing of the town as an earnest of their intentions:

"Chang Hsueh-liang, the most rapacious and wanton, stinking youth, is still failing to realise his odiousness and has established a Provisional Mukden Government at Chinchow to plot intrigues in the territories which are safely under the rule of the troops of the Great Japanese Empire, when the heart of the Manchurian mass is no longer with him, his ground is lost and the four provinces of the North-East are going to revolt against him. The Imperial Army, which, in accordance with the principles of justice, is endeavouring to safeguard its interests and to protect the masses, will never recognise the provisional Government of

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Chang Hsueh-liang at Chinchow, and therefore it is obliged to take drastic measures to suppress such a Government. The people of Chinchow should submit to the kindness and power of the army of the Great Japanese Empire and should oppose and prevent the establishment of Chang Hsueh-liang's Government, otherwise they will be considered as decidedly opposing the army of the Great Japanese Empire, in which case the army will ruthlessly destroy Chinchow. The people of Chinchow are hereby enjoined carefully to consider their situation and to take such decisions as they will deem wise." (C.694.M.399.1931., also quoted on page 10 of A. Extr. 1 of 1932).

Chinchow, it must be remembered, is two hundred miles from Mukden and was at the time far outside the Japanese area of occupation. Attention should be drawn particularly to the efforts to incite the population to revolt against its lawful Government and the statement that "the four provinces of the north-east", that is, the whole of Manchuria, were going to revolt. In general the terms of the proclamation are impossible to reconcile with the avowed objects of Japan's policy - protecting the lives and property of Japanese subjects, let alone Japan's treaty obligations - and are clear proof of the intention to establish a Japanese protectorate in Manchuria. That intention has been steadily pursued since September 18th and is still being pursued.

The subsequent developments which led up to the occupation of Chinchow are well-known. In the December 10th Resolution of the Council Japan re-affirmed her pledge under the September 30th Resolution not to aggravate or extend the conflict and undertook to "refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life." The Japanese Government further gave assurances to the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France that its forces would not take the city of Chinchow. As the American Secretary of State put it in his note of December 27th, 1931, to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Your Excellency will remember that on November 24th in response to my representations through Ambassador Forbes you assured me with the concurrence of the Minister for War and the Chief of Staff that there would be no movement of Japanese troops in the direction of Chinchow and informed me that orders to that effect had been given to the Japanese troops." Nevertheless Chinchow was taken and this matter was not discussed at the January Council meeting, only because attention was taken up by the developments at Shanghai that culminated in the Japanese attack on that city.

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II. Seizure of Railways and Means of Communication.

The first step of the Japanese Army of occupation was to seize railway headquarters, telegraph and telephone administrations, wireless stations, etc., so as to gain control of all means of transport and communication. Thus on September 21st the Chinese Government reported (C.586.M.233.1931):

"Kirin-Changchun Railway seized: Japanese announced it will be managed by South Manchuria Railway which latter has sent 130 employees to Kirin to take over Chinese line, Yingkow, Antung, Changchun, Fushun, and many other towns have been seized by Japanese who have cut all telegraph, telephone and wireless Japanese troops also seized Huangkutun, Santunchiao, and seized railway quarters Peking-Mukden Railway there, driving out all employees. Also seized many locomotives, cars belonging railway."

On September 23rd the Chinese Government reported (C.591.M.235.1931.):

"Kirin station demolished by heavy gun-fire. Kini-Changchun Railway under control of South Manchuria Railway and Taonan-Angangchi, Tahushan-Tungliao, Liaoyuan-Taonan-Sulan-Shenyang-Hailun Railways taken."

On September 28th a further communication (C.627.M.251.1931.) gave the following information:

"Japanese occupied Tungliao junction Chengchiatun-Tungliao and Tahushan-Tungliao Railways twenty-third. Scores innocent people killed. Official buildings, private residences plundered. Five plain-clothes Japanese corps reported organised by Japanese Kwantung garrison each of 1,000 men including Japanese Koreans being assigned duties Peking-Mukden, Mukden-Hailun, Ssup-inkai-Taonan, Tahushan-Tungliao, Taonan-Angangchi, Kirin-Changchun, Kirin-Hailun, Kirin-Tunghua and Chinese Eastern Railways."

C.634.M.253.1931.: "British railway employees Peking-Mukden Railway at stations near Mukden constantly abused by Japanese who are endeavouring to take over control operation of railway gradually extending further southwards."

C.668.M.276.1931.: "On September 29th Japanese troops seized machinery department, telegraph office and engineering department belonging to the Peking-Mukden Railway in Huang Ku Tung."

Further details of the extension and consolidation of Japanese control of Chinese railways involving the driving out, imprisonment or even death of Chinese employees and the substitution of Japanese, generally from the South Manchurian Railway, is given in Documents C.733 and C.789.1931, and C.110.1932.

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III. Destruction of Property, Terrorising the
Population, Killing of Officials.

From the outset the invading Japanese army practised a policy of ruthless terrorism. The bombing of undefended open towns is too well-known to require comment. What was done in Chapei at Shanghai was merely a sample of what the Japanese did all over Manchuria in order to "prepare" the towns they were about to occupy.

The general character of the methods used by the Japanese army of occupation may be gathered from the following quotations:

C.536.M.233.1931, September 21st, reports great destruction of Chinese property and lives at Changchun; it is feared that the city is half in ruins. "Following bombardment of city by Japanese troops last evening fire broke out in several sections and a later despatch received here this afternoon states that while Japanese are in complete control of situation there, conflagration continues unchecked. Magistrate's office, bureau of foreign affairs, bureau public safety and several other public buildings have gone up in flames while numerous other small private buildings have likewise been razed to ground. Death toll includes Brigadier-Commander Fu, whose unit was garrisoning Changchun and vicinity at time of Japanese invasion. Approximate casualties among Chinese soldiers and civilians estimated 600 while over 1,000 now under detention by Japanese military Changchun Commissioner of Public Safety, Commander of Special Border Guards, Chairman of Municipal Committee and several officials reported killed."

C.591.M.235.1931, September 22nd: "Kirin occupied by Japanese troops six o'clock yesterday evening and all official buildings seized. General Hsyita, Chang Tsohsiang's Chief of Staff, Commissioner Ma of Agriculture and Mining and Twenty-fifth Brigade Commander Chang Tsochu made prisoners Chinese barracks burned by Japanese troops. Besides killing several Chinese officials, Japanese soldiers also slew their families and buried alive over one hundred wounded Chinese soldiers New railway depot of Peking-Mukden Railway, cost over million dollars, entirely ruined. Streets of commercial area Mukden being re-named. Conditions at Huangkutung even worse; communication organs, banks and money exchanges have been confiscated. Unscrupulous Koreans rob and plunder Chinese houses. Japanese soldiers after setting fire Changtu camp put to death over one hundred soldiers."

In another telegram contained in the same communication to the Council it is reported that Japanese troops occupied Kow-pangtze on September 19th "gunfire caused heavy casualties among Chinese civilians and peasants Japanese aeroplanes making demonstrations over Shenyang and Sinmin dropping bombs on innocent inhabitants." At Changchun "incendiary fires lit by Japanese soldiers who taking advantage of confusion looted and plundered. Peitaying camp and part of buildings of North Eastern University razed to ground, students being dispersed. More than a hundred Chinese police murdered in cold blood while number deaths among civilians cannot be ascertained. Students who offered remonstrances were bayoneted. Japanese 'mayor' is now in charge of Mukden."

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C.604.M.242.1931, September 21th: "Massacre of Chinese in Kirin city even more serious than in Mukden. Chinese civil and military officials were ruthlessly killed: about 200 met their death. Streets of Kirin have been re-named in Japanese. Railway guards of Kirin-Changchun Railway have been totally disarmed by Japanese troops; many Chinese civilians in Changchun slain. Chouyuping, director of Changchun Municipal Administration, found lying dead on roadside with seven bullet wounds fifty-one bayonet cuts; fifteen members of his family were also butchered. When first occupied Changchun Japanese troops bombed city twenty times in five hours, ruining large number houses Over 3,000 Chinese fallen victims to Japanese thirst for blood in Mukden three Japanese aeroplanes flying over city scattered handbills announcing to inhabitants that Japanese are going to hold Liaoning (Mukden) province permanently and that Chinese should keep quiet and carry on their business. Following appointment of Colonel Dohitara as 'mayor' of Mukden various municipal organs there are undergoing re-organisation, Mukden to be re-named Shengking or incorporated with Kwantung district. Japanese announce Chinese merchants must resume their business at once. Fifteen million dollars reserve funds of frontier bank have been seized by Japanese. Machine guns mounted on city walls, trenches have been dug at commercial area outside city. Liaoning Provincial Government Chairman SangShi-hi still detained at Mukden."

C.591.M.435.1931, September 23rd:

"Confirmed report . . . Brigadier Commander Fu together with all members of family including five-year old son, found with stomach slit open, killed by Japanese troops following bombardment of Changchun."

C.625.M.261.1931, September 28th, mentions that when the Japanese occupied Tungliao junction "scores of innocent people were killed. Official buildings, private residences plundered."

Much further evidence could be adduced but that already given clearly establishes the existence of a deliberate Japanese policy (practically avowed in the proclamation dropped by Japanese aeroplanes at Chinchow, contained in Document C.694. M.299.1931 and quoted above) of (a) terrorising the population in the occupied areas; (b) driving out, imprisoning or slaughtering the representatives of the lawful Chinese Government; and (c) setting up Japanese-controlled puppet authorities in their stead.

IV: Fomenting Disorder.

Part of the policy of terrorism has been to stir up disorder as an excuse for extending Japanese occupation. Here too a great deal of evidence was communicated by the Chinese Government from an early stage of the conflict. For instance, Document C.679 M.236.1931. contains the following information:

"Japanese are busily arming Mongols in several places. Wire from Chengchiatun says Mongols concentrated at Taling-Chen are starting independence movement under inspiration Japanese. Chief of Young Mongol Party been approached by Japanese to declare independence. Commander Mongol Army been coerced to assume command of Mongol forces in district under title of Commander-in-Chief of Autonomous Mongol Army. They are marching on Chengchiatun within few days. First instalment arms

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supplied by Japanese consists 3,000 rifles, 1,000,000 rounds ammunition, 4 trench mortars, 4 mountain guns with ammunition, 2 aeroplanes - all from Mukden arsenal"

Documents C.713, C.724 and C.789 contain further details of Japanese instigation of disorder and the use of bandits and irregulars both Mongol and Chinese to make trouble as an excuse for further occupation.

The same policy was adopted for the purpose of stirring up disorder along the Peking-Mukden railway (Document C.627.1931; tels.29,31,32.).

A further step in this policy was Japanese fomentation of disorder at the great port of Tientsin, which is known as the "Shanghai of North China." One of the objects of this action, which led to a good deal of bloodshed, was, as is explained below, to frighten the youthful Mr. Pu Yi into acquiescing in the Japanese demand that he should leave the Japanese concession at Tientsin and accept the risk of becoming Japan's nominee as head of the Japanese puppet government in Manchuria.

The course of events at Tientsin is clearly indicated in the following communications from the Chinese delegate to the Council of the League:

C.827.M.409.1931, November 10th:

"The following information, just received from my Government, reveals the bloodshed and disorder at Tientsin as but a further step in the policy of the Japanese authorities of suborning the drags of the population in order to foment revolt against the Chinese Government.

"On the 7th and 8th of November the Chinese authorities received information indicating that the Japanese had decided to utilise elements among the Chinese population hostile to the Government, so as to disturb peace and order in Tientsin and Peiping before November 10th. On the morning of November 8th it was reported that the Japanese distributed more than 500 small arms to anti-Government Chinese. On the night of November 8th, at half-past ten, more than two thousand men, in separate groups and flaunting Japanese flags, issued from the Japanese Concession and made surprise attacks on the police stations in Sanpeikwan and Heikwanse which are contiguous to the Japanese Concession in Tientsin and also that in Nankai which is contiguous to the Japanese Barracks. They had planned to proceed to the Provincial Government and the Municipality as well as to the Public Safety Bureau. Fortunately effective defence measures had been taken by our police so that order was quickly restored. At four o'clock on the morning of the 9th, when the irregular forces from the Japanese Concession had been mastered by the Chinese police, the Japanese Commander at Tientsin requested General Wang, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, by telephone, to withdraw Chinese military and police forces to a distance of three hundred metres from the Japanese Concession by six a.m. General Wang asked the reason for this request and pointed out that there was no military force but only Chinese police and members of the Public Safety Bureau; as they were at that very moment doing their duty by putting an end to the disturbance precisely within the three hundred metre zone it was difficult to order their withdrawal.

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The Japanese authorities at 5.30 again pressed their demand upon the Provincial Government. This time, as the irregulars had either returned to the Japanese Concession or been killed or captured, General Wang ordered the withdrawal to take place as requested before 6.0 a.m. Nevertheless, at 6.30 a.m., the Chinese City was suddenly bombarded by more than 30 shells, coming from the direction of Hailuwanse, the Japanese Barracks and the Garden of the Japanese Concession. The Japanese Commander excused himself when asked by the Chinese authorities for an explanation by saying that he knew nothing about the incident. But to the representatives of other nations he is said to have explained that it was due to a clash between the 29th Brigade of the Kirin Army and the police force and members of the Public Safety Bureau at Tientsin. It is a sufficient commentary on this explanation to point out that there is no Kirin Army at Tientsin, nor, for that matter, any 29th Brigade in the Kirin Army."

C.834.H.414.1931, November 11th:

"I have received the following further evidence in support of the statement contained in my note of yesterday (C.827 of November 10th) that the disorders in Tientsin were instigated by the Japanese military authorities:

"On November 7th and 8th Hopei Provincial Government was informed that the Japanese Military Headquarters in Tientsin had been giving arms and ammunition to notorious characters, such as Li Lien-hsiang and Chang Pi, with instructions to organise a force of plain-clothes irregulars and plan an attack on the headquarters of the Provincial Government, the Municipal offices, and the Bureau of Public Safety, on November 8th. The Consuls in Tientsin were accordingly informed of these reports and precautionary measures were taken. The result was that when the irregulars erupted from the Japanese Concession on the evening of November 8th, as described in my previous note, they were repulsed, but only after fierce fighting, in which they made a counter-attack and for a time held the 6th Chinese police station in the 1st police district and the 6th Chinese police station in the 2nd police district. A dozen prisoners were made who corroborated the report that the attack had been instigated by the Japanese. The arms taken from these prisoners were of Japanese make. On examining a shell fired from the Japanese Concession to the Chinese city it has been found bearing following words 'made 15th year Taisho'.

"On the morning of November 10th a motor-car coming from the Japanese Concession to the Chinese city was searched by the Chinese police which found therein 15 rifles and 20,000 rounds of ammunition, all made by the Mukden Arsenal, which was seized by the Japanese troops on the night of September 18th and occupied by them since that date. In the same motor-car there were also hand-grenades bearing the following words, '15th year Taisho'."

("15th year Taisho" is Japanese chronology and refers to the reign of the Emperor.)

Further information is contained in Documents C.847 and C.868 which is quoted below.

The Japanese denial of being in any way responsible for the disorders at Tientsin is contained in the same communication (C.878) as the Japanese denial of any intention of using Mr. Puyi for establishing a puppet Government in Manchuria. Both denials are of equal value.

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V. Setting up of Puppet Authorities.¹⁾

- Instances of the policy of setting up puppet authorities have already been given in connection with the account of the events preceding the capture of Tsitsihar and are contained among the data quoted to illustrate the development of the Japanese policy of terrorism. The following further instances which are inseparable from Japanese preparations for a permanent stay in Manchuria, may be quoted:

C.592.H.236.1931:

"Kirin still burning and being looted . . . Provincial Government of officials retreated to Fanshih. Chinese police functioning but forced to don Japanese uniform. Japanese formed Public Safety Maintenance Committee with seven Chinese, eight Japanese members, all under direction Japanese military headquarters."

C.627.H.251.1931, Despatch No.20:

"That Japanese intend occupy Mukden and Kirin permanently evidenced by fact that they have commenced collecting taxes various occupied territories Chinese merchants refusing resume business are placed under arrest. Colonel Dohibara Japanese Major Mukden already re-organised Mukden Municipality appointed Japanese to different municipal posts. Machine-guns mounted west gate Mukden, two Japanese companies detailed in neighbourhood. Post Office forced fly Japanese flag. President Fengyung University detained by Japanese troops General Tsang Shi-yi chairman Hon Provincial Government still detained on hunger strike. Asked to sign document admitting Chinese soldiers had first launched attacks South Manchuria Railway Tsang flatly refused declaring he rather lose head than affix signature on fabricated document."

C.661.H.272.1931.:

"Japanese-owned Chinese language newspapers inciting north-eastern public self-government and independence. Responded by few disappointed politicians and speculative local rogues."

C.733.H.338.1931:

"The Japanese Army is feverishly consolidating its hold on all the principal towns of Manchuria, outside the railway zone, northward including Kirin and Taonan, from Korea on the east into Mongolia on the west. They are trying to induce the Mongolian princes to sign away their rights and to set up an independent government under Japanese protection. The Japanese Army is rooting out at all centres the Chinese civil government, who are offering no resistance, and are forcing unwilling Chinese individuals to organise puppet independent governments in all the main areas. They openly refuse to recognise Chinese national and civil authority in Manchuria."

"The Japanese have seized the reserves and deposits of the larger Chinese banks, the records of corporations and large quantities of both military and industrial supplies. They are feverishly extending their telegraph and telephone systems

1) See also separate Memorandum from the Chinese Delegation.
A.(Extr.)105.1932.VII.

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"The Japanese have occupied every Chinese public office in Antung, excepting the Customs House, which has Europeans in it. They have, however, placed a guard over the Chinese Customs Superintendent, and are denying him freedom of action. The Chinese banks have been seized and are now operated by them. They have arrested the Superintendent of Schools, and are forbidding the teaching of Sun Yat Sen's principles.

"The Japanese Army occupied Kirin, seventy-nine miles east of the South Manchuria Railway zone, on September 14. They seized and hold the telegraph office, the telephone office, the wireless stations, the provincial arsenal, the water-works, the local office of the Bank of China, the Kirin Provincial Bank, police headquarters and branch headquarters of the Kuomintang Party, and all other public offices. The non-military population was subjected to an exhaustive search. Troops and military cadets were disarmed, and arms and munitions were removed from the Chinese arsenal, including modern rifles, field guns, heavy guns, military motor trucks. They are building a large flying field at Kirin. They impressed certain Chinese and dictated the formation there of a civil government independent of the Chinese provincial and national authorities. The Japanese Army has taken possession of the provincial treasury."

The Council, it will be recalled, requested its Members to obtain information from their representatives on the spot as to the situation in Manchuria. Most important communication from the German Government is contained in Document C.752.H.551. 1931:

"Municipal administration of Mukden handed over on October 20th to the Major Chao Hsin-Po. Former provincial authorities being re-installed; financial and industrial services and traffic commission will soon follow suit. Question of the Governor undecided. All new authorities have, like the Banks of Issue, received Japanese advisers, who are for the most part influential high officials of the South Manchuria Railway."

In Documents C.789 and C.793 on November 3rd and 4th, the Chinese Government adduces evidence as to the seizure of the salt revenues, of which more will be said below, and other matters that lead it to the conclusion that "it is now clear that the Japanese Army of occupation is pursuing a deliberate policy of trying to substitute for the authority of the Chinese Government the rule of various groups and individuals set up and maintained by the Japanese themselves."

As early as November 18th the Chinese Government reported to the Council that a plot was on foot by the Japanese authorities to use the young Mr. Pu Yi, the ex-emperor of the former Manchu dynasty, who had for years been living in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin, as a Japanese tool in the establishment of a pseudo-government in Manchuria. This information is contained in

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Document C.868.M.466.1931. from which the following passages may be quoted:

"Since the forcible occupation of various places in the North Eastern Provinces, the Japanese military authorities have been frequently instigating or utilising bandits, rebels and other undesirable elements to disturb local peace and order as well as to organise illegal governments which are usurping administrative powers under the protection or coercion of the Japanese troops.

"It has been lately reported that during the recent disturbance in Tientsin, created by insurgent rioters who made use of the Japanese Concession as a base of operations, the ex-Emperor Pu Yi of the former Manchu Dynasty was kidnapped and escorted by the Japanese from the said Concession to Mukden for establishing a bogus government with himself proclaimed as Emperor.

"The National Government has already declared to the League of Nations and to the Governments of friendly Powers that the Chinese Government and people will not recognise any illegitimate institutions established in subversion of China's administrative integrity in those places of the North-Eastern Provinces which remain under the occupation of Japanese troops. In the event that establishment of Pu Yi's bogus government is confirmed, the National Government will regard such government as a seditious institution and at the same time as an auxiliary organ of the Japanese Government in disguise, while all acts of such government which are necessarily illegal will be repudiated by the National Government."

The next day, November 19th, the Japanese Government (C.878.M.454.1931) states that it denied formally

"any participation by the Japanese authorities in a movement for the restoration of the ex-Emperor Pu Yi. The Japanese authorities have, on the contrary, always discouraged any attempt of this kind. According to a telegram received from our Consul-General at Tientsin, the ex-Emperor Pu Yi did not feel himself to be in safety, having been frequently threatened and having even had two bombs sent to him in a parcel on November 6th. He fled during the Tientsin riots without the knowledge of the Japanese authorities."

At an early stage in the development of the puppet government policy the Japanese Government declared that "reports from Manchuria state that various separatist movements have broken out. Regarding these movements as purely Chinese affairs, to be dealt with by the inhabitants of Manchuria themselves, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs gave formal instructions to the Japanese Consular authorities in those regions on September 27th, 1931, that Japanese residents must be strictly forbidden to take part in these movements." (C.676.M.283.1931 of October 7th)

In Document C.357.M.208.1932 the Japanese Government gives an extremely tendentious account of the formation of the puppet Government designed to obscure the clear fact that the whole movement has been engineered and controlled from the outset by the Japanese army of occupation. But even this account contains the following significant passage: "The Japanese forces are at present providing the forces of this Government in a friendly spirit with such assistance as they may need to restore and maintain order and tranquillity."

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On February 19th, M. Sato announced in a public meeting of the Council, and was duly recorded as so stating in the roneod verbatim records, that an "independent" Government had been established in Manchuria and added "the setting up of this autonomy in Manchuria has been supported by Japan." M. Sato spoke in French and the French verbatim record reports him as follows: "Le Japon a donné son appui à l'établissement de cette indépendance."

In the printed minutes where each delegation corrects its own contribution to the discussion the Japanese delegation made a very significant change. The printed minutes read: "Japan has regarded favourably the establishment of Manchuria's independence." The corrected minutes, however, do still contain unchanged the second half of M. Sato's statement in the Council when he announced that "our invested capital in Manchuria is too considerable to make it possible for us to accept any system of government in that country. We cannot acquiesce in an arbitrary system of government, one that jeopardises this capital which represents very large sums of money."

Under Article 10 of the Covenant Japan is pledged to respect China's territorial integrity and political independence and under Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Nine Power Treaty she has undertaken to respect China's sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity. The announcement of Japanese policy officially made by the Japanese delegate to the Council of the League of Nations is clearly impossible to reconcile with these treaty obligations. And if the doctrine were admitted for a single moment that a country is entitled to dictate what sort of government there should be in the territory of another country, in order in the view of the former country to safeguard its investments in that territory, there would be an end to international order and peace.

VI. Seizing Coal Mines, Land, Salt and Customs Revenues.

Japanese occupation very soon developed an economic aspect. In addition to controlling banks and commercial establishments the Japanese authorities seized coal mines and land, and went on to confiscate the salt and Customs revenues.

Some of the evidence has been already referred to in previous sections, but the following may be added:

C.661.M.272.1931., October 5th:

"Escaped banker from Mukden states firstly, business firms there closed again because disorder and damages caused by Japanese troops and Koreans although they had repeatedly resumed business under Japanese compulsion. Banks still closed including Hongkong Shanghai Bank, National City Bank New York."

C.743.M.343.1931., October 21st:

"The Frontier Bank and the Three Eastern Provinces Bank at Mukden have re-opened for business, under severe restrictions imposed by the Japanese military authorities now occupying that city."

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"These restrictions include the following rules, that a supervisor for each bank must be appointed from the Japanese army, that there be special investigators from time to time, that business must be suspended at any time at the discretion of the Japanese army, that the employment of all bank officials be subject to the approval of the Japanese army and that no business regarded as injurious to the interests of the Japanese army may be transacted."

C.838.M.418.1931. November 12th:

A Japanese detachment of 50 soldiers with machine-guns has seized an important Chinese mine - the Fuchowan colliery of the North-Eastern Mining Corporation. The Japanese immediately appointed a Japanese superintendent and Japanese advisers in all departments, while compelling the Chinese staff to remain. This mine is a privately-owned commercial enterprise, belonging to a group of Chinese Banks and individuals, and was started three years ago with a capital of three million silver dollars. It produces 250,000 tons of anthracite per year, and has been coveted by the Japanese for a long time. The mine is situated near Dairen, but outside of the leased territory. The seizure is an act of pure spoliation, with no shadow of legal justification."

C.839.M.419.1931. November 12th.

"The Japanese military authorities, who seized all the official documents at Mukden and Kirin after driving out the representatives of the lawful Chinese Government and substituting puppet governments of their own, are now altering and forging land deeds and mining licenses in favour of Japanese. Over 2,000 land-owners in Mukden alone have already suffered in this fashion.

"A typical instance is a proclamation by the so-called Shiuwo Agricultural Company, one of the mushroom growths of the Japanese occupation, addressed to Chinese land-owners stating that:

"Estate at Tsekwantum, West of Mukden, sold by original owner King, who sold to Lee and Yang in 1914, then Lee and Yang leased to Japanese, Koga and Watanabe, who transferred rights to this Company. All land deeds, plans and other evidences are in our possession. You are cultivating our land without our consent which is illegal. If you want to continue the cultivation, come to us before November 8th and sign new contract of lease, otherwise said estate will be leased to others.

(Sealed) Shiuwo Agricultural Company,
 October 31st."

"Thus the Japanese occupation, as time passes, not only extends the area occupied but increases its hold on the country. Undertaken ostensibly to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects, it began by destroying all the Chinese organs of government and supplying Mongol bandits and other disaffected elements with arms and went on to instal Japanese advisers in banks and commercial establishments, setting up puppet administrations under Japanese control, and to seize the salt revenues and other monies. It has now gone on to seize private property, such as coal mines, and carry out large-scale falsifications of title deeds to land."

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As regards the seizure of the salt revenues the details are contained in Documents C.763, C.793, C.810, C.818 and C.852.

The first reports of the seizure of the salt revenues by Japanese soldiers with fixed bayonets acting under the orders of Japanese advisers, were denied by the Japanese Government in Doc. C.311.M.401; the Japanese Government in this communication stated that the "Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order at Mukden" asked the Newchwang Salt Revenue Office to hand over the balance of the tax receipts and the latter "agreed to send the said balance ... together with the net balance of the tax to be collected. Thus the allegation that the Japanese military authorities have forcibly seized the revenue from the salt tax is entirely unfounded. The Japanese military authorities have entirely refrained from interfering in purely Chinese affairs, assuming that there was no reason to object to the Mukden Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order, which discharges these duties in the place of General Chang Hsueh-Liang, receiving the balance in question from the Newchwang Salt Revenue Office, which is also a Chinese organ."

The Chinese Government thereupon communicated to the League a very detailed statement (C.852.M.430.1931. November 13th) from Dr. Frederick A. Cleveland, Associate Inspector General of the Salt Revenue, in which he gave a minute description with names, dates and times, of the proceedings of the armed Japanese detachments that broke into the District Offices of the Salt Revenue, held up and covered the Salt Inspection Office's personnel, told them not to move and then took possession of their accounts and cash. He further gave the names of the Japanese army paymasters who had accompanied these detachments and given receipts for the money taken and concluded his report by stating that photo-static copies of the receipt by Japanese officers for the money taken at Newchwang were being furnished to the foreign delegations in China.

This was too much even for the Japanese to deny so that the next communication from the Japanese Government (C.863.M.441.1931, November 17th) admitted that the Japanese military authorities had indeed done what they were accused of doing and attempted to justify this action by an argument the gist of which was that they objected so strongly to the way in which the Chinese Government used its own revenues for the purposes of its own administrative expenditure that "it is perfectly comprehensible that in these exceptional circumstances the Japanese military authorities should have interfered with the despatch of funds....Accordingly the action of the military authorities in intervening to transfer the surplus revenue of the Chinese Salt Tax Office to another Chinese body cannot be regarded as unjustifiable." The despatch closes with the following assertion: "The Japanese Government considers that the measures taken by the military authorities are in no way contrary to the resolution of the Council of the League of September 30th or to the declaration made by the Japanese representative at the Council meetings of October 24th and 25th."

This statement was presumably made with reference to the following statement by the President of the Council (M. Briand) in a communication to the Japanese Government dated November 5th (C.810.M.400.1931) from which the following passages may be quoted:

"The Chinese representative refers in particular to the seizure by the Japanese military authorities of part of the salt revenue of Newchwang, which is said to be only the first of other operations of the same nature."

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"Your Excellency will remember that in paragraph 5 of the Council Resolution of September 30th, the Japanese Government had already undertaken to 'adopt all necessary measures not to extend the incident or aggravate the situation'. At the meetings of the Council on October 23rd and 24th, moreover, Your Excellency spontaneously renewed on several occasions the formal assurance that the Japanese Government intended 'to bring back its troops within the Railway Zone as soon as it could regard the safety of its nationals and the protection of their property as effectively assured', Japan for her part being prepared to facilitate by all the means in her power the 'pacification' which appeared to her to be indispensable for the fulfilment of this condition of security formulated by herself.

"It is obvious that acts of the kind reported, such as the seizure of the salt revenue cannot be related to the safety of Japanese nationals and the protection of their property and that they would therefore be incompatible with the undertakings entered into before the Council and with the spontaneous assurances recorded by it."

Japan is adopting a similar course with regard to the Customs revenue. The evidence is contained in the following documents:

A. (Extr.) 37; A. (Extr.) 39; A. (Extr.) 72; A. (Extr.) 78; and A. (Extr.) 92 give a detailed account of how Japanese advisers of the so-called "independent" Government have compelled the commissioners of Customs at Antun and Newchwang to hand over their funds and have taken charge of the Customs services. It is further reported that "The Japanese are arranging a Customs Union of the Three Eastern provinces with Japan, thus completely severing Manchuria from China and attaching it to Japan."

The usual denials (A. Extr. 60, 1932 and A. Extr. 96, 1932) have been issued by the Japanese Government. The first denial admits the main charge, namely that a Japanese so-called adviser is interfering with the Chinese Customs Service, and both denials will no doubt in due course meet the same fate as the various Japanese assurances, denials and pledges which have abounded since September 18th.

It is scarcely necessary to point out that this interference with Customs and Salt revenues is a further violation of Article 10 of the Covenant and Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty. It may be added, that as these two revenues are the security for a number of China's foreign and domestic loans, the Japanese interference in addition to being illegal is doing serious harm to the interests of foreign bondholders of Chinese loans.

VII. Present Position.

Six months of Japanese misrule and oppression have plunged China's once-prosperous eastern provinces into chaos and ruin.

Some of the evidence is contained in the communications to the League from the Chinese Government since the outset of the conflict. For instance, (C.634.M.252.1931, September 28th) reports:

"Foreigners arriving from Mukden describe conditions terrible, people in state of terror rapidly becoming foodless, no money owing to banks being closed by Japanese. All shops closed."

The foreign press prints almost daily accounts of the guerrilla war raging throughout the territory enjoying the blessings of Japanese "order".

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The London "Times" of March 1st prints an article from a correspondent in Manchuria from which the following passages may be quoted:

"The first and most serious effect of the military coup of September 18th, 1931, when Mukden was seized, was the immediate paralysis of the established Chinese authority, both in the capital and in the country. Whether intended or not, the consequences for the millions of inhabitants during the succeeding months have been disastrous. The mechanism of trade and commerce has been thrown out of gear at a time when, among other causes, the world slump in prices had already led to widespread financial depression. Worse still, the country became infested with roving bands of brigands, horse and foot. It is true that during normal years brigandage is endemic in the land, though held in constant check by the authorities. But now, owing to the dissolution of the greater part of the provincial army, lawlessness with its attendant savagery prevails throughout vast areas, causing untold agony to the respectable classes of the community, especially to the modest Chinese women.

"Until the breakdown of authority in September the taking of life by the robber bands was rare. It was the Japanese initiative which gave rise to a state of insecurity, likely to continue either until the invaders spread their military control throughout the whole vast extent of Manchuria, which is twice the size of Japan, or until the legitimate Chinese authority is permitted to return."

The Manchester Guardian of March 11th prints an article by a Mukden resident in which the following passage occurs:

"The 'order, security, progress and development' that Japan has set up are not welcome. We see scores of chimney-stacks standing gaunt, department stores employing from fifty to two hundred shopmen each with hardly a customer, pawnshops and distilleries afraid to open their doors, doing only a letter business through barred windows one foot square. Hundreds of mansions are empty. A foreigner can have a twenty-roomed house, servants, coal, electricity, motor-car, rent free, if he will only live there as watchmen. Labour, masons, joiners, all trades are completely stopped, and so tragic and desperate is the fate of the poor who cannot flee that in Mukden city, one of the granaries of the world, free food depots have had to be organized. The ruin is complete; her citizens are little interested in the academic question of to whom or what her former prosperity was due. A foreign invader has upset it all, of that there is no question, and race hatred has burst out anew.

"Whether Japan's action on September 18th was justified is another question, but at the bar of history Japan will inevitably be called upon to answer for her share in the red ruin that has since spread like a disease through the province."

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The MORNING POST (April 13th) publishes a despatch from its Harbin correspondent revealing not only the appalling disorder in Manchuria, but the way in which the Japanese are controlling the puppet government :

"At the present moment it cannot be said that the results of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria have proved very satisfactory, as there are still large bands of demoralised soldiers who refuse to recognise the new State, and there are also hundreds of thousands of Chinese residents who are not in accord with the present government Unless the Japanese can clear the district of these demoralised soldiers within the next two to three weeks, it will be hopeless to make an attempt in spring or summer

"Until the country is entirely cleared of those who are against the new Manchu-Kuo State, it cannot be said that the Japanese scheme has really succeeded.

"Though the new State is said to be Chinese, the administration of the country is at the present moment not in the hands of the Chinese but in the hands of the Japanese advisers. There is not one administrative organ in the country, down to the smallest police station, which has not now a Japanese adviser at the head of the staff, and without him the Chinese nominal head is unable to do anything at all.

"Whether the Chinese will continue to serve under the Japanese, or whether there will be a revolt which might result in great bloodshed, remains to be seen, and it will take all the tact and astuteness of the Japanese who control the situation to prevent trouble arising, as the ordinary Chinese citizen is deeply incensed at the Japanese occupation of his country."

"For months the Japanese Government has been pouring communications into the Secretariat as to the fearful and growing disorder in the territory under Japanese military occupation. Mr. Sato, in an interview in the NIS CHRONICLE of March 18th, is reported as saying: "In ten years we shall establish order and security in Manchuria."

It is clear that on the one hand the Japanese are preparing to stay in Manchuria, and on the other that they are utterly incapable of maintaining order on Chinese territory. It is obvious on the face of it that order can only be maintained where the Government has the allegiance of the population. The Three Eastern provinces have an area greater than France and Germany combined, and a population of 30 million, mostly sturdy peasants who hate the alien tyranny set up by the Japanese invaders and consider it a patriotic duty to combat that tyranny by every means at their disposal. In this view they have the full moral support of the whole Chinese nation, a people of 400,000,000. They know that the Chinese Government will never consent to sign any treaty with Japan so long as the illegal occupation continues: they know that China is supported in this attitude by the whole civilized world and this knowledge increases their strength and resistance.

To complete the picture reference may be made to the speech recently made by Mr. Matsudaira, the Japanese Ambassador in London, when he said, as reported in the Times of April 7th, that "the Manchurian affair had its root deeply embedded in history and Japanese political and strategical interests were involved in it as well as economic interests." This statement confirms the view

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always held by the Chinese Government that the real object of Japanese policy was not to assure economic cooperation with China, since such cooperation can be promoted only by peace and good neighbourly relations between the two countries, but is directed to establishing a political protectorate over Manchuria.

VIII. CONCLUSION.

The facts speak so eloquently for themselves that no comment is necessary. In his letter to Senator Borah of last February, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, declared that "a situation has developed which cannot under any circumstances be reconciled with the obligations of the Covenants of these two treaties (the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty) and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed, such a situation could not have arisen We believe that this situation would have been avoided had these Covenants been faithfully observed and no evidence has come to us to indicate that a due compliance with them would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of those treaties and their nationals."

The Chinese Government has no doubt that the Assembly shares the view of the United States Government that has just been quoted, and will not hesitate to state that the present situation is incompatible with the Covenant and would not have arisen if the Covenant had been observed. Such a statement would merely, indeed, constitute an application of the principles enunciated in the Assembly Resolution of March 11th, making it perfectly clear that any change in the political, administrative or fiscal relations between China's Eastern provinces and the rest of China effected or maintained by foreign support or taking place on Chinese territory, which is under foreign military occupation, is contrary to Article X of the Covenant and Article I of the Nine Power Treaty, and so cannot be recognised by any member of the League as valid or effectual.

A further unavoidable conclusion from adopting the view already expressed by the United States, as to the nature of the present situation and from applying the principles contained in the Assembly Resolution of March 11th, is that the appearance of a so-called "independent" government in the occupied territory in no way release Japan from her obligation to put an end to a situation incompatible with the Covenant by withdrawing her troops. Nor does it release the other members of the League from their obligation under Article X of the Covenant to preserve China's territorial integrity and political independence against external aggression.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council and
the Members of the League.

A.(Extra.) 107.1932.VII.
Geneva, April 28th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Assembly the following communication, dated April 28th,
which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./A.29.

April 28th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate to you at the
request of The Chinese Association in London a telegram
from them addressed to the Assembly of the League of
Nations in my care. I shall be deeply obliged if you
will be good enough to circulate the same among the Members
of the Assembly.

"Any arrangement under whatever ingenious
formula countenancing continuation Japan's
military occupation of Chinese territory Shanghai
as lever for exacting any guarantees will render
League Covenant and Assembly's explicit Resolutions
March fourth meaningless. To make clear resolutions
and then purposely circumscribe them by whatever
clever devices before ink is dry not only most
dangerous but makes League laughingstock. As you
repeatedly emphasized much safer let Japan ignore
and violate Assembly's unanimous clear resolutions
by continuing her occupation than legalise under
dubious excuses her illegal occupation by com-
promising League's own conviction, honour and life.
The world and posterity look to you for upholding
international sense of decency; we trust your
wisdom and courage.

London Chinese Association."

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Extr.) 108.1932.VII.
Geneva, April 29th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Report presented by the Committee of Nineteen in execution
of paragraph 1 (part III) of the Resolution adopted
by the Assembly on March 11th, 1932.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to
the Assembly the following report presented by the Committee
of Nineteen in execution of paragraph 1 (Part III) of the
resolution adopted by the Assembly on March 11th, 1932.

The resolution adopted by the Extraordinary Assembly
on March 11th states in Part III, paragraph 1, that the Special
Committee is instructed:

"to report as soon as possible on the cessation of
hostilities in the Shanghai area and the conclusion of
arrangements which shall render definitive the said cessa-
tion and shall regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese
forces in conformity with the Assembly resolution of
March 4th, 1932."

The report on the situation mentioned in paragraph 7
of the same resolution will be distributed to the Members of
the Assembly shortly.

I.

According to the information received by the Committee,
the situation at Shanghai is as follows:

1. A large part of the Japanese effectives has been
withdrawn.

On March 18th a report by the representatives of the
four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settle-
ments (A. Extr. 56) announced that orders for the return to
Japan of the 11th Division of the 24th Mixed Brigade had been
received at the Japanese Army headquarters. Further reports
from the representatives of the four Powers (March 17th, 21st
and 22nd) announced that the troops in question had embarked.
The representatives of the Powers estimated that after their
embarkation the Japanese forces would be reduced to about
37,000 men.

A communication from the Japanese delegation, dated
April 15th (A. Extr. Com. Spec. 7), stated that after March
22nd other orders for departure had been given, namely, on
March 26th for heavy artillery and 1. of c. formations; on
April 11th for one division (in part); and on April 15th for

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air formations, heavy artillery and 1. of 3. formations. The same communication added that about 33,000 men had already been withdrawn from the Shanghai area and that the forces remaining stationed there amounted to two divisions, about 20,000 men (not including other train and 1. of 3. formations). There remained with these troops 2,000 horses and considerable material (aeroplanes, artillery, munitions, provisions, surgical dressings, miscellaneous stores, fodder, motor-cars, waggons, etc.).

Further, both the representatives of the four Powers and the Japanese delegation have announced the departure of certain naval units.

2. It likewise appears from the reports sent by the representatives of the four Powers that the orders given by both sides for the cessation of hostilities have, generally speaking, continued to be carried out.

The last report received (April 1st) added that the attention of the respective staffs had been officially drawn to the skirmishes referred to in the previous reports, and that they were considering what steps to take. This report further stated that the two armies were continuing to strengthen their respective positions.

Thus the two armies remain facing each other on positions which they have consolidated. According to the Japanese delegation's communication of April 15th (A. Extr. Com. Spec. 7), the Japanese army is on the line Luehochen-Katingchen-Nanziang-Chenzu.

Since April 1st another skirmish has been reported, on the 8th, in a communication from the Japanese delegation (A. Extr. 103). Further, on April 15th, the Japanese delegation communicated a summary of official telegrams announcing, on the basis of reports published at Shanghai on the same day in a newspaper issued in English, an advance by Chinese forces (about one regiment) south of the Soocow river. This communication added that at the meeting that took place at Shanghai on March 26th, the Chinese had mentioned Hwatsaochen, Hunjao and Lungwa as being the most advanced positions in that area, beyond which they did not wish to go, that the present movements of the Chinese troops had brought them well in front of the line joining these three places, that they might threaten the flank of the Japanese army, and that it was superfluous to emphasise the grave character of such a movement, notwithstanding the de facto cessation of hostilities, in the existing state of the negotiations. The Japanese military authorities therefore attached great importance to the result of the investigations to be carried out by the foreign military attachés.

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On the Chinese side, Document A.Com.Spec.2. of April 12th states (page 3) that for the time being fighting has virtually ceased and no blood is being shed; that this is a precious result, and one for which the Chinese Government wishes to express its profound gratitude to the Assembly; that it is nevertheless clear that the present situation is precarious, and that as long as agreement has not been reached, peace, which has never ceased to be troubled by occasional skirmishes and aeroplane raids, is at the mercy daily, almost hourly, of an incident.

II.

In order to put an end to this situation, the Assembly, in its resolution of March 4th, had recommended that negotiations should be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the other Powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlements, for the conclusion of arrangements which should render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.

Negotiations began at Shanghai on March 14th.

From the outset difficulties arose in connection with the agenda of the Conference, and the Chinese representative laid them before the Committee of the Assembly.

The Committee invited the representatives of the two parties to its public meeting on March 17th.

The first difficulty was in connection with a proposal for an addition to Point III of the agenda, brought forward by the Japanese Minister in China. He asked for a joint commission with neutral members, which was to certify to the carrying out of the Agreement proposed, to have the power to "watch and observe the general conditions in the evacuated area until a later settlement."

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The second difficulty arose in connection with a Japanese proposal for a separate note, under which the two parties, "subject to the approval of the Chinese Government", agreed to the following understanding: "provided a definite agreement is reached on the basis of the above points, the Chinese side will voluntarily give an independent undertaking that Mayor Wu's letter of January 28th stands".

The Committee found that the first Japanese proposal was acceptable, on the ground that on the one hand the first point in the draft agenda, which none of the parties questioned, laid down that the "Chinese troops are to remain in their present positions, pending a later settlement", and on the other hand that there was nothing in the Assembly's resolution of March 4th which was opposed to the appointment of a joint commission with neutral members to watch and observe the general conditions in the evacuated area until a later settlement.

The second Japanese proposal was also studied by the Committee, with reference to its conformity with the spirit of the resolution of March 4th.

The President, with the approval of his colleagues, recalled that the Assembly had clearly shown its desire for the elimination of all political conditions from the negotiations with regard to the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.

The Japanese Representative observed that his Government had no intention of making the acceptance of the separate Note a condition for the conclusion of an armistice, as was apparent from the wording of the Japanese proposal, which began with the words "subject to the approval of the Chinese Government," and expressly formulated the condition "provided a definite agreement is reached on the basis of the above points".

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While drawing attention to the importance which his Government attached to the question raised by it in the proposal for a separate Note, the Japanese Representative stated that the discussion on this point might be postponed to a later date.

These two preliminary difficulties having thus been eliminated, the negotiations continued at Shanghai. But by a communication dated April 11th (A.Com.Spec./3), the Chinese Delegation pointed out that the negotiations had again entered on a critical stage in which an understanding between the Chinese and Japanese Governments appeared unlikely. Under these circumstances, the Chinese Government had instructed its Representative to give an account to the members of the Committee of the Assembly of the last phase of the negotiations, and to ask for the meeting of the said Committee.

The Chinese Delegation, by a communication dated April 12th (A. Extr.Com.Spec./2), submitted to the Committee a memorandum and a summary of the Shanghai negotiations. The Japanese Delegation, for its part, submitted, on April 14th, a summary of the negotiations (Doc.C.382.M.215), and, on April 15th, a memorandum (A.Extr.Com.Spec./7).

The Committee of the Assembly met on April 16th.

After taking note of the articles and annexes of the draft Agreement, which had been communicated to it ⁽¹⁾, the Committee reached the conclusion that the articles in question, which had been accepted by the two Parties, were in conformity with the spirit of the resolutions adopted on March 4th and 11th. The Committee at the same time noted that the hold-up of the negotiations was due to the fact that the wording proposed made no provision for a time-limit, except in the case of an initial withdrawal of the Japanese forces to certain positions outside the Settlement, the Chinese proposal for a time-limit for the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops from the Settlement and from the roads outside the Settlement not having been accepted by the Japanese representatives.

(1) Summaries of the draft will be found in the Chinese communication of April 12th (A.Extr.Com.Spec./2) and in the Japanese memorandum of April 15th (A.Extr.Com.Spec./7).

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During the negotiations the suggestion had been made that a paragraph should be inserted in Annex II to the Agreement containing a formula designed to reconcile the Japanese and Chinese points of view. The Japanese Government rejected this formula, but put forward a counter-proposal to the effect that a declaration should be made by the Japanese Government in the following terms:

"The Japanese Government takes this opportunity to declare that as soon as local conditions in and around Shanghai so improve as to afford a sense of security to Japanese nationals as regards protection of lives and property and lawful pursuits (and it hopes that conditions will have so improved within six months or sooner) the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and extra-Settlement roads in Hongkew District as before the incident of January 28th, 1932."

The Chinese delegation, regarding this declaration as inadequate, proposed to alter it in the sense of stipulating a period of four months or less for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, during which period normal conditions were to be re-established in and around Shanghai.

The Japanese delegation rejected this amendment, but eventually, at the fourteenth meeting of the Conference held on April 14th, both delegates agreed to refer the following new formula from the Japanese delegation to their respective Governments:

"The Japanese Government takes this opportunity to declare that as soon as local conditions in and around Shanghai return to normal - and it hopes that conditions will have so returned within six months or sooner - the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew District as before the incident of January 28th, 1932."

The representatives of the friendly Powers participating in the negotiations understood that the Japanese Government would be willing to make a declaration to this effect. The Chinese Government, however, regarding the new formula as being also inadequate, interrupted the Shanghai negotiations and decided to submit the question to the Committee of the Assembly. The Committee instructed its President to put himself in touch with the representatives of both parties, and to endeavour, in conjunction with them, to find a means of smoothing over this difficulty.

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As a result of the conversations which he had had with the Chinese and Japanese delegates, the Chairman informed his colleagues that the text of the agreement negotiated at Shanghai appeared to furnish the means for reconciling the two parties.

The agreement provided as follows:

Article I. Final cessation of hostilities, undertaking that the forces of the two parties will, so far as it lies in their control, cease all and every form of hostile acts in the neighbourhood of Shanghai. In the event of doubts arising in this connection, verification by representatives of friendly Powers.

Article II. The Chinese troops to remain in their present positions pending later arrangements concerning the re-establishment of normal conditions in the area dealt with by the agreement.

Article III. The Japanese troops to withdraw to the International Settlement and the Extra-Settlement roads in the Hankow district, to the positions in which they were stationed before the incident of January 28th, 1932, it being understood however, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, that some of them would have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas.

Article IV. Establishment of a Joint Commission including the members representing the Friendly Powers participating in the negotiations in order to survey mutual withdrawal and to collaborate in arranging for the transfer of the territory evacuated by the Japanese forces to the Chinese police who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw.

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Article V. The agreement to come into force on the day of signature.

ANNEX 1.

Definition of the positions now occupied by the Chinese troops. In the event of doubt, verification of the said positions, at the request of the Joint Commission, by the representatives of the friendly Powers, members of the said Commission.

ANNEX 2.

Withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities where they are to be temporarily stationed, such withdrawal to begin in the week following the coming into force of the agreement and to be completed four weeks after the commencement of the withdrawal.

ANNEX 4.

(now Annex 3).

Composition of the Joint Commission which will contain representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments and of the heads of the missions in China of the four friendly Powers taking part in the negotiations. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of this Commission whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Commission will watch in such manner as it deems best, in accordance with its decisions, the carrying out of the provisions of Articles I, II and III of the agreement.

In view of the terms of the agreement and the explanations supplied to its Chairman by the representatives of the two parties, the Committee considered that it would be fulfilling its rôle as a conciliating body in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Assembly resolution of March 11th (Part III) in communicating to Governments through the intermediary of their delegates a preliminary draft resolution (April 19th).

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The provisions of this resolution, with the exception of paragraph 11, were identical with those of the resolution which the Committee is now recommending for adoption by the Assembly. In paragraph 11 the Special Committee stated that it "is of opinion that the powers, as defined in Annex 4 (now Annex 3) of the Draft Agreement, of the Commission which is to watch the carrying out of Articles I, II and III of that Agreement include the competence to declare at the request of one of the parties that the moment has come when the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops can reasonably be effected." The Committee added that it "hopes that all the decisions of the Joint Commission will be unanimous, but observes that under the terms of the Annex referred to above if unanimity is not possible effective decisions are to be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote."

The Chinese Government accept the draft resolution as a whole. The Japanese Government stated that it could not accept paragraph 11.

At its meeting of April 26th the Committee was informed that the two parties could probably arrive at an agreement on the basis of a new formula which, after being proposed to the Chinese Government by the President of the Commission of friendly Powers participating in the Shanghai negotiations, had been communicated to the Japanese Government.

At its meeting of April 28th the Committee was informed that the negotiations had been resumed at Shanghai and that it had been agreed to insert at the end of Annex 3 the following words: "The Commission will ... watch ... and is authorised to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of the three Articles mentioned above."

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The parties having reached an agreement on this new formula, the Committee has adopted the following text for paragraph 11 of its draft resolution:

"11. Is of opinion that the powers, as defined in Annex 3 to the Draft Agreement, of the Commission which is to watch the carrying out of Articles I, II and III of that Agreement include authority to call attention, in accordance with its decisions taken in such manner as is provided in the said Annex, to any neglect in carrying out any of the provisions of the Articles mentioned above."

The full text of the draft resolution has been distributed to the Assembly under No. A/Extr.(109).

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Communications
Council

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
MAY 2 1932

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

A. (Extr.) 109.1932.VII.

Geneva, April 28th, 1932.

POLITICAL SECTION FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Draft Resolution submitted by the Committee of Nineteen.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate herewith the text of the draft Resolution which is submitted for adoption by the Assembly.

The Assembly.

1. Considering that its resolutions of March 4th and 11th recommended that negotiations should be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai settlements, for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces;

2. Considering that while it is not for its Committee to take the place of the negotiators - since the arrangements contemplated in the Assembly resolutions of March 4th and 11th can only be concluded on the spot - every Power represented in these negotiations is entitled, should serious difficulties be encountered in the course of the negotiations or in the carrying-out of the above-mentioned arrangements, to notify the Committee, "which exercises its functions on behalf of and under supervision of the Assembly", of those difficulties;

3. Considering that the negotiations should be pursued in accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions, no one of the parties being entitled to insist on conditions which would be incompatible with the said resolutions;

4. Having noted the articles of the draft armistice which have been communicated to the Committee of the Assembly and have been accepted by the two parties;

5. Considers that these articles conform to the spirit of the said resolutions;

6. Notes in particular that under Article III of the said draft, the Japanese Government undertakes to carry out the withdrawal of its forces in the International Settlement and the roads outside the Settlement in the Hong Kew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932;

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7. Declares that it is in accordance with the spirit of the resolutions of March 4th and 11th that this withdrawal should take place in the near future;

8. Declares that the resolution of March 4th will only have been fully complied with when the Japanese forces have been entirely withdrawn;

9. Notes that the draft Agreement provides for the establishment of a joint Commission, including neutral members, to certify the mutual withdrawal and to collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw;

10. Notes with satisfaction that the said Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles I, II and III, of which the last-named provides for the complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces as before the incident of January 28th;

11. Is of opinion that the powers, as defined in Annex 4 to the Draft Agreement, of the Commission which is to watch the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of that agreement, include authority to call attention, in accordance with its decisions taken in such manner as it provided in the said Annex, to any neglect in carrying out any of the provisions of the articles mentioned above.

12. Earnestly recommends the parties in question to continue the negotiations with a view to reaching their rapid conclusion, and requests the Governments having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to continue to lend their good offices for this purpose;

13. Expressly points out that unless a conclusion is reached as laid down in the resolutions of March 4th and 11th, the question will necessarily come up again before the Assembly;

14. Requests the Governments of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to transmit to the League of Nations the information which will be in the possession of the Mixed Commission in virtue of its functions, and will be furnished to those Governments by their respective representatives on the Commission.

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A. (Extr.)1932/Agenda . . .

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.

ASSEMBLÉE EXTRAORDINAIRE.

Ordre du jour de la 5me séance plénière

Samedi, 30 avril 1932, à 10 h. 30.

SALLE H

Rapport du Comité des Dix-Neuf, conformément au
 No. 1^{er}, III de la Résolution adoptée par l'Assemblée
 le 11 mars 1932.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLY.

Agenda of the Fifth Plenary Meeting

Saturday, April 30th 1932, at 10.30 a.m.

ROOM H

Report of the Committee of Nineteen, in accordance
 with III 1) of the resolution adopted by the Assembly
 on March 11th 1932.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A. (Extr.)1932/Agenda . . .

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on March 11th 1932.

A.(Extr.).110.1932.VII.

Société des Nations

Communiqué à
l'Assemblée et aux
Membres de la
Société.

Genève, le 29 avril 1932.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS

Communication de la Délégation japonaise

Note du Secrétaire général

Le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de transmettre à l'Assemblée la lettre suivante, en date du 29 avril, qu'il a reçue de la Délégation japonaise.

Le 29 avril 1932.

Au Secrétaire général,

Conformément aux instructions de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que j'assisterai à la séance de l'Assemblée extraordinaire, convoquée le samedi 30 avril, sous la même réserve que celle formulée par Monsieur Sato, par une lettre en date du 29 février dernier (Doc.A.Extr.6.(a).1932.VII).

(signé) H. MAGAOKA
Délégué du Japon à l'Assemblée extraordinaire
de la Société des Nations.

A.(Extr.).110.1932.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council and
the Members of the League.

Geneva, April 29th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following letter, dated April 29th, which he has received from the Japanese Delegation.

(Translation)

April 29th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General,

In accordance with instructions received from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that I shall attend the meeting of the Extraordinary Assembly convened for Saturday, April 30th, subject to the same reservation as that formulated by M. Sato in a letter dated February 29th last (Doc.A.Extr.6(a).1932 VII).

(signed) NAGAOKA.
Japanese delegate to the Extraordinary
Assembly of the League of Nations.

A. [Extr.]/Com.Spéc./P.V. 1.

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

set up under the Assembly's Resolution of March 11th, 1932.

MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING (PUBLIC)

HELD ON MARCH 17TH, 1932, AT 3.30 P.M.

President: M. HYMANS
Present:

British Empire: MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY,
Colombia: (absent),
Czechoslovakia: M. BENEŠ,
France: M. PAUL-BONCOUR,
Germany: M. VON WEIZSÄCKER,
Guatemala: M. MATOS,
Hungary: Count APPONYI,
Irish Free State: Mr. LESTER,
Italy: M. PILOTTI,
Norway: M. COLBAN,
Panama: M. GARAY,
Peru: M. BARRETO,
Poland: M. ZALESKI,
Portugal: M. DE QUEVEDO,
Spain: M. DE ZULUETA,
Sweden: Baron RAMEL,
Switzerland: M. MOTTA,
Yugoslavia: M. CHOUMENKOVITCH,

China: M. YEN, * * *
Japan: M. SATO.

Secretary-General: Sir Eric DRUMMOND.

1. — TRANSMISSION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY ON MARCH 11th, 1932: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE UNITED STATES MINISTER AT BERNE AND REPLY THERETO.

The President read the following letter which the Secretary-General had sent on March 11th to the

United States Minister at Berne and the latter's reply dated March 12th.

1. — Letter, dated March 11th, 1932, from the Secretary-General to the United States Minister at Berne: ¹

"I beg to enclose herewith, for the information of your Government, the text of a resolution relative to the Sino-Japanese dispute, which was adopted this afternoon by the Assembly of the League of Nations.

"In view of the collaboration which has on several occasions in the course of recent events been effected between the Government of the United States of America and the Governments of other Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements, perhaps you will allow me to draw your particular attention to Part II of the Assembly resolution, in which the Assembly addresses a request to the Powers Members of the League of Nations which have such special interests.

"(Signed) Eric DRUMMOND."

2. — Reply, dated March 12th, 1932, from the United States Minister at Berne: ¹

"I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 11th, enclosing, for the information of the American Government, the text of a resolution relative to the Sino-Japanese dispute which was adopted yesterday afternoon by the Assembly of the League of Nations.

"I am instructed by my Government to express to you its gratification at the action taken

¹ Document A. (Extr.) 50.1932.VII.

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by the Assembly of the League of Nations. My Government is especially gratified that the nations of the world are united on a policy not to recognise the validity of results attained in violation of the treaties in question. This is a distinct contribution to international law and offers a constructive basis for peace.

"You suggest that I note particularly Part II of the resolution. In this, the Assembly recalls several resolutions and cites especially its own resolution of March 4th, 1932, adopted in agreement with the parties with a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. My Government, as one of the Powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlement, has already authorised its representatives at Shanghai to assist in co-operation with the representatives of other Powers similarly situated toward the consummation of those objectives.

"(Signed) Hugh R. WILSON."

Speaking on behalf of the Committee, the President took note with satisfaction of the letter from Mr. Wilson.

2. — CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AT SHANGHAI AND WITHDRAWAL OF THE JAPANESE TROOPS: STATEMENTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS.

The President reminded the Committee of the Assembly resolution of March 11th, 1932, which laid down the Committee's terms of reference. Its first task was "to report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the said cessation and shall regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in conformity with the Assembly resolution of March 4th, 1932". The Committee had been informed that conversations between the parties, attended by the representatives of the Powers at Shanghai, had been held with a view to the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the Japanese troops. He requested the representatives of the parties to tell the Committee what was the present position with regard to these conversations and what prospects there were of success.

M. Sato (Japan). — As I announced to the Members of the League yesterday, orders were given on March 14th to the 11th Division and the 24th Mixed Brigade, which consist of about fourteen thousand men, and to certain special detachments, to return to Japan. These troops have begun preparations for their departure and will embark without delay.

Further, preliminary conversations with a view to the negotiations foreshadowed in the resolution of March 4th with the object of rendering definitive the cessation of hostilities were opened through the good offices of Sir Miles Lampson at Shanghai. On March 14th, there was a first unofficial meeting between the Japanese and Chinese representatives in the presence of the foreign Ministers.

My Government has kept me informed of the facts announced in the Chinese delegation's communication and the representatives of the four Powers whose Ministers were present at the conversations also no doubt have information on the point.

It was agreed among those present at the negotiations that in order to prevent any impediment to their progress the strictest silence would be provisionally observed on the subject. I have not been informed that any new arrangement has been made to change this undertaking, which was given by all parties, and that is the reason why I do not feel authorised to give my colleagues fuller details.

I have at present no information concerning the Japanese Government's intentions with regard to the bases of the negotiations on which agreement was reached at the meeting on March 14th. There may still be certain divergencies between the Chinese and Japanese Governments, but we can, I think, all feel satisfaction at the advance that has been made towards the rapid settlement of the situation. It is hoped that there will be an official meeting to-morrow. The Japanese Government sincerely trusts that the negotiators will shortly succeed in overcoming the divergencies of opinion and in concluding a definitive agreement.

The negotiations are now on the point of entering on a positive phase. The Committee will, I feel sure, follow the proceedings with the utmost goodwill and I firmly hope that I shall soon be in a position to supply it with fuller particulars as to their favourable development.

M. Yen (China). — You will recall that, on March 4th, the Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the Chinese and Japanese Governments to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of arrangements which would render effective the cessation of hostilities and also regulate the withdrawal of Japanese forces.

The Chinese Government took the initiative in the matter, through the good offices of Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister, and, the Japanese Government having agreed to enter into the negotiations, a meeting took place on March 14th, as you have been informed by me.

I wish, in passing, to say that there was no mention whatever of the question of secrecy; in fact, to my mind, there is no reason for keeping secret the negotiations and the terms of the armistice.

In any case, a draft agenda was drawn up, as you will see from the telegram just circulated.¹ There are three articles to the agenda proper, and these are followed by a note which states that, "It is understood that no other questions of principle will be raised". There then follows a so-called "Separate Note", according to which the Chinese Government should voluntarily give an independent undertaking to the Japanese Government that Mayor Wu's letter of January 28th stands.

The telegram goes on to say that the Japanese Minister introduced an amendment to the agenda yesterday, and that finally a formal meeting was arranged for yesterday, but did not take place because the Japanese Minister said he had received no instructions from his Government.

I have just received a telegram, dated March 17th, from the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Quo Tai-Chi, which reads as follows:

"There has been no progress in regard to the armistice negotiations, because M. Shigemitsu says no instructions have yet been received from Tokio by him since referring the draft agenda. This seems to us very strange in view of the news published in Europe and America of Tokio's acceptance of the draft agenda."

¹ See document A. [Extr.] 59.1932.VII.

3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
ust 10, 1972
S, Date 12-18-75

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At the end of the telegram from M. T. V. Soong, M. Wellington Koo and M. Quo Tai-Chi, dated March 16th, it is stated that the Chinese Government considers that the amendments proposed by the Japanese Minister are unacceptable; and that in its opinion the Separate Note should not be raised at the armistice negotiations, because it is tantamount to a political condition for the evacuation of the Japanese forces.

In this connection, a word of explanation might be useful. In the Separate Note, the Japanese Government wishes the Chinese Government to re-affirm that the letter written by Mayor Wu on January 28th in which he agreed, after receiving an ultimatum, to endeavour to stop the boycott, stands. You will at once realise that this Note is of an entirely political character, and it is for this reason that the Chinese Government thinks it should not be raised in the armistice negotiations, which should be of an entirely military character.

In the second place, the Chinese Government objects to the amendment proposed by the Japanese Minister, which reads as follows:

"A joint Commission with neutral Members is to certify to the carrying out of the Agreement under paragraphs 1 and 2, and watch and observe the general conditions in the evacuated area until a later settlement."

On the surface, this proposal appears quite innocent, but one can see that it is really of a political character, since it is concerned with the watching and observing of general conditions, which can include even political conditions. Supposing, however, we admit for the moment that general conditions refer only to questions of peace and order, it will seem reasonable that this joint Commission should have the opportunity to watch and observe in the evacuated area. There is, however, a very important fundamental objection: this amendment is contrary to the resolution adopted by the Assembly on March 11th, the last paragraph of Part II of which states that the Assembly "requests those Powers, if necessary, to co-operate in maintaining order in the evacuated zone". The Powers there referred to are those Powers, Members of the League of Nations, having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements, excluding, naturally, Japan, which is one of the parties. The amendment refers to a joint Commission. In reality, this means a Sino-Japanese Commission; it is not a neutral Commission, and the Chinese Government cannot agree that such a Commission should be empowered to watch and observe the conditions in the evacuated area. In other words, the Chinese Government cannot accept that an invader which has just evacuated a region should be permitted to return and act as a party to control the conditions in that area.

With this explanation you will understand why the amendment presented by the Japanese Minister is unacceptable. It is of a political character and is contrary to the provisions of the resolution adopted by the Assembly.

What, then, is the situation? The situation is that twelve days after the adoption of the Assembly resolution on March 4th, we are in the same position as we were, so far as the armistice is concerned. To my mind, the situation is full of uncertainties and dangers, and it is my duty, at the first opportunity, to draw your attention to it.

3. — CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AT SHANGHAI AND WITHDRAWAL OF THE JAPANESE TROOPS: GENERAL DISCUSSION.

The President, following on the explanations given by the representatives of the two Governments concerned, summed up the position. On March 14th, there had been a meeting under the auspices of Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister at Shanghai, attended by the representatives of China and Japan and of the Powers with special interests in the district. An agenda, consisting of three items, for the armistice meeting had been drawn up, subject to the approval of the Chinese and Japanese Governments. It appeared, from M. Yen's explanations, that a preliminary agreement had been reached on these three points. Further, a Separate Note had been submitted by the Japanese Minister, M. Shigemitsu, with regard to Mayor Wu's letter of January 28th; the note was to the effect that the Japanese Government desired the Chinese side voluntarily to give an independent undertaking that Mayor Wu's letter stood. The Chinese Government declined to accept this note. The Japanese Minister had also submitted an amendment to paragraph 3 of the agenda and the Chinese Government rejected that amendment likewise, as being unacceptable.

In this connection, the Chairman pointed out that there was no material difference between the agreement reached by the representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments at Shanghai and the amendment proposed by the Japanese Minister to the third item of the provisional agenda. Item 3 in the draft agenda read:

"A joint Commission with neutral members is to certify to the mutual withdrawal."

The Japanese Minister's amendment said:

"A joint Commission with neutral Members is to certify to the carrying out of the agreement under paragraphs 1 and 2, and watch and observe the general conditions in the evacuated area until a later settlement."

The later settlement referred to was already mentioned in the first paragraph of the agenda which said:

"Chinese troops are to remain in their present positions, pending a later settlement."

It appeared therefore that there was no divergence, since the principle of a later settlement and that of the Joint Commission had already been accepted, and a careful study of the two texts led to the conclusion that the Japanese amendment was not inconsistent with the wording of the draft agenda which had been agreed to by the representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments in the presence of the representatives of the Powers having special interests at Shanghai.

In the Chairman's view, it was not for the Committee to pass judgment on these proposals. He thought, however, he could say that they were in no way incompatible with the Assembly resolution. There was nothing in the resolution against the appointing of a joint Commission with neutral members to watch the withdrawal of the troops and observe the general conditions in the evacuated area until a later settlement. The only point that could be discussed was the methods by which the commission would carry out its task.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In the amendment proposed by the Japanese Minister, M. Shigemitsu, there was one sentence which called for attention, that reading: the Commission "is to watch and observe the general conditions in the evacuated area until a later settlement". Apparently, the Commission was to observe the steps taken for the cessation of hostilities — that was to say, the withdrawal of the troops on either side and the maintenance of order in the evacuated area. It was quite clear that there was no political question involved here.

The chairman did not think that it was possible to have any doubt as to the intentions of the resolution adopted by the Assembly on March 4th. The following was the relevant extract from that resolution:

"3. Recommends that negotiations be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the Powers mentioned above, for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces."

When the resolution was being discussed by the General Commission, the Japanese delegation had proposed an amendment to this sentence so that the last lines would read:

"... and regulate the conditions and details concerning the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and the future position of the Chinese forces."

It had immediately been pointed out both by M. Hymans himself, as President, and subsequently by M. Motta, that the introduction of the word "conditions" might imply political conditions, which would change the whole intention of the resolution. At the same time, M. Hymans had explained that the phrase: "the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces", clearly implied that conditions concerning security and the maintenance of order would be included in the term "arrangements", and that such arrangements would naturally be negotiated by those who were on the spot and who were fully acquainted with the local situation. In the light of this explanation, the Japanese delegation had withdrawn its amendment and accepted the resolution as submitted by the Bureau.

This summary of the events of March 4th seemed to the President to make the situation clear. The negotiations, which the Assembly recommended should be instituted, included such local conditions as immediately affected the questions of the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.

There was then nothing at variance with the spirit of the Assembly resolution. The Japanese Government's Separate Note stated, moreover:

"Subject to the approval of the Chinese Government, the following understanding is agreed upon: Provided a definite agreement is reached on the basis of the above points, the Chinese side will voluntarily give an independent undertaking that Mayor Wu's letter of January 28th stands."

This was the letter sent in reply to the Japanese ultimatum of January 21st by Mr. Wu, Mayor of Greater Shanghai. The Japanese ultimatum put

forward the following demands: (1) formal apology by the Mayor, (2) punishment of the culpable, (3) indemnities to victims, (4) repression of illegal and hostile acts on the part of the Chinese population against Japan and, in particular, the immediate dissolution of all patriotic committees in Shanghai and of all anti-Japanese organisations. The Mayor of Shanghai had stated that he accepted *in toto* the demands addressed to him by the Japanese Consul-General in this ultimatum. The Japanese Government was now asking that the Chinese Government should recognise the validity of this undertaking, but the Separate Note began with the words "subject to the approval of the Chinese Government". It followed that the Japanese Government was making a proposal and not putting forward a condition to the armistice. The matter was of course a political one, and to make it a condition to the armistice would be incompatible with the Council's proposals of February 29th for the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Shanghai district. Taken as a simple proposal, the Separate Note was at variance neither with the Assembly's decision nor with the Council's plan.

In reply to a question by M. Beneš, the President explained that the Committee's functions were to be interpreted in the light of the Assembly resolution of March 4th.

M. Paul Boncour (France) entirely concurred in what the President had said. Notes had been exchanged, and there was now a hope of a definite cessation of hostilities in the form of an armistice. The Committee's friendly, but none the less urgent, pressure upon the parties must, he considered, be based on agreed points. One agreed point was the Council's plan of February 29th, which had been accepted by the two Parties and which fore-shadowed, with a view to the solution of the political events deplored by all, the meeting of a Conference at Shanghai with power to take certain decisions. Reservations on points of substance could not be considered until after the cessation of hostilities. The only reservation accepted for the time being related to the following point: the Chinese Government had insisted on the cessation of hostilities before the negotiations began. Both parties had accepted the plan put forward by the Council on February 29th. The Assembly resolution also had been accepted by the two parties.

The Chinese Government appeared to feel misgivings because the Joint Commission appointed to certify to the withdrawal of the forces of either side was not an exclusively neutral body. The Powers with interests in Shanghai had been requested to give their assistance, but that assistance did not exclude the presence of either of the parties. That was the reply M. Paul Boncour would make to the Chinese representative.

To the Japanese representative he would say, as the President had done, that the contents of the Separate Note related to one of the points which would form the subject of the negotiations at the Shanghai Conference. The Council's plan with regard to that Conference had already been accepted by the Japanese Government. It was then, he thought, hardly in conformity with that plan, which Japan had approved on March 1st, that the two parties should have to negotiate separately on this question. The cessation of the anti-Japanese agitation, which question already formed part of the Shanghai Conference's programme, could therefore be put forward by the Japanese Government as a desideratum with a view to facilitating the negotiations, but would be unacceptable as a condition for the armistice.

M. Sato (Japan). — I should like first to reply to some of the Chinese representative's observations. He said that twelve days had elapsed after the adoption of the resolution of March 4th before the two parties had succeeded in meeting to open negotiations for an armistice. According to him, the blame for this must be ascribed to the Japanese Government.

I am obliged to correct the Chinese representative on this point. To do so I need merely take the facts in their chronological order. On February 29th, the Council adopted a resolution which was unreservedly accepted by my Government on the following day. On March 3rd, our Commander-in-chief gave orders for the cessation of hostilities. That order was followed by a similar one given on the same day by the Commander-in-chief of the Chinese Army. On March 4th, the Assembly adopted the resolution with which you are all familiar. That resolution also was accepted by my Government. On the day following its adoption, the Japanese Government gave, without further delay, the necessary instructions to its representatives at Shanghai to enter immediately into negotiations with the Chinese representatives. From that time — that is to say, from March 5th until March 14th, a period therefore of nine or ten days — we awaited the Chinese representatives for the purpose of opening the armistice negotiations. This interval of ten days is not due to any lack of instructions or effort on our part. We had to await the appointment by the Chinese Government of representatives with the necessary instructions to enter into negotiations with us. We therefore cannot be blamed for the fact that the negotiations began on March 14th only.

Since opening conversations last Monday, we have succeeded in adopting a preliminary agreement as a basis of negotiations. As I said at the beginning of the meeting, the Japanese Government has not yet been able to give any definite instructions with regard to this agreement. No great importance, however, can be attached to the fact that it has taken us four days to give the necessary instructions, seeing that ten days elapsed before the Chinese representatives were even appointed.

With regard to the amendment to paragraph 3 proposed by our Minister, M. Shigemitsu, the explanations given by the President make it unnecessary for me to deal with that point again. If I had replied to the Chinese representative's observation I should have said exactly what the President has just said. On this point therefore I need perhaps say no more.

I come now to the question of the Separate Note concerning which the President has given an explanation. He has informed us of his views on the point. I have also heard M. Paul Boncour's remarks on the same question.

The first thing of which I wish to remind the Committee — and you will all have no difficulty in appreciating the fact — is the importance attached by Japan to the cessation of the anti-Japanese agitation, including the boycott. There is no need for me to say that the Japanese Government regards it as of the utmost importance that negotiations should be opened with the Chinese Government for the purpose of reaching an agreement for the complete cessation in future of these anti-foreign activities. But that is not a political condition. If you read the Separate Note mentioned in the document to which the Chinese representative referred, you will see that it says:

"Subject to the approval of the Chinese Government, the following understanding is agreed upon: Provided a definite agreement is reached on the basis of the above points . . ."

That is not, in our view, a political condition for the acceptance of the armistice. We do not say we will consent to the conclusion of an armistice on condition that such a Separate Note is accepted. We have merely proposed that arrangement to the Chinese representative and asked him to consider whether it is acceptable to his Government before embarking on armistice negotiations. If the Separate Note is not accepted by the Chinese Government, we will postpone the discussion on this point and will open conversations on it at a later date. I must, however, state unequivocally that there is no change in the importance we attach to this matter. As M. Paul Boncour said, the plan adopted by the Council, and accepted by the two parties, contemplates negotiations to settle the entire dispute. It speaks of "the restoration of peaceful conditions at Shanghai". We shall certainly raise this point at the Conference fore-shadowed in the Council's plan. I reserve my Government's complete liberty of action in this matter.

I should be glad next to know what are the views of the President and members of the Committee with regard to its future work.

We have been considering for the moment an entirely provisional agreement which has been submitted to the two Governments for their approval and which was reached at Shanghai between representatives of the two parties in the presence of Ministers of neutral Powers. When it is necessary, later on, to determine all the *modalités*, all the phases for the definite cessation of hostilities, the negotiations will be based on this provisional agreement, but it may happen that changes will be made as regards one point or another. In the actual document submitted by the Chinese representative, we read at the beginning that "the following draft agenda for the armistice meeting was drawn up". It is therefore only the agenda or basis of negotiations. During the negotiations, however, which are about to be held at Shanghai, and which will probably be begun to-morrow, there may arise, during the various stages through which they will pass, difficulties or divergencies of opinion. That being so, I am concerned to know in what way this Committee proposes to follow the progress of the negotiations at Shanghai. Does it contemplate giving instructions to the Shanghai meeting as to certain conditions or certain changes in some of the points on the agenda or under discussion, or alternatively does it simply propose to note the proceedings at Shanghai?

I am concerned in all these matters because wish to obviate misunderstanding in future. I have been very glad to hear to-day certain observations from the Chairman and from other members of the Committee, but it is that to be taken as meaning that the Committee will give instructions to the negotiators of the two parties at Shanghai? In my view, such action is not within the Committee's competence. I may perhaps be mistaken, but I should be grateful if this point could be cleared up in order to avoid confusion in future.

M. Motta (Switzerland) noted with satisfaction that M. Sato had placed exactly the same construction on the amendment submitted by the Japanese Minister, M. Shigemitsu, as that placed on it by the President of the Committee. There was, therefore, no material difference between item 3 of the draft agenda for the armistice meeting to be held at Shanghai, and the amendment proposed by the Japanese Minister. The draft contained three items, in which the only question was that of the armistice. The only difference between the wording of the agenda and the Japanese amendment related to the words "a joint commission with neutral

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members is to certify to the mutual withdrawal" and "a joint commission . . . is to watch and observe the general conditions in the evacuated area until a later settlement". To watch and observe the general conditions necessarily included the certifying to the withdrawal of the troops, but there was as well the maintenance of order in the evacuated area, and M. Motta thought that the Chinese representative would realize that this extension of the meaning of this stipulation was entirely natural. The President's interpretation, which had been accepted by the Japanese representative, definitely ruled out any political condition to the signature of an armistice. The Chinese representative could accordingly reassure his Government on this point, and M. Motta was glad to observe that opinion was unanimous in this respect.

M. Sato had raised a question with regard to the Committee's functions. It was not easy, M. Motta thought, to give an exact and complete definition of its functions. He considered, however, that owing to the nature of the situation and on account of its special composition, the Committee could not enter into details. The Committee was a delegation of the Assembly and its task had been defined according to certain general principles and rules. Any agreement between the parties that was not in conformity with the Assembly's decision, even though it had been accepted by the parties concerned might be challenged by the Committee. In the Japanese Government's Separate Note, for instance, there was a condition which was not in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Assembly's decision and should therefore be discarded by the Committee.

The President expressed his satisfaction at the exchange of views that had just taken place. The statements made by the representatives of the parties had removed the difficulties. He was also glad that his own interpretation, which had been confirmed by M. Paul-Boncour and M. Motta, had been accepted by M. Sato. There was, therefore, general agreement.

With reference to the Separate Note, the Japanese representative had stated that it was merely a proposal to China and that if it were not accepted, the Japanese Government was entirely prepared to allow the negotiations to be postponed. A political question was involved, for the settlement of which Japan would have every facility at the Shanghai Conference. Agreement had apparently been reached on this point as well.

The President thought that opinions also were unanimous as to the functions of the Committee. The Committee was a delegation of the Assembly and its duty was to see that the spirit of the Assembly's resolutions was observed. It was not part of its functions to dictate the terms of the armistice, which must be discussed on the spot by the representatives of the two parties, but it would satisfy itself that the spirit of the Assembly's resolution was respected.

The Committee had therefore come to a unanimous agreement on the bases of the preliminary accord. The official negotiations were about to be opened and the President would request the Japanese and Chinese representatives to inform their Governments of the statements made at the present meeting. He would also appeal to the Powers having special interests at Shanghai to continue to give their assistance, with a view to consolidating the arrangements already concluded.

The next subject that would engage the Committee's attention would be the Shanghai Conference itself. That was the natural course of events. The Secretariat would receive communications from the Chinese and Japanese Governments and

the President would keep in touch with the Secretariat. Should any grave incidents occur, he would issue an urgent summons to the Committee. In the event of incidents of no special gravity, he would, in agreement with the Secretary-General, consider the steps to be taken.

M. Sato (Japan). — I wish to make one point clear. At the beginning of my last remarks, I told the Committee that the Japanese Government had not yet given final instructions to its representative at Shanghai with regard to the agreement reached between the two parties last Monday. So far I have received no telegram from my Government informing me as to the precise attitude it has adopted with regard to this provisional agreement. It is, therefore, possible that the Japanese Government may propose an amendment to one point or another in it. I must reserve my Government's attitude entirely in this respect, since I do not know what that attitude will be. The Chinese Government has made certain reservations on one or two points in the preliminary agreement and the Japanese Government similarly will be entitled to propose amendments. I have no information at all on this subject. I do not, of course, mean to say that I am recommending that my Government should adopt any particular attitude: I merely wish to point out that allowances must be made for the possibility that it may submit amendments to the agreement.

After the explanations given by M. Motta and the President regarding the Committee's functions, we shall not, I think, be faced in future with any difficulties in the way of the progress of the work at Shanghai. It is, I feel sure, the Committee's unanimous desire to promote and facilitate the local negotiations at Shanghai and not to hamper them in any way. If that is the correct interpretation of the Committee's general attitude, I shall feel the utmost satisfaction.

The President replied that he entirely agreed that the two Governments concerned were entitled to submit amendments to the provisional agreement. The only reservation he would make was that such amendments must come within the framework and be in conformity with the spirit of the Assembly resolution.

M. Yen (China). — Mr. President, I am very grateful to you, to M. Paul-Boncour and to M. Motta for the very clear interpretation of the Japanese amendment, and I am also very much gratified that my Japanese colleague has accepted the interpretation. I am inclined to think that when I telegraph this evening to my Government, the latter will be very much relieved and its anxiety will be removed. Because of this interpretation, the character and functions of the Mixed Joint Commission will be made very clear.

I am also very much gratified that the question of the Separate Note is now abandoned. But there is one point which, I think, on account of the particular emphasis that has accidentally been laid upon it, might be misunderstood. I notice that there has been a great deal of talk of the discussion of the boycott at the Shanghai Conference. If I remember aright the Shanghai Conference was called to discuss measures of safety and security concerning the property and lives of the residents in the Settlements. It is again more a question of peace and order than one of a political character. In our view, the boycott is not a local matter. A discussion at Shanghai of the boycott would not solve the problem, since the boycott is found not only in Shanghai, but in Tientsin, Peiping, Tsingtao and, indeed,

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all over China. In consequence, a discussion of that subject locally would not solve the problem. We regard the boycott as part of the whole Sino-Japanese dispute and that question, as I have repeated again and again, will be solved automatically: the moment Japan withdraws her troops and recommences her friendly relationship with China, our people will commence again to buy Japanese goods. Our Government has not prohibited our people from buying. It is the people who will not buy.

The problem of the boycott is a part of the whole Sino-Japanese dispute. As soon as that is regulated in a just and permanent way, through the assistance of the League of Nations, this boycott will die a natural death. I refer to this matter for fear that the repeated mention of the bringing of the question of the boycott before the Shanghai Conference might lead people to think that that Conference has been called to discuss the boycott. It is not so. If we refer to the resolution we shall understand the position. I just want to make that point clear.

The President pointed out that there would be certain objections to reopening the discussion on

this point. The Council's plan of February 29th was clear in this respect and he would read it again.

The Shanghai Conference would consider whether the question of the boycott was one of the factors in the restoration of peaceful conditions; but it was not for the Committee to examine that matter, since its only object for the time being was to ensure the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of the troops and the maintenance of order in the evacuated area. The other points would be discussed by the parties themselves at the Shanghai Conference, but it must be clearly understood that the question of the boycott came within the scope of that Conference.

M. Sato (Japan) was extremely glad to note the agreement of opinion between the President and himself with regard to the boycott question. Unfortunately, he must make it quite clear that he could not share the Chinese representative's view. If the boycott were to die a natural death, he believed that the negotiations at the Shanghai Round Table Conference could only expedite its burial.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

VERBATIM REPORT OF THE FIFTH MEETING.

Held at Geneva, on Saturday, April 30th, 1932, at 10.30 a.m.

PRESIDENT: M. Paul HYMENS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Shanghai Outrage

THE PRESIDENT (Interpretation): Before we start on our agenda I desire to express our feelings of emotion and indignation at the news we have received of the outrage that occurred at Shanghai and which caused many victims. You are aware that amongst those cruelly smitten by this outrage were the Japanese Minister at Shanghai, two Japanese generals, a Japanese admiral and the Japanese Consul-General. Yesterday I visited M. Nagaoka and expressed to him our feelings of reprobation and regret at the news of this outrage. I now take this opportunity to repeat in public, on behalf I am sure of all the Members of the Assembly, our regrets, and to express our wishes that the unfortunate victims of the attack may soon recover from their injuries. I desire to add also that M. Paul-Boncour, President in office of the Council of the League of Nations, who has been called by civic duties to France desires to associate himself with the words that I have just uttered on behalf of the Assembly.

M. NAGAOKA (Japan) (Interpretation): I am profoundly touched by the words of sympathy which the President has spoken on behalf of the League of Nations, on behalf of the President in office of the Council and on his own behalf. Speaking for the country that I have the honour to represent, I should like to express our deep gratitude for this demonstration of sympathy concerning the dreadful event that has taken place at Shanghai.

You can be sure that not only the Japanese Government and the unfortunate victims, but Japan as a whole will keenly appreciate the sympathy that has been shown.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Report of the Committee of Nineteen, in accordance
with III 1) of the resolution adopted by the
Assembly on March 11th 1932.

(Interpretation)

The PRESIDENT/: We shall now start the Agenda of this morning's meeting. This Assembly has been convened in execution of the resolution adopted on March 11th. You will recall that by the terms of that resolution the Committee which was set up was instructed to report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the cessation and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in accordance with the Assembly resolution of March 4th, 1932. Therefore I shall endeavour to carry out the instructions that were given to the Committee, by outlining the state of affairs and the course of events since the Assembly met on March 11th. Then I shall submit on behalf of the Committee of Nineteen a draft resolution which really confirms the conclusion to the report which has been circulated to you. I will add that the second report, i.e. the report on the general situation, which is provided for in the resolution of March 11th will be circulated shortly.

Let me now sum up the facts of the present situation. First of all, we are all glad to note that for several weeks ^{virtually} hostilities may be said to have ceased. The Japanese Delegation in a communication on April 11th informed us that there was no further bloodshed. The Chinese Delegation hailed that state of affairs as a valuable and precious result, and expressed their gratitude to the Assembly. Information has been received from Shanghai and from the Chinese and Japanese Delegations to the effect that the Japanese forces are being withdrawn from Shanghai. Indeed several military and naval units have already left for Japan.

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The Assembly met on March 4th and 11th, and expressed the desire that negotiations should start at Shanghai. Negotiations have been taking place at Shanghai between the representatives of China and Japan, with the assistance of the representatives of the Four Powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. The object of these negotiations has been to consolidate the cessation of hostilities and to regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. These negotiations started on March 14th, but very soon difficulties were encountered. At that moment the Committee of Nineteen happened to be meeting in order to constitute itself. It was in session on March 17th when these initial difficulties were brought to its notice. They considered those difficulties, and after they had been removed the negotiations continued. Provisional agreement was reached on the fundamental clauses of a draft armistice, but a few days later there was a difference with regard to the question of a time limit for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and this led to a temporary suspension of the negotiations. The Chinese Delegate informed the Committee of that suspension of the negotiations and memoranda were received from the Chinese and Japanese Delegations. On April 16th, the Special Committee of Nineteen met and considered the situation. The Committee on that occasion instructed its President to get into touch with the representatives of China and Japan, and the President had several conversations with those representatives. The Committee met again on April 18th, 19th, 26th and 28th and yesterday we had our latest meeting before this Assembly. On April 18th the Committee, considering itself as an organ for purposes of conciliation, prepared a preliminary draft resolution which was intended to facilitate agreement between China and Japan. This resolution was communicated to the two delegations and discussed with them.

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A complete agreement was not reached; there was still difficulty on certain important points.

At that moment we learnt that a new effort was being made at conciliation in Shanghai itself. This effort was being made through the initiative of the President of the Committee constituted by the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement, - that is to say, the British Minister in Shanghai, Sir Miles Lampson.

The negotiations continued and an agreement was virtually reached through an addition that was proposed to the text of the annex to the draft armistice. For details as to that text I would venture to refer you to the report, which gives full particulars on the matter. I should like to point out that by the terms of this draft annex to the armistice a Mixed Committee is to be set up consisting of the representatives of China and Japan, together with the civil, military and naval representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement. It will be the duty of this Mixed Committee to certify to the withdrawal of troops, to collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, and to watch the execution of the terms of the armistice and call attention to any neglect in carrying out any of the provisions of the Articles of the armistice.

The decision to be taken by this Committee will, we hope, be a unanimous decision. It is provided, however, that the decision may be by a majority, the President having, if necessary, the casting vote.

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By the constitution of this Mixed Committee, however, its composition and its duties, we see an important element in the draft agreement. We have now been informed that the final completion of this agreement, and its signature, may be expected to take place at an early date. I would conclude by repeating that a full statement of the details will be found in the report which the Committee of Nineteen has circulated to you.

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The resolution, which is really the conclusion of the report, has been circulated in Document A.(Xtr.)109.1932.VII.

I shall now declare the discussion on the whole matter - both on the report and on the Draft Resolution - open.

Dr. YEN (China): Mr. President, Members of the Special Assembly, ladies and gentlemen, in the past two months the Council of the League of Nations, the Special Assembly as represented by the so-called Committee of Nineteen, and the friendly Powers, have, especially in connection with the attack and invasion of Shanghai by Japanese forces, been unremitting in their efforts to bring Japan back to reason and to make her agree that hostilities should come to an end. You must admit that, as far as my country is concerned, she has always lent a willing ear to the representations thus made to her. When the friendly Powers made their request at the beginning of February to Nanking and Tokio to end the hostilities at Shanghai and commence negotiations for the settlement of outstanding differences in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the Council Resolution of December 9th, my Government at once assented. Japan rejected the proposal. Again, when the British Admiral Kelly exercised his good offices a month later in the same direction, and an understanding was reached for the basis of an armistice which was eminently fair to the two parties, that same understanding was again refused by the Japanese Government.

That agreement, you will recall, provided for the withdrawal of our troops to Chenju and the Japanese to inside the Settlement as a first step, and our troops to Nanshiang and the Japanese troops to their ships as the second step.

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To-day the Japanese are entrenched in Chenju and Nanhsiang, and refuse even to set a date to withdraw, not to their ships but only to the Settlement.

It is true there has been a change of circumstances, but it must be remembered that it is an undeclared aggressive war, and it is indeed a lamentable precedent for us all that the aggressive party should be permitted to enjoy to the fullest extent his illgotten advantages.

In our previous appeal to the Special Committee in connection with the Shanghai negotiations, you were good enough to rule out the so-called SEPARATE NOTE, because it was a political condition. Last week the Special Committee adopted a Draft Resolution wherein paragraph 11 again ruled out a political condition but prescribed the manner whereby the time of the final withdrawal of the Japanese troops into the Settlement should be decided. China accepted, but again Japan disapproved of the decision of the Special Committee.

I have gone over briefly the history of all these negotiations in the past two months to remind you that in every case it was China that accepted and Japan that rejected the proposed terms of armistice, and that after every impasse the negotiations have been resumed only by important concessions on the part of the Chinese Government. Formula after formula has been presented, and the last formula is always more unfavourable to China than the previous one.

So it is true of the present formula. We may say with truth that the actual formula furnishes some kind of a solution of the problem before us; but it is not a solution fair or just

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to China. Nevertheless, my Government, eager always for the restoration of peaceful conditions - an eagerness which is also earnestly shared by all members of the Committee, especially the interested Powers - has decided to accept it as a practical solution. We feel sure that the difficulties of the situation and the merits of the case are fully realised in their proper perspective not only by the Special Committee and the Assembly but by the peoples of the whole world.

In accepting this resolution, may I say that the Chinese Government is acting solely in the interest of peace and does not recede from the position which it has hitherto maintained that the presence of Japanese armed forces in Chinese territory is a violation of China's territorial integrity and cannot under any circumstances be justified. The Chinese Government reserves, therefore, all rights to which it is entitled under the Covenant and International Law in general.

At the same time, may I be permitted to state that the Chinese Government places great importance on paragraph 6 of the Resolution, which takes note of Japan's engagement to withdraw to the International Settlement; on paragraph 7, which declares that the withdrawal must take place in the near future (~~at~~ ^{in brief} ~~detail~~); on paragraph 8, that the Resolution of March 4 will be fully executed only after the complete withdrawal; on paragraph 10, which notes that the Joint Commission has the duty of watching the execution of Articles I, II, and III, whereof the last Article foresees the final withdrawal of the Japanese troops into the Settlement; and on paragraph 13, which points out expressly that in case the negotiations should fail to reach a conclusion,

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the question returns again to the Assembly.

In short, the Chinese Government in accepting the Resolution, accepts it as a whole, and places equal importance on all the paragraphs contained therein. My Government hopes sincerely also that the Special Committee and the Assembly will continue as before their energetic and vigilant efforts to see to it that the provisions of the present and previous Resolutions be carried out with thoroughness and promptitude.

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M. NAGAOKA (Japan):

(Interpretation):

I need hardly say that the Japanese Government has always been most anxious that the negotiations at Shanghai on the basis of the Assembly resolution of March 4th should be successful. Since those negotiations started, my Government has always made every effort to bring about this result in strict conformity with the resolution. It therefore feels great satisfaction that the draft resolution just read notes that the draft agreement prepared at Shanghai is in conformity with the Assembly resolution and expresses the hope that an agreement will promptly be concluded.

In fact a drafting committee at Shanghai has succeeded in co-ordinating the various articles upon which agreement had been reached. A meeting took place on April 28th of the Japanese and Chinese delegates, together with the Ministers of ^{the} friendly Powers at which note was taken of the result achieved by the drafting committee. It is proposed to hold a plenary meeting on May 2nd, and Japan is prepared to sign the draft agreement. My Government will, of course, faithfully carry out this agreement which so satisfactorily embodies the Assembly resolution of March 4th.

I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my great gratitude to the civil, military and naval representatives of Great Britain, the United States, France and Italy who have taken part in the negotiations from the beginning and whose good offices have made a contribution to the preparation of a draft agreement the importance of which it would be difficult to exaggerate.

According to information which has reached me, Mr Johnson, Minister of the United States, in the first place, and afterwards Sir Miles Lampson, Minister of Great Britain, went recently from Shanghai to Nanking with a view to solving the difficulties which

F & G.

- 27 -

had arisen. As a result of Sir Miles Lampson's efforts, the two parties accepted the text known as the "Lampson proposal". At the meeting held on April 28th to which I just referred, the Japanese and Chinese delegates formally assented to the proposal according to which the mixed Commission which is to watch the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the agreement is authorised to call attention, in accordance with its decisions taken in the manner provided in the Annex, to any neglect in carrying out any of the provisions of the above Articles.

The Japanese delegation is not, however, in a position to accept the draft resolution now before you and will refrain from voting, as the Japanese Government maintains the position of reserve which it has always felt bound to observe with regard to the application of Article 15 of the Covenant to the Sino-Japanese dispute. I can assure the Assembly, however, that this attitude in no way affects my Government's determination to do everything in its power to bring the negotiations at Shanghai to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible moment.

A vote was then taken by roll call, all the delegations voting in favour of the resolution with the exception of Japan, which abstained.

The PRESIDENT (Interpretation):

According to Article 19, paragraph 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, which Rule was applied on March 11th, a delegation which abstains from voting is considered absent. I therefore declare that the resolution is adopted unanimously.

I desire to point out that there is agreement between the Governments of China and Japan with regard to the draft agreement, that the terms of that draft agreement will be faithfully carried out and that the agreement will be signed almost immediately.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

28/35 -

I should like to thank the members of the special Committee for the work they have performed in discharging their difficult duties. They have been most conscientious. I should also like to thank the Secretary-General who has given me most valuable help and co-operation in the negotiations I have been called upon to undertake. I would also thank the representatives of those Powers who have special interests in Shanghai and whose representatives on the spot have been most useful in bringing about the present state of affairs. I hope they will be good enough to continue to help us.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

30

Sir John SIMON (British Empire) :

Mr. President, before you declare our sitting terminated, after having expressed on behalf of the Assembly our thanks to many who have assisted to bring about this result, there remains one very special object of our gratitude, and I would permit myself in the name of my colleagues here as well as of the United Kingdom Delegation, to express to you, Sir, our very sincere thanks for your unfailing patience and skill and to congratulate you that this stage of the heavy task which lies specially on your shoulders has been accomplished, thanks to your guidance, with unanimity.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation) : I thank Sir John Simon for the very kind words he has spoken, and I shall always remember them with gratitude.

The Assembly stands adjourned till further notice.

The Assembly rose at 11.45 a.m.

0536

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 21 1932
Department of State

GRAY

FROM

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated May 21, 1932

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

556, May 21, 5 p.m. 15235

Legation's 543, May 19, 3 p.m.

The following telegram has been received from the
American Consul General at Nanking.

"May 20, 4 p.m. Your May 19, 4 p.m. I am reliably
informed that Ariyoshi was an agent of Inukai just as
Matsuoka was and that since the Premier died the day
Ariyoshi arrived in Nanking the latter in his talking
with Wang Ching Wei and Lo Wen Kan confined himself to
generalization and left ~~the~~ Nanking almost immediately.
A fuller statement follows by mail".

JOHNSON

RR WWC


F/LS 793.94/5246

MAY 24 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



The Rumanian Minister called and asked me whether I had been able to see the Foreign Minister Titulesco on my visit. I told him that unfortunately I had not been able to have a special interview with him owing to the pressure on my time caused by the shortness of my stay and the fact that many of the leaders were busy in the Disarmament Conference during the hours that were free to me. The Minister said that he had hoped I would be able to see Mr. Titulesco in order to get an impression, both from conference and from the speech of Mr. Titulesco which he, the Minister, had given me, as to how vigorously Mr. Titulesco had supported the situation which we favored in the Far East. (Note: As a matter of fact, the American delegation gave me quite a bit of an impression of Mr. Titulesco's activities being rather anti-American and opposed to us at critical periods of the hearings.)


I told him that I had seen Benes; that I had had a long talk with him and Ramel of Sweden, and the Minister said that I would get through them the same views that I would have gotten through Titulesco and therefore he was relieved.

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F/LS
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 6 1932.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 776

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on May 19, 1932, with the Rumanian Minister, concerning the Foreign Minister of Rumania. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

E. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Memorandum of May 19, 1932.

A true copy of
the signed original
is enclosed
[Signature]

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JUN 6 1932
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[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten initials]

793.94/5247

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 6 1932.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 337

Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on May 19, 1932, with the Rumanian Minister, concerning the Foreign Minister of Rumania.

Very truly yours,

Edwin L. Stimson

EDWIN L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Memorandum of May 19,
1932.

793.94/5247



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/5247

239

Strictly confidential.

The Honorable

Charles S. Wilson,

American Minister,

Bucharest.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information a copy of a memorandum of conversation which I had on May 19, 1932, with the Rumanian Minister at Washington.

Very truly yours,

E. L. STUMSON

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Enclosure:

Memorandum of
conversation.

793.94/5247

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Copies to Peking and Tokyo 6/1/32
FC (R&X)*




DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

MAY 23 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL



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WE
FE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR, MR. PAUL MAY.

Secretary's European Trip.

The Belgian Ambassador came to talk to me about my trip. I told him that I had had the pleasure of several long talks with his compatriot, Mr. Hymans, who was President of the Assembly; that Mr. Hymans and I talked about Far Eastern affairs, in which Mr. Hymans was personally interested.

HLS.



S HLS:EMS

JUN 6 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 6 1952.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 773

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.


Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on May 19, 1932, with the Belgian Ambassador, concerning my European trip. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Memorandum May 19, 1932.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 6 1932.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 335

Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on May 19, 1932, with the Belgian Ambassador, concerning my European trip.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Memorandum May 19, 1932.

793.94/5248

JUN 2 1932
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 31 1932.

Strictly Confidential.

No. 594

Ferdinand L. Mayer, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
 Brussels.


Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff below the rank of Counselor, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on May 19, 1932, with the Belgian Ambassador, concerning my trip abroad.

Very truly yours,

R. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum.



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Routing
 May 28 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Copy to Paris
5/24/32
File

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

MAY 23 1932

May 19, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
 THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, MR. PAUL CLAUDEL.

Secretary's European Trip.

The French Ambassador came to inquire about my trip abroad. I told him, in outline, particularly of my visit to Paris; my conference with M. Tardieu and M. Berthelot, and I told him that as a result of that visit I felt that I had gotten upon better personal and working relations with his Government than before. I also told him of my talk with M. Berthelot about the Far East and that we were gratified to find that we were working along lines which were so much alike, and that I had expressed to M. Berthelot my gratification for the cooperation that I had received through M. Claudel. I told the Ambassador of M. Tardieu's statement to me that he, Tardieu, was using my expressions of confidence that there was no entente between the French and the Japanese to meet interrogations addressed to him in the French Parliament; that M. Tardieu had come down to Geneva on my suggestion and that we had had conferences there with MacDonald and Bruening which seemed to me to presage the possibility of

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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 27 1932

Department of State

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

a fair agreement on the subjects which have divided France and Germany. The Ambassador expressed his gratification. He brought up the request from Japan for a round table conference and said that Tardieu had sent word to Japan that he thought that the Chinese should be invited. I told him that we felt the same way.

HLS.

S HLS:CBS

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7E

Strictly Confidential.

MAY 26 1932

No. 1112

The Honorable

Walter E. Edge,
American Ambassador,
Paris.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff below the rank of Counselor, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on May 19, 1932, with the French Ambassador, concerning my European trip.

Very truly yours,


E. L. STIMSON

793.94/5249

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum.

793.94/5249

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huebner NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAY 31 1932

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 325

Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on May 19, 1932, with the French Ambassador, concerning my European trip, in which reference is made also to the Japanese proposal for a round table conference.

Very truly yours,

E. L. SIMMONS

Enclosure:
 Memorandum May 19, 1932.



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May 29 1932
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Mem 81 1932

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 764

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.


Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on May 19, 1932, with the French Ambassador, concerning my European trip, in which reference is made also to the Japanese proposal for a round table conference. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

W. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Memorandum May 19, 1932.



793.94/5249

May 28 1932
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94-Shanghai Round Table FOR correspondence

FROM } all sources (-----) DATED subsequent to
 TO } May 13, 1932
 NAME

REGARDING: the Shanghai Round Table Conference.

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793.94/5250

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



REC'D EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 Tokyo, May 7, 1932.

No. 611.

Subject: Regarding press comment concerning possibility
 of withdrawal by Japan from the League.

MAY 21 32

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 MAY 31 1932
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 23 1932
 Department of State

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, judging from comment
 in the press, there is a strong opinion in Japan in favor
 of withdrawal from membership in the League of Nations.
 This opinion, it is true, has been apparent in some form
 since the first action taken by the League to settle the
 affair in Manchuria, but in recent weeks there has been a
 recrudescence of anti-League feeling brought on largely
 by the League's activities in the Shanghai affair. Parti-
 cularly, the resolution of the Committee of 19 which the
 Japanese consider coercive and unjust, has created much
 indignation

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MAY 31 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

indignation in Japan and occasioned much newspaper agitation for withdrawal from the League.

I have not attempted to translate for the Department any of these articles as most of them are prolix and repetitions. Their tone and attitude may be judged from the following quotations which are fairly representative. The Osaka ASAHI stated editorially "What makes the paragraph in question (No. 11 of the Resolution) so seriously objectionable to this Empire as to make it determined even to secede from the League, should the worst come, is that the proposition amounts to an encroachment on the Imperial Prerogatives". The KOKUMIN SHIMBUN reported, on April 21st, that a certain group of Peers are advocating withdrawal from the League. This paper states " These Peers declare that Japan should sever connection with the League and attempt to reestablish Sino-Japanese friendship by frank and direct negotiations between the two countries.... The behavior of the League is eloquent testimony of the fact that it is a league of European nations to all intents and purposes".

General Araki, in an astonishingly frank speech at Osaka on April 21st is reported as stating " If the League puts obstacles in the way of Japan's efforts to preserve peace in Manchuria, Japan should sharply ask it if it intends to bring that territory back into chaos. If the League persists, Japan should utter a vigorous warning that the League is working for the destruction, not the preservation, of world peace. The Japanese people will not deviate in the least from their considered course".

The

0549

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

The Osaka MAINICHI reported, on April 24th, that at a meeting of military leaders, including General Araki, the Minister of War, the opinion prevailed that if the League does not alter its present attitude of curbing Japan's just cause, Japan should withdraw from membership. The JIJI SHIMPO reports that the Premier recently discussed, with the Chief Secretary of the Seiyukai, the public agitation for withdrawal from the League. The same paper says that the Secretary described the situation in detail to the Premier, adding that if the League persists in its present attitude, circumstances may force Japan to leave it altogether.

According to the Osaka MAINICHI, there is a steady growth of the view favoring Japan's withdrawal from the League in Government circles, in the Foreign Office as well as among the military authorities. In the opinion of these officials it would be better to sever connection with the league entirely than to take up a makeshift attitude of opposition to the resolution of the Committee of 19. Moreover, the secessionists think, so long as the League retains its present constitution, Japan's grave differences with the League will not end with the present dispute. Although the issue is of vital importance to Japan, the smaller states within the League treat it as an abstract question. Japan must decide, once for all, either to discontinue cooperation with the League, or else formally to withdraw. Incidentally, the Osaka MAINICHI has been running a serial article in the morning issue, entitled, "Japan Should Withdraw from the League". The English edition of this paper stated editorially on April 27th: "Should the League persist in radically disappointing Japan's expectations and confidence in that body, Japan and

0551

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

and the Japanese would never hesitate to withdraw from its membership".

Opposing the views of those who advocate secession from the League, there have appeared in the press opinions of influential people warning against the movement for withdrawal and pointing out advantages of retaining membership. The statement of Lord Lytton, interviewed in Mukden by Japanese reporters, advising against hasty withdrawal from the League, seems to have had a sobering effect on the agitators and caused favorable comment in several newspapers. I append

- 1/. hereto an editorial article from the Osaka ASAHI which commends Lord Lytton's view and warns against the movement for withdrawal. Incidentally, Lord Lytton's statement, as quoted locally, seems to have touched on a subject that has been studiously avoided heretofore by the press in discussing the question of League membership, that of disposition of the Mandate Islands. There is little doubt that this matter would weigh heavily among Japanese in any decision regarding membership in the League.
- 2/. There is also appended hereto a translation of an article by Dr. Ashida, formerly counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Belgium, written for the HOCHI SHIMBUN. Dr. Ashida gives counsel of caution, and points out the serious consequences that would follow withdrawal from the League.

There is no lack of argument from either side of the case for withdrawal from the League. It may safely be stated that the matter is receiving close attention from both Government and public. There is no immediate prospect of withdrawal from the League, but it is easy to perceive, from the opinions appearing in the press, that continued irritation from the League might cause

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

cause Japan to sever relations with that organization.

Respectfully yours,



Edwin L. Neville,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures:
As stated.

Embassy's File No. 800-Japan

WTT/SR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
 Despatch No. 611
 From American Embassy
 Tokyo.

THE QUESTION OF JAPAN'S SECESSION
FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

(Editorial)

Osaka ASAHI, May 3, 1932.

Lord Lytton, chief of the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations, has expressed his views as a private individual in an interview with a representative of the Osaka ASAHI in Manchuria concerning the question of Japan's secession from the League of Nations. The British Lord wondered what benefit Japan would gain by seceding from the League at the present time when important problems concerning Japan are being discussed at Geneva and elsewhere. Whether the League of Nations is treating Japan fairly or otherwise should be judged after the presentation to the League of the final report of the present Commission. On the whole, we appreciate Lord Lytton's views above alluded to. Whether the secession of Japan from the League of Nations as proposed in certain quarters would prove beneficial or not is a great question. If Japan does so, there is a fear that she will be placed in a position to suspend all her important duties devolving upon her in the field of international diplomacy. Those who insist upon Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations contend that the League sadly lacks knowledge about Japan's rights and interests in the Far East and that the stand taken by the League is doing more harm than good toward Japan. If there is anyone who thinks that if Japan should secede from the League at the present juncture she would be able to do whatever she pleases in this part of the world, we doubt whether such a person is well informed as to the organization of the League of Nations.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

The third paragraph of Article 1 of the League of Nations Covenant provides that any member of the League may secede therefrom by giving two years' notice beforehand, but that during this interval such member shall fulfill all duties under the League Covenant and International Law. This provision is worthy of attention on the part of those who advocate secession. Articles 16 and 17 of the League Covenant must not be overlooked. So long as Article 16 remains in force, it is a serious mistake to think that if a member country should secede from the League it would be totally free from any sort of interference by the League.

The League of Nations is an organ for the solution of international disputes and also for the adjustment of finances and economics. At a time like the present when a nation, if isolated from the rest of the world, is unable to carry out its financial and economic policies, the secession of a member country from the League of Nations would prove suicidal economically because such a country would find it impossible to participate directly in important conferences to be convened by the League concerning financial and economic problems. Take the United States of America as an example. The United States is not a member of the League of Nations. It would appear that with her immense financial and economic strength there is no necessity for the United States to become a member of the League, but such a notion is mistaken. The conditions of the world today are such that even the United States will find it very difficult to protect her economic interests perfectly unless she allows herself to join the League. Accordingly the United States first sent an unofficial observer to the League and then its official representatives to various conferences of the League. At present, the non-membership of
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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the United States in the League is only nominal. In view of this fact, it is quite apparent that if Japan should secede from the League she would experience serious inconvenience in the carrying on of her financial and economic policies.

Another important question is Japan's mandatory territory in the South Pacific. Japan is entrusted by the League of Nations with the duty of administering the former German possessions in the South Pacific. This does not mean that the former German possessions have become Japan's territory in a true sense. If Japan should secede from the League of Nations, it is quite easy and possible for the League to take the initiative and relieve Japan of her mandatory authority over the South Sea Islands. Nothing could be more absurd and foolish, ^{than} for Japan to lose such an important authority in that direction. The proposal of Japan's secession from the League of Nations is, therefore, nonsensical and must not be realized so hastily and imprudently as advocated in certain quarters.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAPAN'S DIPLOMACY AT A
TURNING POINT.

By- Dr. Hitoshi Ashida, Doctor of Law.
(Formerly Councillor of the Japanese
Embassy in Belgium).

HOCHI SHIMBUN , April 27, 1932.

In Japan, the opinion urging the Japanese Government and its people to secede from the League of Nations is now rampant. Nor is this all. There are not a few who contend that all international treaties such as the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact which restrict actions of Japan shall be pushed aside, and that any Power, be it either the United States of America or Soviet Russia, which has a cause to complain of shall come out and challenge Japan to fight. Such a contention is welcomed by those people who are overtaken by war fever. It seems that the public opinion of Japan is also in favor of this contention. I would say that I myself am as courageous as those who brandish swords to fight. At the same time, I earnestly express the hope that politicians in a responsible position will adopt policies calculated to maintain the State in safety and to promote the happiness and interests of the people. I further hope that they will formulate fundamental policies in dealing with foreign affairs and that they will take appropriate measures to guide the masses along the right pass.

It should be recalled in this connection that prior to the outbreak of the World War of 1914-18 Germany, with

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her powerful army and rich finance, overshadowed the whole of Europe. Nevertheless, she suffered a crushing defeat in the war. Germany's present condition was brought about by Germans who were boastful of their national strength in pre-war days and failed to realize the actual conditions of other nations. If Germany had refrained from taking up arms for ten years or so instead of having opened hostilities she might have placed the whole world under her control without shedding blood. Herein we learn a valuable and practical lesson.

If Japan should secede from the League of Nations the Nanking Government of China would be pleased more than any other country. In that event, members of the League of Nations would naturally take the Chinese side. The League of Nations Covenant sets forth, among other things, that even those countries which secede from the League by giving a two years' notice shall be subject to all obligations under international law and treaties. It is further stipulated therein that, with a view to maintaining international peace, proper and efficacious measures shall be taken against such seceders. In seceding from the League, Japan will lose her place as a permanent member of the Council and also her mandatory authority over a group of South Sea Islands. Undoubtedly the secession of Japan from the League would prove disadvantageous in every respect.

I am convinced that the actions taken by Japan in Manchuria were just and proper. There is, therefore, no necessity for Japanese to advance such a proposal as secession from the League. I am of the opinion that Japanese may

announce

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announce their views before the League of Nations and even in the presence of the Almighty God. In dealing with China and the Chinese, one must not be so hasty as to expect to settle all outstanding problems within half a year or one year. So long as China and Japan exist on earth, no such hasty attitude must be assumed in conducting negotiations with China over any problem. If two parties should insist upon carrying their points it would be impossible for them to reach a compromise. To adjust differences between two parties and to make the other party recognize a reasonable claim is diplomacy. In conclusion, I would say that China and Japan must not be so obstinate as to insist upon carrying through their respective claims, and that mankind must not forget the fact that it is their bounden duty to so act as to reflect credit upon themselves.

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BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

SECTION OF MAILS AND FILES

Referred to State

for attention.

~~No~~ partial reply made.

U. S. Dept. of Agr., B. A. E.

793.94/5252

CLN 5/19

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECU

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1112-34 Street
Newport News Va.
May 4, 1932

LAND ECONOMIC

Geographic Survey
Washington
D.C.

MAY 21 32

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 27 1932
Department of State

File
MAY 23 1932
MAY 25 1932
DEPT. OF STATE
cents in stamps enclosed

Dear Sir:

How may I secure maps of Vir-
ginia showing vegetation, distribution
of rainfall, population etc.? Also,
how may I secure information
concerning the recent Chinese-Japanese
War?

Yours truly,
(Miss) Bertha Atkinson

F/LS

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MAY 23 1932

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
HA 793.94/5252

May 28 1932

Miss Bertha Atkins,
1112 Thirty-fourth Street,
Newport News, Virginia.

Madam:

Your letter of May 4, 1932, addressed to the "Geographic Survey" in which you request information concerning "the recent Chinese-Japanese War" has been referred to the Department of State.

It is presumed that you are referring to the present Sino-Japanese situation. There are enclosed copies of Senate Document No. 55, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, entitled "Conditions in Manchuria" and of a letter of February 23, 1932, from the Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which contain information of the nature desired.

As of possible interest there is also enclosed a copy of the pamphlet "Publications of the Department

of

793.94/5252

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of State", and your attention is invited to the statement concerning the system of distributing the publications of the Department, on page one of the pamphlet.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

E. Wilder Spaulding,
 Assistant to the Historical Adviser.


Enclosures:

Conditions in Manchuria.
 Publication No. 298.
 Publications of the Department of State.

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 M. M. D.



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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Shanghai, April 23, 1932.

FE

Subject: Sino-Japanese peace negotiations.

CONFIDENTIAL



F/LS 793.94/5253

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

At the time of my recent visit to Nanking I had conversations with Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, on April 19th and 20th respectively, regarding Sino-Japanese relations, with special reference to the negotiations for the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai.

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I have the honor to enclose two memoranda covering these conversations. Dr. Lo gave me to understand that the Chinese were willing to accept any reasonable settlement of the Shanghai question, provided only they could be assured that the Japanese troops would be withdrawn within a reasonable time. General Chiang, who seemed to be well informed regarding the progress of the Shanghai negotiations, asked me whether it would be

advisable

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advisable to bring the Shanghai incident to a speedy conclusion, which leads me to believe that he had seen Mr. Millard's memorandum of April 17, 1932. (See my telegram of April 21, ^{793.94/6280} 4 p.m., and despatch of April 23, 1932.) He also asked me what action I thought China should take. My replies were informal but frankly expressed my personal views which I felt might be helpful to him.

Very respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosures:

2 memoranda of conversations,
 as stated.

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CVHE:EA

2 Carbon Copies

Received

1 copy in N. C. R.
 for notes. L. C.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Nanking, April 19, 1932.

Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Present: Mr. Peck.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy.

Following a conversation between Dr. Lo and Mr. Johnson on another subject, Mr. Johnson told Dr. Lo that if the latter had any questions he would like to ask in regard to affairs at Shanghai he, Mr. Johnson, would be willing to try and answer them.

Dr. Lo, in the course of the conversation, insisted more than once that the Chinese would accept any reasonable settlement of the Shanghai question, as between the Chinese and the Japanese, which might be proposed.

Mr. Johnson said he was glad of this. Mr. Johnson said he thought that with the Japanese the matter was largely one of "face". Dr. Lo interposed that China's "face" was involved, as well. Mr. Johnson said that the negotiations at Shanghai were being held up pending the issuing of instructions by the Chinese Government to its representative at Shanghai. Dr. Lo observed that instructions had been issued to the Chinese representative, Mr. Quo Tai-chi, and that the latter had returned to Shanghai. Mr. Johnson said that the only way to bring about the removal of the Japanese troops from Shanghai was either to persuade them to leave or to drive them

out

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out, and that it would be impossible to drive them out. Dr. Lo demurred to this and intimated that he thought the Chinese could put up a very good fight against the Japanese.

Dr. Lo remarked that what the Chinese mainly objected to was that the Japanese were injecting political questions into the negotiations for a truce, contrary to the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4, 1932, and he made an observation, which had almost the appearance of a warning, that if a subsequent round-table conference on Shanghai affairs were to be insisted upon, China would present some "knotty" questions, among the first of which would be a demand that all foreign troops and naval vessels should be withdrawn from the Shanghai area. Another of these "knotty" questions would be claims based on the violation by the Japanese of the neutrality of the International Settlement.

Dr. Lo distinctly gave the impression throughout the conversation that he was anxious that a formula should be found which would give China sufficient assurance that the Japanese troops would be withdrawn from Shanghai to enable China to sign a formal truce.

NTJ
 Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

WRP.EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Nanking, April 20, 1932.

General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the
Military Affairs Committee.

Present: Mr. Peck.

Subject ; Sino-Japanese Controversy.

Following an informal entertainment by General and Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek of Mr. and Mrs. Johnson and Mr. and Mrs. Peck on the afternoon of April 20, 1932, at the residence of General Chiang, a conversation took place between General Chiang, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Peck. Mr. Peck acted as interpreter. What follows is the gist of the conversation.

General Chiang asked Mr. Johnson whether he had any news from Geneva. Mr. Johnson replied that he had just received a telegram from Mr. Stimson, the Secretary of State, giving him the substance of the draft resolution in regard to the settlement of the Shanghai matter, which provided that the mixed Commission of the four friendly Powers, composed of both civil and military members provided for in the draft agreement, should report to the League regarding the progress of events and should advise the League of Nations when, in their opinion, the time had come for the withdrawal of Japanese troops. Mr. Johnson pointed out that the Japanese were anxious to avoid the appearance of being ordered by the League and that this mixed Commission would serve the

double

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double purpose of transferring responsibility at Shanghai to the League and of enabling the League to give advice, and not orders, to the Japanese.

General Chiang asked Mr. Johnson whether he thought that the Japanese would withdraw their forces from Shanghai. Mr. Johnson replied that he thought the Japanese wished to withdraw their forces, if only to save the great expense which the maintenance of these forces at Shanghai was costing them.

General Chiang said that Mr. Johnson must have found his labors in connection with the truce negotiations at Shanghai extremely tiring, and General Chiang wanted to express his gratitude to Mr. Johnson.

General Chiang in the course of the conversation asked Mr. Johnson whether he thought that it would be advisable to bring the settlement of the Shanghai incident to a speedy conclusion or not. Mr. Johnson replied that an answer to this question would involve a matter of high policy of the Chinese Government, concerning which, as an outsider, he really ought not to express any opinion. However, he said, since General Chiang had asked him this question, Mr. Johnson desired to express the opinion that it would be advisable to settle the Shanghai incident as soon as possible. In the first place, as long as the Shanghai incident remained unsettled the commerce of the port would remain in a state of suspense, to the great

loss

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loss of Chinese and foreigners. In the second place, so long as the Shanghai affair held public attention, the world would not give special heed to the Manchurian matter. If the Shanghai discussions were cleared from the board the world could give its attention, undividedly, to the solution of the Manchurian problem.

Mr. Johnson, in further explanation of his views that the Shanghai question should be settled as soon as possible, remarked that a great deal of secret intrigue was going on under cover of the negotiations. For instance, many of the old Shanghai residents were advocating the view that advantage should be taken of the discussions between China and Japan for the settlement of the Shanghai issue between these two countries to enlarge the area of the International Settlement. Mr. Johnson had reason to believe, he said, that the Japanese were assisting in the promotion of this idea. It seemed to be related to the proposal that the Foreign Settlement and the Greater Municipality of Shanghai should be turned into a great free port, under International control with Chinese participation. Mr. Johnson said that he distinctly felt that the Japanese were dissatisfied with the part which they have been playing in affairs in and around Shanghai and wished to achieve for themselves there a place of greater importance. Mr. Johnson pointed out that the best method of putting a

stop

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stop to all these underground machinations would be for China to come to an agreement with Japan in settlement of the Shanghai question.

General Chiang asked whether Mr. Johnson thought that a "round-table conference" should be held after the truce had been formally confirmed. Mr. Johnson said that there seemed to be a desire for such a conference but he made no comment, for or against, regarding the proposal.

General Chiang inquired how Mr. Johnson regarded the claims of the Chinese and the Japanese, respectively, in reference to the settlement of the Shanghai question. Mr. Johnson said that the principal point of difference between the two sides was that of the time of withdrawal of the Japanese troops from the occupied areas. He said that the efforts of the representatives of the neutral friendly Powers had been directed almost exclusively to an attempt to bridge this gap, and to devise a settlement which could be accepted by both sides.

General Chiang asked Mr. Johnson what action he thought China should take. Mr. Johnson said that he thought China ought to agree to the terms of settlement which had been arrived at in the discussions and sign them without any supporting declarations.

Mr. Johnson said that he could quite understand why the Chinese wanted to receive a definite statement from

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the Japanese indicating the time when their troops would be withdrawn from the occupied areas; at the same time, he could also quite understand the Japanese attitude, which was that the problem was a military one and it would be impossible for the Japanese military leaders to fix definitely, in advance, the time when the military objective of the Japanese troops would have been achieved and the troops could be withdrawn.

Mr. Johnson said that, after all, there were only two ways of getting rid of foreign troops which were in a nation's territory; one was to talk them into leaving, and the other was to expel them by force. He said that the Japanese troops at Shanghai could not be expelled by the Chinese, and the efforts of the foreign representatives were therefore directed to finding a method of settlement which would be agreeable both to China and Japan and would enable the Japanese to withdraw.

Mr. Johnson said that he had brought with him a great deal of data relating to the negotiations in Shanghai and would be willing to try to answer any questions which General Chiang might like to ask about them. General Chiang seemed to be conversant, in a general way, with the progress of the negotiations, and he did not ask any specific questions about them. It was very evident, however, that he gave close attention to
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the remarks made by Mr. Johnson and that he was devoting intense thought to the Shanghai matter.

General Chiang remarked that he was considering the advisability of sending Dr. H. H. Kung to the United States to conduct investigations of industrial and economic affairs there. He said he had not quite decided whether he would send Dr. Kung on this mission or not. He asked Mr. Johnson whether he thought it would be a good thing to do. Mr. Johnson said that he thought it would be a good idea to send Dr. Kung to the United States but he warned General Chiang that Dr. Kung would find the industrial and economic leaders in the United States preoccupied with their efforts to restore normal conditions in the United States. He thought that, owing to the depreciation in stock quotations, Dr. Kung would find American financiers very unresponsive to any proposals for extensive American investments of capital in foreign countries. On the other hand, Dr. Kung would probably find it very profitable and interesting to look into the plans which American financial leaders were making to restore normal business conditions. General Chiang said that Dr. Kung's mission would be to make investigations only, and not to solicit American capital for investment in Chinese enterprises.

Mr. Peck said that he hoped that if it were finally decided that Dr. Kung should go to the United States, General Chiang would inform Mr. Peck before Dr. Kung's departure, so that Mr. Peck could write some letters on Dr. Kung's behalf. General Chiang said that he would notify Mr. Peck in advance.

N.T.S.
 Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

WRP.EA

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECE

No.D-258

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China.

April 28, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 21 32

Subject: Views of Dr. Thomas F. Millard in
regard to Sino-Japanese Relations
and the Role of the United States.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

Mention is rather frequently made at the present
time of an expectation on the part of some persons that
the United States will at some stage of the present
controversy in the Far East take such action as may be
necessary to obtain for China the full protection
accorded by the Nine Power Treaty.

In this connection I have the honor to enclose
herewith a memorandum of a conversation held by Dr.
Thomas F. Millard, Adviser to the Chinese Government,
with Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, British Counselor of Legation,
and me on April 27, 1932. In the course of this
conversation Dr. Millard asserted his belief that the
American Government would be obliged to act in defense
of this Treaty, even at the cost of war with Japan.

In a note appended to the memorandum I have invited


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the Department's attention to the possibility that Dr. Millard has convinced Chinese diplomats of the truth of this theory and related theories.

Respectfully yours,


Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

✓ Enclosure:

Memorandum dated April 27, 1932.

In duplicate to the Department of State.
One copy to the American Legation, Peiping.
One copy to the American Minister, Shanghai.

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WRP:MCL

Carbon Copies
Received **FIVE**
L.S.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch to the Department No.D-258 of
 Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking,
 China, dated April 28, 1932, entitled "Views of Dr.
 Thomas F. Millard in regard to Sino-Japanese Relations
 and the Role of the United States".

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

April 27, 1932.

Subject: Views of Dr. Thomas F. Millard in regard to
 Sino-Japanese Relations and the Role of the
 United States.

Dr. Thomas Millard, Adviser to the Government of the
 Republic of China.
 Mr. E.M.B. Ingram, British Counselor of Legation.
 Mr. Peck.

About 4:30 p.m. Mr. Ingram called at the American
 Consulate General and just as he and Mr. Peck were
 discussing the Shanghai negotiations Dr. Millard came in.
 The ensuing conversation consists largely of expressions
 of opinion by Dr. Millard elicited by questions put by
 Mr. Peck. The gist of Dr. Millard's observations follows:

Dr. Millard is emphatically of the opinion that a
 signed truce agreement at Shanghai is not important from
 the standpoint of China's welfare. On no account should
 China sacrifice anything, whether of principle or
 tactical advantage, to obtain such an agreement. On
 the contrary, as long as there is not formal agreement
 to refrain from hostilities the rest of the world will
 continue to pay close attention to Japanese actions at
 Shanghai, and this will be advantageous from China's
 standpoint. An agreement fixing the regions which the
 Japanese forces should be allowed to occupy would

necessarily

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necessarily import a certain legal sanction to the presence of Japanese forces which, in the absence of such an agreement, remains unauthorized. Dr. Millard thinks that, in point of view of fact, a resumption of hostilities is unlikely. He thinks this is realized by the commercial interests and that business will revive, even without the assurance which a formal truce would give. Such an assurance would, in any case, probably prove undependable unless the general Sino-Japanese controversy is settled. Dr. Millard said that he had expressed these views to the Chinese Government and that he had come to Nanking a day or two before for the purpose of talking with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in his capacity of adviser.

Dr. Millard expressed his positive belief that the trend of international politics in the Far East will inevitably involve the United States in war with Japan within the next few years. He pointed out that the American Government has taken so positive a stand in opposition to Japan's actions in Shanghai and Manchuria that a sharp issue has been raised which can be settled only through a complete back down either by Japan or by the United States. Dr. Millard asserted that the American Government in its approximately one hundred and fifty years of history had never backed down on a position formally taken.

Dr. Millard said that the justification which Japan professes to find for her oppressive acts in China in the alleged fact that China is "an unorganized state" is entirely unwarranted. He pointed out that the Nine-Power

Treaty

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Treaty signed in 1922 was designed to protect China and that the avowed reason for concluding such a protecting treaty was the fact that China was not completely organized as a state. For Japan to take as an excuse for violating this treaty the very circumstance on which the treaty is based can deceive nobody. This treaty owes its existence largely to the American Government and if the American Government acquiesces in the scrapping of the treaty the Government not only will be abandoning all claim to influence in the Orient, but will be giving its acquiescence to the idea that all treaties are meaningless. The United States is unquestionably the most powerful and most important nation in the Pacific Ocean area; its position in regard to the sanctity of treaties is known to the world; consequently, it is unthinkable that the American Government should acquiesce in the open violation of the Nine-Power Treaty in which Japan is now engaged.

Dr. Millard pointed out that the participation of the United States in the European War was brought about by causes far less potent than those causes which he had just described as being certain to involve the United States in war with Japan. During the first two or three years of the European War there was no important sentiment in the United States in favor of entering the war. America entered the war to protect her rights as a neutral. Not only did the United States have no connection with the international relationships which brought about the war, she even entered the war in almost complete ignorance of many of the secret international

agreements

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agreements which had occasioned the war, or which had been concluded in the first years of the war. America did not know to what she was committing herself in joining the Allies. At the present moment, on the contrary, the issues which are at stake are clearly known to everybody and the United States is identified in the eyes of the world with the championship of these issues.

It was the opinion of Dr. Millard that the military party in Japan has forced the Japanese Government to undertake its present military adventures in China. The military party saw itself faced with extinction and deliberately compelled Japan to undertake the present military operations in Shanghai and Manchuria, in the hope that a satisfactory outcome would reestablish the military party in its former dominant position in Japanese politics. China, however, has much to hope from the probability that the enormous expense entailed by these military operation may rouse the Japanese people against them and may even, if other tactics fail, bring about a revolution and the overthrow of the present Japanese Government. It is evident, therefore, that it is all to the advantage of China to protract the present situation. China can not defeat Japan in military operations, but China can involve Japan in ruinous expenditures which may bring about the downfall of the Japanese Government. Dr. Millard believes that it would not be especially advantageous for China to find a halfway solution to the Shanghai and Manchurian controversies with Japan. He is of the opinion that

practically

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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practically the entire peace organization of the Japanese Army is now on the mainland, in Korea and Manchuria, and that the Japanese Government cannot indefinitely stand the drain on its financial resources which this entails.

Dr. Millard said that he had told the Chinese Government shortly after September 18, 1931, that while the Chinese Government ought to take its grievances against Japan to the League of Nations for adjustment, the League would not be able to take effective action against Japan. Nevertheless, the League's actions in this connection would give valuable publicity to China's cause and its discussions, the creation and sending to China of commissions, etc, would be all to the good

Note: On the morning of April 25th Mr. Peck had a conversation with Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of which Dr. Lo expressed the opinion that there was no urgency from China's standpoint in bringing the truce negotiations at Shanghai to a conclusion. He intimated that the disadvantage to China of a resumption of hostilities would be less than that entailed by the concluding of an agreement which would give a quasi-sanction to the presence of Japanese troops in the Shanghai area. He said that China could not afford to sacrifice anything, merely for the purpose of bringing about a formal truce. The only thing which would be of real benefit to China would be the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The presence of these forces is a threat to China and

creates

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creates an uncertainty in the whole situation and this must be ended before China will be materially benefited. Mr. Peck observed that the American and British Ministers and their colleagues were working extremely hard in Shanghai in an endeavor to bring about a truce agreement between China and Japan, but that it was obvious they could not succeed unless they had some cooperation from China. In view of this fact, Mr. Peck said, he could not but feel that the views just expressed by Dr. Lo showed a rather inadequate appreciation of the efforts which were being made to bring about the truce. Dr. Lo insisted that China was very appreciative of the efforts being made by Mr. Johnson and Sir Miles Lampson and he said that when these two gentlemen visited Nanking recently the members of the Government had tried to show how grateful they were. Nevertheless, China had her own difficulties and could not afford to purchase a truce agreement at too high a cost in the way of sacrificing interests or principle.

The American Minister supplied the Department, in his confidential despatch of April 5, 1932, with a copy of a memorandum by Dr. Millard, dated March 30, 1932. In that memorandum Dr. Millard explained much more fully than he did orally to Mr. Ingram and Mr. Peck his views regarding China's policy towards Japan, the relative unimportance of the League and the decisive role which the United States must play in the settlement of this Far Eastern controversy. In that memorandum Dr. Millard was careful to point out that he had expressed these various views to the Chinese Government in memoranda

submitted

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submitted as early as October, 1931.

Mr. Peck is not prepared to state that Dr. Millard has wielded, or is wielding, a controlling influence in deciding the views and the policies of the Chinese Government in handling the Sino-Japanese controversy. There is, however, a significant similarity between the views which Dr. Millard has expressed in his memoranda and the views expressed by Chinese diplomats, both in writing and orally. In this connection it is interesting to refer to a report submitted to the Central Political Council by the "Special Committee on Foreign Affairs" about November 28, 1931. There is a general resemblance between the view expressed by Dr. Millard and the views expressed in the memorandum in regard to such matters as the probable ineffectiveness of League action, the certainty that the United States will bring about the implementing of the Nine-Power Treaty, etc. (see despatch No. 236, March 29, 1932, Nanking to the Department.)

The memorandum presented to the American Minister by Dr. Millard was supposedly "confidential" but it is interesting to note that Dr. Millard showed no hesitation in expressing his views to Mr. Ingram, a British official, without any reserve whatsoever. Nor did he conceal the fact that he had attempted to induce the Chinese Government to adopt those views. On the contrary, Dr. Millard seems rather anxious to establish the fact that he has been influential in determining the policies of the Chinese Government.

WRP/MVD/MCL

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
LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 Shanghai, April 12, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese peace negotiations.

AM 10:10



100-100000



File
th

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State
 Washington.

Sir:

Referring to my despatch of March 23, 1932, I
 1/ have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum of a
 conversation which Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Chinese Vice
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, held in Shanghai on March
 20, 1932, regarding the preliminary discussions which
 led to the Sino-Japanese negotiations for the cessa-
 tion of hostilities.

This memorandum should have been enclosed with my
 despatch under reference, but was not quite ready when
 the pouch closed.

Very respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Q. Van H. Engert
 Q. Van H. Engert
 First Secretary of Legation.

✓
 Enclosure:
 Memorandum of conversation.

CVHE.EA

F/LS

793.94/5255

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, March 20, 1932.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi.

Subject: Sino-Japanese negotiations

Mr. Quo Tai-chi called at 7 p.m. He said that until yesterday he had not realized that we were discussing the terms of an agreement. He had assumed that the items under discussion represented items in an agenda to be used at a formal meeting. I told Mr. Quo that, while it was true that the items which we had discussed were intended to be an agenda to be used in a formal negotiation, we hoped that these items might become the terms of a formal agreement.

Mr. Quo stated that at the next meeting he would have to take a firm stand to the effect that we were arranging for the withdrawal of Japanese troops and that agreement must show something to that end. He said that malcontents both in and out of the Party were attempting to exploit the situation at Shanghai for their own ends. He intimated that he had talked very frankly about this to Mr. Sun Fo, pointing out that it was obvious that Mr. Sun Fo and his group were not in any position to force the Japanese to leave by superior strength, and that therefore it was necessary for them to discuss the matter with the Japanese. In order to disarm these critics Mr. Quo stated that he would have to insist that the

terms

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terms upon which we were to agree would contain some proposition specifically calling for the withdrawal of the Japanese in line with the terms of the League's Resolution of March 4th. Mr. Quo referred to the matter of the use of the "pao an tui" or constabulary and said that they wished to make this "pao an tui" a permanent thing at Shanghai; otherwise radical agitators among his own people would make use of the fact to embarrass the Government.

Mr. Quo seemed quite wrought up and very much discouraged. He pointed out that he yielded to no Chinese in his attitude as a revolutionary; he had always been a revolutionary; he could talk as high as the best of them. The only reason he was acting now as the Government's representative was that he had been requested to act by his lifelong friend, Mr. Wang Ching-wei. He felt that his status was that of a public slave, rather than that of a public servant. He referred to the fact that a mob had visited his house. He said that many had argued that he should never settle with the Japanese; that all negotiations should be broken off and none entered into with the Japanese until they had withdrawn all their troops; otherwise they were in the position of a conquered people negotiating with their conquerors. He expressed the fear that the British and Japanese are getting together; that the Japanese had intrigued to get the

League

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League Commission to visit Hankow. On the other hand, the League Commission had suggested a delay at Shanghai. He could not understand why the League Commission did not proceed upon its journey, in view of the fact that Japanese were utilizing the time wasted by the League Commission in consolidating their position in Manchuria.

NTJ
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 26, 1932.

~~RCM:~~

~~WHL:~~

~~WRL:~~

The Legation transmits herewith a memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Engert and Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, a member of the Japanese Diet, who has been in Shanghai during the recent negotiations. Mr. Matsuoka seems to entertain rather liberal views in regard to the Sino-Japanese situation at Shanghai and it is possible that upon his return to Tokyo he was instrumental in persuading the authorities there to make the decision (which they did subsequent to his return) to withdraw all Japanese troops from Shanghai.

I think that this despatch and the attached memorandum would be of interest to the Secretary and to the Under Secretary.



JEJ/VDM

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Shanghai, April 16, 1932.

793.94
 Subject: Sino-Japanese relations as viewed by
Mr. Matsuoka.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

MAY 31 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

F/LS 793.94/5256



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum of a conversation Mr. C. Van H. Engert, First Secretary of Legation, had on April 8, 1932, with Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, a member of the Japanese Diet.

Mr. Matsuoka came to Shanghai on February 18, 1932, as the personal representative of the Japanese Prime Minister and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to assist, if possible, in finding a solution for the Sino-Japanese difficulties in this area. He left Shanghai on April 10, 1932, and as he is a prominent member of the Seiyukai or Government party in Japan and also a former Vice President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, his report on the situation here may carry some weight. In previous conversations I had with him he complained, however, that the military were so firmly in control that he doubted whether they would listen to him.

The

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The day before his departure Mr. Matsuoka gave an interview to the Japanese press from which I quote the following interesting passage as characteristic of the broad-minded views held by him and which he expressed freely:

"During my stay here I have been impressed with a number of things. One of the impressions is that there are very few Japanese here who have personal friends among the Chinese. I believe that if more Japanese residing here had intimate friends among the Chinese people the whole situation might have developed more favorably to the Japanese. Of course, the same can be said as regards the contact with other foreigners. I hope that our fellow countrymen in Shanghai will in the future keep in closer touch with the Chinese, as well as with the Westerners, so that unnecessary misunderstanding might be avoided."

Very respectfully yours,


NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

✓
Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation.

Copy to Tokyo.

CVHE.EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation

Shanghai, April 8, 1932.

Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, Member of the
Japanese Diet.

Mr. Engert.

Mr. Matsuoka called this morning to say good-bye to the Minister. As Mr. Johnson was out he told Mr. Engert that he was leaving in a day or two and might not find time to call again before his departure.

Mr. Matsuoka said that he had just sent telegrams to the Prime Minister of Japan and to the Assistant Chief of Staff - he laughingly explained that the only reason he could not address the Chief of Staff himself was that the latter is a member of the Imperial family - and had told them that the Sino-Japanese negotiations for the cessation of hostilities had progressed so favorably that he confidently expected that an agreement would be signed shortly, perhaps within a week. He had therefore suggested that he be permitted to return to Japan.

When Mr. Engert asked him upon what he based his optimism that the negotiations would be so speedily concluded, he replied that the Japanese Government was determined not to permit the Shanghai incident to become anything but a local affair, to be locally adjusted. Whatever Japan's interests in Manchuria might be, in China proper she sought nothing but the protection of

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her economic interests. Mr. Matsuoka said that one of the reasons Japan had recently had such a bad press in the United States and Europe was that Japan had failed to make it clear that she did not seek a dominant political position in China.

Mr. Matsuoka added that Japan had made many other mistakes besides, and that he was hurrying back to Tokyo because he felt his presence there would be more useful to his country than his presence here. He intended to point out to his Government the absolute necessity of closing the Shanghai chapter at the earliest possible moment.


In reply to a question Mr. Matsuoka stated that he did not believe the present anti-Japanese sentiment and anti-Japanese boycott would last very long if the Nanking Government were sincerely desirous of resuming friendly relations with Japan, and that Japan would welcome a united China capable of maintaining law and order throughout the country.

Mr. Matsuoka concluded by expressing his thanks for the valuable assistance Minister Johnson had rendered in connection with the Sino-Japanese negotiations.


Van H. Engert
First Secretary of Legation.

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CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL Authority: Letter
of 5/20/81, Subj: [redacted], State Dept.
D. [redacted] Rowley RM 2/27/65



THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAY 31 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

There has recently been brought to my attention a confidential report prepared by Mr. Henry W. Kipney, an American in the employ of the South Manchuria Railway, on the state of public opinion in America during the first few days after the hostilities in Shanghai began.

FILED
MAY 1 1932

was

F/LS 795.94/5257

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
- 2 -

was about to become reconciled to the fait accompli presented by the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, when the Shanghai incident caused "a very widespread and very unfavorable reaction". As a result Mr. Kinney found it "necessary to pay special attention to those who have been, and are, still trying to be friends of Japan, as those persons find themselves hard pressed in their efforts to obtain arguments which will give them opportunity to present Japan's cause favorably". A list of some of the men who are said to "have been remarkably staunch and have shown great eagerness to obtain the facts from the Japanese side" is given in the last paragraph on page 2.

With regard to the possibility of war between the United States and Japan, Mr. Kinney believes that "all sound opinion overwhelmingly expresses itself to the effect that the present depression is a result of the Great War, and that the United States certainly does not want any more experience of this kind."

Very respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


 C. Van H. Engert
 First Secretary of Legation.

✓
 Enclosure:

Copy of report by Mr. Kinney,
 February 5, 1932.

Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

CVHE:EA

2 Carbon Copies

Received

1 copy in [unclear]
 [unclear]

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

New York, February 5, 1932.

FURTHER REPORT BY HENRY W. KINNEY ON SITUATION IN
 NEW YORK FOLLOWING THE SHANGHAI AFFAIR

The occurrence of the conflict in Shanghai has tended to change very materially public opinion with regard to the Far Eastern situation. Before its occurrence, opinion generally was settling down very rapidly with regard to the Manchurian situation. The prevailing thought was evidently that the spectacular features were over, that the world faced a fait accompli about which nothing could be done and that, after all, it was likely that the eventual results would be good. The public was beginning to understand the essential features of this event, seeing that the Chinese were largely to blame, and while some might deplore what seemed to them to be ruthlessness of Japanese tactics, it may be regarded as certain that such excitement as has existed would have died down very shortly, except on the part of extreme pacifists.

The Shanghai affair changed public opinion completely, and where such had been friendly or, at least, complacent with regard to Japan, it became in most cases strongly incensed at what appeared to almost the entire American public to be Japan's ruthless offensive. Practically everyone believes that Japan evidently wished to fight the Chinese no matter whether these accepted her conditions with regard to the boycott or not, and that this was shown through the fact that Chapel was bombarded after the acceptance of the demands made upon Mayor Wu. This, and the danger to foreign nationals in the Settlement, has caused a very widespread and very unfavorable reaction.

This situation is due to the fact that the newspaper dispatches from the Far East depict mainly the sensational features of the case such as airplane bombardments and bombing, killing of civilians, women and children, and the presence of Japanese marines in foreign sectors of the Settlement, as well as such friction as has come up between the foreign authorities and the Japanese in Shanghai. The news is voluminous, occupying several pages of the principal newspapers, and as a consequence only the most serious students of Far Eastern affairs read it all. The great majority of readers

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 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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readers merely look at the headlines which give the most sensational facts and neglect to read the entire volume of information where the careful reader may find the facts which tend to justify Japan's action, but which are so obscured by the general mass of sensational stuff that they escape everyone except the careful reader.

Thus when I arrived in America I found that my task in discussing the Manchurian situation was becoming easier and easier owing to the gradual change in American opinion which has been described above. At that time, while I, of course, looked up the various friends of Japan, I paid special attention to those whose attitude was inimical, as that seemed to be my most useful function. Now, however, since the Shanghai situation has arisen, I find it necessary to pay special attention to those who have been, and are, still trying to be the friends of Japan, as those persons find themselves hard pressed in their efforts to obtain arguments which will give them opportunity to present Japan's cause favorably.

The main point seems to me to lie in the fact that the common idea is that the Japanese navy wantonly attacked the Chinese in Chapel in spite of the fact that the Chinese authorities had agreed to all that Japan demanded. I have tried to point out that the Chinese authorities lost control of the situation in Chapel owing to the fact that their yielding to Japan's demands aroused the populace; that the Japanese marines in the Settlement as a matter of evident necessity were compelled to enter Chapel to protect the thousands of Japanese there, when the Chinese utterly failed to do so; that the bombardment by air bombs was a reluctantly-taken expedient when the handful of marines could not unaided hold the hordes of Chinese; and the Japanese were making every effort to protect the part of the Settlement assigned to them, as was their duty, and were carefully refraining from involving other parts of the Settlement.

These conversations with editorial writers and other newspaper men, college professors, bankers, business men and others have followed very much the same lines, and I shall not attempt to give details except in a few cases, in order to keep this report down to a reasonable length.

I should merely mention that such men as HERBERT ELLISTON, RODNEY GILBERT, FREDERICK MOORE, WILBUR FORREST, GEORGE SOKOLSKY and others have been remarkably staunch and have shown great eagerness to obtain the facts from the Japanese side. The Wall Street element has shown great endeavors to bring about a reasonable attitude on the part of the public. The HEARST PRESS, curiously enough, is making tremendous arguments against America's adopting any attitude which may even remotely tend to bring the United States into war. I am under the impression that ROY HOWARD, with the WORLD TELEGRAPH and the SCRIPPS-HOWARD SYNDICATE, who is radically pacifist and pro-League, is the most inimical

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ical factor against Japan in the United States.

It is very gratifying to find that lurid war talk is entirely absent. I have heard chance remarks on the street by obscure individuals to the effect that "what America needs is another war", but these evidently reflect the opinion only of entirely unimportant individuals, as all sound opinion overwhelmingly expresses itself to the effect that the present depression is a result of the Great War, and that the United States certainly does not want any more experience of this kind.

JOHN BAKELLESS, a prominent writer and a United States Reserve Officer, told me that at a recent meeting of such officers war talk was entirely discounted, all American official authorities, including the Army and Navy, evidently feeling the same way. The only really radical opinions expressed are those of the most ardent pacifists who are apparently willing to resort to warlike measures for the sake of peace. For instance, Professor HOLCUMBE of Harvard (who visited Manchuria some years ago) and fifteen other members of the Harvard Faculty have drafted a resolution advocating an economic boycott against Japan. This is illustrative of the most radical professorial opinion; but well-informed persons often express the idea that this professorial pacifist element is the most dangerous element in the world situation to-day. It would be noted that Congress has shown great restraint, and that even Senator BORAH, who can by no stretch of the imagination be classed as a friend of Japan, has come out strongly against the boycott as being a measure of a warlike nature.

Even the professorial element is eager to obtain correct data. Thus yesterday I attended a luncheon given me by a selected group of some thirty-five members of the Faculty of Columbia University. While I discussed mainly the Manchurian situation, I was also asked many questions with regard to the Shanghai affair, and while I emphasized that I could speak authoritatively about the former and only as an individual with regard to the latter, I was asked a great many questions, the tone of which revealed that the greater number of those present were willing to take a friendly attitude as long as they could obtain facts on which to base such.

On the whole, the staunch attitude of the friends of Japan who are standing by Japan in these trying days when the deluge of lurid and sensational news is making the maintenance of a pro-Japanese attitude difficult for them, has been very gratifying, and I feel that at this moment the greatest service that can be done is to furnish them with all the material possible with which they can fortify their arguments in favor of the Japanese cause.

I am leaving to-night for Ottawa where I have been invited to stay for a few days by some members of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and where arrangements have been made for me to dine with Dr. C. D. SKELTON, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Mr. STEVENS, Minister for Commerce, and others.

HENRY W. KINNEY.

(A true copy EA)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 26, 1932.

MMH:

The Legation transmits herewith further minutes of the formal meetings of the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations covering the period of April 7 to 9 inclusive. This despatch is supplementary to the Legation's despatch of April 11, 1932. The substance of the information found herein has already been communicated to the Department by radio and I do not think there is any need for you to read these enclosures--their chief value now is for reference purposes.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 Shanghai, April 18, 1932.

FE
EA

Subject: Sino-Japanese peace negotiations.

AM 1000



AM 1000



F/LS
 793.94/5253

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

577

In continuation of my despatch of April 11, 1932,

1/2 I have the honor to transmit herewith the Minutes of two further formal meetings, viz. the twelfth and thirteenth, of April 7th and 9th, respectively, of the Sino-Japanese negotiations in Shanghai for the cessation of hostilities in this area.

Mr. Wilden, the French Minister, not having recovered from his illness, he was represented by the Counselor of Legation.

Very respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

W. H. Engert
 W. H. Engert,
 First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosures:

1/2: Minutes of 12th and 13th meetings.

CVHE.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

12th Formal Meeting.

Shanghai, April 7, 1932.
 Thursday, 10 a.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
 General Uyeda
 General Tashiro
 Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
 General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
 General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
 Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
 Mr. Johnson, American Minister
 Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
 Mr. Lagarde (French Minister being ill).

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

Sir Miles Lampson summarized the position where we left it at the last meeting, namely: that the Chinese had agreed to refer the Japanese formula to Nanking, while the Japanese had agreed to forward the Chinese formula to Tokyo. He expressed the hope that the interval had produced favorable results.

Article I

"The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease-fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from _____ 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease all and every form of hostile act. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers."

Uyeda.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huesten NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Uyeda. Suggestion made by Mr. Lagarde to add words "around Shanghai" between words "cease" and "all" in second sentence, and between word "hostilities" and the comma in the third sentence, is acceptable to the Japanese. As to the question of the position of Chinese troops south of Soochow Creek and on the Pootung side of the Whangpoo, the Japanese wish to know whether Chinese refusal to designate these positions is because they contend that this area is outside the scope of Article I, or because it is outside the area where fighting took place. If they say that it is because the area is outside the scope of Article I, we cannot concede their point; if they say that it is because the area is outside the fighting zone, then we can give some consideration to the question. We can consider a proposal that they point out positions in some modified way, as for instance, adding to the Annex the positions Lungwha, etc., and east of the Whangpoo, merely listing the names.

Quo. Chinese attitude in regard to Article I is that it is clear and specific, and therefore designation of Chinese troops in those areas is unnecessary. When the Japanese asked the Chinese to designate military positions south of Soochow Creek and east of the Whangpoo they introduced into the negotiations a new element. These negotiations are concerned only with such troops as participated in the conflict; to go beyond this point involves

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involves the distribution of Chinese troops in the interior. Mr. Lagarde suggested the addition of words as a compromise; I accepted his suggestion provided discussion of Chinese military positions south of Soochow Creek and east of the Whangpoo River be dropped. We cannot permit any one to discuss China's right to move troops in her own territory. I think we ought to get down to bed rock, which is Article III; this article says quite definitely that Japanese troops are to be moved into certain localities. The only exception made is one due to physical conditions which make it necessary to give temporary accommodation to the troops outside Settlement areas. The whole tenor of the argument by the Japanese has been in the direction of indicating intention of Japanese forces to be indefinitely stationed in and around Shanghai. There is no reason for the Japanese to fear for their rear or their flanks; the Chinese tried to limit their hostilities at all times, and now that hostilities have ceased there should be no cause for worry on the part of the Japanese concerning Chinese troops from which there never has been any danger. I must again repeat that Chinese military positions south of Soochow Creek and east of the Whangpoo River are not in question. We should proceed at once to Article III and its annex. .

Uyeda. Asks what reply Chinese made to his question.

(Later)

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(Later, after translation:)

Uyeda. It is really necessary that the military positions of the Chinese be clearly defined, not only as a matter of principle, but also as a matter of fact. We must ask the Chinese to reply definitely at this moment whether the positions in question are covered by Article I or not.

Quo. I have already replied very clearly that they are not within the scope of the article. These negotiations are confined to the areas actually involved in the hostilities. There are many troops in China; this Conference cannot inquire into the positions of other troops.

Uyeda. The Japanese army cannot agree to the Chinese contention; our understanding is that Chinese troops are included in the scope of the article. We accept the suggestion of Mr. Lagarde as regards the insertion of the words "around Shanghai" in the article as clearing up the situation. We are not concerned with troops in the far interior; we are merely concerned with those in the neighborhood of Shanghai. If the delegates say these are not in the fighting zone, we are prepared to define the zone in a milder way.

Sir Miles. One method of dealing with this question is to leave it over while we consider the next. Another method is to look at it this way: (using map) this area south of Soochow Creek where there are Chinese troops is blanketed by the French Concession and the International

Settlement;

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Settlement; therefore, these positions would seem to be out of the question in so far as danger to the Japanese is concerned. Now, on the east side of the Whangpoo, I have heard that there are no troops in the Pootung area. This is well within the line named in the Japanese desiderata of February 19th. It occurs to me that the Chinese might properly say that they have no troops to the east of the Whangpoo and that they have no hostile intentions there.

Quo. I regard this as a new question; we were agreed that no new question of principle would be raised. I regard this as a matter of principle, and cannot consider it. (It was evident the Chinese were trying to avoid any commitment that would involve troops already around Shanghai.) In order to meet the Japanese point of view and show how conciliatory we are, I am willing to leave the question to the Joint Commission. If the Japanese have any suspicion that Chinese troops south of Soochow Creek or east of the Whangpoo are engaged in hostilities, they can refer the matter to the Joint Commission. I am prepared to accept the words "around Shanghai" in the places suggested by Mr. Lagarde, but we cannot admit the right of the Japanese to bring up the question of the position of Chinese troops.

Uyeda. We insist that the question must be included.

(At this point Sir Miles whispered to me that he

could

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could not be too violent against the Japanese because his nationals here in Shanghai consider that the Japanese are fighting their battle; the Japanese would whisper it about that he was defeating their cause and was unwilling to incur odium, and therefore refused to be quiet.)

Quo. I have repeatedly said why we cannot permit it to be included. If the aim is to make cessation of hostilities effective, then the earlier Japanese troops withdraw the quicker cessation will be effective. The Japanese continue to say that before cessation of hostilities can be complete, it is necessary to discover the positions of Chinese troops, and to this I reply that the sooner Japanese troops withdraw the quicker cessation will be complete.

Uyeda. The Chinese argue that withdrawal of Japanese troops is essential to the cessation of hostilities, but if the Chinese think that ascertainment of Chinese military positions is not important they are wrong.

Quo. There is no confusion in our minds regarding the two points in the League Resolution upon which the Chinese formula stands. As regards Article III, it does not mean that Chinese cannot be relied upon to permit Japanese to occupy adjacent places temporarily to accommodate their troops. The whole agreement permits this and is directed to the end of facilitating Japanese withdrawal; we have tried to accommodate the Japanese in
every

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way. It now remains only for them to withdraw. We do not intend to go back on our word. The Japanese are to be taken care of, accommodated, outside of the Settlement, because physical conditions - and not political conditions - make it necessary.

Uyeda. The cessation of hostilities cannot be made complete until the Chinese military positions are designated. Unless Chinese positions south of Soochow Creek and on the Pootung side of the Whangpoo River are ascertained, we cannot carry on our part in designating the localities to which Japanese will withdraw; the two things are related. (Points to maps and explains reason why Japanese cannot retire on the Whangpoo River if the Chinese remain in Pootung). What about the Chinese troops which were not involved in the recent hostilities? Are they to be governed by this agreement?

Quo. It is the principle that makes it unnecessary that we discuss the matter. The facts are as well known to them as to us and do not make the question important.

(At this point it was beginning to become evident that Japanese insistence on the designation of localities south of Soochow Creek and east of the Whangpoo was forcing the Chinese to statements that would indicate that they did not consider their troops in these areas as bound by the agreement, which was of course not what Quo intended to say.)

Uyeda.

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Uyeda. It is an important and vital question for us to know whether the Chinese troops south of Soochow Creek and east of the Whangpoo are covered by this agreement. Do the Chinese consider that the areas in question do not come under this agreement?

Quo. We have said repeatedly that the question does not come within the scope of this agreement. Those areas not involved in hostilities are not covered by this agreement.

Lampson. Invites attention of Quo to the fact that Article I covers all hostilities.

Quo. Says of course Article I covers all hostilities.

Shigemitsu. Word, "hostilities" means of course not to kill, not to shoot, but does not necessarily cover movement of troops.

Quo. There you raise a fundamental question.

Shigemitsu. The question involves a principle: the marching of troops, the presence of troops. There are big Japanese interests south of Soochow Creek.

Johnson. Article I seems to me to be complete in itself. If it is understood by the meeting that it covers all hostile acts, then it would appear that no explanatory formula is necessary. Certainly there can be no objection to peaceful troops, nor to the shifting of peaceful troops from one place to another, nor to the

activities

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activities of troops in search of bandits.

Quo. Article I is all inclusive.

Lampson. Can we not refer the matter to the Sub-Committee?

Uyeda. Has no objection to handing it over to the Sub-Committee as a practical question not involving a principle.

Quo. We are prepared to do anything within reason to allay Japanese fears. If the Sub-Committee can find a formula that will not involve a principle, or which will quiet General Uyeda's mind, the Chinese will be very glad to help.

Lampson. Suggests the possibility of an agreed minute or any other formula.

Uyeda. Does not wish to give up question of principle, but wants to reserve the point.

Quo. Our principle is that nothing must be done to hamper freedom of Chinese to move their troops on Chinese territory. What is the Japanese principle?

Uyeda. Recognizes Chinese sovereignty, but has defined in this agreement some small part of Chinese troops which are restricted to the north of Soochow Creek. Now only question remaining is whether Chinese troops in areas adjacent thereto are to be taken into consideration.

Quo. That question is in the hands of the Sub-Committee.

(Here

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(Here follows text of instruction to Military Sub-Committee on this point:)

"Summary of conclusion of discussion in main Conference on the question of the definition of the Chinese positions south of the Soochow Creek and on the Pootung side, at the twelfth meeting on the morning of April 7, 1932.

 "General Uyeda said that he had no objection to the matter being handed over to the Sub-Committee. Mr. Kuo concurred. If the Sub-Committee could devise some formula which, while not prejudicing the Chinese principle (the free movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory not involved in the recent hostilities) would at the same time allay General Uyeda's anxieties in regard to his flank and rear, he, Mr. Kuo, would be quite agreeable. Sir M. Lampson suggested that the formula might take the form of an agreed minute or any other such suitable form. General Uyeda said he must make a reservation in regard to the question of principle on the Japanese side. Sir M. Lampson said it should be possible to find a formula not touching the question of principle at all."

Article II.

Quo. Refers to Article II and mentions his reservation in regard to no limitation of movement of Chinese troops. With reference to Annex II suggests we adjourn until 3 p.m.

Uyeda. Asks whether Chinese have anything to offer in connection with question of time in Annex II.

Quo. Chinese are not satisfied with the Japanese formula either as to form or substance. Does not like suggested declaration, but is willing to accept some other formula to meet Japanese view. As to the substance, the Chinese feel that Japanese suggestion is still most un-

satisfactory

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satisfactory because it contains no time limit. He had referred it to Nanking as a matter of courtesy. Nanking has refused to accept it, pointing out that Japanese declaration is unsatisfactory for the two reasons given, and also because declaration raises quite a new principle, namely, principle of "security". This point was not mentioned, or even suggested in the old Article III which only gave physical reasons for Japanese troops remaining outside the Settlement. Chinese have met the Japanese on this question of security by preparing and bringing down a special constabulary. Chinese prefer to stand upon Article III as it was originally written, accompanied by Chinese voluntary declaration regarding special constabulary. The original Article III which mentions certain physical limitations preventing the removal at once of all Japanese forces into the Settlement is much more satisfactory, for it facilitates the setting up of a time table. The Chinese have no hostile intentions against the Settlement or against the French Concession; that fact alone should reassure all as to security; Chinese, however, have gone beyond and have provided for a special constabulary.

Uyeda. This argument put forward so eloquently by Mr. Quo is the same that we have heard so many times. It amounts merely to this: that they want us to give a time table for the withdrawal of our troops. I will
avoid

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avoid repetition of our arguments, and simply say that we cannot give any time table. Mr. Quo speaks of protecting Japanese residents; we appreciate his sentiment in this regard, but it is a clear fact that Japanese residents have experienced fear even before hostilities began, and since that time they have been persecuted; that is why it was necessary for us to bring our troops in to protect them. The standard for our withdrawal must be the safety of our residents, and this is the reason why we cannot name any time. I must again repeat that we sincerely hope that we can withdraw our troops as soon as possible.

Quo. General Uyeda speaks of Japanese nationals experiencing hardships,- this is new ground. The Chinese farmers around Shanghai have suffered hardships at the hands of Japanese troops a hundred times more severe than any which the Japanese have suffered. The Chinese position has been made quite clear. The present Conference was to limit its scope to three principles laid down at the informal discussions which led up to these formal meetings; when questions of this kind are raised we are exceeding the scope then laid down.

Uyeda. I did not mean to raise a new argument. It was called for only by Mr. Quo's remarks about efforts of Chinese to keep the Settlement safe.

Shigemitsu. We did not intend to raise a new
question;

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question; we were only trying to meet your side by our own formula.

Quo. I made Chinese voluntary declaration conditional upon Japanese acceptance of this article. The second sentence in Article III merely sets down physical reasons for keeping certain numbers of Japanese troops outside of the Settlement; it does not stipulate any political reasons.

Lampson. Has the Japanese side received any reply from its Government?

Shigemitsu. We have been repeatedly instructed not to accept a time limit.

Lampson. Even the word "expect"?

Shigemitsu. Even the word "expect" was turned down.

Lampson. What about this formula which I have offered:

"The Japanese Government take this opportunity to declare that, as soon as local conditions in and around Shanghai so improve as to afford a sense of security to Japanese nationals as regards the protection of their lives, property and lawful pursuits - and they hope that conditions will have so improved within six months or sooner - the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932."

Quo. The proposed Japanese declaration is unacceptable to my Government even with the additional words.

Lampson. If the Japanese refuse to accept a time limit, and the Chinese refuse to accept any device less
than

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than that, then we are up against it.

Quo. This statement about "local conditions" raises quite a new issue, and one which was not raised before. The second sentence in Paragraph 2 in Article III mentioned physical and not political conditions. Article III standing alone is clear enough.

Lampson. Well, the other method of handling the matter would be for the two sides to agree to differ. I therefore suggest this formula, which contemplates that the Japanese will make their declaration, while the Chinese will put their own interpretation upon it:

"The Chinese Government, in taking note of the declaration of the Japanese Government,

(Quote original Japanese declaration)

hereby place on record their understanding that the terms of the present agreement for rendering definite the cessation of hostilities and regulating the withdrawal of Japanese forces in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th will not be finally implemented until the Japanese troops have been withdrawn to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932, in accordance with the provisions of Article III of this agreement."

Quo. The Japanese declaration raises not only a political question, but also a question which the Chinese cannot accept. This involves a principle, namely: can a foreign power place troops here for the protection of its nationals whenever it so desires?

Lampson. It seems to me that we are faced with

three

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three alternatives: first, we may accept one, the Japanese declaration; second, we may agree to disagree; third, we may have no agreement at all. The third alternative will be a confession of failure which I think none of us wish.

Quo. We have not exhausted the possibilities. To have no agreement will not necessarily be a confession of failure. These negotiations are really taking place in accordance with the Assembly's Resolution of March 4th, indirectly under the supervision of the Assembly, and directly under the auspices of the four friendly powers. We have reached a deadlock, not a breakdown. The logical course to follow would be to refer the question to the Assembly, while the representatives of the friendly powers can make their independent reports. Perhaps this is the thing which we should do, for it might be possible, at a place far from the scene of conflict and strife, to find a way out. The Chinese Government does not wish to break the conference; it is in an extremely difficult position. Unless we obtain a time table the people of China will look upon our efforts as a failure and as being not in accord with the terms of the League Resolution.

Lampson. Well, Mr. Quo suggests a fourth alternative. We four are present here at the request of the League. If it is a question of going back and reporting

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ing to our Governments that there is a point upon which neither side can agree, it is possible that our mandate from the League will have been exhausted and we will have to have new instructions.

Uyeda. Any proposal to report to the League would be the last resort. It is too early to take this step. Mr. Quo refers to the fact that the people of Geneva are far from Shanghai and might for that reason make a cool decision. But, at the same time, they are so far away they do not know the real conditions here and might be mistaken in their judgment. For this reason I do not concur in the idea of reporting to the League at once. I wish to express my thanks for the efforts of representatives of the friendly powers in assisting us here. Out of respect for their presence we must report these new alternative proposals once more to our Government, although the instructions which we have received are quite different.

Quo. I wish to make it clear to you all that when I mentioned the fourth alternative I did so with due respect to all of your efforts. I did not wish to minimize in any way our hearty appreciation of the help given by the representatives of the four friendly powers. I feel that our discussions have got us no place and that perhaps a change of method might help. I heartily welcome General Uyeda's suggestion that we might yet

agree.

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agree. We have been willing to consider whatever suggestion has been made.

Lampson. General Uyeda has suggested that he will refer alternatives 1 and 2 to Tokyo.

Quo. The Japanese declaration with the insertion of a date makes the whole thing dependent upon conditions and will not have the reassuring effect upon our people which is desired. I offer this suggestion:

"The Japanese Government take this opportunity to declare that, in view of the rapid reestablishment of normal conditions in and around Shanghai, the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932, which withdrawal they expect to complete within three months."

Shigemitsu. (Examining Chinese text) The Japanese are quite ready to make a declaration expressing their willingness to withdraw. This declaration was acceptable to the Chinese with the addition of the sentence "which they expect will be completed in _____ or not later than _____." We had reason to believe that this declaration of ours met you, but now you give us this suggestion; you go back to your original formula. We cannot refer this formula to our Government.

Quo. If I did not make myself clear about your formula of a declaration, it is unfortunate. I said that the Japanese declaration introduced new issues; that it was not satisfactory either in substance or in form.

Shigemitsu.

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Shigemitsu. There is nothing new introduced in the Japanese declaration. It merely uses the substance of discussions which occurred at Geneva.

Quo. Those discussions at Geneva were ex parte, and therefore no more binding than the statement by Dr. W. W. Yen.

Lampson. I suggest that alternatives 1 and 2 be referred by each side to the Governments concerned.

Quo. I am sure that neither alternative will be acceptable to my Government, and Nanking feels that Japanese declaration offers ground for interpretation, while Article III as it stands is quite definite.

Lampson. Why not do without declaration, simply filing reservation?

Quo. I have another suggestion: that the Japanese write us a note defining the word "temporary".

Lampson. Here is a draft of a formula which we will call 2-A:

"The Chinese authorities, in concluding this agreement for rendering definite the cessation of hostilities and regulating the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th, hereby place on record their understanding that the spirit of the said Resolution and the terms of the present agreement will not be finally implemented until the Japanese troops have been withdrawn to the areas in the International Settlement and Hongkew District occupied by them before the incident of January 28, 1932, in accordance with the provisions of Article III of this agreement."

Quo.

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Quo. This formula does not add anything. It is preferable to 2. Unless we can have a time table I cannot sign, nor will the Chinese Government be able to find a representative who will sign.

Lampson. We now have three or four alternatives.

Shigemitsu. Alternative 1 almost meets your point; we are willing to refer it to Tokyo. Tokyo has definitely turned down the additional words "which they expect to be accomplished by _____".

Quo. I would like to refer all of this to Nanking, but they are so clearly against our instructions.

Shigemitsu. Do you not think that our Governments, taking into account everything, will wish to reconsider their decisions. After all, it is a matter of public opinion; we could lead our respective publics on the subject.

Quo. I can consider only two alternatives: 2-A and this text of mine.

Lampson. Alternative 2-A has this to recommend it: on numerous occasions General Uyeda and Mr. Shigemitsu have stated that they were willing to withdraw as soon as possible; with 2-A you can feel free to bring the matter up at any time. If you feel that the question of withdrawal is unduly delayed you do not abandon your point.

Shigemitsu. I cannot refer the Chinese suggestion
to

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to my Government, for it complicates the matter for ourselves.

Lampson. I suggest that alternative 2-A be given consideration by the Chinese, and that alternatives 1 and 2-A be given consideration by the Japanese side.

Quo. I suggest that we leave the interpretation of Article III to the League Assembly. When I suggested reporting the matter to the League I did not want to break the Conference. I would refer the whole agreement to the Assembly of the League and ask for an interpretation of Article III.

Lampson. I would suggest that the two sides refer to their home Governments alternatives 1, 2, and 2-A. We will hold in reserve alternative 2-B offered by Mr. Lagarde which reads:

"The two Governments undertake to examine upon the expiry of a period of _____ months the situation prevailing at Shanghai. They will then fix the date of the final evacuation, taking into account their strong desire to see reestablished as soon as possible the state of affairs existing before January 28, 1932. It would only be if it were evident that conditions were then of such a kind as to cause anxiety to the Japanese residents that the postponement at that time of the completion of the withdrawal would be considered."


Quo. I have already made myself clear, but will refer these alternatives. Before we disperse I wish to make it clear that in referring the alternatives to my Government I am doing so against instructions, because none of them contain any time limit or time table. Only
alternative

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alternative 1 contains any reference to a time, and
that is so diluted it means nothing.

The meeting adjourned until Saturday, April 9th,
at 3 p.m.


Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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13th Formal Meeting.

Shanghai, April 9, 1932.
Saturday, 5 p.m.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
General Uyeda
General Tashiro
Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Tai Chi, Woosung Garrison Commander
General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Lagarde (French Minister being ill).

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

Lampson. When we adjourned the last time we had before us certain alternative proposals which were to be referred for the reactions of the two interested Governments.

Uyeda. The reply of the Japanese Government, if I say it conclusively, is that they prefer the first alternative if the Chinese accept:

"The Japanese Government take this opportunity to declare that, as soon as local conditions in and around Shanghai so improve as to afford a sense of security to Japanese nationals as regards the protection of their lives, property and lawful pursuits - and they hope that conditions will have so improved within six months or sooner - the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew District as before the incident of January 28, 1932."

Even

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Even this is less than we wished, but in view of the hard labor of the representatives of the participating friendly powers we wish to aid in bringing the negotiations to a rapid conclusion.

Quo. Before referring the three alternatives to the Nanking Government I made it clear to the meeting that I was doing so quite contrarily to my instructions. I was quite sure that they would be unacceptable to Nanking. My instructions bear out my conclusions: the first alternative is not acceptable to the Chinese Government, for even though there is a period of six months mentioned the period does not mean that the troops will withdraw. I desire to ask Mr. Shigemitsu what is meant by this "Rengo" despatch which I now hand to him:

"Tokyo, April 9th.

"Mr. Yoshizawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, last night despatched instructions to Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister to China, to accept the first proposal of the three made by Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister, regarding the timetable for the withdrawal of Japanese troops.

"The Japanese Government, in the instruction, expresses its intention to agree to the first measure in principle rather than the second and third, the acceptance of which may accompany the possibility of giving an excuse to the Chinese to evade the round-table conference in case the agreement for cessation of hostilities was not fulfilled. The Japanese Government, in adopting the first proposal, especially wants to emphasize clearly and effectively the following two points:

"1. The first proposal includes a clause that the Japanese Government hopes that the conditions be improved within six months, but the clause does not mean the Japanese Government's promise to withdraw troops to the International Settlement and to extra-Settlement roads within six months. In this connection,

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connection, the Japanese Government wants to make clearly known that the clause above mentioned only expresses Japan's hope that the local conditions be improved in that period of time so as to enable the Japanese troops to withdraw.

"2. The opening of the round-table conference should be guaranteed in connection with the Japanese statement."

Shigemitsu. (Apparently very much embarrassed:)

I have received no such instructions.

Quo. Nanking has an alternative draft which I hand you herewith. It is:

"The Japanese Government take this opportunity to declare that the Japanese troops will, as soon as possible, be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew District as before the incident of January 28, 1932 in accordance with the provisions of Article III of the agreement, it being expected that such withdrawal will be completed within a period of four months or sooner during which normal conditions in and around Shanghai will have been re-established."

Shigemitsu. I cannot entertain your draft; I am sorry.

Quo. I am sorry, but this represents the reply of my Government.

Shigemitsu. I wish I were in a position to entertain your proposal, but I cannot. The same suggestion has been made on a number of occasions. We agreed to submit the three proposals to our Government, but now you bring in an entirely new proposal. If you offer such a proposal which contains phraseology similar to the original phraseology, then we must withdraw our acceptance.

Quo. In your declaration you bring up the question of security. This is a new question and it was originally understood

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understood that no new matters of principle should be discussed. We took care of the question of security by the special constabulary, and we considered that that point had been covered. But now you bring up a new principle.

Shigemitsu. The constabulary will help a great deal but does not meet the situation. This is our declaration. When you added the sentence to our declaration the other day I felt that the addition which is now in there would help to meet your point.

Quo. But I told you at the last meeting that I was overruled by my Government. This suggestion that I now offer represents my Government's view.

Lampson (to Quo:) To which particular phrase in alternative 1 do you object?

Quo. I have just mentioned the point. It is the phrase concerning "security to Japanese nationals as regards the protection of their lives, property and lawful pursuits". So long as we are human we are never secure anywhere. That phrase is too broad; it will cause a great deal of discussion among my people. It is impossible to state when one has a sense of security. We have taken special steps in this matter by having constabulary.

Lampson. I gather that you do not like the phrase about security?

Quo.

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Quo. Yes.

Johnson. It seems to me the parties are so close together now that we ought to find a way through. Like engineers building a tunnel from either side of a mountain, you have now approached within a very short distance of one another, and it merely requires a blow of the pick to break the wall. I am sure that Mr. Shigemitsu and Mr. Quo between them will be able to deal that blow. We must not leave this room admitting failure.

Shigemitsu. We are discussing alternatives 1, 2, and 3. If new issues are raised we get nowhere.

Lampson. Let us examine alternative 1 and the suggestion now offered by Mr. Quo. The Japanese favor the word "hope"; the Chinese favor the word "expect". The Japanese have a period of six months mentioned; the Chinese prefer four months.

Shigemitsu. It is the construction that makes the difficulty. If it is changed we are embarrassed. We have taken much time

Lampson. Well, I was just trying to see what the differences are. (Going on:) The Chinese mention "normal conditions"; the Japanese mention "security". Now, as between the words "expect" and "hope", there is no difference in the meaning. As between the terms "six months" and "four months", there is a difference of two months. The term "normal conditions" covers "security".

Why

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Why can we not here get a phraseology that will be acceptable to both sides? (Offering a suggestion which he and Mr. Johnson had privately discussed:) how would it do to drop the phrase "so improve as to afford a sense of security to Japanese nationals as regards the protection of their lives, property and lawful pursuits" and substitute therefor the phrase "return to normal"? The meaning is exactly the same: when conditions return to normal it means that security is afforded.

Shigemitsu. Is there any difference? One side may think it normal; the other side may not. This is our declaration; it is no one else's.

Quo. I made myself very clear when I undertook to refer the three alternatives to Nanking. I did not commit myself or my Government. Alternative No. 1 does not satisfy us; this redraft that I offer is not satisfactory either, but it is an attempt.

Lampson. Mr. Quo, what is your view as regards my suggestion?

Quo. It means the same thing in a general sense; I am willing to consider the suggestion. But even with this suggested change I must refer it to Nanking.

Shigemitsu. Our acceptance is subject to your acceptance; otherwise we must withdraw.

Quo. We have all along asked for a time table; we are justified in doing so. We regard the presence of a

large

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large army here in Shanghai as unnecessary. The continued occupation by an alien force of Chinese territory is unacceptable; that is why we think a time table very conciliatory.

Shigemitsu. Article III stipulates withdrawal. In this declaration we state that we hope to withdraw soon.

Quo. (Pointing to the Rengo despatch:) I want to know what is meant by that Rengo report.

Shigemitsu. (Obviously embarrassed:) that is not an official interpretation.

Quo. (Quoting the Rengo:) it does not mean that you promise to withdraw to the Settlement.

Shigemitsu. They give out very irresponsible news.

Quo. But this has all the appearance of having been given out by very responsible people.

Shigemitsu. This news despatch surprises me very much. I have had no such instructions from my Government.

Quo. Then the Rengo agency is not an official agency of the Japanese Government?

Shigemitsu. It is not.

Quo. May I quote you in these matters?

Shigemitsu. You may.

Quo. This statement will be published in all of our papers, and in light of your declaration this will

have

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have a very bad effect.

Shigemitsu. Sometimes they fabricate news.

Lampson. (Examining the despatch:) this Rengo is very misleading. Of course it may be due to faulty translation; it conveys a misleading idea.

Shigemitsu. This is not authentic news. I have had no such instructions. Frankly, I thought that in giving to you this declaration you were being given the substance, while our Japanese people would be given some reassurance. I felt that we could wind up the situation; I thought that we were going half way.

6 p.m. Quo. As Sir Miles and Mr. Johnson point out, the wording of the Chinese and Japanese proposals is virtually the same.

Shigemitsu. This gives us more trouble.

Quo. The best I can do is to take alternative 1 and refer it to Nanking with the change suggested just now by Sir Miles; otherwise it has already been sent to Nanking.

Shigemitsu. In that case I also must submit it to my Government.

6.15 p.m. Quo. This is the best that I can do; submit Article I to Nanking with suggested change.

Shigemitsu. I do not mind if you try to do that. We have referred this several times; we thought it was the last time.

Quo.

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Quo. I have made myself quite clear. Even with the suggested change I am not sure that Nanking will accept.

Lampson. Well, we are so near together...

Shigemitsu. That is why we made our supreme effort.

6.21 p.m. Lampson. The only way to handle this is for the two sides to report to their Governments that they are stuck. I threw in my few words hoping they would help.

Quo. I have said I was willing to refer the matter to Nanking.

Lampson. If we have reached the stage of being stuck, then I think we must report to our Governments, for the meeting at Geneva takes place on the 11th.

Quo. I suggested that the other day.

Lampson. (His attention to it having been called by Mr. Johnson:) I see by the Resolution of March 4th that we are required to report upon the progress of the negotiations to Geneva. So far we have not been in a position to say anything, for we wished to say that all was agreed.

Johnson. I think there is nothing else to do, but we are so close that I would hope some agreement might be found.

Quo. I am ready to refer to my Government.

Lampson. The only alternative is that the two representatives report to their Governments that they are
stuck,

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stuck, and then we four will send identic telegrams to our Governments under the Resolution of March 4th.

6.30 p.m. Quo. I will refer it to my Government.

Shigemitsu. I am willing to await the receipt of Mr. Quo's instructions; but for me it is unnecessary to refer. If I get my Government to accept this, then Mr. Quo will bring in another proposal.

Johnson. It seems to me that both sides should refer.

Shigemitsu. It is not worth while. (After a long pause:) what was your suggestion, Sir Miles?

Lampson. (Reads new phraseology):

"The Japanese Government take this opportunity to declare that as soon as local conditions in and around Shanghai return to normal - and they hope that conditions will have so returned within six months or sooner - the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew District as before the incident of January 28, 1932."

Shigemitsu. Is Dr. Quo willing to refer this to his Government?

Quo. It involves a serious undertaking on my side.

Lampson. It involves sacrifice on both sides.

Quo. It is an abandonment of the position that I have taken all along. Mr. Shigemitsu insists that he has done his best; so have we. (After a pause): all right; I will refer to Nanking your suggestion, and on the understanding that that Rengo news report is not correct.

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correct. That news when published will have a disturbing effect upon the Chinese public.

Shigemitsu. It is most unfortunate.

Lampson. Will the Japanese side be willing to refer the new phraseology to their Government?

Shigemitsu. May we consult among ourselves and later give you an answer?

(6.40 p.m.)

(6.45 p.m.)

Shigemitsu asks whether he can let us know.

Lampson. Yes.

We adjourn until 3 p.m. on Monday, April 11th.

N.T.J.
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

Footnote: Subsequently Japanese informed Sir Miles that they had decided to refer matter to Tokyo.

NTJ.EA

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 1, 1932.

~~FROM:~~
~~TO:~~

Consul General Peck transmits herewith a memorandum of conversation between Vice Consul Wailes and a Mr. Shao, until recently an interpreter at the Japanese Consulate at Nanking, in which Mr. Shao makes some statements in regard to the plans and activities of the Japanese Government. The memorandum consists of only a page and a half and I suggest that it be read in its entirety.



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No. D-251

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate General
Nanking, China.

April 15, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy - Chinese
Reports regarding Japanese plans.

Confidential.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum of a conversation held on April 12, 1932, by Vice Consul Wailes, of this office, with a Mr. Shao who was, until recently, an interpreter at the Japanese Consulate General in Nanking. The conversation related to reports of Japanese plans in regard to activities in China. While the statements of Mr. Shao obviously can not be substantiated, nevertheless, they are in general accord with other reports in circulation among the Chinese, which apparently are given general credence by them. The conviction on the part of the Chinese that the Japanese militarists are carrying out a pre-determined program of aggression in China probably has a great deal to do with the stubbornness the Chinese are showing and their insistence on comparatively unimportant points, e.g., that the Japanese shall fix a definite time limit for the withdrawal of Japanese troops at Shanghai.

In regard

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In regard to item 7 of the attached memorandum, which describes the attempt of the Japanese Consulate General to obtain news regarding Chinese troops movements, it is rather surprising, but it seems to be a fact, that the Japanese in Nanking do not seem to have been fully or accurately informed in recent months regarding Chinese troop movements in this area. The Japanese Acting Consul General, judging from remarks made by him to the American Consul General, seems to have been convinced by some of the local Chinese military officers that the Chinese Government has all along been opposed to the fighting at Shanghai and has sent no troops to the Shanghai area, except with a view to protecting Nanking from attack by the 19th Route Army. The actual fact has been, as ascertained from unofficial Chinese sources and from American missionaries, that troops have been moving almost continuously from the interior to the Shanghai area and that many of these reinforcements took their places on the front line before the general withdrawal on March 1. This office was informed by a usually reliable Chinese source a few days ago that two of three "Han chien", i.e. "Chinese traitors", had been arrested at the railway station and severely treated, on the ground that they were engaged in sending military information to the Japanese.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck

Willys R. Peck,
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

One memorandum, dated April 12, 1932.

In triplicate to the Department of State.
 In duplicate to the American Legation, Peiping.
 Single copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.
 Single copy to the American Minister, Shanghai.

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April 12, 1932.

Memorandum of Conversation

Mr. Shao - until recently Interpreter of the Japanese
Consulate at Nanking.
Vice Consul Wailes.

Mr. Shao called on the writer at his home at 6 p.m.
on April 12, 1932, and after discussing some personal
affairs which were the object of his visit, he made the
following statements:

1. The Japanese Government formulated a plan last year
for the capture of the coastal provinces of China, a
strip of territory 50 li wide on each side of the
Yangtze from its mouth to Hankow, all of Manchuria,
Inner Mongolia, and the Philippine Islands. The plan
was not to be put into effect until 1936, at which
time Japan, with the assistance of arms from Germany
and Russia, who would be given certain trade advantages
in Manchuria in return, felt that she would be in a
position to withstand attacks from the other powers.
General Honjo's action in Manchuria was premature and
has caused considerable dissension at Tokyo.
2. Japan has eighty two submarines. It is believed that
the American forces in the Philippines could be captured
in one week. Reinforcements would take at least that
long to arrive from the United States, and sixty of the
eighty two submarines could probably prevent American
troop transports from reaching the Philippines.
3. By 1936, Labor and financial troubles in England and
France would be such as to prevent their entering a
war in the Far East.
4. Now that Japanese troops are in Shanghai, it is her
intention to maintain a force of twenty thousand men

there

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there, as well as to retain her present hold over Manchuria.

5. From May 1, 1930, to May 1, 1931, the local telegraph bill of the Japanese Government was Mex.\$44,000.00
From May 1931 to February 1, 1932, the bill was Mex.\$72,000.00.
6. Since the beginning of trouble in Manchuria in September the Japanese Consulate at Nanking has kept one man in a Chinese Hotel in the city and one in Hsiakwan to learn what news they can about Chinese troop movements etc. Daily reports are made to the Consulate. Both of these men are Japanese.
7. At present there are eight Japanese police guarding the Consulate, but no Japanese soldiers.
8. A radio set with three operators has been maintained at the Japanese Consulate for many months.

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 By Milton C. Hueston NARS, Date 12-15-75

Department of State with
 copy retained in the
 American Legation at Peking

FE

評日人五十四案
JAPAN'S FIFTY-FOUR CASES

BY

SHUHSI HSÜ, PH. D.

*Professor of Political Science and
 Dean of the College of Public Affairs
 Yenching University*

著 希 淑 徐

F/LS

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Peiping, 1932

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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JAPAN'S FIFTY-FOUR CASES

BY

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Peiping, 1932

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAPAN'S FIFTY-FOUR CASES

BY SHUHSI HSÜ

The following pages contain an examination of the fifty-four cases given out by the Japanese as pending against China. The author does not pretend to achieve the disinterestedness of an inhabitant of Mars in undertaking the task: he would be equally inhuman, if he could be equally detached. But every effort has been made to get the basic facts which are essential to a thorough consideration of the larger issues of treaty law. In this effort he is deeply indebted to the cooperation of a number of friends from Manchuria including several professors of the Northeastern University and ex-directors of railways or government departments.

An examination reveals that in most of the cases the Japanese are unable to make a *prima facie* case against China, and in fact only succeed in showing how Japanese aggression is at work in a normal time, and what the Japanese can contribute toward their national aggrandisement as individuals. Perhaps the only cases that may merit attention are those that arise from the difference in attitude between the two countries with regard to the status of the treaties concluded under the Twenty-one Demands and of the loans and loan agreements generally known after their promoter, the notorious Nishihara. But cases of this kind are suitable for submission to international adjudication, and could have been so disposed of in view of China's known readiness to have recourse to that method of

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settlement. One cannot understand why the Japanese chose the course of September 18th.

In the present examination use is made of both the Chinese translation of the list of cases that appeared in the *Chen Pao* of Peiping between October 31st and November 2nd and the list given out in English by the Japanese Consulate-General in Shanghai as published on the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* of November 3rd. Of the two the Peiping version is, however, taken as standard, for although the Shanghai consulate shows better judgment in leaving out a few of the glaringly trivial, the Chinese translation is evidently more faithful to the original, being comparatively free from obvious errors.

GROUP I.—CASES RELATING TO RAILWAYS^a

No. 1. *Alleged violation of an understanding in the construction of the Tahushan-Tungliao and Peishanchengze-Hsian Railways.*^b

The understanding referred to is one recorded in the minutes of the Peking Conference of 1905.^c It reads as follows:

The Government of China, for the purpose of protecting the interest of the Chinese Eastern Railway [*i.e.*, the section of

^a The grouping is the author's.

^b The numbering is based upon the Peking version.

^c The minutes have been kept secret by the Chinese Government at the request of the Japanese until now in spite of the fact that portions of them were revealed to third parties by the Japanese under the title of "secret protocols" shortly after the Conference was over. The Japanese statement that secrecy was maintained "in deference to the desire of the Chinese government" which appears in MacMur-ray, Vol. I, Page 554, is contrary to the fact.

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the Chinese Eastern Railway south of Changchun then under consideration] consent that prior to the recovery of the said railway they will not construct in its neighborhood parallel trunk line, and branch line that is prejudicial to its interest.^a

In this understanding the Chinese Plenipotentiaries consent on behalf of the Chinese government that the latter will not construct in the "neighborhood" of the South Manchuria Railway "parallel trunk line, and branch line that is prejudicial to its interest." The question seems to be whether such a line as the Tahushan-Tungliao Railway is in the "neighborhood" of the South Manchuria Railway, and, if it is, whether it is a "parallel trunk line," or "branch line that is prejudicial to its interest." What then is the meaning of the term "neighborhood?"

The minutes of the Peking Conference do not record the discussion on the understanding and, so far as those documents are concerned, we are left in the dark as to the meaning of the term "neighborhood." But if we turn to the correspondence between China and Japan over the Hsinmin-Faku project, when the understanding was first invoked, enough light will be shed on the question. One of the notes is of special importance. It is addressed by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Japanese Legation at Peking. It denied strongly that the projected railway was one contemplated by the understanding for, it pointed out, its distance from the South Manchuria Railway was not less than usually regarded as proper in Europe and America. It then went on to say:

^a The translation is the author's.

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Your Excellency refers to the minutes of the Sino-Japanese Conference, and declares that the Chinese government has disregarded her engagement and taken action prejudicial to the interest of the South Manchurian Railway. Probably your Excellency is not aware of the fact that at the time the plenipotentiaries of China and Japan discussed the matter the plenipotentiaries of China maintained that the word "parallel" was too comprehensive and that it was necessary to give distance in miles, stating definitely that within so many miles no parallel line could be constructed. The Japanese plenipotentiaries, however, thought that if the number of miles were fixed, it might create the impression in other countries that there was an intention to restrict Chinese railway enterprise. The Chinese plenipotentiaries then asked that the number of miles between the parallel lines be fixed in accordance with the practice of Europe and America. The Japanese plenipotentiaries said the practice was not uniform and that no statement was necessary. And they added a declaration that Japan would do nothing to prevent China from any steps she might take in the future for the development of Manchuria. The declaration was made in all sincerity and with consideration for the interests of a friendly nation. This is what we both ought to observe.^a

At this point the Chinese note passed on to point out at great length that, quite contrary to Japanese apprehension, the line when opened would tend to increase the traffic of the South Manchuria Railway, since commerce served by such a line would naturally take the route to Dairen, as Tientsin and Yingkow were ice-bound ports.

^a Translation made by the author in *China and Her Political Entity*, Page 295. Original text may be found in *Tung san sheng cheng lueh*, Administrative Records of the Three Eastern Provinces, Vol. XI, Page 46, left front.

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Another note of equal importance is addressed by the Japanese Legation to the Chinese Foreign Office. It reads:

Precedents of special concession made by the Chinese government may be found in the agreement of 1898 between the Russo-Chinese Bank and Chinese officials concerning the Chengting-Taiyuan Railway and the agreement of the same year between the Peking Syndicate and Shansi officials prohibiting the construction of competing lines within one hundred *li* on both sides of the Chengting-Taiyuan Railway. The idea is that one hundred *li* is a competing area in which no construction of other lines should be permitted. It is evident that the Chinese government cannot constantly cite the practice of Europe and America as the basis of argument.^a

Several points stand out clearly in the foregoing documents: First, in spite of Chinese efforts, no definition was reached in the Peking Conference because the Japanese preferred to give a general assurance instead. Second, when it came to the application in a specific case, the Japanese found the general assurance too much in their way and voluntarily cited some definite precedent. Third, the precedent thus cited gave 100 *li*, i.e., 30 miles on both sides of the railway as the area. The first and second points of course only throw light on the question at issue; but the third actually supplies us with the meaning that we have sought.

According, then, to the Japanese the "neighborhood" in the understanding means 30 miles on either side of the main line of the South Manchuria Railway. And this interpretation ought to be fair enough to them whatever it may be to the Chinese. This is so especially in view of the assurance they

^a From copy of an unpublished document in the author's possession.

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gave in the Peking Conference; and of their engagement to the same effect made in Article IV of the Portsmouth Treaty over which the Peking Conference was held. It may also be added that the Japanese seem to have acted upon this interpretation until they come to the Tahushan-Tungliao case. When the Chinchow-Aigun project was mooted, Japan did raise objection, but not on the basis that the line was in the "neighborhood" of the South Manchuria Railway. When the Mukden-Hailung line was built, she did not even raise objection.

By the foregoing examination of the case it is evident that the Japanese claim that in constructing the Tahushan-Tungliao Railway China violates an understanding, is entirely groundless. By rail, Tahushan is 85 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Mukden, and Tungliao, 126 miles from Ssuping kai. In the former case the distance is more than twice and a half 100 li; in the latter case, more than four times. Even if China should officially accept the Japanese interpretation of the term "neighborhood," that railway would not be within it.

As to the Peishanchengtze-Hsian Railway, the case can be more easily disposed of. Even if for the sake of argument we should grant that the line is in the "neighborhood" of the South Manchuria Railway, the Japanese position would be just as untenable. The line is built for the transportation of coal from Hsian and by its nature does not come into competition with the South Manchuria Railway. It is a "branch line that is" not "prejudicial to its interest."

No. 2. *Alleged disregard of the agreement concerning the extension of the Peking-Mukden Railway.*

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In the Japanese complaint the particular provision in the agreement referred to is specified as Article VI, which translated from the Chinese original, reads as follows:

Trains of the Peking-Mukden Railway arriving at Mukden which make connections with the South Manchuria Railway (for instance, through express trains) shall pass through the Mukden Station of the South Manchuria Railway to the City Wall Station *via* the connecting line. Trains leaving the City Wall Station which make connections with the South Manchuria Railway shall also pass through the Mukden Station of the South Manchuria Railway *via* the connecting line. This does not apply to special trains, freight trains and trains which do not need to make connections with the South Manchuria Railway.^a

The authorities of the Peking-Mukden Railway suspect that the complaint is directed against the through express trains which have been operated recently between Peiping and Kirin, as these, unlike those that run between Peiping and Mukden, are not routed to pass through the Mukden Station of the South Manchuria Railway. The question is then: can the Japanese position be justified on the basis claimed by them?

The trains that are to pass through the Japanese station are given in the article specified by the Japanese as trains arriving at Mukden or leaving it which "make connections with the South Manchuria Railway (for instance, through express trains)." As to which are the trains

^a It will be interesting to compare the current translation in MacMurray (Vol. I, Page 795) with this translation, especially the clause within brackets and the last sentence of the article. For the Chinese text see *Yo chang lui yao*, Collection of the More Important Treaties, Vol. I, Page 204.

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that "make connections with the South Manchuria Railway," nothing express is said. The phrase, "for instance, through express trains," which appears within brackets after the quoted sentence is no clearer itself, and therefore throws no additional light on the question. It will be necessary to go beyond the specified article itself to find out its meaning.

Two sections in the agreement are pertinent. One is Article II which reads:

The Chinese government agrees to order the Peking-Mukden Railway Administration to build a direct connecting line between the City Wall Station of the Peking-Mukden Railway and the Mukden Station of the South Manchuria Railway to facilitate transportation.^a

The other pertinent section is the preamble which states that the agreement, which, by the way, is dated September 2, 1911, is negotiated in pursuance of Article V of the agreement of September 4, 1909 in which a number of questions relating to mines and railways in Manchuria are settled. The article of the agreement of 1909 reads:

The Government of Japan declares that it has no objection to the extension of the Peking-Mukden Railway to the city wall of Mukden. Practical measures for such extension shall be adjusted and determined by the local Japanese and Chinese authorities and technical experts.^b

From the foregoing examination it becomes clear that the statement in Article VI of the 1911 agreement regarding the trains that "make connections with the South Manchuria Rail-

^a For Chinese text and current English translation see last citation.

^b MacMurray, Vol. I, page 791.

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way (for instance, through express trains)" is simply a reference to what in general would naturally follow as a result of the building of a direct connecting line between the Chinese city wall station and the Japanese station, and not an embodiment of an engagement on the part of China to bind herself to the particular course of action which the Japanese desire. The "local * * * Chinese authorities and technical experts" that negotiated the 1911 agreement could only adjust and determine "practical measures" incidental to the extension of the Peking-Mukden Railway to the city wall of Mukden. Within their power they did agree to the building of a direct connecting line between the Chinese and Japanese stations "to facilitate transportation." They further agreed to run such trains as make connections with the South Manchuria Railway through the Japanese station first. But they could not, without exceeding their power, have agreed to run all through express trains in the same manner. It is, of course, possible for negotiators to exceed their power honestly or even intentionally; but the text in this case does not indicate that probability.

It may also be pointed out that even if the Japanese interpretation be granted as correct, the claim they make still cannot be sustained. As the agreement of 1911 was concluded with reference to the Peking-Mukden Railway long before the lines east of Mukden were even projected, it could refer only to trains running between Peiping and Mukden, and not to trains running between Peiping and Kirin.

No. 3. *Disregard of an agreement in the construction of the Kirin-Hailung Railway.*

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The agreement referred to was concluded between the Anfu government and the Industrial Bank of Japan on September 28, 1918.^a It purported to be preliminary in nature, entered into "with the object of concluding a loan contract for the purpose of building four railways in Manchuria, including one "between Kirin and Kaiyuan by way of Hailung." In reality it was a means through which the notorious Japanese agent Nishihara supplied one of his loans, in this case 20,000,000 yen, for the war chest of the Anfu Party which was then carrying on military campaigns against the people.

In spite of the provision in Article VIII of the agreement that "a formal loan contract shall be concluded within four months after the conclusion of the present preliminary agreement," no such step has ever been taken. The Anfu government which lasted well beyond the stipulated period was naturally not enthusiastic about the matter. As to the governments that followed, they were even less ready to see the consummation of the process, for they had the additional consideration that the people were absolutely opposed even to the recognition of the agreement itself.

Nothing, therefore, was done for a number of years. In the meantime the need for the development of the country east of the South Manchuria Railway as well as for a direct connecting line between Mukden and Kirin became daily more evident, and yet it would be impossible to build the railway on the basis of the preliminary agreement in view not only of popular disapproval, but also of the dead weight of 20,000,000 yen. In the end in June, 1927, eight years and five months after the

^a For current English text see MacMurray, Vol. II, Page 1448.

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extinction of the four-month period allowed for the conclusion of a formal agreement, the government of the Three Eastern Provinces decided to build the railway with funds provided by the people and the government themselves. The work was completed in two years.

From the nature of the case it is evident that the Japanese complaint has no justifiable ground. In supplying a loan to the Anfu Party for civil war purposes the Industrial Bank of Japan knew that it was taking sides in an internal struggle and therefore ought to be ready for certain consequences. It would be a very friendly gesture on the part of the Chinese people, if they should allow their government to return the money advanced. But so far as the Industrial Bank is concerned, it has neither a legal, nor a moral, right to expect such a generous act, still less to estop China from building with her own money one of the railways mentioned in the agreement.

No. 4. *Disregard of an alleged agreement to construct the Changchun-Talai and Tunghua-Hueining Railways.*

According to the Japanese the agreement referred to was one entered into between the Ministry of Communications and the South Manchuria Railway on June 25, 1927, one of the last days of the Peking regime under the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin.

Inquiry at the various government offices that might possibly be concerned has revealed that the Chinese government is not in possession of a copy of the alleged document and in fact has, at least officially, no knowledge of the existence of such an agreement.

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Some of those who were connected with the Peking government of the time, however, said that some sort of an agreement concerning the two railways under discussion was known to have been signed by a member of the Ministry of Communications with an agent of the South Manchuria Railway. But, they continued, the member of the Ministry, so far as they knew, was not the Minister himself, but a bureau head, and the date of signature was not June 25th as alleged by the Japanese, but June 23rd. The reason the Japanese have alleged the 25th instead of the 23rd is, they think, because the bureau head received an order to take charge of the affairs of the Ministry on the 24th on account of the absence of the Minister.

It is evident from the foregoing account that perhaps there is some such an agreement as alleged, but that the legal character of this document is of a doubtful standing. Even if the non-official description of the irregularities be ignored, the fact that the document was signed by a minor officer at the last stage in a civil war, when the opposed party had expressly declared to the world that it would not recognize any international agreement entered into by the other party, would be enough to render the document null and void. It is, therefore, difficult to see what legitimate complaint the Japanese can make in the case.

No. 5. *Alleged restriction on the rights of the adviser to the Taonan-Anganchi Railway.*

This railway was constructed by the South Manchuria Railway on behalf of the Mukden government on funds advanced by the Japanese railway. Article V of the contract providing for the matter reads:

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The Director of the railway shall appoint an adviser nominated by B [i. e., the South Manchuria Railway Company] to serve on the railway, the contract of engagement to be drawn up by the Director.

The power of the said adviser shall be regulated separately.

By an exchange of notes on the same day the contract for the construction of the railway was signed, the power of the Japanese adviser is thus regulated:

The adviser shall be in charge of all receipts and disbursements on behalf the railway. He shall sign all bills jointly with the Director, and may within the needs of his function select not more than two Japanese employees as his assistants.

The notes further provides that the adviser will act as the representative of the South Manchuria Railway Company in its relations with the railway.^a

According to the railway authorities, at the time the first adviser was appointed the South Manchuria Railway Company submitted a request for two assistants for the adviser, one to be in charge of traffic and the other, construction. The railway administration declined to give consideration on account of the fact that the functions thus suggested for the assistants went beyond the original understanding. In the end the South Manchuria Railway Company did not insist upon the request. The railway authorities are at a loss to understand why the rights of the adviser are thus restricted.

As to signing the bills jointly with the Director, the railway authorities declare that no attempt has been made to

^a Copy of this agreement, which is dated September 3, 1924, and accompanying notes are in author's possession.

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restrict this. They produce examples of bill blanks in which reservation for the signature of the adviser is clearly indicated as one of the evidences against the charge.

No. 6. *Alleged failure to appoint a Japanese chief accountant for the Kirin-Tunghua Railway.*

For the construction of the said railway a contract^a was entered into between the Chinese government and the South Manchuria Railway in 1925. By the terms of this contract the latter was not only to undertake the construction on behalf of the former, but was to advance the necessary expenses. Furthermore, the Chinese Director of the Railway was to appoint a Japanese chief engineer during the period of construction, and a Japanese chief accountant, when the whole railway is in operation until the fund advanced is repaid, in both cases with power to countersign the bills of receipt and disbursement.

In 1928 the work was completed, but on account of its poor quality the Chinese government has not even now taken over the railway in a formal way, although through the Director of the railway it has been in actual control ever since the work began. In consequence of the situation the Japanese chief accountant has never been appointed, but on the other hand, neither has the Japanese chief engineer been discharged.

It seems, therefore, that if the Japanese have any complaint at all, it should be made on the account of the refusal to take over the railway formally rather than of the failure to appoint a chief accountant. This is so especially when the object of the appointment, which is evidently the protection of Japanese

^a Copy of text in author's possession.

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interest in the funds advanced, is fully served by the continuation of the chief engineer in service.

No. 7. *Disregard of protest against the establishment of connection between the Tahushan-Tungliao and Ssupingkai-Taonan Railways at Tungliao.*

The Japanese protest must have been made on the ground that the Tahushan-Tungliao Railway was under protest. If so, this case falls down with the other (No. 1) which has been shown above to be based upon no substantial ground.

As a matter of fact, even if their protest against the construction of the Tahushan-Tungliao Railway had been sound, the Japanese could still have acquiesced at its connection with the Ssupingkai-Taonan Railway, if not for other reason, for the benefit to be derived by the Ssupingkai-Taonan Railway, which is already insolvent on account of faults for which they are chiefly responsible. But evidently they are more interested in frustrating Chinese railway enterprise than in coöperating with it.

No. 8. *Alleged repudiation of the Through Traffic Agreement between the South Manchuria and Ssupingkai-Taonan Railways.*

The agreement referred to, according to the Commission on Communications in Manchuria, has never been repudiated. In making the complaint the Japanese evidently have in mind the rejection by the said commission of the proposal to extend the terms of the agreement to cover the Korean Railways submitted by the South Manchuria Railway in 1928. But this, it is clear, is different from what has been alleged.

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One can readily see that if the proposal were accepted, the Antung-Mukden line of the South Manchuria Railway would profit by it. But what, then, have the Japanese to offer as a compensation for the loss which the Tahushan-Tungliao Railway will sustain? The consideration of Japanese interest alone has undoubtedly been responsible for many of the troubles in Manchuria.

No. 9. *Objection to the statement of construction accounts of the Kirin-Tunghua and Taonan-Anganchi Railways.*

The Kirin-Tunghua Railway was built by the South Manchuria Railway on behalf of the Chinese government under a contract dated October 24, 1925, but on account of the poor quality of the work it has not been formally taken over by the latter since its completion in 1928. According to the report of an expert committee appointed by the Chinese government, on the civil engineering side, where abuse could most easily creep in, the account of 13,477,300 yen represented an amount of work worth, in their estimate, only about 7,970,000 yen, a difference of 5,507,300 yen. It is perhaps because of the stock-taking method employed by the expert committee in evaluating the quality of the work that the case has taken on the appearance of a wrangling over accounts.

The Taonan-Anganchi Railway case is one actually involving the statement of construction accounts. This railway was also built by the South Manchuria Railway on behalf of the Chinese government under a contract dated September 3, 1924. In 1927, when the work was completed, the South Manchuria Railway presented a statement of account, including an item known as Incidental Expenses, amounting to 2,075,961

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yen, in addition to the original estimate. This the Railway authorities naturally considered as extraneous and has therefore not been settled so far.

GROUP II.—CASES RELATING TO THE SOUTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY

No. 10. *Failure to protect the South Manchuria Railway.*

Asevidences of China's failure to give protection to the South Manchuria Railway the Japanese have listed the following instances of damages done to it:

Nature	1929	1930
Obstruction to operation	87	84
Robbery during the operation of trains	114	75
Robbery of railway equipment	17	75
Robbery of telegraph wires	13	13

The most obvious answer in this case seems to be that the Japanese should immediately withdraw their troops and police and let China resume her right of protection. This is necessary, if not for other reason, simply because these troops and police have been maintained along the railway with no legitimate basis, either contractual or customary.

No. 11. *Alleged violation of an agreement in the collection of half lumber tax from Chinese merchants from some of whom the Railway purchases material for sleepers.*

The collection of the tax referred to began in February 1, 1927. The complaint against it is made on the basis of Article VIII of the Additional Agreement to the Peking Treaty of 1905 which reads:

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The Imperial Chinese Government engage that all materials required for the railways in South Manchuria shall be exempt from all duties, taxes and *likin*.^a

According to the Chinese authorities the exemption provided for in the foregoing article refers to "duties, taxes and *likin*" levied upon the goods only, and not upon persons who happen to be engaged in the transactions to which the Japanese charge refers.

The Chinese stand in the present case is not an unreasonable one. Since it is a matter of the interpretation of a provision in an agreement, Japan could have suggested a reference to some form of international adjudication.

No. 12. *Alleged violation of an agreement in the imposition of restriction upon the purchase of sleepers.*

It is stated by the Japanese that in the year 1928 when the South Manchuria Railway's purchase of sleepers reached several million pieces, the Chinese authorities refused to issue permits for tax exemption beyond a certain limit, and that it took a whole year's negotiation before they waived the objection. The Japanese complaint is made on the basis of Article VII of the contract of 1896 between the Chinese government and the Russo-Chinese Bank for the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway by which the main line of the South Manchuria Railway is governed. That article reads:

All goods and materials for the construction, operation and repair of the line, will be exempt from any tax or customs duty and from any internal tax or duty.

^a Unless otherwise stated treaty text in the remainder of this paper is given from MacMurray's collection.

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It is scarcely necessary to point out that the article referred to only exempts from tax and duty "all goods and materials for the construction, operation and repair of the line," not any amount of goods and material the South Manchuria Railway may purchase, and that therefore the Chinese authorities were fully within their rights in desiring to be assured that the sleepers were actually required for the "construction, operation and repair" of the South Manchuria Railway before issuing permits for tax exemption. The Japanese complaint is evidently not properly grounded.

No. 13. *Alleged obstruction to the quarrying of stone for railway purposes.*

A number of instances are given by the Japanese which need not be repeated here. According to the Chinese authorities there has not been such obstruction as alleged, and if the Japanese experience difficulty, it is because they do not confine themselves to the rights acquired under treaty. Article VI of the contract of 1896 bearing upon the question states:

The lands in the vicinity of the line necessary for procuring sand, stone, lime, etc., will be turned over to the Company freely, if these lands are the property of the State; if they belong to individuals, they will be turned over to the Company either upon a single payment or upon an annual rental to the proprietors, at current price.

In practically all cases the lands involved belong to individuals, but the Japanese seem to remember only that "they will be turned over" and forget that this is conditional "either upon a single payment or upon an annual rental to the proprietors, at current price." If the Japanese do not want to

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respect the rights of the Chinese people themselves by paying for what they may take, they must not expect the Chinese government to act in the same manner by compelling the people to comply with Japanese wishes.

No. 14. *Alleged obstruction to the exploitation of mines along the Antung-Mukden line.*

According to Article IV of the agreement of September 4, 1909 as well as the memorandum referred to in that article the "coal, iron, tin and lead mines situated near" the Antung-Mukden line are open to joint Sino-Japanese exploitation. The Japanese now complain that in three cases the Chinese authorities have invoked regulations governing mining to obstruct the application of this provision, which regulations, they declare, are contrary to the provisions of Article IX of the Sino-British commercial treaty of 1902 to which Japan is entitled by the provision of most-favored-nation treatment her own commercial treaty with China.

The article of the Sino-British commercial treaty reads:

The Chinese Government, recognizing that it is advantageous for the country to develop its mineral resources, and that it is desirable to attract foreign as well as Chinese capital to embark in mining enterprises, agree within one year from the signing of this Treaty to initiate and conclude the revision of the existing Mining Regulations. China will, with all expedition and earnestness, go into the whole question of Mining Rules and, selecting from the Rules of Great Britain, India, and other countries, regulations which seem applicable to the condition of China, she will recast her present Mining Rules in such a way as, while promoting the interests of Chinese subjects and not injuring in any way the sovereign rights of China,

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shall offer no impediment to the attraction of foreign capital or place foreign capitalists at a greater disadvantage that they would be under generally accepted foreign Regulations.

Any mining concession granted after the publication of these new Rules shall be subject to their provisions.

Since the conclusion of the British treaty China has recast her mining regulations more than once and her object has remained the same as stated in the treaty. The latest of her efforts was promulgated on May 26, 1930, a reference to which will be enough to refute the Japanese charge. If the mining regulations run counter to no treaty provisions, their application in the cases cited, though it may not work to favor the Japanese, cannot be considered as a means of obstruction.

It may be added that according to the authorities at Mukden two of the three cases cited concern mines found respectively 120 and 180 li from the nearest point of the Antung-Mukden line, and could not have been considered as being "situated near" that railway.

No. 15. *Repudiation of certain purchases of land for the Fushun Mines.*

The purchases referred to were made in 1924, but so far the Chinese authorities have refused to recognize them on the ground that, as the land involved is outside the boundaries of the mines agreed to by China, these purchases would virtually amount to an extension of the mining area. The Chinese authorities have evidently acted within the rights of China.

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No. 16. *Alleged obstruction to the purchase of land by the Railway.*

It is stated by the Japanese that beginning with 1929 the Chinese authorities have practised such obstruction, and that there are no less than fifty-nine cases pending as a consequence. The Chinese, on the other hand, strongly denied the charge. They suspect that the Japanese have in mind cases in which the latter do not have a right. Article VI of the contract of 1896 in which the right to purchase land is provided, says:

The lands actually necessary for the construction, operation and protection of the line, as also the lands in the vicinity of the line necessary for procuring sand, stone, lime, etc., will be turned over to the Company freely, if these lands are the property of the state; if they belong to individuals, they will be turned over to the Company either upon a single payment or upon an annual rental to the proprietors, at current prices.

From the foregoing provision it is clear that the right to purchase land is limited to "lands actually necessary for the construction, operation and protection of the line, as also the lands in the vicinity of the line necessary for procuring sand, stone, lime, etc." If the Chinese should refuse to let the Japanese go beyond the limits, they could not very well be accused of obstruction. The situation which has been created by past Japanese encroachment in this respect is already serious enough. The land that has been acquired for settlement purposes alone amounts to forty square miles and one quarter. If the Chinese authorities should not begin to put a stop to the process, before long South Manchuria would become virtually an extended "railway zone."

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GROUP III. — CASES RELATING TO MINING

No. 17. *Alleged obstruction to the construction of a railway by the Kungchangling Mines.*

Article XI of the contract entered into on December 23, 1918 by the local Chinese authorities with the Japanese consul-general at Mukden for the joint operation of the Kungchangling Mines reads:

For the transportation of the product of the mines the Company plans to build a railway from the place the mines are located to connect with the main line or a branch line of the South Manchuria Railway, details to be regulated by mutual consultation.^a

The railway contemplated by the contract is therefore one for the "transportation of the product of the mines" only. The company, however, applied last year for permission to construct one which was designed to serve all purposes of an ordinary railway. The Chinese authorities naturally considered this as an attempt to extend the South Manchuria Railway system and declined to grant the permission. Such an act cannot be designated as "obstruction."

No. 18. *Alleged revocation of permit to purchase clay at Fuchow.*

It is stated by the Japanese that the permit granted by the Chinese authorities to a collateral company of the the South Manchuria Railway for the purchase of clay at Fuchow was revoked without proper legal procedure. According to the

^a *Chung jih tiao yao lui tsuan*, Collection of Sino-Japanese Treaties, Page 233.

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Chinese authorities nothing of the kind has taken place. What has happened is the cancellation of the permit to a certain Chinese for the mining of clay at Fuchow who secretly entered into an agreement with the Japanese company for the sale of clay with provisions that ran counter to mining regulations. The act of the Chinese authorities may be inconvenient to the Japanese company for the time, but is evidently quite different from what is complained of in the case.

No. 19. *Alleged confiscation of permit for the mining of certain magnesite and felspar ores.*

In this case as in the last the Japanese seem to have confused the issues. They have charged that the Chinese authorities not only confiscated the permit issued to a certain Chinese for the mining of certain magnesite and felspar ores, but also compelled the same party to pay a tax for the right lost to them. According to the Chinese authorities the two cases are quite distinct one from the other. The party that was compelled to pay a tax was not the same party that held a permit for the mining of magnesite and felspar ores. Whereas the latter was a Chinese individual, the former was a Sino-Japanese company which happened to have the same Chinese as a member. Furthermore, whereas the Chinese was interested in magnesite and felspar ores, the Sino-Japanese company of which he was a member was a concern for iron-mining.

As to the question of the permit, it is evidently not one of confiscation as alleged. According to the mining regulations^a

^a See Article XLI of those published on May 26, 1930. A copy of these may be found in *Li fa chuan kan*, Special Issue of Legislations, Vole III, Page 162.

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a period of two years is allowed for delay in the exploitation of a mine after the permit is issued. But in the case under discussion the party had held the permit for more than ten years without taking any steps for its operation. The Chinese authorities are, therefore, quite justified in cancelling the grant by the recall of the permit.

It is scarcely necessary to add that as the party concerned is a Chinese, the Japanese could have dispensed with the case in listing their complaints.

No. 20. *Alleged oppression of the coal mining enterprise at Hsian.*

The charge that the Chinese authorities at Hsian oppressed the Sino-Japanese enterprise there by sending police to the mines to interfere with local patronage of the product has been categorically denied. It is stated that what has actually taken place is the refusal of the magistrate of the *hsien* to compel the inhabitants to sell their lands to the enterprise for the purpose of providing exits for the product to reach the local market.

If the enterprise should make itself so obnoxious to the inhabitants as to prevent them from coöperation, it should either wind itself up or change its policy instead of expecting the magistrate to help it to attain its object by the application of what it could best avoid, force. The latter procedure is certainly inexpedient for the magistrate to follow and harmful to the cause of the enterprise, not to mention that the party does not have the right to call upon the magistrate to adopt it.

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nor has the magistrate any duty to comply with the request, if made.

No. 21. *Alleged cancellation of lead mining rights at Fengcheng.*

According to the local authorities a Chinese who had entered into a partnership with a Japanese was granted the right to mine copper ores at Fengcheng *hsien*. Later he was found to be mining lead instead, and his right was therefore cancelled. His Japanese partner, however, refused to give up the lead mines and protested against the cancellation of the right.

There is no call for a discussion on the question whether it was wise for the local authorities to cancel the mining right in general instead of prohibiting the mining of the ore that was not originally contemplated. So far as lead is concerned, it seems that since no right had ever been granted for it, none could have existed there to be cancelled.

No. 22. *Forcible recovery of a stratite mine at Tashihchiaio.*

This is a case in which a Japanese worked some stratite mine under the names of some Chinese without even taking the trouble to make these Chinese apply for a permit from the authorities. The recovery of the mine by the latter against which the Japanese make the complaint is evidently what their countryman should expect.

It is interesting that this case is left out from the list given out by the Shanghai Japanese consulate-general.

No. 23. *Forcible recovery of the lime mines at Penhsihu*

This case is similar to the last. The Japanese involved in it entered into a contract with some Chinese for the mining of

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lime from their land without making the latter apply for a permit from the authorities. The Japanese evidently have no complaint to make, when the Chinese land owners were punished for the violation of the mining regulations and the Japanese themselves deprived of the mines.

No. 24. *Alleged oppression of the Penhsihu Coal and Iron Mining Company.*

As stated by the Japanese this is a case in which the Chinese refused to renew the lease of a reservoir used by the mining company after its expiration on November 1, 1927. In view of the fact that a lessor has no obligation to renew a lease unless specially provided for, it is difficult to see why in exercising his right he can be accused of oppression.

The Japanese seem to think that once they come into contact with something in Manchuria they thereby acquire a claim to it. If they wish to renew the lease, the only way is to make adjustment in compensation for the rise in value through changed circumstances, not by some false charge as that which has been alleged. We are told that in spite of the Chinese refusal to renew the lease on the terms of the Japanese, the latter have not given up the reservoir. If it is a case of oppression, it is the Chinese, rather than the Japanese, who are the victims.

No. 25. *Alleged prohibition of the transportation and consumption of Fushun coal.*

It is alleged by the Japanese that from about 1929 onward Chinese authorities placed restrictions upon the transportation of Fushun coal by the Mukden-Hailung Railway, and that

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during 1930 the head of the Department of Agriculture and Mining of the Liaoning province issued orders with the permission of the Northeastern Administrative Commission to institutions under his control to prohibit the use of foreign coal.

The Chinese authorities have denied both charges as entirely unfounded. In their opinion, if the Fushun coal ceases to be in general use along the Mukden-Hailung Railway or by Chinese government institutions, it is partly because the coal mines at Hsian are being exploited, and partly because the Fushun coal itself which is sold in gold *yen* has risen in price through the fall of silver. They fail to understand why the Japanese must always lay all the blame for any adverse situation they may have to face upon the Chinese.

GROUP IV.—CASES RELATING TO TAXATION

No. 26. *Alleged discrimination against Japanese nationals by means of a match monopoly and of preferential treatment to goods of Chinese origin in the matter of railway rates.*

It is stated by the Japanese that the match monopoly established by the Northeastern Provinces is in violation of Article XV of the Sino-American treaty of 1844 to which Japan is entitled through the provision of most-favored-nation treatment in her own treaty with China, and that preferential treatment given to goods of Chinese origin in the matter of railway rates is in violation of Article V of the Nine-Power treaty of Washington.

Article XV of the Sino-American treaty reads:

The former limitation of the trade of Foreign nations to certain persons appointed at Canton by the Government, and

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commonly called hong merchants, having been abolished, citizens of the United States engaged in the purchase or sale of goods of import or export are admitted to trade with any and all subjects of China without distinction; they shall not be subject to any new limitations nor impeded in their business by monopolies or other injurious restrictions.^a

The monopoly spoken of in the foregoing article refers to the "limitations of the trade of Foreign nations to certain persons appointed at Canton [or anywhere for the matter] by the Government, and commonly called hong merchants [or by any other name]." It is a term used in opposition to free trade and has nothing to do with a fiscal measure as the one under discussion. It is evidently too far-fetched to quote the article as a basis of complaint.

As to the question of railway rates, Article V of the Washington treaty reads:

China agrees that, throughout the whole of the railways in China, she will not exercise or permit unfair discrimination of any kind. In particular there shall be no discrimination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges, or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which or to which they are proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the country from which or to which they are consigned, or the nationality or ownership of the ship or other means of conveying such passengers or goods before or after their transport on the Chinese Railways.

The Contracting Powers, other than China, assume a corresponding obligation in respect of any of the aforesaid railways over which they or their nationals are in a position to

^a Customs' Collection, Vol. I, Page 478.

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exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement or otherwise.^a

In the foregoing article China agrees that, throughout the whole of the railways in China, there shall be no discrimination in respect of charges or of facilities. The question is whether this engagement applies to relations between the Chinese government and all that have recourse to the use of the railways in China, Chinese and foreign alike. The said article as a resolution was adopted in the fifth plenary session of the Washington Conference. At that session the spokesman of the Chinese delegation made the following statement:

I wish, however, to say one or two words in addition to the Declaration that the Chinese Delegation made at the Committee meeting with reference to the question of the open door, and also add a word with reference to the question of Chinese railroads.

China took note of but did not vote on the first Article of the Resolutions on the open door adopted by the Committee on January 18, 1922, defining and declaring acceptance by the Powers of the principle of open door, since the purpose of that Article of the Resolution was to fix the policies of the Powers in their dealings with China or with each other with reference to China. It was not the purpose of that Article to interfere with the appropriate relations between the Chinese Government and its nationals, as was expressly indicated by the Chairman in reply to a question by Sir Auckland Geddes. However, as indicated by the second of the ten Principles or Declarations which the Chinese Delegation had the honor to submit to this Conference on November 16, 1921, the Govern-

^a *Diplomatic Documents: Washington Conference, 1921-1922* (published by the Waichiaopu), Page 235.

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ment of China is glad to give assurance that in the future, as has been constantly done in the past, it will make no discriminations in trade or industry between the Powers having treaty relations with China, or between their respective citizens or subjects, because of their nationality.^a

From the foregoing statement it is seen that it was the understanding at the Conference that the provision in Article V would not interfere with "the appropriate relations between the Chinese government and its nationals;" and that it was only an assurance to the effect that "in the future, as has been constantly done in the past, it [the Chinese government] will make no discriminations in trade or industry between the Powers having treaty relations with China, or between their respective citizens or subjects, because of their nationality." It is therefore difficult to see how it has anything to do with the question the Japanese have raised.

It may be added that, whatever may be Japan's claim in the case, she could have easily dispensed with it as a complaint against China for the simple reason that according to the new regulations of the Ministry of Railways which had become effective since the month of August, 1931 no difference is made between goods of domestic or foreign origin in the application of the rates.

No. 27. *Alleged illegality in the imposition of a business tax in the walled city of Mukden.*

It is contended by the Japanese that the walled city of Mukden is a part of the "Mukden" opened under Article X of

^a *Ibid.*, Page 20.

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the Sino-Japanese treaty of commerce of 1903, and therefore the Chinese authorities have no right to impose a business tax there. To this the Chinese authorities have not been able to agree. Article X of the Sino-Japanese treaty as far as it relates to the question under discussion reads:

The Chinese Government agree that, upon the exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty, Mukden and Tatungkow, both in the province of Shengking, will be opened by China itself as places of international residence and trade. The selection of suitable localities to be set apart for international use and occupation and the regulations for these places set apart for foreign residence and trade shall be agreed upon by the Governments of Japan and China after consultation together.

From the text of the treaty providing for the opening of Mukden it is evident that international trade and residence are confined to "suitable localities" set apart by mutual agreement of the contracting parties. Shortly after the treaty was signed the section of the town situated between the suburb of the walled city and the South Manchuria Railway area, known since as the "international settlement," was thus selected. If the Japanese should choose to live in the walled city instead, they live there only at the sufferance of the Chinese government, and if they resent the idea of paying a business tax like the rest of the inhabitants, the only alternative is to move to the section specially set aside for them, rather than to interfere with China in the exercise of one of her sovereign rights.

This case is another of those left out from the list given out at Shanghai.

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No. 28. *Alleged existence of double taxation at Dairen as a result of the abolition of the system of drawback by the Chinese Maritime Customs in re-exportation.*

It was the practice of China in the past to grant drawback to goods re-exported from a Chinese port to another Chinese port or to a foreign port, the latter of which included a port temporarily not within her jurisdiction, for instance, Dairen. In doing so she was not bound by any treaty stipulation, but was merely in exercise of her voluntary will. On March 1, 1931, however, she abolished the system in favor of issuing exemption certificates, having found the former system too much attended by abuses. In view of the fact that exemption certificates would be of use only in Chinese ports, all foreign ports including Dairen come to be adversely affected by the act.

One finds it rather difficult to see how the Japanese could have a complaint in the present case. China is not obliged to continue the old system of drawback, nor to maintain the favor flowing out of it. This is particularly so when her own interest is at stake.

At first the Chinese government went on the assumption that the change of the system meant the abolition of the privilege enjoyed by foreign ports in the matter, and on this basis decided not to issue exemption certificate for goods re-exported to Dairen for further transportation to the interior overland, thus producing another point of difference between Japan and China. This point, however, was later (September 11, 1931) satisfactorily settled by an exchange of notes between the Japanese minister to China and the Chinese Ministry of Finance.

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No. 29. *Alleged illegality in the increase of export duty on Fushun coal.*

From June 1, 1931 the Chinese Maritime Customs collected a duty of 3.4 mace silver on every ton of coal exported by the Fushun mines. The Japanese protested on the ground that the act violated the Detailed Regulations of May 12, 1911 concerning the Fushun and Yentai mines which, they said, were declared to be "effective for sixty years" and subject to extension at the end of the period, if the mines were not exhausted. No. 2 of the regulations reads:

The Company agrees to pay to the Chinese maritime customs for the coal of the two mines exported from a point of maritime navigation an export tax which shall be computed at one-tenth of a Haikwan tael per ton, that is to say, at the rate of one mace silver.

The Chinese Ministry of Finance has denied the charge. According to them No. 2 of the regulations merely explained the agreement of September 4, 1909, Article III of which has the following provision:

The Chinese Government agrees that in the matter of the exportation of coals produced in the said mines, the lowest tariff of export duty for coals of any other mines shall be applied.

They point out that the rate of one mace silver was merely the lowest tariff of export duty for coals at that time.

The stand taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to be quite correct. The regulations of 1911 was drawn up in accordance with the following provision which formed part of Article III of the agreement of 1909:

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The extent of the said coal mines, as well as all detailed regulations, shall be separately arranged by commissioners specially appointed for that purpose.

It is clear from the agreement providing for the lowest tariff of export duty that the functions of the commissioners to be appointed were only to define the extent of the coal mines as well as to draw up detail regulations and had nothing to do with the fixing of a permanent rate of duty. It must be remembered that the latter would mean a restriction upon the sovereign right of a state. If this had been contemplated, it should have been expressly stated in the agreement itself.

No. 30. *Alleged illegality in the imposition of business and consumption taxes upon the Chinese residents of the South Manchuria Railway area.*

According to the statement of the Japanese these taxes are being collected by the Chinese authorities outside the railway area after they were prevented by the Japanese from exercising the right within it.

The Japanese charge of illegality is based upon their claim that Japan by treaty has the exclusive right of administration in the area, including the political. It will, therefore, be necessary to examine this claim.

As far as we know, the Japanese claim is based upon Article VI of the contract for the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway entered into between the Chinese government and the Russo-Chinese Bank in 1896. This article reads:

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The lands actually necessary for the construction, operation and protection of the line, as also the lands in the vicinity of the line necessary for procuring sand, stone, lime, etc., will be turned over to the Company freely, if these lands are the property of the State; if they belong to individuals, they will be turned over to the Company either upon a single payment or upon an annual rental to the proprietors, at current prices. The lands belonging to the Company will be exempt from all land taxes (*impôt foncier*).

The Company will have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands. (*La Société aura le droit absolu et exclusif de l'administration de ses terrains.*)

The Company will have the right to construct on these lands buildings of all sorts, and likewise to construct and operate the telegraph necessary for the needs of the line.

The income of the Company, all its receipts and the charges for the transportation of passengers and merchandise, telegraphs, etc., will likewise be exempt from any tax or duty. Exception is made, however, as to mines, for which there will be a special arrangement.

The foregoing is a translation from the French text, found in treaty collections. It may be compared with one from the Chinese, which reads as follows:

The land actually needed by the said company for the construction, operation and protection of the railway, as also the land in the vicinity of the line necessary for procuring sand, stone, lime, etc., if this land is state property, will be turned over by the Chinese Government free of charge; and if it is private property, will be either paid for at one time or rented from the proprietors annually, both at current price. The said company shall itself provide funds

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for these purposes. The land belonging to the said company will all be exempt from land tax and will be managed exclusively by the said company which will be permitted to construct thereon buildings and works of various kinds as well as to set up telegraphs, under its own operation, for the exclusive use of the railway. Except in regard to mines for which arrangement will be separately made, the income of the said company, such as the charges for transportation of passengers and merchandise and the receipts from telegrams, will all be exempt from tax or duty.

It is obvious from the text of the article, French or Chinese, that the claim cannot be substantiated. In the French text the "right of administration" spoken of can only refer to such business administration as may be necessary to the "construction, exploitation and protection" of the railway, as no other objects are mentioned. In the Chinese text this point is even clearer. There, indeed, it is only "management" rather than "administration" that is spoken of. As a matter of fact in neither text are settlements ever contemplated. The lands on which the Company is to exercise an "absolute and exclusive right of administration," or "management," read the texts, are "the lands necessary for the construction, operation and protection of the line, as also the lands in the vicinity of the line necessary for procuring sand, stone, lime, etc." for construction purposes, the lands on which "the Company will have the right to construct * * * buildings of all sorts, and likewise to construct and operate the telegraph necessary for the needs of the line," or on which the Company "will be permitted to construct * * * buildings and works of various kinds as well as to set up telegraphs, under its own operation, for the exclusive use of the railway."

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This view, it may be added, is not China's alone, but also that of such a third party as the United States. Writing to the Tzarist government on November 6, 1909 at the time the Russians attempted to organize a settlement at Harbin on the basis of the interpretation since then adopted by Japan, the American Secretary of State says:

The administration by the railway company of its leased lands provided for in Article VI of the contract can refer only to such business administration as may be necessary to the "construction, exploitation and protection" of the railway, these being the objects expressly mentioned in the article for which these lands were granted by China.

This was, without doubt, the understanding of China as evidenced by the Chinese translation of Article VI and by the protest of the Chinese Government against the attempts by the railway company to administer the municipal Government at Harbin.

Adverting to the French text of the contract, it is to be observed that the land which is the subject of the provisions of Article VI thereof is precisely:

"Les terrains réellement nécessaires pour la construction, exploitation et protection de la ligne, ainsi que les terrains aux environs de la ligne, nécessaires pour se procurer des sables, pierres, chaux, etc."

The second paragraph of Article VI reads:

"La Société sure le droit absolu et exclusif de l'administration de ses terrains."

As to the meaning of the word "administration," it seems very worthy of remark that in English the word "administra-

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tion" is quite commonly used of all sorts of business administration, while the same word in French and the equivalent word in the Chinese version of the contract are still more commonly used of business and non-governmental administration. Indeed, the French word "administration" is so very commonly used of business management that its absolute meaning in a given case would be wholly determined by the context.

A reading of the whole contract deprives the second paragraph of Article VI of all semblance of referring to a political administration.^a

From the foregoing it is evident that the Japanese claim to exclusive right of administration in the area, including the political, is unfounded. It is therefore surprising to see that the Japanese not only prevented Chinese authorities from exercising the right of taxation in the area, but have also complained against their exercising it at all with reference to it. As in many other cases the question seems to form a basis of complaint by China against Japan rather than the reverse.

GROUP V.—CASES RELATING TO INDUSTRY

No. 31. *Alleged pressure upon the North Manchuria Electric Company of Harbin.*

In the Japanese complaint it is stated as follows:

In order to bring pressure to bear upon the North Manchuria Electric Co., which was established in Harbin in 1918, the Harbin municipality made the supply of electricity a concession and established a semi-official company to which was given the concession in disregard of the already acquired privilege of the Japanese company. In May, 1930, the Chinese authorities turned the Harbin Electric Co. into an official

^a *United States Foreign Relations*, 1910, Page 219.

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enterprise, and are since bringing all possible pressure upon the North Manchuria Electric Co., alleging the same company to be an infringement of the monopoly.

According to the Chinese authorities the statement gives only a part of the truth. The North Manchuria Electric Company began its operation at Harbin by the purchase of a small Russian electric plant, and at the time both the company and the Japanese consulate of the port were notified that the Russian plant did not possess a concession and therefore had none to transfer; that the municipality reserved to itself the right to operate any public utilities; and that if the new Japanese company should desire to proceed with its plan, it should be prepared to wind up its business, should in the future the municipality wish to establish a power house itself for the supply of electricity or to lease the right out to concessionaries. In 1919 the municipal council of Harbin finally decided to exercise its right in the matter. When call was sent out for tenders, three parties, including the North Manchuria Electric Company, responded. On May 15th in the following year the terms of the bidders were announced, and the most favorable, which did not happen to be from the Japanese concern, was declared. On the 25th of the same month the council awarded the concession to the party so declared and called upon the Japanese concern and all other existing electric plants to wind up their business. The Japanese concern, however, has not complied with the order so far, and now the Japanese authorities have even listed the case as a complaint.

It may be noted that a similar case concerning the South Manchuria Electric Company of Antung is found in the list

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given out by the Japanese Consulate-General at Shanghai. It is stated as follows:

The South Manchuria Electric Co. has been supplying Chinese citizens with electric light for over twenty years upon an understanding reached between them and the Chinese authorities. In March, 1930, the Municipality of Antung established an electric lighting company for the purpose of competing with the Japanese company.

According to the Chinese authorities the Japanese company has never registered with the Chinese government, nor reached any understanding with any authorities as claimed. They further stated that in establishing an electric lighting company the municipality of Antung merely discharged a perfectly normal function; and that instead of the municipality's bringing pressure upon the South Manchuria Electric Company to compel it to close down, the Japanese had done their worst to interfere with the progress of the work of the Chinese plant by the employment of police force.

No. 32. *Alleged illegality^a in the deal of a tender for railway material.*

It is stated in the Japanese complaint as follows:

In a public tender for ten locomotives in August 1929 the Shen-Hai Railway [Mukden-Hailung Railway] awarded the contract to the Scoda Company in spite of the fact that the lowest offer was made for the same specified material by the South Manchuria Railway Co. and the second lowest by the Mitsubishi Company.

Even as stated by themselves the Japanese have evidently no cause of complaint. An invitation to submit tenders is an

^a As stated in the Shanghai version.

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invitation to make offers. Unless it is accompanied by the promise to accept the lowest bid, it does not bind the party that issues it to that course.

According to the authorities of the Mukden-Hailung Railway, when the tenders came in, it was found that although those made by the two Japanese concerns were the lowest, the locomotives they could offer did not fit in so well with the rest in use on the line, which were generally of European make. In consequence they decided to purchase the same from the Scoda Company. But, they added, in order to avoid misunderstanding the South Manchuria Railway Company was given the contract for a large order of ordinary passenger cars, for which no tender was called. It seems that with such consideration on the part of the authorities of the Mukden-Hailung Railway the Japanese should have no cause of complaint even from the moral standpoint, still less from the legal.

In the version given in the *Chen Pao* the act of the Chinese authorities in not awarding the contract to one of the two Japanese concerns was ascribed to the "growing anti-Japanese sentiment." It is evident that the charge is entirely off the point.

No. 33. *Interference with tree felling in the province of Kirin.*

The complaint of the Japanese is that by prohibiting the felling of trees along the Kirin-Tunghua Railway in 1930 the Chinese authorities gave "a blow" to the said railway which, the Japanese declare, is built with a Japanese loan, and to the Japanese "exporters of wood." The Chinese authorities are unable to understand the cause of the complaint inasmuch

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as the forests and cutters involved are respectively Chinese private property and individuals. They deny that the prohibition in any way affects the interests of the Kirin-Tunghua Railway, which, they add, is also Chinese property. As to the so-called Japanese "exporters of wood," they are no other than rowdies who have instigated local wood cutters to the felling of other people's trees in order that they may make a profit by exporting the wood. It is difficult to understand why the Japanese should insist upon protecting such illegitimate interests.

No. 34. *Alleged failure to perform a forestry agreement.*

The agreement referred to relates to the reorganization of the Chamien Company which is engaged in forestry in Hsinnanling, Heilungkiang. It was entered into in a provisional way in 1925 between the provincial government and the South Manchuria Railway. As stated by the local authorities it provides that a new company is to be organized simultaneously with the winding up of the old, with a capital, one half of which to be contributed by the Chinese in the form of the forestry valued at \$2,000,000, and the other half by the Japanese in the form of the camps already erected and cash up to a total value of \$2,000,000. According to these authorities, on account of the fact that during the period of winding up the business the Japanese are naturally free to carry on timbering, the latter have used all means to delay the organization of the new company. They express surprise to find that the Japanese have now attempted to lay the blame upon the Chinese instead.

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GROUP VI.—CASES RELATING TO TREATIES

No. 35. *Non-performance of the loan agreement of August 2, 1918 and repudiation of the loan itself.*

The loan agreement was concluded between the Anfu government and the Exchange Bank of China in association with the Japanese Banking Syndicate. The sum involved was 30,000,000 *yen*. The party that arranged it was the notorious Nishihara. The loan was declared to be for "the development of gold mining and forestry in the two provinces of Heilungkiang and Kirin," but in reality made to enable the Anfu Party to carry on its war against the people. For this reason neither the Anfu government itself, nor the succeeding administrations were anxious to carry out the alleged purpose.

This loan, like all the rest of the said Japanese agent's creations, was repudiated by the opposition government at Canton at that time, and has been accorded the same treatment by the Chinese people ever since. In obedience to the popular will the National Government at Nanking has not paid interest on it since its establishment.

From the nature of the case it is evident that the Japanese claims are not well founded. As has been stated in connection with Case 3, in supplying a loan for civil war purposes the Japanese bankers knew that they were taking sides in an internal struggle and therefore ought to be ready for certain consequences. If the Chinese people should allow their government to return the loan, it would be a very friendly gesture on their part; but the Japanese bankers have no right, either legal or

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moral, to expect such a generous act, still less to insist upon the carrying out of the alleged purpose of the loan.

No. 36. *Repudiation of the advance under the preliminary loan agreement of June 18, 1918.*

This advance, amounting to 10,000,000 *yen*, formed another piece of the work of the notorious Nishihara. The preliminary loan agreement referred to was concluded between the Anfu government and three Japanese banks, ostensibly for a loan to build the Kirin-Hueining Railway, but in reality to enable the Anfu Party to replenish its war chest for campaigns against the people.

According to the terms of the agreement the Anfu government was supposed "with promptness to outline the amount of funds required for the construction of the railway and other items of necessary expenditure" when a formal loan agreement on the basis of the preliminary was to be drawn up. Nothing substantial, however, was done either during the administration of the Anfuites or under the regimes that followed.

The Kirin-Hueining Railway has been one of the lines the Japanese would like to see built. But with a dead weight of 10,000,000 *yen* saddled upon it, the realization of the wish became remote. So when in 1923 they attempted to persuade the authorities of Manchuria to build the western half of the line, *i. e.*, the Kirin-Tunghua Railway, they offered to treat it independent of the funds advanced.

Like the other Nishihara loans it was repudiated by the opposition government at Canton at the time, and since the es-

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tablishment of the National Government at Nanking no interest has been paid on it.

Although in the present case it is only the advance made under the preliminary loan agreement that is at issue, the observations made in connection with the last case (No. 35) are applicable.

In their complaint against the repudiation of the advance the Japanese incidentally charge that the Chinese have attempted to avoid constructing the Kirin-Hueining Railway. Whether the Japanese have any legal or moral right to make the charge on the basis of the preliminary loan agreement of June 18, 1918 need not be discussed again in view of what has been said in connection with Cases 3 and 35. Suffice it just to say that China has never acted as charged. It must be remembered that the Kirin-Hueining Railway covers the only route which gives access to the Tumen region which is under the process of absorption by Japan by means of Korean immigrants. The Chinese are as a matter of fact just as anxious to see the completion of the railway as the Japanese, though for a different reason. Shortly after the preliminary loan agreement was concluded a conference was held to discuss the formal agreement, but the Japanese themselves called it off, when they found that they could not secure certain privileges not contemplated by the preliminary agreement. In 1923 when they approached the Chinese concerning the construction of the Kirin-Tunghua section, the latter fell in with them readily. In the last several years, if the Chinese had not taken up their proposal to complete the line, it was simply because

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not even the account of the construction of the Kirin-Tunghua section was settled, as indicated in Case 9 above.

No. 37. *Alleged evasion of contracts regarding the purchase of rails for the Kirin-Tunghua Railway.*

It is stated by the Japanese that—

China refused to sign a formal contract for about Yen 900,000 which the South Manchuria Railway Company advanced as purchase money for rails in accordance with an agreement with the Ki-tung [Kirin-Tunghua] Railway Administration.

According to the Chinese authorities the charge is entirely unfounded. The facts, they say, are as follows: In 1928 the Japanese Traffic Manager of the Kirin-Changchun Railway urged that the sixty-pound rails of the railway be replaced by the eighty-pound. Arrangement was then made with the South Manchuria Railway for the purchase of the needed material, with the fund which was estimated at about 900,000 yen, to be advanced by the Japanese company at an interest of 9% per annum. The rails on arrival were unfortunately found to be different from what was specified, being mainly used rails, and the Chinese Director of the Railway naturally refused to accept them. The representative of the South Manchuria Railway on the Administration, however, went ahead independently to use the rails as planned. He also sold the replaced material to the Kirin-Tunghua Railway. The question is not one of evasion of contract; nor has it anything to do with the Kirin-Tunghua Railway.

^a In accordance with the Shanghai version.

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The Kirin-Changchun Railway has an administration that needs explanation. As a result of one of the Twenty-one Demands the Chinese government of the Yuan regime was made to agree in Article VII of the treaty of 1915 "speedily to make a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Loan Agreement." On this basis the Anfuities were induced in 1917 to accept a loan from the South Manchuria Railway Company and in return to "commission" it "to direct the affairs of the Railway" during the term of the loan. The latter arrangement was to be carried out by the Company's selecting three Japanese as chiefs of the departments of general affairs, traffic and accounting of the Railway, with one of them to act as the Company's representative. It was, however, stated in the loan agreement that the Chinese government was to appoint a director to "exercise supervisory powers over all the affairs of the Railway;" and that "the orders for all receipts and disbursements of the Railway must be signed in conjunction with" him "before they can be valid;" and that "when the machinery and supplies for the upkeep and traffic requirements of the Railway *** are purchased, no matter whether they are Chinese or foreign, a statement thereof must be drawn up and first submitted for" his "inspection."

From the three accounts given above the facts of the case seem to be somewhat as follows: The South Manchuria Railway Company which is commissioned to direct the affairs of the Kirin-Changchun Railway takes advantage of its position to force some used rails upon the latter. The Chinese government which retains the vetoing power in the administration refuses to accept them. The Japanese government then complains

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that the Chinese have evaded their obligation under a contract!

No. 38. *Alleged refusal by the Peking-Mukden Railway to recognize the purchases made of Fushun coal.*

It is stated in this case that the Peking-Mukden Railway owes the South Manchuria Railway 634,000 yen on account of Fushun coal supplied and only agrees to pay in monthly instalment of 20,000 yen after the latter urges settlement.

This case appears to us to be one of ordinary business transaction and as stated is also a matter that has already been settled. In their attempt to make out a case against China as a justification for their recent conduct in Manchuria the Japanese have certainly left no stone unturned. The case is left out from the list given out in Shanghai.

No. 39. *Alleged forcible construction of a railway across a Japanese farm at Mukden.*

In 1915 a Japanese by the name Sakakibura leased a tract of land at Mukden as a farm, agreeing to pay a rental of \$600 annually on every February 1st, irrespective of the condition of the crop. This Japanese, however, failed to live up to his obligations after entering into occupation and paid no more than \$500 in a period of ten years. In consequence his right was expressly cancelled by the Chinese authorities in 1925.

Shortly afterwards a Chinese railway was projected across this tract of land from the Huangkutun Station of the Peking-Mukden Railway to the airdrome at Mukden. When this took place the Japanese Consulate-General presented a demand for compensation. The Japanese claim was naturally not admitted,

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and on June 27, 1929 Sakakibura, stated the Japanese, "was compelled to remove the railway" with, we may add, the help of Japanese armed forces!

No. 40. *Alleged pressure upon the Japanese residents in the walled city of Mukden.*

The issue involved in this case is the same as in Case 27 and need not be discussed again. It may be observed in passing that in the last thirty years at least China has not been strict in excluding foreign nationals from towns not opened to international trade and residence; and that if in Manchuria a different policy is to a certain extent followed, it is simply because the presence of Japanese nationals means also the presence of Japanese police force.

No. 41. *Alleged pressure upon Japanese residents in the walled city of Sanhsing.*

This case is similar to the last so far as the principle is concerned. As to facts, according to the local authorities, the Japanese statement needs supplementation. Practically all of the Japanese residents in the walled city of Sanhsing, they say, are engaged in prostitution, and for that reason alone they have forfeited their right to remain there.

No. 42. *Alleged pressure upon the Japanese telephone in the walled city of Mukden.*

About two years ago arrangement was made between the Chinese and Japanese authorities to change the pole into the cable system for the Japanese telephone in the walled city on account of the replanning of the town. When the Japanese

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came to carry out the arrangement, they, however, took advantage of the change to extend their system. This, of course, was objected to by the Chinese, and hence the Japanese complaint. The Japanese justified their action on the ground that Japan had reserved her right to operate telephone under Article II of the convention of October 12, 1908, when she restored the telegraph lines in Manchuria to China. The Chinese on the other hand pointed out that Japan also undertook in the same article not to extend the then existing system. The said article reads:

Japan undertakes immediately to hand over to China, against the payment of 50,000 Yen, all Japanese telegraph lines in Manchuria outside the railway territory. Japan is prepared to enter into negotiation with China with a view to coming to a certain arrangement concerning the Japanese telephone service in Manchuria outside the railway territory. Pending the conclusion of such an arrangement, Japan undertakes neither to extend her present telephone system in Manchuria without having first obtained the consent of the Chinese Government, nor to use her telephone lines for the transmission of telegrams in competition with the Chinese telegraph lines.

The Japanese evidently have no cause of complaint in this case.

GROUP VII.—CASES RELATING TO THE KOREANS

No. 43. — *Disregard of treaty in the prohibition against selling and leasing land in the interior to Koreans.*

The Japanese complaint is directed against the regulations issued by the provincial authorities of Liaoning and Kirin in the last couple of years for the punishment of Chinese nationals

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who were to dispose of land to foreigners by the circumvention of the law. Five cases of actual application of the regulations were given in the case of Liaoning. The treaty referred to is the one relating to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia concluded in 1915 under the Twenty-one Demands. The relevant parts of that document read:

Article II. - Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by negotiation, lease land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.

Article III. - Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article IV. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its permission.

Article V. - The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding three articles, besides being required to register with the local authorities passports which they must procure under the existing regulations, shall also submit to the police laws and ordinances and taxation of China.

Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese Consul; those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese Authorities. In either case an officer may be deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations conjointly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage.

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When, in future, the judicial system in the said region is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese law courts.

The question in the present case is whether China is privileged to disregard the provisions just cited. The treaties of which these provisions form a part were concluded, as already stated, under the Twenty-one Demands. They were extorted from the *de facto* Yuan Shih-k'ai government, not because there was provocation on the part of China or existing controversy to satisfy, but simply because China was on the eve of a civil war and the Powers were engaged in a death and life struggle. On account of these circumstances China has questioned the equity and justice of these treaties and therefore their fundamental validity.

At both the Versailles and Washington Conferences, the first opportunities offered, China sought to have these treaties reconsidered and cancelled, but in both occasions Japan refused to entertain the Chinese proposal. China then took the matter up with Japan direct in 1923, but in this occasion her attempt was no more successful.

In view of the fact that China not only has important considerations of equity and justice on her side, but has also exhausted all means to secure reconsideration, she is quite justified in refusing to apply these treaties. But as a matter of fact, so far as the provisions under consideration in the present case are concerned, China has the right to suspend their operation, irrespective of her attitude concerning their validity.

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As clearly stated in those provisions, the Japanese subjects are free to reside, travel and lease land only in South Manchuria and are further to submit to the police laws and ordinances of China. But Japan has never been willing to be so confined. She has claimed to exercise police jurisdiction over these subjects and to interpret the term South Manchuria to cover such districts as are clearly within what she herself describes as Eastern Inner Mongolia. In view of the right to enjoy consular jurisdiction granted in the provisions to Japanese subjects, these pretensions would result in Japan's dividing jurisdiction with China over practically one half of Manchuria. What else could the latter do, if she were not to adopt some such measure as the suspension of the operation of the provisions?

The Japanese charge against China in this case, so far as it concerns the Tumen region, is based upon the agreement of September 4, 1909 relating to the Tumen boundary. According to the Japanese the Koreans in that region have the right to lease or own land under the 1909 agreement independent of the 1915 treaty. They evidently have in mind the following provision in Article V:

The Government of China engages that land and buildings owned by Korean subjects in the mixed residence district to the north of the River Tumen shall be protected equally with the properties of Chinese subjects.

The Japanese seem, however, to have forgotten that the agreement of 1909 is concerned with Koreans already in residence on the north bank of the Tumen within certain limits shown on a map annexed to the agreement, and not with Ko-

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reans who may come afterwards or/and settle outside the prescribed limits.

No. 44. *Alleged oppression^a of Koreans.*

Three cases are given for the alleged oppression, of which the most important is the recent Wanpaoshan case. The Japanese statement reads:

In July 1931 the authorities of the Kirin Province, in order to drive out the Korean farmers of Wanpaoshan, illegally interfered with tenantry, and the Koreans were finally forced out which led to the so-called Wanpaoshan incident.

This case is too fresh in our mind to need a full review. Suffice it to say that the Japanese statement rather distorts the facts. Official interference in the case was not for the purpose of driving out the Korean farmers, for it had not been the policy of the Kirin government to enforce the regulations against Korean immigration in districts adjacent to the South Manchuria Railway. If the local authorities took cognizance of the case, it was because their attention was called to the dispute that had arisen between the Koreans and local inhabitants. The Japanese charge that these authorities "illegally interfered with tenancy" is not any better founded. When the matter was looked into, it was found that the Koreans had started farming in an irregular way. Not only the Chinese who re-leased the farm to them did not register his original lease with the government, but the Koreans themselves also failed, when they took it over, to comply with the same regulations. Worse still, when these Koreans started to bring water from

^a As stated in the Shanghai list.

- 56 -

the nearby river into the farm for irrigation purposes, they dug wide ditches across the neighbors' farm and dammed the river in such a way as to block public communication. In view of these irregularities, is it fair to say that the Chinese authorities "illegally interfered with tenancy"?

As to the statement that the Koreans were finally forced out supplementation is also necessary. The Koreans concerned undoubtedly deserve the fate of being forced out, but so far as facts go, they were not actually forced out, and this is due to none other than Japanese intervention by armed force. They have spoken of Chinese oppression of Koreans! It seems more appropriate to speak of Japanese oppression of Chinese.

No. 45. *Alleged disregard of treaty rights in the arrest and conviction of Koreans.*

The Japanese state that recently the Chinese authorities in Manchuria "in disregard of treaty rights arrested and imprisoned Koreans promiscuously," alleging that they have discovered 60 such persons in the Mukden penitentiary, 40 in Tunghua, 230 in Kirin and 40 in Harbin since the beginning of the present military occupation.

Persons who are connected with the Manchurian government have denied the charge. According to them, if these Koreans were in penitentiaries as alleged, they are most likely naturalized Chinese citizens, who, as Japan maintains the principles of indelible allegiance with regard to Koreans, are naturally Japanese subjects from the Japanese standpoint.

- 57 -

No. 46. *Alleged non-recognition of the right of Japanese subjects to consular jurisdiction in decision rendered by the Kirin provincial court.*

None of the persons of whom we have enquired is able to understand this charge. They state categorically that as far as they know what is said is not the attitude of the Kirin provincial court in the matter. Some add that it is quite possible that at the time the National Government declared the termination of consular jurisdiction to become effective on January 1, 1930, the said court might have for a time made the ruling; but that if it had ever done so, the practice had never been continued.

It may be noted that this case does not appear in the Shanghai list.

No. 47. *Alleged disregard of the agreement relating to the Tumen boundary.*

Three charges are made in this case. The first is that the Chinese government refuses to recognize that the Koreans have the right to own land. This point has been incidentally dealt with in Case 43. The agreement does not pretend to provide for new immigrants. In fact not even immigration is contemplated. It is meant only to regulate questions relating to Koreans already found in the Tumen region. If reference is made to land owned by Koreans, it merely touches a point of fact and cannot be interpreted to have conferred a right to own land upon future Koreans whose arrival is strictly not permissible.

— 58 —

The second charge is that the Chinese government has restricted the freedom of the Koreans in the matter of exporting cereals. The Japanese seem to have forgotten that the Chinese Government has the right to do what they have complained of. Article V of the agreement so far as it deals with the question says:

In respect to cereals produced in the mixed residence district, Korean subjects shall be permitted to export them out of the said district, except in time of scarcity, in which case such exportation may be prohibited.

The Japanese remark that the act of the Chinese government causes great loss to the Koreans of the Tumen region in view of the fact that cereals are twice as expensive in parts of Korea. They seem to care only for the profit that a few exporters may make.

The third charge is that the Chinese government is not in the habit of notifying the Japanese consular officers in cases relating to Koreans. Again they seem to have forgotten something. The section of Article IV that deals with the question reads:

All cases, civil or criminal, relating to Korean subjects shall be heard and decided by the Chinese authorities in accordance with the laws of China, and in a just and equitable manner. A Japanese consular officer or an official duly authorized by him shall be allowed freely to attend the court, and in the hearing of important cases concerning the lives of persons, previous notice is to be given to the Japanese consular officers.

So it is "in the hearing of important cases concerning the lives of persons" that "previous notice is to be given to the

— 59 —

Japanese consular officers." According to the local authorities the Chinese government has never failed in fulfilling China's obligation in this respect.

Like the last, the present case is not found among the list issued at Shanghai.

GROUP VIII.—OTHER CASES

Nos. 48-50. *Alleged anti-Japanese sentiment.*

In these three cases the Japanese complain respectively of Chinese school text-books, the Northeastern Cultural Society and the Liaoning People's Foreign Relations Association as anti-Japanese. In the first the Japanese speak of the insertion of anti-Japanese material. This as far as we can ascertain is nothing but the actual history of Sino-Japanese relations of recent years.

In the case against the Northeastern Cultural Society the Japanese merely cite an instance of inaccuracy in report. This report concerns an accident in the Fushun Mines, which according to the Society involved 3,000 lives but according to the Japanese involved none. The Society is undoubtedly too credulous in believing rumors as facts even in view of the frequency of loss of lives in the Fushun Mines. But if an instance of inaccuracy in report could be taken as evidence in a charge of an official nature as in this case, what would Japan have to say about the various sorts of rumors Japanese news agencies and newspapers in China have from time to time circulated?

— 60 —

The Japanese charge against the Liaoning People's Foreign Relations Association is not even supported with concrete evidence, and hence needs no comment.

No. 51. *Alleged oppression of the Sheng-king-shih-pao.*

The Sheng-king-shih-pao is a Japanese daily published in the Chinese language in Mukden. The Japanese allege that in several occasions the Chinese authorities undertook to obstruct Chinese patronage by, for instance, the persecution of Chinese sales agents.

We have not been able to verify the allegation. But perhaps it is immaterial. This Japanese daily is known to be in the habit of spreading wild rumors in time of crisis, e.g., mutiny and the death of some important personages, evidently with a purpose, and yet at the same time it places itself, through the abuse of the consular jurisdiction in China practiced by the Japanese, beyond the control of the Chinese authorities. If the latter were not to resort to the methods complained of, in what way could they check its evil influence as well as to bring it to its sence of responsibility?

No. 52. *Alleged discrimination with regard to travel in certain parts of Manchuria.*

It is alleged by the Japanese that in the last ten years it has been the policy of the Chinese authorities to prevent the Japanese from travelling in the district west of Taonan and in northern Kirin, and recently also in Hulutao. They, however, do not stop to question China's right to have the policy, but proceed to complain of discrimination and state as evidence

— 61 —

that *allonge* warning the holders not to go to the above-mentioned places are attached to the *hu-chao* (passport) issued to the Japanese.

The Chinese authorities in Manchuria deny that there is discrimination in the matter. They say that requests to travellers on the point are as a rule communicated to all foreign consulates. If special *allonge* is sometimes attached to *hu-chao* issued to the Japanese, it is simply because the latter seem to be more forgetful of the warnings of their consuls than other peoples.

No. 53. *Alleged obstructions at a Japanese farm at Tungliao.*

The Japanese complain that the local authorities by driving the workers away have prevented the farm from building a dyke. But even from the facts supplied by the Japanese alone, it seems that in doing as complained of the local authorities have acted within the limits of their power. Tungliao is in what the Japanese themselves describe as Eastern Inner Mongolia. Even under the treaty of 1915 concluded under the Twenty-one Demands the Japanese could only have joint agricultural enterprise with the Chinese in that region and not by themselves alone.

No. 54. *Alleged murder of Captain Nakamura and party by Chinese soldiery.*

It is alleged by the Japanese that Nakamura and party who travelled through the Hsingan Reclamation district in July, 1931, were arrested by the Third Regiment of the Re-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 62 -

clamation Army on the 26th of the same month and later murdered.

This is perhaps one of the very few charges to which no definite answer can be given, as the present military occupation has interrupted all efforts on the part of China to clear up the point. Enquiry at Harbin where Nakamura is known to have secured his *hu-chao* (passport) reveals that Nakamura applied for the paper as an ordinary civilian and for travel in Manchuria in general. According to the officer in charge of the *Hu-chao* Bureau the Chinese authorities did not have any knowledge of Nakamura's real intention. In fact in this case, as in other cases, it was assumed that the applicant had been warned of the risks attending such a trip as he secretly undertook later, since all consulates at Harbin, including the Japanese, were kept informed of the condition of the district concerned. From the same source it is learned that after the missing of Nakamura, it was discovered that before he proceeded to Harbin this Japanese adventurer had been turned down by the *Hu-chao* Bureau at Mukden, when he applied for the paper as a Japanese military and with the express purpose of visiting the Hsingan district.

The Nakamura Case is certainly a fitting conclusion to the list from the Japanese standpoint, because it is the one through which they eventually succeeded in rousing public sentiment in support of their lawless military adventure. But it appears to us also to be a very proper ending, because it illustrates best Japan's conduct in Manchuria. At every turn in their relations with the Chinese, either the people or the government, the Japanese must insist upon going beyond the limits.

- 63 -

If they succeed, well and good: otherwise, they will come back and allege that the Chinese are acting illegally, or are obstructive, or incompetent, or oppressive, or discriminative, or evasive, or what not!

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated May 23, 1932

MAY 23 1932

Rec'd 7:45 a.m.

DIVISION OF

FROM

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 23 1932
 Department of State

256, May 23, 11 a.m.

Continuing my telegram No. 255, May 21, 3 p.m.,

the Japanese commissioner has notified the Chinese com-
 missioner as follows:

As the Japanese troops are scheduled to be with-
 drawn on May 25, at 11 o'clock from the following places,
 will you kindly see that the special Chinese police corps
 make the necessary arrangements: Walled city of Paoshan;
 Woosung forts, barracks, magazine stores; Woosungchen
 ("the town, east side of the railway line, which was
 designated as the area not to be used by the Japanese
 army").

To forestall any misunderstanding I wish to
 state that the Japanese army will, for the time
 being, make use of the localities assigned by the agree-
 ment of May 5 for the billeting of troops.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WWC

HPD

F/LS 793.94/5261

FEB 1

793.94
 893.0146
 894.23

Del. to Geneva
 May 23/32

5244

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM . GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 23, 1932

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 23 1932

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

560, May 23, 5 p.m.

ASIATIC, Nanking May 20th reports impeachment brought by the censor Ashima against Lin Sen and others for the signing of the Shanghai agreement without consent of the Legislative Yuan. If the report is correct what significance do you attach to this action?

JOHNSON

RR

WWC

Erroneously addressed to Department instead of Nanking. See 793.94/5272.

*D.E.U.
5-31-32*

MAY 28 1932

FILED

793.94/5262

F/L/S

0670

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

DM RECD
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington, Naval Radio

May 23, 1932.

MAY 23 1932

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

130 Your 560, May 23, 5 p. m., last sentence.

Department assumes that this inquiry is addressed
to the Consul General at Nanking.

Strinson
Wly

793.94/5262

793.94/5262

FE:MMH:REK

RE

MAY 23 1932

MMH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator M., 19_____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

RECEIVED
MAY 23 1932
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 23, 1932

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 23 1932

Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

258, May 23, 4 p. m.

Lieutenant Soule this date personally witnessed the withdrawal by the Japanese army of the defense force from Chenju and the vicinity of Chenju Station; and the withdrawal by the Japanese naval landing party from sector of Chapei including "North Station" to area in "Chapei" assigned by Sino-Japanese peace agreement, Article three, annex 2, as area 4, a locality Japanese troops may temporarily be stationed in. Both areas were taken over without incident and control assumed by the Peiping police. One section (25 men) Japanese landing party still occupying Toyada cotton mill and one section occupying Siccawei school west of Settlement area.

Repeat to War Department. Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WWC
HFD

F/L S

793.94/5263

MAY 23 1932

RECEIVED

793.94
note
893.102-5
793.94119

0672

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

PM REC'D
 TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

May 23, 1932.

WILSON,

MAY 23 32

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

May 23 the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphs that
 the Japanese Commissioner has notified the Chinese Commissioner
 as follows:

QUOTE As the Japanese troops are scheduled to be with-
 drawn on May 25, at 11 o'clock from the following places,
 will you kindly see that the special Chinese police corps
 make the necessary arrangements: Walled city of Paoshan;
 Woosung forts, barracks, magazine stores; Woosungchen
 (SUBQUOTE the town, east side of the railway line, which was
 designated as the area not to be used by the Japanese army
 END SUBQUOTE).

To forestall any misunderstanding I wish to state that
 the Japanese army will, for the time being, make use of the
 localities assigned by the agreement of May 5 for the
 billeting of troops UNQUOTE.

May 23 the Consul General telegraphs further that an
 officer of the staff of the American Military Attaché on that
 date QUOTE personally witnessed the withdrawal by the Japanese

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

793.94/5263

0673

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

army of the defense force from Chenju and the vicinity of
Chenju Station; and the withdrawal by the Japanese naval landing
party from sector of Chapei including SUBQUOTE North Station
END SUBQUOTE to area in SUBQUOTE Chapei END SUBQUOTE assigned
by Sino-Japanese peace agreement, Article three, annex 2, as
area 4, a locality Japanese troops may temporarily be
stationed in. Both areas were taken over without incident
and control assumed by the Peiping police. One section
(25 men) Japanese landing party still occupying Toyada cotton
mill and one section occupying Siccawei school west of
Settlement area UNQUOTE.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

Drummond
UK

793.94/5261
5263

FE:MMH:REK

FE

m.w.

ON

May. 23 1932. PM

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





RECD EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, May 4, 1932.

No. 607.

Subject: Transmitting copies of notes to and from Foreign
Office regarding sympathy expressed by the American
Government to the Japanese Government, over the
recent ~~May 21 1932~~ incident in Shanghai.

793.94



F/LS
793.94/5264

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

- 1/. I have the honor to append hereto a copy of my note
No. 235 of April 30, 1932 to the Foreign Office, transmitted
in compliance with the Department's telegram No. 96 of
2/. April 29, 5 P.M., and a copy in translation of the reply
of the Foreign Office(No. 42/P of May 3).

Respectfully yours,


Edwin L. Neville,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures:
As stated.

Embassy's File No. 800 China.

WTT/SR

167
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



C O P Y

Tokyo, April 30, 1932.

No. 235.

Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the American Minister in China has notified my Government of the severe injuries inflicted on his Japanese colleague and other Japanese officials, civil and military, by the bombing at Shanghai. I had the honor to express to Your Excellency orally the deep regret my countrymen felt at this shocking news. I am now in receipt of instructions from my Government directing me to express its sympathy with the unfortunate victims of the outrage.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Edwin L. Neville.

His Excellency

Kenkichi Yoshizawa,


His Imperial Japanese Majesty's,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

etc.,

etc.,

etc.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Translation.

Department of Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo, May 3, 1932.

No. 42/P

Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note No. 235 of April 30, 1932, expressing the sympathy of your Government with the Japanese officials who suffered in the bombing incident in Shanghai.

The Japanese Government is deeply grateful for the kind expression of the sympathy of your Government, and desires that you be so good as to communicate the sincere thanks of the Japanese Government to your Government.

I beg you, Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires, accept the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

Kenkichi Yoshizawa,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
(SEAL)

Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the
United States of America,
Tokyo.

Tr: WTT
sr

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 15. a 4/1048 FOR Memo

FROM State Dept. Secretary (.....Stimson.....) DATED May 17, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Conversation with British Ambassador .
Question of removal of 31st Infantry on next transport
discussed.

ja

793.94/5265

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Yunnan/42 FOR #107

FROM Yunnanfu (Stevens) DATED Apr. 5, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Anti-Japanese activities.
Boycott situation remained passive. No Japanese subjects
have returned since evacuation in October. Dare-to-Die
Society passed a resolution directing volunteers to re-
main in a state of preparedness for service against
Japanese.

793.94/5266

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Anti-Japanese Activities:

During March the boycott situation remained passive. No Japanese subjects have returned to Yunnan since their hasty evacuation in October. Japanese merchandise has almost entirely disappeared from the local market. Consequently, the various committees and other organizations and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and individuals designated to enforce the boycott have been able to devote most of their time and energy to private affairs. It seems that as a whole the merchants themselves are quite determined to support the general movement for severing economic relations with Japan; although a number of "unpatriotic" individuals have been caught and heavily fined for trying to deal in disguised Japanese goods imported from French firms in Indo-China.

Other forms of agitation against Japan continued along the lines mentioned in this consulate's political report for January and February.

Between March 17th and 20th, several anti-Japanese meetings were held in the Yunnanfu Young Men's Christian Association. Speakers were chosen from among the more prominent leaders of the Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Party Affairs and the Provincial Bureau of Education.

The recently organized Dare-to-Die Society, comprising about 2,000 volunteers, held a meeting on March 20th. At this meeting a resolution was passed directing the volunteers to remain in a state of preparedness for service against the Japanese at short notice. At the close of the meeting the following pledge was signed by those who attended:

"I, the undersigned, finding that the 'short pirates' have not only occupied our Manchuria but are preparing again to attack Shanghai in great numbers, feel bound to pledge my assistance to my countrymen in saving the nation from disgrace. When the time comes I will arouse myself with blood and iron. I hereby declare that I am ready to face death in the front line. I promise that before I die for my country I will

exert

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

exert every power within me to kill as many of the pirates as I possibly can. I will obey all orders given me by the Society. Should I desert or fail to fulfill this pledge my guarantor, whose signature appears below, will bear the responsibility."

375 prisoners of the Yunnan Model Prison submitted a joint petition to the Provincial Chairman requesting pardon and authority to organize themselves into a vanguard to fight against the Japanese. A translation of General Lung's reply, as it appeared in the Yunnan Min Kou Jih Pao, follows:

"Your petition shows that you are beginning to amend your ways and to understand something of patriotism. Accordingly, the Provincial Government is preparing to favorably consider your request. Since the punishments imposed on you have been reported to and approved by the Ministry of Justice, it will be necessary to obtain the Ministry's sanction before I can order your release. The proceedings are of course necessarily complicated, but some proper measure of clemency will surely be shown you."

On March 24th a proclamation signed by the Provincial Government appeared on the streets calling on young women from the ages of fourteen to twenty to join the First Aid classes being offered, so as to prepare themselves as nurses and Red Cross workers. Young men from the ages of twenty to twenty five were also urged to join the Red Cross workers, thus receiving military training which will make them ready for service when called to the colors by the Central Government. In this connection it might be said that the entire student body of the Yunnan Girls' Middle School have joined the local volunteers and have asked the Provincial Government for an assignment.

The

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Shanghai, April 22, 1932.

Subject: Situation at Shanghai as viewed by
 Mr. Thomas F. Millard.

CONFIDENTIAL

AM 1123



F/LS 793.94/5267

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

In continuation of my despatch of April 5, 1932,
 and referring to my telegram of April 21, 4 p.m., I

1/2 have the honor to transmit herewith copies of two confidential memoranda which Mr. Thomas F. Millard, an American adviser to the Chinese Government, submitted to the Chinese Foreign Office.

The first is dated April 17, 1932, and is entitled "Relation of the Shanghai situation to the whole international position of China"; the second is dated April 20, 1932, and its subject is "League of Nations' proposals to create 'peace' at Shanghai". Their contents were summarized in my telegram of April 21, 4 p.m.

Very respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

C. Van H. Engert
 First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosures:

1/2: Memoranda, April 17th and 20th.

CVHE.EA

Received

1 copy in K.C.R. for note 200

APR 28 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

April 17, 1932.

By Thomas F. Millard.

Subject: Relation of the Shanghai situation to the whole international position of China.

Political Aspects.

While it is desirable that the situation in and around Shanghai be tranquilized and that fighting between Japanese and Chinese forces in this part of China will end, the Chinese Government, in its desire to accomplish these ends and resume its authority over certain areas now under Japanese military control, should not overlook the effects of any "peace" agreement which may be made upon the eventual liquidation of the Sino-Japan questions.

Japan's military action in the Shanghai district and her control by reason of arms of sections of China's territory in that district now has the status of being wholly contrary to the consent of the Chinese Government. ANY KIND of "peace" agreement to which the Chinese Government consents, and which allocates certain territory for the occupation of Japanese troops will convert Japan's position from an armed invasion wholly against China's wishes to an armed occupation to which at least a measure of China's consent is given.

It matters little in respect to the eventual liquidation of the major Sino-Japan questions whether Japanese troops now or for some months hereafter occupy a few square miles more or less. Unless the negotiations result in complete Japanese military withdrawal from the

Shanghai

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Shanghai district and a resumption of the previous status quo, there is no good reason why the Chinese Government in any so-called agreement should convert Japan's military position there from a bald armed aggression into a position having a measure of China's consent and a kind of international sanction. By such a conversion the Chinese Government will sacrifice something of its international treaty position which may seriously embarrass it later. AND BY DOING IT NOTHING SUBSTANTIAL WILL BE GAINED.

As long as Japanese armed forces are on the soil of China, either at Shanghai or elsewhere, against the protest and sanction of the Chinese Government, the attention of the world and of the Powers will be concentrated on the situation. It is most desirable in China's interest that this attention should be held, and that international opinion should not be lulled into thinking that the situation is improving.

It should be the policy of the Chinese Government, short of a complete restoration of the status quo previous to September 18, 1931, to do everything in its power to harass the Japanese army in China and to make the military adventure as expensive to the Japanese taxpayers as is possible. THE MORE JAPANESE TROOPS THERE ARE IN THE SHANGHAI DISTRICT THE HIGHER THE COST TO JAPAN. Whether there are 10,000 or 100,000 Japanese troops at Shanghai makes no real difference to China, unless they should advance to attack the Chinese positions some distance from Shanghai, but it adds enormously to the cost of the Japanese occupation and, before long, will begin to be felt in Japan.

Therefore,

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Therefore, for the previously-stated reasons, there is no good advantage to be had for China by hastily agreeing to end the present situation at Shanghai.

Military Aspects.

Developments in Manchuria and on the China-Siberia border, as well as internal disorders in Manchuria, more and more require the Japanese Government to increase its military forces in China. Almost the whole peace strength of the regular Japanese army already is on the continent, and (so reliable private information states) the first army reserves up to 30 years of age have been called out and are being sent into Korea as the regular divisions garrisoned there are sent forward into Manchuria. There are at present about 50,000 Japanese troops in the Shanghai district. If this number should be reduced to, say 10,000, it would release 40,000 troops for use in Manchuria. To have 40,000 or more Japanese troops sitting inactive at Shanghai while Japan has to call out its reserves for duty in Manchuria is to China's present and ultimate advantage. Whether the Japanese army occupies a few square miles more or less anywhere in China is of comparatively small importance now and will have little effect on the eventual liquidation. In one way to have large Japanese forces in China during the forthcoming months will operate to China's advantage, having important reactions on the international armaments conference and on the naval and military policy of the American Government, and also on the political and military policy of Russia.

(Initialed) M.

(A true copy EA)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

Shanghai, April 20, 1932.

By Thomas F. Millard.

Subject: League of Nations' proposals to
create "peace" at Shanghai.

A "time limit" for Japanese withdrawal.

According to advance press reports concerning the new plan to be sponsored by the League of Nations, the question of withdrawal of Japanese military and naval forces will be left to the decision of a "neutral" commission, to be composed, presumably, of appointees of the League or of the principal Powers. In the opinion of this adviser, the Chinese Government, if it decides to accept such a solution of the present impasse, should attach to its acceptance a declaration that, in so doing, it does not recede in any respect from its contention that the presence of Japanese armed forces in the Shanghai district outside the International Settlement is an armed invasion of China's territory and neither in the past or now has any justification in fact or international law.

The Chinese Government also should make clear that in accepting such a solution it is acting solely in the interest of international tranquility in the Shanghai district and in no sense delegates to the League of Nations or any international body any of its (the Chinese Government's) sovereign functions within that territory.

The Chinese Government also should distinctly reserve its right, in case under such a plan the Japanese military occupation of sections of territory outside of

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the International Settlement is, in its judgment, unduly prolonged, to declare the arrangement terminated and be at liberty to take unilateral action.

As to restoration of "normal conditions".

In accepting such a plan the Chinese Government should insist that a definition of the term "normal conditions" in respect to the Shanghai district shall be included in the agreement.

In fact, normal conditions in this territory are such as existed prior to the Japanese military action on January 28. If the Japanese forces were withdrawn from the territory outside of the International Settlement normal conditions would be restored immediately. It is the presence of Japanese armed forces in Chinese territory outside of the International Settlement that makes conditions abnormal, and nothing else, except the destruction and wastage caused by Japanese acts.

The Chinese Government should make its position on this point clear.

(A true copy EA)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00/397 FOR #- (to Leg'n at Tokyo)

FROM Kobe (Dickover) DATED April 18, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

The suicide of Japanese officers. Rumors that the officers who took part in the attempted Coup d'etat in Tokyo last October were sent to Manchuria where, in lieu of a court martial, they might conveniently place themselves in front of an enemy bullet or take their life themselves.

ek

793.94/ 5268

5268

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./54 FOR # 1502

FROM China (Perkins) DATED April 27
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese situation. Withdrawal of Chinese forces to 20 miles west of Shanghai following a strong Japanese attack on March 3rd. The false report of victory circulated in China and the peace negotiations that were begun on February 28th at an informal conference on board the British Flagship KENT.

793.94 / 5269

5269

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastman NARS, Date 12-18-75

there could be no official assurance that normal living conditions had been restored in Nanking, the decision in regard to return to that city should be made by each American organization or individual, in the light of the general conditions and on the special circumstances in each case. After the publication of this statement practically all of the one hundred and twenty American citizens who had been evacuated from Nanking returned to their homes.

I. Conditions in China.

1. Shanghai.

(a) Withdrawal of Chinese forces.

The Chinese military forces withdrew to a line twenty to thirty miles west of Shanghai on March 3rd as a result of a strong Japanese attack on the Kiangwan front and the landing of troops at Liuh.

The Chinese troops retreated in an orderly manner and, although followed by the Japanese, were not pursued by them. On March 6th General Chiang Kwang-nai, the Commanding Officer of the 19th Route Army, ordered his troops to cease hostilities but to hold their lines.

During the withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Shanghai, sixteen members of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, including Mr. Sun Fo and Mr. Eugene Chen, sent an open telegram to General Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Wang Ching-wei blaming them for their failure adequately to reinforce the 19th Route Army. The telegram urged the Government to formulate a positive policy in order that the Chinese might be in a

position

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position to carry on a prolonged resistance against Japan. It appears that the Japanese during the month, patrolled a considerable area in front of their actual defence lines and, from time to time, came in conflict with the Chinese patrols. It is reported that quantities of ordnance and other military supplies were moved up to the front lines during the period under review and that the Japanese engaged in making gun im- placements both at the front lines and along a secondary line of defence in the vicinity of Kiangwan.

The Chinese were likewise busily engaged in strength- ening their positions and, throughout the month, troops were brought down the Nientzin-Lukow railway, and de- trained at a point south of Chuchow, in Anhwei Province. They were then ferried across the Yangtze river near Hsichow and Taishih and thence made their way to the Shanghai area, many of them passing through Kuyung, thirty miles south of Hankin.

(b) False Reports of Victory.

On March 4th it was reported throughout China that ten thousand Japanese had been killed at Shanghai and that the Commander of the Japanese forces had com- mitted suicide as a result of a decisive defeat; that the enemy had been driven back to the Internationalettle- ment and that they were about to be forced into the sea. These false rumors caused frenzied demonstrations of joy at Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin and, in fact, through- out the country, and it was feared by some that the cele- brations might get out of hand and assume an anti-

foreign

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foreign atmosphere. Fortunately the police gained control of the situation and the demonstrations subsided in a realization of defeat. . . subsequent investigation failed to disclose the origin of these false reports which inspired such evidences of jubilation but it is thought that certain Chinese language newspapers at Shanghai circulated them for mercenary reasons.

(c) Peace Negotiations.

The first meeting of the Chinese and Japanese representatives for the purpose of entering into negotiations for the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai occurred on February 28th at an informal conference on board the British flagship KENT. Little or nothing was achieved as the result of this conference. The Assembly of the League of Nations on March 4th passed a resolution recommending that negotiations be undertaken by China and Japan with the assistance of the friendly Powers with a view to terminating definitely hostilities and to arrange for the withdrawal of Japanese troops. On March 9th the Japanese Minister at Shanghai informed the Chinese that he was prepared to enter into negotiations in accordance with the terms of the resolution of March 4th of the League of Nations. The following day, March 10th, the National Government informed Mr. Shigemitsu that it was ready to negotiate under the terms of the League's resolution and on the understanding, as stated by China's representative at the League

in accepting

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00/394 FOR tel 548 9pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED May 20, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Death of Inukai and its effect upon the relations of Japan and China.

ek

793.94/5270

5270

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

GRAY AND PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 20, 1932

Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

548, May 20, 9 p.m. (GRAY)

Foreign and vernacular press of China generally anticipate that the assassination of Inukai will result in stiffening of Japanese foreign policy in Far East and that Japanese military clique will exert even greater influence than heretofore. (END GRAY)

(PLAIN) Following press comment quoted for Department's information:

"CHINA TIMES states that since assassination of Premier Hamaguchi political parties in Japan have become subservient to militarists. It expresses surprise that the drastic action taken by Japan under Inukai regime both in Shanghai and Manchuria should have failed to satisfy the younger elements in the Japanese army and navy. The paper states that Fascist movement in Japan has for its avowed objects,

One, annexation of Manchuria and Mongolia by Japan.

Two,

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MP

2-#548 From Peiping May 20, 1932

Two, loyalty to Emperor but reins of Government to be held by Fascists.

Three, stronger foreign policy in complete disregard of League of Nations and war with Soviet Russia and America.

Four, overthrow of present political parties as well as capitalists.

It tries to bring about fundamental revolution in the country's political economic and diplomatic situation through pursuance of these policies. Paper regards assassination as cause for profound anxiety about future of Japan and states that it goes without saying that her neighboring country, China, will be subjected to even more severe military pressure than has recently been exerted upon her.

SHUN PAO, Shanghai, expresses surprise that outrage should have occurred in such an 'organized and orderly' country as Japan and states that the assassination is grave misfortune for Japan. This paper also traces the outrage to Fascist movement and predicts that Seiyukai Cabinet will probably be succeeded by non-party National Government with the military as its dominant element. The paper compares Fascism without an able leader to unbridled horse which will plunge headlong into ruin and if this be

069F

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

3-#548 From Peiping May 20, 1932

be true the already tense situation in Far East and world at large will rapidly tend toward breaking point.

SIN WAN PAO, Shanghai, believes assassination tantamount to political coup de etat traceable to Fascist movement. It predicts that consequences will not be confined to Japan and calls upon Chinese nation to abandon squabbles and prepare for possible contingencies.

NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, Shanghai, states that assassination is only one of series of assassinations aimed against progressive statesmen with object of removing hindrances to militarists' ambitions and believes that prospect of an unveiled dictatorship cannot be safely dismissed.

CHINA PRESS, Shanghai, in editorial May seventeenth states that, while Chinese are naturally greatly interested, the general feeling will probably be that the matter is one chiefly of Japan's private concern but on the other hand it may possibly have effect on the relationship between the two countries. In editorial of nineteenth same paper

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4-#548 From Peiping, May 20, 1922

paper traces fall of Minsheng Cabinet and states that within five weeks after Seiyukai came into power Japanese navy embarked upon its intervention scheme at Shanghai and states further that even Seiyukai was unequal to task mapped out by Tokyo warlords, chiefly because of finances. Paper states that sudden decision to withdraw Japanese army from Shanghai was due to increasing seriousness of Manchurian situation and shortage of money. Paper concludes that if Seiyukai Cabinet was compelled to modify its policy and withdraw troops from Shanghai because of economic and financial reasons the assassination of Premier and formation of military dominated coalition will not change basic elements in Japanese situation and believes that even though stronger China policy should be decided on the Cabinet, which undertakes job of enforcing it, will be confronted by same problems that have faced preceding cabinets.

MINKEJO JIH PAO, Canton official organ, perfunctorily records grief; it contrasts Inukai's early liberalism friendship with Doctor Sun and sympathy towards China with his later alleged
 surrender

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5-#548 From Peiping May 20, 1932

surrender of principles to militarists in exchange for power.

KUKUNG PAO, Canton, observes it did not expect that Inukai would have humiliated himself to bring about a compromise with militarists and apprehends that his death will have serious effect on Japan's future China policy.

SHIMIN JIH PAO, Canton, anticipated that Japanese military party will now have more power in directing foreign policy.

CENTRAL DAILY NEWS, Nanking, an official party organ, expresses sympathy and surprise as well as anxiety about the future situation in Eastern Asia. The recent assassinations of Japanese leaders are evidences of internal discord and the killing of Inukai is of special political significance and will affect Sino-Japanese relations. During Inukai's regime there occurred the occupation of Chinchow; the advance on Shanghaikwan; the attack on Shanghai; the riot of the plainclothes men at Tientsin; and the naval demonstration at Tsingtao, Foochow, and the Yangtze ports. It was manifest that he was a tool of the militarists and in hearts or

eyes

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MP

6-#548 From Peiping, May 20, 1932

eyes of the Chinese he was their great enemy. But even his policy was not strong enough for certain strong factions within Japan who care nothing for China. The life or death of Inukai is not important enough to determine the future of the Far East but developments which might result will be determining factors. Any government change in Japan will be in favor of the certain strong factions above mentioned and cannot fail to be detrimental to the Chinese unless the people unite and prepare for any forthcoming struggle.

TA KUNG PAO, Tientsin, of May sixteenth:

So far as China is concerned the Chinese people must understand that although we always considered that the Inukai Cabinet was the most aggressive, Japanese extremists still disliked its weakness.

KA KUNG PAO of May seventeenth: Recently the Japanese Government publicly announced to the League of Nations that China is not an organized state. Now Premier Inukai has actually been murdered in his official residence. Where is legal government? Where does organization exist?

Japan

3 7 0

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MP

7-#548 From Peiping, May 20, 1932

Japan has since claimed that the despatch of her troops to China is intended for the protection of her nationals. Both in the occupation of Manchuria and attack on Shanghai the protection of nationals was the first excuse. Now she is unable to protect the life of her Premier in Tokyo, capital of Japan. The murderers were military men and the police headquarters were also bombarded.

TIENTSIN YI SHIH PAO of May seventeenth: Japanese cannot deny that this murder indicates the lack of modernization of their country.

CHING PAO, Peiping, of May seventeenth states: Japanese militarists feel confident that under the present circumstances Japan should be ruled by military men and that should they fail to avail themselves of this opportunity to seize control of the Government the political power will be taken over by the extremists party.

TA KUNG PAO, Peiping. Regardless of the existing strained relations between China and Japan our sympathy goes out to this octogenarian at the news of this tragedy. Indeed it would be difficult to find another man in Japan who is

better

MP

8-#548 From Peiping May 20, 1932

better versed in Chinese leaders than Mr. Inukai. His death leaves a void in the Far East difficult to fill.

After voicing the fear that the Japanese political situation will become more chaotic the TA KUNG PAO goes on to say that, assuming that the Government will be able to survive the present crisis, it is possible that the present affair will turn out to be the beginning of the end of the Facisti movement in Japan about which there has been much talk in the public press during the last few months. If this fails to materialize then there will be an end of party government with all that entails.

In conclusion the paper says that, speaking from the standpoint of a disinterested third party, the affair shows that it is dangerous for a country to pursue a headlong military policy toward another country and that the more Japan relies upon its policy of force toward China the worse will become the political development of her country.

CENTRAL DIALY NEWS, Nanking, in its leader this morning expressed grave apprehension

as

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

9-#548 From Peiping, May 20, 1932

as to the future development of Sino-Japanese relations.

The paper first draws attention to the growth of general unrest in Japan in recent years as has been evidenced by the assassination of Mr. Hamaguchi, the Japanese ex-Premier, and the recent attack on the Japanese financial leaders. That political movements are behind the unrest is apparent.

The unrest in Japan has culminated in the crisis of last night's attack on Mr. Inukai and the consequences of the tragedy will be considerable not only for Japan but for China and the world.

The Mukden incident of September eighteenth last year took place when Baron Shidehara was the Foreign Minister. Though the Chinese disagree with certain measures of Baron Shidehara's Chinese policy they, however, viewed his policy with sympathetic understanding. That policy, however, was unacceptable to the Japanese military. With the eventual establishment of a government under Mr. Inukai's Cabinet Japanese troops drove to Chinchow, invaded Shanghai and disquieting incidents were reported from Tientsin, Tsingtao, Foochow and Hankow.

The

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10-#548 From Peiping May 20, 1932

The Inukai Government seemingly followed closely the wishes of the Japanese but from a Chinese point of view the most serious outrages committed by Japan against China within the last hundred years were perpetrated under the Inukai Government. Still the Inukai Government was viewed unfavorably by the military in Japan.

The SHUN PAO, Shanghai, observes that the Fascist movement sweeping over Japan looks like the strong guiding hand of a Mussolini, hence political life will be embittered and bring about a probable war in the Far East."

JOHNSON

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11974 FOR Tel 557 6pm
FROM China (Jonhson) DATED May 21, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese events at Nanking have been greatly exaggerated as it is extremely unlikely the Japanese would withdraw from Shanghai for the purpose of creating another situation at Nanking.

ek

793.94/5271

5271

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 21, 1932

Rec'd 11:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

557, May 21, 6 p.m.

One. The signing of the Shanghai agreement has, on the whole, strengthened the position of Wang Ching Wei. The decision of Japan to make an almost immediate withdrawal of its forces from the Shanghai area has done much to take the teeth from the Cantonese criticism of that agreement as an unpatriotic surrender of national rights; the result has been to disconcert the Cantonese and to cause them to hesitate in their choice as to their next move vis a vis Nanking. Reports from Kwangtung and Kwangsi state their confusion and betray no definite line of action.

Two. The inclination at Nanking under the continuing influence of Wang Ching Wei apparently lies in the direction of giving a very free reign to the provinces and the abandonment, at least for the time being, of any attempt to centralize authority.

by

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#557 From Peiping May 31, 1932

by force. Han Fu Chu has been appointed to restore the national revenues of Shangtung; and an emissary of Nanking is now visiting Peiping and Taiyuanfu doubtless on a mission of promoting generally a good understanding with the leaders in North China. Whether or not appearance of such a policy is the result of conviction or is necessitated by the present emergencies in China's foreign relations is a matter for speculation.

Three. Reports of Sino-Japanese incidents at Nanking have been greatly exaggerated. It would seem highly unlikely that Japan, simultaneously with its withdrawal from Shanghai, would provoke disturbances whereby whatever merit may have been acquired through the Shanghai policy would be speedily dissipated by an adventure along similar lines in North China.

Four. It should not be forgotten that the activities of communist bandits continue to give grave concern to the constituted Chinese authorities in many important areas.

JOHNSON

WWC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

PLAIN

RECEIVED

MAY 24 1932

DIVISION OF

Peiping via NR

Dated May 24, 1932

Recd 2:50 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

562, May 24, 10 a.m. /5262

Department's 130, May 23, 6 p.m. /5262

Legation's 560, May 23, 5 p.m. erroneously addressed
to Department instead of Nanking.

JOHNSON

JS-CIB



F/LS 793.94/5272

MAY 28 1932

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

MP

*793.94
note
893.0146
894.23*

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 24, 1932

Li

Rec'd 9:05 a.m.

*21. to General
May 25/32*

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 24 1932
Department of State

MAY 25 1932

Secretary of State,
Washington.

261, May 24, 3 p.m.

Lieutenant Soule this morning personally witnessed the withdrawal of the Japanese defence force from the vicinity of Yangkahong (Yanghan) and Szetseling and the presumption of control in these areas without incident by the Chinese special police. / Harata notified the Chinese delegate that the control and police of the area lying east of the Shanghai-Woosung Railroad and between the areas designated by the Commission as areas numbers one, two, three and four for the temporary station of Japanese troops, except the area due east of area four to Hongkew Creek inclusive, could be taken over by the Chinese upon notifying him of their readiness to do so.

Repeat to War Department, repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

RR WWC

793.94/5273

MAY 28 1932

FILED

0709

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

May 24, 1932.

WILSON,

BERGUES,

MAY 25 32

GENEVA (Switzerland).

78

May 24/5273

May 24/ the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphs that on that morning an officer of the staff of the American Military Attaché QUOTE personally witnessed the withdrawal of the Japanese defense force from the vicinity of Yangkahong (Yanghang) and Szetseling and the resumption of control in these areas without incident by the Chinese special police. Colonel Harata notified the Chinese delegate that the control and police of the area lying east of the Shanghai-Woosung Railroad and between the areas designated by the Commission as areas numbers one, two, three and four for the temporary station of Japanese troops, except the area due east of area four to Hongkew Creek inclusive, could be taken over by the Chinese upon notifying him of their readiness to do so UNQUOTE.

793.94/5273

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

793.94/5273

FE:MMH:REK

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1935 1-138

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Commission/221 FOR #D-241

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Apr. 5, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Chinese side of the Sino-Japanese conflict, as presented
by certain Chinese dignitaries, during visit of the Man-
churian Commission to Nanking.

793.94/5274

5274

071

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-241

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China.

April 5, 1932.

Subject: Visit of the League Commission
of Inquiry to Nanking - text
of Formal Addresses.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No.D-239
of April 4, 1932 on the subject: "League Commission of
Inquiry".

During the course of the visit in Nanking, March 27-
April 1, formal addresses were made by various Chinese
dignitaries and by Lord Lytton. The texts of some of
these speeches were supplied to the American Consulate
General by the Publicity Department of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. It is obvious that the remarks made on
these formal occasions were carefully prepared, with a
view to their eventual publication. So far as concerns
Lord Lytton, the Chairman of the Commission, I am reliably
informed that he prepares his speeches himself, with great
care. It seems worth while, therefore, to supply the
Department with the texts sent to this office by the
Chinese Foreign Office.

A reading of the speeches shows that the Chinese
speakers denounced the aggressions of the Japanese and

emphasized

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emphasized the peaceful aspirations of the Chinese people and their confidence in the League Commission. The following assertions are typical of the sentiments expressed.

".... a neighboring power, with whom we desire only cordial relationships based upon principles of equality, reciprocity and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and independence, has thought it necessary to attack us with military force. Without any previous notice, without having recourse to any of the pacific means of settling differences between states.... she has employed military force first in the Three North-eastern Provinces, then at Tientsin, then at Shanghai, in defiance of the engagements known to you all."

"China has tried to adapt herself to the political and social conceptions of modern times.... but obstacles are unavoidable. We would like to continue our efforts without external dangers and with the sympathy and support of all nations."

"Not only is China not antagonistic to the foreigner but she has respected the solemn treaties she made with the foreign powers. Although China has called for the abolition of the existing unequal treaties, she has never proposed to effect such abolition without the consent of the parties concerned.... At the present time, China has only one hope and one aspiration-- the maintenance of her territorial and administrative integrity and sovereignty.... China is as anxious as the foreign Powers to secure peace and to develop to the fullest possible extent her economic resources...."

"We have full confidence in the success of your inquiry and in the recommendations which you will make to the League of Nations...."

"We sincerely hope that through your investigations and recommendations a just and permanent solution may be found for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations."

Lord Lytton made the following statements which were worthy of special note:

"The League cannot help one member to injure another, but there are many ways in which it can be of service to any member, provided always that such service is not detrimental to the rights of another."

"Therefore,

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Therefore, Mr. Chen you say that the Chinese people have only one aspiration-- the maintenance of her territorial and administrative integrity-- I can assure you at once that that would necessarily be a condition of any settlement effected by the League."

Mr. Chen (i.e. the special difficulties which China is encountering in this period of transition from the old to the new C.A.B.) are faced with change and reformation by the National Government, they can be overcome and the League will endeavor to secure for you the condition of external peace which is necessary for the accomplishment of that object."

Enclosures number one and number three are able statements of the Chinese position and merit a full reading of the text.

Respectfully yours,

Willis A. Pack,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- No.1. Speech by the President of the Executive Yuan.
- No.2. Lord Lytton's reply to Mr. Tung Ching-wai.
- No.3. Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- No.4. Lord Lytton's reply to Minister Lo Wen-kan.
- No.5. Speech of welcome by the President of the National Government.
- No.6. Speech given by Secretary General of the Kuomintang.

In quintuplicate to the Department.

In duplicate to the Legation.

Single copy to American Minister, Shan hai.

Single copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.

Single copy to American Consul General, Shanghai.

Single copy to American Consul General, Tientsin.

Single copy to American Consul General, Hankow.

Single copy to American Consul General, Canton.

Single copy to American Consul General, Harbin.

Single copy to American Consul General, Khabarovsk.

Single copy to Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet.

Single copy to Commander of the Yangtze Patrol.

Single copy to Commanding Officer U.S.S. Thistle.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to despatch No.D-241 of Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated April 5,
1932, on the subject: "Visit of the League Commission of
Inquiry to Nanking - text of Normal Addresses."

SPEECH OF WELCOME TO THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS BY THE PRESIDENT OF EXECUTIVE YUAN

Nanking, March 28, 1932.
12 noon.

My lord, Honourable Commissioners, and Gentlemen:

On behalf of the National Government of the
Republic of China, I have the honour to accord to
you the most cordial welcome and to convey to you
our sincere appreciation of the important mission
which has been assigned to you by the League of
Nations. All of you have come from distant lands
for the purpose of making investigations in connection
with the conflict between China and Japan. When you
have closely inspected the war ruins in and around
Woosung and Shanghai, you must have seen the pathetic
scene of our cultural institutions and commercial and
industrial establishments virtually reduced to ashes
by the combined Japanese military, naval and air forces.
Thousands of lives were destroyed, innumerable workmen
reduced to unemployment, countless students rendered
idle, hordes of women and children, newly widowed and
orphaned, made homeless. The situation has assumed
alarming proportions, and what you have seen represents
only an imperfect, even if vivid, picture of the wanton

destruction

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destruction by the Japanese invaders of Woosung and Shanghai since January 28. But the more painful scenes further away from the Woosung Creek and those in Manchuria may easily be imagined and inferred.

Gentlemen, both China and Japan, being signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations, are under the solemn obligation to preserve peace and to suppress war. Unfortunately, the state in which China and Japan find themselves, is nothing short of that of war. I must here, however, solemnly declare that China is in no way responsible for this unfortunate state of affairs since the persistent aggression of Japan has made our policy of self-defence both necessary and legitimate.

Ever since September 18, last year, when Japan forcibly seized the Northeastern Provinces known abroad as Manchuria, China has continued to observe her obligation to the League of Nations, confident that the League would effect a fair and just settlement of the conflict. China has so far accepted in good faith all the resolutions passed by the Council of the League, resolutions which Japan, however, has persisted in ignoring. More recently, Japan has invaded the Southeast of China in complete disregard of the resolution passed by the Special Session of the Assembly of the League. In so doing Japan is therefore not only an aggressor against China's territorial and administrative integrity and sovereignty, but has also flagrantly violated the most solemn international agreements.

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On behalf of the National Government I now desire to place before you the hope and aspirations of the Chinese people. The National Government of China, in compliance with the will of the founder of the Chinese Republic, has endeavored to secure for China international freedom and equality, a national aspiration which is far from being the same thing as hatred of foreigners. International freedom and equality constitute the indispensable conditions for China's national and racial existence. China did in fact put forward these demands in statements made at the Versailles Peace Conference and at the Washington Conference. Subsequently, during 1925-1927, the Kuomintang Government and its National-Revolutionary Army, starting out from Canton, effected China's unification, and these demands became more persistent and articulate. This desire for national independence and international equality, being inherent in any awakening nation, is therefore most essential in any nation in their struggle for existence and is certainly not anti-foreign in nature. This is a fact which deserves your most serious consideration.

Not only is China not antagonistic to the foreigner, but she has also respected the solemn treaties she made with the foreign Powers. Although China has called for the abolition of the existing unequal treaties, she has never proposed to effect such abolition without the consent of the parties concerned. China is quite convinced that the

abrogation

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abrogation of the unilateral treaties and the conclusion of those based upon the principle of equality and reciprocity is not only necessary to her continued national existence, but is also beneficial to the true interests of all the Powers concerned. I am therefore sure that the Powers will co-operate with China in achieving this common object.

One illustration may serve to prove China's sincerity in respecting legitimate treaty rights. During Japan's recent invasion of Woosung and Shanghai, the Japanese used the International Settlement as a landing place and a base of operations. This put the Chinese defence forces at a great disadvantage, and has caused unnecessarily heavy losses. But China, respecting the treaties, has, from the beginning to the end, refrained from endangering the security of the Settlements. Thus when Japan used the International Settlement as the base of her military operations against the Chinese forces, the Chinese army did not retaliate by attacking the Japanese forces in the Settlement, in order not to jeopardize the safety of the Settlement. From this fact alone, you can gauge the patience and restraint of the Chinese Government and people.

Gentlemen, when you passed through Japan en route to China you must have been informed that the Chinese people are engaged in an anti-Japanese campaign, in a boycott of Japanese goods. Now it should be pointed out that the Chinese people have resorted to such

activities

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activities only as a result of Japan's aggressive measures. It may be recalled that in 1915 Japan presented to China an ultimatum forcing her to sign the infamous Twenty-One Demands. As a consequence, then as now, the Chinese people were impelled to refrain from trading with the Japanese. In 1929 the Tsinan Tragedy produced the same unfortunate consequences. And ever since September 18, the ill-feeling of the Chinese people towards the Japanese has increased with every new attack Japan launched in China. In view of the fact that China has originally no antagonism to the Japanese whatsoever, the only effective means to secure the cessation of such activities is therefore the cessation of Japan's hostile and aggressive attitude to China.

At the present the Chinese people has only one hope and one aspiration -- the maintenance of her territorial and administrative integrity and sovereignty. Under no circumstances can we therefore tolerate such measures as the establishment of the "puppet government" in the North-east -- measures which were similarly applied to Korea before her annexation to Japan. I wish, however, to emphasize that in so far as her territorial and administrative integrity and sovereignty are not infringed upon, China is fully prepared to welcome the co-operation of friendly Powers for the economic development of the North-east. You may further be assured that China is as anxious as the foreign Powers to secure peace and to develop to the fullest

possible

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possible extent her economic resources.

I feel greatly honoured to have this opportunity of presenting before you my views for your reference, being prepared to do the utmost and to co-operate with you, for the realization of your important mission. In conclusion, may I express my sincere wish that your efforts of upholding justice and maintaining peace be crowned with success; and it is with this wish in mind that I raise my glass and drink to your health.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.2 to despatch No.D-241 of Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated April 5,
1932, on the subject: "Visit of the League Commission of
Inquiry to Nanking - text of Formal Addresses."

LORD LYTTONS REPLY TO MR. WANG CHING WEI

Nanking, 12 A.M., March 28, 1932.

Your Excellency and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the members of the Commission of Enquiry, I offer you our sincere thanks for the cordial manner in which you have welcomed us on behalf of the National Government of China. I should like to take this opportunity of saying how much we were impressed and encouraged by the evidence of popular confidence and goodwill which greeted us on our arrival yesterday morning in your Capital, and my colleagues who travelled via Hangchow inform me that all along their route similar evidence of approval of our mission was shown by the people. And now, as if to put the seal on these popular demonstrations, your Excellency, has welcomed us in the name of all China and assured us of your confidence in the League and your high hopes that it will bring you effective help in the present trouble.

We feel greatly honoured by the reception you have given to us. We recognize that China has shown great forbearance under trials that must have stirred the deepest emotions in her people. Your Government too have shown courage in placing your case unreservedly in the hands of the League. We are certain that the League will wish to prove to you that your

confidence

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confidence was not misplaced, and I can assure you that we will do everything in our power to bring about that result.

In all parts of the world, amongst all people, it is I think a recognized obligation of honour not to fail someone who has trusted you. The League of Nations recognizes that obligation towards all its members, but the help which it can give to any one is conditioned by the necessity of not injuring any other. The League cannot help one member to injure another, but there are many ways in which it can be of service to any member, provided always that such service is not detrimental to the rights of another.

Therefore, Sir, when you say that the Chinese people have only one aspiration- the maintenance of her territorial and administrative integrity - I can assure you at once that that would necessarily be a condition of any settlement effected by the League. The League could not recommend to its members any course which is inconsistent with their treaty obligations.

Subject to the condition I have mentioned, the League has commissioned us to offer you any help which it is in its power to render, and at the same time to assure you of a just and impartial award.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.3 to despatch No.D-241 of Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated April 5,
1932, on the subject: "Visit of the League Commission of
Inquiry to Nanking - text of Formal Addresses."

SPEECH OF WELCOME TO THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

- - - - -

Nanking, March 28, 1932.

Lord Lytton, Honorable Members of the Commission of
Inquiry, Gentlemen,

In the name of the National Government of the
Republic of China, I have the honour to welcome you
as the delegates from the highest authority of the
world, the League of Nations.

From the beginning of the present crisis, we have
entrusted our cause to the League of Nations, believ-
ing that justice will be assured to us by international
agreements solemnly and freely contracted. I am happy
to be able to take this opportunity of expressing
publicly to the Council and to the Assembly of the
League of Nations the gratitude of the Chinese Republic
for the efforts they have made in preventing the
aggravation of situation or minimising the extent of
conflict. We cherish particularly the memory of the
great statesman who presided over the deliberations of
the Council and whose death has aroused the affection
of all France and the sympathy of mankind.

You

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You have landed upon Chinese soil in one of the most tragic moments of our history. When you left Europe, developments in the Three Northeastern Provinces had already threatened the integrity of Chinese territory. Since then, the military measures which Japan has taken at Shanghai have endangered the very foundations of our social and political organization.

Since the proclamation of the Republic, China has, as you know, tried to adapt herself to the political and social conceptions of modern times so that, by her steady and peaceful development, she might contribute her full share to the prosperity and progress of the whole world.

We are fully aware of the fact that the task is confronted with difficulties in a vast country which possesses probably one-fifth of the total population of the world, and where the inadequacy of the means of communication together with other factors has retarded the influence which the enlightened class is exercising upon the people.

China has possessed, Gentlemen, political and administrative organizations somewhat different from those which exist in your countries. The task of directing and developing the republican regime is indeed a heavy one. Obstacles are therefore unavoidable, and we were obliged at times to try new experiments to hasten the realization of our new ideals. We would like at least to continue our efforts without external dangers, and with the

sympathy

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sympathy and friendly support of all nations, particularly of those whose territories are adjacent to ours.

Just at this moment when we are trying to free ourselves from all these complications and obstacles, a neighboring power, with whom we desire only cordial relationships based upon principles of equality, reciprocity and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and independence, has thought it necessary to attack us with military force. Without any previous notice, without having recourse to any of the pacific means of settling differences between states placed at her disposal by international law and by the treaties to which both China and Japan are signatories, she has employed military force first in the Three North-eastern Provinces, then at Tientsin, then at Shanghai, in defiance of the engagements known to you all.

Representing a nation which cherishes perhaps more than any other the love of peace, we immediately adopted a most conciliatory attitude, hoping that our moderation would make the aggressor change his conduct. You know well how that hope has failed, Gentlemen, for you have already been able to gather at Shanghai adequate information regarding the march of events since January 28, and to judge with your own eyes the extent of the suffering inflicted without any reason whatsoever upon a peaceful and innocent population.

To defend our national territory we have countered force with resistance. We shall continue to resist the invader in self-defence. But we are animated by

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a most profound desire for peace, and are prepared to enter into all honorable arrangements to end the conflict which are in harmony with the resolutions of the League of Nations and the existing treaties.

Gentlemen, we have full confidence in the success of your inquiry and in the recommendations which you will make to the League of Nations. We know how thoroughly you are inspired by a spirit of impartiality, and as you have been informed by the assessor whom we have delegated to co-operate with you, we shall place at your disposal all the material and all the information in our possession which you may need in the course of your investigations. We shall withhold nothing, believing that frankness and candour will best reveal the justice of our cause.

I now raise the glass to drink to your health and to the success of your mission.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.4 to despatch No.D-241 of Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated April 5,
1932, on the subject: "Visit of the League Commission of
Inquiry to Nanking - text of Formal Addresses".

LORD LYTON'S REPLY TO MINISTER IO-WEN-KAN

Nanking, 8 p.m., March 28, 1932.

Your Excellency and Gentlemen,

We are very grateful for the kind words of
welcome you have addressed to us. I have already
said, when replying to the toast proposed by the
President of the Executive at Luncheon to-day, how
pleased we are at our reception in the Capital of
China, and at the evident interest taken by the
people in our work.

I am glad that you have referred so feelingly
to the loss which the world has suffered by the
death of Monsieur Briand. No single statesman,
perhaps, has rendered greater service to the cause
of international peace. No one man has done more to
strengthen the confidence of the world in the League
of Nations, of which he was such a loyal servant.
I remember at one of the meetings of the Assembly
at Geneva a delegate said to me: "Monsieur Briand
is the principal pillar on which rests to-day the
fabric of world peace." That pillar has now been
removed; but the work which Monsieur Briand did during
his life did not cease with his death. He brought the
League successfully through more than one crisis.
The present one no doubt is more serious, more
complicated, more difficult than any which have
preceded it. It has already strained to the utmost

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the principles on which the League has been founded, and it will prove a supreme test of the efficacy of its machinery. We all miss at this moment the hand that guided us so well in the past, the eloquent voice that brought messages of hope and comfort to nations in their difficulties. He himself was Chairman of the Council, which appointed the Commission of which we are members. He died in the hour of the League's greatest trial, but his work was so well done that I am confident the League will emerge from that trial triumphant and prove itself able to sustain the heavy burden of responsibility which has been placed upon it.

We appreciate, Sir, the special difficulties which China is encountering in this period of transition from the old order to the new. The obstacles you speak of in the way of her progress towards unity under the republic were inevitable. In a country so vast, so ill equipped with roads and railways, they could not have been avoided. As you say, these difficulties should evoke the sympathy and support of other nations. They are facts which must be borne in mind in any settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute. If they are faced with courage and resolution by the National Government, they can be overcome, and the League will endeavour to secure for you the condition of external peace which is necessary for the accomplishment of that object.

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By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.5 to despatch No.D-241 of Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated April 5,
1932, on the subject: "Visit of the League Commission of
Inquiry to Nanking - text of Formal Addresses."

SPEECH OF WELCOME TO THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT.

Nanking, March 29, 1932.

On behalf of the National and the people of China,
I have the honour to extend to you, Lord Lytton and
other honourable members of the Commission, a most
cordial welcome. It is our fervent hope and wish that
your mission will be crowned with success, thus averting
a great international crisis in the Far East and
establishing a precedent for upholding certain
principles which the world will be happy to follow
hereafter.

The Chinese people are inherently peace-loving.
We have always believed that international harmony is
needed today more than ever, because antagonism and
discord among nations have profited none and injured
all. We want to live in peace with all our neighbouring
nations, both far and near. Even under such most trying
conditions as have prevailed and still prevail, we
have conducted ourselves with great forbearance. We
have placed full confidence in the League of Nations,
not only because it is supported by the liberal and
enlightened sentiment of the world, but also because it

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is an embodiment of the principles of peace, which alone can lead the world to a future of progress and prosperity common to all nations.

in the promotion of this friendly relation we feel, however, that international treaties to be mutually satisfactory and lasting should be based upon respect for each other's territorial and political sovereignty, which is, in fact, one of the basic principles underlying the League Covenant. For we believe that durable peace cannot be sustained by military force but must be founded on justice and good will.

I feel sure that I am voicing the unanimous sentiment of our whole nation when I say to the honourable members of this Commission that we sincerely hope that through your investigations and recommendations a just and permanent solution may be found for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, so that peace in the Far East may be secured to the benefit not only of China and Japan but of all interested nations.

Once more, Gentlemen, allow me to bid you welcome to our land.

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Enclosure No. 6 to despatch No. D-241 of Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated April 5,
1932, on the subject: "Visit of the League Commission of
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LUNCHEON GIVEN BY THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL

Nanking March 30, 1932.

Honorable Members of the Commission of Inquiry,
Ladies and Gentlemen:

For your courtesy in coming all the way, to pay
your respects to the late Dr. Sun Yat Sen, father of
the Republic of China, and founder of the Kuomintang,
we are extremely thankful to you.

Dr. Sun devoted his whole life to the cause of
Chinese revolution, enduring innumerable hardships
and braving countless risks before he succeeded in
overthrowing the despotic form of Government, and
establishing the Republic of China. His Plans for
National Reconstruction and the Fundamentals of
National Reconstruction, of which The International
Development of China forms the second part, display
a breadth of vision and an attention to details that have
justly made them guides like in the economic and
industrial schemes of New China, and the legislative
and administrative measures of the National Government.

But Dr. Sun is no mere revolutionist or practical
statesman. His "San Min Chu I", known in the English
speaking world as the Three Principles of the People,

embodies

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embodies a noble political philosophy that insures not only the salvation of China, but also, through the regeneration of China as a stepping stone, promises to promote international cooperation, and to achieve international peace, security, and prosperity.

In the manifesto issued on the occasion of his inauguration as the first Provisional President of China, our late founder gives utterance, first of all, to "the sincere desire of the people of China to establish cordial relations with neighbouring nations", stating specifically that China desires "to cooperate with all friendly powers for the advancement of civilization", fittingly considering this as "the highest and noblest of undertakings, unsurpassed by any other in the whole world. "This may yet be recalled by our distinguished visitors.

He therefore advocated cooperation with the powers not only in the construction of railways and various other engineering projects, but also in projects of cultural interest, projects that admit of a fusion between the cultures of the East and the West, a fusion of the ethical conceptions of China and the scientific knowledge of the West, to form a modern civilization of the New Era.

In the same address he goes on to say: "The people of China are by nature peaceful and law abiding. Unless forced to make resistance in self-defence, they do not lightly enter into hostilities. "Though placed in a deplorable plight in the present crisis, the Chinese

people

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people have not for a single moment forgotten the admonition of their revered leader.

Before you gentlemen reach his mausoleum, you pass by a triumphal arch bearing an inscription from the hand of Dr. Sun, "Po Ngai", "Fraternalism", an inscription agreeing in spirit to the teachings of Confucius that "within the four seas, all are brothers". After all, the world is but a large family, and the different states are but brothers. In a well-organized family in China, there are effective family regulations to check the acts of violence of disorderly members. This is the only way to secure peace within the family. The same is undoubtedly true of the Family of Nations, justice, peace, and security can only be achieved by this.

As a mark of our esteem for you gentlemen who toil in the interests of peace and justice, we recall and expound, solemnly and respectfully, the teachings of our beloved leader, in the hope that you, our distinguished visitors, and the friendly powers within and without the League, will realize that the Kuomintang is the sincere executor of the will, and faithful follower of the teachings of our founder Dr. Sun Yat Sen. Let us now drink to the health of our honorable visitors and to the successful accomplishment of your noble mission.

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NOTE

SEE 893.00 " R. Hankow/59 FOR Despatch # 137.

FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED April 12, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 220

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese situation.

Main developments during March in connection
with the - aside from the shipment of considerable
quantities of arms and ammunition from Hankow to
Loyang.

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(f) Sino-Japanese Situation. Aside from the shipment of considerable quantities of arms and ammunition from Hankow to Loyang the main developments during March in the Sino-Japanese situation at Hankow were (1) preparations for welcoming the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations, (2) faint indications of the beginning of a revival of Japanese trade, and (3) an exchange of letters between the Japanese Consul General and the Wuhan Garrison Commander on the subject of the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods.

Definite news that the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations would visit Hankow was
first

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NOTE

SEE 711.94/685 FOR Despatch # 78.

FROM Seoul (A Davis) DATED April 13, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 020

REGARDING: Chinese Consul General and members of his staff
have been placed in a most awkward and uncomfortable position since September 1931, and particularly during the severe fighting in and near Shanghai.

hs

793.94/ 5276

5276

0 7 3
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Nanking/50 FOR Despatch # D-249.

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED April 14, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Relaxation of Sino-Japanese tension.
Satisfactory progress of peace negotiations
at Shanghai assisted in the - .

hs

793.94/5277

5277

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

slogans which asserted that "Resistance to the Japanese is not anti-Foreignism."

(2) Relaxation of Sino-Japanese tension.

793.94
The visit of the League Commission and the satisfactory progress of peace negotiations at Shanghai increased the hope that the local situation would speedily return to normal. All but two of the Japanese warships departed before the end of the month and the staff of the Japanese Consulate-General returned from temporary quarters on a boat to its offices on University Hill.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 F. R./53 FOR Despatch # 600.

FROM Japan (Neville) DATED May 2, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING:

Negotiations at Shanghai between Chinese and Japanese leaders were postponed for a day on the 11th of April and this temporary break later developed into "indefinite postponement".

hs

793.94/5278

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

II. POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES:

A. Progress of Shanghai Armistice Negotiations.

793.94
 The negotiations at Shanghai, mentioned in this Embassy's Political Report for the month of March, proceeded fairly satisfactorily until the 11th of April, when the meeting of the Chinese and Japanese leaders was postponed for a day. This temporary break developed two days later into "indefinite postponement". The deadlock seems to have been caused principally by the failure to agree on the date of withdrawal of the Japanese troops. Considerable progress had been made regarding the areas which were to be evacuated but the Japanese refused to have any definite date fixed and felt they had compromised enough when they said that they hoped to retire within six months. The opinion is prevalent, of course, throughout Japan that the Chinese have been to blame for the delay in the negotiations.

7 / 4
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.20262/4 FOR Despatch # 1710.

FROM Germany (Sackett) DATED May 9, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Pamphlet entitled "Betrachtungen zur Mandschurei-
Frage" supposed to be published by the Japanese
Military Attache at Berlin, treating of the
historic and treaty basis of the Japanese
position in Manchuria, etc.

hs

793.94/5279

CONFIDENTIAL

5279

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
 893.0146 MP
 894.23

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 25, 1932

Rec'd 10:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

266, May 25, 3 p.m.

Lieutenant Soule this morning personally

witnessed the withdrawal by the Japanese army of the
 6th Brigade from the walled city of Paoshan, Woosung
 Forts, and that part of Woosung-Chen east of the
 railway line and resumption of control in these areas
 by the Chinese special police without incident.
 Colonel Harata states last of Japanese army units will
 embark for Japan early next month and control of areas
 number one, two and three, annex two Sino-Japanese
 Peace Agreement, will revert to the Chinese by that
 time."

Repeat to War Department; repeated to the
 legation.

QUINNINGHAM

RR WWC



22. to General
 May 25/32
 MAY 25 1932

F/LS
 793.94/5280

MAY 31 1932

FILED

0742

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
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 OR
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,
 May 25, 1932.

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

79 May 25/5280 the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphs
 that on that morning an officer of the staff of the American
 Military Attaché QUOTE personally witnessed the withdrawal
 by the Japanese army of the 6th Brigade from the walled city
 of Paoshan, Woosung Forts, and that part of Woosung-Chen
 east of the railway line and resumption of control in these
 areas by the Chinese special police without incident.
 Colonel Harata states last of Japanese army units will
 embark for Japan early next month and control of areas number
 one, two and three, annex two Sino-Japanese Peace Agreement,
 will revert to the Chinese by that time UNQUOTE.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

793.94/5280

FE:MMH:REK

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5280

MAY 25. 1932. PM

0743

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

May 28, 1932.

Gpn

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (China).

793.94/A
 793.94/S
 793.94/119
 189 The Department conceives that, on the occasion of the withdrawal of Japanese forces from the Shanghai area, the issuance of a statement in a congratulatory vein by the members other than Chinese or Japanese of the Joint Commission might have a good psychological and diplomatic effect in relation to the entire Sino-Japanese controversy.

Such a statement, if made, should only be made after the complete evacuation, in accordance with the Agreement of May 5, of the entire area occupied by Japanese troops since January 28. It would need to be so formulated as to avoid any implication or inference of departure from or surrender of the view that the situation as between China and Japan must be considered and ultimately be dealt with in its entirety.

In their efforts in relation to the problems which have developed since last September, the American Government and the League have throughout striven to suggest methods of settlement which would take into equitable account the grievances both of the Chinese and of the Japanese Governments.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/5230A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

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As further evidence of the view and position that the problems in question should be settled by processes of mediation and conciliation as distinguished from processes based on armed force, it would seem desirable, by way of encouragement, that an express commendation be made of the efforts which the Governments of the disputant countries are now making to follow that policy. At least it is our hope that the steps which are being taken at Shanghai will prove a preface to a successful, comprehensive settlement of the entire Sino-Japanese controversy by ^{similar} processes of negotiation and adjustment.

The Department therefore suggests that, when the withdrawal of the Japanese troops becomes an established fact, the members other than Chinese or Japanese of the Joint Commission might congratulate the Japanese and Chinese Governments on this evidence of their desire for peace; and that the said members might, through the Japanese and Chinese members, induce the Japanese and the Chinese Governments to make statements which would be reassuring both to each other and to the world, the former with regard to reluctance on its part to

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

use force and the latter in affirmation of its intention
 to give adequate protection to foreign nationals and
 interests.

The Department suggests that you, on opportune
 occasions, discreetly discuss this with your colleagues
 on the Joint Commission and inform the Department of your
 views and theirs.

Stinson

OK

May. 23. 1932. PM

FE: SKH: JEF: REK

FE

M.M.H.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
 (FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State
 Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, MAY 14, 1932

At the press conference this morning, Acting Secretary Castle said that Mr. McDermott of the Division of Current Information would make available to the correspondents a press release concerning the situation in China. The Acting Secretary also announced the press release concerning the Foreign Service changes during the past week.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 MAY 23 1932
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

793.94/5281

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

A correspondent asked if, in view of the fact that the other nations were withdrawing their troops from Shanghai, this Government is planning to withdraw the 31st Infantry. The Acting Secretary pointed out that even with the 31st Infantry still there the British have more troops in Shanghai than the United States. The correspondent then explained that he had meant to refer to the forces recently sent to Shanghai by the various powers which were now being withdrawn. Mr. Castle said that, FOR ATTRIBUTION AND NOT FOR QUOTATION, he had spoken to General MacArthur and that the General had said that he hoped the State Department would not find it necessary to request the War Department to withdraw the 31st Infantry until some time after the middle of June, when that regiment could be returned to Manila by a regular sailing of an Army transport. A correspondent then asked if it was only a question of complying with the wishes of the War Department and if the troops would be withdrawn the latter part of June. Mr. Castle replied in the affirmative and added that no further trouble was anticipated in Shanghai. A correspondent inquired if this Government contemplated the reduction of the Marine forces in

304

1 / 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Shanghai at the time of the withdrawal of the 31st Infantry. The Acting Secretary said that no reduction was planned inasmuch as the present Marine force there was a comparatively small one. A correspondent pointed out that the Japanese Foreign Office had made a statement that they were expecting the League of Nations and the interested powers to police Shanghai, and asked if they had made any special request to this Government. Mr. Castle replied in the negative. Asked if the Sino-Japanese agreement did not imply the policing of Shanghai by the neutral powers, the Acting Secretary said that the Neutral Commission was to see that the City was properly policed, and added that the Chinese had brought down some of their best police from Peiping and that it was hoped that they could handle the situation themselves. A correspondent inquired if the Chinese did not still have a force about 27 miles from Shanghai. Mr. Castle replied in the affirmative but pointed out that this was not in the Neutral Zone.

DEBTS

A correspondent inquired if the Acting Secretary had read the newspaper account of the proposal of the American Federation of Labor for the reduction of foreign government debts proportionately to their trade with this country and remarked that this seemed to be virtually the same proposal as that made by former Governor Smith of New York. Mr. Castle replied that he had merely seen the headlines and that he presumed the proposal was based on that of Governor Smith's. The correspondent then asked if the President had requested the State Department to study the plan. Mr. Castle replied in the negative.

LINDBERGH CASE

A correspondent asked if the Department planned to instruct the consulates and missions to keep a watch for the Lindbergh

1

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 26, 1932

Rec'd 8:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

569, May 26, 5 p.m.
793.94/5262
Legation's 560, May 23, 5 p.m.



In reply to the Legation's inquiry American
Consul General at Nanking has replied as follows:

"May 26, 9 a.m. I am reliably informed that
impeachment was directed against Wang Ching Wei only
and that it was brought by three members of the
Control Yuan who were ignorant of the fact that Wang
Ching Wei in directing that the agreement with the
Japanese be signed had already received authorization
thereto from the Central Political Council. The
Standing Committees of both the Central Supervisory
Committee and of the Central Council dismissed the
charges brought against Wang. The position officially
taken was that the sanction of the Shanghai agreement
by the Central Political Council obviated any necessity
for reference of the agreement by the Executive Yuan

to

F/LS 793.94/5282

MAY 31 1932

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893.50

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#569 From Peiping May 26, 1932

to the Legislative Yuan for approval. It does not
seem probable that the impeachment incident had any
special significance."

JOHNSON

RR WWC

3750

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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713.91
793.1025
792.94119

MP

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 28 1932
Department of State

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone

FROM

Shanghai

Dated May 28, 1932

Rec'd 6:46 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

272, May 28, 2 p.m.

15-2802

Referring to the Department's 189, May 24, 6 p.m.,

I have discussed questions therein raised with British
colleague and will discreetly approach those of other
nationalities. I venture to express the opinion that in
entire evacuation is completed prior to June 10th an
expression of congratulation should be made which would
indicate to those concerned a desire to commend when
justified. This would do much to counteract any feeling
of resentment which might exist due to the frequent
protests lodged since January 28. I do not consider
that any effort, to induce through Japanese or Chinese
representatives a pronouncement by Japanese or Chinese
Governments, is desirable as there is too much risk
in having the motives questioned. No amount of tact
we might exert would insure that the motive would not

be

F/DEW
793.94/5283

FILED

JUN 6 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#272 From Shanghai May 28, 1932

be questioned but embarrassment might follow.

Two. It is possibly not known that while it has been definitely stated in the press, and the Japanese military member of the Joint Commission has stated informally, that the Japanese Army will evacuate all of the areas referred to annex two before June 10, the Japanese Navy has given no such assurance and it is (continue?) believed that the Navy will contribute to occupy ~~as~~ area ~~stated in~~ four, in annex two, and probably to maintain a barracks in area two for some time to come.

WWO HPD

CUNNINGHAM

0752

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone.

Department of State

Washington,

June 10, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 189, May 24, 6 p.m., and your 272, May 28, 2 p.m.

Department appreciates the force of your arguments against endeavoring to induce, through the Japanese and Chinese members of the Joint Commission, the Japanese and Chinese Governments to make statements. Accordingly, Department desires that you drop this phase of the suggestion.

If, however, it should be decided that the issuance of a statement in a congratulatory vein by the members of the Joint Commission other than Japanese or Chinese would serve a useful purpose, the Department authorizes you to cooperate with your interested colleagues in this matter provided that such a statement is made after the complete evacuation, in accordance with the agreement of May 5, of the entire area occupied by Japanese military forces since January 28.

FE:MMH:FEJ/VDM

FE

CR

Enciphered by

JUN 11 1932.

Sent by operator

M.,

19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5283

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM REC'D
NO. 276. Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
Geneva, Switzerland, May 17, 1932.



SUBJECT: Transmitting Sino-Japanese Documents for
Period May 1 to May 15, inclusive.

1-1066 GPO

743
w/10
400. C112
CHECK
To the Field
U. S. A.
THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's despatch
No. 266 Political, of May 4, 1932, and previous despatches
transmitting documents relating to the appeal of the Chinese
Government under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In pursuance of the procedure which has been followed
in this matter, I am forwarding as an enclosure to this
despatch further documents which were issued during the
period May 1 to May 15, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert
American Consul.

Enclosures:
as listed.

Original and Five Copies to Department of State.
One copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

F/HS

793.94/5284

JUN 1 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
with No. 276 Pl. of
May 17th 32.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED WITH
GENEVA CONSULATE'S DESPATCH No.276 POLITICAL
OF MAY 17, 1932.

Verbatim Record of the Special Session of the Assembly.
Fifth Plenary Meeting, Saturday, April 30, 1932,
at 10.30 a.m.

C.M.225

C.M.230 to C.M.233

C.M.236

A.(Extr.) 111 to A.(Extr.) 120.

VERBATIM RECORD

OF THE

Special Session of the Assembly

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

SATURDAY, APRIL 30TH, 1932, AT 10.30. A.M.

CONTENTS

President : M. HYMANS.

17. OUTRAGE AT SHANGHAI: MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.
18. FIRST PROGRESS REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY ON MARCH 11TH, 1932: ADOPTION OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE.

17. — OUTRAGE AT SHANGHAI: MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

The President :

Translation : Before we begin our agenda, I should like to express the deep sorrow and indignation we feel at the unhappy news of the outrage at Shanghai, which has claimed a large number of victims and caused severe injuries to His Excellency the Japanese Minister, two Japanese generals, the Japanese admiral and the Japanese Consul-General.

I paid a visit yesterday to M. Nagaoka to express to him our horror and profound regret at this dastardly deed ; and I desire to do so again to day in public and on behalf of you all, and to express my earnest hope for the recovery of the unfortunate victims of the outrage.

I may add that our distinguished colleague, M. Paul-Boncour, President-in-Office of the Council of the League of Nations, who has been called away to France on urgent public duties, has asked me to associate him with this expression of regret.

M. Nagaoka (Japan) :

Translation : Mr. President. — I am deeply moved by your sympathetic words, spoken on behalf both of the League of Nations and of the President of the Council, and also on your own behalf.

I should like to express, in the name of the country I have the honour to represent, my deep gratitude for this mark of sympathy on the occasion of

yesterday's terrible outrage at Shanghai. You may rest assured that, not only the Japanese Government and the unfortunate victims, but the whole country as well will keenly appreciate this mark of sympathy.

18. — FIRST PROGRESS REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY ON MARCH 11th, 1932: ADOPTION OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE.

The President :

Translation : The Assembly has been convened in accordance with the terms of the resolution adopted on March 11th last. You will remember that, by this resolution, the Assembly set up a special committee with instructions in the first place to report on the cessation of hostilities in the Shanghai area and the conclusion of arrangements which should render definite the said cessation and should regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.

In compliance with your instructions, this Committee now submits to you a report describing the development of events since the meeting of March 11th, together with a draft resolution which may be considered the conclusion of the report. A second report on the general situation will be circulated very shortly.

I will sum up in a few words the facts and the present position.

We have first the satisfaction of noting that hostilities ceased several weeks ago. There have, of course, been a few skirmishes here and there, but the Chinese delegation wrote to us on April 12th that fighting had virtually ceased and that no blood was being shed. " This is indeed ", said the Chinese delegation, " a precious result and one for which the

793.94/5284

- 2 -

Chinese Government wishes herewith to express the profound gratitude of the Chinese people to the Assembly".

Secondly, according to information received from Shanghai and from the Chinese and Japanese delegations, the withdrawal of the Japanese forces is now being carried out. A number of army and naval units have left for Japan. The Assembly, at its meetings on March 4th and 11th, recommended that negotiations should be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the representatives of the four Powers which have special interests in the Settlements, for the conclusion of arrangements which should render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the troops. These negotiations began on March 14th, but certain difficulties arose at the outset. The Committee of Nineteen met for the first time on March 17th. The difficulties in question were brought to its notice and it discussed them. They were removed and the negotiations were continued. A provisional agreement was reached concerning the fundamental clauses of a draft armistice. After a few days, however, a difference arose between China and Japan as to the time-limit within which the Japanese troops were to withdraw, and the negotiations were held up owing to this difficulty. The Chinese delegation brought the incident before us. The two delegations sent us memoranda containing information concerning the progress of the negotiations and communicated to us all the relevant papers.

The Special Committee met on April 16th to examine the position, and instructed your President to get into touch with the Chinese and Japanese representatives. A series of conversations followed, and the Committee met again on April 18th, 19th, 26th, 28th and 29th.

On April 19th, the Committee, considering itself to be an organ of conciliation, drew up a preliminary draft resolution which would, it believed, bring about an agreement between China and Japan. The preliminary draft was communicated to the two delegations and discussed with them, but the agreement for which we were hoping was not achieved on all points. There was still a difference on one important matter. In the meantime, we learnt that a new effort at conciliation was being made at Shanghai on the initiative of the Chairman of the Committee of the representatives of the four Powers having special interests in the Settlements. The Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Miles Lampson, told us that the negotiations were going on favourably and that an agreement had at last virtually been reached, thanks to an addition to the text of Annex 3, which refers to Article IV in the draft of the armistice.

The report (document A. (Extr.) 108.1932.VII) gives all the necessary details, and I wish to draw attention to a few points only.

The draft agreement for the armistice provides for the establishment of a Joint Commission including members representing China and Japan and civilian, military and naval representatives of the four Powers which have special interests in the Settlements. The duties of this Commission will be to survey the withdrawal of the troops and to collaborate in arranging for the transfer of the territory evacuated to the Chinese police and to watch, in such manner as it deems best, the carrying out of the provisions of the armistice — in particular, that relating to the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The Commission will also be authorised to call attention to any neglect in carrying out of the armistice provisions. In default of unanimity, for which we all, of course, hope,

the Joint Commission may, in all cases, take majority decisions, the Chairman having a casting vote.

There can be no question that the establishment of this Commission, its composition and its duties are important factors in the draft agreement which, we are informed, will be concluded officially and definitively, and will, it is likewise announced, be signed within a very few days.

The resolution, which is really the conclusion to the report, to which I would refer you for further details, is as follows:

"The Assembly,

"1. Considering that its resolutions of March 4th and 11th recommended that negotiations should be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements, for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces;

"2. Considering that, while it is not for its Committee to take the place of the negotiators — since the arrangements contemplated in the Assembly resolutions of March 4th and 11th can only be concluded on the spot — every Power represented in these negotiations is entitled, should serious difficulties be encountered in the course of the negotiations or in the carrying out of the above-mentioned arrangements, to notify the Committee, 'which exercises its functions on behalf of and under supervision of the Assembly', of those difficulties;

"3. Considering that the negotiations should be pursued in accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions, no one of the parties being entitled to insist on conditions which would be incompatible with the said resolutions;

"4. Having noted the articles of the draft armistice which have been communicated to the Committee of the Assembly and have been accepted by the two parties:

"5. Considers that these articles conform to the spirit of the said resolutions;

"6. Notes in particular that, under Article III of the said draft, the Japanese Government undertakes to carry out the withdrawal of its forces in the International Settlement and the roads outside the Settlement in the Hong Kew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932;

"7. Declares that it is in accordance with the spirit of the resolutions of March 4th and 11th that this withdrawal should take place in the near future;

"8. Declares that the resolution of March 4th will only have been fully complied with when the Japanese forces have been entirely withdrawn;

"9. Notes that the draft agreement provides for the establishment of a Joint Commission, including neutral members, to certify the mutual withdrawal and to collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw;

"10. Notes with satisfaction that the said Commission will, in accordance with its decisions, watch, in such manner as it deems best, the carrying out of Articles I, II and III, of which the last-named provides for the complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces as before the incident of January 28th;

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"11. Is of opinion that the powers, as defined in Annex 3 to the draft agreement, of the Commission which is to watch the carrying out of Articles I, II and III of that agreement, include authority to call attention, in accordance with its decisions taken in such manner as is provided in the said Annex, to any neglect in carrying out any of the provisions of the articles mentioned above.

"12. Earnestly recommends the parties in question to continue the negotiations with a view to reaching their rapid conclusion, and requests the Governments having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to continue to lend their good offices for this purpose;

"13. Expressly points out that, unless a conclusion is reached as laid down in the resolutions of March 4th and 11th, the question will necessarily come up again before the Assembly;

"14. Requests the Governments of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to transit to the League of Nations the information which will be in the possession of the Mixed Commission in virtue of its functions, and will be furnished to those Governments by their respective representatives on the Commission." I shall now declare open the discussion on both the report and the Draft Resolution.

Dr. Yen (China). — In the past two months, the Council of the League of Nations, the Special Assembly as represented by the so-called Committee of Nineteen, and the friendly Powers have, especially in connection with the attack and invasion of Shanghai by Japanese forces, been unremitting in their efforts to bring Japan back to reason and to make her agree that hostilities should come to an end. You must admit that, as far as China is concerned, she has always lent a willing ear to the representations thus made to her. When the friendly Powers made their request, at the beginning of February, to Nanking and Tokyo to end the hostilities at Shanghai and commence negotiations for the settlement of outstanding differences in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the Council resolution of December 9th, 1931, my Government at once assented. Japan rejected the proposal. Again, when the British Admiral Kelly exercised his good offices a month later in the same direction, and an understanding was reached for the basis of an armistice which was eminently fair to the two parties, that same understanding was again refused by the Japanese Government.

That agreement, you will recall, provided for the withdrawal of our troops to Chenju and the Japanese to inside the Settlement, as a first step, and our troops to Nanshiang and the Japanese troops to their ships, as the second step. To-day, the Japanese are entrenched in Chenju and Nanshiang, and refuse even to set a date for the withdrawal, not to their ships, but only to the Settlement.

It is true that there has been a change of circumstances, but it must be remembered that this is an undeclared aggressive war, and it is indeed a lamentable precedent for us all that the aggressive party should be permitted to enjoy to the fullest extent his ill-gotten advantages.

In connection with our previous appeal to the Special Committee in connection with the Shanghai negotiations, you were good enough to rule out the so called Separate Note, because it was a political condition. Last week, the Special Committee adopted a draft resolution, paragraph 11 of which again ruled out a political condition but prescribed

the manner whereby the time of the final withdrawal of the Japanese troops into the Settlement should be decided. China accepted, but again Japan disapproved of the decision of the Special Committee.

I have reviewed briefly the history of all these negotiations during the past two months in order to remind you that in every case it was China that accepted and Japan that rejected the proposed terms of armistice, and that after every *impasse* the negotiations have been resumed only as a result of important concessions on the part of the Chinese Government. Formula after formula has been presented, and the last formula is always more unfavourable to China than the previous one.

This is true if the present formula. We may say with truth that the actual formula furnishes some kind of a solution of the problem before us, but it is not a solution which is fair or just to China. Nevertheless, my Government, eager always for the restoration of peaceful conditions — an eagerness which is also earnestly shared by all members of the Committee, especially the interested Powers — has decided to accept it as a practical solution. We feel sure that the difficulties of the situation and the merits of the case are fully realised in their proper perspective, not only by the Special Committee and the Assembly, but by the peoples of the whole world.

In accepting this resolution, may I say that the Chinese Government is acting solely in the interest of peace, and does not recede from the position which it has hitherto maintained, that the presence of Japanese armed forces in Chinese territory is a violation of China's territorial integrity and cannot under any circumstances be justified. The Chinese Government reserves, therefore, all rights to which it is entitled under the Covenant and international law in general.

At the same time, may I be permitted to state that the Chinese Government places great importance on paragraph 6 of the resolution, which takes note of Japan's engagement to withdraw to the International Settlement; on paragraph 7, which declares that the withdrawal must take place in the near future (*à bref délai*); on paragraph 8, that the resolution of March 4th will be fully executed only after the complete withdrawal; on paragraph 10, which notes that the Joint Commission has the duty of watching the execution of Articles I, II and III, whereof the last article foresees the final withdrawal of the Japanese troops into the Settlement; and finally on paragraph 13, which points out expressly that, in case the negotiations should fail to reach a conclusion, the question will come up again before the Assembly.

In short, the Chinese Government, in accepting the resolution, accepts it as a whole, and places equal importance on all the paragraphs contained therein. My Government hopes sincerely also that the Special Committee and the Assembly will continue as before their energetic and vigilant efforts to see to it that the provisions of the present and previous resolutions are carried out with thoroughness and promptitude.

M. Nagaoka (Japan):

Translation: I need hardly tell you that the Japanese Government has always been most anxious for the success of the negotiations which have been carried on at Shanghai in pursuance of the resolution adopted on March 4th by the Assembly. From the outset of these negotiations, my Government has always done its utmost towards that end, in strict conformity with the terms of the resolution. It therefore feels the greatest satisfaction to find that in the draft resolution just read it is

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to
the Council and
Members of the
League.

C.467.M.225.1932.VII.

Geneva, May 2nd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

PRELIMINARY REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate the following preliminary report, dated Mukden, April 30th, which he has received from the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the Council in its resolution of December 10th, 1931.

MUKDEN, 30.4.1932.

1) Commission of Enquiry appointed in conformity with paragraph 5 of Council Resolution of December 10th arrived at Mukden 21st April and is now occupied with its investigations on the spot. Since its arrival in the Far East, the Commission has investigated general conditions prevailing in Japan and China in so far as may affect its work. It visited Tokyo, Osaka, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Tientsin and Peiping, conferred with members of both Governments, and interviewed representatives of many interested groups and classes in both countries. In Peiping it met representatives authorities who had been in charge of three North Eastern Provinces prior to September 18th. Since arriving at Mukden, the Commission has interviewed, amongst others, Acting Consul-General of Japan and General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in Manchuria.

Declaration of the President of the Council with reference to Council Resolution of December 10th directed the Commission to submit to the Council as soon as possible after its arrival on the spot a preliminary report on the existing situation in so far as this affects fulfilment or otherwise by the Governments of China and Japan of certain undertakings embodied in Council Resolution of September 30th and reiterated in Council Resolution of December 10th. These undertakings are:

- (a) That the Japanese Government "will continue as rapidly as possible withdrawal of its troops into the Manchurian Railway Zone in proportion as safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured;"
- (b) That the Chinese Government "will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that Zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police are re-established;"
- (c) That both Governments "will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of scope of the incidents or any aggravation of the situation."

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The Commission is not yet in a position to submit full information on these three points. It must reserve for later report the consideration of the undertakings of both parties "to prevent any extension of the scope of the incidents or any aggravation of the situation" but as the Council is awaiting an early report on the existing situation in so far as it bears on the undertakings of Japan and China referred to above under (a) and (b), the following information is transmitted.

2) Actual Situation in Manchuria.

Information regarding military situation in the three North Eastern Provinces has been provided by Japanese military authorities. It is given under five headings, the first three relating to Japanese troops and other forces cooperating with them, the last two relating to forces opposed to them. Information with regard to fourth heading has also been obtained from a Chinese source.

It will be noted that in the classification adopted a new feature appears which was not contemplated by the Council in September last. In the course of the events which are the subject of the present enquiry, the local administration was transformed. "Committees for the preservation of peace and order" were first established with Japanese help in the last month of 1931. These were subsequently superseded by an authority which was established on March 9th 1932 as the "Manchukuo Government." This explanation is necessary in order to account for use of expression "Manchukuo Army" by the Japanese military authorities.

I. Japanese Regular Forces.

On 18th September the numbers of Japanese troops in the South Manchurian Railway Zone is stated to have been 10,590. Numbers given for the first part of December are: 4,000 inside and 8,900 outside South Manchurian Railway Zone, making a total of 12,900.

For the latter part of April the numbers are given as 6,600 inside and 15,800 outside the South Manchurian Railway Zone in the region of Tsitsihar, Taonan, Liaoyuang Railway, Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway, Chinese Eastern Railway east of Harbin, and the northern sector of the Kirin-Tunhua railway, making a total of 22,400.

II. "Manchukuo Army."

Troops designated by the Japanese military authorities as the "Manchukuo Army" are said to have been formed partly of Chinese regular troops stationed in Manchuria before 18th September and subsequently reorganised, and partly of freshly recruited soldiers. This force has been created with the help of Japanese military authorities. Many Japanese officers, either retired or still belonging to Japanese Army, have been engaged as military advisers and their number is increasing. Contracts with some of these officers have been made for one year. A Japanese officer has been appointed adviser to the "Department of Defence of the Manchukuo Government" at Changchun.

These troops are stationed or operating chiefly in the region Mukden-Changchun-Taonan-Tsitsihar-Tunhua and along Chinese Eastern Railway, particularly on the Eastern branch, where they are engaged against forces not recognising the authority of the "Manchukuo Government." Total number of the "Manchukuo Army" is stated to have been 85,000 men at the end of March. Actual number is not reliable owing to uncertainty of the information

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regarding these troops at the present time.

III. Local Police Force.

The number of this force is given as about 119,000, of whom 60,000 are local guards. This police force is stated to be in the main a continuation of that existing on 18th September. Its reorganisation is taking place with the help of Japanese officials.

IV. Forces opposed to Japanese Troops and the "Manchukuo Army".

The Commission was informed in Peiping by General Chang Hsueh-liang that forces outside the Great wall on 18th September, including non-fighting elements, numbered 60,000 for Fengtienfu Province, 80,000 for Kirin Province, and 20,000 for Heilungkiang, making a total of 160,000, of which about 50,000 from Fengtienfu Province were subsequently withdrawn inside wall. This would leave 110,000 outside wall.

Japanese military authorities give the number of troops now remaining outside the wall as 110,000, of which they state that 60,000 joined the "Manchukuo Army", 30,000 remained in North-East of Kirin in opposition to Japanese troops and to "Manchukuo Army" and about 20,000 may have joined the so-called Volunteer Corps. The situation is described by them as follows:

(A) Portion of former Chinese army not recognising the authority of the "Manchukuo Government":

- (i) Forces North-East of Harbin, estimated at 30,000 (stated officially by the Chinese to be composed of Kirin Self-Defence Army under the command of General Li Tu and of the Chinese Eastern Railway Guards under the command of General Ting).
- (ii) A force under General Li Hui Cheng in the region north-west of Mukden, estimated at 10,000.
- (iii) Remnant of nine Cavalry Brigades, on the north-eastern frontier of Chengtehfu, estimated at 3,000.

(B) Volunteers.

- (i) The so-called North Eastern Army of anti-Japanese volunteers in the western part of Fengtienfu Province, mainly south of Chinchow, estimated at between 15,000 and 25,000 men.
- (ii) The so-called National Volunteer Army of the North East, under the command of Wu Chin Tsin, mainly operating around Mukden. The present strength of this force, which has had several encounters with Japanese troops, is unknown.
- (iii) The Volunteer Army of Chengtehfu. This comparatively well-disciplined body of some 3,000 men, under the command of Tang Yu Lin, which comprises remnants of the cavalry of General Chang Hsueh-liang's first and second Armies, is reported to be active on the borders of Chengtehfu and Fengtienfu Provinces.

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- (iv) Several minor volunteer corps north-west partly in the Shannaiikwan region, partly between Junhua and Tienpaoshan, where they are in touch with regular forces hostile to the "Manchukuo Government."

The total strength of these irregular forces mentioned under (i) to (iv) is said to be about 40,000.

- (v) Bandits. The bandits, who are not organized primarily for political purposes, appear to have increased in number, due to the disturbed conditions. They are reported by the Japanese to be scattered throughout Manchuria, especially in the part south of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Japanese estimate their total number as 40,000. In addition to these, a special bandit force of 12,000 north and east of the town of Kirin are said to be cooperating with the Chinese forces North East of Harbin mentioned under (A) (i).

Armed conflicts between these various forces are frequent. There are bandits raids; attempts of the Japanese soldiers and of the "Manchukuo Government" troops to suppress them; and fighting between the various military forces attempting to maintain the new régime and those opposed to it. The result is loss of life, destruction of property, and general sense of insecurity.

(3) The Commission purposely refrains from commenting at this stage on the facts and figures above recorded. The Japanese authorities maintain that they cannot at present withdraw their troops without endangering the "safety of the lives and property of their nationals" outside the Railway Zone. They appear to consider that this withdrawal must depend on the progress of the reorganization of the troops described as the "Manchukuo Government Army". The Chinese Government does not now exercise authority in any part of Manchuria, and as events have developed recently the practical question of the fulfilment of its responsibilities has not arisen. The possible and equitable measures which may restore peace and security and create a reasonable measure of goodwill throughout Manchuria will be considered by the Commission in its final report.

The Commission will visit Changchun next week, and then continue its investigations in other parts of Manchuria.

(Signed) LYTTON (Chairman) of Commission.
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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.425.M.230.1932.VII.
Geneva, May 6th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated May 5th.

(Translation)

Ref. 87/1932.

May 5th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that the Sino-Japanese military agreement concerning the definitive cessation of hostilities at Shanghai (English text) was officially concluded on May 5th, 1932, at 1.20 p.m. (local time). As M. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister, had to undergo a serious operation in the afternoon, the instrument was brought to him for signature in the morning by Chinese, British and Japanese representatives.

(signed) S. SAWADA.

For the representative of Japan on
the Council of the League
of Nations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C. 427.1.231.1932.VII
Geneva, May 6th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council and the Members of the League the following communication dated May 4th.

Ref./A.23.

MEMORANDUM ON THE
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE LYTON COMMISSION.

The Commission of Enquiry appointed in conformity with Paragraph 3 of the Council Resolution of December 10th has now submitted a Preliminary Report with reference "to the existing situation in so far as this affects fulfilment or otherwise by the Governments of China and Japan of certain undertakings embodied in Council Resolution of September 30th and reiterated in Council Resolution of December 10th," as enjoined by the President in a declaration which he made on the adoption of the Resolution of December 10th.

The undertaking which the Japanese Government undertook to fulfil in the above-mentioned Resolutions was that it "will continue as rapidly as possible withdrawal of its troops into the Manchuria Railway Zone in proportion as safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured."

The undertaking which the Chinese Government pledged to fulfil in the above-mentioned Resolutions was that it "will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that Zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police are re-established."

The undertaking which both the Chinese and Japanese Governments undertook to fulfil was that they "will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of scope of the incidents or any aggravation of the situation."

As to the joint undertaking just cited, the Preliminary Report says that the Commission must reserve consideration in a later report.

As to the undertaking of the Chinese Government, the Preliminary Report notes that "as events have developed recently the practical question of the fulfilment of its responsibility has not arisen."

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The "events" which the Commission has in view refer presumably to the establishment of the pseudo-Manchukuo Government and the non-withdrawal of the Japanese troops. These "events" naturally absolve the Chinese Government from non-fulfilment of its undertaking, or, as the Commission rightly remarks in its report, "the practical question of the fulfilment of its responsibility has not arisen."

As to the undertaking of the Japanese Government to "continue as rapidly as possible withdrawal of its troops into the Manchurian Railway Zone", the Preliminary Report is explicit; Japanese troops have not only not withdrawn, - they have increased in numbers as may be seen from those figures which the Commission obtained from the Japanese themselves. For the first part of December, there were 4,000 inside and 8,900 outside the South Manchuria Railway, and for the latter part of April, the numbers are given as 6,600 inside and 15,800 outside, an increase of 2,600 inside and 6,900 outside the Railway Zone. These are, of course, only Japanese figures. The real figures must be very much larger.

Aside from these Japanese regular forces, there is the so-called "Manchukuo Army," the total number of which is stated to have been 85,000 men at the end of March. "This force" the report says "has been created with the help of Japanese military authorities, many Japanese officers, either retired or still belonging to Japanese army, have been engaged as military advisers and their number is increasing. Contracts with some of these officers have been made for one year. A Japanese officer has been appointed adviser to the 'Department of Defence of the Manchukuo Government' at Changchun."

As distinguished from the "Japanese Regular Forces, this "Manchukuo Army" might be better denominated "Japanese Irregular Forces" in every sense of the term.

The forces opposed to the Japanese troops and the "Manchukuo Army" vary in numbers according to the Preliminary Report. The Chinese give their number as 140,000 outside the Great Wall. The Japanese give them as 110,000 of which they state that 60,000 have joined the "Manchukuo Army" and 50,000 remained in opposition. Be that as it may, one conclusion may be sustained, namely, that there is still a large organized force opposed to the present regime, and that the Japanese forces and their allies are not engaged in a campaign against irregulars and bandits as the Japanese have claimed them to be.

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In classifying the various forces now prevalent in Manchuria, the Commission notes a "new feature," namely, the transformation of the local administration in Manchuria. According to the Council Resolutions of September 30th and December 10th, local authorities and police of the Chinese Government were to be re-established on the withdrawal of Japanese forces and the handing over of the local police administration by the Japanese to the Chinese authorities. But, contrary to this procedure enjoined by the League Council, the Japanese first helped in putting up in the last month of 1931 the so-called "Committees for the Preservation of Peace and Order," which were in the words of the Preliminary Report "subsequently superseded by an authority which was established on March 9, 1932 as the 'Manchukuo Government.'" That this "new feature" was not contemplated by the Council in December last and therefore contrary to its Resolutions of September 20th and December 10th goes without saying.

The Report makes mention of bandit raids and fighting between the various military forces attempting to maintain the new regime and those opposed to it. This lamentable state of affairs bears witness to the unwisdom of the acts of the Japanese militarists. Their one object, which has been repeatedly claimed as justification for the despatch and presence of Japanese troops in the Three Eastern Provinces, is the maintenance of peace, order and security. This object, the Report avers, is utterly defeated. In its own words, "the result is loss of life, destruction of property and general sense of insecurity." The inevitable conclusion to be derived would seem that the situation can only be remedied by the withdrawal of Japanese forces and the establishment of the legal authorities of the Chinese Government.

As a whole, the Report is a vindication of the Chinese position vis-a-vis the Sino-Japanese dispute with respect to the Three Eastern Provinces. It is of unmistakable opinion that the Japanese have not carried out their pledges as embodied in the Council Resolutions of September 30th and December 10th. All doubts should now be removed that it is the intention of the Japanese to create an armed military state in Manchuria under Japanese direction and control as a preliminary stage towards their realization of establishing a hegemony over the Three Eastern Provinces. As such it should not be countenanced by the League and the world.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.441.M.232.1932.VII.
Geneva, May 9th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate the following
communication, dated May 8th.

Ref. 90/1932.
(Translation)

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that the main
Japanese forces began their withdrawal on May 6th east of the line
Ssutzulin-Yanghang-Tazang-Chenzu.

In order to facilitate the Mixed Commission's task
and the transfer to the Chinese police, detachments will be
left provisionally to ensure the maintenance of public order
at the following points:

Liuhc:	one battalion of infantry.
Kating:	ditto.
Nanziang:	ditto.
Lotien:	ditto. one battery of artillery.

The period for which the above-mentioned troops are
to be stationed at these points is three days.

The subsequent plan of withdrawal communicated to the
Mixed Commission is as follows:

1. Withdrawal from the line Liuhc-Kating-Nanziang.
2. Withdrawal from Lotien.
3. Withdrawal of the last detachments from the line
Ssutzulin-Yanghang-Tazang-Chenzu.

The first of these movements will begin at 1 p.m. on
May 9th, and the second on the following day (May 10th) at
noon.

(signed) H. NAGAOKA.

Japanese Representative on the Council
of the League of Nations.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.456.M.233.1932.VII.

Geneva, May 12th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate the following communication dated May 11th.

(Translation.)
91/1932.

BRIGANDAGE AND DISORDER IN MANCHURIA.

Summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation.

1. The following acts of brigandage have taken place in the neighbourhood of the South Manchurian Railway zone:

	March 1-10	March 11-20	March 21-31	April 1-10
Number of attacks	574	417	612	539
Bands of more than 200 men	153	132	198	198
Killed and wounded	19	7	9	9
Hostages	248	133	146	99

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2. The former rulers of Manchuria have resumed an active campaign of stirring up disorder. In this connection the increase in the number of large bodies of brigands should be noted. The fomenters of trouble redoubled their efforts on the arrival of the League Commission of Enquiry. The communist elements are conducting an active campaign, more especially in Northern Manchuria and Chientao. Evidence has been secured that Chang Hsuehliang is issuing large quantities of counterfeit "taiyang" notes of the three eastern provinces.

3. General Wangtienchung, commanding the railway guards of the Mukden-Tienchuantai line, has been engaged since the end of March in putting a stop to the activities of the brigands in the region of Hankow and Tienchuantai. General Ushishan is protecting the railway in his absence.

General Chang Haipeng's army is fighting the brigands in the vicinity of the Taonan-Angangchi railway.

Nine battalions of Manchurian troops have been sent to put down the disorders fomented by Chang Hsuehliang's people in the Tsunghua area.

Disorders have also been fomented in the province of Jehol.

In Northern Manchuria the forces opposed to the Kirin Government are continuing to pillage the eastern part of the Chinese Eastern Railway area and Chientao.

The Manchuli area is relatively quiet.

The Heilungkiang army is endeavouring to disperse large bodies of brigands in the Anta area (about 1500) and the Futalki area west of Angangchi (about 700.)

Japanese residents in the Peiho area have been obliged to take refuge temporarily in Soviet territory on account of the disturbances in that district.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C Communicated to the
Council and Members
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C.461.M.236 1932.VII.
Geneva, May 14th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Council the following telegram dated May 13th.

Ref. 88/1932.
(Translation).

SITUATION AT SHANGHAI.

Official telegram received by the Japanese Delegation.

On May 11th the Japanese War Ministry issued a state-
ment to the effect that in view of the conclusion of the
agreement of May 5th and the active part taken by the
representatives of the friendly Powers in restoring normal
conditions, all the Japanese land forces at present at
Shanghai will shortly be withdrawn. The troops of the
14th Division have already begun to be transferred to
Manchuria; the other troops will return to Japan.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.) 111.1932.VII.
Geneva, May 2nd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated May 2nd, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./A.31.

Geneva, May 2nd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General -

I have the honour to communicate to you the following telegram which I have just received from my Government and to request that you will be good enough to bring the same to the attention of the Members of the Assembly:

"Japanese troops are still interfering with the functions of the Customs officers at the Nanking-Shanghai Railway wharf at Woosung. Upon protest from the Customs Commissioner of Shanghai, the Japanese Consul replied that the Japanese military were unable to comply with the wishes of the Chinese Customs."

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

793.94/5284

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)112.1932.VII.

Geneva, May 2nd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated May 2nd, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref/A.30

May 2nd, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate to you the accompanying telegram from my Government, dated April 30th, giving some details of the obstructive measures on the part of the Japanese in Mukden, to annoy the Chinese members of the Commission of Enquiry sent by the League of Nations and to prevent them from assisting under the circumstances the Commission in its efforts to obtain any information, for which it has been sent to Manchuria. It is hardly necessary to state that such tactics on the part of the Japanese are entirely contrary to paragraph 5 of the Resolution of December 10, 1931, accepted by both the Chinese and Japanese Governments, which paragraph declares that

"The two Governments will afford the Commission all facilities to obtain on the spot whatever information it may require."

I shall be grateful to you to circulate the telegram among the members of the Special Assembly.

(Signed) W.W.YEN.

TELEGRAM FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

(dated April 30, 1932)

According to the report of a person who has returned here from Mukden, the Chinese staff of the Commission have been able to give only one interview to journalists. They are surrounded by detectives; outside their living quarters, six or seven are on duty by turns to watch their movements. When they go to the dining room or visit other than their own sleeping apartments, they are followed by the detectives. As to taking a walk, outside their living quarters, the watching of their movements is, one need hardly say, intensified. Even the junior members of the Chinese staff are kept under strict observation. The detectives invade even their sleeping quarters, and interfere with their conversations. All visitors are debarred, and some of these have been arrested for daring to make the visit. Two nights ago, a Chinese stenographer, on returning to his bedroom after dinner, saw a Japanese in his room. He immediately ran out of his room, and found several Japanese waiting for him at the door. Only when he screamed for help and upon the arrival of a Member of the Commission, did the Japanese run away. Even the Members of the Commission are not free from surveillance.

773.94/5284

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)113.1932.VII
Geneva, May 4th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Situation in the Shanghai District.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Assembly the 22nd Report of the representatives of the four Powers
having special interests in the Shanghai Settlement.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
MINISTER IN CHINA.

Despatched: Shanghai, 6.15 p.m. 2nd May, 1932.
Received: Geneva, 12.30 p.m. 2nd May, 1932.

Joint Situation Report No.22.

1)
Since date of report No.21 there have been no important
military developments. Japanese ground patrols have frequently
reconnoitred to south of Suchow Creek eastward of Nan..... and
Japanese military aircraft have continued flights westward and
southwards of Shirakawa patrol zone. Chinese report states at
noon April 25th a Japanese aircraft dropped bomb near Shanghai-
Hangchow railway which destroyed a house. This report is denied
by Japanese who state that they have since some time back ordered
bomb racks to be removed from their aeroplanes.

1) Document A.(Extr.)95.1932.VII.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.)114.1932.VII.

Geneva, May 4th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to
the Assembly the following communication, dated May 4th, which
he has received from the Chinese Delegation:

Ref./A.32.

May 4th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate herewith to you a
telegram, dated the second of May, which I have received from my
Government, and to request that you will be good enough to cir-
culate it among the Members of the Assembly:

"According to a telegraphic report from Generals Ting
Chao, who was defending Harbin before its occupation by the
Japanese, and Li Tu, both of whom are still giving a stub-
born resistance to the Japanese in the vicinity of Ilan, a
city of the northermost border of the Kirin Province, about
160 miles to the east of Harbin, two thousand Japanese troops
including rebel forces were dispatched on the 25th of April
from Harbin by the Sungarâ River in six war vessels, ten
steamships and ten tug boats for the purpose of attacking
Ilan.

"A brigade of Japanese troops has engaged in battle our
soldiers for several days in the neighbourhood of Imienpu,
a city on the Chinese Eastern Railway, about one hundred
miles to the south-east of Harbin, and Chuho, also a city
on the Chinese Eastern Railway, about twenty miles to the
north of Imienpu. Serious fighting is still going on."

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

A.(Extr.)115.1932.VII
Geneva, May 6th, 1932.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated May 6th, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation:-

Reference No.A/34

Geneva, May 6th, 1932

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate herewith to you the following telegram, dated the 5th of May, which I have just received from my Government, and shall be grateful if you will circulate it among the Members of the Assembly :

"In the afternoon of May 3rd, Japanese soldiers crossed the barbed wire near the Wuchen Road Bridge (in the western section of the International Settlement) and stabbed a number of our civilians, seven of whom were seriously injured and had to be sent to hospital. Settlement police and American troops hurried to the scene, and Japanese soldiers eventually withdrew to Chapei. Residents in the district were panic-stricken".

(signed) W.W.YEN

793.94/5284

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Extr.) 116.1932.VII.

Geneva, May 8th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate the following communication, dated May 8th, which he has received from the Japanese Delegation.

Ref. 89/1932.

(Translation)

May 8th, 1932.

To The Secretary-General.

With reference to the Chinese Communication A(Extr.) 115.1932.VII of May 3th, I have the honour to inform you that I received the following information some days ago.

For some time past the Chinese mob has been sheltering behind the trenches made by the American Marines to the south of the Oo-chen bridge (on the right bank of the Soo-chow river) and have been throwing stones at the Chinese sentries posted on the north bank. An enquiry by the Municipal Council Police into the matter had been proceeding.

On May 3rd at 6.30 p.m. some 300 Chinese indulged in further provocations, throwing stones at the marines. The latter, their patience being exhausted, sent some thirty men, without rifles, to disperse the crowd. Blows were exchanged; but no Chinese was severely injured.

The Chinese having, after their manner, circulated exaggerated reports in regard to this incident, the Japanese Consulate General published a communiqué reporting the exact facts.

On the same evening at 11 p.m., Japanese sentries posted to the south of the Ta-tung road at Cha-peï, challenged a group of Chinese, who fled in the direction of the Soo-chow river, where they offered armed resistance to their pursuers without obeying the summons of the latter. The marines opened fire, and several Chinese were hit.

As you will observe, there is no question of an "attack" on un-offending civilians, as the Chinese communication would suggest.

(Signed) H. NAGAOKA.

Japanese
on the Council of the League.

193.94/5284

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A. (Extr.) 117.1932.VII

Geneva, May 9th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the
Assembly, the following communication dated May 9th.

Ref./A.35.

To the Secretary-General.

May 9, 1932.

I have the honour to communicate herewith a telegram
from my Government, dated May 9th, and to request that you
will be good enough to circulate the same among the
Members of the Assembly:

"According to authentic reports, the surveillance
by the Japanese on our Assessor Mr. Koo, after his
arrival at Changchun, became more strict. Even in the
case of foreign advisers to the Commission, whenever
they went out, Japanese plain clothes men forced their
way into their cars to accompany them. Certain German
journalists who came in the company of the Commission
have already been arrested and detained. On the third
instant, when Mr. Koo was interviewing some American
missionaries, a number of Japanese suddenly broke into
the room and insisted on knowing the names of the guests
and the substance of their interviews. Lord Lytton's
secretary, Mr. Astor, who was an eye witness of this
sudden intervention, gave the Japanese a good scolding.

Thereupon, the latter demanded to know if Mr. Koo's
reception was permitted by the police saying that any
one in Manchuria who wished to call must first obtain
permission from the police. The Japanese dispersed,
however, on being told by Mr. Astor that the police had
no such right to interfere at all."

(Sgd.) W.W. YEN.

793.94/5284

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A. Extr.)118.1932.VII

Geneva, May 11th, 1932.

Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and the Members of
the League.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

REPORT PRESENTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF NINETEEN IN EXECUTION OF
PARAGRAPH 7 (PART III) OF THE RESOLUTION OF MARCH 11th, 1932.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chairman of the Committee of
Nineteen, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to
the Assembly the report provided for in paragraph 7 (Part III)
of the Resolution of March 18th, 1932.

The resolution adopted by the Special Assembly on
March 11th states in Part III, paragraph 7, that the Special
Committee is instructed to submit a first progress report to
the Assembly as soon as possible, and at latest on May 1st,
1932.

As the Committee submitted to the Assembly on April
29th a report on the situation and negotiations at Shanghai in
accordance with paragraph 1 (Part III) of the same resolution,
the present report only deals with the Manchurian question.

* * *

1) At its meeting on March 17th, the Committee decided to
invite the Governments of China and Japan to inform it of the
measures which they had taken or expected to take in the near
future in order to carry into effect the resolutions adopted by
the Council on September 30th and December 10th, 1931. The
Secretary-General communicated this decision to the representa-
tives of China and Japan by a letter dated March 18th (Document
A.Extr.64).

On April 13th, the representative of China transmitted

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the desired information to the Committee (Document C.372.M.213).

Further, on April 8th, the representative of Japan on the Council sent the Secretary-General a communication arising out of "the two resolutions" of the Council "concerning the general situation." This communication has been circulated to all the Members of the League under No. C.357.M.208.

The Chinese delegation has since forwarded two further communications relating to the situation in Manchuria, one dealing with the "puppet Government" (A.Extr.105. dated April 21st), and the other with the "Japanese occupation" (A.Extr.106. dated April 26th).

2) The Special Committee also decided on March 17th to instruct the Secretary-General to inform the President of the Council that, referring to the penultimate paragraph of the Assembly's resolution of March 11th, the Committee would attach great importance to receiving at the earliest moment which the Council might find possible any reports which might reach the Council from the Commission of Enquiry presided over by Lord Lytton. In particular, the Committee desired to receive information as soon as might be possible in regard to the general situation in Manchuria, and had expressed the wish that the President of the Council should consider what steps might be taken to that end.

The Secretary-General communicated the Special Committee's decision to the President of the Council by a letter dated March 18th (Doc. A.Extr.64). The President of the Council replied that he would immediately communicate the

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Secretary-General's letter to the Members of the Council, and also to the Commission of Enquiry, to which the Secretary-General regularly forwards all the official documents he receives with regard to the dispute.

3) The Commission presided over by Lord Lytton has begun its enquiry into the situation in Manchuria. At its request the Members of the Council having representatives on the spot have agreed that the latter shall furnish the Commission with information. The Government of the United States of America has also intimated that its officials will render the Commission all appropriate assistance.

As the members of the Assembly are no doubt aware, the Commission sent on April 30th a preliminary report from Mukden on the situation in Manchuria. At its meeting on May 10th, the Council decided to communicate it to the Assembly for its information without adding any comment.

For convenience of reference this report has been annexed to the present document.

It would therefore appear that the situation can be summarised as follows:

As regards Shanghai, the Committee thinks it may say that the Assembly's resolutions, aiming at the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, are in process of being carried into effect. The agreement negotiated on the spot in accordance with the Assembly's recommendations seems likely to ensure the complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces in a short time.

As regards the Manchurian question, the Special Committee did not feel called upon to open its examination until it had received from the Council a report by the Commission of Enquiry together with any observations the Council might desire to make.

ANNEX.

C.407.M.225.1932.VII.

PRELIMINARY REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY.

MUKDEN,
30.4.1932.

1) Commission of Enquiry appointed in conformity with paragraph 5 of Council Resolution of December 10th arrived at Mukden 21st April and is now occupied with its investigations on the spot. Since its arrival in the Far East, the Commission has investigated general conditions prevailing in Japan and China in so far as may affect its work. It visited Tokyo, Osaka, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Tientsin and Peiping, conferred with members of both Governments, and interviewed representatives of many interested groups and classes in both countries. In Peiping it met representatives authorities who had been in charge of three North Eastern Provinces prior to September 18th. Since arriving at Mukden, the Commission has interviewed, amongst others, Acting Consul-General of Japan and General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in Manchuria.

Declaration of the President of the Council with reference to Council Resolution of December 10th directed the Commission to submit to the Council as soon as possible after its arrival on the spot a preliminary report on the existing situation in so far as this affects fulfilment or otherwise by the Governments of China and Japan of certain undertakings embodied in Council Resolution of September 30th and reiterated in Council Resolution of December 10th. These undertakings are:

- (a) That the Japanese Government "will continue as rapidly as possible withdrawal of its troops into the Manchurian Railway Zone in proportion as safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured;"
- (b) That the Chinese Government "will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that Zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police are re-established";
- (c) That both Governments "will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of scope of the incidents or any aggravation of the situation".

The Commission is not yet in a position to submit full information on these three points. It must reserve for later report the consideration of the undertakings of both parties "to prevent any extension of the scope of the incidents or any aggravation of the situation" but as the Council is awaiting an early report on the existing situation in so far as it bears on the undertakings of Japan and China referred to above under (a) and (b), the following information is transmitted.

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- 2 -

2) Actual Situation in Manchuria.

Information regarding military situation in the three North Eastern Provinces has been provided by Japanese military authorities. It is given under five headings, the first three relating to Japanese troops and other forces co-operating with them, the last two relating to forces opposed to them. Information with regard to fourth heading has also been obtained from a Chinese source.

It will be noted that in the classification adopted a new feature appears which was not contemplated by the Council in September last. In the course of the events which are the subject of the present enquiry, the local administration was transformed. "Committees for the preservation of peace and order" were first established with Japanese help in the last month of 1931. These were subsequently superseded by an authority which was established on March 9th 1932 as the "Manchukuo Government." This explanation is necessary in order to account for use of expression "Manchukuo Army" by the Japanese military authorities.

I. Japanese Regular Forces.

On 18th September the numbers of Japanese troops in the South Manchurian Railway Zone is stated to have been 10,590. Numbers given for the first part of December are: 4,000 inside and 8,900 outside South Manchurian Railway Zone, making a total of 12,900.

For the latter part of April the numbers are given as 6,600 inside and 15,800 outside the South Manchurian Railway Zone in the region of Tsitsihar-Taonan-Liaoyuang Railway, Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway, Chinese Eastern Railway east of Harbin, and the northern sector of the Kirin-Tunhua railway, making a total of 22,400.

II. "Manchukuo Army."

Troops designated by the Japanese military authorities as the "Manchukuo Army" are said to have been formed partly of Chinese regular troops stationed in Manchuria before 18th September and subsequently reorganised, and partly of freshly recruited soldiers. This force has been created with the help of Japanese military authorities. Many Japanese officers, either retired or still belonging to Japanese Army, have been engaged as military advisers and their number is increasing. Contracts with some of these officers have been made for one year. A Japanese officer has been appointed adviser to the "Department of Defence of the Manchukuo Government" at Changchun.

These troops are stationed or operating chiefly in the region Mukden-Changchun-Taonan-Tsitsihar-Tunhua and along Chinese Eastern Railway, particularly on the Eastern branch, where they are engaged against forces not recognising the authority of the "Manchukuo Government." Total number of the "Manchukuo Army" is stated to have been 85,000 men at the end of March. Actual number is not reliable owing to uncertainty of the information regarding these troops at the present time.

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III. Local Police Force.

The number of this force is given as about 119,000, of whom 60,000 are local guards. This police force is stated to be in the main a continuation of that existing on 18th September. Its reorganization is taking place with the help of Japanese officials.

IV. Forces opposed to Japanese Troops and the "Manchukuo Army".

The Commission was informed in Peiping by General Chang Hsueh-liang that forces outside the Great Wall on 18th September, including non-fighting elements, numbered 60,000 for Fengtien Province, 80,000 for Kirin Province, and 50,000 for Heilungkiang, making a total of 190,000, of which about 50,000 from Fengtien Province were subsequently withdrawn inside Wall. This would leave 140,000 outside Wall.

Japanese military authorities give the number of troops now remaining outside the Wall as 110,000, of which they state that 60,000 joined the "Manchukuo Army", 30,000 remained in North-East of Kirin in opposition to Japanese troops and to "Manchukuo Army" and about 20,000 may have joined the so-called Volunteer Corps. The situation is described by them as follows:

(A) Portion of former Chinese army not recognizing the authority of the "Manchukuo Government":

- (i) Forces North-East of Harbin, estimated at 30,000 (stated officially by the Chinese to be composed of Kirin self-defence Army under the command of General Li Tu and of the Chinese Eastern Railway Guards under the command of General Ting).
- (ii) A force under General Li Hui Cheng in the region north-west of Mukden, estimated at 10,000.
- (iii) Remnant of nine Cavalry Brigades, on the north-eastern frontier of Chengteh, estimated at 3,000.

(B) Volunteers.

- (i) The so-called North Eastern Army of anti-Japanese volunteers in the Western part of Fengtien Province, mainly south of Chinchow, estimated at between 15,000 and 25,000 men.
- (ii) The so-called National Volunteer Army of the North East, under the command of Wu Chin Tsin, mainly operating around Mukden. The present strength of this force, which has had several encounters with the Japanese troops, is unknown.
- (iii) The Volunteer Army of Chengteh. This comparatively well-disciplined body of some 3,000 men, under the command of Tang Yu Lin, which comprises remnants of the cavalry of General Chang Hsueh-liang's first and second Armies, is reported to be active on the borders of Chengteh and Fengtien Provinces.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- (iv) Several minor volunteer corps north-west partl. in the Shanhaikwan region, partly between Tunhua and Tienpaoshan, where they are in touch with regular forces hostile to the "Manchukuo Government."

The total strength of these irregular forces mentioned under (i) to (iv) is said to be about 40,000.

- (v) Bandits. The bandits, who are not organized primarily for political purposes, appear to have increased in number, due to the disturbed conditions. They are reported by the Japanese to be scattered throughout Manchuria, especially in the part south of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Japanese estimate their total number as 40,000. In addition to these, a special bandit force of 12,000 north and east of the town of Kirin are said to be cooperating with the Chinese forces North East of Harbin mentioned under (A) (i).

Armed conflicts between these various forces are frequent. There are bandits raids; attempts of the Japanese soldiers and of the "Manchukuo Government" troops to suppress them; and fighting between the various military forces attempting to maintain the new régime and those opposed to it. The result is loss of life, destruction of property, and general sense of insecurity.

(3) The Commission purposely refrains from commenting at this stage on the facts and figures above recorded. The Japanese authorities maintain that they cannot at present withdraw their troops without endangering the "safety of the lives and property of their nationals" outside the Railway Zone. They appear to consider that this withdrawal must depend on the progress of the reorganization of the troops described as the "Manchukuo Government Army". The Chinese Government does not now exercise authority in any part of Manchuria, and as events have developed recently the practical question of the fulfilment of its responsibilities has not arisen. The possible and equitable measures which may restore peace and security and create a reasonable measure of goodwill throughout Manchuria will be considered by the Commission in its final report.

The Commission will visit Changchun next week, and then continue its investigations in other parts of Manchuria.

(Signed) LYTTON (Chairman) of Commission.
ALDROVANDI
CLAUDEL
McCOY
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A. (Extr.) 119.1932.VII

Geneva, May 12th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following telegram, dated May 11th.

Ref./A.36.

May 12, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

"According to repeated reports, Japan has been continuously committing acts of provocation in the direction of Shanhaikwan through the instrumentality of the puppet government. For the past several days, Japanese troops have been opening gun and rifle fire with the object of disturbing peace and order.

"General Ma Chan-shan, Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, has reported in a telegram that Japanese troops have entered the town of Tungho, on the southernmost border of Heilungkiang and about 105 miles east of Harbin. They set fire to buildings, looted food stuffs in the market, disarmed the police force, arrested and imprisoned on their gunboat the magistrate, the director of the Public Safety Bureau, etc., killed women refugees with bayonets and sealed the mouths of pits where civilians have been hiding for safety and put them to death by burning. Atrocities against all principles of humanity have been perpetrated."

(Sgd) T.Y. LO.

Chinese Delegate to the Assembly of the
League of Nations.

793.94/5284

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, Council and
the Members of the
League.

A.(Extr.)120.1932.VII
Geneva, May 13th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly
the following communication dated May 13th.

Ref./A.37

May 13, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to transmit to you the following
telegram, dated May 13th, which I have just received from
the General Postal Labour Union and the General Postal
Employees Association of China, and to request that you will
be good enough to circulate it among the Members of the
Assembly:

"Japan has established the bogus Manchuria
government in our Three Eastern Provinces and, under
force of arms, this "puppet" government has been
used by her as a weapon of invasion and as a means
of misleading public opinion and hoodwinking the
League of Nations. The Commission of Inquiry of
the League of Nations while in Manchuria is reported
to have been closely watched and prevented from making
enquiries in one way or another with the result that
it is difficult for real facts to be brought to light.
All this serves to prove Japan's invasive attitude.
Our Union and Association representing the whole body
of postal employees throughout China have the honour
to request the League of Nations to uphold justice
by checking Japan's invasive attitude so that China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity may be main-
tained and world peace insured."


(Signed) T. Y. LO

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 361



SUBJECT: NEW AMERICAN POLICY REGARDING TERRITORIAL GAINS ACQUIRED BY MEANS OF AGGRESSION.

MAY 26 1932

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 JUN 7 1932
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 JUN 8 1932
 DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 31 1932
 Department of State

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
 JUN 8 - 1932
 MR. KLOTS

FE
 WE
 U
 SA
 F/DEW

793.94/5285

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 312, of March 23rd, last, in which I reported the interest of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in your letter to Senator Borah and the consequent resolution passed by the Special Assembly of the League of Nations on March 11th, in which it was declared "that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League...

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
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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris". Not only the Foreign Office but the Dutch press has commented very favorably upon this "new principle which has penetrated into international policy".

The MAASBODE of the tenth instant, in a leading editorial a translation of which is enclosed herewith, states that the new principle has the great advantage that it can be condensed into a formula which is exceptionally clear and unambiguous. In its concluding paragraph this article states that if the new principle is fully and effectively recognized a tremendous pressure towards the maintenance of peace may be exercised as a consequence thereof.

Respectfully yours,


Laurits S. Swenson.

Enclosure:
Translation of article

File No.

In quintuplicate

HJ:EKD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO: TO DESPATCH NO: 361

Translation of an Article appearing in "THE MAASBODE"
(Catholic of Rotterdam) dated May 10, 1932.

MR. HOOVER'S NEW DOCTRINE.

A new principle has penetrated almost unobserved, into international policy; it was drawn up by the United States of America with regard to the occurrences in Manchuria and appears even now already to have been adopted by the League of Nations. The new principle has the great advantage that it can be condensed into a formula which, in itself is exceptionally clear and unambiguous: territorial gains acquired by a nation owing to breaches of the Kellogg Pact will not be recognized by the United States. To be able to appreciate the full extent of that new doctrine, introduced into international life under the name "Hoover doctrine", it would be well to bear sharply in mind that the United States has steadily refused to become a member of the League of Nations, because the latter can compel its members to proceed to sanction measures, since the Covenant can impose actions of violence against the aggressor, America which still steadily abides, at least theoretically, by the Monroe doctrine, will not allow others to require acknowledgement of a certain country as the aggressor or to send its youth to war against any such country.

The Hoover Doctrine has a negative side: it lays full stress on the fact that the United States will never be a party

1785

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

party to compulsory measures of force and thus does not intend to renounce in principle the freedom of the seas, i.e. the right to trade with all belligerent nations. Beside that, however, there is also a constructive idea which, provided it be always logically carried out, may certainly contribute to the guaranteeing of universal peace. Had that doctrine laid it down that the prevailing status quo has to be maintained unconditionally, it would then of course have been condemned. Hence it has been officially interpreted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Castle, that the new doctrine does not mean that the prevailing unjustified situations are sacred and unalterable, it only proclaims that the present injustices may not be removed by deeds of violence and it is just in this that lies the most highly credible guaranty against new wars.

Actually thus the new Hoover doctrine is also a sanction and, more particularly for a state that is out for conquests, may be of tremendous significance. For when a nation knows that the territorial gains it has been able to obtain by breaches of the Kellogg pact, thus by making use of war as an instrument of national policy, will not be recognised either de facto or de jure, such a nation will then know that it will only be able to retain those gains at the price of continual and very dangerous tension with the United States. Nor will the United States recognise the sovereign rights which such conqueror state exercises in the vanquished state with respect to foreign powers, hence the United States need

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

need take no notice whatsoever of customs' measures, passport and travel regulations and other requirements affecting the victor; it will even not be able to allow the consular officials to enter into contact with the new power in authority.

It is of course an open question whether those consequences will indeed be drawn from the new doctrine. In this way situations would arise that would be almost untenable, which taken practically could not but lead, earlier or later, in all probability, to war. Even that idea, however, may cause a nation cherishing imperialist plans to stop and think and to withhold it from any too hasty action.

Especially if that principle was fully and effectively recognised a tremendous pressure towards the maintenance of peace might be exercised as a consequence thereof. The League of Nations' Pact might be amplified with this undoubtedly interesting idea which would again be a new step on the road to a more perfect condition of law and order.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PEIPING VIA NR

Dated May 30, 1932

FROM

Rec'd. 8:59 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

582, May 30, 10 am

I have just received the following from Nanking:

May 29, 10 am

"CONFIDENTIAL. I have been told informally that

T. V. Soong would be grateful if I would go to Shanghai

to make confidential and noncommittal inquiries of

Cunningham and Fessenden on behalf of Chinese in regard

to the possibilities of some kind of cooperation between

the Chinese authorities and the International Settlement

in the rehabilitation of Chapei. If you approve of my

acceding to this request, if and when made, I respectfully

request that you issue instructions to me in that sense

by telegraph".

I am informing the British Charge d' Affaires of

this and am stating that I am referring it to you for

appropriate

F/DEW

793.94/5286

FILED

JUN 8 1932

793.94
note
7/3/32

Telegram to
Beijing
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 31 1932
Department of State
HALL

179
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #2 of No. 582, May 30, 10 am from Peiping

appropriate instructions.

It is not clear to me why inquiries of the kind mentioned could not be made at Shanghai by the Chinese Mayor rather than through Peck. I am informing Peck that I have referred this to you and I am asking for his statement as to why inquiries should be made in the manner suggested.

JOHNSON

WWO

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated May 31, 1932

Rec'd 5:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

PRIORITY.

273, May 31, 11 a.m.

One. Japanese army completed evacuation area number two Kiangwan and Chinese resumed complete control of this entire area May 29th.

Two. Last units of Japanese army troops embark for Japan today May 31st.

Three. Japanese naval landing party take over and occupy barracks west of railroad area number one Woosung with one hundred gendarmes; area number three Yinghsiang with two hundred gendarmes and continue to hold area number four Chapei with two thousand marines.

Four. Chinese reoccupy Lunghwa with two hundred gendarmes of sixth regiment.

Repeat to War Department. Repeated to the Legation.

KLP_HPD

CUNNINGHAM



Telegram to Geneva
MAY 28 1932

F/DEW 793.94/5284

FILED

JUN 1 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

PM TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,
 May 31, 1932.

WILSON,
 MAY 31 32
 BERGUES,
 GENEVA, (Switzerland)

80 May 31 the Consul General at Shanghai reports as follows:

QUOTE Japanese army completed evacuation area number two Kiangwan and Chinese resumed complete control of this entire area May 29th. Last units of Japanese army troops embark for Japan today May 31st. Japanese naval landing party take over and occupy barracks west of railroad area number one Woosung with one hundred gendarmes; area number three Yingshiang with two hundred gendarmes and continue to hold area number four Chapel with two thousand marines. Chinese reoccupy Lunghwa with two hundred gendarmes of sixth regiment UNQUOTE.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

FE:MMH:KC

FE

Strinson
 WJ

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

May 31, 1932. PM

793.94/5287

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated May 31, 1932

Rec'd 5:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

583, May 31, 11 a.m.

My 582, May 30, 10 a.m.

I have just received the following from Peck:

"May 30, 4 p.m. CONFIDENTIAL.

I had anticipated no conversation with any Chinese in regard to this subject but Dyer who has talked with Soong and others gave me the impression that the Chinese authorities here are ready and even anxious to find a way to cooperate very closely with the International Settlement in the rehabilitation of Chapei but that they are afraid of opposition and are unwilling to give the slightest publicity to their ideas until they have ascertained what sort of an arrangement would be feasible. Presumably they feel that through unofficial and confidential inquiries made through me they can get the necessary information without committing themselves



MAY 31 1932

F/DEW

793.94/5288

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#583 From Peiping May 31, 1932

themselves and without divulging their ideas until the moment is propitious. Dyer is now in Shanghai on this errand and on his return will report to Soong. Quite possibly my assistance may not be sought. In the meantime I have been staying away from Soong pending receipt of instructions informing me whether I could accede to the request if made. (The improvement?) of the Extra Settlement roads was not mentioned to me."

I am still of the opinion that if inquiry is a serious one it ought to be possible for the Chinese to obtain the information which they desire through regular channels in Shanghai.

JOHNSON

KLP WWC

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT
 Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

VIA NAVAL RADIO

Washington,
 May 31, 1932.

AMERICAN LEGATION
 PEIPING (China)

MAY 31 32

136 Your 582, May 30, 10 a.m., and 583, May 31, 11 a.m.
 Department concurs in your view that it ought to
 be possible for the Chinese authorities to obtain the
 desired information through regular channels in
 Shanghai and is, therefore, not repeat not prepared
 to approve participation by Peck in the manner
 indicated in his May 29, 10 a.m., to the Legation.
 However, the Department perceives no objection to Peck
 discussing the question with the Chinese authorities at
 Nanking if the subject is initiated by them, in which
 event the Department desires to be kept informed
 promptly in regard to the views of the Chinese
 authorities.

793.94/5288

Stinson
 WJ

793.94/5288

FE:JEJ/VDM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94-Shanghai Round Table/22 FOR memorandum

FROM State Department, (Stimson) DATED May 26, 1932
~~xxx~~ The Secretary NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: a conversation between the Secretary and the French Ambassador at which the Ambassador went into a long narration of his views on the Far Eastern situation, which were not very definite and were very very unflattering to China.

dew

793.94/5289

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



AM: RECD

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



LONDON, May 24, 1932.

No. 110

SUBJECT: Transmitting

White Papers on May 1 1932
China.

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793.94-Commission



F/LS

793.94/5290

2 Copies in file
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 2 - 1932
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
PUBLICATIONS SECTION
JUN 2 1932
1 of each encl. to Li
Copy of accompanying
documents stamped to be
returned to DCR

I have the honor to enclose five copies each of White
1 & 2/ Papers China No. 1 (1932) and China No. 2 (1932) containing
respectively the Resolution adopted by the Special Assembly
of the League of Nations on April 30, 1932, with the text
of the Shanghai Agreement of May 5, 1932, and the preliminary
report on conditions in Manchuria of the Commission of Enquiry
of the League of Nations.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Ray Atherton,
Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosures:
2 White Papers.

* Cmd. 4077
** Cmd. 4078

2881 4 JUN 4 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



China No. 1 (1932)

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

IN SHANGHAI AND NEIGHBOURHOOD AND

WITHDRAWAL OF JAPANESE FORCES

Resolution adopted by the Special Assembly of
the League of Nations

Geneva, April 30, 1932
and

Agreement concluded between the Chinese and
Japanese Representatives with the assistance of
Representatives of Friendly Powers

Shanghai, May 5, 1932

*Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
to Parliament by Command of His Majesty*

LONDON

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1932

Cmd. 4077

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743.94/5290

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN SHANGHAI AND NEIGH-
BOURHOOD. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, GENEVA,
APRIL 30, 1932, AND AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN
THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVES WITH
THE ASSISTANCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY
POWERS, SHANGHAI, MAY 5, 1932.

No. 1.

*Resolution Adopted by the Special Assembly of the League of
Nations.*

Geneva, April 30, 1932.

THE Assembly,

1. Considering that its resolutions of the 4th and 11th March⁽¹⁾ recommended that negotiations should be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements, for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces;

2. Considering that while it is not for its Committee to take the place of the negotiators—since the arrangements contemplated in the Assembly resolutions of the 4th and 11th March can only be concluded on the spot—every Power represented in these negotiations is entitled, should serious difficulties be encountered in the course of the negotiations or in the carrying-out of the above-mentioned arrangements, to notify the Committee, "which exercises its functions on behalf of, and under supervision of, the Assembly," of those difficulties;

3. Considering that the negotiations should be pursued in accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions, no one of the parties being entitled to insist on conditions which would be incompatible with the said resolutions;

4. Having noted the articles of the draft armistice which have been communicated to the Committee of the Assembly and have been accepted by the two parties;

5. Considers that these articles conform to the spirit of the said resolutions;

6. Notes in particular that under Article 3 of the said draft, the Japanese Government undertakes to carry out the withdrawal of its

(1) See Cmd. 4040, pages 12 and 13.

forces to the International Settlement and the roads outside the Settlement in the Hongkew district as before the incident of the 28th January, 1932;

7. Declares that it is in accordance with the spirit of the resolutions of the 4th and 11th March, that this withdrawal should take place in the near future;

8. Declares that the resolution of the 4th March will only have been fully complied with when the Japanese forces have been entirely withdrawn;

9. Notes that the draft Agreement provides for the establishment of a joint Commission, including neutral members, to certify the mutual withdrawal and to collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw;

10. Notes with satisfaction that the said Commission will, in accordance with its decisions, watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3, of which the last named provides for the complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces as before the incident of the 28th January;

11. Is of opinion that the powers, as defined in Annex 3 to the Draft Agreement, of the Commission which is to watch the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of that agreement, include authority to call attention, in accordance with its decisions taken in such manner as is provided in the said Annex, to any neglect in carrying out any of the provisions of the articles mentioned above;

12. Earnestly recommends the parties in question to continue the negotiations with a view to reaching their rapid conclusion, and requests the Governments having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to continue to lend their good offices for this purpose;

13. Expressly points out that unless a conclusion is reached, as laid down in the resolutions of the 4th and 11th March, the question will necessarily come up again before the Assembly;

14. Requests the Governments of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to transmit to the League of Nations the information which will be in the possession of the Mixed Commission in virtue of its functions, and will be furnished to those Governments by their respective representatives on the Commission.

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No. 2.

Agreement Concluded between the Chinese and Japanese Representatives with the Assistance of Representatives of Friendly Powers.

Shanghai, May 5, 1932.

ARTICLE 1.

THE Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from the 5th May, 1932; the forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease around Shanghai all and every form of hostile act. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

ARTICLE 2.

The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with in this Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex 1 to this Agreement.

ARTICLE 3

The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of the 28th January, 1932. It is, however, understood, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex 2 to this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4.

A joint commission, including members representing the participating friendly Powers, will be established to certify the actual withdrawal. This commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this commission will be as defined in Annex 3 to this Agreement.

ARTICLE 5.

The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present Agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubt as to the meaning or any difference of meaning between the

5

Chinese and Japanese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

Done at Shanghai, this 5th day of May, 1932.

QUO TAI-CHI, *Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

TAI-CHI, *Lieutenant-General.*

HWANG CHIANG, *Lieutenant-General.*

K. UYEDA, *Lieutenant-General.*

M. SHIGEMITSU, *Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.*

S. SHIMADA, *Rear-Admiral.*

K. TASHIRO, *Major-General.*

In the presence of—

MILES W. LAMPSON, *His Britannic Majesty's Minister in China.*

NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON, *American Minister in China.*

WILDEN, *Ministre de France en Chine.*

GALEAZZO CIANO, *Chargé d'Affaires for Italy in China.*

Representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of the 4th March, 1932.

ANNEX 1.

THE following are the positions of the Chinese troops as provided in article 2 of this agreement—

Reference: the attached postal map of the Shanghai district⁽²⁾; scale: 1/150,000.

From a point on the Soochow Creek due south of Anting Village north along the west bank of a creek. Immediately east of Anting Village to Wang-hieng-Ch'iao, thence north across a creek to a point 4 kilometres east of Shatow, and thence north-west up to and including Hu-pei-k'on on the Yangtze River.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will, upon the request of the joint commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the joint commission.

ANNEX 2.

THE following are the localities as provided in article 3 of this agreement:—

The aforesaid localities are outlined on the attached maps⁽²⁾ marked "A," "B," "C" and "D." They are referred to as areas 1, 2, 3 and 4.

⁽²⁾ Not reproduced.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Area 1 is shown on map "A." It is agreed (1) that this area excludes Woosung Village, (2) that the Japanese will not interfere with operation of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway or its workshops.

Area 2 is shown on map "B." It is agreed that the Chinese cemetery, about 1 mile more or less to the north-east of the international race track, is excluded from the area to be used by the Japanese troops.

Area 3 is shown on map "C." It is agreed that this area excludes village Ts'ao-chia-chai and the Sanyu Cloth Factory.

Area 4 is shown on map "D." It is agreed that the area to be used includes the Japanese cemetery and eastward approaches thereto. In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question will, upon the request of the joint commission, be ascertained by the representatives of participating friendly Powers, members of the joint commission.

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated above will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the agreement and will be completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal.

The joint commission to be established under article 4 will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions, together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

ANNEX 3.

The joint commission will be composed of twelve members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: The Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian heads of mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of the 4th March. The members of the joint commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decision of the commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the chairman having a casting vote. The chairman will be elected by the commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

The commission will, in accordance with its decisions, watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of articles 1, 2 and 3 of this agreement, and is authorised to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three articles mentioned above.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



China No. 2 (1932)

Preliminary Report on Conditions in Manchuria

from the Commission of Enquiry
 appointed by the Council of
 the League of Nations

Mukden, April 30, 1932

*Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
 to Parliament by Command of His Majesty*

193.94/5290

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN MANCHURIA FROM
THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE
COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Mukden, April 30, 1932.

Note by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Geneva, May 2, 1932.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate⁽¹⁾ the following preliminary report, dated Mukden, the 30th April, which he has received from the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the Council in its resolution of the 10th December, 1931:—

(Telegraphic.)

Mukden, April 30, 1932.

1. Commission of Enquiry appointed in conformity with paragraph 5 of Council resolution of the 10th December arrived at Mukden the 21st April and is now occupied with its investigation on the spot. Since its arrival in the Far East, the Commission has investigated general conditions prevailing in Japan and China in so far as may affect its work. It visited Tokyo, Osaka, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Tientsin and Peiping, conferred with members of both Governments, and interviewed representatives of many interested groups and classes in both countries. In Peiping it met representatives (of) authorities who had been in charge of three North-Eastern Provinces prior to the 18th September. Since arriving at Mukden, the Commission has interviewed, amongst others, Acting Consul-General of Japan, and General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in Manchuria.

Declaration of the President of the Council with reference to Council Resolution of the 10th December directed the Commission to submit to the Council as soon as possible after its arrival on the spot, a preliminary report on the existing situation in so far as this affects fulfilment or otherwise by the Governments of China and Japan of certain undertakings embodied in Council Resolution of the 30th September, and reiterated in Council Resolution of the 10th December. These undertakings are—

- (a) That the Japanese Government "will continue as rapidly as possible withdrawal of its troops into the Manchurian Railway Zone in proportion as safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured."
- (b) That the Chinese Government "will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that Zone as the withdrawal of the

⁽¹⁾ Communicated to the Council and members of the League.

8

Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police are re-established."

- (c) That both Governments "will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of scope of the incidents or any aggravation of the situation."

The Commission is not yet in a position to submit full information on these three points. It must reserve for later report the consideration of the undertakings of both parties "to prevent any extension of the scope of the incidents or any aggravation of the situation," but as the Council is awaiting an early report on the existing situation in so far as it bears on the undertakings of Japan and China, referred to above under (a) and (b), the following information is transmitted:—

Actual Situation in Manchuria.

2. Information regarding military situation in the three North-Eastern Provinces has been provided by Japanese military authorities. It is given under five headings, the first three relating to Japanese troops and other forces co-operating with them, the last two relating to forces opposed to them. Information with regard to fourth heading has also been obtained from a Chinese source.

It will be noted that in the classification adopted a new feature appears, which was not contemplated by the Council in September last. In the course of the events which are the subject of the present enquiry, the local administration was transformed. "Committees for the preservation of peace and order" were first established with Japanese help in the last month of 1931. These were subsequently superseded by an authority which was established on the 9th March, 1932, as the "Manchukuo Government." This explanation is necessary in order to account for use of expression "Manchukuo Army" by the Japanese military authorities.

I.—Japanese Regular Forces.

On the 18th September the numbers of Japanese troops in the South Manchurian Railway Zone is stated to have been 10,590. Numbers given for the first part of December are: 4,000 inside and 8,900 outside South Manchurian Railway Zone, making a total of 12,900.

For the latter part of April the numbers are given as 6,600 inside and 15,800 outside the South Manchurian Railway Zone in the region of Tsitsihar-Taonan-Liaoyuan Railway, Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway, Chinese Eastern Railway east of Harbin, and the northern sector of the Kirin-Tunhua Railway, making a total of 22,400.

II.—"Manchukuo Army."

Troops designated by the Japanese military authorities as the "Manchukuo Army" are said to have been formed partly of

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Chinese regular troops stationed in Manchuria before the 18th September, and subsequently reorganised, and partly of freshly recruited soldiers. This force has been created with the help of Japanese military authorities. Many Japanese officers, either retired or still belonging to Japanese Army, have been engaged as military advisers, and their number is increasing. Contracts with some of these officers have been made for one year. A Japanese officer has been appointed adviser to the "Department of Defence of the Manchukuo Government" at Changchun.

These troops are stationed or operating chiefly in the region Mukden-Changchun-Taonan-Tsitsihar-Tunhua and along Chinese Eastern Railway, particularly on the Eastern branch, where they are engaged against forces not recognising the authority of the "Manchukuo Government." Total number of the "Manchukuo Army" is stated to have been 85,000 men at the end of March. Actual number is not reliable owing to uncertainty of the information regarding these troops at the present time.

III.—Local Police Force.

The number of this force is given as about 119,000, of whom 60,000 are local guards. This police force is stated to be in the main a continuation of that existing on the 18th September. Its reorganisation is taking place with the help of Japanese officials.

IV.—Forces opposed to Japanese Troops and the "Manchukuo Army."

The Commission was informed in Peiping by General Chang Hsueh-liang that forces outside the Great Wall on the 18th September, including non-fighting elements, numbered 60,000 for Fengtienfu Province, 80,000 for Kirin Province, and 50,000 for Heilungkiang, making a total of 190,000, of which about 50,000 from Fengtienfu Province were subsequently withdrawn inside Wall. This would leave 140,000 outside Wall.

Japanese military authorities give the number of troops now remaining outside the Wall as 110,000, of which they state that 60,000 joined the "Manchukuo Army," 30,000 remained in north-east of Kirin in opposition to Japanese troops and to "Manchukuo Army" and about 20,000 may have joined the so-called Volunteer Corps. The situation is described by them as follows:—

(A) Portion of former Chinese army not recognising the authority of the "Manchukuo Government":—

- (i) Forces north-east of Harbin, estimated at 30,000 (stated officially by the Chinese to be composed of Kirin Self-Defence Army, under the command of General Li Tu, and of the Chinese Eastern Railway Guards, under the command of General Ting).
- (ii) A force under General Li Hui Cheng in the region north-west of Mukden, estimated at 10,000.

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- (iii) Remnant of nine Cavalry Brigades, on the north-eastern frontier of Chengtehfu, estimated at 8,000.

(B) Volunteers:—

- (i) The so-called North-Eastern Army of anti-Japanese volunteers in the western part of Fengtienfu Province, mainly south of Chinchow, estimated at between 15,000 and 25,000 men.
- (ii) The so-called National Volunteer Army of the North-East, under the command of Wu Chin Tsin, mainly operating around Mukden. The present strength of this force, which has had several encounters with the Japanese troops, is unknown.
- (iii) The Volunteer Army of Chengtehfu. This comparatively well-disciplined body of some 3,000 men, under the command of Tang Yu Lin, which comprises remnants of the cavalry of General Chang Hsueh-liang's first and second armies, is reported to be active on the borders of Chengtehfu and Fengtienfu Provinces.
- (iv) Several minor volunteer corps north-west, partly in the Shanhaikwan region, partly between Tunhua and Tienpaoshan, where they are in touch with regular forces hostile to the "Manchukuo Government."

The total strength of these irregular forces mentioned under (i) to (iv) is said to be about 40,000.

- (v) Bandits. The bandits, who are not organised primarily for political purposes, appear to have increased in number, due to the disturbed conditions. They are reported by the Japanese to be scattered throughout Manchuria, especially in the part south of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Japanese estimate their total number as 40,000. In addition to these, a special bandit force of 12,000 north and east of the town of Kirin are said to be co-operating with the Chinese forces north-east of Harbin mentioned under (A) (i).

Armed conflicts between these various forces are frequent. There are bandit raids; attempts of the Japanese soldiers and of the "Manchukuo Government" troops to suppress them; and fighting between the various military forces attempting to maintain the new régime and those opposed to it. The result is loss of life, destruction of property and general sense of insecurity.

3. The Commission purposely refrains from commenting at this stage on the facts and figures above recorded. The Japanese authorities maintain that they cannot at present withdraw their troops without endangering the "safety of the lives and property of their nationals" outside the Railway Zone. They appear to consider that this withdrawal must depend on the progress of the reorganisation of

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the troops described as the "Manchukuo Government Army." The Chinese Government does not now exercise authority in any part of Manchuria, and, as events have developed recently, the practical question of the fulfilment of its responsibilities has not arisen. The possible and equitable measures which may restore peace and security and create a reasonable measure of goodwill throughout Manchuria will be considered by the Commission in its final report.

The Commission will visit Changchun next week, and then continue its investigations in other parts of Manchuria.


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
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EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



Paris, May 20, 1932.

JUN 1 32



SPECIAL REPORT
 (No. W.D. 1048)



F/LS 793.94/5291

To the Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith
 Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W.D.
 1048, dated May 20, 1932.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, May 20, 1932.

Serial No. W. D. 1048.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

**SUBJECT: The Manchurian Situation As Viewed
By André Duboscq**

Monsieur André Duboscq, Far Eastern Editor of LE
TEMPS, discussed in the edition dated May 20, 1932,
"The Present Influence of the Army in Japan," particu-
larly with regard to the Manchurian situation.

Beginning with a reference to the assassination
of the Japanese Premier, and remaining somewhat non-
committal in general, probably because he lacked
detailed information, Duboscq nevertheless quotes
several newspaper articles which he considers sig-
nificant and about which he makes highly suggestive
remarks.

He quotes notably a telegram sent from Tokyo to
the Shanghai Journal showing that the army was respon-
sible for extending the military operations in Manchu-
ria because Japan needed an outlet for its surplus

population

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population, the military authorities having deliberately imposed their will on the theater of operations instead of in Tokyo. Regrets are expressed in political and diplomatic circles that the affair should have gone so far in Manchuria, leading to local autonomy under Japanese control, a sudden development which risks injuring the slow but steady movement started by Japan for securing control of the whole of China.

Duboseq remarks that he does not share this last opinion, and he considers that business between China and Japan will revive very rapidly subsequent to the present boycott period. What he is seeking to ascertain is the share taken by the army in recent decisions concerning Manchuria, and this part appears to have been very important.

Another press extract quoted by Duboseq is taken from an article which Herbert Wild published in LA DEPECHE COLONIALE, remarking:

"It is certain that Japan, by supporting Manchuria's desire for independence and favoring the accession of a ruler who but for the Revolution would now be Emperor of China, has acted with a view to her own interests. But will you please look at the preliminary report of the Commission of Study in Manchuria, showing that there are 110,000 Chinese irregulars there, causing general insecurity? Would you please reflect that

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if Japan does not establish order there, the Soviet Union will restore it, the Lord knows how! As for us, we believe that a practically independent Manchuria is impossible at the present hour. Do you want Manchuria to have a State organization and a social structure similar to those of the neighboring U. S. S. R.? Certainly not! Then you cannot avoid the conclusion which follows, Manchuria shall be autonomous under Japanese control, just as Mongolia is autonomous under Soviet control."

Duboseq remarks that this point of view is far from being negligible. It provides a good reason not only for the Japanese military authorities but for all the Japanese to take an interest in the Manchurian question. This is the point which should be carefully retained at the present juncture, in the opinion of André Duboseq.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson,
 Special Assistant.

Enclosure:

1. Article from LE TEMPS,
 May 20, 1932.

In quintuplicate

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to special Report No. W.D 1048 of May 20, 1932

From the American Embassy
Paris

Extract from "LE TEMPS, of May 20, 1932

L'influence actuelle de l'armée au Japon

Le crime perpétré par les militaires contre la personne du premier ministre japonais incite plus que jamais à mesurer la part de l'armée dans les résolutions prises à Tokio au cours du conflit sino-japonais. Il a souvent été question de l'influence prépondérante qu'elle y eut. On peut cependant se demander si vraiment cette influence l'emporta sur celle du pouvoir civil. Un télégramme de Tokio, publié dans le numéro du *Temps* du 13 mai, fixe jusqu'à un certain point les idées à ce sujet, au moins en ce qui regarde l'affaire de Shanghai. « Les milieux officiels japonais, dit ce télégramme, espèrent que l'évacuation de Shanghai par les troupes japonaises fera disparaître une fois pour toutes les soupçons concernant les motifs de l'intervention armée du Japon dans le grand port chinois. C'est le conseil supérieur de l'armée qui a inspiré la politique du cabinet, mais il ne s'est résolu à conseiller l'envoi des troupes à Shanghai que lorsque les forces navales et les civils japonais se sont trouvés en danger grave. Le conseil privé a accepté l'explication du général Araki, ministre de la guerre, selon laquelle l'armistice relevait de la compétence du haut commandement et que les représentants diplomatiques n'étaient intervenus dans les négociations que pour en faciliter la conclusion. »

De tout cela retenons que le conseil supérieur de l'armée inspira la politique du cabinet; mais telle qu'elle est ici présentée, l'initiative des militaires n'a rien que de naturel.

En ce qui concerne la Mandchourie, où la marche des troupes japonaises vers le Nord a été maintes fois expliquée par l'esprit conquérant des chefs d'armée, un télégramme de Tokio au *Journal de Shanghai*, donne indirectement de cette opinion, ou plutôt du fait sur lequel elle se fonde, la raison suivante: « Bien que l'armée ait eu l'appui unanime de toute la nation japonaise au début des opérations de Mandchourie, ce n'est un secret pour personne qu'il existe certaines divergences d'opinion entre le gros commerce et les autorités militaires... Les capitalistes cherchent surtout à ouvrir en Mandchourie des marchés pour l'industrie japonaise et à obtenir des concessions. D'autre part, l'armée voudrait que la Mandchourie servit de débouché au trop-plein de la population nipponne. Autrement dit, l'armée voudrait que la collectivité japonaise tout entière, et non pas seulement un petit groupe de capitalistes, pût profiter de ses sacrifices en hommes et en argent. Bien qu'il soit extrêmement douteux que l'émigration massive puisse être pratiquée par le Japon en Mandchourie, le fait que l'armée songe à être utile à la nation, plutôt qu'aux éléments capitalistes, est un facteur significatif. L'armée peut mériter des critiques à certains égards; il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'elle montre actuellement un exemple digne d'éloges, tant aux capitalistes qu'aux politiciens, lorsqu'elle a en vue l'intérêt du peuple tout entier. »

Ainsi ce serait le désir qu'a l'armée de trouver un débouché au trop-plein de la population qui expliquerait l'ampleur donnée aux opérations japonaises en Mandchourie. Les autorités militaires auraient imposé leur volonté tant à Tokio que sur le théâtre des opérations. D'aucuns assurent même que des personnages politiques et diplomatiques de pre-

mier plan auraient exprimé le regret que l'affaire eût été menée si loin et fût allée jusqu'à l'autonomie de la Mandchourie sous le contrôle de fait du Japon, situation que la Chine, naturellement, se refuse à reconnaître; ces personnages craignent que la position soudaine du Japon en Mandchourie ne nuise à la lente emprise économique de celui-ci sur le territoire chinois tout entier et ne l'arrête en chemin.

Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas notre avis, et nous répétons sans tendre au paradoxe ce que nous avons dit ici précédemment, à savoir que selon nous une reprise générale des affaires commerciales entre la Chine et le Japon, dont aucun des deux pays n'aura à se plaindre, suivra la période actuelle de boycottage. Mais ce n'est pas ce qui nous occupe. Ce que nous essayons de déchiffrer, c'est la part de l'armée dans les résolutions prises ces temps derniers en Mandchourie.

D'après le télégramme de Tokio que l'on vient de lire, cette part serait considérable. Pourtant, la fin du télégramme, qui contient un éloge à l'armée, implique aussi autre chose.

On ne doit pas oublier qu'au cours de ces derniers mois un mouvement d'ultra-nationalisme s'est rapidement développé au Japon, bénéficiant de la sympathie non seulement de l'armée, ce qui est naturel dans un pays militaire comme le Japon, mais encore de hautes personnalités civiles, et de l'appui d'une association à tendance plus ou moins fasciste: le Kokuhonsha, dont le président, M. Hiranouma, est vice-président du conseil privé.

Si donc l'esprit militaire s'est manifesté hautement, comme on l'assure, au cours des récents événements, il pouvait s'appuyer sur un sentiment largement répandu dans la population, et nous ajouterons représenté au sein du parti Seyukai qui hier encore détenait le pouvoir. C'est pourquoi, sans nier l'influence actuelle des militaires, nous ne pensons pas qu'elle se soit exercée seule dans le sens de l'extension des opérations de Mandchourie.

On verra sans doute par la suite ce qu'il en faut exactement penser. Mais qu'on veuille bien réfléchir dès à présent à ce qu'est devenu en fait la Mandchourie. Qu'en droit les Chinois la tiennent comme faisant partie intégrante de la Chine, c'est une autre affaire et qui n'entre point dans le cadre de cet article. Mais, étant donné l'état de la politique dans ces régions, la Mandchourie nous paraît devoir nécessairement compter avec ses voisins russes et japonais.

Dans un de ses articles synthétiques de la *Dépêche coloniale* qui témoignent, après d'autres preuves plus éclatantes, d'une connaissance profonde de la matière politique et psychologique extrême-orientale, M. Herbert Wild écrivait récemment: « Il est certain que le Japon, en soutenant le désir d'indépendance de la Mandchourie, en favorisant l'accession au gouvernement de cette région de celui qui, Mandchou de race, serait encore sans la révolution empereur de Chine, agit pleinement en vue de ses intérêts. Mais voulez-vous vous reporter au rapport préliminaire de la commission d'études en Mandchourie, lire que les irréguliers chinois y sont au nombre de cent dix mille, qu'il en résulte une insécurité générale? Voulez-vous réfléchir au fait que si le Japon n'y rétablissait pas l'ordre, c'est l'Union des soviets qui le rétablira, et Dieu sait de quelle façon! Pour nous, nous pensons qu'une Mandchourie pratiquement indépendante est une impossibilité à l'heure actuelle. Désirez-vous que la Mand-

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chourie assimile son organisation étatique et sa structure sociale à celles de l'U. R. S. S. voisine? Non! Alors vous n'échapperez pas à la conclusion suivante: la Mandchourie sera autonome sous le contrôle japonais. Comme la Mongolie est autonome sous le contrôle des Soviets. »

Voilà certainement un point de vue qui n'est pas négligeable. On y trouve entre autres choses une raison pour tous les Japonais, et non pas uniquement pour les autorités militaires du Japon, de s'intéresser à l'affaire de Mandchourie. C'est pour l'instant tout ce que nous voulons en retenir.

ANDRÉ DUBOSQ.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tsingtao/50 FOR # 16

FROM Tsingtao (Berger) DATED May 6, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

The bombing of the Japanese Officials at Shanghai cause little
reaction in Tsingtao.

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accident. There was no response by any of the non-Japanese present.

The report of the bombing of the Japanese officials at Shanghai was received on the afternoon of the 28th and when I had ascertained that the report was true I expressed my sympathy to the Japanese Consul General. There was no perceptible local reaction to this outrage.

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THE UNDER SECRETARY

JUN 1 - 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

May 28, 1932.



SECRETARY OF STATE
JUN 1 - 1932

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W. R. Castle, Jr.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 24, 1932.

Translation Bureau:
 Attention EBC.

Translation of Japanese
 document received by White
 House hereto attached.

WRL:CLS/

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
MAY 26 1932

M.M.R.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



Handwritten: J. L. Tolson
June 6/32
June 7 1932

F/LS 793.94/5294

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Our Society is composed of a group of religious bodies believing that Saint Nichiren is the interpreter of the highest Buddhist doctrine. It understands that the League of Nations was established to promote world peace and ethics, but we doubt whether it has fulfilled its high purpose in so far as the peace and happiness of Far Eastern peoples is concerned. We can not understand the League's action in the recent Sino-Japanese discord, and our mistrust is shared by others.

In China the national and social policy still persists that educationally, administratively and economically Japan shall be overthrown. Under instructions of the central government and in the guise of fostering patriotism, the textbooks of elementary schools and universities, and the educational material of military regimes and political parties all over China are replete with anti-Japanese matter. In the matter of textbooks, 370 anti-Japanese passages are found in primary and higher educational books. In this manner the Chinese Government is cultivating hostile sentiments in the minds of Chinese youth. As an instance, the following passages

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passages are cited from a recitation entitled "Day of Revolution" which the students of Licheng School are made to repeat every morning:

4. Do you love China? We do.

5. Who is Shantung's arch enemy? Japan.

15. What shall we do about Japan's aggression?

Overthrow Japan.

16. How will you overthrow Japan? By striving hard in our reading, our study and by revolution.

17. What other method have you? Even though we die we will not buy Japanese goods nor Japanese food.

18. Is this wish to overthrow Japan a passing passion or an everlasting resolution? An everlasting resolution.

23. Have you understood the meaning of washing away China's shame and overthrowing Japan? We have understood and shall not forget it one jot or one tittle.

The above is a sample of the 370 anti-Japanese passages by which children, university students and the whole people are made deeply hostile to Japan. Does this action square with international morality? The basic principles of our Buddhist code of human ethics are to live and let live and world peace. Darwin's revolutionary theory that the basic characteristic of species is the survival

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survival of the fittest and the devouring of the weak by the strong has for a long time been known to the human race. Marx's theory of class struggle is also based on the theory of evolution of species. If society rests on Darwin's survival of the fittest principle, where is the value of man, the lord of creation? How can peace be expected?

As our Buddhist faith recognizes that all human beings have the nature of Buddha or God, it naturally hopes for a world at peace in which the live and let live principle will reign supreme. Thus world peace is the most prized jewel of the Buddhist faith. In the light of justice and ethics, China by her action toward Japan as described above must be regarded as the foe of righteousness and world peace. What is Your Excellency's opinion on this point?

- II. Why does China show such hostility toward Japan?
- Our Society can not understand the reasons, for Japan fought not only with China and Russia but with Germany in the Great War as well, owing to her duty to Britain. The war with China was fought because China wished to annex the Korean Peninsula and had penetrated into it, and because it was necessary for Japan to prevent her
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in order to protect her security and the peace of the Far East, and fulfil her destiny. The prize of this war was the Liaotung Peninsula, that is, the lower half of south Manchuria. But China's diplomat Li Hung Chang concluded a secret treaty with Russia and, as a result, under the beautiful pretext of the peace of the Orient, Russia, Germany and France interfered and caused the Liaotung Peninsula to be taken away from Japan. The following year Russia built a great naval port at Port Arthur, began work on Dairen and laid railroads to the east and south. Not only was it evident that she was preparing to occupy south Manchuria, but having completed military preparations she penetrated even into Korea. As our Japan's safety and the peace of the Orient were threatened, unhesitatingly we staked our national fortunes and declared war on Russia. Notwithstanding that we held all of south Manchuria, from friendship toward our neighbor and for the sake of the peace of the Orient, we restored it to Chinese sovereignty, receiving nothing whatever in exchange but only taking over from Russia the railway and the lease of Kwantung Peninsula.

Manchuria and Mongolia, particularly Manchuria, have never been historically a part of China, nor has China had intercourse with those regions. For example, before
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the Russo-Japanese War, Manchuria was a wide waste with villages here and there, whereas now (the populous and prosperous character of the country is indicated) in the well-known song "When the grass bends in the wind the cows and the sheep are seen". Truly Manchuria was an ownerless land. But now there are 30,000,000 people in the region, and nowhere in China is there such peace, opportunity for a good living and happiness, and this is nothing but the result of Japan's maintenance of peace, her investment of 2,000,000,000 yen, her promotion of industry and her practical instruction of the people by various activities. What did China do in all this time? Nothing but build arsenals for her generals and take money from the people. Manchuria today is entirely the product of Japan, of her law enforcement and of her enterprise. Even though the Sino-Japanese dispute may be settled, our special relationship toward China is not only denied concretely but is not even recognized in the abstract from the point of view of humanity and ethics.

Again when Japan went to war with Germany she not only fulfilled her duty to Britain but drove Germany from the Far East. Thus she not only maintained the peace of the Orient but by educating Chinese officers rendered China a service in connection with the

maintenance

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maintenance of this peace. The fame of Japan's grand spirit was proclaimed from the mountain tops to the depths of the ocean. Why then does China hate the mention of Japan's virtue? Is it possible to recognize China as a nation from the standpoint of international good faith? What is Your Excellency's opinion on this matter?

III. Notwithstanding that Japan, as has already been stated, was desirous only of maintaining the peace of the Orient and fulfilling her duty as a neighbor, China spurned her kind intentions and tried to drive her out of Manchuria. She started an insulting anti-Japanese movement, and as a result piled up over 300 disputes with Japan, butchered Captain Nokamura and even dared to blow up the South Manchuria Railway track. Finally Japan in self-defense was compelled to draw the sword of righteousness. The cause of war does not lie with us but with the Chinese, and our Imperial army has assumed the heaven-ordained task of chastising evil Chinese groups. The mission of our Japanese army is indeed the mission of righteousness. Our soldiers are the knights of the gods.

In propagating the Buddhist doctrine two methods are used. One is passive and the other active. The first is the use of moral persuasion and the latter the use of

force.

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force. In the case of persuasion introspection is brought about by preaching. In the application of force overt action or military means are employed to crush and subdue. In light cases moral persuasion is invoked but in serious cases submission is brought about by force. Of the two methods to further righteousness our Imperial Japanese army employed punitive methods to correct the serious evil of Chinese wrong-doing. China, however, does not even now admit her guilt but on the contrary intensifies her anti-Japanese campaign and bitter determination to overthrow Japan. Now this condition can not but destroy the everlasting peace of the Orient and work to the detriment of the human race. What is Your Excellency's opinion on this point?

IV. At this point I can not but express distrust of the League of Nation's attitude. As China behaved contemptuously, insolently, violently and improperly toward Japan, the godlike warriors of our Japan declared battle to correct her evil ways. In considering the action of the League we see that while China was never counseled to examine herself, Japan was constantly warned about her actions. Can it be said that the League has been upholding justice? China is seeking to oppress Japan through
 the

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the might of the League of Nations and the United States. Because of League and American sympathy China not only has failed to recognize her guilt, but has become inordinately ambitious as this sympathy has increased. As China caused the outbreak of hostilities, why did not the League warn China first to consider carefully her ambition and wanton ways? As the League's action has been consistently as described above, we do not believe it is possible to hope for enduring Far Eastern and therefore world peace. What are Your Excellency's views in this respect?

- V. Our Society regards China neither with enmity nor with hatred, but with deep pity because she does not know a wrong when she commits one and because she is leading herself to destruction and does not realize it. In regarding Japan as an enemy, Chinese war on their own sense of righteousness, and in hating her they hate their own god-like and Buddha nature. No matter how great their sin, the spirit of gods and Buddha is seen lying at the bottom of their nature in the strong light of the Buddhist faith. They walk in evil ways only because they are unable of their own strength to realize it, and must be pitied because their repeated wrong-doing will make a shambles of their country and
- result

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result in their perdition.

Here is what our Society hopes that the League will do out of the profundity of its knowledge: that it will cause the Chinese Government to completely change its national policy of overthrowing Japan and remove from textbooks of all schools, from primary grades to universities, passages hostile or insulting to or subversive of Japan; also that it will abolish among the people a social policy of ostracism. If the League of Nations will entertain the foolish complaint of our Society and request the Chinese to reflect upon their behavior, we have no doubt that stubborn, turbulent China, too, will be compelled by the justice and prestige of the League, which is the representative of world justice, to turn from provocation and wrong-doing toward cooperation to realize peace among the nations of the Orient. Thus the measure of happiness in store for humanity will be without limit. What is Your Excellency's opinion in this respect?

April 3, seventh year of Showa, 1932.

* S. Osemari,
President, United Society
of Disciples of Nichiren.

To His Excellency Hoover,

President of the United States of North America.

* Address: United Society of Disciples of Nichiren,
555 Sensai ^{Karasu} Toyama, Kitatamagun. Tokyo Fu, Japan.

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ナ、然レバ即チ東洋ノ天地ニ平和ノ光明ガ惶々トシテ照リ輝
ヤキ。ソシテ世界人類ノ頭上ニ幸福ノ寶庫ガ無限ニ開
カレルデアラウ。果シテ閣下ノ所見ヤ如何ニ。

昭和七年四月三日

日蓮門下統合會

會長

大迫尚道

北米合衆國大統領

フーヴァー閣下

東京府下北多摩郡千歳島山五五五

大迫方

日蓮門下統合會

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和ハ勿論世界ノ平和ハ永遠ニ望ミ得ラレナイ様ニ思ハレル之
 レニ對スル閣下ノ所見果シテ如何

(五) 本會ハ所シテ支那國ヲ敵視スルヲデモ、マタ憎惡スルモノデ
 モナイ。タバ彼等ノ爲メニ深キ惻愀ノ情ニ堪エサルモノカアル。何
 ビナラバ、彼等ハ非ヲ行フテ其ノ非ヲ知ラズ、マタ彼等自ラカ
 自ラヲ亡滅ニ導キツ、而カモ之レヲ自覺シナイカラダ。彼等ハ
 日本ヲ敵視スルコトハ、當シク自己ノ正義心ヲ敵視スルコトダ。
 マタ彼等ハ日本ヲ憎惡スルコトハ、當シク自己ノ神性ヤ佛性ヲ
 憎惡スルコトダ。彼等ハ如何ニ重惡デアルニセヨ。大衆佛教ノ明
 鏡ニ照ラストキ彼等ノ内面ノ底ニ神性ヤ佛性ガ存在シテ居
 ルノデアル。タバ魔道ニ彷徨シツ、アル彼等自身ノカデハ之レヲ現
 實ニ發揚シ得ラレザルヤ論ヲ俟タナイ。其ノ故ニ彼等ハ徒ラ非

ニ非ラ。寧ネ、修羅道ヲ繰リ返スノミデ自己滅亡ヘト辿リ行
 クノミデアル。是ニ惘然デナケレバナラナイ。ソコデ本會ハ國
 際聯盟ニ對シ其ノ職責ニ鑑ミ、切望スルニ事ガアル。ソレ
 ハ外デモナイ。支那政府ヲシテ打倒日本ノ國策ヲ根本的
 ニ改メシムルト共ニ小學校乃至大學ノ教科書ヲリ排日侮
 日、打倒日本ニ關スル記事ヲ悉ク削除シ而シテマタ經濟
 斷交等ノ社會政策ヲ廢止シテ之レヲ國民一般ニ通
 達セシムル事デアル。幸ニ國際聯盟ハ本會ノ愚衷ヲ
 採納セラレ、斷乎トシテ支那ニ其ノ反省ヲ求メラレナバ、頑
 迷不逞ノ支那國モ茲ニ世界的正義ヲ代表スル聯盟ノ權
 威ト正義心ニ威壓セラレテ、驕然トシテ懺悔滅罪ニ歩
 進メ東洋平和ノ實現ニ方向ヲ轉換スルヤ疑ヲ容レ

カニヨツテ一壓伏シ降服セシムルコトデアル、而シテ輕惡ニハ
道カラ以テ接受シ、重惡ニハ勢カラ以テ折伏スル、コレ
即チ大衆經ノ正義ヲ顯現スル場合ノ二ノ方法デアル
今回、我ゲ日本ノ皇軍ハ重惡ナル支那ノ魔群ヲ膺懲
セン為メノ折伏戰デアツタノダ、然ルニ支那ハ今ニ及シ
テ其ノ非ヲ悟ラズ、益々排日侮日ヲ宣揚シ、打倒日
本ニ焦慮苦心シ居ルノダ、是レ正ニ永遠ニ東洋ノ平
和ヲ破壊シ、延ヒテ世界人類ノ福祉ヲ阻止スル者ト
謂ハナケレバナライデアラウ、之レニ對スル閣下ノ所見
果シテ如何ニ。

(四)コニ國際聯盟ノ行動ニ對シ、怪訝ニ堪エザル者ガ
アルツレハ外デモナイ。前述ノ様ニ支那ハ日本ニ對シ無禮
忘恩、暴逆、不義ノ有ラン限リヲ盡シタカラ、万止ムナクシテ
我ガ日本ハ支那ノ魔道ヲ折伏スル為メニ神武ノ戰ヲ起
シタノデアツタ。然ルニ國際聯盟ノ行動ヲ觀ルニ支那ニ何等
ノ反省ヲ勸告セズニ只ダ日本ニ一再三止マラス警告ヲ
發シテ居ル様ニ思ハレル、コレ正義ヲ擁護スル國際聯盟ノ
行動ト謂ヒ得ラレルデアラウカ。支那ハ米國モ國際聯盟ノ
カラ籍リテ日本ヲ壓伏シヤウトシテ居ル、ソノ故ニコソ、米國モ
國際聯盟ニ於テ支那ニ同情ヲ有スル限リハ支那ハ其ノ非ヲ悟ラ
ナイ計リテナク、益々其ノ同情ニ增長シテ其ノ非望ヲ遂ゲコウトス
ルヤ必然デアル。聯盟ハ何故ニ戰鬪ノ原因ヲ成シタ支那ニ先
第一ニソノ非望、暴逆ヲ深ク反省スベキヲ警告シナカッタノデア
ラウカ。聯盟ノ行動ニシテ斯ノ如クニ終始シタナラバ、東洋平

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校ヲ日本ノ士官学校ニ於テ教育シタノモ只偏ニ東洋平和ノ爲メニ支那ニ最高ノ奉仕ヲ捧ゲタノデアル。嗚呼日本ノ義ヤ山ヨリモ高く、其ノ恩ヤ海ヨリモ深い。然ルニ何事ゾ、支那ハ日本ノ徳ニ報ユルニ怨ヲ以テスルトハ、コレ支那國ハ國際信誼ノ鏡ニ照ラシテ、果シテ國家ト認ムルヲ得ルヤ否ヤ。之レニ對スル閣下ノ所見如何。

(三)前述ノ如ク、我ガ日本ハ支那ニ對シ大ナル恩義ヲ蒙ラシメタルニ拘ハラズ、善隣ノ義ヲ完フシ東洋ノ平和ヲ維持發展セシメシコトヲ欲シ、只管ニ謙虛ナル態度ヲ以テ支那國ニ接シタリシガ、支那ハ其ノ恩義ニ報シ、其ノ謙虛ナル態度ニ乘ジテ、滿洲ヨリ日本ヲ驅逐シヤウトシ、ソシテ排日侮日ノ運動ヲ起シ、其ノ結果、日

支ノ紛争懸案ガ三百餘件ニ累積シ、果テハ中村大尉殺戮乃至滿鉄線路破壊マデニ至ツタノデカラ、流石ノ我ガ日本モ自衛上止ムヲ得ズシテ、正義ノ刀ヲ振り翳サバルヲ得ザルニ至ツタ。戰ノ原因ハ我ニ無クシテ、正ニ彼レ支那ニ有ツタノデアル。我ガ皇軍ハ正ニ支那ノ魔群ヲ膺懲スル爲メノ天使ノ軍カデアツタノダ。嗚呼、我ガ日本ノ軍カハ、正ニ正義ノカデアリ、神ノ武デアル。

大衆佛教ニハ正義ヲ發揚スル場合ニニツノ方法ガアル、一ツハ接受デアリ、二ツハ折伏デアル。接受トハ是レ道カデアリ、折伏トハ是レ勢力カデアル。道カトハ、説得ニヨツテ反省自覺セシムル事デアリ、勢カトハ権カマタハ軍

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ワハ東洋平和ノ為メニ之レヲ支那主権ノ下ニ復帰セシメ
 支那カラハ何物オモ受ケズ唯ダ我ケ日本ハ露國ヨリ
 満鉄五ニ關東洲租借權ヲ得メニ過ギナク、タノク、元來
 滿蒙殊ニ滿洲ノ地ハ歴史的ニ言ヘバ支那ノ本土トシテ交
 渉ノナイ他國デアレ、手近キ一例ハ日露戰爭以前ニマツ
 テハ、滿洲ハ所々ニ部落ガ散在スル廣原デアワケ、金時
 代ノ詩人ガ「風吹ケバ草ガ偃シテ牛羊分見エルト歌」タ
 様ニ殆ント無主ノ土地デアツタツレカ一躍シテ三千人
 余ノ住民ヲ包容シ、全支那ノ内最モ平和ナ、ソレト最モ生
 活ノ機會ガ多ク、幸福ノ希望ニ照リ輝ヤリ土地トナ
 ワタノハ日本ガ治安ヲ維持シ且ツ廿億以上ノ巨資ヲ投ジ
 テ産業ヲ開發シ、諸種ノ施設ニヨツテ住民ニ實物教

育ヲ施シタ結果デアル。其ノ間ニ支那ハ滿蒙ニ對シ何事ヲ
 爲シタデアラウカ。タハ支那ノ軍閥ハ人民ヲ彈壓シテ財
 貨ヲ搾リ取ル外一事モ爲サナカワタデハナイカ。滿洲ノ
 今日アルハ、全ク日本ノ御蔭デアルコレゾ日本ノ滿洲ニ對
 スル政治的並ニ經濟的ニ優越權ノアル所以デアル、コノ
 我ガ日本ノ支那ニ對スル特殊の事情ヲ具體的ニ認識
 スルコトナク、タト單ニ抽象的一般ノ規準ニヨリテ、日支ノ
 紛爭ヲ解決シヤウトシテモコレハ具體的ニ正義人道
 ノ許容スル所デハナイ。V

加之、更ニ日本ハ日独戰爭ニ於テ日英同盟ノ大義ヲ
 完ウシタノミナラス、独逸ノ東洋進出ヲ支那カラ驅逐
 シ、ソシテ東洋ノ平和ヲ維持シタ計リデナク、支那ノ將

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勤ヲ正義人道、明鏡ニ照ストキ正ニ是レ正義、仇、世界
 平和、敵デナケレバナラナイデアロウ。之レニ對スル閣下
 ノ所見果シテ如何

(二) 支那ハ何故ニ斯様ニ日本ヲ仇敵視スルノデブラウカ。
 コレ本會ノ諒解シ得ザル處デアル。勿論、日本ハ日清元
 日露、ニ大戦争ヲ行ツタ計リデナク、日英同盟、義ヲ
 重シシテ歐洲ヲ中トセル世界戦争ニ参加シテ独逸ト
 戦ツタ。併シ日清戦争ニ於テハ支那ハ朝鮮ヲ併吞ス
 ル為メニ朝鮮半島ニ猿臂ヲ伸シテ未タノデ、日本國防
 上、殊ニ東洋平和ノ為メニ止ムヲ得不國運ヲ賭シテ戦
 其ノ代償トシテ遼東半島即チ今ノ南滿州、大半ヲ
 得ヲノデアル。然ルニ支那ノ外交家李鴻章ハ露國ト密

カニ結ビ、其ノ結果東洋平和、美名ノ下ニ露独、佛ノ
 三國干涉トナリ、其ノカニヨリテ右遼東半島ヲ日本カラ
 奪回シタノデアル。露國ハ其翌年ニ旅順ニ一大軍港ヲ
 修築シ、更ニ大連ヲ終點トスル南下鐵道ヲ、浦塩ヲ
 終點トスル東西ノ兩線ヲ敷設シ、軍事的立場カラ滿
 州ヲ席捲セントシタ計リデナク、種々ナル軍事的設備ヲ
 完了シテ、朝鮮ニマデ手ヲ延ベシ未タカラ、我が日本ハ
 最早國防上モ東洋平和ノ為メニ座視シ得ヌカ止ム
 コトナク國運ヲ賭シテ強大ナル露國ニ宣戦ヲ布告シタノ
 デアル。

斯様ニ次第デアルカラ、滿洲全体ハ日本ノ所有ニ歸スベキ
 筈デアル。拘ハラズ、我が日本ハ善隣ノ義ヲ重シシ且

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十八、汝ノ日本打倒ハ一時的ノ熱度ヲ又ハ堅忍持久ノ決心ヲ
 堅忍持久。

三、日本ヲ打倒シ中國ノ爲メニ憎厭スルハ汝等ニ頼ムトコロ
 解ツタカ。解リコシテ一分一秒タリトモ忘レズ。

以上

コレガ小學生ノ口ニ毎朝唱ヘラル、日讀デアルコレハ單ナル
 一例ニ過ギナイノデアルガ、カ、ル意味ノモノガ小學校乃至大
 學ノ教科書ヲ通ジテ實ニ三百七十餘章ミマフテ無思慮
 ノ幼年カラ壯年且ツハ國民一般ノ頭ニ日本ニ對スル深キ敵
 愾心ガ教育的ニ煽動的ニ植ヘツケラレタルデアル。真ニ驚
 クノ外ナイ。コレ果シテ國際正義ニ適フノ行動デアラウカ。吾
 カ大衆佛教ニ於テハ正義人道ヲ根本トシテ共存共栄ノ

世界平和ヲ實現スルコトヲ生命トシテイル。然ルニ彼ノ「ダー
 ウチン」ノ生物進化論ニヨルト生存競争ト弱肉強食ヲ生
 物ノ本質トシテナル此進化論カ如何ニ久シイ間人類
 ヲ支配シタコトデアラウ。「マルクス」ノ階級闘争説ニ此ノ生物
 進化論ヲ基礎トシタモノダ。若シ人類社會ガ「ダーウチン」
 所謂生存競争弱肉強食ヲ本質トスルナラハ實ニ万物
 ノ靈長タル人間ノ價值カ何處ニ在ルノデアラウ。ソシテ又
 何レノ時ニ世界ノ平和ヲ望ミ得ラレヤウカ。處カ我カ大衆
 佛教ニ於テハ人類全體ニ佛性ヤ神性ヲ認ムルノデアルカ
 ヲ、其ノ必然的結果トシテ共存共栄ノ世界平和ヲ實現
 センコトヲ本質トシテ居ル。真ニ大衆佛教コソ世界平和ノ
 寶典デナケレバナナイ。然ルニ支那ノ日本ニ對スル右ノ行

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會ノ爲メノミナハナイ。

ハ支那國ハ教育的ニ政治的ニ經濟的ニ「打倒日本」ヲ國策トシ
 マタ社會政策トシテ樹立シテ来タノデアル。即チ全國各地ノ
 小學校乃至大學ノ教科書カラ軍隊マタハ黨機關ノ國
 民教育ノ教材等ニ排日記事ヲ記載シテ愛國心涵養ノ
 名、下ニ組織的ニ打倒日本ヲ中央政府ノ命令ダトシテ敢行
 シテ来タノデアル。今支那ノ教科書ニ就テ觀ルニ、小學一至
 ヲリ大學マデノ教科書ニ打倒日本ノ記事ヲ載セラレタモ
 ノハ實ニ三百七十餘章ニ及ンデ居リテ支那政府ハ夫レ等ノ
 教材ニヨリテ無邪氣ノ幼少ノ學童カラ大學生ニ至ルマデ
 ノ頭ニ深ク日本ニ對スル敵愾心ヲ植エ付ケルニ努メタモノデ
 アツタ。今其一例ヲ挙示スルト、歷城縣教育局ハ其ノ管下ノ小

學教員ニ配布セシ「教員須知」中ニ毎朝小學生ニ必ズ唱讀セ
 シムベキモノトシテ、次ノ如キ同答條ノ革命日讀ヲ掲ゲ、教員ハ
 毎朝之レヲ受持テ生徒ニ唱讀セシメテヤル。

「革命日讀」拔粹

四、汝等ハ中國ヲ愛スルカ。中國ヲ愛ス

五、山東、最大ノ敵ハ誰カ。日本人ナリ

十五、我々ハ日本ノ斯ノ如キ侵略ニ對シ如何ニスレバ良イカ。

日本ヲ打倒ス。

十六、汝等ハ如何ナル方法ヲ以テ彼等ヲ打倒スルカ。我等ハ
 讀書ニ勉學ニ革命ニ努力スル

十七、尙ホ如何ナル方法ガアルカ。死シテモ日貨ハ買ハズ、死シテ
 モ日本ニ糧食ヲ賣ラス事ヲ誓フ。

本會ハ大衆佛教ノ最高峯タル法華經ノ行者日蓮聖
人ヲ中ハトシテ設立サレタ宗教的團體デアル。然ルニコ、ニ
敢テ「國際聯盟」ニ對シ質疑スル所以ノモ、ハ畢竟スルニ東
洋ノ和平ト世界人類ノ福祉ヲ念願スル爲メニ外ナリ。今、國
際聯盟カ、正義人道ヲ基本トシ世界ノ平和ヲ實現スル爲
メニ設立セラレタコトハ、コ、ニ言ヲ俟タナイ。然ルニ今、日支
兩國ノ紛争問題ニ對スル國際聯盟ノ行動ハ本會ノ如何
ニシテモ諒解シ得ザル矣。カアル計デナク、甚ダ怪訝ニ堪ヘ
ザルモノアルコトヲ信ズルガ故ニコ、ニ左ノ質疑ヲ發シ、芳答ヲ
仰ガントスル者デアル。幸ニ芳答ニ接スルヲ得バ其ノ光榮独々本

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 7 1932

To the American Consul General,
Tokyo, Japan.

The Secretary of State encloses herewith a translation of a letter dated April 3, 1932, addressed to the President by S. Osemari, President of the United Society of Disciples of Nichiren, 555 Sensai, Karasuyama, Kitatamagun, Tokyo Fu, Japan, in regard to the attitude of the Chinese people and the League of Nations toward Japan in the present Sino-Japanese dispute.

The Secretary of State requests that the Consul General, unless he perceives objection, acknowledge the receipt of the Reverend Mr. Osemari's letter to the President.

Enclosure:
Translation of letter,
April 3, 1932.

793.94/5294

^{WRL}
FE:WRL:CLS
6/4/32

JUN 8. 1932.

793.94/5294

WRL

0837

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEPHONES
 OFFICE, MEDIA 170
 HOME, MEDIA 430



LAW OFFICES OF

WILLIAM TAYLOR

COUNTY BUILDING

MEDIA - PENNA.

MAY 18 32

May 16, 1932.

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,
 Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

My dear Secretary of State:

In some Memorial Day
 addresses which I expect to make it is my desire to
 refer to a certain message sent by yourself to Japan
 in their recent trouble with China in which according
 to Newspapers Japan was given to understand that un-
 less agreements between that Country and the United
 States were complied with in a civil way other means
 would have to be resorted to to carry out these agree-
 ments.

It seems to me that this
 message had a great deal to do with ending the trouble
 between Japan and China and I would appreciate receiving
 from your Department a copy of that message or extracts
 of it bearing upon the point above mentioned.

Thanking you I remain

Yours very respectfully,

WT/M

William Taylor



793.94/5295

MAY 22 1932

FBI

MAY 27 1932

MAY 23/32
EWS

0838

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SPECIAL DELIVERY

May 27 1932.

In reply refer to
FE -

Mr. William Taylor,
County Building,
Media, Pennsylvania.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May 16, 1932, requesting that you be furnished with a copy of a certain communication to the Japanese Government relating to the present existing difficulties between China and Japan.

Your letter would seem to indicate that you are under a misapprehension in regard to the tenor of this Government's communications to Japan in connection with the situation in the Far East as none of those communications warrants the statement made in the first paragraph of your letter under acknowledgment. The attitude and policy of this Government in connection with the dispute between China and Japan are clearly set forth in the texts of communications contained in Senate Document No. 55 entitled "Conditions in Manchuria" and in the letter addressed on February 23, 1932, by the Secretary of State to Senator Borah, copies of which are

enclosed

793.94/5295

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

enclosed for your information.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. M. Hamilton
 Maxwell M. Hamilton
 Acting Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.


Enclosures:

Senate Document No. 55;
 Copy of letter of February 23,
 to Senator Borah.

WJ
 290
 FE: 290
 V-27-32

FE
M. M. Hamilton

V
 May 27 1952.
news



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 THE SECRETARY
 JUN 5 1932

June 2, 1932.

*copies to
 Peiping & Tokyo
 June 6, 1932*

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
 THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI

THE UNDER SECRETARY

Discussion of Dr. Nitobe's Visit.

JUN 5 1932
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

F/LS

793.94/5296

The Japanese Ambassador said that he came to thank me for my reception of Dr. Nitobe yesterday. He said that Nitobe had told him that I had been very kind to him and that he was surprised to find what a nice man I was. I told the Ambassador that I feared Dr. Nitobe had gained an impression in Tokyo that I had horns and hoofs and a tail. The Ambassador laughed and said he thought that might be so. He then said that Nitobe had told him that we had discussed a loophole in the Nine Power Treaty and that he, the Ambassador, had told Nitobe that he must have misunderstood me because in his, the Ambassador's, opinion, there was no loophole in the treaty and he thought it was the tightest we had ever drawn. I replied that Dr. Nitobe had indeed used the expression of a loophole in the Nine Power Treaty and that I had expressed surprise at it and had certainly not admitted that there was any loophole in it. I told the Ambassador that I had discussed with Dr. Nitobe principally our conception in English-speaking countries of the relation between the civil and military government

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

government and had told him how, beginning with the period of the revolution in Great Britain three hundred years ago, when the King of England tried to build a navy without the consent of the people and, in consequence, lost his head, it had been ever since the doctrine that in these English-speaking countries, including ourselves, the civil authorities were superior to the military and naval authorities and exercised control.

The Ambassador pulled out a paper from his pocket which he said was an address to be delivered tomorrow by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viscount Saito, at the opening of the Diet and he said he thought I would be interested in reading it. I told the Ambassador I would be very glad to read it and it is annexed to this aide memoire.

HLS.

S HLS:CBS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOR RELEASE THURSDAY, JUNE 2nd, 1932.

ADDRESS OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, ^{Vis-Count} MR. MAKOTO SAITO, AT THE OPENING OF THE DIET, MARCH 3, 1932.

I have the privilege of reviewing, on this occasion, the latest developments in the foreign relations of this country.

We are all gratified to watch the rapid restoration of peaceful conditions in the Shanghai area following the conclusion on May 5th of the Sino-Japanese agreement for the cessation of hostilities. I may say that in the course of negotiations leading up to this agreement, we encountered not a few difficulties and that the earnest labors of the British Minister to China and the representatives of other friendly powers on the spot as well as our own attitude of fairness and rectitude largely contributed to the final happy outcome. And I desire to avail myself of this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to the officers and men of our army and navy who fought in the Shanghai area and rendered signal service to our fatherland. I also desire to express my profound sympathy with the victims of the bombing incident of April 29th and, particularly, my infinite grief at the death of General Shirakawa, Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary force.

According to the terms of the agreement, Chinese troops are to remain at a prescribed distance from Shanghai and

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Chinese forces are to cease as far as it lies within their power all hostile actions in Shanghai and its vicinity. Should action of the Chinese army give occasion for apprehension, the representatives of the four powers, Great Britain, the United States of America, France and Italy, are to ascertain the situation. As long as these terms of the agreement are observed, there is little likelihood, for the present at least, that any fresh disturbances will be caused by Chinese soldiers in the Shanghai district. In these circumstances, it has been decided to call home the whole of our military forces, relying as stated in the declaration of the Minister of War published May 11 upon operation of the agreement and upon such action as friendly powers shall take in order to insure permanent peace in Shanghai. I am sure that the complete withdrawal of our troops will demonstrate, as nothing else could, the truth of the repeated declarations of our Government as to the absence of any political design in our recent expeditions. However, it is the only terms for ending hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese forces that have so far been arranged. No measures have yet been taken to establish permanent peace in the Shanghai district. It is absolutely necessary to take further steps in order to establish such conditions as will enable both Chinese and foreigners in Shanghai to live in safety and pursue their business in peace of the prosperity of this great international metropolis built up by their peaceful labors for many decades is to be main-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

tained. Indeed, if that city could be freed from the menace of such sporadic disturbances of various kinds as have occurred time and again in the past, it would prove a boon not only to its residents, Chinese and foreign, but also to China and all the powers interested in China. I cannot therefore but look eagerly forward to the early opening and complete success of the round table conference which is desired by the Japanese Government and which was contemplated in the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations adopted with the concurrence of China on February 29th.

In Manchuria we note that the new state is making steady progress with fresh zeal and resolute will. I am well aware of the great interest which is naturally manifested by our people in the future of Manchukuo and I believe that it is no longer possible to ignore the existence of that state in any international readjustments which may be made with reference to the Manchurian incident. I believe that it is of the utmost importance for the tranquillity of the Far East as well as for the restoration of the peace and prosperity in Manchuria that the new state should attain healthy growth. Only the new government has not yet reached the stage at which it can command sufficient resources for the restoration of order while the activities of soldier bandits and other lawless elements often instigated from outside are extremely difficult to suppress. Consequently, our troops in

8/30/1972
 1/1/1973
 Manchuria

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Manchuria are compelled to extend their necessary cooperation to the protective functions of the new Government and to guard against . any eventualities that might endanger the lives and property of our countrymen or eventuate, in general, disturbances on a major scale. Our profound thanks are due the military and police forces serving in Manchuria in the face of constant danger day and night and at the risk of their lives.

Precedents can easily be drawn from the history of other countries to show that political changes such as have taken place in Manchuria are bound to be accompanied by activities on the part of malcontents and lawless elements even where no external institution comes into play and it takes some time in such cases before governmental machinery of a new state can be fully set in order. I am strongly opposed to any impatient and impetuous attitude toward the progress of events in Manchuria. It is essential to give it time and to address oneself to effecting a sure solution of problems with which we are confronted.

61.94 In the course of the present affair, it became necessary for the Japanese army to operate against soldier bandits in North Manchuria for the protection of the Japanese residents there. That we have always paid due respect to the legitimate rights and interests of the Soviet Union in that region and have taken scrupulous care not to infringe or injure them is clearly proved by the conduct of our army. Moreover, the Japanese Government have repeatedly assured the Soviet Government as to the true motive of our advance to the North which

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

does not extend beyond the protection of Japanese life and property. I am certain that the Moscow Government fully appreciates our position. Nevertheless there are some who talk as though there were danger of war between Japan and Russia as a sequel to the Manchuria incident. I am sure I can appeal to the good sense and discernment of our people not to be misled by such rumors.

The League of Nations, as you know, maintained a close watch over developments in Shanghai. During a temporary deadlock in negotiations for the cessation of hostilities, the action of China who laid the matter before the League produced various complications. Nevertheless as the success of the negotiations became practically assured, the League decided to tide over the crisis by relying upon the progress of affairs on the spot. On April 30 the extraordinary session of the Assembly was convoked at which a resolution inviting speedy settlement of the Shanghai negotiations was adopted and the matter was brought to a close. The Japanese Government, as they had previously entered a protest with regard to the application to the Sino-Japanese disputes of Article 15 of the Covenant, expounded the stand thus taken and abstained from voting on the resolution.

As regards the Commission of the League which is engaged in conducting an investigation on the spot, we are extending to it all possible facilities at our disposal in order to help its members to fulfil their mission. I sincerely hope that the Commissioners will form a correct and fair conception of

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the actual conditions in China and Manchuria.

The outstanding issue besides Sino-Japanese affairs in our foreign relations today is the matter of international, political and economic readjustment. The Disarmament Conference which has been in session since last February is largely concerned with this problem. This being the first great conference ever convened to deal with the problem of disarmament in general covering land, sea and air forces, it is expected that its deliberations will last for some time. The Japanese Government intend to insist their own points in accordance with their settled policy and it is our sincere hope that the Conference will achieve the desired results in the interest of world economy and peace.

Finally, in regard to our economic relations with other countries, it cannot be denied that owing to the adoption by every country in order to protect its own industries of various measures without parallel in the past, serious obstacles have been put in the way of all international trade. The Government of Japan have spared no efforts towards removing in as great a degree as possible barriers to our foreign trade. I am happy to report that within the present year we have concluded a trade convention and tariff agreement with Portugal and French Indo-China, respectively. Portugal is a country with which since 1911 we have had no commercial treaty and our trade with that country suffered accordingly, Japan being placed in a disadvantageous position as compared with other powers. Arduous negotiations fructified at last

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

in the trade convention of March this year which has since come into actual operation. With French Indo-China, in spite of her being our very near neighbor, we had no agreement on customs tariffs, the most important key to trade, since as long ago as the year 1896. It was only in the course of last year that various obstacles that had protracted negotiations between the authorities concerned in Japan and France one by one began to be overcome with the result that a convention was signed May 13 this year which is calculated greatly to facilitate commerce between Japan and Indo-China and to strengthen economic ties between the two countries. Both these conventions are to be hailed as signal contributions towards the promotion of international unity and friendship.

The world is suffering today from countless ills of which the economic depression is most acute. Japan, undergoing the ordeal along with other powers, faces many problems which await international solution. The future of our foreign relations is beset with grave difficulties and national unity and solidarity are needed now more than ever before. In dealing with this difficult situation, let me plead for support and cooperation of you all and I shall do the best I can.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JUN 10 1932

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 340

Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,
 American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on June 2, 1932, with the Japanese Ambassador, concerning Dr. Nitobe's visit.

Very truly yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Memorandum of June 2,
 1932.

793.94/5296

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JUN 11 1932

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 778

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on June 2, 1932, with the Japanese Ambassador, concerning Dr. Nitobe's visit. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Memorandum of June 2,
 1932.

793.94/5296

JUN 3 1932
 Contin

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 [Signature]

793.94/5296

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy to Beijing + Tokyo 6/4/32



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY

Office Memorandum
Copy to Beijing + Tokyo
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUN 4 1932
 JUN 6 1932

June 2, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
 MR. FRANK W. CHINGLUN LEE (LY CHING-LUN), UNDER SECRETARY BY
 THE CHINESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, DR. HAWKLING YEN.

JUN 6 1932

DEPARTMENT

F/LS

793.94/5297

Chinese Situation.

71394

The Chinese Chargeé, Dr. Hawking Yen, brought in Mr. Frank W. Chinglun Lee. Dr. Lee started out by thanking me for the part which I had taken in the Manchurian controversy which, he said, was appreciated and understood throughout China. He said that the Chinese people were getting very restless over the situation and anxious that a further step should be taken by their country; that they would never acquiesce in what Japan had done to Manchuria and would resist it. I asked Mr. Lee what news they had from the Manchurian Commission of the League of Nations. He said that he had been following it closely and he thought that the Commission was finding that the present state in Manchuria was a mere puppet state which could not exist a moment without the military support which Japan was accord-
 ing it and he said that much pressure was being brought in China for further action, probably under the Nine Power Treaty. I told him that, while the outside nations were deeply interested in this controversy by reason of their interest

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

interest in the various treaties which were affected and in the general cause of peace which was affected, as was always the case in human affairs. The chief part in the solution of the problem must be performed by the nation which was primarily affected, namely, China. I said that the success of the defense of these treaties and of Manchuria must rest primarily in China herself and that it was more important for China to take a constructive than a merely destructive or combative position. By that, I meant that she must show the elements of national unity and self-control constructively and evidence an ability to subordinate faction to national unity and self-control; that so long as the outside world received only a picture of various Chinese factions cutting each others throats and tearing each other to pieces, there was great danger that eventually these outer nations might, in despair, adopt the thesis which Japan had put forth, namely, that China was not capable of national unity and that there was, therefore, no basis for the Nine Power Treaty. Dr. Lee replied that there was already a very strong movement in China to subordinate faction and that word was being spread around, even among the Chinese here, to stop their disputes and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hufschmidt NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

and to support national union. He said that that was the reason for the recent union of Canton and Nanking.

I said that I had admired President Chiang Kai-shek's restraint throughout the Manchurian controversy and had regarded his refusal to allow his Government to be drawn into war as an evidence of high statesmanship. Dr. Lee said that he agreed, but that great pressure was being brought now by people who thought that some further step was necessary and who were afraid that the League of Nations might let the matter drop. I cautioned him against any such attitude and said that it would be a great misfortune and mistake for China to kick over the support of the Assembly of the League of Nations where the views and interests of such a large group of nations, principally the small nations, ran so parallel to the interests of China. I said that the action taken by the League was of inestimable value, even if merely as a preliminary, to any action under the Nine Power Treaty which Dr. Lee had suggested, and that the action of the Assembly could not be concluded until the report of the Manchurian Commission and action thereon. I therefore begged him to use all his influence with China to be patient and have self-control.

HLS.

S HLS:CBS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED

JUN 1 - 1932

FRANK W. CHINGLUN LEE

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Frank W. Chinglun Lee (Li Ching-lun) was born in New York City in 1884 and educated in the public schools of New York City, New York University and the University of Chicago. In 1906 he went to China and engaged in educational work. With other members of the Kuomintang he was exiled from China from 1914 to 1917. In 1917 Mr. Lee served as secretary to Sun Yat-sen and from 1918 to 1922 occupied successively the positions of chief of the political department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the military government at Canton and Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in that government. During the next five years he was professor of political science and history at Shanghai College and vice president of the college. In 1927 Mr. Lee was chief of the political department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Government and also representative of the National Government in the United States, with headquarters in New York City. He was delegate from China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1928; appointed Minister to Mexico in November, 1928; and appointed vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in November, 1929. After the resignation of Dr. C. T. Wang as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the latter part of September, 1931, Mr. Lee was Acting Minister for about two months.

FW 793.94/5297

C.
 JEGC

W. W.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JUN 6 1932

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 777

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on June 2, 1932, with Mr. Frank W. Chinglun Lee (Li Chinglun), concerning the Chinese situation. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Memorandum of June 2,
 1932.

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JUN 8 1932
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793.94/5297

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793.94/5297

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JUN 8 1932

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 339

Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
 Tokyo.

Sir:


There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on June 2, 1932, with Mr. Frank W. Chinglun Lee (Li Ching-lun), concerning the Chinese situation.

Very truly yours,

HENRY L. TIMSON

Enclosure:
 Memorandum of June 2,
 1932.

793.94/5297



FE:MMH/ZMF

6/4/32

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[Signature]

JUN 3 1932
[Handwritten signature]

793.94/5297

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/232 a FOR Letter

FROM (Mellon) DATED May 27, 1932.
TO Great Britain NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Document entitled "Evidence of Japanese initiative
in the creation and practical control of the new
administration of the Independent State of Man-
choukuo" for delivery to Sir John Simon.

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793.94/5298

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COLLABORATEUR DES GRANDS QUOTIDIENS VIENNOIS ET HONGROIS,
CORRESPONDANT DES REVUES ET JOURNAUX FRANÇAIS, ESPAGNOLS,
PORTUGAIS, DES U. S. A. ET DE L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE

le RÉDACTEUR PHILIPPE GAIGER

présente à S. E. Monsieur le v. d'É. *Henry L. Stimson*
ses respectueux hommages et se permet de lui faire
parvenir par le même courrier sous enveloppe par-
ticulière le numéro du grand quotidien viennois, ou

TEL. A-12-4-66

VIENNE, (AUTRICHE)
IX/1, LIECHTENSTEINSTRASSE 119

18

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*J'ai publié fidèlement au sens et au texte traduit
les explications de F. L. concernant la tenue
si juste, sage et loyale des U. S. A. Sans
la question du conflit chinois-japonais et d'après
le matériel qui me fut envoyé par S. L.
Monsieur Ray Lyman Wilbur. Ces explications ont
été lues et très favorablement impressionné l'opi-
nion publique en Europe Centrale.*

Toujours très dévoué

*lundi de la pentecôte
1932*

H. Gauger

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION

COLLABORATOR FOR THE GREAT VIENNESE AND HUNGARIAN DAILY
PUBLICATIONS, CORRESPONDENT FOR FRENCH, SPANISH,
2-1932 PORTUGUESE, U.S.A., AND LATIN AMERICAN MAGAZINES AND
NEWSPAPERS.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Philippe Gaiger, Editor

Presents his respects to His Excellency the Secretary
of State, Henry L. Stimson, and takes the liberty of
sending him under separate cover and in the same mail
the issue of the great Viennese daily newspaper where I
have faithfully published, within the meaning and according
to the text translated, the comments of His Excellency
concerning the very equitable, wise and loyal policy of
the U.S.A. on the question of the Sino-Japanese dispute
and in accordance with the material sent to me by His
Excellency Mr. Ray Lyman Wilbur. These comments have
enlightened and very favorably impressed public opinion
in Central Europe.

Very respectfully,

/s/ PH GAIGER

Pentecost Monday
1932



TR: ALL: MCS: GES

F/LS

793.94/5299

FILED

JUN 2 - 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Personnelle

U. S. C.

S. S.

Monieur

Henry L. Smith

*Secrétaire d'Etat pour les
Affaires Étrangères*



*Washington
Foreign offices.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
Sonntag:

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HOLZWARTH-GEDENKRENNEN

Montag:

INTERNATIONALES RENNEN



Herrmannsky
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Leitende Männer über die politische Zukunft.

Äußerungen von Herriot, Dr. Eckener, Stimson, Baldwin, Caillaux, Graf Apponyi und Dr. Hellpach.

Wir müssen uns einigen.

Das Schicksal eines Weltteils.

Von **Renard Herriot**.

Früherer französischer Ministerpräsident.

(Als einem Gespräch.)

Renard Herriot ist als Sieger aus den Wahlen hervorgegangen. Man rechnet mit seiner Ernennung zum französischen Ministerpräsidenten. Die folgenden Ausführungen kennzeichnen seinen Standpunkt in den großen europäischen Fragen und im Abschlusse des Versailler Vertrags.

Paris, 12. Mai.

Der verantwortliche Staatsmann muß heute den Blick auf das Schicksal Europas richten. Daran kann das Ergebnis der Wahlen nichts ändern. Europa ist weiter gefährlich krank und alles hängt von der Behandlung des Kranken ab, an dessen Gesundheit wir gemeinsam interessiert sind. Die Stunde drängt mehr denn je. Wenn nicht cheftens etwas geschieht, verlieren wir unsere Märkte, und das wäre das Ende. Denn wenn unsere wirtschaftliche Stellung verloren geht, wird der Niedergang der europäischen Zivilisation folgen. Es etwas ist im Laufe der Geschichte schon vorgekommen. Europa muß sich also helfen; eine Verständigung ist dringend notwendig.

Unverändert besteht mein Glaube an die Möglichkeit einer Schaffung der „Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“. Wenn die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika möglich waren, sind auch die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa denkbar. Natürlich, den Verhältnissen entsprechend angepaßt. Es liegt mir fern, zu meinen, daß sich die Nationen Europas zusammen politisch nach dem amerikanischen Muster einrichten könnten oder etwa nach dem Beispiel des deutschen Zollvereins oder der Unio Italica. Denn in diesen Fällen haben ja gleiche Sprache und gleiche historische Traditionen schicksalsmäßig die Grundlage für die Vereinigung geboten. Auch die Schweiz kann nicht als Beispiel gelten. Es dauerte drei Jahrhunderte, vom Baslerbieter Vertrag bis zum Westfälischen Frieden, bevor die Schweiz als europäische Macht anerkannt werden konnte. Europa aber braucht schnelle Hilfe, kann kaum mehr Jahre, geschweige denn Jahrhunderte warten. Man sagt, die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika würden einer Vereinigung der Staaten Europas entgegenstehen, und sie hätten auch die Macht dazu, den ganz Europa ist ihr Schuldner. Rußland schließlich könnte aus einem isolierten Europa nicht ausgeschlossen bleiben. Wie aber soll man Rußland in seiner heutigen Organisation einer bürgerlichen Föderation eingliedern?

Europa und Amerika.

Alle diese Probleme lassen sich erledigen. Niemand sieht in Amerika in den Vereinigten Staaten von Europa eine Organisation, die sich gegen die Vereinigten Staaten Amerikas richten könnte. Große Politiker wie

Failetton.

Venezianische Beduten.

Von **Roul Auerhelmer**.

Ein faalartig schmales Hotelgärtchen, zur Rechten vom verlassenen Speiseraum begrenzt, zur Linken von Glycerintrauben bekleidet und vorn von einer bejouteten Balustrade eingefast, jenseits welcher die lippig-fromme Maria della Salute über das im Morgenwind leise schmatzende Wasser und ein paar tanzende Gondelhäse hinweg materlich ins Bild grüßt: das ist das Venedig des nachts Angelanaten, wenn er nun, aus dem Speisezimmer stehend, an einem eiligen Eidechsen vorbei, seinen Weg zu den am Steingeländer aufgereihten, mit himbeerroten und zitronengelben Tischern bedeckten Tischen nimmt. Drei Kellner bemächtigen sich seiner, zwei entwenden wieder, der jüngste und blonde unter ihnen trägt nach geraumer Weile den Kaffee auf. Es ist ein venezianischer Kaffee, der, grau mit einem Stich ins

Violette, aussieht wie venezianische Schokolade; man kann ihn eigentlich nur koloristisch genießen. Aber drüben die be- schneidete und bekuppelte, moscheehafte Kathedrale macht vieles gut: Sie ist unglaublich weiß und steht im Morgendusse da, wie aus überiggebliebenem Mondschnein gebrochen. Der Gondolier hingegen, der sich, hart an der Balustrade, in ge- wundener Stellung ruhend, von seiner schwarzen Wiege schaukeln läßt, ist feierlich schwarz. Mit lässig aufgestültem Ellbogen auf das blaue silberne Wasser starrend, träumt er nichtlich vom Glück. Denn in Venedig ist das Glück ein Trinkgeld.

Wohin er starrt, dort wird, draußen am äußersten Ende der peitschenförmig geschwungenen, über und über be- wimpelten, rötlichgelben Riva degli Schiavoni, eben eine große internationale Bilderausstellung eröffnet, die Esposizione biennale. Der König und die Königin sind eigens aus Rom herbeigekommen, es findet ein sogenannter Corteo statt, eine in allen Regenbogenfarben, auch der Etikette, schillernde Gondelauffahrt. Sind diese schwarz-goldenen Schiffshäse, diese Diener in karmesinroten Samtknechten mit fußbreiten

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deutschen Gedanken- und Gefühlswelt vermählen, die sich in der deutschen Musik kundtut? Im Laufe der letzten zwei Geschlechter hat unter dem Druck der modernen Technik die wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Entwicklung mit Riesenschritten die einstigen Formen des Lebens, die früheren nationalen Notwendigkeiten überflügelt. Vieles, dem man einmal auf Grund des nationalen Wertes eine lebenswichtige und dem Anschein nach weltumspannende Bedeutung beimah, erweist sich heute als Gegenstand einer engherzigen Kirchturnspolitik. Zur Zeit, da die Völker vom wirtschaftlichen Standpunkt aus sich selbst genügen, da sie kulturell deutlich voneinander unterschiedene Einheiten darstellten, konnte ein Volk gedeihen, auch wenn sein Nachbar zugrunde gerichtet war. Heute müssen sich alle dessen bewusst werden, daß sich das Leben in jenem gewaltigen Netz abspielt, das alle Völker miteinander umfaßt. Sie müssen erkennen, daß wir es heute mit einer Weltwirtschaft zu tun haben, die weder blühen noch gedeihen kann, wenn Teile von ihr erkrankt sind, und auch die Befürchtung ist berechtigt, daß das moralische und soziale Elend, von dem ein beträchtlicher Teil der Menschheit ergriffen ist, gleich einer Epidemie auf die benachbarten Länder übergreift.

Der Krieg war vielleicht nichts als ein letzter Versuch, die Politik nach veralteten Gesichtspunkten zu lenken. Die Verwüstungen, die er mit sich brachte, sind eine furchtbare Warnung. Ein neuer Krieg würde angesichts der modernen Kampfmittel ohne Zweifel gleichbedeutend mit dem Ende Europas sein.

Statt Mißtrauen — Zielgleichheit.

An Stelle des einstigen Mißtrauens müßte erkannt werden, daß Deutschland und Frankreich, Teile eines Ganzen, in großem Maßstab identische Interessen besitzen und das Unglück des einen Landes nicht zum Glück des anderen werden könne. Ist es noch Zeit, diese neue Wahrheit zu lernen? Es ist notwendig, daß das Problem auf beiden Seiten von Regierungen in die Hand genommen werde, die wissen, was sie wollen, von weitblickenden Männern, die sich nicht von chauvinistischen Tendenzen hinreißen lassen und die bemüht sind, die öffentliche Meinung zu wandeln, selbst unter der Gefahr der Unpopularität. Wenn man die bisherige Politik fortsetzt, trägt man entweder zur wirtschaftlichen Vernichtung Deutschlands mit allen ihren sozialen und politischen Folgen bei oder man löst einen Ausbruch der Verzweiflung aus. Beide Eventualitäten werden nicht verschlen, auf Frankreich und die Welt überhaupt überzugreifen.

Will man die Haltung der beiden Völker zueinander entgiften, heißt es an der Ausgleiche der wirtschaftlichen Interessen, an der geistigen Annäherung, an dem Bekanntheit der beiden Völker zu arbeiten. Wird man den Willen zeigen? Ich hoffe es im Interesse Frankreichs und Deutschlands und im Interesse der zivilisierten Menschheit.

Wachdruck verboten.

Amerika und der Konflikt im Fernen Osten.

Einhaltung der Verträge — oberstes Prinzip.

Von Henry R. Stimson.

Amerikanischer Staatssekretär für Außenere.

Der Neun-Mächte-Vertrag bildet die legale Basis, auf der die „Politik der offenen Tür“ gegenüber China beruht. Die Grundsätze dieser Politik, von John Hay im Jahre 1899 ausgesprochen, beendeten den Streit zwischen verschiedenen Mächten wegen der sogenannten Interessensphären in China, der zur Festfesselung des Kaiserreiches zu führen drohte. Die beiden Hauptprinzipien waren: Gleiche Wirtschaftsvoraussetzungen für alle Länder, die mit China im Handelsverkehr stehen, und Wahrung der territorialen und administrativen Integrität Chinas.

Filz hat sich ganz von selbst mit kupfernen Solbi füllte, in dessen kein Betrüger nichts anderes tat, als etwas tiefer Atem zu ziehen. Welch ein Erwachen steht ihm bevor, wenn er, sich ermunternd, wird feststellen können, daß die ganze Arbeit bereits getan ist und er nun wirklich mit gutem Gewissen weitergehen kann. Fehlt nur noch, daß er sich am Abend, gegen Entgelt, an einer Razzia auf Bettler beteiligt.

Einen anderen, noch vollständigeren Bettler sah ich draußen, jenseits der Jalters, hinter San Sebastian, wohin ich gepilgert war, um die erst vor kurzem aufgefundenen Fresken von Guardi zu besichtigen. Aber die Kirche war versperrt und statt der Bilder bot sich mir ein anderes Bild. In dem schmalen steinernen Durchlaß zwischen dem Seitenkanal und der ihn begleitenden Häuserzeile sprang, zum Gaudium der an der Einfassung lehrenden und in den geöffneten Fenstern liegenden Zuschauermenge, ein alter Mannchen, mit närrischen Gebärden singend und tanzend und ein Stöckchen schwingend, hin und her. Das hurtige Greislein hatte messingfarbenes, sichtlich gefärbtes Haar und einen uralten Melonenhut, der normaler Weise einmal schwarz gewesen war, aber jetzt schon bedenklich blond zu werden begann, und es sang, wie es bei solchem Aussehen gar nicht anders möglich ist, lauter übermütige Lieder mit ausgelassenem Reiz. Wenn es mit einem von ihnen fertig war, hielt es inne, schwenkte das Melonenhütchen, kreuzte das Stöckchen und blickte erwartungsvoll zu den niederen Fenstern wie zu hohen Balkonen empor. Aber nicht die geringste Gabe wurde ihm zuteil, und wenn es, bevor er zum nächsten Gassenhauer aemlos lustig überging, den Lobdank der teilnahmslosen Mitwelt mit einem unverhohlenen höhnischen „Tante grazie!“ strahlte, so antwortete ihm nur ein erdumungsloses Gelächter, aber keinerlei Metallklang. Warum? Weil die Venezianer, wie Goethe ihnen unterstellt, so besonders „Arndel“, besonders grausam wären? Nein, sondern weil der Alte keine Stimme mehr hat. Nichts auf der Welt kann einen Venezianer bestimmen, einen Menschen, der schlecht singt, dafür auch noch



tiven Integrität Chinas. Für die auswärtige Politik Amerikas bedeuteten diese Grundsätze kein Novum, denn auf der gleichen Basis führte es seit vielen Jahren Verhandlungen mit auswärtigen Staaten. Aber in dem speziellen Falle Chinas galt es, eine Situation zu retten, welche die Entwicklung und Souveränität dieses großen asiatischen Volkes bedrohte und außerdem eine gefährliche, ständig wachsende Rivalität zwischen den Mächten veranlasste. Nach der Beendigung des Sino-japanischen Krieges legten sich drei Staaten ins Mittel, um zu verhindern, daß Japan irgendwelche Vorteile aus diesem Krieg einheimse, den es vom Japane gebrochen hatte. Auch andere Nationen bemühten sich, sie erhielten „Interessensphären“, und das Ergebnis war, daß in China ein Aufstand ausbrach, der die Seehandelschiffen in Peking in die Gefahr brachte. Der Aufstand war es, als John Hay die Grundsätze der Politik verkündete, welche den Mächten als Richtschnur dienen sollte.

Der Neun-Mächte-Vertrag.

Erst im Jahre 1922 wurde auf einer Konferenz, an der die Staaten mit Interesse im Pazifik teilnahmen, im Neun-Mächte-Vertrag die Grundlage für die künftige Politik festgelegt und klargestellt. In diesem Abkommen verpflichteten sich die Vertragspartner, die Souveränität, die territoriale und administrative Integrität Chinas zu wahren, China die uneingeschränkte Gelegenheit zu lassen, eine wirksame und stabile Regierung zu bilden, ferner ihren Einfluß dahin wirken zu lassen, daß das Prinzip der Gleichheit für Handel und Industrie aller Nationen innerhalb des chinesischen Territoriums aufrechterhalten werde. Schließlich sollten die Mächte kein Vorrecht anstreben, welche die Rechte von Angehörigen befremdeter Staaten schmälern und eine feindselige Haltung jenen Staaten gegenüber begünstigen könnten.

China versuchte in der Folge, eine republikanische Regierung zu schaffen, was die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Bemühungen vieler Jahre in Anspruch nahm. Die Fortschritte in dieser Richtung waren nur gering, und so

zu unterstützen. Nicht a, sondern die Kunst ist grausam, die ihm heilig ist.

Auch die Duse war Venezianerin und auch Asolo, wo sie begraben ist, liegt in Venedig, wenn auch schon weit drüben, auf dem Festland, am Rande des zum Brentatal hinabgleitenden Gebirges. Dort, inmitten eines uralten Schlossgebäudes des Kapells, in dem vor vierundzwanzig Jahren Jahrhundert Catarina Cornaro Hof gehalten hat, wird eben ein schmuckes kleines Theater eröffnet. Es heißt Teatro Eleonora Duse und ist aus Räumlichkeiten entstanden, die lange Jahre als Staatsgefängnis gedient haben. Eine Gebärde höherer Regierungsgewalt, die etwas milde Gewinnen des hat.

Asolo selbst, dessen Name wie Flötenstimm klingt, ist ein entzückendes kleines Bergstädtchen mit unverhältnismäßig großen Ausblicken und Gärten. Eine dieser Gärten heit Catarina Cornaro, eine andere Robert Browning, nach dem auch eine laubbedeckte Straße benannt ist. Dort, wo die Via Roberto Browning die unvermeidliche Via Roma schneidet, läßt ein venezianischer Brunnen seine Bergwasser nach den vier Weltgegenden sprühen. Ueber diesem Brunnen, in der sogenannten Bottiglieria, gleich rechts von der Bodentreppe, wohne ich in einem Zimmer, dessen Einrichtung nebst einem Bett nur noch aus zwei Sesseln, einem Beugel, einer hellblauen, edelgeformten Wasserkaraffe und handgroßen Wandschiffen besteht. Frühmorgens weckt mich eine Kinderstimme, die tief unten in den Empfangsräumen der Bottiglieria opernhell etwas von Puccini singt. Unmöglich, da weiterzuschlafen, zumal gleich darauf die Glocken vom nahen Campanile ertönen, deren melodischer Sturm sich zu mächtigen Harmonien steigert. Ich stoße, auf dem schon ausgelegten Ziegelfuß sitzend, die warmfühligen Fensterläden auf, und da dehnt sich zu meiner Linken zwischen Kirche und Municipio das Land Venedig, ein Hauch von Grün und Blau, traumhaft sonnig bis zum Meer hinunter. Hinter mir aber, in diesem morgendlichen Augenblick freilich

wurde der Neun-Mächte-Vertrag zu einem Versprechen der Selbstverleugung, gegeben von den Signatarmächten, da jede Stärkung der Entwicklung in China verträglich verhindert war. Man glaubte — und die ganze Entwicklung während der Politik der offenen Tür bestätigt diese Annahme —, daß nur unter dem Schutze eines solchen Abkommens den Interessen Chinas und auch der anderen Nationen gedient wäre. Außerdem war dieser Vertrag einer von den vielen, die auf der Washingtoner Konferenz geschlossen wurden. Ueber keines dieser Abkommen kann man hinweggehen, ohne damit das Gleichgewicht zu stören. Die Konferenz von Washington war im Grunde eine Abrüstungskonferenz, die die Friedensmöglichkeit in der Welt nicht nur durch Beseitigung der Seerüstungskonkurrenz, sondern auch durch Lösung verschiedener anderer, den Frieden bedrohender Probleme zu fördern suchte. Viele Probleme standen alle in einem gewissen Zusammenhang. Die Bereitwilligkeit Amerikas, z. B., seine führende Stellung in der Konstruktion von Kriegsschiffen aufzugeben, wurde von den Bestimmungen diktiert, die im Neun-Mächte-Vertrag eine Sicherung gegen die militärische Stärkung irgendeiner Macht auf Kosten Chinas bildeten. Man kann also nicht Maßnahmen des Neun-Mächte-Vertrages außer Kraft setzen, ohne nicht auch gleichzeitig die anderen Abmachungen einer Revision zu unterziehen.

Gewaltlose Beilegung von Konflikten.

Sechs Jahre nachher erfuhr die Politik, die darauf gerichtet ist, Angriffe einer stärkeren gegen eine schwächere Macht zu verhindern, eine mächtige Verstärkung durch den Pakt von Paris, dem fast alle Staaten der Erde angehören. Die beiden erwähnten Abkommen stellen den Weg zur Beilegung aller Streitigkeiten durch rechtliche und friedliche Mittel an Stelle willkürlicher Gewalt dar.

Der Schutz Chinas gegen jeden Angriff

von außen bildet einen wesentlichen Bestandteil jeder derartigen Entwicklung. Die Welt fühlt, daß das ordentliche und friedliche Gedeihen des 400-Millionen-Volkes der Chinesen für den Frieden und die Wohlfahrt der ganzen Welt unbedingt nötig ist.

Die kürzlichen Ereignisse in China, speziell die Feindseligkeiten in der Mandchurie und in Schanghai, sind weit davon entfernt, irgendeine Milderung der Verträge ratfam erscheinen zu lassen. Sie haben die vitale Bedeutung der Einhaltung der Verträge gezeigt.

Auf die Ursachen oder die Schuldfrage des Konfliktes soll nicht eingegangen werden, aber es ist klar, daß eine Situation geschaffen wurde, die unter gar keinen Umständen mit den Verpflichtungen dieser beiden Verträge in Einklang zu bringen ist. Eine solche Situation hätte niemals entstehen können, wenn die Verträge gewissenhaft beobachtet worden wären. Die Signatarmächte haben jedenfalls keinen Grund die Bestimmungen zu ändern. Uebrigens ist der wahre Wert der Einhaltung der Abkommen durch die Gefahren und Verluste aufgezeigt worden, denen die Niederlagen der einzelnen Staaten in Schanghai ausgesetzt waren. Die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten steht keinen Anlaß, die hohen Prinzipien im Stiche zu lassen, die in diesen Verträgen verkörpert sind. Unsere Ansicht ist, die Lage hätte vermieden werden können, wären die Klauseln richtig eingehalten worden.

Nichtanerkennung einer durch Vertragsbruch geschaffenen Lage.

Im Januar notifizierte unsere Regierung formell Japan und China, daß sie keine Lage anerkennen werde, die zwischen diesen beiden Staaten in Verletzung der Bestimmungen dieser Verträge eintreten würde, wenn die Rechte Amerikas oder seiner Staatsbürger in China dadurch berührt werden sollten.

Wenn eine ähnliche Entscheidung und eine ähnliche Stellungnahme der anderen

unsichtbar, liegt der Monte Grappa, Montello und das Plateau von Asiago...

Das Haus der Duse, in dem sie während des großen Krieges wohnte und ihre letzten Rollen für Amerika studierte, hat teil an dieser geschichtlichen Aussicht. Es ist verschlossen und gibt keine andere Auskunft als eine marmorne Steinplatte, die in vier Zeilen ein Lebens- und Wesensbild der Unvergleichlichen enthält. „Spätgeborene Tochter San Marcos“ wird sie da genannt, eine apparizione melodiosa ihr nachgerühmt. Die Worte, die sichtlich aus den Wortschranken d'Annunzios stammen, machen einiges, wenn auch nicht alles, gut, was er an dieser mater dolorosa der Liebe, dieser Assunta der Schauspielkunst, bei Lebzeiten gesündigt hat.

Ihr Grab, in königlicher Schlichtheit an das Grab Richard Wagners erinnernd, ist nichts als eine große Steinplatte, auf der nichts steht als ihr Name, und auch er kaum leserlich, denn immer liegen Blumen darauf, kein Lorbeer, keine immergrünen Kränze, nein, nur Blumen: Rosen, Nadeln, dunkelblaue Lilien. Niemand, erzählt man in Asolo, wußte zu sagen, wer diese Blüten brachte, aber sie wären immer da, Sommers und Winters immer die Fülle, immer frisch. Auch jetzt hauchen sie einen noch lebendigen Duft aus, den der vom besonnenen Monte Grappa herüberwehende Bergwind mit den traurigsten und kostbarsten Erinnerungen würzig mischt. Das Gesicht der Duse, unvergessen, unvergänglich, steigt daraus empor, dieses fast kindlich weiche, ganz Liebesausdruck gewordene Frauengesicht mit den herabgleitenden Mundwinkeln, den halbgeöffneten Augenlidern und, darüber, den schmerzhaft hoch emporgerückten Brauen. High-Brow sagen neuerdings die Engländer, und wo gibt es etwas im Bereich der Schauspielkunst aller Zeiten, das so High-Brow wäre wie die leider erklärte Kunst dieser allerhöchsten Schauspielerei? Was nicht hindert, daß, lebte die Duse heute noch, Marlene Dietrich die weitest berühmteste wäre.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(e) and 5(u) or (g)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By: M. J. O. S. NARS, date 12-18-75

0861

Warum Einfuhrbeschränkungen?

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^{*)} Wo klar-Preise angegeben, sind kleine Packungen entsprechend billiger erhältlich.

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Regierungen erfolgte, dann käme ein solches Vorgehen einem Einbruch gegen die Legalität jedesweden Ziels oder jedes Rechtes gleich, das durch Freistoff oder Vertragsverletzung zu erhalten gesucht wird.

Die amerikanische Regierung als eine der führenden im Pazifik hat ihre Politik darauf aufgebaut, an die Zukunft des chinesischen Volkes zu glauben, bei Verhandlungen mit diesem Lande am Prinzip des Fair play, der Gebuld und des gegenseitigen guten Willens festzuhalten. Wir stimmen mit den Staatsmännern überein, welche die Nationen auf der Konferenz zu Washington vertreten und die anerkannten, daß China auf die nötige Zeit Anspruch habe, seine Entwicklung zu vollenden. Diese unsere Politik wollen wir auch für die Zukunft einschlagen. Philipp Gaiger.

Vor den großen Konferenzen.

England am Vorabend von Lausanne, Genf und Ottawa.

Von Stanley Baldwin.
Forb. Präsident des Geheimen Rates,
früherer Premierminister.

London, 12. Mai.

Das britische Ansehen ist wieder voll und ganz hergestellt. Die Not wird natürlich nicht in einem Augenblick behoben werden, aber man ist auf dem rechten Weg. Ein neuer Geist der Hoffnung und der Zuversicht hat sich verbreitet und, was sehr bemerkenswert ist, England genießt wieder das Vertrauen bei den anderen Nationen, daß es bei allen Fehlern das sicherste und gefestigste Land der heutigen Welt ist.

Was wir seit dem letzten August erlebt haben, kann heute nicht als etwas Ungewöhnliches angesehen werden. Das Ungewöhnliche ist, wie das britische Volk sich dazu stellte. Das ist es auch, was uns Prestige wieder hergestellt und uns befähigt hat, unsere Position wieder zu erobern, das ist es, was bewirkt, daß das ausländische Geld, das in der Panik des letzten Sommers zurückgezogen wurde, wieder nach England strömt. Die Überzeugung der Welt beigetragen zu haben, rechtfertigt allein die Existenz der jetzigen britischen Regierung.

Ein besonderer Zug in diesen Tagen des Unheils ist die Art, wie der innere Wert des Pfundes aufrechterhalten wurde. Man hat uns gesagt, daß die Preise steigen würden, aber das war nicht der Fall. Es hat wahrscheinlich keine Zeit gegeben, in der die Detailpreise der meisten lebensnotwendigen Waren niedriger waren als jetzt. Was die Zollfrage betrifft, so wird diese nur nach der Wirkung der neuen Gezehe beurteilt werden können. Ich bin froh, daß wir aus der akademischen Diskussion herausgekommen sind. Geht die Sache gut, so wird das neue System so lange erhalten bleiben, als es sich als vorteilhaft erweist. Wenn es verfehlt, wird man es ändern.

Ich habe immer Schutts für England gewünscht, habe aber dabei doch stets eingesehen, wie jeder vorteilhafte Versuch das einsehen muß, daß die Zersplitterung

Europas in kleine, abgeschlossene Einheiten mit hohen Zollmauern, dieser Zustand, der sich seit dem Kriege um so viel verschärft hat, ein schweres Hindernis für den Handel darstellt. Ich war immer überzeugt, daß die Europäer, solange der englische Markt der ganzen Welt offenstand, sich weigern würden, die Frage der Herabsetzung ihrer Zölle in Erwägung zu ziehen. Europa fängt aber nun an, zu begreifen, daß seine fiskalischen Einheiten zu klein sind, als daß sie unter einem hohen Schuttsystem zu leben und zu gedeihen vermöchten. Eben weil diese Einsicht langsam die Nationen Europas durchdringt, ist auch der Wunsch entstanden, irgendeine Art von wirtschaftlicher Föderation unter den Staaten des Donaugebietes zu bilden.

Die Reichskonferenz von Ottawa.

Das allgemeine Streben ist heute auf die Schaffung größerer ökonomischer Einheiten gerichtet. Das ist der natürliche Gang der Evolution, und um ihn zu fördern, gehen wir im Juli nach Ottawa.

Ich hoffe, daß diese Konferenz die Grundlagen zu einer viel engeren wirtschaftlichen Einheit des britischen Reiches legen wird, als sie heute besteht. Wir stehen wirklich und wahrhaftig an einem Kreuzweg. Wir müssen entweder auf dem Weg zur ökonomischen Union vorwärtsgen oder einen anderen Weg einschlagen. Die ist eine Konferenz abgehalten worden, die größere Gelegenheiten bietet. Die natürliche Bestimmung unseres Landes ist die ökonomische Einheit mit unserem eigenen Fleiß und Blut. Wenn das nicht erreicht zu werden vermag, dann kann es wohl sein, daß wir uns nach Europa wenden müssen. Die einzelnen Teile des britischen Reiches könnten, wenn sie nicht zu dieser engeren Vereinigung untereinander gelangen, durch die wirtschaftlichen Interessen in einem halben Jahrhundert weit von denen weggetrieben werden, die jetzt ihre Brüder sind.

Englands Mitarbeit im Kampf gegen die Weltkrise.

Die nationale Regierung hat gut gearbeitet. Es gibt keine Frage, die nicht studiert und erwogen wurde. Die Mäe, unter denen wir leben, betreffen jedoch nur unsere eigenen Schwierigkeiten. Sie sind Weltweite, und so lange im Weltbanbel keine Besserung eintritt, können wir auch in unserem Land nicht wirklich weiterkommen. Die niedrigen Preise sind hauptsächlich durch den entsetzlichen finanziellen Zustand der Welt verursacht, dieser aber kann nur durch aufrichtige und vernünftige Zusammenarbeit der Nationen der Welt gebessert werden. In Lausanne wird zunächst die Frage der Reparationen zur Untersuchung und neuen Prüfung gelangen. Ferner soll die Donaukonferenz abgehalten werden. Die Zeit ist also voll von Problemen, die zeitweilig unlösbar scheinen und die wir jedenfalls nicht allein lösen können.

Aber alles, was wir durch eingehende Beschäftigung mit diesen Fragen, durch den Eifer in der Zusammenarbeit und durch guten Willen dazu tun können, wird von der britischen Regierung im Interesse der Prosperität der ganzen Welt getan werden.

Recht und Leben.

Die Notwendigkeit der Schuldenscheidung.

Von Joseph Galkaus.

Früherer Ministerpräsident.

Paris 12. Mai.

Wenn ich diese beiden Worte als Titel über meinen Artikel lege, so beabsichtige ich nicht, die beiden Begriffe als Gegensätze einander gegenüberzustellen; ich möchte im Gegenteil nach Mitteln suchen, um in der großen Debatte, die durch die Weltereignisse herbeigeführt wird, den Begriff des Rechtes und die Notwendigkeiten des Lebens miteinander zu vereinbaren. Vom Standpunkt des Rechtes ist die Position derer, die eine uneingeschränkte Anwendung der Verträge über Reparationen und interalliierte Schulden fordern, sehr stark. Wenn die Deutschen von einem Diktat sprechen, so vergessen sie, daß der Young-Plan in voller Freiheit diskutiert und von ihrem bevollmächtigten Vertreter unterzeichnet wurde. Es ist müßig, wie es heute jenseits des Rheins geschieht, die angebliche Gleichwertigkeit der Summen, die ausgezahlt wurden, und der Ausgaben für den Wiederaufbau der befreiten Gebiete als Argument anzuführen. Das hat nichts zu bedeuten, denn man muß festhalten, daß weder die diplomatischen Akten noch die wiederholten Debatten, die dieses ungeheure Problem hervorgerufen hat, diese Parallele rechtfertigen, die plötzlich in den gegnerischen Blättern aufgetaucht ist. Zwar sind ohne Zweifel die Bestimmungen der diplomatischen Dokumente im Laufe der zahlreichen Konferenzen, die mit Spa begannen, zerstückelt worden; man ging von einem ungefähren Ueberschlag zum anderen. Das hindert aber nicht, daß der letzte dieser Ueberschläge — der Young-Plan — die Gesamtheit der Rechte der Vierten einschließt und daß man an diesem im Haag, ich wiederhole, einverständlich festgesetzten Ziffern keine Abstriche machen kann, auch nicht mit dem Argument einer hypothetischen Wechselbeziehung zwischen den materiellen Schäden und den Summen, die sich in den insofern zustandbegekommenen Abmachungen eingezeichnet finden.

Keine Luftschlösser!

Aber das Recht ist nicht das Leben. Und das Leben stellt folgende Fragen:

It is möglich, ein Europa aufzubauen oder auch nur zu dem Zustand eines halben Gleichgewichts zurückzukommen, in dem der alte Kontinent sich vor der Katastrophe befindet, wenn man sich an die Wiederaufbau der Schulden von Volk zu Volk klammert?

It is in der Periode der Erichütterung, die wir durchmachen, auch nur möglich, die Uebertragung der Summen, welche die Ausführung der eingegangenen Verpflichtungen erfordert, zu verwirklichen? Jeder wird zugestehen, daß es reine Luftschlösser sind, bei dem gegenwärtigen Stand der Dinge, im Augenblick, da die Kriege den Fluß des Kapitals verstopfen, von Geldeüberweisungen zwischen den Nationen zu träumen.

Manche aber werden einwenden, daß der Young-Plan wieder aufleben kann, wenn die ärgste Not vorüber ist. Sie geben sich, meiner Meinung nach, Illusionen hin. Ich werde versuchen, das klarzulegen.

Als die letzte zwischen den Regierungen abgeschlossene Vereinbarung vom Senat geprüft wurde, habe ich erklärt, daß die Mechanik des Systems, um mit Saint-Simon zu sprechen, nur so weit funktionieren könne, als Amerika Deutschland alimentiere. Ich umschrieb meinen Gedanken genauer, indem ich sagte, daß es nur zwei Wege für ein Land gibt, eine Schuld abzutragen, die jenseits seiner Grenzen zahlbar ist: Waren zu liefern oder Gelbmetze zu übermitteln. Da der übermäßige Protektionismus, der in der Welt machet, den ersten Weg unmöglich macht, bleibe nur die zweite Methode. Diese aber beruhte auf fortgesetzten Zuschüssen der Vereinigten Staaten an Deutschland. Ich gab damals zu verstehen, daß im Laufe der Jahre die deutschen Ertragsarten langsam die Hypothek auf den Besitz der Nation löschen könnten, so daß unsere Nachbarn in einer längeren oder kürzeren Periode, je nach Gut und Gabe des Schicksals, in der Lage wären, den Vorstoß zu tilgen, den die Gläubiger der Neuen Welt ihnen gewährten. Nur unter diesen Umständen könnte der Young-Plan funktionieren, dessen Schaffung an Stelle des Dawes-Planes und der Naturalzahlungen, die ich weit vorteilhafter fand, ich bewaurete.

Die Dinge haben sich durch mehrere Jahre so abgespielt, wie ich es vorhergesagt hatte. Aber die Kriege sind gekommen und hat den Goldstrom aus den Vereinigten Staaten nach Deutschland abgeschnitten. Sie hat für einen Zeitraum, den ich nicht als unbegrenzt zu bezeichnen wage, von dem ich aber überzeugt bin, daß er sehr lang sein wird, jeden Gedanken der Rückkehr amerikanischen Kapitals nach Deutschland verhindert. Seitdem gibt es nur ein Mittel, um Europa frei zu machen: die Neue Welt mit Lebensmitteln und Fertigwaren aus unserem Kontinent zu überschwemmen. Aber wer wird nicht bei der Perspektive derartiger Möglichkeiten die Achseln zucken?

Amerika muß nachgeben.

Die Welt befindet sich also in einer Sackgasse. Sie kann nur herausfinden, wenn sie mit dem Schwamm über die Tafel der Schulden von Volk zu Volk fährt.

Ich unterschätze die Macht des Widerstandes gewiß nicht, der sich von der anderen Seite des Atlantik dieser Lösung entgegenstellt. Ich vertraue aber darauf, daß

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(U) or (S)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By: William D. Shaw/JFK
NARS, Date: 12-18-75

0866

England, wenn es die Sache Europas in die Hand nehmen will, imstande sein wird, die Vereinigten Staaten von der Schwäche ihrer Position zu überzeugen, nämlich von der Schädlichkeit ihrer Forderungen. Es wird ihnen vorstellen, daß von dem Moment, in dem die amerikanischen Staatsbürger wieder die Gelbungen, die ihnen so wenig schmecken, und die sie noch Jahre und Jahre verlangen müssen, zurücklegen, noch die hohen Zollmauern, die sie errichtet haben, niederlegen wollen, die Welt zuerst einen Damm gegen jede Uebertragung von Reichthümern aus der Alten in die Neue Welt bildet. Sich an theoretische Rechte anklammern, kann kein anderes Resultat haben, als die Verdrängung der Welt, die physiologische Unordnung in der Welt zu vergrößern. Damit aber würde nur die Krise vergrößert, unter der die Vereinigten Staaten ebenso oder vielleicht noch mehr leiden als die anderen großen Staaten.

Die notwendigen Ingeklärtheiten Frankreichs.

Um sie instand zu setzen, in Washington erfolgreich aufzutreten, werden unsere Freunde jenseits des Kanals wahrscheinlich von uns verlangen, daß wir auf die Reparationen, die uns nach dem Young-Plan zustimmen, verzichten.

Wir können das ablehnen, das Recht ist auf unserer Seite. Aber noch einmal, ihm gegenüber steht das Leben. Wenn wir ein Europa schaffen oder wieder zum Leben erwecken wollen, müssen wir begreifen, daß wir uns nicht in ein Gewölbe von Dokumenten einmauern können, welche die Zeit und die Ereignisse zerbröckeln.

Das Interesse Frankreichs, das mit dem des europäischen Kontinents verknüpft ist, weist uns auf eine Anpassung, auf Formeln der Nachgiebigkeit, die dabei eine vernünftige Entschädigung für unsere Ingeklärtheiten vorzulegen, Vermittlung und Berechtigung, denn Deutschland, das dem vollständig von allen ausländischen Schulden befreit wurde und seine Zahlreiche dank der durch den Young-Plan angeordneten Kapitalien leicht auszufüllen vermochte, würde sich sonst in einer günstigeren Position befinden als alle seine Rivale. Es könnte sich dabei nicht darum handeln, Zahlungen fortzusetzen, deren Schädlichkeit nicht zweifelhaft zu werden braucht. Aber in verschiedenen Formen, zwischen denen man die freie Wahl hätte, müßte man wirtschaftliche Vereinbarungen treffen, welche die Relationen schärfen, die sich nicht einer Schädigung durch ihre Erhöhung ausweichen können. (Die deutsche Auffassung über diese Frage ist zuletzt an dieser Stelle in einem Artikel des französischen Reichsgeheimrates Dr. Camille Barthelemy zu finden. S. 2. A.)

Den Entscheidungen entgegen.

Die Weltlage zu Pfingsten 1932.

Von Dr. Albert Engel Apponyi.

Österreich, Budapest, 12. Mai.

Es ist nicht leicht, unter diesem Titel etwas klar zu schreiben, denn Konflikte selbst, Konflikte aus dem internationalen Gebiet — womit nicht gesagt sein soll, daß es in den inneren Verhältnissen der meisten Staaten wesentlich anders liegt. Nachdrücklicher Meinung hat in seiner jüngsten Ansprache an die Vertreter der Presse die Darle dieser heftigen Veränderungen treffend begründet; es ist das in seiner Grundkonzeption verdrängte sogenannte „Kriegswort“ von Versailles, und was sich daran knüpft, ein Werk von Radschlag, Hoff und Begeisterung eingegeben — wie es wohl nach der Jahren Weltkrieg kaum anders sein könnte, mit dem Grundgedanken, die Vorfälle für immer ungeschädlich zu machen und den Siegern alles zugutebringen, was die momentanen Nachbesserungen zu nehmen gelassen, ohne Rücksicht auf die natürlichen Grundlagen der Völkerordnung, auf die organischen, naturgemäßen, materiellen sowie moralischen Bedürfnisse der Völker also: ein künstliches, auf künstliche Machtkombinationen gestütztes, von den bekannten natürlichen Kräften fortwährend unterminiertes, künstliches Gebäude, dessen Zusammenbruch früher oder später unvermeidlich ist und katastrophalen Folgen haben kann, wenn nicht rechtzeitig die gesunde Vernunft in bewußter Weise die notwendigen Korrekturen vornimmt. Was wir heute sehen, ist der Beginn der Weltordnung — leider noch nicht, meinetwegen in hinreichender Weise nicht, des Grundgedankens zu bester Einfachheit.

Die Ungleichheit des Hauptbühnen in der heutigen Staatengesellschaft.

Also „In bunten Wäldern wenig Klarheit, viel Irrtum und ein wenig Wahrheit“, so wird allerdings der heutige Zustand genannt, ob es aber „aufgebaut“, ist freilich eine andere Frage. Es ist gewiss, daß in der Welt eine sogenannte Abklärungskonferenz, der Völkerbund ergänzt durch die Vereinigten Staaten, Sowjetrußland, die Türkei, Brasilien, Argentinien, kurz: eine wirkliche Weltkonferenz, welche selbst bezüglich ihrer konkreten Aufgabe nicht recht vom Platz kommt. Dies hat seinen Grund nur zum Teil in der komplizierten Natur dieser Aufgabe, das größte Hindernis liegt in der fundamental verfehlenden Auffassung von zwei Stützpunkten, der einen, die wirklich überwinden will, der anderen, die es im Grunde nicht will, der einen, welche die Gleichheit der Völkerwelt aller

Wieder das Richtige!

Seide

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Vorverkauf Wochenendfahrt ins Waldtal, 21. bis 22. Mai, 1932, 1 1 80, a
Vorverkauf Toppleinbildung

Höher als Grundprinzip der Völkergemeinschaft anerkennt, der anderen, welche an der Permanenz der Ungleichheit zwischen Siegern und Besiegten des Weltkrieges, völliger Einseitigkeit der letzteren bei Bewaffnung der letzteren selbst. Solange es nicht, eine Ueberwindung der Gegensätze zu finden, ist die Konzeption zum Vorschein verurteilt, als Resultat würde ich dann naturgemäß eine gegenseitige gegenseitige Verkleinerung ergeben, die den Völkerbund mehr und mehr zur Fiktion jauchenden ließe. Ich würde dies auf das tiefste bedauern; die Verantwortung würde aber jene Mächte treffen, welche durch Selbsthalten an den Fundamentalkriterien der Friedensverträge, ja durch ihre Ausübung, diese Verantwortung, zum Vorschein gebracht, den Völkerbund in die Lage versetzt hätten, eine moralische Verpflichtung bezüglich der allgemeinen Abrüstung nicht erfüllen zu können.

Die internationalen Konferenzen der nächsten Zeit.

Wie sich nun das gefallene wird, läßt sich aber heute, wie wir doch an A. Gerngroß der Entscheidungen, durchwegs nicht voraussehen, da die mittlerweile gefallenen Entscheidungen in ihren Folgen noch nicht zu übersehen sind. Wird die Verdrängung nach links in der französischen Kammer jenen Gegenstand hindern, der, wie vorher erwähnt, den eigentlichen Kern der Abrüstungsfrage bildet? Es gehört viel Optimismus dazu, es anzunehmen. Auch die Weigerung Brains in dem Wasserfälle, Frankreich eine entsprechende Antwort finden, um das Verdrängen der Hitler-Partei bei den preussischen Wahlen weitzumachen? Was bedeutet im Grunde dieses Verdrängen? Was die Sympathien, die ihm ein Teil der italienischen Presse in Verbindung mit gütlicher Deutschfreundlichkeit beizugeht? Einmal Amerika scheint entschlossen zu sein, einen Erfolg der Abrüstungskonferenz herbeizuführen, weil es für die große Republik eine Briefwechselfrage ist, daß sich Eingreifen sich als entscheidend erweist und der Ausgang dieses ersten großen Kooperationsvertrages mit dem Völkerbund auf die bevorstehende Präsidentenwahl gewiss nicht ohne Einfluß sein wird. Es ist aber fraglich, ob das, was etwa die amerikanischen öffentlichen Meinung als „Erfolg“ angesehen werden kann, vom europäischen Standpunkt — und die Frage ist eine rechtlich europäische — auch wirklich ein Erfolg sein wird.

Ausgleich mit der Abrüstungskonferenz hält aber auch die Völkerbundesversammlung eine außerordentliche Tagung, den Ereignissen im Fernen Osten gewidmet, durch den Sturz eines Bundeslandes veranlaßt, vom Ereignissen hervorgerufen, die vielleicht Vorboten eines Weltkrieges sein und berechneter Tagung. Es ist für die Zukunft der weissen Rasse kein Mangel, gleichwohl, ob sie zur japanischen Weltmacht oder zur europäischen Generation des in einem unklaren, unruhig inspirierten, anarchisch gemachten Uebergangs Stadium befinden, daher momentan hilflosen, hilflosen des Volkes führt. Hat der Völkerbund genug moralisches, ja in den Fernen Osten wirkendes moralisches Gewicht, um dieser Alternative zu weichen? In der Episode von Shanghai scheint er einen Erfolg verzeichnen zu können; aber was diese Episode nicht wirklich nur ein taktischer Schritt, damit sich, während man darum herumtortelt, in der Mandchurie hemmungslos vollende Tatfachen geschehen werden?

Zusammenhang zwischen den politischen und den wirtschaftlichen Problemen.

Alles dies wird aber an unmittelbar entscheidender Bedeutung von den großen Finanz- und Wirtschaftsproblemen übertrifft, mit denen die europäische Kulturwelt — sogar auch Amerika gehört — einen Kampf auf Leben und Tod auszufechten hat und in denen, Tagen wie es gerade heute, die Verfahrensweise, die Weltlichkeit, die Unfähigkeit, zur Zeit noch größer ist, als auf dem Gebiet der früher betrachteten politischen Probleme. Doch wir nur alle zusammen gerettet werden können oder alle zusammen zugrunde gehen müssen, der eine früher, der andere später, aber jedenfalls alle, wird theoretisch ausgeschlossen, aber nirgends findet sich Willigkeit und Entschlossenheit genug, daraus praktisch die Folgen zu ziehen. Die heile politische Vermutung, welche die Friedensverträge in Europa angedichtet haben, und die daraus sich ergebenden Reibschmerzen verhindern jene Entpolisierung der Wirtschaftsprobleme, ohne die meines Erachtens eine Rehabilitation unmöglich ist. Und doch in u. u. auf diesem Gebiet Entscheidendes geschehen. Der Vorteil dabei ist, daß der gegen die Weltwirtschaft. Es ist nicht Genugtuung, es ist nur richtige Erkenntnis ihrer eigenen Interessen, die ihnen da zugewandt wird.

Unser Preisausschreiben für die beste Karikatur.

Wir veröffentlichen auf Seite 13 eine uns aus Anlaß unseres Preisausschreibens für die beste Karikatur zugekommene Zeichnung.

Lausanne und die Entschlossenheit Amerikas in der Kriegsschuldenfrage werden uns zeigen, woran wir sind; es wird symptomatisch dafür sein, ob die Weltöffentlichkeit das ist, auf welche sich das technische Weltungs-werk aufbauen läßt.

DOCTESTED: S.O. 11522, Soc. 3(15) and 5(10) or (5)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By: Milton D. O'Brien, JAMS, Date: 12-18-75

0867

Außer den beiden sichtbaren gibt es zwei unsichtbare Klassen von Menschen, die sich in diesem Klassenlosen (A. Ann. d. Red.) Staat von der Menge unterscheiden.

Die ersten, die Kommunisten, bilden zwar keineswegs einen Orden, wie immer wiederholt wird, sie erkennen einander nicht wie die Freimaurer oder die Homosexuellen am Handschlag, aber sie bilden doch eine Art Aristokratie ohne äußere Zeichen. Es sollen heute zwei Millionen Männer und Frauen in der Sowjetunion der Partei angehören, wozu aber drei Millionen Jugendliche treten, die ihr morgen angehören werden.

Dieses Selbstgefühl, zur regierenden Partei zu gehören, wird teuer erkauft. Ihr Arbeitstag hat meist vierzehn Stunden, denn nach Schluß ihrer Werkstatt beginnt erst die sogenannte „freiwillige“ soziale Aufgabe. Jeden Augenblick müssen sie bereit sein, irgendwohin zu reisen, etwa um die Einbringung des Getreides zu überwachen, und sie sind bei solchen Fahrten zuweilen erschlagen worden. Da eigentlich jeder Erwachsene verheiratet ist — denn es ist nicht teuer, sondern billiger, zu zweit zu arbeiten und zu wirtschaften, und die Ehegattung ist wie die Scheidung sehr erleichtert — so ist der Anspruch des Staates an das Parteimitglied schwerer zu erfüllen als der des Vatikans an einen seiner Priester. Solchen Extrararbeiten, Aufträgen und Entbehrungen stehen keine materiellen Vorteile gegenüber, im Gegenteil, bis vor wenigen Wochen durfte ein Kommunist nur ein bestimmtes Maximum verdienen. Ihm bleibt nichts als das Hochgefühl, zur herrschenden Klasse zu gehören, wie einst dem armen preussischen Offizier.

Die zweite Gruppe, das sind die Regierenden, meist, aber nicht durchwegs Kommunisten. Der Zugang zur Partei ist erschwert, das Mißtrauen gegen bürgerliche Abstammung ist groß, daß selbst Männer wie Tschitscherin und Krasin erst nach vielen Jahren in das Zentralkomitee der Partei aufgenommen worden sind. Diese Männer, die in der Leitung entweder der Partei oder des Staates ihr Leben verbringen, führen das aufreibendste Leben, und während man bei uns lesen kann, daß sie täglich von den goldenen Tellern des Partendienstes im Kreml ihre glänzenden Mahlzeiten gemeinsam abhalten, habe ich einen oder den anderen gesehen, wie er an seinem Schreibtisch irgendein warmes Gericht verzehrte, das ihm die Sekretärin brachte.

Einen Ministerialdirektor sah ich von seiner Arbeit aus direkt am Abend in einem Vorort mit der Tramway fahren, um dort vor 3000 Arbeitern einer Fabrik über ein aktuelles Thema seines Ressorts vorzutragen. Als ich ihm von der Oper erzählte, sagte er: „Ich komme nie hin, denn nach der Reihe zwei Wochen vorher Plätze bestellen wie die anderen kann ich nicht, weil immer etwas dazwischen kommen kann, und zum Kaufe zu Kassenpreisen sind die Karten für mich zu teuer.“ Im Wohnen sind sie bevorzugt, denn während ich sie vor sechs Jahren in den dunklen Dienerräumen des Kremls haufen sah, wohnen die meisten jetzt in dem wohlstehenden Reichenbau an der großen Brücke und haben vielfach schon vier statt zwei Zimmer. Auch haben sich die Volkskommissare für den Sommer kleine Häuschen vor der Stadt gesichert, sind also summegeß bevorzugt.

Ihre Bedürfnisse scheinen so gering geblieben, wie sie waren, denn viele sind, so wie der Kriegsminister, Grubenarbeiter gewesen, die mit 16 Jahren in die illegale Partei eintraten, und bei der erschütternden Offenheit, bei dieser Ährenlosigkeit des gemeinschaftlichen Lebens, könnte keiner im geheimen das genießen, was den anderen fehlt. Zugleich sind sie beständig bedroht, ihr Amt ohne Gründe zu verlieren und wie die Generalsstabsoffiziere der alten preussischen Armee plötzlich „in die Linie“, das heißt irgendwohin aufs Land zu erneuertem Studium der Realitäten verlegt zu werden. Diese Disziplin ist furchtbar: Tschitscherin, der ein Jahrzehnt lang die äußere Politik des Landes mit größtem Geschick geleitet hat, verschwand von heute auf morgen mit einer Notiz von zwei Zeilen im Regierungsblatt, ohne Nachruf, ohne Würdigung, erhielt eine kleine Wohnung, bewirtet sich aber heute vergeblich um die Stelle eines Bibliothekars; und Sinowjew, der als einer der berühmtesten Vorkämpfer glaubte, Lenins Erbe zu werden, verfertigt heute Rechenschaftsbücher für die Schulen.

Denn die Furcht und nicht die Not ist das große Negativum dieses wie jedes diktatorischen Regiments.

Die Not liegt nirgends in Mahrung und Kleidung, sie liegt nur im Wohnen, und umfaßt daher nicht viel Prozent der Bürger, denn es gibt nur wenige Städte in Rußland, und Moskau, das von 1.8 auf 2.8 Millionen angewachsen ist, muß um schlimmen daran sein. Nach dieser täglichen Spannung, die nun schon 14 Jahre beinahe dauernd anhält, müßte der Mensch eine heitere oder mindestens stille, abgeschlossene Stätte abends vorfinden. Da aber alles Geld in die Produktion geworfen wird und erst der zweite Fünfjahresplan, der im Jahre 1933 beginnt, stärker der Konjunktur dienen soll, wird eine halbe Generation vorher wahrhaft verbraucht. Ja, es ist eine ganze, denn auch die heute Dreißigjährigen scheinen geistig und körperlich abgekämpft, die Zwanzigjährigen aber strahlen von Hoffnung und Selbstgefühl.

Vielleicht ergreift uns Besucher das Opfer dieser Menschen stärker als sie selber, denn da sie nichts anderes zum Vergleiche vor sich sehen, erscheint es ihnen gar nicht so furchtbar, daß in sechs Zimmern 22 Personen schlafen, wie ich es sah, aber daß geheime Eheleute mangels Wohnung im selben Zimmer weiter hausen müssen und sich durch Schränke auf eine tragische Weise zu trennen suchen. Diese Umstände, die heute nicht besser sind als vor sechs Jahren, zerstören das Leben der Familien weit mehr als Theorie und Praxis der Marxisten; sie gefährden die tiefsten Gefühle. Kürzlich wurde einer von zwei Freunden, die zusammen ein Zimmer bewohnten, plötzlich verhaftet; als er nach drei Wochen wiederkam, stellte er den anderen zur Rede: „Das, was ihren Verdacht erweckt hat, ruhest du; kein anderer kann es ihnen gesagt haben.“

Ja, ich tat es. Ich wußte, daß dir nichts geschehen kann, daß du aus der Sache unschuldig herauskommst, aber ich mußte einmal ein paar Wochen allein sein. Deshalb geizte ich dich an.“

(Weitere Artikel folgen.)

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Wodurch entsteht das Leben?

Das Geheimnis des Atoms und der Zelle.

Von Fritz von Strass.

Direktor der physikalischen und X-Strahlen-
Sektion der Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris.
(Aus einem Vortrag.)

Paris, im Mai.

Unsere Epoche steht im Zeichen des Fortschrittes der Wissenschaften. Kaum je zuvor in der Geschichte war wissenschaftliche Forschung so fruchtbar an Ergebnissen wie jetzt. In manchen Zeiten ist der Pfad des Physikers, Chemikers oder anderer wissenschaftlicher Forscher mit Hindernissen so verlegt, daß kein sichtbarer Fortschritt erzielt wird. Auch vor dem Kriege gab es eine solche Periode — nach den zehn Jahren wunderbarer Tätigkeit, die auf die Entdeckungen Lord Rutherford's, Sir William Bragg's und Curie's gefolgt waren. Diese Zeit, in der man sich mit aller Kräfteanstrengung kaum einen Weg bahnen konnte, ist nun überwunden. Es geht uns wie den Schatzgräbern, die nach langen Jahren vergeblicher Mühe plötzlich auf Gold stoßen.

Ellen Sie zur „Glückstelle Stein“!

Am 8. April wieder die große Prämie der
Kassenlotterie S 500.000, sowie viele große
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Tel. U-21-5-45 Serie „Glückstelle Stein“,
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Über die „Hohe Brücke“ führt der Weg zum Glück!

Wir haben allen Grund, anzunehmen, daß die
Physik in den nächsten Jahren rapide
Fortschritte machen wird. Wir haben auf dem
Gebiete der Wissenschaft von den Atomen beste Resultate
erzielt. Hier muß sich der wissenschaftliche Forscher nun mit
etwas beschäftigen, was noch so gut wie unerkannt ist: mit
dem Studium des Atomkernes. Diese Aufgabe ist eine
natürliche Folge der Phänomene, die durch die Radio-
aktivität aufgedeckt worden sind.

Explosionen im Atom.

Die Atome im Radium sind instabil
und explosiv. Wir können diese Explosionen nicht
kontrollieren und aus diesen Atomen nicht auf die stabilen
Atome schließen. Wenn wir die stabilen Atome in derselben

Weise wie die instabilen aufbrechen könnten, wären wir
um einen wichtigen Schritt vorwärts gekommen. Dieses
Problem liegt vor uns, früher oder später muß es gelöst
werden. Die Experimente mit instabilen Atomen haben
dank der Radioaktivität sehr wertvolle Erfolge gebracht.
Das unmittelbare Ergebnis des Werkes von Lord Ruther-
ford und seiner Schule war die Auflösung der un-
stabilen Atome durch die Emission von Alpha-Partikeln. Wir haben diese
Methode mit sehr ermutigendem Erfolg benützt.

Die moderne Physik hat die Struktur der
Materie auf zwei hauptsächlichste Elemente
zurückgeführt: die Protonen oder elemen-
taren positiven Ladungen und die Elektronen
oder elementaren negativen Ladungen, zu
denen wir die mysteriösen Lichtquanten
hinzufügen müssen. Es gibt noch zahlreiche
dunkle Punkte, die mit Rücksicht auf diese
Urelemente der Durchleuchtung harren.

Materie und Licht.

Eines der grundlegenden Phänomene der Natur ist
die Wirkung des Lichtes auf die Materie. Ausstrahlung
der Elektronen und vielleicht auch die Trennung
des Kernes der Atome, wo es sich um Kurz-
wellen handelt, wird dadurch verursacht. Wir sind dank
einer Reihe von Theorien imstande, mehr oder weniger
genau voranzuschauen, was geschieht oder geschehen sollte.
Aber wir sind bis jetzt unfähig, das Geheimnis zu erklären,
wie diese sehr wichtigen Wechselwirkungen
zwischen Licht und Materie zustandekommen.

Kriegsbestialität und Wissenschaft.

Später einmal, wenn die Vorstellungen über die träge
Materie weniger nebelhaft sein werden, dürften die Forscher
nach der Meinung vieler Forscher — ich selbst neige zu
dieser Anschauung — ihre Aufmerksamkeit der Bio-
logie zuwenden. Wenn uns die Zusammenhänge der
Zellen ebenso genau bekannt wäre wie jene der Atome, so
könnten wir über das Phänomen „Leben“ Wichtiges
feststellen. Doch wird es gewiß nicht möglich sein, dieses
Ergebnis früher als nach einigen Generationen zu erreichen.
Und auch dann nur, wenn nicht die Menschheit bis dahin
durch einen neuen Krieg — der mit unentrinnbarer Not-
wendigkeit ein Gas-Krieg wäre — Selbstmord begeht.

Es ist schwer, Fortschritte der Wissen-
schaft auf lange Zeit vorauszuzeigen, weil
es noch nicht gelungen ist, die Menschheit
von der bestialischen Scheußlichkeit des
Krieges zu befreien. Die Wissenschaft kann
Großes vollbringen, wenn ihr die Völker
Zeit dazu lassen. Die Gelehrten wirken für
das Heil, die Wohlfahrt, den Fortschritt der
Menschheit. Nicht zu ihrer Vernichtung und
für die Zerstörung menschlicher Leistungen.
Die Kriegsführer und Kriegsgewinner be-
rufen sich auf uns Männer der Wissenschaft,
als stünden wir auf ihrer Seite und als
zielte unser Werk darauf ab, neue Mittel
für die Massenausrottung zu erfinden. Es
ist an der Zeit, diese Lüge zu widerlegen.
Die Wissenschaft hat nur dann von der Zu-
kunft etwas zu erwarten, wenn der Friede
gesichert ist. Und zwar für lange Zeit — für
immer.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By: M. J. D. [illegible] NARS, Date 12-18-75

0865

Ein "allround"-Sommerkleid... 35.

„Moderne Kriege werden nicht mit den Waffen geführt, welche die kriegsführenden Länder am Vorabend des Krieges besaßen, sondern mit den Waffen, die sie im Laufe des Krieges hervorbringen. Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika haben in dieser Richtung der ganzen Welt eine unübergehbare Lehre erteilt — besonders Deutschland.“ (Trotski erklärt hier, daß er damit auf die amerikanische Leistung während des Weltkrieges hinweisen wolle, innerhalb eines Jahres fast aus dem Nichts eine Armee von fünf Millionen Mann geschaffen zu haben.) „Das Ergebnis eines neuen Krieges“, fuhr er fort, „wird von dem Grad der technischen Macht und der Mittel abhängen, die den streitenden Ländern zur Verfügung stehen.“

Je größer die Industrie eines Staates, desto mehr ist er an einer von einer Abrüstungskonferenz festgesetzten „Begrenzung“ interessiert, weil es für ihn viel leichter sein wird, im Laufe des Krieges seiner Armee alle Notwendigkeiten zu sichern als seinem weniger industrialisierten Gegner.

Die Genfer Konferenz wird im besten Fall mit bedeutungslosen Formeln beendet werden. Das unvermeidliche Mißlingen der Konferenz wird den Rüstungen einen neuen Auftrieb geben und die Gefahr neuer Kriege noch vergrößern.

Rußland und Japan.

Die französisch-japanische Politik, militärisch sowohl als „friedlich“, wendet sich immer klarer und offener nicht nur gegen China, sondern gegen die Sowjetunion. Es muß jedem, auch dem der Sowjetunion feindselig aufmerksamen Beobachter, klar werden, daß Litwinow in Genf die aufrichtigen Bemühungen der Sowjetregierung vertritt, die Möglichkeit eines neuen Krieges abzuwenden. Ueberdies hoffe ich, daß die russische Delegation Mittel und Wege finden wird, ihre technisch-pazifistischen Vorschläge, die, mindestens im pädagogischen Sinne, sehr unwirksam sind, in aktivere Politik umzusetzen, das heißt, der Konferenz offen die wirkliche Situation vor Augen zu führen und die Völker vor der Gefahr zu warnen, die näherkommt.

Wenn es auf unserem Planeten eine Macht gibt, die die Rüstungen zu Wasser und zu Land, der leichtsten und schwersten Artillerie „begrenzen“ kann, so ist es der Wille der Volksmassen.

Vorläufig keine Rückkehr nach Rußland.

„Ist eine Möglichkeit Ihrer baldigen Rückkehr nach Rußland vorhanden?“

„Die Gerüchte meiner unmittelbaren Rückkehr in die Sowjetunion in den Zeitungen sind bis jetzt auf keine konkrete Information zurückzuführen. Die Vermutung ist aus der allgemeinen Unruhe entstanden. Es ist unnötig zu sagen, daß die Fraktion, deren Mitglied ich bin, sich im Falle der Kriegsgefahr der Sowjetregierung ganz zur Verfügung stellt. Als Präzedenzfall kann man in diesem Zusammenhang an den Bürgerkrieg in Rußland von 1919 bis 1921 erinnern, als Stalin, Worschilow und andere sich in scharfer Opposition zu dem militärischen System befanden, das ich Hand in Hand mit Lenin durchführte. Das verhinderte aber die aktive Mitarbeit der Opposition in dem militärischen Kampf dieser Periode nicht.“

Vereinbarungen über die Lausanner Konferenz.

Belgrad, 14. Mai. In einem Communiqué von heute abend wurde festgestellt, daß die drei Minister des Außeren der kleinen Entente jene Fragen in Verhandlung zogen, welche Gegenstand der Diskussion auf der nächsten Lausanner Konferenz sein werden. Die Lage jedes der drei Staaten sei verschieden, weil die entsprechenden Interessen auf verschiedene Art engagiert sind. Trotz dieser Verschiedenheit haben die drei Minister sich über die Notwendigkeit geeinigt, daß sie die gleiche Haltung einnehmen, wie sie dies im Haag taten, indem sie sich gegenseitig unterstützen.

Verurteilung des früheren Emigranten Gruber.

Telegramm unseres Korrespondenten.

Belgrad, 14. Mai. Das außerordentliche Gericht zum Schutze des Staates verurteilte heute den früheren Emigranten Peter Gruber, einen ehemaligen Mitarbeiter der kroatischen Emigrantenführer Dr. Pavelic und Percec, zu fünf Jahren Kerker. Gruber kehrte im Herbst des vergangenen Jahres freiwillig nach Jugoslawien zurück und stellte den Behörden zahlreiche Dokumente über die Tätigkeit der kroatischen Emigranten zur Verfügung.

Verhaftungen wegen Devisenvergehens in Berlin.

Berlin, 14. Mai. Die Zollfahndungsstelle hat den Bankier Wilhelm Bentheim des Bankhauses Sachs, Bentheim & Co. wegen Verdachtes von Devisenvergehens festgenommen. Desgleichen sind vier Berliner Remissiers unter dem Verdacht der Devisenverletzung festgenommen worden. Der Wert der verhafteten Effekten beläuft sich nach den bisherigen Feststellungen auf 1.250.000 Mark.



Das Kleid, das ich Ihnen für Sport und Straße empfehle: praktisch — lustig — elegant.

Stoff: Seidenpanama. Farben: weiß, rosa, hellblau, lichtgrün, mit einem lustigen bunten Shawl — alles indanthren, wasch — licht — wetterecht.

Nochmals: der zum Sommerkleid absolut unentbehrliche Wollgeorgette Mantel... 59.—
Ein reizvoller Crêpe de Chine-Schlafrock, reich gestickt. Alle Farben... 29.—

MODENHAUS ERNST BRILL, II. TABORSTRASSE 20.

Geheimrat Professor Wilhelm Rahl.

Wien, 15. Mai.

Der große Jurist und gesinnungstreue Politiker Wilhelm Rahl, an dessen Bahre heute ganz Deutschland ohne Unterschied der Parteigehörigkeit in Ehrfurcht das Haupt entblüht, zählte zu jenen seltenen Männern, die niemals Gesinnungslosigkeit mit Doktrinarismus verwechselt haben. Wilhelm Rahl, der Mitkämpfer auf den Schlachtfeldern des Jahres 1870, der begeisterte Bismarck-Enthusiast, hat tiefes Verständnis für die sozialen Fragen der Gegenwart an den Tag gelegt. Wilhelm Rahl hat sich seinerzeit furchtlos in einer Frage dem kaiserlichen Willen entgegen gestellt, die Wilhelm II. in höchstem Grade am Herzen lag. Er hat im kaiserlichen Erbprinzenreich unerschrocken seiner Rechtsüberzeugung gemäß den Standpunkt des Westfeldber vertreten, während Wilhelm II., wie crimmerlich, an dem Erbrecht seines Schwagers festhielt.

Der große Staats- und Strafrechtslehrer war Angehöriger der deutschen Volkspartei im Reichstag, dessen Vizepräsident er war. Er hatte sich übrigens bereits früher eine Zahl gewährt, von der er sich aus dem Reichstag zurückzog, um der deutschen Juristenwelt zu dienen, deren unbestrittenes Haupt er gewesen ist, wo er unermüdlich für die Reform des deutschen Strafrechts eingetreten ist und diese Strafrechtsreform immer wieder eine der dringlichsten Aufgaben der deutschen Gesetzgebung nannte. So war es selbstverständlich, daß er an die Spitze der Reichstagskommission gestellt wurde, aus deren Beratungen das neue Gesetzbuch hervorgehen sollte. Dieser unentwegte Anhänger des deutsch-österreichischen Anschlusses hat auch Großes für die Angleichung der beiderseitigen Gesetzgebungen geleistet. Hier erinnert man sich natürlich an die nicht immer einseitige Haltung, die Rahl in der Frage der Todesstrafe eingenommen hat. Es war ein Wiener Juristentag, auf dem Rahl mit dem seither verbliebenen Moritz Liepmann jenes berühmt gewordene rechnerische Duell anführte, in dem er sich als Anhänger der Todesstrafe bekannte. Später ist er einige Jahre lang von dieser Auffassung abgewichen, um sich zuletzt wieder auf seinen ursprünglichen Standpunkt zurückzusetzen. Er verwahrte sich aber entschieden dagegen, daß in dieser Sinnesänderung so etwas wie ein Umfall gelegen sein könnte, und verlangte „beachtliche Zeugnisse einer veränderten Volksüberzeugung“, die für ihn und seine Haltung maßgebend sein würden.

Ein gebürtiger Bayer, ist Wilhelm Rahl 83 Jahre alt geworden. Die „Neue Freie Presse“ ist stolz darauf, oft und oft Gelegenheit gehabt zu haben, Aufsätze aus der Feder Wilhelm Rahls zu veröffentlichen. Ist der große Gelehrte doch ein ebenso glänzender Schreiber als Redner gewesen. Unvergessen ist die berühmte Rede geblieben, in der Wilhelm Rahl das Friedensdiktat von Versailles abgelehnt hat. Seine starke Persönlichkeit hat sein wissenschaftliches Widerwärtig mit den Worten charakterisiert, daß in ihm der Mensch, der Politiker und der Jurist zu unlösbarer Einheit verschmolzen waren.

Die Todesnachricht.

Telegramm unseres Korrespondenten.

Berlin, 14. Mai. Geheimrat Professor Dr. Wilhelm Rahl, der deutsche Rechtslehrer und volksparteiliche Reichstagsabgeordnete, ist heute mittag gegen 1 Uhr in seiner Berliner Wohnung im Alter von fast 83 Jahren gestorben. Die Ursache des Todes war eine schwere Brustfellentzündung.

Das Geleide Hindenburgs.

Berlin, 14. Mai. Reichspräsident v. Hindenburg hat an Frau Geheimrat Rahl aus Neudamm das nachstehende Telegramm gerichtet: „Zu dem schweren Verlust, der Sie durch das Hinscheiden Ihres hochgeschätzten Gatten, in dem ich auch den alten Mitkämpfer von 1870/71 ehre, betroffen hat, spreche ich Ihnen und Ihren Angehörigen meine herzlichste Teilnahme aus. Die unvergänglichen Verdienste, die Sie der Entschlafenen in unermüdlicher, treuer Arbeit für sein Vaterland um die Wahrung und Weiterbildung des deutschen Rechts erworben hat, und seine hohen menschlichen Eigenschaften sichern ihm das ehrende Andenken des ganzen deutschen Volkes.“

Der Prozeß wegen des Kölner Ueberfalles auf Wels.

Der angeklagte Hakenkreuzlerabgeordnete Ley leugnet.

Telegramm unseres Korrespondenten.

Köln, 14. Mai. Vor dem hiesigen Schöffengericht fand heute der Prozeß gegen den nationalsozialistischen Reichstagsabgeordneten Dr. Ley und den Chauffeur Fuchs statt, die am Tage vor den Preußenvahlen den Führer der sozialdemokratischen Partei Abgeordneten Wels und den Kölner Polizeipräsidenten Banknecht in einem Restaurant überfallen und erheblich verletzt hatten. Wels leidet noch heute an den Folgen der Mißhandlung. Die beiden Angeklagten erklärten sich für nicht schuldig. Fuchs behauptet, er sei zufällig mit seinen Genossen in das Restaurant gekommen und sei von Ley so unglücklich gestoßen worden, daß sein Arm an den Hals von Wels geflohen sei. Ley behauptet, er habe nur mit einem

Redakteur des Kölner nationalsozialistischen Blattes in redaktionellen Angelegenheiten gesprochen. An seinem Tisch im Restaurant hätten er und einige Parteigenossen sich mit den Rufen: „Heil Hitler!“ zugewandt. In diesem Augenblick sei Wels vorbeigegangen und habe gefragt: „Wilt das mir?“ Dann sei Banknecht hinzugezungen und nun habe sich alles in so kurzer Zeit entwickelt, daß er keine Einzelheiten beobachten konnte. Ley bestritt, tötlich geworden zu sein, beklagte sich jedoch, daß er auf der Polizeiwache von Beamten mißhandelt worden sei.

Die Aussagen der Ueberfallenen.

Abgeordneter Wels, der als Folge seiner Verletzung nur leise sprechen kann, stellte jedoch den Sachverhalt anders dar. Er habe gefragt, ob der Ruf „Heil Hitler!“ ihm gelte. Darauf habe er sofort von hinten Schläge ins Gesicht erhalten, sei vor die Brust gebohrt worden und habe schließlich einen Schlag gegen die Kehle erhalten, der ihm heute noch das Sprechen schwer mache. Polizeipräsident Banknecht erklärte, er habe auf Ley beruhigend eingeredet. Als Antwort habe er eine Verletzung durch einen Faustschlag und einen Stieb mit einer Weinflasche auf den Kopf von hinten erhalten.

Ein Hotelpage sagt als Zeuge aus, er habe am Telefon mit angehört, daß Ley in das Parteihaus telephonierte, man solle Leute schicken, die vor dem Restaurant zu warten hätten. Sie sollten ein Motorrad mit Beiwagen mitbringen und die Nummer fälschen. Das Motorrad ist auch vor dem Lokal eingetroffen und auf ihm flüchteten nach der Tat einige Nationalsozialisten.

Ley zu drei Monaten, Fuchs zu fünf Monaten Gefängnis verurteilt.

Nach zwölfstündiger Verhandlung fällt das Schöffengericht das Urteil. Dr. Ley wurde zu drei Monaten, Fuchs zu fünf Monaten Gefängnis wegen gemeinschaftlicher Körperverletzung verurteilt. Das Gericht erachtete die beiden entgegen ihrem Leugnen nicht nur der begangenen Mißhandlungen, beziehungsweise einzelnen Handlungen für überführt, sondern hielt auch die Gemeinschaftlichkeit für erwiesen. Strafmildernd berücksichtigte das Gericht die alkoholisierte Stimmung und die Erregung des Wahlkampfes, strafverschärfend dagegen den Charakter der Persönlichkeiten, gegen welche die Tat verübt wurde. Der Staatsanwalt hatte für Ley eine Gefängnisstrafe von vier Monaten, für Fuchs eine solche von acht Monaten beantragt.

Gorgulows Identität festgestellt.

Telegramm unseres Korrespondenten.

Paris, 14. Mai. In dem heute geöffneten Koffer des Attentäters Gorgulow wurde ein Studentenausweis, ausgestellt auf den Namen Gorgulow von der Universität Moskau, aus dem Jahre 1916 vorgefunden. Gorgulow erklärte, daß auch unter dem bolschewistischen Regime den Wehrkräften die Fortsetzung ihrer Studien gestattet worden sei. Weiter fand sich ein Testament des Mörders zugunsten seiner Frau mit dem Vermerk „im Falle eines Unglücks“. Das Testament ist vom 3. Mai, kurz vor der Abreise Gorgulows nach Paris, datiert.

Todesurteile gegen zwei Spione in Warschau.

Telegramm unseres Korrespondenten.

Warschau, 14. Mai. Vor dem hiesigen Standgericht fand heute abend ein Spionageprozeß seinen Abschluß, der unter strengstem Ausschluß der Öffentlichkeit durchgeführt wurde. Es handelte sich um einen Beamten der Nachrichtenabteilung des polnischen Generalstabes, Borakowski, der Bautechniker Bonkowski sowie um die stadtbekannte Tänzerin des größten Warschauer Nachtlokales, Majewska. Alle drei waren auf einer gemeinsamen Autofahrt in der Nähe von Dirschau verhaftet worden, als Material der polnischen Landesverteidigung über Danzig an eine sowjetrussische Spionagezentrale bringen wollten. Borakowski und Bonkowski wurden zum Tode durch den Strang, die Tänzerin Majewska zu lebenslänglicher Zwangsarbeit verurteilt. Ein Gnadenersuchen an den Staatspräsidenten dürfte abgelehnt werden, da heute nacht bereits zwei Galgen für die Verurteilten im Hofe der Warschauer Zitadelle errichtet worden sind.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shulman, MRS, Date 12-18-75

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sich herab und uns einprägt: „Die Sonne wird scheinen! Die Sonne wird scheinen! Es wird nicht regnen! Es wird nicht regnen!“

(Spenden für die Sammlungen der „Neuen Freien Presse“) An Kranzabläsen anlässlich des Ablebens der Frau Adele Reimböcker widmen Ing. Arnold Spriger und Dr. Karl und Marianne Spriger für das Blindeninstitut 70 S. — Generalkonsul Dr. Paul Hohenau übermittelt uns statt eines Kranzes für Frau Friederike Schwarz für den Frauenverein 50 S.

(Sehr wichtige Nachricht!)

Schon diesen Donnerstag, den 19. d., 1/3 Uhr nachmittags, beginnt die Ziehung der 27. Oesterreichischen Klassenlotterie. Es ist daher höchste Eile geboten, beim allbekannten 100jährigen Haupttreffer-Bankhaus Schellhammer & Schattner, Wien, I. Stephansplatz 11 — noch ein Klassenlos zu dieser Ziehung zu erwerben, um sich damit die Anwartschaft auf die enormen Gewinne der 27. Klassenlotterie zu sichern.

Bemerkenswert ist, daß in den letzten vier Lotterien nicht nur zweimal die Prämie von S. 500.000.—, sondern auch die Haupttreffer von 300.000.—, 2 à 100.000.—, 2 à 80.000.—, 3 à 60.000.—, je einer zu 50.000.— und 40.000.— Schilling, meistens eine namhafte Anzahl von Treffern zu 20.000.—, 10.000.—, 8000.—, 6000.—, 4000.— und 2000.— Schilling mit Schellhammer & Schattner gewonnen wurden.

(Haben Sie schon Sommerpläne?)

Eigentlich sollte man die Antwort auf diese Frage schon längst geben können, wenn nicht eine so fragwürdige Zeit wäre, in der man unter andern in den meisten Fällen auch die Antwort schuldig bleibt. Endlich und schließlich ist Pfingsten ein Termin, zu dem man schon wissen sollte, in welcher Höhe und Preislage man im Juli oder August spazieren gehen, krocen, baden, flirten und Bridge spielen wird. Aber heuer weiß man noch gar nichts, denn wer kann in einer Zeit, deren Programm die Planlosigkeit ist, Pläne auf so lange Zeit hinaus machen? Man ist schon zufrieden, wenn das Bekleidende kein Ultimatum mit Schrecken ist, wenn man das Geld für Pfingsten beisammen hat, die ja leider doch wieder schon geworden sind. Wie beruhigend ungünstig hat für manchen Gatten und Familienvater noch Mitte der Woche die Wetterprognose gelaute: Nordalpen trüb, Berge stecken in Wolken, in der Nacht hat es geschneit. Aber man kann sich auf gar nichts mehr verlassen. Zugleich mit einer Robinetterie bricht das schönste Wetter über Oesterreich herein, ein breitblättriges Balkongewitter auf dem Semmering, in Reichenau oder wenigstens in der Vorderbrühl. Und wenn der Gatte angesichts dieser Zumutung schmerzhaft fragt: „Glaubst du, ich kann Schillingnoten fabrizieren?“ so erwidert sie ungerührt: „Damit würdest du mir gar nicht imponieren.“ Das Unangenehme an diesen dreitägigen Pfingstfreuden ist aber nicht die Erholung, die Strapazen im Grün der Natur und der Kartenzettel, sondern der bedenkliche Umstand, daß die Gattin dort mit lauter Gefinnungsgenossen zusammenströmt, die die gute Lust dazu benötigen, um eine brennende Frage zu ventilieren: „Haben Sie schon Sommerpläne?“ Ein für einen viel zu langen lässlichen Abend ausreichendes Thema, das heuer hauptsächlich in Schillingverteilung geführt wird: „Auf einen richtigen Sommeraufenthalt möchte ich mich heuer gar nicht einlassen. Höchstens 14 Tage bedingt... Ihr Mann hat noch eine Strafe abzufragen... Nein, ich meine, falls die eingelegten Wechsel bis dahin eingehen... Wir sind von Freunden zu einer Autopartie eingeladen, aber ob sie im August das Auto noch haben werden... Mir ist eine wunderschöne Sommerwohnung angeboten worden: 1000 Schilling freibleibend... Das dürfte auch das Schicksal dieser Sommerwohnung sein... Heuer wird es überall lächerlich billig sein. Pensionenpreise von fünf Schilling aufwärts. Das kommt eigentlich gar nicht teuer als in Wien, denn in einem solchen Alpenort erpart man sich alles Mögliche... Stimmt. Zogar die Erholung... Andererseits wäre es doch schön, wieder nach dem Süden zu gehen. Rimini zum amtlichen Rekurs von 38 ist noch immer eine Okaision... Oder an die Nordsee. Man wird doch jetzt wahrhaftig 1000 Schilling per Person mitnehmen dürfen... Ich wäre schon froh, wenn ich soviel Geld zum Überbleiben hätte... Aber wie ist das, wenn vielleicht doch das Transformatorium — ich kann mir das Wort nie merken, ich meine: das Transformatorium kommt, wenn also Oesterreich dem Ausland alles schuldig bleibt? ... Dann werde ich mich im Ausland wie zu Hause fühlen...“

(Ein unveröffentlichtes Gedicht von Anton Wildgans.)

Eines Tages, es war zu Beginn des Monats August 1919, saßen Anton Wildgans und wir am späten Nachmittag auf einer in der Nähe von Klosterneuburg befindlichen Anhöhe und erfreuten uns an dem wundervollen Anblick der zu unseren Füßen sich hinziehenden Donaualandschaft. Infolge einer raschen Wendung, die ich ausführte, entfiel meiner Rocktasche ein kleines Büchlein, ein sogenanntes Taschenbrevier, worin die priesterlichen Gebete für die kirchlichen Tageszeiten enthalten sind. Wildgans griff nach dem Büchlein und begann darin zu blättern. Da er ein vorzügliches Lateiner war, bereitete ihm die Lektüre schriftliches Vergnügen, namentlich aber war es der an der Spitze des täglichen Offiziums stehende Morgenhymnus, der sein lebhaftes Interesse weckte und den er voll aufrichtiger Begeisterung wiederholt laut vorlas. Wer beschreibe mein Erstaunen, als er am nächsten Vormittag ganz unerwartet zu mir ins Zimmer trat. „Wissen Sie, was ich getan habe?“ rief er aus. „Angeregt durch unser gestriges Gespräch habe ich mich heute früh in den Garten gesetzt und angesichts der aufgehenden Sonne einen Morgenhymnus geschaffen, den ich Ihnen zuerst vorlesen und hierauf zur Erinnerung an den gestrigen Nachmittag in Ihr Gedächtnis schreiben will.“ Und er las mir das Poem zuerst vor, dann setzte er sich hin und trug eigenhändig das folgende Gedicht in mein Gedächtnis ein.

Dank am Morgen.

Herr, Dank dir für den Schlaf, mit dem du alle Nächte
Lied überbreitest all mein irdisches Gemächte.
Gestillt erwach ich dann, gewachend deine Erde,
Wie sie der Adam sah, erschauernder Gebärde.
Geschaffen ist sie mir erneut in jeder Frühlings-
Mit Vogelruf und Duft und zarter Wolkenflügel.
Geschaffen bin ich selbst mir neu an jedem Tage,
Ich, zwischen heut und heut das Jünglein an der Waage.
Darf besser, was gefehlt, und abtun getriggert Arren,
Ob auch, um neu in Fehle mich irrend zu verwirren.
Darf meines Wandels fromm ein Zeichen hinterlegen,
Daß meiner sich bestimmt, wer nachsucht meinen Wegen.
Und darf dann wieder, all der Fülle müd, entsinken
Und friedlich meines Schlafs gekühlte Krüge trinken.

Dr. Wolfgang Pauker (Stift Klosterneuburg).

(Korjo der eleganten Newyorkerinnen.) Aus Newyork wird uns geschrieben: Auf der Fünften Avenue, die durch die billigen Ausverkäufe um jeden Preis ihr elegantes Cachet zu verlieren droht, strömt wie immer der Korjo eleganter Frauen. Der Mai kam blaugelb, aber kühl. Erst wenige Damen haben es gewagt, die hier so beliebten und notwendigen Seidenkostüme anzuziehen und dadurch, trotz der Kälte, den Winter als offiziell längst beendet zu erklären. Große pelzbesetzte Mantelärmel haben auf der Avenue die Vorherrschaft. Hüfste verbergen sich in Ellenbogen und wurden sich grazios dem Handgelenk zu, denn man trägt die Verbrämung senkrecht und nicht horizontal als Manschette. Eine Mode, bei der die billigen Konfektionsware überraschend hohe Preise mit den ärgsten Geschmackslosigkeiten zu verbinden wissen. Manche der magereu Stoppeln sehen darin aus wie kleine verärgerte Igel. Wo kein

Imprimé

Crêpe de chine	Seiden Mousseline	K.-Seiden Mousseline	Agfa Travis
8-80	9-50	5-90	4-20

Radieux-Panama, letzte Neuheit, 96 cm 6-
Doupion noppé, la-Reinseide, alle Farben, 80 cm 8-25

Duldner & Deutsch

Samstag geschlossen VII. Neubaugasse 10 Samstag geschlossen

Pelz ist, blüht die Welt vielfarbig in Searts (Falschschals), und die Phantasie lebt sich in verschiedenartigen Bindungen, Maschen und Flatterenden aus, besonders elegant wirkt die Scotch-Krawatte zum Tailormade. Bunte Farben werden mehr und mehr bevorzugt. Das in Newyork immer im bewußten Gegensatz zur oft recht kitzigen Kosmopolisierung vieler Frauen von den eleganten Damen gern getragene mündliche Schwarz hat ein wenig an Popularität eingebüßt. Man sieht smarte Tailormodes in Ziegelrot, Maisgelb und Kornblumenblau. Der Fuchs als schmückende Beigabe ist nicht mehr Favorit; der Fur-searf, the neck-piece, mit einem Wort, die in Wien ganz unpopuläre Stola aus zwei bis fünf kleinen Tieren, Madern, Alts, Nerz, mitunter auch noch immer Fabel — trotz des fashionsablen und absolut unpatriotischen Grundlages „It is smart to be thrifty“ (Sparen ist elegant) — nimmt seine jahrelang behauptete Stellung ein. Es ist erstaunlich, wie billig man bei den Newyorker Ausverkäufen eine halbwegs elegante Stola erwerben kann; zwei breite, flaumige Gelmarder um 28 Dollar (weniger als 190 S.). Kleine Capes und Capelets sind noch immer große Mode, die Amerikaner kann sich davon ebenso wenig trennen, wie die Wienerin sich damit recht zu befreunden vermag. Das Bolero wird kürzer und kürzer, bedeckt in Empire-Art nur mehr gerade die Brust und wird im Sommer als reizendes Rudiment eines leichten Pelzjägers getragen. Platinblond ist out; man hatte ihm von vornherein kein langes Leben voraussagen können. Es ist unpopulär, da es jede Woche nachgefärbt werden muß, und es steht zu wenig Frauen zu Gesicht. Denn nicht zu wenige Frauen, allzu viele Damen erheben sich eines so schneeweißen Teints, wie er zum Platinblond paßt. Honey- (Sonig) blond und copper- (Kupfer) blond dürfen jetzt in Mode kommen. A. T. L.

(Wiener Sonn- und Montag-Zeitung) diesmal Dienstag früh.

(Dankagung.) Außerstande, die zahlreichen aus dem letzten Freundes- und Bekanntenkreise anlässlich des Ablebens meiner geliebten Frau mir zugekommenen Beweise der Liebe und Freundschaft einzeln zu bekräftigen, danke ich auf diesem Wege für die vielen warmen Worte des Trostes und allen den Vielen, die meiner teuren Frau auf ihrem letzten Wege das Geleit gegeben. Im Namen aller Angehörigen: Oskar Steinfeld.

Pfingstbeilage der „Neuen Freien Presse“.

Seite 33 bis 42.

Gerhart Hauptmann: „Gespräche über Amerika.“

Arthur Schnitzler: „Parabeln.“

Thomas Mann: „Die Imaeliter.“

Stefan Zweig: „Maria Antoinette wird Königin.“

John Galsworthy: „Traum eines Jägers.“

André François-Poncet, französischer Botschafter in Berlin: „Eladigo.“ Ein Beitrag zur Goethe-Feyer.

Franz Karl Ginzley: „Der Gletschermajor.“

Bruno Walter, Generalmusikdirektor: „Dpernmüdigkeit.“

Somerfet Maugham: „Das Geheimnis meines Lebens.“

Maurice Deobra: „Prophezeiungen einer Berliner Hellscherin.“

Francis de Croisset: „Tutanthamen, die Kobra und der Kanarienvogel.“

Frage: „Was gibt es Neues auf dem Gebiete der Technik?“

Gedichte

von: Richard Billinger, Böries Freiherrn v. Münchhausen, Marcell Proust, Hermann Hesse, Rudolf Seremias Kreuth, Helene Schen-Nies, Paul Wertheimer, Paula v. Preradovic, Richard Schanthal.

Der Beginn des Romans „Theater um Maria Thul“ von Otto Zarek befindet sich auf Seite 22.

(Funde und Neuerwerbungen in unseren Galerien.)

Crana hat Luthers Vater mit Farbstiften nach dem Leben gezeichnet. Diese Naturstudie, die dem Wittenberger Porträt zugrunde lag, ist von der „Albertina“ erworben worden. Wolf Huber aus Feldkirch hat kurz nach der Wiener Türkenbelagerung Anno 1529 von der Gegend von Mariahilf aus die zusammengeschossenen Wäfen um das Kärntnerort herum dargestellt; im Vordergrund eine Geschützatterie, auch diese hat die „Albertina“ als Neuerwerbung, ebenso wie Blätter österreichischer Barockmeister (Maulperth) und entzückend feine Kunst deutscher Romantiker. Zu Ende dieses Monats wird die Sammlung Benda in den „Erfischen Sammlungen“ der neuen Hofburg, angrenzend an die Fidor-Stiftung, aufgestellt sein und dem Publikum geöffnet werden; man hat sich sehr bemüht, bei der Aufstellung die Wünsche des Spenders zu berücksichtigen; sein berühmtes Renaissancekabinett wird fast gänzlich unverändert in der neuen Hofburg zu sehen sein. Wieder haben sich im letzten Jahre zwei wichtige Funde im Hause des Kunsthistorischen Museums ereignet! Unter den Kunstschätzen der einstigen Brüsseler Sammlung des Erzherzogs Leopold Wilhelm gelangte zu Beginn des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts in die Wiener Stallburg ein Bild, das wie manches andere beim Einfügen in die verzierten Holzwände der Säle in seinem Format verändert wurde. Dieses Frauenbild mit Vorberhintergrund, das damals oval zugechnitten worden ist, ist auf zarte Leinwand gemalt, aber auf ein Fichtenbrett aufgezogen. Eine schöne Inschrift in Renaissancebuchstaben auf der Rückseite besagt: „Die Tafel wurde von der Hand des Meisters Jorzi da Castelfranco, „Kollegen“ des Meisters Vincenzo Catena, im Auftrage eines Herrn Giacomo... am 1. Juni 1506 vollendet.“ So gibt das kleine Werk die erste zuverlässige Datierung einer Schöpfung Giorgiones, der in jungen Jahren starb und so wenig unzweifelhafte Werke hinterlassen hat; zugleich erfährt man, daß er eine Zeitlang mit Catena die Werkstatt geteilt hat. Die Dargestellte soll Petrarca Laura sein; das Idealbildnis entstand mehr als hundert Jahre nach ihrem Tode. Von packender Wirkung ist ein Brustbild des Kaisers Sigismund, auf Pergament gemalt. Blendend weiß sind Haar und Bart, halb offen ist der Mund, der die Zähne sehen läßt; das Antlitz „von eigenartigem, nahezu unheimlichem Ausdruck“, wie ein altes Urteil lautet. Noch nicht aufgestellt ist eine marmorne Pietà, signiert von Jerome du Quesson, dem Bruder des bekannten „Fiamingo“. Von ihm stammt ein edles Grabdenkmal in Gent, das er nicht vollenden durfte; wegen eines Eitlichkeitsverbrechens wurde er auf dem Kornmarkt von Gent erhängt und verbrannt. Die anmutige Pietà, 35 Zentimeter hoch, zeigt den toten Christus, die Madonna und einen kleinen Engel, Gestalten von fließenden Umrisen und gelöster Bewegung.

(Sind Sie verlobt?)

Der Wäghelton Ludwig Steininger, I. Annagasse 6, zeigt Dienstag bis Freitag eine reizende, komplette Brautausstattung. Freie Beschäftigung. Telefon R-28-1-67.

(Pfingsten auf dem Montmartre.) Unser Pariser Korrespondent schreibt uns: Montmartre wurde schon lange totgelegt, eine Tanzdielen nach der andern schloß ihre einer freudigen Menschen früher geöffneten Pforten, man erzählte sich die Schreckensnachricht, daß die neuen Gäste sich auf Fünfranchscheine Kleingeld zurückgeben ließen — aber Montmartre ergab sich dennoch nicht. Die altberühmte „Abbaye“ hat sich in ein neues Gewand gekleidet, halbes Licht fällt von der Decke auf die Tanzrinnen, deren Haut von Natur und auch noch durch Kunst verschieden gefärbt ist. Es ist zuviel gesagt, wenn man von einem Angebot in Orgien zu Ausverkaufspreisen spricht; aber mit Rücksicht auf die Krise ist der Champagnerzwang aufgehoben, und auch der bescheidene Gast, der mit einigen Banknoten einer Devijenzentrale entkommen ist, wird mit erwartungslosem Lächeln begrüßt. Die große neue Genation aber auf dem Montmartre findet sich unter der Erde: in den Keller gewölben des neuen Theaters Pigalle, das Rothschild als Mäzen bauen ließ und das immer noch das modernste Schauspielhaus von Paris geblieben ist. In diesen Katakomben ist nun die mondäne Diele zu finden: Zeppelin 44. Bei der Einweihung drängte sich wieder einmal ganz Paris. Zeppelin — das ist für Paris keine erfreuliche Erinnerung, doch niemand will an den Krieg denken. Man ist in einem Kellerlokal, der kühnster der Gondel des Lustschiffes nachgebildet war, und in wechselnder Bildern zieht bei verschiedener Beleuchtung Meer und Landschaft, bis Pernambuco an den Augen vorüber, Städte, Meer, Tropen. Luftfahrt unter der Erde, mitten auf dem Montmartre, eine bunte Reisegesellschaft, man singt, man tanzt und man trinkt in einer Kiefernbar, während man dank dem Diorama zu schweben meint und sogar lustig werden kann. Was für Paris einst schreckliche Gefahr war, gibt nun den Namen für eine nach Genation lüsterne Zerstreuung, und Montmartre lebt wieder auf, geht mit der Zeit, mehr noch: fliegt mit ihr.

(Die „Los Angeles“ wird abgerüstet.) Aus Newyork wird uns gemeldet: Der auf Reparationskonto gelieferte Zeppelin „Los Angeles“ wird Ende Juni aus dem Dienst gezogen und die Mannschaft dem regulären MarineDienst überwiesen werden. Die Stilllegung des Zeppelins erspart dem Marineetat 280.000 Dollar. Vorläufig wird nicht beabsichtigt, das acht Jahre alte Lustschiff abzubauen, sondern es verbleibt in Vorkaufsstellung.

(Verhaftung eines Budapest Bankiers.) Wie „Magyarország“ meldet, hat die Polizei den gewesenen Bankier Ernst Hoffmann, den Mitbesitzer des Bankhauses Jakob Hoffmann & Böhme, der sich in der letzten Zeit hauptsächlich mit Wechselgeschäften befaßte, in Prädventhaft genommen. Diese Verhaftung hat in wirtschaftlichen Kreisen großes Aufsehen erregt.

(Generalkonsul Martin Sternberg gestorben.) Aus Berlin wird uns telegraphiert: In den Folgen eines Autounfalls verschied in Naarden bei Amsterdam der holländische Bankier und Generalkonsul Martin Sternberg im Alter von etwas über 40 Jahren. Sternberg war an der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Kriegs- und Inflationszeit erheblich interessiert und war einer der wenigen, die das damals ererbte Vermögen auch später erhalten konnten. Erst in der Wirtschaftskrise hat er einen Teil seines Besitzes abgeben müssen. Sternbergs Hauptinteresse galt dem Hotelgewerbe und der Vergnügungsindustrie. In Frankfurt am Main, in Köln und in Düsseldorf hatte er auf diesem Gebiet erheblichen Besitz. Auch in Berlin war er vorübergehend an Theatern und artistischen Unternehmungen interessiert. Von seinen Industrieinteressen war der Majoritätsbesitz an der Dresdner Flugwerke A.-G. der bedeutendste. Erst vor einigen Wochen gelang es ihm, diese Werke an die Arbeitsgruppe zu verpacken, die bereits vorher eine andere Industrieunternehmung in Brückenbau übernommen hatten.

(Merzliche Nachrichten.) E. Dr. Steinwendner ordiniert für Unterhakenkelgeschwüre, Krampfadernleiden. III. Ungargasse 2, Telefon B-53-0-70. — Dr. Wolf Cebelman hat seine ärztliche Tätigkeit in Karlsbad aufgenommen und ordiniert im „Haus Wappen“.

(Eine Strafanzeige gegen Emmerich Bekessy.) Aus Budapest wird uns gemeldet: Gegen Emmerich Bekessy hat die gewesene Sekretärin des Bankhauses Simon Kraus, Frau Anna Baradi, eine Strafanzeige erstattet. Frau Baradi gewährt Bekessy ein Darlehen von 20.000 Pengö, wofür Bekessy als Deckung ein Paket Aktien seines Verlagunternehmens im Sose einer Bank hinterlegte. Ein Jahr später wurde dieses Darlehen

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (S)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By: Milton D. Quisenberry, NARS, Date: 12-18-75

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um weitere 40.000 Pengo erhöht. Am Verfalltag zahlte jedoch Bekeffy nicht. Es kam zu einem Ausgleich, dessen Bedingungen aber nicht eingehalten wurden. Da sich auch bezüglich des Aktienbepfels Differenzen ergaben, erstattete Frau Barodi die Strafanzeige.

(Todesfälle.) Hier ist Statthalterwizpräsident i. R. Dr. Moritz Zander im 71. Lebensjahre gestorben. Der Verbleibende hat sich als feierlicher Bezirkshauptmann für die Pflege der Bevölkerung und als Referent der ehemaligen Statthalterei besondere Verdienste erworben. (Einführung Dienstag den 17. d. um halb 3 Uhr im Trauerhause VI. Mariahilferstraße 123, Beisetzungsamt in der Hofburg.) — Herr Alois Fiebermann ist im 71. Lebensjahre gestorben. (Beerdigung Montag den 16. d. halb 11 Uhr, Zentralfriedhof, 1. Tor.) — Herr Fritz Sonnenschein ist im 59. Lebensjahre gestorben. (Beerdigung heute Sonntag, halb 12 Uhr, Zentralfriedhof, 1. Tor.) — Am 4. d. ist Dr. Oswald Rimmelman, Geschäftsführer in Dönnau, in Polen, auf seinem Gute gestorben und wurde daselbst beigesetzt. — Am kommenden Mittwoch findet um 10 Uhr vormittags auf dem Hiesinger Friedhofe die Beisetzung des unter dem Ehrenprotektorat des Bundesministers für Inneren, Saupin errichteten Grabdenkmals für General der Infanterie Auffenberg-Komarov unter Teilnahme des Bundesheeres in feierlicher Weise statt.

Protest gegen Maffenmord an Zugvögeln.

Von Dr. Agel Manthe.

Aus dem Vornort der italienischen Ausgabe des Buches von San Michele.

Nach langem Zaudern habe ich in eine italienische Uebersetzung des Buches von San Michele gewilligt. Ich mache mir keine Illusionen; ich weiß nur zu gut, daß ich besser daran getan hätte, mich mit dem leichtesten Erfolg zu begnügen, den das Buch in jener Sprache erlangen, in der es ursprünglich von dem Lande geschrieben wurde, wo der Vorber in dem starken Licht der lateinischen Mentalität blüht. Ich weiß nur zu wohl, daß manches und vieles in diesem Buche der Mehrzahl der italienischen Leser fremd, oft beinahe unverständlich erscheinen wird. Alle diese Reize ohne Fleisch und Blut, die noch in unseren Sagen und Träumen weiterleben, die Dämonen der Kindheit, die in unseren Kindern die Augen der Erde, die auf unseren Fluren unter schimmernden Blumen tanzen, das kleine Volk, das den Bären in ihren Winterhöhlen kugelt, die Trolle und Riesen, die durch unsere Wälder trappeln — sie alle sind mit dem letzten Echo von Pans Flöte von der romanischen Erde verschwunden.

**DAUERWELLEN
HAARFARBEN**
bei **SPESSL** KÄRNTNER
STRASSE 28

Ich fürchte, daß auch all die Tiere, die in diesem Buche ihre Sorgen und Freuden erzählen, es schwerer finden werden, sich auf italienisch verständlich zu machen, als auf englisch, ihrer zweiten Muttersprache. Die römische Kirche lehrt die Kinder die Worte zum Gesang der Engel, aber hat vergessen, sie die Worte zu dem der Vögel zu lehren, auch sie sind Himmelsboten, die dieselbe Kunde bringen wie die Engel. Und doch war es der größte Heilige, den diese selbe Kirche je gehabt, der heilige Franziskus von Assisi, der zum erstenmal unserer barbarischen Welt den Sinn dieser Botschaft deutete: Liebe zu unseren Brüdern und Schwestern in den Lüften, in den Wäldern und auf den Fluren.

Ein Mensch kann in einem anderen Lande leben und sterben als in dem Lande, wo er geboren ist, aber seine Mentalität verbleibt dieselbe. Die Franzosen sagen: L'homme ne naît pas toujours dans son pays, aber vielleicht wäre es einem solchen Menschen besser, er wäre nie geboren.

Ein Mann ist im guten wie im bösen Sinne dasselbe wie sein Buch; Bücher, die leben, sind meistens selbstbiographisch, im entgegengesetzten Falle ist ihre wahre Vaterstadt zweifelhaft. Der Mann aus dem hohen Norden ist ein unweiblicher Idealist, ein unklarer Träumer, ein stummer Poet, der seinen ungeschriebenen „Sonnenfang“ in seinem Herzen birgt. Wenn er früher oder später das gelobte Land erblickt, wird er sentimental, fällt vor der Zauberin, blumenbedrängt wie Botticellis Primavera, auf die Knie, bereit, ihr Ritter fürs Leben zu werden, auch bereit, ihr jede kleine Untreue zu vergeben.

Der Mann aus dem Süden ist Realist. Das Blut, das in seinen Adern rollt, ist heißer, aber sein Kopf ist kühler als der des Nordländers. Er ist leidenschaftlich, heftig in seiner Liebe und seinem Haß, aber er ist kein Enthusiast. Träger der stolzen Namen der Geschlechter und Erbe von so viel Glanz und Pracht, ist es nicht zu verwundern, daß er sich als hochgeborener Aristokrat betrachtet, im Vergleich mit uns kleinen Bürgern aus Ultima Thule, mit unserm spät beginnendem Stammbaum von Kriegen und Seeräubern und unserm harten Erbe an Kunst und Literatur.

Seit der Wiege von so vielen Wundern des Himmels und der Erde umgeben und mit so vielen mächtigen Heiligen und Schutzpatronen in Hörweite, ist es nicht zu verwundern, wenn er geneigt ist, den Tag so zu nehmen wie er kommt, ebenso getrost wie der neapolitanische Lazzarone, der vor San Gennaro Hochaltar kniet, daß das Wunder noch einmal zur rechten Zeit geschehen, das erlachte Blut in der heiligen Schale noch einmal zu wallen beginnen wird).

Und in Wahrheit, noch einmal hat sich das Wunder vollzogen, ein Wunder, groß genug, um all die alten Schutzpatrone in Schatten zu stellen. Von neuem wallt das Blut in den Adern eines ganzen Volkes, das vor dem Augustus-Altar kniet, den der große Zauberer mit seiner stolzen römischen Geste aus den Ruinen an den Tag gebracht hat. Soll ich, bevor ich sterbe, noch ein Wunderwerk des großen Herrenmeisters in diesem Lande der Wunder mit-

*) Das Wunder vollzieht sich zweimal im Jahre in der Domkirche von Neapel, wo das erlachte Märtyrerbild des heiligen Januarius, des Schutzpatrons von Neapel, unter dem Jubel des Volkes noch einmal fließt.



Ein Mantel von

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erleben? Wird der Tag kommen, an dem es den schreckgeagelten Zugvögeln, die jeden Frühling voll Todesangst durch Italien fliehen, vergönnt sein wird, ihre müden Schwingen ein Weilschen im Heimatlande des heiligen Franziskus auszuruhen, bevor sie die lange Fahrt fortsetzen, um den Sommer im Norden einzunehmen? Wird der Tag kommen, an dem unter den Jubelfanaren der fascistischen Hymne „La Giovinezza“ auch die Glocken von Assisi und der Triller der Lerche zu hören sein werden?

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Am nächsten Donnerstag wird man sich im Konzerthaus nach Neapel verliehen. Die Wahl der Conzertetta di Napoli ist ja bekanntlich eines der schönsten und eigenartigsten italienischen Volksfeste. Und das schönste Wiener Lied? Bismarck es nicht genau so triumphal die Welt erobern wie „Addio, mia bella Napoli“? Es ist überaus dankenswert, daß Alfred Deutsch-German an den Einfall hatte, diese musikalische Schönheit konkurrenz aus Neapel nach Wien zu versetzen, und daß die „Concordia“ in Verbindung mit einem glanzvollen künstlerischen Apparat diese Idee verwirklicht. Wie Präsident Leopold Pischke und Alfred Deutsch-German erzählen, bedeutete es für die Jury keine leichte Arbeit, die etwa tausend Einwendungen zu prüfen und zu sichten. Gesamteindruck: Dem Wiener Lied von heute ist jene trübselige Süßlichkeit, die oft unecht wirkt, fremd geworden. Da wird nicht formtötend vom „Mutterl“ und vom Stephansturm, von der blauen Donau und vom Dreieckstakt geschwärmelt. Der Wein fließt, der an den Hängen rings um Wien reißt, wird mit der gleichen Leidenschaft verherrlicht wie nur je. Grinzling ist der meistbesungene Wiener Bezirk. Wilhelm Kienzl betont unermüdlich: „Man darf kein Talent vor den Kopf stoßen, man soll niemanden entmutigen, der Begabung zeigt.“ Wenn Hubert Marischka in irgendeinem Lied den jubelnden Funken spürte, so sprach er in seiner impulsiven Art auf: „Halt, das sing' ich!“ Professor Karl Lafitte, der alle Vögel auf dem Klavier gespielt hatte, fand für fast jeden Kompositionsmangel ein entschuldigendes Wort: „Das ist ja nur ein Kompositionsfehler.“ Auch der Konzertdirektor der „Rovag“, Oswald Kabaka, und der Spezialist für Jazzmusik Eddy Soudriot nahmen an den Beratungen der Jury lebhaft teil. Von besonderem Interesse war auch die Meinung des Musikverlegers Bernhard Herzmannsky, in dessen Verlag die drei preisgekrönten Lieder erscheinen werden, und der sachverständig erklärte: „Dieses Lied wird gehen, dieses weniger, dieses könnte Zugkraft haben.“

Am nächsten Donnerstag um 8 Uhr abends nun findet im Konzerthaus das erste Konzert statt, bei dem das Publikum über die von der Jury für die engere Wahl ausgesuchten Lieder abstimmen wird. Es werden zehn Wiener Lieder und sieben Jazzkompositionen zur Aufführung gelangen. Die Anonymität der Gewinner ist selbstverständlich bis zur endgültigen Entscheidung auf das strengste gewahrt. Bei den Konzerten dieses Wettbewerbes werden folgende Künstler mitwirken: Staatsopernsängerin Maria Gerhart, Betty Fischer, Anna Cora, Staatsopernsänger Gallos, Kammerjäger Ziegler, Wiedemann, Norbert, Hubert Marischka, Otto Glaser, Opernsänger Schirwanek, Konzertjäger Viktor Heim, die Radiosiedler Medina und Petroff, die Pianisten Professor Reller und Pauspertl und die Jazzkapelle Hanns Korngold.

Die Karten zu dem ersten Konzert, für das sich in den meisten Kreisen das größte Interesse kundgibt, sind zum Preise von S. 1 bis S. 6 bei den Konzertschaffern Benno Pie, I. Graben Nr. 28, und III. Hauptstraße 1, sowie an der Konzerthauskasse, III. Zähringerstraße 20, erhältlich.

Maria Theresias Vermählung.

Von Yvonne Gräfin Clauzel.

Reute fürstlicher Abkunft haben oft und oft gewöhnliche Sterbliche, die weniger im Mittelpunkt allgemeiner Aufmerksamkeit oder gar politischer Kombinationen stehen, in manchen Fällen benedict. Besonders anlässlich der Wahl der Ehegatten, die bei Fürstlichkeiten durch alles mögliche bestimmt zu werden pflegen, nur durch die Liebe nicht. Ehrgeizige Motive, politische Interessen zwangen da nur zu oft zwei Menschen zueinander, die unter normalen Umständen niemals etwas füreinander übrig gehabt hätten. Dies galt insbesondere für solche Mitglieder eines fürstlichen Hauses, die dem Thron zunächst standen und die Anwartschaft besaßen, einstmals ein großes Reich zu beherrschen. In einem solchen Falle war es meist ganz ausgeschlossen, persönlicher Neigung einen besonderen Platz bei der Wahl des Gatten einzuräumen zu können.

Auch bei Maria Theresia, der am 13. Mai 1717 gebornen Tochter Kaiser Karls VI., war die Heiratsfrage von dem Augenblick an eine höchwichtige Angelegenheit geworden, da man die Gewissheit erlangte, daß der Kaiser keine männlichen Erben hinterlassen würde. Nicht ohne Sorgen blickte der Monarch in die Zukunft. Würde seine Tochter die Kraft aufbringen, seine Erblande zusammenzuhalten, und was würden die dem Kaiser feindlich gesinnten Großstaaten unternehmen? Unter den regierenden Häusern, deren Mitglieder eine Verbindung mit der Kaiserin anstreben konnten, stand an erster Stelle das Haus Lothringen. Schon deshalb, weil die Mutter des regierenden Herzogs eine Schwester Karls VI. war und der Herzog auch selbst am österreichischen Hofe zu Wien erzogen worden war.

Erzherzogin Maria Theresia war im Jahre 1721 erst vier Jahre alt, da verstarb schon der Herzog von Lothringen die ersten Schritte, um die Einwilligung des Kaisers zu einer eventuellen Verbindung seines damals fünfzehnjährigen Sohnes Leopold Clemens mit der Erbin des Reiches zu erlangen. Karl VI. aber sagte sich, daß noch Zeit genug sei, diese Angelegenheit zu entscheiden, die durch die wechselnden Bilder der Weltpolitik noch ein ganz anderes Gesicht bekommen könnte, und verschob die „grande affaire“ in der Absicht, keineswegs übereilt zu handeln. Von lothringischer Seite aber wollte man das Gießen schmieden, solange es heiß war, und entwarf damals schon einen gewissen Herrn v. Jacquemin zur Förderung dieser Verlobung nach Wien.

Mannigfaltig waren die Erwägungen, die für und gegen den jungen Prinzen sprachen. Am meisten aber nützte ihm, daß er durch seine Großmutter habsburgischer Abstammung war und daher für die Anerkennung der Nachfolge Maria Theresias auch die Herkunft ihres Gemahls hätte ins Treffen geführt werden können. Im Frühjahr 1723 wurde beschlossen, daß der Prinz Leopold Clemens Mitte August in Prag eintreffen sollte, um, vom Kaiser empfangen, drei Wochen am Hofe zu weilen. Der Altersunterschied zwischen dem Freier und der jugendlichen Prinzessin war so groß, daß man alles versuchte, um wenigstens nach außen hin den Eindruck abzuwehren. Man mußte in Prag nicht, ob der Prinz noch langes Haar trug und forberte ihn auf, im Falle er dieses hätte, es schneiden lassen, eine Perücke aufzusetzen, die ihm ein möglichst kindliches Aussehen verlieh. Alle Vorbereitungen zur Reise waren schon getroffen, alles aufs peinlichste vorausbedacht, da kam wie ein Blitz aus heiterem Himmel plötzlich die Nachricht, daß der junge Prinz und präsumptive Gatte der jungen Erbin des Kaiserthrones plötzlich an den schwarzen Blattern gestorben sei. Dieser traurige Fall erregte höchste Bestürzung am lothringischen Hofe, aber sofort entschloß man sich, den zweiten lothringischen Thronerben Franz Stephan, der damals im 15. Lebensjahre stand, als neuen Ehegatten anzubieten. Freilich, wenn Leopold Clemens allgemein als klug und besonnen gerühmt worden war, konnte man dies über den von seiner Mutter Charlotte von Orleans erzogenen jüngeren Bruder weniger behaupten. Der war eher seinem Vater nachgeraten, der schön, ritterlich, äußerst galant war, sein Leben und seine Zeit hauptsächlich den Damen widmete. Auch fürchtete man am Kaiserhofe, daß der zweite Prinz ebenfalls den schwarzen Blattern erliegen könnte, die er noch nicht durchgemacht hatte. Jacquemin verstand es jedoch, alle Befürchtungen zu zerstreuen, und bestimmte den Kaiser dazu, schon zwei Monate nach dem Tode des Prinzen Leopold Clemens zu erklären, er werde dessen Bruder mit gleichen Gefühlen an seinem Hofe empfangen.

Nun begann man, dem Prinzen gute Ratschläge zu geben, die er beherzigen sollte, um am Wiener Hofe zu gefallen. Vor allem andere sollte er Deutsch lernen, sein lebhaftes Temperament zügeln und möglichst wenig von seiner französischen Erziehung merken lassen. Am lothringischen Hofe herrschte kein so strenges Zeremoniell wie am kaiserlichen, und deswegen wurde er ermahnt, sich genau an alle Vorschriften zu halten. Sein Hofmeister, der Graf von Widempierre, legte alle diese Mahnungen in einem Memorandum nieder. Der Prinz sollte sich danach ohne Steifheit und Geziertheit huldigen dem Kaiser nahen und sich ihm in jeder Weise angenehm zeigen, niemals dürfe er vor dem Kaiser sein Glas leeren und niemals vergessen, ihn vor der Mahlzeit die Serviette, nach derselben den Hut zu reichen. Das Einfügen in die strengen Normen des spanischen Hofzeremoniells mußte dem jungen Prinzen sehr schwer fallen, denn er war nichts als ein lebenswütiges und gutes, aber sehr ausgelassenes und zerstreutes Kind. Auch gelang es ihm nicht immer, plötzliche Zornausbrüche zu unterdrücken. Er aß gern und viel und spielte auch gern Karten; vor alledem warnte ihn der Vater, der das Memorandum noch mit einer Reihe von Ratschlägen ergänzte, gleichsam einem Kommentar zu den zehn Geboten

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(U) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. H. [illegible] NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Mitteilungen aus dem Publikum.

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Vortrag Sil-Bara.

So ungefähr wissen ja die meisten Menschen, warum bis heute kein rechter Frieden möglich war. Auch das erlebte Publikum, das den Saal des Gewerbevereins füllte, um Sil-Bara sprechen zu hören, kam nicht in dem Verlangen, tatsächlich Neues zu vernehmen. Der Reiz des Vortrags abends ging zunächst von der Persönlichkeit aus, die am Rednerpult erschien. Man kennt Sil-Baras zurückhaltende, noble Art, seine stille Intensität, die langsam, aber eindringlich wirkt und lange nachwirkt. Er ist ein Dramatiker, denn die internationale Bühne manches wertvolle, erfolgreiche Werk dankt, ein Essaiist von hohem Rang und er gehört mit diesen Eigenschaften außerdem noch zu den ganz wenigen, die sich heute nicht in Szene setzen, die nicht auf die manierlose Art gewisser Handlungsreisenden überall Zutritt erzwingen oder erschleichen. Sil-Bara vertraut dem Gewicht seines Namens, dem Gehalt seiner Leistung und wie oft alle anderen Mittelchen der Propaganda, der Reklame, der Beziehungen verfehlt, mag er den kommerziellen Zeitgenossen naiv erscheinen, doch die wahrhaft geistig Bestrebten, die noch immer keine Minorität sind, erkennen und verehren ihn als einen reinen Menschen, der dem Geist um des Geistes willen zugewandt ist.

Allen bei diesem Vortrag Anwesenden war es interessant, Sil-Bara einmal zu sehen, was es anregend, zu hören, wie dieser ausgezeichnete Schriftsteller die Ursachen gruppiert, die den Eintritt mörderischen Friedens seit mehr als vierzig Jahren mehr und mehr verhindern. Ein Mann, dessen äußere Erscheinung schon vornehmte Reserve zeigt, inneres Gebundenheit, Fremdbild aller Pose und Scharlatanerie, sprach hier voll tiefer, sittlicher Verantwortung, voll eines durch Erlebnis gesteigerten Ernstes seine Gedanken über diese Gegenwart aus. Sil-Bara wendet sich gleich zu Beginn mit ungewöhnlicher Energie gegen das berühmte Wort des Genialen: „Der Krieg ist der Vater aller Dinge.“ Nichts, so erklärt Sil-Bara, sei lägerhafter, als dieser Spruch. Der Krieg, fährt er fort, ist vielmehr der Vernichter aller Dinge! Und Sil-Bara, der an der Front gewesen ist, der alle Furchtbarkeiten des blutigen Ringens selbst erlebt hat, redet mit einem Entsetzen davon, mit einem Abscheu, dem man das Unauswählliche seines Eindruckes anmerkt. Von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus bespricht der Redner sodann alle Ursachen, die einer Verdringung der Welt entgegenstehen. Er zitiert eine Reihe charakteristischer Ministerreden, Zeitungsartikel, Interviews, die den verschiedensten Ländern entnommen und die beinahe alle auf den gleichen Ton gestimmt sind. Er hebt seine eigene pessimistische Einstellung dem heutigen und künftigen Weltgeschehen gegenüber hervor. Besonders fesselnd ist es, wie er die Elementarkatastrophen, von denen der Erdball in einem an biblische Zeiten nahenden Umfang heimgesucht wird, mit dem jetzigen Schicksal der Menschheit verknüpft. Hier erinnert Sil-Bara an Johannes V. Jensen, der nach dem Ausbruch des Weltkrieges und ähnlich gewaltiger Naturereignisse den Weltkrieg vorhergesagt hat, die Revolution und den Sturz der Dynastien. In wachsender Spannung und von den straff formulierten Wahrheiten des Vortragenden nah berührt, war das Auditorium dieser Rede bis zum Schluss gefolgt und stürmischer Applaus zeigte die Wirkung, die Sil-Bara gefolgt hatte. Als man den Saal verließ, konnte man sich des Empfindens nicht erwehren, daß nun hier wieder einmal ein edler Redner in der Wüste dieser Gegenwart vergebens seine Stimme erhoben hatte. Vergebens? Nein. Es ist keine solche Ansprache vergebens. Wenn wir schon ins Unglück stürzen, bleibt es immer wertvoll, zu wissen, warum uns das geschieht. Und wenn wir noch knapp vor dem Abgrund gerettet werden, dann haben Köpfe wie Sil-Bara zu dieser Rettung mit beigetragen. f. s.

Die Fälscher der 20-Schilling-Noten entlarvt.**Geständnis der bei Tulln Verhafteten.**

Die, wie gemeldet, wegen Verbreitung falscher 20-Schilling-Noten in der Nähe von Tulln verhafteten Burtschen, Karl Wranowitsch und Josef Kaganitsch, haben nach langem hartnäckigen Weigern das Geständnis abgelegt, die Herstellung der Fälschate durchgeführt zu haben. Wie sich ergab, sind im ganzen mehr als 40 falsche Noten aus gegeben worden, von denen in Wien allein 24 Stück als gefälscht erkannt worden waren. Gaudburtschungen bei den Verhafteten blieben ergebnislos; ihre durchwegs unglaubwürdige Verantwortung ließ aber vermuten, daß sie das Herstellungsmaterial eben beiseite geschafft haben mußten.

Kaganitsch war der erste, der sich zu einem Geständnis verstand. Er bekannte, daß er die Fälschungen durchgeführt habe, und zwar schon vor zwei Jahren. Die Fälschate sind auf photographischen Wege hergestellt worden. Bis zum März will Kaganitsch 20 bis 100 Stück falsche Noten erzeugt und dann die

Platten, Säuren und Farben vernichtet haben. Er bezeichnet die Fälschungen als Spielerei. Erst vor vier Wochen, als er infolge schwachen Verdienstes in drückende Schulden geriet, er trat mit Wranowitsch in Verbindung, der ihm bei der Verbreitung half und zur Hälfte an dem Gewinn beteiligt war. Das ganze Ertrags gibt er mit 800 S. an. Wranowitsch ergänzte das Geständnis seines Kameraden durch die Mitteilung, daß sie zusammen zirka 45 falsche Noten in Umlauf gesetzt haben. Ueber Kaganitsch und Wranowitsch wurde die gerichtliche Untersuchungsbefugnis verhängt.

Eine neue Verjüngungsmethode. Erfolge in Wien.

Nachdem Steinach gezeigt hatte, daß sich durch einen operativen Eingriff die alternde Pubertätsdrüse wiederbeleben und damit eine allgemeine Verjüngung des Organismus erzielen läßt, festen Bestrebungen ein, das selbe Ziel auf unblutigem Wege zu erreichen. In der Tat gelang es in manchen Fällen, mit Diathermie oder Röntgenbestrahlung der Keimdrüsen einen „Steinach-Effekt“ herbeizuführen.

In der eben erschienenen Nummer der „Wiener Medizinischen Wochenschrift“ teilt nun Dr. E. Schrötter mit, daß er auf Grund dieser Erfahrungen daran gegangen ist, einen Apparat zu konstruieren, der sich bei den praktischen Erprobungen durchaus befriedigend bewährt hat. Der — wenn man ihn so nennen darf — Verjüngungsapparat beruht auf einer Kombination radioaktiver und thermischer Strahlung und besteht im wesentlichen aus einem Elektrothermophor, der mit einer radioaktiven Lösung beschickt ist. Der Apparat wird nach Art der Binden, wie sie Sportleute tragen, angelegt. Versuche haben ergeben, daß durch diese neue Methode tatsächlich eine bedeutende Anregung des Zellwachstums, insbesondere der Zwischenzellen — die nach Steinach die Pubertätsdrüse darstellen — hervorgerufen wird.



Praktische Erprobungen des neuen Verjüngungsverfahrens an Menschen wurden in Wien, Paris und Budapest in vielen Fällen vorgenommen und haben den günstigen Einfluß der mit Durchwärmung kombinierten Radiumbestrahlung der Keimdrüsen dargestellt. Vorzeitiges Altern, Konvaleszenz nach chronischen Erkrankungen, im besonderen Krankheiten an den Keimdrüsen selbst bilden das Anwendungsgebiet des Apparates. Wenn die bisherigen ermutigenden Erfolge auch der Nachprüfung standhalten, wäre mit dem neuen Verjüngungsverfahren durch seine Einfachheit und Gefährlosigkeit eine wertvolle Bereicherung der unblutigen Reaktivierungsmethoden gewonnen.

Die Verfolgung der Mörder des Lindbergh-Babys.**Angebliche Personbeschreibung der Entführer.**

New York, 14. Mai. Der Millionär Curtis hat der Polizei die Namen und Personbeschreibungen der Entführer übermittelt, mit denen er in Verbindung war, als die Leiche des Lindbergh-Babys entdeckt wurde.

Die Staatsanwaltschaft der Grafschaft Hunterton, wo der Mord verübt wurde, ist im Begriff, die Ermächtigung des Gouverneurs Moore zur Einberufung der Großen Jury einzuholen, um unverzüglich die Personen, deren Namen ihr bekannt sind, in Anklagezustand zu versetzen.

Sozialbericht.

(Kinoprogramme.) Die Programme der Wiener Kinos befinden sich auf Seite 43.

(Wiener Radioprogramme.) Das Wiener Radioprogramm und die wichtigsten Auslandsendungen für heute, morgen und übermorgen befinden sich auf Seite 42.

(Die amtliche Wettervorhersage) für die Pfingstfeiertage lautet: Vorwiegend heiter, Gewitterneigung, warm, lokale Winde. Montag vielleicht etwas kühler, nordöstliche Winde.

(Klosterfeld) zeigt neue Modelle in Wäsche, Blusen,ingeriekleidern, Pyjamas, Trikots zu überraschend mäßigen Preisen nur IX. Türkenstraße 19, Palais Rheinhof, Telefon A-16-147.

(Autounfall der „Blumentoni“) Am Samstag nacht hat die unter dem Namen „Die Blumentoni“ bekannte 48jährige Blumenverkäuferin Antonie Stompe, Marokkanergasse 3, einen Unfall erlitten. Die Verkäuferin wollte an der Kreuzung des Ringes und der Dimelepfurstraße die Fußgänger überqueren und kam gerade vor ein vorbeifahrendes Auto, das ein Privatkauffahrer aus Eodereau führte. Wohl verfuhr der Chauffeur im letzten Moment den Wagen, so daß die Verkäuferin, wie mehrere Augenzeugen bestätigten, von dem Wagen gar nicht erfaßt wurde, doch stürzte sie infolge des Schreckens daraufhin „unglücklich“, daß sie sich

Mitteilungen aus dem Publikum.

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Die sicherste Kapitalanlage — ein Grundstück!

Besondere Gelegenheit zum Kauf vorzüglich geeigneter zukunftsfähiger Grundstücke in Wien in jeder gewünschten Größe. Anfragen unter **Sticht vom Eigentümer 837** an das **Städt. Bureau b. V.**

einen Bruch der rechten Elle zuzog. Sie wurde auf die zweite Unfallstation gebracht.

(Kassenfächer bei der Oesterreichischen Postsparkasse.) Zur sicheren Aufbewahrung von Wertpapieren und Wertgegenständen, insbesondere in der Reisezeit und während der Sommeraufenthalte, empfehlen sich die Kassenfächer der Postsparkasse, Wien, I. Georg-Georg-Platz 2. Sie sind in einem gegen Feuer und Einbruch gesicherten und streng bewachten Raum des Postsparkassengebäudes untergebracht und stehen unter eigenem Verluß der Parteien. Die Fächer sind 25 cm breit und 46 cm tief, die Höhe der Fachgrößen I bis IV bewegt sich zwischen 9 und 24 cm. Der Mietpreis für ein Kassenfach beträgt je nach der Größe des Faches halbjährlich 6 bis 20 S. Die größten Fächer (Fachgröße V) sind derzeit voll vermietet. Die Geschäftsbestimmungen für Kassenfächer sind beim Postsparkassenamt unentgeltlich erhältlich.

(Der Wimpffschen Hauskomplex auf dem Hohen Markt verkauft.) Die schon seit mehreren Monaten wegen Verwertung des großen Wimpffschen Häuserblocks auf dem Hohen Markt 8/9 und Berghof 3 gepflogenen Verhandlungen haben nunmehr mit dem Erwerbe der Liegenschaft durch die Anglo-Elementar-Versicherungsaktiengesellschaft ihren Abschluß gefunden.

(Döblinger Strandbad.) XIX. Döblinger Hauptstraße 70, ab 1. Mai eröffnet. Unbefristete Badezeit.

(Kompositionen des Josef Mayer-Wichhorn.) Der bekannte Kapellmeister der Urania Josef Mayer-Wichhorn gab gestern in der Urania ein durch einen überraschend starken Besuch ausgezeichnetes Konzert, in welchem der weite Umfang seiner Begabung und seine Kunst, das Volksliedermäßige zu treffen, in einer von seiner großen Gemeinde mit herzlichem Beifall bedankten Weise hervortrat; sowohl seinelieder wie seine Fragmente aus einer klangerreichen Oper, seine Serenade für Violine, Flöte und Klavier und sein Konzertwalzer für Cello, namentlich aber seine Wienerlieder lösten beim Publikum großes Interesse aus. Die Unterhaltung, welche der Meister der Vortragskunst Direktor Karl Jäger dem Abend zuteil werden ließ, verdient besonders hervorgehoben zu werden.

(Verlangen Sie nur) Prebaurer Sauerbrunn, das österreichische Mineralwasser.

(Selbstmordversuch einer vierzehnjährigen.) Gestern abend hat die 14jährige Hauptschülerin Angela Beda in der elterlichen Wohnung, III. Parkgasse 9, einen Selbstmordversuch durch Einatmen von Leuchtgas verübt, doch konnte sie rechtzeitig gerettet werden. Das junge Mädchen hatte nachmittags eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Mutter, weil sie trotz deren Verbotes eine Freundin besucht hatte. Sie nahm sich den Streit so zu Herzen, daß sie aus dem Leben scheiden wollte.

(Gisler.) Eine den Intelligenzkreisen angehörende Dame, die eine alte Mutter und einen arbeitslosen Sohn erhalten muß, befindet sich in großer Not. Ihr Baute, ein Ingenieur, ist schon seit Jahren als unheilbar am „Leibschmerz“ erkrankt. In der Verzweiflung über das große Unglück, in das die Frau ganz ohne ihr Verschulden geraten ist, hat sie bereits dreimal Selbstmordversuche verübt, konnte aber immer gerettet werden. Nun bietet sich ihr Gelegenheit zu neuer Ergründung. Allerdings sind größere Mittel erforderlich, da verfehlte Gegenstände ausgelöst, eine gute Maschine angeschafft und ein Geschäftslokal gemietet werden müßte. Unsere Administration ist gern bereit, Spenden für diese so bedauernswerte Frau zu übernehmen.

(Die Tabaktrafiken zu Pfingsten.) Pfingstsonntag: von 7 Uhr früh bis 9 Uhr 30 Minuten. Früheres Definieren ist im Bedarfsfalle gestattet, längeres Offenhalten untersagt. Pfingstmontag haben die Trafiken geschlossen zu bleiben.

(Sommerheim Cecelich am Grundsee.) Dieses Heim für geistige Arbeiter wird am 15. Juni eröffnet und bleibt bis zum 30. September offen. Anmeldungen täglich von 11 bis 1 Uhr im Schwarzwaldbischen Sekretariat, Wien, I. Wallnerstraße 9.

(Brigittemeier.) Der Oesterreichische Bridgeverband veranstaltet Donnerstag im Hotel de France ein Bridge-Turnier, dessen Meistertätigkeit der Wiener Freiwirtschafts-Vereinungsgesellschaft angeschlossen ist. Wiener Frauen haben für diese Veranstaltung namhafte Preise gespendet. Eintrittskarten beim Oesterreichischen Bridgeverband, in den Wiener Bridgeclubs und im Hotel de France.

(Ferienkolonie Wollan.) Der Humanitätsverein für die westlichen Berke Wien VI eröffnet wie alljährlich seine Ferienkolonie Wollan, Morarstraße 15, und zwar: erster Turnus Knaben und Mädchen von 7 bis 14 Jahren vom 5. Juli bis 3. August, zweiter Turnus Knaben und Mädchen von 7 bis 14 Jahren vom 9. August bis 7. September. Anmeldungen nur vormittags von 9 bis 12 Uhr, Sekretariat, VI. Mollardgasse 85 (Karl Fröhlich, Tel. B-29-1-65).

(Die Fußball-Eff) des Kaufhauses A. Herzmannsky erhielt eine Einladung aus Budapest, zwei Spiele gegen die Firmenmannschaft Golderberger zu Pfingsten in Budapest auszutragen. Die Reisteilnehmer und Spieler unternehmen die Reise mittels Autobus.

(„Illustrazione Vaticana.“) Seit Januar dieses Jahres erscheint eine deutsche Ausgabe dieser Halbmonatszeitschrift. Bis jetzt gab es neben der italienischen noch eine französische Ausgabe; eine englische und eine holländische werden vorbereitet. Alle Auflagen dieser „Illustrierten Zeitschrift des Vatikans“ werden in einer eigenen, mit modernen Maschinen eingerichteten neuen Druckerei hergestellt. Die Broschüre befaßt sich mit dem kulturellen Leben der katholischen Kirche in der ganzen Welt, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ereignisse im Vatikan und der Vorgänge bei der Zentralregierung der Kirche. Chefredakteur des Blattes ist Conte della Torre, auch Hauptschriftleiter des „Osservatore Romano“. Die deutsche Ausgabe wird von Regierungsrat Professor Franz Xaver Zimmermann redigiert. Die „Illustrazione Vaticana“ ist technisch glänzend ausgestattet.

(Nichtstellung.) Bei der am Mittwoch den 11. und Donnerstag den 12. d. stattfindenden 114. Konvention von Albert Rende, I. Rämmerstraße 4, aus dem Radaß des Großindustriellen Kommerzialrat S. und Wiener Privatbank wurden 110.000 S. samt Zuschlag erzielt und nach wie vorlich bezahlt 1.110.000 S.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shulman, NARS, Date 12-18-75

0876

An die Leser, Freunde und Mitarbeiter der Jugend-Beilage.

Die „Neue Freie Presse“ wird für die Freunde, Leser und Mitarbeiter der Jugend-Beilage in aller nächster Zeit — je nach der Witterung Ende Mai oder Anfang Juni — unter Leitung des Malers und Graphikers Karl Fränkel

in Salmannsdorf

Aufführungen der lustigen und kulturell so überaus anregenden Richard Kralkischen Alt-Wiener Puppenspiele veranstalten.

Zunächst soll ein Marionettenspiel aus Wiens historischer Vergangenheit mit Originalkostümen und Alt-Wiener Originalmusik zur Darstellung gelangen.

Ein Entree für diese Veranstaltung wird nicht eingehoben.

Alles Nähere wird noch verlautbart werden.

Theater- und Kunstnachrichten.

(Ernst Deutsch als Romeo auf der Grabhügel-Schloßterrasse.) Obwohl aus einer Kaufmannsfamilie stammend, erzählt Ernst Deutsch, der feurige Dialekt- und temperamentvolle Teufelskühler, „war ich schon als achtjähriger Knirps vom Theaterfieber befallen, schleppte mir als Volkskühler und später als Gymnasiast, Kollegen in mein Prager Elternhaus, kostümierte mich phantastisch und brachte Klavier im Kinderzimmer zur Aufführung. Nach Ueberwindung der üblichen Widerstände innerhalb einer sehr großen Verwandtschaft kam ich an die Schauspielschule der Akademie in Wien, rig aber nach wenigen Wochen aus, da ich nicht die Geduld hatte, zwei Jahre lang zu lernen. Ich sprach bei Albert Seiner vor und er erteilte mir daraufhin Privatunterricht. Zur selben Zeit, ich zählte damals neunzehn Jahre, eröffneten Stephan Großmann und Arthur Rindt die Volksbühne in der Neubaugasse. Ich war wieder nach Prag zurückgekehrt, wo ich eines Nachts mit Franz Werfel und Heribold Viertel, der Regisseur bei der Volksbühne war und zufällig in Prag weilte, einen Spaziergang machte. Als wir die Stiege auf dem Grabhügel emporstiegen, spielte ich, einer plötzlichen Eingebung folgend, auf den Treppen die Balkonzene des Romeo. Freilich nur mit einer supponierten Julia. Einige Passanten blieben stehen, schüttelten die Köpfe, flüsternten: „Ein Narr!“ und flüchteten. Viertel sprach tags darauf in Wien mit Großmann, und eine Woche später war ich Mitglied der Volksbühne. Zu meiner ersten großen Rolle bin ich ganz wie in einem Theaterroman durch die Erkrankung des Darstellers der Hauptrolle in „Salvatore“, Josef Wörz, gekommen. Von Wien ging ich an das Alberttheater in Dresden, von wo ich auf Grund meiner Erfolge in „Wilhelm“ und „Hänsel und Gretel“, „Sohn“ zu Reinhardt nach Berlin kam. Für die Rollen, die meine Laufbahn entscheidend beeinflussten, halte ich den Fiesco, den ich unter Regie am Staatlichen Schauspielhaus spielte, und den „Alphons“ in der „Jüdin von Toledo“ mit Maria Orska als Rahel. Die Gunst der Berliner blieb mir sogar treu, als ich in der Komödie in „Hänsel und Gretel“, „Kommt ein Vogel geflogen“ einen ausgesprochenen Durchfall erleben mußte. Während in Berlin ein Mißerfolg nicht nur einen Dichter, sondern auch einen Darsteller oft für immer erliegen kann, fand ich bei meinem letzten Auftreten in dem Schauspiel „Kopf in der Schlinge“ viel Anerkennung. An das Wiener Burgtheater bin ich als Gast mit einigen Herzklopfen gekommen. Aber an Stelle der erwarteten Reserviertheit fand ich im Kreise der Kollegen ein wohlwollend freundschaftliches Entgegenkommen, das die künstlerische Arbeit ungemein erleichterte und mich nie fühlend ließ, daß ich zum erstenmal innerhalb eines seit Jahren fest zusammengeführten Ensembles zu spielen habe.“

(Die Regisseure der Salzburger Festspiele 1932.) Für die geplante Neuinszenierung von Hofmannsthal's „Jedermann“ wurde, wie bereits gemeldet, die persönliche Mitarbeit Max Reinhardts gesichert. — In die Opernregie teilen sich Karl Ebert, der Intendant der Berliner Staatlichen Oper, Dr. Franz Ludwig Höpff, der Oberregisseur der Berliner Staatsoper, Karlheinz Martin, Direktor des Berliner Deutschen Theaters, und Dr. Gotthard Wallerstein, der Oberregisseur des Wiener Operntheaters. Mit Clemens Krauß als Dirigenten und Lotte Lehmann, Gertrude Kragler, Viorica Ursuleac, Josef (o.) Manowarda und Franz Söhler in den Hauptrollen bereitet Dr. Wallerstein die Neuinszenierung von Richard Strauß' „Die Frau ohne Schatten“ vor. Außerdem stammen von Dr. Wallerstein die Inszenierungen von Berthovens „Fidelio“ (Dirigent Doktor Richard Strauß), Mozarts „Così fan tutte“ und „Figaros Hochzeit“ sowie Strauß' „Rosenkavalier“ (Dirigent Clemens Krauß). Karl Ebert übernahm die Neuinszenierung von Mozarts „Entführung aus dem Serail“ unter Generalmusikdirektor Fritz Busch, während Franz Ludwig Höpff unter Leitung Bruno Walters Webers „Oberon“ neu herausbringt. Karlheinz Martin zeichnet für die Inszenierung von Glucks „Orpheus und Eurydike“, die, wie im Vorjahre, am Dirigentenpult Bruno Walter und in den beiden Titelpartien Maria Müller und Sigrid Onegin vorführt. Für die Choreographie in diesem Werk wie in Webers „Oberon“ wurde die Berliner Tanzregisseurin Margarete Wallmann mit ihrer Tanzgruppe berufen. Die Festspiele werden Samstag den 30. Juli von Clemens Krauß mit „Rosenkavalier“ eröffnet und Mittwoch den 31. August von Richard Strauß mit „Fidelio“ beendet.

(Erster internationaler Wettbewerb für Gesang und Violine.) Für den ersten internationalen Wettbewerb für Gesang und Violine (5. bis 19. Juni 1932) sind 631 Anmeldungen eingelaufen. In den letzten Tagen hat sich aus dem vorbereitenden Komitee ein künstlerisches Exekutivkomitee gebildet, dem der Präsident der internationalen Jury Operndirektor Clemens Krauß, die Vizepräsidenten der internationalen Jury Direktor Cesare Nordio und Professor Josef Reitler, die Professoren Dr. Robert Konta und Oberregisseur Dr. Gotthard Wallerstein angehören und dem Kongressdirektor Rosner zugezogen ist. Den in Wien einzutreffenden Wettbewerbskandidaten wird die Stunde und das Lokal bekanntgegeben werden, wann und wo sie vor die durch das Los bestimmte Prüfungskommission zu treten haben. Alle Juratoren befragen so wie die Mitglieder des künstlerischen Exekutivkomitees alle Arbeiten ehrenamtlich. Der großen Auswahlprüfung (Selection) folgt dann der eigentliche Wettbewerb (Concours). Die im eigentlichen Wettbewerb

Mitteilungen aus dem Publikum.

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DOROTHEUM - WIEN.

Freiwillige Versteigerung

der Wohnungseinrichtung aus dem Besitze der Pianistin
Margarete Gelbard-Asséo.


Schaustellung: Dienstag den 17. bis Donnerstag den 19. Mai 1932 von 10 bis 6 Uhr im Maria-Theresien-Saal des Dorotheums, I. Dorotheergasse 17.
Versteigerung: Freitag den 20. Mai 1932 von 3 Uhr an im Maria-Theresien-Saal.

als besondere Talente erkannten Begabungen werden prämiert. Die höchste Anerkennung (für je einen Sänger und Geiger) ist die Verleihung des Wien-Prestes; neben diesem werden noch weitere Geldpreise und Diplome zuerkannt. Für die Wochen des Wettbewerbes wird im Militärkasino, I. Schwarzenbergplatz 1, ein Bureau etabliert, das als Zentralfstelle für alle informativen und administrativen Angaben der Juratoren und Konkurrenten (Entgegennahme, Aufzeichnung und Verteilung der einlaufenden Post, Verlegung mit Druckformen, Zuteilung der Prüfungskommissionen und Prüfungsskizzen uho.) zu fungieren hat.

(Die Staatsbürgerhaft Max Reinhardts.) Aus Prag wird gemeldet: Max Reinhardt hat sich zum Zwecke der Erlangung der lettlandischen Staatsbürgerschaft an das Preßburger Notariat gewandt, um eine Urkunde zu erhalten, daß er nicht mehr geschlossenschaftlicher Staatsbürger sei. Das Gesuch wurde dem Innenministerium zugewiesen. Max Reinhardt hatte schon einmal um die Entlassung aus dem geschlossenschaftlichen Staatsverband angeht und diese auch erhalten. Das geschlossenschaftliche Innenministerium untersucht jetzt, ob Reinhardt überhaupt geschlossenschaftlicher Staatsbürger war und ob er je die Staatsbürgerschaft beilegte hat. Max Reinhardt ist in Stamps bei Preßburg geboren. Sein Schach- und das Innenministerium ist damit begründet, daß er lettlandischer Staatsbürger werden wolle.

1832 SEIT 100 JAHREN
STADT KLAGENFURT
1932

(Naturale als Honorar für die Bilder der Hagenbund-Ausstellung.) Ein Zeichen der Zeit: die Künstler, deren Werke in der Hagenbund-Ausstellung zu sehen sind, haben sich bereit erklärt, ihre Bilder im Tauschwege gegen Naturale, Kleidungsstücke, Spielmaterial u. dgl. abzugeben. Schon die erste Woche der Ausstellung hat den Künstlern zahlreiche Anfragen und Tauschangebote gebracht — während normale Kaufangebote nur ganz vereinzelt erfolgten. Eine Dame hat sich bereit erklärt, dem Maler eines von ihr gewählten Bildes einen einjährigen englischen Sprachunterricht zu erteilen. Ein Schneider, der von einem Gemälde entzückt ist, erbietet sich zur Lieferung eines Anzuges. Ein Schuhmacher dagegen, der für ein Paar Schuhe ein Bild zu erhalten wünscht, dürfte allerdings keinen Wunsch nehmen? Einige wünschen sich eine Kompletierung ihrer Wohnungseinrichtung, andere legen Wert auf ein Motorrad oder einen Anzug. Auffallend viele haben nur einen Wunsch: Lebensmittel.



Dieses Zimmer wurde auf der heurigen Frühjahrsmesse viel bestaunt. Wirklich: nicht allzuviel Möbel! sagten alle. Solche und andere Musterzimmer neuerzeitlicher Wohnkultur sehen Sie zwanglos in unseren Ausstellungsräumen: VII. Siebensterngasse 31

neuezeitliche Wohnkultur
Arch. Seidler & Co.

(Konzertabend des Vereines der Museumsfreunde.) Wie in vergangenen Jahren wird auch der diesjährige für Mittwoch den 18. d., halb 9 Uhr, anberaumte Konzertabend des Vereines der Museumsfreunde, zu dem der Bundespräsident, die Mitglieder des diplomatischen Korps sowie die Vertreter von Kunst, Wissenschaft und Literatur ihr Erscheinen zugesichert haben, im Ruppelsaal des Oberen Belvedere abgehalten werden. Das Quartett Maier & Co. wird das Debüt-Quartett von Mozart, Frau Kammerjängerin Elisabeth Schu-

mann und Kammerjänger Richard Mayr, beide von Professor Karl Alwin begleitet, werden Goethesche Lieder, erstere unter anderen „Das Mädchen“ und „Das Mädchenlein“, letztere „Grenzen der Menschheit“, den „Erk König“ sowie einige Lieder aus dem Schenkensbuch zum Vortrag bringen. Die Säle der Gemäldesäle werden den Gästen des Vereines an diesem Abend geöffnet sein. Karten nur im Vereinssekretariat: Reissnerstraße 32, Telefon U-16-6-57. Keine Abendkasse.

(Pflingsten im Burggarten.) Der erste der beiden Feiertage, Pfingstsonntag, bringt auf der Burggartenbühne ein Konzert des Symphonieorchesters unter Kapellmeister Solzer „Alte und neue Operetten-Schlager“. Solist Kammerjänger Ziegler. Am Pfingstmontag dirigiert Dr. Cornelius ein Orchesterkonzert, dessen Violinolo Professor Malcher spielt.

(Kulturundbortrag Paul Valéry.) Paul Valéry, Mitglied der „Académie Française“, der hervorragende französische Dichter und Essayist, wird am Freitag den 20. d., eingeladen vom Kulturbund, im Vortragssaal, I. Parkring 8, einen Vortrag halten. Kartenverkauf im Sekretariat des Kulturbundes, I. Parkring 8, Telefon R-24-2-71, und bei den Vorverkaufsstellen.

(Das Konzert der 1000 Musiker.) Samstag den 11. Juni findet im Stadion das „Konzert der 1000 Musiker“ statt. Dieses größte aller bisher stattgehabten Konzerte wird Johann Strauß (Enkel) dirigieren, der erst vor kurzem von einer erfolgreichen Welttournee nach Europa zurückgekehrt ist. Das Programm dieses Monsterkonzertes, das zugunsten des Roten Kreuzes des österreichischen Musikerverbandes stattfindet, wird ausschließlich Werke der Strauß-Dynastie enthalten. Das Arrangement liegt in den Händen des Kommerzialrates Benno Lie. Sitzplätze 3.— und 2.—, Stehplätze 1.— Schilling.

(Ermäßigte Theater- und Konzertkarten für die Jugend.) Das Europäische Jugendbündnis in Wien gewährt in Fortsetzung der Aktion der „Neuen Freien Presse“ seinen Mitgliedern außer den sonst üblichen Begünstigungen für die Kammerspiele 40 Prozent und für das Simpliciorabatt 30 Prozent Ermäßigung. Karten im Europäischen Jugendbündnis, I. Annagasse 5, täglich von 3 bis 6 Uhr.

(Andreas Dippel gestorben.) Im Alter von 67 Jahren ist in Los Angeles der Opernsänger und frühere Direktor der New Yorker Metropolitan Opera, Andreas Dippel, gestorben. Nach einjähriger Direktionszeit übernahm er, der früher fünf Jahre in der Wiener Oper sich wegen seiner Tüchtigkeit und Verlässlichkeit beliebt gemacht hatte, die Leitung der Chicagoer Oper und gründete in den letzten Jahren ein eigenes Unternehmen, die Dippel Opera Comique Company, mit dem er aber nicht reüssierte. Er starb als Opfer der Wirtschaftskrise.

Burgtheater. Am Pfingstmontag nachmittags 2 Uhr gelangt zu Nachmittagspreisen Goethes „Torquato Tasso“ zur Aufführung. Abends 7 Uhr wird die dramatische Historie „Der junge Medardus“ von Arthur Schnitzler aufgeführt. — Dienstag den 17. d. geht die Komödie „Disraeli“ von G. M. Mayer und Arthur Rindt in Szene (Theatergemeinde Serie B, blaue Mitgliederkarten). Anfang 8 Uhr. — Mittwoch den 18. d. wird gleichfalls „Disraeli“ im Monnement (I. Gruppe) aufgeführt. Anfang 8 Uhr. — Mittwoch den 25. d. findet die Erstaufführung der Neuinszenierung von Schillers „Die Räuber“ statt. Die Besetzung der Rollen ist folgende: Der alte Moor — G. Meiners; Karl — Hartmann; Franz — Kolan; Amalia — Ortrud-Kallina; Spiegelberg — W. Zeha; Schweizer — Walter; Grimm — Siebert; Rozmann — Volters; Schusterle — Gubner; Koller — Hennings; Rosinsky — Lohner; Schwarz — Disinger; Hermann — Marr; Daniel — Müller; Ein Vater — Siebert; Erster Räuber — Braun; Pastor Mojer — Herterich; Regie: Direktor Hermann Kabbeling. Bühnenbilder: Alfred Koller. — In der ersten Hälfte Juni gelangt am Burgtheater zum erstenmal Reizungs „Das Haus der Temperamente“, neu eingerichtet von Julius Bauer, mit Musik von Julius Wittner zur Aufführung. Besetzung: Herr v. Braus — Braun; Robert — Volters; Walburga — Dreger; Herr v. Jod — Womma; Edmund — G. Meiners; Agnes — Seidler; Gutsdub — Maierhofer; Schänkel — Hennings; Herr v. Trüb — Heim; Guido — W. Zeha; Irene — Ortrud-Kallina; Herr v. Froh — Gubner; Felix — Huber; Marie — Janssen; Isabella — Glossy; Sturm — Marr; Schlaf — Pranger; Schmerz — Schüge; Glück — Schmidt; Frau v. Korbsheim — Pünksch; Herr v. Finster — Blum; Frau v. Nachschatten — Karoly; Jakob — Karsten; Gyprian — Siebert; Brigitte — Kramer. Regie: Otto Preminger a. G. Bühnenbilder: Otto Niedermayer.

Akademietheater. Am Pfingstmontag nachmittags 4 Uhr gelangen zu Nachmittagspreisen „Seitenprünge“ von Kurt Goetz zur Aufführung. Abends 8 Uhr wird die Komödie „Der Teufelskühler“ von Bernard Shaw, deutsch von Siegfried Trebitsch, aufgeführt. — Dienstag den 17. d. werden „Seitenprünge“ gegeben. Anfang 8 Uhr. — In den ersten Junitagen findet die Uraufführung von „Professor Unrat“, nach dem Roman Heinrich Manns von Erich Obermayer statt. Besetzung: Professor Unrat — Welker; Rohmann — Lohner; v. Erzum — Bettac; Kiefelack — Edlig; Luise Fröhlich — Wogener; Kiepert — Höbling; Guste — Albach-Reitzy; Dr. Rosco — Friebl; Rektor — Seydelmann; Sedan — Stragni; Drömerjack — Disinger; Rindfleisch — Paufermann; Mutter Rindfleisch — Wilke; Ministerialrat — Siebert; Emilie — Mell. Regie: Otto Treffler. Bühnenbilder: Remigius Geyling.

Kammerjängerin Maria Jeriza wird in dieser Woche im Operntheater zweimal auftreten, und zwar am Donnerstag den 19. d. als Winnie in der Oper „Das Mädchen aus dem goldenen Westen“ und Sonntag den 22. d. als Manon. Diese Partie hat Frau Jeriza im Operntheater seit vielen Jahren nicht mehr gesungen. Herr Jan Kiepura, der seine Tätigkeit als engagiertes Mitglied des Operntheaters gestern begonnen hat, wird in dieser Woche am Dienstag den 17. d. die von ihm kreierte Rolle des Kalaf in der Oper „Turandot“, mit Frau Remeth in der Titelfolle, darstellen. Am Sonntag den 22. d. wird der Künstler in der Oper „Manon“ zum erstenmal in Wien die Partie des Des Grieux singen.

Im Deutschen Volkstheater wird als nächste Neuheit Walter Hajenclevers Abenteuer „Napoleon greift ein“ vorbereitet. Die Aufführung findet nach Abschluß des Gastspiels von Hans Albers in Franz Molnars Vorstadtliege „Liliom“ statt.

In der Volksoper findet die Premiere von „Friederike“ mit Käthe Dorich und Kammerjänger Alfred Piccaver in der Hauptpartien und unter Leitung des Komponisten Franz Lehar Donnerstag den 19. d. statt. In den übrigen Partien Pizzoli Holzschuh (Solomoe), Kapi Kramer-Glänzer (Maddalena), Max Willens (Lenz), Heinrich Pacher (Pfarrer) und Otto Storm (Hauptmann Knebel). Die Inszenierung befohl Eugen Ströhm.

Konzert der Gesangsklasse Alfred Weiß des Neuen Wiener Konservatoriums Freitag den 20. d., 1/8 Uhr, im kleinen Musikvereinsaal. Musikalische Leitung: Fritz Bland. Karten: Schulkasse und Abendkasse.

Orgelkonzert im St. Stephans-Dom am Mittwoch um 7 Uhr. Domorganist Wilhelm Mück wird Werke von G. Böhm und J. S. Bach spielen sowie improvisieren.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By William D. Shaw NARS, Date 12-18-75

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früheren 27 Geschäftsteilungen gibt es nun deren 30. Diese Ziffer allein beweist das bedeutende Anwachsen der Exekutionen und Versteigerungen. Während früher vielfach über den schleppenden Geschäftsgang bei diesem Gerichte geklagt wurde, können nun durch die vermehrte Zahl der Abteilungen und die damit verbundene Vermehrung des Personals die Geschäfte wieder flott abgewickelt werden.

Erklärungen Hofrat Jorns von der Wirtschaftspolizei.

Sehr interessant sind die Auskünfte Hofrat Jorns, des bekannten Leiters der Wirtschaftspolizei: In das Gebiet der Wirtschaftspolizei fallen der Kettenhandel, die Preistreibererei, betrügerische Krida, Veruntreuung von Geschäftsleuten und der Kreditwucher. Nahezu zehn Jahre war bei der Wirtschaftspolizei kein Fall von Kettenhandel zu verzeichnen, bis im November 1931 wieder ein Fall vorkam, in dem auch die Staatsanwaltschaft die Anklage erheben wird. Es war dies um die Zeit, als durch die neu geschaffene Devisenverordnung Gerüchte umgingen, es werde ein Mangel an importierten Nahrungsmitteln eintreten. Dies benutzte ein Kaufmann und lagerte sich eine große Menge Reis ein, die er noch am selben Tage weiterverkauft. Der Reis ging an einem Tag durch drei Hände und verteuerte sich dadurch um 30 Prozent.

Was die Preistreibererei anbelangt, so ist hier ein bedeutendes Sinken der Anzeigen zu verzeichnen. 670 Anzeigen im Jahre 1930 stehen bloß 200 Anzeigen im Jahre 1931 gegenüber. Diese bedeutende Abnahme ist darauf zurückzuführen, daß die Tendenz der Preise im allgemeinen eine sinkende war. Zurückgegangen ist auch die Zahl der Anzeigen wegen Kreditwuchers. Im Jahre 1930 waren es 300, im Jahre 1931 230.

Gingegen haben sich die Anzeigen wegen betrügerischer Krida bedeutend vermehrt. Sie stiegen von 290 im Jahre 1930 auf 450 im Jahre 1931. Das gleiche gilt von den Veruntreuungen, die von 690 auf 750 stiegen.

201 Fälle von Devisenbetrüben.

Die Devisenverordnung schuf der Wirtschaftspolizei ein neues Wirkungsgebiet. Sie hat vom 10. Oktober 1931, an welchem Tage die Verordnung in Kraft trat, bis 1. Januar 1932 201 Fälle behandelt. Bei der Verfolgung der Devisenbetrüben hat sich der Wirtschaftspolizei Gelegenheit, ganz interessante Beobachtungen zu machen. So hat in letzter Zeit unter den Schleichhändlern eine Flucht vor dem Dollar eingeleitet. Der Dollar ist im Schleichhandel um 7.30 zu haben. Der Preis unterscheidet sich kaum von dem der Nationalbank. Sehr interessant ist auch, daß bedeutende Mengen von tschechischen Kronen im Schleichhandel nach Österreich gelangen.

Ein anderes, aber nicht unerfreuliches Krisensymptom wird in der Tatfrage gefunden, daß die Prozesse wegen verbotener Rückkehr im Abnehmen begriffen sind, besonders soweit männliche Uebelthäter in Frage kommen. Das heißt, ausgewiesene, unerwünschte Elemente, Verbrecher, sonstige unbenqueme Personen, kehren viel seltener nach Wien zurück. Wir können uns darüber trösten, daß Wien in seiner Wirtschaftslage die Anziehungskraft auf sie verloren hat.

(Konflikt des Kammerjägers Patáky mit dem Operntheater.) Zwischen dem Kammerjäger Koloman Patáky und dem Operntheater ist ein Konflikt ausgebrochen, weil er in der Volksoper ein Gastspiel im Rahmen der Operette „Bravo, Peggy“ absolvieren sollte, was ihm von der Intendanz mit der Begründung verboten worden ist, daß er damit einen Bruch seines zwölfmonatigen Vertrages mit der Oper begehen würde. Da eine gütliche Einigung nicht zustande kam, hat Patáky

Jugend-Tenniskurse.

Ein neuer Anfängerkurs. — Perfektionsstunden für die Fortgeschrittenen.

Der große Anhang, den die von der „Neuen Freien Presse“ gemeinsam mit dem Lawn-Tennis-Klub „Tempo“ veranstalteten Tenniskurse für Anfänger gefunden haben, veranlaßt unsere Sportredaktion, die Kurse zu wiederholen.

Kurse für Anfänger.

Der neue Kurs umfaßt wieder zwölf Lehrstunden, und zwar zweimal wöchentlich, so daß die Absolvierung des ganzen Kurses sechs Wochen in Anspruch nimmt. Mit Ausnahme der Tennis-, respektive Turnschuhe werden die Teilnehmer keinerlei Ausrüstung brauchen. Neben den Plätzen und der Tennisübungswand, werden auch Bälle und Schläger für die Kursstunden gratis beigegeben. Die Teilnahme am Kurs kostet insgesamt 15 Schilling ohne irgendwelche Nebengebühren.

Die Kurse stehen wieder unter der bewährten Leitung der geprüften Tennislehrer Egon Sokoll-Reno und Walter Kreindl.

Die Einschreibungen zu den neuen Kursen, die wieder auf den Gartenbau-Plätzen abgehalten werden, finden ab Dienstag den 17. d. täglich, mit Ausnahme von Sonntag, in der Zeit von 10 bis 2 und 4 bis 8 Uhr in der Kanzlei des Lawn-Tennis-Klubs „Tempo“ am Gartenbau, I. Parkring 12, statt. Teilnahmsberechtigt sind alle Lehrer und Lehrerinnen der „Neuen Freien Presse“, welche bei der Anmeldung eine Abonnementbescheinigung vorlegen.

Die Kurse beginnen am 23. Mai. Gespielt wird täglich von 6 Uhr morgens bis Einbruch der Dunkelheit. Die Stunden können von den Teilnehmern bei der Anmeldung, bei welcher auch der Kursbeitrag zu erlegen ist, im Einvernehmen mit der Klubleitung gewählt werden. Es gilt hierbei ausschließlich das Recht der früheren Anmeldung, ohne jede Bevorzugung. Es empfiehlt sich daher die Anmeldung möglichst rechtzeitig vorzunehmen, damit den

Wünschen der einzelnen Teilnehmer bei der wieder zu erwartenden großen Nachfrage nachgekommen werden kann.

Wir sind überzeugt, daß auch diese Kurse bei unseren jungen Lesern und Leserinnen den gleichen Beifall finden werden wie die ersten und rechnen damit, daß wir wieder einer Reihe von jungen Talenten unter den Teilnehmern den Weg weisen können.

Perfektionsspiele für die Teilnehmer unserer ersten Tenniskurse.

Die ersten Tenniskurse der „Neuen Freien Presse“ nähern sich ihrem Abschluß. Der außerordentlich große Erfolg zeigt sich darin, daß der weitaus größte Teil der 430 Teilnehmer auf eine derartige Stufe gelangt ist, daß von allen Seiten der Wunsch geäußert wurde, die erworbenen Kenntnisse in irgend einer Form zu verwerten. Daher hat sich die Sportredaktion der „Neuen Freien Presse“, zusammen mit dem Lawn-Tennis-Klub „Tempo“ entschlossen, Perfektionsspiele auf dem Platz, unter Leitung eines geprüften Trainers zu veranstalten. Teilnahmsberechtigt sind ausschließlich Absolventen unserer Kurse. Alles Nähere über diese Perfektionsspiele erfahren die Teilnehmer auf Merkblättern, die in den letzten Kursstunden verteilt werden.

Gilliges Tennisspiel für Erwachsene.

Auf viele Anfragen teilen wir mit, daß in unserer gemeinsam mit der Tennissektion Vienna-Touring-Club durchgeführten Tennisaktion noch einige Plätze für Erwachsene frei sind. Hier wird das Spiel samt Beistellung von Bällen an allen Wochentagen zwischen 7 und halb 10 Uhr früh gegen eine monatliche Gebühr von 15 Schilling geboten. Gespielt wird auf den Klubplätzen auf der Hohen Warte. Anmeldungen mündlich oder telephonisch unter B-15-0-71 in der Klubkanzlei Hohen Warte.

keinen Anwalt, Dr. Max Fürst, mit der Einbringung einer Feststellungsklage beauftragt, daß er auf Grund seiner siebenmonatigen Bindung an die Oper, der er voll entsprochen habe, zur Absolvierung dieses Gastspiels berechtigt gewesen sei. Der Künstler will auch das Operntheater für den ihm durch die Abgabe entstandenen Schaden verantwortlich machen.

(Autounfall auf der Hochzeitsreise.) Am 30. Oktober v. J. stieß ein Autotaxi mit einem französischen Privatkraftwagen an der Kreuzung Semperitstraße-Berggasse zusammen. Es stellte sich heraus, daß die Besitzerin des Privatautos mit Frau Dorothea Valukiewicz, der Schwester des polnischen Gesandten in Wien Lukaszewicz, identisch war. Neben der Dame saß ihr Gatte, ein Großgrundbesitzer aus Tiffis im Kaukasus. Es war nur Sachschaden entstanden. Sowohl Frau Valukiewicz als auch der Taxikaffier Franz Auffnatter mußten sich vor dem Döblinger Strafrichter Dr. Wagner-Vöfller wegen Gefährdung der körperlichen Sicherheit verantworten. Frau Valukiewicz, eine auffallende Schönheit, war in tiefer Trauer erschienen, da ihr Gatte kurze Zeit nach dem Unfall verstarb. Der deutsche Sprache nicht mächtig, legte sie ihre Verantwortung in französischer Sprache ab, die vom Ministerialrat

Dr. Bretschneider-Rechtstreu verbalmetzt wurde. Die Angeklagte erklärte, sie habe sich damals gerade auf der Hochzeitsreise befunden. Sie sei an dem Unfall nicht schuldtragend, denn im Moment des Zusammenstoßes habe sie sich bereits über der Kreuzung befunden. Dies bestätigte auch ein Zeuge. Der Zweitangeklagte sagte, daß die Dame in übermäßig scharfem Tempo gefahren war und sein Auto mit sich riss. Der Verteidiger der Erstangeklagten, Dr. Emil Merwin, meinte, daß Frau Valukiewicz seit acht Jahren fahre und eine ausgezeichnete Chauffeuse sei. In Paris, wo sie wohne, werde bekanntlich sehr schnell gefahren. Nur ihrer großen Erfahrung könne Frau Valukiewicz verdanken, daß sie den Wagen im letzten Moment gestoppt habe und dadurch das Verhängnis verhütete. Frau Valukiewicz wurde freigesprochen, der Taxikaffier erhielt dreißig Schilling Geldstrafe.

(Richterwechsel.) Der Döblinger Bezirksrichter Dr. Hermann Reichauer wurde ins Bezirksgericht Meidling versetzt, wo er nunmehr als Zivilrichter tätig sein wird. An seine Stelle wurde Richter Dr. Karl Kehr, der bisher in Eisenstadt als Strafrichter wirkte, berufen. Dr. Kehr wird auch das Pressereferat innehaben.

NEUZEITLICHE WOHNKULTUR

Die Modernisierung von Altwohnungen.

Von Architektin Diane Zimble.

Der Wiener Hausbesitz ist vielfach vollkommen veraltet. Da es sich aber oft um in bautechnischer Hinsicht noch wertvolle Objekte handelt, wäre eine Modernisierung hoch an der Zeit. Es ist natürlich viel leichter und rationeller, ein ganzes Haus in allen Teilen gleichzeitig zu modernisieren, als einzelne Wohnungen. Da aber die Modernisierung der Einzelwohnungen der häufigere Fall ist, möchte ich nur darüber sprechen.

Elektrisches Licht ist nach dem Kriege wohl in allen Wiener Wohnungen eingeleitet worden. Nicht daselbe gilt für Gas-, Wasserleitung und Klosett im Wohnungsverband. Es empfiehlt sich allerdings in Fällen, wo die Drähte der elektrischen Leitungen frei über die Wände laufen, sie in Rohre oder noch besser in Rohre unter Putz zu verlegen, da die freien Leitungen nicht nur häßlich aussehen, sondern auch Beschädigungen ausgesetzt sind. Die Gasleitung ist ein wichtiges Erfordernis der modernen Wohnung. Wenn auch die Warmwasserbereitung durch Speicher mit elektrischem Nachstrom möglich ist, so gibt es doch vorläufig noch keinen billigen arbeitenden elektrischen Verb. So ist also für eine moderne Wohnung der Gasherd oder mindestens der Gasrechenbrennbehrlich. Die Unterbringung des kleindimensionierten Trodengashebers ist wohl überall leicht möglich. Die Zimmer sind in alten Wohnungen meist größer als in modernen. Was wir an alten Wohnungen oft auszuheben haben, ist die Lage der Räume zueinander, die Grundriszlösung und der Mangel an Nebenräumen. Die Küche von Mittelwohnungen, die vielfach früher nicht nur Aufenstaltort, sondern auch Schlafraum einer Hausgehilfin war, ist meist größer als ihrem Zweck entspricht. Es wird also oft möglich sein, einen Bade- oder zumindest einen Duschraum von ihr abzutrennen. Die Zuleitung des Wassers ist verhältnismäßig einfach. Viel schwieriger ist die Unterbringung der Abflüsse, doch wird man sich hier manchmal helfen können, indem man sie in eine Dachrinne leitet. Bei Klosettabflüssen ist dies allerdings unmöglich. Klosett kann man aber in einer gewissen Entfernung von einem Klosettballrohr dann unterbringen, wenn man ihren Fußboden um eine Stufe hebt und dadurch ein besseres Gefälle erzielt. Dem Mangel eines eigenen Fensters kann oft durch Herstellung einer Ueberlftung abgeholfen werden, das ist ein horizontaler Schacht, der die Verbindung eines oberen Fensterlügels mit dem zu lüftenden Raum herstellt. Auch können unbenutzte Rauchfänge zur Entlüftung von Speisekammern und Badezimmern herangezogen werden. Bei mehrköpfigen Familien macht es sich oft unangenehm bemerkbar, daß die Zimmer mit



DER NEUZEITLICHE
BODENBELAG AUS GUMMI

FUGENLOS, UNVERWÜSTLICH,
DAHER LEICHT DAHER
ZU REINIGEN BILLIG



„SEMPERIT“ OEST.-AMERIK. GUMMIWERKE
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

WIEN, I. HELFERSTORFERSTR. 11/13 - TEL. U 24-500

einem einzigen Eingang hintereinander angeordnet sind, so daß die im ersten Raum befindliche Person durch das Durchgehen der anderen immerfort gestört wird. Hier kann in vielen Fällen durch die Abtrennung eines Ganges, entlang der Mittelmauer, eventuell aus bis an die Decke reichenden Schränken bestehend, abgeholfen

werden. Diese Schränke sind teilweise vom Gang und teilweise von der Zimmerseite zugänglich. An baulicher Adaptierung ist nur notwendig, am Ende dieses so entstehenden Ganges eine Tür in das Nebenzimmer durchzubringen. Auf diese verhältnismäßig wenig kostspielige Weise ist nicht nur die Einteilung der Wohnung verbessert, sondern auch eine Möglichkeit zur Unterbringung von Schränken geschaffen.

Da in kleineren Haushalten das Halten einer Hausgehilfin vielfach abgekommen ist und sich die Hausfrau mit einer stundenweise bezahlten Hilfskraft begnügt, ist es wichtig, nicht nur die Wohnräume, sondern auch die den Verrichtungen der Hauswirtschaft dienenden Behelfe so anzuordnen, daß möglichst wenig Zeit unnütz verloren geht. Es wird sich also empfehlen, vor Inangriffnahme von Adaptierungsarbeiten in einer Wohnung diese Dinge gründlich zu überdenken und den Ablauf der Hauswirtschaft tunlichst ebenso zu berücksichtigen wie die technischen Möglichkeiten. Der stehende Waschtisch im Schlafzimmer oder eine separat zugängliche, abgeteilte Ecke mit einer zweiten Waschmöglichkeit im Badezimmer wird bei einer größeren Familie viel Ärger und Zeitverlust dann ersparen, wenn alle früh zur gleichen Stunde Toilette machen müssen und durch die Unpraktikalität des einen der ganze Stundenplan des ganzen Hauses in Unordnung gerät. Daß Verhaken oder zumindest Delanstrich im Bad oder in der Nähe des Ausgusses und der Abwasch zur Schonung der Wand gemacht werden muß, ist selbstverständlich kein Luxus. Bei alten Küchen mit Bretterfußboden wählt man am besten Gummibodenbelag. An Stelle des Ausgusses neben der Abwasch in der Küche wird bei kleineren Küchen vielfach die Abwasch treten.

Ein wichtiges Kapitel ist die Beheizung: sie erfolgt in Wien gewohnheitsmäßig durch in jedem Zimmer aufgestellte Kachelöfen. Ihre Pflege und ununterbrochene Betreuung bedingt großen Arbeitsaufwand und die stete Anwesenheit in der Wohnung. Die Stokerbeheizung, die in Deutschland schon vor dem Kriege in einem Großteil der Häuser vorgefunden war, ermöglicht die Beheizung aller Räume einer Wohnung von einer einzigen Heizstelle aus. Sie bürgert sich aber bei uns durch größere Kosten der Installation nur schwer ein. Da sie aber durch gute Ausnutzung des Heizmaterials und geringe Betriebs- und materialsparend ist, amortisiert sie sich in wenigen Jahren. Auch der Dauerbrandofen oder die Heizkammer ist gegenüber der Heizung durch einzelne Öfen schon ein gewaltiger Fortschritt. Durch geschickte Ausnutzung des Grundrisses können manchmal drei und mehr Räume durch regulierbare Heizöffnungen von einer Heizkammer aus beheizt werden.

Es gibt natürlich eine Menge technischer Neuerungen, die je nach Bedarf und Größe der Geldbörse durchgeführt werden können. Die Kürze der Zeit hat es mir nur erlaubt, einige der einfacheren Verbesserungsmaßnahmen anzudeuten.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry, NARS, Date 12-18-75

08881

NEUZEITLICHE WOHNKULTUR



**A. G. VEREINIGTER
WIENER TISCHLERMEISTER
WIEN, VI. CAPISTRANG. 10**
(bei Mariahilferstrasse 31)

**Möbel aus unserem Lager werden
Ihnen zeltlebens Freude bereiten!**

Farbe im Raume.

Von Direktor M. Bude.

Es ist kein Zufall, daß die moderne Raumgestaltung einen Farbenreichtum zeigt, der vorher kaum denkbar gewesen wäre. Galt es doch früher als schön, wenn es gelang, möglichst alle Textilien in der Farbe den anderen Gegenständen im Raume anzupassen. Viel Zeit und Mühe wurde darauf verwendet, um dieses Resultat zu erreichen. Weil aber das allzu Gleichförmige schließlich ermüdend wirkt, ist man darauf gekommen, daß Reichtum der Farben bei richtiger Wahl eine nicht nur schöne, sondern auch ruhige Wirkung zu ergeben vermag.

Die farbenfrohe Entwicklung der Raumgestaltung wurde besonders durch die Beobachtung hervorgerufen, daß Farbenpracht erfrischend wirkt, also für viele Menschen wahrhaft Erholung bedeutet.

Sogar für Arbeits- und Wohnräume wählt man jetzt mit Vorliebe hellere Farben, weil sie eine hellere Raumwirkung ergeben. Immer ist auf Stimmung zu achten. So erfordern, um ein Beispiel herauszugreifen, rot und rotorange gehaltene Wände mehr gelblich-braune Möbel. Werden Schlafzimmer verwendet, geben sie in lebhafter Farbe immer eine schöne Wirkung. Auch die Farbe der Vorhänge wählt man am besten unter Berücksichtigung der Farben von Möbeln und Wänden, wobei als Ergänzung am sichersten die jeweilige Komplementärfarbe verwendet wird. Rot- und Blauanteile wirken bei allen Farbkombinationen stets gut. Bei gelblich getönten oder bei gelb-braun gehaltenen Wänden eignen sich bei rötlich-braunen Möbeln blaue Vorhänge oder solche, die in die Farbe der Möbel abgestimmt sind. Werden sie gleichfarbig gewählt, dann sind Flammefekte und krepierartige Gewebe zu bevorzugen, da diese trotz ihrer Einfarbigkeit durch die Struktur des Materials eine neuartige Wirkung erzielen. Blaue oder blau-braune (oligrüne) Wände erfordern als harmonische Farbergänzung rötliche oder rotbraune Töne.

Es ist wichtig, daß die Farben im Raume nicht überall gleichmäßig vertreten sind, sondern sich in der Art teilweise konzentrieren, daß beispielsweise die Farbe der Wände und der Möbel nur untergeordnet wiederkehrt, während die Komplementärfarben in den mannigfaltigsten Tönungen die harmonische Ergänzung ergeben. Wichtig ist, daß Muster, wenn sie verwendet werden, aus guter Hand stammen, denn nur mit Liebe und Sorgfalt geschaffene Ornamente werden dauernd Befriedigung bereiten.

POSPISCHIL'S

**NEUZEITLICHE
RAUMKUNST-AUSSTELLUNG**

müssen Sie gesehen haben!



Es ist die sehenswerteste der letzten Zeit!
Die Ausstellung ist nur im Fabriksgebäude

Wien, V. Wiedner Hauptstr. 133

Wie wenig Beachtung finden noch die Türen, die Farbe der Karmen und sonstige scheinbare Kleinigkeiten. Durch richtige Abstimmung können auch diese das schöne Bild des Raumes günstig beeinflussen. Wenn es die Baugestaltung zuläßt, sollen die Fenster möglichst groß gehalten werden, damit reicher Luft- und Lichteinfall möglich ist.

Das früher ängstlich geschlossene Fenster sollte die in den Räumen verwendeten Stoffe vor dem Verbleichen und Verschleiben schützen. Heute haben wir schon alle Kenntnis davon, daß indanthrenfarbige Stoffe eine solche Vorsicht unnötig machen, weil sie den Einflüssen des Lichtes und Wassers widerstehen. Die Verwendung indanthrenfarbiger Stoffe ermöglicht ohne wesentliche Mehrkosten den Gewinn der schönsten Farben und besten Muster. Durch sie wird aber auch die Raumgestaltung in hygienischer Hinsicht vorteilhaft beeinflusst.

Individuelle Wohnungs- gestaltung.

Von Architekt Kommerzialrat Anton Pospischil.

II.

Was die Wohnung eines Junggefallen bieten soll, habe ich kürzlich darzulegen versucht. Wie soll nun die Wohnung eines kinderlosen Ehepaares aussehen, den heutigen Verhältnissen angepaßt, also mit beheizten Räumen das Auslangen findend? Nehmen wir an, sie bestünde aus drei Räumen, Vorraum, Badezimmer und Küche. Drei Zimmer beschalt, weil ein Raum beiden gemeinsam ist und ständig bereit sein muß, Gäste zu empfangen und etwa auch zu beherbergen. Damit durchaus nicht geklagt sein soll, daß die beiden übrigen Räume, wenn sie auch je einem der Ehegatten zugehören, nicht auch gleichfalls Gäste empfangen können. Daraus ergibt sich, daß heute die gesamte Wohnung den Blicken des Besuchers gezeigt werden darf, und nicht wie einst nur das eine, bevorzugte Schlafzimmer, das immer als Heiligtum behandelt und womöglich von den Wohnungsbewohnern selbst nur selten betreten wurde.

Der gemeinsame Raum wird also nicht so sehr auf das eigentliche „Wohnen“, das heißt Schlafen, Ankleiden usw. eingestellt sein, sondern mehr auf behagliches „Leben“. Hier wird es also zahlreiche bequeme Sitzgelegenheiten geben, niedrige Tische, um die sich Gruppen bilden können, behagliche Säen, gute Beleuchtungskörper. Das Zimmer der Dame trägt natürlich deutlich den Stempel des Weiblichen, es zeigt frohe Farben, gut gewählte Stoffe, Pflanzen, Spiegel und Glasgegenstände. Hier ist der Raufen mit vielen Fächern für die unzähligen Kleinigkeiten

**Seiden-
Vorhangstoffe
doppeltbreit. 56.- der Meter**

Fragen Sie jeden Dekorateur, jeden Architekten: Vorhangstoffe, Möbelstoffe aus dem Indanthrenhaus – und Ihr Heim wird hell, warm und froh – Ihr Heim bekommt seine eigene Note. Vorhangstoffe, Möbelstoffe aus dem Indanthrenhaus sind unvergleichlich! Und – wie Ihnen oben das Beispiel zeigt – auch unvergleichlich im Preis.

Indanthrenhaus
Jedes Stück einzig in Farbe und Geschmack
unübertroffen wasch- und lichtecht

MARIAHILFERSTR. 71

wichtig, der kleine Tisch, der auch als Schreibtisch dient, der bequeme Kanabier mit der schönen Stehlampe und dem kleinen Tischchen mit der Doppellampe, das die Lieblingsbücher und Notizen trägt.

Im Zimmer des Herrn wird Schreibtisch und Bücherkasten den ersten Platz einnehmen, dazu ein Schrank für Vikar und Rauchwaren oder eine richtige kleine Bar. Selbstverständlich überall dazu die eingebauten Kästen für Kleider und Sonstiges, die aber nach Lustigkeit im Vorraum untergebracht werden, der oft zur Garderobe und Empfangshalle ausgebildet ist.

Durch die Wahl der Farben und des Materials, die am besten dem erfahrenen Möbeldesigner überlassen wird, läßt sich der Wohnung der Stempel einer persönlichen Note aufdrücken, läßt sie sich schon und praktisch gestalten.

**KUNSTMÖBELFABRIK
SIGMUND JARAY**
WIEN, IV. PRINZ-EUGEN-STRASSE 70

„Mein Garten.“

Ein Städtchen Garten, eine kleine blühende Gasse, wieviel Freude bereiten sie... Doch der Blumen- und Ziergarten, der Gemüsegarten, der Obstgarten, sie alle verlangen, je nach der Jahreszeit, richtige und stete Behandlung. Oft gibt es beispielsweise alte Obstbäume, die trotz aller Pflege kaum mehr tragen. Sie wieder richtig zu verjüngen, dafür gibt die ausgezeichnete Zeitschrift „Mein Garten“ (Verlag G. Bauer, Wien, XVIII., Gersthoferstraße 14) wertvolle Anregungen. Eine genaue Tabelle besagt, wann die einzelnen Obst-, Gemüse- und Blumenarten zu pflanzen sind, wie sie behandelt werden müssen, um am besten zu gedeihen. Wer auch Zimmerpflanzen erfordern im Frühling spezielle Pflege, und ein Artikel, der diesem Thema gewidmet ist, verdient besondere Aufmerksamkeit. Die Abhandlung „Bepflanzung kühler Mauern“ wird alle Eigenheimbesitzer außerordentlich interessieren, denn eine pflanzenüberzogene Wand ist eine entzückende Freude für das Haus. Es gibt Pflanzen, vor allem der milde Wein, die bis spät in den Herbst durch ihre Farbenpracht erfreuen. Blühende Pflanzen, Schlingrosen oder Clematis, sind von unermesslichem Reiz. Es bedeutet für jeden Blumen- und Pflanzenfreund ein Vergnügen, die mit ausgezeichnetem Photomaterial ausgestattete Zeitschrift, die allmonatlich erscheint, durchzublättern.

L. S.

MÖBEL VON QUALITÄT, ABER DOCH BILLIG BEI **SPIRA**
VIL. STIEBERSTRASSE 1 u. 2

Ihre Wohnung, wie sie sein soll

Frühjahrs-Möbelausstellung

2.-16. Mai 10-1, 3-6 Uhr

EINTRITT FREI

I. OPERNRING 19

Bothe & Ehrmann - J. W. Müller A. G.

**VERLÄNGERT
BIS 31. MAI**

Wie gute Möbel entstehen.

Ein Rundgang durch eine führende Wiener Möbelfabrik.

Es ist eine bekannte Tatsache, daß Maschinen und technische Einrichtungen auf den Laien großen Eindruck machen, aber die jüngst für ein geladenes Publikum durch die Erzeugungsstätte der Bothe & Ehrmann, J. W. Müller A. G. veranstaltete Führung mußte auch beim Fachmann ehrliches Interesse und Anerkennung hervorrufen. Die neuesten Errungenschaften der Technik, alle maschinellen Vervollkommenungen wurden herangezogen, um die Verarbeitung des Holzes zu verbessern, zu verfeinern. Nur eines, so äußerte sich Walter Schnitzer, der leitende Direktor der Bothe-Ehrmann, J. W. Müller A. G., der diese Führung außerordentlich instruktiv und interessant gestaltete, ist nicht modernisiert worden, sondern wird nach den guten alten bewährten Grundsätzen vorgenommen: Das ist die Lagerung und Trocknung des Holzes. Auf riesigen Holzlagungsplätzen werden mehr als 150 Waggons der verschiedensten Hölzer jahrelang getrocknet, bevor sie zur Verarbeitung gelangen. Denn Holz ist ein „lebendes Material“ und von der Art seiner Trocknung hängt die Qualität des Möbels ab.

Interessant ist die Zurichtung der einzelnen Platten, die für verschiedene Zwecke benötigt werden: Der Paneeleplatten. Es wird gezeigt, wie das aufgeschaltene Kiefernholz parkettartig verleimt wird, damit jedes Arbeiten des Holzes von Haus aus unterbunden erscheint. Dann werden die Flächen mit Blindfurnieren abgepergt und kommen in riesige Pressen, die in der Lage sind, selbst Platten im Ausmaße von sechs mal drei Meter in sich aufzunehmen. Erst auf diese sorgfältig vorbereitete Unterlage kommt die Geshfurniere, die für die einzelnen Zwecke vorgeschrieben ist. Von größter Wichtigkeit ist die Trocknung in modernen, geräumigen Trockenkammern, wo das Holz, gleichmäßig gestaffelt, gut durchwärmt und die Feuchtigkeit abgefangen wird. Das Holz für Bauzwecke wird auf zwölf Prozent, für Möbel auf fünf Prozent getrocknet, was ungefähr der Temperatur entspricht, in der die betreffenden Teile in Verwendung kommen. In den Kammern können bis 70 Grad Celsius Temperatur erzielt werden.

Um zu den Lagerräumen zu gelangen, durchschritten wir die einzelnen Werkstätten, wo der Werdegang des Möbels vom Zurichten bis zum Ausfertigen genauest verfolgt werden konnte. In einer Abteilung sahen wir, wie gerade eine Holzleiste aufgebaut wurde, eines der schwierigsten Gebiete, für das ausschließlich besonders qualifizierte Arbeiter herangezogen werden. Der Weg dieser interessanten Erkursion führte auch in die modern eingerichtete Polsterei, in der nach dem neuesten amerikanischen Spritzverfahren, mit Nitrolack, gearbeitet wird. In der Abteilung für Sessel sah man, wie hunderte Sesselfüße gemeinsam gebaut werden. Schöne Kanabier, die im Gestell eben fertiggestellt waren, wanderten in die Tapeziererei. Unter den vielen ausgezeichneten Möbeln, die die Ausstellungsräume zeigten, fiel ein für New York bestimmtes, hochparies Wohnzimmer aus leichter Eiche sowohl durch die Form als auch seine Ausführung vollkommen aus dem Rahmen des bisher Gesehenen. Es wird noch vor dem Transport einige Tage in der Ausstellung am Opernring „Ihre Wohnung, wie sie sein soll“ – deren freie Bestimmung bis Ende Mai verlängert wurde – gezeigt werden, um den guten Geschmack und die hervorragende Qualität des Wiener Möbels zu demonstrieren.

Aline Fell.

Die bekanntesten **JETZT IST ES ZEIT HEIZANLAGEN** auf Ihre Brauchbarkeit begutachten zu lassen. Wir untersuchen bis 15. Juli kostenlos Ofen aller Systeme. **RIG. REICH E** Ofenfabrik Tel. B-20-2-28 IV. Pressgasse 26 Tel. B-20-2-38

Der Ofen, wie er sein soll.


In unserer Zeit der Technik wurden natürlich auch die Wohnungseinrichtungen verbessert. Wenn man also daran denkt, seine Räume neuzeitlicher zu gestalten, so ist die Frage der zweckmäßigen, rationellen Beheizung wohl die „brennendste“. Nicht immer erscheint es möglich und zweckmäßig, Stockwerks- und Zentralheizungen anzuschaffen; dann ist der Dauerbrandofen die beste und einfachste Lösung des schwierigen Heizproblems. Ein guter Dauerbrandofen, sei er nun irischen oder amerikanischen Systems, heißt, richtig gewählt, die ganze Wohnung, erspart das ununterbrochene Nachlegen, ebenso die Wartung des Ofens und amortisiert seine Anschaffung durch die rationelle Ausnutzung des Brennmaterials in aller kürzester Zeit. Dabei sind die Formen moderner Dauerbrandöfen außerordentlich gefällig. Email in verschiedenen Farben paßt gut in den modernen Raum – der neue Ofen ist also nicht nur praktisch, sondern gleichzeitig ein Schmuck für die Wohnung.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Davis/efm NARS, Date 12-18-75

0881

STRAND- UND BADEMODEN

Neue Strandmodelle.



Der richtige Strandanzug ist ärmellos, hat kurze Höschen mit einer wasserdichten Gummipolsterung und einem praktischen Taschchen. — Man ist ein Badeanzug, der den Rücken wirklich frei läßt, dessen Träger oder selbst beim Schwimmen nicht über die Schulter gleiten. — Ganz entzückend ein glatter, weißer Schwimmanzug mit applizierten, hochroten Apachen-Halsstuch.

Die abgebildeten Modelle — Marke „Otte“ — sind in allen führenden einschlägigen Geschäften erhältlich.

Alles für den Strand:

Badeanzüge Marken: Otte, Benger, Forma

Entzückende Badeschuhe mit und ohne Absatz, handgenäht, mit Kreppegummisohle, von S 5.50 Amerikanische Sprunghauben in allen Farben

I. Bognergasse Nr. 3 Kurt WEINER

Badetrikots für den Strand.

Alle Badetrikots für den Strand sind auch für Bad und Wasser geeignet. Die weißen Modelle sind dicht und doppelfädig gestrickt, so daß sie nicht, wie vor wenigen Jahren, im Wasser durchscheinend werden. Aber die Garnierung dieser festen Kostüme ist ganz bezaubernd. Da gibt es einen Badeanzug, der durch eine diagonale geführte Schnur geteilt ist, an dieser Schnur sind applizierte Wimpeln und Fahnen in allen Farben und Wappensteinen befestigt. Fahnen sind überhaupt das neue Embleme. Sie erscheinen auch einzeln auf den Ärmeln und bilden den Hintergrund für Monogramme und Klubabzeichen.

„Diagonal“ ist eine glänzende und schlankmachende Idee. Ein Badeanzug ist, in diagonaler Teilung, weiß und dunkelblau. Hier knöpfe mit vorgetauchten Knopflöchern, blau auf weißem Grund, begleiten die schräge Linie. Auch das applizierte oder durch Antarsia erzielte Bolero sieht reizvoll aus. Entzückend ein Badeanzug, dunkelblau, der durch Steppelinien und vier kleine, Knöpfe darstellende Reimentupfen, eine ganze Weste aufgezeichnet erhält, die selbstverständlich schlank macht und apart wirkt. Besonders hübsch sind auch schattierte Badeanzüge: das Leichen spielt in



mehr Luft, mehr Sonne

für den Körper, sorglos herumtollen im Wasser und am Strand, immer in dem sicheren Bewußtsein, gut auszusehen, das ist OTTE. Die feine langhaarige Wolle, die dichte elastische Bindung geben dem OTTE-Anzug den faltenlosen Sitz, die schmeichelnde Linie. Unverändert in Form und Farbe auch nach langem Tragen: das ist das Zeichen der Qualität, das ist OTTE.

IN ALLEN SPEZIAL-GESCHÄFTEN

weiligen Streifen, die weiß, hellgrün, mittelgrün, dunkelgrün sind; die letzte dunkelgrüne Linie geht in das dunkle einfarbige Höschen über.

Der Gürtel schmückt viele dieser Anzüge sehr vorteilhaft. Ein Modell mit einem Schöpfchen: der Anzug ist herb und sportlich, einfarbig und schmucklos; das unabhängige Schöpfchen hat Glockenwickel und auf dem gummidurchgezogenen Gürtel eine reizende, pastellfarbige Stickerei, nur bunte Blümchen, die, einfach aus Wolle gestickt, nach dem Muster der Kindergartengartenarbeiten gemacht werden. Auch Kissenstickereien und Plastrons in dieser Technik beleben die Badeanzüge.

Neuheiten für die Badesaison.

(Es gibt neuartige Overalls) und entzückende Pyjamas, die Sie im Atelier Margit Deutsch, III. Reissnerstraße 25, auch aus eigenem Material individuell nach Maß arbeiten lassen können, gnädige Frau. (Tel. B-54-2-80.)

(Eine Hofe für den Strand — ja!) Man muß die neueste Kreation von „Estell“ gesehen haben, um zu wissen, wie eine gute Hofe aussieht, wie taubellos sie paßt und wie schön sie ist. Das ist die richtige Strandhofe, wie sie die eleganten Frauen in Juan-les-Pins, am Rido und selbstverständlich auch in den schönen Strandbädern am Wörther See tragen werden. Frau Gisa Lorentz, gnädige Frau, ein, diese Neuheit und auch andere aparte Modelle unverzüglich in Ihren Ateliers, I. Plankengasse 3, zu besichtigen.

(„Forma“ mit eingebautem Hüftengürtel und Glockenrock) die richtige Bodedreh für stärkere Damen, in Modelfarben, bei Kurt Weiner, I. Bognergasse 3.

(Die flottesten Strandpyjamas in Seide und Leinen) bei Agner & Sohn, I. Fleischmarkt 1.

Das Sportliche vom Sport-Lager

IX. Hofingasse 13

Badeschuhe.

Die Gummibadeschuhe wurden garzios und kokett. Oder sie entwickelten sich zu ganz sportlichen Formen. Meist sind sie fürs Wasser ohne Absatz, für den Strand mit einem Absatz gearbeitet. Auch der Absatz ist aus Gummi. Die Strandbadeschuhe, die das lange Pyjamabeinkleid ergänzen, sind anmutig, spangensartig und sie wie Wollschuhe, sandalenförmig, farbig und garzios. Der Absatz ist manchmal sogar „französisch“, also geschweift und besonders hoch. Halbportliche Badeschuhe ahmen, aus Gummi, die Verschönerung des Tennismodells nach; die Wollschuhe haben oft Öffnungen an der Spitze, damit sie beim Schwimmen nicht hindern und aufhalten.

Neu und besonders beliebt sind die Sandalen, die nur aus Sohle und Riemen bestehen und die Fehen freigegeben: mit oder ohne Absatz, mit beweglicher Holzsohle, mit Lederriemen; aber auch aus Gummisohlen und Gummigürteln sind sie ganz bezaubernd. Sie erinnern an die klassische griechische Fußbekleidung, sind oft mit Gold- und Silberbesteckungen verziert. Endlos und unergründlich ist die Phantasie, die sie bereichert. Praktisch sind die Reinenbadeschuhe und die Frotteerbadeschuhe, die, immer irgendwie übereinstimmend mit dem Bodedreh, auf Gummisohlen, Spagatsohlen oder Reinensohlen aufgearbeitet werden. Auch Sandalenmodelle aus Frotte und Reinen sind vorbereitet, um jedem Wunsch der Frau entgegenzukommen.

Pyjamas — Overalls — Kimonos — Blusen

feinste Massarbeit

MARGIT DEUTSCH Tel. B-54-2-80

Badegürtel.

Aus gewebtem, wasserfestem Band sind sie ganz neu. Auch die Gürtel aus Spagat und Garn mit flotten Schließen sind aktuell, besonders hübsch die neuen, mit Streifen und Tupfen verzierten Gummigürteln und die Garnituren, die aus Schuh, Gürtel, Tasche und Tasche bestehen. Denn auch an Buntheit und Verschönerung muß eine gewisse Harmonie den guten Geschmack bewahren. Der Gürtel ist für Herren und Damen unentbehrlich, weil er die Modelllinie betont und die Taille bezeichnen. Die Schnallen der Gürtel sind aus Nickel und blitzen fröhlich an den Pyjamas im Sonnenlicht des Strandbades.



GISA LORENTZ, Trikotkinder

I. Plankengasse 3, Tel. B-28-4-67

bringt eine grosse Neuheit:

die richtige Strand-Hose.

Der Strandschirm.

Die großen Strandschirme, farbig, mit applizierten Blumen und Tieren, naturverbunden in all ihren Mustern, die neuesten von luftigen Tupfen und farbigen Streifen bereichert werden, sie gehören zur Capana, zum Strandplatz, auf die Gartenterrasse und sind ganz unentbehrlich für die Bequemlichkeit des Strandlebens, das nicht wie einst auf wenige Stunden begrenzt ist, sondern von früh bis abends dauert. Aber diese großen Schirme konnten das Attribut der Dame, den Sonnenschirm, nicht verdrängen. Und er ist in dieser Saison besonders hübsch. Mit leichten Modetrastickereien geziert, von Applikationen bereichert, manchmal zweifarbig, oft recht bunt, bestickt, dicht oder durchscheinend, paßt er zur Ausstattung der Frau. Sein Holzgriff ist gar nicht kostbar, nur bunt lackiert und fröhlich. Diese Strandschirme wollen in ihrer praktischen, für Wasser und Sand berechneten Widerstandsfähigkeit den entzückenden zarten Sonnenschirmen, wie sie die Nachmittagskleider garzioser Art begleiten, keine Konkurrenz machen. Schlicht, bunt, lustig, modern, praktisch und einen Sonnenschutz bildend, so sind die neuen Strandschirme der modernen Dame.

Höchstleistungen

in Preis und Qualität

Stürmischer Erfolg

Bemmergasse mit Tupfen, Streifen, klein. Feldblumen S 2.50
Reinselben - Foulards, 95 cm breit S 2.80
Echte chines. Shantung, Modelfarben S 6.50, naturel S 4.—
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
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Seidenhaus Eugen Dancz, Wien, I. Wildpretmarkt 7/8
Mitglied der „CEKA“ Provinzverband

Strandkleider und Strandkostüme.

Das Pyjama und das Badetrikot werden durch allerlei Modelle begleitet und unterfüßt. Da gibt es neue Strandkostüme aus Wollstoffen, aus Jersey, die mit ihrem geknöpften Rock mit einer Rockhose sehr schön sind und wie das Pyjama über dem Anzug getragen werden. Jacken, kleine Mäntel, Westen und Boleros, Capes und Schals ergänzen diese hübsche Mode, die auch der älteren Dame, der starken Frau willkommen sein wird. Die Shorts dagegen, die kurzen Hosen, die die neue Tennistracht angeschlossen, passen nur für ganz zarte und junge Erscheinungen.

Strandmoden.



Ein hellbraunes Badetrikot, dessen Leibchen bunt quergebändert ist und den obligaten Trägerrücken zeigt. — Der neue Sportbadeanzug, aus Spezialwolle gearbeitet; so herb seine Form ist, wird er doch mit zierlichen gestickten Streumustern verziert. — Leichtes Wolljersey, garzig, ergibt das Pyjama; die applizierten Tupfen sind hochrot.

Pyjamas

Spezialgeschäft für feine Damenwäsche I. Sellergasse 3

Individuelle Entwürfe für Strand, Reise und Haus. Auch nach Maß, gnädige Frau!

OLGA BARON

Das Pyjama.

Unwandelbar modern ist das Pyjama. Es ist schick, bequem und jugendlich und hat sich so bewährt, daß man es gar nicht mehr aufgeben will. Aber den modischen Ideen ist es unterworfen. So gibt es heuer noch immer die weiten Beinkleider, die breiten Hosen; mit einer Passe und einem besonderen Schnitt werden sie ganz radikal gefasziert, so daß man erst bei aufmerksamer Beobachtung entdeckt, daß die Dame Hosen und nicht einen knöchellangen Rock trägt. Die neue Richtung entscheidet sich meist für die schmalen Beinkleider, die den Männerhosen ähnlich sind und sehr flott aussehen. Jacken, Boleros, Mäntel und Blusen ergeben die Ensemblewirkung des Pyjamas. Oft paßt auch das Badetrikot in Farbe und Muster dazu. Viele dieser Modelle sind aus Jersey, aus Trikot.

Entzückend und besonders elegant ein schwarz-weißes Modell: schwarz, mit weißem gerade angelegtem Schulterfalten das Trikot, schwarz mit solch einem Sattel der Mantel, der die Knie erreicht, weiß und eng das Beinkleid. Ein auffallendes, neues Strandensemble, geschaffen für die aparte Dame!



Die Bordjacken, blau, mit Metallknöpfen, wirken für Strand und Wasserport vorzüglich; sie bilden mit einem weiten oder einem engen Beinkleid ein Pyjama. Ein Modell wird aus blauem Spitzenjersey, also auch im Dienst der Sonnenbestrahlung, gefasziert und hat nur für ein weißes Bolero mit Reißverschlussknöpfen dichteres Material gewählt. Ein Pyjama trägt japanische Kränze in Seidenstickerei auf dem Jersey. Aber auch andere Materialien werden für Pyjamas verwendet: Reinen und Kretonne, Seide und Batist, Wollkrepp und gerippter Baumwollstoff. Der großen Buntheit ist eine leuchtende Einfarbigkeit zur Seite gestellt. Besonders an der Tagesordnung sind aber kombinierte Modelle: Zum Beispiel eine weiße Hofe aus leichtem genopptem weichen Wollstoff, rot passpoiliert. Eine weiß-rot gestupfte Bluse, rückenfrei und ärmellos, aus Kretonne und eine blaue Bordjacke aus Jersey mit Metallknöpfen. Dies ein Beispiel, das charakteristisch ist und tausendfach abgewandelt werden kann.

Dreifarbigkeit ist für Pyjamas modern und beliebt. Und auch die Mischung des Materials, der glatten und bunten Stoffe, kann zu aparten Kombinationen führen. Das Pyjama ist eigentlich das Sommerkleid der Frau. Und ihr Sonntagkleid, wenn es zum Badeausflug geht. Sie wünscht Abwechslung und mondäne Mode auch auf diesem Gebiet. Vom zarten hellblauen seidenen Pyjama bis zum fröhlich bedruckten Pyjama aus echtem Ching gibt es so viel Variationen, daß jede Dame, jedes Mädchen ihrer Persönlichkeit und ihrer Laune, ihrer Geliebte und ihrem Geschmack entgegenkommen kann. Das Matrosenpyjama ist wieder sehr en vogue; die Pyjamas-in-einem, nach dem Muster des Overalls, ermöglichen für Rücken, Arme und Schulter dieselbe Entblößung wie das Schwimmtrikot und schützen doch die empfindliche Haut der Beine und Oberschenkel vor dem schmerzhaften Sonnenbrand.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shulman, NKS, Date 12-18-75

0886

MODE



Friedl Haerlin (Komödie) trägt zu einem schwarz-weiß karierten Marocainkleid einen lebhaft-roten Wollstoffmantel.

(Photo: Feldscharek.)

SOMMER-NEUHEITEN:

CREPE DE CHINE u. MOUSSELINE IMPRIMES
entzückende neue Dessins der Pariser Couture

CREPE RAYE LAVABLE
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CREPE SAURIEN u. CREPE FLAMISOL
für elegante Sommercomplets und den neuen Hut

KEMÉNY & SIMONOVITS
I. Goldschmiedgasse 7a - Trattnerhof - I. Graben 29

„(Sehn Jahre jünger aussehen!) Das ist die Kunst des Friseurs. Denn graues Haar oder eine unwürdevolle Frisur läßt jedes Gesicht älter erscheinen. Richtige Haarpflege kann Wunder bewirken. Wenden Sie sich in allen Fragen der Haarfärbung oder Dauerwelle vertrauensvoll an „Darlina“, den renommierten Friseurmeister in der Wollzeile 14 (Mezzanin). Dort arbeiten erstklassige, bewährte Fachleute nach den besten Methoden zu zeitgemäß niedrigen Preisen. Sie werden reflos zufrieden sein!“

Ebenso wichtig

wie die richtige und schickliche Badeabstimmung ist für Strand und Sommer die Dauerwelle. Fachgemäß ausgeführte Dauerwellen gehören zum Sommerprogramm der Dame, denn sie ermöglichen es, tadellos auszusehen. Die meisten gut geschnittenen Köpfe, aber auch halblanges und lauges Haar lassen durch die Dauerwelle das Selbstfrisieren im Sommer zur Spielerei werden. Und wie oft ist man zeräuft: nach Bad und Trainingsdusche, nach Sonnenkur, Ausflug und nach sportlichen Strapazen beim Golf, auf dem Motorboot, im Jacht- und Ruderboot, beim Segeln und auf dem Tennisplatz. Mit einem Kammschiff ist das durch die Dauerwellen füglich gewordene Haar wieder in Ordnung! Und die Frau sieht tadellos und loigiert aus. Auch die Reiterin, die Lenkerin ihres Autos braucht diese Unterstützung der modernen Schönheit, der neuen Frisur. Auf Reisen ist die Dauerwelle des Haars nicht zu entbehren. Und mit Schrecken denkt man, wie bös es die Frauen vor gar nicht langer Zeit hatten, als es noch keine Dauerwelle gab, die Omdulation aber von Hitze und Strapaz rasch verschwand und man zumindest 50 Prozent weniger hübsch ausah.

Wie bringen zu neuen Preisen:

- Die neueste Tennisdress (Mosenrock)
- Imprimé-Kleider der letzten Demi-Kollektion
- Richtige Duplonkleider (Wasch-Cr.-d.-Ch.)
- Das flotte dreiteilige Jersey-Kostüm
- Den erfolgreichsten Sommermantel

Walter & Bass

I. Bauernmarkt 3

Leopardenjäckchen.

Leopard wird zum bevorzugten sportlichen Fell der eleganten Frau. Kleine Jacken mit breitem Herrensvers, mit einem Leder- oder gemischtem, passen zum braunen Rock und zum beige-farbigem Kleid. Für die Vormittagsstunden der Kommissionen und des rasch eingenommenen Aperitifs ist die Leopardenjacke vorzüglich. Man weiß sie mit interessanten Gürteln zu taillieren, die Lebergestalt und unterst sind aber mit Nickelringen kombiniert. Auch der Leopardenmantel gefällt ausgezeichnet. Ein wenig tailliert, meist mit dem sportlichen halbgroßen Herrensacktragen entworfen, sind diese Mäntel ganz ungemein elegant. Ein Modell ist mit einer Verbrämung von dunkelstem Nutria kombiniert, das den Ton der Leopardenflecke aufnahm und den Kragen und zwei breite Längsbahnen bildet.

Statt des Mieders

trägt die eleg. Dame den unersetzlichen „Transforma“-Körperformer (Diagramm-Patent „Transforma“ Arthur Günsberger, Wien III., Landstrasse Hauptstrasse 9, gegenüber der Kirche im Eck. - Telefon U-11-2-71.


„Florida“ - die neue Sportbluse

Die eleganteste Creation dieses Jahres! Feiner, bienenwabenähnlich durchbrochener Trikotstoff. Wasch-, licht-, kochechte Farben: grün, gelb, rosa, weiss, blau, beige

Preise: Für Damen . . . 5 9.50
Für Backische . . . 5 7.50

Nur im feinen Strumpfgeschäft der guten Gesellschaft - in der stillen Rotgasse

Jakob Gelles



Mary Nemes (Reinhardt-Bühnen, Berlin) in einem dunkelroten, weiß gepuhten Kleid. - (Photo: Kitty Hoffmann, Wien.)

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Theater um Maria Thul.

Roman von Otto Zarek.

Punkt 11 Uhr betrat Direktor Rönneburg das „Moderne Theater“, den Bruchbau von 1906, in dem er seit zwei Jahren residierte.

Ein Boy in Uniform schlug die Türen vor ihm auf, sprang behender als sein Chef, die samtbeschlagenen Stufen empor, wartete am Vorzimmer, die zurückgeschlagenen Portieren haltend, bis der Direktor haltend, energischen Schrittes grüßlos vorbei war. Dann ließ er die Vorhänge fallen, schnitt eine Ormalasse, entzündete einen Zigarettenreißer, den er gefurden hatte, obwohl ihm das Rauchen verboten war.

Im Sinabgehen ließ er sich Zeit. So traf er noch auf den dicken Probst, den Oberregisseur der Rönneburg-Bühnen. Probst raunte ihn an: „Was es für eine Art sei, zu rauchen? Lachte dann gewaltig über den Schreck des Kleinen, glitt ihm übers seidige Haar, dachte an seinen eigenen Bengel, den Quintaner, und schenkte dem Burschen zwei Zigaretten. „Der Gewaltige schon oben?“ fragte er ihn. „Sehen erschienen!“ rief der Boy.

Probst begab sich hinauf und meldete sich bei der Rudheim, der Direktionssekretärin.

„Bestes Wetter heute!“ rief sie ihm strahlend entgegen: sie meinte die Laune des Chefs.

„Na, dann melde mich mal dem Gewaltigen!“

„Noch nicht. Er hat die Post. Aber dann dürfen Sie ihm auch nicht die Laune verderben!“

Oberregisseur Probst vertrieb sich die Zeit mit Späßen. Er lachte mit der Rudheim. Es machte ihm gar nichts aus, daß sie ihr fettiges, schwarzes Haar ungekämmt flattern ließ; auch ihr ungepflegter Teint störte ihn nicht.

Ludwig Rönneburg saß inzwischen im blauen Kabinett, seinem Arbeitsraum, der ganz in leuchtend blauem Samt tapeziert war, in seinem pompösen Arbeitsstuhl: Empire, goldbesetzte Seide, an den Enden der Lehne beste Holzplastik, geschmückte Löwenköpfe; aus dem Brokat aufleuchtend ein großes R, wie eingemeißelt; die Firma Kampmann, die ihm die echten Möbel lieferte, hatte es gratis für ihn einstimmen lassen. Alles in diesem Raum trug das bedeutsame Signum; auf die blaue Arbeitsmappe aus feinstem

Maroquinleder, auf Briefbogen, Kuverten und selbst auf den Wechselnformularen war es eingebrüht.

Rönneburgs Hände spielten in einem Haufen geklappter Post wie in Sandwerf. Es knisterte, es raschelte — er freute sich daran. Er jögerte noch, die Post zu lesen. Post war Merger. Heute war ihm gut zumute. Wie glänzend hatte er geschlafen! Ihm war wohl, er fühlte sich jung. Man konnte so dastehen und Pläne schmieden. Man konnte alles einfach warten lassen — die Post, die Besucher, das Telefon. Er man nicht den silbernen Knopf drückte, war Stille, Ruhe, Friede. . .

Er sah gemächlich den Raum entlang. Im Hintergrund hing das zauberische Mädchen von Greuze und lächelte. Guten Morgen, Kindchen! dachte er und grüßte hin.

Davor der Niederstich, Geschenk der emsig bemühten Dame Herza, die er in Karlsbad kennengelernt hatte. Süßherz Herza — hält sich, trotz der Wärme. Was ihr das schon ausmacht? Sie beherrscht Oberstleuten: Herza und Co. — nicht umzubringen, dieses Bankhaus!

Rechts, seinen Händen greifbar, deckt die Wand ein unbekannter Meister; achtzehntes Jahrhundert. Mancher wollte ihn für einen Tischbein halten; erinnerte an das Bildnis des großen Karl von Anjou. Na, billig gekauft wenigstens. Wunderwolle Züge, der Mann! So herrlich, eine Führernatur: Zärsenwädel . . . Und ganz modern, ganz heutig. . .

Das dachte der Gewaltige, griff dabei mechanisch in der blauen Kristallkugel nach Kognakstirgen. Die Rudheim hatte die Konfektischachtel wieder aufgefüllt. Seine Fingerringe trafen auf eine weiche Masse; aber was er hervorzog, waren nur Mougatwürfel.

Nun ärgerte er sich und drückte den silbernen Knopf, bereit zu schellen — und die Arbeit zu beginnen.

Wie gut, daß Probst im Vorzimmer war! Rönneburg zog ihn sofort mit sich, pufte ihn in die schwarzige Platte, leutselig und vertraut. Probst kam mit, eilig, prüfend; kaum daß er die Zeit fand, verflohen sein Monokel einzufügen.

Die Rudheim schloß hinter ihnen die schwarzgepolsterte Doppeltür. Sie laufte nicht. Der „Alte“ erzählte ihr doch alles, und tat er es nicht, um so schlimmer für ihn! Sie war sein Gedächtnis und sein Gewissen; sie war seine Vergangenheit und seine Zukunft. Sie hatte mit Ludwig Rönneburg begonnen, als er vor fünfzig Jahren am Werberischen Markt das erste Billettureau eröffnet hatte. Sie hatte ihm geholfen, in das „Friedrichstädtische Theater“ einzuziehen, als das alte, entlegene Haus vor elf Jahren die Tore schließen mußte; sie

war es, die ihm damals geraten hatte, diese billig gepachtete Bühne ganz dem leichten Genre zu widmen, sich durch Verträge mit den großen Organisationen der unteren Beamten-schichten und der Gewerkschaften zu sichern und täglich den bescheidenen, aber gesicherten Verdienst von neunzig Mark einzustücken. So schritt man weiter, die Rudheim neben dem Chef, bis er, vor drei Jahren, „nach dem Westen griff“, wie Rönneburg dies bezeichnete. Jetzt herrschte er über drei Theater — und was bevorstand, das wußte sie gut, sie allein außer ihm.

Im Vorzimmer drängten sich die Besucher. Junge Schauspieler, die sich mit dem Vertreter des Gewaltigen nicht hatten verständigen können; zwei ungarische Herren in schweren Pelzen, die sich als Verlagsleute ausgaben, Operetten anboten und „Material“ vorlegen wollten (wie man Kostproben von Pudding anbietet); dann der junge Regisseur Neuberg, der sich an der im Zentrum gelegenen „Berliner Bühne“ einarbeiten durfte (er hatte gerade einen aufsehenerregenden Mißerfolg mit einer Komödie von Oscar Wilde erzielt, die er als Possen spielen ließ). Vor allem aber war die Anastam erschienen, die beliebte Soubrette, die Rönneburg für die Titelrolle der Operettennovität im „Modernen Theater“ engagiert hatte, obwohl er laut zu sagen pflegte (im Klub sogar, so daß es ganz Berlin erfuhr), sie habe zwar falsche Zähne, aber so schöne Beine, daß niemand merke, wie schlecht sie singe.

Die Anastam hatte einen Stuhl bekommen; sie stützte ihr Haupt auf die gepflegten Hände und kokettierte mit einem imaginären Jüngling (sie liebte nur Jünglinge), ließ ihre schwarzen Augen funkeln, aufklackern und matt werden, in eigenartigem Rhythmus, wie ein Leuchtturm.

Als der junge Herr von Kaun eintrat, blieb er verzaubert stehen. Sie hielt den schönen gepflegten Sportmann für einen Bombivan; in Wahrheit war er der Vertreter einer Firma, die imprägnierte Leinwand für Dekorationen herstellte.

Nach einigem Warten wurde die Anastam nervös, drohte zu gehen, wenn sie nicht sogleich vorgelassen würde, und da ihr auffordernder Blick beim jungen Kaun ein Echo begeisterter Zustimmung fand, erhob sie sich, schlüpfte in ihren Netz und enteilte ohne Gruß.

Herr von Kaun jagte zur Rudheim: „Oh, verehrtes Fräulein, ich sehe, ich bin ungelegen! Vielleicht habe ich abends mehr Glück?“

„Vielleicht“, entgegnete die Rudheim.

(Fortsetzung folgt.)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Kurland, NARS, Date 12-18-75

0882

MODE

Für Sie, gnädige Frau!

Der leichte **Sommermantel**

Das elegante **Shetland-Kostüm**

Das entzückende bunte **Imprimé-Sommerkleid**

aus den

Qualitätsstoffen

von

Spitzhüttl, I. Neuer Markt 16

Große malerische Hüte.

Und wenn man noch so viel von den neuen Turbanen spricht, die im Herbst die Frauen schmücken werden, die heute schon in Georgette und Panamastoff, in schwerer Seide und in Banarbeit zu sehen sind, so muß man doch die ganze Aufmerksamkeit den großen, breiten Sommerhüten zuwenden. Denn zwischen Heute und dem Herbst liegt ein herrlicher Sommer, bunt in Imprimékleidern, elegant in schwarz-weiß Ensembles, jugendlich in amüsanten Baumwollkleidern und blumenhaft in Organza- und Gaze-toiletten. Zu diesen Kleidern, für schöne Tage, wird man die breiten Modehüte tragen, die alle, auch die sportlichen Filzhüte, ja die Conbohüte, einen gewissen Schwung zeigen. Ueber dem rechten Auge bilden sie eine Welle, senken sich schmeichelnd herab und sogar der gerade Canotier hat die Tendenz, durch eine willkürliche Linie weicher, weislicher, lieblicher zu wirken. Panamastroh ist Favorit. Naturfarbig und zartgelb harmonisiert es mit den verjüngenden Farben. Die Hüte reichen alle tief in den Nacken, um aber mit den Schals und Krügen und Pelzverzierungen nicht in Konflikt zu kommen, schneidet man die Nackenkrempen durch, rollt sie aufwärts, ja, man schneidet ganze Segmente aus! Ein schwarzer Hut, breit und an den Rändern aufwärts gebogen, ist nur mit einem schwarzen Satinband garniert und scheint das vorbildlichste Modell — es stammt von Agnes — für schwarz abgestimmte und schwarz verzierte Imprimékleider und für das weiß-schwarze Hochsommerensemble. Georgettegarnituren, farbig und gefleckt, aber nach Kleid und Raume austauschbar, schmücken halbgroße Panamas. Die neuen Filzhüte sind weich, wellig und zart. Oft schneidet man ihre Köpfe in verschiedensten Mustern aus, verbindet die Teile mit Flechtsträhnen und Bändern und hat nun für die Hochsommerfandalen ein hübsches, modisches Gegenstück.

Für Sommer und Sport **Renée Kirchner**
nur die haltbare, schöne **Dauerwelle** von **I. Krugerstrasse 17**
(Ecke Seilerstraße)

Zu den Hochsommerkleidern und zu den Kostümen aber kennt man den flotten, heißen Turban und den kleinen Canotier. Aus Vortierstroh genäht, ist dieser gelbe Canotier mit einem schwarzen Band nur einfach geschmückt. Seine Krempen sind eigentlich eine Krone, ein Wulst. Auch zu den hellen Tenniskleidern paßt dieser Hut vorzüglich. Reizend die Turbanhüte, deren Rand sich meist oberhalb des rechten Auges in gläserne oder andere verjüngende Ringe einhängen läßt. Gelegte Ränder sind halb Krone, halb Turban. An einigen Modellen ist noch der „Postillon“ zu spüren; die winzigen Krempen am länglichen Hutkopf, wie er für den Herbst aktuell sein wird, lassen sich aufwärts oder abwärts biegen, bieten also, wie so viele Modedetails, eine kleine Fregolinschicklichkeit. Ganz besonders hübsch ist die Garnitur: „Dut-Krawatte“. Das Grundmaterial: schwarzer oder weißer Klamfisch, die breiten Enden der Krawatte und der Rand der Toque und ihre kleine Spitzkopfmache aber sind aus buntem gestreiftem Modemolltrikot. Bunte Streifen auf weißem oder auf schwarzem Grund! Das Material wirkt wie eine Stickerie. Diese reizende Garnitur paßt zum Jackenkleid, aber auch zum einfachen Trenchenkleidchen der Saison.

Ein Abendhut, auch von Agnes, aus breiten Satinbändern, schwarz, ganz auf Kopfform gearbeitet, mit einem „Kamm“, der sich aus den Enden der Bänder, auch aus Band konfiziert, löst, ist ganz vorbildlich hübsch. Die Dame sieht also: kleine, oft aus dem Material des Kleides, des Mantels gearbeitete Hüte, Panamamodelle, breite Hüte aus Edeltuch, mit tiefen Nackenkrempen. Dies die Vorschläge der Modistin für die verschiedenen Gelegenheiten der Sommerzeit und für ihre genau abgestimmten Ensembles! Der Badehut: aus leichtem Stroh oder Bast oder aus Kretonne.

Gutmodell-Okkasion bei Jenny Wengraf, I. Graben 12.

Die Original Pariser Modellhüte werden ab 17. d. — vor Fertigstellung der neuen Hochsommerkollektion, die bereits kommende Woche gezeigt wird — tief reduziert abgegeben.

„VOGUE“ MODE-GÜRTELN
I. TUCHLAUBEN 12
Entzückende weisse und modische Gürtel, passend zu jedem Kleid.

Der neue Gürtel.

Sehr reizvoll sind die neuen Gürtel, die aus Lederbändern und kleinen Metallringen bestehen. Etwas Lustiges, Partes ist ihnen, auch wenn sie noch so herb und sportlich sind, mit dieser Mode gegeben. Und wenn alles an der Frauenkleidung auf Feinheit, Houx und Transparenzwirkung eingestellt ist, darf der Gürtel nicht objektiv bleiben. Viele Metallketten oder auch kleine Kettenhaken in Verbindung mit Leder sind maßgebend auf dem Gebiet der Gürtelmode, die so wichtig ist als Unterfütterung der taillierten Silhouette.

Kuranstalt Dr. Werner, Waldhofen a. d. Ybbs
für innere, Stoffwechsel- und Nervenkrankheiten.
Pensionspreise (4 Mahlzeiten) einschl. Kur und Arzt 54.—

Auf Luft und Sonne abgestimmt . . .

Sie wissen doch schon, daß man perforierte Schuhe trägt? Mit den geflochtenen Modellen kann man doch nur im Hochsommer spazieren gehen, und sie eignen sich fürs Land beinahe besser als für die Stadt. Man fand also eine Möglichkeit, auch die Pumps luftdurchlässig zu arbeiten und stanzte kleine Stenchen, Lücken und feine, kurze Linien in das Leder; nun hat man Schuhe, die der transparenten Mode ebenbürtig sind. Bei den Stoffen scheinen Schwämme, Badeschwämme oder gar der Emmenalektische Kase geformt zu haben, so porös sind sie für diesen Sommer ausgefallen. Luft und Sonne, bisher die Diktatoren der Strandmode, beeinflussen jedes kleinste Detail.

Die Sommerabendkleider reduzieren ihre Leiden auf ein Minimum von Stoff, kleine Buchfenster sind Selbstverständlichkeit und beinahe nicht mehr pikant. Und auch die Hüte sind transparenter denn je. Die elegante Frau bevorzugt auch im Sommer Filz, breite Kiefenhüte, reich und malerisch. Um nun diese Hüte der Jahreszeit gemäß abzumandeln, werden ihre Köpfe eingeschnitten und zeigen das Haar, dessen Locken die breite Krempen beschattet.

Mit geflochtenen Köpfen, mit zusammengeflochtenen Teilen werden sie in die Schaufenster gerückt, um in den Damen Kurort- und Hochsommerillusionen auszulösen. „O, wie entzückend, der Filzhut als Gegenstück zum Kleid aus Streifgaze! Und dazu so dekoriert, so ganz Houx“, meinen die modekundigen Frauen. Kein Wunder, daß nach dem Muster der Pariserin nun die Wäsche in allen jarten Farben komponiert wird. Wenn man eine Wäsche aus einer Spitze, die mehr Frischensaum als Musterung besitzt, trägt, dann ist die Wäsche eigentlich schon ein Bestandteil der Toilette, denn sie ist alles eher als unsichtbar.

Ab Dienstag — nach Pfingsten — gnädige Frau . . .

verkauften wir . . . 100 erstklassige ganz feine Damenmäntel
100 hochelegante reineselene Nachmittagskleider
80 Impimékleider u. entzückende Strandpymas
des bisherigen Preises.

um die Hälfte **Axner & Hahn, I. Fleischmarkt 1/4.**
Oreodhaus, Lift frei.

Und auch der Unterrock kam zu Ehren. Nicht der Frau-Frau-Rock der Jahrhundertwende, sondern der Unterrock mit Leibchen, genannt die Rockkombination, die zu den Wollspitzenkleidern einmal in harmonisierender, einmal in kontrastierender Farbe getragen wird. Wieder muß man den Färbekünstler Fregoli zitieren, wenn man sieht, wie die Damen für Eleganz und Aussehen seine Gewandtheit lieben und sogar als Gegenmeasures ein einziges Kleid, dank der vielfarbigen Färbung, das heißt Unterkleider, in drei oder vier Toiletten verwandeln. Der sprichwörtliche „Frischensaum“ des Gedächtnisses von Morgenstern wird lebendig. Wie sehr leuchte man, daß der Baumeister den Raum seiner Frischensäume herabste und daraus ein großes Haus erbaute. Heute bauen die Modeschöpfer aus Frischensäumen ihre Modelle, die Weber und Strickarbeiter schaffen aus Frischensäumen ihre Stoffe. Und jetzt kam sogar für Gut und Schick das Gesetz: „Transparent auf jeden Fall.“ Einer neuen Nachfrucht zufolge wird für Monsieur und Madame im Modeshop bald die Abendseide, Smoking und Pajama“ abgegeben. Auf dem Strand aber wird „Haut“ Mode. Und zwar recht sonnenverbrannt und frisch. Denn die Badeanzüge sind nur noch „barrierte Feigenblätter“ und schrumphen, in Hochachtung vor Luft, Sonne und Wasser, jedes Jahr auf kleinere Dimensionen zusammen. Grete David.

Sommerhüte

in apart geschwungenen Linien, entzückenden feinen Exotenstrahlen, mit den neuen Pariser Blüten- oder Bandarrangements zeigt in exklusiven Modellen die tonangebende Wiener Hutkünstlerin

Frau Rosa Krieser, IV. Margaretenstrasse 31.

Anmutige Pubiköpfe.

Wieder bewies ein Frischfrisieren, wie reizvoll man Locken, Wellen und duftige Franen für den Pubikopf, für das geschnitten Haar verwenden kann. Weit zurück liegt die Verirrung, die „Eronköpfe“ und „Männerhüte“ besaß und den Frauen den herben und rasierten Nacken aufzwang. Der Landesverband der Friseurgenossenschaften Niederösterreichs veranstaltete kürzlich, um den 25jährigen Bestand der Genossenschaft von Klosterneuburg zu feiern, in Verbindung mit dem Wiener Verband ein interessantes Schaulustspiel in den Räumen des Stijckellers zu Klosterneuburg. Der Verbandvorsitzer Rud. Moritz begrüßte Bundesrat Professor Dr. Fugelmann, mehrere Vertreter der Landesregierung, die Bürgermeister Kautz und Kolda von Klosterneuburg, die nach Abschluß der Tagung die Gäste zur Besichtigung des Stijckers und des Museums einluden, und viele andere. Die Landesverbände hatten Delegierte entsendet und die Beteiligung an dem Wettbewerb war außerordentlich groß. Man stellte fest, daß der feilsche Scheitel, der den meisten Gesichtern schmeichelt, hochmodern ist; die Haare werden schräg nach rückwärts omuliert und in harter Tendenz als Umrahmung um das Gesicht angeordnet. Auch die Stirnfrieß sind wieder in

„Für You“ Elegante Jersey-Kostüme und Pyjamas
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Mantel-Complets, Wollspitzenkleider preiswert!

Günst. Die Abendfrisur baut diesen Stil nach aus und schmückt den Nacken mit zart gewellten oder lockigen Effekten und mit Chignons. Mit Preisen wurden ausgezeichnet: die Herren Josef Kraus und Anton Oswald aus Klosterneuburg; Franz Wladar, Korneuburg; Karl Michalek, Eplingen; Louis Spolnak, Baden; Franzpeter jun., Fräulein Schingel, Berta Brunnspurger, Fräulein Stenger, u. a. m.



Bloch-Mieder

VII. Neubaugasse 26

VI. Mariahilferstr. 63

Modelle für jeden Zweck.

Leichte Sommer- u. Bademieder.

In jeden Badeanzug werden Büstenhalter individuell eingebaut.

Geographie und Mode.

Alle Landkarten haben etwas sehr Wirkungsvolles, sie sind kostbar und interessant und hängen in den Hallen alter Schlösser und in durchgeputzten Arbeitszimmern berühmter Männer. Daß aber Landkarten auch noch für die modische Dame Schmuck und Farbe bedeuten würden, das ist wohl überraschend. Und wirklich, das gibt es jetzt! Man malt Landkarten auf die Jacken der sportlichen Dame, man zieht Holzgarnituren und lange lederne Handschuhe mit Landkartenzeichnungen. Nicht nur mit phantastischen Atlasdarstellungen von Flüssen und Gebirgen, Meeren und Seen, nein mit ganz einwandfrei richtigen Landkarten der Gegenwartswelt. „Frankreich“ zu tragen ist patriotisch, eine erotische Weltgeographie graphisch an seinem Cape spazieren zu führen, ist unbedingt schick. Die Ausländerin darf mit der Mode zugleich manifestieren: „Hier bin ich zu Hause.“ Am hübschesten aber sind doch die alten Landkarten, die mit den Darstellungen von Sonne, Mond und Sternen, mit dem amüsanten, auch durch Armbänder in der Mode placierte Tierkreis, ein hübsches Phantasie mitbringen. Ein neuer Mouffeline de Soie ist mit Landkartenmustern imprimiert und sieht hübsch und selbst aus. Zu diesen Kleidern trägt man, um der Theorie zu genügen, die sich im Ornament so sehr ausprägen will, hellgraue Strümpfe. Ueberhaupt ist der graue Strumpf sehr modern geworden und die Pariserin schwärmt vom neuen grünen Farbstoff „Grasmühle“, weil ihr Taubengrau schon zu banal erscheint. Zu dunkelblauen Kleidern wählt man blaugraue gestönte Strümpfe und zu braunen holzbraune. Man glaubt, daß der Strumpf sich nach und nach einer bunten Skala zuwenden will, heute aber steht die Hautfarbe noch in bedeutendster Gunst der Mode und der Frau. Wenn man Landkartenhals trägt, wären Landkartenstrümpfe gewiß nicht Utopie zu nennen. Ueberhaupt scheint man sich sehr viel mit Geographie zu befassen: Der Verschluß einer Handtasche wird aus einem richtigen erprobten Kompaß gebildet und einige turgiditätige Amerikanerinnen, die zwischen der Riviera und Paris hin und her pendeln, balancieren



Spazierföcke, als wären sie nicht in hellrosa Tenniskleider gehüllt, sondern in Fobendräde und Windjacken gekleidet. Die Zeichnungen der Farben schenken sich an geographische Bezüge: Meerblau, Fluggrün, Südbelblau, Bergbraun, Dolomitrot, Alpenwiesengrün, Katergrau, Lavaschwarz, Arktisweiß, Capriblau sind neue Schattierungen. Aber auch nach Ländern benennt man die Farben: Bayrischgelb leucht, wie auch Schwedengels, den Farbton von der Landesfahne; Türkischgrün und Französischblau haben für ihre Mischung das Banner zur Vorlage gehabt. Nachdem man schon recht lang nach historischen Beispielen die Toiletten der Dame entwirft und mit Worten aus dem Geschichtsbuch die Zeichnungen umgrenzt, flüchtet man von der gar zu bewegten Geschichte zur herberen Geographie, die nun für froh gestimmte Mädchen und für schöne Frauen die große Neugierde der Malfaison bedeutet. Geneviève Matour.

Mode-Chronik.

(Es gibt neue Seiden.) die die Pariser Couture-Häuser für sportliche Sommerkleider aufgenommen haben und die bei den ersten Vorführungen begeisterten Anklang fanden. Charakterisiert werden diese Seiden durch ihre Diagonalmusterung, die durch schmale, ajourähnliche Effekte verbunden ist. Die Seide hat „Körper“, sie fällt, obwohl sie transparent wirkt, schwer und eignet sich daher ganz besonders für die sommerlichen Laufkleider, die man blank trägt und die sich nicht zerkratzen dürfen. Das Haus Spitzhüttl am Neuen Markt bringt diese neuen Seiden — Serge tailleur — in den richtigen Sommerfarben: Azurblau, Heckenrose, Maigrün, Ananas und Weiß. Sie sollten sich diese entzückenden neuen Seiden einmal bei Spitzhüttl ansehen, gnädige Frau . . .

(Wovon Damen sprechen.) Diesmal vom Wollspitzenbadeanzug, den Albert Wagner bringt. In der Modefarbe für das heutige Jahr in „Weiß“ (aber doch nicht durchsichtig), und jede Dame am Strand auf das vorteilhafteste kleidet. Der Preis ist bloß 19 S. Albert Wagner, Kohlmeßergasse 8, und fünf Filialen.

TOBRALCO Die entzückenden englischen **Cretonnes u. Volles Piqué** aus dem „Jardin des Modes“, ebenso Orpes de Chine Importeur. Fleurs miniatures auf dunklen Fond bei **PAUL SZENKOVITS** I. Wipplingerstrasse 3 Jordangasse 3 (um die Ecke)

Auch Bodier bringt Cretonnes . . .

so berichtet das soeben erschienene Maillet „Jardins des Modes“. „Les jolies cretonnes“, so nennt sich ein interessanter Artikel über die neuen Materialien: Volles piqué und Tobralco und zeigt an Hand apter Skizzen, wie diese Stoffe, die durchwegs im Zeichen des zarten „Feldblumendessins“ stehen, zu verarbeiten sind. Die neue Sommer- und Strandmode wird durch die bunten, lustig gemusterten Cretonnes charakterisiert werden. In den internationalen Bodeplätzen wird man die reizenden Kleider an allen modischen Frauen bewundern können.

Auch wir haben unsere Preise reduziert! Kleider, Mäntel, Kostüme von 100 bis 200 S. Spezialangebot: Fassonpreise 80 S. **R. & L. ROSENBERG** I. Habsburger-gasse 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By: [illegible] NARS, date 12-18-75

0888

ERSCHEINT
JEDEN SONNTAG

HAUS UND KÜCHE

ERSCHEINT
JEDEN SONNTAG

Zukunftsmöglichkeiten?

Das große Fragezeichen, das hinter diesem Schicksalswort liegt, bedeutet für viele Eltern heute eine schwere Sorge, weil sie keine Antwort auf die Frage finden, wie man der heranwachsenden Jugend wirklich solche Möglichkeiten schaffen kann. Weil sie vor allem im Zweifel darüber sind, welche Erziehungsgrundlagen die gebotenen sind, um der Jugend die Wege in dem etwas dunklen, gewöhnlichen Zukunftschaos zu erleichtern. Solange man sich darüber im klaren sein dürfte, daß eine berufliche Ausbildung wie sie die individuelle Veranlagung und die körperliche Eignung des heranwachsenden jungen Menschen fast von selbst fordert, Zukunftsaussichten verleiht, wenn der nötige Ernst und die Befähigung als Voraussetzung vorhanden waren, hatten die Eltern es ja leichter. Heute aber stehen vielfach arge Zweifel: nützt denn Studium, Bildung, fachliche Ausbildung in der einen oder anderen Hinsicht auch wirklich, wenn alle Berufe überfüllt sind, die Nachfrage nach Arbeit viel größer als das Angebot — und dies eigentlich in der ganzen kultivierten Welt? Auf solche entmutigende Zweifel gibt es auch heute nur die eine Antwort: sichert den Kindern durch entsprechende Erziehung und Kenntnisse vor allem das Bewußtsein, etwas zu können! Gerade in einem harten

Vom Stadtschulrat
genehm. priv. **Kunstgewerbeschule Munk** I. Kal 15
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Lebenskampf ist das jagende Gefühl „Ja — was bin ich — was kann ich denn eigentlich?“ das bedrückende, wenn sich darauf die rechte Antwort nicht finden läßt. Ob nun Studium oder praktische Tätigkeit wählen? Darauf kann natürlich eine unbedingte Antwort nie erfolgen, weil da trotz allem jeder Fall individuell zu entscheiden ist, bei Knaben anders als bei Mädchen — trotz der scheinbaren Gleichstellung der Geschlechter. Aber es kann nicht geleugnet werden, daß das Fräulein Doktor es heute vielleicht schwerer haben wird, zu einer Stellung zu gelangen, von der es leben kann, als die geschulte Kochlehrerin, die geprüfte Diätassistentin, die fähige, phantasievolle Kunstgewerblerin, die geschickte Schneiderin oder mit besonderem Geschmack begabte Modistin. Ebenso wird die stinkende Maschinenschreiberin, die sprachenkundige, geübte Korrespondentin es immer noch leichter haben, irgendwo ein mögliches Unterkommen zu finden. Deswegen soll aber zum Beispiel auch bei Mädchen darauf geachtet werden, besondere Neigungen nach Tatkraft auf eine verwertbare Basis zu bringen. Zum Beispiel die Vorliebe für Landwirtschaft und Gartenbau. Unsere Gartenbauhöfen bieten gerade heute Ausichten für die Zukunft, da man ja bestrebt ist, Obst- und Gemüseproduktion zu heben. Eines ist sicher: je mehr man Kinder lernen läßt, je vielseitiger man ihre Kenntnisse ausweitet, um so besser stellt man sie für den Lebenskampf. Denn heute heißt es angreifen, wie und wo es geht. Wer durch Anlage und praktische Fortbildung dazu befähigt scheint, der wird auf das große Fragezeichen am besten eine befriedigende Antwort erhalten.

3 da Bock.

HAMMER VOLLKORNBROT

Vollkornbrot.

Das Brot war zu allen Zeiten bei den Völkern das Grundnahrungsmittel und eben deshalb gab die Art und Weise seiner Herstellung den verschiedensten medizinischen Richtungen und Schulen immer schon Anlaß, sich damit zu beschäftigen. Die neuzeitliche Ernährungstheorie hat das Problem des Brotes besonders aufgegriffen und es wurde nach einer langen Reihe von Versuchen, unterstützt von brottechnischen, wissenschaftlichen und medizinischen Beratern, ein „Vollkornbrot“ hergestellt, welches die Nährstoffe und Eiweißstoffe des Getreidekörners unverändert vollwertig enthält. Die Hammerbrotwerke haben nun unter Berücksichtigung aller dieser gemachten Erfahrungen ein solches „Vollkornbrot“ herausgebracht, das berufen ist, das Volkernahrungsmittel breiter Schichten unserer Bevölkerung zu sein. Die Grundlauge seiner Zubereitung sind die neuesten ernährungswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse, es ist von feinstem Geschmack, in geschäftiger Form gebacken, und ist durch seine Hochwertigkeit ein Brot höchster gesundheitlicher und geschmacklicher Vorteile.

GLOBOL tötet Motten

Das Schicksal Ihres Mädchens

entscheiden Sie,
wenn Sie sich über den Abschluss einer
Töchter-Versicherung schlüssig werden.

**Lebensversicherungs-Gesellschaft
„Phönix“**

Wenn die Fenster offen sind.

Wie freut man sich über die ersten warmen Tage, an denen endlich die Fenster geöffnet bleiben können, Luft hereinströmt! Luft ja — aber auch Staub, viel Staub, wie man mit Mißvergnügen bemerkt. Es gibt aber ein Mittel, um die dadurch erhöhten sommerlichen Reinigungsarbeiten leicht zu bewältigen: täglich nur immer einen Teil besorgen, also ein richtiges Programm einhalten, nicht immer die ganze Wohnung auf den Kopf stellen. Führt man das durch, dann verlieren auch die gefährlichsten

Premier-Staubsauger: saugen und bürsten d. Teppich!
Staubsauger und Bohrer in einem Apparat!
Premier Spic-Spani der kleine Handapparat (ohne Schlauch!)
entstaugt, bläst, entmilcht, desinfiziert, parfümiert ...
leicht, schnell und gründlich!
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Arbeiten ihre Schrecken. Seit man den Segen des Staubsaugers kennen lernte, ist es ja mit dem Grundsatz nicht mehr so arg wie früher, denn das Klopfen und Reiben, diese entsetzlichen aller Hausarbeiten, entfallen. Staubsauger sind heute unentbehrlich — aber auch für jeden Haushalt erreichbar geworden. Es gibt heute kleine, handliche Wunderapparate, die nicht nur saugen, sondern auch bürsten, desinfizieren und entmotten, kurz alle Reinigungsarbeiten in der Wohnung mühelos besorgen. Das Wichtigste dabei: man kann sie für wirklich kleine Beträge in Teilzahlungen erhalten!

Jetzt ist es Zeit, Ihre Teppiche und Vorhänge in die richtige Hand zu legen.
LUFTSCHITZ A. G., Wien, XXI, 5, Magdeburger-
straße 71, Tel. R-48-5-80/82
Bezeichnung eingetragter Objekte.

Schwere Teppiche, kostbare Vorhänge soll man wohl am besten in fachgemäße Hände geben und nicht die Wohnung damit verbarrikadieren. Denn während des Sommers ist die beste Gelegenheit, Teppiche fachgemäß reparieren zu lassen. Teppiche, die einige Jahre im Gebrauch waren, sollen unbedingt fachgemäß gewaschen werden. Auch etwa notwendig gewordene Ausbesserung läßt man am besten während der Sommerzeit vornehmen. Vorstermübel müssen gründlich gereinigt werden. Flecken sorgfältig entfernen, denn die Motten lieben es, sich gerade an fettigen oder fleckigen Stellen festzusetzen. Ein erprobtes Mittel ist „Globol“, das man in seinen kleinen Säckchen — der Geruch ist nicht unangenehm — in die Fugen der Möbel schiebt und von Zeit zu Zeit erneuert. Mit dem erwachsenen kleinen Staubsauger kann man „Globol“ — so wie es im Handel erhältlich ist — sowohl in Gaseform als auch in feinsten pulverförmiger Form in alle Fugen bringen und die Kleiderkästen richtiggehend „vergasen“.

Die Motten kommen!
schnell **Mottenschutzsäcke „Subi“**
in Papierhandlungen, Drogerien oder Erzeuger:
Adresse ausschneiden! **E. Lammer, Wien, I. Seltersgasse 28.**

Für Kleider und Mäntel gibt es in den bekannten Mottenjäckchen ein ausgezeichnetes Schutzmittel. Sie sind so geschickt angefertigt, daß man die Kleider samt dem Bügel in den Sack hineinhängt. Ist er ordentlich verschlossen, dann haben die gefährlichen Motten keine Möglichkeit, sich einzuschleichen, und die Hausfrau kann auch während der heißen Tage das beruhigende Gefühl haben, keinerlei unangenehme „Mottenüberfälle“ zu erleben.

Menü der ganzen Woche.

(Reichere Küche.)

Freitag: Ragoutsuppe mit Markknödeln, Spargel mit Butter und Bröseln, Brathühner mit Salat, Obstcreme.
Samstag: Biskuit-Eier mit Mayonnaise, kalte Rindbeizung mit Aspik, Käse, Obst.
Sonntag: Frischbutterbrot, gedämpfter Lachsfilet mit Semmelkären und heurigen Butterkartoffeln, Topfenauflauf.
Montag: Schinkenpastete, Radieschen und Butter.
Dienstag: Grüne Erbsensuppe mit Butternockerln, pochierte Beifische mit Rohsalat, Omeletten.
Mittwoch: Kaltes Fleisch von Mittwoch mit feinem Gemüse-salat, Maikäse, Obst.

Inzerdorfer

Eiernudeln * Eiersuppeneinlagen

Donnerstag: Nudelsuppe, Rindfleisch, warm garniert, Reisaufguss mit Himbeersaft.
Freitag: Gebäckener Spargel, Schinken mit geriebenem Kren, Kompott.
Sonntag: Kartoffelsuppe mit gebackenen Erbsen, Spinatpuding, Rahmschüssel.
Montag: Gebäckener Karpfen mit Salat, Butter und Käse.
Dienstag: Schwammerlsuppe, pikanter Schweinschüssel (wie Wild, mit Wurzelwerk und Rahm gebraten) mit Nudeln, kalter Vanillepudding mit Kompott.
Mittwoch: Hirn mit Ei und heurige Butterkartoffeln, Käse und Butter.
Donnerstag: Leberpüreesuppe mit Semmelschnitzchen (auf dem Toaster gebraten), Nierenbraten mit Zuckererbsen und Reis, Sachertorte.
Freitag: Kaltes Rindfleisch mit Senf und Spargelsalat, Früchtenreis mit Himbeersaft.

Topfenauflauf: „Inzerdorfer“ Makaroni oder Spaghetti werden klein zerbrochen, wie üblich in Salzwasser gekocht, kalt überpült und gut abgetropft. Man rührt 6 Dekagramm Butter mit 2 Eidottern, Zucker, 1/4 Liter dicken Rahm fleißig, gibt die Makaroni dazu, 6 Dekagramm gebrühte, grob gehackte Mandeln, 5 Dekagramm Rosinen und den feinsten Schmelz. In der gebutterten Auflaufform backen. Wenn man will, mit warmer Vanillecreme (wie zu bayerische Dampfnudeln) servieren, doch schmeckt der Auflauf auch ohne diese Beigabe sehr gut.

Obstcreme: Man belegt eine Glaschale mit Biskotten, träufelt darauf Vanillelikör (nach Belieben auch nur verdünnte beliebige Marmelade). Davor schüttet man von 4 Eidottern, 12 Dekagramm Zucker und 1/4 Liter Weiß- oder Rotwein auf. Darnach einen bläulichen Schaum, vermischt ihn ausgekühlt mit 1/2 Liter feinst geschlagenem Obers. Erst es frisches Obst, dann dieses, je nach der Sorte, nur entkernt, oder — wie Apfel, Marillen, Pfirsiche — entkernt und zerteilt auf die Biskotten legen, mit der Creme überhäufen und so lagenweise abwechseln.

Kollmers Ochsenmaulsalat

auf jeder Speisekarte, in jeder Feinkosthandlung.
Alleinerzeugen **HUGO KOLLMER, Wien, IV.**

Reicht frisches Obst, Dunstloft verwenden! Denauf soll eine Creme-schicht sein, die man mit Obst hübsch verzieren. Ein paar Stunden kalt stellen. Zwischen jede Schicht kommen immer wieder Biskotten, die auch durch dünne Biskuitscheiben ersetzt werden können. Am feinsten mit frischen Erd- oder Himbeeren.

Schinkenpastete: Man knetet aus 10 Dekagramm Butter, ebensoviel Mehl, einem Ei, Salz und zwei Eßlöffel Rahm einen glatten Teig, den man eine Stunde kalt ruhen läßt. 15 Dekagramm Schinken, ebensoviel gebratenes weißes Fleisch durch die Maschine drehen. 5 Dekagramm Speck würfelig schneiden, gelblich rösten, mit einem Eßlöffel feingehackter Zwiebel und grüner Petersilie vermengen, so daß auch die Zwiebeln gelblich werden. Zu dem Fleisch geben. Mit zwei Eidottern verrühren, drei Eßlöffel Rahm darunter mischen. Diese Fülle kommt in den dünn ausgewalkten, mürben Teig, mit dem man eine gefettete Auflaufform belegt hat, und zwar so, daß Teig auch über die Ränder herabhängt, der dann über die Fülle geschlagen wird. Man bestreicht die obere Teigdecke mit etwas verrührtem Ei und backt die Pastete im gut warmen Rohr.

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Die Wochenspiellpläne der Wiener Theater.

Wien, 15. Mai.

Burgtheater. Vom 15. bis einschließlich 22. d.: Sonntag, 1/2 Uhr: „Faust.“ Montag, 2 Uhr, zu Nachmittagspreisen: „Torquato Tasso“; 7 Uhr: „Der junge Medardus.“ Dienstag, 8 Uhr, Theatergemeinde, Serie B, blaue Mitgliedskarten: „Disraeli.“ Mittwoch, 8 Uhr, im Abonnement, erste Gruppe: „Disraeli.“ Donnerstag, 1/2 Uhr, im Abonnement, zweite Gruppe: „Torquato Tasso.“ Freitag, 8 Uhr: „Disraeli.“ Samstag, 1/2 Uhr: „Faust.“ Sonntag, 1/2 Uhr: „Anna Karenina.“

Akademietheater. Vom 15. bis einschließlich 22. d.: Sonntag und Montag, 4 Uhr, zu Nachmittagspreisen: „Seiten-sprünge“; 8 Uhr: „Der Teufelschüler.“ Dienstag, 8 Uhr: „Seiten-sprünge.“ Mittwoch und Donnerstag, 7 Uhr, Veranstaltung der Staatsakademie für Musik und darstellende Kunst, Aufführung der Schauspiellasse Professor Dr. Schulhaus: „Die Arlesierin.“ Freitag, 7 Uhr, Veranstaltung der Staatsakademie für Musik und darstellende Kunst (Klasse Professor W. Ritsch): Opernakte und Szenen. Samstag und Sonntag, 8 Uhr: „Der Teufelschüler.“

Operntheater. Vom 17. bis einschließlich 22. d.: Dienstag, 1/2 Uhr, im Abonnement, zweite Gruppe: „Lurandot.“ (Lurandot: Frau Maria Nemeth; Ralof: Herr Jan Kiepur.) Mittwoch, 7 Uhr, im Abonnement, zweite Gruppe: „Don Carlos.“ Donnerstag, 1/2 Uhr: „Das Mädchen aus dem goldenen Westen.“ Freitag, 1/2 Uhr, im Abonnement, erste Gruppe: „Don Juan.“ Samstag, 7 Uhr, im Abonnement, erste Gruppe: „Don Carlos.“ Sonntag, 1/2 Uhr, im Abonnement, erste Gruppe: „Manon.“ (Manon: Frau Maria Teriza. Des Grieux: Herr Jan Kiepur.)

Deutsches Volkstheater. Vom 15. bis einschließlich 22. d.: Sonntag bis inklusive Samstag, 8 Uhr: „Vilom.“ Sonntag, 11 Uhr vormittags, Studioaufführung: „Dichter werden gesucht!“; 8 Uhr: „Vilom.“

Theater in der Josefstadt. Vom 15. bis einschließlich 22. d.: Sonntag und Montag, 1/2 Uhr: „Die Braut von Torosko“; 8 Uhr: „Schwarzrote Kirichen.“ Montag bis inklusive Sonntag, 8 Uhr: „Schwarzrote Kirichen.“

Theater an der Wien. Täglich 8 Uhr: „Der Teufels-reiter.“

Stadtheater. Täglich 8 Uhr: „Im weißen Rössl.“
Komödie. Täglich, 8 Uhr: „Die Prinzessin auf der Erbse.“

Raimund-Theater. Vom 15. bis einschließlich 22. d.: Sonntag, 1/2 Uhr: „Lumpacivagabundus“; 8 Uhr: „Unter Geschäftsaufsicht.“ Montag, 1/2 Uhr: „Der Verschwenker“; 8 Uhr: „Unter Geschäftsaufsicht.“ Dienstag, 8 Uhr: „Wunder um Verdun.“ Mittwoch, 8 Uhr: „Unter Geschäftsaufsicht.“ Donnerstag, 8 Uhr, Gastspiel des Wiener Volksstudienembles: „Was Gott zusammenfügt.“ Freitag, 8 Uhr: „Wunder um Verdun.“ Samstag und Sonntag, 8 Uhr: „Unter Geschäftsaufsicht.“

Jüdische Künstler-spiele, II. Praterstraße 34. Heute und die folgenden Tage: „Hütel eure Frauen.“

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(a) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman, NARS, Date 12-18-75

0886

Motorwesen AUTOMOBILISMUS Luftfahrt

Kreuzung und Verkehrsunfall.

Von Kommerzialrat Karl Weniger.

Gerichtlich beeideter Sachverständiger für das Automobilwesen.

Im Kreuzungen spielt sich erfahrungsgemäß ein Großteil der Verkehrsunfälle ab.

Um bezüglich des Vorfahrtrechtes eine Klärung, beziehungsweise Erleichterung für die Verkehrsflüssigkeit zu schaffen, wurde die sogenannte Linkregel eingeführt, welche leider nicht das Ergebnis gezeitigt hat, das zu erreichen doch zweifellos die Absicht bestand. Im Wiener Stadtverkehr unterscheidet man Hauptverkehrs- und Nebenstraßen. Erstere sind solche, in denen Straßenbahngelände verlegt erscheinen oder die vom Magistrat und der Polizeidirektion als solche erklärt sind, während alle übrigen als Nebenstraßen gelten.

Bei Kreuzungen gleichrangiger Straßen hat das von links kommende Fahrzeug den Vorrang, bei Kreuzungen verschiedenrangiger Straßen das auf der Hauptverkehrsstraße fahrende, wobei die Entfernung zur Kreuzung und die Geschwindigkeit des einzelnen Fahrzeuges beachtet werden muß, da ein Kraftfahrzeug unter Umständen, auch wenn es zum Beispiel weiter weg ist als ein im Schritt fahrendes Pferdewerk, im Hinblick auf die bestehende Geschwindigkeitsdifferenz ohne weiteres überqueren oder einbiegen kann.

Leider wurde es aber bisher unterlassen, einzelne Straßenzüge, wie zum Beispiel Graben, als Hauptverkehrsstraßen zu bezeichnen, was im Interesse einer flotten Verkehrsabwicklung dringendst nötig wäre, da derzeit von links aus Nebengassen einbiegende oder überquerende Fahrzeuge eine Verkehrsstockung bewirken können, obwohl gerade ihr Stehenbleiben und Warten mangels nachkommender anderer Wagen nur für sie selbst eine kleine Verzögerung bedeuten würde.

Aber auch außerhalb von Wien gelten Kreuzungsbestimmungen, welche nicht allen bekannt sein dürften. In geschlossenen Ortschaften besitzt das auf der Durchgangsstraße fahrende Kraftfahrzeug den Vorrang, weil diese als Hauptverkehrsstraße gilt. Dazu ist stets eine Bundesstraße zu zählen. Wohl gemerkt in einer geschlossenen Ortschaft! Außerhalb einer solchen hat im Sinne der Bundespolizeigesetze, welche nunmehr auch für die Bundesstraßen gelten (Verordnung des Bundesministers für Handel und Verkehr), an Kreuzungen und Einmündungen das von links kommende Fahrzeug den Vorrang. Es gibt in diesem Falle also keine Hauptverkehrs- und Nebenstraßen, und ein auf der Bundesstraße fahrender muß eventuell einem Radfahrer, der sie überquert, den Vorrang einräumen.

Im allgemeinen muß ich immer wieder bei Verkehrsunfällen die Unkenntnis der gesetzlichen Bestimmungen seitens des einen oder anderen Beteiligten erkennen. Dies ist aber auch nicht zu verwundern, da Kutscher oder Radfahrer, welche den verschiedenen Ständen und Altersklassen angehören, schwerlich in ihrer freien Zeit Gesetze studieren. Gerade dieser Umstand wird aber meistens gefährlich, da selbst der Gesetzeskundige im kritischen Moment nicht weiß, ob der andere das Gesetz kennt, und wenn dies der Fall ist, ob er sich daran hält.

Für den Kraftfahrer ergibt sich daraus die Notwendigkeit, bei Kreuzungen jedenfalls sein Tempo entsprechend zu mäßigen und laute Warnungssignale zu geben; er muß weiter sein sogenanntes Gegenüber genau beobachten, um hieraus sein Verhalten einzurichten. Der Verkehr würde sich viel leichter abwickeln, wenn einer dem anderen durch ein Handzeichen diese vorbedachte Beobachtung erleichtert, was nicht nur unfallvermindernd, sondern auch höflich wirken würde.

Die Absage des Concours d'Élégance.

Die Gründe nicht stichhaltig.

Der Concours d'Élégance für Automobile, der seit Jahren eine der sportlichen Attraktionen der Wiener Festwochen war, ist, wie bereits kurz berichtet, für heuer abgesagt worden. Als Grund wird, wie in allen ähnlichen Fällen, die ungünstige wirtschaftliche Lage angegeben. Die Ungunst der Zeiten kann natürlich von niemandem geleugnet werden, aber deswegen darf man doch nicht von vornherein mutlos die Finte ins Korn werfen. Da, wenn es sich um eine große internationale Veranstaltung handeln würde, die ein bedeutendes finanzielles Risiko, viel Mühe und Beteiligung von Koryphäen des Auslandes erfordert, könnte man die Absage ohne weiteres verstehen. Das alles trifft aber auf eine Schönheitskonkurrenz für Automobile nicht zu. Man hätte sie ganz einfach nicht in so großer Ausmachung durchführen müssen wie zuletzt. Nachdem im Vorjahre, wo wir die Wirtschaftskrise auch schon gehörig spürten, die Beteiligung einige hundert Wagen betrug, konnte man heuer im schlimmsten Falle dennoch mit etwa dreißig Autos rechnen. Das hätte für eine kleine Veranstaltung, die ja nicht wie sonst von 4 Uhr nachmittags bis halb 8 Uhr abends dauern mußte, sondern in anderthalb Stunden vorübergehen könnte — Kürze ist manchmal sogar die Würze — voll und ganz genügt. Auch hätte man die Neuverteilung treffen sollen, daß die Insassen der konkurrierenden Automobile, von Ausnahmefällen abgesehen, aussteigen und sich dem Publikum zeigen müssen, eine Einführung, die schon wiederholt verlangt worden ist und auch in Anbetracht der Teilnahme so vieler geschlossener Wagen sehr vorteilhaft erscheint. Und nun das finanzielle Risiko. Die Kosten der Veranstalter können unserer Schätzung nach nicht übermäßig hoch sein. Der Schönbrunner Schlosshof, der auch heuer wieder als Schauplatz in Aussicht genommen war, gehört dem Bund, und wir sind überzeugt, daß das Ministerium im Interesse der Wiener Festwochen das größte Entgegenkommen gezeigt hätte. Tribünen hätte man nicht gebraucht, sie waren ohnehin immer ungedeckt und erfüllten daher ihren Zweck nur unvollkommen. Einige hundert Sessel, die man in einer Weltstadt wie Wien von

Erfa-Werke S. Erben & Sohn

Wien, K. Laxenburgerstrasse 137

Stocklager:
Wien, III.
Landstr.
Hauptstr. 71

Telephon R-11-0-60



diversen Unternehmen für billiges Geld zu leihen bekommt, hätten genügt. Und die Preise? Die kosteten immer das allerwenigste. Die Prämiierten erhielten Bänder in Flaggenart aus irgendeinem Baumwollstoff, in roter, blauer oder gelber Farbe, mit einer Spagatknur daran. Richtig, es gab als höchste Auszeichnung auch ein paar „goldene Bänder“. Aber keine Sorge, diese waren nicht solcher Art, daß man deswegen Geld von der Nationalbank anfordern müßte. Sie waren ebenso wie die anderen Bänder aus Stoff, nur in Goldfarbe. Die übrigen Kosten? Es ist ja nicht notwendig, daß man eine Art Festprogramm aus Luxuspapier, dicklebig, das natürlich teuer sein muß und in dem sich kein Mensch auskennt, herausgibt; ein billiges Festchen von ein paar Seiten, wie bei den Pferderennen, genügt vollkommen, beim Derby ist es auch nicht anders. Reklame? Die Tages- und Fachzeitungen haben die Propaganda für den Concours d'Élégance noch alle Jahre kostenlos — oder wenigstens fast umsonst — befragt. Das Personal? Die Funktionäre sind natürlich ehrenamtlich, und im übrigen hat der Automobilklub zahlreiche bewährte Sekretariatsbeamte und Angestellte, die für die Anforderungen einer ein- bis zweistündigen Vorführung in einem geschlossenen

Autofahrten in woglosen Gegenden.

Afrikaexpedition von österreichischen Sportkenten.

II.

In Ägypten trafen wir recht gute Straßen an und gelangten nach einem Abstecher nach Assuan an den Suezkanal, dessen Traversierung sich zeitraubend gestaltete. Dann wurden die Wege wieder schlecht und erst 100 Kilometer vor Jerusalem begann eine modern ausgebaute Chaussee. Herrlich war der Dünenweg am Meere von Haifa zur syrischen Grenze, 50 Kilometer lang; ähnlich dürfte die berühmte Rennstrecke am Meeresstrand von Florida aussehen, auf der die Schnellheitsweltrekorde geschaffen werden. Syrien, unter französischer Verwaltung stehend, ist wie Algerien ein Dorado für Automobilisten, wir legten täglich 400 bis 500 Kilometer mit Leichtigkeit zurück. Ueber Damaskus, Aleppo und Alexandrette gelangten wir an die türkische Grenze.

Anatolien ist ein Kapitel für sich, leider ein für den Automobilisten recht unerfreuliches. Von richtigen Straßen kann man überhaupt nicht sprechen, vor allem fehlen aber überall Brücken. Dugende von Wasserläufen mußten wir auf Furtun durchfahren, wobei wir Glück hatten, daß der Wasserstand nicht zu hoch war. Schildkröten und vor allem enorm viele Schlangen kriechen über den Weg, von denen wir eine Menge überfahren. Doch langsam erkennen, daß die Bevölkerung sehr freundlich ist. Um 1400 Kilometer zurückzulegen, brauchen wir sieben Tage. Als wir endlich nach Ueberwindung des Marmarameeres in Konstantinopel landeten, waren wir froh und glaubten nun alle wirklichen Strapazen hinter uns zu haben. Wir hatten uns aber zu früh geirent, denn der Weg — Straße kann man nicht sagen — durch die ehemalige Militärgasse bis Adrianopel ist jeder Beschreibung, und auch nach Besserung der bulgarischen Grenze wurde es um nicht mehr als 10 Prozent besser. In Serbien glücklicherweise eine weitere Besserung. In Belgrad

Keine Preis-Erhöhung für Semperit-Reifen



SEMPERIT

OESTERREICHISCH-AMERIKANISCHE GUMMIWERKE, AKTIEN-GESELLSCHAFT

Die Gerüchte, daß wir wegen der Einfuhrbeschränkung die Preise für unsere Reifen erhöhen, sind falsch.

Die bisherigen niedrigen Preise bleiben ebenso unverändert, wie die hochwertige Qualität unserer Reifen!

Hof in der Stadt Wien selbst wahrscheinlich ohne Hilfskräfte genügen würden.

Nein, diese Absage fast einen Monat vor dem Termin kann nicht widerspruchsfrei hingenommen werden. Agram, Brünn und andere Städte haben, wie wir in den letzten Tagen lesen konnten, kürzlich ihre Schönheitswettbewerbe für Automobile gehabt, in Wien muß der schon traditionell gewordene Concours d'Élégance einer bedauerlichen Geste von Kleinmut zum Opfer fallen.

Kleine Nachrichten.

Großbritannien besitzt schon rund 2600 Kilometer Betonstraßen. Im Jahre 1931 wurde die Rekordzahl von 700 Kilometer gebaut. Diese Betonstraßen werden in neuerer Zeit zum Teil farblich gehalten, rot, grün und weißgelb. In dieser Färbung sollen sie einen schärferen Kontrast zu Randsteinen und Verkehrszeichen hervorbringen, die Sicht also begünstigen. Auch Trennungskügelchen können in verschiedenen Farben in den Beton eingegossen werden, so daß ihre Sichtbarkeit auch bei schlechter Beleuchtung gegeben ist.

ist die große Brücke noch nicht fertig, wir mußten mit dem Fährboot nach Remun überlegen. Im Banat wiederum schlechte Straßen, erst etwa 100 Kilometer vor Budapest erstklassige Chaussee, die bis Wien anfährt.

Rund 13.000 Kilometer haben wir zurückgelegt. Unsere zwei Tatraswagen laufen nach dieser anstrengenden Expedition so ausgezeichnet, daß wir sofort nach unserer Rückkehr am Sonntag die Zuverlässigkeitssahrt der Westösterreichischen Automobilklub in Pilsen, die über 400 Kilometer durch den Bohmerwald führt, als Konkurrenten mitmachen werden.

Straßenbericht.

Das österreichische Straßennetz ist derzeit mit Ausnahme einiger weniger Alpenpässe bereits vollkommen schneefrei und für Kraftfahrzeuge wieder gut passierbar. Unpassierbar sind nur noch: Arlberg und Flexenpäß (bis Ende Mai), Radbätter Tauern, Nibelalpe und Loiblpaß (bis etwa 20. Mai).



STANDARD



Hoch Geschwindigkeit, sofortige Beschleunigung, beste Bergstiegsfähigkeit, glänzende Federung, größte Bequemlichkeit, sparsamer Betrieb, 1 1/2 JAHRE GARANTIE.

4/24 P.S. 5/30 P.S. 8/45 P.S. 10/65 P.S.

Generalrepräsentanz: G. HANS KOCH, Wien, II. Ob. Donaustr. 98. Tel. A-47-4-48.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By: M. J. D. [illegible] NARS, Date 12-18-75

0887

erhältlich bei

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Opel & Beyschlag
Gardinerstr. 5, Canovastrasse 5
Geordinet 1893

Die Sacum Dil Company g. l. f. führend auf dem Schilde der Maschinen- und Motorenherstellung, hat eine neue, vortheilhafte Modell entwickelt und herausgebracht, welche den ganz neuen Anforderungen der neuesten Motorabfabriktionen anpasst. In führende englische Motorabfabriken haben diese neue Modelle: Modell D. eine gründliche Erprobung unterzogen. Auf Grund der hervorragenden Resultate derselben fährte zum Beispiel die Sacum Dil Company, das Sacum Dil Compound, das neue Modell D. einen sehr großen Fortschritt gegenüber jedem anderen Motorabfabrikat herbeizuführen. Die Triumphe Compound gth. ... zufolge dieser Proben: die Ratteng Sac Co. gth. ... für alle unsere Modelle einschließt das beste Material, welches nur ausprobiert haben — in einem Umfang, res auszuweisen, ist empfehlend.

innenleker, 7sitzig, in sehr eleganter Ausführung und in bestem Zustand, privat sehr stnssig abzugeben. Zuschritten erbeten unter „First class Amerikaner“ an das Anknndigungs-Bureau dieses Blattes.

Standard in Südafrika.

Die Stanbarch-Verteilung Wien erhielt zur Verfügung von ihren Werken nachfolgendes Schreiben des Capitän W. v. Gluck aus Südafrika: „Ich möchte die Gelegenheit nehmen, Ihnen mitzutheilen, daß bei mir gekannte „Sirenen“ mit nachdem ich bereits 42.000 Meilen (67.200 Kilometer) zurückgelegt habe, ich während der vielen und langen Fahrten, welche ich in meinem Leben unternommen mußte, außerordentlich gut behandelt ist. Ich kam oft auf gefährlich durchwogeltes Gelände mit sehr großen Steigungen, konnte keinem Gefährdegeheimnis, wo ich mit allem größten Zelle meinen Weg erst bahnen mußte. Ständige Stöße stießen hier und da auf harte Pumpenstößschrägen, auf welchen ich leider nicht viel zu tun habe. Es ist Zufall, daß der Stanbarch sich unter den schlechtesten Bedingungen belassen behandelt hat. Die großenteils zweckmäßigsten und allgemeine Verlässlichkeit machen den Stanbarch besonders passend für überaus wichtige Verhältnisse, für die schlechtesten Straßen und das geringste Terrain. Niemand hat der Stanbarch auch nur im geringsten im Stich gelassen.“

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Guil. Dig. 3. Appendix

Erziehung: Erziehung für Nord=Westfalen.

Audge-MWhitworth-Drahtzieheneüber.

Generalvertrieb: AD. RIEDL Wien, IX. T

Kleine Nachrichten.

Men, I. Sollerstraße 11

Sternfahrt nach Graz.

[illegible]

Gröner Kreis von Temberg.

Champion-Züchter in Österreich.

04

Der „schwebende Motor“.

Kurib-Gummigelenkscheibe mit Spezialarmierung.

Innenlenker, in erstklassiger Verfassung, Umstände halber **sehr preiswert privat abzugeben**. Zuschnitten erbeten unter „Occasion 39“ an das Anknüpfungs-Bureau dieses Blattes.

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sagt, muß auch

sagen; wer

sagt muß

sagen! Dies gilt für jene Automobilisten, die oftmals aus Bequemlichkeit oder ohne weiter zu überlegen, beim Einkauf von Autoöl einfach "BB-Öl" verlangen, wenn Sie "Mobiloil BB", das Qualitätsprodukt der Vacuum Oil Company A.G. zu erhalten wünschen • Es gibt nur ein Mobiloil "BB"!

**VACUUM OIL
COMPANY AG**

Schwimmkämpfe in Budapest.

Niederlage der österreichischen Wasserballer.

Telegramm unseres Korrespondenten.

Budapest, 14. Mai. Aus Anlaß des fünfzigjährigen Jubiläums des ungarischen Schwimmverbandes begann heute hier ein Wasserballturnier. Im ersten Spiel siegte Ungarn A gegen Ungarn B mit 2:1 (0:1), wobei für die Sieger Nemeth beide Treffer erzielte. Für die Unterlegenen war Vertessy erfolgreich. Im zweiten Kampf des Abends siegte die Tschechoslowakei über Österreich mit 7:1 (3:1). Bei den Österreichern verlor die Verteidigung. Für die Tschechoslowaken waren Schmutz (3), Steiner (2), Lomajsek und Svehla erfolgreich. Den Treffer der Österreicher erzielte Schönbauer. Schiedsrichter Schlenker.

Heute starteten Österreich — Ungarn A und Tschechoslowakei — Ungarn B, Montag Österreich gegen Ungarn B und Tschechoslowakei gegen Ungarn A. Außerdem starteten mit deutschen italienischen und tschechoslowakischen Schwimmern der österreichische 1500-Meter-Meister Wimmer, der allerdings gegen Salossy und Gostoli nur kleine Chancen hat, dann im Schnellschwimmen Sepp Staudinger, Österreichs Europameister im Turmspringen.

Kleine Sportchronik.

Die Hochschmännlichkeit des W. A. C. wurde gestern in Prag von D. E. G. mit 3:2 (2:1) besiegt.

Der FIFA-Kongress wurde gestern in Stockholm abgeschlossen. Es wurde die Austragung einer Fußballweltmeisterschaft beschlossen, die voraussichtlich in Italien zur Durchführung kommen wird.

Ein Tennisländerkampf Japan gegen Tschechoslowakei begann gestern in Prag. Die Japaner konnten die beiden Einzelspiele gewinnen und führten mit 2:0.

Im Davis-Cupspiel England gegen Rumänien siegten die Engländer auch im Doppel und führten nunmehr mit 3:0.

Der Millenniumspreis in Budapest.

In Budapest wird heute mit dem Millenniumspreis, 72.000 Pengő, 1800 Meter, eine der bedeutendsten Zuchtprüfungen auf dem Kontinent zur Austragung gebracht. Die Dreijährigen haben hierin im Kampf mit den älteren Pferden den Beweis ihrer Klasse zu erbringen. Entschieden sie das Resultat zu ihren Gunsten, dann hat man zum Derbyjahrgang volles Vertrauen. Heuer haben die Dreijährigen einen schweren Stand, denn es tritt ihnen in Starlight ein Pferd von außergewöhnlichen Fähigkeiten entgegen. Die Wunderluste hat erst im Bathynony-Dunaparty-Preis unsere besten älteren Hengste Corvus und Phönix einfach verloren. Der Dreijährige, dem es gelingen sollte, Starlight zu bezwingen, müßte als ein Ausnahmepferd betrachtet werden und ein solches dürfte sich kaum im Felde vorfinden. Tempo, der heuer zwei überlegene Siege erröcht und als der gefährlichste Gegner von Starlight gilt, wird ebenso wie die Stute von Trainer Hitz trainiert. Gitanio, Kapitän und Kendes, die eine gute Klasse vertreten, werden gegen die Ueberlegenheit Starlights schwer anzukämpfen haben. Österreichische Ställe sind durch Kellermann und Phönix vertreten. Beide Hengste waren im Vorjahr in Front, der ältere vermochte den jüngeren ziemlich leicht abzufertigen. Ob den beiden heuer auch ein so gutes Abschneiden möglich sein sollte, ist allerdings nicht zu sagen. Als Starter werden bezeichnet: Gitanio, 4jähr., 57½ Kg. (Gutai); Tempo, 3jähr., 51 Kg. (Schjöl); Kapitän, 4jähr., 61 Kg. (Goplar); Diadal, 3jähr., 48½ Kg. (Kojan); Starlight, 4jähr., 63 Kg. (Gutai); Phönix (Schlaggi); Kellermann (B. Gsch).

Am Freitagmontag wird das Bienniale-Zuchtrennen, 23.000 Pengő, 1800 Meter, für Dreijährige, als Hauptnummer gelaufen, an welchem von unseren Pferden Rebaggi (St. Takacs) und Orco (R. Szabo) gegen die Ungarn Arpadhalom (B. Gsch), Garuda (Balog), Corvinus (Schjöl), Palcsi (Gutai) und Sunday (Gutai) in die Schranken zu treten haben. Die meisten Ausichten werden Corvinus, dem Sieger im vorjährigen General-Gedenkrennen in Wien, zugesprochen.

Renner zu Berlin-Grünwald.

Preis der Ausstellungshallen, 5500 Mark. 1400 Meter. Des Stalles Landwehr Laotje (P. Borgo) 1., Rochus (R. Nart) 2., Orkaber (O. Schmidt) 3. Ferner liefen: Walzertraum, Winkler, Filmenau. Sieg 93:10. Platz 35, 17:10.

Die Newmarket Stakes.

Die Newmarket Stakes über 2000 Meter, eine der wichtigsten Vorprüfungen zum Englischen Derby, ergaben den Ueberwältigungssieg von Lord Rosebys Miracle unter H. Wragg. Der Sohn des Derbyflegers Manna gewann als 10:1-Außenreiter mit vier Jähren gegen Rolling Rock (P. Knolly), Zulandshor (M. Beary) und drei weitere Gegner.

Renner zu Le Tremblay.

Preis Wachem, 125.000 Francs, 2300 Meter. Marquis de Planos Laeken (A. Rabbe) 1., Shred (S. Semblat) 2., Strip the Willow (F. Perce) 3. Ferner liefen: Formosan, P'Abbe Constantin, Beaumontel, La Camargue. Sieg 124:10. Platz 23, 11:10.

Touring- und Zielfahrt nach Fürnten.

55 Kraftfahrzeuge gestartet.

Gestern früh begann die vom Österreichischen Touringklub veranstaltete Wertungsfahrt mit dem Start auf dem Rathausplatz in Wien, von wo zwischen 5 und 7 Uhr insgesamt 55 Kraftfahrzeuge, und zwar 17 Automobile, 21 Motorräder mit Beiwagen und 17 Solomotorräder, auf die Reise gingen. Die Strecke mußte noch in letzter Stunde infolge Unpassierbarkeit des Niederalpals abgeändert werden. Sie führt jetzt über Mödling, Peitzgenkreuz, Potenstein, Gutenstein, Klosterthal, Breiner Gscheid, Mürzleg, Frein, Tera, Maritzell, Wegscheid, Seeburg, Alsenz, Reoben (Mittagsstation), Ruitelsfeld, Obacher Sattel, Lavanttal, Wolfsegg, Fölkermarkt, Ferlach, Rosenthal nach Warmbad Villach und erhöht sich auf 480 Kilometer. Gleichfalls in den Abendstunden, aber auch noch am heutigen Tage treffen in Warmbad Villach die Teilnehmer an der Internationalen Zielfahrt ein, für die rund 120 Kraftfahrzeuge angemeldet sind, die von den verschiedensten Orten des In- und Auslandes, doch mindestens 100 Kilometer von Villach entfernt, die Reise durchzuführen. Die Fährleitung hat der Vizepräsident des Touringklubs Herbert Schrad, als Sportkommissare fungieren Oberst Heinrich Richter und Direktor Edmund Schuster, die Streckenmarkierung wurde vom Disponenten der Vacuum Oil Company Fritz Jellner vorgenommen.

Der Ökonomist.

Ungarische Wirtschaft in der Weltkrise.

Von Oberhausmitglied Dr. Franz Chorin.
Präsident der ungarischen Arbeitgeberzentrale.

Budapest, 14. Mai.

In der Regel gilt die Kohlenproduktion als Gradmesser der industriellen Konjunktur. Unter den gegenwärtigen Verhältnissen kann aber dieser Gradmesser in Ungarn nicht als verlässlich gelten, da infolge der Devisenlage die Kohleneinfuhr gestoppt und daher der Bedarf der Haushaltungen zum erstenmal vorwiegend durch ungarische Kohle gedeckt wurde. Infolgedessen ist die Förderung im laufenden Semester nicht zurückgegangen, obwohl der Verbrauch der Eisenbahnen sowie der Industrie auch heuer eine stark rückläufige Bewegung aufweist. Auf den meisten Gebieten der industriellen Produktion sehen wir gegenüber dem Vorjahre eine weitere Abnahme. Am schärfsten tritt dieser Rückfall zu Tage bei jenen Industrien, welche mit der Agrarproduktion zusammenhängen oder auf die Investitionen der öffentlichen Hand angewiesen sind. Hierher gehören die Maschinenindustrie, die Kunstbänder- und die Zementindustrie. Bei diesen zeigt sich naturgemäß ein außerordentlich schwerwiegender Rückgang. Eine Ausnahme können nur jene Industrien bilden, welche nunmehr den Bedarf an jenen Erzeugnissen decken, die vor der Devisensperre aus dem Ausland bezogen wurden. In diese Kategorie gehört ein großer Teil der Textilindustrie. Aber auch hier, wie überhaupt bei der gesamten Industrie, wird die furchtbare Gestaltung des internationalen Handelsverkehrs immer nachteiliger fühlbar. Ich will gar nicht davon sprechen, daß die Schwierigkeiten der ungarischen Maschinenindustrie sich gerade infolge der unregelmäßigen Verhältnisse in unserem Außenhandel andauernd verschärfen, sondern bloß darauf hinweisen, daß die mit den Devisenbeschränkungen zusammenhängenden Clearingabkommen den Handelsverkehr in eine Richtung lenken, in welcher Importe ohne begründeten Importbedarf erfolgen.

Die Devisenbeschränkungen haben naturgemäß zu einer Verlangsamung des Verkehrs geführt. Die bisher gesuchten Auswege lenken den ohnehin gestoppten Kreislauf in eine naturwidrige Richtung. In Ungarn bildet die Agrarfrage das schwerwiegendste Problem. Infolgedessen sind Schuldnerschuldenmaßnahmen getroffen worden, welche im Endresultat die Kreditfähigkeit beeinträchtigen, wie denn überhaupt das Kreditproblem den Gang der Wirtschaft bestimmt. Oft hat es den Anschein, als ob wir immer mehr zu einer primitiveren Epoche des Wirtschaftens zurückkehren würden. Dies kann jedoch nur eine Ueberlegungserscheinung sein. Der Mangel an Kreditfähigkeit behindert die Ueberwindung der Erzeugnisse auf jenen Gebieten, wo sich auch heute noch Bedarf zeigt.

Wie sich die Lage in den folgenden Monaten in Ungarn gestalten wird, hängt in erster Reihe von dem Ausfall der Ernte, von der Verwertung der Getreideüberschüsse wie auch von der Lösung der Viehexportfrage ab. Die Lösung dieser Fragen ist aber nicht nur vom Standpunkt Ungarns eine absolute Notwendigkeit, sie ist auch dringlich im Interesse jener Staaten, welche auf den ungarischen Konsum angewiesen sind. Zu diesen gehört in erster Reihe Österreich. Ich glaube, daß die Zukunft unseres Wirtschaftslebens mehr denn je mit der Weltwirtschaft zusammenhängt. Unser Schicksal wird dadurch entschieden werden, ob das internationale Solidaritätsgefühl der Welt, dessen Mangel eine der Hauptursachen der Weltwirtschaft ist, sich durchsetzen vermag oder nicht.

Die Währungsfrage in den Vereinigten Staaten.

Die Frage der „Kreditausweitung“.

Von Dr. Viktor Bloch.

Gesellschafter des Bankhauses Ruz, Bloch & Co.

Wien, 15. Mai.

Seitdem England den Goldstandard verlassen hat und ihm auf diesem Wege von einer Reihe anderer Länder Gesellschaft geleistet wurde, hat sich die Aufmerksamkeit der Welt in verstärktem Maße auf das valutarische Geschehen in den Vereinigten Staaten gerichtet. So wie Keynes in England sich dafür eingesetzt hatte, durch Manipulation der Währung der ungünstigen Lage der Staatsfinanzen und der Privatwirtschaft zu Hilfe zu kommen, propagieren Wagemann, Albert Kahn und viele andere in Deutschland die Rettung aus Krisenmühen durch inflationistische Maßnahmen. Ebenso gibt es auch in den Vereinigten Staaten Nationalökonomien, welche durch Vermehrung des Banknotenumlaufes eine Hebung der Preise und dadurch eine „Entlastung der Wirtschaft“ erzielen wollen. Unschwerwört von theoretischen Erwägungen, verlangen breite Schichten der Bevölkerung daselbst, daß sich dem Mann aus dem Volke die derzeitige Misere der Wirtschaft als ein Mangel an Bargeld (Schlehtin) präsentiert. Das Währungssystem der nordamerikanischen Republik ist noch jungen Datums und in seiner Kompliziertheit den breiten Massen schwer verständlich. Die Zusammenhänge zwischen dem Federal Reserve Board, den zwölf Bundesreservebanken und den unzähligen Mitgliedsinstituten vernehmen dem Laien jene leichte Ueberbith, welche die Ausweise eines zentralen Noteninstituts geben sollen. Außerdem gibt es in den Vereinigten Staaten noch immer eine starke Silberpartei, welche bei jeder Gelegenheit dem weißen Metall seine Rolle im Währungswesen zurückgeben will.

Ein scharfes Licht auf die weite Verbreitung und Stärke inflationistischer Bestrebungen hat die überausende und mit überwältigender Mehrheit erfolgte Annahme der Gold-

borroughbill im Repräsentantenhaus geworfen; dem Federal Reserve Board, der obersten Währungsbehörde der Union, soll der Auftrag erteilt werden, eine solche Valuta- und Kreditpolitik zu betreiben, daß das durchschnittliche Preisniveau der Jahre 1921 bis 1929 wiederhergestellt werde. Zu diesem Zwecke müßte der Notenumlauf, welcher derzeit zirka fünfzehn Milliarden Dollar beträgt, notfalls bis auf neun Milliarden Dollar vermehrt werden. Es sei vorausgeschickt, daß dieser Beschluß wenig Aussicht hat, Gesetz zu werden; hierzu müßte er auch vom Senat angenommen werden, in dem die „hard-money-men“ unter Führung von Owen Glaff die Oberhand haben. Dies wird wohl kaum der Fall sein, außerdem hat Präsident Hoover bereits erklärt, daß er das ihm verfassungsmäßig zustehende Veto gegen ein solches Gesetz einlegen würde. Im übrigen geht die Legislaturperiode im Juni zu Ende und nach der Verfassung müssen Gesetze, welche bis dahin nicht alle Instanzen passiert haben, von der neugewählten Volksvertretung wieder von Anfang an behandelt werden.

Immerhin ist es charakteristisch, daß fast fünf Sechstel der Kongressmänner für das Gesetz gestimmt haben. Die inflationistische Bewegung hat ihren politischen Rückhalt in der demokratischen Partei und insbesondere in den Baumwollstaaten, die unter dem Tiefstande der Preise außerordentlich leiden. Dies ist nicht unverständlich, wenn man den heutigen Baumwollpreis von 5-75 Cent mit dem Höchstpreis des Jahres 1929 von 21-65 Cent vergleicht. Dieser starke politische Nachdruck hat auch die bisherige amerikanische Währungspolitik nicht unberührt gelassen, wennalich sich die Aktionen bis jetzt von derartigen radikalen Maßnahmen ferngehalten haben. Die Ausweise des Federal Reserve Board zeigen immerhin eine Steigerung der Zirkulation im letzten Jahre um 820 Millionen Dollar, und das bei einer außerordentlichen Verminderung der Umsätze in Handel und Industrie nach Mengen und Preisen. Diese Kreditausweitung wurde zum überwiegenden Teil durch „open market operations“, durch Käufe von Bundesobligationen an der Börse, hervorgerufen. Die Käufe sollen mit einem Betrage von 100 Millionen Dollar wöchentlich auch weiter fortgesetzt werden. Außerdem hat sich das Diskontopariveau im letzten Jahre um 430 Millionen Dollar vermehrt. Die Errichtung der Reconstruction Finance Corporation war gleichfalls eine Konzeption an die Inflationisten. Das Institut hat in den zwei Monaten seines Bestandes an 850 Banken 120 Millionen Dollar ausgeliehen und einer Reihe von in Notlage befindlichen Eisenbahngesellschaften Darlehen gewährt, welche keinen wesentlich geringeren Betrag ausmachen dürften. Diese Kredite wurden gegen Sicherheiten gegeben, welche den früheren strengen Bestimmungen der Währungsgegebung nicht entsprechen.

In den Vereinigten Staaten wie in allen anderen Ländern lehnen die Anhänger der Kreditausweitung den Ausdruck „Inflation“ energisch ab und sprechen nur von einer „Reflation“, das heißt von einer Kreditausweitung, welche die übertriebene Deflation der letzten Jahre auf ein vernünftiges Maß zurückzuführen sollte. Diese Deflation, welche das enorme Fallen der Warenpreise, das heißt die Steigerung des Geldwertes, hervorgerufen habe, beruhe im wesentlichen auf zwei Umständen: zunächst auf der Rückziehung von Einlagen bei Banken und Theasaurierung der empfangenen Noten und Münzen durch das Publikum. Wenn man bedenkt, daß die Depositionen der Mitgliedbanken im letzten Jahr um vierhundert Milliarden Dollar zurückgegangen sind, während der Geldbedarf der Wirtschaft sicherlich außerordentlich gestiegen ist, scheint die Ziffer dieser Theasaurierung mit drei Milliarden Dollar nicht zu niedrig gegriffen. Sodann ist das Volumen der Zirkulationskredite, welche sich nur in Guthabens- und Belastungen in den Büchern der Banken und Bankiers ausdrücken, infolge großer Rückziehungen von Bankguthabens und dadurch forcierte Kreditkündigungen stark reduziert worden. Dieser Prozeß dauert noch an, führt zu einer ständigen Vertheuerung des Geldes und gestattet keinen Stillstand der rückläufigen Preisbewegung, geschweige denn eine Erholung der Warenpreise. Um diesen Sachverhalt richtig würdigen zu können, muß man sich vor Augen halten, daß während der großen Kreditausweitungsperiode in den Vereinigten Staaten von 1922 bis April 1928 die Banken neue Einlagen von dreizehnhundert Milliarden Dollar erhielten, ihre Ausleihungen aber um vierzehnhundert Milliarden Dollar vergrößert haben. Trotz der großen Verlängerung ihrer Forderungen hatten sie also ihre Kassenreserven nicht erhöht, sondern sogar vermindert. In der eigentlichen Boom-Periode von Beginn 1927 bis Oktober 1929 stiegen die Brokers' Loans von drei auf acht Milliarden. Dieses Geschehen hat verhindert, daß die durch die produktions- und verarbeitungsgebotene abnehmende Bewegung der Waren- und Effektenpreise schon viel früher hätte einsetzen können, wodurch die notwendige Korrektur viel härter und auf kürzerem Zeitraum zusammengedrängt wurde.

Schon im Oktober 1927, also bei Beginn des Aufschwungs, hat der hervorragende amerikanische Nationalökonom Benjamin B. Anderson diese Geschäftsgebarung auf das schärfste gebrandmarkt und als Quelle der größten Gefahren hingestellt. Dies müßte besonders jene zur Kenntnis nehmen, welche den Wert der theoretischen Forderung für die praktische Wirtschaftspolitik leugnen. Die gegenwärtige Deflationsperiode stellt also in erster Linie die Reaktion auf einen jahrelang dauernden Exzeß dar; es ist aber immerhin möglich, daß die Entwirrung der Kreditverflechtung infolge der eingetretenen Panik und der dadurch hervorgerufenen Theasaurierung nicht bei einem vernünftigen Niveau haltmacht, sondern darüber hinaus bis zu einer Demolierung jenes Systems von wechselseitigen Krediten geht, dessen das derzeitige Ausmaß der Wirtschaft bedarf. Die Absichten der Reflationisten gehen nun dahin, einerseits die thesaurierte und daher auf das Preisniveau nicht virtuell einwirkende Notenmenge, andererseits die durch Rückziehung von Krediten aus dem Verkehr gezogenen Beträge von Zirkulationskredit durch neue, in den Verkehr gebrachte Notenquantitäten zu ersetzen. Während es hinsichtlich der ersten Frage wenigstens Schätzungen der erforderlichen Notenummission gibt, ist es für die Erziehung der Zirkulationskredite so gut wie unmöglich, zu sagen, wie weit die

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(e) and 5(d) or (2)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By: William D. Gresham
NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Deflation überhaupt gegangen ist und bis zu welchem Betrage man sie durch Emission neuer Noten wieder rückgängig machen kann, ohne neuerlich in die Gefahr eines Exzesses zu verfallen. Die Annahme des durchschnittlichen Preisniveaus zwischen 1921 und 1929, von der die Goldborough Bill ausgeht, ist selbstverständlich eine rein willkürliche.

Ganz abgesehen von allen diesen Fragen bleibt noch das Problem offen, wie die neuerschaffenen Noten in den Verkehr gepumpt werden sollen, da ja die Produktion heute keineswegs völlig ist, sich ausdehnen und zu diesem Zweck neue Kredite aufnehmen. Albert Kahn hat bei der Weltwirtschaftskonferenz in Berlin gesagt, daß, wenn die Bundesregierung ihr Defizit von ungefähr zwei Milliarden Dollar durch Druck von neuen Noten anstatt durch Steuern oder Emission von Anleihen bedecken würde, „das Schicksal der Welt sich wenden könnte“. Da die Goldborough-Bill eine Vermehrung der Zirkulation um vierhundert Milliarden Dollar ins Auge faßt, würde eine Aufnahme der restlichen zweihundert Milliarden durch den Markt überhaupt nur denkbar sein, wenn die Bundesregierung gleichzeitig mit der Kreditaufnahme die Schaffung von enormen Anlagen durch die öffentliche Hand, wie Banken von Straßen, Kanälen, Eisenbahnen und dergleichen in Angriff nähme. Darüber, was nach Beendigung dieser Investitionstätigkeit geschehen sollte, in welchem Zeitpunkt die Notenzirkulation ja im die neuerschaffene Notenmenge angereichert sein kann, haben sich die Anhänger dieser Ideen offenbar nicht den Kopf gebrochen.

Einfuhrverbote und Handelspolitik.

Von Dr. Karl Wessely.

Generalsekretär des Österreichischen Handelsmuseums, Zentralverband für den Außenhandel.

Wien, 15. Mai.

Unsere österreichischen Verhältnisse sind auch inmitten einer europäischen Wirtschaftskrise mit ganz besonderen Aufgaben zu messen. Devisenwirtschaft und Maßnahmen zur Drosselung des Imports haben bei uns bisher Folgen gezeigt, die absolut von den Ergebnissen abweichen, die die gleichen Maßnahmen in anderen Ländern hervorgebracht haben. Es ist uns zum Beispiel nicht gelungen, das ständige Sinken des Devisenfußes der Devisenwirtschaftlichen Nationalbank trotz schwerer Eingriffe ins Wirtschaftsleben aufzuhalten. Der österreichische Export, aus dessen Erlös eine Auffüllung der Devisenbestände der Nationalbank erfolgen und der überdies den Importbedarf an Devisen alimentieren sollte, ist stetig gesunken, was ein Beweis dafür ist, daß unsere Ausfuhr sehr wenig Widerstandskraft gegenüber jeder Zwangsmaßnahme abgibt, gegenüber jeder Zwangsmaßnahme überhaupt, ja.

In der Tat sieht sich der österreichische Export in normalen Zeiten zu etwa drei Viertel aus der Ausfuhr von Fertigwaren, zu einem Viertel aus der Ausfuhr von Lebensmitteln, Rohstoffen und Halbfabrikaten zusammen. Innerhalb der Fertigfabrikate handelt es sich bei der Hälfte der Positionen um Artikel, die bei der sogenannten „Bedarfsindustrie“ zumind. unter die nicht unbedingt lebensnotwendigen Artikel eingereiht werden müssen. Devisenverordnungen, Einfuhrverbote und Kürzungen der Währung unserer verschiedensten Absatzgebiete in Europa und in Übersee hätten — das muß man offen zugeben — auch ohne die Einführung der österreichischen Devisenwirtschaft und der damit verbundenen Abgabe von Exportzöllen zu Kurven, welche mit denen des Auslandes bis zu 30 Prozent differieren, eine beträchtliche Senkung des österreichischen Exports mit sich gebracht. Daß die Devisenverordnungen, insbesondere die vierte Devisenverordnung, dieser Senkung nicht entgegenwirken, sondern sie noch beschleunigen haben, ist eine allgemein verbreitete Anschauung der Fachwelt geworden. Es muß aber zugegeben werden: Wer immer sich mit dem Problem einer Regulierung von Österreichs Außenhandel befaßt, muß bei der der Zahlungsdrückung und damit die Währung gefährdenden schweren Passivität unserer Handelsbilanz sein Augenmerk bei fallenden Exportmöglichkeiten auch einer Drosselung des Imports anwenden. Die Nichtzuteilung von Devisen für Importe bedeutet gewiß schon eine beträchtliche Einschränkung des Imports. Es ist nur fraglich, ob eine kräftige Verringerung entbehrlicher ausländischer Importwaren (durch teure Devisenbeschaffung) nicht eine weit bessere Wirkung gehabt hätte, das heißt, ob nicht der Import solcher Artikel mit Rücksicht auf die geringe Aufnahmefähigkeit unseres Marktes stärker zurückgegangen wäre, als wenn man dem Import durch die Möglichkeit der Kreditierung seitens des ausländischen Lieferanten noch immer weite Türen offen gelassen hätte. Daß von der Kreditierung sehr viel Gebrauch gemacht wurde, zeigen die verschiedenen in der jüngsten Zeit veröffentlichten Daten über die Zunahme der Handelsüberschuldung Österreichs an das Ausland seit Oktober 1931, die zwischen 200 und 300 Millionen Schilling schwanken.

Die Stellungnahme der Wirtschaftskorporationen, welche Einfuhrverbote, also eine Drosselung des Imports, als Maßnahme der Währungsstärkung fast einmütig abgelehnt haben, hat bewirkt, daß die besonders agrarischen und sozialdemokratischen Ziele vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen nur in einer völlig veränderten Form unter dem Titel von Einfuhrverboten mit einem Bewilligungsscheitern, beschränkt auf eine verhältnismäßig kleine Anzahl von Artikeln, beschlossen worden sind.

Die Wirtschaftskorporationen haben den Standpunkt vertreten, daß solche Einfuhrverbote nur als handelspolitische Notmaßnahme gebildet werden können und daß sie den Anlaß geben sollen, sofort in Verhandlungen mit jenen Staaten zu treten, mit denen unser Handelsverkehr schwer polst. Der einen Notwendigkeit kann man sich ja nicht verschließen: daß das Handelsbilanzpassivum Österreichs zum größten Teil verschwinden müßte, was schon oft dargelegt wurde, zwei Wege, dieses Passivum zu bekämpfen: die Drosselung des Imports oder die Steigerung des Exports.

Nun ist es evident, daß jede Drosselung des Imports eine Verringerung des Handelsvolumens mit sich bringt. Es sei denn, daß an die Stelle des Imports eines ausländischen Gutes sofort Ersatz durch eine neue Produktion des gleichwertigen Gutes im Lande treten kann. Es unterliegt nun keinem Zweifel, daß gegenüber normalen Zeiten vergangener Jahre die Möglichkeit gegeben wäre, namhafte Teile des ausländischen Imports durch einen leicht fabrik und eventuell auch eine Mehrerzeugung österreichischer Waren im Inlande zu ersetzen. Dadurch, daß dem Export seit 1931 mehr und mehr die Wege ins Ausland verschlossen wurden, dadurch, daß die Devisenwirtschaft und schließlich die Einfuhrverbote dem Import Hemmnisse entgegengekehrt haben, ist fraglos unter gewissen Umständen der Produktion ein Teil der österreichischen Gütererzeugung mehr auf den inländischen als den ausländischen Absatz eingestellt worden. Es sind auch einzelne Betriebe wieder neu beschäftigt worden oder es hat sich der Umfang ihrer Beschäftigung erhöht, was natürlich auch seine Wirkung auf eine Entlastung des Arbeitslosenmarktes haben muß. Aber der überwiegende Teil der österreichischen Produktion ist davon, daß er Rohstoffe und Halbfabrikate aus dem Ausland unbedingt beziehen muß, daß er also zur Erzeugung von Gütern, gleichgültig, ob er sie nun im Inland oder im Ausland absetzt, auf den Verkehr mit dem Ausland angewiesen ist, und diese mögliche Tatsache darf nie außer acht gelassen werden, wenn das Problem besprochen werden soll, eine zwangsweise Regelung des österreichischen Außenhandels oder gar seiner wirtschaftlichen Struktur herbeiführen zu wollen.

Bei dieser Angelegenheit auf den Bezug aus dem Ausland handelt es sich durchaus nicht nur um die Veredelungsindustrie allein, sondern, wie schon erwähnt, um den Großteil unserer industriellen und gewerblichen Produktion überhaupt, der irgendwelche notwendige Rohstoffe, Bestandteile usw. zur Produktion des einzelnen Artikels aus dem Ausland einführen muß. Es liegt mir, daß diese Abhängigkeit vom Ausland der österreichischen Außenhandelspolitik zwangsläufig ihren Stempel aufdrücken muß. Wir können mit einem vollkommenen Verbot oder einer anderen wirksamen Drosselung gar nicht vorgehen, ohne durch zu befürchtende Repressalien die ganze inländische Produktion zu gefährden, selbst wenn wir den Import von Lebensmitteln und Rohstoffen außer acht lassen.

Diese Erwägungen müssen aber ergänzt werden durch die Feststellung, daß auf der anderen Seite der Import von Rohstoffen, Lebensmitteln und Betriebsstoffen sowie von Rohstoffen, die verarbeitet werden, und den verschiedensten Artikeln, die unsere Produktion dringend benötigt, gleichgültig, ob ihr Absatz im Inland oder Ausland gefunden wird, eine ungeheure handelspolitische Waise in die Hand gibt, deren Grundbedingung allerdings durch das bisher in Kraft gebliebene System der Weltzölle in den bisherigen Handelsverträgen sehr ersichert wurde. Es handelt sich dabei um einen einfachen Grundgesetz, den man annehmen muß. Vor allem deswegen, weil die Entwicklung unserer Zahlungsbilanz deutlich zeigt, daß uns im wesentlichen zur Bezahlung unserer Importe nur der Erlös unseres Exports (auch des sogenannten unsichtbaren Exports, des Fremdenverkehrs usw.) zur Verfügung steht. Dieser Grundgesetz heißt: Do ut des.

Wenn also ein Land nach Österreich wesentlich mehr importiert, als es von dort bezieht, dann sind auf die Dauer nur folgende Möglichkeiten gegeben, um die Bezahlung dieser Importe zu gewährleisten: Entweder der österreichische Export nach anderen Ländern wirft derartige Überflüsse ab, daß sie für die Bezahlung jener Importmengen des betreffenden Landes verwendet werden können, welche unseren Export nach diesem Lande dem Wert nach übersteigen; oder aber dieser Überfluß reicht nicht aus, dann müßte das Importland mit allen Mitteln danach trachten, den österreichischen Export zu steigern, um so die Möglichkeit zu schaffen, seinen Export nach Österreich aufrechtzuerhalten. Solche Erwägungen müssen rein objektiv und ohne jeden politischen Abhangenden vor allem die Wirtschaftskreise der vier Staaten Deutschland, Tschechoslowakei, Polen und Ungarn für sich durch den Kopf gehen lassen.

Im Verkehr mit diesen vier Staaten betrug das Handelsbilanzpassivum im Jahre 1931:

Gegenüber Deutschland	nach 273 Millionen Schilling
Polen	222
Tschechoslowakei	219
Ungarn	106

zusammen also 719 Millionen Schilling. Das Gesamtpassivum unserer Handelsbilanz betrug im Jahre 1931 868 Millionen Schilling; daraus zeigt sich klar, daß der meiste Teil des Passivums im Verkehr mit den genannten Staaten entsteht und daß eine Verbesserung unserer handelspolitischen Situation mit diesen Staaten von der entscheidenden Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der österreichischen Handels- und Zahlungsbilanz überhaupt ist.

Es gibt nun eine ganze Reihe von Artikeln, welche vor allem Deutschland, Polen und Ungarn bereit von anderen Quellen importieren, die sie aber auch von Österreich beziehen könnten. Und es ist gar kein Zweifel, daß bei gutem Willen und verständnisvollem Eingehen in die gegenwärtige Situation, die entsprechende Ratifizierung der Regierungen, die ein Interesse an der Aufrechterhaltung des bisherigen Exportes nach Österreich aus diesen Ländern haben, ein Ablass österreichischer Artikel in einem solchen Ausmaß möglich wäre, daß das Bilanzpassivum schon in einem Jahr wesentlich vermindert werden könnte. Gegenüber der Tschechoslowakei liegt allerdings die Möglichkeit nicht in so reichem Maße gegeben.

Die politischen Wirtschaftskreise haben durch die Gründung des politisch-österreichischen, beziehungsweise österreichisch-polnischen Studienkomitees unter gegenseitiger Zusammenarbeit bereits in der Praxis einen Weg beschritten, der den hier angegebenen Zweck erreichen soll. Systematisch wird die Exportmöglichkeit des Ablasses österreichischer Waren in den verschiedenen Branchen erörtert und die Handelsverhältnisse statistisch Daten können kürzlich festgestellt werden, daß in einer ganzen Reihe von Artikeln eine Umstellung des Bezuges Polens bei gleichbleibender Gesamtimportmenge auf österreichische Bezugsquellen ohne weiteres möglich wäre.

Vor allem gilt es also, das Verständnis für die Situation Österreichs, die diese handelspolitischen Konsequenzen

einer Steigerung des österreichischen Exports vor allem nach den vier Staaten absolut erheischen, in den maßgebenden führenden Kreisen des Auslandes lebendig werden zu lassen. Es ist unser wie unserer Nachbarn Vorteil, wenn das Handelsvolumen sich hebt, wenn dadurch Beschäftigungs-, Arbeits- und Verdienstmöglichkeiten steigen, wenn die Einkünfte und Einnahmen der Verbrauchsleistung sich heben, wenn mit einem Wort wieder Quellen zu fließen beginnen, aus denen sich ein besserer Wohlstand — eine Verbesserung des Lebensstandards — entwickeln kann.

Gegenüber einer solchen Erwägung muß das System der Einfuhrverbote und Besperung, der Drosselung des Imports und der damit verbundenen notwendigen katastrophalen Senkung des Handelsvolumens als eine Maßnahme erscheinen, die man nur als verwegene Notwehr Österreichs bezeichnen kann und an deren Vermeidung gerade unsere Nachbarn das größte Interesse haben.

Das hundertste Geschäftsjahr der Assicurazioni Generali.

In der ordentlichen Generalversammlung der Gesellschaft am 8. Mai dieses Jahres wurde der Nechenschaftsbericht über das hundertste Geschäftsjahr genehmigt. Am 1. Mai 1931 hatte in Rom die Jahrhundertfeier vor einem noch und fern zusammengeführten Kreis markanter Persönlichkeiten der Finanz, Wirtschaft und Politik und in Gegenwart des italienischen Regierungschefs Mussolini stattgefunden, der ebenfalls das Wort ergriß und eine glänzende Ansprache an die Generalversammlung hielt. Da in dieser Generalversammlung außer der Würdigung der hundertjährigen Geschichte der Anstalt durch ihren Präsidenten Edoardo Morpurgo hinlänglich Gelegenheit genommen wurde, die Stellung der Gesellschaft im gegenwärtigen Wirtschaftsleben und zu den schwierigen Problemen der Weltkrise zu beleuchten, enthält sich die Vorrede des Nechenschaftsberichtes diesmal der kritischen Würdigung des Zeitgeschehens im abgelaufenen Jahr und bringt fast nur ziffernmäßige Daten. Die Krise, von der man im Vorjahr erwartete, daß sie wenigstens zum Teil abklingen würde, hält ungemindert, eher sogar noch verstärkt an. Dello bewundernswürdiger ist die Kraft der Anstalt, der es gelungen ist, ihren finanziellen Standard nicht nur ungeschwächt zu erhalten, sondern zu festigen und zu vergrößern.

So sind die Garantiemittel wieder gestiegen, und zwar auf 1471 Millionen Lire (534 Millionen Schilling) bei dieser Ziffer ist zu bedenken, daß darin ein Wertpapierportfolio von 912 Millionen Lire (331 Millionen Schilling) — also trotz der Auswirkung der Effektenkurssteigerung auf dem ganzen Wertpapiermarkt mehr als im Vorjahr — enthalten ist, das zu den Kurven vom 31. Dezember 1931 bewertet erscheint, ohne von den Bewertungsvereinfachungen Gebrauch zu machen, die den Versicherungsanstalten in vielen Ländern gemacht wurden. Eine Erhöhung um rund 30 Millionen Lire (11 Millionen Schilling) — größtenteils durch Neubauten und Erweiterungen — hat auch der Zinsenabteilungsbeitrag beigetragen, der mit 291 Millionen Lire (105 Millionen Schilling) zu Buch steht. Die durch die anhaltende Krise geschädigte Sparfähigkeit der Bevölkerung wirkt sich natürlich sehr in der Lebensversicherung aus. Dennoch ist der Stand der versicherten Kapitalien in der Lebensversicherung um 58 Millionen Lire (21 Millionen Schilling) auf 6144 Millionen Lire (24 1/2 Milliarden Schilling), die Prämienentnahme um 14 Millionen Lire (5 Millionen Schilling) auf 293 Millionen Lire (106 Millionen Schilling) gesunken. Die Prämienentnahmen der Lebensversicherung erreichen nun die imposante Höhe von 1050 Millionen Lire (381 Millionen Schilling). Die Prämienentnahme der Elementarversicherung betrug 304 Millionen Lire (110 Millionen Schilling), bei welcher Ziffer darauf Bedacht zu nehmen ist, daß die Generali in fast allen Schutzgebietsstaaten und in vielen anderen Ländern das Elementargeschäft nicht selbst, sondern durch Tochter- und Konzernanstalten betreibt. Die Gesamtleistungsbilanz befreit sich auf 147 Millionen Lire (52 Millionen Schilling), und damit erreichte die Summe der in hundert Geschäftsjahren liquidierten Schäden die wichtige Höhe von 9180 Millionen Lire (34 1/2 Milliarden Schilling). Der Reingewinn bleibt mit rund 30 Millionen Lire ungefähr der gleiche wie im Vorjahr, die Dividende ist mit Lire 175.— per Aktie unverändert.

Das illustrativste Bild über den Aufschwung der Gesellschaft bietet ein Vergleich mit Ziffern aus ihren Anfängen. An zwei Beispielen sei dies dargestellt: Garantiemittel 1831 fl. 2.000.000.—, 1931 1471 Millionen Lire, Prämienentnahmen der Lebensversicherung 1836 fl. 235.000.—, 1931 1 Milliarde Lire. Das ist wohl eine herrliche Sprache, und so steht die Assicurazioni Generali, deren hundertjährige Geschichte fast aus nichts anderem besteht als einem ununterbrochenen Kampf gegen Krisen und Widerwärtigkeiten aller Art, wenn das Schicksal der Weltwirtschaft die lang erhoffte Erleichterung nicht gewährt hätte, selbst den schwersten Stürmen gewappnet gegenüber.

Wien, 15. Mai.

(Wahrscheinlichkeit einer parlamentarischen Behandlung der Einfuhrverbote.) Wie in kaufmännischen Kreisen verläuft, hat der Präsident des Nationalrates auf Grund der bei ihm unternommenen Vorstellungen zugelegt, daß die bisher nur vom Staatsrat beschlossene Verordnung über die Einfuhrverbote auf Grund des Artikels 2 des Zollgesetzes in einer der nächsten Sitzungen des Nationalrates zur Beratung gestellt werden soll. Bei dieser Gelegenheit sollen die verschiedenen Einwände, die bisher gegen die Verordnung und die Durchführungsmaßnahme erhoben wurden, zur Sprache gelangen. Obwohl die Einfuhrverbote noch nicht zwei Wochen in Kraft sind, werden doch zahlreiche Beschwerden vorgebracht. Insbesondere wird betont, daß die mit der Durchföhrung betrauten Stellen vielfach noch nicht die nötige Vertrautheit mit den Vorschriften zeigen. Im Folgenden sollen die häufig erregte Fragen an und es hat sich die Notwendigkeit herausgestellt, die Äußerungen der maßgebenden Organe von bestimmten Stellen benachteiligen zu lassen. Schädliche Eingaben werden sich wegen der Erstreckung der Verbote auf jene Waren, die sich in offenen Lagern befinden, wobei Fälle bekannt wurden, daß die Einfuhrbewilligung selbst für solche Sendungen verweigert wird, welche sich seit vielen Monaten in Wien befinden und bereits vor der Einführung der Tarifveränderung im Oktober 1931 anbezahlt wurden. Man hofft, daß wenigstens diese Äußerungen der Betroffenen bald befriedigt werden.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(e) and 5(1) or (b)
Department of State
Office of the Historian
NARS, Date 12-8-15

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(Die Eisenindustrie Belgiens und die J. R. G.) Wie gemeldet wird, haben die belgischen Eisenwerke unter einander eine Art Gentlemen's Agreement in der Absicht geschlossen, eine Erhöhung der Exportpreise zu erzielen. Die Exportpreise haben tatsächlich in letzter Zeit beträchtlich angezogen, wobei die Verkäufer in Bezug auf Preisentgegenkommen auffallend zurückhaltend waren. Es verlautet ferner, daß die belgischen Werke bedeutende Aufträge in Profilstählen und Blechen für Rußland heringekommen haben. Diese Aufträge stehen offenbar in Zusammenhang mit den Lieferungen Sowjetrußlands in Manganeerzen an die belgischen Stahlwerke. Es verlautet im übrigen, daß die Neugruppierung der belgischen Eisenindustrie ohne Fühlungnahme mit der Internationalen Rohstahlgemeinschaft vor sich geht, für deren Aufrechterhaltung in Kreisen der belgischen Eisenwerke anscheinend kein großes Interesse besteht.

(Der internationale Automarkt.) Der internationale Automarkt steht heute im Zeichen der allgemeinen Geldkrise. Diese wirkt sich unter anderem dahin aus, daß die Finanzierung des Kreditgeschäftes, das besonders im Personwagengeschäft eingeführt ist, auf die größten Schwierigkeiten stößt. Aber auch das Kraftwagengeschäft läßt heute viel zu wünschen übrig, da die industriellen Betriebe ihren Transportapparat ganz wesentlich eingeschränkt haben. Die Absatzkrise in fabrikneuen Wagen wird ferner durch das starke Angebot gebrauchter Wagen stark beeinträchtigt. — Die Produktion an Automobilen zeigt in fast allen Ländern einen starken Rückgang gegenüber der Vorjahreszeit. So betrug im ersten Quartal 1932 in den Vereinigten Staaten die Erzeugung nur 357.000 Kraftwagen gegen 668.000 in der gleichen Vorjahreszeit. Gegenüber dem ersten Quartal 1929 ist die Autoerzeugung in den Vereinigten Staaten um 75 Prozent zurückgegangen. In Deutschland erlitt im ersten Jahresviertel 1932 der Autoabsatz in Personkraftwagen gegenüber dem Vorjahre einen 38prozentigen Rückgang, in Kraftkraftwagen beträgt der Rückgang sogar 58 Prozent. Nur England konnte infolge Fundamentierung seiner Autobildung wesentlich verbessern, indem im ersten Quartal 1932 die Einfuhr auf weniger als ein Fünftel der Vorjahresimporte gesunken ist, während die Ausfuhr gegenüber dem ersten Quartal 1931 um 43 Prozent und gegenüber dem vierten Jahresviertel 1931 um 22 Prozent gestiegen ist. Ford, der immer mehr von der General-Motors-Konkurrenz bedrängt wird, hat auch die Erzeugung des kleinen 4 PS-Babywagens in seiner englischen Fabrik Dagenham zurückgestellt, da sich herausgestellt hat, daß der kleine Motor zur Beförderung von vier Personen zu schwach ist. — In Amerika machte sich im April im Autoabsatz bereits eine Belebung bemerkbar, doch beschränkt sich diese Belebung vorläufig auf General-Motors-Wagen.

(Die geplante Kürzung der Bezüge von Auslandsrenten.) Von Konteradmiral a. D. Anton Racic erhalten wir folgende Zuschrift: „In dem Entwurf des Nachtragsbudgets für 1932 sind auch Eriparsen von 0,7 Millionen Schilling eingestellt, die durch Kürzungen von den Pensionen der Auslandsrenten heringekommen werden sollen. Die Auslandsrenten werden ohnehin dadurch arg benachteiligt, daß ihre Versorgungsgebühren, im laufenden Monat zum drittenmal, erst Mitte des Monats zur Auszahlung gelangen. Im Inland werden, trotz der geringeren Steuerentgelte, Mittel und Wege gefunden, um alle Personalsgebühren pünktlich auszuzahlen, die Auslandsrenten werden aber in die Zwangslage versetzt, Schulden zu machen und für diese Zinsen zu zahlen, damit ihre Familien ihr Dasein fristen können.“

(Internationaler Kongress für Brücken- und Hochbau.) An dem in der Zeit vom 19. bis 25. d. in Paris tagenden Internationalen Kongress für Brücken- und Hochbau nehmen als offizieller Delegierter der österreichischen Regierung Ministerialrat Ing. Franz Zelisko vom Bundesministerium für Handel und Verkehr, als Vizepräsident der Arbeitskommission des dritten Sitzungstages Dr.-Ing. Karl Rosenberg, Präsident des ständigen österreichischen Stahlschiffes, teil.

(Schwedische Banken gründen ein Konsortium für lombardierte Kreuger-Werte.) Aus Stockholm wird uns telegraphiert: Die Schwedische Bankvereinsung, der sämtliche Großbanken angehören, gibt bekannt, daß diejenigen Banken, die aus dem Kreuger-Konglomerat oder von Kreuger persönlich Stammsaktien in großen Posten besitzen haben, diese Werte zur gemeinsamen Verwaltung in eine Gesellschaft einbringen.

(Abschlüsse jugoslawischer Industrieunternehmen.) Die Agrar Lederfabrik weist bei einem Stammkapital von 20 Millionen Dinar einen Reingewinn von 1.17 Millionen Dinar aus. — Jugoslawische Auer A.G. für Gasglühlicht und Elektrizität in Agram. Stammkapital 15 Millionen, Verlust 80.480 Dinar. — Agrar Schuhfabrik A.G. Stammkapital 25 Millionen, Verlust 82.596 Dinar. — Jis A.G. für Drogen- und Chemikalienindustrie und Vertrieb. Stammkapital 5 Millionen, Gewinn 447.888 Dinar. — Jugoslawische A.G. Schicht-Leber, Agram. Stammkapital 20 Millionen, Gewinn 397 Millionen Dinar. — Brüder Turkovic, Bankhaus A.G. in Agram. Stammkapital 10 Millionen Dinar, Gewinn 161.872 Dinar. — Gesellschaft für Elektrotechnik und Kabelfabrik A.G. in Agram. Stammkapital 3 Millionen, Gewinn 134.221 Dinar. — Pilot A.G. für Bauindustrie. Stammkapital 2 Millionen, Gewinn 67.586 Dinar. — Croatia Portlandement A.G. in Agram. Stammkapital 7 Millionen, Gewinn 644.062 Dinar.

(Wichtig für alle Versicherten.) Der Schutz der Interessen des Publikums hat sich auf allen Gebieten der Wirtschaft, insbesondere im kaufmännischen Leben, sehr bewährt. Auf dem Gebiete des Versicherungswesens, an dem nahezu die gesamte Bevölkerung beteiligt erscheint, sei es durch Lebens-, Elementar- oder irgendeine Art Schadensversicherung, hat bisher ein derartiger Schutz durch eine entsprechende Organisation nicht bestanden. Dem ist nunmehr abgeholfen. Der neugegründete Verein „Verba“, Verband für Versicherungsschutz, an dessen Spitze prominente Persönlichkeiten der Wirtschaft und der Berufe stehen, hat es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht, unter Mitwirkung erster Versicherungssachleute diese Lücke auszufüllen. Die „Verba“ wird ihren Mitgliedern und ausschließlich diesen mit Rat und Tat in sämtlichen wie immer gearteten Versicherungsfällen, vor oder nach Abschluß derselben, auch in Rechtsfragen durch befugte Organe beistehen. Der Verband ist nicht auf Gewinn berechnet und übt daher seine Tätigkeit vollständig unbeeinträchtigt aus. Deshalb ist es der „Verba“ statutarisch verboten, bestimmte Versicherungsgesellschaften zu empfehlen oder Versicherungsabschlüsse zu vermitteln. Gerade von der angestrebten Erhöhung des Versicherungsschutzes verpflichtet sich der neugegründete Verein eine Forderung des allgemeinen Vertrauens und dadurch erhöhte Teilnahme der Bevölkerung an den Wohltaten des Versicherungswesens.

(Die ungarische Aktienrechtsreform zurückgestellt.) Aus Budapest wird uns gemeldet: Der vor etwa einem Jahre im Justizministerium ausgearbeitete Referentenentwurf zu einer Aktienrechtsreform wurde von den Interessenten, aber auch vom Handels- und Finanzministerium als unannehmbar bezeichnet. Der Entwurf wurde zurückgezogen und sollte umgearbeitet werden. Wie verlautet, hat die Regierung im Einvernehmen mit den

Interessenten die Frage der Aktienrechtsreform überhaupt zurückgestellt, da unter den gegenwärtigen Verhältnissen, inmitten der schärfsten Wirtschaftskrise, für die Durchführung einer solchen einschneidenden Reform die notwendige Objektivität nicht gesichert werden könnte.

(Aufgabe des Goldstandards in Peru.) Aus Lima wird telegraphiert: Peru hat den Goldstandard aufgegeben. Diese Maßnahme wird jedoch nur als zeitweilige erklärt.

(Ungarische Bodenreformobligationen.) Aus Budapest wird uns gemeldet: Im Zusammenhang mit der Vergabe des Rindholzmonopols an den Schwedenklub wurde bekanntlich zur finanziellen Abwicklung der Bodenreform eine 36-Millionen-Dollaranleihe abgeschlossen, beziehungsweise emittiert. Mit dem Erlös dieser Anleihe wurden die im Laufe der Bodenreform emittierten Grundbesitzer bis zu Zweidrittel ihrer Ansprüche in Bargeld befriedigt. Der Begleich des dritten Drittels des Grundbesitzes sollte durch Ausfolgung 4prozentiger Ablosungsoptionen der Genossenschaft zur finanziellen Abwicklung der Bodenreform erfolgen. Es war ein Emissionsbetrag von etwa 30 Millionen Pengo vorgesehen und die Obligationen sollten in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahres 1931 ausgefolgt, der Zinsendienst mit Ende 1931 aufgenommen werden. Infolge der inzwischen eingetretenen Krise der Staatsfinanzen wurden die Ausgabe der Obligationen und die Aufnahme des Zinsdienstes verzögert. Da die erwartete Besserung bis nun nicht eingetreten ist, wird die Regierung eine Verordnung herausgeben, mit welcher die Emission der Obligationen und die Aufnahme des Zinsdienstes bis Ende 1934 verschoben werden. Die anpruchsberechtigten emittierten Grundbesitzer haben einen ansehnlichen Teil ihrer Obligationenansprüche gegen 30prozentige Sofortzahlung an Geldinstitute und sonstige Anleger verkauft. Diese werden nun durch die Verzögerung der Aufnahme des Zinsdienstes empfindlich betroffen.

(Die Beschäftigung im deutschen Maschinenbau.) Aus Berlin wird uns telegraphiert: Der Verein deutscher Maschinenbauanstalten teilt mit, daß im Monat April der Auftragsbehang und die Beschäftigung die Besserung des März beibehalten haben. Dagegen blüht das Auslandsgeschäft Teile seines Aufstieges wieder ein. Die Beschäftigung beträgt nur 30 Prozent der Kapazität.

(Standard Oil Company, Newjersey.) Aus New York wird uns telegraphiert: Die Standard Oil Company in Newjersey, die Hauptgesellschaft der Rockefeller-Gruppe, verzeichnet einen Reingewinn von nur 8,7 Millionen gegenüber 42,15 Millionen im Vorjahre. Der Rückgang beträgt also drei Viertel des vorjährigen Gewinnes. Per Aktie ergibt sich ein Ertrag von 34 Cent. Ähnliche Rückgänge weisen auch die anderen Gesellschaften der amerikanischen Ölmultis auf.

(Ein belgischer Kunstseidenfabrik.) Aus Berlin wird uns telegraphiert: Nach Brüsseler Meldungen ist unter Führung der Kunstseidenfabrik Tubize ein belgischer Kunstseidenfabrik in Bildung begriffen, welchem fünf maßgebende belgische Wiscose-Seidenfabriken angeschlossen sind. Nicht einbezogen ist die Wiscose-Seidenfabrik Pinove in Brüssel, die täglich 2000 Kilogramm Kunstseide herstellt. Der neue Trust wird täglich 17.000 Kilogramm herstellen, so daß die Pinove keine große Konkurrenz bereiten dürfte. Der Trust wird den Namen Sella erhalten und wird ein Kapital von circa 130 Millionen Francs umfassen. Die Verpflichtungen gegenüber den fünf Gesellschaften betragen bis zu 70 Millionen, wovon auf die Tubize 30 Millionen entfallen.

(Devisenentwertung für rumänische Futtermittel.) Die Leitung der Wiener Produktentwertung verlautet: „Nach Kenntnis der Preisentwertung haben maßgebende Getreidefirmen wegen der schon seit längerer Zeit auf Verfürgung der Nationalbank eingestellten Devisenentwertungen für Getreide in rumänischen Futtermitteln beifolgende, bis auf weiteres Geschäftsabschlüsse in rumänischen Futtermitteln nicht zu tätigen.“

(Ungarischer Getreidemarkt.) Aus Budapest wird uns telegraphiert: Auf dem Getreidemarkt herrschte Geschäftstille. Es ergab: Weizen, 80-Kilogramm-Oberteil 12,15, Spargasler 13,25; Mais 16,50 ab Budapest. Auf dem Terminmarkt erfolgten nach anfänglichen Deckungskäufen neuerlich Realisationen, so daß alle Sorten niedriger schlossen. Amtliche Schlusskurse: Weizen per Mai 11,78, per Juni 11,88; Roggen per Mai 13,90, per Juni 14; Mais per Mai 16,10, per Juni 15,20.

(Zufolgeb.) Das Wiener Handelsgericht hat das Ausgleichsverfahren eröffnet über H. Hörmann, Schulmeister, III. Hauptstraße 14-16. Ausgleichsverwalter Julius Wdch. I. Rudolfsploß 6. Anmeldefrist bis 15. Juni. Ausgleichstagung am 30. Juni um halb 11 Uhr. Aktiven 5742 S., Passiven 12.068 S. Anbot 35 Prozent in zehn Monatsraten. — Das Ausgleichsverfahren über die Verlassenschaft nach Johann (Hans) Glück, gewesenen Alleinhaber der Firma Glück & Leeb, VII. Andreaskasse 7, wurde eingeleitet.

(Die Devisenpreise.) Auf den gestrigen Devisenmärkten ergaben sich folgende Notierungen:

Wien, 14. Mai. Beltern notierte der Schilling in Budapest mit 80,454.

Budapest, 14. Mai. (Devisenschlusskurse. Der erste Kurs bedeutet Geld, der zweite Ware.) Amsterdam 231,50 232,70, Athen —, Belgrad 10,03 10,13, Berlin 136,20 —, Brüssel 80,20 80,70, Bukarest 3,41 3,49, Cistambul —, Kopenhagen 113,30 114,10, London 20,77 20,97, Madrid —, Mailand 23,37 23,57, New York 571 — 574 —, Oslo 104,40 105,20, Paris 22,40 —, Prag 16,96 17,04, Sofia 4,08 4,19, Stockholm 106 — 106,80, Warschau 64,10 64,50, Wien 80,454 —, Zürich 110,80 111,40.

* Abrechnungskurse.

Triest, 14. Mai. (Schlusskurse.) London 71 —, Paris 76,65, New York 19,38, Zürich 379,80.

London, 14. Mai. New York 3,65%, Paris 92,53, Berlin 15,28%, Mailand 70,92, Zürich 18,64, Amsterdam 9,00%, Wien —, Madrid 44,61, Brüssel 26,03.

Paris, 14. Mai. Berlin 604,75, Madrid 206,25, Holland 1027,50, Italien 130,50, New York 25,33%, Schweiz 495,7%, Belgien 355,70, Wien —, Prag —, Bukarest 15,15, London 92,40.

New York, 14. Mai. London 3,65%, Paris 3,94 1/2%, Berlin 23,89, Mailand 5,15%, Zürich 19,58, Kopenhagen 20 —, Stockholm 18,71, Oslo 18,36, Amsterdam 40,56, Prag —, Wien —, Budapest —, Bukarest —, Belgrad —, Madrid 8,18, Brüssel 14,04.

New Yorker Börse.

Rabellien der „Neuen Freien Presse“.

Mail.

New York, 14. Mai. Die letzte Börse vor dem Pfingstfest brachte keine Erholung und die Stimmung blieb weiter recht gedrückt. Die Informationen aus Maklerkreisen lauteten zwar nicht pessimistisch, doch wurde der Meinung Ausdruck verliehen, daß eine neue Anregung notwendig sei, um eine Besserung herbeizuführen. Die Meldungen der Stahlhandelspreise ließen erkennen, daß sich der Beschäftigungsgrad der Werke in der nächsten Woche kaum ändern dürfte. Zu Beginn des Verkehrs gingen die Kurse bei schwacher Grundstimmung ziemlich ruhig zurück. Obwohl sich im Verlaufe eine kleine Erholung durchsetzen vermochte, bezogen die Verluste gegen Ende des Verkehrs bis zu 2 Dollar. Besonders stark in Mitleidenhaft gezogen wurden Handelswerte, Eisenbahnaktien und Public Utilities. Die Börse schloß in matter Haltung.

New Yorker Schlusskurse.

	14. Mai	13. Mai		14. Mai	13. Mai
Atchaf. Top. & St. St.	33 1/2	31 1/2	Radio Corp. of Amer.	37 1/2	37 1/2
Canadian Pacific	10 1/2	10	Royal Dutch	15	15 1/2
New York Central	11 1/2	11 1/2	St. Oil of N. Jersey	28	28 1/2
Northern Pacific	7 1/2	8	U. S. Rubber	3 1/2	3 1/2
Union Pacific	43 1/2	45 1/2	U. S. Steels	28 1/2	27 1/2
Amer. Tobacco B.	64	64	Dames-Moyle	56	57 1/2
Anaconda Coppr. Co.	4 1/2	4 1/2	70% österr. Völk.		
Bethlehem Steel	12 1/2	12 1/2	bundanleihe	81	81 1/2
General Electric	13 1/2	13 1/2	Wiener Stadbanl.	47 1/2	48
General Motors	10 1/2	10 1/2			
Zagelb	2 1/2	(2 1/2)	Prozent.		
			Umsatz	600.000	(900.000)

Amerikanische Warenkurse.

Rabellien der „Neuen Freien Presse“.

New York, 14. Mai. Baumwolle. Loko 5,65 (13. Mai 5,65), per Juni 5,51 (5,52), per Juli 5,55 (5,56), per August 5,67 (5,69). Tendenz: Stetig.	Kaffee. Per Mai 6,66 nominell (13. Mai 6,60 nominell), per Juli 6,65 nominell (6,64 nominell), per September 6,55 (6,54 nominell), per Dezember 6,44 (6,45 nominell). Tendenz: Ruhig.
Weizen. Rotwinter Nr. 2 67 1/2 (13. Mai 68 1/2), Hartwinter Nr. 2 68 1/2 (69).	Metalle. Elektro Kupfer Loko 5,50 Brief (13. Mai 5 1/2), Blei 3 — (3 —), Zinn 20,40 (20,50), Zink 2,37 1/2 (2,70 1/2), Silber 28 1/2 (27 1/2).
Zucker. Per Mai 0,53 Geld, 0,55 Brief (13. Mai 0,53 Geld, 0,55 Brief), per Juli 0,60 Geld, 0,61 Brief (0,61, 0,60), per September 0,67 Geld, 0,68 Brief (0,67 Geld, 0,68 Brief). Tendenz: Ruhig.	Chicago, 14. Mai. Weizen: Per Mai 53 1/2 (13. Mai 54 1/2), per Juli 55 1/2 bis 56 1/2 (56 1/2 bis 56 1/2). Tendenz: Raum stetig.
Mais: Per Mai 29 1/2 (13. Mai 29 1/2), per Juli 32 1/2 (32 1/2). Tendenz: Stetig.	Gafer: Per Mai 22 1/2 (13. Mai 23 1/2), per Juli 22 1/2 (22 1/2). Tendenz: Raum stetig.
Roggen: Per Mai 36 1/2 (13. Mai 37 1/2), per Juli 39 1/2 (40). Tendenz: Raum stetig.	Schmalz: Per Mai — (13. Mai 3,80), per Juli 3,75 (3,90). Tendenz: Billig.
Winnipeg, 14. Mai. Weizen. Per Mai 61 1/2 (62 1/2).	

Warenberichte.

Börse für landwirtschaftliche Produkte.

Wien, 15. Mai. (Orig.-Ber.) Obwohl von den Auslandsbörsen fast durchwegs fester Tendenzberichte vorliegen, hat das Geschäft an der Wiener Börse auf keinem Gebiet eine Zunahme erfahren. Es ist begreiflich, daß die innerpolitischen Verhältnisse besprochen werden; das Geschäftsbildung tritt dadurch zurück und die Umsätze hielten sich an der gestrigen Börse in sehr engen Grenzen, zumal auch die Absatzverhältnisse in Mehl keine Zunahme erfahren haben. In Weizen kam es zu kleinen Bedarfsanforderungen in rumänischen und ungarischen Sorten, wobei unveränderte Preise in Geltung standen. Ungarischer Südhelfweizen wurde mit 20 ex Schlepp Wien gehandelt, rumänischer 78 kg, mit 2 und 2 Prozent Befehl mit 82 ex Schlepp Bratislava. Die Forderungen für oberungarischen Dapfel stellten sich auf 18,50 bis 19,50, für Primajorten bis 22 ab Grenze. In Roggen lagen in ungarischen Sorten etwas billigere Preisforderungen vor. Man verlangte für Vester-Weizen 19,50 ab Hegyeshalom. Marchfelder Korn wurde mit 33,50 ab Station aufgenommen. In Futtergerste ist die Tendenz ruhiger, 65/66-kg-Qualitäten sind mit 18,50, 67 kg mit 19 ab Grenze erhältlich. In Mais hat sich eine leichte Aufwärtsbewegung vollzogen. Die erhöhten Forderungen werden nur zum Teil zugebilligt. Das Angebot in geschlossenermaßen Hafer überwiegt den derzeitigen Bedarf, so daß die Preise abwärts gleiten. Zu erwähnen wäre, daß die von den böhmisch-mährischen Lieferanten ausgegebene Parole, in Schillingen keinen Hafer handeln zu wollen, zurückgezogen wurde. Man verlangte gestern für lichtfarbige böhmische Sorten 19,25 ab Schattau, für beregnete 16,50 bis 17. In Nebenprodukten sind geringe Wertveränderungen eingetreten. Das Mehlgeschäft ist weiterhin schleppend, lediglich für Futtermehl und Kleie zeigte sich gebesserte Nachfrage.

Amlich notieren inklusive Warenumschlagsteuer und Zoll per 100 kg in Schillingen ab Wien: Weizen, Weizen 35,25 bis 35,50, Wiener Boden 34,50 bis 35, Marchfelder 34 bis 34,75, ungarischer Dapfel 35,50 bis 40, oberungarischer Dapfel 35 bis 35,50, ungarischer 34,50 bis 35, jugoslawischer Dapfel 36 bis 36,75; Roggen, Marchfelder 33,75 bis 34, Wiener Boden 33,50 bis 33,75, ungarischer 32,25 bis 32,75, Vester Boden 32,50 bis 33; Gerste, Braumare, inländische, Ausfuhr 35 bis 36, Prima 34 bis 35, Mittel 32 bis 33; Mais, neu 16,25 bis 16,75; Hafer, inländischer 27 bis 28, jugoslawischer 23 bis 27, russischer 27,50 bis 29; Kartoffeln, gelbe 12 bis 13, weiße 9,50 bis 10,50; Weizenmehl, inländisches 63 bis 65, ungarisches 62 bis 63; Roggenmehl, inländisches 55 bis 58; Brotmehl, inländisches 41 bis 44; Futtermehl, inländisches 16, 7 1/2, 23 bis 24; Wiener Weizenroggen 52 bis 53; Weizenkleie 16 bis 16,25; Roggenkleie 16,50 bis 17.

Rindermarkt.

Wien, 15. Mai. (Orig.-Ber.) Nach den bisher hier eingelangten Anmeldungen und erfolgten Ausladungen steht für den Montag stattfindenden Rindermarkt ein Auftrieb von ungefähr 2000 Stück Schlachtrindern in Aussicht.

Warenkurse vom 14. Mai.

Rabellien der „Neuen Freien Presse“.

Baumwolle.

New York, 14. Mai. (Eröffnungskurse.) Per Mai — (Schlusskurs vom 13. Mai 5,52), per Juli 5,58 bis 5,60 (5,60), per Oktober 5,83 bis 5,84 (5,85), per Dezember 5,93 (5,99 bis 6 —), per Januar 1933 6,05 (6,07). Tendenz: Stetig.

New Orleans, 14. Mai. (Eröffnungskurse.) Per Mai — (Schlusskurs vom 13. Mai 5,55 bis 5,57), per Juli 5,63 (5,62 bis 5,63), per Oktober 5,83 (5,80), per Dezember 5,95 (5,94), per Januar 1933 6,02 (6,05). Tendenz: Stetig.

Getreide.

Buenos Aires, 14. Mai. (Schlusskurse.) Weizen: Per Mai 6,87, per Juni 6,89, per Juli 7,11. Mais: Per Mai 4,58, per Juni 4,60, per Juli 4,68. Gafer: Per Mai 5,75. Reinsaat: Per Mai 8,90, per Juni 8,95, per Juli 9,05.

Zucker.

Hamburg, 14. Mai. (Schlusskurse.) Per Mai 5,15 Brief, 5 — Geld, per Juni 5,20 Brief, 5,05 Geld, per Juli 5,45 Brief, 5,30 Geld, per August 5,65 Brief, 5,45 Geld, per September 5,70 Brief, 5,55 Geld, per Oktober 5,80 Brief, 5,65 Geld, per November 5,90 Brief, 5,80 Geld, per Dezember 6,05 Brief, 5,90 Geld, per Januar 1933 6,20 Brief, 6 — Geld, per Februar 6,30 Brief, 6,10 Geld, per März 6,35 Brief, 6,20 Geld, per April 6,45 Brief, 6,30 Geld. Tendenz: Ruhig.

New York, 14. Mai. (Eröffnungskurse.) Per Mai — (Schlusskurs vom 13. Mai 5,55 bis 5,57), per Juli 5,63 (5,62 bis 5,63), per Oktober 5,83 (5,80), per Dezember 5,95 (5,94), per Januar 1933 6,02 (6,05). Tendenz: Stetig.

Sottogierung vom 14. Mai.

Wien	59	41	35	37	27
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By: M. J. O. [illegible] NARS, Date 12-18-75

0891

0895

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated June 4, 1932

Rec'd 5:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

606, June 4, noon.

Following from NIPPON DEMPO, Tokyo, June third:

"The relations between Japan and the League of Nations regarding the Manchurian question are getting more and more complicated and it is feared that the existence of Japan may be imperiled depending upon the attitude that will be displayed hereafter.

The League of Nations is threatening Japan by various means, consequently no optimistic view could be held with regard to the report of the League Inquiry Commission.

Considering the situation as serious the central military authorities and those concerned are voicing that as the National Cabinet has been ^{formed} unarmed with the aim to cope with the present difficult situation, the Government should issue a declaration all over the world

in

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 7 1932
FILS

793.94/5300

JUN 7 1932
RECD

Dr
793.94
note
793.94 - Commission

L
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 4 - 1932
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#606 from Peiping via N.R.,
June 4, 1932, noon.

in the name of the Premier in order to clear misunderstanding of the powers and to clarify the definite policy of Japan".

KLP-WWC

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

JUN 6 1932
 21. to Peiping June 6/32

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated June 4, 1932

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.



Secretary of State

Washington

612, June 4, 6 p.m.

Upon signing of Sino-Japanese agreement at the Joint Commission consisting of British, American, French and Italian Consuls and British, American, French and Italian ^{Commission} Military Attaches (*) was appointed under Article Four of the agreement. Information from Shanghai indicates that main undertakings of Japanese under agreement of May 5 have been completed. Unless the Department desires to the contrary I am withdrawing Lieutenant Soule who is my present military representative upon the Commission and I shall request Admiral Taylor to designate a marine officer stationed at Shanghai to take his place during remainder of work of Commission.

WWC-KLP

JOHNSON

(*) apparent omission.

F/HS

793.94/5301

RECEIVED

JUN 7 1932

793.94
 note
 793.1025
 793.94119

0898

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

PM RECD
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

June 6, 1932.

JUN - 6 32

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

144/1/1/5301
Your 612, June 4, 6 p.m., last sentence.

Department approves change in American
military representative as proposed.

Simson
Wley

793.94/5301


FE:MMH:EJL

CE
Jun. 6, 1932.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM PLAIN

Peiping

Dated June 6, 1932

Rec'd 2:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



618, June 6, 12 noon.

Following from Reuter, Nanking June fifth:

"With reference to Viscount Saito's speech yesterday a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office today stated that the Shanghai agreement would not limit the movements of Chinese troops which have perfect freedom to move in Chinese territory. The Chinese troops are now remaining at their original posts instead of Viscount Saito's allegation that they are the prescribed distance from Shanghai."

As regards Viscount Saito's statement concerning the origin of the trouble at Shanghai the spokesman said he regarded the statement as unilateral saying that the causes of the Shanghai incident were due to Japanese aggression and if Japan did not adopt hostile action nothing untoward could happen at Shanghai.

The spokesman stated that China is willing to attend

F/DEW

793.94/5302

NOV 7 1932

1911
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 618 from Peiping

attend round table conference if it is of the nature of the Washington Conference and aimed at the settlement of the Sino-japan issue as a whole.

With reference to Manchukuo the spokesman declared that at first the Japanese Government denied any active support for Manchukuo but now Viscount Saito openly announced support for the new state. This fact is making the Chinese authorities more suspicious of Japanese sincerity in international dealings".

JOHNSON

CIB WP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/235 FOR Communication

FROM Chinese Legation () DATED May 2, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1187 ***

REGARDING: Memorandum quoting text of telegram outlining
facts in connection with Independent Gov-
ernment of Manchuria.

hs

793.94/5303

5303

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11990 FOR Tel. #585 lpm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED May 31, 1932
TO NAME 1-1137 ...

~~REASONING~~ Dr. W.W.Yen, Chinese delegate to the League of Nations,
has been instructed to inform the League that the Chinese
Government is willing to participate in an international
conference on Manchuria and all Sino-Japanese issues.

793.94/5304

5304

190

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 31, 1932

Rec'd 6:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

585, May 31, 1 p.m.

Following from Kuo Wen, Nanking, May 29.

"Dr. Lo Wen Wang will continue to carry on as Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was originally planned to appoint Mr. Kuo Tai Chi to succeed him.

Mr. Kuo has agreed to accept the post of Chinese Minister to the Court of Saint James, to which he was appointed about a month ago. He will sail for England by the first boat available. Today he wired the Shanghai office of the Waichi-Aopu and requested it to book reservations for him on the next steamer sailing for England.

General Chiang Tso Pin, chairman of the National Foreign Relations Commission, and Chinese Minister to Japan who returned to China several months ago, has been ordered by the Government to

return

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#585 From Peiping May 31, 1932

return to his Tokyo post as soon as possible.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is reported to have instructed Dr. W. W. Yen, Chinese delegate at the League of Nations to inform the League that the Chinese Government is willing to participate in an international conference on Manchuria and all Sino-Japanese issues, and that it likes to see the League call the conference."

JOHNSON

KLP WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 794.00/46 FOR Tel. #610 4pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED June 4, 1932
TO NAME 1-1197 ...

REGARDING: statement by the new Japanese premier, Viscount
Saito, concerning the Sino-Japanese relations.

793.94/5305

5304

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated June 4, 1932

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

610, June 4, 4 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, June second:

"Replying to a questionnaire the new Japanese premier, Admiral Viscount Saito, in a written statement given exclusively to Reuter's Tokyo correspondent emphatically denied the rumors of serious tension between Japan and the Soviet though he expressed an earnest desire that the Soviet should see its way to repose greater confidence in Japan by discontinuing the concentration of troops in the Far East which is considered the primary cause of the unfounded rumors.

Expressed a belief that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviet would weaken the force of the Kellogg Pact and be equivalent to establishing those special intimacies which have too often been depreciated. Admiral Saito asserts that the Soviet

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#610 from Peiping via N.R.,
June 4, 4 p.m.

Soviet interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway are not considered to militate against Japan's interests in Manchuria where the policy of the Open Door entitles respect for all vested interest irrespective of their national complexion.

'Consequently' the Premier's statement goes on 'I do not consider it desirable that Japan should acquire any interests possessed by others in the Chinese Eastern Railway'.

Other points stressed include:

One. A hope that circumstances will not arise to cause Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations.

Two. No customs union or economic federation between Japan and Manchuria is contemplated.

Three. The recognition of Manchuria would depend on the proved capacity of the new state to maintain itself.

Four. The annexation of Manchuria is certainly not desired by Japan nor does Japan wish illegitimately to control the policy of the Manchukuo authorities".

CIB-KLP

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00/415 FOR Despatch # W.D. 1050.

FROM France (Dawson) DATED May 24, 1932.

TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING:

Article by Dr. A. Legendre in which he states
that events in Shanghai and Manchuria have
caused dissatisfaction in Japan.

hs

793.94/ 5306

5366

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Chuske NARS, Date 12-18-75

Paris, May 24, 1932.

SPECIAL REPORT

(No. W.D.1050)

To the Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith
Mr. Harrington Dawson's Special Report No. W.D.
1050, dated May 24, 1932.

WD/DAS

0911

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Paris, May 24, 1932.

Serial No. F. D. 1080.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Harrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: Dr. Legendre's Opinion on
the Japanese Situation

Writing in FIGARO on May 24, 1932, Dr. A. Legendre discussed "The Reaction of the Army in Japan."

He declares that the press is exaggerating when it represents the disturbed conditions in Japan to have a Revolutionary character. The criminal acts being committed are merely the result of overwrought patriotic sentiments on the part of young men who, conforming with their ancient customs, have resorted to this method for declaring the country to be in danger. Japan has made the mistake of trying to progress too rapidly on European lines; a race as personal as the Japanese and having so many old traditions cannot be promptly brought to democratic ideas. Therefore, according to Dr. Legendre, Japan is in fact leading a dual existence, that of Europe and that of the far distant Orient.

With

0911

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

With respect to the current situation, he remarks that the army cherishes resentment against members of Parliament for having notably created an intellectual proletariat by means of the Single School, so that many young men are now dying of hunger and are a cause of real social danger. On the other hand, want prevails in the country districts so that the peasantry can hold out only owing to an extreme spirit of self-sacrifice. Finally, the events in Shanghai and Manchuria have caused dissatisfaction, the Japanese Government being considered as having defended themselves very inadequately against the partiality of the League of Nations which was favorable to the Nanking faction.

That is why, according to Dr. Legendre, the army wants a national Government instead of a party Government even taking the form of concentration.

The conclusion reached by Dr. Legendre is that the present reaction was by salutary for Japan, a point of view which he promises to explain later.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

Enclosure:

1. Excerpt from FIGARO,
May 24, 1932.

In quintuplicate
881.9111/6a

SD/DRS

Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. S.D. 1050 of May 24, 1934

From the American Embassy at Paris

Extract from "PIC 10" of May 24, 1934

La réaction de l'armée au Japon

par le D^r A. LEGENDRE

Certaine presse parle d'un bouleversement au Japon, d'une véritable révolution à ce moment : c'est aller vite et montrer qu'on n'est guère familier avec les caractéristiques de la vie sociale et politique de ce pays et surtout avec la puissance de ses vieilles traditions. Le meurtre de M. Inouye et du baron Takuma Dan, un magnat de la banque, et l'assassinat tout récent du premier ministre, M. Inukai, ne sont en rien l'œuvre d'une faction, d'un parti politique organisé, usant du terrorisme contre les gouvernants actuels et les grands financiers. Ces actes criminels sont simplement le fait, la résultante de l'exaltation patriotique de quelques jeunes hommes qui, suivant la tradition ancienne, entendent lancer ainsi un cri d'alarme, déclarer la patrie en danger, le grand Nippon des ancêtres, cette terre sacrée. C'est l'idée de sacrifice qui inspire ces jeunes gens : ils connaissent la sanction qui suivra leur acte, mais la mort leur sera douce, puisqu'ils estiment être restés dans la tradition du Bushido (1), en supprimant des hommes d'Etat, qu'à tort ou à raison, ils considèrent comme dangereux pour l'intérêt du pays. Un premier ministre comme Inukai est donc frappé parce que, au Japon, tout pouvoir implique responsabilité directe, absolue.

Pareils concepts d'un âge ancien toujours en honneur ne sauraient être jugés avec notre mentalité d'occidentaux ; tout au plus pouvons-nous les déplorer, mais en reconnaissant toutefois que ces principes sont aussi à l'origine des plus nobles actions, de cet héroïsme japonais si connu qui va jusqu'à l'immolation de soi-même, jusqu'au harakiri, quand l'intérêt du pays est en jeu.

Le tort de certains gouvernants du Japon, c'est d'avoir voulu aller trop vite dans l'imitation de la culture européenne : on ne démocratise pas un peuple à grande vitesse, surtout une race aussi personnelle que celle japonaise, avec un lourd passé de traditions, considérées comme d'importance vitale par toute la masse pensante. D'ailleurs, on lutte difficilement contre l'« inconscient », contre les instincts ou sentiments qui ont façonné l'âme populaire. On ne saurait supprimer par la seule volonté des imprégnations séculaires, millénaires qui dominent notre moi, ont la force de véritables réflexes. Non, l'âme ancestrale n'est nulle part un vain mot ; elle ne meurt pas : sa vie est éternelle. Elle est la flamme qui active le foyer intérieur, provoque toutes nos réactions, bonnes ou mauvaises. Elle s'humanise sans doute graduellement, cette âme, mais aux heures cri-

tiques elle a de ces réveils qu'il est bien difficile de contrôler. C'est ce qui explique le dualisme réel qu'on aperçoit au Japon entre la culture moderne, occidentale, et celle des Daimios, ou seigneurs féodaux, des Samourais et des fameux Ronins surtout, dont tout Japonais ne cesse de rêver. Il faut voir comme il les salue frénétiquement ces Ronins, ces héros du sacrifice, lorsqu'ils paraissent sur une scène théâtrale !

Le Japonais d'aujourd'hui mène donc une double existence : la nôtre, plus ou moins réalisée, et celle de l'Orient lointain si caractérisée chez lui par l'esprit guerrier, dominateur des âges anciens. C'est du choc constant de ces concepts opposés que surgit un déséquilibre, un malaise social qu'accroît fortement la crise économique actuelle avec le cortège de souffrances quelle impose aux masses japonaises.

En Europe, on tend à assimiler au fascisme ou à l'hitlérisme le mouvement présent au Japon, c'est-à-dire la réaction de l'armée contre le politicien, le financier, contre leur collusion qui serait, à son avis, menaçante pour la vitalité du pays. Mais ce que je viens de dire sur les traditions du vieux Japon prouve qu'il n'y a qu'une lointaine ressemblance entre ces divers mouvements.

La réaction de l'armée japonaise n'a rien de bien nouveau : ses chefs restent dans leur rôle ancien de contrôle, sinon d'initiative, qui n'a eu d'ailleurs qu'une courte éclipse, soit à partir de 1920, où le Parlement réussit peu à peu à prendre la direction des affaires. Mais aujourd'hui ce Parlement, les partis qui le composent sont considérés par l'armée comme les responsables du désordre actuel dans la nation, en raison de leur « incapacité et corruption ». Or, l'idée de responsabilité est très ancrée au Japon, comme je l'ai dit.

L'armée en veut donc aux parlementaires, surtout d'avoir dévoyé la jeunesse universitaire, d'avoir, en réalisant l'école unique, créé tout un prolétariat intellectuel débordant par le nombre et qui, mourant de faim, est un réel danger social.

D'un autre côté, la misère est telle dans les campagnes qu'il faut tout l'étonnant patriotisme, tout l'esprit de sacrifice de la masse rurale pour l'endurer.

En outre, les affaires de Changhaï et de Mandchourie, où les gouvernants japonais se sont mal défendus contre la partialité de la S. D. N. en faveur de la faction de Nankin, ont causé un profond mécontentement.

Aussi, c'est un gouvernement national, en dehors de tout esprit de clan, de toute mystique politique, que veut l'armée, et non un gouvernement de partis, même sous la forme dite de « concentration ». Le général Araki, ministre de la guerre, est mis en demeure par ses pairs de se dissocier aussitôt d'un ministère de politiciens. Et les masses du peuple japonais dans leur ensemble partagent les vues de l'armée, se tiennent derrière elle, mais surtout derrière leur grand empereur, symbole, lui, de la puissance nipponne, de sa durée, et non le Parlement, aujourd'hui discrédité, honni. Nous expliquerons pourquoi, montrant aussi que la réaction actuelle est salutaire pour le Japon.

D^r A. Legendre.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Bluestein NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PM RECD

No. 1519.

Peiping, May 11, 1932.



Subject: General Summary of Political and
Military Events in Manchuria JUN 4 32
September - December, 1931.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Copy in FE

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUN 6 - 1932

Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's telegraphic in-
struction of March 14, 11 a.m., to the Minister at Shang-
hai, I have the honor to transmit herewith a general sum-
mary of the political and military events in Manchuria
between September 1 and December 31, 1931. A summary
covering China proper will follow.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Mahlon F. Perkins

Mahlon F. Perkins,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:

1. General summary,
as stated.

3 Carbon Copies

800.

Received

FJC-SC

F/LS

793.94/5307

JUN 11 1932

FILED

JM
las

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 1519.

CONFIDENTIAL.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF POLITICAL AND
MILITARY EVENTS IN MANCHURIA,
SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER, 1931.

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By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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I.

MILITARY AND POLITICAL EVENTS IN MANCHURIA.

The period under review opened with a steadily increasing tension in Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria. As early as July 9, 1931, responsible members of the Chinese Government in Nanking had expressed to representatives of the British and American Legations the Chinese Government's belief that the military party in Japan was planning to occupy Manchuria and, with this end in view, was assiduously endeavoring to provoke some incident to serve as an excuse. The Wanpaoshan incident and the massacre of Chinese in Korea were cited. Later, great publicity was given by Japanese to the Nakamura incident (It will be recalled that this was the case of the irregular execution in Mongolia by Chinese military of a Japanese spy.) by the Japanese military, but the conciliatory attitude adopted by the Chinese prevented the use of this as an excuse. On September 6th Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang is stated to have issued instructions that his troops in Manchuria were under no circumstances to resist if attacked, and were by all means to avoid giving the Japanese any pretext for an armed clash. Japan's intentions vis-à-vis Manchuria became more and more evident during the first half of September, and the feeling of tension increased accordingly. On September 17th the American Minister was informed by the Counselor of the Japanese Legation that rumors to the effect that the Japanese

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were preparing to occupy Manchuria were absurd, and that it was to be expected that the Nakamura case would be settled amicably. As late as five o'clock on the afternoon of September 18th an officer of the American Consulate General at Mukden called at the Japanese Consulate General there to inquire as to developments in the Nakamura affair, and was told that the Japanese Consulate General felt that the matter was progressing very satisfactorily.

At half past ten on the evening of September 18th Japanese troops occupied Peitaiying, just north of Mukden, meeting with practically no resistance, due to the order issued by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. By the next morning the Japanese had occupied Mukden, Changchun, Newchwang, Antung, and Fangchuancheng. Only at Changchun was any resistance encountered, and even there the resistance was slight. The movement seems to have been carefully prepared for by the Japanese military and the pretext advanced, that three or four Chinese soldiers had attempted to blow up a section of the South Manchuria Railway, is not convincing.

Kirin was occupied on the 21st. Japanese troops advanced up the Szepingkai-Taonan Railway to Tungliao and Taonan, occupying Szepingkai, Changtu, and Liaoyuan. The Chientao region was occupied, probably from Korea, and a small Japanese force occupied Tunhua. It is reported that by the 21st Japanese troops had actually left Changchun for the north, presumably planning to proceed to Harbin, but are stated to have been turned back by advices from the Japanese Consulate General at Harbin. By the

24th

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24th the Japanese had completed an aerodrome at Szeping-kai. At the end of September the Mukden garrison of Chinese troops had been concentrated at Chinchow and the Liaoning Provincial Government was set up at that place.

Japanese diplomatic and consular officers seem to have been taken by surprise by these sudden military developments, and the Japanese Foreign Office would appear also to have had very meager information. In reply to inquiries, Japanese civil officials at first attempted to minimize the matter by stating that it was a purely local incident and that the Japanese troops were acting in self-defense. It was later stated that Japanese troops were occupying the various places only for the protection of Japanese life and property and would be withdrawn to the railway zone as soon as the safety of the latter permitted.

During the month of October the Japanese bombed Chinchow and also bombed a troop train carrying Chinese troops toward Chinchow. Aside from this Japanese troops engaged in operations only against bandits and disorganized and scattered Chinese troops during the month, and were occupied in consolidating the positions which they had taken. Chang Hai-peng, however, at the head of Mongol troops armed by the Japanese, moved toward Tsitsihar with the aim of setting himself up as the head of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government. When resisted by Ma Chan-shan, the acting head of the province, Chang's Mongols fled.

By the middle of October, Hsi Ch'ia had, under Japanese auspices, assumed office as the head of an "autonomous government" of the Province of Kirin.

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In November the Japanese proceeded to consolidate their positions and extended the occupied area to include Tungliao-Taonan. A military force was sent over the Taonan-Anganghsi Railway to repair the railway bridge over the Nonni River, the Japanese stating that the line must be opened to facilitate the shipment of the bean crop. The bridge had been destroyed by General Ma Chan-shan to prevent the crossing of Chang Hai-peng. General Ma's force had taken up a position on the north bank of the river to resist any advance on Tsitsihar by Chang's Japanese supported forces. A Japanese commander ordered Generals Chang and Ma to withdraw ten kilometres from the banks of the river respectively held by them until the bridge could be repaired. Since General Ma failed to comply with these orders, he was forced back to Tahsing. Japanese reinforcements were brought up and General Ma was attacked by the Japanese 2nd Division. Ma's troops were forced to make a general retirement north from Anganghsi and Tsitsihar along the railway to Koshan. Japanese troops occupied Tsitsihar on November 18th and proceeded towards Koshan, harassing Ma's retreating columns.

The Nanking Government issued a mandate appointing Ma Chan-shan governor of Heilungkiang. General Ma spent the last part of November and the first part of December organizing his forces at Hailun.

Chang Ching-hui, strongly pro-Japanese, was urged by Japanese interests to go to Tsitsihar and assume control of the Heilungkiang Government.

Towards the end of the month more Japanese forces had entrained and were moving toward Chinchow. Then the Ja-

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anese troops were suddenly withdrawn, in consequence, it is believed, of the statement of the Secretary of State.

During December the Japanese launched attacks on bandits and disorganized Chinese forces.

Chang Ching-hui fully acceded to Japanese wishes and accepted the chairmanship of Heilungkiang. Tsang Hsih-yi, Governor of Fengtien, who had been kept under detention by the Japanese since September 18th, was released and restored as Governor about the middle of the month. Thus by the end of December the provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Fengtien had Japanese creatures as governors. T'ang Yü-lin, Governor of Jehol, had also cast in his lot with Japan.

On December 29th Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang ordered the retirement of his troops from Chinchow. This movement commenced on that date and was completed before noon on January 1st. This left no organized Chinese force under the orders of Nanking or Chang Hsüeh-liang outside the Wall.

Although Japanese pretensions in Manchuria are less than forty years old, the feeling that Manchuria and Mongolia are territories separate and distinct from China, wherein Japan has almost if not quite as good a right as China, has during recent years been so sedulously fostered that it is doubtful if more than a handful of the present generation of Japanese would be found who, even granted intellectual honesty, would think of questioning this view. It is certain that for some years all classes of Japanese

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have felt that the eventual absorption of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia into the Japanese Empire is a patriotic duty and merely a question of time and opportunity. As to the method of the assimilation of these territories, opinions differed. The events outlined above illustrate the method favored by the military clique, whereas many of the civilians favored intensive economic penetration and industrial exploitation. Following upon the orientation of Mukden toward Nanking rather than Japan, the successful blanketing of the South Manchurian Railway by Chinese lines, the blocking of Japanese economic expansion in Manchuria, and the accumulation without redress or satisfaction of many instances of what doubtless genuinely appeared to the Japanese to be honest grievances, - all these made it possible to enlist the support of non-military Japanese interests for what was originally described as the Japanese "military adventure" into Manchuria, but what due to its large measure of success must be given a more dignified nomenclature. Sound business, shrewd politics, sturdy patriotism, and far-seeing statesmanship might be suggested to hard-headed worshippers of efficiency and success.

It is believed that the factors mentioned above merely afforded the Japanese military party its opportunity and did not necessarily constitute its motive. The pre-occupation of the Chinese Government with banditry and communism, flood and famine relief, and dissensions in the ranks of the Kuomintang, added to the fact that Europe and America were in the grip of the most widespread severe economic depression known and the fact

that

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that Soviet Russia is determined to complete its Five Year Plan regardless of other distractions, must have made the opportunity seem to the Japanese military party a truly unique one. Of possibly more importance than any other factor in the situation was the proposal in Japan to reduce the Japanese military establishment and expenditures together with the gradual loss during recent years of the popularity and ascendancy of the military. While the diplomatic representatives abroad of the Japanese Government and the Japanese representative on the Council of the League of Nations were giving no doubt sincere assurances that Japanese military action in Manchuria was strictly defensive and that Japanese troops would retire to the railway zone as soon as the safety of Japanese nationals and investments was assured, the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria were bringing about Japanese supervision over all civil government in the areas under their control and were effecting complete Japanese domination and control of all communications in South Manchuria and were bringing all public utilities into Japanese hands. Only Japanese of all foreign enterprises in the area under their control escaped stagnation. These, on the contrary, flourished like the green bay tree. Certain Chinese enterprises such as electric light and power plants, coal mines, et cetera, have been taken over forcibly by Japanese non-military interests. (All Chinese railways were taken over by or in the interest of the South Manchuria Railway immediately after the occupation.)

The

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The Provincial Government of Fengtien and the several hsien and municipal governments under it have been established with the real power in all affairs in the hands of Japanese "advisers", so that literally nothing, no matter how unimportant, can be carried out in the way of legislation or other governmental activity without Japanese sanction.

Of interest also was the continual endeavor on the part of Japanese, allegedly unconnected with the military machine, to bring about the formation of "autonomous" governments in eastern Mongolia.

By the end of December, it was apparent to all that the Japanese military would not leave the occupied territory until it had been brought under a Japanese hegemony. And more thought was being given to Northern Manchuria, since the Soviet had shown that it desired peace at almost any price.

FJC-SC

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JUN 6 - 1932

June 1, 1932

THE UNDER SECRETARY

JUN 8 1932

F/DEM

793.94/5308

Confidential File

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

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treaties, including the Nine Power Treaty, on which the nations of the world had been laboriously building up ever since the Great War a bulwark against a repetition of such a disaster. And I told him very plainly that in my opinion Japan had made a great mistake in taking the position that she would not discuss Manchuria with the outside nations. I pointed out that the Nine Power Treaty directly provided for a discussion of all parts of China and that Japan's refusal to discuss it was making a very bad impression upon the outside nations. Whereas we were none of us hostile to Japan or to her rights in Manchuria, such as they were, and were only anxious to preserve the treaties from a destruction which would affect the peace of the world, I felt that if instead of trying to prevent discussion of these matters she had, in accordance with those treaties, offered to discuss her troubles and controversies frankly with us she would have met a most friendly and fair minded audience and discussion. This point I made very clear to him and emphasized it by repetition.

In the course of the talk, the question of the relations of the military authorities and the civil authorities in Japan came up and I discussed at length our theory of

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THE SECRETARY

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those relations arising as they did out of several centuries of English-speaking history. I told him the story of the issue between Charles I and the British nation of ship money and John Hampden's defense ^{against} ~~of~~ ship money, and how in that controversy a civil war arose in which Charles I finally lost his head, and I stated that ever since that date it has been thoroughly recognized in all English-speaking countries that the civil authorities were superior to the military authorities and exercised dominion over them, and that we regarded this as one of the basic elements of our freedom and of our representative system of Government. I told Dr. Nitobe how we felt that that issue came up in the Great War because Prussia had reached in 1864 a contrary view of the relations of civil and military authorities and Bismarck had built up an army without the consent of the Prussian House of Deputies, and I mentioned Mr. Root's speeches on this subject at the time of our going into the World War. Dr. Nitobe said he was very deeply interested in this aspect and wanted to know whether he could make it public. I said I did not wish to say anything which would appear unfriendly to Japan. He assured me that he would not repeat

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repeat it in a way which would give such an unfriendly appearance. We had a very long and friendly talk during the course of which Dr. Nitobe assured me that he had no idea that the thirty million Chinese people in Manchuria could be dominated by Japan by force of arms; that China in her long history had shown her ability to smother any alien conqueror and that he did not think it would be any different in Manchuria. He said his hope was that the Japanese occupation of Manchuria might teach the Chinese the elements of law and order and government which would be of eventual benefit to the rest of China.

HLS.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 2 1932

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 779

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on June 1, 1932, with Dr. Inazo Nitobe, concerning the Sino-Japanese situation. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

R. L. STANSON

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum,
 dated June 1, 1932.

A true copy of
 the signed original
[Signature]

793.94/5308

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[Signature]

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 2 1932.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. /

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on June 1, 1932, with Dr. Inazo Nitobe, concerning the Sino-Japanese situation. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

E. SIMON

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum,
 dated June 1, 1932.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 5, 1932.

Mr. Hornbeck:

We have now received a copy of the
Shanghai Defense Scheme.

The problem in this case is what action
to take in the light of Minister Johnson's
statement that "I feel very strongly that
in future the officers commanding American
forces in Chinese ports should receive
definite instructions to submit a copy of any
defense scheme which they may have occasion
to sign to the nearest American consular
officer, for reference to the Legation".

I heartily concur in Minister Johnson's
view. I suggest, however, that it would be
preferable that the officers commanding
American forces in Chinese ports should
receive definite instructions not, except in
cases of great emergency, to commit them-
selves to any defense scheme until they have
first consulted the nearest representative
of this Department.

I have not examined the defense plan
carefully and, unless you think the matter
urgent, would suggest that this file be held
for Mr. Jacobs to examine upon his return
(August 15).

H.W.W.

MMH/REK

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE UNDER SECRETARY
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUN 7 1932
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 7, 1932.
 RECEIVED

Subject: Defense Plan for Shanghai

Mr. Castle:

JUN 8 - 1932

Mr. Secretary:

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

In the Department's telegram of May 25, 5 p.m. to Tokyo, to which Minister Johnson refers, the Department referred to the defense plan for Shanghai which has been in force since the spring of 1927 and stated that it doubted whether any developments in China in the way of further civil war and possible increase in the Communist movement would require changes in that defense plan. FE still believes that that statement is sound. However, Minister Johnson's telegram raises several important questions, one of which is that a United States military officer signed a defense plan at Shanghai and did not make known to our Consul General there the contents of that plan. FE believes that, when the Department receives the further comment which Minister Johnson states that he is forwarding by mail, we should give careful consideration to taking up here with the Navy and the Army the question of more adequate cooperation and exchange of information between the representatives of this Department and the representatives of the War and Navy Departments, in China.

It is recommended that no action be taken on

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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on the attached telegram from Minister Johnson
until the receipt of his mail despatch.

*Approved and
Keep me informed HVS
M.W.W.*

FE:MMH/ZMF

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED

MP

JUN 7 - 1932

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM
fore being communicated
to anyone

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Peiping

Dated June 6, 1932

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUN 6 - 1932

Department of State

623, June 6, 7 p.m.

793.94-Shanghai
Round 100.00/2
Your 119, May 25, 5 p.m. to Tokyo.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Your reference to "defense plan for Shanghai"
leads me to make the following comments:

One. While in Shanghai last March I was shown
copy of secret defense scheme contents of which were
apparently unknown to Consul General Cunningham although
it was signed by Colonel Hooker of the 4th Marines. It
was elaborated in December 1931 for the purpose of de-
fending "International Settlement and its vicinity".

Two. Defense committee was charged with
responsibility of deciding when plan for combined
action should come into operation but this was not to
prevent independent action on the part of any garrison
commander provided chairman of the defense committee

was

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SECRETARY OF STATE
JUN 8 - 1932

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MP

2-#623 From Peiping June 6, 1932

was immediately informed.

Three. Defense scheme described perimeter of the International Settlement and areas adjacent thereto through which line no persons "likely to threaten safety of foreign lives and property would be allowed to pass". As far as I am aware location of this line was never communicated to the Chinese although running through areas entirely under Chinese control.

Four. The situation which therefore presented itself on January 28 was that a defense scheme was in force which had been agreed upon between the commanding officers of the foreign forces, Shanghai volunteer corps and the Municipal Council some three months ^{(*) previous to} ~~against~~ the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and with full knowledge of threatening danger due to tension arising from activities in China of one of the nations party to the defense scheme. This party notified the defense committee on January 28 of its intention to take drastic action whereupon the committee requested the Municipal Council to declare a state of emergency. This put the defense scheme into operation and enabled Japan as a member of the committee to proceed to the occupation of sector assigned to her which included purely Chinese territory

Subsequent to

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territory and to claim that the Japanese were acting on behalf of other foreign nations as well as their own in protecting the International Settlement. In reality the cooperation of the other foreign forces under the defense scheme merely served to cover action which was exclusively suited to Japan's interest. At no time were the interests of the other powers threatened or attacked. Further comment by mail.

JOHNSON

WSB KLP

(*) Apparent omission.

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793.94

MANCHURIA



Referring to the news from the Far East, a correspondent said that the Japanese Premier had made two interesting statements. One, made to the representative of the Associated Press, apparently referred to the American notes identic of January 8 and the hope that the League of Nations Commission would be able to find a solution of the differences between China and Japan. A quotation from this exclusive interview reads as follows: "If the toleration afforded to bandits by the present unsettled state of political affairs in China should be ended through recognition by the League of Nations of the unsubstantial nature of the Chinese National Government's claims in this region, military operations in Manchuria probably would come to a speedy and successful end."

Mr. Castle remarked that he had seen this press account, and

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added that the only supposedly authentic account of the Premier's speech was given out by the Japanese Embassy, and the Embassy translation did not contain the quotation referred to above, or anything resembling it. The correspondent explained that he was referring to the Associated Press exclusive interview. Mr. Castle said that he understood the interview was taken from the Premier's speech to Parliament. A correspondent said that in the Premier's speech to Parliament a statement was made indicating that he was about to recognize Manchukuo.

A correspondent observed that it was intimated that the League of Nations would assist at the conference in the recognition of Manchukuo. He added that if the situation should be ended through the League, and the recognition of the schedule of Chinese Government claims in that region, a military solution will have been reached.

Asked if the American policy remains unchanged, Mr. Castle replied in the affirmative.

A correspondent asked if this were not the first suggestion that the League of Nations should issue an announcement on sovereignty. The Under Secretary replied that it was, and added that it was hoped that the League of Nations will make suggestions as to how the situation could be straightened out.

M. J. McDermott.

MICROCOPY

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